y
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
RIVERSIDE
yO-
-^UllO-l K^-EL.r-l
C^e^^j^ ^W^ ^^
COLONIZATION
A STUDY OF THE FOUNDING
OF NEW SOCIETIES
BY
ALBERT GALLOWAY KELLER, Ph.D.
Professor of the Science of Society in Yale University
GINN & COMPANY
BOSTON . NEW YORK • CHICAGO ■ LONDON
Entered at Stationers' Hall
Copyright, 1908, by
ALBERT GALLOWAY KELLER
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
78.S
Clit Stbtnettim i)rt<<
GINN .V CDMI'ANY • I'RO-
ruil-TOKS • lUlsroN • U.S.A.
TO
WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER
Xelpeaai dTifiapriai 7ri/Xas vbov aliv 6'i.'yvvs'
^l/evdea 5 ixGaipeii' Kal vrjXti dvp-if ifpopfxav
OTrXoTepoi. irpbs aov (Oa.T)p.iv ■ aol X'^P's ecrru.
CONTENTS
Pages
INTRODUCTION ix-xii
CHAPTER I. DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION . 1-20
Emigration and Conquest. Basis of Classification. Vital Conditions.
Population. Industrial Organization. Agricultural Economy. Types of
Society. Conclusion.
CHAPTER 11. COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 21-78
The Colonies of the Chinese. The Colonies of the Phoenicians. Con-
ditions of the Development of Trade. Characteristics of Phoenician
Commerce. Nature and Extent of the " Empire." Relations of the
Colony and Metropolis. Carthage as a Phoenician Colony. Temper and
Influence of the Phoenicians. The Colonies of the Greeks. Motives of
Emigration. Relation of the awoiKla to its Metropolis. Extent of Greek
Colonization. Character of the Colonies. The Roman Coloiiiae. Motives
for Founding the Coloniac. Nature of the Coloiiia. Romanization : Case
of Gaul. Mediaeval Italian Colonies. Settlement in the Eevant : Motives
and Extent. Character of the Foiidachi. Relation of Colony and Metrop-
olis. Monopoly Policy and Trade Wars. Decline before the Turks.
Italian Influences upon Later Ages. The Italians in the Discoveries
Period.
Summary of the Conditions of Colonization preceding the Discoveries.
CHAPTER III. THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST . 79-130
Conditioning Factors of Iberian Colonization. Portugal's Preparation
for Colonization. Henry the Navigator. Effects of the Discovery of the
Cape Route. Conditions in India. Conditions of Navigation. The
Monopoly and its Defense. The " Crusade in the East " : Almeida.
Albuquerque : his Administration, Personality, and Policy. Extent of
the Empire. The Army and Navy. 'Monopoly Policy and Demoraliza-
tion. Demoralization in the Metropolis. Corrupt Administration in India.
Social Conditions in India. Relations with the Natives. Activities of
the Church. Infringement and Collapse of the Monopoly. Portuguese
Africa. Angola. Mozambique. Portuguese Influences in Africa.
CHAPTER IV. THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL . . .131-167
Early Conditions: the Captaincies. Industry and Trade. Social Con-
ditions. Relations with the Natives : the Labor Question. Foreign
Aggression. The Gold and Diamond Discoveries. The Expulsion of
the Jesuits. Conditions Preceding Independence. Factors Leading to
vi COLONIZATION
Independence. Achievements of the Portuguese in Brazil. Conclusion "ages
of Portuguese Colonization.
Note on Brazilian Revenue. Estimates of the Yield of ("rold and
Diamonds.
CHAPTER V. THE BEGINNINGS AND THE SETTING
OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 168-206
Political and Religious Unification. Economic Strength. Comparison
of the Spanish and Portuguese Discoveries. Effects of the Discovery of
America. The Demarcation. Early Policy of Spain. The Conquests.
The Early Strength of Spain. Spanish Decadence and its Causes.
"Accidental" Causes. Political Causes. Treatment of Foreigners.
Treatment of Jews and Moriscos. Legislation and Regulation. At-
tempted Reform. Ta.xation. Economic and Social Causes for Decline.
Religious Causes for Decline. The Colonial Career as a Cause for
Decline. The Mercantile System. The Inflow of Bullion.
CHAPTER VI. SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION,
INDUSTRY, AND TRADE 207-241
Mine-Production and Revenue. Emigration to America. Restriction of
Emigration. Constituents of Population. Race-Mixture. Interrelation
of Classes. Industrial Organization. Trade-Restriction. Monopoly
Policy. The Seville Monopoly. The Casa de Contratacioii. The Fleets
and Galleons; the Fairs. Further Restriction : the Privileged Companies.
Results of Restriction. Disintegration of the Restrictive System.
CHAPTER VII. SPANISH AMERICA: RELATIONS
WITH FOREIGNERS AND NATIVES ....'... 242-282
The Exclusion Policy. The Safeguarding of the Monopoly. The In-
fringement of the Monopoly. The Asieiitos: Illicit Traffic. Territorial
Aggressions. Decline of the Spanish Sea-Power. The Contact of Races.
The Conflict of the Economic Need and the Religious Motive. Subjuga-
tion. Enslavement. The Kcpartiinieutos and IC>icomiendas. Decline of
the Native Population. Causes of Dejiopulation. Protective Legislation.
Las Casas: the New Laws. Effectiveness of Governmental Control.
Negro Slavery.
CHAPTER VIII. SPANISH AMERICA: MISSIONS,
CLERGY, GOVERNMENT 283-315
Indian Village I>ife. Extension of Religious Influence. The Missions.
Seclusion of the Natives. The Jesuit Reductions in Paraguay. Expul-
sion of the Jesuits. Conclusion of the Spanish Native Policy. Clerical
Organization. Policy and Influence of the Clergy. Colonial Administra-
tion. The Coiiqiiistadores. Transfer of the Metropolitan system : the
King. The Council of the Indies. The Viceroy and Aitdioicia. Char-
acter and Results of the System. Class Discriminations. Colonial
Revenue.
CONTENTS vii
CHAPTER IX. SPANISH AMERICA: 15UEN()S AYRES ; p^'^-^^
CUBA. THE PHILIPPINES. AFRICA 316-365
Early Conditions in the Southern Colonies. Contrasts with the Northern
Colonies. Movements toward Independence. Grievances of the Colo-
nists: the Revolution. Summary of Spanish Influence. Cuba and
Puerto Rico. Cuba after 1800. The Supply of Labor. Spanish Policy
in Cuba. Insurrection. Cuba's Relations with the United States.
Puerto Rico. The Philippines. The Moros. Constituents of Popula-
tion. Industrial Organization. Clerical Predominance. Power of the
Church. Results of Clerical Rule. Administration. Foreign Aggression
and Popular Discontent. Anti-Clericalism : Revolt. Spanish Africa.
CHAPTER X. COLONIZATION OF THE NETHER-
LANDERS: SETTING; THE INDIA COMPANIES . . 366-415
Unification. The Struggle for Freedom of Faith. Economic Strength.
Growth of Trade. Commercial Predominance of the North. Resistance
to Spanish Policy. Movements toward Independence. The Revolt.
Development of Trade : Earlier Voyages. The Voyage to India. Foun-
dation of the East India Company. The Charter. The Monopoly.
Relations of Company and State. Interrelation of the Chambers.
Internal Organization. Rights of Shareholders. Participation. Conflicts
between Directors and Shareholders. Hostility to the Company. Re-
newals of the Charter; Decline. Foundation of the West India Com-
pany. Willem Usselincx. Organization of the West India Company.
Maladministration and Decline.
CHAPTER XL THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 416-462
Centralization of Administration. The Crushing of Competition. Monop-
oly Policy ; Oppression of the Natives. Policy toward Private Trade.
Limitation of Production. Corruption of the Service. Native Policy.
Conquests; Native Services. Policy toward Colonization. The Chinese.
Foreign Aggressions. Bankruptcy and Ruin. The Cape Settlements.
The Boers as a Product of Company Rule. Policy of the West India
Company in New Netherlands. Administration : the Patrooiis. Belated
Reform. The Company in Brazil and Surinam. Aspects of the Chartered
Company. Influence of Dutch Colonization. Influence of the Com-
panies upon the Metropolis. Collapse of the Monopoly.
CHAPTER XII. DUTCH COLONIZATION IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 463-495
Reorganization: Daendels. British Dominance: Raffles. His Revenue
and Administrative Systems. The Commission of 1816. Reversion to
Company Policy. The Culture System. Plan of the Culture System.
Real Character of the System. Oppression and Corruption. Condition
of the Native. Reputation of the Culture System. Reform : Methods of
Indirection. " Max Havelaar" : Decline of the System. " Free Labor."
The Chinese. Recent Fiscal and Other Conditions. The Dutch East
Indies other than Java; the Atjeh War.
viii COLONIZATION
CHAPTER XIII. THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDI- p^<«
NAVIANS 496-516
The Danish East India Company. The Danish West Indies. Early
Conditions : the West India Company. Purchase by the King. Admin-
istration ; Social Conditions. Trade-Conditions. Decline of the Islands.
Polar Colonies of the Scandinavians. Population and Life-Conditions
of Iceland. Government. Colonization and Life-Conditions of Greenland.
Race-Contact. |
«
CHAPTER XIV. MODERN ITALIAN AND GERMAN
COLONIZATION 517-596
Italian Colonization. Disqualifications of Italy. Motives of Expansion.
The African Acquisitions. Policy and Administration. Creditable Suc-
cess. Italy's "Natural" Colonies.
German Colonization. Earlier Colonial Projects. Unification of Ger-
many. Agitation for Colonies. Policy of Bismarck. Colonial Acquisi-
tions. The Chartered Companies. Character of the Colonies. Summary
of the Beginnings. General Character of the Colonial Policy. The
Modern Chartered Company. The German Companies : Function and
Administration. Imperial Administration. Population. Colonial Trade.
Internal Improvements; liudget. The " Native Question." Severity and
Cruelty : Maladaptability. Sirc-tige mit Gerec/iiigkeit. The Tropical Labor
Issue. Compulsory Labor. Missions and Education. The Colonial Service.
Minor Colonial Possessions. Colonial Prospects.
MONEY-EQUIVALENTS 597
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE AND BIBLIOGRAPHY . . 599-611
INDEX 613-630
MAPS 631
INTRODUCTION
The main motive in writing this volume has been to provide a
text-book for the study of colonization. It does not take one who
essays to teach the subject long to see the futility of dilating upon
this or that aspect of colonization when his students are not yet
in possession of an adequate historical background ; but this they
seldom have. Their historical studies have generally been circum-
scribed, and envisaged from different standpoints ; while coloniza-
tion, if approached by the comparative method, must call for a
wealth of historical allusion, widespread both as to place and time.
In the absence of text-books, at least in English, of any adequate
character, the instructor in colonization is therefore confronted by
an ever-present dilemma : the assignment of widely scattered and
disconnected collateral readings, or the devotion of a large part of
his lectures to historical detail. The former alternative is, for
practical reasons, next to impossible for classes of any size ; and
it is rendered in a higher degree impracticable, so far as compre-
hensiveness goes, by reason of the linguistic training which it must
involve. In the field of colonial history, translations, especially
from the less well-known foreign languages, are but few ; and it
is only by the rarest exception that even a German or French
treatise can be utilized ; for the undergraduate who ventures upon
the actual use of even those languages upon which he has spent a
good deal of time is commonly a prey to faint-heartedness and
sore misgiving. Thus, at best, assigned readings must be of
narrow scope. And as for the other alternative, in so far as he is
obliged to introduce into lectures that from which a text-book
ought to secure freedom, the instructor is compelled to exclude
what he regards as more worth while and to sacrifice the continuity
and logic of his exposition.
To meet such a need, felt personally, the following sketches of
colonial history have been written. They have been condensed so
far as their purpose seemed to allow, and include very little that
appeared at the time of writing reasonably easy of access to serious
X COLONIZATION
students. Thus the whole of British and French colonization has
been passed over, although there existed here an added deterrent
in the intolerable lengthening of a task somewhat outside of the
author's field, if such a pair of topics were to be included. It
seemed likewise that the author would be able to add little to
what is accessible to any one concerning the colonial activities of
the Russians, Belgians, Americans, and Japanese. Consequently,
of the moderns, only the Germans and the Italians are treated,
and they in something of the appendix style ; for until they are
taken up the continuity of the narrative need show no essential
breaks. An attempt has been made to treat the several colonizing
states in slightly differing ways, while adhering, in the main, to one
general plan ; indeed, such shifting of emphasis has been almost
unconscious in view of the fact that accessible material tended to
show strength now in one direction and again in another. The
treatment is not designed to be encyclopaedic. Nor, finally, is any
consistent endeavor made to bring everything up to date ; for the
present-day political, fiscal, and other details, publications on the
order of the Statesman's Year-Book, with its references, can easily
be consulted. What have seemed to the author from his point of
approach to be the signal and salient facts and relations in the
colonial history of the ancient, mediaeval, and modern peoples have
been set forth, with some pedagogic devices of partial repetition
and the like, to meet the needs of the college student as these
have been brought home by the experience of several years. The
hope is not renounced, however, that this book may be useful to
others than college students. The American collegian is, after all,
simply a member of society in posse who is being put through a
course of learning designed to fit him to become one in esse. In
general, the kind of book upon any particular subject that may
meet his needs ought to meet those of one who, in later life, it may
be, is directing his own education along the same line. It is hoped
that the information here assembled, and its arrangement, may
prove of some utility to any one interested in colonization.
Naturally, however, any such fact-assembling must be referred
to some set of guiding elective and systematizing principles ; and
these, in the present case, are such as appeal to the student of
human societies. The study is one of that societal movement
which commonly results in the formation of new societies in new
environments, and so seems to the writer — though the question of
INTRODUCTION xi
nomenclature is naturally a matter of indifference — to be ranged
rather under the social sciences than under history in any moderate
and reasonable understanding of the term. There has been no
attempt to get at new historical data, but rather to assemble what
is known and arrange it under somewhat different categories, with
an eye to any important relationships, newly or long recognized,
that may emerge.^ Hence the sub-title of this book.
And it may be worth while, perhaps, to go a little farther and
indicate the place in a series of studies of man and human society
which colonization as here treated is designed to occupy. It pre-
supposes some such study as geography in its broader sense,
including physical geography, the geography of man (anthropo-
geography), and the geography of trade; or, put more generally,
since man is the center of interest, a study of environmental
influences on man and human groups, and of the various topics of
general anthropology. A geography of trade or of man comes
inevitably to touch upon the trading settlement, which is in turn
the commonest forerunner of the colony ; and the science of
society then reaches out to these frontier societies as in many
respects peculiarly significant. The subject of colonization opens
out, therefore, as a sort of special topic of the science of society
(sociology), following, in so far as the exigencies of a curriculum
will allow, upon the more general study of man and human groups.
It is possible that the concreteness of these statements may serve
to define the scope and method of attack of the present volume, as
the more general considerations which precede may not.
Finally, although some attempt has been made to define a colony,
there has been no systematic effort put forth to exclude from
treatment everything that does not square with that definition,
loose though it may be ; this book deals with colonies and colonial
empires in the common acceptance of these terms.
In the preparation of the following essays I have received aid
from many colleagues and friends ; the faithfulness of their wounds
accounts for a large part of any value which these labors may
have. The influence of Professor Sumner is ever present with his
former disciples wherever their subsequent interests may lie ; and
I am conscious in particular that my first interest in colonies as
frontier societies was awakened by his illuminating suggestions.
^ See the Bibliographical Note, p. 599.
xii COLONIZATION
It is but fair, though I esteem it a great privilege, to dedicate
this volume — and I wish it were a more mature and worthier
offering — to him. Among younger men I hasten to mention
Professor Edward G. Bourne,^ to whose stimulating criticism and
helpfulness and never-failing kindness I wish here to bear witness.
I have also been privileged to profit by the advice and criticism
of several other colleagues in the matter of details which fell
within their fields ; such assistance I have derived from Professors
Gregory, Emery, Day, Schevill, and many others. Formal acknowl;
edgments are due to my colleagues on the editorial board of the
Yale Revieiv, and to the editors of the Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, for permission to use
material originally published in those journals.
A. G. K.
New Haven, Connecticut
1 Now that this gifted and intrepid spirit is gone from among us, it is perhaps of
interest, as bearing upon his many side-activities, to record the fact that all of the
following chapters except X-XII and the first part of Xlll were read in manuscript
and criticised by him — Chapters II-IX during the early weeks of his last illness.
COLONIZATION
CHAPTER I
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION
The word "colony " is like all other current terms of language in
that it covers, as Whitney puts it, " not a point, but a territory."
For the purpose of this book it will be necessary to make the
term more precise ; there seems to be no urgent need for restrict-
ing it artificially to cover a point, but it must be defined with
reasonable sharpness within a portion of the field to which it has
come to be applied.
Emigration and Conquest
The fundamental ideas of colonization are a movement of popu-
lation and an extension of political power ; because it is allied to
them both, colonization is therefore to be distinguished on the one
hand from migration, and on the other from conquest in the broad
sense. The former distinction is not so difficult, for it is generally
admitted that one area and society cannot rightly be called a col-
ony of another when the sum of mutual relations does not include
political dependence of the former upon the latter. No one thinks
of regarding the Vandal groups in Africa as having been colonies;
and if the Italian settlements in Argentina are so denominated, it
is usually with the added qualification, " natural " (colonies), or the
like. The other distinction is more troublesome ; yet it may be
said that in common understanding of the terms a dependency is
scarcely a colony until it contains actual emigrants from the colo-
nizing state ; or, at least, until it looks to such settlement, or
counts upon potential emigration. As long as the activity of the
colonizing state is purely governmental, — as long as the immi-
grants are simply officials, — there is a province, perhaps, but no
2 COLONIZATION
colony. However, by adding either of these fundamentals, emigra-
tion and conquest, to the other, the essence of colony is brought
out. A group of emigrants in a foreign land may become a colony
by the extension of political control over them, their possessions,
and interests, on the part of the state of which they are citizens;
and, on the other hand, a state-acquired domain or mere sphere of
influence may become a colony through settlement by non-official
members of the state's population. Both individual and govern-
mental initiative and subsequent support are needful in the crea-
tion of a colony.
Formulating a working definition upon these terms, a colony is
here understood to be a political dependency, settled or prospec-
tively to be settled, to some degree, by the citizens of its dominant
state. This, it will be noted, is a definition of a type; the following
treatment may exhibit variations about the type, but to it return will
constantly be made, in the belief that it represents a popular and
at the same time sufficiently precise conception.^ Cases where
either of the two prime conditions is represented rudimentarily
will be treated simply for the light which such immature, simpli
fied, or abnormal forms may cast upon the typical or normal ones.
More specifically, the definition would exclude as a whole from
direct treatment such dependencies as the Roman provinces, the
Arabian conquests in Africa, the Turkish vilayets, and the Chinese
republican communities in the Malay Archipelago, although any
and all of them might be drawn upon for side-lights and in loco
cxpcrimcnti, while it would include the territories of the United
States, Russian possessions in Asia, and the like. The so-called
" interior colonization " of the Germans would naturally be a mis-
nomer on the basis of the definition suggested.
The portion of the " territory" connoted by colony and coloniza-
tion being thus roughly defined, its limits can be sharpened in
some degree by proceeding to a classification of colonies ; for
although this classification, being one of societies, might apply to
groups which do not form colonies, yet, as a cross-classification, it
should not be without its value in filling out the conception of the
term " colony " itself.
1 The etymological demonstrations in which some writers on colonies deal are of
little or no value in framing a working definition. They are rather of historic interest.
The etymology of colo)iia is of great value in forming a conception of the character
of the Roman colonies; but the modern term "colony" conveys a dissimilar and
modern conception, suited to the modern world and its organization,
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION 3
Basis of Classification
It is a common conviction among students of the less complex
forms of human society that the character of the latter is ulti-
mately, if not immediately, determined by the conditions of natural
environment.^ For these conditions at once evoke the local form
of the struggle for existence, that is, the industrial organization ;
and upon the latter rests a series of secondary social forms, such
as systems of property-holding, marriage, and government. And it
is further believed by those who hold this view that the influences
of natural environment enter far deeper into the life of even the
more evolved societies than is generally recognized. If now such
a standpoint were taken, and natural environment were conceded,
if only for the sake of argument, to be a sort of elemental deter-
minant in the destiny of societies in general, it would be so a
fortiori in respect to such special and peculiar forms of societies
as colonies. For colonial societies are, by their wide diffusion over
the earth, exposed to a great variety of environmental influences,
under conditions where these can be the more freely gauged and
estimated, owing to the essential constancy of other factors (e.g. race-
character of the colonizers) whose diversity commonly obscures
every such valuation. Here should be a chance for a striking
refutation or vindication of more general views.
But it is not necessary for the present purpose to embark
upon any such troubled waters in attempting to demonstrate
wide generalities. Naturally, as has been hinted, the relationship
between a society and its environment comes out most clearly in
. the case of the simpler human groups which are, as we say,
"nearer to Nature"; but colonies are, at least in their begin-
nings, societies of relative simplicity, as yet unendowed with that
accumulation of relationships, institutions, and so on, through
which older human groups appear to have rendered themselves,
to some extent, independent of natural conditions. If this is
admitted, either through conviction or as a working hypothesis,
then it should be possible to construct a useful classification of
1 The views set forth in this classification represent a sort of composite impression
derived from the reading of some years in anthropology, sociology, and colonial
history. Hence it is impracticable, if not impossible, to fix the exact provenance of
derived ideas. That which is owed to Darwin, Ilu.xley, Spencer, Sumner, and other
stock authorities will be easily recognized.
4 COLONIZATION
colonial societies upon the broader variations of the natural con-
ditions to which they are or have been exposed.
Of these conditions climate is, in the present case at least, the
vital and determining one. It is usually so, carrying with it, as it
does, so many other factors whose variations are correlated with
its own ; for instance, flora and fauna, including among the latter
the microscopic fauna of disease. Climate, though itself varying
in accordance with several factors, and though it evades classifica-
tion except by type, may still, for the purpose in hand, be broadly
divided into tropical and temperate. But this distinction would be
of no utility in classifying colonics, because too general, if these
distinct types of climate did not condition the human struggle for
existence in a manner so vital as to determine two distinct types
of industrial organization, upon which in turn, as what follows is
designed to show, there would regularly be developed two dis-
tinctly variant types of human society. Thus the classification
based upon climate and attendant influences may be shifted over
into a classification based upon the type of the industrial organiza-
tion. Anticipating what is to follow, we should then distinguish
the tropical and the temperate colony upon the ground of their
common and basic occupation, agriculture, and might name them
respectively \hQ plantation colony and \hQ.farm colony}
Vital Conditions
But there are not a few considerations and reflections of a more
concrete nature that underlie the assertions ventured in the last
paragraph ; we turn now to what must be a rather rapid survey of
the same. The new environmental influences felt by colonists
most obviously condition the struggle for existence, perhaps,
through their direct action upon the struggling individual or group;
they create new vital conditions, conformity to which means life,
health, fecundity, working power of body and mind, while inability
to conform entails an absence of these same advantages. The
issue is one which popular parlance rightly denominates one of
acclimatization. The question of acclimatization is simplified in
the colonial field because the important colonizing nations of the
1 As this classification is based in large part upon data to be found in the succeed-
ing chapters, it is suggested to the teacher that the first chapter might profitably be
re-read by the student after completing the book.
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION 5
world have been without exception nations of the temperate zone
and mainly Europeans ; hence the racial element is all but elimi-
nated, and the colonists may be conceived as moving either into
regions of a temperate climate similar to their own at home, or
into the tropics. Climate transitional between these two types,
and polar climates,^ must be understood to exist, but need not
confuse or add to the main and clearly marked types.
Let us first consider the vital conditions of the European colo-
nist in another part of the temperate zone. From such a change he
is likely to experience physical profit rather than detriment. What
variations he encounters in physical conditions are seldom so great
as to call for vital modifications in his constitution or mode of
living, while on the other hand there exist the positive advantages
of a life free from the crowding and over-competition of his fellows.^
Conflicts with the native races have been, in the temperate colonies,
short, though sharp, and the outcome never seriously in doubt ;
indeed, the aborigines have been but sparsely represented in
temperate regions at all open to colonization.^ The momentum
of the inter-racial struggle and the elation of relatively easy and
sweeping victories have often lent to the colonists a vigor that
lasted on. That such change of environment is generally bene-
ficial is indicated by the more rapid growth of population in the
new country as compared with that at home, despite the ruder
conditions met. It is also likely that the physical and mental
quality of the population is bettered, partly no doubt because
of the more unrestricted activity of natural, and perhaps of sexual,
selection as compared with their impeded action under the regime
of a higher development of the arts. There are fewer of those
agencies, such as surgery, medicine, humanitarian institutions,
and the like, by which man seeks to lessen the mortality of the
less fit, and the selection of mates must rest more largely upon
^ The really polar possessions of the Danes, Russians, Americans, and British
have never assumed the real forms of self-supporting colonies. They are temporary
camps of hunters, traders, miners, or missionaries, and if they deserve the name of
colony at all, they represent aberrant and e.xtreme forms.
2 The many analogies between man's occupation of a new habitat and what is well
known to naturalists concerning the migrations and struggles of plants and animals
scarcely need to be pointed out.
^ In Australia and America, for example. Such a country as China is taken to be
not open to colonization. For the effects of contact upon the native stocks, see p. 269
below.
6 COLONIZATION
physical adequacy. Again, although nature yields a liberal return
to sturdy effort, no bounty is offered regardless of industry and
foresight. The temperate colony is one which invigorates the
constitution of the immigrant race and at the same time coerces
it into an incessant and wholesome activity in meeting and coping
with difficult but not insuperable obstacles.
In a tropical country, on the other hand, there occurs a \it)lent
change in the life of the emigrant from temperate regions. The man
animal is out of his habitat. A few years of unvaried tropical heat
undermine the most vigorous constitutions, and acclimatization in
the case of individuals is practically impossible. Even when the
vicissitudes of the climate, including its diseases, are minimized by
an artificial mode of life or by other means, ^ profound changes in
the physical organism still appear. Of these the most important
from a sociological standpoint is the general disturbance of the
reproductive system, both in the direction of morbid stimulus and
of decreased vitality. In the case of animals this perturbation, in
consec}uence of what is often a very slight change of habitat, is
fully recognized ; it was used by Darwin as one of his causes for
otherwise unexplained variation. This disturbance is often fatal to
mother and child, owing to the decrease in vitality of both ; preg-
nancy and parturition constitute a grave danger to European women,
and, as is natural, the infant death-rate is high where the more
stable constitutions of adults are wont to disintegrate. Population
suffers quantitatively owing to the above causes, and to their
deterrent action on immigration, especially of females ; it also
tends almost inevitably to take on a temporary and changing char-
acter as accession after accession dies off or is forced to withdraw.
The quality of ptjpulation also tends to retrograde, for lethargy
replaces energy where life is both easy and hopeless ; and before
such a small and enfeebled society there stands always the menace
of a numerical preponderance of native population incapable of
being restrained by the unaided force of the immigrant merchants
or planters. The conditions of the tropical colony are thus ex-
tremely unfavorable to both individual and society.
1 I.e. by not living as the natives do.
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICA'llON 7
Population
A comparison of colonial population in one and the o'thcr type
of colony, as determined by the vital conditions thus briefly indi-
cated, reveals the following results. Emigration to the plantation
colony is slight, and natural increase thereafter is inconsiderable.
The colonists are few in number, do not contemplate an extended
stay, and are represented preponderatingly by males ; the racial
unit is thus the individual, not the family.^ The population is
rendered by the climate and attendant influences unfit for strenu-
ous Labor, and is practically excluded from the direct working of
the soil. Excesses are not infrequent, and the attempt to stimu-
late a languid physical organization by the use of alcohol is common
and disastrous ; incredible deeds of criminality that must have
their origin in an unsettled nervous system are from time to time
reported to an offended world. Relations, often irregular, with
native women, especially on the part of the Latin nations, have
produced a multitude of half-breeds, whose general character is
but rarely an improvement upon that of either of the uniting races ;
for its objectionable qualities are likely to increase proportionately
to the degree of contrast exhibited by the uniting hereditary ele-
ments. In general, the colonial population exhibits the character-
istic symptoms of a group of animals transported into a habitat to
whose strange conditions it is unable to adapt itself within a reason-
able time ; but because these animals are Jioniincs sapientcs, they
are enabled to adopt rational methods which limit the immediate
and fatal action of natural selection.
The state of affairs in a temperate colony presents a marked
contrast in almost all these particulars. Immigration is relatively
strong at the outset ; later, in consequence of the accelerated rate
of natural increase the accession of periodic relays of population
from without is not a matter of vital importance. The colonists
are numerous and intend to stay ; and since they include a con-
siderable number of females, the unit is the family ^ rather than
the individual. The climate invigorates the population, which is
energetic, self-reliant, early of marriage, and fecund, and displays
these qualities in its vigorous and healthy activity. The native
1 The Portuguese in India, Dutch in Java, etc., compared with the EngHtih in
North America.
8 COLONIZATION
population of the temperate regions is unable long to withstand
the new and generally ruthless competitor. Mongrel races are ex-
tremely r$Lre, for the settlers marry within their own ranks, either
before or after migration, and are not led by strange and unnat-
ural conditions of life to associate irregularly with the natives.
Hence the whole stock of the society is homogeneous and of
high physical and racial quality.
Industrial Organization
The total diversity of vital conditions here indicated is also
sufficient to effect the wide divergence between the temperate
and tropical forms of the organization of industry to which allusion
has been made. Here, however, dealing as we are in types, some
narrowing of the field is possible. On looking over the colonies of
the world, it becomes perfectly clear that of the industrial opera-
tions which secure their existence, agriculture stands foremost.
Only when the environment approaches the desert type does
agriculture yield to cattle-raising ; and since the savannas or
steppes suited to the latter occupation are practically all of a
temperate or sub-tropical climate,'^ agriculture is the only important
primary form of the industrial organization common to colonies of
all latitudes and altitudes, and so the only criterion of classification
of adequate generality, not to mention importance. It is also the
ultimate form to which any preliminary occupations may lead.
Practically all colonies have their origin in trade, as Roschcr^ says ;
but exchange of life-supporting prodjuts is the form toward which
it tends. There must be that wherewith to trade, and, if the
colony is to be economically self-sufficient, there must exist first
and foremost that wherewith to support life. Mining may last on
for a long period, but it is not a basis upon which a normal society
may continue to rest. The only self-sufficient vocation of man is
that of working the earth and utilizing its i)rimary or derived
nutritious products. It is a significant fact that, as time goes on,
all colonies where the soil will permit are forced into agriculture
on their own account. Classifying by the forms of agriculture
characteristic respectively of the temperate and of the tropical
climate, therefore, one discriminates upon a character that is not
1 Those nearest the tropics are, for example, the savannas of the Sudan, the llanos
of South America, the interior semi-deserts of Australia, etc. ^ I'age i6.
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION 9
transitory but ultimate. Hunting, fishing, and mining last but for
a time ; even cattle-raising tends relatively to decline as unoccu-
pied or arid land is redeemed ; whether the masters of the colony
labor, or steal the results of others' labor, the occupation which
assures combined societal existence, either directly or through
exchange, is the vital one.
This fact has been recognized by the two most eminent writers
on colonies, Roschcr and Leroy-Beaulieu.^ The former's classifi-.
cation (A, conquest colonies; B, trading colonies; C, agricultural
colonies ; D, plantation colonies) is faulty from the simultaneous
employment of several criteria of discrimination : for example, in A
the criterion is mode of acquisition or administration ; in B, motive
of settlement or acquisition. But C and D, to which in his discus-
sion Roscher assigns a special importance, correspond to the dis-
tinctions contended for in this essay. Leroy-Beaulieu distinguishes
colonies of (i) exploitation or plantation, (2) settlement or agricul-
ture, and (3) mixed colonies. The first two categories correspond
with Roscher's C and D above, and are in reality tropical and tem-
perate agricultural colonies, although the alternative terms suggest
also the predatory or sedentary tendencies of the population. No
subordination of these alternative terms one to the other is indi-
cated. The term " mixed colonies " represents an unnecessary
effort to cover inevitable transitional forms, and does not aid in a
classification which seeks well-marked types for purposes of expo-
sition and clarification of thought.
Both authors, then, recognize the two types of colony mentioned
above, — the tropical agricultural and the temperate agricultural ;
for this is what the terms "plantation colony" and "agricultural
colony" really mean. These forms of colony might be denomi-
nated, to avoid confusion, plantation colony (tropical) and farm
colony (temperate).
Agricultural Economy
It requires something more than the assertion, however, to
prove that these two forms are marked enough to constitute the
basis of a classification ; that is, that they really possess a sort of
generic value. Besides their direct action on man, as sketched
^ Roscher, chap, i; Leroy-Beaulieu, II, part ii, book ii, chap. i. For a minute and
involved classification, see Schaffle's, in Reinsch, pp. 19-20.
lO COLONIZATION
above, the natural conditions which center about cHmate exert
other strong though less direct influences. First of all, they pro-
foundly affect the rnedium upon which man works. For example,
the tropical soil, flora, fauna, etc., are of types entirely distinct
from those of temperate regions. This fact may be brought out
clearly enough by proceeding at once to a general comparison of
the industrial organization of tropical and temperate colonies,
which will incidentally explain the coordinate terms " farm colony "
and " plantation colony " already employed.
Owing to the diversity of natural conditions in the two regions,
the tropical lands are fitted to produce with ease certain goods
which either cannot be produced at all, or not without great diffi-
culty and cost, in the temperate regions. To the northerners who
were reaching out beyond the confines of their native habitat for
the fuller satisfaction of their wants these tropical products (spices,
sugar, coffee, etc.) were purely luxuries, but of a desirability
measured by history-making efforts to attain them. Even now
they remain largely luxuries, though their extended use has made
them seem indispensable ; they are not really so in the sense that
life would be for many people impossible without them ; they are
not like wheat or corn. Another cardinal fact respecting tropical
products is that those which pay are relatively few in number. Of
a consequence, production is specialized, and, as a rule, must be
carried out on the larger scale, extensively and with a strong labor
force. Thus the characteristic tropical " plant " has been the
plantation rather than \hQ.farm.
But this very form, of necessity taken by tropical production,
implies a number of definite results which in turn enter as condi-
tioning factors of production. First of all there arises the troubled
question of tropical labor ; tropical colonies are the home of the
"native question." Vital conditions do not permit of the accom-
plishment of plantation labors at the hands of an unacclimatized
race. But the disposition of the inhabitant of tropical regions is
not industrious, and he has never been induced to alter his ways
by the application of economic stimuli. However, the logic of
what was conceived to be necessity would not be denied. The
formula ran : The tropics must be developed ; the native of the
tropics is the only available agency for such development ; there-
fore, whatever his will in the matter, he must work. The earliest
form of compulsion was slavery of the local native ; then, in
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION n
certain regions where this native remained intractable, slavery of
an imported native. Plantation colonies have regularly been the
seats of wholesale enslavement, and planters have championed
such theory as was needful to support what was to them an
indispensable actuality. But those who did not feel the neces-
sity of the system were able to coerce those who did. The aboli-
tion of slavery then led to the development, where the former
system did not persist, of various substitutes and subterfuges :
contract-labor, debt-slavery, "compulsory labor," and the like,^ all
in greater or less degree disguised forms of coercion. Such com-
pulsory production, however, under whatever form, was bound to
suffer from the stock weaknesses of slave-labor, — lack of energy,
purpose, and initiative. Thus tropical production has never lived
up to such possibilities as it might have realized with an adequate
labor supply.
But it has not been the native situation alone which has crip-
pled the industrial organization of the hot countries. The Euro-
peans had a well-founded distaste and fear, rather than love, of
the new environment ; and their presence in it has been prevail-
ingly motived by a desire for wealth speedily gained. ^ They have
exhibited, as a rule, no real interest in the region of their tempo-
rary sojourn. Taking into account the tendency of mankind to
strike into courses offering least resistance, it is not surprising to
find the system of plantation-culture to have been a ruthless and
wasteful one, not only of soil but of men. It is what the Germans
graphically denominate Raubbau. Agriculture presents the exten-
sive rather than the intensive form, with all which that implies of
non-restoration of soil, even non-rotation of crops, etc. Frequent
and protracted absenteeism of sick or indifferent owners — who
are often, indeed, mere shareholders in a company — has played
its part in mismanagement and waste. A widespread indifference
or cynicism respecting the fate of the human working-animal has
prevailed ; he has been regarded in general as an insentient factor
in the accumulation of wealth. There has been but little concern
for the future well-being of the land or people ; the unexpressed,
if not openly av^owed, sentiment has been, " After us, the deluge ! "
This attitude is so characteristic of the plantation colony as to
have led Leroy-Beaulieu and others to employ tRe alternative title
of "colony of exploitation." It was natural enough for European
1 Cf. pp. 580 ff., below. 2 cf pp 238 ff., below.
12 COLONIZATION
peoples who invaded the tropics in quest of what they did not
have at home to seize by any methods the spices, or the ivory,
and depart.^ They were not figuring on the long run, but the
short ; this is the main reason why they pursued their character-
istic methods in the tropics alone, — there was comparatively
nothing in the other type of environment to allure them. It took
a different theory of life to render the cooler regions attractive.
The tendency in the tropics toward the specialized production
of a few staples, and those usually incapable of being transformed
into a local food-supply, has had, finally, for one of its results, a
thorough-going economic dependence upon the dominant state,
the importance of which in a political direction will presently be
seen. This dependence is most clearly shown by the distress
attendant upon either failure of the staple crop or interruption of
communication with the mother-country or outside world. A lack
of self-sufficiency is further shown in the failure of the population
to provide for its own immediate and simple needs along the line
of manufacture or small jobbing; or, in general, to develop any
natural resources beyond those few that are immediately and
highly profitable.^ This species of economic dependence is of
course quite different from that of a frontier society in the tem-
perate zone which specializes in a certain kind of production, —
for example, in that of corn, - — to the temporary exclusion of such
products of the mechanic arts as can be easily obtained by ex-
change with more settled sections.
A parenthetic word may here be introduced relative to the
other extractive industry, mining. This is generally pure exploita-
tion, at least for a time, wherever practiced ; but it yet differs in
form as between the regions where natives are numerous and where
they are few.^ Precious stones and metals were costly luxuries
which attracted the adventurous exploiter, and in the tropical
regions called for native labor and made for economic dependence.
Hut this industry, because in itself it implies no definite and pro-
tracted settlement, is here passed over in favor of the more basic
occupation.
Carrying out, now, the comparison with the farm colony, it is
found, first of all, that the products of the new country do not
materially differ from those of the home-land. Because they
1 Cf. pp. 91 ff., below. '^ Cf. pp. 221 ff., below.
^ For instance, compare Peru and Australia.
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION 13
represent more fully the extractive industries, the colonies with
their raw products may be able so to supplement the mother-
country as to encourage a progressive mutual diversification of
industry on a grand scale ; but the colonial society, under normal
conditions, produces a variety of products, most of which are
necessities of life designed for local consumption. Because these
products do not afford immense profits by reason of their absence
or rarity in the older lands, — because there is no great diversity
of the conjuncture, — specialization and exploitation on the grand
scale are seldom seen. The characteristic "plant" is \.h.Q farm
rather than t\\Q plantatio7i.
Contrasts between the labor-situation and other important
phases of the industrial organization may be signalized in a few
words. The colonists themselves furnish labor of a high order,
for they are healthy and sturdy, and efficient as few natives can
be. Wholesale slavery, therefore, has been found unprofitable in
temperate colonies, and has yielded, even though tried in a number
of cases, as in New England, to a more effective system impossible
in the torrid regions. The native-labor question does not exist ;
even in the mines the bulk of labor falls upon the immigrant race.
Nor does the custom of improvident exploitation develop with
any such generality as in the tropics ; except in the short-lived
fur-trade and in mining, motives of a different stamp ^ — economic,
political, and religious — have led to establishments of a permanent
nature. Foresight and economy in the use of natural advantages
result, and agriculture is intensive rather than extensive. Absen-
teeism is almost unknown ; the owners cannot afford to be absent
if they would. The future well-being of the land is to the interest
of all, especially as parents expect their descendants to succeed
them, perhaps for centuries, in the enjoyment of their possessions.
And economic independence and self-sufficiency are, with few
exceptions, marked. There is no .great staple crop, relatively use-
less as a food-supply, upon the hazard of whose success or failure
well-being or misery wait. Industry is diversified ; the people are
resourceful and inventive, practice simple manufactures as the
forerunners of greater yet to come, and develop natural resources
of all kinds that may make for their own success in the struggle
for existence and comfort.
1 As bearing upon the character of these immigrants, the relative loftiness of their
motives should receive attention.
14 COLONIZATION
Types of Society
The colonial societies and social life built upon these contrasting
forms of the industrial organization could not but reflect in the
superstructure the lines of the foundation. The system of property-
holding in land characteristic of the temperate colony is the small,
inherited freehold ; at first, the farm or clearing. This system,
being the one upon which forms familiar to us all are built, needs
little characterization beyond that afforded by its contrast with
the system as developed in the ti"opics. The latter started with a
larger unit and developed the estate-form and the domain of the
chartered company. The tropical plantation was an undertaking
beyond the power of the individual, and ownership thus became
shareholding rather than individual possession or active partner-
ship. The immediate concern of the owners was thus replaced by
a remoter interest through functionaries of various kinds, absen-
teeism was thus encouraged, and such undertakings have taken on
a marked speculative character. Brief reflection will show that
these diverse forms were not the product of traditional legal
prepossessions, except as these fell in with the demands of the
new environment. Peoples as prejudiced against monopolies as
were the Dutch promptly developed chartered companies ; and
the failure of the proprietary system in the English colonies is
notorious.
Comparison is likewise challenged in respect of marriage and
the family. The fundamental factors which rendered the conditions
in the tropical colonies so different from those, say, of the New
England settlements, were the great preponderance of males, and
the feeble economic efficiency of such females as were present.
The former factor led to formal celibacy, intermixture of races,
and aberrations all but unknown in societies of the other type, —
all this amounting to a negation of matrimony in the sense char-
acteristic of the temperate colony. The other factor, economic
inefficiency, minimized the importance of woman's status ; the
materfamilias had no such independent and influential position in
the tropics as in the cooler regions. And where woman was absent
or of little significance, there could be little of the family life and
solidarity characteristic of many settlement colonies. Thus, as
has been said, the individual was in one case the unit of population,
in the other the family.
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION 1 5
It is probably impossible to show any consistent contrasts between
the religious ideas of one region and the other ; but in the matter
of missionary activities a distinction follows partly from the condi-
tions already described.^ In the temperate regions the native people
were decimated or driven back in a fierce race-conflict, inconsider-
ate of their material or spiritual interests, almost before there had
been time to institute propaganda ; but in the tropical countries a
distinct proselytizing type of religion has often appeared, stimulated
as it was by the abundant and persistent native population. The
necessity of adaptation to the needs and understanding of the latter
has often induced, likewise, a modification of the alien toward the
native type of religion. Actual or pretended solicitude regarding
the spiritual weal of the native has disguised the selfish and eco-
nomic motive rather more in the warmer zones than elsewhere.
And, in general, in the tropics, the invading religion of the higher
race has usurped and discharged, for good or ill, an important
economic and political function but rarely approached in the
colony of settlement.
Political dissimilarities between the plantation and the farm
colony afford, perhaps, the most striking and evident basis of dif-
ferentiation ; and with these differences is closely identified the
political destiny of the societies in question. For these reasons not
a few classifications have been based upon such criteria of distinc-
tion ; the latter are deducible, however, from the more fundamental
basis here adopted. The economic dependence of the plantation
colony has been explained already ; its very Hfe lies in exchange
with the cooler regions — exchange not only of products but of
men ; and it is not infrequently dependent regularly or for varying
periods upon the bounty of the mother-country. In the presence
of a native population which far outnumbers its own, the colony is
likewise dependent upon the support of the sponsor state ; and its
very riches under the typical policy of exclusion tempt foreign
aggression. The colonizing power is often forced to take upon its
shoulders enterprises which have proved too arduous not only for
the individual but for large corporate bodies with practically un-
limited power. These conditions promote constant outside inter-
ference and molestation, and keep the colony and its doings from
1 Compare the missions in Spanish America and Central Africa with those in
French and British North America.
l6 COLONIZATION
lapsing into that happy state of obscurity where it may direct its
own destiny. The peoples of such colonies gain no experience
in managing their own affairs, and, if left to themselves, possess
no body of norms or local precedents by which to gain an orien-
tation. If they have become, by some contingency, nominally in-
dependent, their ensuing political form has been unstable and they
have offered a standing temj^tation to aggression on the part of
stronger nations.^ This instability both before and after inde-
])cndence is the more marked if the presence of a mongrel pop-
ulation has already provided the unfortunate element of what
might be called biological instability and incongruity. No tropical
colony has ever yet proved itself capable of living up to a regime
of representative institutions (self-government) or of independence,
apart from the sponsorship of some state of the temperate re-
gions. The terms " protectorate," " crown colony," ^ etc., express-
ing a distinctly subordinate relation, are all but peculiar to the
tropical lands.
The contrast with the other type of colony is pointed. The latter
is economically independent ; it is able early in its career to settle
its own disputes with its native neighbors ; it is not unwilling at
times to challenge an older society to the arbitrament of the sword.
But because it presents few immediate rewards to the conqueror,
it generally escapes the latter struggle. It is not rich enough to
evoke, and suffer under, so rigid a policy of exclusion and monop-
oly as has been so regularly applied to tropical colonies. In short,
it can live its own life, without much aid, even though it demands
help as of right when its advantage seems to lie in so doing. At
other times outside interference is bitterly resented. The society
not infrequently lives under a beneficial regime of neglect and even
' E.g. the Spanish American republics.
2 As an example of a popular classification, which is practical, but of administra-
tive rather than of scientific value, the following, based upon the degree of exten-
sion of control of the mother-country, may be cited : (i) colony proper, which may
have representative or semi-representative institutions, or nothing of the kind
(crown colony) ; (2) protectorate ; (3) sphere of influence. Classifications of this
kind simply darken counsel in the popular mind, for they envisage the colony from
the administrative standpoint of the home government, and afford to the expert
alone a clue as to the real nature of country and people. It depends largely upon
the identity of the colonizing power, and to a certain degree upon chance, whether
the form of administration is, within a reasonable period, adapted to the vital
peculiarities of the dependency in question; i.e. whether this form is an index of
the character of the colony or not.
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION 17
contempt on the part of the native country, and is thus able to
work out its own salvation. Not being hermetically sealed from
the world, it learns from others, friends or rivals. The experience
and suggestions thus gained are invaluable, and create a sense of
self-sufficiency and power which in the course of time asserts itself
in the forcible or peaceable acquisition of virtual or real independ-
ence. And since the population is homogeneous and politically
experienced, the resulting state is fitted to take its place alongside
the older states as a stable and safe government, not essentially
different from its elders except in the qualities of vigor, however
crude these may be, and possibilities of growth characteristic of a
healthy society in a roomy and wholesome environment.
This political comparison is not complete unless supplemented
by an alignment of the divergent social structures which grow out
of the other conditions, mainly economic, already described. It has
been suggested that the population of the tropical colony, taken as
a whole, is unhomogeneous. The presence of native and mongrel
races, the latter usually of all degrees of mixture, causes the popu-
lation to cleave along various lines so as to create castes or classes
of a marked order. This is the kind of growth upon which a rigid
aristocracy is wont to develop. The large-scale production and
system of latiftindia, or extended estates, implying as they do an
original aristocracy of wealth, contribute to the speedy appearance
of social strata ; and the system of slavery on the large scale
causes the lines of cleavage of the society to widen into unmistak-
able chasms between "higher" and "lower." The adventurer
class often finds its level in a sort of retainer relation ; priests and
missionaries form at times a sort of sacerdotal caste. And the
scattering of population-groups in what might well be termed
manors — a phenomenon due again mainly to the mode of produc-
tion and the relations with subject races — lends still another
characteristic feature of the aristocratic regime.
These conditions are all but reversed in the farm colony. The
population is homogeneous from the outset, for the mediocre
gains of the farm colony attract neither the very wealthy nor the
helpless pauper ; while for the former a large aggregation of capital
will not pay, the man who has no capital and feeble instincts of
industry has few prospects before him. Hence the original immi-
gration is largely from the middle class, or what is likely soon to
attain that station (e.g. indented servants), and a certain feeling of
l8 COLONIZATION
equality exists at the outset.^ This is speedily augmented by the
action of the characteristic economic conditions. Abundance of
available land and the prevalence of the small holding render men
independent of birth, landlord, and employer. Rents are low and
wages must be high enough to tempt the laborer to remain in a
position where he is not his own master. Efforts to transplant the
retainer relation from the older lands have resulted in utter and
ridiculous failure. Evasion was too easy, and livelihood, in conse-
quence of individual effort, too well assured. Thus no social
cleavage of moment occurred among the immigrants themselves,
and in the absence of slavery or miscegenation on the large scale,
an incalculably strong factor working against a democratic regime
was excluded. The adventurer class clung to the outposts of civili-
zation and actually discharged a service to the society comparable
to that of the sappers and miners to an army. And, finally, the
population was not indefinitely scattered, owing to a large-scale
division of the land, but congregated in groups of farms, or towns.
This is a ground on which ideas of equality and democracy
throve, as the wheat and maize throve in the soil ; and to carry out
the comparison in this detail, it was a ground as little fitted for
aristocracy as was the soil for sugar, coffee, and spices. Such a
society was enabled to receive elements of the most diverse and
often objectionable kinds, and transform them to its type. And its
1 It ha.s not seemed necessary to go into a number of subsidiary points bearing
upon tliis classification, — for instance, into the motives for emigration. Strictly
speaking, there is no real emigration to most plantation colonies. It may be noted,
however, that the very motives that lead to real emigration reveal in those who
found the farm colony a very different temper from that displayed by those who go
to the tropics. The latter are generally mere sojourners ; they go out for wealth and
wish no break with the metropolis, guaranteed as they are by its support. Genuine
emigration, on the other hand, is motived by discontent with the old environment,
— and such a sentiment must be strong to overcome the human tendency toward
inertia or love of accustomed environment (home). Roscher (32 ff.) and Leroy-
Beaulieu (II, 471 ff.) catalogue these motives. Taken in broad lines, the discontent
with the old may be directed toward the economic conditions prevalent (over-popula-
tion, and its attendant ills) or toward the political and social (dominance of a hostile
political or religious faction, etc.). In any case there is a disposition to break with
the old, ignoring the bonds once recognized. Home is not alone a certain congenial
fraction of the physical environment ; it is not alone a matter of latitude and longi-
tude. Congeniality must extend to that which is less tangilile, in group-life.
Hence if the conditions of the colony are, or are made, different and more accept-
able, the home feeling grows and the former sentiments of attachment and loyalty
are displaced. This is another aspect of the " independence " of the settlers in the
farm colony.
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION 19
local and detached governments were able, even though with throes,
to coalesce into a centralized and powerful state. The only strong
and stable European offshoot societies are located in temperate
regions and are developed farm colonies.
And these were evolved into their stable form, without as yet
important exception, beneath the British flag : Canada, the United
States of America, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand. This
consideration would seem to cross a classification based upon
environment by introducing the element of race-character, and
perhaps national policy. These factors have been reflected upon,
and, while their importance has been realized, they have been re-
garded as, in the large, distinctly ancillary to the criteria of classi-
fication adopted. Where have even the British developed a stable
state in the tropical regions } And have not the Germans and
Italians in Argentina, or the Spanish-Americans in Mexico, made
notable progress — even if aided somewhat in indirect ways by
British and Americans — toward evolving (but only in a temperate
region) a promising state ? It is no place here to argue upon the
reasons why nearly all the eminent young states of the modern
world have developed out of British colonies : opportunity seized,
the capability of learning from the experience even of others,
adaptability, indifference, — these and other less general elements
have contributed to the astonishing results chronicled in British
colonial history. The British, because of their race-character, con-
formed themselves and their methods more aptly to the conditions
amidst which their colonial destiny launched them than did other
colonizing peoples. But they performed no miracles in the setting
aside of elemental forces of nature.
Conclusion
Returning from this digression, the discussion of classification,
which has been developed chiefly with the purpose of getting the
essentials of a colony before the mind, may be concluded in a word.
The sharp and vital contrasts in primary and secondary societal
forms, which have here been detailed, seem to afford a sufficient
ground for assigning to the two types of colony distinguished by
climate a separate and, as it were, varietal value. As colonies, or
better, perhaps, as frontier societies, the plantation and the farm
colony possess many characteristics in common. So closely allied
20 COLONIZATION
varieties possess specific characters in common, although they may
be, as varieties, sharply differentiated in a number of respects one
from another. But the characters here selected havS, to all appear-
ance, such a determinative influence upon the characters by which
colonies are more obviously or superficially distinguished, as to
deserve precedence, from the genetic point of view, over the latter.
From the practical standpoint, also, it could not be a misfortune to
a statesman of a colonizing state to get clearly before his mind the
essential diversity, in constitution and destiny, of colonies exposed
to such diverse types of natural environment.
CHAPTER II
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE
The colonics and colonization of the ancients have this value for
the social scientist, — they exhibit in their simpler form the ground-
work of the complex structures and processes of a later day. In
the social sciences, owing to the impossibility or impracticability
of experimentation, such less complex instances, fairly representing
an isolation of one or more factors, attain a special importance.
The same might be said with perhaps even greater pertinence of
the colonial operations of races widely alien to our own.
The chief writers on colonies have been criticised for not includ-
ing in their treatises the colonial activities of primitive peoples,
and the critic cites a brief list of facts calculated to illustrate these
activities among certain African, Malay, and other tribes. ^ They
are good enough so far as they go. The reader of ethnography
often meets with cases of emigration and settlement consequent
to pressure of population in certain tribal areas, or to the stimuli
of economic gain ; and occasionally observes an instance of what
might well be called c5lonization, in a sense approaching that of
our definition. The new society is not infrequently a strict repro-
duction of the old, and is sometimes temporarily united to the latter
by a loose sort of political cohesion ; or, as in the case of the
ancient Peruvians, a deliberate governmental colonization may be
observed. But all these instances tell us scarcely more than that
men of lower races flee from an actual or impending catastrophe
in the struggle for existence ; or that they seek to raise their
standard of living by temporary or permanent change of environ-
ment ; or that they find the artificial shifting of population an
effective means for consolidating the power of the state or com-
munity. Men of higher races, however, do all these things, and
leave completer and more definite records of their activities. So
^ Ratzel, Politische Geographic, pp. 143-145; cf. Wilken, p. 63; Van der Aa,
"Koloniale Politick" {^De Gids, i860); Lctourneau, La Guerre, pp. i84ff.; G. C.
Lewis, pp. 96 ff .
2 2 COLONIZATION
that while no evidence germane to the subject — especially if it is
calculated to simplify it — should be neglected, it is scarcely possi-
ble to make practical use of the scattered, fragmentary, and often
largely inferential ethnographical data which are as yet available.
THE COLONIES OF THE CHINESE
These considerations, however, do not apply so well to the
case of the Chinese. With them we are already within the field
of history. Their activities, while they stand in no genetic con-
nection with the evolution of what are called the modern or occi-
dental .systems of colonization, merit, from their very isolation and
exceptionality, a brief mention.
That which would, in strictness, remove the case of the Chinese
from our field is that, where popular initiative has been most strik-
ingly exhibited, there extension of governmental control has been
least ; and conversely, where the authority of the government has
been extended, there the whole movement has resembled the mere
widening of political boundaries rather than colonization in any
strict understanding of the term. The former of these alternatives
is what has led Ratzel ^ to remark that " Chinese colonization is
an exclusively economic and ethnographic affair. Nothing is more
manifest than the incapacity of the Chinese to effect a military
conquest and then to rule." This refers mainly to the extension
of political control over districts already economically and ethno-
graphically Chinese. The other alternative — boundary extension
— is represented by the cases where conquest of territories adjoin-
ing the empire was followed by the attempt to further an economic
and ethnographic assimilation.
The latter alternative may be considered first. Precaution in
self-defense early prompted China to secure her boundaries by
extending political control over neighbors who threatened them,
— chiefly the unruly and restless nomad tribes of the northern and
western steppes. At the outset the half-unconscious policy was
one of conquest through civilization rather than by force of arms,
a movement due less to pressure of population on land, and more
to the desire for political influence in the steppe region. But
although settlers and merchants came thus to form nuclei of
culture in wilder lands, the necessity of more compelling agencies
^ Chin. Ausw., p. 252.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 23
soon became manifest ; " in the steppes, in view of the pccuhar
character of their inhabitants, one must follow the rule : nothing
or everything." Districts occupied in consequence of such necessity
were secured by the founding of military colonics and by govern-
mental measures such as the wholesale transfer of population
between unruly districts and loyal sections of the empire. These
colonies were generally prosperous and soon became agricultural
or industrial in type ; but of voluntary emigration there was little. ^
Individual enterprise played but a small part in operations of this
nature.
Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Tonkin represent governmental
activity of the order described. The policy followed was to assure
the nomads or other natives of a semblance of freedom, which
stood to them for its reality. Their leaders were sometimes placed
in a position corresponding to that of Chinese mandarins ; they
not infrec[uently received their lands back in fief, tribute being
exacted where practicable. The Chinese settlers promptly inter-
married with the natives and gradually acquired possession of the
best lands. They were favored in important ways by the govern-
ment, which sought likewise to attract to permanent settlement
both such laborers as had emigrated across the boundaries in search
of employment, and criminals, chiefly political, who had been
banished from the older society.^
In sharp contrast with the favoring policy of the government as
here exhibited stand the restrictions imposed upon Chinese emi-
gration which took its origin in individual initiative. To envisage
these private motives it is necessary to realize, first of all, that
the Chinese have been too firmly rooted in ancestral soil, and too
little actuated by ideal considerations, to emigrate for any reasons
short of the most obvious and vital, i.e. material ones. One of
these was the discomfort and danger arising from the pressure of
population on land, already alluded to ; ^ and it must be realized, in
order to gain a conception of the pressure, that what we call pru-
dential checks to the growth of numbers have played but a van-
ishing role among a people the whole weight of whose superstition
1 Ratzel, Chin. Ausw., pp. 56-59; Von Brandt, pp. 126-127, 137, 140 ff., 151 ff.,
161 ff., 191-192. The Chinese influence advanced as far west as the Caspian (p. 138).
2 Ratzel, Chin. Ausw., pp. 75-81 ; Von Brandt, pp. 136-139, 190-191, 521.
3 It must be admitted, however, that emigration did not, as a rule, take place from
the most thickly settled districts ; contiguity to the territory to be settled played a
considerable part in those days.
24
COLONIZATION
and tradition is thrown against celibacy and the restriction of off-
spring.^ Cooperating with this motive to emigration, and often
directly derivable from it, were others arising from political dis-
content or friction ; - but only when the latter reflected economic
dissatisfaction did they rise into the importance of true motive
forces. Religious motives were practically non-existent. For the
consideration which, above all others, impelled the Celestial to pass
the boundaries of his country was commercial gain. No govern-
mental aid was here needed ; such emigration pursued its course
not only without state aid but despite state opposition. The
Chinese government decreed from time to time against the depar-
ture of its subjects at the promptings of individual enterprise. It
could not, however, prevent the gradual growth of a shipping-
trade^ for which environing geographical and other conditions pro-
vided so irresistible an incentive, nor that of a land-trade which
was tempted ever farther by opening vistas of commercial profit.
In spite of all restrictions the Chinese early made their way by sea
not only to Japan and the Philippines, but throughout the Malay
Archipelago and far into the Indian Ocean ; and by land they
penetrated at such a remote period and in such great numbers
into the southern peninsulas that Siam and Cambodia are half-
Sinicized, and India came to exhibit a strong ethnological and
cultural strain of the same character.^
Something of the importance of the Chinese element in the
colonies of modern nations will be seen in later chapters. Their
movement to the adjacent islands and countries has been almost
irresistible. Adherents of the Ming dynasty, settling in Formosa
in the latter half of the seventeenth century (a.d.), led a colonial
movement which practically conquered the rather strong Malay
population of that island. In the rhilipi)incs and in Java the Chinese
element has for centuries been of an importance quite dispropor-
tionate to its size ; heavy taxation and extreme cruelty at the
hands of Spaniards and Dutch were inadequate to secure relief
from its hateil though indispensable presence. In general the
Chinese have functioned as itinerant frontier-traders, plantation
1 Schallmayer (pp. 193 ff.) works these conditions with a somewhat precarious
argument for " the biological value of Chinese civilization."
2 Chiefly in the case of Formosa and the frontier provinces of Korea.
8 Cf. Lindsay, I, T28ff. This was after the conquest of southern China (220 n.c).
* Cf. Von Brandt, pp. 544-545, 569 ff., 592 ff. ; Ratzel, Hist., Ill, 171 ; Chin. Ausw.,
pp. 121 ff.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 25
and mine workers and directors ; not infrequently as large mer-
chants and money-lenders ; and as a successful, frugal, and clan-
nish group ^ they have been, as a rule, cordially hated both by
natives and by later European conquerors. Nevertheless, when
reasonably and intelligently dealt with, they have proved to be
industrious, law-abiding, and valued subjects. The Chinese immi-
grants were mostly males {except to some extent in Formosa,
which by reason of the exception more nearly resembled a colony
in the stricter sense of the term), and commonly consorted with
native women, producing mongrel races which are, at least in the
Philippines, of a relatively high quality. Native wives and their
children were generally deserted when the adventurer had accumu-
lated enough property to return to China and live at ease ; yet
from time to time the Chinese chose to remain permanently in
foreign parts, and even constituted settlements modeled after the
local political form of the fatherland. ^
It is plain that the Chinese have displayed in vigorous form
certain activities characteristic of so-called colonizing peoples ;
that they have formed what might be termed a potential colonial
empire. Had the capacities and disposition of the home govern-
ment admitted of an extension of control analogous to that exer-
cised by much weaker European nations over more ephemeral
European settlements in lands far less. accessible, we might here
be studying the Chinese settlements as full-fledged Chinese colo-
nies. However, governmental activity of this kind is an evolved
product, and China had not developed it.
One consideration connected with this potential colonial empire
is of curious interest. Owing to the apparent power of the Chinese
to live, labor, and procreate in any climate,^ the so-called planta-
tion colony in a hypothetical Chinese colonial empire would lose
many of its distinctive features, as sketched in Chapter L And it
will be seen, at the close of this chapter, that the Chinese settle-
ments fall in with those of the ancients in illustrating the effect
upon the nature and results of colonization produced by the elimi-
nation of several factors often assumed to be of great moment in
the modern and irresolvable product.
1 The Chinaman does not easily assimilate to the environing type. He adapts
himself with little difficulty to all climates, but retains his peculiar characteristics —
language, customs, industry, commercial ability — under all governments and in all
natural environments with only general modification. ^ Cf. l?ordier, Col., p. 59.
2 De Groot, Het Kongsiwezen, etc.; cf . Knoop, " Krijgsgeschiedenis " {^De Gids, i860).
26 COLONIZATION
THE COLONIES OF THE PHCENICIANS
The forms of migration and colonization thus far considered are
not genetically connected with colonial systems familiar to us at
the present day. They have been cited because they throw a
side-light upon the latter, through their exhibition of the similari-
ties and diversities of human motives and actions as displayed in
similar social movements under widely diverging conditions. At-
tention now turns to the colonizing peoples whose activities lay in
the Occident, and whose influence, consciously or unconsciously,
has extended down to the present day and its modern systems.
Conditions of the Development of Trade
Of these peoples the first to found what may be called a colo-
nial system were the Semites of the eastern shores of the Mediter-
ranean, the Phoenicians.^ If now we seek for the causes of that
movement of trade, and finally of population, to which the Phoeni-
cian colonies owed their being, we find them rooted in conditions
of actual or relative discomfort in the home-land. Phoenicia, with
a coast-line of about two hundred miles (far shorter than that of
Portugal), a maximum extension from the coast-line of some thirty
odd miles, and with considerable unproductive soil, was not well
fitted to support a growing population. And, in addition to this,
there existed constant pressure from the directions of the neigh-
boring empires, and not a few incursions ; Phoenicia was not infre-
quently the unfortunate witness of Egypto-Assyrian collisions on
her own ground. This meant not alone pressure of population but
also political discontent ; and all these factors contributed to ren-
der the native environment unsatisfactory and to motive an ever-
augmenting attention to the lands which lay in sight across the
sea. The Phoenicians became the first people of the West who were
able freely to sunder their relations with the native soil and to
1 Much of the following is condensed or adapted from the first chapter of the
author's Homeric Society, and rests largely upon the authorities there used. Refer-
ence is also made to the Homeric Society as a study of one of the undeveloped
societies of the Phanician period, envisaged in good part from the standpoint of its
relations with the Phoenicians. On PhcEnician trade, Speck's Ilandelsgeschichte has
been the general source and check. Busolt (I, 263 ff.) gives some attention to the
Phccnicians in their influence upon Greek history. Professor Seymour's authoritative
handbook of Homeric antiquities has appeared during the progress of the present
volume thrcjugh the press.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 27
adapt themselves readily to the varying conditions of the outside
world, without at once losing their national individuality. To these
motives for emigration was added the positive incentive of com-
mercial gain. Overland trade between the two great empires of
the time had long been in progress, and had been, at least in part,
in the hands of the Phoenicians. But when once the latter had
overcome the initial difficulties of the sea-route to Egypt, they
were increasingly disposed to sacrifice the land-traffic to the even
greater profits of a maritime frontier-trade. It is to be noted here
that Phoenicia was favored for the development of commerce
above either of the empires, both in geographical position and in
the possession of materials (cedar, etc.) for the construction of
ships. Moreover, in the very dawn of their history the Phoeni-
cians appear already to be characterized by that restless energy,
persistence, audacity in enterprise, acuteness of intellect, commer-
cial genius, adaptability, and general unscrupulousness which were
their distinguishing qualities in later time. Hence, with the inev-
itable advance of civilization toward the west, their country be-
came the staple and they the middlemen and carriers for the whole
occidental world ; and they were thus enabled to seize at the
outset and to maintain for ages the predominant position in a
rapidly extending frontier-trade.^ The lucrativeness of such a
trade is proverbial. It matters not that they were adapters rather
than inventors ; they reaped for centuries enormous gains from a
double exchange of commodities between markets of widely di-
verse conjunctures,^ and speedily advanced their sphere of opera-
tions to include the limits of the then-known world. But a widely
developed trade implies trading-posts, and successful trading-
stations have ever formed favorable ground for the erection of
colonies.^ This latter result was the more likely to take place, if,
as was not uncommon in the case of the Phoenicians, delays in
procuring a return-cargo led to temporary settlement, including
1 Rawlinson, pp. i ff., 50 ff., 89, 129; Duncker, II, 70; Movers, II, part ii, 6 ff . ;
part iii, 127 ff. ; Pietschmann, pp. 7 ff., 252 ff.
2 Cf. Lindsay, I, 22-23; Pietschmann, p. 291 ; Movers, II, part iii, 87 ff.
3 Winckler does not believe that there was much emigration from Phoenicia
proper; he thinks that the settlers, in North Africa for instance, were peoples
racially related to the Phoenicians, who came to be thought Phoenicians because of
their connections with Tyre. The trading-colony, or fondaco (cf. p. 64, below), was
the typical form of Phoenician colony. See pp. 341 and 349-357 of Winckler's first
article.
28 COLONIZATION
tillage and the like. Starting out in search of the nmrcx, from which
the popular purple dye of the time was expressed, they were led by
this motive, and in quest of metallic treasure, step by step across
an island-dotted sea, until, with the lengthening of such easy
stages, their nautical art and their confidence had grown able to
cope with the more formidable distances and exigencies that lay
beyond. In one's astonishment at the extent and daring of Phoe-
nician enterprise he must not lose sight of the fact that these
mariners were " children of destiny," and, even though apt
scholars, were taught by Nature in one of her exceptional moods
of suggestiveness, sequence, and complacency. These progressively
established trading-stations, extending from the eastern to the
western end of the Mediterranean, and beyond, were subjected, in
the course of time, to a sort of unconscious selection whereby the
most favorably located and circumstanced became actual settle-
ments and colonies. Located on the coasts, at the mouths of rivers
and in other eligible spots, these colonies became centers for the
dissemination of culture in all its existing forms.
Characteristics of Phcenician Commerce
But no sufficient conception can be gained either of the colonies
themselves, or of their influence upon the West and upon civiliza-
tion, without at least a sketch of that stream of trade to which they
owed their origin and of which they marked the successive courses
and branchings. This commerce found its strongest incentive and
richest rewards in the exchange of the characteristic commodities,
crude and elaborated respectively, of West and East. It cannot be
said that the eastern-bound traffic compared in any degree with the
western-bound in the momentousness of its effects upon contem-
porary culture and subsequent history ; but it was the desire for
the raw materials of the West which constituted the predominant
motive for the early extension of Phoenician trade. These unelabo-
rated products were, in large part, metals or ores, and later, wool
and grains. Copper was gotten from Cyprus in early times, and
tin, — of such importance in a "bronze age," — from Spain, and,
through direct or intermediary trade, from the Scilly Islands
and southern Britain. Silver was derived largely from the fabulously
wealthy deposits of Spain ; and gold, lead, and iron, from points
near and remote. Mining was a colonial occupation of the highest
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 29
importance, and many of the settlements were as truly mining
colonics as were those of the Spanish in America. Rare and curi
ous products, such as ivory, amber, precious stones, feathers, and
even apes and peacocks, made their way to Tyre and Sidon from
such remote points as the Senegal and Gambia regions. The impres-
sion created in the East by this influx of commodities is vividly
expressed in the Book of Ezekiel (chap, xxvii).
It is, however, to the stream of commodities which flowed from,
rather than toward, the centers of civilization that the attention of
the student of colonization is directed. The latter stream served
to provide an already refined civilization with additional necessities
and luxuries, but the former carried civilization where before it was
not, and in its train came those results of commercial and colonial
activity which have contributed so effectively to make the later
world what it is. The western-bound ^ traffic consisted roughly of
products of the arts, and, of these, manufactures formed the chief
component : the various creations of metal work, textiles, wines,
oils and ointments, spices, perfumes, dyes, drugs, and the like, —
in brief, those products of the high civilization of the East which
would progressively appeal to the evolving taste of the western
peoples, starting with trinkets and baubles and leading up to the
most refined of artistic creations. And to these products of the
mechanic arts are to be added others of scarcely less significance,
— those of domestication and breeding, i.e. plants and animals
within whose organisms there had been accumulated, by the select-
ive activity of man, elements of refinement and superiority. That
the Phoenicians were the main agents in the spread of the noble
grains, vines, and trees, and of some, at least, of the most useful
domestic animals, admits of little doubt.^ In the course of time
the processes also of the arts of agriculture, domestication, manu-
facture, etc., followed in the wake of the products, if, indeed, they
did not often come with them. And there can be no question but
that the slave-trade and indiscriminate kidnapping practiced by
the Phoenicians considerably aided in the latter result.^ For one
1 Phoenician traffic with the farther East does not concern the present argument,
as it affected only indirectly the origin and life of the colonies.
2 Lippert, I, 584 ff. ; Rawlinson, pp. 38 ff., 243 ff. ; Duncker, II, 287-300;
Movers, I, 524-525 ; II, part i, 250 ; part iii, 83 ff., 316 ff. ; Maspero, pp. 234 ff. ;
McCurdy, I, §66 ; Pietschmann, pp. 245 ff., 287 ff. ; Meyer, I, 226.
3 Movers, II, part iii, 71 ff.; Maspero, pp. 248 ff . ; Pietschmann, pp. 28 ff. ; cf.
Odyssey, xiv, 200 ff.
30 COLONIZATION
must realize that the slaves of this time, and indeed of all antiquity,
were not necessarily racial, cultural, or social inferiors. Quite the
reverse would be true if Egyptians, Hebrews, or Assyrians, kid-
napped in the East, were sold in the West. Western masters
learned much from such slaves ; and if a westerner happened to
undergo the same ordeal of loss of liberty in an eastern land, it
would occasionally be possible, no doubt, for him to escape with a
wealth of ideas and accomplishments acquired in his enforced con-
tact with a higher culture. And thus, to some degree, would the
dissemination of civilization be attained.
Nature and Extent of the " Empire "
This surv^ey of the main lines of Phoenician commercial activity
is sufficient to demonstrate the general groundwork out of which
grew their colonial system, if it should be dignified by such a name.
It cannot, in justice, be maintained that the Phoenician settlements
and dependencies fully satisfy our definition of colony. Emigration,
especially during the periods of Assyrian and Persian aggression
in Phoenicia, was strong enough seriously to undermine the pros-
perity of the colonizing cities ; but the extension of governmental
control over the colonies was of a sort which would to-day be
deemed shadowy, to say the least. One must reflect, however,
that such extension of state control as that upon which as a
criterion we form our judgments, is rendered possible only by the
advance in power over nature, and especially by the development
of speedy means of communication. By ship, Carthage was in
early times as far from Tyre as is Australia from England, and
Cyprus itself was at an equally great distance as far as administra-
tive control through direct communication is concerned. Assuming,
however, the sufficiency of means of communication in the setting
of the age, there remains the significant and vital fact that Phoenicia
was not a unified state with a central government. There was not
so much as a capital. Authors tell us of the " hegemony " of Sidon,
and then of Tyre ; ^ and this word, as in later Greek times, ])re-
cisely expresses the degree of governmental centralization to which
^ Meyer, art. " Phoenicia," says that it cannot be shown that any other Phoeni-
cian towns, except Tyre, founded colonies. Cf. McCurdy, I, §§ 42-44; Movers, II,
part i, 318 ff. The hegemony of Tyre covered the period of great Phoenician pros-
perity (ninth and eighth centuries B.C.). Winckler, I, 344 ff., 357 ; II, 439 ff.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 31
the Phoenicians, and later the Greeks, attained. Not even inside
the single cities, which formed the largest political and colonizing
units, was centralization secured. This absence of national or even
local coherence and cooperation, and of centralized direction, is
heavy with fate for the " colonial empire " when there are enemies
in the field ; but it does not necessarily prevent the growth of
such an empire under favorable conditions. In the early days of a
Phoenician settlement there existed a distinct relation of depend-
ence — even unwilling and coerced dependence — of the new
settlement upon the mother-city ; and there even arose a certain
recognizable solidarity between the complex of colonies and metrop-
olises, worthy of the name of empire. This preliminary statement
of the reasons for employing " colony " and " colonization " in refer-
ence to the Phoenicians should receive justification in the more
specific account which follows.
" In the tenth century e.g. the navigation and trade of the
Phoenicians extended from the coasts of the Arabian Sea, from the
Somali coast, and perhaps from the mouths of the Indus as far as
the coast of Britain." ^ This extension of activity, immense, even
though it be cautiously discounted, implies a long past of com-
mercial enterprise and attendant colonization. It is therefore with
less astonishment that we are able to accept the truth of the state-
ment that Phoenician colonial activity began, with the settlement of
parts of Cyprus, as early as the thirteenth or fourteenth century b.c.
The movement was continued along lines of least resistance to the
then navigation (island-chains, etc.) toward the north-west, and the
islands of the yEgean and the coasts of Greece (Thrace, Euboea,
Cythera) were visited and partially settled within a relatively brief
period. The Black and Adriatic seas, offering as they did compara-
tively unfavorable opportunities for lucrative commerce, were, for
the most part, neglected. However, by the time they had advanced
to the Adriatic the Phoenicians were able to leap the barriers of a
1 Duncker, II, 302 ; cf. McCurdy, I, App. 3. It is of course impossible to assign
dates except with vague approximation. The chronology of the ancients was, as was
inevitable at their stage of civilization, legendaiy, conventional, and uncritical. See
Pietschmann, p. 287, note. The tendency of the older writers on ancient history
was undoubtedly toward the assignment of a too high antiquity, especially as regards
the activity of the Phoenicians. Movers (II, part ii, passim ; part iii, 21 ff.), Duncker
(II, 54 ff.), Rawlinson (pp. 96 ff.), have been corrected by Pietschmann (pp. 27,
240 ff.), Meyer (I, 230 ff.), Maspero (pp. 244-246), and other authorities of a later
date. From the standpoint of the present volume the precise dating of these early
colonial movements, even if possible, is not a matter of essential moment.
32 COLONIZATION
narrow sea and to pass on to Sicily, Sardinia, the Balearic Islands,
and Spain. They likewise visited the northern coast of Africa,
opposite Sicily, and founded colonies, one of the earliest of which
was Ityke, the later Utica. From these stations they pushed on
through the Straits of Gibraltar and founded Gades (Cadiz), the
extreme of their colonies {ca. looo B.C.); for, although they
advanced beyond the straits both northward and southward, and
even westward, there is no reliable record of further settlement in
these outlying parts. The Mediterranean thus became a Phoenician
sea, fringed with Phoenician settlements, and crossed by a network
of Phoenician trade-routes.^ Although our information concerning
the actual life in these settlements and colonies is very defective,
there can be little doubt that they were typical trading and some-
times mining colonies, and came in the course of time to engage in
agriculture for the support of life. Population was shifting during
the " factory" period, and it was only during later and more settled
times that Phoenician wives and families emigrated, and then in no
considerable numbers. Free miscegenation with the natives must
have been the rule, as will appear later. The local governmental
form was probably that which regularly obtains in a group of mer-
chants far from home, — an oligarchy of the older and more experi-
enced. These general inferences are supported by the better-known
case of Carthage, later to be cited.
Relations of the Colony and Metropolis
It is fitting now to examine the relations subsisting between the
colony and its metropolis. The bearing of the means of communi-
cation upon this matter has already been noted, but definiteness
may be given to that factor by a word upon Phoenician navigation.
In the early periods the ships were very small and slow, and their
effectiveness as vehicles of communication was halved by the
impossibility of night-sailing. But this was soon remedied, and the
Phoenicians also learned to sail into the wind, — a feat regarded
as no less than marvelous in those days, — to steer by the north
(or Phoenician) star, and to venture over untried seas. As early
as the Homeric times Phoenician ships had taken on a magical
1 On the tradition of the circumnavigation of Africa by Phoenician sailors dis-
patched by King Necho of Egypt, see Merodotu.s, IV, 42. Saco (App. I, 362 ff.)
collects the o])inions of scholars ui)on the reliability of this account.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 33
character because of their relatively high speed and extensive
voyages. Their advance in nautical technique was, relatively to
that of their c(}ntemporaries, very great, but it did not suffice to
draw the bonds of empire close, even in the latter days.^ Thus it
is clear that the very apparatus for the extension of metropolitan
control, had this existed in the spirit of the age,^ was yet inade-
quate. On the whole, however, the political bond seems not to
have been much in evidence or attention ; the ties between colonies
and parent-cities were rather commercial and religious than polit-
ical. " Most of the colonies of importance were held under a very
mild form of the general system of vassalage. The tribute expected
was light, and ships and sailors were more in demand than money
for the fulfillment of the obhgations to the mother-state."'^ Any
relations in which Phoenicians figured are better understood if the
fact be kept before the mind that the desire for actual, material
gain overweighed, in the Phoenician temperament, all other con-
siderations, especially those of large and unsubstantial ideals of
"empire" and the like. When the sometimes sorely oppressed
metropolis was dependent upon one of its colonies for contributions
or trade in raw materials and foods, any defection would naturally
be resisted with energy. Thus Utica was forced to resume pay-
ment of tribute, and the policy of monopoly and exclusion of alien
rivals led to the employment of mercenaries in considerable num-
bers. In general the government of the metropolis was not so
much averse to the exercise of coercion, as incapable of enforcing it.
If, however, the purely political bonds were thus weak, there
certainly existed other ties of a rather intimate variety ; quarrels
between colonies, for example, were referred to the authorities of
the metropolis for settlement. And if the purely political bonds
were weak, it must be realized that the religious bonds of the
period were of a far more vital and material character than those
of modern times. The colonies made yearly presents, which were a
1 Herodotus (IV^ 86) reckons 700 stadia for a day-voyage and 600 for a night-
voyage, aggregating 1300 stadia, or 150 miles, for twenty-four hours. Cf. Lindsay, I,
3 ff. The voyage from the Syrian coast to Gades occupied eighty days, even in
Greek times. Pietschmann, p. 307; cf. Maspero, pp. 246 ff.; Rawlinson, pp. 57,
411-412, 467 ; Movers, II, part iii, 157 ff. ; Pietschmann, pp. 27 ff., 283.
2 Cf. p. 43, below.
3 McCurdy, I, § 42 ; Meltzer, I, 144 ; Meyer, art. " Phoenicia" ; Movers, II, part ii,
34 ff.; Lewis, pp. 108-109T Speck, III, part i, I73ff. (on Carthaginian relations to
Tyre).
34 COLONIZATION
sort of tribute to the state, to the temples of the metropoHs ; even
Carthage thus supported the worship of Melkarth in Tyre.^ And
the commercial bonds were at first the more closely drawn, inasmuch
as the ways of trade converged in the parent-cities and commerce
thereby attained its exclusive and monopolistic stamp. The soli-
darity engendered by all these alliances, when practically all mer-
chants were natives of one small country, took the place, to some
extent, of the political union now deemed, in the wide and cosmo-
politan extension of trade, to be the sine qua Jion of colonial empire.
This semi-coherence tended to pass away with time, but was
confirmed for a considerable period during the rise of the early
competitors for that alluring traf^c which had once been all but
exclusively Phoenician. If the mother-country could have preserved
and extended its independence and effected some adequate unifica-
tion, and if the colonists had safeguarded the integrity of their
blood, this clannish feeling of a monopolistic nation might have
continued. That friendly feelings toward the country of origin
were preserved for long periods is indicated by the continued
migrations to the colonies, and by the welcome there extended to
Phoenician fugitives during the encroachments upon Phoenicia of
Sargon, Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar, Alexander, and others.
But it was evident from the disposition and ideals of the Phoeni-
cians that the formation of a colonial empire, in the modern sense,
was outside of their purposes and endeavors. Temporary union
for self-defense, to say nothing of the formation of any political
aggregation, had to be forced upon them — as is evidenced by the
case of the Carthaginian empire — by the exigencies of the struggle
for existence. All the Phoenicians cared for was commercial gain :»
if in force, they had always pillaged, robbed, and practiced piracy;
if inferior in strength, they fell back upon pilfering, cheating, and
kidnapping. They were known even to Homer as rogues and '
deceivers,^ but were endured throughout antiquity for the sake of
that which they brought within the reach of active and progressive,
if rude, races.
One of the cardinal points of Phoenician policy was the preser-
vation of their monopoly through the exclusion of rivals ; to this
end they were ready to expose themselves to serious loss and danger.
1 Meltzer, II, 149, 151 ; cf. Winckler, I, 342 ff.
2 Cf. the piotica fides of the Carthaginians, of which *the Romans Hked to tell.
Speck, III, part i, 63.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 35
This attitude came out more clearly when their monopoly, in its
origin almost a natural one, beg'an to suffer from the encroach-
ment of much-tempted comj)etitors. When at last the sources of
their material prosperity were threatened they were eager to resist.
However, in the palmy days of greater security they were willing
to sacrifice all to economic profit; language, religion, customs,
even integrity of blood — all the characteristics which distinguish
a race or a people — were readily renounced for the gratification
of an all-pervading passion for the accumulation of material wealth.
It could not be otherwise but that the Phoenician colonies should
thus lose their national character. And more : even the racial
character of the settlements gradually merged with its environment,
so that while the Hebrews, who pursued a policy almost diamet-
rically opposed to the easy adaptability of the Phoenicians, have
maintained their racial stamp into modern times, the Phoenicians
as a people have long ceased to exist.^ If, then, the specialized
commercial spirit has been able to effect a result of this generality,
it is no wonder that the inceptive or potential colonial empire
disintegrated and melted away. But it was not left entirely to
these broadly acting forces of nature to begin and conclude the
process of decay. As in most such cases, the fatal sweep of the
storm did not occur without an antecedent brewing, nor apart from
ominous indications in previous periods. Even during the Sidonian
hegemony (roughly estimated as extending to about the tenth
century b.c), the period of early expansion, the people first to
profit by and imitate the activities of the Phoenicians had already
replaced their masters in the eastern regions of the Mediterranean.
By the thirteenth century the Greeks had driven the Phoenicians
from the yEgean Sea. And during the glory-period of Tyrian
supremacy which succeeded that of Sidon, the end was already
foreshadowed. With a vigor to which they could offer but insuffi-
cient resistance, the Phoenicians were forced from the hitherto undis-
puted advantages of their position, and were encroached upon until
1 Cf. Gumplowicz, Rassenkampf, pp. 332-333; McCurdy, I, §§ 39, 683; Duncker,
11,263; Rawlinson, p. 28 ; Maspero, pp. 214 ff.; Movers, I, 6i ; II, part i, 559-561. The
Phoenicians did not resist the payment of tribute, provided there was a net commercial
gain. " The Tyrians, like the other Phoenicians, were at all times ready to pay tribute
to the Great King, whether he was Assyrian, Babylonian, or Persian. But in the
present case [that of Sennacherib] it was not a question of allegiance, but of the
abdication of maritime supremacy, and such preeminence Tyre was as little willing to
forego as was afterwards her greatest colony, Carthage." McCurdy, II, 283-284.
36 COLONIZATION
there existed in the Mediterranean Sea another colonial empire
conterminous with their own.
To the activities of these new colonizers the account will presently
come ; it is enough here to say that they overcame and forced back
the Phoenicians through the same methods of aggression practiced
by the latter throughout their history. But when the Phoenicians
had retired to a point where further withdrawal meant a complete
surrender of their share in the world-trade, they began to evince a
characteristically tardy willingness to unite and to fight for com-
mercial existence. And, since the decline of the Phoenician cities
left the headship of this enforced ccjnfederation to the greatest
colony of the west, — Carthage, — the center of historical interest
moves, naturally enough, to that city and its destiny. Here, in the
strict sense of the word, leave is taken of Phoenician colonization.
But since the subsequent history of the quondam colonies is well
fitted to bring out several important considerations respecting
Phoenician capabilities and colonial policy, a sketch of this history
as it centered about the figure of Carthage is yet in place. ^
Carthage as a Phcenician Colony
Carthage, the "new city," founded about 800 B.C., was already
beyond the early stages of a trading-colony — was, indeed, a large
and powerful city — before the Greeks thought of moving westward.
During the three centuries of upheaval and general insecurity which
followed the second elevation of the Assyrian kingdom in the first
half of the ninth century b.c, many a noble family and its retainers j
and many a prominent business firm was transferred from Tyre,
the mother-city, to Carthage. The position of affluence and inde-
pendence thus attained was increased by the results of Greek
aggression in the eastern Mediterranean, which interposed a foreign
and hostile element between the metropolis and its colony. And
so, because of its prosperity and power, Carthage came to usurp
the position of a common metropolis, as it were, for the colonies of
the west. 2 With the tardy recognition on the part of these colonies
of the true significance of the advance of the Greeks, at first under-
estimated, Carthage was led to assume a theoretical, if not actual,
1 See especially Meltzer, 1, 144 ff. Speck (III, part i) gives a very valuable general
account of Carthage and its dependencies.
2 As Winckler {II, 449) puts it, Carthage gathered together " PhcL-niciandoin " as
Tyre had done before.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 37
protectorate over Phoenician interests ; to direct united efforts
where the spur of necessity had clearly demonstrated the need of
concerted action, and to enforce cooperation on the part of recalci-
trants. A quasi-imperial station was thus, as it were, forced upon
her. She aided other colonies in their wars with native peoples,
and in return possessed herself of part of their lands ; she was even
led to a certain amount of true colonization on her own account.^
But it was as a willingly or unwillingly acknowledged head of a
defensive coalition that she, like Athens in the Delian League,
administered her empire.^ The progressive advance of the Greeks
to the shores of Sicily seems not to have aroused the Phoenician
colonies to a sense of danger, but their abrupt appearance in the
western end of the Mediterranean, and even in the Gades-region,
awakened the Semites to the fact that their last and most treasured
possessions were threatened ; and before the Greeks could advance
across Sicily, a line of defense had already been formed, facing the
south and east, by cities under the protection of Carthage, and by
allied native peoples. The Greeks were at first repulsed, and in
succeeding times were held back from political advance both in
the islands and on the coasts. To this end a system of alliances
with Etruscans, Romans, and others was skillfully employed.
Treaties went even to the modern extent of delimitation of spheres
of influence, for instance in the relations of the Carthaginians with
Massilia. The Carthaginian hegemony took on a more and more
imperial aspect, and the administration a progressively centralized
form.^ From this time on the colonial quality of the settlements
1 The Carthaginians had much difficulty with the nomad peoples of Africa, over
whom they were unable to extend an unquestioned supremacy. They had, indeed,
bought or rented their own ground from the natives and paid them an annual stipend
up to the middle of the fifth century. They attempted to enlist native races in their
armies from time to time, but above all tried to keep on good terms with them.
Meltzer, II, 74/f., 93, 104; Speck, III, parti, 37-50, 407 ; cf. Smith, pp. 13-21, 43 ff.;
Lewis, pp. 110-112 ; Ratzel, III, 183-184. On the Phoenicians and Carthaginians in
Spain, cf. Colmeiro, I, 29-43. On the rather close mutual relations of Tyre and
Carthage, see Meltzer, II, 149-152.
2 On the Carthaginian league or empire, see Speck, III, part i, 2 5-28, 33-36,50 ff ., 1 44ff.
3 Cf. Ihne, II, 5 ff. This author naturally envisages Carthage from the standpoint
of its relations and conflict with Rome, summing up the comparison as follows (II,
461) : "The main cause of the superiority of Rome over Carthage we have found in
the firm geographical and ethnographical unity of the Roman state as compared with
the chequered career of the nationalities ruled over by Carthage, and in the disjointed
configuration of its territory, scattered over long lines of coast islands." This contrast
serves to bring out from a somewhat different angle of vision several considerations
upon which the present treatment lays stress. Cf. Speck, III, part i, 6^ ff.
38 COLONIZATION
drops away, and states are pitted against states. The rise of
Carthage demonstrates, however, that there was in the trading-
settlements of the Phoenicians the possibility of the construction
of a closely knit colonial empire. The elements lacking to this
end, and cited above, are easily recognizable as functions of the
Phoenician character and of the contemporary stage of civilization. ^
Temper and Influence of the Phcenicians
But, before leaving the Phoenicians and their activities, recogni-
tion must be accorded to the services rendered by them to civiliza-
tion. Working from the sole standpoint of self-interest, they
neither harbored humanitarian and missionary aims nor felt the
necessity of utilizing them as cloaks to conceal their real motives.
Hence any " culture-mission " performed by them was discharged
with indifference, if not unconsciously. If their influence upon
later times was a powerful one, it represents the effectiveness of
the virtually isolated factor of trade, — a factor which, in later
times, it has been all but impossible convincingly to isolate. It
must be realized that the Phoenicians had largely to do with active,
receptive races, and no doubt effected changes in their culture with
the minimum of resistance. But it is likewise true that they had
no notions of what "ought to be," but contented themselves with
a tactful display of temptations to the acquisition of a higher
material civilization, this being a commercial activity which brings
its own rewards. It would be hard to do justice to the unconscious
culture-dissemination of the Phoenician settlements and colonies.
Most authorities would doubtless agree upon the general statement
that but for the Phoenicians Europe, and so the farther West, could
scarcely have become what they now are. From the trade-routes
of this people, both to the north and to the south, there radiated a
glow of enlightenment and civilization ; and in their wake came
worthy successors in the task of race-education, whose arts and
1 Speck (III, part i, 147), envisaging terms in a sense somewhat different from
that here employed, can write : " Kein anderer Staat der alten Welt hat das Kolonial-
system in solchem Umfange geiibt wie Karthago, und fiir keinen zweiten sind die
Kolonien andauemd von gleicher Bedeutung geblieben. Der Staat bestand beinahe
nur aus Kolonien, war in solchem Masse auf sie begriindet, das seine Existenz davon
abhing." This author calls attention to the wide extent of Carthaginian trade (III,
part i, 182 ff.), asserting (p. 182): "Kein anderes Volk brachte gleichzeitig so
zahlreiche und mannigfaltige Waren in den Ilandelsverkehr wie die Karthager."
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER 'lA'PE 39
methods were based upon those of the path-breakers themselves.'
The same trade-routes continued to mark the widenin<; highroads
of culture until the way was prepared for the great civilizing
agencies which proceeded westward with the extension of the
Christian religion. Owing to physiographical and ethnological con-
ditions, this progress of culture turned to the north rather than to
the south. Possibly some indirect influences penetrated in the latter
direction ; in any case it is certain that the African coast would
have exerted less attraction upon the later Moslem conquerors had
it not been brought within the civilized world, and made worth the
effort of conquest, by the initial activity of the Phoenicians.''^
" Not only were the Phoenicians the originators of a worldwide
trade and of a farsighted commercial policy unrivalled in ancient
times, but their maritime supremacy has been the most enduring
known to men. Even that of Britain has not yet lasted one-fourth
as long." ^
THE COLONIES OF THE GREEKS
After the Phoenicians, the next people to found colonial societies
on a large scale were the Greeks.^ Their activities have been
touched upon in so far as was necessary to the preceding argument,
and may be reviewed the more rapidly for the reason that they
were so largely inspired by and patterned after those of the Phoeni-
cians. The genesis of Greek maritime enterprise can be made out
in the Homeric poems, which, in addition, cast considerable light
upon early relations between Greeks and Phoenicians. The Homeric
Greeks are about as proficient on the sea as the earlier Phoenician
1 Winckler (I, 340; II, 450) lays particular stress upon the fact that the Phoeni-
cians were only intermediaries ; he says that they had no more of independent
culture than does a harbor-town in comparison with the interior district to which it
affords an outlet. He likewise insists that the Phoenicians have been given too
much credit, because everything that came to the less-cultured nations from the East,
i.e. through trade, was referred Ijy the recipients, who knew of no other, to a Phoeni-
cian source. Cf. Keller, Horn. Soc, pp. 10, 24, 89-90. The Phoenicians thus came
to be trade personified.
2 Meltzer, I, 63 ff. ; Pietschmann, p. 2S5 ; Duncker, II, 287 ff. ; Movers, II, part ii,
4ff. ; part iii, 2 ff. ; Meyer, art. " Phrenicia." "Wherever the Phoenicians had been,
the grandeur and audacity of their enterprises had left ineffaceable traces in the
imagination of the people." Maspero, p. 234.
3 McCurdy, I, §66.
* The greater part of what follows on the Greek colonies has been taken from
Beloch (Vol. I), Busolt (Vol. I), and Speck (Vol. II); where there is substantial
agreement between these authorities specific references to them are omitted.
40 COLONIZATION
mariners ; they are just learning from the latter, who display the
products and processes of culture to their eager eyes, and pour
wild and competition-discouraging " commercial myths" ^ into their
astonished ears. The Greeks venture on the sea, it is true, but
their voyages are short and slow, and but rarely for trading-pur-
poses ; they are still the sought and not the seekers. From the
Homeric narrative we are therefore able to apprehend the point of
view of the lower and rising race in its contact with a superior
civilization. This picture is but the reverse of the process as it
has been viewed from the Phoenician side ; the early colonial
activities of the Greeks are the more readily understandable if the
scope and nature of Phoenician commercial enterprise be kept in
mind.2
Motives of Emigration
At the outset, however, it would appear that the main motive
for Greek emigration to and settlement in adjacent islands was less
a desire for commercial gain than an impulse to escape the evils
attendant upon pressure of population on land. Emigration because
of political discontent played but a small role in these early ages,
and trade-interests of an aggressive sort did not exist in the absence
of industries sufficient to provide products for exportation. It was
under such a system of folk-movements that the neighboring
.^gean and other islands and the western coast of Asia Minor
were settled, in the latter half of the second millennium B.C. The
native peoples were absorbed or reduced to a subject class, and the
various cities united their interests in a sort of religious league
with its center at Mykale. By the eighth century, therefore, when
the stream of emigration began to flow with stronger sweep over
greater distances, the Greek race already occupied an area far
larger than Greece itself, and some of the earliest settlements of
the yEgean were ready to send out colonies in competition with
those of the parent-land.^
1 It seems probable that the tales of strange and vaguely localized tribes and
monsters in the Odyssey may be in large part referred to the only mariners of the
time well known to the peoples of Greece. These tales were certainly calculated to
discourage travel upon the sea. It will be seen in later chapters of this book that
other peoples who have held valued monopolies have utilized such means to hold off
encroachment.
2 Cf. Keller, Horn. Soc, chap, i, et passim ; Letourneau, Commerce, pp. 426 ff.
3 Hertzlierg, pp. 3 ff. Speck (II, 166) says that "the external history of the Greek
people consists essentially in an unbroken transmarine migration."
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPF: 41
Meanwhile the simple motive for emigration in the sense of folk-
movement had been superseded by a complex of incentives, of
which the desire to escape the direct ills of over-population was
but one. Commercial interests had sprung up with the advance in
culture gained by contact with the East. These took form, first of
all, in piracy, wherein the Greeks speedily came to surpass their
old masters, the Phoenicians. Thucydides ^ notes that the older
Greek settlements were established inland rather than directly upon
the shores, in order to expose them less to piratical raids ; and even
in his own time this historian had not seen the suppression of the
freebooters. Another motive was the adventurous and wandering
spirit which characterized the Greeks in their newly gained power
of sailing the sea, and which, indeed, promoted settlement less in
a direct way than indirectly through piracy. Motives of conquest
were also involved in the complex of Greek incentives. And,
finally, the development of factions in the home-cities had led,
through consequent political dissatisfaction, to the voluntary or
coerced withdrawal of considerable bodies of citizens.^ But the
primary motives remained rooted in the conditions of pressure of
numbers and in the opening prospects of commercial gain through
imitation of Phoenicians and their methods. It has been stated by
some that the typical colony was of the agricultural type ; and it
is no doubt true that Greece was, by its physiographical nature, a
land sure to suffer from limitations of agricultural and pasture areas.
These limitations were felt the more because of the strength of the
growth of population. There were many purely agricultural colonies
and not a few fishing-stations, but a survey of the facts leaves no
room for doubt that a large number of the inceptive undertakings
were essentially commercial in nature and represented an effort to
win a share in the lucrative operations hitherto monopolized by
the Phoenicians. In the course of time the trading-stations acquired
adjacent areas and took on a distinctly agricultural type, for the
Greeks exhibited a tendency thus to identify themselves with land,
which was almost as marked as the indifference of the Phoenicians
to all else than exchange. The progress of the Greek colonies was
1 1, 7 ; cf. 8.
2 Speck, pp. 180-182. A writer on the term diroiKla in Pauly-Wissowa distinguishes
a third period of emigration and colonization, subsequent to the year 580 l?.c. and
lasting till the time of Alexander, where the predominant motive for movement lay in
the stre.sses and calamities of war. This period, however, falls rather outside the scope
of this discussion.
42 COLONIZATION
from trade to agriculture and cattle-raising rather than the reverse ;
and this, their ultimate form, in accordance with general principles
explained above, rendered them of a type less dependent and
ephemeral than that of the Phoenician colonies, and so differenti-
ated them from the latter in an important respect.^
Relation of the uTroiKia to its Metropolis
In fact, the drrotKia is not infrequently used as a type of the
so-called "natural colony," ^ — an emigrant group connected with
the country of origin by no more definite bonds than those of a
common nationality and culture. If this were strictly true, the
diroLKia could have small place in our present discussion. In their
early history, however, and sometimes in their subsequent periods,
the Greek colonies seem to have recognized bonds of a much closer
character. In founding the colony, the activity of the metropolis
was generally the determining factor. For, in addition to service
in forwarding the emigrants to their destination, the parent-city
appointed a director (ot/cio-TT;?) for the colony, who supervised the
settlement and established institutions for the settlers modeled
directly upon those of the metropolis.^ This bound the colony to
the mother-community by ties of an intimate nature ; and to these
were added those of a common dialect, religion, body of customs,
etc. Even the rivers, mountains, and other natural features of the
new habitat were named after those of the home-land.'* War of a
colony upon its metropolis was regarded as a crime analogous to
an assault of a son upon a father,^ and the metropolis was, on its
part, supposed to aid the colony in time of danger. Corinth, for
example, afforded aid to the adult Syracuse through four centuries.
The colony was represented at festivals in the mother-city by
solemn embassies, and common intellectual interests — in poetry,
art, and ideas in general — added to the more material solidarity.
The political dependence characteristic of trading-stations, with
their sparse population and dangerous environment, gave the
1 Speck, II, i8o ff. ; cf. Ihne, II, 4-5. 2 Roscher, pp. 44 ff. ; Ireland, p. 3; etc.
^ For the details of colony-founding, see Caillemer; Speck, II, 167 ff. The colo-
nists generally emigrated willingly, but sometimes under constraint. Surveys implying
the definition of titles to land were undertaken.
* The airoiKla was really a " home away from home."
'' Cf. Raoul-Rochette, I, 33-34, 44-45
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 43
metropolis an especial influence in the earliest times. Not infre-
quently the colonies paid tribute in return for protection, and were
forced to submit to a certain amount of coercion, especially in
times of danger. But with the divergence of interests the power
of the metropolis declined, and became rather a respected and
honored general influence upon trade and politics than a real rule.
The mother-city sometimes rebelled against this consummation,
and, in the case of Corinth, resisted it and formed what might be
called a true, if miniature, colonial empire ; but the non-centraliza-
tion at home, and the inadequacy of means of transportation and
communication, rendered an extensive empire almost as impossible
for the Greeks as it had been for the Phoenicians. ^
The loose relationship between metropolis and colony — so
striking to one who has in mind the extent of metropolitan pre-
tensions at the present day — was largely a function of the com-
paratively diminutive scale of areas and activities of the ancient
times. Both Greek and Phoenician colonies were settlements of
cities, " not of nations, not of kingdoms, nor of commonwealths on
the scale of kingdoms." The emigrants were citizens isolated from
their spheres of civic activity, not subjects who owed loyalty to a
sovereign man or government in all places and at all times ; the
latter is an idea which demanded the mediaeval environment to call
it into being. The metropolis continued to lead its life as before ;
the colony began one of its own. Claims of actual dominance on
the part of the older society did not enter into the category of pos-
sibilities harbored by the minds of the time. There was no need
of a declaration of independence, still less of the severance of an
irritating relation in wrath and by the sword ; the falling-out of
Corcyra and Corinth, by its very exceptionality and the popular
feelings it engendered, contributes to the strengthening of the
general case.^ There was no necessary economic, political, or
financial dependency, such as characterizes, as has been seen, the
distant or tropical colony. No allegiance was implied ; hence no
constraint was felt in the acknowledgment of what would seem
in a later age to indicate dependence, — of such names, bonds,
and the like, as are not infrequently suppressed, ignored, or chafed
^ In collateral confirmation of this principle it may be noted that the centralized
monarchies of some of the colonies were able to hold in subjection their own sub-
colonies if the latter were not too remote.
2 Busolt, I, 305-307 ; Raoul-Rochette, I, 33, 48.
44 COLONIZATION
under in modern times. ^ The lasting tie between colony and
metropolis, and the one which constantly recalled community of
nationality and interests, was that of trade. And here we have
the familiar relation of the supplementary markets of communities
producing respectively elaborated and raw products. It is scarcely
necessary to rehearse the details of Mediterranean trade, which
have been indicated already in treating of the Phoenicians ; for
the Greeks virtually imitated the Phoenicians, then expelled them
and took their places, at least in the eastern sections of the Medi-
terranean.^
Extent of Greek Colonization
The spread of Greek colonization might roughly be indicated
by saying that it was practically conterminous with that of the
Phoenicians, but also included certain districts to which the latter,
with their exclusively commercial interests, gave less attention.
P'rom the eastern end of the Mediterranean to Sicily the Phoeni-
cian colonies were largely suppressed and replaced ; beyond that
point, toward the west, the settlements of both nations existed,
occasionally in close proximity. The first Greek colonies, the
results of irregular movements of population, had been located in
Crete, the ^gean Islands, and on the coasts of Asia Minor ; they
were composed largely of emigrants from Attica, Boeotia, and
other agricultural centers. But with the lengthening of distances
and the development of shipping, the centers of dispersion had
changed to such maritime districts as Chalkis and Eretria ; and
later to Megara, Corinth, Rhodes, Lesbos, and the Ionian coast-
cities, among which Miletos was the most eminent. Owing to the
resistance met with toward the south and east, the course of emi-
gration had been directed predominantly toward the west, where
its energetic currents rapidly drove before them the almost non-
resisting Phoenicians. In this western movement the first great
stage was Sicily, a fertile island, rich in hides, wool, salt, clay,
asphalt, valuable stones, and other desirable pro.ducts. Roughly
1 Freeman, pp. d-^d passim.
2 Speck, II, 187-190. "Den Kem einer Kolonie bildete eine Schar von Auswan-
derern, die eine neue Heimat suchte und eine neue I'olis l:)egiiindete, welche zwar
in einem Pietatsverhriltnisse zur Mutterstadt blieb, sicli jedoch als selhstandiges
Staatswesen entwickelte." Busolt, I, 281 ; cf. Raoul-Rochette, I, 36-42, 56-58;
Lewis, pp. 107-108.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 45
speaking, the Greek voyages to the west began with the eighth
century, and by 700 B.C. Naxos and Syracu.se had been founded.
Corinth was especially prominent in these early western enter-
prises. The emigration to Sicily was large, and the early colonies
were soon able to send out sub-colonies. New settlements were
made in what was later known as Magna Graecia, the most impor-
tant of them being Cumae, Sybaris, Croton, Tarentum, and
Neapolis.i By the middle of the seventh century the growth, pros-
perity, and aggressiveness of the Greek colonies, particularly of
Syracuse, aroused the Phoenicians to their peril, and the struggle
between the rivals began. However, the Greeks were not deterred
by opposition from passing beyond the chief scene of conflict and
founding settlements in the farther West. The most important of
these was Phocaean Massilia (about 600 B.C.), which, with the aid
of the metropolis, proceeded to surround itself with a series of
daughter-settlements located especially on the south-eastern coast
of Spain. 2 The Greeks thus secured the trade of the Gulf of
Lyons and of the Spanish eastern coast, and even opened up
routes for the overland transportation of Gallic and British prod-
ucts. Upon the southern shore of the Mediterranean they like-
wise established themselves in Cyrenaica and Barca, between the
Egyptians and the Carthaginians.
It has been shown how the Carthaginians, called to assume the
headship of a defensive Phoenician league, succeeded in blocking
the hitherto irresistible advance of the Greeks. The details of
this action need scarcely be given, for neither Carthage on the
one hand, nor Syracuse on the other, after this time deserve the
name of colony. No doubt the indefatigable activity of Dionysios I,
had it met with success, would have opened up a broad field for
further Hellenic expansion. And it is not without its significance
that under pressure both Phoenicians and Greeks could cooperate
among themselves for a common end ; Dionysios received aid
from even the old Greek metropolis in his struggles, which shows
that the original bonds had not yet dropped away.'"^ Nevertheless,
interest in the western colonies as colonies can hardly be extended
farther.
^ Cf. Ihne, I, 376 ff. ; Pauly-Wissowa, sttb d-rroiKla ; Hertzberg, pp. 20-80 ; Speck,
II, 168 ff. ; Lindsay, II, 68 ff.
2 For the commercial importance of Marseilles, see Pigeonneau, I, 18 ; Speck, III,
part i, 55 ff. 3 Qn the career of Dionysios, see especially Beloch, II, 155 ff.
46 COLONIZATION
Toward the south and east the Greeks found insuperable obsta-
cles to settlement in the presence of the older empires and their
influence. Even Cyprus was never fully cleared of Phoenicians.
Before Egypt the Greeks first appeared as pirates, later as mer-
cenaries ; and in subsequent times they had factories, with rights
of corporations, at the mouths of the Nile. This acquaintance
with Africa probably suggested the settlement of Cyrenaica, but
has little importance for our subject. Toward the north-east, like-
wise, attention was directed. Greek cities, especially Miletos, early
conceived an interest in the Black and Marmora seas ; of the
former they made, with their many trading-settlements, an " hos-
pitable sea." ^ There was, however, but little colonization in this
region. The configuration of the coast enforced settlement in
localities unprotected by nature from the inroads of barbarian
tribes ; and the Greeks, besides, never cared to dwell permanently
outside of their native vine-and-olive type of physical environment.
The Black Sea stations were not populous, and, for the most part,
discharged the function of supply depots for grain, salt fish, and
other raw products in demand at home. Somewhat the same may
be said of the colonies in the northern /Egean.
If, now, the data of Greek expansion be summed up, " In a
period of two centuries {circa 800-600 B.C.) the Greeks turned
the Ionian Sea, the Propontis, and the Pontus into Greek seas, and
founded settlements in the lands of the Scythians, Thracians,
Italians, Kelts, Iberians, Libyans, and Egyptians. Greek mer-
chants visited the courts of inland kings as far as the great moun-
tain chains of Central Asia, in the Libyan oases of Egypt, the Po
region, and that of Tartessus ^ on the Atlantic Ocean. The nation
outgrew former narrow boundaries ; Greek influence made itself
effective in the whole Mediterranean region ; the Hellenes took
their share in the evolution of the world's history." ^ The process
by which the Greeks spread civilization has already been indicated
in speaking of the Phoenicians and their methods ; but some differ-
ences in results may be seen by noting several characteristic
features in the growth and life of the colonies.
^ n6vTos ED^eiws. It was once called dff os because of the rude tribes which sur-
rounded it; Ei/^eifos may be a euphemism (Liddell & Scott, sub cvfecos).
2 The Phoenician Tarshish, the region about Gades.
'' Speck, 11, 7^-71 ; cf. lUisolt, I, 293 ; Beloch, I, 198. A full list of Creek dn-ot/c/ai
is given under dTrotxta in Tauly-Wissowa. See for exhaustive details Raoul-Rochette.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 47
Character of the Colonies
When Cicero speaks of the Greek colonies forming a "border"
about the seas,^ his expression is descriptive rather than metaphor-
ical ; for the inland penetration of the colonies was very slight.
This was natural enough in the trading-colonies, for commerce, as
well as fishing and mining, affords gains to a limited number
only ; but even the agricultural colonies, or those which later
took on the agricultural type, although they received a large
immigration, remained essentially coast-settlements. The Greeks
never cared to leave the sea and found an inland empire ; perhaps
their greatest inland expansion, if it may be so called, before the
time of Alexander, occurred in Magna Graecia, across the penin-
sula of Italy. The colonial areas varied from four to twenty-four
square miles ; in North Africa they got no farther than eleven or
twelve miles from the sea. It may be judged, therefore, that
Greek influence proceeded but little farther through direct contact
than Phoenician. And in the Greeks' relations to natives, since
they had no "colonial system," variation was the rule — variation
according to the strength and needs of the colonists and the state
of settlement, on the one side, and in view of the military strength
and disposition of the natives on the other. Friction was gener-
ally avoided, and simple relations of trade maintained ; if, however,
the colony received numerous accessions, it made itself mistress,
through force or treachery, of the native peoples.^ These were
destroyed only in desperate cases ; the Greeks preferred to keep
them as slaves, or subjects without rights. Thus the significant
influence of the Greeks upon later civilization was not exercised
through conquest, political or religious, but primarily through the
adaptable instrumentality of exchange. Thus far the cases of
Greek and Phoenician are parallel.
It is noteworthy, however, that the Greeks maintained their
national identity more successfully than did the Phoenicians, and
that they impressed the type of specifically Hellenic civilization
where the Phoenicians spread a less specialized form. This result
is referable partially to the Greek character and partially to the
condition under which colonization took place. For while the
Greeks lusted for gain quite as much as did the Phoenicians, they
1 De Republica, II, chap. iv.
2 Speck, II, 185-186; Busolt, I, 271-272.
48 COLONIZATION
substituted in place of Phoenician adaptability a positive element
of aggressiveness in the retention of their national characteristics.
With all its city-economy, ^ Greece was more of a nation than was
Phoenicia. There was a general loyalt}^ to the Delphic god, who,
it should be noted, relying as he did upon rather full information,^
actively furthered and directed colonization ; and the national
games long formed a tie of an intimate nature. The distinction
between Greek and barbarian was too strongly felt to admit of
systematic neglect, for example, in miscegenation. The barbarians
became Greek less through contact with Greek settlements than
through the dissemination of the Greek tongue and culture — they
became Greek by adoption, not by the infusion of Greek blood .^
And the spirit of Greek institutions and customs was not allowed
to lapse. It has been shown how a colony was modeled through-
out upon its metropolis, and this went so far as to render an oUi-
aT7]ro7ii/ici(ie, see Arnold ; Lewis, pp. 1 1 7 ff .
The provinces form a very suggestive side-study for one interested in the general
question of colonization. As for the cohuiiae, they were, in strictness, only special
parts of \\y&\x provinciae.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 53
function, subordinate up to the time of the Gracchi, of providing
for poorer citizens from whose presence the state desired rehef ;
this function was strongly emphasized by the younger Gracchus,
who wished to reestablish an independent, land-owning peasantry.^
It is clear that such colonization rested upon the family as its
unit, especially as preference is regularly given to prospective
emigrants with families.^ After the Civil Wars the coloniae were
further employed to afford a place of retirement, together with a
sort of pension in land, for the veterans. Not infrequently, in
later times particularly, the distinction between colonia and, for
example, iminicipiuin, became legal or fictitious merely, implying
no vital differences of any kind.^ Thus the term changed during
the life of the Republic and Empire, with the extension of security
of rule in the wake of conquest. But the essential of colonia for
the present purpose is the conception of a garrison-society main-
taining itself by industry, and to a certain extent producing its
kind, on the borders of the empire, and exercising a moral re-
straint rather than an actual coercion upon the surrounding popu-
lation. Of the colonial types hitherto cited it resembles most
closely the Greek cleruchy.^
The foregoing considerations form the justification of the state-
ment that " the area embraced by Roman colonization was co-
extensive with the whole Empire." The first local conquests did
not need colonies to secure them, but a large number were formed
in more distant parts of Italy. A strong indisposition to extend
the system outside of the peninsula was made manifest at the
time of Caius Gracchus ; indeed, the senate was committed to
many steps in the direction of world-dominion before it was well
aware of the fact. But this reluctance was made short work of by
the emperors, who regularly followed up their conquests with the
1 Ihne, IV, 455; V, 394.
"^ Brunialti, p. 26, note. Livy gives the numbers sent to several colonies as 300,
1500, 3000, and even 6000 (IV, 47; VIII, 21; X, i; XXXVII, 57; XL, 26, 34).
The assignments of land ranged from 2 jugera (a superficial measure equivalent to
about one acre and one-quarter) to 140 a head (Id., IV, 47; VIII, 21 ; XL, 26, 34 ;
Brunialti, p. 27).
^ Such were all post-Hadrian colonies, " purely fictitious." Pauly-Wissowa,
"Coloniae"; Lewis, p. 115.
* " The Coloniae were settlements of Roman citizens in Italy, who occupied a con-
quered town, divided the whole or a large part of the lands belonging to its citizens
among themselves, and became the coloni, or cultivators of the lands thus appropri-
ated." Lewis, p. 114. This definition covers mainly the ^^^xXx^x colotiiae.
54 COLONIZATION
founding of colonies.^ The latter varied in number with the tur-
bulence of the locality, were sometimes very prosperous, as in
Africa, and at other times short-lived and unsuccessful, as in
Spain. ^ In the latter country troops had to be assigned for garri-
son-duty year by year.*^ All these colonies, with the provinces
they guarded, were bound closely to Rome both by their interests
and by the presence of relatively complete means of communica-
tion.'* For Rome instinctively created for herself those bonds of
empire for which the less imperial genius of Phoenicia and Greece
had not clearly conceived the necessity ; by her roads Rome held
to herself not only her provinces but her colonies.-''
Under this ever-present domination of the capital, however, the
coloniac remained as they had begun, comparatively devoid of indi-
vidual enterprise, initiative, and character. They had no life of
their own, never conspired against Rome nor asserted independ-
ence. They clung to Rome with a " sort of passive, mechanical
cohesion," ^ even after the imperial government had become weak
and old ; from having been self-governing above other sections of
the empire, they suffered their privileges to lapse in the general
gravitation of power into the hands of a single despot.
But little is known of the internal life of these garrison-colonies,
and that may be summed up by saying that they constituted small
replicas of Rome. Agriculture was practically the only industry.
Miscegenation with natives doubtless occurred, but did not elim-
inate the need of fresh relays of emigrants to keep up the popula-
tion. Theoretically these emigrants did not lose their Roman
civic rights, but in practice such rights, culminating in the fran-
chise, lay dormant. It is certain that as a whole the colonies
possessed no capacities for self-transformation or development into
1 Brodrick, p. 52 ; Arnold, pp. 2-3, 9. For the number of colonies founded at
various periods and by different rulers, see Pauly-Wissowa, sub " Coloniae " ; Brod-
rick, p. 50; Ihne, I, 455, 473, 543, etc.
2 Cf. Martins, Civ. Iber., pp. 14 ff . ; Colmeiro, I, 57 ff.
3 Ihne, III, 373-374-
* The care taken by the Romans to afford material benefits to their colonies is
evidenced, among other things, by ruins of aqueducts, cisterns, etc., in such dry
regions as North Africa. See Brunialti, p. 31, note; p. 32, note. The careful enu-
merations and surveys which formed a part of the founding of the colonii) defined
the holdings of land and titles to it in a most satisfactory manner. It would be
hard to discover another such matured and scientific system until the nineteenth
century.
5 Cf. Arnold, pp. 7, 14 ff. ; Lewis, p. 127 ; Brunialti, p. 31.
•' Brodrick, p. 77.
. COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 55
new states; ^ nor were they able, in the final time of trial, to aid
themselves or Rome in any considerable degree. They were con-
nected with Rome alone, and in a quasi-parasitic relation ; they
existed for her and fell with her ; among themselves they had no
common interests and no fellowship except in their common de-
struction at the hands of the invading races.^ Hence Roman
colonization represents no such grandiose and startling movement
of population and no such generation of new societies as do the
antecedent activities of the Phoenicians and Greeks.
ROMANIZATION : CaSE OF GaUL
In their influence, however, upon the world-to-come the Roman
colonies were far from insignificant. This their effect upon sub-
sequent history was exercised by them rather as expedients in
imperial administration than as colonies pure and simple ; never-
theless it seems desirable briefly to consider this influence, even
though it leads to a certain amount of digression from the subject
in hand. In much later days colonial administration is occasionally
hard to distinguish from imperial administration ; but a suggestion
of the system of which the coloniac formed part cannot fail to cast
light upon their origin and their destiny as instruments in the
spread of culture. It is in order, then, to show the methods of
the Romans in dealing with and modifying subject peoples ; and
for this purpose it has seemed best to single out a particular
people, the Gauls. ^ For while the activity of the Romans in Gaul
may not be absolutely typical of them in the capacity now under
consideration, it is sufficiently so for the present purpose ; and it
is the more in point because of its pervasive and enduring influ-
ence upon the disposition and tendencies of several peoples with
whom any complete study of colonization must deal. Like the
^ The coloniae conserved the form into which they were originally molded ; they
preserved what was distinctively Roman when Rome itself was " Roman " no longer.
Pauly-Wissowa, sub " Coloniae." By way of comparison with the relations of Greek
colonies to the metropolis, Brodrick's remark (p. 68) is apt : " The despotic character
of the relation between father and son, as defined by the Roman jurisprudence, was
amply realized in that between Rome and her colonies." Cf. Ihne, I, 413-414 ;
Lewis, pp. 1 1 6-1 17. - Brodrick, pp. 77-82.
3 Most of what follows on Gaul is derived from Fustel de Coulanges. The atti-
tude of this author is pro-Roman, but his conclusions as here cited seem amply sup-
ported over a wide range of scholarship. His views find a rather more popular
presentation in De Saussure's chapter on Roman Gaul. Cf, Brodrick, pp. 51-52.
56 COLONIZATION
Phoenician and the Greek, the Roman left his stamp unmistakable
upon the rising races of his time ; but it was impressed through
agencies widely diverging from those of his predecessors.
It was a primary and vital condition of the Gallic conquest and
subsequent history that the Gauls did not conceive the Romans to
be enemies of their race. The sentiment of race-diversity was
vague in those days, and what little there was in evidence was not
accentuated and perpetuated by any marked external distinctions,
such as were familiar in the ages succeeding the discovery of new
worlds and races. Nor did the Gauls regard the Romans as ene-
mies of their country, in the modern sense. There was no Gallic
state, no national feeling ; all was turmoil and encroachment of
neighbor on neighbor, to say nothing of threatened irruption from
the north. Hence the dominion of those who could guarantee
security and peace, as it became better known, was accepted rather
than repelled ; subjugated on one side, the Gauls were freed on
the other. The conquest, so far as fighting went, occupied but
a few years, and did not degenerate into the petty but endless
guerrilla warfare to which an irreconcilable people takes recourse.
There were therefore no vital difficulties in the way of extension
of Roman rule. Not only this, but, because they wished simply
to govern, the Romans systematically escaped the consequences
of an interfering and meddlesome policy.^ "Assimilation" of the
conquered district to the metropolitan model was an idea foreign
to the ancients. Hence Gaul was not crushed by the conquest
and its sequel, nor were the Gauls reduced to servitude ; they
retained, with few exceptions, their civil liberty, internal organ-
ization, traditions, and habitudes. Most men of narrow horizon
perceived no great change in their existence as a consequence of
the conquest. If the Gauls had to pay taxes and furnish soldiers,
that was nothing new to them ; and discharging these obligations to
the Romans, they were sure of the return they desired, — security
1 The actuality of rule was preferred to its name, and consequent ostentation.
Bordier (p. 165) quotes the Roman maxim in reference to colonies, " Non tarn
regendae sunt quam colendae " ; adding, " Ce ne sont pas les lois qu'il nous faut,
disent les colonies, ce sont les bras ! " It must be understood, however, that the
Roman citizens were those who profited most largely in a material way from the
development of Gaul, receiving almost all the concessions, commercial privileges,
etc. The great and rapid development of the country proves conclusively that the
activity of the latter, even though often oppressive, was, conjoined with the advan-
tages of Roman rule, a favorable factor. Pigeonneau, I, 22 ff., 29 ff.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 57
and peace. The "Pax Romana " was something for which the
provinces could afford to pay dearly, as is proved by their pros-
perity, even under the exactions of Roman rule in the hands of
certain unscrupulous functionaries.
The Roman system of dealing with subject races was one of
non-disturbance ; such changes only were made in local forms as
were necessary to complete subordination.^ Even the exercise of
sovereignty was mild, and it impinged upon the common people
through old and familiar channels. In the case of Gaul, the country
was, if not subjected, certainly administered and developed through
the Gauls, somewhat as India has been through the Hindus ; for
with few exceptions the Gauls were left to themselves, and it is an
evidence of their satisfaction with their destiny that they did not
care to be free. Indeed, the "assimilation" policy originated in
the subject people itself, starting with the richest and noblest
families and working on through the population. The people passed
with no great difficulties or throes from the state of subjection to
that of citizenship. They became attached to Rome as to a native
land ; and their union with her was broken not by themselves but
by another race. If Gaul was transformed from her former state,
it was the will of the Gauls rather than of the Romans that this came
to pass. Here again, then, as in the cases of the Phoenician and
Greek colonization, we are drawn to note the absence of any pre-
conceived ideal or " mission"; differing from their predecessors in
many and characteristic respects, the Romans were one with them
in the practicality of the ends which they set before themselves.
The results were of far-reaching and wholesome effect in the one
case as in the other. ^ For, as a matter of fact, as members of the
Empire the Gauls renounced in favor of Roman characters most of
1 Lewis, p. 119. Judjea, says this autlior (p. 120), presents a "lively image of the
continuance of the peculiar laws and religious usages of a Roman dependency outside
of Italy."
2 Language and religion were respected, but the needs of trade, etc., brought about
a use of Latin even among the higher classes of Carthage, however much the lower
classes clung to their gods and native tongue. Rome did not try to modify everything
by a sweeping tabula rasa, but altered the present and prepared for the future.
Brunialti, p. 31, note, quoting from J. Toutain, Le citta romane della Tunisia (French),
Paris, 1896. Pliny (Hist. Nat., Ill, v) says of Rome: "... terra omnium terrarum
alumna eadem et parens numine deum electa quae caelum ipsum clarius faceret, sparsa
congregaret inperia, ritusque molliret, et tot populorum discordes ferasque linguas,
sermonis commercio contraheret, coUoquia et humanitatem homini daret, breviterque,
una cunctorum gentium in toto orbe patria fieret." Cf. De Saussure, pp. 268-269;
Van der Aa, De GiJs, i860, I, 833-834.
^8 COLONIZATION
those national characteristics which race-educators have desired to
remove or change ; rehgion, language, law, customs, even names,
were remodeled after or directly replaced by the Roman forms.
The popular religion w^as not essentially different from that of
Rome; Gaul not only adopted Roman gods, rituals, etc., but,
following Rome's example, those of other Mediterranean nations
as well. Druidism was, indeed, uprooted and proscribed, but it
was hardly a genuine Gallic form. As for the Gallic language, it
scarcely appears after the first century a.d. Rome never fought
the Gallic tongue ; in fact, the change in language was less a
consequence of conquest than of an altered social status. The
Gauls took up Latin " because they found interest, profit, and pleas-
ure in its adoption." For their new and advanced status of culture
Gallic was insufficient ; it lacked terms corresponding to the things
and ideas of a changed order. Latin was from the first, of course,
the official tongue, and as the Gauls gradually entered into the
empire as an integral and patriotic constituency, they naturally
adopted the traditional speech of the Roman citizen. There is here
afforded a case of the prevalence of that language which suits the
situation over one which is spoken by the majority of the group.
In the matter of law the same gradual but sweeping change took
place. After the conquest the Gauls retained their own law ;
the Romans, through the suppression of the Druids, simply replaced
a sacerdotal with a lay justice, and a rigid and unmodifiable system,
rooted in religion and ancestral custom, with one capable of con-
sistent adaptation in the interests of the community. The Gauls
were quick to perceive the advantages of security of individual
property, freedom of contract, and, above all, of the impartial pro-
tection of all classes, which, under the Roman law, succeeded their
own system of clientage, debt-slavery, etc. The capricious Druid
justice was gone, and in its place was the responsible, reasonable,
and accessible system of Rome, with its unheard-of right of appeal
to governor, senate, and emperor. And when, by a natural process,
the Gauls had entered the ranks of the Roman citizens, their own
legal forms were already things of the past. But it should be noted
that for two centuries and a half no constraint was laid upon them
to become citizens ; here again they were the seekers and not the
sought. And the like is true when we consider the alterations
which took place in the more general customs and habitudes of the
subject people. They speedily renounced their hitherto proverbial
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 59
warlike habits and disposition, and adopted the usages, mode of
existence, and even the tastes of the Romans. They imitated them
in such important activities as road construction, and freely built
schools where Latin and Greek should be taught. The whole
political education of the land was derived from Roman sources :
a national political and religious unity was formed, and a compact
and centralized government became traditional. This centralization
was not attained, however, at the expense of local freedom ; for
the cities administered themselves, and their councils were even
able to exert a certain controlling influence over the proconsuls
and governors.
The function of the colonies in the dissemination of Roman
ideas and customs has already been noticed ; they were responsible
in no slight degree for the transformations just described.^ But
these transformations, it should be clearly apprehended, were not
a matter of racial mixture. From Gaul, for example, there was
practically no emigration, permanent or temporary, to Italy, and
but few Italians were introduced into this country through the
colonies. If these intermarried, the Roman strain and traditions,
passed on thus family-wise, could not have left much trace upon
the population. The colonists, here, as elsewhere, were often of
races other than the Roman ; and the functionaries did not care
to establish themselves away from Rome, the great center of
interests and careers. It was, therefore, neither the blood of the
Romans nor their will and policy which produced the far-reaching
changes whose result was the impressing on the western world,
through the elevation of the backward peoples, of a sort of homo-
geneous stamp. It was the attraction of superiorities in the prac-
tical ordering of individual and communal life, — superiorities that
were not heralded to others nor forced upon their attention, but
which were self-evident. And here reflection returns to that vital
condition of Roman influence upon subject peoples, — the absence
of wide racial diversity in these ancient times. The superiorities of
Roman ideas and systems were self-evident because the grades
of civilization were not so distant one from another as to prevent
easy passage from the lower to the higher. This was particularly
noteworthy in respect to Gaul, but not untrue in the case of other
1 " All that was valuable in the Roman Empire, transmitted through the colonies
whole and entire, has long since been encorporated into the social life of modern
Europe." Brodrick, p. 85 ; cf. Arnold, pp. 21, 45 ff.
6o COLONIZATION
lands. It is said that Rome succeeded better with races inferior in
civiHzation to herself than with her equals or superiors. ^ What she
would have done with a complex of races such as are represented
within the British Empire we cannot know ; her experiences in
Africa held no great promise. But the essential factor in her
influence on the world, as in that of the Phoenicians and Greeks,
was the relatively high quality and remarkable potentiality of the
civilizations with which she came into effective contact. And into
this momentous work the coloniae entered as examples and nuclei
of Roman civilization among ruder peoples ; their importance is
correspondingly great in the history of the contact of races
through colonization.
MEDIEVAL ITALIAN COLONIES
The troubled course of events which preceded and accompanied
the dissolution of the Roman Empire was such as to preclude
both state-directed colonization and that which takes its origin in
individual initiative. Imperial colonization had, of course, reached
its end together with the expansive power of the Empire, and
could not reappear. The next series of social phenomena to which
the name colonization may apply was almost purely commercial,
and was connected in no slight degree with the great reactionary
movement from west to east represented, among other results, by
the Crusades.2 Hitherto the general rule had been that the East
should seek the West, resorting thither as the carrier of its own
civilization ; but when, in consequence of the great changes of the
early Middle Ages, the East retired into itself and ceased to mani-
fest the active initiative of former times, the hitherto relatively pas-
sive West began to reach out on its own account for that of which
it now felt the lack.^ Naturally enough this effort was directed at
first along commercial lines ; from the tenth century on through
the Discoveries period the attention of the West was regularly
and continuously directed toward the East, and finally toward
that vicarious and, a*s it were, accidentally substituted East
represented by America.
1 Arnold, Introduction.
2 The following is written mainly from Cibrario, Heyd, Prutz, Pigeonneau, and
Sumner. Brunialti covers the period in an interesting chapter leased largely upon
Heyd.
2 For the articles of mediaeval commerce, see, besides Heyd, Pigeonneau, I, chap,
iv ; Cibrario, III, chap. ix.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 6 1.
The Mediterranean was, naturally enough, the theater of action
for many decades ; and in view of Italy's central and commanding
position, it is not surprising to find the eastern movement most
strikingly developed in that country. The desire for the charac-
teristic products of the East, stimulated under the Empire, mani-
fested itself anew with the relative emergence of the West from a
period of turmoil and confusion ; but the agency through which
these products were transported, changed. During the early Middle
Ages the trade-routes toward the East remained practically the
same as those in use under the Empire ; but it suited the policy
and pride of Byzantium to renounce the intermediary function and
to force the westerners to acknowledge her commercial predomi-
nance by personal suit for the commercial favors which they
desired.^ This policy, like that later developed at Lisbon, was
well calculated to raise up strong rivals, and amounted in the end
to an abdication of the leading position which it was desired to
hold. Of the diminutive city-republics which at this time flourished
in Italy, Amalfi was the first to bridge over a gap thus widening
between West and East ; the trade of the Amalfitans with the
Levant began in the tenth century, or earlier ; and they were
followed by the Venetians, and somewhat later by the Genoese,
Pisans, and others. The activities of these four cities in the Levant
were practically identical, but the historical importance of the
Venetian and Genoese factories and colonies so far outweighs that
of the Amalfitan and Pisan settlements that the latter may be ex-
cluded from more than casual mention, as may also, for the same
reason, those of the Florentines, Sienese, Provencals, and Spanish.^
Settlement in the Levant : Motives and Extent
It has been suggested that the activities of the westerners were
motived almost wholly by the prospect of commercial gain. The
Italian settlements were at the outset trading-posts or factories of
an almost pure type. In those days of undeveloped means of
communication it was necessary for a merchant to go in person to
the scene of his operations, and generally to remain there for a
protracted period. Although protected by treaties with native
1 Heyd, I, 64-65.
2 Details in Heyd, I, 105 ff. et passim ; Lindsay, I, 232 £f., 473 ff., 522 ff. ; Wappaus,
I, 118 ff. ; on tlae mercantile activities of the mediaeval Jews, see Heyd, I, pp. 139 ff-
For the French merchants of the Middle Ages, see Pigeonneau, I, chap. iv.
62 COLONIZATION
rulers, considerations of safety led such traders to cleave together ;
they even went so far as to have a military organization and de-
fensive structures in those city-quarters in which their commer-
cial purposes favored settlement. Under these circumstances the
trading-colony was not infrequently tempted to a display of force
in conquest. These two motives, the predominant one of trade
and the derived one of conquest, lay at the bottom of Italian
colonization in the Levant ; other stock motives play but a small
part in its inception and history.
The internal development of the Italian city-states brought it
about that Venice should earliest attain a degree of political coher-
ence which justified and rendered possible the turning of attention
without. This advantage in time was augmented by the favorable
geographical and topographical conditions which early assured her
of safety from aggression and of a picked population of desirable
refugees, together with the further advantage of relative nearness
to the East. Some time before the Crusades the Venetians had
already attained many grants in reward of aid lent to the Emperor
of the East against the Saracens ; their settlements came early to
be regarded by him as those of allies rather than subjects. Ofie
of the earliest of these was in Byzantium, but from this central
point they were scattered throughout the country, forming the
outlines of a real " maritime empire." ^ Their influence was so
strong that the emperor excluded from his domains any nation
with which they were at war, thus considerably hampering the
early operations of the Genoese and Pisans.
The latter competitors were later in the field, for they attained
the requisite internal unity and organization only shortly before the
Crusades. But such was the energy of the Genoese that they were
not far behind their older rivals in sharing the gains of this great
movement of peoples.''^ It was only with the Crusades, indeed, that
the opportunity came to them both to found the characteristic
Italian colony in the Levant ; their timely and indispensable, if
not disinterested,^ services during the early Crusades enabled them
1 Ileyd, I, i2off.; Brunialti, p. 41; Cibrario, III, 275; Wappiius, I, iiSff.;
Sumner, Lectures.
2 Cibrario, III, 278 ff. ; Prutz, p. 377.
3 The Crusaders and their trappings were the Italians' '• back -freight." Sumner ; cf.
Ileyd, I, 145 ff. " Pardessus observes that in reading the history of the period of the
Crusades, any one would suppose that these expeditions were made merely to promote
and extend their [tlie Italians'] commerce." Lindsay, I, 473.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 63
to acquire wide and practically sovereign areas and rights in the
most important trading-centers of the land of commercial, as well
as of other, promise. To Venice, for instance, was granted as
much as a third of such important cities as Tyre (capitulated 1 124)
and Sidon, to say nothing of extensive rights in Jerusalem, where,
in consequence of many pilgrimages, business was very profitable.
Even greater concessions were gained by the Venetians after
the capture of Constantinople (1204), undertaken largely at their
own instance as creditors for transportation services, and at which
they assisted ; the removal of the Doge to this station as a center
of empire was at one time considered. Their ambition extended to
the exploitation of the ^gean Islands and, in 1395, even to the
seizure of Athens and Thessalonica ; and their trading-settlements
were gradually extended along the shores of the Black Sea.^ They
were well received in Egypt, Tunis, and Tripoli, and established
regular lines of navigation to these coasts ; through the Barbary
settlements they were enabled also to share to some extent in the
commerce of interior Africa. The Genoese and Pisans were at
first mere novices, where the Venetians were masters ; but the
Genoese were not contented to follow afar off, and, after acquiring
a commercial colony in Constantinople (11 55), had speedily risen
to be deadly and dangerous rivals for the monopoly hitherto enjoyed
by their predecessors. For the strains of this great conflict the
forces of the Amalfitans and Pisans were insufificient.
Character of the Fondachi
Such was the general field covered by the Italian factories. Had
they remained factories merely, they could have but little im-
portance for the subject in hand ; and they might have retained
a more rudimentary form had it not been for the Crusades. The
results of these quasi-migrations which concern this immediate
contention were the presence of a large, if unstable, European
population in the East, and, especially in the Holy Land, the sub-
stitution of political, legal, and other conditions modeled upon
familiar European patterns for the more unfamiliar and difficult
1 Canestrini, II Mar Nero, etc., covers mainly the local Genoese colonies, — their
government and legislation, products and commercial policy, decadence and fall.
Cf. Wappaus, I, 183 ff.
64 COLONIZATION
Mohammedan systems. The East was no longer a foreign country ;
it was a complex of European nationalities, and a favorable ground
for the development of security-loving trade. ^ Hence the Italian
factories, through the presence of a considerable population, includ-
ing whole families, became real Italian settlements ; and the per-
sistence of close, strong, and partisan relations between the several
Venetian, Genoese, and other settlements and their respective
cities of origin, formed the ties which bound together two real,
even though diminutive, colonial empires.
In accordance with the terms of their treaties with eastern
rulers, and grants from them, the citizens of the several Italian
republics were assigned to different quarters in the cities of the
Levant. Here was erected a warehouse, or fo}idaco,'^\\\nQ\\, in the
smaller settlements, was likewise the courthouse, dwelling-house,
and inn. The quarters were sometimes much more extensive,
including a whole street or several streets, with official and
private buildings, warehouses and salesrooms, churches, mills,
slaughter-houses, baths, etc.^ Venice is said at one time to have
had fondachi in all the cities of importance in the Eastern Empire.
But the life of the colonies was not always strictly confined to the
cities ; when they received, for instance from the Crusaders, a
concession of one-third of a city, they likewise acquired claims on
one-third of the surrounding land for a mile out. The larger of
these domains were under the charge of overseers ; in Syria the
peasants did most of the cultivating, on shares, where their remu-
neration appears to have been a generous one (two-thirds to three-
quarters of the product).^
The relation of the Italian communes, as they were called, to the
dominant power of the region in which they were established, was
an extremely independent one. They were states within states ;
v/ere regularly exempt from the payment of full taxes, and often
made no contribution whatsoever. Indeed, it was not uncommonly
the case that they received a considerable share in the revenue of
their cities, so that in the event of the local preponderance of one
Italian city, another might be paying tribute to it. In the Holy
1 Heyd, I, i8o.
2 From the hx2M\cfunduk = Greek tra-vhoKitov (or Trdi/So/cos). See especially Simons-
feld, II, 3 ff.
* See Heyd, I, 167 ff., 445 ff. ; II, 430 ff. A community of such relative magnitude
was called a ruga or viciis.
•» Heyd, I, lyoff. ; Prutz, pp. 377 ff.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 65
Land during the domination of the Crusaders ^ the communes owed
no feudal obligations and existed as equal and generally self-suffi-
cient powers. During the period of their prosperity the colonies
were relatively uncontrolled by the local governments, a fact which
will emerge the more clearly from a consideration of their internal
administration and relations to their cities of origin.
Relation of Colony and Metropolis
The influence of the metropolis was from the first supreme.
The original grants and privileges were obtained by the mother-
city, often as the rewards of considerable military and naval
activity and expense ; the buildings were erected at public and
not private cost ; the trade of the colonies was manipulated for
the advantage of the metropolis. The colonies were treated as a
piece of external domain ; it was only at first that they elected
their own head-men ; as the factory grew into a colony, the magis-
trates were regularly appointed by the home-authorities. These
officials were called at first vice-cotnites, later consoli {Genoese and
Pisans) and baili (Venetians). In earlier times each colony had its
supervisor ; later a consul, or bailo^ residing in the chief center
of trade, was appointed for an entire region or country. After
the capture of Constantinople, in which the Venetians afforded the
Crusaders indispensable aid, the chief Venetian official of the
region became tho, podestd, with the rank of despot or prince, and
with a very high power delegated in the name and commission of
the Doge. These vicegerents were chosen for a specified time and
given complete instructions, the central power to which they were
responsible, in the case of the Venetians, being the three consoli
1 De Lanessan (p. 13) says that the Crusades were nothing but tentatives at the
colonization of Syria, rendered unfruitful by climate, difficulties of communication,
etc. Prutz (pp. 1-5) compares them with the operations of Alexander the Great.
The religious and mystic elements which surround these enterprises should not blind
us to their essentially worldly and economic character ; nor is the comparison of the
Crusader-states and the Italian communes without great value for the understanding
of the latter. Nevertheless, there appears to be good reason for regarding these
adventures as constituting a case of conquest rather than colonization ; the relation
of the Syrian governments to any possible metropolis or metropolitan complex (i.e.
Christian Europe) is too vague to justify the use of the term "colony," even in a
loose sense. Certain phenomena aptly bearing on the effects of a changed environment
and the contact of races tempt one to include these curious settlements and govern-
ments; but for the same reason one might well include migration or conquest in
general. See, for details, Prutz, especially pp. 1-32, 89-181, 314-354, 396-415.
66 COLONIZATION
dei incrcanti, by whose general supervision a marked unity of policy
was effected. This body was a sort of prototype of later Boards
of Trade. ^ The post of consul, or bailo, was one of great honor and
responsibility; in the lists of the baili oi Syria occur many famous
Venetian names.^
A large part of the official responsibility granted to local direc-
tors was due to the impossibility of receiving instructions from the
metropolis at all times. To somewhat neutralize the personal
power which attended such independence of function the governors
were provided with counselors or councils without whose knowledge
they should not act. Thus the superior officers, whatever their
title, remained at least nominally subordinated to and controlled
by the metropolitan government. The laws of the metropolis
were, in addition, carried over with little alteration to the colonics.
The communes administered their own justice, and their exterri-
toriality sometimes went so far as practically to disallow the author-
ity of the former ruler of the district. Appeal could be made from
an inferior officer to the bailo, and through him to the highest author-
ities at home. They were able to lay taxes, e.g. on industries, and
sometimes, as has been mentioned, enjoyed large revenues from
their share in public income. Because of this, and the fact that
they were enabled to raise most of their own food, they were much
less dependent upon European importation than, for instance, the
Crusader-states.
Monopoly Policy and Trade Wars
The temper of the communes was in consequence extremely
free and independent respecting local control ; they even insisted
upon having their own clergy, from their own cities of origin.
Their sense of nationality was very pronounced, not to say assertive ;
they stubbornly and successfully resisted the attempts of the
1 Casa da India, Casa de Contrataciim, etc. Cf. p. 228, below. As this volume
does not pretend to follow the derivation of institutions, it is possible on occasion
simply to hint at or suggest accepted or probable prototypes or aftertypes.
2 Heyd, pp. 176 ff., 282 ff., 317 ff.; Brunialti, pp.44, 59 ff- ; Prutz, pp. 384 ff. The
Officium Gazariae discharged the regulating fun'-tion from Genoa to her colonies.
Cibrario, pp. 292 ff. Many of the governmental measures regarding trade, such as
the detailed directions given to ship captains (the keeping of the fleets together,
etc.), foreshadow the policy of the later commercial and colonial powers. Cf. Brown,
pp. 277-278; note, p. 71, below.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 67
Crusader-rulers to lay hands upon the administration of justice, or,
indeed, to direct the least important parts of their lives. They
formed an element totally incongruous amidst the feudal regime
of the knights and orders. They were in, but not of, the Crusades ;
after the acquisition of their privileges they took little part in
succeeding wars against the Mohammedans. They exhibited no
religious enthusiasm and but little of the intolerance and narrow-
ness of the Crusaders ; for their commercial motive was their
strength. They were prudent and farsighted in trade, zealous for
the interest of their several states, steadfast for their rights, and
moderate in their living, — all of which made life in the East
easier for them, as compared, for instance, with the ill-living
Crusaders. They utilized their exceptional advantages to the
utmost and profited accordingly. The exclusively commercial pre-
occupation was likewise, however, their weakness. Their policy
was one of closed monopoly and " secret commerce " ; all com-
mercial operations were veiled in the deepest mystery, and the
exposure of trade-secrets was severely punished.^ Their trade-
envy and insatiable greed led to recurrent, if not constant, and
always savage, feuds with the Crusaders and with each other, by
which the enemies of Christendom profited. The victories of these
enemies caused a shifting of the trading-centers toward the end of
the tljirteenth century from Syria to Cyprus and Lesser Armenia.^
One great object and ideal, above all, lay before the Venetians
and Genoese, — that of trade-monopoly, implying the ruthless
exclusion or destruction of all competition. The pursuit of this
policy naturally brought the Italians into conflict with the authori-
ties in the Levant and with each other ; the history of the colonies
in Constantinople and elsewhere, to the very end of their existence,
is one of intrigues, expulsions or massacres, and restorations, to
say nothing of mutual friction and bloody wars. In the desperate
struggles for the creation and maintenance of monopoly, Amalfitan
hopes were early crushed, and the role of Pisa was cut short. The
details of the fierce colonial wars of Genoa and Venice do not
especially concern us ; on the whole, Venice seems to have emerged
with a residuum of advantage over her great rival, but not with
1 Cf. Hunter, I, 218, 220; Sumner, Lectures.
2 Heyd, I, 2i6ff. ; II, 3. For the relations with the Crusader-states, see especially
Prutz, p]). 377 ff. An interesting account of " Christian and Infidel in the Holy Land"
is given by Munro.
68 COLONIZATION
the power to crush her. But the essential bearing of this condition
of affairs lies in its fatal effect upon the colonies themselve s ; for
not only were they crippled and sometimes prostrated durimg the
periods when conditions promised rich rewards to cominercial
activity, but they could in the end offer no unified resistance to
the advancing Turks. Behind the trade-hostility there lay alsc? fj
political hostility of city against city in Italy itself. Here agai-n,
as amongst the Phoenicians and Greeks, we have a city-economy, —
a too small and restricted metropolitan unit. Political control was
indeed extended over the persons and interests of subjects in
foreign parts, such as neither Phoenician nor Greek had been able
to encompass, but upon a scale insufficient for the erection of any
considerable empire. The parent society, taken as a city-republic,
was too small, and the complex of city-republics was so unhomo-
geneous as to refuse to cohere even in the face of destruction.
The Venetians and Genoese allied themselves even with Spaniard
and Ottoman ^ in order to prevail one over the other. When, now,
the Turks took Constantinople (1453), and began to extend their
conquests toward Egypt, the several Italian colonies were unable
to make an effective resistance. Payment of tribute was their
only safety ; all their old preferential treatment was reversed in
favor of taxation to the limit of endurance. Certain ostensibly
favorable agreements were drawn up, but the rude and brutal
invaders paid but little heed to them ; the usual contempt of a
warlike people for an industrial and commercial one was exhibited
in an extreme form. The duties of consul became difficult and
even dangerous ; the Italians fervently wished the Greeks back
in power.
Decline before the Turks
The gradual extension of Turkish conquests brought on actual
war with Venice, which led (1479) to considerable losses of terri-
tory on the part of the latter. Individual traders suffered severely ;
many Venetians had been seized and imprisoned and much property
arbitrarily confiscated. The Constantinople colony dwindled under
such adverse circumstances and presently disappeared in conse-
quence of another war. By 1 500 but few of the eastern possessions
1 Hrunialti, p. 46.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 69
of Venice and Genoa remained ; the Black Sea colonies also dis-
appeared under incursions of the Tatars and in consequence of
the fall of Constantinople. The last great blow in the East was
the Turkish conquest of Egypt (15 17), followed by the disappear-
ance of the fondachi and colonies in that country, upon which the
last hope depended. Cyprus held out till 1570, and then it, too,
was swept under by the wave of barbarism. In none of these
cases were the Italian cities or colonies of material aid one to
another.^
The colonies were gone, but not even ut extremis was the trade-
monopoly given up or modified. The Venetians struggled tena-
ciously for many decades against the inevitable. But by their very
policy and its accentuation they had invited rivals into the field ;
the artificially elevated prices, in Europe, of the products of the
East stimulated the western nations to repeated attacks upon
the monopoly system. As long as the Mediterranean remained the
center of activities, such efforts were of little avail against the
preponderant maritime power of the Venetians.^ But the center
of trade was moving inevitably westward, and deserting a " thalas-
sic " for an " oceanic " field. When, therefore, at the end of the
fifteenth century both Portuguese and Spaniards broke through
the cordon of restrictions by their discovery of independent and
uncontrollable routes to new regions of supply, the supremacy of
the Venetians was already obsolescent and doomed. In spite of the
utmost efforts of the Venetians to demonstrate to the Turks
the advantage and necessity of reasonably low transit dues and
taxes, the latter, taking counsel of greed and ignorant lack of
foresight, refused to be persuaded. The situation from the com-
mercial standpoint became desperate, and in i 504 the Italians con-
templated even the project of piercing the Isthmus of Suez, an
undertaking beyond the possibilities of the age. The attempt to
utilize more tortuous land-and-river routes to the Indies also proved
1 Details in Ileyd, I, 383 «-, 445 «• ; H, i58ff., 257 ff., 313 ff., 381 ff., 427 ff., 505 ff.
This book is by far the best authority for the period it covers ; especial attention is
here drawn to Anhange I and II of Vol. II, which deal with the various products
derived from the East, and their destinations.
2 For some data on the maritime power of Venice, see Cibrario, III, 277 ff. He
quotes (p. 277) Marin Sanuto, who assigns to Venice in the fifteenth century 36,000
sailors, 16,000 workers in the arsenals, and 3300 ships in commission (jiiro). For the
commercial wealth of Venice, see Lindsay's figures (I, 4S0-481). Brown (p. 278)
quotes an estimate of the annual revenue of Venice in 1500 as amounting to 1,145,580
ducats. Cf. Wappaus, I, 240, 262 ff., 317 ff.
70 COLONIZATION
impracticable,^ and it was only through the inertia of custom and
habit that a temporary respite from the inevitable was rendered
possible. By a timely realization of changed conditions and by
submission to them, Venice might have long retained a secondary
importance in the commerce of the new period ; but the old spirit
of haughtiness and selfishness had persisted, and brought on the
end the more speedily.
Italian Influences upon Later Ages
The significance of the Italians and their colonies during the
Middle Ages was in many respects analogous to that of the Phoeni-
cians and Greeks in ancient times. They transported the products
and ideas of civilization from East to West, and thereby uncon-
sciously educated the westerners to a civilization which they could
have evolved independently only through the lapse of ages. They
likewise engaged to no small extent in the slave-trade, an activity
whose results for the spread of civilization have already been pointed
out in the case of the Phoenicians. Their function was not so vital
as that of their early predecessors, for the seed had been long sown,
and in addition the crusading movements had effected a certain
contact of West with East ; ^ but they nevertheless bridged over
the chasm between the Occident and the Levant long before the
Crusades, and they maintained such connection when protracted
estrangement was threatened, and when degeneration might easily
have taken place. But when the Italians' activity was waning, the
West was ready to take its fate in its own hands, since it had
acquired confidence in the effectiveness of its own initiative. It is
not necessary to rehearse the details of this educative process, for
they were analogous to those of preceding ages ; but a word may
be given to the commercial example of the Italians, so faithfully
copied and maintained by the nations of the West.^
^ The final struggles of the Venetians are treated briefly in Erunialti, capo iv,
pp. 84 ff. The Venetians had an idea that the Cape-route trade would not last ; that
the Sultan would be obliged to lower duties and then their old trade would return.
Sumner, Lectures.
^ This contact was not exclusively beneficial, of course. Among other eastern
products the plague is thought by some to have been transferred directly through the
agency of the Crusades. Bordier, Geographie medicale, p. 256.
8 The best presentation of this phase of the subject known to the autlior is that
formerly given by Professor Sumner in unpublished lectures on "The Industrial
Revolution of the Renaissance Period."
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 71
During and after the Crusades, in operations which demanded
the movement of much capital, the Italians were led to the inven-
tion or practical application of many new and economical com-
mercial devices, among them the bill of exchange, letter of credit,
and other banking and credit devices.^ Money, interest, specula-
tion, and like topics occupied much of their attention, and practi-
cal api^lications along these lines did a good deal to break down
bigoted mediaeval notions derived from the intuitions and deduc-
tions of ecclesiastical visionaries. But the characteristically short-
sighted ideas and practices connected with the maintenance of
monopoly constituted, to its misfortune, a large part of the herit-
age from these talented peoples to the modern world. Many of
the dog-mas and doctrines later known under the collective name
of the Mercantile System were original, as far as effective applica-
tion goes, with Venice and Genoa. Because of admiration and
emulation of Italian successes, these were eagerly adopted, and
have persisted in force or as survivals down to the present day.
It has already been mentioned that the colony was utilized strictly
for the benefit of the metropolis, and to provide her not only with
regions of active demand and supply, but with a profitable carry-
ing and transfer trade. This trade was regulated in the most
minute and arbitrary fashion ; ^ for Venice insisted upon retaining
for herself the so-called " active " as distinguished from " passive "
commerce. The regulations, for example, to which traders of other
nations living in Venice were obliged to conform, were no less than
tyrannical as viewed from the standpoint of the present day.^ In
short, an unremitting and tireless effort was put forth to limit the
movements of commerce and to confine the action of the great
forces of exchange within local and selected channels.
One of the commercial expedients of the period under examina-
tion deserves special notice as the forerunner of many a grandiose
enterprise of later times, — the joint-stock company with rights
of sovereignty, that is, the prototype of the later chartered
companies.* Amidst the strife of parties in Genoa, in the middle
1 See Pigeonneau, I, 253 ff, 278 ff; Cibrario, III, 306 ff ; Prutz, pp. 362 ff.
2 Officers were required to take oath to obey instructions. Their routes were
minutely prescribed, size of anchors and quaUty of rope scrutinized, etc. The ships
were to stick together, refit at prescribed ports, etc. These vessels were, of course,
convertible into men-of-war. Brown, pp. 277-278. ^ See Simonsfeld, /^j-j/'/w.
* Hopf, in Ersch und Gruber's Encyclopadie, Part LXVIII, 308 ff., stib " Giusti-
niani"; see also Heyd, I, 509, 542 ff.
72 COLONIZATION
of the fourteenth century, it became necessary for the city to
depend for its defense upon the efforts and capital of private
persons. The latter were then allowed to farm certain revenues
and to make any conquests they pleased until fully indemnified.
The body of citizens who stopped the breach for the city were
called Mahonenses, and the body into which they organized them-
selves Mahona, or Maona. The fleet raised by the Mahonenses
sailed off to the east to protect the Genoese colonies in 1346, and
in pursuance of their purposes of self-indemnification seized Chios
from the Greeks and Phocsea from the Turks. Complaints to the
Genoese government were met by a disclaimer of responsibility.
And yet Genoa was to have complete jurisdiction over these
acquisitions ; though the profits were to go to the 29 Mahonenses
for 20 years, the city could obtain full sovereignty by completing
the indemnification within that period. By a treaty of 1363 with
John Palaeologus the Greek claims to Chios were renounced in re-
turn for tribute. The Maona was a real joint-stock company, and
the shares were salable; by 1358 Chios belonged to eight men,
only one of whom had been a member of the first company. When
in 15 10 the republic proposed to pay off its indebtedness, the com-
pany protested, and was finally for a consideration left in possession.
They retained the island of Chios (chiefly valuable for its mastic)
until, falling into arrears in their tribute, they lost it to the Turks ;
in 1588 the republic disclaimed to the Sultan all responsibility for
the Maona. Claims for compensation were lodged against Genoa
by the representatives of the Maona as late as 1805.
This instance is noteworthy in that it exhibits with especial
clearness the function of the chartered company as a substitute
for or a concealing medium of state action. It thus offers an
anticipation of a phase of the chartered company most clearly
exhibited in the resurrected type of recent decades, — a prototype
in a sufficiently elaborated state to challenge comparison and
suggest principles.
Whatever may be said of the influence of the Italians on the
later world, it should be noted yet again that it was exercised with-
out direct policy or intent. Although nominally participators in a
great religious movement, the Italian cities had but one real motive
for their activities, — that is, material self-interest.^ In pursuance
1 It should be pointed out that what was likely to have vitally differentiated the
activity of the Venetians and Genoese from that of their predecessors was the fact
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 73
of this worldly end they effected significant political and social
changes which followed upon the economic ones to which allusion
has already been made. Their influence was far more lasting in
the diffusion of culture than was that of the Crusades, h(nvever
important the latter may have been ; for when, with the loss of
their cause in the ruin of their Syrian empire, the Crusader-states
disappeared, the Italian colonies stayed on, resolutely holding to-
gether their mother-cities and their trading-areas, and thus prevent-
ing the deadly hatred incident to a religious war from " effecting a
cessation of the most important culture-relations." ^ In Europe
this commerce and its consequences helped to disintegrate the
manor-economy by widening the horizon of individuals and of socie-
ties ; it likewise aided in the shattering of the whole feudal system.
The Italian monopoly unwittingly and unwillingly forced potential
but diffident rivals into an activity which resulted in the ensuing
great discoveries with their far-reaching effects upon subsequent
history .2 Italian activity, in short, ushers in what are known as
modern times ; and this momentous function was furthered not a
little by the possibility of prolonged sojourn in eastern countries,
with a consequent better knowledge of eastern civilization ; that
is, by the existence of the colonies whose origin and course has
now been traced.
The Italians in the Discoveries Period
Nor must it be thought that, with the decline of the Italian
supremacy, the influence of Italy upon the world's history abruptly
ceases. This is not in the order of nature. Experience such as the
that they and their Saracen clients in trade professed two separate and irreconcilable
religions. Former conditions about the Mediterranean of essential religious similarity
and consequent tolerance had suffered a metamorphosis since the spread of Christianity
and Islam. But because the Italians were led frankly to recognize the preponderant
importance of trade over creed, whatever the danger to their souls of such a com-
plaisant or mercenary attitude, they so subordinated the newly introduced element of
hostility as practically to pursue their projects with the tolerance of Phoenicians and
Greeks. Hence the essential similarity, as respects methods and results, of their
activity and that of their pagan prototypes.
^ Prutz, p. 393. For a comparison of the civilization of the Saracens and Crusaders,
cf. Munro, Christian and Infidel in the Holy Land.
2 If the Syrian tolls raised prices, including the large margin of profit, from one
ducat in Calicut to from 60 to 100 in Venice, then, taking the average as 80, the Portu-
guese could get a market for whatever they could import at a profit just short of equal
to that of the Venetians plus the tolls, say 79. This was a powerful incentive. Sumner,
Lectures.
74 COLONIZATION
Italians possessed was not built up in a day ; and under the medi-
aeval system of mystery and secrecy respecting trade but little of
it had been transmitted. Of a consequence we find that Italy, as
represented by individuals, in a sense directed the progress of the
Discoveries. The detailed demonstration of this statement would
make a long story ; but a few of the best-known cases, several of
which will appear in later chapters, may be cited by way of illus-
tration. Prince Henry of Portugal is supposed to have derived,
through his brother, considerable information from Italian sources ;
and, farther back, a Genoese, Pezagno, became admiral of Portugal.
The brothers Vivaldi discovered the Azores and Madeiras ; Cada-
mosto operated under Prince Henry ; the thirteenth-century jour-
neys of the Poli took them to China. Two of the greatest discoverers
were a Genoese and a Venetian, — Columbus and John Cabot.
Men of lesser fame were Verrazano, Sebastian Cabot, Amerigo
Vespucci, Pigafetta, Toscanelli ; not to mention many others, pilots,
map-makers, travelers, and the like.^ If, now, some such list be
compared with one made up from names of any other single nation-
ality, however actively the latter may have been engaged in the
operations of the early period, it will not suffer in comparison.
This is perfectly natural, and in the order of events ; for human
progress depends always upon the accumulation of knowledge,
experiences, and dexterities. The Italians knew, and the west-
erners were ignorant ; the latter had to secure their footing under
the guidance of the former before they were able to work out their
destiny upon the different lines determined by newly invaded areas
and newly experienced conditions of nature.
Summary of the Conditions of Colonization preceding
THE Discoveries
Before proceeding to the colonization of the modern times, it
seems useful to survey some general aspects of the subject as they
emerge from the study of the foregoing simpler cases, — cases in
whose evaluation, moreover, since sentiment cannot enter as in
^ A brief chapter on the Italians during the Discovery period is given by
Bruniaiti (capo iv, 68 ff.), who quotes the old formula Sic vos, non vobis to charac-
terize their activities in the service of others. See also Major, p. 309; Bourne,
Spain in America, pp. i ff. ; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. i ff. ; and any work on the
Discoveries period (e.g. Peschel, Huge, Fiske), /ajj»>« ; cf. Cheyney, pp. 41 ff.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 75
more modern phases, any other consideration than that of historical
impartiaUty can scarcely find place. It has been possible here to
study the course of colonization in the absence of several factors
which have attained considerable importance in later times, and to
which great significance has been uncritically assigned. In a whole
series of phenomena it has been found that strict control on the
part of the metropolis was unessential for the economic and other
development of offshoot societies ; indeed, so far as the converse
case of the Roman coloniae goes, rigorous governmental supervision
has tended to undermine the independent life and development of
the new community. It has been seen, however, that the weakness
of control, practically unavoidable under the conditions of the
times, — in the absence of swift communication, in the relative
feebleness of political units, etc., — has precluded, the case of
Rome excepted, the existence of a real and persisting empire. In
most of the cases considered, centralization of authority in a more
than local metropolis has been consistently absent. Relations of
colonies to parent-cities have been those of material interest rather
than of political integration, and of a common civilization rather
than of actual dependency. The argument of Freeman, above
cited, ^ is susceptible of an application wider than that given by the
author, whose specific comparison is that of Greece and Britain.
The motives for colonization reviewed have been preponderantly
commercial, and as a consequence the colonies have regularly
originated in trading-stations ; important exceptions must naturally
be made of the state-initiated enterprises of the Chinese and the
Romans. Incidentally it should be noted that trade has not
"followed the flag" to any convincing degree,^ although military
operations have at times removed obstacles against which a healthy
trade has employed its own expedients in vain. Economic and
political discomfort, as an incentive to emigration, has played a
relatively unimportant role ; it was rather to gain more abundantly
than to avoid loss and misery that change of station has taken
place. Among the stock motives the absence of religious discontent
is noteworthy : there were no irreconcilable religious (or, indeed,
political) dogmas in those days.^
^ P- 43-
* That " trade and the flag " were not inseparable ideas to these non-conquering
commercial experts lends color to the contention that their close association has
something of affinity with the imperial disposition that does not care openly to pro-
claim its purposes. 8 Cf. Keller, Horn. See, p. 17.
76 COLONIZATION
For similar reasons the "native policy" of ancient times was
constructed to subserve the purposes of exchange, or was directed
simply toward the maintenance of such subordination and order as
a wider administrative experience had proved to be socially bene-
ficial, if not indispensable. There was no idea of " culture-mission "
or the like, and consequently no dogma, rooting in national egotism,
of "assimilation." No moral or religious crusades were carried on
through the colonies ; diversity of customs and morals was regarded
as natural and a matter of course, — though both customs and
religions were nationally less differentiated than they have come to
be in the eyes of later ages. The predominant commercial motive,
and the imperial policy as well, counseled respect for the social
forms of an alien people ; hence the influence of the higher civiliza-
tion upon the lower proceeded through example and suggestion
rather than coercion. Participation in exchange between the com-
plementary trade-areas of East and West was indeed enforced, as
was the maintenance of peace and order (e.g. by Rome) ; but these
were benefits, self-evident or speedily demonstrated, thus needing
but little insistence. In short, influence was brought to bear pri-
marily upon the economic life and industrial organization of back-
ward peoples, while their secondary and derived social forms
(marriage-system, property-tenure, etc.) were for the most part
let alone. This is the secret of much of the success in the spread
of civilization which has been noticed ; ^ but such influence was, of
course, of almost totally unconscious application. It was effective,
because, falling in with the order of nature and evolution, it moved
along lines of least resistance.
One makes haste to add that if the elder colonizing peoples
appear to have attacked the question of elevating the less ad-
vanced races with better effect than have their successors, it is
largely owing to the fact that the problem was presented to them
in a form more easily soluble ; for between the races that were
brought into contact, especially around the border of the Mediter-
ranean, there existed few contrasts of any significance. The like
was true in the case of the Chinese and their ethnic environment.
There were no obvious ethnological differences such as distinguish
one race sharply from another, and the various stages of culture
were separated by no impassable or discouraging chasms. If the
eastern races had lifted themselves to a higher plane of material
1 Cf. Keller, Soc. View, etc.
COLONIZATION OF A SIMPLER TYPE 77
civilization, they yet retained in their religious forms and in their
body of customs and snores an essential likeness to those of racially
allied peoples. Even slavery was an institution totally different
from that with which later ages have made us familiar : there was
no "color-line"; the system was one of "domestic slavery" in
the main ; and the passage from freedom to servitude was easy,
often turning purely upon chance. Hence that eternally vexatious
and unsolved question of the treatment of a "lower race" was
but faintly represented ; except in mining, we hear little of the
labor supply or "native-labor question." If other than economic
stimuli had to be applied, it was not the colonizing state that had
to apply them, for the forces of trade impinging upon local con-
trollers of labor were sufficient.
Another point well worthy of notice, and which really lies
beneath the one just mentioned, as Chapter I is designed to sug-
gest, is that the colonists before the Portuguese but rarely settled
outside of their native climatic zone.^ The Semites and Aryans
colonized the shores of their own Mediterranean ; and as for the
Chinese, no climate appears to affect them adversely to any great
degree. Hence there have been brought into the discussion thus
far none of the physical and social disturbances incident to a
sudden and violent change in vital conditions. In other words,
any of the colonies hitherto mentioned might have developed into
what has been called the farm colony. One of the consequences
of this condition has been already mentioned, — the absence of a
"lower" race, or, as it might be stated from another point of
view, the absence of the need itself for an acclimatized labor
force. It is not surprising, therefore, if the foregoing types of
colonies fall in rather strikingly with the temperate or farm colony
in the matter of life, social forms, etc. ; but they differ from it
markedly in one respect : instead of native wars and annihilation,
an auspicious large-scale miscegenation, mainly of closely allied
races, took place, this being due to the several facts that the seats
of the colonies, conformably with their commercial purpose, were
but rarely in relatively unoccupied country ; that the colonists
were regularly too weak to indulge in extended conquests ; and
that no such barriers to intermarriage existed as appeared in later
times, when racial distinctions were more marked. Under these
1 Hertzberg (pp. 86 ff.) develops this aspect of the Greek colonization to some
extent.
jS COLONIZATION
conditions a greater modicum of success in the spread of a fructi-
fying civilization is the less to be wondered at. It was the Dis-
coveries which, by opening up new parts of the world where
Europeans were subjected to new and strange conditions, im-
mensely complicated the matter of colonization. In so far as these
conditions were new and strange, they drew in their wake new
necessities of adaptation ; but it is hoped that the rehearsal of the
foregoing simpler phases of a now complicated and tortured social
movement cannot be without its utility for the better understand-
ing of the modern forms, and the factors which condition them.
CHAPTER III
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST
It has been shown how the monopolistic pohcy of the ItaHans
was calculated to raise up rivals whose energy and eagerness
would vary directly with the rigor with which monopoly was
maintained ; for it is when monopoly is at its climax of efficiency
and tyranny that it offers the richest rewards to him who shall
evade or break it. The strength and prestige of Venetian mari-
time power was great enough, indeed, to deter all rivals from the
serious attempt to dispute Venetian monopoly within the Mediter-
ranean,^ but the extraordinary prizes of this monopoly were suffi-
ciently alluring to other nations to overcome the inertia of things,
and to motive those efforts along untried ways which were des-
tined to set upon commerce an oceanic and cosmopolitan stamp,
where before it had been mediterranean and relatively local. The
successors of the Venetians would come into no less a heritage
than the intermediary function between the two complementary
trade-areas of East and West, — India and Europe, — a func-
tion which had been historically the making of the wealthiest
and most powerful commercial nations. The incentive was suffi-
cient to force a display of activity along indirect and unpromising
lines, when the old direction of least resistance had been, to all
intents and purposes, blocked.
In preceding pages it has been noted that merchants of coun-
tries west of the Italian peninsula had been drawn into commer-
cial activity during the period of the Crusades and later, and that
the inhabitants of western Europe in general had during this
period experienced considerable enlightenment as to the nature of
the Orient and its commerce. Some of these peoples, like the
Germans, long received their dole of luxuries through the hands
of the Venetians ; others, Provencals and Iberians, made a more
1 One might query why the Venetians did not fight the Portuguese for the posses-
sion of the ocean-route. But it must be reaUzed that they were led by the inertia
of things to cling to the old and familiar ways, especially since the new were so
formidable and were for many decades of so little promise.
79
So COLONIZATION
or less vigorous attempt to supply themselves at the source.^ But
it was the historical destiny of the Iberians to break the Italian
monopoly and to found it's aftertype on a grander scale.
Conditioning Factors of Iberian Colonization
The two streams of colonial enterprise which thus arose in
Portugal and Spain can hardly be treated in isolation one from
the other. They flow in parallel channels, and recurrent reference
from one to the other is inevitable ; and when one looks to their
historical antecedents, he finds a number of determining and con-
ditioning elements common to both. These may be briefly indi-
cated before embarking upon an account of more detailed and
local matters.
The status of the Peninsular peoples toward the end of the
fifteenth century was in large part the outcome of centuries of
war, on native soil, with an alien race ; of conflicts culminating in
1492 with the reduction of Granada. These wars had effected a
racial and national cohesion exceptional in its time, and visibly
represented by the strengthening of monarchy ,2 and, later, by the
formation of larger political units. They had likewise engendered
a military spirit attended by the usual qualities of endurance,
courage, skill in the use of arms, love of an irregular and venture-
some life, and, too often, contempt for the arts of peace. And
because these racial struggles were likewise religious wars, there
had grown upon the people an ideal of religious solidarity which
had within it the germs of intolerance and fanaticism. The spirit
of conquest was commingled with that of crusade ; the Iberian
soldiers went out to win the temporal empire for the sovereign
and the spiritual dominance for the faith. It is probable that the
exaltation of mind under which they strove lent them a motive
force with which their opponents found it difficult to reckon, and
which the historian cannot well measure or define.^
In addition to these elements of strength, Spain and Portugal
possessed undoubted economic vigor at the outset of their colonial
i Wappaus, I, 191-210, 277-309.
2 "The Ilanseatic confederacy, powerful as it might be, was but a confederacy;
and Venice, however magnificent, was but a city. The really modern states of Western
Europe had the germs of quite another force and power within them." Major,
pp. 308. ^ Martins, Civ. Iber., p. 205 et passim \ Major, p. 300.
THK PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 8 1
careers. The Peninsula as a whole had benefited by the intelli-
gent industrial example and legislation of its Moorish conquerors ;
for the latter, despite their military prowess and successes, were
endowed with the habits and sentiments characteristic of an indus-
trial society. The Moors, for example, were experts in the manip-
ulation of arid soils, and were the repositories of both agricultural
and other sciences during the Dark Ages. Under the protection
of their Semitic brethren, likewise, the Jews for long years advan-
taged the economic life of the Peninsula by developing their char-
acteristic financial functions. And even after the fall of Granada,
the Moriscos, or conquered Moors, continued to confer benefits
upon the Peninsula by their presence and activities. The very fact r
that they attained, under hard conditions, an industrial prosperity «,
which in later times drew upon them the envy and greed of
the Christians, witnesses to their economic efificiency.^ Moreover, ^'
apart from the Moors, the Peninsula had by 1500 developed
industries already of long standing, and of vitality rugged enough
to have weathered the fantastic regulation of the Middle Ages.^
A high quality of wool was produced in relatively enormous quan-
tities ; the ^live was a prolific source of national wealth ; silk was
a prime asset of the Peninsula, and the manufacture of siTken and
woolen fabrics formed before 1500 a point of distinct industrial
superiority. In short, the. industrial population of the period formed
a middle class capable of developing into a lasting resource and
stay of any government. And to these several advantages was
added a prosperous maritime commercial element susceptible of
a high development under reasonably favoring conditions. When
a series of momentous possibilities along many lines of activity
was about to be opened by Da Gama and Columbus, the Peninsular
nations were ready to play a considerable part in their realization.
No European peoples were more closely unified and nationalized,
and few save the Venetians and Genoese economically stronger.^
Although now the calamities and decline of Spain and Portugal
cannot be treated conjointly, still, at the risk of anticipation, a few
^ Colmeiro, I, 159-198; Lea, Moriscos, pp. 5 ff.
2 Colmeiro, I, 233 ff. ; cf. 349 ff.
8 This is not believed by Leroy-Beaulieu (1,3), who thinks that "no people [
were less fitted to colonize than the Spaniards." But he adds the limiting clause,
" a juger les choses de notre point de vue actuel." The reader will be furnished in
later pages with information and considerations upon which to base a judgment as [
to this contention.
82 COLONIZATION
general considerations growing out of the projection of the above
factors upon the hfe of the sixteenth century may be noted. Both
of the Iberian states were enticed or forced into efforts dispropor-
tionate to their population and economic strength, this being due
in large part to royal and clerical incitement, to the inebriating
and demoralizing effects following upon the Discoveries, and to
miscellaneous unhappy combinations of circumstances of a less
general nature. The destructive forces were at work before the
sixteenth century began, but displayed themselves in aggravated
and menacing form only toward its close. Then both states suffered
from the incapacity and maladministration of kings who were always
short of funds ; from decline in quantity and quality of population
and of industry, — in short, from the effects of the diversion of
national life into uncharted ways. Under the influence of racial
and religious hatred, and economic greed and envy, both nations
drove from them economic assets of a high order : the Jews,
expelled from Spain and Portugal in 1492 and 1496 respectively,
and the Moriscos, banished in cruel fashion in 1609.^ Both nations
came to support a large parasitic element in the population in the
persons of the clergy, and of the vagrants and mendicants attracted
by a profuse and indiscriminate charity for which the Church stood
as champion. The encouragement of such classes amounted to
contraselection in the evolution of the national type, and aided the
government in blocking industrial development. Idleness, venality,
cheap ostentation, and superstition infected rulers and ruled.^
Each state collapsed in its own special way from the lofty posi-
tion to which its earlier energy had elevated it ; and that this
decadence was decisive and irrevocable finds evidence in the sub-
sequent history of the Peninsular peoples and their colonial empires.
1 Martins, Os Filhos, etc., chap, vii; Hist, de Port., II, 13 ff. ; Civ. Iber., pp. 266-
271; Colmeiro, I, 250 ff. ; cf. pp. 335 ff. ; Varnhagen, I, 87-88. Upon the Moriscos, Lea
is the special authority. The story of the oppression and expulsion of these valuable
people and of the Jews cannot be gone into in this place, but will be found in all
needed detail in Lea's Moriscos, especially chaps, i, iv, vi, vii, viii, x, and xi; and in
his Inquisition, especially I, chap, ii, 84 ff. ; II, 315 ff., 485 ff. ; III, i ff. It will be
noted that almost the chief activity of the Inquisition was the harassing of Jews and
Moriscos. Even if the number of actual autos-da-fe was less than was once supposed,
not running into the tens of thousands (cf. Inquisition, III, 551 ff.), yet the other
penalties of torture, imprisonment, confiscation, etc., constantly overhung the pre-
destined victims, rendering life and property insecure and so crippling all economic
activity. In fact, "practically acciuittal amounted to a sentence of not proven"
j(Inciuisition, III, 107).
2 Marlins, Hist, de Port., II, 32, 1 13-116, 192-193 ; Civ. Iber., pp. 271-273, 2S3-286.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 83
The general impression of the Portuguese and Spanish activities
under consideration is that of an excessive and feverish energy, a
prodigal^ver -expenditure of vitality , followed by an equally accentu-
ated reaction and exhaustion. As one follows more specially tTie
course of Spanish and Portuguese colonial enterprise, these general
considerations are found to underlie not a few of the sets of con-
ditions encountered.
Portugal's Preparation for Colonization
If in the period immediately preceding the Discoveries the
Peninsula as a whole had been gathering its forces, the same was
true of its constituent political units, — Spain and Portugal. Each
of these nations exhibited, moreover, the action of local forces
making for internal coherence and the storage of energy.
Portugal had won its independence, after a series of wars, toward
the end of the fourteenth century,^ and had developed a centralized
government of some strength Conflicts with an alien race had
accentuated racial and religious homogeneity, and the genius of
the King Affonso Henriques (1143-1183) was enabled politically
to consolidate a land and people neither geographically nor ethno-
logically distinct from their neighbors. At the end of the four-
teenth century, according to Stephens, Portugal formed a political
and social entity more conscious of nationahty than almost any
other people of Europe.^ This unity of purpose, conformably with
the laws of state-development, proceeded to display itself outside
the boundaries of the state, and at first along lines already familiar.
Expeditions were led against the Moors of North Africa, and the
idea of external dominion was, in true crusading fashion, com-
mingled with the desire to extend the outposts of Christendom.
The strength of the rising state was augmented also by the skill-
ful use of foreign relations. A striking illustration of the essential
analogy between the Crusades and the Moorish wars of the Penin-
sula lay in the fact that Portuguese kings were able to divert large
bodies of itinerant Crusaders to their own local purposes. Even
1 The battle of Aljubarrota, 13S5, practically ended the aggression of Castile.
Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 15, 158 ff.
2 Stephens, p. 100 ; Hunter. I, 57 ff. ; Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 67 ff " The grand
movement, popular in its essence, of the fourteenth century, invigorated the nation
and prepared it for the great period of daring navigation and grand discoveries."
Corvo, I, 6.
84 COLONIZATION
the Pope declared that crusading in the Peninsula was as meritori-
ous as in the Holy Land.^ Of still greater and more lasting import
were the relations between Portugal and England. Himself the
founder of the house of Aviz and the consolidator of the realm,
John I, by his union with Philippa of Lancaster ^ (1387), laid the
foundation of an international relationship and sympathy which
have often redounded to the advantage of the less powerful nation.
Already in 1385 English archers had rendered matcFial assistance
in the attainment of Portuguese independence ; and after the recog-
nition of John as king (141 1) and the completion of the era of consoli-
dation, the cementation of this alliance through the more palpable
and enduring bonds of trade went on with few interruptions.
The position of Portugal was scarcely favorable, under the con-
ditions of the age, for the development of trade and shipping. Cut
off from the Mediterranean, the scene of action of the time, the
Portuguese felt the influence of the trade-movements already
described only after the Italians had extended their voyages to
Flanders and the North ; and even then the Italian exclusion-policy
allowed them but small share in the new operations. Portuguese
sea-battles of the twelfth century showed courage rather than skill ;
it was not until the early fourteenth century that a real beginning
of maritime activity was made.^ From this time on the Portuguese,
together with the Spanish, became more alive to the economic
advantages enjoyed by the Italians in the trade with the East and
with North Africa. On the part of both nations there emerged
more and more plainly the tendency to outgrow the status of the
passive recipient and to enter upon the lucrative function of the
distributor. King Diniz (i 279-1 325) of Portugal, in addition to
his unremitting efforts to repair the damage of the Moorish wars,
through the development of economic resources, managed to check
the overgrown power of the Church, and thus to lay the founda-
tion of a strong and undisputed monarchy.* He also attracted
Genoese shipbuilders to Portugal and employed an Italian as ad-
miral of his fleets, thus making the first definite advance toward
1 Stephens, pp. 48, 52-53, 61, 72; Martins, Ilist. de Port., I, 84, 181.
2 Daughter of John of Gaunt and granddaughter of Edward III. Hunter, I, 58 ff. ;
Martins, Hist, de Port., II, 130-131.
'^ Wappaus, I, 209-210; but cf. Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 26.
* The strife between the kings and the clergy was practically ended by 1360.
Lavisse et Rambaud, III, 478-481; IV, 872-874; Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 118;
II, II, note. The popular title of Diniz was Lavrador.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 85
maritime power; and in succeeding reigns, notably that of Ferdi-
nand IV ( 1 367-1 383), numerous privileges and exemptions were
granted to shipbuilders and sailors. This attention to sea-borne
commerce went even to the extent of founding a marine insurance
society. Merchants of all lands were attracted to Lisbon under
this fostering policy, and John I, on attaining power, found the
ground prepared for a solid advance in commercial development.
This opportunity was not suffered to slip away.^
That the subsequent generations of astonishing activity on the
part of Portugal, and her final degeneration as well, were the work
of no single man, or group of men, the preceding argument is
designed to indicate. It is in all ways probable, however, that the
very strength of the monarchy as it existed in Portugal was at the
bottom of a premature or exaggerated display of enterprise and
aggression. 2 Fitted to play a part proportionate to her resources,
Portugal was constantly forced into situations with which she was
normally unfit to cope. And yet her royal directors were far from
being unpopular ; the sound or senseless ideals at which they aimed
in their early contact with Africa and the East appealed to the
spirit, or at least encountered no resistance on the part of their
subjects ; it was weakness of the flesh rather than unwillingness
of the spirit that caused a falling-short.
Henry the Navigator
In some such way as this the spirit of the Discoveries period was
epitomized in an influential member of the ruling house. This was
Dom Henriques, son of John the Great and his English queen, a
character more familiarly known in history as Henry the Navigator,
— a prince who was enabled in an exceptional degree to direct the
fortunes not only of his own country, but of the civilized world, with
his own hand.3 Raised in an environment of religious militancy,
1 Wappiius, I, 351-364; Schafer, I, 112 ff. ; Danvers, I, 16 ff.; Hunter, I, 16-1S.
Major (p. 46) thinlcs that the expulsion of the Moors from the Peninsula, entailing
as it did a dearth of objects of Oriental luxury to which the westerners had become
used, " was one of the great stimulants to the search for a passage to India by the
sea." He adds : " In this expulsion the Portuguese took the lead, and were con-
sequently the first to feel the effect of the incentive." Cf. Martins, Hist, de Port.,
I, 165. 2 Cf. Hunter, I, 89 ff.
8 The best accounts of Prince Henry's life and work will be cited below. Briefer
estimates are Stephens, Story of Portugal, pp. 141 ff.; Bourne, Kssays, etc.,
pp. 173-189; Zimmermann, I, 4-10. Martins (Hist, de Port., I, 166 ff., 183 ff.)
gives Henry rather the character of a ruthless enthusiast.
86 COLONIZATION
its spirit was his, and his eadiest independent efforts were spent
in the endeavor to gather such information concerning the Moors
of North Africa as would enable him the more crushingly to defeat
them and to reduce the power of Islam. The sah^ation of souls
was an object very near to his heart in his character of medi-
aeval knight and crusader ; his earliest ships were fitted out to
injure the enemies of Christendom rather than to advance the
worldly interests of Portugal or the king. Yet Henry was more
than mediaeval and unworldly ; he was a man of scientific curiosity
and of practical astuteness. He was versed in the geographical
and other lore of his time and imbued with respect for that reason-
ing which proceeds from fact to theory, and which has become the
special heritage of modern science. His knowledge, as a child of a
new age, was the fruit of an accumulation of what had gone before ; ^
like Columbus, he represented one of the results of the invention
of printing. He was able to apprehend the import for the general
advancement of culture of the extension of the geographical horizon
and of nautical education, attained through the development of
shipping. He saw at least some of the results to be expected from
the establishment of easier and cheaper communication with the
East.^ He was aware of the seemingly secure but really precarious
tenure of Venetian monopoly, and coveted for Portugal not only
the souls but also the lucrative trade of the easterners.^ He may
not have seen that the discovery of a direct route to the Indies
would " turn the flank of Islam," but he was convinced that it
would neutralize the excessive advantages held by Italian cities,
and, above all, by Venice. He stood, as it were, the inspired and
clarified exposition of the time's awakening spirit,'^ and was for
this reason enabled to wield the influence he did. As commander
of the wealthy Order of Christ he controlled ample funds for his
purposes, and, renouncing all else in the pursuit of his life-idea,
retired to the rocky promontory of Sagres, there to pass his days.^
i-The Arabs were "the most important helpers and informants of Prince
Henry." Beazley, in Azurara, II, xlv ; cf. pp. xliii ff.
2 Wappaus, p. 145; Beazley, in Azurara, II, Ivi ff., cxvii ff. ; Major, pp. 47 ff. ;
Ruge, pp. 81 ff. ; Martins, Os Filhos, etc., chap, iv ; Hist, de Port., I, 167 ff.
^ There also existed at this time a legend derived from the classics concerning
certain Gold and Silver Islands in the Far East. The Portuguese later made several
ineffectual attempts to find them. Huge, pp. 207 ff.
* Cf. Leroy-Peaulieu, I, 41-42 ; Cheyney, pp. 43 ff., 76.
''That he took up his abode in .Sagres in 1419 is doubtful, but he certainly
remained there most of his life after 1437. Beazley, in Azurara, II, viii, xii ; Martins,
'rm-: pori'UGUesp: in the east 87
In spite of considerable opposition accompany ini; and following his
many reverses, he did not fail, such was his consistency of purpose
and great force of character, throughout his life to inspire his fol-
lowers with a spirit similar to his own. There is, in his case, more
reason than usual for asserting the effect upon history of the work
of a single man.
His activities came to be directed almost wholly to the attempt
to circumnavigate Africa, — a feat reputed to have been accom-
plished in the remote past.^ To this end he not only gathered
about him the leading scientists of his time, but also secured the
services of daring sea-captains and sailors.^ In their wretched,
insufficient saihng craft these mariners made their way, little by
little, down the coast of Africa, were long daunted before the
terrors of Cape Bojador, but finally doubled it (1434) and passed
on toward the south. The long trend to the eastward represented
by the Gulf of Guinea no doubt raised false hopes ; it took until
147 1, eleven years after Henry's death, to cross the equator. Yet
he lived to see some of the wealth of Africa, if not of India, return
to Portugal, and to experience, though it probably affected him but
slightly, the sudden veering of a public opinion hitherto adverse to
him (about 1442). The Madeira Islands had been occupied (after
141 8), and endowed with the beginnings of their future resources ;
to these the Cape Verde Islands were added (1446) and the Azores
(1449).^ Slaves had been introduced (1441) into the great estates
of the south of Portugal where the labor supply was depleted ; this
set free large numbers of men for the royal policy of adventure,
but the cruelties attending the seizures had already embittered the
natives of the African coast. "^ Whatever its immediate effects for
Os Filhos, etc., chap. iii. What he did was, in one of its most important aspects, to
found a " .school of sea-training." Cheyney, p. 76. These expeditions, owing to laclc
of private capital and enterprise, could not have been sent out without drawing upon
some such funds as a prince might be able to control. Cf. Van der Chys, p. 1 17, note.
1 See p. 32, note. Payne (Age of Disc, p. 12) doubts this, regarding Henry as
little more than a crusader. But cf. Beazley, in Azurara, II, v.
2 Seamen of Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands entered Henry's service in
relatively considerable numbers. Major, pp. 308-309.
3 It is scarcely necessary to take up in detail the history of these island groups.
Being unoccupied, they were divided in feudal fashion into captaincies, and gradu-
ally settled by Portuguese, as a vacant portion of Portugal might have been settled.
They soon became portions of Portugal and were administratively so considered.
See Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 3 ff., 194 ; Corvo, I, 43 ff. ; Saco, pp. 20 ff.
* Hunter, I, 61 ff . ; Beazley, in Azurara, II, cix ; Bourne, Essays, etc., pp. 173-189;
Payne, Age of Disc, pp. 13 ff.
88 COLONIZATION
good or ill, the life of this determined and undaunted prince had
seen a grand undertaking so far upon its way that non-cessation of
effort was assured. Without his activities " the results of the great
forty years (1480- 15 20) of Diaz, Columbus, Da Gama, and Magel-
lan must have been long, might have been indefinitely, postponed." ^
After the death of Henry the voyages to the south continued,
with few interruptions, to extend their range, until the Cape was
doubled by Diaz (i486), and until finally Da Gama swung clear
around the southern tip of the continent and made his way to
India (1497- 1498). The details of these voyages are important
to our purpose simply as they display from the outset the daring
and reckless spirit of the Portuguese of the time. Shipping had
been much improved in the hard school, and was now better
adapted to the ocean and the exigencies of oceanic commerce.
The sea had lost its imaginary terrors ; navigation under strange
skies had been learned. In short, a beginning had been made in
the creation of a vehicle to meet the needs of a world-wide com-
merce.^ The timely impulse of the single farsighted man had prob-
ably hurried on the evolution of the period at a greatly accelerated
pace. When it was removed, exploration was indeed largely sus-
pended for about twenty years ; but it needed only a resumption
of royal encouragement to stimulate it to the accomplishment of
its ultimate object.^
It is noteworthy as illustrating the knowledge and purposes of
the Portuguese that in 1487 two envoys were dispatched to pursue
the overland route to India, and to search for the mysterious Chris-
tian potentate, Prester John. The latter, it was hoped, would
prove an efficient ally against the Moors. It fell to one of these
envoys, Covilhao, not only to reach India and to become the " theo-
retical discoverer"'* of the Cape route — he sent back assurances
^ Beazley, in A/uraru, II, vii. Yet .such was the .slowness of progress in these
early years that the forty-two years from 1418 to 1460 had added only 18 degrees of
latitude to verified geography. Hunter, I, 69; cf. Roscher, p. 258, and note.
'^ Henry really founded, with the funds of his Order, the first real commercial
and discovery company of modern times. Bourne, Essays, etc., pp. 173-179.
8 The details of the voyages under Prince Henry's direction are to be found in
Azurara, Discovery and Conquest of Guinea. In the second volume of this publi-
cation is included an excellent introductory essay by C. R. Beazley, who gives some
space to the voyages suljsequent to Henry's death, in completion of his work
(pp. xxviii ff.). See also Major, pp. 317 ff.; Martins, Os Filhos, etc., chap, ix;
Lavisse et Rambaud, IV, 800 ff. ; Heyd, II, 506 ff.
* Hunter, I, 78-79; Whiteway, p. 16; Major, pp. 339-340; Martins, Hist, de
Port., pp. 163 ff. For a resume of the legends, etc., about Prester John, see Huge,
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 89
to Portugal that ships would of a certainty attain the termination
of the continent, and he directed them to Sofala — but to discover
Prester John in the king of Abyssinia, and to be retained by him
under kindly restraint for the rest of his life.
Effects of the Discovery of the Cape Route
With the discovery of the Cape route, Portugal takes her place
as the successor of Venice in the empire of commerce ; ^ for,
despite the efforts of the latter, her monopoly was already doomed
when the ships of Da Gama had once anchored at Calicut. The
center of the world's commercial activity again shifted toward the
west, and its medium became the ocean which connects, not adja-
cent areas, but all lands of the earth. Local trade, with its rela-
tively restricted interests, was a thing of the past, for in the
distance lay the world-market and its limitless possibilities for the
meeting of all nations and peoples.^ The policy of Portugal, how-
ever, contemplated no such cosmopolitan aims. It has been shown
how the ancient nations strove to maintain, through any and all
means, the monopoly of trade, each for itself ; and how the Italians
invented expedients and fought for their realization, in the effort
to exclude rivals. As was inevitable, the policy was adhered to by
the new mistress of the seas. Prince Henry had no sooner realized
the likelihood of success in his prime endeavor than he secured,
from the only arbiter of the time, a clear title to all lands to be
discovered from Cape Bojador "ad Indos." The Pope "repre-
sented after the fashion of that age what we now call the concert
of Europe"; he exercised an authority which was "regarded as
essential to the peace of Christendom," for Papal arbitration was
the only course short of war. Even recalcitrant nations like Eng-
land, under aggressive sovereigns like the Tudors, hesitated openly
to assail a " settlement which had become part of the public law
of Europe."^ Hence India became Portuguese by fiat, and the
pp. 37 ff. Payne (Age of Disc, p. 11) says Henry hoped to unite forces witli Prester
John through the " Western Nile," — a geographic illusion, — and so turn the
flank of Islam. ^ See p. 69, above.
2 " Of all the changes which mark the transition from ancient and medi.xval to
modern history, none is so profound as that which has regrouped human life about
the Atlantic as a new and grander central sea." Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 3.
8 Hunter, I, 83, 84, 85. Under the conditions of the time, then, the Portuguese
had a right to call intruders upon their dominions "pirates" {ireiparaL), i.e. those
who make (wrongful) attempts. Hunter, I, 86, note; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 43-44.
90 COLONIZATION
Portuguese habitually spoke of it as theirs, despite their scanty
occupation.
It is necessary here to anticipate slightly. When, in consequence
of the discoveries of Columbus, Spain entered the lists with Por-
tugal, it became imperative for the Holy See to construct some
working agreement between these, its favorite children. This
arrangement worked out ev^entually into the Treaty of Tordcsillas
(1494), whereby the non-European world was divided along a
meridian 100, later 370, leagues west and south of any one of the
islands known as the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands.^ The
Portuguese were excluded from areas west of this line, the Spanish
from those east. In conformity with the spirit of the time, as will
be seen, this to us stupendous presumption was regarded as a
matter of course, and as indisputable. Its bearing upon the sub-
ject directly in hand is this : it justified the destruction of inter-
lopers, and enlisted the superstitious and religious tendencies of
the time in the maintenance of commercial and colonial monopoly.
Its incompleteness may be passed over for the present ; the Por-
tuguese had the East as a sphere of activity, the Spanish the West.
It was time enough to consider and discover where the East and
West must meet, when that question became a practical issue. ^
Conditions in India
The marvelous good fortune of the Portuguese — for thus one
must denominate the happy outcome in their colonial history of
many an unplanned or ill-planned venture — attended them from
their arrival on the scene of action. They landed i)ropitiously both
as to place and time. Calicut was part of a narrow strip of shore
1 See especially Bourne, P2ssays, etc., pp. 193-217; Sp. in Anier., pp. 29-32,
71-73; Hunter, I, 83 ff.
2 " Neither in the Papal Rull.s nor in the Treaty of Tordesillas was there any
specific reference to an extension of the Line around the globe or to a division of
the world. The arrangement seems to have contemplated a free field for the e.xplora-
tion and conquest of the unknown parts of the world, to the eastward for Portugal
and to the westward for Spain. If they should cross each other's tracks, priority of
discovery would determine the ownership.
" The suggestion of the extension of the line around the globe and of the idea that
Spain was entitled to what might be within the hemisphere set off by the Demarca-
tion Line and its extension to the antipodes does not a])pear until the time of Magel-
lan, and it is then that we first meet the notion that the Pojie had divided the world
between Spain and Portugal like an orange." Bourne, Hist. Introd., p]). 2.^-25; cf.
Payne, Age of Disc, p. 23.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 9 1
belonging to petty rajahs of whom its ruler, the Zamorin, was a
sort of chief. Too feeble to offer a serious resistance, and with an
eye to an increase of revenue, the kinglets welcomed foreign mer-
chants ; and having long been accustomed to differences of faith,
they conceded freedom of religious belief and practice. And at
the time of the Portuguese arrival united resistance was further
weakened because of the encroachments of Mohammedan invaders
upon the Hindu overlordship of the interior. The Mogul Empire
was not yet firm ; petty states were isolated and the Portuguese
could deal with them with a free hand, and one by one. And the
people, though in important respects more highly civilized than the
Portuguese, were not only insufficiently advanced in the arts and
almost unprovided with the modern weapons of war, but also
exhibited in their military system certain customs of a chivalrous
nature, e.g. antecedent declaration of hostile intent, of which the
Portuguese were able to make consistent and unscrupulous use.
These considerations, while in no way detracting from the courage
of the Portuguese adventurers, rendered their task an easier one
than had at first appeared.^
The mood in which the Europeans approached the East is well
exemplified in the character of the first great leader, Vasco da
Gama. A man of great energy and indomitable firmness, incorrupt-
ible in dealing justice, and of strong religious purpose, he added
to his inflexibility a harsh manner and a cruel, violent, and revenge-
ful character. 2 He dealt out justice untempered with mercy, and
was utterly lacking in tolerance, and even in a formal and diplo-
matic courtesy. The striking success of his summary methods
scarcely atoned for the friction and ill-feeling which they engen-
dered. In conformity with the purpose of his voyage, however,
•Da Gama's immediate duty was the collection of such a cargo of
spices as would verify the high expectations of his royal patron in
Lisbon. Trade agreements were therefore made with the rulers
of Calicut and Cochin ; an attempt was made to fix prices once for
all ; and in the face of Arabic misrepresentation, and in spite of
high-handed and hot-headed conduct on the part of the Portuguese,
1 Whiteway, pp. 27-28 ; Lindsay, I, 152.
2 "... so liegen auch bei Vasco da Gama als die treibenden Krafte : ritterlicher
Waffenruhm und die Verbreitung des heiligen Glaubens offen vor Augen ; denn
vielen, und darunter den Edleren, erschienen die indischen Kampfe als heilige Kriege,
als Kreuzziige gegen den Erbfeind des Christenthums." Ruge, p. 190. The spirit of
exploration had succeeded and absorbed that of the Crusades. Hunter, I, 58.
92 COLONIZATION
the ships were well loaded with pepper, cinnamon, and other local
products. In exchange for his spices the Zamorin wished chiefly
gold, silver, coral, and scarlet. In accordance with instructions,
Da Gama likewise visited Cannanore and established a factory at
Cochin, making arrangements for its protection during his absence,
and for the purchase and storage of goods destined for the lading
of the yearly fleets which it was planned to send. By reason of
ignorance of local conditions and a tendency easily to take offense
with a people whom he despised without in any degree striving to
understand them. Da Gama managed also, at the end of his brief
sojourn, to leave the Zamorin of Calicut his bitter enemy. ^ Beyond
imposing the natives with brute force, his activity had been sterile
of real results. The breach which he had made with the Zamorin
was widened by the blundering incapacity of his successor, Cabral.^
Conditions of Navigation
Some more definite information concerning the nature of ships
and navigation at the date in question will help to form a concep-
tion of both the advantages and the difficulties of the discoverers
and their successors. Since the time of Prince Henry considerable
advance had been made in the size and power of the vessels and in
the outfit of the navigator. The fleet of Da Gama consisted of a
flagship of 1 20 tons and about 80 feet long, two other vessels of
100 and 50 tons respectively, and smaller craft with munitions.
The flagship had a very high bow and stern and possessed great
floating power and strength, but was nautically deficient ; it carried
twenty guns.-^ The combined crews of the vessels came to about
150 men. Cadamosto says the Portuguese caravels of his time'*
were the best sailing ships afloat ; there had certainly been much
improvement since Prince Henry's early life, but when we read of
1 The exclusion of Da Gama from the Indian enterprises from 1502 to 1524 is
thought by some to have been a consequence of his rude and exasperating methods.
Ruge, p. 188; cf. Whiteway, pp. 77-81 ; Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 212 ff.; Lindsay,
II, 41 ff.; Danvers, I, 85 ff. ; Hunter, I, 109.
2 Whiteway, pp. 88 ff. It is noteworthy that Cabral sailed for India not as a dis-
coverer and adventurer but as an ambassador, fitted to appear in state. Martins,
Hist, de Port., I, 223.
8 For further details of construction, see Danvers, I, 43-44. Here also (pp. 33 ff.)
and in Azurara (/xisstm ; and Beazley's Introduction to II, viii ff.) are to be found the
details of the voyages down the west coast of Africa, including the noteworthy one
of Diaz. See also Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 209-210, and especially Lindsay, I, 547 ff. ;
II, I ff. * He was in the service of Henry after 1455 and died in 1480.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 93
"lateen sails on long poles suspended from the masthead," we are
led to realize the essential backwardness of the arts of construction,
and the corresponding hardihood of the navigators. Yet these
constituted the new "ocean-going" type of vessel and were un-
doubtedly a great improvement on the galleys that went before.
The navigation of the time was also much advanced ; this is
proved partly by the fact that sailors dared to let land out of their
sight. After the equator was crossed, also, it had been necessary
considerably to modify the means of determining directions and
bearings. The rude astrolabe had been improved and the constel-
lations of a new hemisphere learned. Nevertheless, in the time of
Da Gama and his successors navigation was a haphazard affair.
To take an observation with an approach to accuracy it was neces-
sary to land ; this was done repeatedly by Da Gama on his first
voyage. The compass was known, but its use was checked by the
superstition of the sailors. ^ Without satisfactory charts and pilots
dangers abounded, and although the efforts of Prince Henry had
exorcised most of the ridiculous superstitions of preceding centuries,
yet in their frequent calamities, due to storms and unseaworthy
craft, the sailors, as Albuquerque remarked, " always had the
pumps in their hands and the Virgin Mary in their mouths." ^
Voyages were lengthened out into years. Da Gama, it is true,
covered the distance from Lisbon to Calicut between July 8, 1497,
and May 20, 1498 ; but it took one unfortunate captain consider-
ably more than two years, and several trials, to make the return-
voyage.^ And if the perils of the sea and of indifferent quality of
ships and seamanship were overcome, there still remained the
danger of encountering one's fellow-men. Every strange vessel
was a possible enemy, and even friends, in the panic of ignorance
and inexperience, could not be relied upon. On the Indian coast,
ships blown into a wrong port became lawful prize ; and during the
wars succeeding the Portuguese entrance into the eastern seas, a
rank growth of piracy was fostered.* The conditions of navigation,
of which such instances as the above are typical, must be con-
stantly kept in mind in order to form a just estimate of the
Portuguese exploits and failures in the East.
1 Hunter, I, 71 ; Major, pp. 58, 59.
2 Whiteway, p. 46, note ; a short description of the voyage to India is found in
Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 306 ff.
3 Beazley, in Azurara, II, cxi-cxii, cxliv ; Whiteway, pp. 45 ff. ; Lindsay, I, 547 ff.
* Whiteway, pp. 44-45, 47, 175-176; Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 282-283.
94
COLONIZATION
The Monopoly and its Defense
If the risks were great, the rewards could scarcely be regarded
as disproportionate. The freight of Da Gama's ships covered the
expenses of his voyage sixty times over.^ Of Cabral's fleet only
five vessels out of thirteen returned laden, but the cargo more
than repaid the cost of the whole fleet. The elation and excitement
in Lisbon may be imagined, for these were the first rich rewards
of monopoly. At this time the Portuguese merchant-in-chicf, that
is, the king, assumed with Papal sanction the resonant title of
Lord of the Navigation, Conquest, and Commerce of Ethiopia,
Arabia, Persia, and India. '-^ The very exuberance of self-confidence
indicated by this rather premature assumption witnesses to the
exceptional and exalted frame of mind in which the foremost
people to grasp opportunities unparalleled in history approached
their destiny.
It was the voyage of Da Gama, then, which brought to its defi-
nite fruition the work of Prince Henry. The first striking evidence
of its importance was the readjustment of the markets and routes
of the eastern products, which followed upon the safe return of
this expedition.^ The Venetians came after a time to perceive
1 To get these spices was, says Ruge (p. 203), " das iiusserste und letzte Ziel der
portugiesischen Handelspolitik." For some discussion of the prices of pepper, etc.,
at this time, see Danvers, I, 64; Ruge, pp. 127-128, 20?-203; and especially the
tables of D'Avenel, passim. Cf. note 3 below.
Those who would gain a conception of the difficulty of attaining anything approach-
ing exactitude of valuations in past centuries should read the opening chapters of
U'Avenel, and consider the herculean toil evidenced in his treatise. In the present
book no attempt could be made to secure such exactitude, and wherever prices are
quoted or money-values transferred into modern terms, it must be understood that
only rough approximations are presented.
2 Hunter, I, 104. King Manuel displayed great ostentation in his embassy to the
Pope, announcing the tidings ; he attempted in some degree to assume the leader-
ship of Europe, especially as against the Turks. Martins, Hist, de Port., II, 6 ff .
8 The statement has been made that, in consequence of Da Gama's return, spice-
prices experienced a sudden drop of 50 per cent or more. Cf. Adams, p. 289. If
this statement is made to apply directly or by implication to more than local and
exceptional conditions, it does not represent what one is led to expect from the first
infringement of a monopoly-price. The Portuguese were actuated as little by
philanthropic intent as had been the Venetians before them, and could hardly have
bidden under the latter to any extent greater than was necessary in order to attract
their customers away. Cf. note 2, p. 73 above. Some local flurries of a speculative
nature might have been experienced, but, taxed as they were in transit, it is incredible
that the Italians could have supported even for a few years such losses as the halving
of prices would have brought upon them. The detailed tables of prices of eastern
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 95
that their worst apprehensions had been reahzed, that both their
center and their routes of distribution had been superseded ; and
they made some approaches to the king of Portugal with a view
to saving at least a share of their disappearing commercial advan-
tage. But it was not in the spirit of an age imbued with the
Italian theories to refrain from utilizing the immediate advantages
of the commercial upper-hand ; cooperation was impossible, and
the struggle, now rendered practically hopeless for the Venetians,^
pursued its course. The scene of the conflict was transferred,
however, to regions nearer the sources of supply, and the opposi-
tion of the Venetians was felt, not directly, but indirectly in the
person of the Arabs and later of the Turks. The trade-routes
toward the west, mainly in the hands of the former, started from
Malacca and, diverging from its complementary port, Calicut,
passed into the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. At the entrance of
the former lay Aden, whence routes finally emerged into the Medi-
terranean, by way of the Nile or Suez, over Cairo and Alexandria ;
it was by way of Aden also that the supplies of goods and the
ship-loads of pilgrims destined for Mecca and other Moslem centers
were carried. The corresponding port on the Persian Gulf route
was Ormuz, an island-city ; from this point the trade-way passed
through Mesopotamia, then westward (via caravan) through Syria
to Beirut. Through these channels the Venetians obtained the bulk
of their Oriental products. More immediately, however, the Red
Sea traffic served the purposes and revenues of the Mameluke
Sultan of Egypt ; and the latter speedily became aware of the
presence of the Portuguese in India through the complaints of
the Venetians, and, more effectively, through a decline in his own
products given by D'Avenel in Vol. IV (especially pp. 576-577) indicate a more
normal sequence of events, as do the figures of Thorold Rogers (III, 518-543; IV,
656-660). According to the latter authority, spices were cheapest in England, in the
period under discussion, from 1471 to 1490, while their highest quotations are for
1521-1540. The significant fact here is that the latter period follows closely upon
the date (1517) of the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans, an event which, as has
been seen, practically put an end to Venetian competition. Cf. also Rogers, IV,
chap, xxiii'; Ileyd, II, 525-526, 531-532. D'Avenel's figures show no startling
changes in price-levels toward the end of the fifteenth century. In view of these con-
siderations it seems to the present writer that the rather dramatic statement alluded
to at the beginning of this note does not fairly represent those general market-
conditions with which we are here concerned.
1 In 1521 the Court of Lisbon refused an offer of the Republic of Venice to buy
up all the spices yearly brought to Portugal, over and above what Portugal itself
required. Hunter, I, 187. See p. 69 above.
96 COLONIZATION
revenues. To these causes of irritation was added the even more
disquieting fact that the victorious activities of the Christians in the
West were now to be transferred to a new and promising field.
The Sultan accordingly threatened the Pope (Julius II) with war in
the Mediterranean and the East, and with the destruction of the
Holy Sepulcher, in case the activities of the Portuguese vvere not
suspended. King Manuel was able to defy the Sultan through the
Pope ; and, in view of the concourse of enemies in the Mediterra-
nean, the Sultan determined to crush the Portuguese in India, where
they could count on no allies. The Portuguese learned in 1505 of
these plans and of the formation of a considerable fleet designed
to approach India the next year.^
The "Crusade in the East": Almeida
Although Vasco da Gama and the sev^eral captains who, up to
this period, had succeeded him, had operated in behalf of the
king, — for, from Prince Henry down, these enterprises had taken
their direct origin in the royal initiative,- — they had worked
almost wholly for commercial ends. Adventure was eagerly sought,
but the idea of conquest and subjugation had not as yet appeared
in any definite form. When Arab ships had been seized and
plundered, religious hatred had been sated by a gruesome mal-
treatment of the men, women, and children taken with the vessels ;
this activity might be called " religious piracy," were such a term
self-explanatory. But when the Portuguese interests in India
came to be threatened by the inhdel, there appeared in the East,
as there had appeared in the West years before, a centralization
and unification of political and, through it, of religious strength
and control. It is more than a picturesque fact that the first
viceroy of India should have been a man who had won a high
reputation with the Spaniards before Granada. To the Iberians a
Moor was a Moor, and the best man to oppose the Moors of the
East was one who had distinguished himself in conflict with those
of the West. This man was Francisco d'Almeida, who was hurried
^ Ruge, pp. 145-147. Hunter remark.s that this conflict was "the third and last
act in the long conflict between mediaeval Christendom and Islam" (T, 115); l"^ing
Manuel "knew that he had turned tlio flank of Islam, and that he had the sympathy
of Catholic Europe in this final and greatest of the Crusades" (I, 116).
2 Stephens (p. 176) says that nearly all the great Portuguese heroes of the period
were of the noble classes.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 97
off to India in March, 1505, to oppose the Sultan's movement; it
is signilicant of the nature of this expedition that it drew support
from Genoese, Florentine, and German merchants, but met only
hostility from Venetian sources.^ Almeida was fitted out with
what was at that time a powerful force ; there were over twenty
ships and about i 500 soldiers pledged to a service of at least three
years. Other squadrons followed, for national enthusiasm was
aroused. After some inconsiderable reverses he managed to gain
a complete naval victory at Diu (February, 1509); in this battle
he commanded a fleet of twenty-three ships and 1600 soldiers.
The Egyptian ships were attacked systematically, and sunk one
after the other; the native auxiliaries and the city were spared,
for the viceroy could not risk the hostihty of the local potentate,
and held, besides, to a general policy of friendly relations with the
natives.
The impending danger which had called into activity the patriotic
and religious zeal of the Portuguese was thus, at least temporarily,
repelled. But the popular sentiment in Portugal was not satisfied
with this ; it demanded a general crusade against the Mohamme-
dans in the East wherever and whenever encountered. It was not
content with Almeida's idea of concentrating a power on the sea
which would hold the most valuable parts of the Indian coast
tributary to the Portuguese trade and government ; it found its
ideal, rather, in the offensive operations of Affonso d'Albuquerque,
with which Almeida had no sympathy. Its goal was conquest and
the propagation of the faith. Thus it may be said that the Sultan's
attack precipitated in India a consolidation of Portuguese power
similar to that effected nearer home in wars with the European
and North African Moslems. Of this state of popular energy and
aggression the radical Albuquerque expressed the spirit ; so that
with his accession to the governorship the hitherto uncertain policy
of the Portuguese turned squarely toward conquest. At this parting
of the ways it is useful to compare the variant policies of these two
exceptional men, the first viceroy and his successor.^ Almeida had
started out with a threefold task : to secure a base for permanent
occupation in East Africa ; to effect the coercion of the Malabar
ports and the construction of factories ; and to break the Moslem
1 Ruge, p. 147.
2 Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 236 ff., 241-245, 269-270; Hunter, I, 118 ff., I35ff.;
Danvers, I, xxviii-xxx, 261 ff.; Whiteway, p. 16.
98 COLONIZATION
sea-power. By the construction of a fort at Quiloa and by the
reduction of Mombasa his first purpose was realized ; by the
destruction of the Zamorin's fleet and that of the Arabs, not only
were the Malabar ports rendered available to the Portuguese, but
the influence of the latter was extended as far as Ceylon ; ^ and as
a consequence of the engagement at Diu the Indian Ocean was
made for a hundred years a Portuguese sea. It is little wonder,
therefore, that Almeida favored a sea-policy and opposed the
foundation of garrisons, except at dominant points ; for to his
mind they simply depleted his power. He wished also to confine
his operations to India alone, in order not to divide his forces ; he
believed it would be impossible for Portugal, with its small popula-
tion, effectively to maintain a colonial empire under Portuguese
administration. In this view, as will be seen, he was largely
justified by the final outcome.
Albuquerque
Albuquerque's programme, on the other hand, representing the
more alluring idea of empire and of a general campaign against
the infidel, appealed to the king with a peculiar force ; for it fell
in with the spirit of an age of grandiose movements in both the
temporal and spiritual fields. Albuquerque believed that the whole
Moslem world was united against him ; neither he nor the king
realized the presence of a conflict between the Ottoman and Mame-
luke Sultans. He felt, therefore, that command of the sea was
not enough to assure the Portuguese of the upper-hand ; that a
land empire alone could afford a sufificient base of operations during
the ups and downs of a life-and-death struggle, especially in the
case of a metropolis so distant as was Portugal at this stage of
undeveloped communications. F'or this reason he wished to convert
every captured district into a permanent possession ; and, dis-
believing in the utility of alliances with local sovereigns, he inva-
riably planned to coerce conquered princes into acknowledging
Portugal as a suzerain power. He aimed at the command of all
the trade between East and West ; but he intended to found such
dominance entirely upon physical force, exercised directly and
solely by the Portuguese. This demanded a cordon of fortresses
^ Ceylon was visited in 1505 and conquered in 1515. Von Brandt, p. 511. A good
general account of tiie penetration of the eastern seas by Europeans is given by this
author.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 99
and naval stations at strategical points, and also factories and
colonies to meet the demands of an enormous development of
exchange and to repair the wastage of life entailed by this general
policy.^ Almeida could not be accused of tenderness toward the
Moslems ; but the projects of Albuquerque looking to their dis-
comfiture were no less than vast, not to say visionary. The old
crusading spirit, as so often in Spanish and Portuguese colonization,
was highly developed in both men. Albuquerque, for example,
planned and actually attempted a reckless expedition for the pur-
pose of seizing Mohammed's bones, to hold as ransom for the
Holy Sepulcher, or to burn in public ; and even contemplated with
the utmost seriousness the diversion of the Nile into the Red Sea
for the purpose of ruining Egypt. His actual activities in India
were grouped about three main purposes : to intercept Moslem
trade at its base in the upper Nile region and the Persian Gulf ;
to destroy Moslem trade on the Malabar coast by concentrating
the commerce of that region in Portuguese ports ; and to seize
the fountain-heads of the spice-trade by taking Malacca. The
Portuguese were intent upon diverting to themselves the profits in
the spice-trade enjoyed by Mohammedans and Italians; that in the
attainment of this end the unbelievers would suffer was an added
incentive. In Albuquerque's mind these objectives went hand in
hand with empire ; " he supplied no new aim, he merely pointed
out a new method of attaining an old object." ^
Differing thus in his views from Almeida, Albuquerque got the
ear of the king and was sent out in 1508 to succeed the viceroy;
his title, however, was merely governador. He died late in the
year 15 15. Within the few years of his command, however, is to
be reckoned the real glory-period of Portuguese dominance in India.^
For this reason, and because during these years there emerged
many a portent of the dull decades to come, it is fitting to dwell
here somewhat at length upon details and chronicles of events.
^ Hunter, I, 119 ff.; Danvers, I, xxviii ff. ; Whiteway, pp. 169 ff. ; the annals of
Portuguese India are full, for example, of the costly sieges resulting from this policy.
2 Hunter, I, 100 ff., 125-126; Whiteway, p. 16 (quotation); Martins, Hist, de
Port., I, 251, 264. Leroy-Beaulieu (I, 46-47) regards Almeida's policy as the more
sound; he cites the costs, enmities, jealousies, etc., of the conquest policy, and quotes
a contemporary, Sir Thomas Roe (early seventeenth century), upon the disadvantages
of the Portuguese policy as laid down by Albuquerque. Cf. also Martins, Hist, de
Port., I, 298-299.
3 An excellent brief article. " De Portugeezen in den Maleischen Archipel," is
found in Encycl. Ned. Ind.
lOO COLONIZATION
Albuquerque's Administration
The threefold purpose alkKlcd to formed the basis of Albuquei
que's action. He commenced operations with an attack on Cali-
cut ; but the ill-success of this and other early ventures led him to
pause before Goa until he had restored the discipline and morale
of his forces. The soldiers were drilled, and laxness in all branches
of administration was corrected with characteristic decision and
energy. Many enemies were thus made, but it was only during
Albuquerque's last years that they succeeded in thwarting his
designs. The disciplined forces were now turned against Goa,
the headquarters of a league whose object was to eject the Portu-
guese from India, and prospectively a good base of operation for
the Turks; it fell in November, 1510.^ This result, as Albu-
querque had foreseen, greatly enhanced the prestige of the Portu-
guese, not only in the East, where the native princes hastened to
declare their allegiance, but in Europe as well. According to Albu-
querque, the taking of Goa kept India in repose ; the city became
his capital and that of his successors. Its capture represented to
the Portuguese the success of the endeavor to control the Malabar
coast. But such local and defensive operations were but the begin-
ning of Albuquerque's projects ; it remained to lay hands upon
the sources themselves of the Oriental trade. There had been a
factor in Malacca, the great entrepot of the Far East, since 1508,
and the importance of this focus of trade-routes, rendered by
geographical and meteorological conditions the terminal of con-
verging sea-roads, was a cardinal belief in Albuquerque's mind.
In 15 1 1, as soon as his hands were free on the Malabar coast, he
led an expedition which took Malacca, thereafter destined to remain
in Portuguese possession for about a hundred years.
These operations at a distance were doubtless more important
for Albuquerque's general plans, effecting as they did a stoppage
of Mohammedan trade at the source, but it was an ideal dear to his
crusading spirit to attack the infidel at his very doors. These were,
so far as commerce was concerned, Ormuz and Aden.^ His designs
on Ormuz were revealed even before he became governor. Indeed,
it had become increasingly apparent, since the arrival of the
Portuguese, that the real and sole menace to their commercial
supremacy came directly from the north. The native rulers were
1 Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 260-262 ; Whiteway, p. 137. ^ See p. 95, above.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST loi
regularly incited to opposition by Egyptian agents, and the king
repeatedly urged an expedition to the Red Sea.^ In 15 15 the
governor was successful in extending a sort of protectorate over
Ormuz and its environs ; a move which effectively closed the Per-
sian Gulf to the Mohammedans. An attack on Aden, the key to
the Red Sea route, failed after great expenditure of resources
and lives, but the trade in these waters was greatly crippled by
the possession of Goa and the other Indian ports, and by the
constant activities of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. The
Mohammedan ships were forced to sail around Ceylon and were
often hunted out in waters even so remote. Thus the purpose of
intercepting Mohammedan trade C7i route was largely realized ; and
the insecurity caused by the successes and restless energy of
Albuquerque was an even more deadly blow. Ottoman resources
were drained and Ottoman forces divided ; this proved the saving
of Europe itself.^
All these successes, crowded into the space of a few years, raised
the renown of Portugal and of the governor to an extraordinary
degree. At the end of Albuquerque's life Portugal was the undis-
puted mistress of the East, while in India peace was universal from
Ormuz to Ceylon. The interior of the land " he left so quiet and
well-ordered that there was never a nation left so completely con-
quered and subdued by force of arms as this was." ^ Trade was
not endangered by robbery ; east of Cape Comorin the kings were
at peace and friendly with Portugal, and even Malacca enjoyed
repose. The kings of Siam, Java, and even China were glad to
make peace with the redoubtable conqueror.* All these results
were the outcome of a strong man's guidance ; the Portuguese
were as brave both before and after, but they never again swept
all before them. A review of Albuquerque's personality and inter-
nal administration throws much light, partly by contrast, upon a
century of Portuguese dominance.
Albuquerque's Personality
He was a man of great sagacity and decision of character, as
fearless elsewhere as he was in battle ; his policy was therefore
an intelligent, independent, and consistent one.^ He was deeply
1 Ruge, p. 177 ; on the " Rumes," cf. Payne, Age of Disc, pp. 27 ff.
2 Hunter, I, 132.
8 Danvers, I, 330. * Id., I, 330-331. ^ Whiteway, pp. 131, 169-171.
I02 COLONIZATION
religious, strictly loyal, and incorruptible ; and so, while he dealt
hardlv and to our eyes mercilessly with the enemies of the faith,
he upheld against constant and treacherous opposition standards of
rectitude in the colonial service. He had a talent for the business
of administration ; he labored incessantly himself, and required no
less of his subordinates. And yet he was not so immersed in detail
that he could not view his own activities in perspective, and look
forward to and plan for a period of peace as the end and outcome
of war. He was fortunately so far removed from Lisbon that his
actions were not subject to control, even if he had wished it. The
fact of it was that he resisted and resented interference, even from
the king,^ and it was owing to the high opinion of the latter that
he had his own way so largely, to Portugal's profit, for the term
of his command.
Turning to some of Albuquerque's measures, we find his charac-
ter reflected not only in their excellences but also in their defects.
He would not tolerate inefficiency or slothfulness in his subordi-
nates ; he constantly appealed to Portugal for a better quality of
functionaries. He exclaimed in exasperation that the latter were
so poorly trained that they were " not fit to purchase two-penny-
worth of bread in the bazaar. A clerk trained in the counting-
house of Bartholomew, the Florentine, would be more useful than
all the factors the king has in India." ^ Disinterested himself, he
pursued with vigor the detection and punishment of dishonest
officials ; he wished the temptation to unrighteousness to be
removed by the extension of the term of offices from three to
eight years. He himself, in spite of unexampled opportunities for
amassing wealth, left scarcely any property behind.^ All presents
that came into his hands passed on to those of the king or queen.
He had a way of summarily disposing, during his morning pere-
grinations, of many complaints and petitions ; the parties were
thus satisfied, and processes spared, which, in the ordinary channels,
would have been indefinitely spun out and correspondingly involved
and costly. He was interested, above all, in the development of
1 He once retorted to the king, to whom he practically refused obedience from
time to time, " But do not require of me every year an account of what I am doing,
as if I were a tax-gatherer." Danvers, I, 263.
2 Whiteway, p. 174; cf. Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 298.
8 He made his will, and in leaving his last wishes to his successor his old humor
flashed out : " I beg he will not put up my goods to auction : I do not wish my
ragged old breeches to be seen." Whiteway, p. 166; cf. p. 174.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 103
trade and the attendant advance in the well-beinf; of the people.
He even checked, so far as possible, the indiscriminate persecution
of the Moslems, and granted passes to Arab ships for trade other
than that in spices.^
It was, however, in his relations to the native population that
his peculiar powers found their most striking expression. His
personality was of the compelling sort which inspires the Oriental
with awe and which he will follow blindly. The very heat of
Albuquerque's temper and the swiftness with which action followed
on impulse captivated the imagination of the Easterners, and the
governor's herculean toil and notable successes were calculated to
impress sturdier spirits than theirs. But Albuquerque was more :
through quick perception or long experience he understood the
workings of the native mind, and aroused their respectful admira-
tion by repeatedly overreaching them in their own methods of
intrigue and wile.^ Albuquerque's insight into local conditions
was generally unerring ; for example, he realized that in Malacca
the Portuguese had replaced a foreign (Mohammedan) intruder,
who was hated cordially, and so he exerted himself to appear, in
contrast to his predecessors, friendly to the native dynasties.'^ And
he was, though stern, approachable and just to a degree remark-
able in his day ; his word was scrupulously kept, and a promised
punishment or reward seldom failed to be meted out. If he him-
self oppressed, he did not allow the liberty to his subordinates ;
his clear-headed judgment was not warped by fear or favor. His
pithy and proverbial speeches circulated among all classes. An
atmosphere of superstitious awe enveloped his striking figure ;
and after his death the natives made pilgrimages and left offerings
at his tomb to secure his aid against the oppression and injustice
of his successors.*
1 Whiteway, pp. 160, 162.
2 According to Whiteway (pp. 24-25), these methods, successful only in a master's
hands, reacted banefully upon the Portuguese. Among the moral causes of Portu-
guese decline, he says, "one of the most potent was the adaptation of the Oriental
methods of diplomacy which placed Eastern and Western on the same plane, and in
an intrigue the Eastern won." Another cause was " ingrained suspicion and distrust
of each other," referable possibly to the same methods.
3 Ruge, pp. 171-172.
* Whiteway, pp. 166-169; Hunter, I, 140. The Hindus still have fetiches which
they call " Affonso de Albuquerques." Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 267.
I04
COLONIZATION
Albuquerque's Policy
The policy of Albuquerque toward the natives is said to have
been modeled upon that of Alexander the Great ; his furious
attacks in war and his deft treatment of the Orientals certainly
bore likeness to those of the Macedonian.^ It was his policy, after
inflicting a thorough-going and unquestioned defeat, to bind the sub-
ject people to him through even-handed justice and even affection ;
and he never let slip the opportunity to impress the susceptible
Oriental mind by pomp and ostentation. He left the administration
of conquered countries to the natives, but kept the military and
the revenues in his own hands. The general arrangements with
princes were that the Portuguese should be allowed to erect
fortresses, that merchandise should enter no Indian port save
Goa, and that the natives should not receive Turks into their
kingdoms ; but inasmuch as the objects of the Portuguese were at
first largely commercial, the tribute-system was not an exaggerated
one.^ The colonial, as distinguished from the purely commercial
and political policy of Albuquerque deserves a word ; as has been
stated, he proposed to draw the men for the armies and navies,
which would be rendered necessary by his policy as distinguished
from that of Almeida, from colonies in India. He could not hope
for any considerable emigration of women from Portugal ; he
therefore fostered unions between the Portuguese and the native
women. This policy had been foreshadowed by Da Gama, and
was one of the expedients of Alexander the Great. It is to be
noted that the Portuguese were, in the home-country, accustomed
to mixed unions and their offspring, and consequently there was
little or no prejudice to overcome. " In every Portuguese settle-
ment the married men rapidly became a caste to themselves with
special privileges ; all petty offices were reserved for them, and in
Goa all the lands belonging to the King — a very large part of the
area — were divided among them." ^ Albuquerque also encouraged
the married men to engage in industrial pursuits. It is perhaps an
anticipation to say that this policy was totally unsuccessful ; as
will be seen, the mongrel type thus formed tended to revert, in the
absence of regular infusion of the blood of one of its constituent
1 Danvers, I, 328 ff.
2 Danvers, I, 255. For models of these treaties, see Hunter, I, 142 ff.
8 Whiteway, p. 177 ; cf. p. 17 ; Danvers, I, 217.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 105
elements, to the type of the country of its origin, and thus was
unable to hold its own with sturdier races. Comparison is here chal-
lenged with the results which appeared in Brazil. These " colonies,"
in any case, amounted to little or nothing ; they were a curse
rather than a blessing.^ In three places only did the Portuguese
hold cities that had been transferred under treaty or as a result of
conquest ; these were Diu, Bassein with Salsette, and Goa, all
upon small islands. Here only were the Portuguese masters ; the
consequence was that European settlers were relatively numerous
and that these cities lost their native hue. Elsewhere the Portu-
guese came to dominate only so far from their forts, or the coast,
as their guns would carry. Moreover, in spite of their familiarity
with a relatively warm climate, and their proverbial temperance,
the Portuguese succumbed in large numbers to the climate of India.
Their dense ignorance of the laws of health, and the demoralization
of their customs, effectually blocked all possible efforts toward
neutralizing the changed environmental conditions. ^
The relatively extended term of Albuquerque gave to Portuguese
policy a fixity from which there was in form little subsequent
deviation ; but it will be seen that the same policy, in the hands
of inferior men, took on a different aspect and led to disastrous
results. The fact is that Albuquerque's policy was himself. He
was an imperator, with the virtues and faults characteristic of the
practically unlimited despot. His system was satisfactory, there-
fore, in his hands only ; when his powerful grasp was relaxed, a
thousand growing disorders, hitherto held at bay, began to compass
the disintegration of the structure. These influences embittered
Albuquerque's last days. After years of effort his enemies, often
the victims of his inexorable insistence upon purity in the service,
gained the ear of the king and effected his supersession. Officials
whom he had cashiered were sent back in positions of power ; one
of his enemies was named as his successor.^ " In bad repute with
men," he exclaimed, " because of the King, and in bad repute with
1 Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 260-262 ; Hunter, I, 162 ; Whiteway, pp. 24-25,
176-178; cf. p. 164, below. Leroy-Beaulieu (I, 42) says : " Ce ne furent pas de veri-
tables colonies dans le sens etroit du mot, c'est-a-dire des etablissements territoriaux
destines a etre peuples par les habitants de la metropole, ce fut une chaine de comp-
toirs et de points de ravitaillement, defendus par des fortresses, qui constitua les
celebres possessions portugaises."
2 Huge, p. 199; Urunialti, p. 105; Whiteway, pp. 24-25; Lavisse et Rambaud,
IV, 897. 3 Danvers, I, 326 ff.
Io6 COLONIZATION
the King because of the men, it were well that I were gone." He
had lived a life of toil and self-denial, had never been viceroy, was
superseded as governor, yet he lifted up his hands to heaven,
"giving many thanks to our Lord." ^ His was the old crusading
spirit, the deep loyalty and ardent piety which lent strength to the
Iberians to accomplish unheard-of deeds and die gladly for the King
and the Faith. But in Albuquerque we have plainly an exceptional
man, to whom the ordinary limitations of humanity do not apply.
This was realized after his death. Too late King Manuel reversed
the order for his retirement ; regrets for the old warrior (he died
at the age of 63) replaced the scanty recognition accorded him in
life. For his capture of Malacca he had not received even verbal
acknowledgment ; but when he was dead, the superstitious awe of
the natives invaded the thankless minds of the Portuguese. It was
provided in his will that his body should be taken home to Portu-
gal ; but the Portuguese kings believed that India would be safe
for Portugal only while his bones rested there, and it took a fulmi-
nation of the Pope to secure the carrying-out of his wishes (1566).^
Extent of the Empire
It is not in the plan of this treatise to pursue in detail the
exploits or failures of Albuquerque's successors. In Albuquerque
is found the climax of Portuguese power and glory in the East,^
and already in his lifetime decline had set in, never to be seriously
interru])ted.
The centers of Portuguese influence in the East ha\-e been indi-
cated in what has gone before. No additions of moment were
made to the empire after the death of Albuquerque. As may
have been gathered, the East African possessions received com-
paratively little attention from him ; of these something will be
said further on. An unsuccessful exj^edition or raid was occasionally
directed toward the Red Sea coast or that of the northern Arabian
Sea. The final capture and defense of Diu, in 1537 and 1538, by
Nuno da Cunha deserves rank among the best exploits of the
1 His words were : " Mai com os homens por amor d'elrey, mal com elrey per
amor dos homens, bom e acabar." Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 266; Hunter, I, 128.
2 On the life and activities of Albuquerque, see his Commentaries ; also Hunter,
Whiteway, Dan vers, /(?j\r/w. References are given in these books to primary sources.
■■^ " A cette date de 1515, la situation de I'ortugal est merveilleuse. Le petit
royaume est devenu le premier des Etats maritimes." Lavisse et Rambaud, IV, 891.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 107
Portuguese. Strong aid was lent to Diu by the Turks ; the Portu-
guese recruits were a poor lot, yet the spirit and vigor of the com-
mander roused them to truly heroic activity. As usual the sight
of the Crescent spurred dormant energies to a sort of irresistible
frenzy. 1 But the bulk of attention at this time was turned toward
the farther East. Ceylon was approached in Almeida's time and
was later brought into a subject relation. The Coromandel Coast,
the region of Calcutta, and certain portions of Burma were visited
in a desultory manner. In Albuquerque's time relations were
joined with some of the rulers of Farther India and China. After
taking Malacca, Albuquerque sent an expedition to explore the
Moluccas (151 1); factors were located in the islands and in 1564
Portuguese suzerainty was acknowledged.^ Borneo was visited in
1530, and various expeditions penetrated to this and that island of
the Archipelago, to New Guinea, and even farther. Toward the
north-east they visited the Philippines, and in 1540 the first Portu-
guese came to Japan. In none of these cases were colonies founded,
and there were few permanent factories. However, by 1571 the
"empire," extending as it did from Africa to China, was thought
to be too great for control from a single center. King Sebastian
constructed three separate governments : that of India, including
all territory from Cape Guardafui to Ceylon ; that of Monomotapa,
extending from Cape Corrientes to Cape Guardafui ; and that of
Malacca, covering the claims between Pegu and China. The head-
official of the India department kept the title of viceroy ; the
others were called governors.^ In 1580, by the accession of
Philip II to the Portuguese throne, the whole Portuguese East
came under Spanish influence and remained so for sixty years.
The Army and Navy
The military operations of the Portuguese, especially during the
first years of the sixteenth century, seem to our eyes remarkable ;
their forces were always small, but their achievements appear to
have been accomplished with an almost ridiculous ease, and in a
spirit of light-hearted confidence and daring. The losses of the
1 Ruge, pp. 193 ff. Martins (Hist, de Port., II, 276!?.) describes the wretched
material upon which this commander had to rely.
2 On the more detailed history of the Moluccas, see Argensola, passim.
3 Danvers, II, i ff. ; for a list of the viceroys and governors, see Martins, Hist, de
Port., I, 291.
Io8 COLONIZATION
Portuguese were often of the most trivial nature, while their oppo-
nents suffered crushing defeats or annihilation.^ This was so for
almost a century, despite the growing demoralization of army and
administration. The element of good fortune constantly favored
the invaders, and came to be reckoned upon as a matter of course.
Opportune arrivals of unexpected reenforcements, timely ravages
of disease among the enemy, — such occurrences are the order of
the day. Not a little of the success of the early periods is referable
to that mood of confidence, rooted in the conviction of divine
approval and strengthened by good luck, which attended what was
in reality a crusade. The truly heroic deeds thus inspired brighten
the annals of conquest. However, one must not be led by the
prolixity of Portuguese descriptions to infer that even the majority
of the engagements with the natives consisted of operations on
the grand scale ; many of them were merely " magnified street
brawls." ^ Nor must too much importance be lent to the originally
enormous advantage of the possession of cannon and fire-arms. The
ordnance and matchlocks were more effective at first through the
noise of their explosions than through the force or accuracy of
their fire ; indeed, they were often more dangerous to the marks-
man than to the target.^ The Portuguese were, however, greatly
superior in armor ; the risk of the panoplied knight was suffocation
rather than wounds. It must be realized also that their opponents
were seldom well organized. The success of the Portuguese rested
rather upon their past : the discipline and experience of the Euro-
pean wars, the endurance and fearlessness derived from facing
new and strange vicissitudes, the conviction of superiority and of
divine approval, — these are the qualities that enabled them to win
with such apparent ease.'* Indeed, much more peril lay in the voy-
age to India than in the fighting which came after ; on the average,
it is said, not 60 per cent of the men who left Portugal for India
reached their destination : of DaGama's 170 men only 55 survived
to return to Portugal.^
During the century the Portuguese held an irregular coast-line
of 15,000 miles; but this was solely through their navy. That
1 See, for instance, Danvers, I, 480-481, 534-535, 565, 566, 567, 56S, 571.
2 Whiteway, p. 35; Hunter, I, 93-96.
8 A shot fired point-blank by the Portuguese at the hull of an Egyptian ship in 150S
cleared the fighting top of its defenders. Whiteway, p. 39 ; cf. pp. 37 ff.
< See Danvers, I, 377 ff., 384, 473, 531, 545, 555.
5 See Whiteway, pp. 47, 82.
THE rORlUCUKSE IN THE EAST 109
invisible agent was always able to concentrate, strike, and dis-
appear ; it was assured of an unquestioned prestige, under local
conditions, whatever became of the army.^ And its successes
against unmatched opponents lent it a world-wide and utterly dis-
proportionate distinction. In spite of isolated exploits of great
brilliancy, however, both arms of the service speedily declined in
the sixteenth century. At the end of the reign of Manuel, "The
Fortunate," decadence was already manifest throughout the Portu-
guese dominions.^ Albuquerque is found to complain bitterly of the
equipments and the men forwarded to him from Lisbon. The
former were flimsy, and often old and patched ; the latter were
insufficient in number and of contemptible quality.^ The miscege-
nation furthered by Albuquerque gradually lowered even this low
quality ; and the native auxiliaries, although they never came up
to expectation, were often preferred to the Portuguese. After a
time discipline was relaxed, and when the meager pay of officers
and men ran behind and stopped, the army became a military mob,
which sold its equipments and those of the military posts, and
gambled away the proceeds. The old faith in the saints degener-
ated into vague and superstitious hopes of supernatural aid ; the
spirit of the earlier years was gone, and with it former good fortune.
The amount of genuine bad luck met by the Portuguese early in
the seventeenth century is almost as striking as was their good
luck at the outset. The navy also suffered, although its decline
was not so immediately self-evident. The vessels for the India
defense and trade became ever more unwieldy, in the attempt to
make them more imposing, and for decades their reputation rested
upon nothing but the inflated prestige just alluded to.^
1 Hunter, I, 134, 166 ff. To such relatively small advances as the Portuguese made
in nautical matters the dictum of Foreman (pp. 12-13) can yet be applied, when he
says that it is the modern scientific discoveries that have enlarged governmental areas
and made larger ones as compact as the older and smaller ones. ^ Corvo, I, 7.
3 Danvers, I, 305-306. Albuciuerque had more faith in his common sailors than
in his officers ; he called them " my cavaliers," and preferred to meet a crisis depend-
ing on them alone. Danvers, I, 275.
* On the original fear of the carracks, see Roscher, p. 256. The ships finally became
floating castles that could not stand the India voyage. The Madre de Deos had seven
stories, was 165 feet long and 47 feet beam. Hunter, I, 165 ; cf. pp. 160 ff . ; Martins,
Hist, de Port., I, 309, 316. The authors remark upon the progressively increasing
casualties from shipwreck, capture by enemies, etc. Martins (O Brazil, etc., pp. 35-
36) contrasts the extended period 1497-1612 with the critical years 1585-1597, and
finds that the percentages of vessels lost in the India service by wreck or fire in the
two periods were 8.4 per cent and 33.4 per cent ; those of ships captured by the enemy
no COLONIZATION
Monopoly Policy and Demoralization
All this witnesses for a demoralization of administration, center-
ing, in last resort, in Lisbon, and in the king. This administration,
if it should be so denominated, had in view but two points of policy :
to secure the commerce of the East, and to render it as productive
as possible. These really reduced to one and the same thing. It
has been shown how the initiative in the discovery of the Cape
route had been taken by royalty, and how the succeeding com-
mercial operations had been prosecuted on the count of the king ;
it was not in the spirit of the time, nor in the stage of material
advancement of the people, that such a movement should rise from
a popular origin. Hence the policy which directed it is primarily
royal, and national only in the sense that royal direction was popu-
larly accepted. The royal policy, in conformity with current com-
mercial ideas, was monopolistic, in this showing its relationship
with that of the republics of the Middle Ages. The system of
" secret commerce " was continued, being remodeled, however,
upon the new doctrine of exclusive right based on priority of
discovery and confirmed by the highest tribunal of the age.^
Although the exploitation of this monopoly belonged to the king,
the effects of his enterprises could not but be national. When,
therefore, Da Gama returned from the East, laden with spoils,
the effect upon all Portugal was galvanic. A limitless field for
"conquest, commerce, and conversion" was opened, and by contrast
the ordinary interests of the people seemed flat and unprofitable.
The spirit of adventure, the impulse to gamble with unheard-of
chances, combined with distaste for the common vocations of life
and a certain ardor for the saving of souls, laid hold upon a people
as averse to industry as they were predisposed to the life of
hazard. Every one hastened to get a share in the exploitation of
0.5 per cent and 3 per cent. These vessels were of from 500 to 600 tons, carried crews
of 120 and troops to the number of 250, and cost on the average about $20,000. Such
losses must be referred largely to the general demoralization of the service. See also
Hunter, I, 171.
1 Hunter, I, 218-221; cf. Varnhagen, I, 36, 79, 86. Pilots, seamen, and chart-
makers were long subjected to jealous scrutiny, restrictions, prohibitions, etc. ; and the
stock " commercial myths " were retailed.
About 1534 one Hotelho embarked from Diu, with a few men, in a bark i6J feet
long, 9 feet l)road, and 4', feet deep, and, without seamen or pilot, managed to reach
Lisbon. The bark was immediately burned, that the possibility of performing the
voyage in so small a vessel might not be discovered. Danvers, I, 409.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE F:AST m
the East.^ It is characteristic of the age, however, that the chron-
iclers give but little attention to trade and its development. Such
subjects, they felt, little befitted a "grave history" ; and so acci-
dental notices form the bulk of evidence along these lines. But it
is clear that the first operations in the East were immensely profit-
able. Characteristically these enterprises included a large element
of piracy, or, according to the ideas of the time, spoliation of the
infidel. There was, besides, the long-distance traffic, between
markets of widely diverse conjunctures, and likewise the port-to-
port trade in the East, in opium chiefly, and other local articles.
Tributes and ransoms were added components of income.^ The
net annual revenue of the king from India in early days, despite
the peculation to which it was almost from the outset exposed,
is reckoned at about $750,000; it is said that the king's profit
should have been $2,100,000 per annum.^ It was impossible, in
the face of such temptations, to anticipate or eradicate the most
wholesale corruption. The king was merchant-in-chief, because,
among a people to whom corporate enterprise was scarcely known,
he alone could control sufficient capital for the purpose in hand ;
but his subjects were not slow to improve a subsidiary capacity.
The Portuguese monarchs were willing to admit their subjects into
the eastern trade ; but only with the permission of the govern-
ment, and into certain restricted branches.^ The trade resolved
1 Schjifer, III, 330 ff. Martins (Hist, de Port., I, 222) says, characteristically,
"All Portugal embarked for India in Cabral's squadron."
2 " A pirataria e o saque foram os dois fundamentos do dominio portuguez, cujo
nervo eram os canhoes, cuja alma era a Pimenta." Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 233.
8 Hunter, I, 174-175. For some of the rich "hauls" of the Portuguese, see
Hunter, I, 170 ff. ; -Whiteway, pp. 143-144 ; Dan vers, /(?.«/>« ; Martins, Hist, de Port.,
I, 271 ff. Corvo (I, 9-10) calculates that at the end of the sixteenth century the
taxes and the monopolies of the Portuguese dominions rendered between three and
four million dollars, in modern money, and that the chief expenses amounted to 60 per
cent of this sum.
* Hunter, I, 104 ff., 175-176; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 47-48. The great royal monopoly
was the pepper trade. " It was so jealously guarded that no authority in India could
enter into any agreement or make any peace that affected it. It was the cause of
most of the coast wars, for the Muhamedans strove by every means to load cargoes
of pepper for the Red Sea, and there can be no doubt but that not many years after
the time of Albuquerque all the Portuguese, from the Governor downwards, traded
illicitly in pepper. The prices paid by the King were those fixed when his ships first
visited the coast, before competition had raised them; naturally the King got the
worst stuff in the market ; some sent home . . . was so bad that 33 years later it still
lay in the Lisbon warehouses." Whiteway, p. 171 ; Martins, Hist, de Port., II, 20.
On the conditions of cultivation of pepper, etc., see Wallace, chap, xix ; on the other
desirable products of the East, Cheyney, pp. 1 1 ff.
112 COLONIZATION
itself then into a royal monopoly operated through hundreds of
subordinates not susceptible of any adequate control from the
far-distant metropolis. The mood of these ofBcials, who were
poorly paid in anticipation of their own activities in accumula-
tion, soon became one of unscrupulous greed ; and the vital con-
ditions of life in the tropics further accentuated this attitude.
All other motives merged in the dominant one of the speedy
amassing of wealth ; and corruption in all branches of the pub-
lic service followed. Every one hastened to procure, through
slander, bribery, flattery, and general parasitism, some post in
the service whence he could derive gifts, extorted moneys, or
other riches.^
Naturally enough the king lost heavily through this disposition
on the part of his agents. The latter were at first allowed to load
some small amounts of merchandise in the cabins, or to get a low
percentage on the cargo ; but this speedily became a competing
private trade on a large scale, and the king's interests, especially
in the distant Indian ports, were regularly sacrificed. As early as
15 13 service on the royal ships was shunned, and private traders
coerced native rajahs to sell to them, leaving the king to purchase
at higher prices ; private cargoes were disposed of before the
king's goods had their turn.^ The king struggled against these
tendencies in vain. As early as 1524 the aged Vasco da Gama
was again sent out to India, and for the few remaining weeks of
his life quelled abuses with characteristic sternness. ^ A few
officers, like Da Gama's son, Estevao, completed their terms with
their means depleted ; but the abuses suffered merely a temporary
check. The old spirit was gone : it was no longer the desire of the
soldier to shed his blood for King and Faith, but all sorts of rascality
were excused on the ground of insufficiency of pay. The wages of
the soldier were indeed ridiculously small. It was tacitly admitted
that any one in India could add to his stipend by avocations of
some sort ; and in time the higher officials, representing the govern-
ment and king, began to pay off officers or appease relatives or
cast-off mistresses by the reversion of an office or the " gift of a
1 Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 245-246, 304 ff. ; Hunter, I, 175 ff. ; Lavisse et
Rambaud, IV, 898. The Portuguese government, despite the great sources of income
that lay before it, was never properly solvent. Whiteway, pp. 175-176.
2 In 1530 the Bengal voyage from Malabar yielded the captain ;[^2450 and the
king ^^78. Hunter, I, 177. Cf. Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 287.
^ Danvers, I, 368-374.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 113
voyage." ^ By such means the Indian administration, both in
Lisbon and in Goa, was thoroughly dcmoraHzed ; in 1552 the civic
authorities of the latter capital appealed to the king, asserting that
" In India there is no justice, either in your viceroy, or in those
who are to mete it out. . . . There is no Moor who will trust
a Portuguese." ^
Demoralization in the Metropolis
It is evident that such depravity of customs in that portion of
the nation's life which had to do with the colonies must have been
correlative with momentous changes in the metropolis itself. Allu-
sion has been made to the decline of the ancient and solid char-
acter of the people before the prospect of sudden wealth. The
result was a general movement to the capital, which soon increased
in quantity and declined in quality of population ; a movement
which early depleted the supply of labor in agriculture, and largely
increased the idle and dependent classes.^ To meet the shortage
of labor, especially in the south of Portugal, natives of Africa were
introduced under a system of slavery, with the result that, through
race-mixture and otherwise, a heavy blow was struck at the homo-
geneity and quality of population in general.'* The growth of
estates dispossessed the lesser nobility and gentry and caused them
the more surely to drift into the crowded centers, which, at that
stage of the arts, were the hotbeds of disease as well as vice. To
partially remedy this state of things the government came to use
India as a refuge for depraved and destitute clients ; for one and
all tried to force themselves into a share of the royal monopoly by
besieging the doors of the influential. Young women were shipped
1 According to Falcao, in 161 2 tlie China and Japan voyage was wortli $125,000;
that to Goa by Mozambique, #30,000 ; to the Moluccas, $35,000. Whiteway, pp. 74-
75. According to the same authority, at the same date the pay of the captain at
Sofala for three years was $4250, and the profits $285,000. The salary was a
matter of the utmost indifference, and not infrequently decreased. In 1 550 the captain
at Ormuz received $3000 a year and $1580 as the salary of his guard; in 161 2 the
captain's pay had sunk to $2000 a year, that of his guards had risen to $2700, and he
was allowed $4300 to recompense 40 hangers-on who were supported out of public
funds. Whiteway, p. 72. 2 Hunter, I, 185.
3 Stephens (p. 182) says that Lisbon trebled its population in 80 years, in spite of
unsanitary conditions and continuous pestilences. Martins, Hist, de Port., 1, 1 75-1 76 ;
Hunter, I, 181 ff.
* Corvo (I, 13) gives the annual importation of slaves into Lisbon, from about
1535 °"' ^^ 10,000; into Portugal, in 1573, as 40,000.
114 COLONIZATION
off to India with dowries of office for those who would marry
them ; the multipUcation of the forms of government employment
was carried to a ridiculous extent, but the rapidity of their creation
could not keep pace with the increase of applicants.^ For all this,
the wealth of the Indies poured into Portugal in prodigal abun-
dance ; ^ visible prosperity increased. Lisbon became the entrepot
of the western world. Yet at the same time the national wealth,
which was neither pepper nor pearls nor gold, was well on in its
decline. Prices of necessities rose very high ; population fell off ;
famine and disease wrought periodic havoc. The regime of luxury
sapped the vigor of the upper classes, and the lot of the sturdy peas-
ant farmer became, with the growth of estates operated by slave-
labor, ever more intolerable.^ " All were, or aspired to hQ,fidalgos ;
they had themselves attended in the streets by a multitude of serv-
ants, although they often had nothing for the latter to eat." ^ The
lower classes lived upon the higher in a subject relation, and the
higher upon the royal favor ; Portugal as a whole became dependent
upon the India trade, and the development of natural resources fell
away. It is clearly to be seen that if the accidental source of wealth
should be removed, but little would remain to fall back upon. Nor
ought the India trade itself to be regarded as a fountain of riches
commensurate with its quondam reputation. The possibility of un-
reasonably high profits dazzled the judgment, for the policy of the
time and of the frontier-trade was directed toward the realization
of large gains upon small quantities of merchandise, rather than of
moderate profits upon large quantities. For this reason the con-
tinuity and multiplicity of exchanges were sacrificed in favor of a
disjointed movement from extreme to extreme ; from the feverish
activity at the arrival of the India fleet to the dullness and torpor
of a sluggish interim. And the very object of the military equip-
ment of the individual trading-vessels and of their joint movement
increasingly failed of realization ; for the concentration of the year's
booty in a single fleet was a temptation hardly to be long resisted
by enemies. By this preference for magnitude in commercial opera-
tions all possibility of the development of a steady and normal
1 Hunter, I, 185; Martins, Hist, de Port., II, 27, 30, 165.
2 Profits on wares sent from the East must have been enormous to bear all the
costs of passage and transshipments. See Whiteway, pp. 7-8. For a list of the
imports, see Martins, Hist, de Port., II, 23-24.
3 Lavisse et Rambaud, IV, 900; Martins, Hist. de. Port., II, 19, 25-26, 73, no-H2;
Lindsay, II, 44. ^ Corvo, I, 13.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 115
commerce, resting upon the humdrum business of the small dealer,
was destroyed.^ The function of the humbler occupations had been
long regarded as sordid, and fit only for the Jews ; and, at the
very outset of their colonial career, the Portuguese had rid them-
selves of this element of their population. The royal interests and
those of the Faith had decreed the expulsion of the people renowned
in Europe for intelligence and commercial probity, in whose hands
rested the whole machinery of commerce.^ The Portuguese were
thus unable to profit by the large opportunities placed in their
path, except through a rude and awkward manipulation not differ-
ing in essence from that displayed by semi-civilized peoples.
Corrupt Administration in India
In most respects the Portuguese policy of commerce and coloni-
zation is a mere replica of the Spanish, presently to be described
in greater fullness ; indeed, after the accession of Phihp II to the
throne of Portugal the two systems actually merge for many crit-
ical years. The motive forces which explain both cases have been
indicated, in general lines, above.^ Both nations tended inevitably
in the direction taken, for private initiative scarcely existed, and
when they had become habituated to their system, it was too late
to change. In 1580, in consequence of pressure by the Dutch,
succeeding the union with Spain, the royal monopoly was sold to
the CovipanJiia Portugueaa das Indias Orientaes ; but the success
of this corporation and its successor a century later (1697 : Com-
panhia do Coviniercio da India) was wrecked against the opposi-
tion of spoils-seeking officials.* The environment was thoroughly
unfavorable for the development of trade along evolved and modern
lines ; the abnormal gains of individuals brought only loss to the
nation, which, as in the case of Spain, shouldered, or rather sank
beneath, the taxation necessary to keep upon their feet a power
and monopoly from which it derived no benefits. The material sent
to India became progressively poorer in quality. The crown had
realized at the outset that it must delegate an almost uncontrolled
power to its representative in the East. This arrangement was
1 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 47-48; Whiteway, p. 18; Lavisse et Rambaud, IV, 899-900.
2 See especially Schafer, III, 13 ff.; p. 188, below.
8 Pp. 80 ff.
* Hunter, I, 181-182; Danvers, II, 79-80.
Il6 COLONIZATION
very advantageous in the case of the few disinterested and incor-
ruptible viceroys and governors, although, as has been seen, there
developed a tendency to suspect such a man even as Albuquerque.
It has been remarked how systematically the best officials in India
were treated with ingratitude ; the officers in question assert the
fact and the chroniclers corroborate it. The reason lies, in«good
part, in conditions already reviewed : many regulations and decrees
originating in the capital arrived belated because of the distance, or
were ill-advised owing to ignorance of local conditions in India. ^ If
the viceroy suspended or put off the execution of these orders, it
was felt to be a contravention of royal power, an evidence of an
unmanageable spirit aiming at independence ; if an incorruptible
ruler, like Albuquerque, cashiered disobedient nobles who had
come to India simply to get rich with all speed, he created against
himself at Lisbon an opposition unscrupulous of means in securing
his downfall. Hence it was the energetic and faithful official who
was most likely to be inconsiderately superseded, insulted, or even
thrown into chains.^ Already in Albuquerque's time the policy of
shortening the tenure of offices in order to curb their incumbents
was begun ; and, often for good reasons, the attitude of the crown
became increasingly one of suspicion. The natural tendency of
European activity in the tropics is toward the speedy and improvi-
dent use of opportunity for exploitation ; and to this tendency the
policy of short appointments and low salaries lent a spur, if not a
sort of justification. By 1518 governors had ^gotten into the habit
of taking men out with them to fill all the more important posts ;
and there was established a sort of baleful rotation in office wherein
each appointee tried to sweep the ground clear during his incum-
bency. It went so far that at times the new viceroys seem to have
adopted a deliberate policy of discrediting and insulting the officers
whom they succeeded. Hence the slanders, peculations, and gen-
eral corruption already referred to. Naturally enough, any attempts
to control the viceroy from Lisbon, or through a resident counter-
check (intcndant), simply rendered the administration cumbrous
and immobile. Captains became merchants and shunned war;
honor was travestied ; they were even allowed, in the chronic
^ For a conspectus of the laws, customs, revenues, number of parishes, etc., in
India in 15S4, see Menezes's "tractate." Here also (p. 139) is mentioned the
rci:;iJemia^ to whose Spanish aftertyjie attention will presently be called. Cf. p. 307,
below. 2 Ruge, p. 198; Danvers, 1,458.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 117
insolvency of the Indian government, to repay themselves irregu-
larly, and by acts of piracy which constantly neutralized efforts for
peace. This went on until 16 14, when the king ceased to struggle
against the trend of the times ; he " suspended all royal grants and
ordered the Viceroy to put up for sale by public auction all com-
mands of fortresses, all other of^ces, and all voyages, and give
them — on a vacancy occurring — to the highest bidder." This
document " stands as one of the most remarkable state confessions
of utter demoralization on record." ^ " D. Joao de Castro was the
last man with any pretentions to superiority who held office in the
early days of Portuguese connection with India, and the names of
his successors for many generations, some indolent, some corrupt,
some both, and all superstitious, are but the mile-stones that mark
the progress along the dismal path of degeneration." ^
Social Conditions in India
The Indian government could do little, under the circumstances,
for the welfare of the land. Harbor-works, lighthouses, charts, and
other necessities and conveniences of commerce were neglected ;
in later times the Portuguese actually depended upon the English
and Dutch for their knowledge of channels and shoals. The very
government was a sort of organized robbery; and its example was
not lost on the population.^ The latter rapidly became Orientalized
and worthless. Life in Goa, which was the type toward which
existence in Portuguese India ultimately tended, was marked from
early times by luxury, profligacy, and sloth. This luxury was the
outcome of the enormous wealth of " Golden Goa " (Goa Dourado)}
All the work was done by slaves ; the pursuit of a trade disgraced
a man, and domestic labors ruined a woman's social status. The
1 Whiteway, pp. 74-75. But it was in the spirit of the time and is actually
defended by Montesquieu, Esprit des lois. Cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 238. Menezes
(p. 165) gives the net income from the estate of India (1584) as about $775,000.
2 Whiteway, pp. 324-325 ; Martins, Hist, de Port., II, 275 ff., 293. De Castro was
viceroy from 1545 to 1548. His views upon the conditions of his times are given in
a letter to the king quoted by Martins (Hist, de Port., I, 294). This author contrasts
him with Albuquerque and Almeida : " The government of India created three great
men : Castro, who might be called a saint ; Albuquerque, whom the name of hero
better befits ; Almeida, who is a wise administrator, an intelligent factor." Id., I, 236.
8 Whiteway, pp. 42-43 ; Danvers, I, xxviii ff.
* According to a Portuguese proverb, the man who had seen Goa had as good as
seen Lisbon : " Quem vie Goa excusa de ver Lisboa." Hunter, I, 155.
Ii8 COLONIZATION
only respectable livelihoods then were the Church, the army,
government employ, or buccaneering. Gambling in all its forms
provided recreation for idle minds and bodies ; the ccnaua-aystem
invaded the home, and domestic relations were corrupted. Vanity
led to gorgeous display of eccentric apparel on the part of strutting
idlers. In later times Portuguese women, hopelessly in debt,
begged in the streets from gilded palanquins. This life in Goa
was a magnificent type of the life of other Portuguese settlements.
On account of scarcity of men in Portugal, outlaws were banished
to India, and residence in the colonies provided the punishment
for thieves and prostitutes. The newly arrived Portuguese soldiers,
ev^en of the better class, were not paid, were the sport of the older
inhabitants, and either starved, begged, hired out as cutthroats,
or deserted to native states and changed their religion.^ It was
this class of Europeans from which the natives of the East gained
their early impression of western civilization, religion, and morals.
This "last crusade against Islam" was scarcely living up to its
early renown. Turning more specifically to the religious activity
of the Portuguese, the state of the case is not bettered. When
Cabral sailed for India in 1500 he was liberally supplied with
ecclesiastics to hold up his hands in the conversion of the benighted.
The attitude of these evangelists may be stated in the words of
Barros, the official historian : " The Moors and Gentiles are outside
the law of Jesus Christ, which is the true law that every one has
to keep under pain of damnation to eternal fire. If then the soul
be so condemned, what right has the body to the privileges of our
laws .''... It is true they are reasoning beings, and might if they
lived be converted to the true faith, but inasmuch as they have
not shown any desire as yet to accept this, we Christians have no
duties towards thcm."^ Moreover, the Pope was empowered to
turn over to the faithful all the material goods of the unbelievers,
a doctrine whose practical application was not suffered to lapse.
With a "repulsive mixture of unctuousness and rapacity" the
religious orders set on foot an exploitation that could compare
with the government's best efforts.^ To the effects upon the
natives we shall presently come ; the religious organization was,
1 Hunter, I, 155-158; TI, 157 ff.; Whiteway, pp. 72-73, 261, 335; Martins,
Hist, de Port., I, 273-274.
2 Hunter, I, lofi; Whiteway, p. 21 (quoted).
8 Whiteway, p. 60.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 119
besides, a great drain on the resources of the India government.
The zeal of the friars found its outlet in building cloisters and
then in filling them. The cost to the state of the purely religious
establishments in Portuguese India was, about 1550, $35,000; by
16 1 2 it had risen to $130,000 in the same limited area, other semi-
religious establishments costing over $30,000 in addition. Religious
property in land had extended widely ; some attempt was made to
check this development in 1635. The power of the clergy became
little by little a menace to the state ; the Jesuits retained armed
bands in defiance of the government, intrigued constantly, and
even with the Dutch and Moors. Such activities led to their
expulsion from the Portuguese dominions, by Pombal, in 1759.-^
Relations with the Natives
In considering the relations of the Portuguese to the native
peoples, the three salient objects of the Portuguese should be
recalled: these were "conquest, commerce, and conversion."
The formula might well read " commercial conquest," for the
trade-motive was really dominant. But in those days it was thought
that a preliminary intimidation formed a good overture to success-
ful exchange ; consequently the Portuguese aimed at a regime of
terrorism, and this was seconded by intrigue of questionable
nature. Rival dynastic claimants were taken up and thrown over
according to expediency ; even Albuquerque employed the assassin
to effect his ends. Conviction of the rectitude of the mission often
excused the means. After intimidation or the attainment of political
ascendency the Portuguese regularly extorted tributes, commercial
exemptions, and privileges, and a correspondingly unfavorable treat-
ment of rivals. They did not — in fact, could not — effect any
religious changes. They pursued the rule of expediency, imposing,
to use a modern expression, " what the traffic would bear." Above
all, they worked out their monopoly of the spice-trade, first by
securing a " most favored " position, and later, as their power
waxed, by ruthless prohibitions, impositions, and exclusions. In
more distant parts they descended periodically in force to collect
tribute in spices, or as individual and favored merchants they
frequented the native markets and fairs. As has been seen, they
1 Danvers, II, 247, 253; Whiteway, p. 65; cf. index, sub " Botelho, Simao"; cf.
pp. 154 ff., below.
I20 COLONIZATION
seized all the entrepots.^ They lived, in short, in a commercially
parasitic relation upon the native industrial organization, and as
they were able to extend their power, they drained it of its vitality
and bloom. It should be understood, for a clear comprehension of
the Portuguese native policy, that the invaders, intolerant and igno-
rant, never understood or tried to understand either the superior
or the primitive native life. Ignorance of the native languages
persisted to a late period, and offenses against native customs,
prejudices, and superstitions were the order of the time.^ The
Amboinese, once friends, were alienated by an attempted assault
on the wife of a prominent native. They had adopted Christianity
and begun to intermarry with the Portuguese, but after this time
Ternate and Amboina were the sources of recurring calamities
and expense.^ The natives of the East hold much to ceremonial,
religious and other, and were constantly shocked and insulted by
the rude invaders. They suffered atrocious cruelties, even under
the better officials ; Almeida blew prisoners from his gunsr, " salut-
ing the town with their fragments"; mutilations of men, women,
and children were practiced in cold blood. Garcia de Noronha
blinded fifteen relatives of the king of Ormuz by passing a red-hot
bowl close to their eyes.*
In the course of time the relations of the Portuguese with native
peoples resolved themselves into a series of unprovoked aggressions,
attended by speedy retaliation.^ Native allies conceived a deep
contempt for the cruel, bigoted, and mercenary Europeans, and,
as the Portuguese power waned, they fell away or went over to the
Dutch and English. It was only the fleet, and rare good fortune,
combined with lack of organization and inability to prosecute a
siege, on the part of their enemies, that saved the Portuguese from
destruction at the hands of the King of Atjeh, and other native
rulers, during the sixteenth century.^
1 They were peremptory with the most uncivilized peoples (e.g. of the Laccadives),
where more powerful rajahs were treated with politic consideration. Hunter, I,
149. For their experiences in Atjeh, see Veth, Atchin, pp. 60 ff.
2 Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 215; see especially (p. 294) the letter to the king of
J. de Castro (viceroy, 1545- 1548) ; Whiteway, pp. 29-31.
8 Danvers, I, 537-53'^, 550; Argensola, /r/jj/'w.
* Hunter, I, 139 ff. ; Whiteway, p. 165. The accounts teem with worse instances.
6 Danvers, II, 92-98.
'' Ataide (1568-1571) suppressed a dangerous coalition with a skill and firmness
worthy of the earher time. Lavisse at Rambaud, IV, 893; Zimmermann, I, 68 ff.,'
cf. Danvers, I, 480-481, 534-535-
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 12 1
Activities of the Church
To the other agencies that constantly provoked the natives was
added the activity of the Church. It should be reahzed that an
exaggeration of severity was natural in the Portuguese in India,
owing to their ingrained hatred and fear of the arch-enemy of
Christianity, Mohammedanism ; Islam was already in the East,
and its superior hold upon native peoples was coming to be
realized. Hence the Portuguese proceeded in the East with a
severity unknown in Brazil. To this element there was likewise
added an ecclesiastical cupidity, stimulated by possibilities of mate-
rial gain that did not exist in America. The clergy understood
the natives as little as the laymen, and fulminated against every-
thing that bore a heathen, and especially a real or supposedly
Mohammedan tinge. After the time of Manuel, fanaticism became
more unbridled ; in 1540, under orders of the king, all the Hindu
temples in the island of Goa were destroyed, and the ecclesiastics
hastened to seize the confiscated lands. In 1560 Goa was made
an archbishopric, and the first inquisitors were dispatched to harry
the resident Jewish refugees from Portugal.^ The recommenda-
tions of the first provincial council of Goa, in 1567, adopted by
the state, at the command of the Church, for the conversion of
Mohammedans and Hindus, give some idea of the aggression of
the Church upon the native organization. No Christian could
have infidel servants in his house, or employ infidel doctors or
barbers ; neither Hindus nor Mohammedans could have any public
worship, all their priests were banished, and even the twice-born
Hindu was forbidden to wear the sacred cord of his caste ; the
Hindus were obliged to attend church in squads of fifty, on alter-
nate Sundays, to hear long sermons on the benefits of the Christian
religion. The viceroys were instructed to favor converts in all
ways, temporal as well as spiritual ; inheritance was made to
follow the kinship of faith rather than that of blood ; the native
Christian could demand all the privileges of the Portuguese citizen ;
female converts could claim heritages as if they had been males.
Political power was taken, as far as possible, from the unconverted,
and justice was practically denied to non-Christians. ' Those who
were not Christians must wear a distinctive dress, and must not
ride on a horse or in a palanquin or carry an umbrella in Goa or
1 Lavisse et Rambaud, IV, 899 ; Corvo, I, 8.
122 COl.OXIZATION
its suburbs." As a result of these and other senseless reg;ulations,
based upon clerical influence, Goa and the surrounding islands
were, as early as 1561, practically depopulated of natives.^ By
1729 native commerce was ruined, owing to the horror which
local merchants, especially Moors, had of another clerical institu-
tion, the Inquisition ; for the latter had been utilized freely for
secular, not to mention private, ends, under guise of effecting
religious purity and homogeneity. Its abolishment in India, in
1 8 14, came too late to atone for or neutralize its evil consequences.^
Of course the corruption of the clergy and of the original dis-
interestedness of faith occurred, for the most part, in the centers
of Portuguese power. Much unselfish effort was put forth in the
outlying parts by men of the Xavier stamp. The Portuguese
undoubtedly spread Christianity abroad in the East Indies, both
among the Buddhists and the common heathen ; and their con-
verts, when in rare cases they were treated decently, were the
firmest prop of their domination.^ Xavier, indeed, during his
activity in the East at the end of the sixteenth century, boldly
assailed the India administration and exposed its corruption. Con-
siderable missionary activity was put forth in China, and many
brave lives sacrificed in Japan and in the Archipelago. But what
the Portuguese gained by courage and devotion in war and in the
missions, they lost by avarice and attendant shortsightedness of
policy, and through the scandal which the unbridled j:)assions of a
low class of representatives brought upon the nation as a whole."*
The resident Portuguese, for there were some, offer a typical case
of race-degeneration."'^ Illicit relations with native women were
common ; Albuciucrque had a son by a negress. There was never
any considerable immigration of European women, and consequently
no family life of a normal type. Jorge Cabral (1549) was the first
governor who had his wife with him in Goa.'' Miscegenation
had been a policy since Prince Henry's time, both in Portugal
and the dependencies, and had shown only evil results in both
cases ; these consequences were naturally accentuated in the
tropical environment.
^ Whiteway, pp. 65-67.
2 Danvers, I, xl, xli. Autos-da-fe were practiced with ostentation and cold
cruelty. Since Jews did not exist in sufficient numbers, the institution was speedily
turned against native victims, especially Mohammedans. Corvo, I, 86.
'^ Van der Aa, De Gids, i860, I, pp. 853-854; Danvers, II, i^off.
* See Ruge, pp. 213 ff. ^ Tylor, Anthropology, p. 19. " Whiteway, p. 321.
THE rORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 123
Infringement and Collapse of the Monopoly
It is clear that by the opening of the seventeenth century the
Indian Empire had been long ready to disintegrate under the
impact of a sufficient shock. By this time, as will later appear,
the nations of central Europe had come to perceive the true state
of the Portuguese power. After 1600, therefore, they appear with
progressive frequency in the East and deal ever more deadly blows
to the waning power of the Portuguese.
Portugal's first competitor in the East had been the sister
Iberian nation, Spain. It will be recalled how a preliminary divi-
sion of the field was made through the offices of the Pope, in the
treaty of Tordesillas.^ This settlement appeared to be satisfactory
until, in 1521, the voyage of Magellan led the Spaniards to the
Moluccas, and until it became evident that part of South America
fell within the Portuguese sphere. The Spice Islands being the
ultimate objective of both nations, it became expedient to deter-
mine the full perimeter of the great circle of which the famous
Demarcation Line formed half. For this purpose a learned council
was summoned at Badajoz and spent a long time in futile wrangles
over a problem whose settlement was beyond the scientific powers
of the age.^ The Portuguese introduced a further element of dis-
cord by their attempt so to manipulate the meridians as to include
both Brazil and the Moluccas within their hemisphere. It is
questionable what outcome would have been reached had not
Charles V converted the uncertain Spanish claims into hard cash
by selling them to the Portuguese for 350,000 golden ducats
(about $850,000).^ However, in these centuries peace between
mother-countries did not preclude constant strife in the colonies,
and the Spanish and Portuguese alternately expelled each other,
concluded agreements, and bandied prohibitions throughout the
sixteenth century.* Even the union of Spain and Portugal in 1580
did not put a stop to petty warfare.^ The effects of this union
with Spain can be better appreciated after a review of the
1 p. 90, above.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 130-131 ; cf. note 2, p. 99, above.
3 Convention of Zaragoza. Hunter, I, 189; for details of the history of the
Moluccas, cf. Argensola. '* See Danvers, I, 38S, 458, 463 ff.
5 For the conditions leading to the accession of Philip II, see Martins, Hist, de
Port., II, chaps, iii, iv (a presentation rather picturesque than accurate) ; Stephens,
pp. 243 ff. ; Hume, Spain, especially pp. 171 ff., 250 ff.
124 COLONIZATION
Spanish colonial system ; but it may be said here that it exposed
Portugal, for sixty years, to the results of all the follies and enmi-
ties of Philip II and his successors, without affording any com-
pensating advantages. Philip II promised to keep the Portuguese
intact in their nationality and policy, but by the nature of the case
this was impossible. Because of this union the aggression of
Portugal's competitors was considerably hastened ; for the Dutch,
English, and French were thus given a pretext, if not a reason, for
the general development of hostilities in the East and in Brazil.
Nevertheless it would be wrong to charge to the union of the
crowns anything more than an acceleration of an already advanced
decline.^ For when the Portuguese had laid hand upon the trade
of the East, they set about what turned out to be a deliberate
education of potential competitors. First of all they stimulated
the imagination and cupidity of the Dutch and English by the
secrecy and ostentation of their trade. They depended upon the
bugbears of papal disfavor, an impregnable navy, and a deliberate
exaggeration of the terrors of the deep to hold competition at a
distance, so far as the India voyage was concerned. They early pro-
hibited the sale of charts to foreigners, and the service of Portu-
guese seamen in foreign navies.^ In order to distract attention from
the possibility of approaching the East, the coastwise traffic was
renounced ; complacent in seeing the ships of all nations flocking
to the harbor of Lisbon rather than seeking the East, and besieging
the Casa da India,^ the Portuguese disdained the function of dis-
tribution and constituted Lisbon harbor as a terminal. Thus both
the Dutch and the English not only conceived most highly colored,
though vague, views as to the profits of the India trade, but were
actually forced to develop a coastwise shipping, which was the
best of training-schools for the development of sea-power. The
weaknesses of the Portuguese were learned, and isolated adventurers
even dared to infringe their monopoly. Experience taught the
truth about the commercial myths regarding the dangers of navi-
gation, and with the Protestant movement the papal authority
became non-existent. War with Spain at the end of the sixteenth
century discovered the inferiority of the then combined Iberian
1 Danvers, I, xl ff. ; II, 39 ff.; cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 49-50. Martins (O Brazil,
etc., p. 35) says: "One can affirm that India would have been lost even if the
Philips had not reigned in Spain ; just as one can affirm that Brazil has been pre-
served despite the rule of the Bragan9as in Portugal."
2 See p. 67, above. ^ See note, p. 228, below.
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 125
navies ; then the English and Dutch, debarred access to the
Lisbon market, went to the East to trade for themselves. And
" the course of trade was the more easily diverted as there was no
skeleton of custom formed out of existing trade-routes to retard
the decay of Portugal." ^ The fate of the Venetians had overtaken
their conquerors ; monopoly had again raised up an agency for its
own destruction.
The losses of the Portuguese in the East in consequence of the
penetration of competitors into those regions will be treated from
the standpoint of the dispossessors. The empire needed but a
touch to make it fall ; the incompetence, treachery, and corruption
displayed in these latter days eclipse the isolated acts of heroism.
Illicit traffic with the enemy was common ; the revenues of the
government were minimized through smuggling and misappro-
priation. The restoration, in 1640, did not materially change
the situation, for the harm had been done long before, and decline
went on without interruption.^ Muscat was lost in 1650 ; Colombo
in 1656; Cochin and Cannanore before 1663 ; Bombay was ceded
to the English in 1661.^ The Dutch gradually expelled the Portu-
guese from the Malay Archipelago, until at last they held (and
still hold) only part of Timor. The Portuguese have retained from
its cession in 1556 up to the present the inferior port of Macao
in China : it enjoyed a passing importance before the cessation of
the coolie-trade.'*
In 1670 the Portuguese met for the first time the invading
forces of the Mahrattas, before whom the Mogul Empire had
crumbled; and between 1737 and 1740 they lost nearly all of
their northern provinces. Commerce was practically swept from
the sea by Arab pirates and by the rival Europeans.^ The Napo-
leonic era, whatever may have been the grandiose Indian projects
of the Emperor, brought nothing but misfortune. From 1844 on,
1 Whiteway, p. 18; cf. Danvers, II, 65 ff., 105 ff.; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 48; Hunter,
I, 221 ff. Martins (Hist, de Port., I, 303) says that, despite the signs of decomposi-
tion, the apogee of commercial empire came at the end of the sixteenth century.
2 Danvers, II, 172-173, 222 ff., 237 ff.
3 The concessions and privileges acquired by the English are deplored by Martins
(Hist, de Port., II, 138 ff.); cf. Hunter, I, 191 ff. ; II, 190 ff.
* Corvo (IV, 131 ff.) discusses the history and final abolition of contract-emigration
over Macao ; his attitude is one of great hostility to the system — in fact, as Minister
of the Marine, he was himself responsible for the decree of abolition. He says that
this move was not prejudicial to the prosperity of the station (p. 167).
5 Danvers, II, 367, 373-374. 402, 413-
1 26 COLONIZATION
Portuguese India has consisted only of Goa and the dependencies
of Daman and Diu. Goa was largely in ruins in 1780, and it was
only in the middle of the nineteenth century that any real effort
was made to better the conditions of these remnants of the empire.
Such improvements have been executed mostly through British
enterprise ; they consist of roads, a railroad to British Indian
centers, steamship service, telegraphs, etc.^ It is difficult to see
any future for the few Portuguese possessions in Asia.
PORTUGUESE AFRICA
The fate of Portuguese Africa has been reserved, in the interest
of clearness, for a place by itself. The African stations were at
the outset simply halting-places upon the opening, and finally
opened, India way. The early explorers of the west coast brought
back some native products, and a number of slaves ; but with the
attainment of the ultimate object these lesser enterprises passed
into abeyance. The African stations took a position distinctly
ancillary to the Asiatic ; an occasional expedition in search of
rumored gold mines, and a number of brushes with the Kaffirs
and other natives, saved their history from being entirely tame.
With these halting-places must also be reckoned some of the
oceanic islands, such as St. Helena and Tristan da Cunha, and
naturally the contiguous coast islands, such as S. Thome, Principe,
Fernando Po, and Annobom. Most of these posts, calculated as
they were to meet the needs of navigators who hugged the coast,
became anachronisms under a more developed system. They were,
besides, situated among peoples too barbarous to become large
buyers and sellers, and in districts which were insufficiently fertile
to overcome the aversion of the Portuguese to agricultural labors ;
they were consequently but feebly occupied, were sometimes used
as penal colonies, and were easily seized by enemies.^ In 1520 the
1 Danvers, II, 442 ff., 475 ff. ; Martins, Civ. Iber., 305 ff. For the decline of
Portugal itself during the Napoleonic j^eriod, see Martins, Hist, de Port., II, 250;
for the conditions of an earlier jieriod (i 706-1 750), see Branco, pp. ^2 ^-i 45 ff-'
109 ff.; for a sketch of Portuguese colonial administration, etc., in the nineteenth
century, see Danvers, I, xliv ff. ; Zimmermann, I, 216 ff. The most exhaustive hand-
book on the Portuguese colonies is that of Corvo, of which Vol. I, after a brief intro-
duction, treats of the Cape Verde Islands, S. Thome and Principe, and Angola ; Vol. II,
of Moyambifiue ; Vol. Ill, of African civilization ; and Vol. IV, of the Asiatic colonies.
A late treatise, modeled upon the German Kolonial-IIandljuch, is that of Vasconcellos.
2 Leroy-15eaulieu, I, 42; Johnston, pp. 28 ff.; Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 271 ff.,
283 ff. The latter author says (Civ. Iber., p. 263) that within twenty-five years after
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 127
Portuguese held Ouiloa, Zanzibar, Mombasa, Sofala, Mozambique,
and other ports of call ; but by 1698 the Arabs had retaken every
stronghold north of the last-named factory, while the Dutch had
occupied the Cape, and other nations had encroached on the west
coast. The development of the slave-trade was what k^ept the
settlements alive for many generations ; in particular, their prox-
imity to Brazil afforded especial advantages in a traffic which even
compensated in some measure for the loss of the India commerce.^
Guinea and the Congo and Angola districts were in early days the
chief theaters of the trade, which reached its apogee in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. From the middle to the end of
the eighteenth century, from Benguela and Loanda alone, 642,000
slaves were exported; in 1770 the revenue from the Angola
export was $150,000. From 18 17 to 18 19 it was $177,000, while
other income scarcely reached $25,000.^ Interest in these human
products brought about a general neglect or decline of the African
possessions as respects agricultural and other development ;
exploited almost solely in the interests of the slave-trade, they
lapsed into insignificance when it was crushed.^ A certain evasion
was practiced by shifting the trade to Mozambique, but it was
allowed no respite by its active enemies, and in 18 10 and 1869
the Portuguese finally and with reluctance abolished respectively
the trade and the institution.* As time goes on and civilization
advances in these parts of Africa, illegal evasions are being more
and more restricted.^
Angola
Angola constitutes, according to Johnston, "certainly the most
successful of the Portuguese attempts at the colonization of
Africa." ^ The Portuguese are inclined to esteem it above the
rest of their possessions ; this, however, witnesses rather to the
the discovery of India the Portuguese could no longer hold their African stations
against the foreigner. 1 See p. 145, below. ^ Corvo, I, 15-16.
3 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 50-51; Corvo, I, 150. Yet Martins (O Brazil, etc., p. 191)
and Corvo (I, 24 ff.) seem inclined to minimize this effect. For the prostration of
S. Thome and Principe, see Corvo, I, 100, 105, 111-113, 121-124, 135-136.
* Corvo, 11,344-345. Yet "before 1849 the port of Mossamedes was nothing more
than a factory for the embarcation of negroes for Brazil, America, and Cuba." Id., I, 288.
s But compare the recent disclosures of Nevinson, who has observed in Angola
conditions that recall the worst features of evasion.
6 Johnston, p. 44; cf. Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 98-99, 192, 224 ff. The latter
author is clear upon the possibilities of free negro labor. Id., pp. 219-221.
1 28 COLONIZATION
unenviable status of the latter than to the exaltation of the former.
For decades the country was passed over in favor of India ; it was
not until 1575 that its conquest began, chiefly under Paulo Diaz,
and its reduction, even in semblance, took a century. In fact,
Angola is still merely a "land of war and trade"; of settlement,
there has been practically none.^ From the early years of the
seventeenth century the Portuguese attempted, through the estab-
lishment of fairs and markets, to call some trade into being ; a
species of fetichistic Christianity resulted in still earlier times from
the activities of questionable missionaries. Even these enterprises
were rendered well-nigh impossible of accomplishment by the
excessive mortality of the Portuguese and by the general corrup-
tion of the service. Although Sao Paulo de Loanda was founded
in 1574, it took a long time to master the country down to Ben-
guela, and until 1840 to reach the present limits.^ Emigrants will
not go to Angola, even from the Cape Verdes ; the convicts exiled
thither in earlier times proved a doubtful benefit ; both men and
capital for economic development are lacking.'^ All the " significant
works of civilization " have been conspicuous by their absence ;
" there did not exist in Angola, until 1877, any organization in the
service of the public works " ; not a road was projected between
1862 and 1877. The country had been torpid after its "long past
of indolence and ignorance." * A great deal of this misfortune is
referable to the existence and cessation of the slave-trade ; for
during its existence it smothered all other enterprise, and with its
cessation little of importance was left. Because of the trade, Portu-
guese Africa suffered the incursions of the Dutch and the hostility
of the British, and laid up for itself a heritage of rancor on the
part of the abused and demoralized negro population.*^ However,
in later times the country had been favored by the execution of
public works, chiefly roads, of a very necessary character. Portu-
guese writers differ in their estimate of the colony's possibilities,
but they are unanimous in their condemnation of the governmental
policy and its supineness.^
1 Corvo, I, I92ff.
2 On the mortality of the African climate and the attempts to minimize it, see
Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 248 ff.; Corvo, I, 140. A somewhat favorable view is
presented in a letter to Martins by a Portuguese colonist in Quelimane. Id., p. 235,
note. ^ Corvo, I, 47. * Id., ]>]). 214, 227, 236.
•» See p. 147, below; Corvo, I, 150, 200, 2S7-28S, 29r>.
^ Corvo, I, 230, 268. Corvo sees a "brilliant future "for Angola (I, 153). Martins
regards Portuguese Africa, as a whole, as unprofitable, and, f(jr the Portuguese,
THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST 1 29
Mozambique
As for Mozambique, its history has been even less edifying.
" The savage state which three centuries of our rule, more or less
direct, did not avail to transform ; the lack of activity and of energy
in the labor of the natives ; their unruly tendency toward war and
violence ; the lack of European or even Asiatic colonization ; the
disastrous influence of the Mohammedan Arabs who for many
centuries have weighed East Africa down ; the lack of capital and
of commercial activity ; the fatal consequences of the horrible
and sterilizing slave-trade ; the errors and vices of the administra-
tion ; the lack of facilities of transport for merchandise ; the monop-
olies and exclusions which have embarrassed foreign transactions,
industrial activity, and competition, — all these, in fine, have con-
tributed to the lack of development of and profit by the powerful
resources, the immense material riches, of Mozambique." ^ The
white population is a vanishing quantity and enterprise almost non-
existent. Mozambique appeared of some account in Portuguese
eyes only when the journeys of Livingstone in the middle of the
nineteenth century had directed British attention to that region.
The Portuguese then made some costly attempts to unite their
east and west coast possessions ; but the advance of the British
could not be withstood. The Portuguese gained a slight advantage
from the biased decision of Marshal MacMahon, who awarded them
the whole of Delagoa Bay (1875), and from the construction of
the railroad to the Transvaal. But their attitude is one of complaint
rather than action in the face of British pressure. Little of the
Mozambique trade is in Portuguese hands ; even the Portuguese
chartered companies in East Africa have been capitalized by the
English and French ; Mozambique has yielded a deficit regularly
from 1508 to our own time. Exchange is hampered in all of Por-
tuguese Africa by the imposition of unreasonable customs dues.^
One especial attempt by the Portuguese government to aid
settlement in East Africa deserves mention. This was the effort
to introduce, in the so-called prasos da coroa, a sort of proprietary
hopeless. The British might be able to make something of it. O Brazil, etc., pp. 197 ff.,
212-213, 215, 222-223. Ribeiro, in a work upon The Portuguese Colonies, their
Present and Future, presents a much more optimistic outlook. Reported in the
U. S. Consular Reports, No. 1996, July 6, 1904.
1 Corvo, II, 355; cf. pp. 263, 278, et passim.
2 Johnston, pp. 45 ff. ; Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 97.
130 COLONIZATION
system not unlike that of the early doacoes in Brazil.^ 1^'erlile
crown land, chiefly on the banks of the Zambesi, was given for
three lives to women who were descendants of European Portuguese
parents, and who must marry European Portuguese husbands. The
prasos were limited in extent to three square leagues, and males
were excluded in the succession But the project came to naught,
owing to labor difficulties, the invasion of the slave-trade, and other
practical difficulties ; new concessions were prohibited in 1838, and
the institution was abolished in 1854. It is severely condemned by
Corvo and others ; ^ of course it was well-nigh impracticable in
tropical Mozambique. However, it was resurrected in 1890 under
a more strict regulation, and is said to have attained a limited
success.^
Portuguese Influences in Africa
It can hardly be contended that the Portuguese have consciously
exerted any influence for Africa's weal ; but they have unintention-
ally conferred some notable benefits by their additions to the
articles of local food-supply and comfort. Fruits like the orange,
lemon, and grape ; sugar-cane, maize, manioc, tobacco, and like
plants, at least in superior varieties, were introduced ; likewise some
animals, in particular, swine.* The fact is that the conditions
obtaining in India were present here too on a smaller scale ; for,
as Corvo says, " The early Portuguese did no more than substitute
themselves for the Moors ... in the parts that they occupied on
the coast ; and their influence extended to the interior very slightly,
unless, indeed, through some ephemeral alliances of no value what-
ever, or through missionaries, or without any practical or lasting
results. The true conquest is still to be made." ^
1 See pp. 133 ff., below.
2 Corvo, II, 1 19-12 1, 243.
8 Zimmermann, I, 192-193.
* On Portuguese Africa, see, besides Corvo, Johnston, pp. 28 ff. ; Keltic, pp. 32 ff.,
136 ff., 401 ff. Some successful attempts at improvement in Abyssinia are said to be
referable to the period of strong Portuguese influence in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Ratzel, Hist, of Mankind, III, 226.
^ Corvo, II, 125-126. This volume is dated 1884. The quotation may be found
in Keltie, p. 57. For the luxury and corruption of an earlier period of decline, during
the seventeenth century, see Corvo, II, 67.
CHAPTER IV
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL
The exploits of the Portuguese in India, because of their con-
nection with the "golden East," and their semi-religious character,
have drawn the attention of the world, not only in earlier centuries
but in a later age as well. The imagination of their contemporaries
was captivated by phenomenal successes in the reaUzation of aims
that existed or came to exist in the minds of all. The Portuguese
had, to all appearance, successfully consummated the connection
long striven for between the trade-areas of East and West, and
were in consequence the envied holders of exclusive commercial
advantages. That the worth of this monopoly was consistently over-
estimated, simply added to the power and reputation of its posses-
sors. And, in subsequent time, the romantic tale of Portuguese
achievements, bereft by distance of any unpleasant or sordid aspects,
had exercised a peculiar fascination upon recounters and their
audiences. The " wealth of Ormus and of Ind " is familiar to those
whose interests lie far from markets and colonies. And yet, when
the tale of the exploits in India is done, we have the really enduring
contributions of the Portuguese to the history of colonization still
to consider.
Vasco da Gama, relying upon the accumulations of nautical
experience made by the captains who had preceded him, and profit-
ing by his own special knowledge, provided Cabral, who commanded
the next Indian fleet, with sailing directions which, to catch the
south-east trades, carried him far toward the west.^ In the pursu-
ance of this course, or in fortuitous deviation from it, Cabral made
the coast of South America. He thus discovered (April, 1501)
what proved to be the New World, on the count of Portugal, some
nine years after the voyage of Columbus ; and the occurrence was
thought important enough to warrant the return of one ship to
1 Varnhagen, I, 17 ff.; cf. Rio-Branco, p. 105 ; Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 217-218;
Payne, Age of Disc, p. 35. For a brief description of the voyage of Yaiiez Pinzon,
see Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 69-70 ; reference to the third voyage of Columbus, id.,
p. 47.
132 COLONIZATION
convey the news to Portugal. Cabral was unable, of course, to esti-
mate the magnitude of the new acquisition. He conceived it to be
another of the Antilles Islands, and named it Ilha da Vera Cruz.
This was subsequently modified to Terra da Santa Crnz, and finally
changed, upon the discovery of a dyewood similar to the valued
brazil-wood of the East, to Brazil}
Early Conditions of the Captaincies
The only appeal which Brazil could make to Portugal was on the
score of profits from the forests, and even of these but little is heard.
It is characteristic of the age and its aims that the Portuguese
repeatedly tried to get around or through Brazil toward the west,
and thus it was presently (i 501) discovered that the supposed island
was part of a very large land-mass. For many years, however,
Brazilian harbors were little better than substitutes, along a more
satisfactory route, for the declining African stations. Preoccupa-
tion with the riches of In^a.anticipated any vital interest in a rough
and virgin land. The government sent out colonists, but at first
rather with a view toward its own relief than toward Brazil's better-
ment, for the exiles were mostly convicts and women of ill repute.
Little more was done during the first decades of the sixteenth cen-
tury than to establish small settlements or factories on the best
harbors. According to Varnhagen, the earliest real colony was at
Sao Vicente, near Sao Paulo. But it was already the intention of
the government that the fleet which should hold and defend the
Brazilian coast should be supported out of local resources. The
money which Portugal could spare for such objects had been swept
into the current that set toward India.^
However, as time went on, the original nuclei of population
received additions from the voluntary immigration of a much
better quality of colonists. These were represented in large part
by Jews, who had fled from Portugal to escape the Inquisition,
and who proposed to make their homes in Brazil.^ This growth
^ It is perhaps significant of the relative predominance in Portuguese minds of the
commercial over the religious aspects of their new possession that in this christening
the " gainful wood " {Jenho lucrativo) thus supplanted the " sacred wood." Varnhagen,
I, 24;"cf. pp. 17-24; Watson, I, 91 ; Zimmermann, I, 117-118. ^
2 Varnhagen, I, 18-20, 30, 43, 53; Stephens, pp. 220 ff., 347. — ^
^ Zimmermann, I, 119. Leroy-Beaulieu (I, 51-52) assigns great importance to this
element in the population. Stephens (pp. 227 ff .) says that Brazilian colonization was
essentially popular, not royally or otherwise artificially initiated.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 133
of population and the increasing interest of the French in South
America gradually attracted the attention of the Portuguese to
their lightly esteemed dependency. The necessities of develop-
ment and defense were met, in the absence or impossibility of a
display of individual initiative, by the adoption (1532) of a semi-
feudal system of proprietary grants or fiefs. The proprietors
{doiiatarios) were lords who should defend the country and settle
it on their own counts, thus releasing government resources for
the India enterprises. In pursuance of this expedient the w^hole
dependency, back theoretically to the Demarcation meridian, was
divided by lines running parallel to the equator into fifteen sec-
tions, forming twelve hereditary captaincies of from 600 to 12,000
square leagues in area.^ These were distributed to favored per-
sons, and so differed in size with the favor shown. The powers of
the donatarios were, roughly speaking, somewhat more than vice-
regal. The home government exercised over them a sort of pro-
tectorate with limited control, in return for the payment of a few
taxes and the right of instatement at every change of possession ;
the donatario could issue land-grants, found cities, name officials
and judges, and exercise other similar powers. The colonists were
assured only of protection of property, freedom of trade with the
Indians, and non-extradition on account of former crimes. Catho-
lics of all nations were allowed to settle, but non-Portuguese were
discouraged from trade by various restrictions.^
The history of the captaincies is for the most part a dull chron-
icle of life on a small scale. Few of them actually prospered. The
donatarios were eager, of course, to get people to come with capi-
tal and take up land ; but their efforts met, on the whole, with
little success. The scattered and backward native population ^
offered but few inducements to traders. No one believed that
Brazil had any value. Two ships a year conveyed from Portugal
the aforesaid men and women of questionable character,* and
1 A map of these doafoes or capitanias is given in Varnhagen, I, opp. p. 88; a list
with dates, in Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 10.
2 The details of the system are to be found in Varnhagen, I, 60-63, 72 ff. ; Wat-
son, pp. 155 ff.; Zimmermann, I, 119 ff. The idea was earlier utilized in the Azores
and Madeira Islands (Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 3 ff.), and later, in the form of the
prasos da coroa, in Mozambique (Corvo, II, 119-121, 243).
3 See Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 133 ff.
* Of these the donatario of Peniambuco wrote to the king ( 1 546) : " These people
are \^orse than the plague ; therefore I beg you, for God's sake, to spare me this
poison in the future." Quoted in Zimmermann, I, 124.
134
COLONIZATION
brought back wood, parrots, and other curious products. The
scanty European population, exhibiting scarcely any of those
qualities of energy and self-sufficiency which we have come to
associate with the term "settler," took to the ways of the natives
in its attempt to conform to an environment which it could not
control ; native products were raised, and native arts and crafts
were imitated. Fusion of races began early, and several varieties
of half-breed came soon to be distinguished. On the part of
the government no effort was directed toward exploration. The
interior was unvisited and unknown ; the whole colony was sys-
tematically neglected. Portuguese indifference under the pro-
prietary system " recognized the independence of Brazil before
colonizing it." ^
A great deal of this adversity was directly chargeable to the
regime of the donatarios, and when, toward the middle of the
sixteenth century, Brazil had come to be regarded as of some
importance to Portugal, the fact was immediately recognized.
The original division has been made on too sweeping a scale
and with little or no discrimination ; the grants were too large,
and no reservation of land for future assignment had been
made. The massing of smaller holdings about the ports would
have concentrated population and encouraged industry, whereas
the system adopted had effected the exact reverse. The dona-
tarios, also, had been given too much authority. It was impossi-
ble for the supreme power from across the Atlantic to control the
virtually separate governments of the captaincies. The lives and
property of the colonists were at the mercy of the several lords,
and the many complaints made to the king witness for the fact
that some, at least, of the captains did not fail to take advantage
of the situation. Even where they were honest, the donatarios
were generally pitiful failures. Those in northern Brazil had
almost all come to grief by 1550, and misunderstandings with
the natives and miniature wars of all kinds constituted the order,
or rather disorder, of the day. In view of all this the king was
led in 1 549 to revoke the powers of the captains while leaving
1 Varnhagen, I, 74; cf. pp. 98, 170-172. Velasco (p. 566) reports the following of
Brazil in 1574 : " Christians in this land live in a space of 350 leagues close to the
coast, and they do not settle in the back-country because the Indians do not allow
it, and at the same time because they wish to be near the sea for jnirjioses of trade."
In all the captaincies " they have sixteen i'ortuguese to\Vns, in which there are 2 540
inhabitants."
THK rORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 135
them their grants, and to appoint over them a governor-general,
who should regulate abuses and correct and unify ill-considered
and divergent policies. The seat of government was fixed at
Bahia.i
This move led, of course, to the break-up of the captaincies,
although the latter would inevitably have passed away with the
growth of population. The system was, like that of the chartered
company, simply a governmental makeshift. The donatarios dis-
played the semblance of administration and defense until the
state had satisfied itself that it was worth while to take over the
burden. This persuasion was reached when the India dream had
begun to betray its illusive nature, and when Brazil had com-
menced to attract the attention of European rivals. ^ " Little by
little the kings of Portugal recovered all these fiefs through
inheritance, purchase, or otherwise. The last captaincies still
existing under feudal regime were bought back by the crown in
the eighteenth century in the time of D. Jose I and Pombal.^
The fundamental charge against the captaincy-system was, of
course, its artificiality, or, to put it another way, its contravention
of natural development. The provinces were crudely ruled off on
the map with little or no regard to natural conditions. The stream
of emigration was split up into a number of currents, each setting
under direction toward the locations in each captaincy upon which,
for sufficient or insufficient reason, the donatarios had pitched.
Consequently, as Martins says, settlement started in several dis-
tinct centers of "social ossification," and the colony tended to
subdivide itself into a number of disconnected areas.^ Thus a
variety of small centers of feeble development, and therefore ex-
posed to many special exigencies, took the place of several strong
and populous nuclei in localities naturally selected as favorable
to man and his activities. Again, the attempt to impose an aristo-
cratic system upon a virgin country was sure to encounter the fate
reserved for such attempts, under similar circumstances, through-
out the history of colonization. The efforts of noble Portuguese
houses to transplant their less promising offshoots beyond the
1 Vamhagen, I, 69-71, 192, 200; Watson, I, 155-158 ; Zimmermann, I, 125 ff.
2 Cf. Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 52.
3 Rio-Branco, pp. no ff . ; Watson, II, 239; cf. Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 13.
For a list of the early governors of Brazil, see Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 25, note.
•* O Brazil, etc., pp. 126, 127; cf. p. 12. This tendency was later accentuated in
consequence of the " adventurous hunt for Indians and mines."
136 COLONIZATION
seas in the natural course of events came to naught.^ The estab-
lishment of the capital at Bahia was a further exhibition of the
same artificial methods ; although cartographically central among
the scattered nuclei already mentioned, Bahia was the focus neither
of economic development nor of population. It took a time of
stress, forcibly calling attention to the superiority in these respects
of the southern provinces, to secure the removal of the capital to
Rio de Janeiro.^ One must, however, realize that at the outset
the southern provinces were regarded as relatively unimportant,
since they contributed none of those tropical products which alone
appealed to the Portuguese. The flow of population to these regions
was slight and almost unnoticed before the gold discoveries.
The man chosen to be the first governor-general was D.
Thome de Souza, and the selection was apparently a happy one.
He attended to the much-neglected interests of the crown, re-
duced the excessive power of the donatarios, and established
better relations with the Indians. He also saw the value of the
" new Christians " {iiovacs christidos) and tried to protect them.
Without using his position to justify undue interference, and leav-
ing locally established government, where it was stable, alone, he
yet punished prevalent acts of atrocity with great severity and
labored always to curb the mutual hostility and to effect the con-
solidation of the almost independent captaincies.'^ His administra-
tion is looked upon as one of the landmarks in Brazil's early history.
Under his successors, although they were in general men of an
inferior stamp, population increased and the state of the colony
became more satisfactory. This was more particularly the case
during the governorship of Mem de Sa (15 58-1 570).'*
Indu-Stry and Trade
At the very outset of their acquaintance with Brazil, as has
been said, the Portuguese, judging that country and India accord-
ing to the same criteria, regarded it as of comparatively slight
value. Of the one local product which appealed to them with any
force, relatively but small and variable quantities could be gotten
at the coast. For the native population of Brazil were_and re-
mained practically insensible to economic stimuli, presenting in
1 See Martins, O I'razil, etc., p. 12. 2 c;eg p ,50, below.
3 Stephens, pp. 225 ff. ^ Or Men de Sa, as Varnhagen insists (I, 233)
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 137
this a complete contrast to the Eastern peoples to whom the
Portuguese were used. In the East, European demand impinged
upon the native rulers, and these took measures to secure an in-
creasing output ; but in South America, as the Portuguese knew
it, there was no native organization to receive and transmit pres-
sure. A certaIn~amouhr"or settlement and of proHuction under
European management was thus in Brazil an almost necessary
condition for the development of trade. It has been seen that the
earliest settlers were largely convicts and fugitive Jews ; the latter,
with characteristic resource and industry, speedily introduced the
cultivation of the plant which furnished in time the staple of Brazil,
— the sugar-ca,rx&. Sugar-production once started in a favoring
environment, plantations developed rapidly and yielded good prof-
its. Each plantation demanded a rather numerous European per-
sonnel,^ and since the Portuguese government, in its low appraisal
of Brazil, spared it a good part of that petty regulation which dis-
courages individual initiative, a number of desirable emigrants
were gradually attracted across the seas. Because Brazil had
shown no promise of wealth in gold and silver, it had for a time
been on the verge of official abandonment. It was the " whole-
some neglect " which fell to its share that saved it in some degree,
especiany^cTuring its early years, from the system of ruthless exploi-
tation under which tropical dependencies have so often languished. ^
In spite of the fact that the Portuguese frequented this tropical
climate with some impunity, it soon became clear that they were
incapable of doing justice to the sugar-industry without aid. They
were not numerous enough, many were physically unable to put
forth the effort required, and almost all were by character unfitted.
They began early to have recourse to native labor, and experienced
little difficulty in coercing the rude and mutually hostile Indian
groups to their will. The Portuguese have always taken readily to
1 Watson, II, 120.
2 " A policy of rational freedom exempted agriculture, industry, and commerce
from vexatious restrictions, opening the colony to foreigners upon the payment of
light differential duties. The imposts were moderate, the monopolized articles few,
and the movement of individuals from one captaincy to another, or from any one of
them to foreign parts, was free. Such was the first constitution of Portuguese
America. ..." Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. lo-ii. In fact, after 1640 and the loss
of the Oriental empire it was seen to be useless to prohibit the cultivation of spices,
etc., in America. Id., p. 67. It was much later (eighteenth century) that limitation of
Brazilian production in the interest of Portugal took place. Zimmermann, I, 172 ;
Stephens, pp. 227 ff. - "
138 COLONIZATION
the slavery system, and here it was in many ways indispensable to
the preservation of economic life. But it was not put into operation
unopposed ; if in their material preoccupations the Portuguese as a
whole had ceased to think much' about the extension of the faith,
there was among them a class of professional zealots who claimed
to think about nothing else, — the Jesuits. This powerful order
set itself strongly against Indian slavery, for it contemplated the
organization of the untouched savages, their segregation from de-
moralizing association with Europeans, and their conversion en
masse. The incompatibility between the economic needs of tlie
planters and the religious aims of the Jesuits manifested itself in
the early days of the Portuguese settlement, and the story of the
collision of the two conflicting interests forms a good part of the
history of the colony.
The country was, then, primarily an agricultural one, and sugar
and woods long formed its major exports. About 1580 Sao Sal-
vador had 57 sugar- works, exporting annually 2400 hogsheads ;
Pernambuco had 50. In addition to sugar, many products for a
prevailingly local use were raised. The orange, lemon, and palm
trees grew well, likewise the cocoa and tea plants ; there were also
some valuable Indian foods like manioc. Cattle and horses, imported
from the Cape Verdes, throve and multiplied. Aside, therefore,
from a single main staple, Brazil grew many other products valu-
able for the maintenance of life. All through the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries the colony proceeded toward a more settled
and extensive agricultural economy, and although only an occasional
portion of its immense periphery was settled, the stations were of
a common type. The colony became constantly more valuable to
Portugal ; for one thing, the mother-country enjoyed its exclusive
trade. Toward the end of the sixteenth century about forty-five
ships came to Brazil annually for sugar and brazil-wood, and Por-
tugal likewise monopolized the coasting trade. ^ When the deca-
dence of India had now become apparent, it was realized that Brazil
was the most valuable national possession, and it went steadily on
in its development, despite checks presently to be mentioned, until
its trade with Portugal equaled that of Portugal with all the coun-
tries of Europe. 2
^ Watson, pp. 251-252 ; cf. Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 67.
2 Varnhagen, I, 303; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 53. In 1688, "the fleet which sailed from
Bahia was the largest which ever left that port, and yet it did not contain tonnage
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 139
In spite of the value of Brazilian sugar, however, the Portuguese
trade jiolicy was, at least in comparison with the Spanish, liberal.
Non-Portuguese were early handicapped by certain disabilities, but
these were not i:)rohibitive, as is proved by the constant increase
of foreigners and their factories from the sixteenth century on.
Commerce was subjected to the system of regular " caravans," but
this was rendered but slightly oppressive because of the number of
ships allowed and the number of stations visited. ^ Here again the
treatment accorded to Brazil was markedly distinct from the meas-
ures that hampered the India trade. In fact, the Brazilians em-
barked so eagerly in commerce that the civil and judicial officers
and even the clergy showed great readiness to become involved in
speculation.^ The settlers, too, had something to say about the
system. In 1649 when a privileged company was founded, com-
manding a large number of armed ships and a regiment of infantry
and artillery, the merchants of Rio and Bahia were able by their
representations to secure needed reform, and finally the suppression
of the organization (1720).^
What has been said is perhaps enough to establish the fact that
for two hundred years Brazil's development followed the line of
agricultural production and exchange. It is not surprising, there-
fore, to find the writers on Brazil adopting a sort of self-congratu-
latory vein as they remark upon the lateness of the discovery of
the country's mineral wealth. For, as they say, Brazil's very pov-
erty and its consequent neglect gave it the opportunity for ah
unhurried, natural development as a transplanted portion of the
Portuguese nation, and as a result they adduce the conservation in
Brazil of tTie Portuguese language, the Catholic religion, and many
another national character which causes the powerful western
state, now that India is gone, to reflect glory upon its diminutive
metropolis, and to lend it economic and other support."* This is an
a posteriori judgment with the usual excellences of its kind ; the
Portuguese of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries felt nothing
sufficient for the produce. ..." A further indication of commercial advance lay in
the betterment of the currency (1694). Watson, II, 109.
1 These were six in number, — Lisbon, Oporto, Rio de Janeiro, Parai^ba, Olinda, Sao
Salvador. Pombal replaced the caravans with privileged companies. Leroy-Beaulieu,
I) 53- ^ Watson, II, 116-117.
8 Rio-Branco, p. 135 ; Varnhagen, II, 37 ff.
* Leroy-Beaulieu (I, 52) says : " Portuguese colonization in America, at least during
the first two centuries, differs much from Spanish colonization and approaches rather
the English system." A brief series of comparisons follow.
q^^,.|^->-V■'>^*< ' ' ^'^^ ^- ^'
O' ,-\ V \r S^
140
COLONIZATION
but chagrin at their commonplace colony, when they compared it
with the golden soil of Peru. There were from the outset certain
rumors of mineral wealth, and convictions that " the ground of
Brazil and of Peru were the same," but iov generations no verifica-
tion appeared.^ The discoveries for which the pioneers longed and
toiled were delayed until the eighteenth century.
The history of the colony, from the time of Mem de Sa (about
1570) until the period just mentioned, shows little worth remark
upon the purely administrative side. The doings of many decades
are really massed about two great and protracted struggles, — that
between the p^lanters and the Jesuits in regard to the labor supply^
and that of the Portuguese colonists as a whole with the aggression
of foreign nations, ^chiefly France and Holland. '-^ That the former
and internal contest was subject to periodic truces, during which
erstwhile enemies worked shoulder to shoulder in a common cause,
goes almost without saying, if one recalls the traditional qualities
of the Portuguese when forced to the defensive.
Social Conditions
Of the quality of the European population in Brazil something
has already been said. Taking into account the fact that Brazil was
at the outset practically a penal colony, it is not difficult to under-
stand why the ecclesiastics soon found themselves obliged to raise
a voice against the depravity of religion and morals. There was no
honor in the public business, but in its stead a "cynical egoism."
Justice, good faith, and confidence had fled the land ; robberies
and assassinations were everyday affairs. The average of crime was
for some time higher than in Portugal itself.^ This state of things
was peculiarly characteristic of the time of the captaincies. But
there were other influences at work to modify the character of the
population, and one was the change of natural environment. The
climate of tropical Brazil proved hurtful to many Europeans, and
i " There existed a conviction that the ' ground of Brazil and that of Peru were the
same.' . . . But it did not please God to ordain that this should be confirmed before
Brazil was more secure. The expeditions which were undertaken did not come to
anything. And it is lucky that they did not, for the discoveiy of mines in the interior
when there were still so few people on the coast, would have left the latter district
deserted, and the French would have perchance seized upon it." Varnhagen, I, 214;
of. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 54-55. ^ Watson, II, 112.
3 Watson, I, 122, 253; Varnhagen, I, 203-204, especially pp. 185-189.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 141
new diseases or new forms of old ones constantly appeared. Of the
children born not one in three lived until the Portuguese mothers
had learned to adopt native methods of care-taking.^ If, in spite of
these facts, it is said that " in no instance have Europeans suffered
so little by transplantation from their own country into one of very
different climate as did the Portuguese in Brazil," ^ the implication
is that other Europeans suffered excessively rather than that the
Portuguese escaped well-nigh scathless.
Out of this tropical climate and other physical influences arose
also the plantation-systfim...o£ agriculturCj to which some allusion
has been made, and its general adoption and prosperity had pro-
duced a singular modification of customs on the part of what had
been at one time a fairly laborious and economical element of the
population. " In the more flourishing settlements . . . nothing
could exceed the luxury of the female costume, the wives of the
planters being attired in silks and satins covered with the richest
embroidery, with pearls, rubies and emeralds. . . . The ladies of r
Bahia were so indolent of habit that on going abroad they had to
lean on their pages lest they should fall. Even the men — if men
they might be called — were unable to descend the declivity on
which Bahia stands, and were carried down on a contrivance called
a serpentine, that is to say, a hammock suspended from a pole, a
slave attending meanwhile with a parasol."^ About 1560 gaming
had to be prohibited under severe penalties, for it had become a
prevalent vice of an idle people.* The officials gambled with the
opportunities of the colony itself in no less consistent a manner, and
the governors, appointed generally upon a three-year term as in
India, enriched themselves by every means. The underpaid func-
tionaries were almost compelled by their exigencies to be dishonest.
Even the priests, except the Jesuits, were chiefly engaged in
securing gain.^ The population was vain of material successes, but
raw and uncultured, and it was still very small toward the end
of the seventeenth century. The number of Portuguese who held
this vast area subject should not be over-estimated. Until mining
led them inland they held small coast stations only ; sjiaces equal in
size to an average European kingdom are still uninhabited. During
the seventeenth century the numbers were " so scanty that it seems
strange that the Portuguese could have at the same time contended
1 Southey, I, 345. - Watson, I, 252-253. '^ Id., TI. 121.
* Varnhagen, I, 252. ^ Southey, I, 345; Watson, II, 114-115.
1^2 COLONIZATION
successfully with a foreign invader and with hostile tribes in the
interior."^ In 1585 the settlements had a population of about
57,000, of whom 25,000 were whites in scattered groups, 18,500
civilized Indians, and 14,000 African slaves,^ and the next century
saw relatively slight increase.
Relations with the Natives : The Labor Question
The whole system was based upon the domination and exploita-
tion of the reduced country and people. For reasons assigned, the
vital condition of economic existence was a chcai) labor supply, und
the natives were early enslaved. Against this outcome'lhe Indians
struggled with all the desperation of the American savage, preferring
death and race-extermination to a servile station and labor. By the
influence of the Jesuits their case was repeatedly brought before
the king and state, and from early times orders of various kinds
looking to their freedom were emitted from Lisbon. Without a
strong local agency for their enforcement these would have been of
no avail, and as it was they were again and again rendered null and
void by the necessities and self-will of the colonists. The natural
conditions demanded native slavery, and it took all the force of the
most powerful of religious and political brotherhoods to stem the
tide.^ The planters grew to hate the Jesuits as the authors of their
misfortunes, and did not fail to assert that the fathers profited
largely by their discomfiture. Yet it is to be noted that the Jesuits
were not opposing slavery as an institution, but the specific enslave-
ment of the Indians, of heathen whom they wished to gather into
the fold while they were still uncontaminated by contact with the
lambs already technically in, but not as yet wholly above suspicion.
Whatever the theories, the facts speak for themselves. The
colonists at first repaid themselves for their labors in reducing the
country by drawing upon the physical forces of the conquered.*
But as the plantation grew, these products of "just wars" were
not numerous enough, and periodic slave-raids comparable to the
better-known razzias of Africa were the regular thing ; these were
1 Watson, II, 1 19 ; cf. p. 112.
2 Rio-Branco, p. 116.
3 Walson, I, 161-163; Vamhagen, I, 257 ff. A good general sketch of the Indian
situation and the conflict of planters and Jesuits is given by Zimmermann, I, i 2S ff.
■♦ Martins, O Ikazil, etc., p. 50.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 143
attended by an enormous waste of life under cruel treatment and
exposure. As slaves the Indians were not able to perform the hard
labor imposed upon them and to which they were totally unused,
and they died away as a race beneath it. At first the colonists were
allowed to enslave at will ; later King Sebastian issued a clerically
inspired regulation (1570) declaring all Indians free "excepting
such as should be taken in war made by command of the king or
governor, or such as were aggressive cannibals." In still later times
many similar decrees were published, but these were almost invari-
ably made to suit every individual occasion. ^ As in the Spanish
Indian legislation, the intent was of the best, but the force of
natural conditions in the distant colony completely negatived its
reahzation. Even the so-called free Indians, who had voluntarily
subrnitted to the Portuguese, were forced to leave their families
destitute of support, while they raised and prepared tobacco on the
plantations.^ The aggressions of the Europeans rendered the efforts
of the Jesuits in collecting the coast-natives into villages, there to
civilize them under a paternal direction, a constant disappointment.
Continued raids and fomentation of inter-tribal strife brought it
about that by the end of the sixteenth century both missionaries
and slave-raiders had to penetrate much farther into the interior in
quest of converts and captives. '^ This was particularly marked in
the district of Sao Paulo ; in this relatively temperate climate the
inhabitants (Paulistas) exhibited a superior energy and persistence
in the enslavement and extermination of the natives. Attacked
by the exasperated savages, they retaliated in a seven years' war
(i 592-1 599), in which about three hundred villages were destroyed
and thousands of Indians slain or enslaved. Man-hunts of this
nature then became periodic, and the Paulistas gained a disgrace-
ful reputation for their exploits in a bad business. The bewildered
natives, a prey to epidemics of disease strange to them,** with every-
thing going against them, became panic-stricken and intractable,
choosing death in preference to the hazards of the strange and
1 Watson, II, 82-83, '^5' 115-116; Varnhagen, I, 173 ff-; Zimmermann, I, 128 ff.
2 Watson, II, 84.
^ Watson, I, 258. Varnhagen (I, 174-178) regards the early enslavement as a
civilizmg process, and asserts Aat the tales of cruelty represented exceptional cases,
many of which were punished ; the effects of a mistaken humanitarianism, sustained
by the Jesuits, were deleterious.
* Peschel (Races of Man, p. 151) quotes from travelers, who assert that the Portu-
guese "deposited the clothes of scarlet-fever or small-pox patients on the hunting-
grounds of the natives, in order to spread the pestilence among them."
1^4 COLONIZATION
repulsive fate forced upon them.^ The Jesuits, seeing the futihty
of their strenuous and for the most part disinterested efforts for
the natives, were gradually driven to the conviction that it was
impossible to proceed with the conversion and civilization of the
latter so long as the civil authorities should have any power over
them. During the seventeenth century, under the leadership of
the single-minded and energetic Vieyra, their efforts to secure the
sole authority over the Indians were unremitting. They gradually
gained extensive control ; large sections of the aboriginal popula-
tion were delivered entirely to them, and they enforced their
authority with characteristic fearlessness.^
The jealousy of the settlers now passed the bounds of repression.
They were so given over to the slave-system that they could no
longer provide for themselves. A biological differentiation of func-
tion, as it were, had left them, like Darwin's slave-making ants, in a
sort of parasitic relation to a subject race. " Men of noble lineage
could not bring their children to the city because they had no slaves
to row their canoes." On account of the activity of the Jesuits
many i:»lantcrs " had no one to fetch them wood or water, and were
perishing for want of slaves to cultivate their lands." Respect for
law, heretofore manifested at least in form, broke down, threats of
separation from Portugal were uttered, and a general tumult of
hostility to the Jesuits broke out. The mob dragged the fathers
from their cells, forced a resignation of control over the Indians in
favor of the civil authorities, and undertook the speedy deportation
of the whole order. A skillful governor^ Segueira, managed to
uphold authority without an appeal to force (1662), biitJhe planters
did not forget their day of triumph, and the Jesuits never again
dared so imperiously to assert their dominance in the colony's
affairs.^ Thus their struggles against the enslavement of natives on
the plantations were of little ultimate avail, and the outcome of their
subsequent efforts to save their proteges from the mines was, as
will presently appear, still more disastrous, at least to themselves.
The Indians constituted the labor force nearest at hand. Their
conquest and capture afforded an employment which had been,
and is said still to be, congenial to the Portuguese as a people.**
1 Rio-Branco, pp. 127 ff. ; cf. Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 25-26; Watson, II, 97-98,
1 1 5-1 16, 270.
2 Wat.son, II, 85, 88-89 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 52 ; Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 30, note.
8 Watson, II, 92-94. * Watson, II, 81-82.
THK I'ORTUGUESl': IN BRAZII.
145
Their initial cost was, especially at the outset, negligible. Hence
the prevalence of Indian slavery and the resistance to its abolition.
However, from the earliest years of its occupation, Brazil had
been the destination of an increasing number of African slaves,
chiefly from the Guinea coast. ^ The various hindrances thrown by
government and clergy in the way of the enslavement of the
Indians caused the less tenacious or more law-abiding of the culti-
vators to have resource to the imported labor supply. And it was
speedily recognized that the negro was far superior to the Indian
for the purpose at hand. Indeed, it has been observed through
history that the former race, both by physique, resistance to
environment, and temperament, has been almost preordained to
serve its more energetic fellows. But the great difficulty was that
the planters could not afford the initial cost of the negroes, evi-
dent as was their superiority.^ There was no opposition to negro
slavery, per se, however, on the part of any one, and it steadily
increased with the decline or liberation of the natives. By 1585
Pernambuco counted some 10,000 African slaves, Bahia^ooo to
4000. Elsewhere they were relatively few in number, for they
found their greatest usefulness on the sugar-plantations. At. one
time in the seventeenth century the proportion of negroes to
whites in Bahia was estimated at twenty to one, but this was by
no means true of Brazil as a whole. ^ It need scarcely be said that
this trade in human working-animals exhibited the stock features of
heartlessness and incredible cruelty. The voyage from Guinea was
relatively short, but its terrors were manifold. There are not lack-
ing those who believe that the scourge of yellow fever was fixed
upon Rio de Janeiro and other American ports by reason of the
dumping of filth and diseased corpses from the slavers into the
waters of the harbor and its environs. Once at work, however,
the very value of the negroes insured them against such harshness
of treatment as fell to the lot of the unadaptable and generally
obdurate Indians, and with their increase there were added to the
constituents of population several new varieties of mongrel, and a
body of runaways or bush-negroes, who ranged the forests in a
condition of dangerous tribal independence.'^
1 Vamhagen, I, 182.
2 Watson, II, III ; Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 52. ^ Watson, II, 116-117, 121.
* Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 62-63. ^o"" ^^^ negro " republi c" of Pal mares, which
attained its greatest vigor about the middle or the seventeenth century, see Watson,
II, iio-lii, 134; Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 64, 66.
146 COLONIZATION
Foreign Aggression
The internal struggle over the labor question was not allowed,
in the course of events, to monopolize the attention of government
and people. The more northern nations of Europe were gradually
losing, as the sixteenth century wore on, both their respect for
the papal awards to Spain and Portugal and their fear of the
exaggerated naval power of these once irresistible states. Pluck-
ing up their courage, they began to infringe, first of all upon the
Spanish and Portuguese possessions on the Atlantic. From the
time of the discovery of Brazil the French had occasionally visited
the region ; indeed, it was their appearance in this quarter which
incited in the Portuguese a realization of the possible value of their
neglected acquisition in America. The first serious attempt of the
French to establish themselves in what is now Brazil occurred in
1558, when an adventurer, Villegagnon, occupied an island in the
bay of Rio de Janeiro. He was actively encouraged by Coligny, and
was left unmolested by the Portuguese for four years. " Some
ten thousand Huguenots were ready to emigrate with their arts
had they been sure of meeting with toleration, but the governor's
arbitrary proceedings ruined the project." By this time the court
at Lisbon had been aroused by the Jesuit Nobrega to a realizing
sense of the rivalry of the French, and after some hard fighting
the latter were expelled from their position. Several subsequent
attempts of the French in the same region were speedily thwarted ;
Rio was again taken by them in 1 7 1 1 , but was held for a brief
period only. It was not until the latter half of the seventeenth
century that they actually established themselves in Cayenne.^
If the PVench peril was a serious one, that which attended the
appearance of the Dutch came near to being fatal. Up to the
incor))oralion of Portugal by Spain (1580) the Portuguese and
Dutch had been common enemies and combatants against the
latter power, but with the accession of Philip II to the throne of
Portugal, both this and other fortunate rapprocJuniciits were
terminated. For sixty years Portugal was destined to share the
odium of Spain and to receive blows delivered at her. Dutch
1 Watson, I, 160-161 ; II, 106-108, 184 ; Vamhagen, I, 36 ff., 329 ff. A chapter
on the Huguenots in Brazil is given in Parkman's France and J^ngland in North
America, Part I (" Pioneers of France in the New World," chap, ii) ; cf. Payne, Age
of Disc, pp. 49-50.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 1 47
successes in the East had led to the formation of the West^India
Company (jjS2-i^ one of whose main objects was the harassing and
conquest of Brazil. The difference between the enterprises of the
Dutch and the predatory expeditions of the French and English
speedily became apparent to the Brazilians ; they found, to their
^ton|shrnent, that the Dutch intended to stay. This situation
roused the national spirit in the contests with the Hollanders as
it had not been stirred in the brushes with other Europeans.^
The history of the Dutch occupation of Recife (Pernambuco)
and six provinces of Brazil might be more fitly taken up from the
standpoint of the West India Company and its career.'-^ The Portu-
guese steadily opposed the Dutch occupation, and, owing to the
shortsighted and parsimonious policy of the company, with some
success. The turning-point came in 1640 with the separation of
Poj;tugal from Spain and the accession of the house of Braganza,
an event which detached Portugal from the destiny of Spain, and
ranged her again among Spain's enemies, among the chief of whom
were the Dutch. The altered situation was at once recognized in
form, and a truce for ten years was arranged between the States-
General and Portugal (1641J. This, however, was illusory. A year
was given for notifying the truce to the Dutch authorities in the
Indies, and aid was afforded to Portugal against the common
enemy ; but the interval was employed in pushing forward the
Dutch conquests in Brazil, and in seizing Sao Paulo de Loanda in
Angola, the source of the entire supply of slaves for Brazil.^ This,
besides cutting off a lucrative trade, was a severe blow to the
prosperity of the plantations ; and after the recall of Count Nassau
from Brazil the policy of the Dutch became less and less concilia-
tory, and the exasperation of the Portuguese more pronounced. In
Maranhao, Bahia, and Pernambuco the people began to work for
their own deliverance. The general revolution was headed by Joao
Fernandes Vieira, a very wealthy planter, operating in the region
of Pernambuco. It was not at first a universal movement, for
many thought it hopeless and wished for peace at any price ; but
the impolitic procedures of the Dutch, who in their inability to
reach the actual insurgents began to oppress the lukewarm who
1 Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 39-40. 2 q{ pp_ ^j^^ ^^^^ below.
^ The prete.xt given for this action was disbelief in the permanent separation of
Spain and I'ortugal. It must also be borne in mind that peace concluded between
European nations never strictly applied, in these earlier periods, to their respective
colonies.
148 COLONIZATION
had stayed at home, speedily rendered a neutral status untenable.
The party of Vieira gathered momentum, and advanced from guer-
rilla warfare to battles and sieges. The West India Company pro-
vided insufficiently against the danger, and the outcome was not long
delayed. The Dutch, hampered by the English war, were driven
by 1654 to a surrender of all their holdings on the coast of Brazil,
and further activity on the part of Holland was discouraged by the
attitude of England and France. In 1661 negotiations were con-
cluded whereby the Dutch renounced attempts on Brazil in return
for certain considerations in money and trade and the restoration
of their captured cannon.^
Thus ended the most serious danger to Portuguese dominance
in Brazil. Under a more enlightened policy on the part of the
Dutch the whole destiny of the country might have been altered.
But an outcome of the kind described was quite characteristic of
the West India Company. Of course the violence and disorder
of the period were very unfavorable to the economic prosperity of
Brazil ;. in partial compensation, however, certain distinct advantages
emerged from the Dutch occupation. First of all, the Brazilians
attained a sense of self-sufficiency and power and a consciousness
of unity not experienced before. Like the Spanish-Americans of
a later period, they had expelled a powerful invader practically
unaided, for Portugal, though in sympathy with the insurgents,
did not dare to offend her Dutch allies against Spain by openly
lending aid. Thus the Brazilians felt, in a sense, that they had
attained their political majority. Portugal realized the changing
conditions, and in 1645 the colony was made a priiicipado by the
designation of the king's^eldest son and presumptive heir as Prince,
of Brazil. 2 During this period of misfortune the Brazilians came
also to realize the nature of the Inquisition ^ as a check upon the
country's development, and were able better to secure commercial
1 On the Dutch in Brazil, see Watson, II, pp. i ff. ; Vamhagen, I, 335-404;
Zimmermann, I, 138 ff . ; Edmundson, in Eng. Hist. Rev., XI (1896), 231 ff. ; XIV
(1S99), 676 ff. ; XV (1900), 38 ff. 2 Vamhagen, I, 246; II, 2.
•' The Holy Office, as has been intimated, never attained a firm footing in Brazil ;
but it interfered more or less regularly in affairs. Immediately preceding and during
the union with Spain its influence waxed, and it assumed at times an independent
judicial power. About 1702 a second period of vigor ensued, and between 1707 and 171 1,.
160 persons were seized and persecuted. The total number of colonists condemned
by the Office acting in Lisbon was about 500. At times physicians, lawyers, and even
ecclesiastics came under its displeasure. Autos-da-fe were relatively infrequent.
Varnhagen, II, 179-183.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 149
and other enterprises against the peril of confiscation of capital,
ecclesiastical interference, and like impediments. A Brazil company,
in imitation of the Dutch company, was created, against clerical
opposition, and aided considerably in bringing the war to a success-
ful end.i It should be said, too, that the Brazilians profited by the
fact that the Dutch introduced, as it were, their country to Europe.
The conquerors not only described Brazil, in the course of their
commercial operations, to people to whom it had been but a name,
but they also made Brazilian products, chiefly sugar and rum,
familiar articles in European markets. Their charts and records
of soundings remained in use up to a very recent time. It can
hardly be said that the Dutch occupation exerted otherwise any
considerable influence upon the future of the country. The Hol-
landers furnished an example of industry and extreme domestic
cleanliness to a people who had a good deal to learn along these
lines. They also benefited the country by their experience in the
treatment of damp soils, in horticulture, in the construction of
public works, and in other lines. But they had not time to develop
any of these things to the full, nor did they intermarry to any
great extent with the Portuguese, for difference of religion pre-
sented insuperable obstacles. They were in the country twenty-
five years, but " when they departed they left little or no trace
behind them either in religion, language or manners." ^ In fact,
the departure of the Hollanders was signalized by a reaction toward
Catholic fanaticism, and oppression of the Jews and Protestants.^
There was no ominous menace to Brazil from other enemies
than the French and Dutch. During the Spanish predominance
English fleets occasionally raided the coast, notably in 1582, 1586,
and with most damage in 1594. Although considerable booty was
secured, none of these attacks threatened the conquest of the
country.'*
The Gold and Diamond Discoveries
An attempt has been made thus far to clear up the perspective
of Brazilian history previous to the eighteenth century ; for with
the end of the seventeenth the general trend of development in
this colony takes a decided turn which provides a convenient break
^ Watson, II, 71-72.
2 Watson, II, 118. Life in the interior still remained distinctly primitive. Id., II,
266. 2 Vamhagen, II, 42. * Watson, II, 254-258.
150
COLONIZATION
in presentation and an apt point of departure for the ensuing narra-
tive. Hitherto the colony had been ahnost wholly devoted to
agriculture and the exchange of agricultural products ; ^ but with
the eighteenth century there is injected into its life the new ele-
ment of the exploitation of the mines, destined here as elsewhere
to set a characteristic stamp upon social development. But it is
to be noted in the case of Brazil, as has been intimated already,
that, unlike the majority of gold- and jewel-producing countries, it
had already worked out two centuries of development along other
and substantial lines before the rush of prospectors and the forma-
tion of mining communities could introduce disorder and a perver-
sion of steadier and more normal development.
Hopes of a second Peru were early indulged, but the seventeenth
century was well on to its end before any real promise was disclosed.
A succession of arduous exploring expeditions culminated in 1693
with the exhibition of some promising specimens of gold,^ and the
consequent establishment of a smelting-house. The district toward
which attention was turned was Minas Geraes, and, although the
section was uninviting, it speedily became the Mecca of those who
were impatient of laborious methods in the acquisition of wealth.
The stampede for claims was so wild that special regulations had
to be passed as early as 1702 limiting grants and defining tenure.^
The plantation system was all but ruined ; farms were deserted
and ran to waste ; negroes were transferred, by an excess of
demand for their services, from the sugar-producing areas to the
mines. The rise in the price of raw sugar disabled the refining
industries, and the French and English in the West Indies, taking
advantage of the situation, began to invade the European market
hitherto supplied almost exclusively from Brazil. With the decline
of the staple commodity, general trade suffered a great reverse.
1 Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 15-16, summarizes the early development of Brazil as
follows : " a) First material of colonization : convicts and Jews deported by the
sovereign ; escaped criminals ; colonists assembTfed" l5y the Sbiiatarios ; in Brazil,
enslaved Indians, and everywhere Guinea negroes, e.xported as instruments of labor,
b) Species of colonial enterprise : agriculture, characterized almost exclusively by
the culture of cane and the manufacture of sugar, c) Social constitution : feudal,
by way of territorial grants, seigniories or captaincies; or by mercantile monopolies,
as in Guinea; conjointly with the governors-general as representatives of the sover-
eign. Ecclesiastical organization ; in imitation of the kingdom, in bishoprics and
parishes. Free missions, chiefly of Jesuits." For the status of Brazil at the end of
the seventeenth century, see Varnhagen, IT, 92 ff., 136 ff.
2 For the earlier efforts, see Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 7S, note.
8 The regulations in force about 17 10 are rehearsed in Varnhagen, II, 103 ff.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 151
Some attempts were made to remedy this situation, but they were
presently given up, for the Lisbon government was not hard to
persuade that mining was more profitable than sugar-raising.^ The
old preoccupations which had once rendered Brazil inconsiderable
to the Portuguese now exalted it to a position of superlative im- 1
portance. With the development of the mines, then, it may be f
said that Brazil ceased for the time to be an agricultural colony.
And the discovery in 1730 of the diamond fields, also in the Minas
Geraes, carried the change considerably farther. Brazil fell back
from its dignified status as a producing and developing region intcj
the position of a California or a South Africa.
The results of heightened interest on the part of the home
government began at once to make themselves visible. The crown
demanded its fifths and marked out its allotments, and, as was
inevitable under the conditions, it gradually enacted more and
stricter regulations in its effort to control the illicit export of gold
dust. All the gold was to pass through the royal smelting-house.
Restrictions of the entrance of foreigners to Brazil were rendered
more stringent than before, and even the Portuguese were required
to exhibit passports. The ineffectiveness of the crown levies on
the gold production led in time to the substitution of a poll-tax
upon slaves ; and yet, in spit6 of its strenuous efforts, the govern-
■ment was constantly defrauded. In the case of the diamonds, the
system of the royal fifths was found impracticable from the first,
and a capitation tax on slaves was early adopted. The diamonds
were to be remitted in the royal ships only, .one per cent on their
value being charged as freight. It was necessary likewise to limit
the output of diamonds, for within two years their price in Europe
had declined seventy-five per cent.^ The state undertook to re-
serve the diamond country and to limit the extraction, and the
profits thus derived were very large. Between 1700 and 1820
Portugal consistently drew from the takings and taxes in gold
mines and diamond fields a revenue upon which rivals looked
with undisguised envy.^ However, prosperity based upon such
1 Watson, II, 171-174; Vamhagen, II, 174 ff.
2 Leroy-Beaulieu (I, 55-56) defends upon economic grounds this limitation of out-
put, at the same time stigmatizing the means adopted by the government. Cf. Watson,
II, 171-172, 186-190, 244-245; Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 80.
3 Definite estimates of such income are, of course, impossible. Eschwege calculated
the total product of the fifths as about $65,000,000. They are thought by others to
have reached a minimum of $2,000,000 annually. See note appended to this chapter.
152 COLONIZATION
hazardous undertakings is apt to be illusory. It has been cal-
culated by a competent authority that the value of the diamonds
extracted between 1740 and 1820 scarcely equaled the product of
eighteen months derived from the sugar- and coffee-plantations.^
The social effects of the discovery of the mines were naturally
very marked. The passion for gambling with large hazards induced
a general movement among the population towards the uncertain
and away from the secure and substantial. In a certain sense the
temper of the Portuguese in India was reproduced. That this
movement was not more disastrous than it was, is referable largely
to the tardiness of the discoveries, as occasion has already been
taken to show. Of course the mining districts themselves were
the centers of turbulence, irregularities, and disorder. In the arid
interior conditions of existence were very hazardous. Life in the
diamond fields was about synonymous with sojourn in a desert.
The necessaries of life rose to famine prices. Men were driven by
a shortage of food to cultivation or cattle-raising, occupations which
were often found to be more profitable than mining. However,
the great enticements of the golden harvest led to a considerable
settlement,^ much of which was referable to the immigration of
the stubborn, independent, often half-Indian Paulistas. In 1776
Minas Geraes had a population of some 320,ooo.'' The temper of
the miners was lawless from the outset, and they had to be quelled
again and again by governmental forces, as well as constantly spied
upon and restrained in the interest of the crown revenues. Insur-
rections against such restraints were put down only after prolonged
resistance, and by summary methods. Again, the large importation
of negroes into Minas Geraes rendered race-confhcts the order of
the day, and special effort had to be put forth to check the forma-
tion by escaped slaves of dangerous predatory bands. However,
1 Eschwege, quoted in Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 55-56.
2 " Brazil attracted, early in the eighteenth century, the entire Portuguese emigra-
tion. The rapidity with which this emigration developed was such that I)om Joao V
. . . promulgated a decree in 1720 in order ' to prohibit the yearly migration from this
country to the captaincies of Brazil of so many people . . . chiefly from the province
of Minho, which, from being the most populous, to-day finds itself in a state of not
having enough people to cultivate the soil, or to perform social services.' " Corvo,
1,15.
8 Watson, I, 269. Martins believes that the very names of the new mining settle-
ments, which are mainly of local origin and seldom I'ortuguese, witness a progressive
nationalization or assimilation of the stream of immigration. O l^razil, etc., p. cS5 and
note. lie also thinks the frontier education was one that strengthened the love for
independence and at least indirectly contributed to the emancipation. Id., p. 79.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 153
despite the perversion of law and order that resulted from the gold
and diamond discoveries, the outcome of the movement toward the
interior was a progressively increasing exploration of the country,
its resources and waterways.^
The Expulsion of the Jesuits
One of the consequences of the gold discoveries was, naturally
enough, the accentuation of differences regarding the treatment
of the natives, for not only were slaves of all kinds in demand at
the mines, where their position could scarcely be better than on
the plantations, but the penetration of the interior and the rapid
growth of European population worked toward the infringement
of that isolation in which the Jesuits desired to keep their actual
or prospective converts. The idea of the Jesuits, which perhaps
appears more typically in the Paraguay missions,^ was to keep the
Indians under their own tutelage and in a life of repose under dis-
cipline. They divided the country systematically, and their aldeias,
or industrial missions, rose at regular points over the whole. They
labored excessively, building churches and establishing schools,
learning native tongues and translating into them the prayers of
the Church. Their system was mild and paternal ; they neither
corporally punished their charges nor would they sell or otherwise
part with them. They did much to introduce civilization among
the Indians, and, in order to make their work secure and to spare
bad examples, they strove to keep the settlers at a distance.^ In
this they were aided by the laws of Pedro II (1667- 1706), which
forbade Portuguese to dwell in the missions. However, the Indians
in Brazil, still subject to civil authority, never clung to the fathers
as did the Guarani's of Paraguay ; nor could the settlement of the ^,
whites be prevented, when strong enough motives for such estab- *"'*^
lishment were once developed. But the activity of the Jesuits, *~'^
hateful as it was to the planters, and the legislation secured in ' - "^
favor of the Indians, were not without their influence. For when
the mines were opened the effect upon the condition of the natives '^ C^i-,,^
was far less disastrous than would have been anticipated. This was
partially due, of course, to the increased use of negro labor.^ The
1 Watson, II, 171 ; Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 19, 32-34, 8o-8r.
2 Cf. pp. 287-294, below. 2 Watson, II, 267.
* Id., pp. 170, 201-202 ; Vamhagen, II, 93 ff.
154 COLONIZATION
natives' sphere of rights had been extended, and with fewer quali-
fications as time went on. It is a curious coincidence that the
Indians were made unqualifiedly free before the law almost coinci-
dently with the expulsion from Brazil of their old-time defenders,
the Jesuits (1758). ^
It has been shown how the popular mind became inflamed
against the Jesuits in consequence of the determined efforts of the
latter to prevent the settlers from taking full advantage of what
seemed to them a naturally provided labor supply. It was practi-
cally impossible to persuade the planters that the Jesuits were dis-
interested antagonists. The conviction grew apace that the aldeias
were simply competing plantations, worked at a merely nominal
cost by converts adroitly turned into slaves. There was much
color to this persuasion, for the missions did not lag behind in
production. The planters felt that they were being overreached
even before the opening of the mines, and when, in consequence
of this latter event, they lost a large proportion of their workers,
and the price of negroes rose, their exasperation over the relatively
prosperous status of the Jesuit plantations steadily increased. The
Company had become "a true industrial association with which no
single capitalist could compete." ^ It had acquired or assumed a
degree of political power, in the attainment of its economic strength,
which galled the settlers, especially in the southern provinces
where poj)ulation was more dense. The fathers were driven from
the south first of all, and then from the Bahia region. They were
not secure even in the extreme north. ^ It is probable, therefore,
that with the growth of population Brazil would alone have rid
herself of her incubus, but it was from the metropolis which had
fostered the Jesuits that final relief came.
King John V (i 706-1750) had been the unresisting tool of the
Society,* but with the accession of Jos6 I (1750) the situation
changed. Carvalho, the Marquis of Pombal, became the dominant
figure of the new reign, and, in the estimation of some, the most
eminent statesman of his time.^ Of his many projects, those which
touch vitally upon our subject were the freeing of the Indians in
Brazil and the universal and merciless pursuit of the Jesuit order.
1 Martins, O 15razil, etc., p. 30, note ; for a general account of the Indian legisla-
tion, etc., see Zimmerman, I, I36ff.
2 Varnhagen, I, 260 ; cf. pp. 257-261 ; Martins, Hist, de Port., II, 1S5 ; Rio-Branco,
p. 131. ' Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 70-73.
* Cf. Branco, Port, na Epocha de D. Joao \, passim. ^ Watson, II, 232.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 155
Pombal's object in freeing the Indians was that they should blend
with the Portuguese population in Brazil ; his hostility to the
Jesuits resulted from his desire to strengthen the monarchy both
in Lisbon and in the colonies.^ In 1757 the temporal power of
the mission was suppressed. The Indians were definitely freed in
1758, and the aldeias were transformed into villages under common
law. Naturally the Society suffered much from this cancellation
of its means of support, being reduced almost to penury. Lay
directors were appointed to carry out the royal purpose of Christian-
izing and civilizing the Indians ; needless to say, they neither
possessed the preparation nor gained the successes of the Jesuits.^
But there was more opportunity given for the amalgamation of
races, and it was improved. " This is the true reason," says Varn-
hagen, " why the Indian type has disappeared almost absolutely
from our provinces." ^ From this time on little is heard of the
natives, for, as will be seen, the possibilities of African slave-labor
began to engross the attention of those who had hitherto made
requisition upon the Indians.
As for the Jesuits, the reasons for their expulsion from Portugal
and the colonies go back to a series of wide-reaching activities of
which the championing of the Indians was but one. " For two
hundred years the Society had exercised unbounded influence over
kings and courts. Its machinery for governing was so perfect, and
its system was so subtle, that it began to appear to statesmen
that unless this ambitious order were speedily and effectually
opposed it must soon dominate Christendom. . . . The doctrines
of Ignatius Loyola admitted of nothing short of an absolute obedi-
ence. . . . Kings were afraid to act without the approbation of an
Order whose system of espionage was so complete as even to baffle
secret confidential intercourse between sovereigns and statesmen.
No one Catholic monarch felt himself strong enough single-handed
to throw off the humiliating yoke." ^ Meanwhile the economic and
political strength of the order waxed steadily ; it had already, and
1 Rio-Branco, p. 146 ; Martins, Hist, de Port., II, 204-205 ; cf. pp. 207-208 ; cf. also
Branco, pp. 109 ff.
2 Watson, II, 236-237 ; Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 72-73"; Rio-Branco, pp. 148-
149. ^ Varnhagen, I, 205.
* Watson, II, 232. For an extremely eloquent arraignment of the Jesuits, see
Martins, Civ. Iber., pp. 289-294; Hist, de Port., II, 85-100, 147 ff., and elsewhere in *"^
this author's works ; somewhat the same judgment, with special reference to the
Jesuits iu the Philippines, is passed by Montero^y Vidal (II, 141 ff.).
1^6 COLONIZATION
with considerable success, resisted the royal authority in India.
A strong desire to free his country from this element led Pombal
to seize the Jesuits in Portugal and ship them off to the Papal
States (1759), and to decree their expulsion from Brazil together
with the other colonies, an operation which was carried out in
America with considerable gusto, and, it is said, with much
brutality.^ Their expulsion from P>ance (1764) and Spain (1767)
followed, — events which attest the widespread misgivings occa-
sioned by their economical and political activities.
The ignominious exit of the Jesuits from Brazil must not divert
attention from the great services performed by them before, having
become conscious of the power of their well-knit organization,
they yielded to the temptations of wealth and power. They per-
formed herculean toil in their attempts to better the condition of
the natives, and their preaching was not wholly in vain, even
amidst the exigencies of frontier-life. By 1750 no hostile tribes
remained on the banks of the Amazon throughout its entire course.
Such as had not submitted to the missionaries had retired into the
interior.^ We may pause here to note that, partly because of the
activities of the Jesuits, Brazil had suffered from none of the dire-
ful native wars common in the earlier stages of a colony's life.
The teaching of the Jesuits and their paternal system may have
unduly hampered the development of initiative on the part of their
proselytes. Their methods may often have been questionable and
their lives scandalous. It is significant, however, that the natives
could with difficulty be induced to leave the missions and work for
the settlers. The Jesuits were often, no doubt, especially in later
decades, examples of apathy and inculcators of superstition, but
" the conquest and colonization of Portuguese America in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries is in large part their work. As
missionaries, they succeeded in winning thousands of Indians for
civilization, and the native race became, thanks to their devotion,
a considerable factor in the formation of the l^razilian people." ^
One of the outcomes of Jesuit ojjposition to Indian servitude
was the growth of African slavery and the slave-trade. Despite
the cost of the negro, the colonist was forced to use him, when the
^ fathers had gained their day of success and had drawn the native
1 Watson, II, 233-234, 237-238 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 52-53 ; Martins, Hist, de Port.,
II, i47-i.(.S, 153, 182 ff.; Varnhagen, II, 194 ff. 2 Watson, II, 15S-159, 199-202.
3 Rio-Branco, p. 149; cf. Watson, II, 114-115, 123; Varnhagen, I, 202, 243.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL I 57
peoples into the missions under their paternal protection. But it
was the delicts of Pombal, freeing the Indians and giving them
actually or prospectively the same rights as the Portuguese, that
lent to the negro slave-trade an impetus hitherto unknown. ^ " In
the first years [1755 ff.] of the existence of the Conipaiihia do Grao-
Pard the import of slaves, into Brazil amounted to 100,000 per
annum; of these 22,000 to 43,000 had Rio as their destination.
. . . From 1759 to 1803 the colonial registers give, as consigned
from Angola to Brazil, 642,000 negroes. The income from the
exportation of negroes is estimated at i6ocontos [$160,000]. . . .
From 18 1 7 to 18 19 the average shipment for Brazil was 22,000, and,
despite the legal cessation of the traffic, as late as 1839 there still
issued from Angola 35 cargoes of slaves." ^ These great numbers
were demanded partially in consequence of a heavy death-rate on
the passage and in the colony. To get 65,000 slaves to Brazil it
was necessary to start with some 100,000, and of the 65,000 some
3000 to 5000 died in the first two months after arrival. The
profits of the trade were of course high ; " the mine of negro labor
was worth as much as or more than the New World mines of silver
and gold." "The colony acquired decidedly and definitively the
character common to all the [plantation] colonies of North America
and the Antilles, — abandonment and extinction of the indigenous
races, colonization by whites, and negro slave-labor." ^ The results
for Brazil of the prohibition of the slave-trade and the activities of
the British cruisers were similar to those experienced by those
other American districts which were devoted to tropical agriculture.
If the outcome was less disastrous, it was because part of Brazil
was a true settlement colony, and because even the tropical portions
had gotten a start early in the country's history.
1 Vamhagen, I, 181-185; ^f- Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 30, note.
2 M. de Sa, O Trabalho Rural Af ricano, quoted in Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 56,
note. The close natural connection between Brazil and the source from which it
drew its indispensable labor supply, the West African stations, should receive
especial attention. Cf. p. 127, above. When the Dutch occupied Brazil (see p. 147,
above) they were led as a matter of course to acquire the slave-stations; after their
departure the Portuguese again managed to secure these complementary districts.
See Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. vii, 37-38.
3 Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 54, 58-59, 73, 75 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 53.
158 COLONIZATION
Conditions Preceding Independence
The gradual exhaustion of the mines toward the end of the
eighteenth century allowed^TIie^Glony, though with some distress,
to return to its former and interrupted course of material develop-
ment. Abandonment of the famous, but now sterile, source of
wealth was hard, and it took almost a quarter of a century to give
it up. It is during this period of transformation that Brazil, by
the fact of its separation from Portugal, passes from the field of
our researches. However, before it ceased to be a colony, Brazil
had already turned back toward the type of life in vogue before
the gold discoveries. The province of Minas Geraes had been the
first to suffer from the decline of the mines and the ensuing
economic crisis. Early in the nineteenth century, while its inhabit-
ants were vacillating between the mining of failing deposits and
agriculture, many parts of the jDrovince were .practically^- in ruins.
Apathy and abandonment of alr'Sffof't were all but universal.^ In
time, however, it was seen that cotton, coffee, tobacco, and other
products of the soil promised a better and more solid yield than
had the mines at their best. With this turn of the tide population
began to grow with great rapidity again, and export and coast
trade took on new life.^ The opening up of the interior had fol-
lowed the development of the mines and had not ceased with their
virtual abandonment. King Jose I and Pombal had always had
the interests of Brazil at heart, and the latter benevolent despot
had formed in 1755 a commercial company for Maranhao and Para
which had aided much in the exploration and colonization of these
regions.^ Pombal likewise curbed the power of religious establish-
ments other than those of the Jesuits, and rendered life in Brazil
more endurable for the Jews.^ By 1800 Brazil had a population
of 3,200,000, half negro-slaves; in 1817-1818, 3,817,900, without
counting children under ten years of age. Of these, about i ,000,-
000 were whites, 260,000 civilized Indians, 526,000 mulattoes or
free negroes, and 1,930,000 slaves. In 1800 Brazilian exports
^ Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 86-89.
2 Id., pp. 168-170.
3 Watson, II, 238-239; Rio-Branco, p. 146.
* Watson, II, 242-243. Official corrujjtion, was, however, rife. The desire to get
rich quickly invaded the minds of the colonial appointees as it had in India. The
population was still raw and illiterate. Zimmermann, I, 173 ff.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 1 59
and imports amounted to over ^11,000,000 and $10,000,000
respectively.^
The advance of the Portuguese toward the interior in conse-
quence of the discovery of gold and diamonds revived the old
contentions whose settlement was the object of the treaty of
Tordesillas.2 The Demarcation Line had been respected neither
by the Portuguese in Brazil nor the Spanish in the East Indies.
Spain had kept the Philippines and exacted an indemnity or
purchase-price for the Moluccas. Admitting these facts as evi-
dence of a western shift of the Pacific demarcation meridian, Por-
tugal could claim a good part of Patagonia, Paraguay, and the Plata
region. But by a treaty of 1750, a division which rested upon
the principle of the maintenance of present holdings, boundaries
essentially the same as those of to-day were established. Unrealiz-
able pretensions based upon the famous papal bull were thus
abandoned ; the temper of 1493 had long passed. Portugal
renounced any rights to the navigation of the Plata, and all
trade between the two nations was forbidden.^
Factors Leading to Independence
In order now to understand the impelling forces of that move-
ment which made of Brazil an independent state, it is necessary to
recall the fact that a certain part of the country lay within a tem-
perate region, and as a result of vital and other conditions was
fitted to work out the line of development natural to such environ-
ment. This favored district was the south. From early times its
population had been superior in quantity and quality to that of the
tropical regions, and the fact that the mines lay within it lent it a
still greater attractive power. " Mountains, rivers, mines, men,
geography, and human choice coincided to give to the region of
Sao Paulo-Minas the supremacy over all Portuguese America.""^
This district was at first neglected as especially unpromising accord-
ing to the ideas of the time. It came, however, to a position of
leadership in all Brazilian history : in the exploration of the interior,
1 Rio-Branco, pp. 149-1 52 ; cf. Watson, II, 268 ; Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 68-69.
An estimate quoted in Humboldt's Essai (II, 855) gives, for 1776, 1,900,000; and for
1798, 3,300,000 (800,000 whites, 1,000,000 Indians, and 1,500,000 negroes). The
latter figures are said to be too low, and the Portuguese informant judges 4,000,000
to be nearer the truth. ^ p ^q, above. ^ Watson, II, 144, 218, 220; cf. p. 212.
* Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 125; cf. Stephens, pp. 163 ff.
l6o COLONIZATION
in Indian wars and slave raids, in mine discovery, in the beating off
of attacks from without. The PauHstas were the most energetic,
stubborn, and independent component of the population of the
colony. As contrasted with the north, the progress of the south
was less speedy but more solid ; while in the north attention
turned to an e.\otic culture dependent upon an imported labor
supply, the south exhibited a system approaching that of "free
colonization." The north still formed a Portuguese " plantation,"
while the south had acquired many of the rudiments of a develop-
ing nation. This supremacy was recognized by the transference of
the capital in the middle of the eighteenth century from Bahia to
Rio de Janeiro.^
The temper of this region was never tractable. It was quarrel-
some rather, violent and revolutionary, particularly after the infu-
sion of the miner element. When the eighteenth century was
drawing to a close, the ground was already prepared for almost
any degree of political assertion. The principles of the French
Revolution and the example of the American united to render the
Brazilians more uneasy; indeed, a revolution broke out in Minas
Geraes in 1789, which witnessed in some degree to the receptivity
of the Paulistas for the doctrines of the French philosophers. It
was repressed with needless severity.^ Now it was precisely during
this disturbed period that the great European struggles impinged
indirectly upon the local situation, and with a result unique in the
history of colonization. I"or, in consequence of Napoleon's activi-
ties in the Peninsula, the crown of Portugal itself was forced to
emigrate into its great transatlantic i)ossession, thus completely
perturbing the antecedent status of affairs. Socially, a veritable
experiment in the admixture of oil and water ensued ; the Portu-
guese " mandarinate " was brought into close proximity to the
^ Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 31-32, 46-48, 75-77. "The Brazilian nation evolved
in colonial fashion {coloiiinlmente) in the north, but organically and spontaneously
in the south. Semi-independent, the region of S. I'aulo-Minas with the great bay of
Rio-Janeiro, the national capital of a future empire, was working out in obscurity an
organic structure ; while the Brazil of officialdom, of brilliance and opulence, the
Brazil of the viceroys and governors, was seated in the north, in Bahia and I'ernam-
buco. That Brazil, however, was not geographically the center of the empire. Its
climate seemed to condemn it to the eternal condition of a colony dependent upon
an exotic culture and upon African slavery, or to the unhappy lot of a Jesuit Para-
guay." Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 76. For the general status of Brazil at the end of
the eighteenth century, see Vamhagen, II, 236 ff.
2 Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 101-104 ; Rio-Branco, p. 151 ; cf. Varnhagen, II, 269 ff.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL l6l
Paulista type, rudfc and democratic. There was likewise an inver-
sion, as it were, of political relationship between Portugal and
Brazil, whereby the latter became the dominant state and the for-
mer the dependency.^ Rio de Janeiro constituted, to all practical
intents, the capital of the Portuguese empire. Results of great sig-
nificance could not fail to follow upon this situation.
The royal family of the Braganzas arrived in Brazil early in
i8d8, thus realizing a transference of the court projected by
~JoIm ^IV in the seventeenth century, by Da Cunha in 1736, and
by Pombal in 1761. The country at once, and by the logic of the
situation, became an independent empire. The king hastened to
issue a series of decrees assuring to Brazil such industrial and
other advantages as the metropolis had possessed : agriculture,
manufacture, and commerce were put on their feet and encouraged,
foreigners freely admitted, departments, courts, and councils estab-
lished, roads built and exploration furthered, schools, libraries,
and scientific projects supported. In 18 15 Brazil was accorded
the title of Realm. For seven years the country was adminis-
tered directly by local officials under a local sovereign ; this
event was e.xtremely opportune, for it had the merit of placing in
evidence and politically sanctioning an inevitable and imminent
change of Brazil's status.^ It also had a more lasting effect in
binding the various Brazilian provinces together, both politically
and economically (through the construction of roads and other
means of inter-communication), as the Spanish South American
colonies, for example, were never united.^ And when the king,
against his will, was "forced by the insistence of England to
return to Lisbon, he left behind his oldest son, Dom Pedro, as
regent of the realm.
For all the benefits of the royal sojourn, however, the Brazilians
were glad to see it end. The European court was an exotic plant
in the rude new country, and the ways of the aristocracy palled
upon the hardy settlers of the Paulista type. There was nothing
in common between the two. When now the Lisbon Cortes
opposed the royal policy, voted the suppression of schools and
higher courts, ordered the dissolution of the central government
1 Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 94 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 56-57 ; Vamhagen, II, 297 ff. ;
Zitnmermann, I, 411.
2 Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 94. For the emigration of the Braganzas, see also
pp. 90 ff. ; Rio-Branco, pp. 154-155; Watson, II, 263 ff.; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 56-57;
general sketch of the period in Zimmermann, I, 175 ff. ^ Watson, II, 260, 270.
1 62 COLONIZATION
in Rio and the recall of Dom Pedro, and tried to break Brazilian
unity by attaching each province separately to the metropolis, an
almost universal movement in favor of Brazilian autonomy set in.
Dom Pedro, in response to overtures on the part of the people of
Rio and Sao-Paulo, declared (January, 1822) that he would remain
in the country. The Portuguese troops who opposed the resolu-
tion were allowed to depart for Portugal, and the prince, after
proclaiming the independence of Brazil (September 7, 1822), was
acclaimed first perpetual protector, then constitutional emperor
(October 12). It was impossible for the metropolis to resist this
culmination, for it had " a smaller population and perhaps less
wealth than its colony. It resigned itself cheerfully to an inevita-
ble fact," ^ and Brazilian independence was recognized in 1825.'"^
Achievements of the Portuguese in Brazil
The achievements of the Portuguese in Brazil deserve a word
of notice in perspective, and by way of comparison with those of
other peoples operating under similar conditions. The case is well
put by Leroy-Beaulieu : " The end of the eighteenth century and
the beginning of the nineteenth brought to Brazil none of those
calamities which broke over the English and Spanish possessions.
Portugal followed in all the European conflicts the destiny of Eng-
land, the mistress of the seas, from which it resulted that free
circulation between the metropolis and the colonies was never
interrupted : Brazil was in a position to gain rather than to lose
during the maritime wars of the Europeans, for these smote the
sugar islands of her rivals while leaving her intact. If the separa-
tion of Brazil and Portugal came to pass without violence and
almost without shock, this must not be regarded as a fortuitous
circumstance. It was not alone the diminutiveness and powerless-
ness of the metropolis which rendered the transition so easy ; the
colony was ready for independence, and, when it had detached
itself from its trunk like a ripe fruit, it did not cease to grow and
prosper. The fact is that the Portuguese administration in Brazil,
despite its errors and faults, . . . had not been very oppressive ;
liberty had been the cradle of colonization. The abundance of
1 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 57 ; figure.s for the decline of Portugal's commerce in Martins,
O Brazil, etc., p. 249.
2 Riolkanco, pp. 163-164; for the activities of Jose Bonifacio and the character
of Dom I'edro, see Martins, O Brazil, etc., pp. 107, 111-116.
THE PORTUGUESK IN BRAZIE 163
fertile lands, the absence of exaggerated regulation, the feebleness
of the main viortc, had allowed the colony, in spite of certain
restrictions and monopolies, to reach conditions which were normal
and appropriate to an adult age." ^ Brazil was likewise saved from
the Inquisition, the Santo Officio, " from that Status in Statu
whose dictation, superior to all law, diminished the majesty of the
king, the power of the government, the justice of the courts,
the ecclesiastical authority of the prelates, and the liberty of the
people — liberty not only to discuss but even as it were to think.
No special inquisition was ever created in Brazil." ^
"The relations of Portugal with Brazil are, besides, much more
familiar, more intimate, more frequent, than those of Spain with
her former colonies in America. This has been seen by the num-
ber of Portuguese who [still] emigrate to Brazil. Several years
ago the trade with Brazil represented about one -sixth of the export
and one-seventeenth of the import movement of the total trade of
Portugal. ... In the Indies a jealous, narrow, and ambitious pol-
icy lost no time in ruining the edifice of Portuguese power ; in
Africa a disgraceful and degrading trade afforded Portugal a
debasing wealth ; in Brazil alone the Portuguese demonstrated
themselves colonists. They managed to blend the spirit of adven-
ture in a just degree with practical patience and laborious per-
severance, and they thus succeeded in realizing one of the aims,
if it is not the sole object, of colonization, the creation of a great
state, rich, industrious, and free." ^
These statements may serve to bring out the special achieve-
ments of the Portuguese in America as distinguished both from
those of other nations in the New World and from those of the
same nation in the Old. It is probable that Leroy-Beaulieu, in his
partisanship for the Latin nations ^ and his solicitude for their
future and the persistence of what is distinctive in their culture,
1 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 56. It should be realized that Brazil is about ninety times the
size of Portugal. Cf. Watson, II, 113.
- Vamhagen, I, 88. ^ Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 58, 59.
* He also applauds the Germans and Scandinavians for their efforts in the colonial
field, remarking (I, 186, note) : " II ne faut pas desirer la disparition des especes ou
des races, quand elles ont des qualites solides. Or, I'amoindrissement de son rang
relatif dans le monde, I'abaissenient indefini du coefficient qu'il represente dans la
population totale du globe, equivalent presque pour un peuple a sa disparition." He
adds, more concretely (p. 187, note) : " On a trop longtemps laisse le monde entier
livre aux Anglo-Saxons, c'est une cause d'appauvrissement futur pour la civilisation
humaine."
164 COLONIZATION
somewhat exaggerates the favorable case of Brazil. But it is clear
enough, nevertheless, that, partly because the colony furnished a
fa\orable environment, partly because it was let alone, partly be-
cause it was treated with less incompetence than ordinarily, partly
for a number of lesser reasons, Brazil has become an independent
nation whose kindly feeling for the metropolis, unbroken by bloody
revolutionary struggles, is an international asset ; for it adds much
to the importance of an otherwise insignificant parent state. Con-
tinuous infusions of Portuguese blood, due to an immigration
motived not by governmental but by popular initiative, have gradu-
ally overcome the native strain of what was a largely mongrel popu-
lation, and a fortunate reversion toward the more developed ethnic
component, with its happier adaptation to modern conditions, has
ensued. The contrast with the outcome in the Portuguese East
is sharp. In Brazil there has arisen a new and powerful sponsor
for that in language, religion, customs, and literature which is
Portuguese. To a certain degree a nation and its life have been
transplanted, and a new society, inheriting its distinctive charac-
ters from an old, has come into a relative fullness of strength.
Conclusion of Portuguese Colonization
After all, however, there has been but a single and brief period
during which Portugal was enabled to hold the center of the stage
in the working-out of the world's history, and that was when she
had succeeded in making the first direct contact between Europe
and Asia, the West and the East. Fitted for some such desperate
exploit, and through its achievement the objects of envy of the
rest of the western world, the Portuguese could not maintain
through cool and rational means what they had gained by dash
and the impetus of enthusiasm. Even the Portuguese historians
were wont perpetually to confuse personal heroism with political
achievement.^ Administration was beyond the intrepid path-
breakers, facing as they did a situation which called for the
handling of problems new to men. It would have been hard in
that age to have found any people in Europe which would have
met the new situation untrammeled with the convictions, preju-
dices, and other intellectual handicaps to which Portugal largely
owed her disasters.^ Portugal was in truth the fine flower of the
1 Hunter, T, 92 ; cf. Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 95 ; Whiteway, pp. 24-25.
2 Cf. Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 296; for a list of the causes of Portuguese
decadence, see Corvo, TV, 88 ff.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL 165
age ; all wished to do as she was doing. There was not so much
incongruity between the specifically Portuguese methods and the
medium in which they were applied and failed, as between the gen-
eral methods characteristic of an undeveloped age and the new envi-
ronment suddenly thrown open — of world-wide commerce, distant
empire, and the contact with alien races. The transition from
that mediterranean or "thalassic" stage of commerce and coloni-
zation to the oceanic stage was sure to cause throes of misunder-
standing, and failure in adjustment. Portugal was destined, for
reasons stated, to be the first to plunge into a task far beyond her
power of numbers or grade of discipline. Thus she did not reach
the goal, but fell back, becoming as the years went on less and
less able to dominate the situation, deriving a waning benefit from
the relics of her old empire. She spent her strength before the
race was really begun. In her decline she has been unable to
attend properly to matters now regarded as fundamental in coloni-
zation : preparatory works of various kinds {roads, surveys, harbor-
works, etc.), hygienic measures, educative systems, and enterprises
of all kinds. She has fallen into a more or less dependent relation
with the nation which was able to seize the dominant place in the
modern world-movements of trade and colonization, — the British.^
Amidst these failures, however, Brazil stands forth as a success
due to largely uncontrolled and natural development ; it is only the
more visionary, or the practical in more visionary moods, who an-
ticipate for it the menace of the Anglo-Saxon encroachment, or fear
political interference on the part of the United States of America.^
Note on Brazilian Revenue
For various reasons it is impossible to get any exact figures for the revenue
derived from the gold mines of Brazil. Reckoning must start out, for the most
part, from the amount of the government fifths as a basis. These are not
always distinguishable from other items of revenue, and for other reasons are
uncertain. No calculations such as those of Humboldt for Spanish America
are available, and when the attempt is made to ascertain the total production
of the mines, estimates enter for the most part into the region of rough guess-
work. The amount to which the government was defrauded is indeterminable,
although it is known to have been large. The case is much worse when the
diamond revenue and production are considered ; here the system of taxation
1 Corvo, I, 140; IV, 59-60, etc.; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 59. Martins, citing statistics,
speaks of the "denationalization" of Portuguese commerce with the colonies.
O Brazil, etc., p. 197, note ; cf. Hist, de Port., I, 16.
2 Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 58.
1 66 COLONIZATION
varied between two incommensurable bases, and evasion was still more diffi-
cult to detect.
The subjoined collection of estimates can give, therefore, no more than a
general idea of the situation ; it is given for what it is worth. W'at.son * says
that the fifths of gold from Minas Geraes were assumed to amount to loo
arrobas (over 3200 pounds) ; in 1753 they reached a value of nearly $2,000,-
000. That year the fleet from Rio de Janeiro was believed to have brought
home gold, silver, and goods worth #15,000,000. The bullion and jewels sent
to Lisbon in 1754 were estimated at a million moidores ($6,500,000). On an
average of sixteen years the royal fifths exceeded 100 arrobas. Stephens -
gives the following: entire amount of gold extracted, $225,000,000; yearly
revenue to crown from fifths, $1,500,000. Martins*'' says that D. Joao V (1706-
1750) received about 130,000,000 crusados (over $50,000,000) from the gold-
works, and, among other items, swelling this figure, 40,000,000 cruzados
($16,000,000) from diamonds. The same author'' states that Eschwege cal-
culated the total product of the fifths at $64,800,000. They rendered about
$2,000,000 annually; some think double that sum. In 1809 Minas produced
for the fifth over 4800 pounds of gold; and in 1820 the total product of the
revenue was scarcely $240,000, the value of 440 kilograms.''' Martins's cata-
logue of estimates, containing some rather inaccessible data, is translated in
full below. All these calculations should be taken cum grano ; they should
be compared, by one who wishes a greater precision, with those of Humboldt
for Spanish America. It should also be realized that these sums appeared far
greater in the eighteenth century than they would at the present time. For
purposes of comparison the following facts may be appended : value of fine
gold per ounce at the present time, $20.67 ; go'd production of the world : 1885,
$108,435,600; 1895, $198,763,600 ; 1900, $254,576,300 ; 1904, $347,000,000.
Whole stock of gold in the world, about $6,150,000,000.^ A cursory review
of various national crop reports will show the superiority of agriculture and
other kindsof economy, once despised in comparison with the mining of precious
metals.
Estimates of the Yield of Gold and Diamonds
(Translation from Martins, O Brazil, etc., p. 83, note.)
The insuflficiency of the registers and the importance of contraband render
impossible the determination of the sum of production of the Brazilian mines.
We give, however, certain selections upon the topic.
Humboldt, in his Essay on New Spain, ^ calculates thus :
From 1699 to 1755 there came registered to Europe . 480,000,000 piasters
From 1756 to 1803 there came registered to Europe . 204,544,000 piasters
Not registered 171,000,000 piasters
Total 855,544,000 piasters
Gold in coin and the arts in Brazil ?
I'roduction from 1803 to 1815, yearly (30,000 marcos) . 4,360,000 piasters
1 II, 244. 2 p. 348. 3 Hist, de Port.. TI, 151. •» O Brazil, etc., ]x 84, note.
'" Other estimates are to be found in liranco, I'ort. na Epocha, etc., p. 99; Martins,
O Brazil, etc., p. 83, note. "^ Moody's Magazine, December, 1905, p. 20.
^ Essai, II, 643-644.
THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL
167
The mines of Goyaz apparently produced annually (middle of the eight-
eenth century) 150 arrobas of gold.
Ayres do Cazal says that the first fleet of Cuyabd looted by the Payaguas
in Paraguay (1730) bore 22,000 libras of gold; and that in 1731 there went
out from Matto-G rosso to S. Paulo 25,600 libras.
In 1773 the gold produced in Minas weighed 118 arrobas, and from 1773
to 181 2 the total was 6895 arrobas, worth 85,000,000 cruzados.
From 1752 to 1773 the total registered production was 6400 to 8600 kilos
per annum, and the contraband more than as much again.
Here are the figures of Chevalier : ^
Annual Production op America
Brazil
Other Countries
At the beginning of the )
century )
kilos 3,700, fr. 12,744,000
kilos 10,418, fr. 35,885,000
Before the discovery of )
the California mines )
kilos 2,500, fr. 8,611,000
kilos 12,715, fr. 43,796,000
The following are the tables of Baron von Eschwege in his Pluto
Brasiliensis : -
Extraction of Gold
Minas Geraes 1700 to 1820 351687 arrobas
Goyaz 1720 to 1730 9,212 arrobas
Matto-Grosso 1712 to 1820 3,107 arrobas
S. Paulo 1600 to 1820 4,650 arrobas
This excludes contraband, confiscation, etc. The total production of Brazil
might have reached from 1600 to 1820, 63,417 arrobas of a value of 391,000
contos of reis.
In 1 735, according to Constancio, the diamond mines produced a million and
a half of cruzados annually. The district of Diamantina (Minas) yielded, in
1808, from 20,000 to 25,000 carats, and in 1809 the treasure of Rio allowed
D. Joao VI to decree an annual sale in London of 20,000 carats to guarantee
the debt-charges.
Up to 1 794, according to the Correio braziliense,^ the total expense of the
extraction had arisen to 6185 contos, the product being 48,547 oitavas [eighths
of an ounce] of diamonds. The work was, as is known, a royal monopoly, and the
diamonds went, on the count of the national finances, to Amsterdam to be cut
and sold. From 1802 to i8ig they were adjudicated to the service of the loan
raised in Amsterdam, and the firm of Hope was the consignee. During this
period the house in question received 348,926 carats, liquidating 8,810,479
florins. This sum, however, does not represent the total production ; there
must be added the value of diamonds of greater size and price, preserved in
the Treasury, and all those which circulated in the hands of individuals in
the Reino-unido.
1 Coursd'ficonomie Politique, in, 397, 401. Marlins's figures are wrong. ^r-33-
■^ Nos. 79, 81, and in. See a chart of A. Patricio de Anderlecht, in the Padre
Arnaro, London, 1821, t. IV, 343.
CHAPTER V
THE BEGINNINGS AND THE SETFING OF SPANISH
COLONIZATION
In passing from the colonial enterprises of the Portuguese to
those of the Spanish, strong contrasts clue to racial differences
in the two peoples are conspicuously absent ; and the same may
be said of those rooting in antecedent history. The common
motive forces which led to the exploits of the two Iberian nations
have been reviewed in a former passage.^ It is necessary only to
recall the religious unity and political coherence forced upon them
by the western crusade against the Moslem invader ; the enthusi-
asm, love of adventure, taste for gambling with large hazards,
impatience with a humdrum existence, and the overpowering greed
begotten of preceding generations of war and rapine ; and finally
the benefits derived from the presence and efforts of an alien
industrious people, and the deep national disaster incurred or
about to be incurred through its expulsion. These considerations
being recalled, it is possible to turn without further preliminaries
to the more special and local conditions of Spain in order to find
what particular preparation lay behind her activities in the Dis-
coveries period and later.
Political and Religious Unification
The case is not so simple as that of Portugal. Politically the
provinces which were to become Spain had never been soundly
welded together ; their union was more accidental than natural or
inevitable. The need of concert against the Moors appealed, with
the gradual retirement of the latter, chiefly to the South. It was
really the much opposed union of Ferdinand and Isabella (1469),
rather than any inherent necessity, which represented the draw-
ing together of the two leading kingdoms. Nevertheless this
union powerfully furthered political concentration under a strong
1 Pp. 80 ff., above.
1 68
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 169
monarchy. Ferdinand, upon whom had been conferred the grand-
mastership of the three miUtary orders, Santiago, Alcantara, and
Calatrava, came thus to be the "sole and only leader of the old
chivalry of Spain, as of its modern military system." The two
sovereigns, united in their purposes, grasped the situation and con-
stantly built up their power by breaking that of the nobles and
by resolutely repressing disorder; "the unity of the king and
queen was so entire, and the personality of each so strong, that for
purposes of external policy Castile and Aragon were already Spain." ^
The subsequent extension of the Spanish dominions but added to
this power. " It placed them on a pedestal high above the strong-
est nobleman, or the wealthiest ecclesiastic ; it gave distance and
atmosphere to royalty. Yet this very extension would have been
impossible or dangerous had not king and queen resolutely increased
also the intension of their power." ^
However unhomogeneous by nature the several districts of Spain
may have been, there is no doubt that the Catholic Sovereigns
soon attained a position from which they could dispose of the
forces of Spain as of a nation politically unified. Indeed, the po-
litical unity seems as a practical factor to have surpassed the
religious, in spite of the aftermath of passion following upon the
Moorish wars ; ^ for these sovereigns, perhaps not deliberately but
in any case opportunely, played upon the religious interests com-
mon to all sections, interweaving with the success of their grand
crusade against the Moorish kingdoms many a strand of political
loyalty to themselves, and extending their rule through actual con-
quest."* In many ways the cementation of religious unity appears
to have been merged into or even to have been secondary to the
establishment and preservation of the monarchy ; the Inquisition
was later employed as an effective political agency, and in Spain,
as in few other Catholic countries, the sovereign dominated the
Church.''' At the same time, as will be seen, the religious motive
flowed in a powerful current through the minds of individuals,
high and low, and through the life of the nation at large. Certainly
at the end of Ferdinand and Isabella's reign an effective coherence
1 Hume, pp. I, 12-14.
2 Id., pp. II, 19-24, 29-30 ; Martins, Civ. Iber., pp. 179,220 ; Haebler, Wirt. Bl.,p. 7.
The same process was carried forward by Charles V and Philip II. Haebler, Wirt. Bl.,
pp. 12-16. ^ Cf. Colmeiro, I, 219.
* Navarre, for instance, was conquered in 151 2.
6 Hume, pp. 128-131 ; cf. Fabie, p. 41.
I70 COLONIZATION
along all lines had been secured ; " with a disciplined infantry, a
guileful diplomacy, a powerful Church, Spain was fully equipped
for the conquest of territory or the control of opinion." ^
Economic Strength
The question of the economic strength of Spain at the entrance
of her world-career still remains. The opinion has been offered
that both Spain and Portugal were led by enthusiasm for King
and Church into enterprises which placed too severe a strain upon
their material resources. This does not necessarily imply that
Spain's economic development was relatively backward, for it is
morally certain that there was no nation in Europe that could
have coped with the new and dangerous situation with which Spain
was presently to find herself confronted. To one who pauses in
amazement over the absurd restrictions placed upon industry and
trade by the casuistries of the mediaeval system, the periodic and
capricious alteration of the coinage and other ill-advised and unfair
measures, it seems well-nigh impossible that any economic develop-
ment whatever should have taken place ; ^ but one must reflect
that the prescrijHions of the canons weighed upon all Euroi)ean
nations except the most advanced and skillful of evaders, and
really represented an honest though blundering attempt at the
solution of the rising problems of society. Despite all these draw-
backs, it would be difficult to show that Spain, upon the eve of the
Discoveries, was not economically as well prepared for her open-
ing career as were several other states of later times with which it
has been the custom to compare Sjmin to her disadvantage.''^ The
period of Spanish decline, once believed to have been in full swing
before the sixteenth century, was yet to be ushered in ; in fact
the exigencies of the opening century were largely responsible for
its coming.
Traces of industrial development in Castile and Aragon were
slight up to the fourteenth century, when some protection was
1 Hume, p. 30; cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 3; Clarke, pp. 353-356; Cheyney, pp. 79 ff.
For an eloquent but perhaps " impressionistic " account of the factors of royalty and
the Church, see Martins, Civ. Iber., pp. 158 ff.
2 Colmeiro, I, 405 ff. ; chaps, xlv, xlvi, xlvii, 1, etc.
^ The Spanish and Portuguese were confronted with a series of problems for
whose solution they were, as was the rest of the western world, by education unfitted.
\ The Dutch and English, in a later time, profited by their errors. Martins, Civ. Iber.,
pp. 261-263.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COT,ONIZATION 171
extended to the arts and crafts. Unable to maintain the level of
Moorish agriculture, the Spaniards allowed aqueducts and other
irrigation devices to remain in the ruins to which war had reduced
them, and turned their attention more particularly to an occu]:)ation
which made fewer demands upon their warlike minds and unsettled
dispositions, — cattle-raising. It cannot be denied that the physical
character of the Peninsula favored sheep over grain ; but the
extensions of privilege granted to the owners of flocks over the
cultivators of ground were plainly excessive, and they choked
whatever agricultural development was possible. Valencia supplied
but one-third of her own needs along this line, and Catalonia and
Aragon were almost wholly dependent upon importation from
Sicily, the Balearic Islands, and elsewhere. Castile, depending
upon her ill-treated Moriscos, managed even to export a little grain
up to the time when the latter were crushed and expelled. In the
fifteenth century the chief raw products of Spain were wool, wine,
and iron.^ Industries were far from being self-sufficient, for almost
all industrial products were imported-; the realization of the fact
that " wealth was being drawn from the country " to pay for them,
motived the efforts of Isabella to build up industries, although as
respects agriculture and cattle-raising no great departure from
traditional policy was attempted. ^
Of all those 9CCupations whose pursuit builds up national material
wealth, commerce was as little neglected as any. Spain had lain
in the path of trade for many centuries and could not but have
profited by her position. Cadiz (Gades) had been famous in Phoeni-
cian times ; and the Italians of the Middle Ages had met a fierce
competition, especially in the African trade, from the merchant-
shipping of Barcelona. The parts of the Peninsula accessible from
the sea had been visited and enriched by the sojourn of Phoenician,
Greek, Carthaginian, Roman, and Arab. In the first half of the
fourteenth century regulations of Castilian commerce with England
and the Netherlands occur, and in 1348 the barbarous " strand-law "
was abolished.^ Barcelona entered the field somewhat earlier, and
the inhabitants of other districts learned more of the sea with the
extension of their fisheries. The very need of imported food
1 Colmeiro, I, 300 ff.; II, 112 ff.; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 8, 22-26, 32-35. On the
Consejo de la Mesta, see also Hume, p. 84 ; Clarke, p. 356.
2 Haebler, pp. 8, 47 ; Hume, pp. S5-86.
8 Wappaus, I, 348 ; Lindsay, I, 471, 548-549, 554 ff.
172 COLONIZATION
and other products forced the development of commerce, and
Ferdinand and Isabella, as soon as their hands were freed from
wars, are found to have directed close attention to the require-
ments of a sea-borne traffic.-^ Indeed, as has been seen, the very
entrance into the heritage of the Moslems could not but open the
eyes of the conquerors to its value. Whatever may have been the
weakness of the Spaniard in the matter of industrial pursuits, he
certainly experienced an economic awakening as well as a spiritual
revival and an access of loyalty to a centralized power during the
course of the decades which just preceded the capture of Granada.^
Comparison of the Spanish and Portuguese Discoveries
In judging of Spain's preparedness to meet her destiny, one finds
himself laying more stress upon the religious and political, rather
than upon the economic factors. Yet it is not the strength or
weakness of any special factor, economic or other, upon which
judgment must be rested, but rather the sum total of all the ele-
ments which combined to constitute national strength or weakness.
Thus judging, Spain is found to have been strong for an inspired
effort, but to have possessed scarcely enough stamina to react
against a severe and enduring strain. It is plain, in any case, from
what has been said, and from a closer study of Spain's economic
conditions in the fifteenth century, that a display of individual
initiative was as little to be expected in Spain as in Portugal. This
fact, and the concentration and exaltation of the royal power, led
naturally, in one case as in the other, to the lodgment of the new
enterprises in the hands of the sovereigns. What we miss, how-
ever, in the case of Spain, is the presence, as in Portugal, of a
directing mind, reaching out in a series of tentatives leading to an
ultimate and at length consciously visualized aim ; there was no
Spanish Prince Henry. But the fact is that Henry the Navigator
performed his service, not for Portugal alone, but for the whole of
1 Colmeiro, I, 377 ff ., 391 ff. ; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 44-46.
2 " The period during which Spanish territory was divided between the Christians
and the Mohammedans appears, from the standpoint of social enHghtenment, tlie
most hopeful in the history of the Peninsula. The process of race affiliation and
assimilation had begun, and, through the mingling of the elements present, there was
forming a new nation, big with the prospects of great material achievements and of
splendid cultivation. ... Its resources for establishing a high grade of civilization
appear to have exceeded those of any other Western nation at that time." Moses,
p. 10.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 173
Europe ; and that the final success of the Spaniards in the West
represents one of the forms of a grand dual consummation of which
Da Gama's exploit was the more immediately evident. For it is
plainly stated by the son of the Genoese discoverer of America that
the latter attained many of his ideas, and their final clarification,
while in Portugal. Columbus married the daughter (and the pair
lived with the widow) of one of Prince Henry's captains, and he
came into a certain sea-dog heritage thereby.^ As is well known,
he tried his fortune first of all at the Portuguese court, and there
attained a degree of success represented by a treacherous attempt
at appropriation of his ideas. His grand projects were in so far not
the dreams of a visionary, but an increment of constructive imagi-
nation, added to the persistent, steady, and dogged perseverance
of the Portuguese-English prince, who avowedly built upon the
accumulated experience and wisdom of the past. It is with a sense
of satisfaction that one perceives the continuity of the efforts of
these two men, and feels himself justified in discounting once again
the asserted value of intuition and inspired speculation over com-
monplace toil in the world. ^ At the same time the attainment of
Columbus cannot but convey an impression of the accidental and
fortuitous which that of Vasco da Gama does not.
The cases of the two nations and their discoverers may be aligned
for comparison and contrast by the consideration that, in Spain,
Columbus was really the talented source of a novel enterprise,
while Da Gama was simply an agent — one of many — in the elab-
oration of a settled pohcy.^ For Spain Columbus furnished the
ideas and put them into practice, receiving material aid only from
1 Hunter, I, 76-77 ; Major, pp. 347-348 ; Beazley, in Azurara, II, xxxv.
2 Forthestudiousness of Columbus, see Bourne, Sp. in Amer.,p. 11. Haebler(Amer-
ika, p. 335) says that the only part of the enterprise of Columbus which was peculiarly
his own, was his decision to steer across a trackless, endless ocean, in the knowledge
that weeks or months would pass before land would be seen. Columbus was thus the
way-breaker from the "thalassic" to the "oceanic " stage of navigation. Cf. Foreman
(p. 30), who credits the Portuguese with the exploits of Magellan and Elcano as well.
3 " It is not difficult to understand why the king of Portugal should have hesitated
to accept the proposition of Columbus. Nearly seventy years of continued effort on
the part of the Portuguese to realise the great conception of Prince Henry afforded
substantial proof of their conviction of the soundness of that conception. . . . That
route, therefore, . . . was identical with their hopes in the future as well as their pre-
dilections in the past." Major, p. 354. It is equally clear that Columbus could hope
for no interest on the part of Genoa and Venice, whose preoccupation lay in keeping
the Oriental trade in its old channels. The discoverer turned naturally to the states
bordering on the ocean. Payne, pp. 21-22.
1 74 COLONIZATION
the government ; for Portugal, Da Gama simply carried out royal
instructions. The prospects of realization lay for both in the support
of royalty — the hopes of Columbus were centered on kings alone.
Columbus carried in his own mind the religious obsession _of the
time and place, and through it appealed most strongly to Isabella ; ^
his i)lans and pleas looked to the regaining of the Holy Sepulcher,
to the extension of the Faith ; and with the queen who sent him,
material considerations seem to have played a relatively insignifi-
cant role. Prince Henry and his successors were crusaders, too,
and fervent in the Faith ; Albuquerque's designs on the bones of
'the Prophet haunted him; but an unmistakable strain of commer-
cial sagacity existed in Henry and was impressed upon the policy
he bequeathed to those who took up his work. For these and other
reasons the Portuguese exploits not only give the impression of
being consistent outgrowths of the national system, with more
momentum at first than those of the Spanish, but they likewise
appear to fall into a more logical sequence with the earlier move-
ments of trade and of national expansion.
Effects of the Discovery of America
America as an outlet for Spain's forces was thus opened by a
foreigner, suddenly and without warning.^ The results were prob-
ably more accentuated in Spain than in Portugal. For while to the
bulk of the people in either country the Discoveries came, as it were,
unawares, the directors of the Portuguese voyages had always had
Africa, with its possibilities, before them, and, in the later decades
of the fifteenth century, had been seeing more and more light
toward the consummation of what became their highest and final
purpose. Spain, on the other hand, with no series of experiments
to rely upon, and no continent to skirt, was really dependent upon
chance, or, as piety would have it, upon Divine Providence for her
position in the new world-order that was being evolved. There was
no chance to duplicate the performance of Da Gama, for the vice-
gerent of God had assured to the Portuguese who were able and
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 76, 79, 82, etc.
^ The romantic stui-y of Columbus has been told often and well ; for this reason,
and because our present studies center about collective rather than individual enter-
prise and activities, no rehearsal of the discoverer's life is attempted. See Bourne,
Sp. in Amer., pp. 8-25, 47, and bibliography. On his rights and those of his early
successors, see Fabie, pp. 13 ff., 27 ff., 86.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 175
willing to defend it a monopoly of the fruits of Prince Henry's
activities. The exaltation of mood that followed upon the sup-
posed attainment of the East by Columb\is can be the better
apprehended for these considerations. In spite of all, Spain was
not to be left out ; she, too, was to have a chance to serve God and
herself on the grand scale. The reception of Columbus by people
and sovereign witnesses to this attitude. As Martins, somewhat
extravagantly, puts it : " Men thought of the millions of souls to
be won for God ! Of the mountains of gold to bring home ! Of
the great battles, the vast kingdoms to conquer ! They saw all the
crosses, commanderies, riches, captaincies, and glory. This shower
of fortunate possibilities fell upon a nation in the plenitude of life,
in the meridian of force, and in the ardor of faith. All the future
captains of the Indies were formed in that moment. Columbus
revolutionized the anterior direction of the current of national
genius, directing it to that world which he discovered." ^
The Demarcation
The first move of the Catholic Sovereigns was to assure their
permanent possession of the " East" as it had been opened up to
them despite the sanctioned monopoly of the Portuguese. Might
not the new lands be claimed from them by the king of Portugal
by virtue of the bull secured from a former Pope .-" ^ As has been
previously narrated, they succeeded so far as to cause the issuance
of a new bull by Alexander VI (May 4, 1493), which recognized in
the new worlds a dual "sphere of influence" of the two favored
Catholic nations. This outcome was not palatable to King John of
Portugal, and he would have fought Spain if he had dared. The
Portuguese did not wish to be restricted to the original 100 leagues
west of the African islands, for this would have prevented them
from taking advantage of the trade-winds to evade the calms of the
African coast. Spain yielded to Portuguese representations, and
the demarcation meridian was shifted 270 leagues farther west by
an agreement of June 7, 1494. As will be understood, the instru-
ments, charts, etc., of the time were inadequate for the meas-
urement of longitude and so for the exact fixation of any such
1 Martins, Civ. Iber., p. 238. It is interesting to note that the fortunes of Columbus
^at the Spanish court remained dubious until it was seen that Granada was about to
fall. Then only the new crusade, substituted for the old, was in order. Cf. Haebler,
Amerika, pp. 356, 357 ; Moses, p. 15. ^ See p. 89, above; cf. Saco, pp. 52-53.
176 COLONIZATION
demarcation ; of a consequence disputes were sure to arise. These
appeared unmistakably after the voyage of Magellan (1521), when
it became necessary to fix the other half of the great circle of which
the Atlantic meridian was part. A council summoned at Badajoz
in April, 1524, failed to settle the question. The Portuguese were
really served by uncertainty, for if the line were measured from
the eastern end of the Azores archipelago they would lose re-
cently discovered Brazil; if from^the western end, the Moluccas.
Charles V finally sold his rights to the latter islands, so that the
Portuguese actually gained both their objects, and the dispute fell
into oblivion.^
The appeal of the two European nations which first systematic-
ally approached the newly discovered regions, to the great political
and religious arbiter of Europe, the Pope, set in motion a train of
consequences which may here be foreshadowed. The policy of
exclusion, as has been seen, was not new ; but the invocation, to
secure such exclusion, of that which alone stood for international
law, gave to the long-prevalent national policy a wider significance.
A ix)licy sanctioned by the head of Christendom, and consistently
enforced by the states most prominently in the eye of the western
world, was sure to be erected into a sort of universal and unques-
tioned dogma. The triumphal progress of this dogma through the
succeeding centuries can be traced in the narrative which follows.
V Early Policy of Spain
The words of Columbus and others make it clear that the
original intentions of Spain with regard to America were ai)proxi-
mately those of Portugal in the case of India ; ^ she ai:)pears to
have been more eager to gain native converts, but she was as
keenly alive to the getting of spices and gold. However, after
some years of disappointments, it was recognized that the Nucvo
Mimdo was not the East, and that cloves, cinnamon, and other
Oriental spices were not to be found.^ And it was not so very
1 For an excellent brief treatment of the Demarcation, see Bourne, Essays in
Crit., pp. 193-217; cf. also p. 159, above.
2 Cf. I'ayne, p. 24. Instances will appear in what follows of the Spanish tendency
to utilize I'ortuguese models. Indeed, it is often through the better-known Spanish
types that one arrives at some conception of the Portuguese.
^ Premiums offered by the government in 1529 for the collection of cloves, ginger,
cinnamon, and other .spices seem to indicate that hope was not yet extinct. Bourne,
Sp. in Amer., p. 217; cf. Fabie, j)p. i(')3-i64.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 177
long before it became evident that there was no easily accessible
passage through the new land-mass to the much desired desti-
nation. There were few who cared to contemplate a voyage over
the course of the redoubtable Magellan. Consequently Spain was
unable, after all, to compete with Portugal for the heritage of
Venice. It was early discovered, however, that gold was to be
found in the New World, and that there existed people whose
bodies could be utilized by a parasitic organization to accjuire the
gold, while their souls were being inducted into the true faith.
The relation of Spain to America soon reduced itself to the simple
old terms, Cgncjuest and Conversion, herein recalling the Portuguese
attitude toward India and Africa. Any extended parallelism be-
tween the operations of the two nations is not, however, to be
made out, owing to a diversity of colonial environment, both
physical and ethnic, and to differences of national strength. There
was no spice-trade in America, the conquests were far more
thorough-going, the subject peoples upon a much lower stage of
culture ; there was no competing religion of a high order as in the
East, for a long time no European intruders, and never any such
disastrous period of foreign administration as the year 1580 initi-
ated for Portugal.
The Conquests
The interest of the Spaniards in agricultural development and
in actual settlement was sUght.^ The plantation system came to
some development in later times, when certain products had
attained an unforeseen importance, but these articles were largely
luxuries and of tropical origin. ^ The great temperate regions of
North and South America were uninteresting and repellent ; such
lands, yielding neither gold nor tropical products, were denomi-
nated "worthless territories";^ the discoveries of De Soto, Coro-
nado, Cabe^a de Vaca, Ponce de Leon, De Solis, and Cabot were
not followed up ; ^ it was those of Cortes, Pizarro, and their lesser
aftertypes that received instantaneous recognition, for they opened
alluring avenues for the unleashing of the spirit of adventure and
1 See p. 207, below.
2 See pp. 10 ff., above. The expedition to Florida was condemned by the objection,
" For what purpose do we need such products as are identical with those of southern
Europe ? " Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 2.
8 Tier r as de ningitn provecho. Peschel, Races of Man, p. 211.
* See Bourne, Sp. in Amer., chaps, v-xi; Watson, I, 91 ff.
178 COLONIZATION
the satisfaction of greed. ^ The conquests of the Spaniards deserve
to be termed magnificent ; they are as wonderful as the exploits of
the Portuguese under the early viceroys. The martial spirit of the
Spaniards, as of the Portuguese, has been traced to their antecedent
training ; ^ it was also derivable to no small degree from their
nature and natural conditions. " The Spaniards were admirable
military material. Sober and temperate, they were more easily
provisioned than any European troops except the Turks. . . .
Spanish troops . . . have always been celebrated for marching
powers. Peculiarly uneducated, they had remarkable natural intelli-
gence in soldiery. . . . They distinguished themselves especially in
the attack and defence of fortresses, and in retreats." ^ The value
of these qualities, and of the superior resistance of a more south-
ern people to the strains of a tropical climate, will appear in any
account of the American conquests. Such admirably adapted
soldiers of fortune, the Spaniards found in America an extended
and, on the whole, easy field for their purpose of exploitation.
From the original headquarters, Santo Domingo (Espanola), con-
querors licensed by the kings reached out to Cuba (15 11) and
Florida (15 13); to the Isthmus (Balboa, 15 13) and Venezuela (i 527);
and, greatest of all, to Mexico (Cortes, 15 19) and Peru (Pizarro
and Almagro, 1531). Later years saw the invasion of Lower
California (1534), the Plata regions (1534), and of Chile (1535).'*
The Spanish power came actually to be felt from Plorida and
Louisiana to Tierra del Fuego, excluding, of course, Portuguese
South America.^
In order to render more definite the motives and procedures of
the Spanish conquests, it may be useful to recall certain aspects
of those two great enterprises, accounts of which, from the hand
of Prescott, have made them household words. Each of these
expeditions represents an outcome of individual adventure, rather
1 Haebler, Amerika, pp. 378 ff. " The importance of New Granada in the eyes of
the Spaniards lay in its being the source whence the best emeralds were procured."
Watson, IT, 151. ^ Pp. 80 ff., above.
2 Hume, p. 29.
^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 159 ff. ; Haebler, Amerika, pp. 378 ff. ; Watson, /(zj-j/w.
On the significance of the term "Florida," see Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 175.
^ " Under the pressure of the immense excitement which resulted from the dis-
coveries of Columbus, the entire eastern coast of the American continent, from
Labrador in the north to Terra del Fueti^o in the south, was explored within about
thirty years from A.i). 1492." Watson, 1, 105. For the great changes of the Discoveries
period, see Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 1 90-1 91.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 179
than a deliberate state-enterprise ; ^ the luster of the unknown
always attracted the Spanish commanders, for they could from
the nature of the case conduct no definite program like that
of Albuquerque. Cortes, it is true, made use of royal troops,
but in reckless disregard of the commands of his superior, the
governor of Cuba ; it was, indeed, the victory of Cortes over
the government's punitive expedition which gave him the strength
to subdue the Aztec empire. Pizarro and Almagro were in effect
merely the active members of a triple partnership, for which
De Luque secured the financial support.'-^ Both expeditions repre-
sented gambling with large hazards for the sake of golden pros-
pects whose realization was relied upon to excuse irregularities ;
the case of Balboa shows what might have happened to the
conquerors. That the brigandage of Pizarro should be invested
with a religious character, begun as it was under the patronage of
the Holy Trinity and the Virgin, and with the sacrament of com-
munion, is in line with the spirit of the age.^ The insignificant
number of the followers of Cortes and Pizarro is again evidence
of the essentially adventurous nature of their enterprises, as well
as of the self-reliance and military daring of this nation of seasoned
soldiers. Cortes had about 400 Europeans with him, and Pizarro
168.* Even though the Spaniards were superior in weapons and
discipline, and were enabled besides to impose upon the supersti-
tions of the natives with their horses, guns, and negro attendants,
yet the odds were overwhelmingly against them.^ In both cases
these odds were reduced by acts of reckless boldness in the seizure
of the persons of the semi-divine rulers, and by a policy of alliance
with conflicting factions. Again, predominance once established,
it became the object alike of Cortes and of Pizarro to secure by any
1 " A fact of great importance in revealing the economic characteristics of Spanish
rule in America was, that discoveries and settlements were usually made, not at the
expense of the state, but with private funds. If at any time the crown made advances
for the support of an expedition, it was regarded as a loan to be repaid out of the
first proceeds of the undertaking ; and assurance was given that the settlements should
remain under Spanish authority." Moses, p. 262. Cf. the case of Pizarro, id., pp. iii-
1 13. 2 Haebler, Amerika, pp. 379 ff. ^ Qf Watson, I, in, 116; Moses, p. in.
* Cortes had also 200 Indians, 16 horses, and 14 cannon; Pizarro had no allies at
all. Haebler, Amerika, pp. 370, 3S0; Watson, I, 124.
8 The natives thought the horsemen were centaurs, and stood aghast to see the
beast and man parts separate themselves. And, as is well known, they at first re-
garded the Spaniards as beings of a divine nature, come in accordance with an ancient
promise of their god Quetzalcoatl. Haebler, Amerika, pp. 370-371; cf. p. 289. Cf.
Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 1 51-157 ; Zimmermann, I, 267 ff., 285 ff.
l8o COLONIZATION
means the treasure which would enrich themselves and secure
justification at court. In both instances, finally, the state asserted
itself, sequestered the conquerors or their representatives, and
entered into a wider activity in governmental exploitation.
These cases are but types of what the rest of the explorers
hoped to do ; that personal adventure and self-aggrandizement
were the driving motives is rendered the more likely by the fact
that, of all the explorers, few besides Cortes possessed a station,
education, and other qualities which raised them above the type
of the poor and ignorant soldier of fortune. Pizarro, Balboa, and
others were plainly ruined men, grasping at straws to gain rein-
statement. The prevalence and effectiveness of these motives is
attested by the number and extent of the expeditions, and in turn
cast light upon the material qualities and predisposition of the
Spaniards as indicated above.
Conquest in the hope of exploitation may then be regarded as
the primal activity of the Spaniards in the New World. For many
years this exploitation had reference almost exclusively to mineral
wealth ; hence the relations of Spain to America, although they
were begun in the hope of reaching the East and its spices, really
stand apart from the series of national enterprises resulting in
colonization, which, from the Phoenicians to the Portuguese and
Dutch, were centered about the acquisition for Europe of the prod-
ucts of the Orient. If, however, the conquests had been effected
in somewhat irregular ways, and through, as it were, unauthorized
agents, it was not in the disposition of the Catholic Sovereigns
that they should be thus administered. When Cortes had been
recalled to a position of inactive elevation at court, and the preten-
sions of the Pizarro family had been finally disposed of, the mon-
archs laid a heavy hand upon their continental possessions in the
New World, as they had upon the island-empire of Columbus.
Henceforth direction in all particulars, whether effective or not,
emanated from Spain, and no one subject was allowed to hold the
center of the stage for any extended period.
In Spain the tidings of the discoveries and then of the conquests
had been, naturally enough, productive of great pojuilar excitement.
Columbus had about as much difficulty in keeping down the number
of his comjilement for the second voyage as he had in raising a
scanty crew for the first. ^ The various motives that have been
^ Haebler, Amerika, p. 360.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION i8l
mentioned contributed to this result ; but that material considera-
tions overweighed all others is made probable by the decline of
enthusiasm when the life of romantic adventure and quickly
acquired wealth failed immediately to materialize. After hopes
had been again raised in later years the hand of the state had
already descended in restriction of freedom of emigration.
The Early Strength of Spain
Before, now, the colonial policy of Spain is "further considered,
it seems in place to isolate as far as we are able the colonial activi-
ties of Spain from her other activities. It is always a fascinating
problem to attempt to determine the effect upon a country and
people of a colonial career ; and it is the more so in the case of
Spain in view of the fact that her subsequent and tragic fate has
not infrequently been explained to be, at least in good part, the re-
sult of her New World conquests and of their attendant reactions
upon the mother-country, its organization and people. Unques-
tionably the over-sea enterprises carried in themselves, or in their
wake, many contributing causes to Spain's subsequent misfortune ;
but these cannot well be estimated unless they are disengaged so
far as possible from other and much more serious causes for such
an extraordinarily dire result.
Some discussion of the preparedness of Spain for her colonial
activities has already been set forth. In 1500 Spain was really
strong, not only in her religious and political unity and enthusiasm,
but also in her economic org^ani^ation. This state of affairs suffered
little diminution during the early decades of the opening century.
The king, as real head of the State and Church, increased in power,
and was, in the time of Philip II, about as nearly unlimited in
action as the head of a relatively civilized state may ever be ; and
on the whole this was with the approval of the people. No Spanish
king was more popular than Philip II. That such a state of the
popular mind was induced by fetichistic adoration of what Was
royal and ecclesiastical, rather than by any rational considerations,
but added to its fervor and contagion. Economically, too, Spain
continued strong for some decades, albeit partly, as before, upon
borrowed force. She profited, among other things, by a foreign
king whose whole education and experience inclined him to go
counter to the restrictive ideas of the more genuinely Spanish
1 82 COLONIZATION
sovereigns. However, before the time of Charles V,^ Ferdinand
and Isabella strongly favored industry, especially as it formed the
basis of trade; for example, they founded a consulate in 1494 in
Burgos, the first of a series whose services to Spanish trade were
signal. This attitude was maintained by Charles, within whose
reign falls Spain's period of greatest commercial energy. The
immigration of foreign artisans was encouraged by him and his
predecessors, despite the opposition of the Cortes. " Manufactures,
chiefly wool and silk, increased tenfold in the course of a century ;
the great fairs drew buyers from foreign lands ; it seemed as though
the inborn Spanish dislike of commerce and industry had been
overcome " '^ These conditions lasted on into the time of Philip II ;
it is difficult to determine the date at which decline may be said
to have set in, but the situation was still hopeful in 1560. "Spain
was at that time not only at the climax of power, but also at the
summit of her prosperity, and she owed this far more to trade and
industry than to the gold of Mexico and the silver of Potosi. The
wool industry alone supported almost a third of the Spanish popu-
lation, and in Castile itself it occupied the inhabitants almost ex-
clusively." ^ With all this came the growth of the merchant marine
and the navy — one and the same thing, for the most part, in those
days ; Spain " in the time of the Catholic Kings possessed over a
thousand merchant ships, and there was no nation whose maritime
power equalled ours." * Wars were fought by Charles in defense
of trade or for its extension, and his treaties with England wit-
ness his preoccupation with commerce.^ And if the growth of a
national literature is to be regarded as an outcome of the quickening
of national life, the time of the three consecutive Philips calls for
an antecedent period of economic and other power.^ In what de-
gree these phenomena were referable to entrance upon the colonial
career itself will be clearer presently ; naturally enough, there was
a baffling interplay of causes and results, actions and reactions.
Spanish Decadence and its Causes
It would be safe to say, however, that the forces which made
for decadence had begun to turn the scale by the middle of the
1 The Emperor Charles V was Kirvg Carlos I of Spain, but he is referred to in this
book under the better-known title.
2 Ilaebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. lo, 47, 49-50, 58-59; Clarke, p. 357; Colmeiro, IT, 185-
188, 197 ff. 8 Haebler, Wirt. HI., pp. 66 ff . ; Colmeiro, II, 185.
* Colmeiro, II, 465. '' Ilaebler, Wirt. HI., pp. 54-55. " Cf. Hume, pp. 246-247.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 183
sixteenth century. Colmeiro finds the first indication of the decline
oF mahvffacture in ValladoUd in 1537, and oflPers evidence to show
that within twenty years of that date Spain could no longer meet
the domestic demand for textiles.^ Whatever the dale preferred
for the first visible signs of decadence, all reliable accounts would
agree that its progress was clearly manifest by the end of the cen-
tury in question, that it was astonishingly rapid, and varied by
remarkably few reactions toward the former, if fictitious, prosper-
ity. Details of Spanish history do not appertain to our discussion ;
given a realization of the fatal sweep of Spanish destiny, it is
desirable here only to rehearse the probable causes other than
those which might be called specifically colonial. The authorities
make little question but that the destructive agencies were in the
main of a^^olitical nature ; if the government had been a fortunate
one, or even a,n indifferent one, such deep destruction would scarcely
have been entailed. ^ In so far as the people stood behind the kings
in their ill actions and policies, results were, of course, inevitably
the outcome of race-character and education. That the Spanish
were predisposed to a religious and political autocracy we have
already seen. When, therefore, it is asserted that the causes of
decadence were mainly political, the meaning is that they emerged
in the form of unthwarted measures, decrees, etc., to which subse-
quent damage may be aptly and logically referred. There were,
however, other misfortunes of a political nature which appear to
have been as nearly fortuitous as such things may be ; which would
scarcely have existed but for the fact that certain men, and not
others, were the Spanish kings. These should be cleared from
the path first of all ; plainly they are not referable to the colonial
career.
"Accidental" Causes
Spain suffered from the Hapsburgs because of their hereditary
peculiarities and degeneracy ; genius in Charles V speedily ran down
irvfb the gloomy and self -immolating conscientiousness of Philip II ;
and the grotesque defectiveness of the impotent, k)lling-tongued,
pin-hunting Charles II was but a question of time and inbreeding
1 Colmeiro, II, 186-188; cf. p. 440.
2 " Hatte die nationalokonomische Einsicht der Regierung und der Landesvertreter
nur einigertnassen Sciiritt gehalten mit dem grossartigen Aufschwunge des Unterneh-
mungsgeistes im Volke, so ware der Verfall Spaniens um Jahrliunderte verschoben,
wenn nicht unmoglich gemacht worden." llaebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 35.
1 84 COLONIZATION
from the insane Jiiana, mother of the first Charles. The morbid
mind of Philip II was at the bottom of many positive regulations
of a harmful nature, and the progressive imbecility of his succes-
sors threw a baneful influence into the hands of unworthy panders
and dependents. The fact, again, that Charles V became Roman
Emperor, and that he and Philip II were drawn or tempted into
foreign wars of a costly nature simply because they were the
descendants of certain ancestors, was, in a certain sense, a matter of
chance; but it was responsible in large measure for the economic
downfall of Spain. Taxation for Peninsular and American projects
could never otherwise have been so ruinously high ; the loyalty
to King and Church would not have been so extravagantly drawn
upon. The disastrous wars in the Low Countries might have been
avoided if Charles had not been a Hollander and Philip a mono-
maniac upon the subject of his divine mission. ^ The personal
character of the latter, in particular, furnished a specific cause for
governmental aberrations during a crucial period. Conscientious
to a degree, he was slow, distrustful, secretive ; modest and labori-
ous, he was so conscious of divine inspiration as to become rigid
and unadaptable in methods. Early and late he toiled at his desk ;
matters of the smallest importance were exhaustively discussed
with uninspired spirits who could endure and thrive upon such a
deadly routine. Men of parts and initiative were shut out from
control of affairs, and all free play of intelligence and intuition was
paralyzed. Questions of broad principle were excluded by a mass
of sordid minutiae. Delay was inevitable under such a system of
grinding, dragging toil ; ambassadors fretted and fumed and lost
opportunities, for instructions were delayed, between the delibera-
tions of Philip and the inadequacy of means of communication,
for weeks and months. Jealous of his divine prerogatives, Philip
hoped to make of a man like Farnese a mere machine ; " cold half-
confidcnce and semi-veiled distrust were given in grudging return
for slavish obedience to the orders of an anchorite a thousand miles
away." The Duke of Medina Sidonia protested his unfitness for
the command of the great Armada, but Philip insisted ; having in
mind the very fact of the duke's incompetence and self-distrust,
he "doubtless hoped to command the Armada from his cell in
1 Ilume, pp. vi-vii, 194-196, 299-302, 306-307, 317; for the strains incident upon
Philip IPs establishment of claims to the throne of Portugal, see id., pp. 171, 250-
254, 279-285.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 185
the Escorial." ^ For his own purposes likewise, Philip fomented
jealousy and distrust among his secretaries. Yet " the nation
gave him credit for all his laborious good intentions in its behalf,
and loved him accordingly ; but it credited him with a wisdom he
did not possess. No country in the world has ever been so com-
pletely ruined as Spain was by the avoidable faults and follies of
its governors." ^
Before leaving what might be termed the accidental causes of
Spain's decline, mention should likewise be made of the pure bad
luck which attended her upon her downward path, as it accom-
panied and dragged down Portugal in hers. Pestilence, floods,
hurricanes, earthquakes, and other calamities well-nigh impossible
to foresee swept the empire with all the thoroughness and diabolical
timeliness of mischance when the tide of men's affairs is no longer
at flood.^
Political Causes for Decline
Here are grave causes for a nation's decline ; but they are only
a beginning. It will be recalled that the Spanish people had
exalted the ever more centralized power of the king to the position
of a fetich, and this is in itself, a sufficient explanation of their
non-resistance to many a wild and vicious decree. In the royal
measures now to be recounted, the status of popular feeling must
bear its share of responsibility, for those who in other countries
and under other conditions might have restrained disastrous
policies, in Spain lent them rather support. Ignorance and super-
stition led the people to refer the rolling up of their calamities
rather to God than to themselves, and in truly primitive fashion
to seek a reconciliation through propitiation rather than relief as
the result of rational analysis and action logically based upon it."^
^ Hume, pp. 189, 180.
2 Hume, pp. 136-137 ; for the above general characterization of Philip, see pp. 119,
122, 134, 136 ff., 169-170, 180, 1S9-196; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 15-16; Blok, III,
449-450. For a striking characterization of Philip, see the play " El Haz de Lena,"
by Nuiiez de Arce ; the introduction in Schevill's edition is important.
2 Hume, pp. 306-307.
* Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 17; Martins, Civ. Iber., p. 263. "It is the fatal delusion
that liberty and national welfare depend solely upon good government, instead of
good government depending upon united and cooperative individual e.xertion, that
has brought the Spanish nation to its present state of deplorable impotence."
Foreman, p. 219.
1 86 COLONIZATION
The most disastrous enterprises of the kings, taking origin in
religious prepossessions, were the insistence upon a single faith at
home and the attempt to enforce conformity abroad ; the oppres-
sion and expulsion of the Jews, Moriscos, and foreigners from
Spain ; and the religious wars in other parts of Europe. The
general causes leading to tHe banishment of the Moriscos have
been dwelt upon before ; here it is necessary only to recall the fact
that beneath the religious hatred lay motives of a more material
nature, — jealousy, covetousness, irritation at habits of industry
and frugality ; fear, fictitious or real, of political plots, — motives
whose very character witnesses to the solid economic virtues and
energy of the subject race. The case of the Jews was similar.
The whole procedure reduced itself, industrially speaking, to skim-
ming off the cream of the population ; it was, indeed, even more
serious than this. For the state was further relatively weakened
by the strengthening of such national rivals as received these exiles
with their specialized dexterities and handicrafts. The expulsion of
Moriscos and Jews from Spain ranks with the persecution of the
Huguenots in France as a grand, even if inevitable, political
blunder. Together with this goes also the oppression of the Low
Countries, and the consequent emigration, largely to England, of
their skilled artisans.^ And as .for the religious wars in which
Spain undertook to champion Catholicism, they form a whole
section of European history and require no detailing. Those which
bear most closely upon colonial affairs, and which were in many
respects the most disastrous, were the attempted reduction of the
Low Countries and the ambitious enterprises directed against
England.^ And to the count of disasters arising out of religious
conflicts must be presently reckoned the reverses in America and
elsewhere, referable in good part to the exasperation of Protestant
nations at the arrogant pretensions of the Spaniards, and at their
cruel bigotry, — a quality doubly happy in its results in that it
served God by burning or dismembering alive His human enemies,
while at the same time it destroyed for His adherents a brood of
hateful competitors.
^ Colmeiro, II, chap. Iv; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 164; Hume, pp. 16-18, 152-155,
210-213; Moses, p. 15; Clarke, pp. 359-360. See pp. 81-82, above.
* Hume, pp. 130-131, 184, 206-208, 218-219, 232-243, 267-268; cf. pp. 256, 370,
below.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 187
Treatment of Foreigners
Relations with foreign merchants were marked by less cruelty,
but were scarcely more rational. Owing to the character (jf their
past, the Spanish were as little fitted by training as by nature for
the discharge of the more specialized economic functions. There
was little or no native business talent, and the hidalgos, w'th their
strong military and other biases, despised and hated it in others ;
for the treatment of the foreign merchants the sovereigns were
assuredly not solely to blame. Ferdinand and Isabella encouraged
the presence in Spain of German, French, and Italian colonies ; to
propositions of exclusion presented by the Cortes, Ferdinand
averred that Spain could not do without the foreigners. For it
was they who supplied the capital and the apparatus of production
and exchange, and farmed the revenues ; and they were the more
indispensable after the expulsion of the Jews. Indeed, as time
went on, they became the real support of the empire, and after
the death of Philip II their activities were absolutely essential to
the maintenance of the public credit.^ But it is little surprising
that the Spanish looked with increasing distrust and exasperation
upon the rich monopolies enjoyed by the foreign capitalists, notably
the German Fugger, and that repeated attempts were made to
force them to surrender or to disgorge. These attempts met with
little success in view of the royal necessities and policy, but they
did drive the foreigners to an ever-increasing haste and unscrupu-
lousness in the piling-up of profits. The whole situation made for
the progressive decline of what economic strength Spain had, and
the general attitude toward producers and exchangers made of the
latter a group of rapacious and predatory aliens where they might
have become active factors in a sturdy economic life. The fact
that all this was inevitable in the setting of the time excludes the
colonial career as a specific cause.
Treatment of Jews and Moriscos
Some writers have asserted the causal relation between the
treatment of foreigners, and especially the expulsion of Jews and
Moriscos, and the subsequent numerical decline in the Spanish
1 Colmeiro, II, 208-212, 235-236, 258-259, 567-568; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 51,
165-171; Hume, p. 87. On the dependence of Spain upon foreigners for a labor
force and for transport facilities, see Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 81, 83-84 ; Hume, p. 285.
1 88 COLONIZATION
population. Emigration to the Indies has likewise been taken to
explain this disaster. The inefficiency of the latter factor as a cause
will be shown presently ; ^ and as for the former, it should at least
be set in a more precise relation to that which it is supposed to
explain. The number of Moriscos expelled is variously estimated
from 300,000 to 1 ,000,000 ; Lea, who has made the subject a matter
of exhaustive research, decides that 500,000 is not far from the
truth. The number of Jews expelled is reckoned as low as 200,000,
but more generally at between 400,000 and 800, ooo.^ This repre-
sents unquestionably a heavy quantitative loss in material strength,
but it does not at all sufficiently explain the subsequent decline.
Since Darwin's time, and before, there has been no doubt as to the
possibility of the rapid increase of any species up to the limits
assigned by its life conditions. Of a consequence it is to these latter
that the careful observer is bound to look for an explanation of
Spanish depopulation. History is full of cases where the ravages
of wars, plagues, and other calamities have been succeeded by a
national fecundity under freer conditions which speedily filled all
gaps in the ranks. He would miss the full significance of the
expulsion in question, however, who failed to note that men make,
to a large degree, their own life conditions, and that it was pre-
cisely that part of the population which represented the most
energetic and successful assault upon natural conditions which
was driven from the scene. That is to say, while the quantitative
injury to population consequent upon the expulsion was almost
negligible, the qualitative injury was no less than ruinous.^ And
the same line of argument may apply with equal force to the with-
drawal from the propagation of the race, through religious celibacy,
through the ambition to be an hidalgo, or even through army
service, of the most promising of the Spanish youth.* The quality
1 P. 210, below.
2 Colmeiro, II, 62; Hume, p. 213; Lea, Moriscos, pp. 359 ff.; Inquis., I, 84 ff.,
131 ff., 142; III, 231 ff., 3i7ff., 388ff. ; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 153; Moses, p. 15.
^ To gain a clearer conception of what the merely quantitative loss meant to Spain,
her 500,000 exiles might represent to us a loss of 4,500,000 to 5,000,000 in a popula-
tion of 80,000,000. But since the United States are so largely industrial, these figures
would have to be considerably increased in order correctly to parallel the qualitative
loss suffered by Spain. Add now the results of persecutions, insecurity of vocation
and trade, etc., and the whole foots up to an appalling calamity. The practice of
infanticide attained considerable development at this time.
* Schallmayer, pp. 1 1 1 ff., 223 ff. ; Uarwin, Desc. of Man, p. 144 ; Galton, pp. 356 ff.
Still, sacerdotal celibacy was " more an ideal than a fact." Bourne, Sp. in Amer.,
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 189
of Ihc population declined, its vigor was sapped, and the result
could not fail presently to appear in a diminution of numbers.
Under Philip III the number of marriages is said to have decreased
almost one-half. 1 The degree of depopulation is a matter of dis-
pute ; Haebler gives the total population of the Peninsula in 1723
as 5,777,900, — about three million below the figures for 1594,
and one million below those of I54i-^
Legislation and Regulation
It has been stated that the woes of Spain were due prevailingly
to bad government, supported or at least unchecked by public
opinion. The ..expulsion of the Jews and Moriscos was merely the
clima.x of a course of class-legislation, and the latter was by no
means confined to the period in which class meant race. It is now
in place, with no further specific reference to Jew and Morisco, to
pass in review, as hastily as consideration for clearness will permit,
the main types of legislation to which Spain's calamities were due.
It is to be noted, first of all, that the government, partially in con-
sequence of its sense of divine guidance and universal responsibility,
was, through all the earlier colonial period, possessed of a very
monomania for regulation ; regulation not alone on the grand scale,
but also upon one of pitiful and incredible pettiness, whose sordid
and fatuous detail, the specialist alone is called upon to follow. In
general, however, regulatory measures touching the industrial or-
ganization turned upon theory derived from mediaeval sources ;
or represented contradictory experiments in time of trouble, pur-
sued with no adequate idea of economic laws ; or took their origin
in an ever more insatiable hunger for revenue. Out of her past
Spain retained contempt for agriculture, industry, and trade, espe-
cially upon the small scale ; while, therefore, such vital improve-
ments as those of irrigation, communication, and transportation
were neglected, the government spent its efforts in making detailed
and rigid rules for the movement and sale of goods, with the result
p. 307. For a general treatment of the subject, see Lea, Sacerdotal Celibacy, especially
chaps, xix, xxi, and pp. 392-393.
1 For a discussion of depopulation in Spain, together with proposed remedies, see
Colmeiro, II, chaps. Iv, Ivi, pp. 12 ff., 43 ff., 156 ff.; this author is corrected to some
extent by Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 146-157. See also Hume, pp. 212 ff., 297 ; Martins,
Civ. Iber., pp. 261-262; Blok, III, 131 ff.
2 Wirt. Bl., p. 1 58. For summaries of the causes of this decline, see id., pp. 1 53-1 54 >'
Colmeiro, II, 15-17; Martins, Civ. Iber., p. 261.
190
COLONIZATION
of crushing free competition ; for trade was thus subjected to a
system of costly and harassing examination. In contrast with the
modern system, the object was the protection of the consumer ; ^
and it was pursued well-nigh as vigorously as the safeguarding of
the producer has been in the United States. Preference was ac-
corded to the gild system, under close scrutiny ; frauds, actual and
imaginary, were guarded against ; prices were regulated, exporta-
tion prohibited. All this left no time to keep the currency sound,
or even to suppress or buy off the pirates of the Mediterranean ;
and the immediate result, as far as the machinery of government
was concerned, was an endlessly complicated bureaucracy .'"^ The
harassment of this detailed regulation, whose repetition witnesses
to the resistance and evasion which it met, fell almost wholly upon
the useful classes ; it fostered rather than harmed the beggar and
the priest.^
When, now, such ill-advised measures had produced a paralysis
of economic life, the inexperienced government of an ignorant and
passive people was driven to make changes whose appropriateness
could be but a matter of chance."* All sorts of political nostrums
in the hands of unpractical theorists or charlatans [arbitn'stas) were
applied ; unprincipled favorites swayed the royal mind. The accu-
mulation of church-property went on apace ; law-suits, lo retain
what little they had, ruined the poor, while sumptuary laws were
ineffective in restraining extravagance. Policies were adopted and
reversed with the utmost inconsequence.^
But it is when revenue considerations are added to our category
that the worst economic conditions come to light. Multiform and
exacting taxation, both at the boundaries and within, ground down
the productive part of the community. Monopolies ; alteration of
the coinage ; repudiation of debts, and other forms of governmental
1 Owing, no doubt, to the preponderance of the upper middle class in the Cortes.
See p. 195, below.
2 Colmeiro, II, 167-178 (the Afesta), 180-183, 235, 237-239, 241, 244, 267-272,
296, 472-474, 487 ff., 498, 583, 585 ff. {arbitristas); Hume, pp. vi-vii, 85-S6, 197-19S,
244, 265; Clarke, pp. 356-357; Ilaebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 62-63. ^ See p. 82, above.
* " The afflictions of the Spanish monarchy went on increasing, toward the end of
the sixteenth century, without the public men or the government l:)eing able to con-
jecture why, des])ite the treasures of the Indies, the realm was so poor. . . . Kvery
one clamored for the remedy and no one came to the rescue with rational counsel."
Colmeiro, II, 504.
^ Colmeiro, II, 190, 197 ff., 252-253, 259-260 ; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 17-19, 35-36,
40-43; Hume, pp. S6-87, 197-198; Martins, Civ. Iber., pp. 261-263.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 191
dishonesty ; forced loans ; confiscations at slight provocation ; the
reduction of interest rates ; the indiscriminate farming of the rev-
enues, inducing deep corruption, — these were some of the forms
of the financial policy. Unpaid soldiers who plundered right and
left, and an army and navy supplied with deteriorated and useless
stores, were some of the visible signs of bankruptcy and corrup-
tion. For while the revenues were unreasonably large, that part
of them which was left for the government, after they had passed
through many unscrupulous hands, was rarely sufficient to meet
immediate needs. ^
Attempted Reform
Two centuries of this kind of thing were enough to have ruined
a prosperity more firmly rooted than that of Spain. When, there-
fore, in the eighteenth century, under Philip V and especially under
Charles III, sincere and intelligent efforts were made to reverse
an inveterate policy and to neutralize its effects, it was already
too late to mend. " The status of the monarchy at the beginning
of the eighteenth century was such that one political writer com-
pared Spain to a building which was afire in many parts at the
same time, so that it was necessary to rush to the aid of them
all." 2 Philip V (1700- 1 746) attacked with vigor most of the evils
detailed above ; not always wisely, but with good intent. He owed
much to his French ministers — indeed, Spain seems to have been
not infrequently rescued from herself by the suspected foreigner.
And even at this late day the nation rallied with unexpected
patriotism and strength. Ferdinand VI (i 746-1 759) carried the
reforms still farther; and the ministries of Ensenada (i 743-1 754)
and of Aranda (1766-1773), the latter under the enlightened
Charles III, represented a greater return to prosperity than could
reasonably have been expected. At this period came the expulsion
of the Jesuits. But the death of Charles III (1788), "the only
good, great and patriotic king that Providence had vouchsafed to
Spain in modern times," ^ allowed the scepter to fall once more
into incompetent hands, directed by contemptible favorites. Then
1 Haebler, Wirt. BL, pp. 14, 135-138; Colmeiro, II, 26, 542; Hume, pp. 181 ff.,
193-196, 208-210, 214-215, 226-227, 257 ff., 285.
2 Colmeiro, II, 215 ; cf. Hume, p. 222.
3 Hume, p. 41 1. Aranda was at first minister of Charles IV (1792), but was speedily
removed.
192 COLONIZATION
comes the age of Napoleon, with all the misfortune it brought to
Spain, to be followed by the general prostration of the nineteenth
century, and the tinal disappearance of the " Empire " at its end.^
Taxation
Inasmuch as the administrative evils detailed were grouped so
consistently about over-taxation, and because the greed for revenue
fell upon the colonies as upon victims devoted, it is fitting to enter
somewhat more fully upon the system of taxation before taking up
the more general economic and social factors of Spanish decline.
One relation stands out in the raising of revenue : taxation varied
directly, not with the development of the colonial empire, but with
the extent and frequency of the foreign wars which resulted largely
from the policies enumerated. Ferdinand and Isabella, although
their intentions were of the best, found it necessary to resort to
extraordinary taxation to carry through the conquest of Granada ;
and their successors, plunged into ever greater expenditures of the
same kind, were never able to carry out the last wish of Isabella
with regard to the repeal of these taxes {jiiros). No successful
attempt at reduction came under the Hapsburgs ; in contrast to
the later impositions, those of the Catholic Sovereigns seem light
and reasonable.^ Charles V became more and more deeply en-
tangled in foreign wars, and was obliged, against his will, to raise
the means to prosecute them. And yet, in his time, owing to the
threefold rise in prices, with a corresponding fall in the value of
money, the tax-payer really contributed lesser values than at the
opening of the century. Despite, however, the larger sums at his
disposal, Charles was not infrequently unable to follow up an
advantage, or even to pay his troops, and when he passed over
the rule to Philip he transferred with it a considerable increase in
the public debt. No doubt this was due in some considerable
degree to the dishonesty of the collectors, who absorbed at times
almost a half of the contributions.^ But it was to Philip II and his
successors that Spain owed the relentless draining of her resources
before which her recuperative powers failed. Philip's extraordinary
demands for the pursuit of the several phases of his divine mi ssion .
^ Colmeiro, II, 87-109, 218-225 ^ Hume, pp. 327-328, 351, 356, 3S1-382, 388-391,
399 ff-
2 Colmeiro, II, 539-540, 565, 578-579; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 108.
* Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 64-C5, 109, 1 17-1 18, 163 ; Colmeiro, II, 546 ff., 556, 558.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 193
were combined with the most reckless system of collection — a
constant farming (nit of future revenue at ruinous rates to foreign
capitalists — and a feebleness of conscience strongly contrasting
with its morbid strength as exhibited elsewhere in his life. Colossal
sums were sunk in religious wars, to say nothing of uncounted
ducats that were swept away by misfortunes frequently recurring
and not to be forecasted. The king at one and the same time
depended upon Genoese bankers, and frightened them into unscrupu-
lousness and rapacity by arbitrary and oppressive measures. His
finances grew steadily more hopeless, until, as a virtual pauper, —
had he not been a king, — he left behind him a debt of a hundred
million ducats.^ And the favorites who ruled Spain under the later
degenerate Hapsburgs pursued toward the same end of ruin, but
sordidly and with rascality, the policy dictated to Philip by a certain
morbid and ignorant, but high-minded, narrowness and bigotry.
The most obvious source of revenue was, naturally, the Cortes ;
and the servic io, the subsidy demanded at each of its sessions, was
paid with astonishing submission. At most the king had to listen
first to a series of petitions and complaints. The servicio ran
regularly, under Philip II, into millions of dollars.^ Aside from
this triennial tax however, the government leaned directly and con-
stantly upon the people. The most hateful of the food-taxes was
the mil/ones, introduced in embryo by Philip II (1590) in conse-
quence of the Armada disaster ; an excise which was increased and
developed, and which for over two hundred years weighed (at length
to the extent of one-eighth of the value) on wine, vinegar, meat,
and oil, the principal food of the people. Debasement of the coin-
age also fell with severity upon the cost of living.^ A further ex-
travagant method of raising revenue was through Xhtjinvs whose
suppression Isabella had wished : " The Crown raised a loan, and
assigned the product of certain estates or taxes in payment of
interest, often at the rate of ten per cent." Naturally, the foreign
capitalists were most likely to profit by this. And there were sold
besides such favors as the legitimization of illegitimate children,
titles, newly made positions in councils, and the like — anything
that would add to income.*
1 Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 123-130, 131 ff., 134.
2 Colmeiro, II, 541 ff., 583; Haebler, Wirt. BL, p. in ; Hume, pp. 26-27.
3 Colmeiro, II, 233, 542 ff. ; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 129-130; Hume, pp. 179,
201 ff., 271-272.
* Hume, p. 27 ; Colmeiro, II, 579-580; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 115-116.
1 94 COLONIZATION
One of the heaviest and most ill advised of the taxes was incident
upon trade, and through it, of course, upon production : the alcabala,
which became no less than a tax of ten per cent upon all exchanges
of commodities, ad valorem, and usually farmed. Such a tax needs
no comment.^ In addition, agriculture was severely taxed because
Philip thought it could bear it ; the farmer's very plow and hoe
were not safe in his own hands.^ The internal and external cus-
toms-dues rendered legitimate commercial profit extremely haz-
ardous and smuggling very profitable ; applied to the Netherlands
they infuriated a merchant-people and incited to war.^ And by
various moves, which threatened an indefinite postponement of
payment or even a repudiation of the state's debts, the foreign
merchants resident in Spain were rendered insecure, and so the
more ready to impose upon an ignorant people. Even ecclesias-
tical taxation {subsidio) was not totally excluded.'* Between the
year of his accession and 1573 Philip had well-nigh doubled the
state-income.^
It is plain that the country was being systematically and cynically
bled of its resources of all varieties. This process explains a very
large part of the decline of national vigor in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. The time of Philip III brought peace, and
the age of the Bourbons real efforts toward reform, but the strain
had been too prolonged and too pitiless ; resiliency was gone.
"Finally," says Colmeiro, "the deplorable state of our treasury
during the whole of the domination of the house of Austria, and
its extraordinary obligations, owing to wars, in the eighteenth cen-
tury . . . had accumulated deficit upon deficit until the Spanish
nation was oppressed with the weight of a debt of 13,250,207,506
reals." •' Expenditures constantly outran income, however unreason-
ably the latter might be increased. The extravagance of the palace
under Charles II (1665- 1700) and Philip V (i 700-1 746) formed a
marked contrast to the parsimony of Philip II.'
1 Ilaebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 73 ff., iio-ii I, 118-122 ; Blok, III, 83 ff. ; Hume, pp. 135,
157-159, 198-200, 245-246. "Bread paid three times over, as corn, as meal, and as
manufactured." Clarke, I, 356.
2 Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 37, 39-40; Blok, III, 132 ff.
8 Hume, pp. 159-160; cf. pp. 155, 227-228, 271; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 54-55,
62-63,77-81; Colmeiro, II, 261-262. * Haebler, Wirt. BL, pp. 70-72 ; Hume, p. 27.
^ Haebler, Wirt. Bl.,p. 122; Blok, III, 155 ff.; for a general sketch of Philip's ex-
ploits in tax-laying, see Haebler, id., pp. 118 ff.
" Colmeiro, II, 584 ; cf.pp. 544-545, 565, 570,575-576; Haebler, Wirt. Bl.,pp. 87-
88, i34-i35> '38-143- '' ^f- Hume, pp. 2S6-287, 382.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 195
Economic and Social Causes for Decline
In the rehearsal of what have been called in a broad sense the
political factors leading to national impoverishment, a sufficiently
threatening set of conditions has been disclosed. In order, however,
to get the effects of Spain's colonial career into a proper perspec-
tive, it is necessary still to consider several important factors which
might be called economic and social, and which represent popular
persuasion and habits of thought and of action rather than a definite
state-policy. The national economic character of the Spaniards
was such as in any case to have rendered their supremacy but
short-lived in an era characterized by the steady gain of the indus-
trial and commercial type over the military.^ The attitude of re-
garding the industrial organization as a contemptible appendage
upon the social structure persisted during the centuries that suc-
ceeded the Discoveries period, and it placed industry and commerce
at a disadvantage only partially portrayed in the actual statutes
and their implications. Mediaeval ideas, together with prejudices
against the Moors, and the inevitable teachings of their own mili-
tarism conspired to create and nourish this disesteem of the gain-
ful occupations (oficios vilcs y baxos). The Spaniards were not
alone among the nations in this view, but being so largely hidalgos,
or aspirants to that station, they naturally formed an extreme and
unadaptable case. The law made the matter worse, because it re-
flected this attitude, and custom and precedent backed the law up
strongly. The infamy of labor might even pass on to one's family,
or carry with it exclusion from office. This political ignominy of
toil is one of the reasons why the interests of industry and com-
niefce were never adequately represented in the Cortes.^ It also
explains the tendency of the whole population toward display and
luxury, for these were the badges, as the example of the upper
classes proved, of a respectability unsullied by usefulness.^ And
the curse of vagabondage itself, though referable in part to love of
adventure, was really the result of such contempt for and discour-
agement of industry. " The caballero, before whom peace closed
the path of glory and fortune, enlisted in the crusading armies, or
^ Cf. Martins, Civ. Iber., pp. 255-256.
2 Colmeiro, II, 26-27 ! Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 61 ; Hume, p. 136.
^ Colmeiro, II, 26; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 37; for the sumptuary legislation and its
causes, see Colmeiro, II, 524-537; Hume, p. 170.
196 COLONIZATION
placed himself in the service of a foreign prince at whose side he
could go on in the profession of arms ; and the villein, accustomed
to live and thrive on the spoils of the enemy, suffered the yoke of
labor with impatience. Even though he had formed the resolution
to stay at home and gain by his industry the support of his family,
he was prevented by conditions : now by the lack of land from
becoming a cultivator ; now by the gilds and their ordinances if he
set out to make himself an artisan ; and again by the shortage of
his capital if he wished to follow the example of the merchant. And,
finally, the laws which left liberty and property all but unprotected,
the exclusive and monopolistic privileges, the royalties and dues,
the alterations of the coinage, the insecurity of the roads, the con-
fusion of the taxes, and the whole medley of economic errors char-
acteristic of that period, condemned him to enforced idleness."
Thus mendicancy became worse and worse during the sixteenth,
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.^
Even the attempts to favor the industrial vocations resulted in
no progress ; for they started out from the mediieval prepossessions
of a people that knew nothing of industrial progress and could
not, economically speaking, think rationally. So that while other
European nations, through the forced and recurring inconsistencies
of their own practice, made heavy inroads into whatever obsolete
theories they professed, — and were at last obliged to make the
theories square with the objective facts, — Spain long clung to
traditional doctrines with the virtuous consistency of inexperience.^
Among the professions social selection favored types whose domi-
nance in the world was already a thing of the past, and whose
association could not form a national structure fit long to compete
under the new conditions imposed upon the strife of nations.
Spain " put her money on the wrong horse " when she favored
over the merchant the soldier or priest. Naturally, as time went
on and the young refused to disgrace themselves with toil, the
1 Colmeiro, II, 21.
- Louis XIV said of Spain : " It is sufficient in Spain that an abuse be old-estab-
lished for it to be scrupulously maintained without any care being taken to consider
whether a thing which perhaps may have been good in the past is bad for the
present." Hume, p. 320. In 1678 (treaty of Nimeguen), when Spain was utterly
bankrupt and humiliated, "the overwhelming grandeur and w'ealth of its own mon-
arch continued to be an article of national faith ; and his clemency in letting his
enemies off so easily, a matter for admiring congratulation upon his magnanimity."
Id., p. 294. See also Colmeiro, II, 243, 246-248 (gild system), 139 (system of inherit-
ance, etc.).
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 197
proportion of political hangers-on and sycophants, of priests or
commoner mendicants, increased. Corruption and the undermining
of moral standards gained headway year by year. That the colonial
enterprises were responsible for all this can therefore be denied ;
it would have been in all but degree the same, had America never
been discovered.
Religious Causes for Decline
Submissiveness to the exactions of the kings has several times
been noted as a Spanish trait ; and the importance assigned to the
minister of the faith by a loyal, ignorant, and superstitious people
invited economic and social consequences of an extreme type. So
many landholders had been led, especially in the frequent times
of stress, epidemic, or of expectation of the end of the world,
to insure themselves for the life to come, that by 1600 a large por-
tion of the best land in Spain had come into the possession of the
Churc h ; and once there it became inalienable. The phenomena,
then, of the latifjuidia were not long delayed in their appearance,
for the dispossessed migrated to the towns and too often became
sturdy ruffians therein. " Ecclesiastical amortization absorbed the
larger and better part of the landed property, and against this rock
all the forces of agriculture were shipwrecked. The clergy afforded
liberal succor to the poor ; but its blind and indiscreet charity
often fomented sloth and its unproductive monopoly of the land
rendered labor sterile." ^ Not only that : " in reality there were
many who took the habit and entered religious institutions, fleeing
from the labors and miseries of the world in order to enjoy the
sweetness of idleness ; and not because they were led to this life
through devotion, penitence, or the love of a life of contemplation.
These are the words of the Council of Castile in 1619." ^
As time went on this double process of robbing industry of the
best Jands_and the land of its complement of workers proceeded
apace, being rather strengthened and justified than weakened by
later developments : it was not until a much later time that Church
and State were shorn to any considerable degree of their land-
monopoly.^ Again, careers for the ambitious seemed to become
1 Colmeiro, II, 160; cf. pp. 28 ff., 131-133, 139, 146-148; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p.
153. The ecclesiastical rights even struck at the royal power. Colmeiro, II, 157-15S.
2 Colmeiro, II, 151.
3 Colmeiro, II, 159 (Philip IV); cf. pp. 131-133, 162-163; see the account of the
report in 1618 of the Council of Castile, in Hume (pp. 221-222).
198 COLONIZATION
less and less attainable except through the Chunh. " Tn justice,"
says Colmeiro/ "we ought to condone the inclination ot the
Spaniard of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to take
refuge in the religious establishments. Those professions which
held out hopes of fortune were few. The toga and the uniform
appealed very aptly to the vanity and presumption of the caballeros
and hidalgos, while agriculture, the mechanic arts, and commerce
were suitable only to an humble station, inasmuch as they were
regarded as lowly occupations. The Church was a neutral field,
where noble and plebeian mingled and became indistinguishable.
All, ascetic as well as worldly, proud and modest, lazy and diligent,
wise and ignorant, found in the Church a harbor of refuge from
the storms of the age, without thereby renouncing, however, the
opportunity of embarcation upon the high sea of the Court, and
upon functions and offices of greater honor and authority, when
occasion, acceptable or unavoidable, should have cast them into
the tumult of affairs. Spanish history is full of cardinals who
became ministers, of prelate-ambassadors, or bishojvprcsidcnts of
Castile. It offers us the example even of a mere priest like Pedro
de la Gasca, named pacificator and governor of Peru ; and of
certain good and simple ecclesiastics sent out to check the insolence
of the captains, administer justice, and bring order and accord into
various parts of the Indies."
The religious loyalty of the Spaniards, strong as it was, did not
remain proof against the very evident evils of this exaltation of the
power of the Church; in 1619 the Council of Castile proposed
that licenses should be necessary for new religious foundations,
and that a minimum age limit should be set for those entering the
religious life.^ But it was not until the eighteenth century that
the great estates were broken uj) and sold under full property
rights. And as for the numbers of the religious, an estimate of
Davila, reported by other authorities to be moderate, assigned to
Spain (about 1623) 9000 convents and 100,000 personS of ecclesi-
astical status — 30,000 of the secular and 70,000 of the regular
clergy. In 1768 the census showed 148,815 curates, monks, nuns,
etc., and in 1787, although certain semi-connected persons were
not counted, there still remained 138,761. In 1797 the number
had decreased by 15,000.'^ To gain a correct impressicMi of the
1 II, I ^4-155 ; cf. Ilaebler, Wirt. 151., p. 154. 2 (^;Q]iy,eij-o jj ,^o ; Hume, p. 222.
' Colmeiro, II, 149; cf. II, 52. This author was not able to find the reported
estimate of Davila, and regards the above numbers as excessive. Upon scanning the
CONDl'lIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION
199
strain brought upon the nation by these estabhshmcnts, it must be
reahzed not only that most of the members of the orders were
withdrawn from any profitable service to society, but that it was
really the pick of the population that was thus cut out from social
service, and in theory from the propagation of the race. They had
to be supported by an already over-burdened laboring-class, yet
they consistently interfered with and injured the useful occupations.
When the Inquisition was at its climax of power and ferocity, they
systematically forced from his place in the society any one who
possessed activity and independence of mind enough to fall into
religious or political heresy.^
Nor must the interruption or stoppage and the consequent
demoralization of labor, caused by the over-development of reli-
gious exercises, fail of mention ; it is even to this day a distinct
hindrance to the growth of industry in Spain. Festivals and holi-
days in honor of this or that saint took up a large fraction of the
working days of the year ; Campomanes counted ninety-three
fiestas in the year, and Colmeiro,^ reckoning 8,000,000 laborers at
a minimum wage of two reals a day, foots up the annual loss at
1,488,000,000 reals. The almost 800,000,000 days' labor sacri-
ficed per annum, with the resulting irregularity in habits, and the
acquired taste for amusement, are of course far more striking and
serious than any loss calculable in money. Again, the hours of
labor were always short, and tended to become shorter ; in Aragon,
in 1640, the working hours were five per day, and what was done
was scanty, costly, and poor.^
It is indeed hard to see where the workers of this society were,
or to what economic support it owed the deferring of its decline.
For while the lower classes starved rather than work, the upper
had to be restrained from a senseless luxury by repeated sumptuary
laws. It is not surprising, under these conditions, that a great
burst of immorality in nobles, clergy, and common people followed
7\atro the present writer found no such specific estimate, but counted up about
2000 convents and 40,000 religiosos alone. P'igures for the nunneries, hospitals, etc.,
were incomplete, but it is not difficult to believe that the estimate given in the text
needs comparatively little discount, especially when it is compared with Colmeiro's
figures for the eighteenth century. Davila says (p. 308) that in all the parishes, con-
vents, hospitals, etc., which he has named, no fewer than a million masses are said
each year. The tone and matter of the Teatro are certainly evidence of the strength
in numbers and in social importance of the clergy.
1 Hume, p. 304; cf. Galton, pp. 357-359; see p. 188, above.
2 II, 53-54. ^ Colmeiro, II, 23.
200 COLOM/AriOX
upon economic decline : petty vanity, venality, all kinds of corrup-
tion, looseness of sexual relations, and other vices from which the
nation had formerly been relatively free, invaded all walks of life.^
The Colonial Career as a Cause for Decline
No considerable part of the factors that made for decline, and
which have now been recounted, can be charged to the colonial
career. They lay in the constitution of the race, in the results of
mediaeval and later European systems and complications, theories,
and institutions ; they were sufficient to have ruined Spain even
though America had never been discovered. The effect uj^on
them of the colonial enterprises was, at the most, contributary ;
not creative, determinative, or even prominent. They were there
already. What the colonial experiences did was to evoke, as a
special case, a pronounced and striking exhibition of what had come
to be the national way of doing things ; and if it stimulated fateful
impulses and policies not elsewhere so active, it is in this sense
only that it may be considered to have hastened an evil destiny.
For example, the possession of the colonial empire drew Spain into
hostilities whose cost had to be covered by an added increase of
taxation ; but this was largely because the external possessions
afforded Spain a stage in plain sight and directly in the path of
her most enterprising rivals, upon which her hateful and obstructive
policy could be displayed. Possibly the enlarged sphere of Philip
IPs accountability to God may have intensified his effort to live up
to his destiny. Such effects were, however, relatively insignificant;
and with reference to the taxation, to which the authorities refer
so large a part of Spain's exhaustion, it will presently be seen that
the metropolis was far from being required to expend money on
America ; the New World was rather an abused source of income.
It is reasonable to believe that the effect of the Discoveries was
to enhance the characteristic feeling for King and Church, bearing
witness as they did to the world-power of both ; and both were no
doubt stimulated to an extravagancy of self-confidence and pre-
sumption for the very reason that they saw themselves the holders
of such universally envied advantages.^ We of the present day can
scarcely call before the imagination a semblance of the excitement
^ Colmeiro, II, 524 ff. ; Ilume, pp. 169-170, 221 ff.
2 (3f_ Koscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 42 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 35-36.
CONDITIONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 201
and elation of the period under review ; ^ comparison may be
made perhaps with the emotions excited here and there by the
gold discoveries in the Transvaal and Alaska, or, farther back, in
California and Australia The pretentious titles assumed by the
king of Portugal after the attainment of India ^ reflect an exalted
frame of mind, and the pious ecstasies of an Azurara betray excite-
ment before the prospect of extended religious dominion. Perhaps
the additional prestige thus lent the Spanish rulers rendered them
less assailable for criticism in their series of unfortunate measures.
In fact, it was the very refusal of Spain to adapt herself to the
conditions of a new destiny which made the colonial career so
disastrous. She was not alone in mistaking her way in an un-
charted course, but she occupied a bad and almost unique eminence
in that she seemed to learn nothing by experience. Conditions
were not studied with the idea of better coping with them. Other
nations managed to dodge and shift ground and adapt, — profiting
not infrequently by the mishaps undergone before their eyes by
Spain, — but Spain pursued a course of rare and ruinous con-
sistency.^
Taking up now the larger economic and social effects of the
colonial career, which are here distinguished for the sake of clear-
ness from the more purely political or administrative, the case
becom.es considerably less simple and evident. A larger share in
Spanish decline seems referable to the relations with America ; and
it is possible to appreciate the standpoint of those older Spanish
observers of affairs who used to query whether the Indies had not
been a curse, and not infrequently answered themselves in the
affrrmativc* For, first of all, the discoveries and conquests opened
an illimitable range for the adventurous military and missionary
spirit, thus promoting the diffusion over a wide and uncertain
field of such forces as might have been rendered productive if
closer confined. Beside the prospective treasures of the Indies,
former wealth seemed of little account. The Spanish non-industrial
type and ideal attained thus a new lease of life when the situation
at home was already calling for their effacement. If the military
and ecclesiastical professions in Spain were at the saturation-point
1 Cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 190 ff. - See p. 94, above.
3 The unavailing efforts of the Netherlander Charles V to limit the application of
mercantile doctrines are significant. Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 11-14.
•* Cf. Colmeiro, II, 421, 440-442; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 30.
202 COLONIZATION
there was chance enough in the Indies ; thus Cerv^antes and other
contemporary writers represent the situation.^ Of a consequence,
as in the less-known case of Portugal,^ the tendency to dependency
and sycophancy was largely increased, and the steps of every man
of importance were dogged by hangers-on hopeful of undeserved
chances in life. The plain tendency toward corruption in public
affairs was naturally increased ; and the demoralization of the
people under the regime of unreasonable luxury for some, incredi-
ble but unresisting poverty, devoid of all self-respect, for others,
and indiscriminate charity for social parasites, was intensified. In
short, the social shortcomings, natural or acquired, were enhanced
all along the line by the entrance into Spanish life of the new
factor of romance and hazard represented by the acquisition of
America.^
The Mercantile System
Neglecting minor effects, which are either deducible from the
rather extended treatment already accorded, or will appear in the
ensuing narrative, there yet remains one prominent factor in
Spain's decline to which, from Adam Smith down, a considerable
degree of importance has been assigned, especially by economists.
This is the effect of the mercantile system as adopted by Si:»ain in
her relations to her colonies. One of the stock illustraticMis of the
fallacy of the seventeenth and eighteenth century views regarding
the identity of money (coin) and wealth has been afforded by the
fact that Spain, although the recipient of an uninterrupted golden
stream from the New World, yet grew steadily poorer and more
miserable, declined in population, and sunk from a position of
preeminence to one of humiliation and degradation. It was partially
to get this contention into a proper setting that the causes for the
1 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 3 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 37. It is jjerhaps superfluous to
point out, in this connection, the great importance for the study of colonial affairs of
the impressions preserved in contemporary literature.
2 See pp. 113 ff., above.
3 Cf. Martins, Civ. Iber., pp. 255-256 ; Colmeiro, I, 253. "The highest ambition
of the nation in its golden age was to be to Europe just what the nobility, the clergy
and the army were to single nations. Consequently there was an enormous pre-
ponderance of personal service in the industrial organism, and much of this was
purely for ostentation. Nowhere in the world were there so many nobles, so many
ofificers, civil and military, so many lawyers and clerks, priests and monks, so many
students and school-boys, with their servants. ]5ut as truly, nowhere in the world
were there so many beggars and vagabonds." Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 3-4.
coNDrrioNs of Spanish colonization 203
decline of Spain have been so extensively recounted ; and now,
admitting freely the disastrous nature of any such economic pre-
possession, the reader is in a position to draw his own conclusion
as to its share in the whole process. Plainly, however harmful, it
could have constituted only one factor among several scarcely less
effective. Taking the matter up upon its own account, it is note-
worthy, first of all, that Spain never developed the mercantile
system /// ex tens o ; never so far as did England, for example. She
naturally followed her prototypes, the Italians and Portuguese, in
their policies of monopoly and exclusion ; she regarded the colonies,
in practice at least, as destined to subserve the necessities and
desires of the metropolis. But the Spaniards were not enough of
_an^mdustrial and merchant people to adopt unconsciously, or even
as the result of rational reflection, any but the crudest and most
obvious phases of the system. ^ The crudest dogma of the mercan-
tilists was probably that which confounded the metallic species of
wealth with the general term, and this view, largely because they
had the bullion, and because they knew they were, on that account,
envied and feared by the rest of Christendom, the Spaniards applied
in an extreme.^
The Inflow of Bullion r
It has been shown how, in default of spices and like products,
the whole attention of the Spaniards in the New World was turned
predominantly, and at first almost exclusively, to the search for
precious metals. Anticipating somewhat,^ it is fair to say that
between 1525 and 1825 a quantity of buUion was entered via Spain
upon the markets of the world, which utterly dwarfed any former
experience of the race. The contemporary and subsequent litera-
ture of Europe reflects the impression made upon the western
world by this period, and in particular by its opening episodes. Inas-
much, now, as the circulation of commodities between Spain and
1 Cf. Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 42; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 26; Moses, pp. 300-301.
2 See pp. 227 ff., below. " While heaven was exerting itself to rain gold and silver to
slake the burning thirst of our forebears, the doctrine prevailed which regarded the
precious metals as the sum of all the temporal riches of life, the blood of all peoples
and nations, and the nerve of all the powers of the earth. The art of governing con-
sisted in retaining the rivers of gold and silver which flowed from the Indies, and in
hoarding up their abundance in Spain without spilling a drop for the benefit of
foreigners." Colnieiro, II, 437-438. For a comparison of the "metal-policies" of
Spain and England, see Moses, pp. 300-301. ^ gee pp. 208 ff., below.
204 COLONIZATION
the rest of the world was impeded, not only by the desire to hoard
gold, but also by the advancing feebleness of Spain's industrial life,
and by the artificial barriers placed in the j^ath of trade, money
tended to stagnate along the avenues of exchange. An immediate
effect was an extraordinary rise of prices which outdid that of the
first half of the sixteenth century. It must be understood that
before the influx of gold prices had already gone up by reason of
the industrial conditions of Spain; between 15 19 and 1565 they
rose on the average about 300 per cent. Double prices were com-
plained of as early as 1528. But whereas money was by 1558 down
to one-third of its earlier purchasing power, it declined between
that date and 1632 to one-fifth.^ Wheat rose from 110 to 952
maravedi's, and the other grains kept the pace.^ Naturally a con-
siderable impulse was given to industry by this prevalence of high
prices ; but real wages soon experienced a decline. Meanwhile it
cost so much to produce in Spain that foreigners could pay the
heavy dues demanded of importers and yet undersell the Spanish
producers.^ Thus was the periodic flood of gold which accompanied
the returning galleons drained away, and with the greater speed as
Spain was forced the more consistently to rely upon foreign pro-
ducers to supply her needs. "* And so the Spanish coins came really
to flood the world, being found in China and Japan, the East Indies,
Persia, Constantinople, Cairo, and Barbary, — " destinations of the
larger part of the silver of Spain, because scarcely any other coin
was current among those remote tribes than pieces of eight {rcalcs
1 Haebler, Wirt. BL, pp. i6off. ; cf. p. 32 ; Colmeiro, II, 445, 451. By i 55S Philip II
was acting upon the theory that coin had fallen 40 per cent in value. Colmeiro, 11,
449. The general level of prices in Europe from 1200 to 1800 is treated by D'Avenel
in his monumental work. He says (I, 15-16) that prices began to rise about 1500 and
were speeded after 1525 through the incoming of American bullion. The value of
money fell one-third between 1530 and 1 560 ; then about one-half by 1600. The price
of merchandise tripled in 70 years. The following table is taken from notes on pages
27 and 32 of Volume I.
Purchasing Power of the Precious Metals compared with their Present (iSgo)
Value taken as Unity
1451-1500 .... 6 1626-1650 .... 2.50
1501-1525 .... 5 1651-1675 .... 2
1526-1550 .... 4 1676-1700 .... ,2.33
'S5'->S7S .... 3 1701-1725 .... 2.7s
1576-1600 2.50 1726-1750 .... 3
1601-1625 .... 3 ' 1751-1775 . . • ■ 2.33
iTjb-ijcp .... 2
2 Colmeiro, II, 232.
=5 Ilaebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 15; cf. pp. 52-53; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 38; Cunningham,
pp. 518-520; Clarke, p. 357. •* Colmeiro, II, 443-447.
CONDl'llONS OF SPANISH COLONIZATION 205
de a ocho) and Castilian doubloons. It was for so short a time that
we enjoyed the treasures of the fleets and galleons that they
dampened our soil without watering it." ^
The natural results of this constant inflation of the stock of
bullion were economic instability, insecurity of trade, and a great
amount of social misery ; and when to such natural inflation, if it
may be so called, were added periodic capricious alterations of the
currency on the part of king and irresponsible favorites, the case
was by so much the worse. ^ What the Spaniards, and indeed all
the nations of the time who were not shaken in their dogmas by
being forced constantly to test them in practice, failed to see is
what one of their own writers of 1684 stated so clearly: "The
most necessary metal," the anonymous one asserts, " the most
noble, precious and sure which has ever existed or will exist, is the
sweat of the brow ; it ought to be designated the unique element
in the conservation of realms. For where this metal shall be want-
ing, gold and silver cannot hold their place, since it is alone the
sweat of the individual which constitutes the universal coin of the
world." ^ Instead, however, of adopting rational means for deliver-
ing themselves from the results of price-inflation, recourse was had
to acts of legislation aimed at the symptoms alone ; and such price-
regulation simply aggravated the economic ills.'*
The cult of the metals was certainly pursued to the extreme ;
but the other dogmas of the mercantilists seem to have suffered
1 Colmeiro, II, 439. " The permanent gain from the treasure went to the countries
which could employ it as capital for industrial or agricultural development. This
Spain could not do. Even in the Low Countries her system forced a migration of
industry. Foreigners were forced to go into banking and their failure in this witnessed
to the fact that the treasure was passing into foreign hands. Thus the prosperous
element were the Dutch, who used this treasure of Spanish America as capital in
commercial shipping and industry." Cunningham, p. 521 ; cf. Colmeiro, II, 440-442 ;
Hume, p. 305. Realization of these conditions brought the doubt referred to (p. 201,
above) as to the real value to Spain of the Indies. " En fin algunos llegaron a poner
en duda si el descubrimiento y conquista de las Indias habia sido, un bien 6 un mal
para Espaiia, puesto que al cabo si nosotros cogiamos las floves, los demas reinos y
provincias de Europa se llevaban el fruto."
2 " There is another powerful cause of dearth which has been passed over hitherto
by the political writers, and which nevertheless played a very prominent part in the
general rise of the prices of our goods and products, namely, the frequent alterations
of the money. With their eyes upon the inflow of the riches of America, they do not
note that the value of merchandise rose proportionately with the decline in weight
and quality of our esatdos and reales" Colmeiro, II, 452 ; cf. pp. 492-494.
3 Colmeiro, II, 227-228. Other isolated pamphleteers urged the same views; cf.
pp. 226-227, 452. * Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 32, 35-36; Clarke, p. 357.
2o6 COLONIZATION
considerable attack and modification. Colmeiro^ says that the rigor
of the system was tempered as far as the theories regarding the
precious metals would permit. Haebler, a more modern authority
and of great weight, sees in the operation of mercantilism, espe-
cially as it demanded the exclusion of foreign merchants, a " strong
factor" in Spanish decadence.^ But touching this exclusion, the
Spanish, as has been seen,^ were never, even in their early history,
fond of strangers ; and it seems doubtful if an economic theory not
reenforced by the uncommon intolerance, bigotry, and race-hatred
of the Spanish could explain the rigor of the treatment accorded
to aliens, from the Jews and Moriscos on. Again, the foreigners
were never entirely excluded, and were even the objects of favor-
able discrimination in the time of Charles II (latter half of the
seventeenth century).'* The fact is, as Haebler says in another
work,''^ that Spain was economically too weak to react against con-
ditions : " If Spain had been an economically sound state, it would
have been as little likely to collapse in consecjuence of the super-
fluity of gold and silver as in actuality England has been harmed
by the treasures of India." " It is certain," says Colmeiro,*^ " that
other industrial nations of Europe suffered from the same or simi-
lar errors ; but they corrected themselves with greater timeliness,
while we persevered for a long period in the policy which consum-
mated our ruin."
1 II, 226-227.
2 Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 14.
3 See pp. 187 ff., above.
* Haebler, Wirt. Bl, pp. 89-90.
^ Amerika, p. 418.
8 II, 452. " Bending every energy for years to stay the tide of change and progress,
suppressing freedom of thought with relentless vigor, and quarantining herself and
her dependencies against new ideas, conservatism grew to be her [Spain's] settled habit
and the organs of government became ossified. I'olicies of commercial restriction
which were justifiable or at least rationally explicable in the sixteenth century lasted
on, proof against innovation or improvement, until the eighteenth century and later."
Bourne, Hist. Introd., p. 48.
CHAPTER VI
SPANISH AMERICA : POPULATION, INDUSTRY, AND TRADE
In the conclusions to which the foregoing account of Spain and
Spanish policy have led, we now possess a setting or perspective
for the colonial career itself. For a nation like the Spaniards, it
has been seen, the first and most engrossing interest in any new
world must have lain in the large element of hazard and adventure
which it offered. The expeditions and conquests were motived by
the desire for wealth won speedily in the opening up of a mysteri-
ously attractive Unknown. How far and with what sincerity the
crusading spirit entered into the situation will appear a little later ;
but earlier experiences in the subjection of the Moors had certainly
made the Spaniard aware of the great material advantages to be
gained by reducing empires such as Montezuma and the Inca held.
Enterprises reached out in all the directions indicated by rumor as
the approaches to more developed and richer civilizations ; and the
booty thus gathered was so large as to afford a certain realization
to the visions of Columbus. Naturally the state had always re-
ceived a generous share of such takings, — a share which sometimes
stood for propitiation on the part of insubordinate adventurers.
Even at the outset the government as represented by Columbus
had demanded gold in quantities which were beyond the power
of the natives to furnish. ^ The yield to the king from Pizarro's
enterprise reached, reckoned as a fifth, almost a million ducats ;
the Inca's ransom is estimated as having been the equivalent of
1^17,500,000, and out of this ransom Pizarro paid to every knight
of his army 8000 pesos ^ and to every foot soldier half of that
amount. These values are enhanced when it is realized that the
precious metals at that time possessed purchasing power consider-
ably above that of later periods.^
1 See p. 262, below.
2 Bourne (Hist. Introd., p. 50) renders the Spanish peso as dollar, adding: "The
reader will bear in mind the varying purchasing power of the dollar. To arrive at an
appro.ximate equivalent, ten may be used as a multiplier for the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, and five for the middle of the eighteenth century." Humboldt
(Essai, n, 64CS) gives the Inca's ransom as 3,838,058 piasters.
^ Haebler, Amerika, p. 382; Watson, I, 130; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 41.
207
2o8 COLONIZATION
Mine-Production and Revenue
When, now, the acquisition of the gold came to turn upon extrac-
tion rather than ui)on looting, the state laid its hand with vigor
upon an obvious source of revenue, and the regular fifths-system
was put into operation. The mines proved almost from the first to
be a source of incredible metallic wealth ; after the conquest of
Mexico the average annual output about doubled ; and with the
discovery of the quicksilver process, their productivity was greatly
augmented. " The mine-owners promised to freight the ships of
the New Spain fleet to the masts with silver if they could only get
enough quicksilver"; the inevitable effect of this was the stimula-
tion of the Almaden mines in Spain (held from 1563 to 1641 by the
Fugger) and a considerable consequent increase in royal revenue.^
Then came the discovery of the astonishing Potosi deposits {1546),
and the takings in the precious metals soared to undreamed-of
amounts. In the earlier and less productive period (1506) the
annual importation of gold into Spain reached a value of some
$1,200,000 ; this had risen by 1 556 to 700,000 ducats for the crown
alone.^ The royal taxes from the Potosi deposits alone amounted,
from 1556 to 1783, to over 3,000,000,000 reals, while from 1754
to 1 791 there were coined in Lima over 3,000,000,000 reals,
and from 1792 to 1813 over 2,200,000,000.'^ Estimates given by
Watson^ fix the annual import of Spain in American gold and silver
at $20,000,000, while Peru yielded the crown some $5,000,000
annual revenue. In the latter half of the eighteenth century the
fifth of the annual i)roduct of the mines was reckoned as $7,425,000,
and the king's net revenue from America as $6,750,000.'^
The estimates of Humboldt, taking into account his sagacity,
wide experience in Europe and America, and general scientific re-
liability, prol)ably form the best guesses at our disposal ui)on the
matter in question. He estimated the annual yield of the mines of
New Spain at $23,000,000;^ the total yield from 1493 to 1803 at
' Ilaebler, Amerika, pp. 415-416; during the time of Ferdinand, however, the
colonies had yielded only 50,000 to 70,000 ducats. Id., p. 1 14. On early mining con-
cessions and their terms, see Fabie, pp. 49, 86, etc. On the mines in general, see
Humboldt, Essai, II, book iv, chap. xi. An attempt to infringe upon the royal fifth
was punishable by death. Watson, I, 121.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 104; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 114.
3 Colmeiro, II, 429. * II, 139, 145. ^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 239.
'• This estimate is the same as Bancroft's. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 298, note.
SPANISH AMI:R1(\\: POPULATION AND IkADl'. 209
5,706,700,000 pesos, and the total annual production at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century at 43,500,000 pesos, or about
ten times the known production of the rest of the world. The
average annual production, as calculated by the same authority, is
represented in the following table : ^
1492-1500 250,000 jjesos
1 500- 1 545 3,000,000 "
1545-1600 11,000,000 "
1 600- 1 700 16,000,000 "
1700-1750 22,500,000 "
1750-1803 35,300,000 "
To these figures Colmeiro ^ adds the following from the Spanish
minister of finance, Canga Argiielles :
Entered into the public treasury :
1808-1814 30,000,000 pesos
1814 5'439.^75 "
1816 100,000 "
1818 2,472,627 "
It must be understood, as mentioned above, that in any estimates
of, or based upon, the royal fifths, a large element of error is repre-
sented by the constant evasion and peculations ^ which were invited
both by the richness of the field exploited, by the monopoly policy
of the government, and by the system itself of collection and su-
pervision. Occasionally, on the other hand, even under Charles V,
the whole cargo of the bullion-fleets was confiscated to meet a
pressing emergency.* But, even if the total receipts in bullion of
king and private importers are discounted by a large percentage,
they must have represented a powerful and consistent attraction
away from the development of a settled industrial economy. It
was in the order of events that a non-industrial people should have
been so dazzled by these extraordinary yields of metallic treasure
as never to have seriously considered the immensely larger and
steadier profits to be gained through the more commonplace and
less picturesque vocations of agriculture and trade. The results of
such prepossessions upon Spain have been indicated ; and they
were, in many respects, duplicated in the colonies. But the latter
1 Humboldt, Essai, II, chap, xi, 652. Quoted in Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 301 ; cf.
Cunningham, Econ. Change, p. 518. 2 jj^ 435-436.
8 V^'^atson, II, 139; see also note appended to chap, iv, above. For thefts from
the mines, see Humboldt, Essai, II, 555.
* It was in 1535 that Charles first confiscated all the precious metals brought by
the fleet. Ilaebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 114; Hume, p. 89.
2IO COLONIZATION
suffered also from the increasing demands for revenue of a govern-
ment which could get less and less at home, and from the debasing
effect of the constant endeavor to evade or circumvent such
demands.^ This last result will appear more clearly when the
general policy of monopoly and restriction is considered.- Never-
theless, " the Si)anish colonies fulfilled their i:)urpose down into
the eighteenth century. They provided the mother-countr)' with the
financial resources of which it stood in unconditional need to main-
tain its position in the European concert, — and so abundantly that
the envy of all other countries was awakened and they were induced
not only to go into colonial enterprises on their own accounts, but
also to relieve the Spaniard of as many as they could of his
colonial prizes." ^
Emigration to America
In view of the attitude of both state '^ and individuals toward the
New World, it is not difficult to understand why early emigration
was of so poor a quality. Indeed, it is doubtful if the word
"emigration " should be used either of the early movement of the
Spaniards to the New World, or of that of the Portuguese to
India. The motive of the incomer w^as, in both cases, to return,
as soon as return with a competence was possible ; and the women
who accompanied the earlier voyagers were extremely few. The
description given by Columbus of the insurgents of 1498, even
though discounted considerably, is witness for the fact that emi-
gration began most unpropitiously."'' Leroy-Beaulieu ^ distinguishes
two classes which took part in the founding of the Spanish colonies :
adventurers recruited especially from the nobility and army, men
whom the end of the Moorish wars had left without employment
or resources ; and the clergy who were to convert the pagans.
Doubtless these were the main classes recognized ; it was the
intention of the Catholic Sovereigns " to give the posts and offices
to caballcros, hidalgos -Sindi gcnte principal -AwOi. to distinguished and
1 Cf. Watson, II, 139. 2 See pp. 226 ff., below. •' Haebler, Amerika, p. 419.
* Ilaebler (Amerika, p. 368) opposes the old view that the whole stale-policy was
directed predominantly and continuously toward the acquisition of metallic wealth.
At first, naturally enough in the setting of its time, the government neglected every-
thing else in favor of the advantages which it hoped to gain from the support of
Columbus's schemes. But metal exploitation was not " from the beginning and con-
tinuously the directing view-point of the Spanish colonial policy."
^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 49-50. ^ I, 4.
SPANISH AMERICA : POPULATION AND TRADE 2 i i
prudent persons of good family," so that the "conquest and pacif-
ication of those lands and the colonization of the New World
might be entrusted to the flower of the nobility and virtue of
Castile." Nevertheless, Ferdinand found it necessary later, in
order to keep up a declining emigration, to commute sentences of
death or mutilation to i)erpetual or limited sojourn in the islands.
" There went, besides, the soldiers of fortune, men of valiant
spirit and of endurance, tested, some of them, in the campaigns in
Italy and Flanders, men of stout heart who fought with the hope
of enriching themselves with the spoils of war, and never admitted
that they were content with their lot, since, although they received
great favors, they held their services poorly paid. And when the
fervor of the discoveries and conquests was over, there began the
emigration of the plain and common folk, in part honorable and
laborious, in part stow-aways and license-evaders or vicious crimi-
nal adventurers." ^ In any case they came, not to labor, " but as
conquerors who take possession of the wealth and the persons of a
vanquished people and force the latter to labor for their profit. In
such a system it is understandable that if the conquest was rapid,
the settlement was slow." ^ Of the elements here mentioned the
clergy is reserved for a later treatment. But the results of having
the nobles, with their lofty contempt of labor, as constituents of
the early colonial bands appear even in the time of Columbus's
second voyage. When most of the laborers became disabled, in
consequence of the climate and of the hardships, the Italian admiral
adopted the un-Spanish recourse of ordering the gentlemen " to
take hold and work, under threat of severe penalty. To add the
degradation of labor with .their hands to their suffering was too
much for the Spanish hidalgos, and Columbus never escaped from
the resentment engendered at this time." '^ The history of the
insurrections, factions, and acts of violence, and the tales of
deeds of lust, cruelty, and general scoundrelism certainly betray
the abundant presence in the society of degraded and degenerate
elements.
Restriction of Emigration
During preparation for the second voyage of Columbus the
climax of national excitement over the Indies was evidenced, as
has been noted,'* by the throngs which besieged the authorities for
1 Colmeiro, IT, 379-3S0 ; cf. IIae1)ler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 29-30.
2 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 5. ^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 40. * P. 180, above.
2 12 COLONIZATION
permission to embark. At that time it was necessary to adopt
certain restrictive regulations, and these, although the fever of
popular interest never again approached so nearly to delirium,
became the prototypes for a policy of restriction of emigration
which was adhered to and extended during the whole period of
colonial predominance and beyond.^ From the time of Charles V,
no Spaniard could go to the Indies without express permission
from the crown, and then for only a stated time ; and " whoever
sought permission had not merely to furnish a sufficient reason,
but to present in addition satisfactory proofs regarding his morals
and especially that neither he nor his ancestors for two genera-
tions had been punished by the Inquisition (law of 1518)."^ This
restriction-system was not palatable to Charles V, who granted
numerous exceptions in favor of all the subjects of his kingdoms
and lordships, and even admitted the Welser and Fugger families
within the pale of the monopoly.'^ But under Philip the lines were
more sharply drawn ; for example, the permission granted was
usually limited to a certain province, and the journey had to be as
nearly direct as possible. Emigrants had to reside in the locations
and practice the vocations indicated in their licenses. Creoles
educated in Europe required official permission to return ; ship-
masters had to declare under oath that they had on board no
unlicensed person.* The details of these restrictions occupy
seventy-three laws in the code.
From what has been said of the disposition of the Spanish, and
of the quality of the early emigration to the Indies, it is not diffi-
cult to derive the reasons for this legislation ; and although it
represents over-detailed regulation, it was not entirely uncalled for.
From this point of view the conscientiousness of the Spaniard
stands in not unfavorable contrast with the indifference of the
Briton.^ However, it must be borne in mind that these motives
were not all. There was a monopoly to be safeguarded and an
empire to be held, and held in subjection ; and the secretiveness
which developed many ages before in the dissimulation of profitable
trade-advantages had descended unquestioned to the Spanish.
1 Ilaebler, Amerika, p. 360.
2 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 6; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 17-18; Moses, p. 56. Restric-
tion of movement within the Peninsula had been previously applied. Ilaebler, Wirt. I!!.,
p. 155. 3 Boume, Sp. in Amer., pp. 243, 245 ; cf. Colmeiro, II, 380.
* Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 17-18; Moses, pp. 58-63.
^ Cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 246-248; Ilaebler, Amerika, pp. 416-417.
SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION AND TRADE 213
It is of course unjustifiable to depend upon the prescriptions of
Spanish law-codes in determining the conditions in the colonies ;
but despite i)robable suspensions and infractions of the regulations,
and occasional panic flights from the relentless tax-gatherer/ it is
probable that emigration to the colonies was, through all the period
of Spanish dominance, very slight. The population of the home-
country was neither numerous nor enterprising enough to break
over the barriers. Annual emigration from Spain to the captaincy-
general of Caracas was estimated as one hundred at most; during
the sixteenth century the entire movement from Spain to America
is thought not to have much exceeded a thousand or fifteen hundred.
"About 1546 there were in Peru upwards of 6000 Spaniards;
four years later there are said to have been in all the New World
only 1 5,000." 2 In 1574 a competent official enumerates in the
New World some two hundred Spanish cities and towns, contain-
ing, together with stock-farms and plantations, about 160,000 Span-
iards. In the city of Mexico there were about 15,000 Spaniards
of all vocations ; in Vera Cruz, 200 Spanish families ; in Yucatan,
300 householders; in South America, some 13,500 households;
in Quito, 400 families ; in Lima, 2000 families.^ Although the
error in these figures may be considerable, the fact is patent
that emigration was slight ; and it is to be feared, despite the
efforts to rule out turbulent adventurers anxious only " to get
rich quickly, and not content with food and clothing, which
every moderately industrious man was assured of," * that the
type appealed to by the logic of the situation was generally a
disappointment.
One other fact to which reference has been made ^ as a distinc-
tive characteristic of the non-settlement colony is that the emigrants,
such as they were, were almost wholly men. The objects of emi-
gration — adventure, etc. — excluded nearly all women who were
not objectionable ; and these, as we have seen, the conscientious
Spanish laws refused to foist upon the colonies. The privilege of
going to the Indies was strictly withheld from all single women ;
and it was even difficult to return and get a wife who had been
left behind. At the same time, married men were encouraged to
1 Haebler, Wirt. Bl, p. 153.
2 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 17-18; Bourne, Sp. in Amen, p. 250.
^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. ig6, 198-200 (from Velasco).
■* Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 246.
'' See p. 14, above.
214
COLONIZATION
take their wives. ^ The net result was, naturally, a prevailing
absence of Spanish women, married or marriageable ; and the
inevitable results followed. And when, with the attainment of the
temperate altitudes, real colonies of settlement could have been
developed, this phase of the restrictive system, or a predisposition
brought about by its earlier effectiveness, still prevailed to keep
the unit of the society the individual, or the family based on a
mixed union, rather than the family as known at home. The natural
increase of the pure Spaniards in the New World was bound there-
fore to be negligible.
Despite this general policy, however, there were sporadic pro-
visions for the encouragement of emigration which had actual
settlement as its object. Columbus himself took over prospective
settlers ; and, in April, 1495, the sovereigns actually adopted a plan
of voluntary assisted emigration to Espanola. Here, however, the
rights of the admiral were infringed and the monopoly system pre-
vailed : " It is melancholy to observe to wiiat extremities Colum-
bus was reduced to get colonists beyond those numbered on the
royal pay-list." ^ Whether the sovereigns w^ould have succeeded
in attracting a satisfactory quantity and cjuality of settlers remains
doubtful, for, although their terms were extremely liberal, the lot
of the cultivator was not hard at this time in Spain. Naturally,
however, a like liberal-mindedness regarding colonization was not
to be expected of Philip and his successors. In 15 18 most liberal
offers were made in the hope' of inducing workers to go to the
New World and help take the pressure off the natives : free pas-
sage and living on shipboard ; lands and live-stock on arrival ;
relief for twenty years from the alcabala and nearly all other taxes ;
premiums for production, etc. Again, in 1529, "a new plan was
tried, — that of establishing feudal lordships.''^ If any one would
take over to Espanola fifty married couples, twenty-five free
whites and twenty-five negro slaves, build a church and fort and
1 Moses, p. 59. " In striking contrast to the subsequent policy of Louis XIV in
Canada and Louisiana and of the EngHsh generally, the emigration of single women
to the colonies was not favored in the later legislation, and the king reserved to him-
self the power to grant the necessary license if exception was to be made. It was
therefore inevitable that there should be an excess of white men in the colonies and
that marriage with Indian women should be common. It was Humboldt's estimate
in 1803 that not one-tenth of the Kuropean-bom Spaniards in Mexico were women."
Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 265-266.
^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 45-46, 215-216.
3 Cf. pp. 133 ff., above.
SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION AND TRADE
215
support the clergyman, pay the freight and supply provisions for
the emigrants, build their houses, give each couple two cows, two
bulls, fifty sheep, one mare, ten pigs, and six chickens, and make
the settlement within a year, completing twenty-five stone houses
within five years and fifty within ten — he was to receive an area
of about sixty square miles, with its mines (subject to the king's
royalty of one-fifth), its fisheries, one-fifth of the royal income from
the territory, the right of patronage for the church, etc. ; and
finally his family should be raised to the nobility and granted a
coat of arms." ^ But this proposition ran counter to the prevail- /
ing imj^ulse of the time, namely, to steer straight for the mines ;
no toilsome industry could compete with the visions of a Potosi'.^
Constituents of Population
Of a consequence, colonial wealth and population early tended
to concentrate upon the plateaus and in the high valleys of the
Cordilleras. The life-conditions in lower altitudes had been found
questionable by Columbus, even in the islands ; and the Atlantic
shores of both Americas were considerably worse. Neglecting the
" worthless regions " which lay outside the tropics, the only health-
ful and at the same time wealth-producing areas were the interior
altitudes ; and it was only there, of all of Spanish America, that
a numerous population was to be found .^ That these conditions
were persistent is proved by the figures given by Humboldt for
the period of his visit (about 1800). There were then, for every
hundred inhabitants, the following number of whites : in New
Spain (excluding the so-called interior provinces), 16 ; in Peru, 12 ;
in Jamaica, 10; in the city of Mexico, 51 ; and, for purposes of
comparison, in the United States, 83.* It must not be understood,
however, that the distribution of the Spanish immigrants was, in
any sense, an even one. It was a town population above all else
which they formed ; and even the dwellers in rural districts tended
to cohere into villages. This phenomenon is due to a number of
causes, some of which will appear presently ; Leroy-Beaulieu ^
sums them up as follows : " When, in a new country, one sees the
population flowing wholly to the towns, he may be sure that local
production is feeble, that the majority of the colonists are useless
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 217, 249 (quoted from Saco, pp. 147-149).
, 2 (3f_ Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 41.
« Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 18. * Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 18. ^ j^ 7.
2i6 COLONIZATION
persons, speculators or functionaries, not workers, and that there
is beneath them a vanquished population exploited for the profit
of the victorious class." In addition such agglomeration was a
national trait of the Spanish and no doubt represented in part the
result of having lived long amidst a hostile vanquished people ;
but it was very ill adapted, in any case, to the development of
industry. Probably also the government had some interest in
restraining whatever diffusive tendency the population exhibited.^
If, now, the early settlement by the Spaniards was so slight
and was subject to but inconsiderable natural hicrcase ; ^ and if,
owing to restrictions of emigration from Spain, which, it must be
supposed, allowed of comparatively little evasion, the number of
new recruits was never large ; and if, finally, the pure Spaniards
and the native-born Spaniards, or Creoles, tended inaptly to gather
in unnaturally large groups ; then it is evident that the constant
and determining constituent of the population, biologically speak-
ing, must have been the native element. It was too large to be
eradicated, except in isolated stations such as the islands ; being
acclimated, it was almost everywhere present ; but, since it usually
possessed less civilization and unity than the Europeans, it was pre-
vailingly and hopelessly subject. Class-division between the two
strata of population was therefore inevitable. Owing, however, to
the exigencies of the type of settlement practiced by the Spaniards,
— a form demanded, so far as the tropical areas were concerned,
by the very nature of things, ^ — and to the fact that they had never
acquired, or had lost as the result of experience, any aversion to
race-mixture, the immediate result of their contact with the native
Americans was a large-scale miscegenation. Bui the incxitablc con-
sequence of this was the addition of a third sub-division or class to
the population. Nor was this j*11: the introducti(Mi of negro slaves
resulted in the course of time in the creation of several other species
of mongrel, each of which had a more or less clearly defined i:)osi-
tion in the society. Social distinctions between the Peninsular
Spaniards and the Creoles completed the class-stratification. The
main constituents di the j^opulation, taken as ethnic and social
types, were as follows ; their several political abilities and disabili-
ties will provide a topic for a later page.^ The Spaniards who had
arrived from Europe were called chapctoiics (or gacliupines) ; and
1 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 6-7.
2 For the influence of altered environmental conditions upon national increase, cf.
Darwin, Orig. of Sp., II, 26. '^ See pp. 4 ff., above. * Pp. 312 ff., below.
SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION AND TRADE 217
next in order came the criollos (creolcs) or the descendants of
Europeans (or even Africans) settled in America, a class which
early exhibited the degeneracy characteristic of a parasitic and
unacclimated stock. A third class was formed of mongrels of
Europeans with the aborigines or (later) with the negroes ; these
were called respectively mestizos and ntulatos, and the former mul-
tiplied so rapidly as to constitute a very considerable portion of the
population of Spanish America. It may be said in passing that the
same phenomenon took place, but in a far less degree, in the Philip-
pines.^ Next in order were the negros, and finally the last and
lowest class, the indios, or natives. And, naturally, there came to
exist between these main components of population many transi-
tional grades which approximated to one or the other class or con-
stituted small anomalous groups.^
During the earlier periods the Indian element, so far as numbers
are concerned, was, of course, predominant. In 1576 a reasonably
reliable estimate gives for the New World the following figures :
Spaniards (and Creoles), 160,000 ; Indians, about 5,000,000 ; negro
slaves, 40,000 ; and a " large number of mestizos and mulattoes."
In the city of Mexico the proportion of Spanish to Indians (1574)
was 15,000 against 150,000 ; in the province north of Mexico, 130
against 114,000, counting merely the tribute-payers; in South
America, 13,500 "households" against 880,000 tributaries; in
Lima, 2000 families against an Indian population of some 25,000.^
The estimate of Humboldt, over two hundred years later, gives
some idea of what the course of development had been. He reports
the proportion of whites to the whole population which is quoted
above,* and later the following figures : '"^
In Mexico
In Guatemala ....
In Colombia ....
In Peru and Chile
In Buenos Ayres . .
In Cuba and Puerto Rico
Indians
3,700,000
880,000
720,000
1,030,000
1,200,000
7,530,000
Whi
1,230,000
280,000
642,000
465,000
320,000
339,000
3,276,000
387,000
389,000
776,000
Mestizos
1,860,000
420,000
1,256,000
853,000
742,000
197,000
5,328,000
1 See p. 346, below. ^ Watson, II, 132-135 ; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 20;
Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 266-267; Colmeiro, II, 391-392.
3 Velasco, in Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 196-200, 196-197 (quoted); cf. pp. 278-279.
*P. 215.
^ In Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 18. There were scarcely any negroes in Mexico.
Humboldt, Essai, I, 130. For the jiroportion of the elements of population in the
2l8
COLONIZATION
For a later period (latter half of nineteenth century) Roscher
assembles the following percentages : ^
Whites (%)
Indians(%)
Mixed (%)
Negroes (%)
Mexico ....
12.5
60.
27-5
(included in " mixed")
Central America .
5-0
56.
38.
I.
Panama ....
5-5
7.2
87.3 (mestizos, 74.6)
(included in " mixed")
Ecuador . .
8.
50.
Peru
M-
57-
29. (mestizos, 22. )
(included in " mixed ")
Venezuela .
27.5
-3-3
44.
5--
Reflection upon the foregoing figures will show no very serious
error in estimating the averages of the constituent elements of the
mainland population as follows : Indians, not much less than 50
percent; mestizos, about 33 percent; whites (a shifting popula-
tion) less than 20 per cent ; negroes, not over 5 or 6 per cent.
Though rough approximations, these percentages are close enough
for the present purpose.
Race-Mixture
In view of the fact that the pure Spaniards and negroes consti-
tuted such a small fraction of the population, it is plain tliat the
prevailing ethnic mixture, the mestizo, was bound to revert toward
the Indian component.^ It had only caste considerations to pre-
serve it from this fate; for it appears improbable, from the biologi-
cal standpoint, that this newly formed cross should have so differed
from other such mixtures as to have been able to preserv^e its new
character by breeding strictly within itself. Despite a later more
free influx of the European element, the reversion referred to seems
to have taken place.'^ Whether the Spanish-American mixture, in
its varying proportions, was a favorable one, is a difficult cjuestion.
Anthropologists as a rule look with little favor upon a mixed race
whose parent-components are widely diverse in their stages of
evolution, however much they may enthuse over the results of a
blend such as has occurred between European stocks in the United
States. The present generally unstable status of the Spanish
American "republics" is often popularly referred to the character
Antilles as against other parts of America, see id., p. ii6. The proportion of men to
women in New Spain is given (id., p. 138 ; cf. p. 140) as 100 to 95. ^ Sp.Col. Sys., p. 18.
2 According to Humboldt (Essai, I, 135) seven-eighths of the "castas " were mesti-
zos. Moses, pp. 196, 285; Ratzel, Hist, of Mankind, II, 27; Darwin, Variation, etc.,
11, 64 ff. Rut cf. Darwin, Descent, p. 196. ^ Cf. the case in Brazil, p. 164, above.
k
li - 'nM _
SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION AND TRADK 219
of an unfortunate hybrid race.^ Judgment as to the constitutional
quality of This population should be reserved, however, until the
conditions under which it lived and developed have been carefully
scrutinized. It is certainly important to try to appraise the Spanish-
American stock, for there has never existed in historic times any
other such experiment in the mixture of really alien races. The
natural lack of antipathy to such miscegenation exhibited by the
Iberians, combined with the natural and artificial conditions inher-
ent in the physical and climatic environment and in the Spanish
system, all contributed to produce an cxperimentum in extremis.^
It may be asserted in a general way that the parts of the former
Spanish empire which rank to-day with the colonies of pure Euro-
pean race are, above all, the temperate Argentine region, and, in
addition, such other sections of South America as have become
the objectives of German, Italian, and other immigration. No
Spanish section proper, excepting Mexico, can lay claim to a popu-
lation comparable in qualities and efficiency with that of the other
European colonies in temperate regions. Again, the population of
the really tropical colonies of the Spanish can scarcely bear com-
parison with that of India or Java, despite the evident misrule
long practiced in the latter. Any such comparison, however, is
very hazardous, for the multiplicity-of -causes error must be con-
stantly guarded against. In its net results race-mixture plus other
factors seems scarcely to have produced a favorable human type
in Spanish America ; taken at its very best it has not represented
a striking success. Even the French writers who advocate the
policy in their North African colonies are inclined to admit this.
The biological value of a cross is established to some degree
by its fecundity ; and in this respect there is, if one accepts
the statement of B ernard Moses , a marked contrast between the
Spanish-American race and, for example, the crosses between the
closer related stocks of the United States. This student of Spanish
America asserts^ that " at the end of any considerable period, the
increase in the English colony, even when allowance has been made
1 Cf. Colmeiro, II, 391-392 ; Darwin, Orig. of Sp., II, i ff. ; Bordier, Col., pp. 47-
54 ; Le Bon, pp. 52-56.
2 The government favored miscegenation to encompass the fusion of the two
races, thus " avoiding the extinction of the natives which has taken place in the
countries occupied by the other nations of Europe." Fabie, p. 52.
3 Pp. 309-310. Humboldt (Essai, I, 65) shows the slower growth of Mexican
population.
220 COLONIZATION
for different physical conditions, will be found to have far outrun
the increase of the combined Spanish and native populations."
Interrelation of Classes
A marked suspicion and antipathy characterized relations between
the population-constituents named. This was largely due to the pol-
icy of Spain in fostering antagonism which existed in the nature of
things. Naturally the Spanish officials held in contempt the Creoles
and especially the mestizos who formed the industrial element in
the colonies ; the mixed races felt superior to the native or negro
stocks from which they had sprung ; ^ the negroes, rejoicing in
greater physical strength and in the favor of their masters, treated
the Indians with insolence and scorn ; while the latter, in their
unenviable position, hated all their oppressors and insulters in
varying degrees.^ Plainly there was no hope of this caste-system
developing anything approaching a homogeneity of population,
especially under the policy of inculcation of antipathies practiced
by the metropolis. The fact that marriage between the different
degrees of color was considered a incsalliatice naturally prevented
any speedy obliteration of such class distinction.^ Again, the
local Spanish spirit of provincial pride and distinction had invaded
the New World ; " everywhere in Spanish America there existed
the most violent antipathy between the inhabitants of the coast
and those of the mountains, as, for example, Vera Cruz and
Mexico ; the former were accused of being frivolous, the latter
of being slow. Few countries contain in themselves such numer-
ous differences in climate and mode of living as the ticrra calicnte
and ticrra f via in Spanish America, the inhabitants of which despise
each other heartily." The separate colonies too were all so differ-
ent from one another as to have little natural sympathy.'*
1 ^ whites and negroes. The civil position of every class depended mainly and naturally
" upon the greater or less whiteness of their complexion. Todo bianco es cnlhilUro."
*^'< Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 21.
" The different shades were classified with minute attention, not only by the force
of custom but also by the law. When there was only a si.xth of negro or Indian blood
in the veins of a colonist, the law granted him the title of white : que se tcuga por
bianco. Each casta was full of envy for those above and of contempt for those below."
Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 1 1 ; cf. Roscher, pp. 149-151. ^ Watson, II, 132-135.
8 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 20; Colmeiro, II, 291-292. " If the Spanish emigrant
rose in fortune, he would marry into a wealthy creole family ; if he fell, he would
marry into one of the blends." Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 267.
* Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 21 ; cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 11.^
i>>^^
SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION AND TRADE 22 1
Industrial Organization
Having obtained some idea of the constituents of population,
interest now centers upon the way in which the society thus formed
pursued the struggle for existence. As for the Spaniards them-
selves, it has been shown how, at the outset, attempts to develop
agriculture were rendered futile by the overpowering attraction of
the^ite of~a dvenj ure j and to this negative factor a second was
added through the inability of the immigrants to withstand the
climatic and other environmental changes to which they were
subjected. 1 Plantation development in the hands of the whites
alone was practically an impossibility ; it could succeed only through
the aid of better-adapted human organisms. Likewise the old d^s-^
dainjor manuaMabor persisted unbroken — fostered rather by the
New World conditions. During a considerable period, therefore,
the colonies remained dependent upon the metropolis for the very
means of existence, this period coinciding with the impulse to
Spanish industries alluded to above and bringing with its concki-
sion the decline of the same.^
Economic insufificiency, of an at least temporary nature, was an
inevitable consequence of the natural conditions and of the temper
of the invading group. For in the islands the stock conditions of
the tropical colony prevailed, and in those areas where altitude
corrected latitude, attention was turned for long decades almost
exclusively to the mines.^ In the mining-industry, as in most of
their occupations in America, the Spaniards were owners, overseers,
and directors, rather than performers, and the story of the mines,
'clespite the humanity of the laws, is in good part the story of the
oppression and decline of the native races.^ In a general way the
mines were opened and operated by private individuals or groups,
on the condition of paying a fifth of the output to the crown. The
methods were crude, particularly before the application of the
quicksilver process, and wasteful of hfe ; of the output something
is said in another place.^ Great fortunes were undoubtedly gained
1 For the vicissitudes of the early period, see Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 25-26,
34-37, 204-209, 217-218; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 2.
2 P. 182, above. Cf. Colmeiro, II, 255-256, 399-400; Clarke, p. 356; Haebler,
Wirt. BL, pp. 30-32,34-35, 56-59; Amerika, pp. 367-368 ; Cunningham, pp. 518-519;
Hume, pp. 83-85. 3 Cf. p. 12, above.
* See pp. 265 ff., below; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 261-264.
^ Pp. 208 ff., above. The quicksilver process was introduced into Mexico in 1 566, and
into Peru in 1574. Encycl. Brit, sub " Silver, Mexican process." For the introduction
222 COLONIZATION
by individuals, especially since the fifths were notoriously evaded.
The whole atmosphere was that of the fortuitous or aleatory, hazard
replacing rational calculation aimed at the dcxclopmcnt of solid
economic resource ; the whole body of the conquerors and their
immediate successors, overwhelmingly attracted by the prospect,
through a lucky discovery, of sudden wealth, paid but scant atten-
tion to the development of any form of tame industry. In fact,
about the only agricultural resource of the Spanish island-colonies,
before the wider extension of the empire, was the production of
^sugarj__in which they depended almost entirely upon native labor.
The later inclusion of areas where maize, maguey (agave), cacao,
vanilla, cochineal, etc., could be produced, naturally rendered the
settlements less dependent.^ Moving thus from the islands and
the coasts to the plateau -country, they encountered climatic,, topo-
graphical, and other conditions remarkably like those of the home-
land. So far as nature was concerned, there was no reason why a
considerable development of agricultural economy should not have
taken place. But the national character of the Spanish, and the
restrictive policy extended over them, prevented this. Cortes alone
among the conquerors seems not to have been utterly consumed
by the desire for gold.^ It is doubtful if the temperate-zone prod-
ucts would have been much developed in the absence of the native
or mixed elements in the population ; that agriculture was a
distinctly secondary consideration in Spanish minds is proved by
the fact that " the regions which were best adapted to agricultural
colonies, as, for example, Caracas, Guiana, Buenos Ayres, were
neglected by the Spaniards for centuries." ^ It was apparent to
no one that the potato, — of which the first European discoverers
were Pizarro and his band, and which was thus known to Europe
only after 1526, — and the febrifuge quinine, introduced to Europe
by the Jesuits, in 1632, were wortli far more to the world than
Potosi.^ Whatever the purpose of the government,^ the popular
objective was not production but exploitation.
of the amalgamation process into the Potosi region, Humboldt (Essai, I, 624) gives
the date 1571. ^ Haebler, Amerika, p. 399; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 298-299.
2 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 2, note 3.
^ Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 2 ; see pp. 316 ff., below.
* Quinine, as then made, was worth in Europe in 1640 a hundred crowns ($125) a
pound ; during the colonial period it was practically the sole article of export of
Quito. Watson, I, 113, 155.
^ See p. 214, above; cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 216-219, 249-250; Watson, 1, 136.
SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION AND 'I'RADE 223
As a consequence it was not until recourse was had to a levy
upon the vital forces of the conquered, that anything of significance
was accomplished in the way of agricultural production. Then,
despite the ruthless using up of these vital assets in the mines, the
interior mainland, chiefly Mexico, began to exhibit signs of eco-
pomic self-suflficiency and even of affluence.^ But the cultivation
of the ground never received in the early days any such impulse as
it did' in the tropical plantations of other nations ; the fleets carried
away from New Spain and the islands certain amounts of natural
products other than metals, but the development of such a mine
of agricultural wealth as Cuba remained rudimentary until a fatal
breach had been made into the restrictive system by which com-
merce had been tight-bound. ^ In fact, it can hardly be said that
the Spaniards founded any plantation colonies with security in the
'"■sbTEeefit'h and seventeenth centuries. The superior attractiveness
of Mexico and Peru early drained away the Spanish population of
the islands, so that by 1574 the number of the Spanish in the city
of Santo Domingo, for example, was only about 1000, and Havana
harbored only 50. Santiago had fallen from 1000 to 30.^ Colmeiro
says,^ having in mind chiefly tropical production, that the whole
of Spanish America remained sterile in Spanish hands; "in the
middle of the eighteenth century Martinique and Barbados pro-
duced more for France and England than all the islands, provinces,
^Eh gdoms~a nd empires of America for the Spaniards." Allowing
for a considerable degree of exaggeration, and realizing that this
result was due to a number of contributing causes, it is inevitable
that the observer should conclude that for three centuries the
glantation-agriculture of Spanish America was a failure.
Besides agriculture there was one other productive vocation in r"-
the colonies, namely stock-raising. The climate and soil combined ii'<-'*C
to favor this occupation, which was besides more congenial to the
1 See pp. 303 ff., below; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 198-200, 29S-300.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 250 ; cf. p. 299. " Tlie Spanish settlements, despite all
efforts of the government to the contrary, had long remained little more than perma-
nent trading-stations. In barter with the natives the settlers accumulated what objects
of value they could, and, always with native aid, they dug and washed for precious
metals. But no matter how often the government sent seeds and plants over the
ocean, cultivation did not prosper ; for the natives did not understand it, and the
colonists on their part regarded such occupation as beneath them. And because, now,
valuable products of the soil were present only in limited quantity, the barter-trade
was soon exhausted." Ilaebler, Amerika, p. 399. The foregoing has especial refer- ;>
ence to the islands. ^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 197-198. * II, 421.
224
COLONIZATION
restless hidalgo.^ Moreover, the cattle throve in the new environ-
ment, as superior animals naturalized into regions whose fauna offer
little competition are wont to thrive.^ They lived in a half-wild
state ; the horses in particular soon showed a tendency to reversion
from domestication, the visible outcome of which was represented
by the droves of wild horses of the more northern plains. Never-
theless beef was cheap, and considerable exports of hides were
made long before the present stock-breeding areas of the Pampas
were opened.^
It does not appear that the small results attained by agriculture
and stock-raising are referable in any important degree to the
application directly to them of restrictive regulations, mercantile
or other. In fact, it was for the interest of Spain that the colonies
should produce sugar and other tropical products for her, and it
was only such important temperate-zone products as grapes and
olives which were looked upon with disfavor as duplicating those
of the Peninsula. Charles V and Philip II favored even the hide
and raw-wool industry of the New World.'* Indirectly, however,
the restrictions on commerce impinged with force upon all forms
of production. And to these restrictions were added by the consti-
tution of the Spanish system the unfavorable conditions represented
by the extension of ecclesiastical and private estates {ina^razgos),
and by the collection of tithes.^
The case is similar in respect to the manufacturing industries ;
no such direct restriction was intended as that of the English in
North America. Spain had few manufactures for which she sought
either a supply region of raw materials or a demand region for
finished products. Consequently she is found to have favored,
though to little purpose, the development in the colonies of the
mechanic arts, such as spinning and weaving, sugar-refining, and
the like.*' Where restrictions were actually put in force and with
^ Cf. p. 171, above.
2 Darwin, Orig. of Sp., I, loo-ioi, 136 ff., 225; cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 218,
on tiie wild hogs in E.spanola. ^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 200, 298-299.
* Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 42-43; Moses, p. 284; Watson, II, 213. But the
colonies were mainly dependent for their subsistence. Watson, II, 153.
^ See pp. 297 ff., below; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 22; Watson, II, 131-132.
" Colmeiro, II, 395-396; cf. Ro.scher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 42 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 24,
26. The exportation of manufactures to the colonies was subject to absolute prohi-
bition, "in order to start there at once manufactories for silk, cloth and leather-work
which might relieve the mother-country of care for the colonies." Ilaebler, Wirt. HI.,
p. 62 ; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 300.
SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION AND TRADE 225
widely deleterious results, it was for local reasons, and not infrc-
tjuentiy with a view to the protection of the natives ; ^ of the
mercantile system as applied to dependencies but few and vanish-
ing traces occur. When the colonists complain of restrictions, it
is largely those of trade which they have in mind. Nevertheless,
as might be expected, the growth of manufactures was slower even
than that of the other vocations.'-^
In fact, the Spaniards in the New World were, for many decades,
either exploitmg the mines or living in some other sort of unpro-
ductive parasitic relation upon the native population.^ Aside from
the priests, who really pretended to return some equivalent to the
natives, and often did so, the Spaniards and Creoles seem to have
been interested chiefly in squabbling for property, preferment,
offices, or titles, — in floating about on the surface of the economic
currents from which they derived, without return service, such
livelihood as they could. For instance, one traveler stated that
" the whole population of Spanish America was divided into two
classes : those who ruined themselves by law-suits and those who
enriched themselves by the same means." In a population of
3 1 ,000, Caracas had 600 judges, lawyers, and clerks. " There is
no one, white or almost white, who does not desire to be a lawyer,
priest or monk ; those who are unable to give such scope to their
pretensions aim, at least, at being notaries, secretaries, clerks of
church-sacristans, or attaches of some religious community, such
as lay brothers, pupils, or foundlings. Thus the fields lie de-
serted and their fertility arraigns our inactivity. Cultivation of the
soil is despised. Every one wants to be a gentleman or to live in
idleness."^ It was many years before cultivators, industrials, and
merchants gained numbers and a station in society such as secured
for them any consideration in comparison with the adventurers,
clergy, and officials.^
' Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 43 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, p. 24.
2 " Until far into the second half of the sixteenth century no kind of industry
could gain a foothold in the colonies." Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 59.
^ As early as 1508, the colonists, after petitioning the government for other favors
and exemptions from interference, recpiest that the artisans be required to resist the
temptations to secure allotments of Indians, and desert their trades. 15ourne, Sp. in
Amer., pp. 217-218. Thus the very logic of natural conditions may be seen to have
militated against industry.
■* Depons (IT, 63 ff. ; and T, 186) in Roscher, pp. 156-157.
^ Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 4-5.
2 26 COLONIZATION
Trade-Restriction
The markedly non-productive character of Spanish America,
whatever its more general ethnic, economic, and social causes, was
certainly accentuated by the cordon of restrictions imposed upon ex-
change, especially as between the mother-country and the colonies.
In the latter areas there was at first little question of local exchange,
insomuch as they were economically dependent upon Spain for sup-
plies purchasable by the export of treasure and other articles destined
to pass through but few hands. But with the growth of production,
a merchant class, composed mostly of European Spaniards, slowly
arose. It is difficult to discover the relative numbers of this class ;
in Vera Cruz (1574) there were 200 families of Spaniards, all mer-
chants and shopkeepers ; ^ but in the New \Yorld as a whole the
merchants certainly formed but a small minority. They appear,
however, not to have been heavily taxed or oppressed. The alca-
bala was introduced in 1558, but on the low basis of two per cent ;
and although this was later raised,^ it seems never to have produced
any special outcry. A subsequent consideration of the other taxes
levied in America ^ will show that inter-colonial exchange was not
singled out for unreasonable treatment ; indeed it was, strictly
speaking, too insignificant to draw attention except as it suffered
indirectly through its connection with the general exchange between
Spain and America.
To this topic we now turn ; and it is here that we meet the
extraordinary system of restriction which has riveted the atten-
tion of economists from Adam Smith down. In the earliest years
Charles V is found to be, as usual, the exponent of a liberal policy :
under Isabella only Castilians had been allowed to enjoy the fruits
of the new Castilian discoveries ; Ferdinand had extended such
privileges of emigration and trade to Aragon ; but Charles granted
them to all his subjects without distinction of nationality (1526).
In the first decades succeeding the discovery there appear to have
existed the beginnings of a lively trade between Spain and the
colonies ; certainly the period of Spain's prosperity under Charles '^
is referable in no insignificant degree to the stimulus of having to
provide and being allowed to provide the means of comfort and
luxury for adventurers and colonists who had considerable wealth
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 199. ' Pp. 314 ff., below.
2 Ilaebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 118-119. * See p. 182, above.
SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION AND TRADE 227
together with extravagant tastes, and who would not engage in
productive industry. Large exports to America of wines, manu-
factures, and other characteristic products of the Peninsula were
imperatively demanded. Restrictions were removed from agricul-
ture and manufacture, and even beggars and vagabonds were im-
pressed into the factories of Valladolid, Zamora, and Salamanca.^
In 15 18 fear of foreign competition had so far disappeared that the
prohibition of the importation of silk-fabrics was removed. There
was a considerable shifting of occupation toward industry and
trade.^ The result was a rather lively exchange between the
mother-country and the colonies; for example, about 1550 Cadiz
and Seville exported 140,000 centners of wine to America. The
colonial demand exceeded Spain's power of supply, and the com-
petition of foreigners was invited ; Charles V admitted certain
Germans, as has been seen, into the colonial trade. ^
Monopoly Policy
But the course of things at home did not admit of a normal
development from these beginnings.^ " On the whole, it appears
that the large colonial demands for food on the one hand, and the
large supplies of foreign manufactures on the other, prevented
a healthy reaction of commercial on agricultural and industrial
development ; Spain was left exhausted by the feverish activity
which had been temporarily induced, and which passed away." ^
Even during the reign of Charles it was found necessary, in view
of the European situation, to begin the process of restriction, a J'
policy much more in harmony with Spanish prepossessions than
that of freedom ; and under Philip it was developed rapidly and
with general approval. Neither Spaniards nor Portuguese had
ever emerged from the spell of the monopoly system of the Middle
Ages, typically represented by that of Venice. "The colonial
system," says Colmeiro,*^ "was nothing else than the extension of
the common code of Europe to the American dominion. The
economic regime of the ancient world rested upon privilege and
prohibition, and just as the provinces of a single kingdom were
^^rvTded and separated by customs-houses, thus also the colonies
^ Haebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 57, 59; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 287 ; Hume, pp. 83-85.
2 Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 57 ; Colmeiro, II, 255-256.
' Pp. 187, 212, above. Cf. Haebler, Amerika, p. 367 ; Cunningham, p. 518.
* See pp. 204 ff., above. '^ Cunningham, p. 520. '' II, 423.
2 28 COLONIZATION
lived apart from the mother-country, excepting for the bond of a
reciprocal commerce." Jt should be noted, however, that the
Spanish took as a model the Portuguese system rather than the
more remote Venetian ; they were expecting to meet with condi-
tions similar to those encountered by the Portuguese in India :
large cities and prosperous states admitting of an extended trade.
Hence, among other things, the apparatus for the direction of trade
and the preservation of monopoly, and especially the Casa de Con-
tratacioti, or House of Trade, modeled upon the Portuguese Casa_
dc Giiiuif, the forerunner of the Casa da India} To this and other
devices for securing monopoly attention will presently be given ;
but the broad consideration to be borne in mind as the chief factor
leading to restrictions of many kinds is the monopoly policy itself.
This policy has appeared already in the history, commercial and
colonial, of all the anterior peoples who in succession or as rivals
controlled the exchange between the East and West, or, to express
it in its final terms, between the complementary trade-areas of the
tropics and cooler regions. Exclusion of others from such rich
advantages was entirely natural, upon an undeveloped stage of
economic and social progress ; it represents, indeed, an ineradicable
motive of self-seeking in the battle of life as waged by individuals
and groups ; in the minds of most, if not all nations its inferiority
to a more generous and cosmopolitan policy still awaits practical
demonstration. What is peculiar to the Spanish system and its
prototypes is the crude, extreme, and baldly consistent exhibition
of the exclusion-principle rather than that principle itself.
The Seville Monopoly
The expression of the exclusion-principle as respects foreign
nations is reserved for a later page ; ^ it is rather in its application
as between sections of the Spanish dominions that it now engages
our attention. The most obvious example of this is the reservation
of the trade with the Indies, at first (until 1529) exclusively to
Seville, and later to that city and Cadiz. Such a proceeding was
^ Haebler, Amerika, p. 392; cf. p. 66, above. It is a disappointment to tlie author
not to be aljle to furnish at least a brief account of the Portuguese Casa\ but con-
siderable effort expended in the search for materials has failed to yield, as yet, any
results of importance. Inquiries made in the Peninsula by a colleague have been so
fruitless as to suggest that the Casa da Lnfia is a matter of curious interest rather
than of historical importance. - I'p. 242 ff., below.
SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION AND TRADE 229
plainly after the Portuf^uese model, for the India trade of Portu<;al
had been centered at Lisbon. " This preference for Seville came
from the fact that it was the only large place in the kingdom of
Castile that could carry on ocean-commerce and at the same time
had a considerable river trade. Then, again, since the kingdom of
Castile alone had borne the expense and dangers of the_discovery
of America, it wanted to have all the profit of it." ^ Further
reasons for the exceptional status of Seville, less plainly dictated
by a monopoly policy, are to be found. The establishment of the
Casa de Contratacion in 1503, for example, was the outward and
visible embodiment of a policy of strict supervision ; and the need
for such control was found in the estimation and collection of
royal and royally assigned revenue. The discovered lands " were
regarded less as the territorial growth of Spain or Castile than as
an extension of the royal domain of the Castilian kings"; and the .
income transferred by the sovereigns to the great admiral had to
be strictly accounted. It was the natural result, upon a stage
where the machinery of revenue-collection was yet crude, to per-
sist in the mediaeval idea of a "staple-port," and to force all (a
income-producing currents of trade through a "narrows" where
they could be estimated and levied upon. Again, in an age where
piracy was rife, and merchant-ships, sailing upon the ocean at their
own risk, could not yet be differentiated from war-craft, it was in
the nature of national insurance that inspection of vessels, crews,
and passengers should be rigidly enforced ; and it was easier to
control all this, and later the religious character of emigrants,^
from a single ofifice, more highly organized. The weight of motives
other than fiscal is witnessed by the fact that for some time the
trade to the Indies was not taxed. ^
' However, the monopoly idea is implicit in some degree in all
these considerations, as it had been in making Cadiz the staple of
JJie^receding Barbary trade. It was in the spirit of the place and
time. With all his liberal ideas, Charles V, who up to the end of
his reign meditated an assault upon the Seville monopoly ,"* was
yet obliged to decree, " on pain of death and confiscation, that
every Spaniard, embark where he would, must direct his journey
back from America only to Seville ; and soon the journey out was
1 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 32-33; Ixroy-Beaulieu, I, 27. * P. 212, above.
8 Haebler, Amerika, p. 410; Wirt. Kl., pp. 50-51 ; Hume, p. 88.
■» Ilaebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 53.
230 COLONIZATION
permissible only from Seville." The very fact that the starting-
places were not at first designated, although the final return-desti-
nation was, and that " in particular all gold and silver, all pearls
and precious stones could be brought only to Seville,"^ betrays the
early development of the monopoly idea as distinguished from that
of benevolent supervision. Again, when, in 1529, Coruna, Bayona,
Avilcs, Laredo, Bilbao, San Sebastian, Cartagena, and Malaga re-
ceived permission to send out vessels to America, the latter were
obliged to return over Seville,?
The benefits conferred by this monopoly upon the favored city
were all that could have been expected. In 1552 the import-restric-
tions were greatly reduced and Seville became the entrepot of a
stream of trade, artificial though it may have been, whose terminals
were the countries of Europe on the one hand and America on the
other ; the merchants of Seville thus reaped a double gain, acting as
they did as factors for foreigners who were excluded both in person
and in proxy from the colonies. The more Spanish industry declined
the more decidedly did the commercial operations at Seville take on
the character and afford the easy gains of a transit-traffic, " so that
Seville became the richest and most populous city of the monarchy
as well as an inexhaustible treasure-house for the crown. ... At
a time when throughout Spain the decline of trade and industry
gave cause for the most serious complaints, the merchant-popula-
tion of Seville were erecting, in quick succession, truly monumental
edifices." ^ Many a time a single returning fleet brought them
back more than a thousand millions of maravedi's, and " not a few
of their daughters became the ancestresses of newly vivified noble
families which in their traditions harked back to Pelayo." "* But
Cadiz began to put forth rival claims for the American trade as
early as 1550, and after 1680 was plainly preferred by commerce.
The sanding-up of the Guadalquivir, and the greater draught of
vessels, which made it imjiossible for them to pass the bar of San
Lucar, combined to render Seville obsolete. The official change
was delayed only imtil 1717, and brought with it the end of this
city's prosperity. The system of the staple was yet maintained
for about fifty years.^
1 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys.^ p. 32.
2 Colmeiro, II, 402 ; Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 54 ; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 283.
8 Ilaebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 75-76 ; cf. Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 44 ; Clarke, p. 356.
* Ilaebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 69; Colmeiro, II, 401-402.
'' Colmeiro, II, 402, 408; Haebler, Amerika, p. 425 ; Wirt. BL, p. 76.
SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION AND TRADE 231
It is (lilTicult to disengage the effects of one measure of restric-
tion from the whole, but it may be said that the rest of Spain
suff ered fr om the excess of favor and opportunity vouchsafed to
Seville; "naturally this transit-trade of Seville heli)ed on the
decline of Spanish industry by drawing from it, to the advantage
of foreign countries, an important part of its commissions." ^
"The error lay in the persistence with which, after the great dis-
coveries and conquests, . . . the commerce of the New World was
still concentrated in Seville or Cadiz ; in governing the much
according to the rule of the little, and in converting an ephemeral
ordinance into a perpetual privilege. Thus the Indies came to be
the patrimony of a single city of the realm ; and the interior
provinces of Spain, and those which occupied the littoral of the
Cantabrian or Mediterranean, could hardly enjoy the benefits of
trade with America by reason of the re-iraposition of tolls in
transit, of the municipal duties and other taxes, and of the rise in
charges for transportation,^ — all of which made our manufactures
dear and inclined the scales of competition in favor of those of the
foreigners." ^
The Casa de Contratacion
Reserving for a later page '^ the effects upon the colonies of the
single-emporium policy, we now turn to the consideration of other
manifestations of the all-regulating activity of the government. The
general supervision of communications and trade will appear most
plainly, perhaps, in an account of the agency designed to carry
them out : the House or Board of Trade, the Oisa dc Contratacion.
This organization was established at Seville in 1503, and at first
appears to have been designed to look after the trade-interests of
the crown, under the contracts with Columbus ; later it extended
a progressively augmenting control over the whole of the trade
with the colonies, including all correspondence connected therewith.
1 Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 76. '■^ E)i razon de los partes y fletcs.
•^ C'olmeiio, II, 408. "Of the manufactures exported to America, the greater part
(it is said nineteen-twentieths) was made in England, Holland, France, etc., and the
Spaniards themselves, apart from their own illicit trade, had only two kinds of profit
from it. In the first place the national treasury secured the considerable customs
which had to be paid in transit through Spain. Second, the merchants, ship-owners,
etc., gained from the many charges which were added to the price of the goods and
were paid again by the Americans. In order to avoid . . . the customs an immense
partial smuggling was carried on at Cadiz." Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 44.
4 Pp. zy] ff., below.
232 COLONlZA'i'lON
Increasing as it did in authority, it likewise took on judicial and
administrative functions, acting as an adjunct to the Council ot" the
Indies {Conscjo dc Indias), but in such manner that it disposed of
all minor business independently. It was " at once a board of trade,
a commercial court, and a clearing house for the American traffic " ; ^
it " regulated the number of shijjs and the bulk and value of their
freights, received and distributed the precious metals and the
merchandise from the Indies," and kept itself informed regarding
the extension and possibilities of trade. A certain amount even of
instruction was associated with its other activities ; especial atten-
tion was given to nautical subjects and the education of pilots.^
An efficient agent of trade-supervision and extension was thereby
created, and constituted, in the time of Charles V, an object of
envy and emulation even to a Henry VIII. "No ship was per-
mitted to sail from Spain to America, or land from there, until it
had been inspected by the officers of the Casa and had received a
license. Of everything a most careful register was kept." '^ " The
historical significance of the organization known as the Casa de
Contratacion lay in the fact that for a long time it held the key
to the New World" and enabled the Spanish king to apply the
extraordinarily rigid system of commercial restriction which has
drawn invectives from economists of the succeeding centuries.*
The Fleets and Galleons ; the Fairs
But the Casa was only one agency, however imjiortant, in the
general apparatus of regulation, here applied to trade ; it constituted
the sleepless eye of the Seville monopoly, and was later transferred
with the latter to Cadiz. Regulation and cramping restriction did
not, however, begin and end at the Peninsular terminal ; it accom-
panied the vehicles of commerce to the colonies, determining
schedules, routes, destinations, and manner of sailing to and fro,
impressing its characteristic stamp upon markets, methods of ex-
change, and all the other factors and phenomena of trade. During
1 Armstrong, II, 47 ; cf. Ilaebler, Amerika, pp. 391-395, 412 ; for it.s officers and
personnel in general, see Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 222-223 ; for early legislation
concerning it, see Fabie, pp. 42-45, 71-73, 104 ff., etc. Moses (chap, iii) has made a
rather exhaustive study of the Casa.
2 Hume, p. 88 ; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 222; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 32.
3 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 32.
* Moses, p. 50. This author regards the system of restriction as the most rigid ever
framed.
SPANISH AMERICA: POPULATION AND TRADE 233
the earlier years this influence extended but Httle beyond the Euro-
pean terminal ; under a proper license, a vessel might sail when
she willed, and whither. But with the increase in the number
of pirates and their insistence and skill in following the scent of
spoil, need was felt of the mutual protection of association during
voyages. Charles V decreed in 1526^ and Philip II more urgently .
in 1 56 1 j^ that the ships should sail in company. Thus were organ-
ized the famous Jlo fas 2ir\d galeones , companies of merchant vessels
to which, in order to insure complete safety, there were assigned — -;«^
regular convoys of war-vessels.^ The establishment of the fleets, ^r"^
as of other factors in the restrictive system, seems to have been'. ,i^JJjj
almost wholly in the interests of trade ; but this complex of pater- '^-^*-^
Patiiio, who had imitated the policy of England and Holland.^ But '"^ ' "^ '^
the former burden of misrule always rolled back with irresistible
inertia, and in 1762, after carrying everything before them and
capturing Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Tobago, the English
took Havana and treasure to the value of ^15,000,000, an enormous
quantity of arms and stores, and twelve ships of war ; in the same
year Manila surrendered to an English fleet. The one instrument
1 Colmeiro, II, 401 ; Hume, pp. 290—291.
2 Colmeiro, II, 421 ; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 294-295.
^ Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 31 ; cf. p. 251, above.
* Haebler, Amerika, p. 424 ; Hume, p. 277 ; cf. Woodward, pp. 129-130.
5 Hume, pp. 374-380, 395 ; cf. p. 256, below.
2 54 COLONIZATION
possessed by the Spaniards which upheld their monopoly in earlier
times, and after the divine dispensation securing it had lost its
force, was their navy. It has been seen that through most of the
sixteenth century Spain was the first naval power in existence ;
and the union with Portugal, her only serious rival, in 1580, con-
siderably augmented the size of the fleets at her disposal. Besides
policing the New World, she was able to muster J64 vessels, well
equipped and manned, to fight the Turks at Lepanto (1571), and
shortly thereafter 130 sail with 10,000 men on the occasion of fit-
ting out the Invincible Armada. Again, — for the merchant-ma-
rine of those days was much more than a cipher in war-times, —
she had, even under the Catholic Kings, over 1000 merchant-ships.
The contrast, seventy years after the Armada, is sharp : "in 1656
the whole squadron of Spain was reduced to six galleys in poor
repair, the miserable remnant of the sixty which some writers
suppose her to have had in 1535."^ And as for the merchant-
vessels, they were mostly replaced by those of foreign nations.^
This represents a disastrous decline, and an efficiency in the main-
tenance of former advantages diminished almost to nothing.
Decline of the Spanish Sea-Power
Throughout our preceding studies in the field of commerce and
colonization, that metropolis seems to have held the center of the
stage which possessed the most efficient, if not the largest, marine.
Cases still to be cited demonstrate the same fact, that commercial
and colonial empire go with the prevailing sea-power. It is some-
times difficult in a limited field to judge which one — the empire
or the navy — was the factor that called forth the other as a
result : whether, to put it in a more modern form, trade followed
the flag, or the flag trade. However, there is no question, given a
colonial empire founded, as most of them have been, upon trade and
across the sea, that under conditions of competition a strong navy
is all but indispensable for its preservation. It is no wonder, then,
that Spain could not defend or hold her colonies, even though Span-
ish America was geographically isolated and approachable through
a few points only.
1 Colmeiro, II, 465-467 ; Ilaebler, Wirt. Bl., pp. 56-57, 8r.
2 Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 85; Colmeiro, II, 440, 471 ; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp.
43-44-
SPANISH AMERICA: FOREIGNERS AND NATIVES 255
The decline of the much-needed navy is but another phase of
the disastrous destiny which fell upon Spain in consequence, of
conditions and policies detailed above. The deterioration of the
merchant-marine, and of the navy as well, scarcely needs explana-
tion after the restrictive policy is fully apprehended : " in general
the causes for the decadence of Spain in the seventeenth century
also hold good for her retrogression in navigation, for without agri-
culture or fiqurishing. manufactures no commerce is possible, and
without commerce there is nojnerchant marine or navy." ^ " The (
lack of competition condemned this marine to immobility : it made
no progress and was in the eighteenth century what it had been in
the sixteenth." ^ These quotations give the core of the matter, but
some attention may be called to a f^w selected details of unwise
policy and stubborn conservatism. Naturally the regime of taxa-
tion and of minute and suspicious regulation smote the Spanish
ship-builder and seaman as they did the rest of the useful members
of society ; ^ but assuming all this, which was general and need not
be repeated, it is to the special system of restriction represented
by the fleets and galleons that attention is now directed. First of
all, as respects the merchant-shipping, the size of the fleet was
limited ; it needed not to be large, for there was not much product
of Spanish industry to take, and foreign goods were, on principle,
anathema ; again, the return cargo made demands that were no
greater. But few ships were needed, and if there had not been
some evasion of the system, still fewer would have been called for
even by the trade of a hemisphere. Thirty for the year was a fair
average ; and as almost all of the other trade possible for Spaniards
was discouraged, it is no wonder that presently less than half of
the ships in Spanish harbors were Spanish, and that there was
scarcely any Spanish merchant-marine left outside of the fleets."*
Under the system quality was called for with about as little
urgency as number. As all the ships had to go together, the pace
was that of the slowest ; all were armed to a greater or less degree
and lumbered heavily, like floating castles, upon their way. The
naval escort of the fleets consisted normally of nine galleons and
eight frigates, manned by 1 500 persons, of whom 950 were marines;"
1 Colmeiro, II, 470 ; cf. pp. 468-469.
2 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 36. ^ Cf. Colmeiro, II, 468, 470-471.
■* Haebler, Wirt. Bl., p. 85. For a general treatment of the Spanish shipping, see
Lindsay, I, 554-620. ^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 286-287.
256 COLONIZATION
and the average length of the voyage for the whole aggregation,
from Spain to Mexico, was over ten weeks for the estimated 6500
miles. ^ The small demands of the system, and the early security
of the monopoly, allowed the persistence of obsolescent models,
both of merchant and war vessels. Great transformations had
indeed taken place since Columbus set out with a flagship of at
most 280 tons and two only partially decked tenders of certainly
less than 150 and 100 tons; but the changes were more striking
to the eye than profitable for the type. Like the Portuguese
carracks, the galleons imposed at first by their very size and
unwieldy bulk, and for decades there appeared to the backward
and unpractical Spanish no need, present or prospective, of change.
Even the arts of seamanship, at first so great a care to the Casa de
Contratacion,'^ were suffered to become antiquated. The whole
decline of the navy, which had been rapidly retrograding under
cover of an inflated reputation, became evident with the destruction
of the Invincible Armada ; for here the question as to the best
adapted type of vessel and of naval tactics was settled, for that
stage of history, once and for all. It is not necessary to go into
detail respecting the defeat of the Armada, for the story has been
often and eloquently told, but it may be said, in a word, that the
Spanish vessels were out-sailed, out-maneuvered, out-generaled ;
for one light blow received many severe ones, and were finally
destroyed or forced into a long and disastrous homeward journey
around Scotland. Much even of their ill-fortune harked back to
the incompetence fostered by the system of the recluse who sent
them.^ By the time of the last Austrian king the sovereign had
no ships to protect trade any more than his subjects had them to
trade with ; merchants lost courage and ceased to struggle, for
their ships disappeared into the hands of foreigners and trade was
destroyed almost as thoroughly as agriculture and industry had
been.'* In the eighteenth century some attempt was made to revive
the merchant-marine by imitating the English Navigation Acts,
but the whole situation was so bad as to admit of little alleviation.'^
' Colmeiro, II, 470 ff. ; I.eroy-Beaulieu, I, 36. "The voyage from Panama to
Lima [1500 miles] usually took two months, and if continued to Chile, two more.
This was partly owing to head winds and adverse currents, for the return voyage
could be accomplished in less than half the time." Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 288. On
the crossing of the Pacific, see p. 348, below, and refs.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 222-223. ^ q{ Woodward, pp. 29,61 ; ]). 1S4, above.
* Hume, pp. 271, 304-305. '' Cf. Colmeiro, II, 471-472.
SPANISH AMERICA: FOREIGNERS AND NATIVES 257
THE CONTACT OF RACES
When Roscher says * that the Spanish colonies were originally
pure conquest-colonies, he has in mind, as his following treatment
demonstrates, chiefly the phenomena of the contact of races. This
is the topic which is now to engage our attention for a considerable
space ; for this contact of races called forth what are in many
respects the most characteristic phases of the Spanish colonial
system ; ^ and its outcome, for better or worse, has determined the
destiny, at least for centuries to come, of a large section of the
human race.
When the Spanish arrived, even in their relatively insignificant
numbers, in America, they started the first case in history of the
permanejiL-CDatact of two races widely separated in civilization,
this contact taking place within the habitat of the lower race. The
Mediterranean colonizers had never encountered this eventuality ;
and the Portuguese did not locate in India, Africa, or the Malay
region in sufficient numbers to create the conditions of real race-
contact. In India, indeed, they met a race in many ways their
superior in civilization. But the Spaniards found an ethnic strain,
whatever its origin, which was new to the civilized world ; and they
lived beside it, molded its life, and intermingled with it for many
years and decades. To it they applied, instinctively or with con-
scientious consistency, a policy or lack of policy which was the out-
come of their own separate Aryan, European, and local history. It
may be said, in partial anticipation, that the case was analogous in
the Philippines. 3 So that we have in the Spanish colonies, if we
care so to view the situation, the first historical meeting, upon a
scale that deserves the name, of two of the great varieties or sub-
species of the genus Homo.
1 P. 133-
2 The most noteworthy brief account of the Indian policy of Spain is from the
hand of the veteran authority, Henry C. Lea. It offers corroborative evidence for the
argument of this chapter and'oppose5""^t115^ittempts at exculpation which have been
fashionable of late years." The narrative is built about the biography of Las Casas,
to whose testimony a just amount of weight is given. Dr. Lea begins and ends his
article with practically the same statement : the Spanish relations with the Indians
show the essential mildness and good will of the powers at Madrid, but they likewise
form an example of " how the kindly intentions of governments, expres.sed in benefi-
cent legislation, may be rendered nugatory when administration is intrusted to un-
"w'uithy IkiiuIs or when sufficient influence is brought to bear by those who profit from
abuses." 8 See pp. 347 ff., below.
U,JjL (^^
\M ""^ "
f\r^,\^\'\
258 COLONIZATION
The Conflict of the Economic Need and the Religious
Motive
The Spaniards started out, naturally enough, with no conception
of the real state of the case : they expected to encounter a numer-
ous and highly cultured Oriental population, with whom they could
trade advantageously, taking to themselves all the gains formerly
reaped by the Arab, Turk, and Venetian middle-man ; and likewise
to find the old enemy, Islam, with which they were prepared to
try issue. IrTofher words, while conquest was in mind, it was not
exactly the kind of subjugation later carried out ; and if religious
aims were cherished, they were directed upon the old lines of
crusade rather than upon that of such conversion of primitive
heathen as Prince Henry had projected for non-Mohammedan
Africa. There was need, therefore, of a considerable readjustment
of views and intents when the truth began to dawn upon the minds
of sovereigns and people. The first natives encountered by Colum-
bus, and exhibited through specimens in Spain, were a curiosity.
Though called " Indios," they were regarded as outlying Oriental
tribes, as the natives of islands off the coast of the Grand Khan ;
there were no especial designs upon them, but rather sympathy for
them, and pity, and the pious desire to insure them the hopes of a
Catholic heaven.^ The designs were on the more remote and cul-
tured states and their trade, and had no gold appeared in Espanola
this attitude might have persisted longer. Certainly one of the
most impolitic things Columbus ever did was to send these wards
of the Church home as slaves.^ The queen could not support this
policy, modeled as it was upon that of the Portuguese ; and even
in her will, as if foreseeing what was to come, she recommended
with especial earnestness the protection of the natives against the
greed of their conquerors.'^ The key to the queen's attitude lay
in her strong religious nature, wherein material advantages weighed
but little when their attainment was conceived to be detrimental
to the extension of the faith.'* Had the discoverers encountered
^ The following provision (1503) may serve as an example of paternalism: the
governor was to order that the Indians "nose baiian con tanta frequencia como
solian, porque los Reyes eran informados de que eso les haci'a mucho dafio." Fabie,
p. 52. 2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 50-51 ; Zimmermann, I, 232, note.
3 Haebler, Amerika, pp. 395-396.
* Cf. the instructions of Columbus, the very first of which read : " Que procure la
conversion de los Indios a la fe." Fabie, p. 18; Zimmermann, I, 232 ; cf. Bourne,
Sp. in .\mriL's ;
it was nearer to Spain, and so more easily controllable. Humboldt
compares it, to its great advantage, with Peru, in respect of the
treatment of the natives. He states, however, that the numbers in
the region of the city of Mexico were, in his time, only a third of
the old population, and that the condition of the Mexican cultiva-
tors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was very pitiable.
Better treatment and a consequent increase in population came only
in the eighteenth century, and especially in its latter half under the
administration of Charles III and Galvez. Humboldt's optimistic
opinions refer almost wholly to contemporary conditions; in 1793
the total population, he thinks, was fully 5,200,000, and in 1803,
5,800,000 ; and these numbers he regards as above those of the
pre-Spanish period.^ Endeavoring to get actual figures for native
population, one finds that for 1570 Velasco ^ gives to New Spain
(i.e. the archbishoprics of Mexico, Tlaxcala, Guaxaca, and Mechoa-
can) 691,000 Indian tributaries, or about 3,000,000 persons. Two
hundred and twenty-three years later (1793) Humboldt* takes the
Indian population to exceed 2,500,000, exclusive of half-breeds,
remarking that it has increased considerably in fifty years. ^ What
it was before the time of Charles HI we are left to infer.
1 Humboldt, Essai, 1,112-113; cf. Zimmermann, I, 371-372. The figures of the
latter author, since, in the absence of references, they could not be checked, and since
considerable carelessness or credulity appears in his work, have been, for the most
part, neglected. Those given in the preceding reference, hov^-ever, have been found,
by chance, to be nearly correct in so far as they refer to the end of the eighteenth
century. Hence the following data are added for what they may be worth. Zimmer-
mann says (I, 370) that in 1573 there were 11,199 laborers for the Potosi mines, but
that in 1673, although the same regulations were in force, there were only 1674 ; that
encomiendas of 1000 grown men were reduced in a century to 100.
2 Essai, I, 56, 57, 65, 73, 194; cf. Colmeiro, II, 387, note.
3 Pp. 182, 187, 207, 227, 240. * Essai, I, 76.
•^ Humboldt's estimates allow for errors of under-enumeration where Velasco's do
not. If the Indians form, as Humboldt says (I, 76), two-fifths of the total population,
and the uncorrected whole is 4,483,529 (I, 57), the number of Indians would be, un-
corrected, less than 2,000,000. As for the concealment in returns, to cover which he
adds one-sixth or one-seventh, he remarks (I, 58) : " Dans le nouveau continent,
SPANISH AMERICA: FOREIGNERS AND NATIVES 269
Conditions elsewhere on the mainland are more difficult to deter-
mine and are not of special importance.^ It is clear enough from
the above that depopulation took place with great rapidity pre-
ceding the thorough establishment of control, and especially in
those regions (of plantations and mines) where a labor force was
in imperative demand.
Causes of Depopulation
When, now, the attempt is made to determine, with some approxi-
mation, what part of so disastrous a result was due to the Spanish
system, it is necessary first of all to clear the ground by recogniz-
ing and then excluding certain general factors, ethnological and
other, and their probable consequences. The phenomenon of the
declme of a native race in contact with one more highly civilized is
not, as has been previously shown,^ an exceptional occurrence dur-
_ing the last four centuries. It occurs, indeed, in spite of policies of
a benevolent character which have actually been put into execu-
tion. Under such conditions, decline seems to be owing to nothing
tangible and remediable, but to the inevitable workings of biologic
and other laws the action of which is generally very obscure, but
which is clearly set into operation by more or less evident or sub-
tle changes in environmental conditions. The introduction of the
micro -organisms of disease, for example, among peoples never
rendered even slightly immune through the action of natural
selection ; the introduction of strong alcoholic drinks, or of drugs,
among tribes whose intoxicants were weak in their alcoholic con-
tent or whose narcotics or stimulants were mild, — these are re-
sults of contact which have been responsible for much mortality
and degradation among native peoples. And there is a further con-
sequence of contact which is all the more determinative because it
occurs unconsciously and as a necessary function of the diversity
of the culture of the races thus brought together. The travelers
report the natives, though not directly ill-treated, and even though
favored, as dying of homesickness, or nostalgia^ as it has been
comme dans I'ancien, le peuple considere tout denombrement comme le presage
sinistre d'une operation de finances." For birth-rates, etc., in Mexico, cf. I, 6[ ff. ;
for the easy conditions in the mines, II, book iv, chap. xi.
1 Since Velasco (p. 2) assigns 1,500,000 Indian tributaries to all Spanish America,
and 6So,ooo plus 691,000 to Peru and New Spain, there remain only some 130,000 for
the other districts, of whom there were some 80,000 to 90,000 in Chile (p. 514; cf. p. 551).
2 Pp. 5 ff., above.
270 COLONIZATION
called. What this means, however, is not that they have been
removed from their habitat, but that gradually their enviro nme nt
jias been so altered that they are no longer adapted to it, or feel
at home in it : a hunting-tribe is surrounded by cattle-ranges or
farms, for example, and subjected to the civilized institution of
private property in land. Now it is a well-recognized biological
fact that alteration of environment is likely to find one of its first
visible effects in derangements of the reproductive system ; ^ and
whether or not this be true of man in the case of a change such as
the one under consideration, there certainly is involved a thorough
alteration of the conditions under which the struggle for existence
is pursued, and this cannot fail ultimately, in event of the usual
inability of the native to rise at once to a much more evolved
stage of the arts, to have its effect upon numbers and strength of
the population.
Considering these more general points, now, in their relation
to the Spanish-American contact, it is possible to assign great
mortality to the introduction of diseases, especially the eruptive
diseases, the chief of which was small-pox. In 15 18 the natives
died from this disease "like sheep with the distemper"; it ap-
peared in Mexico at the outset of the conquest and swept off in
some provinces half the population, seeming to be particularly fatal
to women. Again, the Indians always suffered severely from the
inferior eruptiv^e diseases such as measles, for they possessed no
knowledge of the means of treatment, but usually employed the
steam-bath and cold plunge for all illnesses indiscriminately. The
same may be said of diseases of the respiratory system ; other
epidemics also, including finally yellow fever, resulted from the
presence of the Europeans in the local environment. And the
famines consequent to conquest, besides bringing their own special
and perhaps unavoidable mortality, simply enforced the ravages of
disease.^ It is, however, perfectly evident that maladies could not
have produced the extreme and continuous depopulation to which
reference has been made ; such c|uantitative injuries to population
are speedily made up, if the life-conditions are otherwise favorable.^
Diseases have occurred in colonies of other nations, and in the
later history of the Spanish colonies, but without such extended
1 Cf. Darwin, Descent, pp. iS5ff.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 212-213; Colmeiro, II, 387-388; Haebler, Amerika,
P- 397! Watson, I, 219; II, 127. 3 cf p jgg^ above.
SPANISH AMERICA: FOREIGNERS AND NATIVES 271
consequences. Nor could the innocent or willful introduction of
alcoholic poison have played any considerable role in Spanish
America ; for the Spaniards were peculiarly temperate, even in the
use of their own light wines, and could not have introduced in very
considerable quantities the consuming " hre-water " which demoral-
ized the more ncnlhcrn tribes. Again, the change of environment
brought about unconsciously by the encroachment of the bearers
of a new regime of civilization, by the steady transformation of the
region into one of a higher industrial economy, could not have
occurred, in any generality, the immigrants being what they were
in numbers and character, in Spanish America. The ca uses of
depopulation must have _been , ffiore.jQ£a.Land direct than tho se
which have been cited.
In fact^The comm.on explanations of this phenomenon are based
upon- such local considerations. The savagery of the conquests and
raids ; resulting famines ; ^ heavy taxes ; tFe greed for immediate
gain which did not scruple at overloading the natives with hard
and unaccustomed labor, and even impossible tasks, while stinting
them regularly in their food ; the imposition of similar labor in
particular upon women and children ; the separation of families ;
the transference of plain-dwellers to the mountains,^ — these are
causes not necessarily inherent in race-contact, but which easily
explain a great mortality and race-decline. It is also clear that the
effects of the actual wars of conquest and their train of woes may
be eliminated from consideration as enduring factors of depopula-
tion ; their effects could not have been so persistent. What is left
are the divers manifestations of selfish greed in the exploitation,
particularly in plantation and mine (hence chiefly in the islands, in
Mexico and Peru), of a practically defenseless subject race. What-
ever the legislation, this was the fact.^ The very actions of the
natives reveal the state of the case : they fled to inaccessible
places, and there died or dragged out a miserable existence ; they
renounced cultivation at the risk of starvation, if only they might
1 Haebler, Amerika, p. 398; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 211.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp.212, 214; Haebler, Amerika, p. 367 ; Watson, II,
126-127, 131 ; cf. Letourneau, Commerce, p. 214.
8 Colmeiro (II, 400) inveighs especially against the system of allotments of mer-
chandise made by the officials for the Indian families. The latter were obliged to
receive goods in quantities and at a high price, and, not being able to pay at once,
they were drawn into an oppressive debt-relation which hampered all progress and
filled the breasts of the natives with hatred "against the metropolis, and against the
infamous alliance of commerce and justice."
2 72 COLONIZATION
injure the Spaniards ; they destroyed themselves in numbers ; in
their misery and despondency they even reduced an already de-
clining birth-rate by renunciation of procreation or by infanticide.^
It does not seem just to charge these truly pitiable results, without
qualification, to the monopoly-system ; ^ had such destruction per-
sisted through centuries and throughout the colonial world, such
an explanation would have been rendered more apposite, for the
monopoly-idea, as has been seen, was universally in evidence. But
the haste in getting wealth, and especially metallic treasure, was
more generally determinative of the character of the early race-
contact than any defined system could be ; and this it was which
motived irrational oppression. No doubt the frame of mind which
found institutional expression in the system was bound, given con-
ditions of contact with a subject race, to pursue such an advantage
in the competition of life with thorough and consistent unscFupu-
lousness ; but it is difficult to see any direct causal connection
between the upholding of a monopoly in favor of Seville, or the
fleets, or Vera Cruz, or Spain as a whole, and the wantonness of
the destruction of the Indians at the hands of the rude adventurers
who constituted the vanguard of the Spanish in America.
Protective Legislation
Indeed, as a system of any kind became more workable, the
figures given indicate that the decline of the native population was
retarded rather than accelerated ; the instances of extreme depopu-
lation were confined in the main to the opening, or least-controlled,
periods in the history of the colonies.'^ Where there was intelligence
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 43, 210-21 1 ; Ilaebler, Amerika, p. 397 ; Peschel, Races,
p. 151; Watson, II, 126. They were quite willing to take their chances elsewhere than
in heaven if, as they were informed, the Spaniards were to frequent the latter place.
- " The rnost^ p^robable cause of the diminution of the Indians is the oppression
itself of the colonial system," which limited the progress of agriculture, hindered the
establishment of factories and looms, rendered commerce sluggish, and, in fine,
choked up all the springs of public wealth in order to perpetuate an alisurd and
ruinous monopoly. Without adequate means of subsistence, the population not only
couM not increase but could not maintain itself on the old level. The ill treatment
of the Indians and the unseasonable wars with the barbarous tribes are simply con-
comitants of the mail! trend of events." Colmeiro, II, 388.
3 The true sign of real and permanent increase in population, says llunilioldt
(Essai, I, 64 ; cf. p. 102 ; Velasco, p. 26), is the increase of means of subsistence. This
was evidently taking place at the end of the eighteenth century. Preceding conditions
can be inferred from the foregoing description of the industrial organization in
Spanish America.
SPANISH AMERICA: FOREIGNERS AND NATIVES 273
and a strong hand, such oppression of the natives was much less
pronounced. In Mexico, for example, the desire of Cortes, which
was that of the crown, was to avoid such wasting oTThe popula-
tion as had taken place in the islands ; the encomienda system was
limited to four generations, after which the encomiendas would
revert to the crown. The tribute demanded was not to be more
thanthat which was supported under Aztec rule.^ Not a few other
regulations were carried into effect to the betterment of the natives'
lot. But that the encomienda system, however modified by the
many edicts incorporated in the Recopilacioit^ effected anything
approaching eradication of evils may be seriously doubted. The
whole economic and social conjuncture was against control of the
Indian question : the colonists neede d a labo r force in order to
realize their purposes of exploitation, and it was unthinkable that
men of their stamp should not utilize the one at hand, and the
more ruthlessly as it was cheap and helpless. Under the facilities
of communication of the day, especially as abridged for an enor-
mous empire with a thin and scattered population by the Spanish
system of isolation, there could be little respect for a distant, poorly
informed,^ and slowly operating control. Add the inefficiency and
vacillation of the Spanish authorities, and the picture of incompe-
tence to carry legislation into effect is nearly complete. Finally,
the very representatives of metropolitan control, the governors and
viceroys, were largely imbued or soon infected by the spirit of their
subordinates and outdid them in their own line ; or were weak and
inefficient, and over-ridden or intimidated even when their inten-
tions were good. The difficulties of even the able, determined,
and conscientious representative of the crown will presently ap-
pear, as well as the benefits assured to the natives by his occasional
interposition. The rapid succession of the viceroys and governors
rendered the development of any consistent policy all but im-
possible.
In fact, it was, in good part, " the persons, not the laws, which
nourished the propensity for war and conquest ; so that whether a
governor was clever and prudent or stupid and impetuous deter-
mined the good or ill treatment of the Indians. In the city of
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 256; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 12; Zimmermann, I, 300 ff.
Elsewhere the encomieiida-tenure became in some cases even shorter.
2 Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias, a collection of legislation
made in 1681. Colmeiro, II, 382-383. ^ cf. p. -jq^, below.
74
COLONIZATION
Mexico, for example, several years after pacification and subjection
to our rule, the greater part of the Indians had learned nearly all
the vocations of Castile, and were accomplished silver-smiths,
lapidaries, painters and intaglio-makers, knew how to read and
write, wove textiles of silk and wool, made hats, and bettered the
cultivation of the fields. Others enjoyed exorbitant privileges and
scarcely recognized vassalage to the crown ; but all lived at the
mercy of the encomenderos who held them in the status of slaves,
or of the alcaldes ^ who tyrannized over them, making them work
for them and appropriating the fruits of their labors. In a word,
inasmuch as the laws and royal decrees broke down with distance
from the metropolis to the colonies, the condition of the Indians
was bound to be, and was in reality, very precarious." ^
This is the key to the whole matter of Indian administration.
The native laws were exceptionally humane, among those of all
history ; alone among modern nations Spain " tried to put into
practice in her relations with conquered peoples the precepts of
humanity, justice, and religion." ^ But they could not be enforced
with any regularity. " Whilst excellent laws and regulations for the
well-being and proper treatment of the natives of America were
constantly being enacted in Spain, we nowhere read of wholesome
examples being made of the wrong-doers, who treated these laws
as a dead letter. Even the laws and regulations, good and well-
meant as they were, were not the result of the reaction of public
opinion against the ill treatment of the Indians, but were brought
about by a few humane ecclesiastics who had been helpless eye-
witnesses of the atrocities." ^ The laws were often merely protests ;
their recurring injunctions arc to be taken in general, especially in
their repetition,'^ rather as registered criticisms of an anterior state
of affairs than as really effective measures of future control which
can be assumed to have been carried out. The " Protector of
the Indians," even when he was a Las Casas, was almost power-
less. " In practice the treatment of the Indians was by no means
always in accord with the beneficent purpose of t^e laws." *^
1 Local judges with some executive powers; cf. German Kichtcr.
2 Colmeiro, II, 3S5-386; cf. Koscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 9; Moses, p. 96.
8 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 11. * Watson, I, 70.
^ "The laws upon this point [i.e. the duties of the encomendero] are explicit, but
were the customs in conformity with the laws .-'... These laws are so often repeated,
the same prescriptions return so frequently with so few years' interval, that one may well
ask himself whether they were not perpetually violated. Great abuses must have taken
place." Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 13. ^ Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 9; cf. Watson, II, 135-136.
SPANISH AMERICA: FOREIGNERS AND NATIVES 275
Las Casas : the New Laws
What has been said is perhaps enough to indicate that Spanish
Indian legislation was scrupulous fr(>j]i-_Lh£..earliest time. Slavery
was limited and finally abolished in 1530; the tributes were made
more reasonable and protectors of the Indians appointed; the
encomenderos were required to protect, educate, civilize, and
convert their charges ; and their conduct was carefully prescribed,
even to the point of requiring their speedy marriage, restraining
their presence in the Indian villages, prohibiting absenteeism, and
so on.^ Although regulation necessarily proceeded in a tentative
way, striking at abuses as they cropped up, there was already, by
the end of the first fifty years after the discovery, a considerable
body of Indian laws.^ It was at this time, however, that the famous
attack of Las Casas ^ upon the native policy was delivered to
Charles V. If one credited its utterances to the full, as they were
credited at the time and for many decades after, there is nothing
left to say except that the enforcement of benevolent legislation had
been thus far totally impotent. It is impossible here to dwell upon
the life and work of Las Casas, but it is perfectly evident to one who
runs that his arraignment reveals the feverish and neurotic tone of
the reformer possessed of a fixed idea ; of the forerunner of calmer
and more constructive men — one whose destiny seems to be to evoke
popular enthusiasm or rage by which the latter may profit. Of a con-
sequence his statements call for considerable correction for error."^
Nevertheless there is, in his work, enough concrete evidence
that can scarcely be false, even though it is selected, to demon-
strate that the laws had been of comparatively slight effect. And
that the more elementary and fundamental of these statutes had
been consistently set aside is made conspicuously evident by the
resistance encountered in their enforcement when reembodied in
the so-called "New Laws" of 1542. The emperor had allowed
Las Casas, who hacTbBen sent out 'by Ximencs as early as 15 16 as
Protector of the Indians, an almost free hand ; and the latter had
incorporated and reaffirmed in his new code all the most stringent,
' Colmeiro, II, 382-383 ; Boume, Sp. in Amer., pp. 259-260 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 13.
2 Fabie's Ensayo covers the legislation of this period.
^ Brevissima Relacion de la Destruycion de las Indias ; a " voluminous plea " pre-
pared for presentation in 1540, and published in 1552. Cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 257.
* Cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 257, where the author denominates Las Casas the
" Lloyd GaiTison of Indian Kiyhts"; Watson, I, 75<
276 COLONIZATION
because the most axiomatic, of the preceding legislation, garnished,
of course, with certain favored measures of his own. The New
Laws, for example, absolutely re-prohibited the enslavement of
the Indians ; all slaves whose masters could not prove a just title
were to be liberated. They also attacked the semi-slavery of the
encomiendas, for it was really from personal dissatisfaction with
his own role as an encomendero that Las Casas set out. " Encomi-
endas belonging to officials, churchmen, and charitable institutions
were to be given up ; encomenderos who had abused their Indians
were to forfeit their holdings ; no new encomiendas were to be
granted, and existing ones were to lapse on the death of the
holder." ^ In short, the laws were aimed squarely against the
exploitation of the man-resources of the New World. The details,
given this attitude, were negligible ;. it was precisely upon this
main contention that the issue between the legislator and the
colonist was joined. The colonist was confronted by the dilemma
of working himself, which he could not or would not do, or resist-
ing the removal of the only means he had for realizing anything
for his past enterprise, services, or toadyism. Even if the freed
natives would work for wages, which, and with considerable reason,
he doubted, yet he rebelled against paying for what had been done
so much more simply by the old system. Consequently the New
Laws were received with deep hostility by the colonists. In Mexico
they were incapable of enforcement, especially as concerned the
limitation of the encomiendas ; " that the attempt . . . did not
lead to bloodshed in a popular uprising in Mexico was in large
measure due to the wise discretion of the viceroy, Mendoza," who
deferred the execution of the laws. Attempts at enforcement, nine
years later, encountered as undiminished opposition. Even the
ecclesiastics were, with rare exception, "in favor of continuing
the encomiendas, and opposed to the liberation of the Indians."^
The laws were published in Mexico, March 24, 1544, and Charles V
granted the desired revocation October 20, 1545.^ Their application
was delayed, especially in Peru ; trouble was seen to be imminent
in that newer and more turbulent province, and in 1542 it was
resolved to appoint a viceroy and a royal audiencia, through whom
the new legislation might be carried into effect. In spite of the
^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 255; Moses, p. loi. 2 Moses, pp. 101-104.
^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 255. The crown hud tried already (1523) to forliid the
granting of repartimientos in Mexico, and to revoke those already granted, hut the
order had to be withdrawn. Moses, p. 95.
SPANISH AMERICA: FOREIGNERS AND NATIVES 277
resistance, shortly before, to the attempts of Vaca de Castro to
Hmit the re[)artiniientos, it was probably not foreseen by the govern-
ment that tlie i)r()jectecl laws struck at the very foundation of the
colonial society. But " the Spanish settlers in Peru, with remark-
able unanimity, felt that the enforcement of these laws would
deprive them of whatever material advantages and prospects they
possessed " ; and they lent the more attention to the projects of
Gonzalo Pizarro.^ The task of crushing this incipient rebellion and
of introducing the New Laws was intrusted to a tactless man, De
Vela, whose attempt at execution of the latter speedily led to armed
collision and his death. Pizarro thus gained control of the whole
of Peru. This remarkable manner in which Pedro_cle_.la Gasca
restored allegiance to the crown (i 546-1 548) does not pertain to
the present subject, but it is sufficient to say that he disposed of
Pizarro and gained a perfectly free hand. Yet even he did not see
his way clear to the enforcement of the prohibition of personal
service, for this measure, above all else, had been the cause of the
rebellion. He was forced to compromise and managed to leave
the condition of the Indians "on as good a footing as colonial exi-
gencies might admit of." To a man of any perception, as soon as
he had arrived on the scene, the impossibility of carrying out the
Laws to the letter became immediately self-evident. The rougher
type of the frontier would not endure the diminution of what they
conceiv^ed to be meager payment for great and admittedly arduous
services ; " and more than one governor, in the effort to enforce
respect for the laws touching the encomiendas, was thrust aside by
his decivilized contemporaries." ^
Effectiveness of Governmental Control
That the New Laws did not shatter the encomienda system, as
was designed by Las Casas at least, is evidenced by the fact that
in 1574 , out of 160,000 Spaniards in the New World, 4000 were
1 See p. 304, below.
2 Watson, I, 172, 175, 206; Haebler, Amerika, p. 397 ; Moses, pp. 102, 122 ff.
" The crown had ... to adopt some other policy than uncompromising coercion, or
run the risk of losing Peru completely." Moses, p. 126. Naturally enough, the prete.vt
of humanitarianism and religion was employed in justifying the repartimientos. As it
was " evident that the colonists could not support themselves without the services
of the Indians, the ecclesiastics and the leaders of the expedition [Pizarro's] all
agreed that a repartimiento of the natives would serve the cause of religion, and
tend greatly to their spiritual welfare, since they would thus have the opportunity of
being initiated in the true faith." Moses, p. 115.
i
278 COLONIZATION
reckoned to be encomenderos. The Indians were divided into 3700
repartimientos belonging to the king or private persons. In the
bishopric of Tlaxcala there were 200 Indian villages containing
215,000 tributaries divided into 127 repartimientos. Of these, 61
belonged to the crown and 66 to private encomenderos. In Yu-
catan there were 300 householders, of whom 130 were encomen-
deros. In Lima, of 2000 Spanish families, 30 held encomiendas ;
the Indians of the district, 25,000 or 26,000 in number, were
divided into 136 repartimientos, of which six were royal. ^ But
while the argument thus far tends to demonstrate the ineffective-
ness of the earlier laws, and while their repetition after the middle
of the sixteenth century implies that enforcement still remained
lax in many places and times, it is not meant to assert that they
were of no avail. The Spanish government never gave up, nor did
the clergy ; and after the empire was brought into a more settled
order, this persistence had its effects. What retarded the process
was, on the one hand, theideleterious effect of the monopoly-appa-
ratus, which set back the development of such ease and frequency
of communication as would have enabled the metropolis to over-
come, among other disadvantages, its remoteness from its scattered
provinces ; and on the other^ the character and personnel of the
local administration, to which attention will presently turn.^
The government did not cease to scrutinize and attempt to con-
trol the encomenderos. It was not in the character of Philip II, at
least, to stay his hand in a matter of regulation which appealed to
his conscience and to his European clerical advisers, simply because
the individuals to be regulated objected almost as one man. So
the attempted regulation of the encomiendas goes on through the
decades ; several typical examples may be given. " No encomen-
dero could own a house in his village or stay there more than one
night (law of 1609, 1618); not even his nearest relatives or his
slaves could enter the encomienda (law of 1574, 1550, and often).
He was forbidden to maintain any industrial establishment in the
encomienda (law of 162 1), or to take into his liouse any of the
inhabitants (law of 1528)." Indians were on no account to be sold
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 196-200. The figures are from Velasco. The terms
encomienda and repartimiento were all but synonymous in the time of Las Casas.
Id., p. 206, note 4.
2 P. 310, below. " Under the conditions of communii ation . . . the actual practice
of Mexico was determined r3.ther by the wishes of Ihu local authorities than by the
will of the king of Spain." Moses, p. 96.
SPANISH AMERICA: FORKKiNERS AND NATIVES 279
by the cncomcndcros. None of the officers of the government might
participate in the system of enforced labor, even indirectly. The
Indians were compelled to labor in mining, road-making, cattle-
raising, maize-culture, and like production of necessities, but were
exempt from plantation service where the vine, olive, and sugar-
cane were cultivated, and from labor in factories and sugar-mills.
In Peru not over one-seventh, in Mexico one twenty-fifth of the
Indians could be summoned to general service ; and for that of the
mines {tniia) only those within a radius of thirty miles. Natives
were not to be transported from the plains to the elevated regions.
The imposition of irregular personal services (carrying in a litter,
for example) and of porterage in general was forbidden ; it was not
intended that the natives should continue to be beasts of burden.
General injunctions are liberally interspersed to suggest the proper
attitude of mind in all these matters.^
Unquestionably the conditions of the natives were bettered as
the government gradually got the situation in hand ; hence they
were better off in Mexico than elsewhere. In some cases the mita
was shown not to be excessive by the fact that the initayos worked
overtime to gain the high wages promised.^ A competent author-
ity states that " in the last years of the Spanish colonial rule there
were in general scarcely any well-founded complaints about the
situation of the Indians : a certain status of minority and depend-
ence, where it existed, was due far more to the outcome of the
natural situation and of generations of ancient usage, than to that
of the perverted application of the laws." ^ Nevertheless the en-
comienda system did not appeal, even in a mitigated form, to
Galvez and Charles III (i 759-1 788), and the king abolished it.^
It is much to be doubted whether the well-meaning Spanish
legislation ever possessed an apparatus of local enforcement of a
character thorough-going enough to insure the desired economic
treatment of the Indian, except in certain restricted districts and
where the pressure to secure mine-workers was not so urgent.
Leroy-Beaulieu ^ ventures the opinion that " when once the Crown
of Castile could by its laws curb the undisciplined bands of the
^ Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 4-6; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 260-261 ; Colmeiro,
II, 382 ff.; Watson, II, 135.
2 Haebler, Amerika, p. 399; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 12 ; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 6.
3 Haebler, Amerika, p. 409.
* Cf. Humboldt, Essai, I, 102. Galvez was visitaJor-i:;eneral\.o America (1761-1774)
and was appointed Alinistro Universal de Indias in 1775. ^ I, 12.
28o COLONIZATION
first invaders, the lot of the Indians was so far alleviated that one
might ask himself if the conquest had not, at least for the Mexicans,
bettered their destinies." But, as Leroy-Beaulieu at once adtluces
the suppression of human sacrifices, he is evidently reflecting upon
Spanish successes in conferring positive and largely immaterial
benefits rather than upon actual results attained in thwarting un-
scrupulous demands upon the life -forces of the natives. In 1803
Humboldt gained an impression of Indian life which is expressed
by the words " une grande miscre." ^ It is very difficult to see
where the position of the Indian was economically better under the
Spanish regime than it liad been under native rule. What the
Spanish laws did, where they did anything, was to soften the rigors
of a slavery or semi-slavery that was formerly unknown and to
render this service endurable instead of utterly destructive. The
fortunes of the Indians took a sudden and great fall as the result
of the discovery ; they were restored in part by the benevolent
laws, where enforced ; but that they ever reached their status under
the pre-Columbian conditions, who could maintain ? Spain is to be
praised for her efforts rather than censured for their only partial
success. What colonizing people would cast the first stone .-* The
passions unleashed in such a contact of races as that in Spanish
America were inherent in the situation and in human nature ; and
"since it was the first important case of its kind in human history,
the task of control was the more difficult. But that to which the
conquered owed their misfortunes was not disease, nor any other
impersonal cause, but the avidity of the conquerors, leading to
reckless exploitation of the conquered.
Necro Slavery
One of the indications, however, that the Spanish laws were, at
least for a time, locally effecti\'e is afforded by the earl)- introduc-
tion of a slave-labor supply from without ; for if they had had a
free hand with the Indians, it is probable that the Spanish would
have been slower in taking up with the slavery of the negro, despite
1 Essai Politique, I, 103: " Les Indiens mexicains, en les considerant en masse,
presentent le tal^leau d'une grande misere." They are "in a state of extreme abase-
ment " (p. 106; cf. pp. 59, 82, loS, etc.). To the present writer it seems clear, in view
of Humboldt's many other expressions of pity, etc., respecting the Indians, that his
remark (p. 100) should not be interpreted in the sense taken by Professor Bourne
(Sp. in Amer., p. 263); in aligning the Indians' status with that of the lower classes
in Europe, Humboldt purposes only a comparison of evils.
SPANISH AMERICA: FOREIGNERS AND NATIVES 28 1
the lattcr's superiority for their purposes. Some such agency for
effecting the development of natural resources was indispensable
if the Spaniards were to profit by either the mines or the planta-
tions. As early as_i 5 10, when the severity of the labor in the mines
began to tell on the Indians, a few negroes were introduced ; they
experienced a high death-rate, but were so much more efficient than
the Indians that in 1 5 1 1 measures were taken to encourage their
direct shipment from Guinea. This trade naturally developed with
the decline of the Indian tribes of the islands, and perhaps with suc-
cess in protecting them by law ; " in the whole export-trade which
Spain maintained with her colonies there was still only one article
which could measure up in importance with quicksilver, and that
was the negro slave." The method of procuring negroes was by
letting out a contract or asiento, the first of which appeared in
I5_ij'^^ .During the union of Spain and Portugal (i 580-1640) these
asientos were granted largely to the Portuguese as the holders of
the sources of supply ;^ and it was the Asiento of 17 13, as will be
recalled, which really opened Spanish America to the British.
What the Spanish government was trying to do was to satisfy at
the same time "the demands of economic production and humane
feeling"; and in this case it was "by sparing the Indian at the
expense of the African " that the reconciliation was to be made.
The agitation of Las Casas furthered this policy powerfully ; for,
like the agitators in Brazil, his opposition was not to slavery as
slavery, but to the enslavement of the Indians.^ However, negro-
slavery never became widespread outside of the tropical regions,
the Antilles, and the northern coast region of South America;-^
according to Humboldt not over a hundred negroes were imported
annually into Mexico. Figures given above '^ indicate the negro-
component of the population of various districts. In general it may
be said that the demand for negroes varied according to the develop-
ment of that prime tropical employment, sugar-production. "The
1 Bounie, Sp. in Amer., pp. 270-273; Haebler, Amerika, pp. 416-418. Saco treats
most fully the whole subject of slavery in America ; for early conditions, cf. pp. 6i ff. ;
for the asientos, cf. pp. no, 146, et passitn.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 270-271; Colmeiro, II, 389; Haebler, Amerika,
pp. 400, 417.
3 Humboldt's figures for the total number in South America are 776,000. Bourne,
Sp. in Amer., p. 275. Caracas took by far the larger portion of those who reached
the mainland; there were, in 1822, 387,000 on the mainland, of whom Caracas pos-
sessed 218,400. Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 10.
* I'p. 215 ff. ; cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 278.
282 COLONIZATION
development of the^sugar industry and the growth of slavery were
dependent upon each other, especially after the mines in the Antilles
gave out. Each trapiche, or sugar-mill, run by horses or mules,
required thirty or forty negroes, and each water-mill eighty at the
least. Had the commerce of the islands been reasonably free,
plantation slavery on a large scale would have rapidly developed,
and the history of Hayti and the English islands would have been
anticipated a century by the Spaniards." ^ But despite the relief
supposed to have been given to the Indians, the Spanish govern-
ment did not favor the wholesale introduction of the negro ; in
earlier days a ratio of slaves to whites of over three to one was re-
garded as dangerous. The asiento-holders did not introduce much
over 3000 slaves a year between 1 550 and 1750. A sequel of insur-
rections, one finally culminating in the establishment of the negro-
state of Haiti, testifies to the justification, though distant, of some
of the misgivings. Naturally, however, the planters, bent on gain
and caring little for larger policies, took precautions hardly, clam-
ored for more slaves, and were willing to get them by any means
that were effective. There resulted the contraband operations of
ihe English and French corsairs to which allusion has been made.'-^
Because of their value, due partially to their rarity, but more to
a race-temperament which is adapted to the slave-status, the negro
received kindly treatment, and really ranked above the native in
the scale of castes.^ "The Spanish laws and the administration
favored eraancipation^t_every turn," with the result that there
existed a " large number of free colored people everywhere in the
Spanish colonies." If the Spanish system had not been so restrict-
ive as to paralyze plantation-production the case would probably
have been different. " In general the slaves were not overworked
for the same reasons that kept their masters from overwork"; and
in the dulling of interest in tropical production lay also the reasons
for omission of all severe measures looking toward security from
uprisings.*
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 272 ; cf. Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys.,p. 10, note.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 275-276 ; cf. p. 207 ; Haebler, Amerika, pp. 399-400;
p. 247, above.
3 Cf. p. 217, above. The Spanish term castas, it must be understood, does not
connote the rigidity and exclusiveness which are associated with the word when used
in reference, for example, to India. The castas are rather the ethnological divisions
of the population. Cf. Saco, pp. 225 ff.
* Houme, Sp. in Amer., pp. 2So-2cSi ; Roscher, Sp. Col. .Sys., p. ro, note; Leroy-
Beaulieu, I, 17. Nevertheless the mortahty of the negroes was high. Saco, p. 130.
CHAPTER VIII
SPANISH AMERICA: MISSIONS, CLERGY, GOVERNMENT
Indian Village Life
Returning now to the consideration of the Indians, the question
of their labor as slaves or serfs yields place to the more general
one of their treatment outside of their connection with the services
of the encomienda, that is, in their villages or in the missions.
Ovando, in 1503, had been instructed to establish the Indians in
villages, assigning them lands which they could not alienate,
appointing a protector, erecting school-houses, and the like. This
was largely for the purpose of restraining them from their tend-
ency to withdraw from any sort of relationship with the Span-
iards ; ^ later, this village system was more widely extended in
regions as yet but sparsely occupied by the Europeans. Here the
natives remained subject to their own caciques, whose tenure was
hereditary and who in general had charge of such part of the
administration as directly touched the natives, while the supervi-
sion of the whole lay in the hands of several local or native officials
(alcaldes and rcgidores) who were annually elected by the residents.
These offices were not purchasable as in the Spanish towns, and
were filled, in Humboldt's time, by respectable and conscientious
men. One of the duties of the protectors was the collection of the
revenue ; and they were especially to guard against oppression of
the natives at the hands of their chiefs.
Thus, while the towns and their Indian inhabitants were subject
to Spanish laws and magistrates, the inner life of the village went
on along traditional lines ; the society was regulated, however, espe-
cially as to its external relations, with considerable care. Like the
Portuguese, the Spaniards looked with suspicion upon the kind
of European who might through trade or otherwise come into
contact with the Indians; police regulations restrained Spaniards,
mestizos, negroes, and mulattoes from settlement in the villages;
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 209-210. On the early Indian legislation, see Fabie,
PP- 34-35' 79. 87 ff-, etc.
283
284 COLONIZATION
and a law of 1600 forbade even merchants to sojourn therein over
two nights. No Indian, again, might live outside his village, or
change his dwelling-place without permission of the authorities, —
regulations which were intended in part to restrain relapses into
the barbarism of the hunter's life. The provision that Indians
could not own weapons or ride on horseback probably rested upon
similar considerations. No wine was to be sold in the villages,
and the alcoholic content of the native pulque was not to be in-
creased by adulteration. The attention to be paid to conversion
dictated regulations as to the presence of churches and priests, the
expenses of whose maintenance came from the encomendero, royal
or other ; schools also, for the teaching of Spanish, were directed
to be opened. For all these benefits the Indians were supposed to
pay little, being exempted entirely, for example, from the alcabala.^
In short, the so-called " reduced " ^ or village Indians remained in
a protected status. " On account of their ignorance, and weak
minds," they were treated with indulgence, as perpetual minors;
" as late as Humboldt's time the laws of Isabella and Charles V.
were still in existence — laws which declared the Indians minors
for life, so that, for example, they might not, on their own
responsibility, contract debts of over five dollars. No pucden
tratar y contratar. Neither their real estate nor their personal
effects could be sold except in due legal form (law of 1571), and
the law gave its consent then only when it found the trade advan-
tageous to the Indian. On the other hand, guilt in a criminal case
could be pronounced only on the agreeing testimony of six Indians
because of their great and universally prevailing lack of truthful-
ness." ^ Here, again, we have a system which is a credit to the
good intentions and honor of the Spanish government, and to which,
in all likelihood, approximation was made in proportion as the
Spanish jurisdiction was settled and fortified. But it is clear that
the net result must have been the hindrance of the development of
industry in America, and so must have been generally combated or
evaded upon the ground.'* Naturally, as the encomiendas reverted
1 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 14; Bourne, Sp. in Anier., pp. 25S-259 ; Roscher, Sp. Col.
Sys., pp. 6-7; Watson, II, 135-136.
'^ Redticir means " to convert to the Catholic faith." A reduccioit (reduction) was
"el pueblo de indios convertidos 4 la verdadera religion (neophytorum oppidum)."
3 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 7. The Indians were not expected to emerge from this
minority. Leroy Beaulieu, I, 13-14.
* Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, p. 14; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 263.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 285
gradually to the king, the administration of the villages became
more direct and so probably more strictly in accord with the legal
enactments.
Extension of Religious Influence
The provisions which have been but casually noted hitherto
respecting the conversion and religious training of the Indians call
for some special mention. It was, as has been seen, one of the
chief preoccupations of Isabella, as revealed in the first of the
directions given to Columbus, that the heathen should be con-
verted ; and she adds that Friar Buil and others shall accompany
the discoverer to assist in good works. ^ To Ovando, again, the
injunction was given that the Indians should not be disposed against
Christianity.^ In other words, the attitude of the Spanish in
America was not to be the militant one characteristic of the colli-
sion of CJinstianity with Mohammedanism, as, for example, in the
PoHuguese East ; it was to be paternal, inspired by pity called
forth by ignorance of the faith, and adapted to a state of intellect
scarcely able to comprehend the dogmas of the Church. For this
reason, again, the religious policy of the Spanish does not preserve
a direct sequence from the Crusades as did that of the Portuguese
as represented typically by the activities of Albuquerque. Colum-
bus expected something more nearly like the experiences of the
Portuguese ; he had no idea of coming upon a whole new and virgin
field. But when the truth began, at least in part, to dawn upon
the Spanish kings and church that here lay an almost limitless
opportunity for the exercise of the positive function of religious
construction practically ab origine, the accession of zeal in the con-
quest of souls set on foot a series of missionary enterprises hardly
matched, of their kind, in history. " The work of conversion . . .
followed upon the heels of conquest, indefatigable friars devoting
every moment to preaching! baptizing and learning the native lan-
guages . . . Every town, Indian as well as Spanish, was by law re-
quired to have its church, hospital and school for teaching Indian
1 " Que procure la conversion de los Indies a la fe : paraayuda de lo qual va Frai
Buil con otros religiosos, quienes podran ayudarse de los indios que vinieron para
lenguas. Para que los indios amen nuestra religion, se les trate mui bien y amorosa-
mente, se les daran graciosamente algunas cosas de mercaderias de rescate nuestras :
i el Almirante castigue mucho a quien les trate mal." Fabie, p. 16.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 207.
2 86 COLONIZATION
children Spanish and the elements of religion." ^ Naturally the
friars extended their ministrations first and most directly over
the Indians of the towns and villages ; but the really independent
portion of their activity had to do with those natives who had not
been " reduced " to village life and placed under the systematic
control of encomendero or government. The most striking enter-
prises of the priests were those tnisiones which preceded or lay
without the extension of the power of the state. In wide regions
relatively or totally unoccupied by Europeans, they alone repre-
sented the forces making for civilization and conversion ; thus they
constituted, as Humboldt pointed out, a sort of intermediary status
between the true colony and what might well be called, from the
standpoint of civilization, the desert.^
They were thus part of the apparatus of conquest ; the fore-
runners too often, and quite against their will, of the soldier and
the exploiting slave-raider, cultivator, or merchant. That the
religious motive was utilized as a cloak for more material ones,
during the conquest, has been already indicated ; the very attack
upon the Inca was rendered ostensibly more justifiable by his
expressed contempt for the Bible and for the bishop who sought,
stans pede in uno, to explain to him the doctrine of the Trinity.
Likewise the missions had to be repeatedly restrained from con-
verting the Indians by force ; regulations to that effect were put
forth, "and yet as a matter of fact it was quite customary for
missionaries, whenever slaves {poitos) seemed necessary, at the
head of their soldiers and converted Indians {Indios rcdncidos) to
make inroads upon the territory of the heathen in order to seize
young people there {entrada^ cojiquista dc almas).'' ^ For all this,
however, the methods of conversion were generally peaceable ;
despite their own enthusiasm for the faith, the friars seem to have
taken a sane view of their self-imposed task and its possibilities
and impossibilities. They allowed the. Indians the gratification of
their simple vanity in their long hair, indulged them as no Spaniard
would have been indulged respecting confession, penances, feast-
days, hearing of masses, fasts, marriage within spiritual relation-
ship [parentela spirituals), and so on. Even the eating of human
flesh was overlooked. The Indians were regarded as children and
^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 303, 304.
2 Cf. Haebler, Amerika, p. 401 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 15.
^ Cf. pp. 142 ff., above; Watson, I, 127; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 9 (([uoted.)
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 287
^o treated ; theoretically at least the Inquisition never had to do
yvhKJthGm^ There were never any real prosecutions for heresy,
for who could treat the vagaries of a child as significant enough to
bear that name ? This policy has been called humane, and it was
doubtless so ; but it was either blundered into with rare fortune or
deliberately adopted with extraordinary discernment. Mere con-
version, that is, the acceptation of the newly introduced cult and
its adaptation to local conditions, is not so very difficult for a
native people not under the dominance of some more than primitive
religion ; it is when the customs and habitudes {inorcs)^ sanctioned
by the respective religions come up for adjustment that the real
strains of contact appear.^ It is here that an uncompromising
rigidity on the part of the more developed system may result in
the destruction of all possibility of modifying the less evolved, and
it was just here that the Spanish clergy introduced their principle
of indulgence and forbearance.
The Missions
If now the work among the wild Indians was successful, "they
were gathered together in a village called a mission, where, under
the increasing supervision of the friars, they were taught the ele-
ments of letters and trained to peaceful, industrious and religious
lives. In fact, every mission was an industrial school, in which
the simple arts were taught by the friars, themselves in origin
plain Spanish peasants. The discipline of the mission was as
minute as that of a school : the unmarried youth and maidens were
locked in at night ; the day's work began and ended with prayers
and the catechism ; each Indian, besides cultivating his own plot
of land, worked two hours a day on the farm belonging to the vil-
lage, the produce of which went to the support of the church.
The mission was recruited by inducing the wild Indians to join it,
and also by kidnapping them. Spanish America from California
and Texas to Paraguay and Chile was fringed with such estab-
lishments, the outposts of civilization, where many thousands
of Indians went through a schooling which ended only with their
lives. In the process of time a mission was slowly transformed
1 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 7. Negro slaves were treated with similar clemency.
Id., p. 10, note. 2 cf Sumner, Folkways.
^ E.g. the Spanish found the jiolygamy of the chiefs especially difficult to deal
with. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 304.
288 COLONIZATION
into a ' pueblo de Indios ' . . . and the mission frontier was
pushed out a little farther." Later the whites gradually established
themselves among the Indians. " The missions become Si)anish
villages, and the natives lose even the remembrance of their natural
idiom. Such is the progress of civilization from the coasts toward
the interior — a slow progress shackled by the passions of man,
but sure and uniform." ^ It was not until after the conquests were
over (middle of the seventeenth century) that the missionary enter- >
prises really began to discharge these important functions. But
after that time, with their forts ox presidios, guns and cavalry, they
formed for the government, and with little cost to it, the best
of outposts. 2 In their influence as nuclei of civilization they were
remotely similar to the Roman coloniae.
The tact of the friars in not insisting upon instantaneous and
absolute change of old habitudes has already been accorded some
attention. But as explanatory of the really astonishing influence
exerted by them upon their charges, decided emphasis must be
laid upon the fact brought out in foregoing quotations, namely,
that the basis of their whole system was industrial. It was their
demonstration of success in the organization of industry which
held their charges to them. The Indian, particularly of Mexico,
was quite able to see the aptness of new agricultural methods and
mechanic arts, and valued them and the greater ease of living con-
sequent upon their exercise enough to be willing to accept all the
religious ])araphernalia and ceremony which, in this case, accom-
panied them. The missionaries preserved, first of all, the natural
resources which had often previously been wasted : their strict
regulation protected game and favored domestication and breeding.
Then they got together from 200 Indians (in the inland missions)
up to from 800 to 2000 (near the sea), and engaged them in a
style of production clearly superior to that which they had been
practicing, but yet easily maintainable under the priests' direction.
"The finest mission of New California, San Gabriel Arcangel,
still in 1834 numbered almost 3,000 Indians and pos'sessed 105,000
head of horned cattle, 20,000 horses, and over 40,000 sheep ; they
harvested annually 20,000 fancgas (20,000 to 40,000 bushels) of
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 305-306 ; and Humboldt, quoted in id., p. 306. For a
brief description of the mission, with references to more detailed accounts, see
Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 12.
2 Ro.scher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 12-13.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 289
corn, 500 barrels of wine, and as much brandy." ^ " The foundation,
the maintenance, and, up to a certain point, the prosperity of such
estabhshments is one of the most notable facts of Spanish coloniza-
tion. These little societies were productive beyond the personal
consumption of their members : they carried on a rather notable
commerce in foodstuffs and in articles for exportation ; they
exchanged this surplus of production for ornaments for the church.
They thus responded, although in a measure peculiarly limited, to
the two mercantile desiderata of colonization : they furnished
Europe with the raw products, and they drew upon Europe for
manufactured articles : they constituted a region of demand and
of supply." ^ In other words, they attracted their charges, through
the example of their own efforts and productions, and by means of
this limited participation in the trade of the outside world, within
the range of influences which profoundly modified the industrial
basis of their social organization. They assembled the natives into
relatively large aggregations and then set before them a standard
of economy somewhat higher than their own, but not so lofty that
its benefits were not immediately self-evident. In short, they began
and continued their enterprise with the direct effort to modify the
organization of industry, — to better organize the struggle for ex-
istence, — introducing changes in the matter of religion, marriage-
system, etc., with tactful deliberation.'^ This is one of the more
general reasons for their success in dealing with a situation before
which so many peoples have failed.
Seclusion of the Natives
In fact, the misioneros seemed to feel that immediate and full
contact with a higher civilization could do only harm to their
charges. Consequently the seclusion practiced in the villages
found its extreme type in the mission ; and it was expressly stated
that it was the enlightened people [gente de razoji) with whom the
natives were not to have intercourse. The padres superintended
the traveler during his sojourn and speeded him forward as soon
as possible ; usually a single night's lodging was the extreme of
tolerance. Thus, too, was trade controlled : " the missionary, who
did not himself disdain to trade, was to form the only connection
1 Roscher, p. 143; cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 15.
'^ Leroy-Beaulieu, I, i6; cf. Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 13.
8 Cf. Keller, Sociol. View, etc.
290 COLONIZATION
between the mission and the outside world." ^ In view of the
character of Spanish emigrants in the earher periods such a strict
poHcy of sechision seems somewhat justified ; on the other hand,
the very presence of the Indians gave point to many of the con-
scientious government's restrictions of movement imposed upon
the Spaniards.^ But the poUcy led to frequent collisions with
secular authorities, and, had production with a view to exportation
reached any considerable development under the Spanish system,
doubtless the same phenomena of conflict between clergy and
settlers observed in Brazil would here have been repeated.
On the whole, and despite the fact that the clergy deteriorated
somewhat in morals in the new environment, the control of the
Indians seems to have been in good hands. Here again the omni-
present governmental regulations forbade the missionaries to accept
any perquisites whatever beyond their small salaries ; and, although
such prohibitions were here eluded, as they were on other fields,
still the picture of the priests is one, in general, of the endurance
of " the greatest hardships with almost indescribable resignation " ;
of " silent and pious enthusiasm." ^ There was, in the Spanish
dominions, scarcely any temptation to actual competition between
the missions and the planters, and consequently the former did not
exhibit the worldliness and lust for power characteristic of many of
the aldeias of Brazil. Whatever the artificial seclusion, the geo-
graphical was too thorough-going to admit of much participation
in the struggle for wealth, even though the missions h^id been
climatically so situated as to have produced the tropical products
upon which attention centered. By the time, too, that the mission
had been included within the slowly expanding area of intercourse
with the outside world, it was no longer a mission.
The services of the clergy in the education of the natives, aside
from the important training given in industry, have been indirectly
touched upon in the foregoing. Indeed, the mechanic arts were
themselves taught in the city schools. Both the crown and the
Church were solicitous for education in the colonies, not only for
the Indians but for the rest of the population as well. To this we
shall revert. But the instruction as given in the missions was
1 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 13-14 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 15-16.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 247-248.
" Piippig in Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 14; for the inunorality of the clergy, see
p. 299, below, and p. 188, note 4, above.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 291
necessarily slight, consisting of reading, writing, singing, and the
like.^ At the most it may have given an initial impetus to some
individuals of more than ordinary powers, who might then take
advantage of a higher instruction from which they were not de-
barred, but to which they were, rather, invited.
The Jesuit Reductions in Paraguay
Before closing the topic of the missions, it remains to sketch
briefly the history of the most reputed of them all — the Jesuit
Reductions in Paraguay. The Jesuits had been active in America
from early times, but rather more in the Portuguese possessions
than in those of the Spanish. In particular they had been endeavor-
ing to rescue the Guarani Indians from the persecution of theJPor-
tuguese_slaye-raiders and the colonists of Asuncion and Buenos
Ayres. Finding that the commoner method of simply collecting
the Indians about them in the wilderness really acted as a tempta-
tion to raiders, whom they could not resist without organization,
and whom the state could not quell in that distant corner of the
empire, they strove for a certain autonomy and grant of local
power. They attained such an exceptional status in 1608, when
Philip III assigned them a field in Paraguay, which was under no
civil power, and where they might, exempt from colonial control,
undertake the civilization and conversion of the Indians on the
grand scale. Two friars arrived in 16 10 and established the first
reduction, called Loreto, upon the upper Parana ; the neighbor-
ing natives were invited to resort there to receive instruction and
become members of the community. It is not surprising that they
did so in numbers, for the contrast between the ways of the Jesuits
and those of the European settlers and raiders was such as to
attract confidence.^ Once in control of their charges, the Jesuits
speedily put into operation a most skillful adaptation of the com-
munism natural to primitive tribes who have never yet attained to
an agricultural economy. Their model might well have been in
many respects the Inca state with its denial of private property and
with its universal obligation to labor. And for this society they
created a defensive force which gave it the character of an inde-
pendent state and secured it against its enemies for many years.
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 308-309.
- Haebler, Amerika, pp. 403-406 ; Watson, I, 266-267. ^o'' ^ fairly complete
thougli rambling treatment of the Jesuits in Paraguay, see Zimmermann, I, 377 ff.
0-^ ^. CUv<;v>. ,
292 COLONIZATION
Roschcr ^ provides the best brief sketch of the internal relations
of the reduction : " In every mission the Indians chose their own
gober?iador, although, naturally, subject to the veto of the priest, to
whom, likewise, all the punitory sentences of the gobenmdorh-^d to
be submitted for confirmation. These punishments had altogether
the character of church penances. Usually the affairs of the mis-
sion were divided between two monks ; the elder had the spiritual
oversight, the younger the secular economic control. With great
shrewdness the Indians were formed into a military organization
and, allured by the splendor of uniforms, titles and the like, they
came to constitute a well-constructed machine. All foreign neces-
sities were paid for by the sale of Paraguay tea \^jiiatc'\ which the
order managed ' because the Indians are too timid.' Then, too, the
laborers and such people worked under the direction of the priest,
and even the public slaughter-house was managed by him. Work
on the conuco [i.e. on the common land] claimed two days of every
week. The beginning and ending of a day's work were marked off
by church ceremonies ; likewise the hour and manner of meals,
dress, and so on were arranged once for all by the mission. ' The
missionaries,' says Duflot de Mofras, ' had solved the great problem
of making work attractive. They had brought the Indians to the
realization that, grouped about the mission, they were safer from
the attacks of hostile tribes, and that they could maintain them-
selves more comfortably and plentifully from the light and varying
work of the mission than from the insecure and dangerous spoil of
the chase and of robbery.' In every mission there was a special
house, called bcaterio, where women of bad repute were kept under
surveillance ; here also resorted childless married women during the
absence of their husbands. In similar cloistered seclusion young
maidens {monjas) were reared up to marriageable age. The mission-
aries, too, had charge of the diversions, combining with them in-
struction in all kinds of vocal and instrumental music. One may see
how ably the community of property which obtains among almost
all quite rude peoples was here retained, and yet was freed from its
natural defects by a remarkably appropriate organization of labor."
It should be noted that the Jesuits employed the same tactful-
ness exemplified by the missionaries above described, but in a
degree exhibiting even more insight and discernment. The com-
munal arrangements, the pomp of uniform and title, the cerenK)nies
' V\y. 145-146; cf. Ilaebler, Amerika, pp. 405-407.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 293
dividini,^ off the day, the seclusion of young women, the attention
paid to diversion and play, — these and many other minor details
could not have gone astray in their effect upon native predisposi-
tions. The compulsion to light labor was taken, again, as the basis
operandi ; " the monks followed the only intelligent course for
missions among heathen — they realized that conversion has to
begin" with civilization." ^ Since the Jesuits had all the power, they
were responsible for all the general results of their experiment. So
far as the natives were concerned there seems to have been little
question that they found it satisfactory ; for they consistently
followed the fathers and made every attempt to retain them when
the state decreed their recall. The reductions grew in numbers
and population, so that by the end of the seventeenth century there
were forty large establishments, the greatest of which contained
from 15,000 to 20,000 souls. At a very early period of their domi-
nance the order controlled a military force of 7000. That the
growth of these stations was so rapid during their first quarter-
century was due in great part to the desire for protection against
the furious Paulista raids of that period; and that this protection
was found efficacious admits of no doubt. ^ What the Jesuits have
been blamed for is that they made of their charges mere apes and
parrots, incapable of progress and invention if left to themselves.
The old accusations against communism, that it destroys emulation
and individual initiative, were lodged against the reduction.. Again,
the protests were directed against the rigorous seclusion policy,
for in this the Paraguay Jesuits rivaled all other missionaries be-
cause they had the power to do so. They admitted no European
even within the bounds of their reductions, " and, having themselves
no ties of kindred by marriage or otherwise with those around
them, remained a distinct class apart. Their disciples were not
even instructed in the Spanish or any other European tongue, save
so much, perhaps, as was implied by their being taught to patter
certain prayers by rote." ^ But this amounted, the critics of the
Jesuits have regularly asserted, to the inducing of a mental and
moral imbecility in a group held in virtual servitude for ulterior
ends. One author* puts it thus : " One of the two following causes
appears reasonable, — either the administration of the Jesuits was
1 Haebler, Amerika, p. 406.
2 Haebler, Amerika, p. 407 ; Watson, I, 269, 271, 276, 279 ; p. 144, above.
8 Watson, I, 272 ; cf. pp. 271-277 ; p. 287, above. ■* Watson, I, 278.
294 COLONIZATION
contrary to the' civilization of the Indians, or they were such a
people as were incapable of emerging from their primitive state of
infancy."
To such comments the Jesuits bluntly replied " that the Indians
could not have been developed out of the condition of perpetual
childhood ; that a larger measure of individual freedom would only
have injured the individual and general weal." ^ It is probable that
they were correct in principle ; and it is likely also that the objec-
tions of the colonists were based upon something more solid than
a theoretic dispute concerning the best way to exercise benevolent
intent toward the savage. But the experiment was to produce no
demonstrable result.
Expulsion of the Jesuits
The colonists had not welcomed the interference of the Jesuits
with their own way of working out the Indian question, and as the
reductions waxed in numbers and prosperity their discontent and
jealousy, fostered doubtless by the sight of Jesuit ambition and
independent policy, took on more ominous proportions. For here,
as elsewhere, the inevitable success which attended the first intent,
vigorous, and fearless onslaught of the strictly disciplined monks,
was speedily metamorphosed into characteristic presumption and
odious self-sufficiency. Without following out the details, it may
be said that the settlers determined to possess their own Indians
and to put an end to Jesuit pretensions to actual empire, and
that out of the resulting situation, together with a boundary dis-
pute with Portugal in Ikazil, rose the War of the Seven Reduc-
tions (175 3-1 761). Certain Guarani's were obliged to removelroni
seven missions located in territory ceded to the Portuguese ; they
were insufficiently provided for, became wearied and exasperated,
and finally resisted the treaty; and the other twenty-four reductions
showed sympathy. The Jesuits then became the scape-goats, being
held by the trcaty-commissif)ners to persuade the Indians, and at
the same time distrusted by the latter as the causes of all their
troubles. War was declared untimely, and probably under local
pressure, upon the Seven Reductions. The Jesuit Provincial then
addressed to the authorities, in the name of the order, a general
resignation of control of all the communities ; but it was not
1 Haebler, Amerika, p. 407.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 295
accepted. The fathers were summoned by the government to
deHvcr up the revolting reductions without resistance ; they were
the sole cause of the rebellion and would otherwise be guilty of
high treason. And when, finally, Spain and Portugal had grown
weary of the demarcation question, the priests were required to
collect the scattered remnants of the natives and encourage them
to repair their ruined towns and recultivate their devastated
country.^
In 1 767 c ame the expulsion of the Jesuits and the "last signifi-
cant phase in the native-policy of Latin America." ^ After this
time, in Paraguay as elsewhere, the lay authorities controlled the
Indians together with the rest of the population. The impover-
ishment of the Paraguay communities under the shortsighted
exploitation of the controllers, who " regarded the goods of these
communities as a mine which they might not be allowed to work
but a short time," bears witness again to the real virtues of the
Jesuit rule. The Jesuits were more intelligent than their succes-
sors ; they were skillful, moderate, and economical ; " they looked
upon the towns as their own work, and regarded them as their
peculiar property and sought to improve them." ^
Conclusion of the Spanish Native-Policy
Returning now to a final glance over the Spanish native-policy
and its results, it is necessary to recall not only the economic,
social, and religious aspects of the case, but also to retain within
the perspective that prime phenomenon in the contact of races in
Spanish America, miscegenation. Viewed in the large we have,
then, first of all, the creation of what might rank as a mongrel
race, the Spanish-American. Opinions are still too widely diver-
gent regarding the suitability of this race to world-conditions to
allow of the determination of a consensus. But that it constitutes
a really important advance in the process of the modification of
humanity toward the necessary type of the future, few would
assert. If the evolutionary process consists, in the last analysis,
in weeding out races which are less fit to compete in the larger
struggles of a later age and of a world more fully occupied, then
there seems here to have been called into being a new nondescript,
^ Watson, II, 222-231 ; cf. I, 279. 2 Haebler, Amerika, p. 409.
3 Moses, p. 235; cf. Fabie, p. 22.
296 COLONIZATION
whose ultimate fate is not so clean-cut as that of either of its racial
components. The Spaniards, unlike the more northern peoples,
particularly those of English origin, have been willing to depart
from the European standard and affiliate with a lower race ; " in
Spanish America, the Spaniards have mingled their blood with the
blood of the natives, and have compromised with them in the
formation of political and religious institutions. The English policy
has tended to exterminate the barbarians ; under Spanish dominion
the Indians have, indeed, perished in great numbers, but those
who have survived have entered to form a constituent part of the
new nation." ^ Whether the Spanish policy, however well it com-
pares in immediate effects with the uncompromising practice of
the English and of the Americans of the United States, represents
a process suited to world-conditions, is a question which must
await a definitive answer in future generations.
When now the results of Spanish native-policy, aside from race-
mixture, are made the subject of reflection, it is seen that there
could be no such conflict of races as has so generally occurred in
temperate regions. In the tropical areas of Spanish America,
excepting the islands, the native element remained strong or the
mixed race arose ; there was naturally no formation of European
communities to compete with and destroy the natives. In the
limited areas of the islands the natives disappeared before temporary
or shifting concentrations of greater numbers ; there was here no
conflict and competition of societies. On the Mexican and South
American plateaus there were no factors in the environment which
were prohibitive of the development of the farm colony. Commu-
nication with the outside world was difficult, but no more so than
in many another colony of settlement. To be siu'c, the natives
declined before the hardships of labor in the mines ; but here
again, for reasons of Spanish character and policy, real European
societies were not founded. Hence there could not have been an
advancing frontier of the English type, "with its clean sweep, its
clash of elemental human forces"; with its results of a home
established " for a more advanced civilisation and a less variously
mixed population, and its justification like that accorded perforce
to the inexorable processes of nature." ^ The temperate plateaus
of the New World make the impression, if the terms be allowed,
of unsettled colonies of settlement.
' Moses, pp. 306-307. - Bourne, Sp. in Anier., p. 306; Moses, p. 306.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 297
Since, then, there was no real race-conflict resulting from the
impact, in the struggle for existence, of rival societies, there was
left a free field for the religious and benevolent operations of the
exclusively male communities of the clergy ; and there resulted
that gradual and all but unconscious advance of frontiers which
has been described.^ The missionary had time to exert an unhur-
ried influence before the settlers were upon his heels, introducing
economic and social factors into the situation which would not
have been consonant with his aims, or methods, or even presence.
Consequently, even though the assertion be not accepted that " as
the child physically and mentally passes rapidly through the earlier
development of the race, so the natives of New Spain in a genera-
tion and a half were lifted through whole stages of human evolu-
tion," ^ yet it is freely admitted that, as within limited districts
much was done speedily, so over greater areas a good deal was
accomplished, though in slower tempo. If such uplifting of a native
race has not been matched on earth, if it is "one of the great
achievements of human history," ^ it must still be recognized that
many of the uniquely favoring conditions were neither created by
the Spanish nor consciously taken into account. What the Spanish
system did was, negatively, to keep out those who might have com-
peted with the natives, with results analogous to those commonly
met with in settlement colonies, — and the object of this exclusion
was dictated only partially by religious and benevolent purposes
respecting the natives ; and what it did positively was to intrust
the latter to the clerical agents selected. The importance of the
clergy and the tactfulness of their measures were certainly very
great ; clerical successes in America cause Roscher,* with other
cases likewise in mind, to assert that "barbarous peoples who are
unable to maintain their complete independence are most gently
subjected by a strong Church."
Clerical Organization
Although the most important part of the work of the Church in
America has now been sketched, the method of presentation has
1 Pp. 287 ff., above.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 201 . It is perhaps captious to point out that the strength
of this comparison, granted that it is not calculated to carry an argumentative weight not
sustainable by analogy, rests in a confusion of ontogenetic, phylogenetic, and societal
evolution. ^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 195-196; cf. pp. 196-201, 303-304, 353-354-
* Sp. Col. Sys., p. 15.
298 COLONIZATION
not yet admitted of an account of the general clerical organization,
apart from its purposes. The chief characteristic of the Church
in Spanish America is, perhaps, its subjection to the crown.
" Because no monarch of the world was esteemed so Catholic as
the Spanish, so none had such a power over his country's church
with the permission of the pope. . . . This influence was even
much greater in America, a papal donation. No priest could go to
America without the express permission of the king (law of 1522
and later). The ecclesiastical patronage of the whole of the Indies
belonged exclusively to the crown ; by it all bishops were nomi-
nated to the pope, and all canons to the prelates (law of 1508).
Again, no papal bull could extend to America except by permission
of the Council of the Indies. One of the most important prerog-
atives was the royal sale of indulgences ; similarly the annates
flowed not into the papal but into the royal treasury." Members
of the religious orders went to America in most cases at the king's
expense, and remained under his jurisdiction. " The long list
of ordinances limiting the movements and general activity of the
members of the religious orders indicates to what marvelous lengths
and into what minute details Spain's restrictive system extended." ^
As in Spain, the clergy was composed of the regulars, or members
of orders, and of the seculars of all grades ; the regulars held the
large uK^iasteries in the cities and were likewise distributed up
and down the country in smaller groups, and their fields and those
of the seculars were carefully delimited. Clerical labors consisted
mainly of parish work in Spanish towns, teaching and i)arish work
in Indian villages {doctrind), and the specific mission work. The
different orders followed divers ])olicies : the Dominicans emplo)-ed
fire and sword, purposely destroying many of the monuments of
earlier culture, though they preserved others ; the Franciscans
attached little importance to science, but preached with fervent
love; the Jesuits, admitted in 1664 to missionary work, pursued a
more varied policy, and did much for geography, philology, and
the like.' Despite the strict control of the king, who had triennial
reports from his officers upon the number and activity of the
monks, the extent and power of the church-establishments increased
1 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 11 ; Moses, pp. 61-62 ; Watson, II, 136-1 37 ; Bourne,
Sp. in Amer., pp. 302-303. The annate was the first year's revenue of bishops or
other ecclesiastics.
2 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., j^p. 304-305; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 17; Watson, II,
137 ; Moses, pp. 61-62.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 299
with great rapidity, especially in the second half of the sixteenth
century. In 1600 there were in New Spain 400 convents of the
Several orders and 400 districts in charge of clergymen. ^ The
economic burden entailed by the presence of the clergy was very
o ppressive , for "it enjoyed more extended tithes here than in
other places and they were collected with greater precision. As
early as the year 1501 the payment of the tithes had been ordered
in all the colonies ^ and the method of collection regulated by law.
All the products of agriculture were subjected to this tax ; sugar,
indigo, and cochineal as well as maize or wheat." Such a land-tax,
in a new country, according to Leroy-Beaulieu, is "essentially
prohibitive of cultivation." Again, the extension of the mortmain
was a distinct obstacle to production; "in new countries where
the lands have not enough value to be leased, the ill-cultivated
possessions of the mainmorte constitute often vast expanses of
poor pasture which arrest the agricultural development of the
districts wherein they are located. The mainmorte was incredibly
developed in Spanish America."^ The Church " held^ aj30ut_QD£.._
half of all the p rope rty J n _t h e colonies, and was directed by men
not always in the fullest sympathy with those interests on which
the material prosperity of society depends. On the economic
affairs of Spanish America, as on those of Spain, the church cast
the blight of its dead hand." In 1 576 Lima, for example, contained
five monasteries and two convents, a convent for mestizo girls and
a house of sisters of charity, and two large and rich hospitals, one
for Spaniards and one for Indians ; this for a population of some
2000 Spanish families and 26,000 Indians.* And as the power of
the clergy increased, constant defra.uding of the crown o ccurred ;
the Jesuits, by far the richest and most powerful order, were con-
spicuous for such practice until their expulsion in 1767.^
Policy and Influence of the Clergy
But what the Jesuits usually were in their private life, many
of the clergy certainly were not. Isabella's purging of the morals of
the clergy was not sufficiently drastic to render them proof against
the temptations of new conditions, and concubinage became a not
1 Moses, p. 251 ; Zimmermann, I, 337. 2 por that date, "all the colonies" means
practically Espanola. ^ Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 22.
* Moses, p. 31 1 ; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 200; Zimmermann, I, 342.
^ Zimmermann, I, 337, 366 ff.
300
COLONIZATION
uncommon thing, as practiced by regulars and seculars in the New
World. Morals in general were much relaxed among a class of
religious adventurers whose chances at home had been small. As
late as the reign of Ferdinand VI (i 746-1 759) an edict was issued
prohibiting regulars of any denomination from taking charge of
parishes.^ In reckoning up the services of the clergy in civilizing
the Indians, some attention should be accorded to this aspect of
their case, although such irregularities probably affected the out-
come but little, one way or the other.
Except for the Indians, the Church displayed as little tolerance
in America as in Spain. Reference has been made to the treat-
ment of heretics when military operations or chance threw llicm
into Spanish hands ; and it has been shown with what care the
genealogies of prospective emigrants were scrutinized in order to
select only the spotless. It is probably a testimony to the early
strictness of this examination that the introduction of the Inquisi-
tion into Spanish America was not authorized until 1569, and that
its history there was relatively free from the grim spectacles often
viewed in Spain. The Holy Office began promptly upon its arrival
in 1574 " by pouncing on all of Hawkins's men who had been put
ashore in 1568 that could be got hold of"; the first Mexican
auto-da-fe was celebrated in that year. But in general it could find
but small game amongst a population scarcely intellectual enough
to doubt, and spent most of its efforts in harrying foreign heretics,
Jews, witches, and bigamists. In an activity of 277 years the
inquisition put to death in Mexico forty-one unreconciled heretics ;
in Peru, within the same period, there were celebrated twenty-nine
autos-da-fe, fifty-nine persons being burned at the stake. As for
the Indians in their relation to the Inquisition, there was a law
conferring upon them exemption from its searchings ; for their
misdemeanors were adjudged to be those of childish irresponsibles,
and over them was held the threat of the rod rather than that of
the more terrible apparatus of the Holy Office.'-^
The ecclesiastical censorship was wielded with vigor, the entire
control of the press being given, with detailed prescriptions, into the
hands of the Inquisition. Heavy fines and temporary banishment
were the punishments of booksellers who could not produce a cat-
alogue of prohibited books, or who sold one of tlicm ; travelers
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 306-308; Watson, II, 137-13CS.
2 Moses, pp. 310-31 1 ; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 243-244, 312-314 ; Zininieiniiinn,
I. 341-342.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT
301
crossing the frontier with such an article in concealment suffered
a fine of 200 ducats. The agents of the Inquisition might enter
private houses at any hour of day or night in the search for pro-
hibited books or any similar articles. Thus the Inquisition came
to exercise a repressive influence upon the growth of ideas and
civilization comparable only with that of the state as directed
against commerce and external communication. And when, in the
eighteenth century, an intellectual awakening was actually threat-
ened, the Office made haste to tighten the strait-jacket ; the cata-
logues of prohibited or expurgated books grew to include the works
of 5420 authors. On the lists occurred the names of the leading
thinkers of the century. ^ Whatever the clergy may have done for
the Indians, its influence could not have conduced, under such a
system, to any great advancement for people of greater possibilities.
The higher education which they professed to give was, for many
generations, merely scholastic and theological. It was owing largely
to the Jesuits that advance was made in the scientific study of the
native languages, and in some other fields. The Inquisition had
no special objection to the pious and orthodox study of geography,
linguistics, ethnography, and history, and it was almost inevitable
that a knowledge of these subjects should be forced upon the
clergy, particularly the viisioneros, in their work. In fact, it is
hardly just to credit the clergy in general with scientific intent ;
their preservation of certain material, like their destruction of
much more, was a casual and almost accidental consequence of
their main preoccupation — the civilization and conversion of the
Indians. It is lucky that certain information highly prized by a
later age happened to be desirable for the realization of their then
purposes. There was created, certainly, a considerable educational
plant. In later times, doubtless, knowledge was pursued for its
own sake, and it cannot be denied that notable authors occasionally
appeared ; but the whole educational system was vitiated by the
persistence of mediaeval prepossessions and was unfit to rear up a
people to take its place in the modern world. ^
Whatever the destiny of Spanish America, the Church has con-
tributed largely to make it what it has been and will be ; for the
religious coherence of Spain and her colonies was much stronger
than the political could be made, despite all the bonds forged by
1 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 31 ; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 314.
2 Cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 308-316; Haebler, Amerika, pp. 401-402.
302 COLONIZATION
the colonial policy. For " when the struggle for Spanish inclei:)cnd-
ence came, . . . the bond of ecclesiastical union and s)ni[xithy
remained, always Rawing a large part of several nations back to
allegiance with Spain. . . . Even after the Si:)anish-Amcricans
had achieved their political independence, they remained still in a
strong ecclesiastical alliance with the mother-country." ^
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION
Much has been said, from time to time, in the foregoing, con-
cerning the policy and actions of the government. Some of its
agencies, as these controlled the activities under discussion at the
time, have been described. But, as in the case of the clergy, it
has seemed best to reserve for this later place an account, in its
main and general lines, of the machinery of government. And the
attempt to gain a perspective of its development will carry us back
once more to the time of the descobridorcs and conquistadores.
" During the process of exploration and settlement, authority in
America rested in the hands of leaders of expeditions and colonies,
who usually bore the title of adclantado," a title formerly applied
to the commanders in the wars against the Moors, and whose use
in the New World may stand for a certain transference of the
crusading spirit to a new field.^ Who the adelantados were, by
what means and under what circumstances they attacked their
enterprises, and with what successes, has already been indicated.'"^
Gradually, however, the conquests reached their limits, and, first
locally, then more generally, the passion for discovery, which had
been fed by fancy and by hope of the acquisition of fabulous wealth
through the opening of strange and unheard-of sources, found for
the Spaniards no further promise of satisfaction. " In its place
emerged the serious and difficult task of organizing the endless
extent of territory of which they now possessed some knowledge,
even though it was rperely superficial. The epoch of the coiiqnista
had come to an end, and that of the coloniaje, the colonial economy,
had begun." ^ Roughly speaking, the close of the period of conquest
may be taken as 1550.^
1 Moses, pp. 31 1 -31 2.
2 From adelantar, to further, or extend. Cf. Moses, pp. 68-69.
•'' I'p. 177 ff., above. * Ilaebler, Amerika, p. 391.
^ The e.\]5ecliti()ii of Orellana (1541) was the last important example of the El
Dorado enterprises. Ruge, p. 455. Of course the area of conquest extended more
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 303
The Conquistadores
When it came to organization, however, the immediate destiny
of the colony depended largely upon the personality of the con-
queror ; Mexico and Peru may be taken, as the most valued
conquests, to afford the most striking contrast. In Mexico the
determining factor, despite greater nearness to the metropolis, was
Cortes, for he combined the qualities of the superior organizer
"witTTThose of the intrepid leader. In all his exigencies Cortes
" revealed such inflexibility of resolution, never-failing presence of
mind, unwavering self-control, such readiness to strike or to con-
ciliate as best fitted the case, such consideration for his own men
and for the conquered, such constructive statesmanship, such down-
right business ability, such scientific and practical interest in
geographical exploration that he is easily the greatest of the con-
quistadores, if not the ablest man that Spain produced in that
age." In consequence of his enlightened efforts the country began
to possess an organized means of defense, the rebuilt city of Mexico
came in a few years to have thousands of inhabitants, and a net-
work of smaller European settlements spread over the whole
country of Montezuma.^ The shocks of conquest and the heavings
to and fro, back to a state of relatively stable equilibrium, were
thus minimized, and Mexico gave little cause for uneasiness and
anxiety.
The case of Peru was very different. The first attempt to estab-
lish royal control ended in total failure ; Peru came near to acquir-
ing independence, an example which, according to Hume,^ the
other colonies would speedily have followed. Francisco Pizarro had
been given in 1529 the practically absolute authority of captain-
general, and permission had been accorded him and his associates
to extend their conquests at their own expense. But Almagro's
jealousy of what he regarded as undue preferential treatment of
Pizarro, matched with the latter's envy of the former's successes
in Chile, led to internal strife ; and the quarrel was carried on by
Almagro's son after Pizarro had inflicted a traitor's death upon
the father. Upon such an unsettled society came now, in 1544,
slowly, and in the outlying regions or the mountains native tribes either retained their
barbarous independence unbroken or regained it from time to time. Watson, II, 147.
1 Bourne, Spain in America, p. 157 (quoted); Haebler, Amerika, pp. 375-376;
Moses, p. 79. 2 p gi_
304 COLONIZATION
the viceroy De Vela, with commission to put the " New Laws "
respecting IncHan freedom and rights into execution. Resistance
to these measures was rendered more bitter by reason of the^brupt
and tactless proceedings of the viceroy ; largely in consequence
of such discontent the last of the Pizarros, Gonzalo, was forced
into what was practically a rebellion, as its head. The viceroy was
taken prisoner and Pizarro proclaimed governor and captain-general
until the king's pleasure should be known. Pizarro could easily
have made himself an independent sovereign at this time, for his
authority was undisputed from Quito to Chile, while the mines of
Potosi supplied a royal revenue. But, fortunately for the crown,
he vacillated, hesitating to throw off his allegiance, until the pleni-
potentiary Gasca managed to work upon Spanish loyalty and won
the empire back for the king.^ And at length, a'fter the final
cessation of the civil wars (1555), the lawless society was brought
into order by the vigor and severity of the viceroy Mendoza.^
Transfer of the Metropolitan Svstem : the King
When, now, the conj rol of the king began to replace the
licensed conquests of the adelantados, the common phenomenon
of the application of metropolitan political institutions to the
colonial field at once appeared. " The whole drift of Spanish
political life in the sixteenth century . . . was toward the strength-
ening of the power of the crown and the loss by the Cortes of its
legislative function. . . . The government of Spanish America was
pre-eminently monarchical." From what has been recounted con-
cerning the power of the Spanish sovereigns it is not difficult to
understand how " Spanish America did not belong to Spain, but
was a part of the hereditary domains of the sovereigns of Castile
as heirs of Queen Isabella, with which the cortes of Castile had
little more to do than with the kingdom of Naples or the Nether-
lands." Hence it is more clearly to be seen that the king was little
susceptible to control in the management of his own ; that while
" the laws of Castile were made by the king with the advice of his
councils . . . the laws of Spanish America were made by the king
tlirougli the Council of the Indies." A monojioly such as that of
1 Moses, pp. 111-113; Haebler, Amerika, pp. 384 ff. ; Watson, I, 117-11Q, 134-
136, 140-141, 177-182, 187-188, 190-197, 203-204; Zimmermann, I, 319 ff.; see
p. 277, above.
2 Moses, pj). 134-T37; Wats(jn, II, 127-131.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 305
Seville was his to give.^ "The colonies of Spain, although the
funds for their original settlement were largely private, were, like
the Roman colonies, creations of the central political organization,
and were upheld and controlled by a power outside of themselves."
T^hey were from the outset, at any rate, equipped with ample legal
machinery, built upon the genuine Spanish pattern.^
One of the main characteristics of the colonial administration,
perfectly in consonance with the policy of a Philip II, was its
secrecy. No reports were published, and the inquisitorial powers
"oTThe" Church were enlisted in the maintenance of mystery. Of
course this is another outgrowth of the. exclusion policy, especially
as respects foreigners ; Count Revillagigedo was seriously blamed
for publishing statistics of Spanish American population, and thus
informing rival nations of the small number of Spaniards in the
colonies. Because of this absence of information the most mis-
taken opinions prevailed in Europe respecting the Spanish colo-
nies; "while, in the sixteenth century, every one exaggerated their
prosperity, their riches and population, in the eighteenth every
one depreciated them beyond measure." In fact, the principle
of secrecy, combined with the deliberate neglect of means of
communication, referred to in another place, actually left the
government itself poorly informed of affairs in the colonies ; so
that sometimes it became aware of important happenings only
through the reports of foreigners.^ The other determining charac-
teristics of the administrative policy will appear in a review of the
agencies employed, but it may be said preliminarily that, together
with the .Spanish institutions, came also the Spanish political habi-
tudes of mind ; besides secrecy there existed suspicion, the tendency
towardminute regulation, and other characteristics of the metro-
politan administration.
The Council of the Indies
Taking the king, now, to be the source of all legislation and
government, the body nearest him was the Conscjo dc Iiidias, the
Supreme Council of the Indies, founded by Ferdinand in i 5 1 1, and
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 228, 221 ; Haebler, Amerika, p. 395 ; Moses, pp. 18-22,
298-299; cf. 295-296; Watson, II, 127, 131. ^ Moses, pp. 298-299 ; Hume, p. 91.
3 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 21 ; cf. pp. 18, 23 ; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 35 ; p. 245, above.
This was not so bad in the earliest years, but later the development of means of rela-
tively rapid communication was looked upon as a highly dangerous innovation. Moses,
pp. 64-65 ; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 22.
3o6 COLONIZATION
finally orj^anized in 1542. "This board originally embodied all
financial, police, military, ecclesiastical and commercial authority,
and at the same time serv^ed as a high court of appeal in civil
actions. . . . Endowed with the entire royal prerogative, it had, at
all times, to remain in the neighborhood of the court. New laws
could be passed only by a majority of at least two-thirds. For a
century the Council of the Indies was universally and deservedly
held in the greatest esteem. Its members were chosen preferably
from those who had held high ofifices in America with distinction." ^
The Council was a most dignified body, therefore, and it performed
its tasks in a worthy manner, collecting information, initiating
schemes for improvement, nominating all officials, civil and eccle-
siastical, and calling them to account, and otherwise controlling
and supervising large policies and details. A worthy monument to
its activities and intentions for two centuries is formed by the
Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reinos dc las Indias, a body of law
evidently dictated by the broadest considerations of humanity.
Its industry and the seriousness with which it took its functions
are indicated by the fact that it was to meet five hours daily,
except on church holidays ; however numerous the latter, the
Counselors certainly labored well and long as compared with a
considerable part of the population.'^ But it must be recognized
that the Council came to constitute the most stubborn conservator
of the traditional policies whose effects have been passed in review ;
so that when, under the Bourbons, more liberal measures were
adopted respecting America, it had to be suppressed. It was suc-
ceeded by a Ministry of the Indies, which in turn passed away
under Cliarlcs IV, through the distribution of its functions among
the five ministries of the state. The Council was at this time
resuscitated in outward form, but its utility was gone.'^
The Vicef^oy and Audiencia
This body, in its period of vigor, conferred all offices in America
and held accountable every incumbent, from the loftiest down.
The most important of all the officers was, naturally, the king's
representati\e, the viceroy. This official possessed by delegation
the entire royal authority, and his person was surrounded by retinue
1 Koscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 25-26; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 224-225 ; Saco,
pp.66ff. '^ Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 225-7226; Wat.son, II, 130.
2 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 20, 30 ; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 26, note.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 307
and ceremonial of a truly pompous character. Nevertheless he
was hedged about with checks of many kinds, for the independ-
ence necessarily granted him because of the remoteness of the
colonies from the mother-country made him a shining object for
the perennial suspicion characteristic of the Spanish administration.
To secure unity and sequence of policy the colonial affairs were
directed first by Fonseca, then by the Council of the Indies, and
the viceroy's duties were at length specified to such an extent that
over seventy laws in the Recopilacion are devoted to him. Again,
there was set over against him the midiencia or court of appeals,
presently to receive notice, and the whole clerical organization.
Even Columbus, with his extensive grants, never afterward dupli-
cated, had been given full instructions, and the tendency to regu-
late gained strength with time.^ One of the most obvious methods,
practiced also by the Portuguese, of curtailing opportunity for the
viceroy, was the limitation of his term, which was fixed at three,
later at five, years, subject to royal extension. The first two vice-
roys reigned fifteen and fourteen years respectively ; but from
1535 to 182 1 sixty-two incumbents held the office, averaging a
little over four and one-half years. Again, persons of very dis-
tinguished rank were seldom appointed. Numerous apparently
petty restrictions hedged about the private life of the viceroy ;
inspectors were sometimes sent out ; and, finally, the viceroy,
upon his retirement from office, was subject to the rcsidencia ^ or
inquest into his conduct during his term. " The Council of the
Indies appointed for this a particularly prominent jurist, who had
to be ready for months to receive charges of every kind against
the outgoing official. The justice of these charges was decided in
Spain, and no viceroy or other officer could receive the slightest
new appointment without first successfully meeting this test."
Vaca de Castro was detained twelve years as state-prisoner, while
his conduct was being laboriously analyzed, although in the end he
was approved and granted due honors. " The wellnigh proverbial
ingratitude of the Spanish court towards its great discoverers
and conquerors is at bottom nothing more than the painful intro-
duction of the later colonial policy of permitting no one to become
1 Haebler, Amerika, pp. 393 ff. ; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 23 ff. ; Bourne, Sp.
in Amer., pp. 229-230 ; Moses, p. 87 ; Watson, II, 128 ff.
2 The Portuguese practiced the " legidencia" in India, but apparently upon inferior
ofificers. Menezes, p. 139.
3o8 COLONIZATION
too powerful." ^ Comparison with the case of Albuquerque and
others of the Portuguese viceroys and governors is here challenged.
And wlial is said respecting the viceroy applies to the captain-
general, who was simply the "king of a smaller kingdom." No
efforts, however, to break the essential power of the viceroy really
succeeded, limited though he may have been.^
The position of the conscientious viceroy was one of arduous
labor and trying responsibility ; he had, among other duties, to
contribute toward the continuity of the colonial policy a general
report embodying information and counsel for his successors. '"^
Mendoza was granted in 1535 a salary of 6000 ducats, and 2000
for the expenses of his bodyguard. In the seventeenth century
the viceroy of New Spain received 20,000 ducats, and of Peru,
30,000. In the middle of the eighteenth century the salary of the
viceroy of Mexico was raised to 60,000 pesos, 12,000 of which he
was expected to devote to his captain-general. The captain-general
of Caracas held office on the average seven years and received
9000 pesos. Naturally perquisites might add considerably to these
stipends. The viceroyalty of Peru appears from the above to have
ranked as a higher dignity than that of New Spain ; successful
viceroys in the latter province were often promoted to Peru.*
The check which was set up as the most definite and tangible
counterbalance to the viceroy who might be wielding, or suspected
of planning to wield, too much power, was the aitdiencia. In
Espanola a court independent of the governor was established
(15 10) to hear appeals from the decisions of the governor's jus-
tices; this is taken as the beginning of the audiencia, "a body
which also became the mouth-piece of colonial needs by presenting
memorials to the Council of the Indies." ^ On the mainland the
adelantados were superseded by the audiencias, or balanced by
them. In 1527 it was thought prudent to curtail the po\\er of
Cortes, and the conviction that no single minister would be able
1 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 23-24 ; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 229-232; Watson,
p. 183; Moses, pp. 86-87, 90-91, 144. The residencia was of varying efficiency. Bourne,
Sp. in Amer., p. 232.
2 Bourne, Sp. in -Xmer., p. 331 ; Moses, pp. 107-108.
3 The Relaciones and Memorias cited in the bibliography of this book.
* Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp, 229-231, 331; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 41 ; Moses,
pp. 86, 90.
'' Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 227-228. On the germ of the audiencia, legally con-
sidered, cf. Fable, pp. S3 ff- This author (p. 24) regards the instruction given to
Columbus as the prototype of all succeeding legislation.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 309
to do this led to the selection of a collegiate body.^ The audiencia
in general was a sort of council of state, corresponding roughly to
the Council of JKe Inches, in Spain. It had great restraining power
over the viceroy, for the Spanish government turned to it for in-
formation as to his conduct; "that in some respects the powers
of the viceroy and the audiencia were co-ordinate may be seen in
the fact lliat each without informing the other might corresponds^
directly with the king.'' The audiencia acted in place of the gover-
nor m case of absences or vacancies, and its commands were
regarded as if they emanated from the king himself. Persons who
felt wronged by viceregal decisions could appeal to the audiencia ;
the fact that in important cases such appeal was carried to the
Council of the Indies reveals the kinship of the two bodies. Again,
the audiencia exercised a direct supervision over the economic, re-
ligious, and other conditions of its district, for one of its members
was delegated every three years to make a thorough inspection,
extending even to the testing of the purity of drugs in apothecary
shops. The closest attention is said to have been given to the
selection of proper men for the audiencia ; because of their high
rank and good salary they were more than ordinarily independent,
and uncommon precaution was taken to detach them from social
connections and business relations calculated to impair their im-
partiality.^
The political divisions of the empire, after the conquests were
over, were based upon the viceroyalties and audiencias. " In the
year 1574 the Spanish American world was officially described as
consisting of two kingdoms : New Spain, comprising the main-land
and islands north of the isthmus, and also that part of South
America which is now Venezuela ; and Peru, comprising the
isthmus and all the territory from New Spain to Patagonia except
Brazil." A third viceroyalty was added in iJjS at Bogota, the
capital of New Granada, the later Colombia, and a fourth in 1776
at Buenos Ayres. The other lesser divisions of the empire, most
of them dating from the eighteenth century, were the captaincies-
general : Guatemala (1527); Venezuela (1773); Cuba {1777);
Chile (1778). The American audiencias were, in the seventeenth
century, under Philip IV, eleven in number : Santo Domingo,
^ Moses, pp. 69, 80.
^ Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 24-25; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 232-234; Moses,
pp. 69-72.
3IO COLONIZATION
Mexico, Panama, Lima, Guatemala, Guadalajara, Bogota, La Plata,
Quito, Chile, Buenos Ayres.^
Character and Results of the System
It is not necessary for our purpose to pursue the colonial admin-
istration into its subdivisions — the "governments," the municij^al
councils (cabildos), officials, etc.^ The characteristic of the whole
system, both in the large and in its details, was perennial regula^_
tion from above, constant balancing and counterbalancing of power.—
The system was like a complicated machine calculated to make of
each member of the government an obstacle to the action of the
other members.''^ " This official system, with its good and bad
features, had taken very early and deep root in Spain,"'* and could
not well escape transference to America. And, aside from this
system, one most ill-adapted to a new country and a more unde-
veloped society, the colonial ofificial personnel was very far from
being a model one. The praiseworthy intent in respect to appoint-
ments, voiced in the precepts of many of the laws, did not material-
ize at all prevalently in practice. With such sovereigns as Spain
had for many critical decades, men feeble and degenerate and
s^vayed by unscrupulous favorites, it would have been little short
of miraculous if the colonial appointments had been exemplary.
Aside from their inapplicability under the economic and social con-
ditions, the Spanish laws lacked, then, a medium of interpretation
and enforcement in the personnel of the colonial functionaries. " It
was impossible for the best governors to put into practice measures
which were of the most incontestable utility to the public interest,
while magistrates with small scruple had full facility in enriching
themselves and their favorites." As to the captains-general, "their
power soon became very limited and nothing at all remained to
them but a grand ceremonial, an enormous patronage and the
chance to enrich themselves in a thousand illegal ways." ^^ Again,
one of the regular sources of the royal revenue was the sale of
offices as the latter increased in number with the expansion of the
1 Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 229, 232, 331 ; Watson, II, 12S; Moses, p. 161.
2 Cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p]). 234-237.
'* Merivale, in Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 19.
■* Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 23.
'' Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 19; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 41 ; Moses, p. 96; cf. Bourne,
Sp. in Amer., p. 242 ; Zimmermann, I, 340, 355-356.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 311
king's domain (1557 on); whatever may be said in extenuation of
this practice, it was certainly one the exercise of which was not
destined to educate and equip a society or series of societies for
the struggle of the sequent age. It is one thing to demonstrate a
practice of this kind as natural in the setting of its time — so is
cannibalism — and it is thus scientifically futile to pass moral judg-
ments upon it ; but it is equally profitless to seek to excuse or to
have recourse to the tu qiioque retort.^ It is not that the Spanish
system was morally bad ; it is that it was hopelessly anachronistic
and unsuitable ; persisting in doleful consistency where the powers
of the next age were adaptive, it virtually retrograded and became
survivalistic.
For one thing, it taught the Spanish-American societies in no
respect that self-reliance, visibly shown in the power of self-
restraint and self-government, in the poise, which the nations that
succeeded Spain as lords of affairs have in general so steadily ex-
hibited. One author, who is inclined to minimize all the factors
except education, puts the case as follows : " Under the rigid rule
of the Council of the Indies and its subordinates, the great body
of the people in the Spanish colonies learned only one lesson, and
that was the necessity of obedience. The power of self-direction
or self-control they had no opportunity to acquire. They only
learned to follow ; not because they saw any reason for going in
one direction rather than in another, but because they were domi-
nated by a superstition or habit favoring obedience, born of long
subjection to absolute rule, and of inexperience in matters of public
concern. The result of this was to make possible quiet and orderly
conduct, as long as the power of the parent state remained un-
shaken ; but it did not prepare the way for independent national
action. When, therefore, the tie of allegiance to Spain was severed,
the communities were like a ship without a rudder or ballast.
There were no points of advantage that could be used to give them
consistent movement in any direction. They were subject to the
shifting currents of uninstructed prejudice. While the bulk of
the people were willing to render obedience, they were without
the means of determining to whom it should be rendered. They
were perfect material for the demagogue, or the pliant tools of
revolutionists. The Spanish-American attempts at self-government
haye^-therefore, in most cases had a sorry outcome ; not because
"1 ef. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 237-239.
3 I 2 COLOxXIZATlON
of any original incapacity in the stock, but because of the lament-
able political education which the dependencies received during
their three centuries of bondage to Spain." ^ The Spanish colonial
government was the product of anterior and contemporary Spanish
history, embodying the working-out in a new and ruder environ-
ment of the system evolved in an older and non-progressive land.
It was only under the sought-for seclusion that it could stand; light
and knowledge were inconsistent with its endurance.^
Class Discriminations
One of the interesting phases of this futurd^s_system was the
class division which it fostered; here again appears the policy of
distrust, working out into the principle of divide ut impcres. The
class distinctions were, as has been seen,^ partially racial or social,
and so inevitable ; but there was no attempt made to amalgamate
the unhomogeneous elements. Quite the opposite : the lines of
cleavage were accentuated and demarkcd. " Mexico," says Hum-
boldt,^ "is the land of inequality." For example, the European
Spaniard (chapeton or gachupin) was consistently favored over the
American-born Spaniard (creole). " Legally the creole was on
complete equality with the chapeton ; but, as a matter of fact,
until 1637 only twelve of the 369 bishops had been Creoles, and
until 1808 only one of fifty viceroys of New Spain had been a
Creole. Wappaus knew of only four Creoles among 160 viceroys,
and only fourteen among 602 cajitains-general or governors. To
the excluded this must have been all the more irritating, since
they had in their midst a numerous and brilliant nobility." ^ 'J_It_
was in the cabildos (municipal councils) only of all the machinery
of government that the Spanish Creoles had a prominent or con-
trolling share." The effects of such preferential treatment may be
judged from the fact that_j;he republicans of Buenos Ayres, upon
lifting the standard of revolt, stated such exclusion to be one of
the chief of their grievances.^
1 Moses, jjp. 302-303; cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 235, 263; Danvin, quoted in
Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 46.
2 See pp. 322 ff., below; cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 5.
* Pp. 215 ff., above. * Essai, I, 103.
^ Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 19-20. The single creole viceroy was Juan de Acuna,
Marquis of Casa Fuerte (1722-1734). Humboldt, Essai, I, 203.
*> Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 236-237 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 9.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 313
The intention behind this pf)licy was to keep the " old Spaniards,"
as the natives of Spain were called, so loaded with favors and
honors as to secure in their envied status one of the surest guaran-
ties of Spanish-American dependence. On the other hand the
native-born were to be held as far as possible in a pliable status of
simplicity and ignorance : " the viceroy, Gil de Lemcs, uttered to
the colleges of Lima this characteristic language : ' Learn to read,
to write^and to say your prayers : this is all an American ought to
Toiow.' " ^ " The tremendous pride and stiff ceremonialism which
characterize the Spaniards in Spain had developed here incom-
parably more, so that all cordiality was smothered beneath it, and,
more than that, numberless family quarrels, denunciations, etc., re-
sulted from it." ^ A special mark of favor granted to the chapeton
was the feudal estate or fief, a grant taking origin from the time
of the conquistadores, when it was assigned to the families of the
latter or to court favorites. The fiefs were extensive and proved
a great detriment to production, but, since the government held
the more to such grants as the provinces were more distant, they
seem to have been the visible expression of misgivings as to the
growth of a very considerable agricultural and creole population.
The political accentuation of class distinction led also to the inordi-
nate love of titles and rank, especially among the Creoles, and the
consequent or correlative contempt for productive employments.
But the dissemination of discord was effected within the lower
social groups as well as the upper, and at the same time care was
taken to deprive the former of their natural leaders. The implac-
able antipathy between Indians and negroes, for example, was made
into political capital ; any general union to shake off the common
yoke was rendered almost impossible.'^
In short, as respects governmental treatment of class distinction,
Spanish America represents a "classic ground for the so-called
official aris tocracy ." ^ "By the establishment of a numerous
nobility which sustained a rigid system of entails, by the con-
stitution of a powerful clergy endowed with all the old temporal
privileges in all their fulness, by the omnipotence of the royal
^ Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 9, 10; Watson, II, 132 and ff.
2 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 22.
' Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 19-21 ; Watson, II, 134.
* Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 23. This author regards the independent bureaucracy
in Spain as a bulwark against arbitrary despotism, "and the class exclusiveness and
arrogance of the numerous officials as a help to independence against temptation."
314 COLONIZATION
functionaries, by the restrictions of all sorts presented to the
initiative of her subjects, Spain had wished to found an old society
in a new country : in that phrase can be summed ui5~the whole ot
"Spanish colonization." ^
Colonial Revenue
Before following the later stages of Spanish policy in Spanish
America to their final outcome in revolution, it is perhaj)s in place
to introduce a few facts concerning the sources of revenue in the
New World aside from the mining royalties. The importance of
the latter, and the expedition shown by the state in laying hands
upon them, have been discussed ; it should be mentioned that, in
Peru at least, the demand for a large revenue stood constantly in
the way of establishing a good government. Whatever her humanP
tarian aims, Spain had to have the ducats, and " in her decline
toward bankruptcy was practically insatiable." ^ But, with refer-
ence to the taxes apart from the fifths, they were much the same
in kind as those in Spain : the alcabala ; export and import divties
(about 1 5 per cent) ; convoy-tax ; receipts from the sale of offices
and indulgences ; monopolies of gunpowder, salt, tobacco, and
quicksTTver^ ; and a part of the church income. "In 1746 the
total revenue of New Spain was estimated at 3,552,680 pesos.
A little less than half a century later, in 1796, it had risen to
$19,400,000, of which probably $3,500,000 represents the king's
mining royalties, leaving about $16,000,000 from taxation from a
population of five million." "* This would not have been severe in
the absence of the restriction which, as has been seen, checked
the development of economic strength ; and if it had borne equally
upon the poor and the wealthy. Naturally the mining royalties
received the most attention ; and the other taxes, notably the
alcabala, were not so severe as in Spain. But it is impossible to
believe that any such complex of dues was not detrimental in the
extreme to the development of the new societies.
What revenue the crown actually derived from America it is
difficult to say ; some estimates of the yield of the mines have
1 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 5.
2 Moses, pp. 137-138.
8 On the quicksilver royalty and its yield, cf. Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 44-45.
* Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 239-241 ; Watson, II, 145.
SPANISH AMERICA: CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT 315
been given above. But the collection of statistics made by Roscher ^
from Humboldt and others certainly demonstrates a considerable
hiatus between the gross and net revenue. Of course the king
possessed the equivalent of income in the opportunity afforded
him by the well-paid offices, loaded often with perquisites, which,
in lieu of other gifts, he could bestow upon distinguished men or
favorites.2
1" The actual surplus which, in Humboldt's time, flowed into the treasury at
Madrid from the colonial administration was estimated at the following amounts :
from New Spain, from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 piastres annually; from Peru, 1,000,000
at the highest ; from Buenos Ayres, from 600,000 to 700,000; and from New Granada,
from 400,000 to 500,000. In the remaining provinces the expenditure was at least
equal to the receipts; in fact, regular appropriations {sitiiados) of probably 3,500,000
had to be sent annually to the Spanish West Indies, Florida, Louisiana, the Philip-
pines, and Chile to help out their domestic administration. From Lima a contribu-
tion of 100,000 pesos went to Santiago and Concepcion every year, half in silver and
half in supplies for the garrison there. Valdivia received annually 70,000 pesos like-
wise from Lima. The supplementary contribution for San Domingo is said to have
amounted to 200,000 silver piastres annually, or from the beginning of the eighteenth
century to 1784, inclusive, to about 17,000,000. Before the establishment of the
Guipi'izcoa company two-thirds of the expenditure of Caracas, Maracaibo, and
Cumana had to be supplied from Mexico. Taken all together the exports from
Spanish America towards the end of the eighteenth century amounted to 9,800,000
piastres more than the imports. Whatever portion of this is not to be reckoned in
the above-mentioned government surplus must have flowed into the hands of private
individuals in Spain." Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 40; cf. Bourne, Sp. in Amer.,
p. 241 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 36.
2 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 41 ; Hume, p. 396.
CHAPTER IX
SPANISH AMERICA: BUENOS AYRES, THE REVOLUTION,
CUBA. THE PHILIPPINES. AFRICA
One section of the Spanish American empire still awaits dispo-
sition in the general scheme of Spanish theory and policy : the
temi)erate regions of the south, Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile.
These areas have been thus isolated, aside from certain inevitable
references to them, because, by reason of their physiographical
and other natural conditions, they clearly exemplify a special phase
of Spanish colonial history and policy, and were thus marked out
for a specifically different destiny.
Early Conditions
The Plata was discovered by Magellan in 15 19, but it was not
until 1534 that any attempt at colonization of the region took
place; Almagro made a campaign in Chile in 1 535-1 537, and
Santiago was founded by Valdivia in 1541 ; Irala penetrated the
Paraguay region (in search of treasure) in 1540. But any effective
settlement in any of these districts was long delayed ; in Buenos
Ayres, for example, until 1562.^ It will be recalled that the
Spaniards took but slight interest in regions which furnished
neither precious metals nor articles of production complementary
to those of European origin. Apropos of voyages toward regions
north of Plorida, a member of the Council of the Indies remarked :
'* What need have we of these things which are common with all
the peoples of Europe ? To the South, to the South, for the riches
of the Aequinoctiall they that seek riches must go, not unto the
cold and frozen North." ^ Hence the development of what is now
the United States of America was not seriously considered, and
for many decades and generations the southern regions of South
1 Haebler, Amerika, pp. 3S5-3S6, 41. |; Moses, pp. 1.47-148, 192; Watson, I,
98-103, 148-150; P)Ourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 192-193; Zinimermann, I, 326-327.
2 Quoted in Bourne, Sp. in Amer., page 142 ; cf. Haebler, Amerika, pp. 385-
386, 402. ^
316
SPANISH AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN COLONIES 317
America were left to unaided and actually impeded settlers, and
to the missions. In consequence of such neglect, the settlers of
Buenos Ayres early undertook the management of their own affairs,
electing as leader a notable man, Irala, who organized the colony
and extended its borders (1537).^ In Chile, Valdivia established a
form of feudalism similar to that introduced in Mexico and Peru,
and fought the first wars against the Araucanians.^
Emigration to Buenos Ayres and Paraguay was never large, and
included few European women ; relations with the natives were
cordial, and miscegenation was prevalent as it was in no other
Spanish American district. Therefore the population always exhib-
ited a predominance of the Indian stock, even though the number
of those actually denominated mestizos was small, and, especially in
Paraguay, " became characterized by Indian rather than by Spanish
traits." ^ Otherwise the stock phenomena of the temperate colony
are in evidence : the Indians were, between i 580 and 1740, gradu-
ally pushed back from the littoral, but with comparatively little
violence; then, from 1740 to 1881 they were warred upon by the
now more numerous and powerful race. They could not become
civilized, and miscegenation seems to have been their single, though
partial, preservative.^ In Chile, on the other hand, the temper of
the natives admitted of no close affiliation ; their relatively advanced
civilization declined before the depredations of the Spaniards and
in consequence of prolonged wars. So that while the usual racial
mixtures occurred in Chile, the white element exhibited a predomi-
nance scarcely duplicated in Spanish America.^ Conditions of racial
contact were in Chile more nearly analogous to those found else-
where in temperate colonies than to those characteristic of any
other part of the Spanish empire.
1 This was done with the sanction of Charles V. Moses, pp. 192-193 ; Watson,
I, 103-104; Zimmermann, I, 326 ff.
2 Cf. p. 260, above ; Moses, pp. 147-148 ; Watson, I, 148-150.
3 Moses, p. 196 ; Haebler, Amerika, pp. 387, 403 ; Watson, 1, 104, 271-272. Velasco
(p. 551) gives to the Plata region for 1574 only three Spanish settlements of about
400 inhabitants, almost all encomenderos, and more than 2000 mestizos. The census
of the Buenos Ayres colony in 1776 gives the following elements of population
(Daireaux, I, 45) : ^^^^ country
Spanish iS;7i9 9>732
Indians 544 i)54z
Mestizos 674 I
-- , t 1,020
Mulattoes 3,i53 '
Negroes 4,ii5 ^3°
* Daireaux, I, 49 ff., 60 ff. ^ Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 19; Watson, II, 165-166.
3i8 COLONIZATION
But the rapid growth of these regions was contravened not only
by the general indisposition of the Spaniard for the humdrum ex-
istence of the farm colony, but also by Spanish policy itself. As
has been seen, Argentina and Chile were regarded commercially
and politically as mere appendages of Peru ; they constituted the
extreme frontier and were accessible only via the Isthmus and
Lima.^ This roundabout route of trade so enhanced prices at the
destination that Argentine life of the early periods had to order it-
self in the most simple manner : " in contrast with the conditions
of civilized life which the denser population of Peru made possible,
the life of the sparse and slowly increasing population on the plains
of Buenos Aires drifted toward a state of barbarism." - The value
of the unlimited herds was little better than nil ; "in the early
years of the eighteenth century, even after the port of Buenos Aires
had been opened to the extent of admitting two small vessels
annually, an ox was worth one dollar, a sheep from three to four
cents, and a mare ten cents. The prices had risen to this amount
from a still lower point under the influence of the demand made by
these vessels for hides, strengthened by the larger demand of the
contraband trade of the English and Portuguese." But this manner
of seclusion was not destined to endure ; when Buenos Ayres be-
came in time one of the chief terminals of contraband traffic, it
did not fail speedily to realize the enormity of the system to which
it had been subjected. " It was clear enough to the people of the
Argentine that to them a closed port meant poverty, and a free
port prosperity." Their opposition to the Spanish policy, and, in
fact, to the Spanish fuTF, which appeared in the begmmng ot the
nineteenth century, " was no sentimental opposition, but rested on
the hard basis of economical considerations." ^
The first real recognition of Buenos Ayres came in 1620, when
it was declared a separate colony, though still subordinate to Peru,
to comprise all the regions of the Plata below the confluence of the
Paraguay and Parana.* There was some wealth in the Argentine
region, and it was gradually laying solid foundations for its future
importance and prosperity. But the latter did not actually appear
until, in 1776, Buenos Ayres was erected into a viceroyalty and
' (f. p. 235, above; Moses, pp. 18S-189.
'■^ Moses, p. 207 ; cf. pp. 20S-209, 268-270; Watson, II, 208; Bourne, Sp. in Amer.,
pp. 204, 290-291.
^ Moses, p. 287 ; cf. Watson, 11, 207.
* Watson, I, 204 ff., 265; Ilaebler, Amerika, p. 414.
SPANISH AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN COLONIES 319
delivered from some of the vexatious conditions of its former sub-
ordinate status.^ It thus became a preferred port for trade with
the southerly colonies, for vessels bound for Chile and Peru were
now allowed to proceed by the Cape Horn route. Under these
new laws, Buenos Ayres " speedily took an equal place, by reason
of the wealth of its agricultural and pastoral economy, beside the
richest colonial provinces of Spain." Freedom of trade stimulated
all industry.^ This economic movement gained such momentum
that not only could restriction not be re-introduced, but the days
of political submission to a distrusted rule were numbered.
Contrasts with the Northern Colonies
A point of clean-cut distinction between the Buenos Ayres region
and those farther to the north appears in the treatment of the
natives . The Spanish emigration to the former district, small as it
was, was motived by intentions of settl ement. Had it been unre-
stricted and included both sexes, the fate of the natives must have
approached that observed elsewhere under conditions of contact in
regions where the more civilized race can live and reproduce itself
rapidly.^ As it was, the native policy of the settlers was one of
fellowship leading toliTiscegeliation. Of thenatives no very great
labors wer'e^demanded, for there were no mines or tropical planta-
tions, and the isolated community provided merely for its own
simple needs ; thus the Indians labored moderately as cultijvators_
or herds men,^ or, in remoter districts, came under Jesuit control in
the reductions. Naturally the settlers resisted the interference of
the latter, even though the natives were not in such a degree
indispensable to them as to the miners and planters. But the
motives for ruthless oppression and exploitation of the human
working-animal were, owing to environmental conditions, conspicu-
ous in their absence.
One of the results of the breaking of the policy of seclusion by
the contraband trade, which, besides, affected the Indians through
the wasteful War of the Seven Reductions, was the boundary dis-
pute with jheJPortuguese in Brazil.^ Early in the eighteenth century
the governor of Buenos Ayres, being reprimanded by the viceroy
of Peru for the negligence or connivance of his government with
1 Watson, II, 216; Zimmermann, I, 374 ff. 2 Haebler, Amerika, p. 426.
3 Cf. p. 5, above. * W^atson, I, 266, 271-272 ; Haebler, Amerika, p. 403.
^ Cf. pp. 159 and 294, above.
320 COLONIZATION
the smugglers, asserted that the contraband traffic could not be
stopped ; that either the markets must be thrown open to legiti-
mate trade, or that the Portuguese must be expelled from Uruguay
(Banda Oriental). After considerable strife the_treaty_oLi75g_Avas
adopted ; it stipulated that Portugal should cede to Spain the whole
eastern bank of the Plata, and in return should receive the seven
missionary towns on the Uruguay. Hence the War of the Seven
Reductions ; later negotiations fixed the holdings, as has been
seen, according to the principle of actual occupation.^ These
strifes had been largely fought out by the settlers themselves, and
: had inspired in them a certain degree of self-confidence and inde-
pendence, in addition to that engendered by carrying on trartic witlT
impunity in direct violation of Spain's restrictive commercial regu-
lations, and by frequently electing their own officers.^ Isolation
and neglect were bringing forth their fruits of alienation and dis-
affection. But the years 1806 and 1807 saw further developments
f which strengthened the sentiment of self-sufficiency. The English,
■^^ ' in the course of their struggle witli Napoleon, saw fit in J_8p6 to
make a descent upon Montevideo and Buenos Ayres, then colonies
of a prospectively Bonapartist kingdom. No especial difficulty was
experienced in reducing the towns. But, although almost totally
unaided by the mother-country, the settlers and Indians, under the
I Frenchman Liniers, managed to expel a strong English force from
BuenQS Ayres and to negotiate the evacuation of Montevideo as
/ well. The results were inevitable ; a dominant iiower had been
worsted, and without aid, and the natural conclusion was that the
colony could take care of its own interests. Moreover, it was un-
willing to give up the gain from freedom of trade vvith England,
which it had enjoyed during the occupation. Yet no voice was
raised at this time in favor of separation ; ^ if there were such ideas,
they were as yet inchoate. Buenos Ayres simply profited by her
strength, and by the end of the colonial period had attracted immi-
gration, and increased to such a degree that the population num-
bered about 800,000, of whom only about a half were Indians.
Chile experienced a more commonplace and uneventful develop-
ment, was more hampered, as being less isolated, by the activity
of the government, — for instance in the policy of granting great
entailed estates, — but afforded in general a smaller replica of the
^ Watson, II, 209 ff.; Moses, pp. 213 ff.; cf. p. 159, above.
2 Cf. Moses, p. i88. ^ Watson, II, 272 ff. ; Zininiermann, I. 437 ff.
SPANISH AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN COLONIES 321
conditions on the eastern coast. In 1787 Santiago contained over
40,000 inhabitants and tlie number was rapidly increasing.^
It is clear that the cases of the southern colonies, especially that
of Bue nos Ayr es, constituted as distinct a divergency from those
of the other Si)anish colonies as did the history of the Portuguese
SacT^ Pa u 1 o_d i s t ric t from that of the rest of Brazil. The general
explanation has been given in treating of the latter case, and in
more general terms in our preliminary classification of colonies ; ^
it is largely a matter of physical, especially climatic environment.
The situation is well set forth by Leroy-Beaulieu,^ whose remarks
are worth reproducing m extcnso : " It is an observation of Hum-
boldt that there is no country in the world where the social status
is subjec t to such a degree to the influence of climate and of the
disposition of the soil as it is in Spanish America. The examination
ofthe physical constitution of the different provinces is, in fact,
indispensable to the understanding of their economic organization.
In the extreme northern and southern districts, in the interior
provinces of Mexico, and in the Pampas of the Plata, immense
plains, somewhat dry and of temperate climate, became the seat
of a pastoral population . The domestic animals of Europe multi-
plied in astonishing fashion in these pasture-lands, and came to
constitute the chief wealth of the colonists. The latter originated,
for the most part, from the pure Spanish race. The Indiansjwere
few in nu mber in these districts, and they manifested a warlike
disposition which preserved them from subjection ; and on the
other hand, the poverty of the colonists prevented the introduc-
tion of slavery. The Creole in these regions obeyed the law which
m our day governs colonists of European origin : he isolated him-
self from his companions in order to have a larger space and one
sufficienl; for the pasturage of his immense herds. This is the way
the shepherds of the Cape or of Australia are doing. A perpetual
struggle against the Indians and a rude life of labors and watchings
tempered with vigor these scions of the old Castilians. Towns . . .
were rare and served only as refuges against Indian invasions. This
pastoral civilization became eminently useful to Europe through
the primary products, wools and hides, with which it supplied
European manufactories.
1 Moses, p. 148; Watson, II, 164-165; Ro.scher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 19.
2 Cf. pp. 14 ff., above.
3 1, 16-17.
322 coi.OM/.vnoN
" The hot and fertile regions with easy access to the sea, Hke
Guatemala and Venezuela, presented a quite different civilization :
there the great wealth of the inhabitants consisted in the products
of exportation characteristic of the tropical climates, — coffee, cot-
ton, sugar, cacao. The status of society then approximated to that
of the West Indies. The whites enriched themselves through the
product of their plantations, which increased much in quantity and
value during the eighteenth century. Manual labor was performed
by the Indians in places where they were numerous, by the mixed
races which were so common in certain provinces, and especially
by the negroes." Here is a fundamental contrast in colonial life-
conditions, and a further justification of the segregation of the real
settlement colonies of the Spaniards from those depending upon
the mines and the plantations — for the latter two may be treated
as allied species of the exploitation colony. The economic, social,
and political consequences of the contrast have been set forth in
general terms in a preceding chapter ; ^ and they are yet clearly
in evidence in Spanish America as the first century after emanci-
pation draws on to its close. The only relatively stable states of
Spanish America at the present timerafe"tBb'se \vFose lite-condT^
tions have allowed of free immigration and unimpedc'd ]ir()pagation
of European stocks ; and of these states, the most i)r()gressive,
despite its past disadvantages of remoteness and other drawbacks,
is Argentina.
But Argentine self-sufficiency and independence were a result of
isolation as well as of climatic and allied conditions. This factor was
of great importance; for whereas Mexico, a prevailingly temperate
colony, lacking isolation, was less insistent upon independence, tlie
neg lected Cara cas, a tropical colony, became one of the chief centers
of revolt against Spain. But we move on to consider briefly the
immediate antecedents of the revolutionary struggle, limiting atten-
tion still to those colonies which won independence in 1825, that
is, to Spanish America in the narrower sense.
Movements toward Independence
It is clear that the Spanish system, as we have come to see it,
was not calculated to harmonize with the spirit of a more modern
age — that its great menace was enlightenment. But, however
1 Pp. 7 ff., above.
SPANISH AMERICA: THE REVOLUTION 323
strictly guarded against, enlightenment was bound to come ; the
penetration of the once almost absolute seclusion of the colonies
through contraband trade, the asiento-agreements, and otherwise,
soon afforded the Spanish Americans food for reflection and for a
comparison of their own status with that of the rest of the colonial
world. Indeed, it is not at all impossible that the liberal policy of
Charles III, inspired by Aranda (1766 and following) and continued
by Galvez after 1775, contributed rather to the break-up of the
empire than to its preservation ; for it was too late to put new
wine into old bottles. Moreover, the subsequent vacillation back
to the old policy completely nullified preceding wisdom, so far as
the retention of the colonial empire was concerned, and made of
the liberal regime a simple incident in a consistently anachronistic
policy.^
With the acquisition of knowledge of the outside world there
early came to the Spanish-Americans the stirring story of the
American Revolution and the foundation of a great republic based
"upon principles which their resentment of the Spanish policy led
them to regard as the sum of truth and political desirability. Upon
the heels of this movement, itself in great part a revolt against a
political and economic "system," came the more feverish French
Revolution, enacting into a universal dogma the rights of man,
and constituting a violent and infectious reaction against the
mediaevalism inherent in royal rights, caste-systems, and other
principles fixedly embodied in the Spanish system. The Creoles
and mestizos had long chafed against political discrimination and
were quite ready to subscribe to any and all of the principles of
the new political evangel. That Spain lent aid to the American
revolt but stimulated this attitude. Tumults arose in Peru and
Buenos Ayres immediately after the American Revolution, and
anarchy reigned for months. Agitators arose in the chief cities,
the foremost of them being General Miranda of Caracas, who
approached England, France, and Russia in behalf of the colonies,
and under whose leadership the Gran Reunion Americana was
formed in London. ^
1 For the liberal reaction of the latter half of the eighteenth century, see Leroy-
Beaulieu, I, 32-34 ; Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 316 ; Hume, p. 396; Zimmermann, I,
362 ff., 429 ff.
2 Hume, p. 407 ; Watson, II, 272; Humboldt, Essai, I, 115; Leroy-Beaulieu, I,
10; Zimmermann, I, 436 ff. The basis of the treatment of this whole period is the
work of Mitre _gs condensed by lulling.
324
COLONIZATION
In the meantime Spain was in no condition to control the situ-
ation ; during her constant wars "the colonies had been allowed
to go on in their own way, Spanish governors and officials, clerical
and lay, plundering right and left, with little or no thought of the
benefit of the people over whom they ruled." In 1783 Aranda
had plainly before him the prospects of the separation of the
American colonies.^ But it was again, as in the case of Portugal,
the European wars which brought the situation to its climax.
" The terrible shock given the mother-country by Napoleon was
. . . the principal cause for the revolt of the colonics : tlie captivity
of the old royal house, the elevation of the Bonapartist dynasty,
the frightful war with France, and finally the rapid alternation of
absolutist and constitutional rule through revolution in Spain herself.
As a result the old carefully transmitted structure of colonial insti-
tutions, ideas, and policy was thrown completely out of joint. The
keystone, as it were, was removed. This was the more markedly
the case since many of the highest colonial officials exhibited a
significant vacillation between the legitimate kings and the usurper.
Because at the same time the mother-country was in such pressing
need of the political help of the English, it was now impossible to
repel their commercial invasions of the colonial markets. ... In
addition, after the restoration of general peace in Europe, the
English both privately . . . and as a part of public policy . . .
favored strongly the separation of the Spanish colonies from the
mother-country."^ It was believed that the colonies were an.xious
to throw off the yoke of Spain, and attention and aid were accorded
to Miranda and others in the prosecution of their projects. Trafal-
gar (1805) had destroyed the navy, almost the last vestige of the
apparatus of colonial control, and the end, whatever the attempts
to avert it, could be only a matter of time.''^
It does not lie within the province of this book to trace the
history of the revolutionary struggle ; except for its general aspects,
or as it throws light upon what has gone before, it scarcely forms
a part of the subject of colonization. But it cannot be otherwise
than enlightening to realize, among other things, that the strength
of the revolutionary movement appeared (18 10) in Argentina, its
origin, however, having taken place in the Caracas region ; that
the struggle displayed a m arked jerocity of characte r and left
^ TTume, p. 396 ; Zinimermaim, I, 363, 429.
2 Koscher, p. 176. •' Wat.soii, II, 271-272; Ziiiimermann, I, 436.
SPANISH AMERICA: THE REVOLUTION 325
behind it a legacy of lasting hostility ; and that the revolutionists
were effecUialjy aided by foreigners, especially the English, and in
a less degree by the emancipated Americans.^
Grievances of the Colonists : the Revolution
What the colonists fought for was the overthrow of the Spanish
system of restriction. A manifesto issued in__i8 18. cites the main
points of contention. It demanded the following : equality of rights
with the inhabitants of the metropolis (this being the protest of the
Creoles against the discrimination they felt ever more strongly 2) ;
entire liberty of cultivation and of manufacture ; liberty of impor-
tation and exportation as respects all the ports of Spain and of
friehclIyTbimtnes -freedom of commerce between Spanish America
and Asia ; the same liberty with the Philippines ; '^ the abolition
of every governmental monopoly, an indemnification to be made
through taxation ; liberty to exploit the silver mines ; reservation
of half of the public functions for American Spaniards (this point
being designed to fortify the one first cited) ; the establishment
of -Si junta in every capital to see to it that this latter disposition
should be always carried out. "Such were the just demands of the
malcontents. And it was not alone the upper classes, it was the
mass of the people itself which was penetrated by the necessity of
these reforms."^ What they wanted was liberty — freedom — as-
the repetition of the term indicates. The repeated discrimination
against the native Spaniards and the mestizos in favor of the
exploiting class, the European Spaniards, is what made the struggle
so fierce and relentless.
Mitre, th e first constitutional president of the Argentine
Republic, gives the following synopsis of the Revolution.^ " In
.the year iSo^the first tremors of the revolution began to be felt
simultaneously in the two extremities and in the center of South
America ; the fact that its several forms were identical, their
immediate purposes the same, and their aims analogous, reveals as
of long standing an innate predisposition and an organic solidarity
1 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 30-31 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, to; Moses, p. 187; Zim-
mermann, I, 442 ff.
- For the resentment of the Creoles, cf. Humboldt, Essai, I, 11 4-1 15.
3 Cf. pp. 347-349. below.
* Leroy-Beaulleu, I, 34 ; cf. Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., pp. 26, note; 4(')-47.
'" Hist, de San Martin, I, 8-9.
326 COLONIZATION
of the living whole. In iSio, simultaneously, without a mutual
understanding between the parties, and as if in obedience to an
inborn impulse, all the Spanish American colonies rose in insur-
rection, proclaiming the principle of self-government, the germ of
their independence and liberty. Six years later all the insurrec-
tions in South America had been smothered (i 8 14-18 1 6) and the
United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata alone had kept their foot-
ing. The latter, after expelling from their soil all their former
masters, declared their independence before the world, and, through
making common cause with them, gave to the conquered colonies
the signal for the great and last conflict. IrL.i^Si/ the_Argentine
revolution, which had become an American movement, developed
a plan of campaign, and a policy of emancipation that were to
embrace the continent. The revolutionists took the offensive and
wrought a change in the destiny of the struggle that had begun ;
they advanced across the Andes and freed Chile, and then, united
with Chile, gained control of the Pacific, liberated Peru, and carried
their delivering arms to the equator, thus assisting the Colombian
revolution to its triumph. This vigorous forward movement made
itself felt in the northern extremity of the southern continent,
which, in its turn, conquered and expelled the champions of the
metropolis, evolved through the same phases as the Argentine
revolt, assumed the offensive, crossed the Andes, became general-
ized as an American movement, and converged toward the center
— where the two forces of emancipation effected their union, as
has been said. The strife remained confined to the highlands of
Peru, the last refuge of the Spanish domination already wounded
unto death in the battles of Chacabuco and Maipu, Carabobo and
Boyaca. From this time on, Spanish American independence
ceased to be a military antl political problem and became simply a
question of time and of .persistent effort. The Spanish American
colonies were free in fact and by right, through their own strength
and without external aid ; they fought alone in the face of the
count r)'s absolutist powers in alliance against tlicni, and from the
colonial chaos arose a new world in due order — a world crowned
by a sky in which gleamed the i)olar and the ecjuatorial stars. Few
times has the earth presented a similar j^olitical genesis, few times
an historical epic more heroic."
It should be noted that whenever tlie Spaniards effected any
]iaciru\'ili()ii, it had been attended by sucli cruelties and was followed
SPANISH AMERICA: THE REVOLUTION 327
proniiiUy by such tactlessness of policy that the temper of tlie
revolt was strengthened rather than impaired. Heavy forced loans,
confiscations of i)atriots' property, and trials for high treason
attended the restoration of Spanish authority. Yet it must be
admitted that the situation was not much helped by the few exhi-
bitions of a different spirit : what freedom was allowed, for instance
to tlie i)ress, was at once used in spreading separatist ideas. In
general, however, the successes of the counter-revolution meant
the reaffirmation of the essential features of the old system.
In Mexico, Iturbide won over the soldiers and had himself pro-
claimed in 1822 the Emperor Augustin I ; this ill-advised move
was, however, but the overture to the formation, in 1824, of the
Republic of the United States of Mexico, with a constitution
modeled upon that of its northern neighbor. In 18 19 Florida had
passed into the hands of the United States of America. By 1824
all the former colonies upon the mainland were lost to Spain. But
the end might have been yet delayed had it not been for the
active partisanship of England ; she, and to a lesser degree by
reason of feebler strength, the United States, had aided with nien
and credit upon many former occasions. Trade interests in the final
and complete invasion of the old monopoly were combined with
sentimental sympathy, and any number of formal governmental
prohibitions on the ground of the friendship of England and Spain
could not avail. President Monroe recognized Colombia as an
independent state at the end of 1823, and England withstood a
continental alliance whose purpose was to support Spain. The
Monroe Doctrine was promulgated at about the same time ; and
in 1824 English consuls were dispatched, first to Argentina, then
to Mexic o, Ch ile, and Colombia. Upon January i, 1825, the inde-
pendence of the republics was recognized by England and so stood
as -A. fait accompli}
Thus was the hampering monopoly system finally broken, and
largely through the agency of the rising commercial and colonial
world-power, Great Britain ; the fate of the Venetians and Portu-
guese, n(jt to mention more ancient holders of monopoly, had over-
taken still another aspirant for exclusive rights to trade. " In the
case of the Spanish dependency, the bands binding it to the
mother-country have been rigid and unelastic, so that they have
1 The foregoing sketch of the Emancipation i.s condensed from Mitre, with some
reference to Zimmeimann, I, 444-475.
328 COLONIZATION
parted with the first considerable strain, and the colony has been
irretrievably severed from its superior. The English dependencies,
on the contrary, have found themselves at the end of an elastic
lie. When they have tugged to be free, the cord has } ielded, but
has gradually drawn them backward when their discontent was
past. . . . But Spain, or the Spanish king, insisted on an essential
uniformity throughout the Spanish dominions ; in other words,
obedience to that [)olicy which would contribute most to the selfish
interests of the mother-country. The outcome of rigid adherence
to Spanish policy has been the loss by Spain of her vast colonial
possessions and abundant sources of wealth. . . . The tratlitions
with which Spanish America began her career were the traditicjns
of despotism, and any permanent advance towards liberty had to
be made in oi)])osition to these traditions." ^ And the separation
was one which left ineffaceable scars behind it. Kindly feeling did
not return, and commercial relations between Spain and her former
colonies became practically nil ; " to-day Spain takes less part in
the commerce of Peru than does, for example, Sweden, not to
mention Italy." In the shipping reports for 1876 Spain is found
to be considerably behind Sweden and is included under "various,"
her shipping amounting in all to 8154 tons. The same is true in
Chile and Argentina. " Thus the relations of Spain with her old
colonies have nearly ceased ; she furnishes still, however, immi-
grants in considerable number." ^
Summary of Spanish Influence
After what has been said, it is unnecessary to summarize at any
length, in view of its results, the activity of the Si)anish in America.
It has been the order of the day to criticise them severely ; recently,
however, we have had a rehabilitation or an apologia representing
the swing of judgment in the oi)posite direction.^ Among patriotic
Spanish writers, one of extraordinary ability and distinction has
often been quoted — Colmeiro ; and an ending may be made of
specifically Spanish America by a quotation from him, representing
jirobably the best he has to say. " We have dissimulated neither
the faults nor the errors committed by the Spanish in America —
from which the peoples who founded colonies in those days were
1 Moses, pp. 305, 308-309.
2 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 3S-40 ; Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 48.
8 Bourne, Sp. in Amer. ; cf. especially pp. 202-204, 242, 316-319.
SPANISH AMERICA: CUBA AND PUERTO RICO 329
not exempt, because they had their roots in the age and in the
system. But those authors are writing with passion, and merit
little credence, who paint us as ferocious wild beasts, or at least
as barbarians thirsting for blood and gold, and forgetting good
works. It was the Spaniards who introduced into the Indies the
ox, the ass and the horse, pigs, sheep and goats, and a multitude
of domesticated birds, for the comfort and pleasure of the inhab-
itants ; it was they who transplanted the vine, olive, pomegranate,
orange, lemon, and almost all our fruit trees; they introduced the
sugar-cane and founded the first sugar-refineries ; they taught the
art of raising silk, they sowed flax and hemp, and propagated
various garden plants and vegetables ; they, in fine, juirged the
l and of id olatry, eradicated the sacrifices of human blood, pursued
the cannibals, and punished their cruelties and abominations." ^
CUBA AND PUERTO RICO
Although Spanish America was lost in 1825, a Spanish colonial
empire was destined yet to endure for over seventy years. Of the
West Indies we have still to consider Cuba, whicH virtually was
not reckoned as an important part of the enipire until late in the
eighteenth century ; and, of less importance, Puerto Rico. And
there also remains the empire in the East, especially the Philip-
pines, to which only casual attention has been accorded in the
foregoing.
Cuba stands for the latest phases of the Spanish system and the
latter-day resistance accorded to a prolongation of the anachronistic
policy which led to the falling-away of the mainland colonies.
Cuba actually suffered less beneath the old repressive system than
did the other sections of Spanish America. She rebelled against
the native laws as did the other tropical colonies, but, despite her
almost unrivaled natural resources, she never attained a status of
population ^ or of wealth, calculated to react with force against the
enormity of the repression to which she was subjected, until the
end of the eighteenth century. Cuba was revealed to the world
only^after Havana had been taken by the English in 1762; the
possibilities of her commerce then became apparent. Although
she had profited to some degree by the more enlightened policy of
J Colmeiio, 11, 421-422.
2 Cf. Humboldt, Isla de Cuba, chap, iii ; Saco, earlier chapters, /«.
330 COLONIZATION
the latter part of the eighteenth century, her economic awakening
was due largely to the impact of external forces. This is what
Leroy-Beaulieu means when he says that the history of Cuba
(and Puerto Rico) is of recent date : during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries Cuba was characterized by "a status of
mediocre and obscure prosperity, a rather general competency, a
mild civilization, good treatment of the slave population, slight
financial resources, and the need of aid and of subsidies from the
metropolis. A combination of exceptionally favorable circum-
stances," he adds, " brought about a radical change in the con-
ditions of this colony and placed it in a few years above all the
Antilles." ^
The English, during their ten months' tenure of Havana, had
opened the port to all English ships, and the immediate result was
that, during this period, instead of the usual five or six merchant
vessels, 727 entered the harbor. The same period saw as many
slaves (3000) imported as the preceding twenty years had afforded
under the privileged companies. "The enlightened Charles III of
Spain, profiting by this example, opened the trade of the islands
in 1765 and of Louisiana in 1768 to eight Spanish ports besides
Cadiz, and relaxed many of the regulations that had hampered
the merchants."^ "The trade with Cuba, which in 1765 required
scarcely six ships, required over two hundred in 1778, after all
Spaniards had been allowed to share in it by paying a duty of six
per cent. From 1765 to 1770 the income from duties at Havana
trebled, while the exportation from the whole island increased
fivefold. Before 1765 this magnificent island, which was able to
provide all Europe with sugar, did not have even enough for the
consumption of the mother-country." -^ It can thus be seen that " the
prosperity of Cuba dates from the English capture of Havana" ; *
that is to say, from the first direct subversion of stock Spanish
policy. Allusion need scarcely be made to the fact that such a
desirable end was regularly thus attained in Spanish America.
1 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 251, 252; cf. Humboldt, Isla de Cuba, p. 248. The latter
author considers in some detail the geographical and other natural advantages
possessed by the island, and especially by the port of Havana. See his chapters :
Consideraciones Generales, Extension, Clima, Comercio, fassifii. Merivale (quoted
by Leroy-Beaulieu, L 253) notes that, by reason of its elongation, there is no produc-
tive part of Cuba which is over forty miles from the coast.
2 I'.ourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 296-297 ; Saco, p. 325; Zimniermann, I, 396.
•' Koscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 36. ■• Bourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 297.
SPANISH AMERICA: CUBA AND PUERTO RICO 331
But the great material advance of the island took place somewhat
later and attained a sort of acme during the series of revolutions,
first in Spain herself, and then in the colonies of the mainland.
Cuba, therefore, seems in a way to have arisen from the collapse
of the American empire, and its history to form a prolongation of
Spanish American history after the great crisis. It is for this
reason that the island has been singled out for separate treatment ;
a sketch of its nineteenth-century vicissitudes really exhibits the
last phase, prolonged over seven decades, of Spanish American
colonial policy and methods.
Cuba after 1800
What differentiates Cuba after 1800 most sharply, for present
purposes, from the rest of Spanish America, is ^e com position of
jts population. Indeed, the island long before that date formed a
marked exception to the general rule in this respect. The fact
that, besides lying farther to the north, it was an island, seems to
have been determinative, in large degree, of its diverse destiny.
With the rest of the Antilles it early lost its native population ; ^
hence the rarity of the Spanish-American hybrid, the absence of
race-conflicts and of the complex stratification into classes, the
exclusion of the mission, and so on. Again, the more temperate
climate, especialFy in the loftier interior, permitted and invited a
larger settlement of Europeans. Despite the fact that Cuba was
the Queen of the Antilles in the production of stock products of a
warmer zone, she approached far closer to the type of the colony
of settlement than did any other of the Spanish American colonies
between the tropics. At the end of the year 1825 Cuba is thought
by Humboldt to have had a population of 325,000 whites in a
total of 715,000.^ This was after a considerable importation of
slaves, — the census of 1775 gives: whites, 95,419; mulattoes,
24,751 ; negroes, 50,200. In 1 791, of 137,800 inhabitants of the
jurisdiction of Havana, 73,000 were whites and 64,800 people of
color. These figures may be compared with those already recorded ^
for different sections of Spanish America, and with those which
Humboldt and others give for divers non-Spanish sections of
1 On the disappearance of the Cuban natives see Humboldt, Isla de Cuba, pp. 1 26 ff.
2 Rough estimates for 1850 are: 605,160 whites, 694,070 colored. In the latter
part of the nineteenth century the whites constituted over half of the population.
Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 254, 264. ^ See pp. 215 ff., above.
332 COLONIZATION
the Antilles ; for example, the proportion of colored population,
negroes and mulattoes, amounted, it is said, for the whole of the
Antilles, to 83 per cent of the total. And the suggestion of the
colony of settlement becomes the more pronounced when it is
realized, for example, that in 1775 there were 40,864 while
women in Cuba to 54,555 white men.^ Again, the percentage of
Spaniards was raised by the flow of loyalists thither during the
revolutionary period ; Leroy-Beaulieu compares it to the movement
of English loyalists to Canada during the American Revolution.'-^
Si)ain held in Cuba, therefore, after the falling-away of the
mainland possessions, the nucleus of a real colony of Europeans,
inspired, at least in good part, with loyalty to herself. Many of the
blacks and mulattoes were free men,'^ and identitied with the main-
tenance of Spanish rule. The island has been perhaps the most
potentially productive section of any colonial empire. Here was
yet another opportunity for Spain, recently chastened in a most
suggestive and pointed manner, to develop a modern policy.
In addition to the benefits of the liberal policy of the early
nineteenth century, Cuba fell upon slill another piece of fortune,
economically speaking, in the general abolition, in 1812 and follow-
ing, of the slave-trade ; upon her, " given the method of cultivation
adopted in all the sugar colonies, it conferred, from the point of
view of production, an incontestable advantage." For while the
other islands lost their labor force, Cuba's was recruited ; and the
consequent decline of their production was pure profit for her.
" She avoided that dismal transition which was to cost the EngUsh
and French planters so dear. By a remarkable spirit of prudence
and initiative, even while they were maintaining slavery, the
planters of the Spanish islands introduced into their cultivation
and their manufacture all the progress of which these were sus-
ceptible." Moreover, for the very reason that she was thus pros-
perous, Cuba drew to herself a large immigration of the European
races. Again the passing of the " colonial pact " left Cuba undis-
criminated against in France and England, and " the Cuban
planters saw open before them twcL_great^jTiarkets in which the
illumboldi, Isla de ("uba, pp. 97-109; cf. table, pp. 9S-99 ; yet in the typical
exploitation period in the middle of the nineteenth century Oallenga (p. 36) could
call Havana a "city without women."
- Leroy-I5eaulieu, T, 254.
3 Humboldt, Isla de Cuba, pp. 100 ff.
SPANISH AMKRTCA: CUBA AND PUIIKIO RICO ^;^t^
natural and artificial conditions of their production assured them
great advantages." ^
It is plainly to be seen that the continued prosj^erity of the island,
and so the progress of its cultivation, hinged ui)on the free utiliza-
tion of the uniquely favorable economic advantages recounted.
The fate of Cuba was bound up in that of her plantation production ;
but it was upon this that the attention of the metropolis was to be
fixed. Hence the history of Cuba, for the present purpose, to the
exclusion of most of such other topics as have engaged attention
in the survey of other sections of Spanish America, narrows down
to the attitude of the Spanish administration toward Cuban trade.
The Supply of Labor
For the moment, however, it will clarify counsel to devote a
few words to the labor force over which the Cubans had control.
That the whites themselves could labor to a certain degree with
impunity seems undeniable ; ^ there were, at any rate, too many of
them for all to be owners or overseers. But the bulk of the heavy
labor, in consonance with sub-tropical conditions, fell upon a more
fully acclimatized race ; and, the natives having disappeared, this
was at first the African, imported in relatively small numbers under
the familiar system of the asiento.*'^ Cuba had in her early days
very little use for slaves, inasmuch as the chief local occupation
was cattle-raising. The Asiento of 17 13 only slightly increased the
importation; in 1763 there were but 32,000 slaves in the island;
the whole number introduced between 1521 and 1763 is thought ^L4A>-
by Humboldt to have been no more than 60,000. But between ^^,^c-,__fc.
1 7 63 and 1 7Q O there were received at Havana 24,875, and else- i-fT^
where in the island some 6000. The prohibition of the slave-trade ^^
north of the equator (18 17) and its entire abolition (1820) were \
preceded by the introduction of 225,574 slaves between 1790 and
1820, through the port of Havana alone. It is reckoned by Hum-
boldt that the whole island received at least 320,000 negroes
between 1791 and 1825, as against 93,500 in all the decades pre-
1 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 254-255. Even after the direct traffic was universally sup-
pressed, Cuba still imported illicitly a considerable number of blacks.
2 Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 264.
8 P. 249, above; during the earlier centuries Cuba and Puerto Rico constantly
demanded more slaves and at the same time feared slave-uprisings. Saco, earlier
chapters, passim.
334 COLONIZATION
ceding. It is easily seen that the emergence of Cuba into a copi-
ously productive status called for an immediate and large increase
of the human labor force ; and that the result was the creation of
an important constituent of population with which reckoning had,
in future, to be made. And it must be added that tolerance of
race-mixture resulted in the formation of a considerable body of
mulattoes ; in 1775 there were some 24,750; in 181 1, 70,000.^
The conditions of the colored population were remarkably favor-
able : even Humboldt,^ who hates the system of slavery so cordially,
takes pains to demonstrate this. The possibility of attaining
freedom is perhaps as good an evidence as any of the slave's status;
and in Cuba, in 1825, one-third of the people of color were free.
The free^element, white and colored, reached in Cuba 64 per cent
of the total population, as against scarcely 19 per cent in the
English Antilles. These considerations will aid the American to
a realization of the fact that Cuba in some respects more nearly
resembled the southern states of his country than it did the rest
of the Spanish colonies.^
Anticipating somewhat, it may be said that toward the middle
of the nineteenth century ^ a strenuous effort was made to meet a
growing need for a labor supply. Immigration of European families
was encouraged, and Yucatecs, and especially Chinese, were intro-
duced. Of the latter, 5560 were imported in 1859, and before
i860 some 17,000; of these, only seven were women. Further
requisition upon the Chinese in i860 resulted in the presence in
Cuba, in 1862, of over 60,000; the regular cost of their intro-
duction was $300 to $400 per head. In 1884 there were in Cuba
1 Humboldt, Isla de Cuba, pp. 141-147, 109; between 1799 and 1S03 there were
imported into Havana 34,500 negroes, of whom seven per cent died per annum.
Ilumljoldt, Essai, I, 131. ^ i^la de Cuba, pp. 97-100.
^ Leroy-Beaulieu (I, 256) states that the development of wealth and of the slave-trade
changed the lot of the slaves. " The Spanish planter became more cruel and immoral
than the other Europeans: the Cuban sugar-plantations are exploited, thanks to the
slave-trade, at an enormous expense of human lives, losses which new recruits replace
without ce.ssation. The slave-trade being prohibited, commerce in slaves goes on as
contraband, and their condition is rendered worse in default of the protection of
the legal prescriptions which regulated the trade." He adds, upon the authority of
Merivale : " The average life of a Cuban slave is only ten years ; in Barbados, during
the worst period of English slavery, it was seventeen years." On the later conditions
of slave and free labor, emancipation, etc., consult Gallenga, pp. 75 ff., 91 ff., chap. vi.
Cf. Bordier, Col., p. 78.
* For conditions of native population, sugar-production, etc., as they appeared at
this time to a young Dane, see " Th., " Erindringer, etc., latter Y>a.rt, passim.
SPANISH AMERICA: CUBA AND PUERTO RICO 335
some 70,000 Chinese men ; of women, only 1000. The usual
abuses of the coolie system did not fail to appear, as well as the
stock disadvantages to a colonial society of the presence of such
aliens in its midst. Upon a revelation of the oppressiveness and
rascality of the system there ensued uprisings in Canton against
the coolie-agents and a formal protest to the European consuls
from the governor of Shanghai.^
Spanish Policy in Cuba
Having accentuated these main points of dissimilarity between
Cuba and the rest of Spanish America, and refraining from the
rehearsal of what they had in common, we now turn to the consider-
ation of post-revolutionary Spanish policy in America, as applied
typically to "The Pearl of the Antilles."
Early in the nineteenth century it seemed that Spain had
learned her lesson, and that there lay before Cuba an unhampered
development of great resources. Measures were taken in 18 17 by
Ferdinand VII which looked toward a continued moderation in
the matter of government requisitions. But as time went on, the
inveterate tendency toward exploitation and exclusion again mani-
fested itself. Again Spain retrograded through failing to advance
with the times. Tariffs which had been moderate (7^ to 33I per
cent ad valorem) in 1809, became exorbitant when the other powers
had deserted their former policy based upon the " colonial pact "
and mercantilism; the jjlanters- found cause of complaint about
their status when they came to compare it with that of the colonies
of Jamaica, Martinique, and Barbados. One of their chief grievances
lay in the unfavorable situation in which they were placed with
their best customers, the people of the United States. For since
the products of the northern republic, notably grains, were subject
to differential duties upon entering Cuba, the obvious return-blow
was the imposition of differentials upon Cuban sugar. But the
United States formed the natural market for this sugar, taking
62 per cent of it ; and England bought another 22 per cent as
against 3 per cent taken by Spain. Yet upon the part which
entered the United States the Cuban planters paid about two-thirds
1 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 255, 257-2 5.S; Ciallenga, pp. 109, 127; for the place of the
coolie system under the topic of tropical labor, cf. p. 11, above; Keller, Sociol.
View, etc.
336 COLONIZATION
of the selling value. " Such were the deplorable results of a colo-
nial regime which the metropolis, far from amending, rendered
daily more rigorous : the planters had to pay very high for t.heir
flour, iron, fabrics, — for all those articles which were useful for
existence and for manufacture, — and they found themselves in
respect to sales in the great market of America inider conditions
far worse than those of their competitors from the neighboring
islands. When the interests of colonists are thus manifestly in-
jured, loyalism does not delay its departure." ^
Naturally, as had been the case in the now revolted colonies, the
Creoles were allowed no share in their own government,^ no chance
to protest officially against treating Cuba like " a milch-cow which it
[Spain] seemed to wish to exhaust." A complicated administrative
mechanism whose various arms were sinecures with full lines of
perquisites for Spaniards, and whose general character was corrupt
to an exceptional degree, was saddled upon the Cuban producers.
Captains-general made disgraceful fortunes ; high functionaries
levied upon the people for their daughters' dowries and for their
infants' baptismal finery. The budget augmented to the enormous
figure of $30,000,000, covering expenses incurred by Spain in
ways entirely disconnected with Cuba, and yielding a yearly profit
of about $6,000,000 on her colonial budget. Cuban finance became
disordered and the result was a forced circulation.''
Insukrp:ction
Cuba's old proverbial loyalty was not proof against all this. The
middle of the nineteenth century saw the inception of an insurrec-
tion, with independence as its aim, and numbering among its
adherents not only the wealthy Cubans, planters, industrials, and
merchants, but likewise the blacks. For the insurgents, taking
advantage of the well-known willingness of the proprietors to eman-
cipate their slaves, proclaimed, in February, 1869, the immediate
and total abolition of slavery. Thus the negroes also came to
espouse the cause of their liberators. The latent rebellion came
to a head with the revolution of 1868 ir^Spain, which overthrew
1 Leroy-Beaiilieu, I, 255, 258-259; cf. Gallenga, pp.42 ff.
2 On class-animosity in Cuba, see Gallenga, pp. 39 ff., 62-66; cf. p. 360 and
note 3, below.
3 Leroy-Keaulieu, I, 260; Gallenga, pp. 13, 66 ff., etc. For the later vicissitudes
of the depreciated currency, see Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 262, 266; Gallenga, pp. 44 ff.
SPANISH AMERICA: CUBA AND PUKR'l'O RICO 337
the Spanish queen ; of course this confusion provided only " the
occasion, not the cause, for a conflagration which had been long
smoldering in the colony." ^ \f^^'
Spain's treatment of the insurgents was most ill-advised and
tactless : all their claims were refused ; no concessions to rebels
were to be made by Castilian pride. "On March 21, 1869, 250
Cubans, selected from the (^lite of Creole society, were torn from
their firesides and deported to Fernando Po and Mahon. The in-
dignation which seized the whole insular population at the spectacle
of this unjustifiable barbarity, doubled the forces of the insurrec-
tion." The struggle was long and characterized by great atrocity ;
it was not until 1878 that the vigilant and apparently upright Cam-
pos managed to quell it, and then largely through buying off the /^'
insurgents. He is said to have paid, as a result of his agreement -t^IaX
\cojivcnio), as much as $8,500,000 ; he himself admitted such an ex-
pense of $850,000.^ Reforms in general and in particular*^ were
promised the Cubans, and overt hostilities were suspended.
The years of the insurrection had brought Cuban prosperity
almost to ruin. For the island had had to suffer, not only the
ravages of war, but also the insensate exactions of a suspicious
and fearful government. Sugar-production was reduced by half ;
at the same time, however, the budget rose to $40,000,000, the
equivalent of which for France, according to Leroy-Beaulieu,
would be $1,000,000,000. Taxes of all kinds were capricious as
well as heavy; simple merchants paid direct taxes of $2550;
planters paid up to $60,000. Such taxes often surpassed income
and infringed upon capital.* The only one of the promises wrung
from Spain which had been fulfilled seventeen years later, was
that which had to do with the slaves ; they were definitively eman- .^ i* o -
cipated in 1880. The budget of 1884-188 5 was certainly over cj^,_,,„„_^
1 Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 258. For a more detailed discussion of this insurrection, see
Gallenga, pp. 14-22, chap, iii ; on emancipation, see chap. vi. For the nineteenth-
century history of Spain, see Hume, Modern Spain, or Clarke, Modern Spain, to
which text-allusions, from this place on, r.efer. Upon topics connected with slavery
Aimes is the latest authority.
■^ Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 261-262 ; see Gallenga on " Pacification," chap. vii.
3 It seems unnecessary to rehearse the formal demands of the Cubans. Fellow-
sufferers under the same rigid system wanted pretty much the same things. The
reader is referred to the list of Filipino demands (p. 363, below), which included in
general what they thought Cuba had gotten, or was about to get. Cf. also Zimmer-
mann, I, 500.
* Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 262-263.
2,2,^ COLON I /.All ON
$32,000,000, a figure which woulci rci)re.scnl over $21 per capita ; ^
it was divided as follows :
Interest and liquidation of debt $10,000,000
War-expenses 9,000,000
Marine 2,204,000
,^ ,. ( (or den publico) 700,000
Police ■{ , J- /v
1^ [i^iiardia civil) 2,537,000
Various ( public works, public instruction, administration, etc.) 5,000,000
Collection and financial organization 2,000,000
The meager provision under " Various " needs no comment.
" These charges were crushing. They came from a much too
numerous military force, and from an administrative waste of which
the figures of the budget scarcely give an idea." " If you treat
the provinces of Cuba as enemies," said an orator in the Spanish
senate in 1884, " 24,000 men are not sufficient to hold them under ;
it would be necessary to send 100,000 men. If you treat them as
friends, it is different." And this senator recalled the fact that
England maintained only 6,000 troopers in the midst of 4,000,000
inhabitants of Canada. " Never has a colony been so pitilessly
exploited by an avaricious and improvident mother country." '^
It is plain that Spain had learned nothing from the separation
of the colonies in 1825 nor from the hardly suppressed insurrection
of the seventies. She blundered back into the old policy, and even
accentuated it. It is a wonder that the final insurrection was so
long delayed ; but it came at length in^895_and found issue in
the loss of what was left to Spain in America. Once again, how-
ever, Spain was destined to refer the collapse of her system and
the loss of her colonies to the accursed foreigner. It seems unlikely
that the insurgents could have realized their aims within any cal-
culable period of time, had it not been for aid from without. In
the earlier insurrection the " patriots " were as little able to take
Havana as the royal forces were to pacify the island ; and the
same situation recurred in the later revolution. An interminable
vista of petty guerrilla strife afforded no prospect of future settle-
ment and peace, while the economic interests, not only of Cuba,
1 A Spanish senator, calling attention to the high per capita tax, gave the following
comparative average rates : C^anada, between $6.20 and #6.40 ; Martinique and (luade-
loupe, $4 to $5 ; in the ensemble of the English colonies, )i52.40 to 52.60. " No coun-
try in the world," he said, " attained to such a quota of taxation, not even France
whose ordinary budget represents about 85 francs per French taxpayer." Leroy-
Beaulieu, T, 265.
2 Leroy-Heaulieu, I, 261-265, 266. For the earlier periods, see Humboldt, Isla de
Cuba, pp. 250 ff., chapter entitled " Hacienda."
SPANISH AMP:RICA: CUBA AND PUERTO RICO 339
but of all the world that had to do with her commercially, suffered
intolerably. And because the interests of the United States were
so extensive, irritation in this country waxed ever greater, and
gradually metamorphosed itself into the form of a crusade against
misgovcrnment and oppression. Thus it was that, whereas the
young Republic no more than held up the hands of England in
helping on the emancipation of 1825, she became the protagonist
in sweeping Spain finally from the New World. ^
Cuba's Relations with the United States
That Cuba's destiny could not be disassociated from that of the
country to the north appeared long ago to both practical men
and to philosophic observers. The American colonists were deeply
interested in the island, and there have been throughout later
decades many occasions when half-stifled desire for its possession
has flashed forth in plans of conquest. Geographical proximity and
geological continuity have been the texts of those who professed
a less material view-point. Of course the fundamental attraction
was the complementary nature of the production of the two areas ;
as Leroy-Beaulieu asks, " Is not the American Union the natural
market of Cuba.''" Humboldt, long before, had answered this
rhetoricaT'query, for his statistics of Cuban commerce speak for
the growing commercial affiliation of the two regions ; as early as
£832^_the flour of the United States, though severely taxed, could
easily endure all competition.^ The modern treatment of Leroy-
Beaulieu ^ leaves no room for doubt as to the essentiality of the
economic bond in question, and its potentiality in the creation of
much closer relations. In his edition of 1891 the French econo-
mist, after noting the agitation, in 1884, for a commercial treaty
between Cuba and the United States, adds^: "Let Spain make
haste. If she does not profoundly reform the economic legislation
1 Gallenga (pp. 117-118), writing in 1873, ^^Y^ ^^^^ Cuba, by reason of its climate,
would be " at all times an unprofitable possession" for the United States ; that whites,
" especially dram-drinking Yankees," would perish there like flies. Consequently the
Cubans expect no overt act of hostility against Cuba. The policy of the United
States, he says, "is simply, by worrying the Spanish Government — which, as she
well knows, is here utterly powerless — so to aggravate the evils and hasten the
disasters of the Island as to make her interference at some future period a matter of
necessity for the Island itself, when she may be solicited to step in as a 'saviour of
society.' " To what degree this passage is prophetic and to what degree cynical may
be judged from the events of the succeeding decades. ^ I, 259, 267-268.
- Humboldt, Isla de Cuba, pp. 221 fi., passhn (231, 238, 241). * I, 268.
340 COLONIZATION
and the administrative organization of Cuba, soon the Queen of the
Antilles will be irrevocably lost to her."
The issue has justified the monition. For decades before the
Spanish-American War the Cuban bond of economic and other
sympathy with the United States had been viewed with hope and
delight by the " patriots " and with suspicion and hatred by the
Spanish. Americans lent furtive or even overt aid to the former,
and in a few conspicuous instances ^ suffered the penalty. What-
ever the exact truth of the matter may be, it is certain that the
irritated feelings of the Americans awaited merely some such shock
as they received in order to break forth into the fury of war.
There could be but one result, for, while there had been an exag-
gerated notion of Spain's strength in earlier centuries, there was
no possibility of a misconception respecting her subsequent decline
and weakness. The unmatched struggle was carried out in reckless
and holiday spirit by the Americans ; target-practice upon the ill-
kept and ill-manned f^ect of Cervera was checked up with a view
to the distribution of the meed of praise, as if the running fight of
July 3, 1898, had been a mere tournament or diversion.
Puerto Rico
Spain lost, along with Cuba, not only the Philippines, of which
more is to be said presently, but also the valuable dependency of
Puerto Rico. The history of the latter island '^ offers several vari-
ants upon the course of Spanish colonial policy, together with an
essential regularity. Up to the emancipation-period it was neglected
or used as a place of exile for convicts ; it profited during this
period as an apt contrab and station, and later its temperate climate
and abundance of fertile soil attracted a considerable settlement of
whites. Consequently the misfortune of absenteeism was, in Puerto
Rico, reduced to a minimum. Merivale ^ says that the case of
l^uerto Rico is sufficient to disprove twoj.iniversal and inveterate
prejudices : that a European population cannot p rosper a nd mul-
tiply freely in the West Indian climate, and that sugar and coffee
cannot be produced by free labor and yet yield ample remuneration.
Though a diversity of opinion is possible as to whether Merivale is
1 For example, the Virgiiiius case ; cf. Ilalstead, chap, ii, etc., for the popular view
of this episode and others; and Cabrera as an appeal to American sympathies.
'■^ What is here said of I'uerto Rico represents for the most part a summary of
Leroy-l'eaulieu, I, 269-271.
" Quoted in Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 270; cf. Iluniholdl, Isla de Cuba, pp. 26 ff., 64 ff.
THE PHILIPPINES 34 1
not utilizing an exceptional case to disprove a matter of common
observation/ yet the very exceptionality of the case would afford
strong evidence as to the unusual conditions of Puerto Rican
population.
Puerto Rico profited with Cuba from the reform in administra-
tion of the early years of the century ; among other benefits con-
ferred was the avoidance of great demesnes by the fostering of the
system of small holdings. Taxes were lowered and the alcabala
abandoned ; and a period of prosperity like that of Cuba ensued.
Toward 1835, however, these enviable conditions began to change
for the worse : estates began to form ; large subject populations,
African and Asiatic, had to be dealt with. In the sixties Puerto
Rico was going the way of Cuba and might have duplicated her
history had she possessed the same attractiveness for the cupidity
of the mother-country. However, she suffered but little from eman-
cipation (1872) since it came about so easily. "As in Barbados,
the smallness of the territory, the rarity of free and uncultivated
lands, 2 and the relatively slight number of slaves occupied upon
the plantations, facilitated the passage from slavery to freedom."
In the early nineties Puerto Rico was, for a Spanish colony,
remarkably prosperous. It is noteworthy that her trade-relations
were, like Cuba's, prevailingly with the United States, and second-
arily with Great Britain ; Spain, however, had a modest share.
In 1 89 1 Leroy-Beaulieu wrote : " It is probable that Puerto Rico
may remain a dependence of Spain, if the metropolis is prudent
and liberal ; it will be perhaps the last remnant of the Spanish
power in the New World." But the destiny of the island w-as
absorbed in that of Cuba, in that it passed to the conqueror as
spoil of war. And there seemed to be no serious protest anywhere
against the final exclusion of Spain from the field of her secular
blundering and humiliation.
THE PHILIPPINES
In an attempt to cover the important sections of the Spanish
colonial empire, there yet remains to the recounter that group of
trans-Pacific islands, discovered by Magellan in 1521, and later
named Filipinas. It has been seen ^ that Cohmibus and the earlier
explorers labored in the hoj^e that they would presently discover
1 Cf. p. 4 ff., above.
2 The population of Puerto Kiro was, in the nineties, six times that of Cuba
(being 80 per square kilometer). ^ I'p. 132, 177, 25S, above.
\4^
COLONIZATION
some passage through America to the Orient, and that in this
respect they encountered only disappointment. When, now, the
actual experience of the Portuguese had demonstrated that the
Spice Islands lay some fifty degrees east of Calicut, the old project
of reaching them by sailing westward was revived. And it was
shown that these islands must lie within the Spanish hemisphere
as defined by an extension of the Demarcation meridian about the
globe. ^ In pursuance of this object, and through the indomitable
energy and resolution of " the first navigator of ancient or modern
times," 2 Spain actually reached, at last, the East, the final objec-
tive of her early efforts, the source of the coveted gain of Venice
and of Portugal. Magellan and two-thirds of his companions
perished, but " the cargo of spices brought by the little Victoria,
consisting principally of twenty-six tons of cloves, exceeded in
value the total net cost of the expedition." ^
But the East that she found could scarcely stand to Spain in
the hoped-for relation. Portugal was on the ground, and was
determined ; she was able to concentrate resistance to encroach-
ment upon her single and familiar, if widely extended, field better
than Spain, already involved in America, could organize assaults
upon a second and more than doubly-distant section of her half-
world. Of a consequence, Spanish invasions of the Malay Archi-
pelago were insignificant in result ; and even the Moluccas, the
goal of desires, were speedily freed of their presence. When
Charles V sold Spanish rights to the Moluccas and their trade, he
also accepted a new north and south Demarcation Line seventeen
degrees (297 leagues) on the equator east of the Moluccas. This
renounced in reality all claim to the Philippines, but in practice it
meant nothing of the sort. That actual conditions of possession
and ability to defend formed the basis of the settlement respecting
the Moluccas is rendered more probable by the fact that the
Spaniards retained these northern islands almost unchallenged.
" As they did not produce s])ices, the Portuguese had not occupied
them, and they now made no effectual resistance to the Spanish
1 IJourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 24-25; Sp. in Amer., pp.41, 115, 118-119; on the
Hadajoz Junta, etc., see p. 123, above.
2 Hourne, Sp. in Amer., p. 12S; for the voyage of Magellan, see id., p]). 1 19-130;
Montero y Vidal, I, 9 ff. For the e.xliihition of " Spanish gratitude" in Magellan's
ca.se, see Foreman, p. 28.
* Uoiirne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 129-130. Cinnamon, sandalwood, etc., were also
represented in the cargo. Foreman, p. 31.
THE PIIIMI'PINES 343
conquest of the islands. The union of Portugal to the crown of
Spain in i 580 subsequently removed every obstacle, and when the
Portuguese crown resumed its independence in 1640, the Portu-
guese had been driven from the Spice Islands by the Dutch." ^
The destiny of the Spanish in the East was metamorphosed
when they were thus turned to the Philippines, as was that of the
British when forced from Java to the mainland of India. Again,
as in the case of America, they were to deal with uncivilized
peoples,'-^ again to miss, even in the Orient, the Oriental trade.
Small wonder, then, to find their energy directed again into the
primal activities of conquest and conversion. The results in the
Philippines may therefore afford some idea of what might have
occurred in America without the mines.
The conqueror of the Philippines was Miguel Lopez de Legazpi,
one of the greatest of colonial pioneers. Starting in 1564 with four
ships and 400 soldiers, and with a reenforcement of 200 in 1567
and of small contingents at irregular intervals, he effected results
in the winning-over of the natives and in the repelling of the
Portuguese which outdid in enduring quality those of any other
Spanish conqueror except Cortes. In this he was much aided by
the monks, but as representing a tactful, resourceful, and coura-
geous directing spirit, he deserves the bulk of recognition.'^ The
conquest was marked by none of the disastrous features of its
American prototypes ; Luzon was reduced (in 1579 and succeeding
years by Salcedo) rather by persuasion and peaceable means than
by force."* There was no pressing need of unwilling native labor
as in the mines, and for a long time almost no plantation develop-
ment took place ; thus the relations with the natives were analogous
to those which obtained in the early days of Buenos Ayres.^
1 Bourne, Hist. Introd., p. 32; cf. pp. 24-25, 29-30; Sp. in Amer., pp. 131-132;
Montero y Vidal, I, 6, 26 ff.
2 For a brief ethnography of the Philippines, see Blumentritt, pp. 6 ff. ; for the
character of the Filipino, see also Scheidnagel, p. 59 ; Worcester, pp. 476-482 ;
Foreman, chap, xi, et passim.
3 Bourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 32-33. " It was owing to his heroism, his civic virtues,
his superior genius, his grand patriotism and his noble disinterestedness that the
Philippine Islands were incorporated quickly, pacifically and justly to Spain." Id.,
p. 43. Cf. Montero y Vidal, I, 35-43; Foreman pp. 33 ff.
* Montero y Vidal, I, 75-79; Bourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 3S-40. Of course the
Philippines were never thoroughly reduced, even excluding the Moro islands.
Foreman, pp. loi ff.
5 P. 317, above.
344 COLOXIZATION
The Moros
However, it must be noted that these early operations were
directed mainly to the island of Luzon, and that the results sig-
nalized were attained among Malays whose natural development
had been approximately uninfluenced from without. Farther south,
on the contrary, the Spanish met a population already and definitely
under the sway of the old arch-enemy Islam ; for the Arabian
influence had extended eastward through the preceding centu-
ries and had just begun to make itself felt in the southern part
of Luzon when the Spaniards arrived.^ This state of affairs was
recognized by the latter in the application to the Malays of the
southern islands, particularly Mindanao and Jolo (Sulu), of the
generic term for Mohammedan, Aloro or Moor. With these peoples
the relations were those of persistent intermittent warfare. Los
piratas malayo-uiahomctanos, as they were designated, descended
periodically upon the coasts of Luzon, plundering the heretic in
genuine Bedouin style ; and Filipinos and Spaniards were always
at one in their fear of these raids and in their determination to
resist. For three centuries the chronicles are full of such piratic
descents, and although Spanish expeditions took occasional nominal
possession of Moro towns, destroyed the chiefs' sepulchers and the
like, the succeeding repetition of attack and defense shows that
such demonstrations were of small effect.^ The Moros, with their
^ Peschel, Races of Man, pp. 306-307 ; Blumentritt, pp. 18 ff. "The religion of
the prophet had penetrated to Malacca in 1276, had reached the Moluccas in 1465,
and thence was spreading steadily northward to Borneo' and the Philippines. Jolo
(Sulu) and Mindanao succumbed in the sixteenth century, and when Legaspi began
the concpiest of Luzon in 1571, he found many Mohammedans whose settlement or
conversion had grown out of the trade relations with Borneo. As the old Augustinian
chronicler Grijalva remarks, . . . ' So well rooted was the cancer that had the arrival
of the Spaniards been delayed, all the people would have become Moors, as are all
the islanders who have not come under the government of the Philippines.' " Bourne,
Hist. Introd., pp. 34-35. Montero y Vidal (e.g. I, 59-60) adverts to this view from
time to time.
2 Raids by malayo-mahometanos are chronicled by Montero y Vidal, I, 115, 117,
182, 201 ff., 242 ff., 273ff., 434ff-, 482 ff., 540, 579; II, 344, 36Sff., 4S3, 500 ff., 559;
III, 21, 87, 93 ff., 183 ff., 200 ff., 220 ff., 274 ff., 417 ff., 454.
"The year 1754 was fatal for the Philippine provinces by reason of the vandal
attacks of the Moro Malays" (I, 515). There follows a list of damages for the year
by months. "In 1789 the governor wrote to the king saying that the constant war
with the malayo-mahometanos was an ' evil without remedy ' " (II, 340). " According
to official reports, the Moros captured per year over 500 persons, destining them to
the fnost painful labor. The old, as of less value, were sold to the inhabitants of
THE PHILIPPINES 345
lighter craft, regularly rowed into the eye of the wind, or took
refuge in shallow waters, or, in the case of bombardment of their
towns, simply evacuated them temporarily. It was not until the
introduction of the steam-propelled gun-boats, about 1848, and the
regular maintenance of a fleet of them in the eastern station (after
1 861) that the seas were rid of the spoiler, and the course of com-
merce and travel became reasonably secure.^ It is plain, therefore,
that in the consideration of the Spanish system, one is justified in
eliminating the Moros with slight notice as a people nominally
subject but not actually so ; indeed it may be said that the same
condition of affairs has persisted to a considerable degree under
the more masterful and vigilant system pursued by the United
States.^
Constituents of Population
With this brief notice the southern part of the archipelago may
be dismissed from attention. Returning, now, to the actually sub-
jected areas, it is proposed to give an account of the develop-
ment of Spanish colonial policy in this new and, in some respects,
very different field. In a general way, this policy was everywhere
consistent with itself ; many of the measures applied to the Philip-
pines were the counterparts of those whose effects in Spanish
America have just been reviewed. But, in part for reasons already
suggested, there were variations in the East, which are instructive
and significant to one who seeks the driving motives of the whole
system.
In so far as emigration of Spaniards to the Philippines is con-
cerned, it was almost negligible, being totally unsuited, in volume
Saiidakan [in ISorneo], who sacrificed them to the manes of their dead relatives or of
important personages, preserving the skulls of the victims in proof of having fulfilled
this barbarous custom " (II, 369). From 1778 to 1793, aside from incalculable losses
in other ways, the expenses of pay for soldiers, for vessels, expeditions, etc., had
amounted to 1,519,209 pesos fuertes (II, 369). The pirates were the "eternal
question" as late as 1826 (II, 500); and even in case of victory the Spanish did
not know how to handle them (III, 213 ff.). See also a special work by Montero y
Vidal, Historia de la piraten'a malayo-mahometana en Mindanao, Jolo y Borneo,
Madrid, 1888.
1 Montero y Vidal, III, 87, 135-136, 327 fi., 417 ff. ; Foreman, p. 132. For the mas-
terful administration of Arolas in Jolo, see Worcester, pp. 1 68-1 88.
Jolo was the most constant thorn in the flesh. " Precisamente es esa una isla
que ha causado mas males al comercio asiatico que todas las demas Filijjinas."
Montero y Vidal, II, 559, note.
2 On the Moros, see, besides Montero y Vidal, Foreman, chap, x ; Blumentritt,i8 ff.
346 COLONIZATION
and quality, not only to constitute a new Spanish society, but even
perceptibly to alter the ethnic type of the population. It was, from
the first, composed almost exclusively of males, and these were
practically all connected with military or religious establishments.
For two centuries and a quarter the stock exclusion-policy of Spain
forbade the establishment of any foreigner in the islands. About
1820 the ratio of whites to natives was about as one to 1600, and
most of these whites lived in Manila. "As late as 1864 the total
number of Spaniards amounted to but 4,050, of whom 3,280 were
government officials, etc., 500 clergy, 200 landed proprietors, and
70 merchants." ^ During the last quarter of the nineteenth century
the Euroj^ean Spaniards, apart from these functionaries, consti-
tuted scarcely a thousandth of the population ; and the native
Spaniards, or Creoles, were about three in ten thousand (.03 per
cent). Their influence upon the native strain was but slight ; of
Spanish mestizos (vicst/sos f^rivi/egiados) there were less than two
per cent. Plainly the case is one quite divergent from that of
America. If the Chinese be reckoned in at two and a half per cent,^
and the Chinese mestizos {mestizos dc sanglcy) at two per cent,
the essential predominance of the native Malay stock is but accen-
tuated ; ^ the whites, at least, have been but transitory in the
population. This is, of course, natural enough, when one reflects
upon the essentially tropical type of environment represented by
the Philii")pines ; ■* there are no such corrections of latitude by
altitude in the archipelago as rendered the sojourn of the Spaniards
in Mexico and Peru more endurable.
1 Bourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 59-60 ; cf. Foreman, pp. 4, 355. Filipino names are
deceptive a.s a distinction of race. In 1S49 a catalogue of Spanish names was sent
out for distribution among the natives, a number of whom bore the same name, with
the result of much confusion. Hence many Filipino families bear illustrious Spanish
names. Montero y Vidal, III, 89.
- Foreman (p. iiS) estimates the total number of Chinese in the islands just
before the last insurrection against Spain (1896) as 100,000.
^ Blumentritt, pp. 32, 35. Chinese and Spanish mestizos together constitute
3I per cent, but the former are more numerous.
* See pp. 7 ff., above. On the climate and diseases of the islands, see Worcester,
pp. 64, 67-68, 313, 362-363, 434; Scheidnagel, 42 ff., loi ff., 149-156. "It is unfor-
tunately true," says Worcester (p. 67), " that the climate of the Philippines is espe-
cially severe in its effect on women and children. It is very doubtful, in my judg-
ment, if many successive generations of European or American children could be
reared there." Again (p. 47S), " No one can work there as he would in a temperate
climate and live."
THE PHILIPPINES 347
Industrial Organization
Of industry there was but little in the islands and it was the
result largely of the activity of the friars.^ The chief products for
export were those of the tropical plantation : sugar, Manila hemp,
and tobacco ; anything could be raised there, says Blumentritt,^
which could be raised in the Dutch East Indies, but the trouble
lay with the Spanish system. In any case, plantation-agriculture
never attained any importance in Spanish hands ; and the same
may be said of mining and manufacture. Royal projects for the
stimulation of industry and production were of no avail. The
European Spaniards had no influence, wealth, or education ; what
local industry there was, was monopolized by the Chinese and the
Chinese mestizos, who formed a noted contrast in vigor and enter-
prise with the Spaniards, Creoles, and Spanish half-breeds. The
Filipino (Malay) was an economic factor of small significance."^
The one economic activity of the Philippines, or, to be more
exact, of Manila, was exchange — not of local products, but of
those mainly of China ; and it was naturally upon this trade that
the hand of the regulator descended. From about 1576 the
archipelago had profited by the visits of the mainland-dwellers ;
at the beginning of the Spanish domination, the Filipinos were
trading with Japan, Cambodia, Siam, the Moluccas, and the Malay
Archipelago. The Spaniards planned, in 'the absence of other
means of accumulating wealth, to make of Manila the intermediary
depot of trade between China and the Spanish world ; and in this
they seemed to be succeeding with some rapidity when the govern-
ment, inspired by the Seville merchants, began to fear the com-
petition of Chinese silks with those of Spain in the Lima market
and a resultant movement of silver toward the East ; and for this
and other reasons began to introduce restrictions.^ Whereas for
thirty years there had been no limitations imposed, now came pro-
hibitions of importation of Chinese fabrics from Mexico into Peru
1 Montero y Vidal, I, 107 ; cf. p. 351, below.
2 P. 6 ; cf. Worcester, pp. 73 ff., 503 ff. Foreman (pp. 269 ff .) discusses the commer-
cial products in some detail.
8 Montero y Vidal, II, 513-514; Blumentritt, pp. 32 ff. ; Scheidnagel, pp. 70 ff. ;
Foreman, pp. 109 ff. ; Worcester, pp. 516-517. Because of distance the home govern-
ment was occasionally unable to check the enlightened policy of some active governor.
One of these said of the government veto : " Afortunadamente habia llegado tarde."
Montero y Vidal, 11, 288.
* Colmeiro, II, 405 ff. ; Montero y Vidal, 1, 456 ; Foreman, chaps, v, viii, pp. 247 ff.
348 COLONIZATION
(1587), of all direct trade between South America and the East
(1591), limitations of shipments between Mexico and the Philip-
pines (1593; rigorously enforced 1604), and restrictions to the
Chinese of the trade between the islands and China. Because
Chinese goods were smuggled into Lima, trade between New Spain
and Peru was interdicted in 1636.^ Finally, since the Philippines,
as an appanage of New Spain, could trade with it only, Acapulco
became a Seville for the Philippines ; and the flotas were repre-
sented by one annual ship, — the nao.
For in actuality the commerce of the Philippines was crowded
into one ship a year, and, thus confined, yielded the monopoly
profits characteristic of the flotas. "In these great profits every
Spaniard was entitled to share in proportion to his capital or stand-
ing in the community." The capacity of the nao was measured in
bales of about seven cubic feet, and the right to sliip numbers of
such bales was represented by bolctas, or tickets, the distribution
of which was determined by a semi-political board. These boletas
were worth in the later eighteenth century, in time of peace, from
^80 to $100 ; and in war-time, about $300. Speculators bought up
the tickets of poorer holders, borrowing money at 25 or 30 per
cent from religious corporations, and hoping to clear 150 to 200
per cent. The voyage to Acapulco lasted in one instance 204 days ;
the ordinary time from Acapulco to Manila was 75 to 90 days.^
The nao thus represented, on a small scale, the regular Spanish
system as developed in the fleets and galleons, and with the same
results. Large merchant-houses controlled the terminals, and the
people at large profited little if at all — except that the command
of the ship became a valuable piece of political patronage and that
the pilots, mates, and even sailors made great gain in event of suc-
cess. Individual enterprise was discouraged and the growth of
population retarded ; " the Acapulco ship has been the cause for
the abandonment by the Spaniards of the natural and industrial
resources of the Islands." ^
There was no chance under such a system for the development
or enrichment of a class of genuine merchants ; corruption was
invited. The old industries of the land declined ; while the Dutch
were enriching themselves in their eastern possessions, the Spanish
* Bourne, Sp. in Amer., pp. 2S9-290 ; Ilist. Introd., pp. 61-63, ^'^' "ote.
2 Houine, Hist. Introd., pp- 63-65 ; Sp. in Amer., pp. 289-290; Reseller, Sp. Col.
Sys., p. 35, note ; Hiumentritt, pp. 38 IT.; Montero y Vidal, 1,455 if.; Foreman, pp. 243 ff.
8 Bourne, Hist. Introd., p. 63, and notes.
THE PHILIPPINES 349
and natives in the Philippines, even during the long peace succeed-
ing 1648, grew poor in the most miserable fashion. Only Manila
enjoyed spasmodic prosperity ; in fact, all the Spaniards but the
monks and the province-governors removed thitherto secure a share
in the yearly lottery. The other settlements declined to mere vil-
lages.^ And not only this : the nao, like the fiotas, tempted the for-
eigner by its accumulation of valuables ; the booty taken from the
Acapulco galleon in 1762, by the English admiral Anson, is said to
have amounted to 3,000,000 piasters.^ This system could not sur-
vive, of course, in the modern period ; the last nao sailed from Manila
in 181 1, making the final return-voyage in 1815. Trade then fell
into private hands, and a port each in Mexico, Ecuador, and Peru
was opened to it. Direct trade with Spain in a national vessel was
allowed after 1766, the Cadiz ship continuing until 1783 ; but this
system was replaced by a privileged company {Real CovipaTiia
de Filipinas) in 1785. The latter was embarrassed by the opposi-
tion of the Manila merchants, who resented the invasion of their
monopoly of the export trade, and ceased to exist in 1830.^
It might also be mentioned, as paralleling the conditions in
Spanish America, that the consistent policy was to keep the prov-
inces apart ; even during the personal union with Portugal, the
Portuguese might not trade from the Moluccas with the Philippines.
Of the China trade it may be said that it was entirely in the hands
of the Chinese and mestizos, and that if it prospered, together with
trade with Japan, Borneo, Siam, and other eastern countries, it
was due in no respect to assistance derived from the Spanish
system.* In short, the regular policy of exclusion of foreigners
obtained in full in the Philippines ; that it entailed, as in America,
its inevitable results, will presently appear.
Clerical Predominance
But the economic life of the archipelago was at most a secondary
consideration : the islands were too far away, and promised too little
of what the Spanish desired, as compared with America which lay
1 Blumentritt, p. 38.
2 Roscher, Sp. Col. Sys., p. 35, note ; Montero y Vidal, I, 456 ff. After the capture
of the nao by Anson, the king ordered that, during war with England, no more ships
should sail for Acapulco. Id., p. 481.
•^ Bourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 66-67 ; Montero y Vidal, II, 122, 297 ff., 446 ff., 4S1,
543 ; III, 539 ff.; Zimmermann, I, 420-421 ; Foreman, chap. xv.
•* Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 40 ; Bourne, Hist. Introd., p. 68, note.
350 COLONlZATlOiN
between ; the temptation to the merchant, especially under the
restrictions recounted, was not large. But it was different for the
votaries of the Church ; and so the history of the Philippines came
to be more purely mission history than was that of any other
of the Spanish provinces except, perhaps, and in a different way,
Paraguay. " From the beginning the Spanish establishments in the
Philippines were a mission and not in the proper sense of the term
a colony. They were founded and administered in the interests of
religion rather than of commerce or industry." Spain knew that
"a greater development of trade would only have hampered the
progress of the missionaries and enfeebled the power of the con-
vent." ^ In other words, the fathers had their way in the Philippines
as they had not had it in Spanish or Portuguese America. There
was no planter-class to oppose them. Consequently we miss in the
Philippines, in any important form, all those topics of the encomienda-
system, the decline of native population, the introduction of a sub-
stitute labor supply, and the like. Legazpi, it is true, followed the
orthodo.x plan of apportioning encomiendas, but, in the absence of
the exploiting class, these tended to become rather fields for the
exercise of paternal and priestly influence than for the derivation
of a labor force. ^ Laws favoring the natives were promulgated,^
but there was no such occasion for reaffirmation, and no such dis-
putes over enforcement, as in America. The representatives of
the " practical," as against the " theoretical," were not in the field
in the early times. Probably the treatment which the Filipino
received would have appealed to Isabella as approaching the ideal ;
certainly the unrivaled feat represented by the wholesale conver-
sion of the Malays * would, in retrospect, have filled her pious soul
with joy. As a matter of fact, it was early discovered that the
natives were eager to accept the new religion, at any rate in form,
being impressed by its spectacular side. And so the friars, through
their evangelistic enterprises, became active agents in the pacifica-
tion of the country, religious advisers regularly accompanying the
expeditions.^ The extent and importance of their services cannot
1 Bourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 48-49, 70-71; Leroy-Beaulieii, I, 40. For "forced
cultures " in the Philippines, cf. Day, pp. 336-337.
2 Cf. Montero y Vidal, I, 42, 87 ff., 380 ff. ; Foreman, pp. 38, 212.
3 Montero y Vidal, I, 38off.; II, 135 ff., 353 ff.
* Cf. Bourne, Hist. Introd., p. 37. On the " Domesticated Natives," see Foreman,
chap. xi. Cf. also, on the treatment of the natives, Slosson, The Philippines Two
Hundred Years Ago. '' Montero y Vidal, I, 17, 286; Foreman, p. 199.
THE PHILIPPINES 351
be doubted, for during many decades the opinion prevailed that
" in each friar in the Philippines the king had a captain general
and a whole army." ^ Well on into the nineteenth century, in more
than half of the 1200 villages in the islands, "there was no other
Spaniard, no other national authority, nor any other force to main-
tain public order save only the friars"; this persuasion lasted as
a survival practically until the end of the Spanish domination.^ It
was true enough that the monks knew far more of the nature of
the land and the people than almost any one else ; and their reputa-
tion along this line was the involuntary recognition on the part of
the home authorities, to whom, in the impotence of their real con-
trol, these matters were as a sealed book, of the value of acquaint-
ance with a lower race's manners and customs.
The mission in the Philippines was on the plan of the reduction
in America. An efficient defense was organized against aggression,
in this case prevailingly that of the Moro pirates ; not a few of the
fathers had been seasoned soldiers, and rejoiced in the resumption
of military operations which bore the stamp of divine approval.'^
They likewise supervised the tilling of the soil and laid the usual
stress upon the development of a higher industrial organization ;
beyond this they afforded the simple kind of education which they
judged suitable for the natives. Under their ministrations their
charges appear, as elsewhere in the absence of interference, to
have been comfortable and prosperous, and to have increased in
numbers.^ The same attempt was made to exclude foreign influ-
ences ; trade with neighboring peoples, notably the Chinese, was
discouraged, and a European layman was a persona non grata in
the villages. The influence of the Church was so constant and
strong as to lead the more energetic governors to chafe beneath it.
Collisions between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities were
recurrent.^
1 Bourne, Hist. Introd., p. 42 ; Blumentritt, p. 44.
2 Bourne, Hist. Introd., p. 60; Blumentritt, pp. 44-45.
3 Montero y Vidal, I, 242 et passim ; Blumentritt, p. 39.
< Bourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 32-34, 41-42, 57, 81-84, 85-86. Slavery was forbidden
by Philip II; it lasted nearly up to the twentieth century, however. There are no
slaves now except among the Moros and wild tribes. Foreman, p. 191.
5 Montero y Vidal, I, 380, 382, 384 ff. ; Bourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 49, 58; Blumen-
tritt, p. 50; Foreman, pp. 51 ff., 209-210. The latter author asserts (p. 200) that up
to 1896 the monks were stronger than the law.
352 COLONIZATION
Power of the Church
Thus the power of the Church became established in the islands,
and gained an inertia against which the political power, wherever
it undertook to resume authority, beat in vain. Opposition to the
monks might easily cost a man his whole career, if not his life.
This immunity from control had, again, the usual effect of ren-
dering the ecclesiastical authorities haughty and intractable, and
finally ambitious and extortionate. Benefices were freely accepted,
solicited, or demanded ; church-revenues were very large. Taken all
in all, the friars have never possessed a more favorable large field
for their activity than they had in the Philippines. Consequently,
in view of their not having been seriously interfered with, it may
be said that the present case demonstrates the outcome to be
expected from such ecclesiastical control. Positively it may be
asserted that the friars performed a great enterprise in converting
oi masse so large a body of heathen ; the magnitude of the exploit
is unquestioned, however the term "conversion" be taken. But
its real value and success must be otherwise measured, if at all.
It is no particular service to a native people to supply them with
a new set of fetiches, ceremonials, and so on ; and wholesale
baptisms can no longer be looked upon as guaranties of the general
establishment of a new and improved frame of mind. The real
effectiveness of the "conversion" lay in the fact that it brought
the natives into permanent and friendly contact with the trained
exponents of a new order of civilization. It is equally unscientific
lo hold the missions in contempt for the skin-deep Christianity
wliich resulled from their ministrations, and to laud them for
attaining at a blow, through modification of religious belief, what
can be accomplished only through long and steady pressure
brought to bear upon the ensemble of economic, social, and moral
habitudes and customs. ^ The careful and minute discipline of the
pious brothers undoubtedly started the natives in the direction of
European civilization and its standards, but it never went very
far ; it could train to a certain point only. " To prolong it beyond
that stage would be to prolong carefully nurtured childhood to
the grave, never allowing it to be displaced by self-reliant manhood.
The legal status of the Indians [Filipinos] before the law was that
of minors, and no provision was made for their arriving at their
1 ("f. Bourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 36-40, 45-46.
THE PHILIPPINES 353
majority. . . . The only thought was to make Christians and never
citizens." ^ What the mission did was, here as in America, to ease
the first relations of contact between a backward race and a modern
world-economy ; and it was the industrial and other by-products of
their instruction that weighed infinitely 'over mere "conversion."
The great speed with which the latter was carried out does not,
therefore, form any measure of the real advance in civilization of
the European type on the part of the Filipinos ; it simply gave
the friars a better chance.
They seem not to have improved the opportunity to promote
civilization, partly because of the natural limitations set by their
system of native education, and partly because they themselves
diverged from the simple and unpretentious programme of their
earlier years. As trade gradually opened up communication and
diffused information, their pedagogic system was felt to be obsolete
and a hindrance to advance ; and to this was added active resent-
ment of their encroachment upon the property-rights of individuals
and of the community. In short, they became haughty and extor-
tionate, and through means of various description they increased
the holdings of the mortmain until, at the end of the Spanish
domination, the friars held seven-eighths of the most valuable land
in Luzon. ^ Their dispossessment constituted one of the most
serious problems of the American rule, and caused considerable
embarrassment for the Holy See itself.
In the Phihppines, as elsewhere, the case of the Jesuits was one,
in many respects, apart from that of the other religious orders.
As usual, they had been the most energetic and enlightened of
the brotherhoods, but had exhibited here also the ambition and
other qualities which rendered them universally obnoxious to the
political powers.^ They had accumulated properties to the amount
of several million pesos and controlled a lucrative industry and
commerce. In many ways they displayed their usual superiority over
rival orders, for example, in education and culture. The natives
1 Bourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 76-77 ; cf. pp. 73-74 ; Blumentritt (p. 28) says bluntly :
" The national industry of the Filipinos at the time of the Spanish conquest stood
upon a higher stage than it does now [1900]." On instruction in the Philippines,
see Montero y Vidal, III, 536 ff. ; Foreman, pp. 192 ff.
2 Cf. Blumentritt, pp. 26, 53 ff. ; Worcester, p. 31 5 ; Foreman, pp. 106-107 ; Bourne,
Hist. Introd., pp. 73-74 ; The A'ation, LXXII, No. 1857, pp. 82-83.
3 Montero y Vidal, II, 141 ff., iSoff. ; Foreman, pp. 200 ff. In reading Fore-
man's account of the friars it should be borne in mind that his censure is not that of
the Protestant.
354
COLONIZATION
were under their influence, and they displayed the regular contempt
for royal control ; after the English occupation they were accused
of aidini;' the invasion. When their expulsion, for reasons already
cited, ^ took place (1770), all their estates were confiscated and
confided to the administration of a commission.'^
The organization of the clergy was not so systematic as in
America. Although the Archbishop of Manila was the head of
the system, the orders, in their earlier numerical superiority, were
unwilling to acknowledge subjection of any kind, and many sordid
pages of the Philippine chronicles arc taken up with accounts of
refusals of visitation by the local head of the Church. During the
last two centuries, however, the number of the secular clergy has
increased. Another question in the archipelago was that of the
native clergy, who were forbidden to enter the orders. It was
asserted that they were not worthy of the high office of friar, lack-
ing as they did both personal dignity and character, and being in-
clined to relapse, upon taking charge of a parish, into the indolent
and barbarous habits of their previous years.'^ The seculars were
also ill treated and repressed in all ways ; they were given the
inferior livings, and as soon as a parish became worth anything, it
speedily fell into the hands of the clerical orders. This constituted
a distinct political error, for the lower classes to whom the seculars
ministered lost all sympathy with Spain. As will later be seen,
the ill feeling thus engendered contributed not a little to the dis-
integration of the Spanish domination.
Results of Clerical Rule
On the whole, there seems to be little doubt that the experi-
ment of control through the clergy worked out in a thoroughly
disastrous way. The Inquisition (introduced in 1 569) may never
have gotten a strong hold upon the country ; there were doubt-
less many of the clergy, the keepers of the Manila observatory, for
example, who labored conscientiously and well, and even in an en-
lightened and scientific way ; but the clerical regime by its intoler-
ance and system of isolation certainly j^revented the investment of
foreign capital, and otherwise injured the economic and commercial
1. Pp. 155 ff., above.
2 Montero y Vidal, II, 36, 116, 141 ff., iSoff. The re-suppression came in 1835.
Id., p. 552, note. On the conditions of their return in 1S59, see Foreman, p. 206.
3 Bourne, Hist. Introd., p. 57 ; Montero y Vidal, II, 133-134, 3i>> ff-, 362 ff., et
passim ; Blumentritt, pp. 46 ff.
THE PHILIPPINES 355
prospects of the islands. And there is no doubt that there was, at
least in more recent times, a liberal sprinkling of the low-natured,
ignorant, and rapacious among the ranks of the clergy. ^
One of the results of the dual activity of the commercial policy
of jealousy and exclusion, and of religious prejudice, was the op-
pression of the Chinese. For them no need was felt, as for the
negroes in America, as a substitute labor force ; and they were
cordially hated for the same reasons which have made them un-
popular elsewhere : parsimony, business shrewdness, clannishness,
religious differences, asserted immorality, and the rest. It is also
noteworthy that the Filipinos and even the Chinese half-breeds
(mestizos de sangley) exhibited this hatred in as bitter a form as
did the Spanish themselves.^ At the time of the discovery it was
found that Chinese merchants visited the coasts of the islands ;
and much damage was done in the early times by Chinese pirates.
But the commercial relations were not cultivated, and the position
of the Chinese who came to settle in the islands was rendered
very dangerous by intermittent murderous outbreaks against them.
In 1639 they were provoked to an uprising and 22,000 of them
are said to have perished in five months of fighting. Despite pre-
ceding bad treatment, however, at the end of the sixteenth century
about forty junks arrived at Manila for the month of March, in
anticipation of the sailing of the nao in July.^ But the Chinese
were subject, not only to such irregular assaults, but also to the
periodic attention of the government : the expulsion of the " in-
fidel Chinese" was decreed for June 30, 1755, and it was again
ordered in 1769 and in part was realized. They were allowed to
return in 1778, and did so in large numbers. These periods of
resentment of their presence, and of realization of its essential
importance, alternated up to modern times ; but in the attempi to
tax and otherwise discriminate against them, there was a steady
consistency. Indeed, it was invited by the success with which
they monopolized most branches of paying business ; '^ and the
1 Cf. Bourne, Hist. Introd., p. 6i ; Foreman (pp. 202 ff.) devotes considerable space
to their rascality. Cf. also Worcester, pp. 340 ff. ; Scheidnagel, p. 62 ; Leroy, Phil.
Life, chap. v. 2 Blumentritt, pp- 33-35; cf. Scheidnagel, p. 199.
3 Montero y Vidal, I, 24, 71-79, 144-147, 256-257, 461 ff. On early attempts at
conquest by the Chinese, see Foreman, pp. 47 ff.
* Montero y Vidal, L 532; II, 139, 289, 323 ff., 576 ff. ; IH, 150-152, 160. 171;
Blumentritt, p. 33; Zimmermann, L 4i(J. 482, 485; Foreman, pp. 109 ff. The latter
author notes the several massacres of the Chinese in his general chronological table,
pp.651 ff.
356 COLONIZATION
inveterate feeling of hostility to possible infringement which was
involved in the monopoly and exclusion system lent energy to the
movement.
Administration
But, before entering further upon the policy of cxxlusion, and
the irruption of foreigners, it is in place to review the main lines
of government policy in administration. In accordance with the
Spanish theory whereby the king of Spain was also the sovereign
of the external dominions, and was to rule them in consonance
with the Peninsular system, the Philippine Islands became a king-
dom under the charge of a governor and captain-general. They
thus fell, for the most part, under the rule of military men, remain-
ing, until 1 8 19, a dependency of Mexico. As in America, the local
executives were balanced and restrained by an audiencia and ac-
countable through a'residencia.^ A local administration made con-
nection with the subject races ; the islands were divided into prov-
inces under sub-governors {alcaldes mayores), the provinces into
pueblos under an annually elected native or mestizo gobernadorcillo,
and the pueblos into tributary groups {barangay) each under its
head-man {cabeza de barangay)."^ Thus the type of administration
was not in form essentially different from that of America ; nor
was the general attitude of suspicion, secrecy, and distrust any
the less marked. The king suspected governors who showed initia-
tive;^ short-term functi(maries rapidly succeeded each other. The
same kind of spying upon the same kind of corruj^tion took place;
the same race-hatred separated classes ; ■* the ignorance of the
1 Bourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 49-50 ; Montero y Vidal, II, 323 ff.; Foreman,
chap, xiii, 211 ff., pp. 306 ff., above. The salary of the governor-general was $Soooa
year, with perquisites. Bourne, Hist. Introd., p. 50; cf. salary-lists in Foreman, pp.214 ff.
2 Bourne, Hist. Introd., pp. 53-56 ; Worcester, pp. 132 ff. ; Scheidnagel, jip. 51-54 ;
Foreman, chap. .xiii.
3 Foreman, p. 78. The following quotation (Foreman, p. 4) will recall conditions
sufficiently treated under Spanish America, and will support the stundpoiiit there
occupied (e.g. p. 274, above) regarding the efficiency of benevolent legislation.
" The fundamental laws, considered as a whole, were the wisest desirable to suit
the peculiar circumstances of the Colony; but whilst many of them were disregarded
or treated as a dead letter, so many loop-holes were invented by the dispensers of
those in operation as to render the whole system a wearisome, dilatory process. Up
to the last, every possible imjDediment was placed iii the way of trade expansion."
* Montero y Vidal (III, 566-567) says that the leaders in insurrections were mainly
Creoles; De Lanessan (p. 27) says the insurgents in both Cuba and the l'hili])pines
were mostly mestizos.
THE PHILIPPINES 357
Spaniards regarding the islands was profound.^ The main differ-
ences between Philippine and other colonial conditions were those of
degree, such as became well-nigh inevitable in view of the greater
remoteness of the islands from the center of rule, and the conse-
quent augmented influence of the clerical orders. The isolation of
the islands and the vexations of the residencia made it j^articularly
difficult to get good officials ; the friars were always ready to pur-
sue a governor who crossed their desires, both during and after
his term ; and their opposition was a serious matter. Even after
the regular residencia had become obsolescent, at the end of the
eighteenth century, they still exercised a significant influence. ^
• In the Philippines the government had no such revenue-produc-
ing occupation to levy upon as it possessed in the mining-operations
of America. It can scarcely be maintained that the government
itself in earlier times oppressed the natives with taxes ; if they
were imposed upon, it was rather by the clergy. A certain revenue
was raised by the taxation of the barangay through its head, who
was held responsible ; but the islands depended for the most part
upon the regular subsidy from Mexico, which was, in a sense, the
mother-country of the Philippines.^ Up to 1884 all subdued tribes
paid tribute, the sum varying ; at the date mentioned the tax was
$4.25 per year, $3 of which were remitted in return for 40 days'
work rendered the government. There was also the system of the
cMida personal, or personal certificate ; every one over 18 years of
age must possess one and pay for it from 50 cents to 25 dollars.
Licenses of all kinds were purchasable at prices which were high
in proportion to the wage, five to ten cents a day, received for
labor. In later times, between the government and the priests,
the natives were often involved in a life-long fruitless attempt to
meet these obligations. And when it is realized that the govern-
ment assured them of but few of the advantages for which taxes
are paid — protection, education, harbor-works, roads and commu-
nications, sewers, etc. — the severity of the levies appears still
1 Cf. Montero y Vidal, II, 305. Scheidnagel's book is largely a 7 353; IT, 29-30, 64 ff . ; Pringsheim, p. i.
368 COLONIZATION
be permanently established." ^ It docs not conduce to our purposes
to pursue the details of the Burgundian policy, or of its results ; ^
it is enough to say that a certain degree of centralization was
effected which had in it the possibilities of continuous and rapid
growth. Local prejudices had not been aroused to an extent which
precluded the sinking of local differences in a common cause ; the
several districts had been made to see the advantages of closer
political union, and were well on the way toward state-formation.
This is a condition which we have learned to know as an indis-
pensable preliminary to any such exterior activity as colonization.
Taking these general results of the Burgundian period as a basis,
we are now briefly to follow the succeeding phases of the political
drawing-together of the Netherlands.
It must not be understood that imposition of a common admin-
istration from without is enough to evoke a state from a number
of scattered communities, with local ends and methods of attaining
them. When, in 15 15, Charles V took over the Netherlands, it
rested largely with the character of his rule whether the promising
movement toward union should continue. From what has already
been said ^ of the emperor it is clear that he was entirely in sym-
pathy with the Netherlanders ; in fact, he was by birth and rear-
ing, if not by ancestry, their fellow-countryman. lie understood,
and was understood by them ; the very cjualities which made
him unpopular in Spain conspired to render him acceptable to
the Netherlanders. Realizing the strength of local traditions and
l)rejudices, he not only proceeded cautiously with his projects of
centralization, but, to a certain degree, modified his own Catholic
zeal in his treatment of the great religious problem of the day.
The Low Countries formed, in his view, an integral part of his
empire, and their interests were subordinate to those of the empire
alone. He was cordially liked by the people, and his retirement
took place amid scenes of profound feeling and regret. His reign
tended, therefore, considerably to strengthen the bonds of grow-
ing nationality ; in spite of subsequent happenings, the provinces
were never again to manifest a distinct separatist tendency.*
Nevertheless, Charles did not feel secure as to the future of the
provinces after his death. He had forebodings of disintegrating
1 l'>lok, II, 1 14 ff. ; cf. pp. 159, 204, 237, 292 ff., 316.
'■^ Blok, I], 259 ff., 400 ff., 505 ff. •'' 1*. 181 ct passim.
* Blok, II, 305 ff., 317-319; Armstrong, Emperor Charles V, passim.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 369
strifes of succession, and endeavored to anticipate such misfortunes
by securing from the provinces a "pragmatic sanction," binding
them to the Hapsburg succession. The readiness with which they
accepted this arrangement shows their appreciation of the advan-
tages of centraHzation and peace ; it affords " strong evidence for
the conviction that the feeling of mutual coherence, of common
needs, was at length fixed in the inhabitants of these regions. . . .
Above all, in the protracted war against France, people had learned
to appreciate the advantage of the coherence of all the Nether-
lands." ^ And this conviction was not to be entirely lost, but rather
strengthened by the events which were to follow. Philip was no
such man as his father ; even during the short progress through the
Netherlands which, as a young man, he undertook at the emperor's
command, he made a distinctly bad impression upon the people.
He was stiff and formal and could not assume such affection for
the country as his father had cherished. He was a Spaniard of
the Spaniards ; and in contradistinction to Charles, was unpopular
in the Netherlands by reason of the very qualities which endeared
him to Spain. As king, he ignored or crossed local privileges and
traditions, and in no way masked his abhorrence of the form of
religion which was now making its way in the provinces. Moreover,
while to Charles the Netherlands had constituted an integral sec-
tion of his empire, to Philip, who was simply king of Spain, they
were no more than an appanage of that country, not to be con-
sidered where Spain's advantage forbade, and distinctly subsidiary
in importance to Naples and other objective points in the south.
" There was no independent Netherland state ; there was a con-
geries of Netherland states and statelets, dependent upon Spain."
That this was Philip's view became increasingly evident after 1562,
when his hopes of becoming emperor had collapsed.^
The possibility of further unification of the Netherlands under
Bourbon or Hapsburg rule was thus eliminated ; it was to take
place, as the fates decreed, not under, but in resistance to Charles's
successor. This resistance was bred of anger which was roused
against Philip mainly for two general reasons : because he hampered
the economic development of the provinces ; and because he op-
posed in so inexorable, tactless, and ruthless a manner the spread
of the Protestant movement. For one who is familiar with the
economic policy of Philip in Spain a guess as to its aspect in the
1 Blok, II, 316. 2 Blok, II, 319 ff., 325.
370
COLONIZATION
despised Netherlands is attended with little hazard ; and it is
even easier to lnia<;ine what the gloomy, religious monomaniac
would try to do to heretics for whom he had not even the sym-
pathy of nationality. In either case Philip treated the Nether-
landers as foreigners who sought to injure Spain. He rendered the
sojourn of the Dutch merchants in Spain at least as unpleasant as
that of other foreigners ; and at home he subjected them to the
heavy taxation and other discouragement of which, as applied in
Spain, much has already been said. He created in the Nether-
lands a state of uncertainty, as well as an atmosphere of oppres-
sion, which struck at the heart of material development ; and then,
deaf to remonstrances, he visited manifestations of a rebellious
spirit with arbitrary restrictions of customary privilege and with
curtailment of political power.
The Struggle for Freedom of Faith
Of this attitude toward material development, and its results,
more will presently appear. It was chiefly, however, Philip's policy
of religious intolerance which ultimately brought about rebellion
accompanied by a burning hatred which material oppression could
hardly engender. And it was his savage repression of a growing
religious persuasion, common especially to the northern provinces,
which finally welded the latter together into a strong resisting con-
federation. In earlier times the Netherlands, with the rest of ac-
cessible Europe, had been inundated by the clergy. In Flanders,
toward the end of the thirteenth century, there were forty-six
cloisters, more than thirty associations of regular and lay preben-
daries, and thirteen convents. The incomes of such religious estab-
lishments were very large. A growing indifference to the Church
was manifested, however, as early as the twelfth century, and in
succeeding time resentment against the clergy, on the part of princes
and people, gained strength. Toward the end of the fifteenth cen-
tury, Gansfoort and Erasmus won a number of adherents among
the higher classes ; but it was Luther who brought the unlettered
into definite resistance against the Roman Church. The economic
development of the provinces had tended to render the claims of
the clergy anachronistic and exasperating, and the common people
were angered at the gross abuses which they witnessed. A com-
munity with its face set toward economic progress and commercial
THE ORGANIZATION OK Till': INDIA COMl'ANIKS 371
development could not longer endure restriction which had been
scarcely sensed in the mediaeval period.^
Luther's ideas were introduced into the Low Countries about
1520; and Calvinism spread from Flanders and Henegouwen to
Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht shortly after the middle of the cen-
tury. Lutheranism was met with determined opposition by Charles,
for however much he loved the Netherlands and desired their pros-
perity, he could not, as a fervent Catholic, connive at the spread
of heresy. The lay authorities succeeded to the religious orders,
chiefly the Dominicans, as chastisers and inquisitors of the heretics ;
and after 1525 there was a systematic pursuit of the unfaithful,
most of whose leaders were put to death, imprisoned, or banished, by
1530. Doubtless the number of executions has been grossly exag-
gerated ; perhaps a thousand met death at the stake or otherwise.
But many thousands were harassed and interfered with in the pur-
suit of their livelihoods. This persecution took place with especial
thoroughness in the north, chiefly in Holland ; and one of the
results was a considerable emigration to hospitable England of
valuable elements of the population. Thus, even in the time of
Charles, discontent was strong enough to overcome the love
of home and the inertia which opposes movement to alien lands.
But such persecution had but small effect in retarding a develop-
ment called for by the spirit of the age and the people ; it opposed,
rather, a barrier which challenged and thus united the rising floods
of opinion and resentment. This appeared almost immediately after
the accession of Philip, being reenforced by the popular discon-
tent which, as has been seen, his personality and economic policy
called forth. 2 Philip was, of course, more severe than Charles, and
speedily transformed the latent hostility of the Netherlanders into
open resistance. Thus he united against himself, as king and as
champion of the Church, a complex passion of hatred with a footing
in both economic and religious discontent ; and his subjects of the
scattered provinces were forced to cohere as never before in com-
mon armed resistance to a common oppressor.^ Or, envisaging the
situation from the other side, we have now a series of formerly iso-
lated communities, here forced into close cooperation in the mutual
1 Blok, I, 277 ff. ; II, 458 ff. 2 Blok, II, 46S-4S2.
3 It was really under the stern hand of Alva that local differences between sections
of the Netherlands were reconciled. He thus realized, in an unforeseen way, the
policy of the I5urgundians. Blok, II, 413.
372 COLONIZATION
defense of cherished habits and institutions. Material interest and
religious sentiment were fused into a common group-feeling, for
which patriotism is scarcely too strong a term ; like the Spanish
before them, the Dutch arrived at a certain sense of nationality in
the process of defending themselves from alien aggressors on their
own soil. And by reason of this strengthened habit of cooperation,
they were the better prepared to develop into a state, and as such
to form the center and directing power of an e.xtended commer-
cial and colonial empire.
Economic Strength
The other conditioning factor for such a destiny, for which we
have come to look, is economic strength ; for it is in proportion
primarily to the degree of its political homogeneity and unity, and
to the strength of its economic organization, that a state is likely
to succeed or fail in the colonial field. ^ The Low Countries, with
the rest of western Europe, were awakened by the Crusades to the
extent of the outside world and to the variety and desirability of
its products. They suffered with the rest the loss of population
and destruction of labor forces consequent upon the enterprises in
the Holy Land, but at the same time gained a conception of the
value of trade, and a desire for gain and adventure.^
Agriculture in the Low Countries was favored by natural condi-
tions, and early attained a respectable development. The local place-
names of the Dutch indicate that they early concentrated attention
upon the physical characteristics of the land ; and it was, again,
their natural environment which led to intensive methods of agri-
culture, forced the extended application of labor to land, and, among
other things, made of the Netherlanders specialists in the treatment
of marshy soils. '^ The proverbial industry and economy of the Dutch
and Belgians testify to their earlier development along this line.
When the towns began to form, the kernel of their i:)oi)ulation was
composed of men trained in the school of careful and economical
1 Blok (II, 4S2), while admitting and empliasi/.ing the great political import to the
Netherlands of unification under one ruler, thinks that their jjrominent role in the
world-history of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries fell to them rather more by
reason of their develojiment of industry and trade, that is, of economic strength.
2 Blok, I, 1S3-184, 295.
^ Many local names end in loo, boscli, /tout, ivoiid, moer^poel. Blok, I, 302, 305.
Credit should be given to the monks for their early activities in diking, draining, etc.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 373
intensive cultivation. This production of local food-supplies was a
distinct element of national strength in the sixteenth century ; and
to such agricultural interests there was added a considerable de-
velopment of sheep-raising, especially in Zeeland.
But agriculture could not keep pace, in such a country, with
manufacture, especially after the development of a lively exchange.
Towns formed early and became centers of gilds of artisans of all
kinds. Especially in Flanders was there a strong development of
manufactures, chiefly of fabrics ; that province, alone of Europe,
could vie with Spain during the period of prosperity of the Spanish
textile industries ; and it was the forced emigration of Flemish
and other weavers that taught England much to her economic
advantage. The forces of wind and water lent power to the manu-
facturers. As early as the fourteenth century, despite famines,
wars, oscillations of prices, bad hygienic conditions, and the like,
the position of the Flemish artisan was very strong ; and the same
thing may be asserted, in less degree, of artisans elsewhere in the
Netherlands. 1 Even in the fourteenth century these industrial
classes were prone to display their strength and independence in
various uprisings and disorder which could not well be repressed.
The type of the region was prevailingly industrial and commercial,
and it became increasingly more marked, until, with the decadence
of Venice and Spain, the Low Countries became industrially
superior to all the rest of Europe. Thus at the outset of their
colonial career the Netherlands added industrial solidity and force
to their other elements of strength. Many of the details of their
economic organization will appear in what follows.
Growth of Trade
Despite, however, the advancement of production and of indus-
try, the Netherlands found their supreme advantage in commerce ;
and thus pursued exchange with a fervor, skill, and success un-
equaled before in the history of Europe. To " beat the Dutch " in
trade became the high, but almost hopeless aim of their rivals of
later centuries. The geographical and physiographical advantages
of the Netherlands for the development of commerce have been
touched upon before : they provided not only the point of outlet
for central and northern Europe, but the convenient point of inlet
1 Blok, I. 333 ff. ; IT, 3 ff., 64 ff., 483 ff., 495-
374 COLONIZATION
of sea-borne wares from the south. They were physically consti-
tuted to develop a people of middlemen. The Low Countries sur-
rounded the mouths of the largest rivers of western Europe, the
Rhine, Maas, and Schelde, thus securing easy communication with
the inland. And on the sea they were only five or six days' sail
from Denmark and somewhat less from Norway ; six to fifteen days
distant from the Spanish and Portuguese harbors ; and only a few
hours from the French and English coasts.^ Combined with this
advantage of position they possessed others of a more local nature
which conspired to train their population for its commercial destiny.
The flatness of the country ; the navigability of the rivers ; the ease
of canalization ; the archipelago-like coast, especially in the north ;
the location and good quality of the harbors ; the prevailing winds ;
the nearness, not to say imminence, of the sea — these are broad
environmental influences which nurture up sailors and fishermen
through the various stages of nautical skill and daring until they
venture upon the ocean. The Dutch early took to the sea and be-
came daring skippers, so that other nations came to seek the services
of their ships and sailors ; and this natural movement was fostered
under the Burgundians.'^^ The immediate cause of the rapid develop-
ment of trade lay, however, as has been intimated, in the fact that
the Netherlands formed the objective of the annual Venetian fleets,
and that the Dutch were thereby constituted a group of middle-
men. As early as the thirteenth century these favorable conditions
were showing their effect in the concentration of population ; and
the development of towns was reacting as a great stimulus upon
that of trade. Population increased rapidly, so that there were by
1500 a number of towns of 20,000 inhabitants, and many of half
that number. The total population of the Low Countries at this
time is estimated at 3,000,000 ; that of Holland (15 14), at 400,000.
And together with this increase of numbers there went a develop-
ment of municipal life and institutions, of schools and the like, and
a consequent evolution of a personal freedom which was to con-
stitute the mainspring of reaction against an earlier and more cramp-
ing system. The Burgundian rule had proved a blessing for the
land ; agriculture, cattle-raising, manufacture, and trade had been
encouraged and the Netherlands were rapidly coming to be the
" finest jewel " among Spain's possessions.'*^
1 Hlok, II, ^83. 2 Van Kees, II, i ff. ; Rlok. IT, 417.
8 Blok, II, pj). 505-522 ; cf. pp. 522 ff. ; Pringsheim, p. i.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 375
Recurring specifically to trade, it is seen that local " hanses "
began to take form in the thirteenth century, later to be absorbed
into larger aggregations. Distributing activity began to extend
from rivers to sea, and gradually strengthened until important
commercial privileges were gained from neighboring states. The
rulers of England, France, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Russia
granted the Netherlanders exemptions from taxation, right of staple,
use of their own laws and magistrates, and the like ; and to please
them the strand-law was abolished in a number of regions. ^
Commercial Predominance of the North
Thus far the Low Countries have been considered as a whole ;
it is now in place to indicate the local shifting of the centers of
trade which effected the dominance of the northern provinces, and
which contributed in large part to assure to them alone the com-
mercial and colonial career. In the twelfth, thirteenth, and four-
teenth centuries Flanders and Brabant were far superior to their
fellow-provinces. The Hanseatic League had a strong station at
Brugge, which thus became the staple for all the river trade ; it was
through Brugge that Lubeck and Hamburg made trade-connection
with Italy ; through it passed the Oriental products from the south
and east, French wines, grain from France and the Baltic region, Rus-
sian furs, Scandinavian woods, Spanish iron, and Italian silks. Natu-
rally a considerable development of the machinery of exchange, of
credit-instruments, etc., accompanied that of trade. ^ About 1400,
however, the sanding-up of Brugge's sea-approach caused the diver-
sion of the trade-routes, and they passed, from that period on, over
Antwerp; the latter had become, by 15 50, the richest merchant
city of Europe, with a steady population of 100,000 and a float-
ing one of 50,000. Daily 500 ships entered and cleared from its
harbor, and on occasions 2500 might be seen at one time on
the Schelde ; 5000 merchants were day by day on 'change, and
the European money market was centered here. The amount
of Antwerp's trade is estimated as having been one and a half
milliards (about ^600,000,000) annually.^
But Brabant as well as Flanders was falling upon evil days ;
jealousies and factions, civil wars, the competition of the English,
1 Blok, I, 350 ff. ; II, 148-149. 2 Blok, II, 483-485.
^ Blok, II, 29-30, 486-487. For the development of the Dutch cities and trade,
see also Wappaus, I, 328 ff.
376 COLONIZATION
and the difficulties in getting supplies of raw materials, caused
chiefly by these same rivals, all conspired to check the develop-
ment of the southern provinces. And a sturdier commercial power
was rising in the north. Hollanders and Zeelanders were sea-faring
as Flemish and Brabanters had never been; from 1400 on their
herring-trade had been of great importance, constituting the chief
means of livelihood of the coast districts. Of the 700 herring-craft
in 1562, the Flemish owned 100, while Zeeland came in for 200 and
Holland for 400, including the largest and best. The superior
aggressiveness of the northerners in the sea-trade is indicated by
the fact that while Brugge and Antwerp had been mere stations of
the Hanseatics, the Hollanders and Zeelanders had been Hanseatics
themselves. Thus they were not merely purveyors of their own
products, or mere brokers ; they were active transporters of mer-
chandise from north to south. In the fifteenth century they had
more trade in the Hanse towns than the Hanseatics in Brugge.
By I 5 10 Holland and Zeeland were the great carriers between the
Mediterranean and the Baltic ; they sailed even to the polar seas ;
and in 1528 reached the Cape Verde Islands. From the middle of
the fourteenth century they pressed Flanders and Brabant ; and
by 1560 Amsterdam had distanced the rest of the northern towns
and was second only to Antwerp : in the si.xteenth century it was
the "Venice of the North." Holland particularly rejoiced in its
fine situation, excellent and well-kept waterways and harbors,
numerous and enterprising population, splendid cities, and rich
lands. Combined with the poorer, ruder, but energetic sea-folk
of Zeeland, the Hollanders were fitted to play a great role in the
economic development of the world. ^ Money-conditions were com-
ing to be better understood, and Charles V by his liberal policy
contributed to this end ; banking houses were established, and the
mechanism of exchange became steadier and more secure ; even life-
insurance was developed. This was a situation which was forming
during the time of Venetian trade-supremacy; and the extent and
importance of Dutch commercial operations were only augmented
after the discovery of the Cape route to the East, and of America.
The Netherlands were much nearer now to the main ways of the
Orient trade ; and since the Venetians were still, and long remained,
strong enough to block the free entrance of the Portuguese into the
Mediterranean, the stream of tropical wares destined for central and
1 Blok, II, 4S9-500.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 377
western Europe, which naturally ching to the waterways, tended to
flow almost undivided toward the north. Likewise the Hollanders
gained control of practically the whole carrying-trade of Spain.^
This meant that the Low Countries were to enjoy a still more ex-
tensive intermediary function, with its correspondingly increased
profits. And when the policy of the Portuguese caused them, as
has been seen, to renounce the coasting-trade, it further meant that
the Dutch were to be obliged to develop a larger quantity and a
better quality of merchant shipping, and to increase their nautical
skill and confidence by regularly venturing across the stormy waters
of the Bay of Biscay. They did this successfully, and their conse-
quent wider activity in the field of commerce operated to accumu-
late opportunities for the exercise of a constantly increasing power
to meet and utilize them. Development of trade toward the north
was more difficult. The Hanse had to be met and overcome, and
the taxes levied by the Danes paid or evaded. But by the end of
the fourteenth century the Hanse was rapidly declining, and some
alleviation from the Sound-tolls was secured. In any case there
was peace in the north, for the most part, even if the heavy dues
could not be evaded.^ Relations with England, at first easy and
free, became gradually more difficult and ominous. From 1430 on
there arose contentions and competitions which could only issue in
an ultimate struggle for trade-dominance ; but for many decades
the Dutch retained an unquestioned supremacy. In short, by the
end of the reign of Charles V the Dutch constituted potentially, if
not yet actually, the strongest commercial power in the West ; the
Netherlands had become "a member of great significance in the
body of Europe." The population continued to increase rapidly
and to display an energy and development superior to that of sur-
rounding peoples; and in Charles V the country was governed by
a powerful prince in such a way as not to neglect the freedom-
loving traditions of the subject nor yet to sacrifice the power of
the central rule.^
Resistance to Spanish Policy
A people thus prosperous in material ways, and so independent
of mind, had no grace to submit to the narrow and mediaeval
policy of Philip II. What the Prince of Orange and others, as
1 Blok, II, 500.
2 Blok, II, 491-494, 500-504 ; Pringslieim, pp. 20 ff. ^ Blok, II, 436-437.
378 COLONIZATION
representatives especially of the malcontents of the northern prov-
inces, complained of was the political and religious absolutism of
that policy ; in particular, they resented the injury to trade which
Philip's attitude toward Denmark and England was sure to bring.
" In short, they wanted a government in a Dutch, not in a Catholic
or Spanish-Hapsburg sense ; they did not want to see the Nether-
lands sacrificed to the king's religious and political purposes, which
were not their own." ^ In other words, a progressive, enterprising
people, alive to the conditions of national wealth, success, and
growth, and not benumbed by a rigid subordination to an obsolete
fetichism of King and Church, were ready to react violently against
the same measures which Philip imposed upon the Peninsula to
the ruin of all, and yet to the satisfaction also of all except a small
and pow^erless minority. And as concurrence with Philip's mediae-
val policies led inevitably, as has been seen, to national degeneracy
and final elimination from the concourse of the powers, so resist-
ance thereto, representing as it did the awakening of the genius
of a new age, elevated its exponents into a dominant i:)osition in
the world. The Dutch exhibited the characteristics of an adapt-
able, and so viable, human society ; they sensed the conditions of
national existence and prosperity and attacked with resolution
every artificial obstruction calculated to prevent or hinder speedy
conformity with them.
What the provinces wanted was, above all, freedom from con-
nection with that for which Philip so preeminently stood : regula-
tion. And because the king was so much more obstinate and
inexorable in the imposition of religious conformity than else-
where, it was over this question that the storm-center so consist-
ently hovered. At his accession the Protestants were not very
numerous, especially in the south ; but his measures against them
were so severe that even the Catholics objected ; and the reaction
against his policy simply served to increase the rebellious element.
The regime of Alva (i 566-1 573), including the execution of the
popular counts Egmont and Ploorn, drove the country into the
arms of the Prince of Orange and brought on open war. Hatred
of the grasping and overbearing clergy increased ,• and all through
the long ensuing conflict other issues were in the background as
compared with that of religion. Occasional savage outbreaks such
as the " Spanish Fury" (1576) left Catholic as well as Protestant
1 Blok, III, II.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANn<:S 379
in terror of indiscriminate slaughter and devastation. The insist-
ence especially of the Hollanders and Zeelanders upon religious
freedom blocked many peace-negotiations, for Philip remained
bigoted and inexorable to the end ; but it was incorporated after
his death among the conditions of peace (1609).^
Thus it might be said that the struggle of the Netherlanders
was very largely for religious liberty, or, more exactly, for freedom
of thought. And it is unquestionably true that whatever aid was
lent in the war by other Protestant states, was to a varying de-
gree motived by sympathy for the struggle of Protestant against
Catholic. Doubtless this consideration bulked largely in the minds
of the common people of England, and certainly among the Hugue-
not sympathizers. In a certain sense, Philip's Catholic bigotry, his
station as champion of the Faith, united against him all the most pro-
gressive elements of western Europe ; and they all later advanced
together by reason of the stimulus and inertia of their reaction
against his attacks. The other motives which impelled especially
England to lend aid to the struggling northern provinces will
presently become more clear ; recurring to these provinces them-
selves, it is evident that a war waged so largely for religious
liberty could not but effect a consolidation of interests calculated
to weld the participants into a more coherent national form.
Movements tov^^ard Independence
The resistance encountered by Philip was, however, based to
a large degree upon economic considerations. Nothing could blind
the Netherlanders to the chance of national gain or loss, and they
foresaw little but calamity from the application of Philip's system.
The correctness of this view was abundantly demonstrated to the
northern provinces through the fate of the southern ; for these fell
rapidly from their high estate with the strengthening of Spanish
control, and in consequence of the war which the attempted further
extension of that control brought on. The Dutch, for example,
resisted taxation for Spanish purposes : the attempt of Philip,
during the early days of Alva's rule (1569), to introduce the
alcabala as a regular tax encountered first active opposition, and
then, when this was quelled by stern means, a complex of evasion
and silent resistance. Yet the people had paid the " tenth penny "
1 Blok, III, 15-23, 25-27, 37-48, 59-70, 89, 204-209, 258, 262, 313, 520 ff.
3S0 COLONIZATION
{tiendc penning) on several separate occasions, where apparently
its payment was without prejudice to their jealously cherished
privileges. Again, in 1571, the attempt to impose this tax led to
protests, — of which even Alva realized the justice, — that by this
move the lower classes would suffer and trade be ruined ; the
opposition this time gave origin to an actual uprising and lent
strength to the Prince of Orange. In, all this period Holland had
been particularly unmanageable ; and that province remained under
arms when the uprising had been elsewhere repressed.^ Apart,
also, from the direct injuries wrought by Spanish fiscal and other
regulations, the provinces suffered greatly in the loss of valuable
constituents of their population. Every striking exhibition of re-
pressive action, especially in the line of religious intolerance, was
followed by copious emigration of superior elements of the popu-
lation, largely to England, or, during Spanish domination of the
southern provinces, from that region to the resisting north. This
movement meant likewise the emigration of considerable capital
in the narrower sense. ^ And if war and its effects be reckoned
in as sequels of Spanish policy, the economic consequences were
of the most far-reaching upon the status and destiny of the
provinces.
The aspect of this last assertion which bears most vitally upon
our subject is the development of a separate destiny for the north-
ern provinces as distinguished from those in the south which re-
mained Spanish. It has been shown how Holland and Zeeland, as
the most important of the northern provinces, had been gradually
developing to succeed Flanders and Brabant as commercial centers ;
and it has been noted that, while not prevailingly Protestant, they
were yet the strongholds of the reformed faith. Here it was that
Spanish fiscal and religious oppression encountered the most deter-
mined resistance on the part of a population representing in excep-
tional degree the qualities and policies of a coming age ; and it
was hither that the resisting spirits of subdued regions fled, to
further resist. The great contest lay between Spain and this kind
of antagonism — that of a small l)ut strong j^opulation, favored in
its struggle by the lie of the land, led by an extraordinary captain,
itself of stubborn character, insistent upon its rights, and, in this
1 Blok, III, 83 ff., 101 ff.
- Hlok, III, 59-60. He estimates the emigration from the Low Countries as
400,000 in 30 or 40 years. Cf. also III, 66, 89, 309, etc.
THE OR(>ANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 381
case, spurred lo desperate endeavor by the savagery of repression.
Of this people the determining factor was a minority ready to die
for its beUefs and freedom, prepared to go into exile rather than
submit to what it regarded as tyranny. Compared with such a
nation, says Blok,^ Spain was the earthen vessel contending with
the iron, a colossus with feet of clay.
These northern districts increased in industrial and commercial
importance with the decline of the south under Spanish rule, and
especially under the blight of war waged largely within the same
stricken region. After Alva's departure Antwerp was practically
ruined, and the events culminating in the Spanish Fury of 1576
rendered prostration complete. At this time the southern prov-
inces seemed about to throw in their lot with Orange and the
northern districts ; the Ghent Pacificatic of 1576 seemed to herald
a complete union of all the Netherlands. But the opposition of
the Catholic south to the increasingly Protestant north rendered
the union of little permanent effect.^ The north then united within
itself in the Unic of Utrecht (1579), a defensive and offensive
alliance ; ^ and the two unions came to stand for diverse purposes :
the Pacificatie for reconciliation with Philip, and the Unie for
wholehearted support of the Prince of Orange and resistance to
the end. Hence the south became virtually the supporter of
Philip's great general Farnese (Duke of Parma) and the reaction
in Holland and Zeeland took form in the practical abolition of
Catholicism (1580). And so the final and, to a certain extent, un-
locked for outcome was that it was the northern provinces alone,
and chiefly Holland and Zeeland, which finally resisted Spain and
thus came into the heritage of nationality and material prosperity
which followed upon the successful defense of commonly cherished
religious and economic ends. The conflict of thirty years, waged
only in small part in the north, encompassed the complete ruin of
the south, while Holland and the other northern provinces made
such gain from it as scarcely to welcome for themselves conditions
of peace.*
If this contrast has been drawn with sufficient clearness, it
is now possible to eliminate the southern provinces from further
,1 III, 134-135; cf. p. 173. 2 Blok, III, 127, 170-175, 196, 204-207.
^ The uniting provinces, later the Dutch Republic, were Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht,
Gelderland", Overijssel, Groningen, and Friesland.
4 Blok, III, 22S-234, 262, 297-305, 309, 400, 410, 448-449. 536-537-
382 COLONIZATION
consideration, and to concentrate attention upon Holland, Zceland,
and the other districts which cooperated in the formation of a
commercial and colonial empire. Henceforth in this book the
unmodified term " Netherlands " is taken to include them alone.
The Revolt
It seems unnecessary to follow in any detail the story of the war
with Spain. The Spanish commanders were consistently handi-
capped by lack of funds, by the half-confidence, suspicion, and
dilatoriness ^ of Philip, and by the rooted distrust of Spanish good
faith. ^ The Dutch, on the other hand, persisted under all circum-
stances in the most stubborn manner, gradually developed a respect
little short of worship for the great statesman who led them, sup-
plied funds collected in copious streams ^ mainly from duties upon
a constantly growing trade, received considerable countenance and
but small actual aid from England and France,'* and so labored on
through reverses and successes, with steadfast purpose, inundat-
ing the country in the darkest hour, until their independence was
finally wrung from Spain in 1609. After the defeat of the Invin-
cible Armada in 1588, the hollowness of Spain's reputation became
speedily apparent, and 1590 made a decided change in the char-
acter of the war ; it ceased to be almost purely defensive, and
the consummate soldier Maurits of Nassau began those offensive
military operations whose extraordinary success soon filled his
camp with young military men sent from many of the states of
Europe to learn the art of war.^ And, besides all their successes
on land, the Dutch, in company with the English, began to harry
the Peninsula with naval forays of greater or less vigor, thus
terrorizing the coast towns, and not seldom garnering large booty ;
a little later they even overcame the garrison and seized the African
island of Princip6.^
1 One high Spanish functionary in Italy is said to have remarked : " If death had
to come from Spain, we should he certain of a long life." Blok, III, i6o.
2 Blok, III, 89, 135, 187, 2S2. The unpaid Spanish troops plundered right and
left, exasperating the Netherlanders, and rendering the task of the Spanish governor
doubly difficult (III, 209).
•' Holland paid for some time 60 per cent of the war-costs. These were very high,
and were used to support 100 ships of war, 150 companies of infantry, and 58 troops
of cavalry. I51ok, III, 424-425.
* Blok, III, 79, 97-98, 1-05, 122, 249, 280, 324, 334 ff. (Leicester), 383, 386, 428.
^ Blok, 111, 258, 348, 401 ff. (Armada), 414-416, 420 ff., 466, 504-505.
" Blok, III, 437, 451, 457, 466-46S, 504-505.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANn<:S 383
To the development of trade during the war time attention will
presently be given. But one consideration, as bearing upon the
development of national strength, yet awaits mention. Not only
were the members of the resisting confederation bound by this
protracted war into a more coherent whole, but there was likewise
developed within the local and confederated governments a power
of corporate action which made the Republic of the United Nether-
lands (recognized in 1648) something more than a name. During
the early years of the war, in their more or less disunited condition,
the provinces looked to the Prince of Orange as the father and
savior of the country. Nevertheless the local parliaments main-
tained a locally uncontrolled function, and the States-General
exercised considerable power despite a prevailing deference to the
Prince. The result of this was that when the long-feared and
finally encompassed assassination of the latter came, the States-
General were able, after a new outburst of grief and rage against
Spanish perfidy, to take the destiny of the United Netherlands
into their own hands. Even during the life of Maurits, the bulk
of real authority lay in the hands of Qldenbarnevelt, the State-
Advocate of Holland, in his capacity as a leader of a parliamentary
body.i So that we see here the partial explanation of the contrast
soon to be drawn between Dutch colonial enterprise and that of
the Portuguese and Spanish, namely, that the predominant factor
in this movement is no longer royal initiative and support, but
individual and above all corporate activity.
Development of. Trade : Earlier Voyages
We recur now to the succession by the Netherlanders to the
trade-monopoly of their Portuguese predecessors. It is natural that
mere freight-carrying between the Peninsular ports and the north
should not long have contented so energetic a sea-faring people ;
at first, however, attention turned to the north and east. The year
1577 marks a voyage to the White Sea, and 1584 the establish-
ment of a factory at Archangel ; after the defeat of the Armada,
however, vessels began to penetrate to Venice (1590) and soon
visited Alexandria and Constantinople. They also frequented from
that period the Cape Verde Islands, at first for salt, and the coasts
and rivers of Guinea. Moreover, in the earlier years Dutch sailors
1 Blok, III, 264-265, 289-293, 321, 387-396, 475, 500 ff.
3cS4 COLONIZATION
were employed by the southern nations ; and Portugal and Spain
even sent Dutch ships laden with northern merchandise on to
Brazil and to other parts of America instead of unloading and
reshipping their cargoes.^ How dependent Spain speedily became
upon the ships of foreign nations has already been pointed out.^
But for a considerable period the Dutch clung to their old routes
and were seemingly unmoved by the report of Portuguese dis-
covery and adventure. First of all there was no imperative need
of change : wares could always be gotten on the Lisbon market,
and thus the long, unknown voyage was obviated. The mistaken
policy of the Portuguese in surrendering the European coastwise
traffic was partially designed to preserve and confirm these condi-
tions ; when they forbade the exportation of India goods from
Portugal in Portuguese ships it was largely with the idea of remov-
ing any stimulus toward undertaking the India voyage. And, for
a time, the rest of Europe was quite willing to leave it to them.
Moreover, the Netherlander received important commercial favors
from Spain and Portugal in their rivalry for his trade. To encour-
age the visits and sojourn of the Dutch, Portugal conceded them,
for example, security of person and goods, religious freedom, and
judges of their own nationality, all on condition of agreement to
trade with Portugal and not with Spain. ^ The value of this trade
to both parties was such that even national hostilities could not
quell it : Portuguese and even Spanish officials connived, and the
Dutch held resolutely to it, in greater or less degree and against
the representations of powerful allies, almost up lo the peace
of 1609. The grains of the north were so essential to the im-
poverished Peninsula that sudden stoppage meant little less than
famine ; while the Dutch j^'actically jiaid their war-expenses out
of their profits. Their claim to continuance during hostilities was
that if they did not supply the grain, the Hanseatics and north-
erners would, and thus they could neither accumulate gain nor carry
on war.* How much of speciousness this plea embodied let one
familiar with commercial argumentation say.
P'urther hindrance to the attempt to reach India lay in the lack
of proper ships, of capital, and of knowledge. European coasting
vessels were thought unfit for such extended voyaging ; and capital
had not yet assembled into units large enough to finance heavy
^ Blok, III, 452-453 ; Van Rees, II, 2 ff. ^ y^j,^ (jg^ Chys, pp. 1-2.
2 I'p. 254 ff., above. ■• Blok, III, 305, 307-308, 440.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 385
and protracted hazards. It was not until the fall of Antwerp in
1585 that large capitalists began to settle in the northern provinces.
The ocean and its routes were little known before the publication,
in 1595, of Linschoten's Itiiicrarinni ofte ScJiipvaert nacr Oost
ofte Portugacls Indioi, the first treatise on the subject in the
Dutch language. Sporadic voyages to the East by Netherlanders
had yielded as yet but little satisfaction ; for it should be recalled
that the Portuguese were strictly forbidden to give information
which would tend to lift the veil of ominous secrecy with which
they masked their operations in the East. It need hardly be said
that they fashioned a series of "commercial myths," like the
Phoenicians of old, which were calculated to play upon the super-
stitious ignorance of the age ; these ranging from fairly accurate
tales of strange winds and reefs, and of the deadly calms of the
African coast, to the wildest flights which an unsophisticated
credulity would tolerate. And even if information had been at
hand, experience was lacking. Hence the "sure-going" Dutch
were impelied by a complex of motives to cling to the humbler
function of simple intermediaries. In addition to these natural
hindrances two other inhibitions rested upon them : that of the
Portuguese king, who threatened with death and confiscation of
goods any one who should sail in Portuguese seas without royal
permission ; and that of the Pope, several times alluded to, which
added religious sanction to the secular menaces of the lay author-
ities. It is understood that, prior to the accession of Philip to
the Portuguese throne in 1580, Portugal was, nominally at least,
a friendly power, in common cause with the enemies of Spain.
Hence any attempt of the Dutch to evade the license-regulations
would have been an unfriendly act toward a strong ally. But the
Portuguese king in principle granted no licenses to foreigners ; in
short, it was made as hard to go beyond Lisbon as it was easy to
come to that port. The same conditions long obtained in respect
of voyages to America ; these were undertaken but rarely by the
Dutch before the last years of the sixteenth century.^
What finally enabled the Netherlanders to overcome all these
obstacles was nothing less than the jeopardy of all their trade.
In 1580 Philip II became king of Portugal, and at once manifested
an intention of assailing the Dutch carrying-trade in toto. The
1 Van der Chys, pp. 3-1 1 ; Blok, III, 453-454; Rosclier, p. 258. On the earliest
voyages to the East see art. "Tochten" in Encyl. Ned. Ind.
386 COLONIZATION
Dutch in Portuguese harbors now ran the risk of seizure and
"examination" by the Inquisition, and although they did not give
up their trade, but pursued it under a connivance which repre-
sented its real value to the Peninsulars, yet the state of insecurity
engendered by the new conditions produced a restlessness and a
close examination of all alternatives. Matters came violently to a
head in 1595, when Philip seized such vessels of the Hollanders
and Zeelanders as were then in Spanish and Portuguese harbors ;
these were 400 or 500 in number, manned by 5000 to 6000 sailors,
and constituted about two-fifths of the whole merchant fleet of the
northern Netherlands. Such a severe blow, threatening as it did
the solvency of their large merchant houses, awoke the Dutch to
the perils of the situation and the futility of their dreams of its
betterment.^
One other alternative to the Cape voyage, it should be noted,
had been attempted with ill success ^— that of the north-east pas-
sage. As early as 1580 adventurers had requested aid of the state
in an attempt to discover this route to the Indies. It was reck-
oned that it would be shorter by 2000 miles, would avoid the loss
of life attendant upon tropical voyages, and would be pursued
without molestation of any kind. But it was not until 1594 that
a beginning was made ; in that year one Moucheron discovered
what he supposed was a passage, and a second expedition was at
once prepared and fitted out for the China trade ; it is noteworthy
that the policy of exclusion of other nations from this commercial
bonanza was at once adopted. But the expedition of 1595 ended
in no more than a small and but slightly edifying extension of
geographical knowledge concerning the region of Spitzbergen and
Nova Zembla. Hopes were not given up, however, until 160 1, by
which date Houtman's voyage by way of the Cape had been made,
and interest diverted permanently toward the southern route.'^
The Voyage to India
By 1585 improvement had been made in ships and methods of
navigation, and a flow of capital had set in toward Amsterdam.
Linschoten returned in 1592; and as far back as 1579 and 1587
Drake and Cavendish had reached resj)ectively the Moluccas and
Java, thus providing examples of contempt for the Portuguese,
1 Van der Chys, pp. 13-14; Van Rees, IT, 4; Blok, III, 436, 45S; De Reus, p. xi.
2 Van der Chys, pp. 16-51 ; Blok, III, 454-455.
THE ORCIANI/ATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 387
Spanish, and the Popc.^ The reformed religion, together with op-
position to Catholicism as almost personified in its royal cham-
pion, had freed the Dutch from any strong religious scruple in
the matter of infringement of the Church-sanctioned monopoly
now held by Philip ; and it was at this favorable juncture that the
inevitable individual who was destined to precipitate the situation
came into prominence. This was Cornells Houtman, a man who
seems to have had long experience in Portugal and Spain, and
whose consequent influence was considerable. A company of nine
merchants was organized and there were laid the keels of four
ships to be built on the English plan, small but manageable ; they
carried over 100 cannon and 248 men, their entire cost reaching
290,000 florins.^ The undertaking was of something more than a
priv^ate character ; the cannon were borrowed from the government,
under security for their return, this being in the nature of a sub-
sidy which should not weigh upon the general population ; there
were likewise furnished from the government stores powder, guns,
spears, etc. Further, exemption was extended from licenses and
taxes, it being understood that no goods were to be taken in
or unloaded west of the Cape. The commander carried letters of
introduction from Prince Mauritsand from him received injunctions
not to attack any one, but to defend only at need ; to accomplish
his ends through friendly means, realizing that his mission was
mercantile, not military ; to strike his flags when suspected ships
approached ; to make a treaty of peace at Bantam ; and so on. .
All these considerations lend to the operations of the nine mer-
chant-adventurers a certain political status ; in these negotiations
little mention is made, however, of the States-General. At the
advice of Linschoten, Java was selected as the objective, much to
the future advantage of the Dutch in the extension of their power
over the Archipelago.^
Houtman sailed April 2, 1595, arriving in Bantam June 22, 1596,
and returning home in July, 1597. He brought back with him
three of the four ships, but only a third of his men, and a very
small cargo; lack of knowledge and divisions of opinion had length-
ened the voyage and perturbed its course, while a parsimonious
trade-policy had lent confirmation to the representations of the
1 Van der Chys, p. 15.
2 Van der Chys (p. 31) reckons this sum as equivalent to 362,000 florins of
modern money. 3 Van der Chys, pp. 28-37 ; Van Rees, II, 6-7.
388 COLONIZATION
Portuguese and enabled them to convince the Javanese that the
Dutch were simply pirates, with no real desire to trade. Neverthe-
less a conception had been gained of the lucrativeness of the direct
trade ; another company was at once founded in Amsterdam, and
two in Zeeland,and in 1598 twenty-two vessels sailed for the East
Indies. By July, 1599, of nine ships in one of these fleets four had
returned richly laden, the voyage having covered the incredibly
short time of fifteen months.^ By the end of 1601 fifteen fleets,
comprising si.xty-five ships, had sailed, some by way of the Cape
and a few through the Straits of Magellan, and had returned with
cargoes of great value. In some cases they not only made treaties
with native princes but expelled the Portuguese and built Dutch
strongholds. A passion for the India trade, long regarded as a
hopeless dream, piled capital on capital for its prosecution ; and
to these new enterprises the government was persuaded, chiefly
by Oldenbarnevelt, to lend some such assistance as it had granted
the first. Before the end of the century the loss of the trade with
Spain and Portugal was no longer regretted ; direct connection
with the East was far more profitable, and the old routes to the
Peninsula were deserted. Great misery ensued for Portugal and
Spain, thus robbed of an almost indispensable supply of food-prod-
ucts ; it began to be seen even more clearly that the new venture
was a deadly blow at an old enemy, and the government granted
aid the more gladly to an enterprise of national importance. Sailors
were put under oath of service and the force of law was lent to
punishments of their misdeeds. The state did not yet grant com-
missions as against Spain, but great changes had nevertheless
occurred since the time of Houtman's instructions.^ It is certain
that neither government nor people intended to yield the great
prospects opening up in the direct eastern trade ; they were inured
to war, which had become an almost normal condition, especially
for Holland and Zeeland, the leaders of the Unie. Hence they
resolutely refused any peace which did not leave them free to trade
1 It was joyfully exclaimed that never had such richly laden ships returned since
Holland had been Holland. Bells were rung and great excitement prevailed. The
Portuguese in Amsterdam said that the fleet could not have visited India in so short
a space of time, and must have looted the cargoes at some intermediate station.
These cargoes included, as most important constituents, 600,000 pounds of pepper,
250,000 of cloves, 20,000 of nutmegs, 200 of mace, and 100 of long peppers. "The
merchants admitted to have made easily two penninck on one." Van der Cliys, p. 74 ;
cf. Roscher, p. 262 and note. - Van der Chys, pp. 64-69; lilok, II I, 457-.15S.
THE ORGANIZATION OK THE INDIA COMPANIES 389
in the East, and they won their point in the negotiations preceding
the cessation of war in 1609; negotiations which led to a settle-
ment modeled all along the line upon the principle of uti posside-
tis} a practical acceptation of the actual status in the last years of
the war.
We may pause here to indicate the effects of this long-delayed
peace upon the fortunes of the northern Netherlands. Danger
of sudden attack disappeared ; the perennial strain upon finance
ceased ; the number of troops might be diminished ; e.xtraordinary
protection was no longer needed by merchant vessels ; internal
disorder could be sternly suppressed ; credit could be restored ;
the public debt, reaching 12,000,000 guilders, and which carried
up to 10 and 14 per cent interest, could be diminished ; arrange-
ments might now be made with England and France regarding ad-
vances which amounted to 14,000,000 or 15,000,000 in the case
of the latter, and over 8,000,000 for the former ; the peace was
sure to redound to the ultimate advantage of industry and trade. ^
Such considerations more than outweighed the gains incident to a
state of war, especially since the peace-settlement upon the prin-
ciple of holding what was held in 1609 assured the Netherlanders
of practically all the advantage which the successful last years of
the war had gained for them. They were now recognized partici-
pants in the trade with the Orient and the directors of their own
fortunes in both economic and religious lines, which were the main
points of issue all through the conflict. And this conflict had con-
solidated them in such fashion that, despite sectional bickerings,
the United Provinces now constituted a new state and nation.'^
Foundation of the East India Company
As early as 1598 it was seen that for the prosecution of the
East India enterprises a coalition of all participators was neces-
sary ; and the rapid formation of local companies "* ensuing upon
the return of Houtman rendered cooperation the issue of the day.
There were at the end of the century four companies in Amsterdam
^ Blok, III, 520-525, 534-536; cf. p. 436 (return of the seized ships).
2 Blok, III, 536.
* The provinces which formed the I'ereenigde A^ederlanden are named in note 3,
p. 381, above.
* The companies grew, says De Reus (p. xii),"wie die Pilze aus der Erde"; they
"sailed the money out of each other's purses and the shoes off each other's feet."
390 COLONIZATION
alone, two in Rotterdam, one in Delft, one in Hoorn and Enk-
huizen. In a short time the mischief of competition, which had
been dimly foreseen, began to work concrete effects ; despite the
warnings of the States-General the companies, having only gain as
their object, commenced to work against each other both at home
and abroad. In the East Indies the ships were loaded as quickly
as possible at the cost of a general deviation, under competition
of buyers, of the local prices ; and so the Dutch merchants came to
be at the mercy of the greed of native chiefs. And in Holland the
competition of sellers caused a great decline of j^riccs. Thus the
diversity of the conjuncture, so profitable in the frontier-trade, was
being reduced at both ends toward a mediocrity of profit. The
companies went so far as even to seek a monoj^oly of the best cap-
tains, each striving to pledge them to itself. On March 20, 1602,
a resolution was passed in the legislative assembly of Holland
denouncing the contemporary conditions of the East Indian trade
as a harm and a shame to the United Provinces.^
The difficulty experienced, in such a condition of affairs, and the
valuable time wasted in efforts to effect a union of the several com-
panies, is evidence for the persistence, even after years of coerced
common defense, of local interests and narrow selfishness. Despite
the pressure of the powerful Oldenbarnevelt it was not until Sep-
tember, 1600, that an actual movement toward union was set on
foot. Nothing but failure and a redoubled bitterness of competi-
tion resulted. In December, 1601, the representatives of the sev-
eral companies were finally assembled and induced to submit in
writing proposals for the establishment of union ; but Holland op-
posed the union as under the protection of the States-General, and
Zceland and other districts feared the richer and more powerful
Holland. No terms could be agreed u|)()n. Finally, in the last
days of 1601, the delegates were again summoned by the States-
General, and listened to a crafty exhortation from Oldenbarnevelt
wherein the weight of argument for union was shifted to the polit-
ical field. The king of Spain was hoping, it was stated, for just such
quarrels and disagreements in the Netherlands ; he was always
eager to see his purposes furthered by disintegration of the pro-
vincial Union. Combination must be made against the ancient
enemy, and would issue in an aggravation of his already deej) hu-
miliation. By union and agreement the maritime interests of the
' Vail der f'liys, pp. 70-71, 75, 130-131 ; \'an Rees, II, 9-1 1 ; lllok. III, 4SS-4S9.
Till': ORGANIZATION OF THK INDIA COMPANlP:S 391
Netherlands would be strongly furthered and damage consistently
done to Spain without cost to the country. Resistance was weakened
by this appeal, but the towns still stood to their rights, clamor-
ing against the proportion of their proposed representation on the
board of directors. As a last resort the authority of Prince Mau-
rits, the Stadhouder, was called in ; pressure was brought to bear
upon the most stubborn, and at length, on March 29, 1602, the
union was pushed through and the companies coalesced into one
grand organization, chartered for twenty-one years, the East India
Company.^ For many decades the history of the commerce and
colonization of the Dutch is the history of this chartered corpora-
tion and of its offshoot, the West India Company.
The Charter
This being the case, when once the driving motives of their
activity are known, the results attained appear, in many ways, sin-
gularly consistent and inevitable. The character and policy of the
East India Company, of which the West India was but an after-
type, come out clearly in the provisions of its charter. This instru-
ment is both historically significant and remarkable of its kind ; it
constituted one of the first weighty experiments in the definition
of the powers and obligations of a large corporate body. It is the
more important, likewise, to attend to the provisions of this charter
inasmuch as they continued for nearly two centuries to form the
recognized expression of a set of principles upon which the Com-
pany's policy was consistently based. These gradually took on the
force of a stereotyped commercial creed, resisting modification and
steadily thwarting projects of adaptation to altering conditions.^
It is not probable that the charter borrowed anything from that
of the English East India Company, formulated two years before.
Movements in England toward establishing a company may have
exercised some general influence in the Netherlands ; ^ but any
alignment of the two organizations has the value of a comparative
study of the simultaneous reactions of two similarly minded peoples
1 Van der Chys, pp. 76-97 ; Van Rees, II, 12 ; Blok, III, 488-490 ; Day, pp. 40 ff. ;
cf. Colmeiro, II, 453.
2 Cf. De Reus, p. i ; this author says (p. vii) that the Company had no history, no
development in organization or policy. Changes occurred in the extent of its opera-
tions, its financial status, etc., but its principles remained the same- Cf. Day, p. 39.
3 Van Rees, II, 19; Van der Chys, p. 129.
392 COLONIZATION
upon similar conditions, rather than that of an exercise in the detec-
tion of mutual borrowings.
The charter, excluding the preamble which recites the reasons
for the Company's formation, and the last article (46), which com-
mands all good subjects, under pain of severe punishment, to re-
spect the charter-provisions, and enjoins upon all officials to let
the Directors benefit without molestation from the fruits of their
activities, falls roughly under seven main heads or topics : the
organization of the Company (§§ 1-6); participation (§§ 7-1 i) ;
inlerreUuion of the Chambers {§§ 12-14); relations with share-
holders (§§ 14-17); the Directors (§§ 18-33); grants of monop-
oly (§§ 34-35); relation to the state (§§ 36-45).! The history
of the Company, as it functioned in the metropolis, may well be
assembled about the explanation and further development of these
topics, taken in such order as to insure clearness and sequence
of narrative.
The Monopoly
First, thert, as to the crucial feature of the charter, the granting
of a monopoly. Why were exclusive rights of any kind conferred,
and why did the state create within its own body an ivipcrinvi in
ivipcno which was able, within a comparatively few years, to bid
it defiance .-^ That this was done is the more remarkable as the
Dutch harbored a positive distaste for monopolies, and ran all to
individualistic enterprise.- It has been shown in what precedes
that the formation of a comi)any was not easy ; that it recjuired,
indeed, strenuous governmental pressure to bring the several jeal-
ous companies into union, and this too, although they all realized
that they were dragging each other down to ruin. Left to them-
selves it is difficult to see how unification could have come about
within any definable period; it was, indeed, the very hoj)elessness
of the situation that overcame prejudices against the erection of a
monopoly as the least of several alternative evils. In view of the
total disorder in East Indian affairs it was at first proposed that
the state should send a fleet to occupy certain stations, afford j)ro-
tection, and kee]5 order ; but, involved as it was in a desperate
* The charter is rei)roduced by Van der Chys (pp. 9S-115), and translated, largely
literally, into German, by l)e Reus (])p. 5-12). Van Rees (II, 23 ff.) and Van der Chy.s
(pp. 116 IT.), as well as De Reus, give an extended discussion of the organization.
Cf. Day, pp. 82 ff. 2 Van Rees, II, 13-15 ; Van der Chys, p. 1 17.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 393
struggle for independence, it could not spare the necessary forces.
Again the possibility was considered of establishing something on
the order of the Portuguese Casa da India, which should regulate
colonial affairs from home ; but this meant that the government
was to function as did the Portuguese king, owning all the ships
and working through its own agents ; and, in addition to the fact
of the government's preoccupation with Spain, the Dutch were un-
willing to concede it such power. The government distrusted itself;
it was only newly and provisionally a centralized one, and it felt its
own ignorance and incompetence to manage the affairs of the East
Indies, at that time so strange and distant. The only other practi-
cable alternative was to leave the enterprise in the hands which had
shown so much zeal in opening up the East and had secured such
important national advantages through their activities. The Nether-
lander salved his prejudice against monopolies with the reflection
that the States-General could keep an eye upon the running of this
one, which would, moreover, proceed to discomfit Spain without it
costing the state anything.^ The public felt the safer inasmuch as
the charter was to run only twenty-one years, — a provision designed
to render the Company powerless at the end of that period, — and
so acquiesced with small objection in the monopoly. Thus it was
enacted that for twenty-one years no Dutch competitor was to sail
east of the Cape of Good Hope or through the Straits of Magellan,
under the penalty of confiscation of ship and cargo, the clause as
to the Straits-voyage becoming null if the Company did not utilize
its privileges in that section inside of four years (§ 34). Within
the area of its monopoly, moreover, the Company was granted
practical sovereignty : power to make treaties with native rulers
in the name of' the States-General, to build strongholds, appoint
governors and military and judicial functionaries ; in short, to take
all measures called for in the interest of trade, and looking to the
maintenance of order, government, and justice.^ That the States-
General strove to retain a voice in the destiny of the functionaries,
who were required, moreover, to swear their oaths of allegiance be-
fore the States-General previous to doing the same before the Com-
pany (§ 35), is, as will be seen, interesting as theory rather than as
practice. As to India, the Directors could really do anything they
1 Van Rees, II, 17-22; Van der Chys, pp. 118-119; De Reus, pp. 2-5; Roscher,
pp. 257-258.
2 Cf. Van der Chys, p. no ; De Reus, p. 10 ; Colmeiro, II, 453-454.*
594
COLONIZATION
chose except establish a government wholly apart from that of the
Netherlands ; their oath of allegiance prevented this.^
But around the scheme of the monopoly here granted there arise
certain other considerations of especial interest from the compara-
tive view-point. Unlike the monopolies that went before, that of
the Dutch was to be enforced regarding only a portion of the seas ;
and not against the world, nor against the adherents of another
religion, nor even against any special foreign nation, but against
fellow-countrymen as potential competitors. This consideration,
sometimes taken ^ to show the changed attitude of the Dutch with
respect to the "free sea," witnesses rather to the essentially local
character of the charter as a document calculated to obviate only
intra-national competition. Spanish and Portuguese alike were
enemies, and the plain intention, however much disowned in
earlier times of weakness and when the Dutch were novices, was
to smite them anywhere and everywhere, including of course the
eastern seas ; and the subsequent temper of the Dutch toward
English, and other interlopers,^ leaves no doubt as to their working
theories. Since, however, the Dutch were too sensible to go on
record with any such impossible project as general exclusion, they
have had far less word-swallowing to do than had their immediate
predecessors in the field. The idea of a generally exclusive monop-
oly was just as attractive as it had been to the Venetians, but the
Dutch had emerged far enough from mediaeval ignorance and pro-
vinciality to perceive its impracticability in the world as it was
coming to be. Their efforts to realize as much of monopoly as
possible will appear through subsequent pages.
Relations of Company and State
Much in the foregoing has already suggested the close relation-
ship of the Company with the state ; formed under political pres-
sure, it acted as a substitute for the direct extension of the state's
control, and stood forth to fight its battles for it. It is doubtful if
unification of the companies could so soon have been brought about
if the argument for a company as an arm of war had not proved so
compelling ; again, as has been noted, the state was expected, by
constant control of the Company, to guard against the foreseen evils
of a monopoly. Aside from the national and inevitable predominance
' Van def Chys, p. 126. "^ Id., p. 121. ^ Pp. 41S If., 492 ff., below.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES
395
of the creator over its creature, the States-General are represented
once and again in the charter as the arbiter of the Company:
for example, if the Directors fail of agreement, the States-General
will decide (§ 6); if the Company incurs losses, it can appeal to
the States-General (§ 36). Other articles define more exhaustively
the Company's relation to the government ; the state is to receive
twenty per cent of the gain from seizure of Spanish and Portuguese
ships (§ 37) ; likewise it holds receivable from the Company 25,000
guilders with which it is credited on the Company's books, in order
to share gains with the rest (§ 44) ; it levies export and import
duties on existing lines upon the Company's goods, and it will allow
certain irregularities (§§ 38, 41) ;^ it will not take away the Com-
pany's artillery, ammunition, etc., without its consent (§ 39) ; it
enforces a common system of weights and measures (§ 40) ; it will
not allow the seizure of the person or goods of a Director, but will
assure him a hearing before a regular judge (§ 42) ; it delegates
the Company a certain police power in apprehending its sailors in
Dutch ports, but with proper deference to local officers (§ 43) ; it
requires of commanders of fleets or ships a full report of the condi-
tions in India, and of the voyage, before the States-General (§ 45).
Several of these provisions are scarcely more than the assertion of
the ordinary rights of a government ; others convey favors or ex-
emptions ; but a warning that control is to be exercised inheres
throughout.
This topic of state-control may here be pursued into its subse-
quent and virtually typical and final stage. The founders meant
well, but they could not reckon with the forces of avarice and cor-
ruption which were prompted by the prospect of enormous gain.
Instead of the govefnment controlling the Company irom without,
in the interests of the shareholders, governmental officials came to
control it from within for the benefit of their own class, the politi-
cal and commercial aristocracy. The directors of the state and of
the Company became almost identical in personnel, and nearly all
of the popular attempts to control the latter were foiled by the
States-General. All objections were evaded by adducing reasons
of state : the Company constituted the safety of the nation against
Spanish aggression, and must not be subject to let or hindrance.
Such willful abdication or abuse of the controlling function on the
1 Freedom from taxes, licenses, etc., had likewise been granted to the earlier
separate companies. Cf. Van Rees, II, 15-16.
396 COLONIZATION
part of the state left the Company all but independent ; in fact
the Directors, upon the occasion of their opposition to the found-
ing of the West India Company, stated bluntly that the Company's
East India possessions were theirs and could be sold to the king of
Spain if they so desired. It took the state two centuries, and end-
less effort and trouble, to lay hands upon the directive povver.^
Interrelation of the Chambers
Another significant aspect of the situation out of which the uni-
fication of the companies grew, is to be found in the provisions
dealing with the interrelations of the Chambers, that is, the local
bodies representative of the formerly independent trading centers.
These retained such independence that they could at any time have
gone on by themselves as separate organizations had The Seven-
teen, the visible bond of their union, been done away with ; ^ hence
they were not willing to merge their identity in the union, and their
jealousies and strivings with each other, which meant generally
the opposition of province to province, betray the newness and
instability of the " United Netherlands " This separatist tendency
comes out plainly in the charter, which both recognizes it and seeks
to minimize its effect. The general board of Directors (" The
Seventeen ") was granted the widest of powers and affiliated with
the States-General ; ^ the Chambers were to keep each other fully
informed as to business done and projected (§ 14), and those whose
ventures came out well were even to provide their unlucky fellows
with spices and other eastern wares in event of uneven fortune
attending their respective enterprises (§ 13). Such provisions were
designed to increase solidarity; nevertheless the separate Chambers
practically controlled themselves. A ship was to return to its
port of departure if possible; and if it was obliged to enter another
Dutch harbor, the Chamber which fitted it out was to send Direc-
tors to attend to all the details of its homecoming, unless it seemed
advisable to delegate this business to the local Chamber (§ 12).
Again, if a Director became bankrupt, his own Chamber had to
shoulder the losses incident, not the general treasury (§ 32) ; and
1 Van der Chys, pp. 116, tic;, note ; Day, pp. 86-88.
2 Van der Chys, p. 128. "So war auch die Comp. nichts anderes als eine kiinsl-
liche Vereinigung von verschiedenen llandelsge-sellschaften welche unter den Namen
' Kammern ' selljst.standig bestelien blieben." De Reu.';, p. 19 ; cf. pp. 20-22.
•^ Of. p. 398, below.
Tlir; ORGANI/ATION OF '1111-: INDIA COMPANIES 397
such cmj)l()yces as bookkeepers were to be paid by the Directors
of the several Chambers, their maintenance not coming from the
body of shareholders (§31). All such provisions clearly indicate
the rudimentary nature of the union and a reluctance to accept the
full consequences of centralization ; and this not only in the case
of the companies but also of the provinces which they represented.
Such a condition of affairs is perfectly normal, as is shown for
example by the history of the confederation of the American col-
onies; that the initial advances toward nationality are imperfect
and slowly traversed does not impair the general consec^uences of
such development.
The Chamber of Chambers was constituted by The Seventeen,
a body which united the constituent companies as the States-Gen-
eral united the Provinces,^ and whose constitution and function
^ will presently be explained.
Internal Organization
Having cleared away the more general aspects of the charter,
we now turn to the actual organization of the Company and to
its relations with the public who took up its shares. The basis of
organization was, of course, the constituent companies, operating
in the several chief cities of the Republic. These were grouped
according to location and came under the administration of local
directors whose appointment was assigned to the " States " or
parliaments of the several provinces. The body of local directors
thus constituted was called a Chamber, and represented the inter-
ests of what had been the companies of its district. Naturally,
then, the size of the local Chamber was proportional to the com-
mercial strength of its district, as represented by the antecedent
formation of companies : Amsterdam had 23 Directors, Zeeland
14, Delft 12, Rotterdam 9, Hoorn 4, and Enkhuizen 1 1 (§§ 18-23).
This made a total of 73, which was later to be reduced to 60, of
which Amsterdam was to have 20, Zeeland 12, and the rest 7
apiece. When it came to equipping fleets, etc., a similar proportion
of contribution was fixed, namely : Amsterdam one-half, Zeeland
i"Ebenso wie in dem Niederlandischen Staate die sieben fast unabhangigen
Provinzen in der Versammlung der Generalstaaten zu eiiier Republik verbunden wur-
den, ebenso wurden auch die sechs selbststandigen Kammein durch die Versammlung
der Siebzehner zu einer Compagnie vereinigt." De Reus, p. 39.
398 COLONIZATION
one-quarter, and the rest one-sixteenth each (§ i).^ Thus else-
where the proportion is maintained (cf. § 29). The extent of the
powers of these local Chambers and their relation to each other
have been already indicated.
When the companies merged, a general directorate was created
which was called The Seventeen, or, for brevity's sake. The XVII ;
of these the Chamber of Amsterdam appointed 8, that of Zee-
land 4, those of the rest one each, while the seventeenth was to
be elected from the Chambers of Zeeland, of the Maas region
(Rotterdam and Delft), and of the "North-Quarter" (Hoorn and
Enkhuizen) in turn.^ To The Seventeen was comprehensively dele-
gated the management "of all affairs touching these united com-
panies " (§ 2). It decided the times and destinations of voyages,
the number of ships to be sent, and, in general, was sovereign of
the East Indian trade (§ 3). Its sessions were regularly fixed in
Amsterdam for a term of six years, then in Zeeland for two, and
so on in alternation (§ 4) ; but irregularities occurred, especially
when it was deemed needful to engage in political activities at
the capital. The several functions of The Seventeen will appear
throughout the ensuing narrative ; in general, this body sui)ervised
the trade as a whole, the carrying-out of its policy being left to
the local Chambers ; it was administrative in its activity, not
judicial.^
It is unnecessary here to pursue the organization of the Com-
pany into its finer ramifications.^ But a word may be given to the
chief director by way of further clarification of the relation of the
Company to the state. The Stadhouder Maurits van Nassau had,
as has been seen, considerable influence in effecting the coalition
of the companies, and both he and his successors exerted a certain
important influence, as in some sort heads of the government, upon
the Company as a state-organ; but it was not until 1674 that the
Princes came into permanent office in the Company, drawing divi-
dends from it. Willem III was at that time formally constituted
Chief Director and was to receive one-thirty-third of the total divi-
dends declared. This move, however, though it indicates the grow-
ing political trend of the Company, had no essential significance,
says De Reus,'' for its internal prosperity or external reputation ;
1 De Reus, pp. 8, 5. ^ cf. De Reus, pp. 5-6. " De Reus, pp. 19, 44.
* De Reus (pp. 51 ff.) treats of the Bookkeeper and other more special functionaries.
6 P. 69 ; cf. pp. 59-67.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 399
the Prince was simply the nominal head of the Directorate, but
without special powers.
In fact, there were no essential changes in the Company's home
organization until the years of its downfall, toward the end of the
eighteenth century.^
Before coming to the conditions covering general participation
in the Company, it remains to summarize the provisions of the
charter which were designed to control the local Directors, the
active agents in carrying on the actual operation of trade. These
were, of course, the managers of the constituent companies. The
names of the 73 are given (§§ 18-23) ^^^ ^^^ immediately followed
by the provision that vacancies are not to be filled (§ 24) until
the total number is brought down to 60, apportioned as explained
above (§ 25) ; after that time vacancies are to be supplied through
selection by the local legislatures of one name out of three pre-
sented by the Company (§ 26). It may here be remarked that with
the growth of political influence this selection passed into the
hands of the burgomasters, who were supposed to possess a more
intimate knowledge of the candidates and their qualifications; they
did possess such knowledge, at least so far as they and their polit-
ical friends were concerned, and so the local Directors, and conse-
quently The Seventeen, came presently to be the political leaders
of the cities and state, and were able as officers to guard them-
selves as Directors from many unpleasant consequences.'^ Neverthe-
less it was intended to control the Directors and so avoid the bad
effects of monopoly ; they had to take a solemn and pious oath to
act honorably, render honest accounts, and not to prefer one share-
holder over another (§ 27). They must be interested in the enter-
prises which they managed, to a certain amount varying with the
importance of the trade of their local Chambers (§ 29). They could
not make free with the Company's money in any way (§ 30) nor
shift expenses upon the shareholders (§ 31) ; they were responsible
for the administration of their several treasuries (§ 33). How effect-
ive these safeguards were to be will shortly appear. They were
paid on the basis of one per cent on the outfit of the fleets and on
the return-cargoes, apportionment of such profits to be on the lines
already cited : the Amsterdam Chamber receiving one-half, that of
Zeeland one-quarter, and the rest one-sixteenth each (§ 29). Thus
a careful attempt was made to guard against the weakness of human
1 Alterations are discussed by De Reus, pp. 12 fi. '^ De Reus, pp. 26-30, 37.
400 COLONIZATION
nature and to obviate what the slang of the i:)resent age terms
"graft "; even private correspondence was forbidden, in later times,
between a Director and any one in India.' If the Directors had
lived up to the spirit of the charter j^rovisions, no such tale would
follow as that which is to tell ; but they were practically irrespon-
sible and their actions do not belie the fact.
Rights of Shareholders
The definition of shareholders' rights as against the Directors'
really amounts to further restrictions and control over the latter.
It was provided that at the end of ten years a general [public ac-
counting should be held in the presence of the shareholders (§ 14) ;
and, further, that local provinces or cities interested to the extent
of 50,000 florins could demand an accounting, even of incoming
cargoes (§ 15), and that several provinces together could appcnnt
an agent who should have the right of thorough examination (§ 16).
It was also provided that dividends should not be held back ; they
should be declared when five per cent profit lay in the treasury
(§ 17). These provisions of restraint fall in with the ones just con-
sidered, and their evasion or nullification forms part of the same
mournful and sordid tale. It is to be noted that there was no way
provided for deposing a Director.^
Participation
The provisions respecting participation in the Company remain ;
and the most general of these was that any citizens of the United
Netherlands could invest in shares, with sums small or great.
Smaller investments were encouraged ; for it was provided that if
the shares were over-subscribed, the larger investors should yield
to the smaller (§ 10). Certain generous and fair-appearing articles
were added, allowing any shareholder to withdraw his money at
the end of the first decade when the first general accounting was
to take place (§ 7) ; similarly any one dissatisfied with the early
ventures was to be permitted to withdraw, receiving back his in-
vestment with seven and one-half per cent (or more) interest for
1 De Reus, p. 24. The Chambers were not to receive presents (p. 24) ; cf. Day,
pp. 84-86, 88-91.
2 Van der Chys, p. 125. This author thinks (p. 12S) tliat the defective provisions
respecting the shareholders resulted from there being no shareholders at the time of
the foundation to develop this side of the charter.
THE 0R(;ANIZATI0N of THK INDIA COMl'ANlIsS 401
the period of investment (§ 9). Provision was made in apparently
perfect fairness for the subsequent entrance of new participants
(§ 11); and there seemed to be foresight and conservatism in the
arrangement whereby the naturally larger outlays of the first decade
were to go over, to the extent of "half or less," upon the partici-
pants of the second ten-year period (§ 8). It is noteworthy here, as
bearing upon the attitude of the Dutch toward a national monopoly,
that only Netherlanders might hold shares ; in fact it was likewise
enacted that prospective Directors should declare under oath their
entire disassociation with any competing foreign company.^
Conflicts between Directors and Shareholders
Of the topics based upon charter-provisions and now before us,
the one about which most of the history of the Company, at the
European end, was made, was that of the relations between Direc-
tors and shareholders ; and it is to the phases of this relationship
that return will constantly be made.
The reputation of the Company was so high that shortly after
subscription to its shares was opened, 6,450,000 florins had been
brought together, Amsterdam alone furnishing something over
half of this sum. A few days after the Company's establishment
seventeen vessels sailed for the East, the last of them returning
richly laden in 1607. The new organization seemed to justify all
the high expectations of the country : in 1605 it returned divi-
dends of fifteen per cent, in 1606 seventy-five per cent, and in the
following four years forty, twenty, twenty-five, and fifty per cent
respectively — a total of two hundred and twenty-five per cent in
eight years. But this tremendous showing was evidently decep-
tive, for the shares, having risen to 140 in 1605, fell to 80 in
1607.2 And it was not long before voices of protest against the
Directors were heard. The latter had already found that their task
was not entirely simple. In the effort to keep up the Company's
early reputation they had been lavish in dividends ; they were
1 De Reus, p. 34.
2 Van Rees, II, 22-23, 27; De Reus, pp. 175-179; Blok, III, 492, 495-496, 498;
Roscher, p. 277, note 4. De Reus (p. 17S) shows that the older writers were incor-
rect in believing that these dividends came out of the Company's earnings subsequent
to its formation. The accounts of The Seventeen give 1609 as the date of the first
real Company payments. But whatever the source of the dividends, the Company
could scarcely fail to get the credit for them, especially among the uninstructed. For
the reputation of the Company, see Colmeiro, II, 453-454.
402
COLOXI/ATION
moxcd by considerations of immediate gain, and paid little atten-
tion to the preservation of their capital and to the meeting of their
debts. They became unscrupuhnis as to the source of the divi-
dends, and began to borrow money at high rates of interest in
order to be able to declare them. The expenses of the Company
as a militant organization encroached deeply upon their funds and
left them ill prepared to take advantage of commercial oi)p()rtu-
nity ; for example, the dispatch of two large war-vessels to conquer
the Moluccas cost them 150,000 guilders. They commenced to
fear competition, and, asserting that the government did not afford
them security in this respect, they began impudently to refuse
payment of money which, according to the grant, they owed to
the state. ^ The sort of procedure of which these are specimens
could not have failed to arouse suspicion and distrust in a people
who had embarked on the way of monopoly with misgivings.
Hostility to the Company
The critical attitude toward the Company was exemplified in
Le Maire. Le Maire had been elected a Director, but had quarreled
with his colleagues and resigned, a move which frightened them
more than it should have done had their operations been irre-
proachable. They feared that he would use his inside information
to aid others, or against the Company, and they placed him under
a penalty if he should so do. It can be seen that Le Maire was an
excellent authority upon any point of the Company's policy about
which he cared to speak. But he was far more than a scandal-
monger ; he was an independent-spirited man and a farsighted
merchant. He complained of the narrowness of the Company's
policy, directed as it was toward the exploitation of the proximate
source of gain, the spice-trade, alone ; it was interested, he said,
only in Bantam and the Moluccas ; the east coast of Africa had
not been approached, and the Japanese trade was left to the Portu-
guese. The Company, moreover, was not truly loyal ; warfare was
with it merely a means to get gain ; it did nothing from love of
the fatherland ; it managed its great monopoly without conscience,
appealing to its charter to exclude all better-minded people. From
having been one of its Directors, Le Maire emerged as a deter-
mined enemy of its monopoly. He was even in communication
1 Van Rees, II, 28, 31.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 403
with Henry IV of France in regard to a French company when
the latter suddenly died, in May, 16 10, and the plans broke up.^
The Company being in such bad repute, there were not a few
who, though they saw in the prosi^ective peace with Spain the
probable dissolution of the Company, were yet quite ready to con-
sent to its sacrifice. But the government, now largely involved in
the organization, — for, as has been seen, the political oligarchy
had gradually filled the Directorate, or translated the Directors
into its own ranks, — had no such purpose ; and the Company was
well assured of this fact. But there was no certainty that the latter
could keep up in any case : if there should be peace with the grant
of access to the East, other European nations would press in whose
competition was already a menace ; and if war continued, its ex-
penses would only increase. In any event, now that France and
England had made peace with her, Spain was free to cause the
more trouble and cost. Again, were the state obliged to send
warships and defend the Indies, it would attain a power of super-
vision not to the liking of the Directors; if the people as tax-payers
had to carry on the operations in the East, there would be an
accounting despite all political quietism. Hence the Directors felt
that to keep the monopoly they must themselves hold to the East
Indies, pay high dividends, and pose the Company as an institution
too valuable to sacrifice.^
But peace was made in 1609 and the Company did not cease to
be. However, it was in wretched shape and was, moreover, face to
face with the approaching decennial report and accounting due in
1612. Conscious of its desperate condition, and fearing withdrawal
of capital if anything approaching the truth should get out, it em-
ployed the subterfuge of asking for an extension of time, so that
it might make its reckoning of 161 2 along with that of the second
decade, in 1622. This request was clothed with a show of reason-
ableness and with an appeal to loyalty by the explanation that
the expenses of the first decade had naturally been heavier, and the
gains less, than were to be expected from the second ; and by the
warning that unless all the capital could be held together, success-
ful opposition to Spain in the East Indies would be impossible.
This request provoked a storm of hostility : Le Maire, for exam-
ple, declared it to be " out and out absurd and impertinent." As
1 Van Rees, II, 33-37, 45 ff. ; De Reus, pp. 67 ff. ; Blok, III, 496-497.
2 Van Rees, II, 38-40.
404 COLONIZATION
spokesman of many others, he denounced retention of shareholders'
capital, under such pretexts, as tyranny ; and when the Directors
suggested that shares were marketable for any who did not wish to
retain them,^ he retorted that the right to sell them was valueless,
as they would at once fall if the Company attained its demands.
Despite all opposition, however, the States-General indorsed the
proposition of the Directors ; they were not yet able to send a
fleet to the Indies, and judged the aid of the Company to be indis-
pensable in harming the Spaniards and preserving trade for the
Republic. An assault upon the Company was construed to be an
attack on the state. Also, as must constantly be borne in mind, the
legislators were themselves largely interested in the destiny of the
Company.^
This proceeding was not calculated to allay the suspicions and
discontent of the shareholders, now virtually constrained to remain
in a questionable venture. The revelations of the fearless governor-
general of the Indies, Coen,^ but confirmed their fears, as did the
eccentric succession of dividends. These were, in 1611, 50; in
1612, 25; in 1613, 12; and in 1614, 3 per cent. Then up to
1 6 19 no more were paid, though several high percentages were
declared and interest upon them promised. Thus it appears " that
the wrong principle of declaring dividends, even if there were no
profit, is almost as old as the Company itself." The dividend for
1620 was 37| per cent. The charter had required a declaration
of dividends whenever there should be five per cent profit in the
treasury, though it had unfortunately neglected to determine the
maximum percentage to be paid.'* This fluctuation of returns re-
acted upon the value of the shares, causing great instability, a con-
dition aggravated by the actions of Le Maire and others, who in
disgust and anger threw their shares on the market, causing great
decline in quotations. The Directors asked the help of the govern-
ment to stop this panic and the latter responded by forbidding the
sales of futures in shares and by other measures, and thus further
aroused the ire of those who asserted that freedom in buying and
selling was the great privilege of the country. Le Maire was so
1 Cf. also De Reus, p. 72. The Company's policy was to make the transference of
shares difficult. Id., p. 176.
2 Van Rees, IT, 47-48. Holland especially supported the Company. De Reus,
pp. 69, 74. '' Cf. p. 423, below.
* Van der Chys, p. 127; De Reus, pp. 178-179. For an excellent brief sketch of
the Company's finances, see Day, pp. 70 ff.
THJ<: ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 405
hounded by legal persecution that he had to leave Amsterdam.
But instability of the shares continued ; the renewal of dividend-
payment in 1620, together with the influence of an agreement with
the English,^ brought quotations from 166 to 250, but for the next
two years, under non-payment of dividends, they fell to 165. The
conviction gained strength that the Directors were utilizing their
inside information regarding the issue of dividends in shameless
speculation; that they were acting "neither trustworthily nor
prudently." During the second decade also the Company had
been led to invest a million toward the proposed West India Com-
pany, and this without reference to the shareholders at all ; it was
correctly objected that the charter contemplated no such use of
funds. ^
Hence all the malcontents and any neutrals among the share-
holders were very anxious to see the double decennial report of
1622. But there was no intention of making any such accounting.
The Directors had by this time attained a position of equanimity
respecting state supervision which measured their real identity with
the government ; and when the participants went to them to get
information, they were snubbed right royally as " shameless men
who wanted to mix in everything and were presumptuous enough
to call to account their- own lords and masters." They were in-
formed that if they did not compose themselves they would get no
dividends for seven years. Memorials to the Directors and repre-
sentations to the States-General were of no avail ; the petitioners
were denounced as Flemings and Brabanters, ungrateful for the
hospitality they enjoyed, or even as friends of Spain who were try-
ing to destroy the agency that did Spain so much damage. Hope
was held out, however, that after the extension of the charter, from
1623, attention would be given to grievances of the shareholders.
This was small satisfaction, especially when it leaked out that the
Directors wanted the charter extended for fifty years, and that they
all should retain their offices. An appeal was made, in the fashion
of the time, to public opinion ; pamphlets were printed and circu-
lated broadcast, showing how the Directors had taken advantage
of their position. Vacancies had not been filled, in order that the
survivors might divide the Directors' percentage among fewer
claimants ; this percentage had been raised through extravagant
outlays and purchases ; more Eastern wares also had been bought
1 Cf. p. 419, below. ~ Van Rees, II, 65-67, 145-147 ; De Reus, p. 177.
4o6 COLONIZATION
than could be sold with advantai^c in Europe. The Company was
known to be in considerable debt, and the million advanced to the
West India Company was supposed to be merely a way of securing
to the Directors a good share of the latter's profits. In any case,
many of the Directors became suddenly and inexplicably rich, some
were known to have done private business in the Company's ships,
and others to have been " shamelessly solicited with gifts and
presents." They had failed to observe the articles of the charter
dealing with accounting, declaration of dividends, etc. ; and they
had proved untrue to their oath of office.^ They were plainly escaping
more and more from the choice and oversight of the shareholders.^
The answers of the Directors to all this were specious : they
harped on the fact that the Company's records were "material of
state"; that the hcav^y expenses had been incurred in waging the
country's wars, latterly against the English ; that their borrowings
really advantaged the country, affording as they did ■ such excel-
lent investments ; that the decline of the shares was really due to
speculation, crushed in 1610 by the state, but rife again in 1621.
They also resorted to bluster, branding some of the strongest pam-
phlets as seditious and disorderly libels, and offering rewards for
the discovery of author or printer. The state seconded these meas-
ures ; in Holland the courts were even forbidden to take cognizance
of complaints regarding the extension of the charter and allied
subjects. These gag-measures, however, did not frighten the peo-
ple, who were coming to perceive the true inconsistency of the
Company's existence ; they did not demand its dissolution, but the
separation of politics and trade ; they were willing to leave their
money in the Company, but they wanted the Directors to be re-
sponsible. Let the state do the war-making, if need be (ran the
plea), for it could do that better than the merchants ; and let the
latter run the business, which they could do much better than
the state.-
It is not to be denied that the Company was in good part a vic-
tim to experimentation in a new field of economic organization, or,
i:)erhaps more exactly, to experimentation upon a much larger scale
1 Van Rees, II, 147-151 ; De Reus, pp. 70 ff.
2 Van Rees, II, 1 57-161. This seems to have Ijeen prophetic. " The fiscal history
of the Company can be roughly summarized by saying that in its early period, when
il was more trader than ruler, it made money on the whole; that in its later ])eriod,
when it was more ruler than trader, it lost." Uay, p. 73; cf. Koscher, p. 2S6;
p. 560, below.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 407
in an old field. The Company was always serving two masters :
the shareholders and the state. The returning fleets had been
obliged by the charter to report to the States-General, and gradu-
ally the Directors fell into the discussion of war-policy with the
authorities. Thus the Company's archives came really to be state-
documents ; and its credit and strength were synonymous with those
of the United Provinces. And with the increasing degree of iden-
tity between the controllers of the state and of the Company, al-
ready noted, this inherent condition became the more pronounced.^
Renewals of the Charter ; Decline
But the state was not willing to resolve this union of inconsist-
ent functions by itself taking up the war-making in the East ; there
was no doubt that the charter would be renewed and the Directors
continued. But when, in December, 1622, the renewal for twenty
years was made, public opinion was recognized in the attachment
of certain conditions having to do with the relation of the Com-
pany to its participants. The Directors were to present to certain
chief shareholders, within six months, a general reckoning " accord-
ing to the style and fitting form, as it is wont to be done among
merchants "; this was to be public, and was to be repeated every
ten years. Again, the Directors were to retire according to sched-
ule, becoming eligible again after three years, and their selection
was to fall slightly more into the shareholders' hands. They should
not be preferred purchasers from the Company. Also the chief
shareholders should choose nine out of their number to supervise
the annual accounts of their Chamber, while The Seventeen should
ask their advice concerning sales and other important matters.^
The shareholders had to acquiesce in the charter-extension, and
made the best of the new conditions, electing the inspectors of ac-
counts and sending them to Amsterdam in 1623. But the Direct-
ors would give them only the most general of the records, refusing
the detailed India accounts, letters, etc. An appeal to the States-
General brought a command to turn the latter over (April, 1624) ;
but on the return to Amsterdam all these documents were gone
and effort to find them was vain. The searchers were informed
1 Van Rees, II, 155-156. The state assisted the Company in diplomatic ways
also ; and when it was feared that sailors would go into foreign service, it forbade
experienced mariners to take service in other lands. Yet the policy of the Company
really drove talent out of its serv'ice. Id., pp. 28-32, 37. 2 Van Rees, II, 161 -164.
4o8 COLONIZATION
that they would not be able to satisfy their curiosity that time, nor
earn big vacation pay ; the accounting did not take place. A simi-
lar fate awaited the nine auditors of annual accounts. The Direct-
ors tried to use undue influence in their choice and insisted that
they should have at least a thousand Flemish pounds^ invested in
the Company ; they received in their resistance and obstruction
such political support, especially from Holland, that the partici-
pants had finally to give it up. Thus the struggle for the renewal
of the charter left the Company still more free from the duty of
responsibility to shareholders, and the Directors practically per-
manent and unimpeachable.''^
Each succeeding extension of charter found the Directors ever
farther advanced upon the way they had taken, and the resistance
encountered by them ever more languid. The Company itself got
into worse straits financially, declaring dividends in the latter part
of the century in question when there was nothing to declare them
with except a debt; they gave the shareholders, to quiet them,
interest-bearing obligations on the Company (at four per cent) in
1679, 1680, 1 68 1, 1682, 1697, 1698. The speculation in shares,
which began early in the history of the Company and was graphic-
ally described as a " Windhandel," went on through all the later
periods. Quotations were up to 400 in the middle of the seven-
teenth century, and rose at times, after a succession of dividends,
to 1080 and even 1720. Again, after bad news from the East,
they fell to 60 and 48 ; 1730 was a " dark time " for the Comjiany.
But as late as 1720 shares reached 1260, and in such unfortunate
years as 1672 and 1781 they were quoted at 250 and 215 respec-
tively. During the latter half of the eighteenth century they rose
as high as 750. It is clear that these were thoroughly fictitious
values.
The last dividend was ]x\k] in 1782. During the 198 years of
the Company's existence the sum total paid to shareholders is fig-
ured at 3600 .'5 per cent, or an average of 18 per cent a year. This
seems very high ; but it must be realized that the Company con-
stantly operated with a capital in excess of the par value of its
shares, and that the state of mind of the shareholders was one of
constant insecurity. No one knew where the dividends came from
and they lent no solid value to the shares. '"^ In its latter years, the
' About 52400; cf. De Reus, p. 20, note 2. - Van Rees, IT, 165-169.
■* De Reus, pp. xxxiixxxiii, 175-180; Van Rees, II, 294; lilok, III, 495-499.
THE COLONIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 409
only ones beside the Directors who seem to have drawn steady
profit from the Company were the members of a commission of
the States-General, who received generous gifts of money, spices,
and the like, for an indulgent examination and certification of shaky
accounts. The charter was extended from period to period with-
out any strife, on condition at times of a goodly contribution to
the state or an addition to the fleet. From 1782 to 1794 the
debts increased nearly 8,000,000 florins, amounting to a grand
total of 74,000,000 in 1789, and the aid of the government was
asked, in humility, over and over. But the Directors would not
renounce their petty perquisites,^ caring little really for the Com-
pany ; after 1790 the latter was entirely dependent on the state.
Thus it continued to lead a dishonorable and sordid existence,
growing steadily weaker until the war with England in 1781 re-
vealed its true condition, and the events culminating in the fall of
the state before the French power, in 1795, swept it away.^
Foundation of the West India Company
We have thus far observed the Company's operations and policy
in Europe, and have yet to exhibit its other and even more char-
acteristic aspects, or phases of the same aspect, in its Eastern
dominion. But, by way of throwing similar topics into proximity,
it seems advisable first to consider the formation and, in many
respects, parallel organization and career in Europe of the West
India Company.
Although the older Company had made little or no use of its
monopoly of the Magellan Straits passage, it had consistently
resisted all efforts to utilize this route of approach to the East.
The most serious of such attempts had been made by the arch-
enemy, Le Maire, who, smarting under his persecutions, conceived
the idea of hunting for a passage to the Pacific farther to the
south. He attained from the state assurances of rights in any
passage he might open up, and an expedition was fitted out which
discovered the Straits of Le Maire (January 24, 16 16) and later
the passage around the Cape. A ship was now dispatched to the
Moluccas by the new route, but upon arrival its papers were seized
by the Dutch governor-general and the crew shipped home. A
^ Their " Zuckerbrot," as De Reus (p. 31) calls it.
2 Van Rees, II, 171-172,210,217; De Reus, pp. xlvi, 27-33 ; Fortanier, pp. 39 ff. ;
Day, pp. 73 ff.
4IO COLONIZATION
protest from Le Maire before the States-General secured restitu-
tion and damages ; but the whole incident made it clear that the
Company would brook no competition, that it was ready to do the
same thing over again. About a century later a second attempt
with a similar history took place, after which there was no further
competition on the part of Dutchmen while the Company lasted.^
With regard to America itself, however, in so far as enterprises
thither directed did not threaten the East, the Company was far
more indifferent. This appeared in its half-contemptuous attitude
toward the agitation preceding the West India Company's formation.
WiLLEM USSELINCX
The man above all others who kept the project of an American
company before the Dutch public was Willem Usselinc.x,^ an enthu-
siast, in many respects far in advance of his age, and who ])ursued
a plan of his youth varying only in its details, through a long life.
" This plan was in the main very simple, and consisted in the
founding of settlements without slaves in America, not in order to
seek gold and silver there, but to establish a profitable reciprocal
exchange of manufactures for raw goods between mother-country
and colony." He likewise hoped thus to transfer the field of strife
between the Netherlands and S))ain to a distance, and to under-
mine the power of the enemy by cutting off the sources of his
strength. Thus he thought to benefit the Netherlands in a positive
way, and also to honor God by spreading the holy evangel ; and
since segregated traders could do little, he proposed a great West
India Company. These ideas were presented to the public as early
as I 591, and in 1600 there seemed to be some likelihood of their
realization, though the tendency was always toward organization
on the lines of the East India Company, a fact which gave Usse-
lincx great anxiety. For this man was in several respects like Le
Maire, and was dominated by a similar hatred of the older organiza-
tion. 1 lowever, the question of war or peace with Spain was to the
fore in the first decade of the seventeenth century, and the foun-
dation of a new Company was made to await its issue. The war-
party, realizing that such a move would destroy all hope of j^cace,
favored the project, but the peace-party, headed by Oldenbarne-
velt, was unwilling to organize such an expensive war-machine,
' Van Rees, II, 67-72. ^ q,^ ti^g ]jfe Qf Usselincx, see Jameson.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 411
which, besides, offered no prospect of gain. The temper of the
country decided for peace and it was concluded in 1609 with
Httle attention to Ussehncx or his partisans.^
However, what with the growth of confidence as against Spain
and the widening conception of commercial possibility, the idea of
the Company was not allowed to drop. The state toyed with the
project, and asked a good deal of advice from Usselincx, who seems
to have possessed a wide practical knowledge of the Indies, both
East and West. Thus matters developed until 1621, when the
Company was actually founded. Its charter, following closely that
of the East India Company, realized the worst apprehensions of
Usselincx, who had been a severe critic of the older Company and
who believed that " merchants have gain for a pole-star and greed
for a compass, and are unfit to rule." It is of little utility to
follow his criticisms of the charter, for they were of no av^ail ; it
may simply be said that his views were of a distinctly modern
type, and so, to his own age, visionary and in many respects really
impracticable. To get booty, to found strongholds, and to conquer,
were the colonial goals set before the peoples of that age ; the
slow, costly, and laborious foundings of true settlement colonies
presented no attraction at all. Again, when the power of Holland
among the Provinces is realized, and it is borne in mind that the
most influential Hollanders were also Directors of the East India
Company, it is little wonder that such innovations in policy were
promptly rejected. Thus Usselincx's advice and warnings went
for naught ; they even called him a friend of Spain, which hurt
him more than all else. He suffered the fate of a man who is in
advance of his time ; he became bitter in his disappointment, fell
into debt, drifted into the service of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden,
and assisted him in his schemes for a South Sea Company until
the death of the monarch put an end to this also. He came to
regard himself as a martyr, speaking continually of his unpaid
services, but gradually dropped out of sight, and died, probably in
1647, at the age of eighty. ^
1 Van Rees, II, 72-96.
2 Van Rees, II, 98-103, 112-122, 129-132, 134-142. Jameson's monograph on
Usselincx covers many details of the founding of the West India Company, as well
as of that of the Swedish company. Into the story of the latter, because it possesses
curious interest rather than importance to the general student of colonization, it has
seemed unnecessary to go. In all essentials Jameson supports Van Rees.
412
COLONIZATION
Organization of the West India Company
The monopoly granted to the West India Company in 162 1 was
for twenty-four years ; it covered most of the west coast of Africa,
all of the east coast of America from Newfoundland to Cape Horn,
and a large part of the west coast of South America, as well as
all Atlantic islands included within these boundaries and all " south-
ern lands" from the Cape of Good Hope westward to New Guinea.
There were constituted five Chambers which met at Amsterdam
and Middleburg (Zceland), and a directorial college, "The Nine-
teen." Reports were due every si.x years. The state by virtue of
subsidies given was to have a large share in the gain to be gotten,
and was to insure the safety of the Company with sixteen large
and four small war-vessels. The Company was essentially a fighting
organization, with sinister designs upon Spanish and Portuguese
America. 1 In view of the prospective expense of this military
function, and because there was no immediate promise of gain, as
in the spice-trade, the subscriptions for shares came in very slowly ;
people had taken warning from the East India Company and feared
to invest. But the government granted the new Company the
monopoly of West India salt (1622) ; state-officials subscribed and
urged the richest citizens to do so. The East India Company was
forced to put a million into its younger contemporary, and sub-
scriptions were solicited in foreign countries. Despite all this
pressure, however, the subscription-list stayed open until Septem-
ber, 1623 ; finally there were gotten together 7,108,106 florins, of
which half came from Amsterdam, and in November the new Com-
pany had fifteen ships at sea.^
The history of the West India Company is in one distinctive
respect different from that of its East India contemporary : of
the two inconsistent functions of trade and war, it accentuated the
latter, while the East India Company, despite all its talk of
patriotism, was above all a trade-organization. Hence the West
India Company assisted the state against Spain to a greater
extent, and more as a matter of avowed policy, and thus debated
its operations with the government and was supported by national
ships-of-war and troops. It was thus far less indei:)cndcnt than the
East India Company, which, after the early strifes over the charter
1 Van Rees, II, 1 10-112, 121 ; Roscher, pp. 270 ff.
2 Van Rees, II, 125-128, 133-134.
THE 0R(;AN1ZATI0N of the INDIA C;OMPANH^:S 413
had practically gone its own way. Nor was the monopoly of the
western Company so complete ; there was from the outset a great
deal of illicit trade in America which the extent of coast-line and
the absence of any natural point of supervision made it impossible
to prevent. As early as 1631 certain rights of voyage were allowed
to private persons under provision that they should use only well-
armed ships and should pay a recognition of 20 per cent to the
Company; and in 1634 the whole of Brazil, with a few reserva-
tions, was opened under like conditions. The gain to these private
traders was so great that by 1636 The Nineteen considered limi-
tation of freedom, but the Amsterdam Directors opposed this,
and won their point; in 1638 the Directors, in conjunction with
the States-General, left commerce free to the Dutch and the
inhabitants of Brazil under payment of 10 per cent for European
and 30 per cent for American wares. But one trip a year was
allowed to each vessel ; and the Company reserved for itself the
trade in slaves. Brazil-wood, and necessities of war.^
Maladministration and Decline
The Company had attained a strong footing in Brazil during the
early years of its existence, but was unable, largely for lack of
funds, to hold it.^ Reckoning on state-subsidies it had expended
nearly all it possessed in dividends, and so ran out of money just
at a time when new enterprises and war demanded large outlays.
In 1629, after the capture of the Spanish silver fleet, dividends
had reached 50 and 25 per cent; but already in 163 1 aid was of
necessity sought from the state. It was given in the form of a
loan of 700,000 guilders and later repeated. But after a time the
subsidies began to fail and to be replaced by bad debts. In 1629
the Company had stood by the state, furnishing ships and men,
and contributing, besides other aid, 600,000 guilders ; in 163 1 the
States-General were in debt to the Company 1,250,000 guilders
for money advanced. Holland alone had been prompt in payments,
but, when the rest had fallen behind, refused to pay till they did ;
in 1638 Holland alone owed over a million. By 1636 the Company,
having been forced to borrow, was in debt 18,000,000 guilders,
and by 1640 the case was hopeless. There was too little unity of
purpose in the States-General ; the several Provinces were always
1 Van Rees, II, 179-180, 1S3-188. ^ cf. pp. 146 ff., above, and 453 ff., below.
414
COLONIZATION
pursuing their selfish interests, and set them aside only in times of
the utmost need. As long as the war with Spain was located
within its district the Company was favored ; now hostilities were
on the southern boundaries of the Republic and its services were
no longer needed.^ In 1644 the charters of both companies came
to an end, and a union was proposed. Strong objection immedi-
ately developed on the part of the East India Company, which
declared that it could not go in for the war-projects of its fellow,
and asserted its absolute rights in the East Indies. The West
India Company recalled other combinations, among them that by
which the East India organization had itself been formed ; and it
called to mind its own services. From 1623 to 1636 it had fitted
out over 800 ships, with 67,000 men, and had maintained 24,000
men in service at a cost of 45,000,000 guilders. It had captured
or destroyed over 600 Spanish ships, 98 of which were " famous
galleons," and had brought the king of Spain 75,000,000 guilders'
worth of trouble. The winnings of the Company from ships cap-
tured and from booty had been about 37,000,000 guilders from
1623 to 1636. These operations had aided the East India Com-
pany, also, by diverting Spain's attention from the East ; and now
that the king of Spain had heard of the proposed union of the two
companies he was the more eager for peace. The conqueror of
Brazil, Count Nassau, was convinced that Spain could not stand
against the two in union, but would lose all she had in the New
World. The pamphlets of the time appear to have favored the West
India Company,^ and men like Usselincx opposed the union on the
ground that thereby all the trade would fall into dishonest and
disreputable hands. The older Company had involved the coun-
try with the English and was out of favor ; it was even seen that
the West India Company's trade in raw goods and manufactures
was more solid and valuable than that in the spices of the East.^
During this discussion the charters were periodically renewed
for brief terms, until finally decision was made against union
(March, 1647). The charter of the East India Company was
then extended for twenty-five years, but it was to pay a million
and a half guilders to the West India Company. In July the
1 Van Rees, II, 180 ff., 190-193; Roscher, p. 272.
2 The king of Spain regarded the West India realm as his "true spouse," while
that of the East Indies was only his " mistress." Hence the greater damage wrought
against him by the West India Company. Van Rees, II, 202.
^ Van Rees, II, 193-205; Watson, II, 21.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIA COMPANIES 415
latter's charter was extended, also for twenty-five years, although
its shares were down to 30 and the state of affairs in Brazil was
lamentable, the families of the Dutch functionaries actually suffer-
ing from hunger. This situation was charged up to extravagance
and questionable practices adopted after the example of the East
India Company ; but it was against the constitution of the Repub-
lic and the spirit of the time for the state to take over colonies,
however wretched, so it merely propped up the old organization.
Creditors began to make trouble in 1655, ^I'^cl in 1667 sale of the
charter to the highest bidder was considered ; in 1674 the state
of the Company was so bad that it was decided to give it up. A
new one was then erected, with certain provisions regarding triennial
accounting and the separation of war and trade ; commerce was
to be open to all on condition of a recognition to the Company, thus
become a mere incubus upon private trade. In 1730 further limi-
tation of the monopoly took place. Shares had sunk from 92 in
1723 to 35, and the dividends between 1730 and 1780 averaged
about one and one-half per cent ; the Company was living upon
the dues paid by private traders, and the opinion was growing that
it was useless. In 1 791, when the question of charter-renewal came
up, it was disbanded ; the council of the Company was succeeded
by a Council of the Colonies, and the shares at 30 were converted
into three-per-cent obligations of the state. ^
The story of these companies seems a sorry enough affair ; yet
the Dutch rather unanimously regarded them as " the two pillars
upon which the status of these lands rests." They appeared to
constitute a necessary part of a government unable to attend to
distant possessions and interests. " During the second half of the
seventeenth and almost the whole of the eighteenth century no one
doubted that the possession of the East India trade was dependent
upon the existence of the great Company." ^ But before attempt-
ing any more general estimate of these chartered monopohes, or
trying to arrive at a conception of their influence upon the life of
the metropolis, it still remains to treat of their activity within the
regions assigned to their control.
1 Van Rees, 11, 209-211, 213, 218-223.
2 Van Rees, II, 213, 216; cf. Colmeiro, II, 453-454.
CHAPTER XI
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS
Immediately after the formation of the East India Company, as
has been seen, a fleet of seventeen vessels sailed for the East ;
these were followed in 1603 by one of thirteen, well-armed ; and in
1606 by a third. The first established a factory at Bantam, where
a head-merchant and sub-officials were left. Thence ships plied
in all directions, to Banda, Atjeh, Borneo, Siam, and China. The
second visited Goa and Calicut, concluding a treaty with the
Zamorin of the latter district ; went to the Moluccas, where con-
quests were made and a governor left ; founded a factory at Banda
and penetrated as far as New Guinea. The third, under Matelief,
defeated the Portuguese near Malacca but could not take the place,
and thence pushed on as far as Tidore, Ternatc, and even Macao.
In 1607 a stronger fleet, under an admiral, departed to fight the
Portuguese in Malacca and the Moluccas ; it visited and made
treaties in Mozambique and Farther India, seized many Portuguese
ships, and was just ready to assault Malacca when the peace of
1609 was announced.^ Matelief's idea in attacking Malacca had
been to close the Straits of Singapore to rivals, Portuguese above
all ; but he intended to shut out both Arabs and Chinese as well,
and then to drive the Spanish from the Philippines. Coen elabo-
rated the same idea in his plan of forcing the Chinese to allow free
trade along their coast and to keep out of the archipelago except
in so far as they came to Batavia to trade with the Dutch. This
project, it may be added, was partially realized ; in 1624 the Dutch
occupied Formosa and a lively trade with the Chinese ensued ; but
the arrogance and greed of the Dutch disgusted the Orientals, and
after 1661, when the Chinese private Coxinga seized F'ormosa, the
Chinese trade was confined to the taking of tea to Batavia. How-
ever, there was no more serious competition from east and south
Asia and, after the conquest of Malacca (1641), the straits remained
closed.
1 Ulok. 111,493-495 ; Van Rees, II, 226-228.
416
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS
Centralization of Administration
417
All through this early period the Company proceeded upon the
regular mercantile programme of making treaties and founding
factories on an extensive scale. Gradually, however, these estab-
lishments began to display a lack of unity of purpose, heads of
factories acting independently of each other as far as their instruc-
tions permitted. Local management was proved a failure and the
need of centralization shown ; it was likewise desirable to present
a strong front to the Spanish and Portuguese, and, as the latter
had done, to impress the natives by a magnificent court. Thus, in
1609, a governor-general, Pieter Both, was appointed, who arrived
in Bantam and began actual Dutch rule in the Indies on December
19, 1 6 10. From this time on, the ofifice thus created was almost
that of a monarch. The governor was expected to follow the
orders of The Seventeen, and there was attached to him, as a
sort of check, a council {Raad van Indie) of five men, later (16 17)
increased to nine.^ In general, however, The Seventeen were too
far away, especially since the imperfection of means of communica-
tion as compared with those of to-day multiplied distances as now
reckoned, to dictate more than general policies. In the seventeenth
century it was ordinarily more than a year before a governor could
get an answer from home, and even as late as 1769 a prize of 1200
guilders was offered by The Seventeen for the skipper who should
reach Batavia within six months ; as for the Raad, only five mem-
bers were stationed at Batavia, the other four being governors of
districts outside of Java, and so too far away to do much. And
the governor had his own ways of evading their control. At first
he was to confer with the Raad when there was no special instruc-
tion from The Seventeen ; later he was merely its president, with
casting vote. But as head of fleet and army he far outdid his ad-
visers in importance ; and he could easily get the upper hand by
reference to secret advices of The Seventeen, or on the pretext
of awaiting instructions. The Seventeen were willing to grant large
powers, thinking that thus only could unity be secured ; and realiz-
ing their own ignorance of local Indian affairs, they were glad to
1 This was called : " Het Collegie van regeering over alle actien en zaken van
gansch Indie, de Nederlandsche Compagnie betreffende." De Reus, p. 83 ; cf. Day,
pp. 42-43, 91-94. Encycl. Ned. Ind., arts. " Gouverneurer-generaal," "Raad van
Nederlandsch-Indie."
4i8 COLONIZATION
depend upon the man on the spot.^ Thus the history of adminis-
tration in the East is largely a record of the governors-general.
The Crushing of Competition
One of the first duties that fell to the governors was the crush-
ing of all competition within the areas of spice-production. The
States-General held strongly to the idea that the Company was the
proper organ with which to keep up trouble with Spain, and so gave
it large power against the enemy ; a discretion which it used so
energetically as to foil all hostile projects and to establish itself
strongly in factories and forts. The status of the Portuguese
power in the latter half of the sixteenth century was, as has been
shown,^ deplorable ; in particular the natives, in their hatred of
their oppressors, were all ready to go over to the Dutch or any one
else hostile to the Portuguese. The whole structure of the empire
was ready to collapse at a slight shock ; and the Portuguese them-
selves were the more apathetic inasmuch as the Indies now belonged
to Philip II as king of Portugal. The Dutch captured Malacca in
1 64 1, and were thereafter masters of the archipelago, possessing
its keys in the straits of Malacca and Sunda ; the Portuguese con-
tinued to hold Timor only, and the Spanish soon (1663) turned
their faces east from the Philippines to Mexico, both alike fearing
and avoiding the Dutch. But the latter were not content with any-
thing short of a closed monopoly, and determined to expel friendly
nations also. The French possessed small capacity and little capi-
tal, and their East India Company, founded in 1C04, rapidly de-
clined. The Company did not balk at the use of force, although it
was willing to pay damages after the object had been gained. After
1682 the French kept out of the archipelago, and the Danes con-
(ined themselves to the mainland.''^ With the English the struggle
was sharper, not only because they were stronger, but because
England had been and was the traditional friend of the Netherlands.
But this consideration was not allowed to weigh overmuch ; and
in any case strife between their "colonies " was not pvooi of the
1 Van Rees, II, 48-50; De Reus, pp. xiii-xiv, 80-85; Day, pp. 88-91.
^ I'p. 115 ff., above.
'' Van Rees, II, 51-52, 63 ; cf. Danvers, II, 105 ff. For more detailed accounts of
these various nations in the East, see Encycl. Ned. Ind., arts. " De Denen," " De
Engelschen," "De Eranschen," " De I'ortugeezen," " De Spanjaarden in den Ma-
leischen Archipel."
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 419
enmity of two nations ; the English did not hesitate to provoke or
even aid the natives of the Mokiccas against the Dutch. They
hesitated to consider combination with the latter, fearing that the
Netherlanders' superior energy and capacity would come more and
more to limit the number of English participants. But some such
pooling of interests was being brought to definite form in 1619,
and was favored by the Dutch Company in the hope of thus secur-
ing extra insurance against mishaps due in a few years, when war
broke out in the East Indies. The Dutch then determined upon
the expulsion at all hazards of their rivals from the Moluccas ; and
in 16 19 the governor-general, Coen, was instructed to attack them
at all points. He treated the English as a sort of subject nation ;
and early in 1623, on the occasion of a conspiracy of English
agents in Amboina, he openly broke with them. The conspirators
were executed (" Amboina Massacre ") and the English forced to
leave the Moluccas, and also, in 1624, Batavia. From this time on
the policy was one of absolute exclusion ; the Dutch, despite all
efforts of their enemies, remained in full possession, and in 1667
(Peace of Breda) the English gave up their last hold in the Moluc-
cas and upon the spice-trade; in 1683 they surrendered Bantam
and their exclusion from the East Indies was complete. There
were no other foreign rivals.
The Dutch had started out, as novices, with Hugo de Groot's
theory of freedom of the sea, which conveniently demonstrated
their own right to approach and trade in the Indies. But the
situation appeared so altered when viewed from the inside that
they ended by giving the world an exemplar of the old exclusion
policy carried out in truly orthodox form. Having come to occupy
the situation and to be appealed to by the conditions of the Span-
ish and Portuguese, they speedily reacted in a fashion identical with
theirs, but with an energy and thoroughness that realized what had
been the dreams rather than the hopes of the Iberians. And this
was after all but the local application of the principle of exclusion
universally applied by the Dutch ; in the trade-history of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth century " the fundamental starting-point for
our merchants is simply this : for us the greatest possible freedom,
for our competitors the greatest possible obstruction, here and else-
where.. To this end our trade-legislation and trade-policy were
directed." ^
1 Van Rees, II, 53-63 ; Blok,II,504 (quoted) ; cf. 346-349, 502-504; Day, pp. 51-55.
420 COLONIZATION
Monopoly Policy ; Oppression of the Natives
In their increasing freedom from interference on the part of
the outside world, The Seventeen and their governors-general were
enabled to turn more attention to the objects, or rather the
object, for which they labored. This was commercial gain, con-
ceived to be derivable first and foremost, and to the exclusion of
all else, from the spice-trade. Like the Portuguese the Dutch were
determined to get the spices at a low price, and thus their policy
was to cajole or coerce the natives, through treaties or by war,
to sell their products to them at a fi.xed price and to have no
trade-relations with other nations. With Ternate, one of the few
centers of clovc-production, a treaty was made to the effect that
the cost of expelling the Spaniards was to be borne by the natives
and that they were then to sell to the Company at prices arranged
between the States-General and the local king. Strongholds were
to be erected to keep the natives in order and to repel the foreigner.
This arrangement was on the whole a peaceable one, but usually
violence was not long restrained. The Bandanese, who displayed
a greater sense of freedom and more energy than is usual with
Easterners, and had even developed to the extent of holding folk-
assemblies to consider policy, had agreed in 1602 to sell all nut-
megs and mace to the Dutch, but with no special condition as to
price. They had likewise stipulated for the right of trade in their
junks wherever they wished. But they speedily discovered that
the Company could force them to take low prices by refusing to
buy at higher figures ; and they came to make more and more use
of their stipulation, trading with the English and Portuguese, and
even receiving aid from the former against the Dutch assertion of
monopoly. The governor-general, Coen, put an end to all this in-
subordination ; in 1 62 1 he assembled a large force and made him-
self master of the Banda Islands, and then proceeded to depopulate
them with relentless cruelty. Those of the Bandanese who remained
in the islands were obliged to live on the coast, where it was imjios-
sible to keep up their agriculture ; others were removed to Java
and located near Batavia, to cultivate rice. Some escaped to other
islands and stirred up hatred against the Dutch, and some fled to
the bush in their own islands and died of hunger. The Directors
approved entirely of these measures. The sequel of the tale like-
wise throws its light upon Dutch trade and native policy. Coen
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 421
tried to populate the islands again, and sent there four hundred
men and women, mostly whites, a number which increased in ten
years to one thousand. The Company was to furnish them slaves
to till the soil and sell them rice and cloth at cost price ; they, for
their part, were to sell nutmegs and mace for a fixed price to the
Company. But the latter could not see enough in the rice-trade to
continue it, and so decided, in the latter part of the seventeenth
century, that the slaves would have to live on sago and fish, which
the islanders could procure for themselves from the Moluccas.
This food was insufficient, the slaves died in great numbers, and
the consequent rise of their price gave impetus to the slave-trade.
Meanwhile the sago and fish gatherers had utilized their opportu-
nities to engage in illicit traffic and were getting rich. This trade
was discovered in the early years of the eighteenth century and
crushed by force. ^
In some such way the whole archipelago was rendered subser-
vient ^ to the paramount consideration, and, at least at first, the
gains were very large. The Dutch bought nutmegs at a stiver and
a half and less per pound in the Indies, and sold them in Holland
and Zeeland for three guilders and a quarter, making in some cases
up to five thousand per cent. The clov^es also of Amboina and
Ternate yielded heavy profit ; a half million pounds, purchased at
four stivers, sold at four guilders, and even in the early part of the
eighteenth century the Company still got the cloves for six stivers
a pound and sold them for almost four guilders. But in the case
of the cloves also the contraband traffic naturally arose, for the
clove was a favorite spice in the East itself ; and since smuggling
was carried on by native skippers in their elusive small-craft, it was
difficult to check by ordinary means. Hence arose the Company
policy of uprooting the trees wherever its mastery was not com-
plete, on the pretext that the natives had not kept to their agree-
ments with the Dutch. A sort of annual voyage of as many as
sixty-four vessels was organized and natives were taken along to
1 Van Rees, II, 229-232.
2 The ease with which the Dutch appear to have extended their power recalls the
experience of the Portuguese, detailed above (pp. 107 ff.). According to Day (p. 10),
who makes a survey of the native organization a prime factor in his argument, the
native institutions in Java were " not fresh and in a course of vigorous development,
but old and worn, going through their cycles of change only to return to the starting-
point. Nothing else would explain the ease with which the Dutch conquered and
ruled the island."
42 2 COLONIZATION
destroy trees ; if these were found where they were unauthorized,
the adjacent towns were burned. When, for a certain year, the
Company had need of more cloves, there was cither no round made
or a short one ; if the spice was in plenty, a long one. The Amboi-
nese natives on occasion of the long voyage were unable to return
in time to sell their own spice and so suffered want. This extirpa-
tion was in general the destruction of livelihood itself, for the trees
had need of years of careful tending before they bore.^ The bitter-
ness that such inhuman greed had caused aided the illicit traffic,
a result which the Company met with new severity ; the seven-
teenth-century history of the Indies is that of brave but hopeless
defense of liberty on the part of the Malays against the cupidity
of the Dutch. The latter did not stop with severity but employed
deceit and treachery to effect their ends. Coen brought fulfillment
of the monopoly policy ; nutmegs were thereafter raised on the
Banda Islands alone and cloves in Amboina. In Ternate the extir-
pation found less resistance because of the local interest in tobacco,
but in 1680 the people, discouraged by the collapse of their trade,
took up arms. After they had been quelled in blood, prosperity
never returned to the island ; it remained a costly Company post,
maintained for reasons of monopoly and war. In Amboina, after
some strife, the Company had its way, uprooted such trees as it
chose, and forced the inhabitants to live under the guns of the
forts ; from being a fairly civilized, energetic, brave people, they
were reduced to a poverty-stricken group of slaves. By these
varied means the production of cloves was reduced to one-fourth
of what it had been. Then ensued a direful policy of vacillation :
first the Dutch had misgivings as to there being enough trees, and
encouraged the natives of Amboina to plant more, and then the
fear of low prices caused them to force submission to the destruc-
tion of the young trees; and "so it went on through the whole of
the eighteenth century." ^
Policy toward Private Trade
But it was not enough to destroy the trees — the native mer-
chant shipping must also be annihilated, if the raisoii d'etre of the
Company was to be vindicated. At the period of the arrival of the
' Van Kees, IT, 232-234, 238-239. For details of the spice-trade see Encyol. Ned.
Ind., arts. "Amboina," " Notenmiiskaat," " I'eper," " Kaneel," " Nagelen (Kniid ),"
"Ternate," etc. ^ Van Kees, II, 234-235.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 423
Dutch in the East they had found a prosperous merchant shipping
in the hands chiefly of Javanese and Macassars. This had not been
disturbed by the Portuguese because of their dependence upon it
for the assembUng of their cargoes ; but the Dutch felt no such
need. The Javanese were rather easily disposed of; in 1646 a
treaty with the sultan of Mataram forbade his subjects from going
to the Moluccas. Passes from Batavia were demanded as a condi-
tion of passing Malacca ; and it was finally ordered that the Java-
nese should follow the coasting-trade only, their ships and cargoes
to be confiscated if they were found more than five miles from the
shore. The Macassars of southern Celebes were more stubborn ;
their praus visited the whole archipelago, and in vain did the
governor, De Vlaming, threaten intercourse with the Moluccas with
hard labor for life. But by 1667, through sowing disaffection, the
Company reduced the strong Macassar state, and thereafter, since
all trade had to be done under a pass, the Moluccas were secure.^
This determined policy toward foreigners and natives assumed
a form scarcely less truculent and inexorable as against the private
trade of the Netherlanders in the archipelago. The trade-areas of
the East were roughly divided into two classes : the region actually
held by or treaty-bound to the Company, and the outlying districts.
For the first class, Company functionaries could be used, but for
the second they were less valuable since they lacked the spirit of
individual enterprise. Hence there was in the latter case something
less of opposition to private traders; Coen, in 1623, attempted
to demonstrate to The Seventeen that such exchange was better
intrusted to individual enterprise under a recognition-fee to the
Company. India must maintain and feed itself, his argument runs,
and so men, ships, and capital must be attracted to India and put
in a position to help themselves and the Company through free
trade. Coen partially won over The Seventeen and the Chambers,
but illness delayed him from setting his own hand to the work,
and the complaisant attitude of the Directors suffered speedy alter-
ation. The reaction in 163 i was signalized by a determined assault
on freedom of trade, and another period of generosity in 1662 was
again followed by a tightening of restriction. The Company grad-
ually strengthened prohibitive ordinances until the years 1771 ^o
1774, when a good deal of relaxation took place ; but it was then
too late. The Directors seemed to miss the significance of the
1 Van Rees, II, 236-238.
424 COLONIZATION
fact that even a delegate from their own body, when sent to the
Indies as governor to effect measures of restriction, was shortly
made over, once in touch with local conditions, into an advocate
of freedom.^ The results of their consistent narrow-mindedness
will appear the more clearly when actual attempts at colonization
under the Company are considered.^
Limitation of Production
Thus far the activity of the Company in doing away with rivals
of all kinds has received the bulk of attention, although inciden-
tally some idea has been given of the processes by which the natives
were reduced and of the profits subsequently secured. We now
turn to the business policy of the Company in the regions which
it had cleared of all resistance. The keynote of this policy, struck
almost at the beginning, was the counterpart of that which domi-
nated at the European end ; and its underlying motive was the
preservation of diversity of conjunctures. The supply of spices
was kept down on the European market in order to realize high
returns, this procedure extending to the actual destruction of crops
and even to the burying and burning of large quantities of spice ; ^
and in the East the theory always prevailed of purchase at the
lowest prices and sale of the Company's goods to the natives or
resident Dutch at the highest. The old ideal of large percentages
of gain on a small movement of trade still persisted, and had been
strengthened by the happenings of the first few years when, in
consequence of the competitive activity of the disunited companies,
the price of pepper had been brought low in Europe*
What has been said as to the clove-production and its limita-
tion a}:)plies in general to all the products in whicti the Company
conceived it worth while to trade. The raising of pepper was
forbidden elsewhere than under Company control ; and since the
1 Van Rees, II, 246-247; De Reus, pp. 246-249, 259-261. - P. 433, below.
3 " Some years . . . many hundred pounds of cloves are openly buried, and in part,
also, burned." Valentijn (IV, 251) in Van Rees, II, 285; cf. Roscher, pp. 280-281.
l.eroy-l?eaulieu exhibits the folly of staking everytliing on the sj^ice-trade ; its great
profits were illusory. In 1840, he says (I, 275), the spice-trade was insignificant. The use
of substitutes for the monopolized articles cut deeply into profits. Van Rees, II, 286.
* Van Rees, II, 283 ff. ; De Reus, p. xxi ; Blok, III, 496 ; Day, p. 62. In 1623 the
shareholders complained that the Directors asked such high prices that much of their
goods remained in the warehouses, the capital invested lying idle in the meantime.
But price-regulation was a cardinal tenet, and elevation of prices was a popular expe-
dient for covering losses. Van Rees, II, 285-286.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 425
plants grew slowly and could not quickly respond to the mood of
the Directors, determined as this was by the momentary ups and
downs of European demand, the culture was gradually given up
and after the dissolution of the Company practically ceased. CofTee
was earlier procured in Mocha, but when the price rose and the
Arab government made some trouble, it was introduced (about
1700) into Java. To incite its culture the Company paid at first
ten stivers a pound ; but it speedily got down to six, and then set
out to eliminate individuals from the production. Thus arose the
regular monopoly ; but, since coffee could be bought cheaper in
Ceylon, it was necessary now to reduce the purchase price to two
stivers. Further, in order to prevent the inevitable resistance here
encountered, the Directors proceeded now to limit production to
the region of Batavia, where control was easy ; elsewhere the plants
were to be uprooted. Thus through meddling and oscillation of
policy the industry was destroyed in Javanese districts. Indigo,
again, had been a successful product of the Javanese before the
Dutch arrived, and trade in it quickly arose ; but the prices the
Dutch were willing to pay were too low and the forcing system
came again into operation. Sugar-production suffered in the same
manner. The Company held also the monopoly of the opium and
salt industries, which were let out at handsome sums to the
Chinese.^ Plainly there was little economic chance for the natives
under such a system.
What prices the Company paid in the East were largely in
money. This was theoretically unfortunate ; the Dutch thought to
make double gain if they could barter linen and other textiles and
manufactures for the spices. But the Easterners had little need of
food ; and their clothing was made so well and cheaply at home as
to render European competition, in these centuries that preceded
the use of steam-driven machinery, impossible. Nor must it ever
be lost sight of that, especially in its later period, a very large pro-
portion of the Company's wares " came to it in a political rather
than an economic way, as tribute and not by exchange." ^ Thus
the exports of the Company to the Indies were mainly the necessi-
ties of life for the Europeans, a few cloths, and some gold and
1 Van Rees, II, 279-282; Day, pp. 65-70. See Encyl. Ned. Ind., arts. "Indigo,"
" Koffie," " Tabak," " Rijst," " Suiker," " Opium," " Zout."
2 Day, p. 63. The " contingents " and " forced deliveries " are regarded by this
author (pp. 63-64) as essentially the same.
426 COLONIZATION
silver articles that pleased the natives ; upon these goods the Com-
pany forced the payment of high prices, not only from the natives,
but also, where it could, from the Europeans. These imports to
the colonies were not of very great volume, never exceeding, ap-
parently , a value of 3,000,000 guilders a year. Payment for the
spices was largely in gold and silver ; in the latter half of the eight-
eenth century a value of 4,000,000 to 6,000,000 guilders was sent
yearly to the East, and as high as 450,000 at a voyage. In accord-
ance with the prevailing mercantilism of the day, this export f)f
metal from the Netherlands was looked upon with a misgiving,
which but reenforced the tendency to make a little of it go a
great way. Later it seemed the part of policy to jwy in copper
duits, which were worth in the East twice as much as in Europe ;
between 1771 and 1780 over 100,000,000 of these were sent to
the Indies.^
Corruption of the Service
Such a penurious, catch-penny policy could not but have its
effects upon the morale of the Company service. ^ The functiona-
ries were, first of all, very poorly paid ; the principle here was to
exact the maximum of service for the minimum of actual outlay.
The local agents lived not infrequently in a condition of real
misery ; and gradually their quality deteriorated, not only because
good men would not come but because they did not remain honest
when they did come. There was a provision that no one could
enter the Indian service who had failed or committed crime at
home, or who had once been sent back from the Indies ; but such
criteria were not maintained. Ofificers cashiered for incompetence
were given refuge in the Indies, and no evidence was demanded as
to the quality of the immigrant or sojourner except that he nnist
not be French, Scotch, or English. Here the policy of the Dutch
must be compared, to its plain disadvantage, with that of the
Spanish. Wonderment is with reason expressed that so much as
the Dutch did could have been accomplished with the human
agencies they emi)loyed. Rut whatever the quality of the func-
tionary, he was practically forced, in order to exist, to prove false
1 Van Ree.s, IT, 245, 283-285; Van der Chy.s, p. 79 and note; Encycl. Ned. Ind.,
art. " Scheepvaart en Mandel."
2 For a list of the Company officials in India, see De Reus, pp. 97 If.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 427
to his boundcn duty ; and this was to some degree recognized by
his employers. The functionaries took to dishonest methods, espe-
cially to illicit trade ; and they had no scruples as time went on
about oppressing the natives. Officers both high and low engaged
in contraband traffic even in the ships of the Company ; clergymen
were often deeply involved, and both they and their wives could
give instruction in method to expert merchants. The Company's
agents w^ere too few and were too widely separated to be under
much control, and the evil became so all-pervasive that it was prac-
tically impossible to identify and punish the guilty ; as the years
went on the honest man became more rare. All this was seen to
harm the Company, but the latter reasoned that the evil would be
the worse if the waters were opened for freedom of trade. ^ Thus
the policy deliberately adopted was one calculated thoroughly to
demoralize the local agents.
The damage thus done extended to the personnel of the army
and the merchant marine. The military force, which was under
the civil power, was kept small through the parsimony of the Com-
pany ; the whole army was not over 10,000, and of these but few
were Europeans. Its quality was lower still, for the idea seems to
have been to get certain numbers of men into uniform, with no
respect to their race or character ; the European contingent was
composed largely of those who for various reasons found life in
Europe impossible. Wages were extremely low and prices of sup-
plies purchasable by the soldiers high ; clothing cost enough to
allow the Company alone to make upon it seventy-five per cent
gain. The men were systematically cheated. The navy was much
better in all ways, for a good marine, here as at home, was a strict
necessity ; yet conservatism entered to undermine its effectiveness.
For one thing, the routes of the ships were strictly prescribed, and,
despite all protests, they were obliged by the Directors to sail
around Scotland on their home voyages. The ships were too large
and unwieldy, though too few in number. The quality of the cap-
tains speedily declined and numerous complaints were raised against
them on the score of their ignorance, uselessness, and infidelity to
trust. The increase of illicit traffic testifies to the justice of the
latter charge ; but rascals consistently got off with impunity. The
sailors were in a condition similar to that of the soldiers ; their
* Van Rees, II, 248-249 and note, 293; De Reus, pp. 24-25, 94-95 ; Day, pp. 89-
91, 93-106; Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. "Opleiding van Indische Ambtenaaren."
428 COLONIZATION
numbers were larger, running up to 4000 sailing to the East
yearly, but their position was wretched, whether they voyaged
between East and West, or remained in the Indies. ^
Hence the natural tendency of the European sojourner in trop-
ical countries — to accumulate with speed and ruthlessness, in
order presently to return homc'^ — was strongly accentuated by
the characteristic policy of the Company, itself animated by like
desires.
Native Policy
To one who has gotten before his mind a clear conception of
the aims of the East India Company, the inevitable destiny of the
native can scarcely come as a surprise. Indeed it has already been
seen how native life was subjected to all sorts of economic shock ;
how native industry was cynically cramped or crushed in order to
assure the profit of a closed monopoly. The Dutch came, without
question, to regard the native as simply one of the factors entering
into the making of money, a factor to be treated in the same objec-
tive way as water, soil, or any other non-sentient or inanimate ele-
ment. To find the Company harboring any idea of benefiting the
native peoples is to surprise it acting out of character ; and yet
some such benevolent intent existed, at least in theory, at the out-
set of its career. There was no lack of instructions from home to
treat the natives well and kindly, these being dictated by politi-
cal as well as humanitarian considerations. In respect of religion
in particular it was desirable " to enlighten the poor, blind heathen,
eager to learn, through the grace of God, and to bring them out
of blind darkness into the knowledge of the holy evangel." The
Dutch had scarcely finished a struggle in which religious ardor was
a driving factor ; and national honor, if no more, demanded that
they do no less than the Spanish and Portuguese. The Seventeen
accordingly began to bestir themselves that the natives might,
through spread of the Holy Scripture, be defended against the
superstitions of Moors, atheists, and their kind.
1 De Reus, pp. 108-117, 120-124; T^ay, pp. 107-10S; Roscher, p. 286. For the
carrying-trade of the Company, see Day, pp. 61 ff . For the early instructions to sailors,
and the rules governing life on ship-board, see Van der Chys, IJijlagen, I, II, and III.
Cf. Encycl. Ned. Ind., arts. " Kaarte," " I^ger," " Scheepvaart en Handel," " Trian-
gulatie," " Verdediging," "Zeekarten," " Zeemacht." The mortality in the crowded
ships was very high. Roscher, p. 275.
2 See p. II, above.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS
429
There had been an eye to business in all this. The Company
thought to bind the natives to itself through a common religion and
thus enforce in them the moral obligation to fulfill contracts. It
was found, however, that, after the pious exploits of the Portu-
guese, religious instruction was regarded with hostility and fear ;
that the surest way toward confidence and good will was to inter-
fere as little as possible with religion or government, and to confine
efforts purely to trade. This was a comfortable conclusion, and
instructions came to convey the praiseworthy maxim of non-inter-
ference. When, now, the question arose as to whether the church
or the Company should take the superintendence of religious instruc-
tion, the latter felt that one might go further in religious fervor
than the aims of trade would justify ; where the people were abso-
lutely subject little harm could be done, but elsewhere Mohamme-
dans and others might become distrustful. Nothing could be lost
by intrusting such matters to the discreet and practical. Finally
the Company had its way ; general instructions to the functionaries
provided that they should see that the Christian religion was spread
abroad, good schools founded, and so on. The results were slight,
for, except in Ceylon, the Moluccas, and Formosa, where there
were preachers, the natives were left pretty much to themselves.
Discontent arose among the pious at home, and in 1645 it was pro-
posed not to renew the Company's charter until it had had the Bible
translated into the native languages. But the government refused
to bind the Company. Thus all preachers and schoolmasters came
to be Company dependents, and were even thus few in number,
owing to the indisposition of the Directors to assume the cost
and trouble incident to energetic missionary endeavor.^ What the
Company did for religion and education in the East was therefore
practically nothing. All such activities were calculated to detract
from the commercial well-being of the organization. If they had
hoped by religious means to influence the natives to keep their
low-priced contracts, the Dutch were in this disappointed ; it was
found that complete conquest alone could make the natives fulfill
their obligations as interpreted by the Dutch. This had not been
the attitude at the outset ; there was then no desire to get ground
except for factories, for it was proposed to proceed through trea-
ties and contracts. But the Orientals, perceiving the over-reaching
1 Van Rees, II, 239-244 ; Van der Chys, p. 62 ; Encycl. Ned. Ind., arts. "Christenen,"
" Eeredienst," " Evangelisatie," " Zending."
430 COLONIZATION
which lay in the essence of these agreements, were brought to a
deceit and enmity that could be quelled through conquest alone. ^
Constant reference of all projects back to the dominant trade idea
thus choked the develoi)ment of generous imi)ulses and high mo-
tives, and reduced the relation with subject peoples to one of sor-
did exploitation, pure and simple.
Conquests ; Nativk Services
Through the seventeenth century the Dutch became ever clearer
upon the subject of acquiring territory. They found the factory
insecure without a fort, the fort imperiled without mastery of the
surrounding district. Native princes paid the costs of war on the
Company by the cession of domain, or of income of the same ;
petty tribal wars where the foreigner was haled in as an ally yielded
a like return. Thus in 1677 the Company forced entry into Mata-
ram through special privileges accorded, becoming the only seller
of opium, sugar, and linen in that region. Later (1743) the Dutch
gained such control that the native officials swore allegiance to
them rather than to their own rulers ; the people were to cultivate
what the Company wished, and sell or give their j^roducts to it.
A succeeding uprising played further into Dutch hands. Similarly
in l^antam and Cheribon : a foothold was gained in the former,
securing trade advantages ; and this was later followed by conquest.
The sultan then received back his lands in fief, under the promise
to sell to the Company at low prices all the i)epper that should be
raised. Thus the Company came to impinge upon the masses of
the Javanese natives through their princes, who were to have rice,
and, above all, coffee, pepper, indigo, sugar, turmeric, etc., raised
and sold to the Dutch at a figure yielding the latter a large profit. ^
The native princes turned out to be la.x in their duties, knavish
and oppressive to the people ; hence the Company came to prefer
land sales to more responsible parties ; and, together with the soil,
the natives were passed over to private supervision. But they were
nf)t thereby released from service to the Company ; all the natives
in the region of Batavia were obliged to perform certain tasks on
its account, such as attending to roads and bridges and transport-
ing persons and goods. Beyond this they had to give a part, usu-
ally a tenth, of their products to their landlords, and work one day
^ Van Kees, II, 240, 271.
2 Van Rees, II, 271-276 ; Day, pp. 43-50; cf. p. 43, note 3.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 431
in the week for them ; otherwise they labored for wages, with the
Chinese and slaves. They were not bound to the soil but could go
and settle where they would. The status thus defined does not
look so bad on the face of it ; but it was hard to keep track of the
landlords and much oppression occurred. More service and higher
contributions were exacted than was lawful, this being done through
native chiefs who received a commission on the business ; and army
service was often required. Thus the natives labored under a three-
fold yoke, and the authorities were always averse to supporting
them against their landlords.^
In the actual domain of the Company the Javanese were left
under their own chiefs, as that plan was found to be cheaper ; and
certain conditions as to the sale to the Company of specified prod-
ucts at low prices were imposed. The chiefs were bound to call
the people to war when the Company wished it. These local rulers
were not paid by the Dutch ; indeed they had to bid for the tenure
of their position through gifts to the governors. Son usually suc-
ceeded father, but the succession might be perverted if another
party offered more. Naturally all the expenses of the chiefs, legiti-
mate and illegitimate, had to come out of the people, through ways
direct or devious. Here the latter had really two masters to serve.
They got little or nothing for their goods or services from the Com-
pany ; where by exception a decent price was paid, it emerged
from the hands of the functionaries reduced beyond recognition.
The Company paid little attention to the needs of the natives, in-
terfering only in cases of crying injustice on the part of the chiefs,
or, more commonly, when the contingents failed or when scarcity
and dearness of products indicated some per\^ersity to be corrected.
As for the dishonest functionaries, it was more profitable to con-
nive at their rascality — such as demanding more of the people
than the Company itself, and appropriating the differences — and
then tax them for it.^
• Although the average status of the natives appears to have been
that of an abject servitude, nothing has hitherto been considered
which bears the actual designation of slavery. But there were, in
the Indies, up to January i, i860, what were called house-slaves
1 Van Rees, II, 277-278. For a closer examination of the Company's administra-
tion, see Day, pp. 108-121 ; this author regards the activities of the Dutch as on the
whole beneficial to the natives. Cf. pp. 36-37, 121 ff.
2 Van Rees, II, 278-279; Day, pp. 108-121.
432 COLONIZATION
and Company-slaves. They were held at first in default of other
means of securing service, and were reckoned in with the "dead
effects," such as gold and silver, food, ammunition, houses, furni-
ture, etc. In September, 1694, the Company had 1273 slaves, men,
women, and children, and certain private persons possessed a great
many. Strange to say, as regards these slaves, the Company seems
to have suppressed its characteristic greed ; they were treated on
the whole very humanely, were paid for service, and allowed to ac-
cumulate funds to buy their freedom. They were really better off
than free people under their regents. Slaves who turned Christian
must be sold to Christians, and a freed man could even demand
aid of his old master ; slaves, however, could not make wills, and,
among other minor disabilities, might not wear a hat unless they
could speak Dutch. They did the rougher work, especially of agri-
culture ; it was largely the cost of providing them for the prospec-
tive colonists, who had been proved incapable of performing such
heavy tasks in the hot regions, that made the parsimonious Seven-
teen oppose colonization as a policy. There was no feeling whatso-
ever against the institution ; use of slaves was allowed in the Old
Testament and was not forbidden in the New ; and the imperial
Roman law recognized it. Moreover the slaves could, here as in
America, be converted and no longer remain " slaves of the devil."
The system was indorsed by such jurists as De Groot. And, above
all, it was demanded by economic necessity, however this might be
veiled, just as it had been in the case of the Portuguese and Span-
ish. Nevertheless, owing chiefly to the slight development of plan-
tation agriculture and industry under the direction of actual Dutch
settlers, the extent of what went by the acknowledged name of
slavery was never great in the Indies.^
Enough has been said to demonstrate the deplorable situation
of the native peoples ; it could not have been otherwise under the
control of a corporation governed by motives both sordid and self-
ish. ,The account of the further fortunes of the natives under the
later " culture system " ^ will serve to reflect additional light upon
their previous status as here indicated in its general outlines.
1 De Reus, pp. 127-131, 2S9; Van Kees, II, 321-322 ; cf. pp. 25.S ff., above.
^ ''P- 473 ff-> below.
THI<: COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 433
Policy toward Colonization
A single phase of the Company's activity in the East remains
to be noticed : its relation toward actual settlement and coloniza-
tion in the stricter sense. ^ In the charter there was no idea what-
soever of settlement ; naturally, however, the ordinary factories
demanded for their support a certain number of Dutch residents ;
and the larger the factory became the greater was the number of
Europeans who were required in order to provide stores and lad-
ing for outgoing vessels and to receive those that arrived. Thus
a certain amount of population, however shifting as respects its
units, was rendered inevitable. Some one of these factories was
bound to gain an ascendency over the rest, and this mainly because
of its favorable location. The Dutch with unerring skill picked
the straits as the dominant situations and at first cast their eyes
on Malacca, which had been under the Portuguese the chief entre-
pot of the East. There were at first and for some decades great
difficulties in seizing Malacca, and attention turned toward the
Sunda straits, where it was hoped to build a fort " serving as a
rendezvous of the whole Indies navigation." In 1619 Coen con-
cjuered the whole province of Jacatra and the local fort took the
name of Batavia, becoming the great deposit-station for all Com-
pany funds and goods, and the residence of the governor-general.
At first its site lay in a waste, for all the natives had been swept
away, and the Dutch were confronted with the need of population.
This they recruited largely from the Chinese by securing them
preferential rights, and gradually, as the factory-interests grew,
both other Orientals and Dutch functionaries became relatively nu-
merous. To attract the Dutch, private trade was allowed by Coen
even to the west of the Straits of Malacca ; and the Netherlanders
thus and otherwise attracted were the first free citizens of Batavia.^
The projects of Coen^ deserve to be dwelt upon with brevity,
even though they came to little more than naught, for this gover-
nor-general, standing at the parting of the ways, cruel and ruth-
less though he was, was a man of great keenness, and probably
1 Cf. Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Kolonisatie."
2 Van Rees, II, 252-255, 304; De Reus, pp. 276-277; Day, pp. 56-61. In 1632
Batavia had 8058 inhabitants, including the garrison, etc. ; of these the number of
Dutch in the service of the Company, with wives and children, was 191 2 ; the number
of burghers, with wives, children, and slaves, 1372. De Reus, p. 251, note.
^ For the life of Coen, see Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Coen."
^34 coi.OM/.vnON
the best informed of his generation. lie is found to have been the
advocate of settlement, and, by way of promoting and supporting
the latter, of freedom of trade. The Directors had sent only men,
and of these but a few ; and both the men and women whom they
finally forwarded at his solicitation were, in Coen's judgment, the
"scum of all nations." They were too lazy, he protested, to put
food in their mouths, or even, when it was once there, to chew it.
He wanted several hundred boys and girls from cHarity-houses
who should grow up to regard Java as their fatherland ; he rebelled
against the sole dominant idea, to return home with full pockets.
Believing that labor could do little without capital, and that con-
sequently the entrepreneur was a necessity to economic develop-
ment, Coen urged also that peoples of the leisure classes should
be induced to go to the Indies. In other words, he seems at first
sight to have risen in opposition against some of the normal char-
acteristics of the tropical colony.^ In so far as he desired to see a
transplantation of the European race it is probable that his views,
despite the favorable island-position of Java, were visionary. Prob-
ably the Directors had some reason in their refusal to send Euro-
pean women " from whom no permanent and healthy offspring
arise in India." It was not denied, in somewhat later time, that
" hitherto Dutch children born in India, especially the half-breeds,
have been accustomed to lead a somewhat dissolute and disorderly
existence"; and very likely the Company may be excused for not
standing the cost of the great number of slaves needful for planta-
tion agriculture and cattle-raising. But Coen did not base his whole
argument, nor any essential part of it, upon premises thus easily
and rationally swept aside. He understood that tlie immediate
source of livelihood for Dutch settlers must lie in exchange, and
it was a freedom of trade adequate to meet these needs for which
he contended. He wished trade to be free to his settlers even from
the Cape of Good Hope to Japan.^
But such a suggestion could meet with no lasting accord on the
part of the Directors ; nor were the costs of real colonization such
as they could contemplate without aversion. Hence, as has been
seen, the policy of trade-restriction speedily came to its own, to be
modified only at rare intervals and for brief periods.'^ It is during
1 Cf. pp. 4 ff., above.
2 Van Rees, II, 255-256 and notes, 258-260 and notes, 307 ; De Reus, pp. 277-278.
8 Van Rees, 11,306-315; cf. p. 423, above.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 435
these sporadic periods only that any movements of settlement took
place. Dutch colonization under the Company may then be divided
roughly into three periods: that of 1618-1630, including Coen's
activities; that of 1662-1700; and that of 1742-1752, covering
mainly the term of Van Imhoff. When the settlers of the first
period had come to realize that they could not cultivate without
capital, nor compete in the industries with the Chinese, and were
not to be allowed to trade, they migrated back to the Netherlands ;
colonial enterprises remained in abeyance for a generation or more,
and then were resurrected to a hopeful though short-lived popular-
ity. In 1662 the Chamber of Amsterdam offered free transport
to prospective settlers in the Indies, and assured them, under cer-
tain conditions, of freedom of trade ; in 1669 action still more favor-
able was taken respecting settlement in Ceylon, Mauritius, at the
Cape, and elsewhere. The effects of this policy at the Cape are
yet to be recounted ; but in the tropics success could not be at-
tained. The Dutch suspected any favors ; if any one sought for-
tune in the Indies it was as a Company agent, not as a freeholder
subject to the caprices of officials. By 1684 Ceylon presented the
regulation picture of misery ; the Company would not transport
the locally grown tobacco for fear of encouraging contraband traf-
fic, and would not allow the producers to seek their own markets.
Even where trade was ostensibly free, passes were refused, or
granted only in cases where the profit could not be large. Trade
was left free in those articles only which the Company could not
hope to monopolize ; and if an article not proscribed, like sugar,
became important, the Company had a way of interfering and de-
stroying all opportunities. Insecurity thus engendered paralyzed
the little enterprise that remained ; toward the end of the seven-
teenth century all effort of the Company directed toward coloniza-
tion had been proved an entire and dismal failure. During the
general misrule of the first half of the eighteenth century no further
action was taken. Then under Van Imhoff transportation and some
actual aid in securing a start ^were offered, which were the basis
of later settlement in Java ; but after the death of the governor,
in 1750, there was no great advance. Robber-raids from Bantam,
motived by local dissatisfaction under Company rule, destroyed
what little had been done and the government abandoned the colo-
nies. ^ In 1778 Batavia had a population of 110,816, but of these
1 Van Rees, II, 261-264 ; De Reus, pp. 282-285.
436 COLONIZATION
only 468 were free citizens ; 33,408 were Javanese, and of the
remaining 76,940, all Orientals, 20,072 were slaves and 23,309
Chinese. Outside of Batavia there was, of course, an overwhelm-
ing preponderance of the native element.^
It is unnecessary to pursue such melancholy attempts into their
details, for these amount, as has been seen from examples given,
to little more than a catalogue of instances of ineptitude, selfish-
ness, and greed on the part of the Company. There was bound to
be no society of a pure European type in the Indies, for, besides
the very grave menace of the physical environment,^ the Company
constantly threw obstacles in the way of the emigration of women
from the Netherlands. This being the case, the only alternative,
if the agent or settler were to have a home, was to marry a native
woman ; but to this procedure also discouragement was opposed,
for the native wife could not go back to Holland with her husband.
In the case of the higher functionaries, moreover, those who
contracted marriage had to bind themselves to twice the regular
length of service.^ It is, therefore, not at all strange that inter-
race marriages did not take place with any frequency. Miscegena-
tion on a large scale was nowhere present, and half-breeds born
of unions legitimate or otherwise played no such prominent part
in the destiny of the Dutch Indies as in that, for example, of
Spanish America.
From what has been said of the destiny of private trade and
of settlement, it is clear that the only real administration in the
Indies was the imposition of the Company's will. The burghers,
such as they were, had no share worth mentioning in the govern-
ment, which was, in last analysis, the governor-general alone. In
general the colonization was not a state enterprise at all. Pam-
phlets speak of necessities for emigration rooting in over-population
and poverty at home, and they discuss the various problems con-
nected with state-favored colonization ; but the state turned over
1 Van Rees, II, 264-265, 268-270; I)e Reus, pp. 285-2S9. Even in 1892 the Euro-
peans were a vanishing quantity outside of tl>e main centers. In Atjeh, for example,
there were in that year 252 Europeans as against 525,579 natives and 3159 Chinese.
Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Atjeh."
2 De Reus, who was j^erhaps anxious to write what the German colonial societies
would like to hear (cf. his introduction), states (p. 290) that the experience of the
Dutch proves nothing as to the possibility of European colonization of the tropical
highlands. Cf. Van Rees, II, 258, note 4 ; De Lanessan, p. 34 ; Bordier, Col., p. 47;
Engler, p. 154, note; Van der Aa, Dc Git/s, i860, I, 837.
8 Van Rees, II, 265.
THK COMPANIES IN THEIR P^IELDS 437
the direction of the movement in all its details to the Company,
with results recounted, as to their main lines, in what precedes.^
The Chinese
But if the colonization of Europeans was almost steadily dis-
couraged, the same cannot be said of settlement by the Chinese,
at least in the earlier periods. By 16 17 instructions to the gov-
ernor not only permitted their presence in the Moluccas, but
urged that they should be attracted, as being industrious and
peaceable ; in 1632 it was the policy to draw their trade, so far as
possible, to Batavia. Coen said, " There is no people in the world
that serve us better than the Chinese " ; and asserted that too
many could not be attracted to Batavia. They were of benefit to
agriculture and the mechanic arts, and could be ruled the more
easily as they would not appeal to their own country. The Chinese
came then to function as the local transporters and middlemen of
the Dutch possessions, and in time became owners of large sugar-
plantations and refineries, etc., chiefly in the region of Batavia.
But the Company could not renounce the opportunity of preying
upon them, and they were taxed if poor, and ruthlessly blackmailed
if wealthy ; then came the Company's agents, each with itching
palm. The success of the Chinese was their undoing ; embittered,
they finally rebelled (1740) against this oppression, and united
many Javanese to their cause. The governor, Valckenier, broke
their resistance, and for two days Batavia was a scene of blood
and death ; even the prisoners and those sick in the hospitals were
put to death. The Chinese quarter was plundered and burned ;
600 dwellings were destroyed and 10,000 defenseless Chinese were
killed. Similar exhibitions of inhuman ferocity elsewhere in Java
have left a lasting disgrace upon the name of Valckenier.^ By
1743, however, the Chinese and their allies were reduced to sub-
jection ; the former returned to Batavia, for they could not be
spared, and later spread over all Java. They lent money to the
improvident natives and gained great profit ; they lived under
their own rules and customs, in separate quarters, and almost the
whole of the interior and coast trade drifted into their hands.
Indeed, in both earlier and later times, the commercial privileges
accorded them by the Company, which represented its estimate of
1 Van Rees, II, 305, 30S. ^ cf. Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Valckenier."
438 COLONIZATION
their indispcnsability, are contrasted with the much sHghtcr favors
extended to individual Dutch traders. Of the later fortunes of the
Chinese the main outlines will appear in subsequent pages. ^
FoREioN Aggressions
Certainly the Company had had its way ; it had been allowed
to develop a great predatory activity, varied by but few impulses
of a more generous nature, within the range of its monopoly.
Government by a body of merchants had been permitted to pro-
ceed in its extremest form. Something of its influence upon the
destiny of the human life beneath its control may have appeared
in the foregoing ; it seems to have desired to subserve no interests
save its own. The question as to whether it realized its own aims,
however the latter may present themselves to later ages as respects
worthiness or unworthiness, may now engage attention. These
aims may be summed up conveniently under two heads : mainte-
nance of monopoly, and so realization of profits ; and — for it must
not be lost to view that the Company was in one of its most signifi-
cant aspects a political agency — support of the state.
After the expulsion of the English from Batavia, in 1624, the
Company was not seriously annoyed by foreign competition for a
century and a quarter, and after the Peace of Breda (1667) the
Netherlanders were practically alone in the Indies for well-nigh a
hundred years. The time of Van Diemen {i 636-1645) represents
the first period of expansion and the disclosure of new sources of
profit. The rest of the century saw the extension of the Company's
power from Ceylon to New Guinea, and of its influence and trade
from Persia to Japan. But the eighteenth century brought a
reversal of destiny, for reasons presently to appear, although the
vertex of the prosperity-curve was not sharp. The French, Eng-
lish, and Danes began to pluck up courage again and to invade the
Dutch seas. In consideration of international rights and courtesy,
their vessels could not be refused the privilege of making repairs
and laying in provisions in Dutch harbors, and thus, under revela-
tion of the richness of the Company's monopoly, was offered the
temptation to illicit trade. The real impotence of the Company
was likewise discovered, and its existence was not long allowed to
remain as a merely curious or astounding academic consideration ;
1 Van Rees, II, 265-267; De Reus, pp. xxxiv-xx.xvi, 250-251, 281-282; Encycl.
Ned. Ind., art. " Chineezen "; cf. p. 488 ff., below.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 439
from 1750 on the Company was forced to meet an aggression to
which it could offer no adequate resistance. The war between the
Netherlands and England in 1781 was the beginning of the end;
Dutch stations fell without a blow, and the English came to con-
trol the Coromandel coast and Ceylon. The events that followed
the French Revolution, whereby the Netherlands were made over
into the Batavian Republic (1795), completed the dissolution. The
Stadhouder Willem V, exiled to England, urged that the colonies
be placed under the protection of that country; and this was a sig-
nal for a weak yielding of most of the Indies. In 1795 Malacca
and other posts in Farther India were lost; in 1796 Ceylon, Am-
boina, Banda, and other stations. Ternate and Timor alone of the
islands were defended, and Van Overstraten struggled on in Jav-a ;
but the monopoly was gone and the course of the Company's
history as a controller of vast territories was run.^
Bankruptcy and Ruin
Such an exhibition of weakness argues internal deterioration and
a prostration of finances. Enough has been heard of the "hook-
handed " functionaries of the Company and of its generally costly,
ineffectual, and disreputable internal organization and personnel ;
so that a realization of these elements of weakness may be assumed.
Aside from the incessant drain of peculation and embezzlement of
funds, however, the Company had found that the very attainment
and preservation of monopoly constantly defeated its end ; before
they knew it the Directors were led into a costly conquest-policy
that ate up profits with awe-inspiring celerity. Wars in Europe
likewise obliged the Company to come to the state's aid. With
the later growth of competition, prices in Europe were brought
down, and in the East even the Arabs and Chinese dared again to
take advantage of the Company. By 1676 there existed a large
unfavorable balance in Batavia, yet the Directors learned nothing
and proceeded with even increased severity against the private
trade of the Dutch settlers, imposing penalties in the way of
heavy fines, public whipping, exile, and even death, to stop it.
At the end of the seventeenth century the Directors were pursu-
ing the " ostrich-policy " of suppressing unfavorable reports, and
1 Van Rees, II, 2S8-291 ; De Reus, pp. xvi-xxviii, x.\xix-xlvi ; Encycl. Ned. Ind.,
arts. " Verdediging," " Verovering van Java door de Engelschen in 1811,"
440 COLONIZATION
the early part of the eighteenth saw the golden age of illicit traffic.^
When the competition of other nations had at length become con-
fident and strong, the expenses of maintaining the monopoly became
naturall)' heavier ; according to Van Imhoff tliey rose from 680,-
000 guilders in 17 15 to 990,000 in 1739, and ye't prices were con-
stantly sinking in Europe. The French and English left the local
trade of the East free under a recognition-duty, and the Dutch
could not combat this kind of competition, backed by the zeal,
daring, and knowledge of the private adventurer; for because such
trade had no rules of prescribed action it could adapt itself to new
or altering circumstances as the Company could never do. The
Dutch even emulated the Portuguese in forming (of Batavia) a
staple where all returning ships must report ; thus their cargoes
suffered from deterioration, their tea, for instance, coming upon
the European markets several years later than that brought direct
from China by the Danes. ^ Deficits accumulated : the credit
balance of 40,000,000 of 1693 was all gone by 1724, after which
time the course was steadily toward bankruptcy. From 1750 to
1760 the income gotten from the Indies was 750,000 guilders;
from 1760 to 1770, 680,000; and although it was 500,000 for the
next five-year period, debts were always mounting, for the Direc-
tors kept paying out dividends of 12J to 20 per cent through
the whole second half of the century. By 1779 the Company
owed 85,000,000, and the war with England brought it in 1782 to
ask aid of the state. It received loans from this source, for its
reputation was still great as the essential factor in preserving the
East Indian trade. After 1790 it was entirely dependent upon
the government; in 1795 its debt was 112,000,000 guilders. War
had cut communications with Holland and all profits disappeared ;
even interest on debt could not be paid. The Company ships
became antiquated and were sold ; at the end of the century
scarcely any of them were usable, and Dutch ships and products
ceased to arrive from the East. The last sale of East Indian wares
took place in 1797. There was even talk of reforming the Com-
l)any, semi-defunct as it was ; but, as has been seen, its end was
nigh, for the conviction was becoming confirmed that war and
trade were inconsistent functicjns.''^
1 De Reus, pp. 253-257 ; Day, pp. 73 ff. "^ Van Rees, IT, 28S-2S9.
" Van Rees, II, 294-297; He Reus, p. xlvi. On the income of the (Company in
India, see De Reus, pp. 202-232.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 441
One of the reasons why the essential weakness of the Company
was not earHer discovered at home lay in its system of secrecy,
especially in regard to its finances. We have already viewed the
twistings and turnings of the Directors and how they were able
^bluntly to defy public scrutiny. The utmost secrecy was main-
tained regarding especially the income and outgo in the Indies ;
the very accounts of the Company were merely unrelated expenses,
orders, etc., and such announcements as were made were issued
with a purpose. The functionaries were forbidden to keep with
them maps, journals, and the like ; all such documents were to be
deposited where the governors-general or the Chambers could
guard them well. It was the middle of the eighteenth century
before regular news was sent from the East, and the medium, a
newspaper, was suppressed in 1746 after running a year. The
people at home had their curiosity satisfied, if at all, with respect
only to the flora, fauna, and inhabitants of the East ; this diverted
them from more intimate topics. Thus almost to the end the finan-
cial situation remained unknown to the body of the Dutch people,
and the Directors had free hand in their sinuous operations.^
The profits went largely to individuals, who, in their dual capac-
ity of controllers and controlled, saw to it that investigation re-
mained irrelevant and innocuous. Yet even they could not have
so often adduced reasons of state to prevent examinations, if there
had been no political services of the Company with which to weight
the argument ; there seems to be no doubt that the Company did
confer tangible and concrete benefits upon the fatherland. The
Netherlands were made the staple of the Indies trade, with all
that implied of economic importance and opportunities for the in-
crease of public wealth. In the first half of the eighteenth century
the servants of the Company brought into the country each year
2,500,000 guilders in addition to the dividends of 1,300,000 guilders
dispensed annually. That the spesding of such sums or their in-
vestment in Holland conferred an economic benefit upon the nation
at large seems never to have been seriously doubted ;^ all such
services of the Company were highly rated. But there were rela-
tions between it and the state of a still more intimate character,
for, during the seventeenth century, the latter was often directly
assisted in its straits by the former. It was said that the state,
1 Van Rees, II, 297-300.
2 But cf. p. 460, below.
442
COLONIZATION
by way of revenue, received three times the gain from the Com-
pany that the participants had derived. The whole matter of the
Company's finances is a troubled question, but if these general
statements are accepted, it becomes clearer why the government
was willing to extend for period upon period the monopolistic cor-
poration whose collapse, with all it revealed, became then a dis-
grace even to the state itself.^
But before attempting any further summary of the Company's
characteristics, and of its reflex influence upon the life of the
metropolis, two topics should engage attention : first, that of the
settlement at the Cape of Good Hope ; and, second, the history of
the West India Company within its monopoly-area. The alignment
of the West India Company beside the elder organization is of
especial imj^ortance, for not only do the two show a strong similar-
ity in essential points, but they also exhibit a significant diversity
resulting from their disparate conditions. From a composite set
of impressions taking in both organizations, a clearer idea can be
formed of the politico-commercial corporation of the centuries
under review.
The Cape Settlements
In any topical treatment of the activities of the East India
Company, what it did at the Cape would fall under its function
as a colonizing agency. For there were in the Cape region none
of those products from which it thought to derive large profit. In
fact, for the dominant commercial purpose the Cape was worth
nothing except as a way-station upon the predestined route of
trade ; and the same may be said of Mauritius and other points
in the Indian Ocean. For this liurjwse the Dutch appropriated
the Cape region from the enfeebled Portuguese in 1652.^ At
first there was no intention of founding a settlement or colony;
it was simply a secure port of call that the needs of trade seemed
to demand. But quarrels with the Hottentots, followed by a war
(1659), left the Dutch the possessors of territory which they must
needs defend against both natives and Europeans. In the early
years of possession an attempt to raise grain and vines met with
1 Van Rees, II, 286-287 ; De Reus, pp. 275-276.
^ The Portuguese in reality never made any use of Table Bay ; South Africa
offered them no inducements. 15ut after 16 16 tlie Dutch ]iut in at the Cape nearly
every season. Theal, I, 13, 30,40.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 443
little success, for the labor supply was unsatisfactory and the Com-
pany's policy toward colonization was discouraging ; later negro
slaves were introduced in considerable numbers, and, as in the
East, humanely treated. After thirty years the colony showed
a total of 663 Dutch settlers; and the fact that of these 162 were
children witnesses for climatic and other environmental conditions
far more favorable than those of the Indies. Relatively little, how-
ever, in the way of settlement was projected or encouraged until
the " second period " of attention to colonization. Then the oppor-
tunities offered to prospective settlers ^ chanced to coincide with
the sudden increase of human material in Europe. After the Revo-
cation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, numerous Huguenots had
fled to the Netherlands, and these, with certain Piedmontese peas-
ants and vine-growers, seized the favorable chance to begin life
over again; by 1689 nearly 200 French emigrants had settled at
the Cape. In 1687, likewise, in response to an appeal to the Direct-
ors, many of the free burghers had been furnished with wives ;
and they and their families numbered nearly 600, in addition to
439 other Europeans, mainly Company employees. The success
of the new cultivators was marked ; by 1690 they could ship wine
to the Netherlands. " If the Company had gone on in the same
way the Cape would undoubtedly have become one of the most
beautiful and rich of the Dutch possessions." ^
But as soon as the Company had secured a good harborage for
its ships, it ceased to have any interest in colonization, and speedily
slipped back into the typical attitude of exploitation. Land was
assigned more sparingly and the grants were to be separated from
one another by a clear space of three miles. Then the Company
began to enforce its rights as the only trading agency ; the settlers
were obliged not only to sell it their products at a low price, but
to buy from it at rising prices. Since it was found profitable to
barter with the natives toys and trinkets for cattle, the colonists
were prohibited from this source of gain under pain of whipping
and branding. Freedom from taxes, assured at first, gave way to
high taxation ; all goods had to be painfully transported to Cape
Town to sell, hand over to the Company, or pay taxes upon. And
^ P. 435, above.
2 Van Rees, II, 261-262, 375-376 ; De Reus, pp. 282-283; Johnston, pp. 67-72;
Theal, I, 82, 88 ff., 337 ff., 358 ff. For the population in 1672, 1691, etc., see Theal,
I. 221, 335, 370, etc.
^_^^ COLONIZATION
since this provision applied chiefly to grain, agriculture was con-
fined within the narrow limits defined by the crudeness and slow-
ness of means of communication. ^ Naturally the temptation to
evade such restrictions soon led to a development of illicit traffic.
That the people should have any share in the government lay in
the plan of the Company as little here as elsewhere ; gradually
almost all the conditions necessary to the prosperity of a colony,
even where these had once existed, were withdrawn, and the Cape
ceased to attract any movement of colonization. Yet the Company,
despite all its restrictive and oppressive measures, could not bring
the local revenue to balance expenditure.^
The settlers already established in South Africa, who, with the
absorption of the Huguenot strain, were prevailingly Dutch, could
not endure the exactions of the Company and gradually " trekked "
away from the coast. For a certain distance the officials followed
and sought to prey upon them, but they gradually escaped surveil-
lance of any kind. In 1 788 the boundary of the colony was extended
to the Great Fish River. It was during this movement toward
the interior that the settlers came first into direct contact with the
Bantus who were migrating from the north-east, and who from that
time on have formed an important factor in the history of South
Africa. The Company, naturally enough, provided no protection
for the farmer-settlers (Boers); and owing to the relatively small
numbers of the latter, in comparison with the Kaffir invaders, the
native situation was a constant peril. The Dutch appear to have
practiced miscegenation with little or no repugnance, both with the
Hottentots of the Cape and the Bantus ; the result being in the
first case the so-called Bastaards, of whom there are at present some
tens of thousands.^ But the bulk of this race-mixture, which befits
the tropical rather than the temperate colony, is probably assignable
to the absence of European women; for the latter were not likely to
come of their own accord to so uncertain and hazardous a frontier,
1 Communication by sea was also very slow ; up to 1 750 a voyage from the Nether-
lands to South Africa which consumed less than 120 days was regarded as a fortunate
one. Theal, I, 40.
2 Van Rees, II, 375-37S; Johnston, pp. 73, 75 ; Theal, I, 1S8, 276 ff., 322 ff. ; II,
I ff., 41-43. 71 ff-, 121, 155, 231 ff., 2S4 ff., 299 ff., 332 ff.
3 Keane (Africa, II, 187) reports 1000 Bastaards for German Southwest Africa,
and says (II, 238) respecting the ('ape Colony region that it contains not greatly over
180,000 Hottentots pure and mixed, but that of these the mongrels and half-castes
form the immense majority. Cf. Schmidt, II, 233-234 ; Letourneau, Guerre, p. 59 ;
Ratzel, Hist, of Mankind, II, 295.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 445
and the Company was not willing, and, later, was unable to undertake
the cost of their transportation. In actual results the Company-
had little to show when, in 1790, it became practically a financial
ruin. There was at that time a population of 14,600 Europeans
owning 17,000 slaves, but it was not ready to support its rulers.
Indeed the Boers of the interior expelled their magistrates and pro-
ceeded to govern themselves in a rude fashion ; and the people of
the Cape, while they joined with the Company agents in an attempt
to beat off the covetous British, were really half-hearted and quickly
yielded. For in 1795, as a sequel of European upturnings and
political readjustments, the Netherlands had come to be the enemy
of England, and the latter had at once set out to seize the Cape.
The West African stations were passed over as being relatively
worthless since the abolition of the slave-trade. The Cape was
taken with little effort, and, except for three years (1803- 1806),
when it was, by a short-lived agreement, restored to Holland, it
has remained British ever since. ^
The Boers as a Product of Company Rule
The history of the burghers who had isolated themselves in the
interior in consequence of Company oppression presents a socio-
logical phenomenon in many respects unique. Here is a case,
namely, of a strong European stock suffering degeneracy in a
temperate colony. It may seem fanciful to refer phenomena so
far subsequent in time to the policy of the long-extinct Com-
pany ; but it is none the less true that the Boers of 1900 pre-
sented in no visionary sense the logical and finished product of
the system imposed so strictly by the Company. They were the
products of the isolation and attendant influences forced upon their
ancestors as recalcitrants against the policy of greed and exploita-
tion. For these progenitors had been led to plunge " ever more
deeply into a rude and harsh natural environment, wherein they
came into contact with a grade of civilization, or non-civilization,
much cruder and coarser than their own. Like all frontier societies
placed in similar conditions and almost wholly segregated from the
outside world, they sunk in large degree to the level of their sur-
roundings." And they did not then progress. " In 1880 the bulk
1 Fortanier, pp. 69-70; Johnston, pp.72, 74-80 ; Keltic, p. 79 ; Theal, IT, 359;
III, I ff., 96-97.
446 COLONIZATION
of the Boers of the Republics were, to most intents and purposes,
of a pronounced seventeenth-century type of civilization ; indeed,
in many cases they were inferior in education, general culture, etc.,
to the Hollanders, and especially to the Huguenots, from whom
they derived their descent." Thus they were primitive in their
industrial organization, in their manners and customs, religion and
morals, law and government.^ Whatever the merits of the recent
struggle between these backward peoples and England, it cannot
but be admitted that they stocKl for the narrowness and ignorance
of the past, even though their antagonist seemed often to be
championing the ruthless aggressions of modern capitalism rather
than the greater blessings of a later and higher stage of human
culture. In any case the trend of the age is sure to sweep away
what the Boer stood for, and the Boer himself, if he proves unadapt-
able. The conflict was one of civilizations, not races, except as
they represented different ideals of civilization. Mad the Cape been
colonized upon liberal lines of policy, with a slowly advancing fron-
tier closely connected with and so supported by a freely increasing
settled population, there could have been no such isolation, with its
attendant results of ignorance, bigotry, and general maladaptation
to the altering conditions of life. In South Africa the Company
had a chance to work out its colonial policy for over a century
almost undisturbed ; and it has left to the student of societies
its human " results " sealed in an isolation virtually unpenetrated
until the discovery of gold in the Transvaal toward the end of the
nineteenth century.
It is no wonder, therefore, that under Dutch rule South Africa
gave little promise of what it was to be. The old type of policy,
continued through the eighteenth century, with brief respites
that served only to increase uncertainty, allowed of no natural
development. Details are scarcely necessary, after what has been
said of colonization in Java and elsewhere, and in view of what is
to come respecting the West India Company's policy in the New
1 Keltic, Africa (chapter by the editor, on " Africa since 1895"), pp. 275-276. " Der
Boer ist ein StockhoHander, der um zwei Jahrhunderte hinter der Ciiltur zuriickgeblie-
ben ist, und einen Ueigeschniack von Kafferthum angenommen hat. . . . Herr von
Weber riihmt ihm zwar nach, dass er die Biljel stets auf dem runden Tische liegen
hat und sein Tagewerk mit einer Ilymne beginnt, aljer neben seiner Frommigkeit
trachtet er danacli die Schwarzen mit Scorpionen zu ziichtigen, und seine Bibelfestig-
keit aussert sich meist in alt-testamentarischen Citaten iiber die Vertilgung der
Heiden, d. h.der Kaffem." Phihppson, p. 35.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 447
World. One important consideration must, however, be noted,
namely, that inasmuch as South Africa has later been proved
colonizable, it is not possible to minimize the Company's responsi-
biUty in any degree, as was done in the case of Java, by reference
to unfavorable natural conditions. Rather does the case of South
Africa demonstrate the truth of what De Reus has been cjuoted as
asserting, 1 that the experience of the Dutch proves nothing as to
the possibility of colonization of such regions as Java. The Com-
pany's policy was a sufficient cause for ill-success in the Indies, as
it was the sole cause for the same at the Cape.
The narrative turns now to the operations of the West India
Company within the field of its monopoly, and may be the more
condensed in that points of general similarity between the policies
and enterprises of the two companies need little more than a
recordinsf allusion.
Policy of the West India Company in New Netherlands
The younger Company, having been organized in the manner
described,^ began to survey its field in order to locate promising
sources of gain and possible points of attack upon the arch-enemy
whom it was designed to discomfit ; it turned its attention first of
all to the northern continent. The East India Company, with the
purpose of rendering its monopoly perfectly secure, had sent out
Hendrik Hudson (1607) to discover a north-west passage to the
Orient ; and this unfortunate explorer had opened up the waters
that bear his name. Then, in 16 14, the district of the New Nether-
lands, between the fortieth and fiftieth parallels of north latitude,
had been granted to certain shipowners of Amsterdam and Hoorn
for purposes of discovery and trade. In 1621 the newly formed
West India Company took over the station that had been located
upon Manhattan Island, as well as certain smaller ones farther up
the Hudson River. The Director Minnewit purchased the island
from the natives and founded New Amsterdam (1626).^
But the new Company, like that of the East Indies, was entirely
given over to commerce, and proposed to make of the fur-trade
an analogue to the spice-trade of the East. The early years were
promising: in 1624 there were exported 27,000 guilders' worth of
1 P. 436, note 2, above. ^ pp 412 ff., above. ^ Van Rees, II, 42-43, 332.
448 COLONIZATION
beaver-skins, and in 1627 twice that value. This, however, did not
pay the costs of the settlement, and the Company began to seek
some way to avoid such burden without losing hold of the fur-
trade. It seemed clear that the colonists must be put in the way
of self-support through agriculture, and the Company aimed to
encompass this end while leaving the costs of colonization to indi-
viduals. In 1629 it was enacted that any shareholder who, within
four years after announcing his purpose, should found a colony of
fifty persons over fifteen years of age, bound to temporary serv-
ice, should receive the title of patroon over the land thus settled.
Such an estate might front for four miles on the coast, or two
miles on a navigable river, with no limits set toward the interior ;
the land must be purchased from the natives, and was then to be
governed by the patroon under the Company. Free colonists who
were able to come to America could have all the land they could
cultivate, and were to be immune from taxation for ten years. ^
These terms appear very favorable for colonization ; but the trade
policy and monopoly were yet to be attended to. Both the colonist
and the patroon were forbidden to engage in the fur-trade, except
where the Company had no station; and even in the latter case all
pelts had to be brought to Fort Amsterdam and taxed a guilder
apiece before they could be taken to the metropolis. All exported
wares, likewise, had to be taken to the same point of departure and
loaded upon Company ships. The patroons might trade along the
coast from Florida to Newfoundland, but must at every turn put in
at Fort Amsterdam and pay a duty of five per cent. As for the im-
port trade, the Company reserved that for itself ; it engaged to bring
necessities from home at a reasonable price, and any patroons who
wished to do this were obliged to pay large recognition-dues. The
colonists must not trade in this way at all ; nor could they weave or
otherwise compete with home-production, on pain of penalties that
went as far as banishment. In the colonists' trade with the natives
and in the disposal of their own products they were consistently
obstructed. It is plain that the Company was out for gain, and cared
for colonization only as it was conceived to conduce to that end.^
1 Van Rees, II, 332-333.
2 Van Rees, II, 333-334. It is noteworthy tliat the West India Company, owing
to the length and accessibility of the American coast-line, always suffered more from
the competition of illicit traders than did the East India Company. Van Rees, II,
12.S; Roscher, pp. 273, note 3, 274.
THE COMPANIES IN 1 HEIR FIELDS
Administration : the Patroons
449
The government of the new stations was a purely Company affair;
there was no thought of civil freedom. A council, or Raad, com-
posed of the director-general and five members chosen by him from
the most important Company agents, wielded all power, legislative,
executive, or judicial ; the lives, property, honor, and freedom of
the colonists were surrendered unconditionally into such partisan
hands. The director-general, or governor, was really all-powerful,
for the men he selected could not oppose his will. Despite this cen-
tralization of power, however, and the fact that the patroons were
simply vassals, the latter had sufBcient opportunity, in so unsettled
a country, to dupe the Company and escape its oversight ; for they
had no schemes of colonization at heart, but intended merely to bar-
ter with the natives under the loop-hole conditions of the decree.
Some even of the Directors of the Company had bought through
agents the best places along the Delaware and Hudson rivers, an
underhand policy which deterred better men from settlement or in-
vestment. The patroons got presently a great deal of the native
trade and simply refused to fulfill the conditions attendant. But the
Company resisted such an invasion of its monopoly and took meas-
ures, under the administration of the weak Van Twiller (1633-1637),
which so incensed the patroons that they came to resist even the
conditions with which they had formerly complied. Both parties
appealed to the States-General.^
The actions of the patroons and the Company seem to have
convinced the colonists that there was something in the fur-trade
for them too ; thus agriculture was deserted in favor of barter with
the Indians. Colonization was neglected, even the patroons, in
disgust, selling their rights back to the Company. Restrictions
of industry and trade, and interference with the colonist's choice
of a means of livelihood and with his power of disposal of the
products of his own toil, led to general discouragement and im-
patience. In 1638, after fifteen years of Company rule, the New
Netherlands showed few traces of cultivation. And what incensed
the settlers the more was that, while the Company, intent on gain
alone, could do nothing for agriculture in its own colony, it was
importing oxen, horses, and sheep into the near-by settlements of
the English. But about all that could be at once accomplished
1 Van Rees, II, 335-337.
450 COLONIZATION
was the recall of Van Twiller ; ^ any alleralion of policy took more
time, and it was not until 1640 that substantial chan[;es were
effected. Then the coast trade was made free from Newfoundland
to Florida and the fur-monopoly was given up, the Company retain-
ing as in 1629 the practical control of exchange with the mother-
country. The States-General insisted also that the patroons should
not be exclusively shareholders in the Company, but that any
citizen of the land could make use of the same privileges under
similar conditions. The rights of individuals to pass in their own
ships between metropolis and colony were widened, and to any one
who should take over five persons besides himself there were
assured not only 200 acres of land, but even the right to hunt and
fish. The prohibition upon the manufacture of fabrics and other
articles was removed. It looked as if the Company had at last
become a sponsor of colonization ; it even agreed to provide free
passage, tools, cattle, and the like, for a yearly payment of 100
guilders and 80 pounds of butter, the Company to take back the
number of cattle given after six years ; it even suggested advances
to the settlers of money and necessities on credit. Results began
at once to appear : first of all the Company agents, who had regu-
larly gone home at the end of their service, took advantage of the
new liberality and set about raising corn and tobacco, or building
ships to trade with New England and Virginia ; population like-
wise increased through immigration from New England caused
by religious intolerance in Massachusetts. Everywhere land was
cleared and farming begun. '^ But the Company had yielded only
to need and the demands of the States-General, and as soon as
the attention of the authorities was relaxed it returned stealthily
to its old policy ; it saw in every settler a competitor and pro-
ceeded against him as of old. The documents conferring rights
to land were given under conditions of submission to exactions
and dues ; they were recalled under pretense of errors in form,
and when returned were altered to suit the Company. Churches,
schools, and courts of justice that had been promised were with-
held ; and a general colonization was effectually opposed, for none
would venture to settle under such a system. Then the Company
set to work to regain the export trade : the 1640 duties of ten per
cent on pelts and five per cent on other. wares were gradually
1 Van Rees, II, 337-338.
2 Van Rees, II, 339-341.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 451
raised, the latter to sixteen per cent ; and the regulations were
strongly enforced under penalty of confiscation of ship and cargo. ^
The cruelty and injustice to the Indians of Kieft, a bankrupt
and evil man who succeeded Van Twiller, brought on a destructive
war from 1641 to 1645, wherein the farmers' establishments were
ruined and the population reduced from 3000 to 1000. There
resulted a bitter strife between the governor and his council, upon
whom he had to depend for aid, but whom he treacherously dis-
missed when trouble seemed to be over. English soldiers nvere
hired to defend the colonists and were to be paid by Kieft through
the imposition of a tax on beer. In 1645 the government called
the Company to account and found its condition miserable ; for,
despite its oppressive policy, it had suffered heavy losses. The
debit-balance of the period 1626 to 1645 was 500,000 guilders.
It was a question whether the New Netherlands should not be
given up ; but a further effort was decided upon. Trade was
opened generally to private persons, and colonization was to be
encouraged ; Stuyvesant, a more intelligent and energetic man,
was sent out as director-general. But the latter, being of extreme
obstinacy, and opposed to civil freedom in principle, began by
simply repeating in slightly different form the oppressive measures
of his predecessors. Representations to the States-General again
secured (1652) better conditions for the colony, and, as usual, the
removal of pressure was followed by a relatively large natural
inflow of population. Manufactories started up; in 1659 trade
with France, Spain, Italy, and the Caribbean islands was made
free, though, as a survival of the old monopoly policy, beaver-skins
had to be taken direct to Amsterdam. ^ •
Belated Reform
Prosperity redoubled the desire of the colonists for autonomy ;
they wished, as the price of their endurance in creating a colony
from which the metropolis derived great benefit, to possess the
same rights as their fellows who stayed at home. Seizing an occa-
sion when Stuyvesant needed support in war, they presented a
memorandum of demands and comments which shows the whole
story of their grievances. They asserted that it was not right that
the people's lives, property, and all the rest should be in the power
1 Van Rees, II, 341-343. - Van Rees, II, 344-353.
452 COLOM/.VnON
of one man or several who would act with caprice or with little
understanding ; they complained that the Company left them with-
out protection from their enemies ; they demanded that each
locality should have its own local government ; they asserted that,
since obsolete laws and enactments were not expunged, they knew
neither their own rights nor duties ; and they charged the colonial
government with caprice and favoritism in its land grants. Despite
the ire of Stuyvesant, who declared these representations to be
seditious, there resulted some betterment from their publication.^
But that which infused a belated haste into reforms was the
imminence of the English, who had moved down the Connecticut
River, driving the Dutch outposts before them, and were already
strong on Long Island. When it dawned at last upon the Dutch
government that the English colonists were eager to seize Dutch
territory, and that the British government was a party to their en-
deavors, nothing was omitted which might incite the settlement of
defenders. The Directors saw that a mistake had been made, and
that their possessions with few inhabitants lay open to encroach-
ment. Huguenots, Waldenses, and Germans, who were present at
this time in great numbers in Holland, were shipped over by hun-
dreds ; religious freedom became the policy. The population of
the New Amsterdam region increased under Stuyvesant (1647—
1664) from 2000 to 10,000.
But a change of heart at the eleventh hour, after fifty years of
selfish neglect, was in this case unavailing. The Connecticut colony
was laying a strong hold upon Long Island when, in 1664, the
English king, Charles IT, gave the whole of the New Netherlands
to his brother, the Duke of York. Stuyvesant was luiable to pro-
tect Long Island even against the Connecticut colony, and when
the duke had sent without delay four ships-of-war to assume pos-
session of New Amsterdam, there was no defense ; it was given
over under a treaty.^
Such, in brief, are the salient features of the Company coloniza-
tion in the New Netherlands. Analogies with the colonization of
Java and South Africa under the East India Company crop out
at every turn ; they display the same policy based upon the same
1 Van Rees, II, 354-355- It was during the administration of Stuyvesant (1655)
that tiie Dutch took possessif)n of the colony of New Sweden. P'or an account of
this colony, see Acrelius and Caniiianius.
2 Van Rees, 11,355-357.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 453
motives, in a slightly different setting. The present case demon-
strates, says Van Rees,^ that the Dutch lacked neither the will nor
the skill to found colonies. Religious or political persecution was
not necessary to drive them to it ; as soon as it was known that
labor and capital might make great gain across the ocean, many
were ready to go. The less rich were content to settle if they
received free passage and reasonable assistance in overcoming the
early obstacles ; the wealthy were ready to invest if they were as-
sured the rights they had at home. But the Company was not in
a state of mind to grant either of these essentials. Whether this
argumentation absolves the Dutch from the charge of being unable
to colonize successfully, may be susceptible of doubt ; certainly the
rank and file were bent on "great gain" as the most successful
colonizing peoples have not been. It is doubtful if they could ever
have withstood the racial elements that surrounded them and have
founded a new Dutch nation. But it is at least true that, both
here and in Africa and in Brazil, the Dutch labored under an in-
cubus, in the shape of the two India Companies, with which few
other colonizing peoples have had to contend.
The Company in Brazil and Surinam
The case of the Dutch in Brazil provides almost a surfeit of
demonstration along this line. Since, also, the story of their at-
tempted settlement in that country has been told already, from
the standpoint of the Portuguese defenders,^ it may be dismissed
in a few words, the only attempt being to fit this exhibition of
Company policy in with the rest of its class.
One of the strong motives, if not the strongest, in the founding
of the West India Company had been to do damage to the king of
Spain ; and since he was, from 1580 to 1640, king also of Portugal,
the Portuguese colonies were as desirable points of attack as any
others. During the first years of its existence the Company had
made an attempt to get footing upon the coast of Brazil ; and its
activities were encouraged in 1629 by the capture of the Spanish
silver fleet. In 1636 the determination to conquer Brazil was so
strong that the Count of Nassau-Siegen, Joan Maur[ts,_wasL^sent
for its prosecution. His successes have been elsewhere noted ; by
1640 the West India Company held the best six provinces of Brazil,
1 II, 357-35S. 2 Pj). 146 ff., aljove.
454
COLONIZATION
extending from Sergipc in tiie south to Ceara in the north, Recife
(Pernambuco) being the seat of its government and commerce.^
The need of colonists at once appeared, and the usual policy of
opening up trade under dues to the Company, and under reserva-
tion of certain profitable articles, was evolved. As noted above,
Dutch and Brazilians could make one voyage per year, paying ten
per cent on European and thirty per cent on American wares, but
were to let the trade in slaves. Brazil-wood, and war articles severely
alone. The Count of Nassau established order and discipline and
attended to school-facilities and the like. Brazil began to be pros-
perous ; the revenues, chiefiy from a thirty per cent tax on the
product of the sugar-mills, paid nearly all the expenses of the war.
But this could not long satisfy the Company. Nassau's religious
tolerance, in consequence of which numerous Jews had flocked to
Brazil, was not to the taste of the Directors, and they began to
throw obstacles before him. The prices of the necessities of life
were kept high ; the military force of about 6000, employed mainly
in garrison-duty, was reduced, and the pay and even the food-
supplies for the army were held back. In a country whose culti-
vators had been largely driven away and which was dependent
upon supplies from Europe, the results of this exhibition of cramp-
ing avarice were fatal. Nassau returned discouraged to the Neth-
erlands in 1644; then the troops, no longer restrained by his
presence, fell to plundering and abusing the Portuguese, who
had come to regard Nassau as their protector, with the result of
a revolution and the loss of the colony, as detailed in a former
chapter.^
In the same year that the Dutch lost the New Netherlands, they
lost also Cayenne to the French, after holding it since 1656; but
in 1667 this was made up for by the Zeelanders' conquest of the
Enghsh province of Surinam. In the administration of tliis new
possession the Dutch seem to have tried to keep in mind the les-
sons they had just been obliged to learn. But naturally conditions
were far less favorable here than in Java or the New Netherlands,
and reversions to the old policy were sure to occur.
In 1682 the West India C()mi)any took over Surinam from Zee-
land, paying for its rights the sum of 260,000 guilders. To attract
1 Van Rees, II, 180-182; Watson, II, 1-2, 21, 28-29.
- Van Rees, II, 182, 186-190; Wat.son, II, 28-35, 43, 46-48, 74-75, 1 18; Zimmer-
mann, pp. 142-152.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR ElELDS
455
colonists the Company granted generous terms on the analogy o-f
those temporarily and successfully employed elsewhere ; taxes and
dues were to be kept down in the early years, free trade encouraged,
and rights similar to those enjoyed under the English were decreed.
But the Company recoiled before the costs attendant upon this
system, and had, by 1683, sold two-thirds of its rights to the city
of Amsterdam and one Cornells van Aerssen. The new controlling
body was called the Chartered Society of Surinam, and Van Aers-
sen became governor. He was an able, energetic, and good man,
and his policy of stimulating emigration was effective in promoting
the settlement especially of foreigners temporarily located as reli-
gious refugees in the Netherlands. Plantations speedily increased
in number from 50 to 200. The special skill of the Dutch in deal-
ing with wet and swampy regions stood them in satisfactory stead,
and the sugar-plantations and mills began to put out a good prod-
uct.^ But the new Society, whatever its intentions, soon fell heir
to the reputation of Dutch colonial governments, and was believed
to be working for the maximum income. The citizens thought they
had too little share in governing themselves, and they knew they
were insufficiently protected. In 17 12, when the French undertook
to reduce Surinam, the burghers were obliged to buy them off at
a cost of 700,000 guilders, which the Society refused to refund.
It also afforded little protection against escaped slaves, the so-called
bush-negroes, who fell upon their old masters at every opportu-
nity ; and the peace concluded with these outlaws in 1761-1762
was regarded as ineffective, besides being dishonorable.
All this might have been endured if the conditions of production
had remained favorable. In the tropical region, here as elsewhere,
the indispensable factor in production was the acclimatized laborer,
the negro. There was no opposition to slavery as a system ; in
fact the complaint was that there were not enough slaves.^ The
West India Company had reserved the slave-trade for itself, agree-
ing to supply enough negroes — at least 2500 yearly. But the
Company could not renounce the old policy of raising prices by
limiting' the supply, and in some of the years imported no slaves
at all ; and when, later, the captured African posts had been
1 Van Rees, II, 361-367 ; Fermin, I, 3 ff. For a brief treatment of the Dutch in
Guiana, see Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 299-302.
2 Van Rees, II, 319-324. "On the whole, colonization is not possible in Surinam
with Europeans alone, in the absence of an intermediate negro population." Host-
mann, I, 257.
456 COLONIZATION
lost,^ it was unable to keep its word if it had so willed. Thus the
only labor force was lacking, although the prevalence of slavery in-
jured the position of the free laborer. In addition to this trouble
with labor, the absenteeism of proprietors, in the latter half of the
eighteenth century, began to produce its regular effects. Bad local
management then induced the owners to sell ; debts increased, and
misery resulted in the colony. ^ While Surinam was at times rated
as superior to the East Indies, it steadily declined under the stock
policy of shortsighted greed and exploitation so characteristic of
tropical establishments. Its history came to afford only another
variation upon the stock destiny of the Dutch colony."^
Aspects of the Chartered Company
The general aspects of the chartered company, as they appeared
in the Netherlands and in the over-sea possessions, tempt one to
digression from the main subject of colonization. Considered, how-
ever, as expedients for the furthering of colonial enterprise, the
story of the companies affords reason for several broad observa-
tions upon a phase of colonial endeavor.
In a country whose people were averse in principle to monopoly,
there arose in these companies one of the most striking cases of
monopoly in history. And this development was, so far as can be
seen, inevitable in the conditions of the age. For, first, there ap-
peared in the decades succeeding the Discoveries a need of accu-
mulation and concentration of capital such as had never before
been experienced. This necessity led, in the case of Spain and
Portugal, to a monopoly lodged in the hands of the only master of
^ Cf. p. 127, above : 1 5,000 slaves brought an annual profit to the Company of 2,000,-
000 guilders ; in the latter half of the eighteenth century the yearly demand called for
about 8000 slaves. Van Rees, II, 325. Fermin (pp. 120 ff.) says that in 1762 there
were 425 plantations in all in Surinam, and that each of these contained at least 180
slaves. The whole number of blacks, including escaped slaves {iiiari-oiis), was about
109,500. Cf. chaps, xi ff. Hostmann discusses the question of emancipation in a
rather impassioned manner. He treats of the details of the ordering of the slave's
existence (I, 212 ff.), of the missions (I, 197 ff.) ; discusses the bush-negroes quite at
length (I, 240 ff.) ; and gives a list of the chief negro stocks imi^orted into Surinam
(II, 247ff.).
2 On climatic and vital (and moral) conditions, see Fermin, chap, iii, and especially
Hostmann, II, 228, and chap. xii. 15olh Fermin and Hostmann were physicians. On
the government, see Fermin, pp. 30 ff. ; Hostmann, II, 433. Of the policy of confin-
ing production to one staple crop (sugar) Hostmann has many bitter criticisms (II,
255; chap. xiii). For a general treatment, see Zimmermann, V, 148-168, 267-286.
3 Van Rees, II, 368-375 ; cf. pp. 314-324.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS
457
sufficient capital, the king. But in the Netherlands there was none
such. Hence the function of financing the new and ha/^ardous ven-
tures descended upon individual initiative, and could be discharged
only through some form, at first local, of incorporation of capital.
But the competition of these local capitals which speedily ensued,
enforced a larger consolidation, and finally, as a means of protec-
tion to those who were discharging what was conceived to be
a weighty public and patriotic function, a grant of absolute mo-
nopoly. There was no other expedient at hand, and theories and
prejudices bent before inexorable concrete fact. That such monop-
oly was now used in a way ill-befitting, lay also in the conditions
of the time, as well as in human nature. For by the very constitu-
tion of the companies there could be but one object before them,
and that was present gain ; and because of the height of popular
expectation, the need of self-justification in a new and suspected
enterprise required that profits must be large. All the urge and
stress of the situation tended in this direction ; returns must be
immediate and high, and so policies in any case quick-acting, if
the investing participants were to be satisfied. The latter were
in the organization, not for theoretical or humanitarian aims, not
for the benefit of posterity or the heathen, but for material return.
Even the patriotic desire to injure Spain was not without its back-
ground of visions of treasure-ships and of seas free to trade. Natu-
rally the situation was too much for the as yet unformulated ethics
of corporate management, and there ensued the often crude and
sometimes singularly modern spectacle of wholesale rascality and
general corruption.
If such a system existed in the metropolis, nothing more en-
lightened could be expected in the distant possessions. The com-
panies could not pursue farsighted policies, as a state of modern
times is thought to do, awaiting slowly-maturing results, or even
renouncing actual returns in the pursuit of cosmopolitan, not to
say cosmic, ends. And so the companies' history shows little at-
tempt to better the natives, to colonize in the stricter sense — in
a word, to lay strong foundations for future political, social, or even
commercial structures. They not only neglected such matters, but,
under the increasing stress of yielding constant and high dividends
while confronting and somehow solving problems in transporta-
tion, administration, race-contact, and the like, but newly presented
to man (and many of them still unresolved), they fell back upon
458 COLONIZATION
expedients hurtful to the ruled as well as destructive of the perma-
nency of empire. Thus it came about that they challenged the
well-known comment of Adam Smith, that "of all the expedients
that can well be contrived to stunt the natural growth of a new
colony, that of an exclusive company, is undoubtedly the most
effectual." ^ This author, writing at a time slightly preceding the
total collapse of the East India Company, clearly perceives the in-
consistency of its double role of ruler and merchant. " It is in the
interest of the East India Company, considered as sovereigns, that
the European goods which are carried to the Indian dominions,
should be sold there as cheap as possible ; and that the Indian
goods which are brought from thence, should bring there as good
a price, or should be sold there as dear as possible. But the re-
verse of this is their interest as merchants. As sovereigns, their
interest is exactly the same with that of the country which they
govern. As merchants, their interest is directly opposite to that
interest." He then goes on to show how the administration in
India must pursue the same ends as the direction in Europe, and
how it is vain to prohibit the functionaries from trading on their
own account. " The regulations . . . which have been sent out
from Europe, though they have been frequently weak, have upon
most occasions been well-meaning. More intelligence, and perhaps
less good meaning, has sometimes appeared . . [in] those established
by the servants in India. It is a very singular government in which
every member of the administration wishes to get out of the coun-
try, and consequently to have done with the government as soon
as he can, and to whose interest, the day after he has left it and
carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly indifferent though
the whole country was swallowed up by an earthquake."^
Influence of Dutch Colonization
These reflections may reveal the character of the companies in
its broader and most general lines. It is clear that the trade-motive
was the dominant and almost the sole consideration, the function
of government being exercised as an "appendix"'^ to the prime
activity of commercial enterprise. Here again, then, is found the
1 Book IV, chap, vii, part ii (II, 77 of Cannan's ed.) ; cf. De Reus, pp. 292-310.
2 Book IV, chap, vii, part iii (II, 137, 139-140, of Cannan'.s ed.).
^ Smith, Book IV, chap, vii, part iii (II, 136 of Cannan's ed.). " Als .souverein, niet
als koopman, is de Compagnie te kort gekomen." R. Friiin, " Nederlands Rechten
en Veqilichtingen ten oijzichte van Indie." /)c- (Jitfs, 1865, II, 45.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 459
isolation of the motive of material self-interest, as in the case of the
Phoenicians of old. But the effects are certainly not to be compared
with those wrought by the ancients. There are several changed
factors in the situation which preclude the attainment of like re-
sults. It will be recalled^ that the chief point of difference between
the colonial enterprises preceding the Discoveries period and those
subsec|ucnt to it, was that the former were not called upon to meet
any of the conditions of tropical colonization, while the latter en-
countered new and strange environmental exigencies at every turn.
There appeared not alone the need of acclimatization, and its at-
tendant evils, but also the baffling question of relationship with
strange, uncongenial, and largely Mohammedan native races. The
equation was set in odd and difficult terms and with a number of
unknown quantities ; it was no longer one Mediterranean people
dealing with another. The possibilities of such a situation in en-
gendering mutual misunderstanding, contempt, and hostility, and
so in undermining that attitude of tolerance which conduces to the
growth of trade-relations, need no development in this place. Yet,
even so, it is probable that, if the Dutch had confined themselves to
exchange and had exhibited a tithe of the adaptability of the Phoeni-
cians and their successors, they might have left some such record
of culture-dissemination as that of the Mediterranean merchants
and colonists. Where they were unable to conquer, they applied
their undoubted business sagacity with results more favorable to
the spread of civilization than in their immediate domain. That
the people of the East were, after all, receptive of the germs of a
higher culture as implanted in their economic life is proved by the
widespread peaceful influence of the Chinese, the " Phoenicians
of the East," throughout what became Netherlands-India. But,
although the idea of the Dutch was gain pure and simple, as has
been seen, the methods which they employed were those of force ;
in this respect they followed the Portuguese, whose notorious ill-
success where conquest and conversion were added to the motive
of trade-exploitation has furnished the subject of previous pages.
And when the consideration is included that the Malays were a
tropical people, with all that that means of divergence from the
European races upon which the ancients exerted influence, the
comparative inefficiency of the trade-motive as a civilizing factor
in the East becomes immediately explicable.
^ Cf. pp. 74 ff., above.
46o COLONIZATION
Influence of the Companies upon the Metropolis
One further consideration respecting the companies remains :
their reflex influence upon the hfe of the metropolis ; and the first
and main reflection to be made is an obvious one. By the intro-
duction into the hfe of the nation of a large element of uncertainty
and hazard, their tendency was to divert the economic habitudes
of the country into forms less solid and sure. The speculation to
which they gave an unheard-of impetus, and the corruption into
which Directors and government fell, could not but react unfavor-
ably upon industry of all kinds, and make for inefliciency where
preceding conditions had called for courage, initiative, skill, and
strength. Even maritime enterprise was on the wane ; it w^as too
far to the Indies and the voyage demanded too much capital for
the individual to undertake it. Freight-carrying along the coast of
Europe gave quicker returns and aj^pcared more profitable ; this
was the reaction after the fevered excitement of earlier years. The
case is, mutatis mutandis, that of the Portuguese and Spaniards
over again, except that it is the more clearly marked because the
Dutch were so far superior to their predecessors in industry and
trade, and in the qualities that lay behind them. Wealth became
unequally divided ; and where there had been practically no de-
pendent class there was nurtured up a horde of hangers-on of the
wealthy. Every one who had power used it ruthlessly, and internal
dissension, political and industrial, was already common after 1650.
In other words, there ensued upon the activity of the companies
a significant change for the worse in the economic and moral char-
acter of the nation.^
How far the persistence of the companies was effective in re-
tarding consolidation of the provinces and government it may be
hard to say, but it certainly contributed to foster local attach-
ments which were detrimental to national development. One writer
asserts that "before 1795 the Netherlander knew no father-land',
but merely a father-city." ^ If this is fhe^case, and if it took the
French Revolution to make over the Netherlands from a city-econ-
omy into a modern state, certainly the companies can be said to
' Cf. Pringsheim, ])p. 59-70; Van Rees, II, 213-214.
2 Blok, Eene hoUandsche stad in de middeleeuwen, 1SS3; quoted in Pringsheim,
p. 2, note 5.
THE COMPANIES IN THEIR FIELDS 461
have failed after what looked like a splendid start toward promot-
ing national unification.^
But the final ills that reduced the Netherlands from a position
of preeminence were directly connected with the attempts of the
companies, especially that of the East Indies, to maintain their
exclusive monopolies. The great period of Dutch commercial
power came early in the seventeenth century ; then began the
attacks of rivals, especially England, whose Navigation Acts, com-
bined with the operations of Colbert (1664 and 1667), struck a
blow from which, under the conditions indicated, there was only
partial and intermittent recovery. For the old monopoly ideas
were not abandoned in the face of competition, and so the process
of sinking into the commercial background went on apace. Had
the colonial raw products entered the Netherlands in any suffi-
ciency, the Dutch industries could have better weathered the
rising competition ; but as it was, the height of prices and of taxes
made it impossible f6r them to keep their place in the world. The
India trade was really of inferior importance, never being over
11,000,000 guilders' worth of importation per year; and the total
export of Holland to the West Indies for the period 1623 to 1636
was worth somewhat less than 7,000,000 guilders. But the trade
of the Indies was a sort of fetich and the monopoly principle a
dogma ; and so the Dutch went on in the now traditional system
until war with England in 1780 completed their humiliation, and
rendered the company-system moribund. ^
Collapse of the Monopoly
Thus is added yet another case to those which demonstrate
the inevitable outcome of the monopoly system. The closer the
monopoly, and the more successful it is in securing the elevation
of prices for which it aims, the greater is the temptation to its
infringement ; but because of the waste and costliness of the sys-
tem, such infringement means ruin. Thus, toward the end of the
^ Cf. Pringsheim, pp. 2-9 ; De Reus, p. 292. " The condition of this Company in
India was the thermometer of the poHtical life of the Netherlands, exactly as this
political life can be regarded as the cause of the conditions of the Company with
which it kept pace." De Reus, p. 310. Leroy-Beaulieu (I, 79) remarks: " Ce n'est
jamais impunement qu'un peuple commet des fautes nombreuses et persistantes dans
une des branches principales de son activite : toute la vie economique et politique
d'une nation s'en ressent a la longue."
■- Pringsheim, pp. 11-15, 3^-39' De Reus, pp. 290-293.
462 COLONIZATION
eighteenth century, the course of the Dutch as a colonial power
seems to have been run. That they did not lose all their external
possessions shortly thereafter, and relapse into the status of Por-
tugal and Spain after their monopolies were broken, was due in
part to the real superiority of their economic and social organiza-
tion over that of the Peninsular countries, and also to the newer
and larger outlook ujjon the relations of nations which was gradu-
ally replacing the narrow purview of earlier centuries. The world
was opening up under the influence of developed means of com-
munication, and other broadening factors ; and the old fetich of
monoj^oly was being shattered thereby, and through the growing
prevalence of ideals reflecting the changed material conditions.
But the commercial and maritime preeminence of the Dutch
was as irrevocably gone as was that of their predecessors. It
remained for them to try in what was left of their colonial empire
to work out some system that should be in closer harmony with
the spirit of modern times. Such a system became then as inevi-
table in its time as the monopoly regime had been in its own day
and generation, although the new long retained traces of derivative
relationship with the old.
CHAPTER XII
DUTCH COLONIZATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The attempts of commissions to probe into the abuses of the
East India Company during the last years of its existence met
such opposition as totally to defeat their purpose. The charter's
last extension came to an end on December 31, 1798 ; and in the
following year there was formed a Council of the Asiatic Posses-
sions, responsible to the government of the now Batavian Republic.
But upon the accession of the Napoleonic dynasty (1806) what
was left of the Eastern possessions was practically turned over
to a local autocrat in the person of Governor-General Daendels.
During the period of French predominance, as has been seen, cer-
tain parts only of the Dutch possessions resisted the encroaching
English, and presently Java alone remained.^ It is chiefly with
this island that the colonial activity of the Dutch in the last cen-
tury was concerned.
Reorganization : Daendels
The period from 1807 to 1830 engages attention chiefly as one
of reaction away from the company-system, followed by a grad-
ual resumption, in changed form, of what was essentially the old
exploitation based upon the dominant consideration of commercial
gain. This troubled period would be of less importance to the
subject were it not that subsequent counter-movements tended to
return in some degree to the theories and methods essayed at this
time. But it is necessary to realize, first of all, that in a vexed
and hurried period of reorganization attention must still be pre-
occupied with the same subjects which engaged the Company to
the exclusion of all others, namely, commerce and administration.
The spirit of the reaction against Company-policy lies in the fact
that emphasis was shifted from one of these purposes to the other,
so that whereas a company of individuals had been pursuing gain
and keeping up a semblance of government, a state, partly under
1 P. 439, above ; cf. Fortanier, pp. 40-46, 65-70.
46.5
464 COLONIZATION
the stress of need of defense, now set about the reorganization of
government while striving still to gather revenue to support its
own existence and to favor the life of trade. At first the Dutch
state was substituted for the Company, then for five years (181 1-
18 16) the island was ruled as a dependency of British India, and
finally (1816-1830), "during the first period of the Dutch restora-
tion, Java was managed on a mixed system in which the traditional
methods of the East India Company were employed to exploit it
for the benefit of the crown. ^ This explains why the narrative of
Dutch colonial policy during the period preceding 1830 is so
largely one of administrative changes and development, however
much these were based upon commercial and fiscal considerations.
Other aims than these were excluded, not only because necessity
demanded concentration upon immediately vital issues, but also
because the frame of mind of the Dutch still for decades led them
to hold that " colonies exist for the mother-country, and not the
mother-country for the colonies." ^
The first move toward administrative betterment was the dis-
patch of Daendels by King Louis, who had dissolved the Council
of the Asiatic Possessions, substituting a minister of his own,
and thus centralizing the whole matter of colonial administration.
Daendels was no colonial expert, but a man of energy and independ-
ence of mind, who had seen military and political service under the
French in the Netherlands ; he was bound by no traditions, and,
because of the belated and defective character of his instructions,
was practically uncontrolled. His methods were direct and were
designed for the securing of immediate results ; he " saw many
things going wrong, and set about in a rough-and-ready fashion
to right them." ^
The first and most evident evil was the inefficiency and corrup-
tion of the colonial service. Both men and methods were of poor
quality ; there was no intelligent division of function, nor was
there cooperation between officers and departments. Into this
1 Day, p. 128.
2 From a State Commission's report of 1 803, quoted in Pierson, p. 8. Day (pp. 1 29-
146) gives a number of carefully written pages to the analysis of the opinions of the
period respecting reform and the lines upon which it should be pursued. He sum-
marizes the charter of 1803, and assigns it great weight in the history of Java in that
" it outlines with substantial correctness the Dutch policy and the ideals of the Dutch
government in the following period, while its accompanying report gives an insight
into the reasons that determined the decisions " (p. 146).
^ Day, pp. 148-149.
LATER PHASES OF DUTCH COLONIZATION 465
chaos Daendels introduced system and centralization, considerably
extending the power of the governor-general through his prefects.
Payments and promotions were so altered as to make the colonial
career a field for an honest man ; and the corrupt were resolutely
pursued. Daendels had no fleet, and his army was treacherous ;
but although he could do little to better the former, he whipped
the latter into a passable shape. He also made of Batavia a rela-
tively wholesome place for Europeans, and developed, too often
regardless of the means employed, facilities for internal communi-
cation. ^ The courts and justice were placed upon a trustworthy
footing for the first time. Upon the native organization likewise
the influence of Daendels was strongly exerted, though with less
beneficent result. " Regents were henceforth to hold the position,
not of protected rulers, but of government officials, bearing the
honorable title of 'the king's servants'; they were to stand no
longer in the relations of contract with the government but subject
to it." The will was present to curb their oppression of the people,
but seems not to have been realized. As for the fiscal system, it
went back to the traditional expedient of contingents, for Daendels
saw no practicability in a system of taxation ; he was advanced in
many of his measures, but in the most vital ones touching produc-
tion, he could do little better than persist in the controlling and
forcing system. Again, though he protected the natives against
the Dutch, he laid upon the regents many heavy burdens which
were then shifted over upon the people he tried to aid ; the latter
were overwhelmed with forced services and were miserable. Daen-
dels gained the name of "the tyrant of the East"; his system
was described as " the most vigorous attempt ever made, at least
in Dutch India, to get from a people by force and by forced labor
all that can be demanded not alone for commerce but for public
works, for a strong defense, for ample payment of officials, and
for the unhampered establishment of all departments and branches
of administration." ^ Nevertheless, in view of the unsettled times
and the absence of, as well as the danger to carriers of the revenue-
bringing products, Daendels was always in straits financially, while
facing the menace of a British attack which he saw to be inevitable.
Thus he resorted to loans and confiscations, depreciation of the
currency, sale of government rights in land, and the like, and was
1 Encycl. Ned. Ind., arts. " Daendels," " Wegen."
2 Muntinghe, in Day. p. 160. •
466 COLONIZATION
naturally none too tender toward the natives when it came to
raising revenue.
" He shows throughout the brief period of his rule tlie methods
of a politician rather than of a statesman, making his decisions
suit the needs of the moment with little regard for the future."
Thus, though he really reorganized the administration, was con-
scious of abuses and inclined to work for their rectification where
heavy necessity did not oblige him to renounce wise and farsighted
plans, yet he reverted in many cases toward the old exploitation
policy of the Company, in some cases even exaggerating it, and
finally left the island, so far as economic and social status go,
pretty much as he found it.^ His administration possesses for our
subject, then, the importance of an unsuccessful attempt to break
with the past ; and the details of these years that might be gi\en
are of less significance inasmuch as they do not contribute in any
constructive way to the evolution of later stages of colonial theory
and policy.
British Dominance : Raffles
The first sharp break with the past was made under British
dominance through the undaunted energy and persistence of
Stamford Raffles.''^ Daendels had been the object of much com-
plaint to Napoleon and had asked for and finally obtained honor-
able release from his post in 1811. Later in the same year the
British conquest of the island took j^lace with ridiculous ease,^
and Raffles became lieutenant-governor ; this position conferred
virtually absolute power, for although he was nominally subor-
dinate to the governor-general in Calcutta, in practice he was a
local autocrat. He himself was the government, and his period of
rule was marked by varied expressions of his personality. This
was in general an intelligent and forceful one, and his personal
qualities were supi)orted by an extended experience and by scien-
tific and linguistic attainments of a high order. What makes him
of such marked significance as a factor in the destiny of Java was
rather the ])r()jection of this personality than the definite results
1 For the administration of Daendels, see Day, pp. 148-163; cf. Fortanier, pp.
71-76.
2 On Raffles's administration, see Pierson, chap, i ; Day, chap, v ; cf. Fortanier,
pp. 77-S,S ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 277-278.
^ Cf. Encycl. Ned. Ind., arts. " Verdediging," " Verovering van Java door de
Engelschen."
LATER PHASES OF DUTCH COLONIZATION 467
for which he was responsible. " His efforts should be judged . . .
by direction as well as distance. Raffles was great, not in the
results which he achieved, but in the ideals that he established,
which have been a power in all later reforms. He tried to do
alone, in a few years, and with the uncertainty of his position
constantly before him, what generations of later workers have
accomplished." It was doubtless his eagerness to see these re-
forms through before the restoration of the island to the Dutch,
that led him into a course somewhat headlong, with results some-
times bearing the marks of his want of time for mature delibera-
tion. "Viewed in the light of the difficulties under which he
worked, the faults of Raffles's career as Lieutenant-Governor grow
smaller, and his failure appears only as a deferred success." ^
Raffles's Revenue System
The most significant change upon which Raffles was bent was
an alteration of the government's fiscal policy toward the natives.
He felt that there must be public loss through the delivery of
produce, for it entailed unavoidable waste and expense, and yet
there was no certainty of sale ; he saw that the revenue must
suffer during its passage through a number of intermediate hands,
just because it was likely to produce the further evil of irregularity
and corruption ; and he was concerned not only that there was no
security for the people against the oppression of the regents, but
that incitement to industry must be absent. Hence he planned the
establishment of perfect freedom in cultivation and trade, — this
to entail the abolition of forced deliveries at inadequate rates, and
of feudal services ; the assumption by the government of the super-
intendence of lands together with their revenues and rents, — this
to do away with the intervention of the regents who should be re-
stricted to public duties ; and the renting out of such lands in large
or small parcels on moderate-term leases. The many chances for
petty oppression which occurred along the tortuous ways of native
procedure in these matters were to disappear under the European
system of dues proportioned to the rental value of the lands. More-
over, indirect taxation was to be reformed in the interest of free
industry and trade ; internal tolls were to be abolished, customs
duties regulated by the government, and the salt tax no longer
farmed out. The " whole process of assessment and collection was
1 Day, pp. 169, 170.
46S COT.ONIZATION
to be brought under the control of European ideas of honesty,
economy, and justice,"^ this being effected by direct contact of the
government, to the exclusion of more or less independent native
officials, with the people.
" The central part of Raffles's system was the land-tax, which
was to absorb all the multiform dues and services paid by the
people under native rule, and was to be, as it has been in British
India, the mainstay of the government treasury." ^ Into the details
of the collection of this tax it is not necessary to go. Its applica-
tion was a failure, not only because it had certain faults that only
experience could mend, but because of Raffles's own limitations in
the matter of time and resources. Geographical and ethnological
conditions were insufficiently known, and any logical application
of the system was locally thwarted by the emergence of number-
less obstacles, small though some of them may seem to have been.
The tax-collectors, confused before the difficulties of the new sys-
tem, fell back upon the principle that it is better to get, in any
case, and presently the inequities of the old regime were again in
almost full swing. And the whole situation was perturbed inas-
much as Raffles could not cut loose absolutely from the old prac-
tices, such as the contingents, until the tax had begun to yield.
This did not take place in any degree sufficient to cover expendi-
tures. Hence with all his good intent Raffles really contributed
to make " the reversion to the Company's policy much more easy
and natural in the time of the culture system by preserving the
most important cultures to that time."^
Here is where the British governor was forced, in a sense, to a
better appreciation of the Company's situation, although the con-
ditions he faced were largely created by the misbehavior of the
Company in its straits. Raffles had no clamoring shareholders to
satisfy, and yet, if the natives were to be treated rightly, he could
not balance his budget. How the Javanese must have been exploited
before and after his time may be left to the imagination.
Raffles's Administrative System
The fiscal phase of Raffles's activity may be taken to corre-
spond to the commercial preoccupations of the Company ; but the
Englishman also governed, as the Company did not, and mainly in
1 Day, p. i8i. 2 jj^ p ,7^ 3 ij., p. 190.
LATER PHASES OF DUTCH COLONIZATION 469
an -enlightened and beneficent manner. He proceeded directly to
the strengthening of the position of European officials, who were,
of course, largely Netherlanders ; he nearly doubled the number
of residents, and informed them so well as to their powers and
duties that his instructions were retained entire after the Dutch
restoration. Among the first of the prescribed duties was the
making of periodic journeys and reports ; at last the residents
were to know their districts. Again, Raffles greatly bettered the
administration of justice, establishing " the principles upon which
the judicial relations of the natives were afterward developed." ^
With his attempted reorganization of the native government
Raffles was decades in advance of his time, and succeeded only
in leaving a series of vigorous and pregnant suggestions for later
reflection and action. Briefly speaking, he meant to relieve the
regents ^ of functions and privileges which had been oppressively
employed, making them government officials with carefully defined
powers and duties. They were to profit in a material way by rea-
son of such renunciation, but through a definite grant or salary ;
they were no longer to help themselves from the property of the
people. But here again resources to carry the new system failed ;
native officials soon renewed their relations with the cultivators,
and the old exactions continued as before. Thus it was likewise
in the less sweeping aspects of Raffles's reorganization.
If the English governor had had the maximum of extraneous aids
in his work, and could have possessed a secure tenure of several
times five years, it is yet entirely unlikely that posterity would
have been robbed of the privilege of finally realizing some of his ad-
vanced ideas. Under such favoring circumstances he might, indeed,
have made some impression upon the Company system, with but
two centuries of time and a correspondingly and relatively slight
inertia behind it ; but the attempt vitally to alter the native organi-
zation, especially in the matter of its traditional habitudes, its mores,
given both time and other resources, rests yet upon a forlorn hope.
It is sanguine to expect to modify the industrial organization except
over a long period; and to look for anything of the kind in the sec-
ondary social forms within a brief five years is rather ridiculous
than visionary. If Raffles knew as much of the East as he is given
1 Day, p. 195; Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Rechtswezen."
2 The regents were the old native authorities. The need of curbing such super-
seded chiefs was felt also by the Spanish in America. Cf. p. 283, above.
470 COLON iz.vriON
credit for, he could not have been much depressed by what looks
in cold type like failure almost all along the line. What he did was
to dischar^^e the function of the strong, clear-seeing, independent
man : he caused the customary discomfort and upheaval produced
by the application of candid rationality to that which is growing
obsolete and anachronistic. That the movement was one of the
man and not of the time, place, and people, is shown by the^speedy
settling-down of the situation into old lines as soon as this per-
turbing personality was removed.
The Commission of i8i6
In 1815, according to antecedent agreement, the Dutch East
Indies, and, chief among them, Java, were restored to their former
owners ; ^ and in 18 16 officials were sent out to resume possession.
These men had behind them a colonial constitution which was to
serve them as a guide in the reestablishment of Dutch rule, a
document which went back to the more liberal principles that
succeeded, in the early years of the century, those of the Com-
pany ; it allowed free cultivation except of spices and opium, re-
serving the question of the forced deliveries as maintained under
Raffles for future attention. The implication was that the land-
ta.x was to cover most of the fiscal relations with the natives. Now
these Commissioners fell upon an evil situation, succeeding as they
did to the half-completed and confused application of the English
reformer's work, and unable as they were to retain his English
agents. The treasury was empty and the deficit constant.
The first question which arose was whether labor should be
compulsory or free ; that is, whether the land-tax principle should
be rejected or retained ; the Commissioners decided for its reten-
tion, though planning improvement of its administration. The
laws of 18 18 and 18 19, which were based upon the Commission's
reports, continued to regulate the land-tax until 1872 and after.
The chief alterations made in Rafiles's ])!an were : the im])()sition
of the tax upon village -groujis rather than upon individuals ; assess-
ment not upon a fixed i)rinci])le, but in accordance with local con-
ditions ; and the allowance of jxiyment in money or in kind. These
relaxations from a rigid system naturally eased the conditions of
1 For the period of the Dutch restoration the jiresent treatment follows Day,
chap, vi, and I'ierson, chaps, ii and iii. Cf. Fortanier, pp. 90 ff.
LATER PHASES OF DU'I'CH COLONIZATION 471
the natives who were in a position to suffer from any rigorous
appHcation of pure theory. At the same time the Commissioners
" stood squarely on the ground that the home country had full
right to all returns that could be got from the natives without
infringing their claims to liberty and protection." ^ And, like
Raffles, they were obliged to retain the system of forced service
in a number of cases until the land-tax should have demonstrated
its fiscal utility. In the matter of administration the system and
ideas of Raffles were pretty generally followed ; in particular the
Commission insisted upon better quality and training in the colonial
service. The attitude of the government toward native offlcials
was developed into more definite form, and in 1820 found expres-
sion in the following paragraph, conceived in part, as will be seen,
in apt native terminology : "In matters concerning the government
of the natives the regents are the confidential advisers of the resi-
dent, and he shall treat them as his younger brothers."^ How far
this attitude allowed the regents power and the abuse of it will
appear when the culture system is considered. Certainly the at-
tempt was made to introduce the salary regime so far as practi-
cable ; payments through grants of land were abolished in 18 19,
and the regents were forbidden to engage in trade or otherwise to
use their positions to get irregular gain from the people.
Reversion to Company Policy
The Commissioners held office for three years (until 18 19), and
naturally saw during their term but few positive results, in vindi-
cation or otherwise, of their policy. The yield of the land-tax in-
creased from 3,259,933 guilders in 1818 to 3,876,221 in 1819, and
then rather steadily to almost 6,000,000 in 1829; but any general
justification of measures was long delayed, not only through the
natural inertia of things, but because the years 1820 to 1830 saw
what might be taken as a slowing-up, if not a partial reversal, of
the process of development of the preceding decade. "In the period
after the departure of the Commissioners in 18 19 there is observ-
able a tendency in India to gravitate back to the Company's policy,
though it was never strong enough to lead to the open sacrifice of
the tax system to that policy, and would not have led to the cul-
ture system except for the influence of the home government." ^
1 Day, p. 213. 2 Quoted in Day, p. 219. 3 Day, p. 226.
472 COLONIZATION
The tendency to reversion lay not onl)- in the withdrawal of the
influence of the English, but in the fact that the Dutch officials
had somewhat resented their inmixture in affairs and felt it more
patriotic, especially when they found it easier and more profitable,
to return to the system under which they had been trained.
This spirit seems to have been embodied in Van der Capellen,
the governor-general who succeeded the Commission, who " in the
seven years of his rule entirely ignored the principles that had been
established for his guidance and reverted step by step to the old
system." ^ Among other things he did not favor the tendency
toward the settlement of Europeans, and the promising beginnings
of organized industry and private trade. "The government had
returned to the jealous attitude of the East India Company, and
could tolerate no industry, however much it might conduce to the
welfare of the people, so long as it seemed likely to affect the
immediate interests of the treasury."^ And as for foreigners,
the imposition of relatively heavy differential duties, although they
did not restore to the Dutch any great share in the trade of the
island, yet betrayed the survival of the old exclusion policy, and
deprived the colony of the higher degree of material prosperity to
which it seemed ready and able to attain.
In fact a return to the company system took place, not only in
essence but likewise in name. Although trade after 1816 was for
a time left in private hands, the old conviction of the superiority
of the corporation remained and regained strength; thus in 1824
the Dutch Trading Company i^NederlandscJic Handclsmaatschappij)
was founded to further " the national trade, navigation, ship-build-
ing, fisheries, agriculture, manufactures and business." "^ The king
took one-third of the stock originally designed to be issued and
guaranteed the other stockholders a return of four and one-half
per cent ; and such was the po]:)ularity of the C(mipany that " the
public over-subscribed to the remainder of the slot'k nearly nine-
fold on the first day that it was offered to them, and the capital
was greatly increased to meet their demand." It is to be noted,
however, that the Company was to be denied full nionojioly and
was to possess no sovereign power such as the East India Com-
pany had held. It could not imj^jose forced cultures nor own its
own vessels; the latter must be chartered and its prolits were to
be those gained as an ordinary trader. " The main advantage that
1 Day, p. 233, 2 id.^ p_ 2j(3_ 3 Quoted in Day, p. 241.
LATER PHASES OP^ DUTCH COLONIZATION 473
the articles of agreement promised it was the chance to contract
for government business, and until the culture system built up this
business the Company's books showed an unprofitable balance." ^
The Culture System
Attention now turns to this new method, or rather modification
of an old method of securing to the mother-country a favorable
balance from its colony ; for the Dutch continued to regard Java
and the rest of their East Indies from the standpoint of what is
in essence almost unmixed national egoism. Hence it is that the
narrative of Dutch colonization seems so barren and sordid, so
unrelieved by the dramatic or romantic, almost empty of the play
of passion, of personal highmindedness and renunciation in the pur-
suit of perhaps unwise ideals ; for it is almost exclusively a record
of accountings and cheatings, a tale of consistent exploitation. Thus
the topics to be considered as period follows period are variations
upon the same monotonous theme: commercial policy. Even where
the subject of administration enters it is generally an account of
the maintenance or alteration of conditions as they directly or in-
directly affect the batig slot, the favorable balance, the desirable
plus quantity in the national ledger.
Such another expedient was the cnltinir stchel, or culture system,
once from insufficient and unreliable evidence adjudged the philos-
opher's stone of colonial policy, not only because it yielded mate-
rial gold, but because it was likewise thought to embody all other
desiderata in a colonial policy such as, in particular, the assur-
ance of native welfare and happiness and the spread of civilization.
Because, however, of the recent publication in English ^ of the
truth in regard to this system, together with an abundance of con-
vincing detail, it is possible for the present treatment to confine
itself largely to generalities now demonstrated. The attempt will be
made to throw the salient features of the system into line with the
general aspects of colonization as heretofore developed.
Md., pp. 241-242; Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Handelsmaatschappij, De Neder-
landsche."
2 Day, The Dutch in Java, 1904, especially chaps, vii-xii. This is evidently a very
careful and able treatise ; in addition it possesses the special confidence of the present
writer because of his personal knowledge of the author and of his scholarly tempera-
ment and methods and sound judgment. Pierson, Koloniale Politiek, chaps, iv-x,
covers the same period, for a reader of Dutch, in a most enlightening manner.
474 COLONIZATION
The reasons which lay at the bottom of the reaction toward
Company poHcy represented by the culture system were of a pre-
dominantly fiscal nature. The land-tax had nearly doubled its re-
turn in the period 1818 to 1829, it is true; but its satisfactory
condition was not duplicated elsewhere on the credit side of the
budget. And the expenses of an imprudent administration and, in
particular, the cost of the liative war in central Java which broke
out in 1825, overbalanced any increase of income to such an extent
that by 1830 the Indian government was over 30,000,000 guilders
in debt. But the sentiment in the Netherlands was for immediate
and constant gain, not loss ; and impatience with the situation and
fear of having a weak dependency saddled upon the country led
to a policy of decisive interference on the part of the metropolis.
Thus it hajjpened that General Van den Bosch, an official who
recognized the exigencies of the situation and was ])repared to
meet them in what looked like, and jiroved to be from the fiscal
standjioint, an effective way, was left in virtually undisturbed con-
trol of the East from 1830 to 1839; and was then succeeded by a
man of like mind. Baud, who maintained the system of Van den
Bosch until 1848.
Plan of the Culture Svstem
" The plan of the culture system, as proposed by Van den Bosch
in 1829, was in brief as follows: Instead of paying to the govern-
ment a certain proportion of their crops, the natives were to put
at its disposal a certain proportion of their land and labor-time.
The revenue would then consist not in rice, which was almost uni-
versally cultivated and which was of comparatively little value to
the government, but in export products grown under the direction
of government contractors on the land set free by the remission
of the former tax. According to the estimate, the natives would
give up only one-fifth of their time in place of two-fifths of their
main crop. The government proposed to bear the loss from failure
of crops if this was not directly due to the fault of the cultivators,
and moreover promised to pay the natives a certain small price for
such amounts as they furnished. The government proposed in this
way to secure products suited for export to the European market,
on which it expected to realize profits largely in excess of the prices
paid to natives and contractors, and of the costs of administration.
LATER PHASES OF DUTCH COLONIZATION 475
To the natives it promised increased prosperity and a lighter bur-
den of taxation, as a result of the fuller utilization of their chances
under the far-sighted management of Europeans. The labor that
before through carelessness and ignorance would have been wasted
in idleness or in the cultivation of some cheap and superfluous crop
was to supply a product of great value in the world market, and
the natives were to share in the resulting profits. Van den Bosch
justified his proposal not only by the benefits it would heap upon
all parties, but by reference to previous history and the character
of native institutions which made it seem not only impolitic but
unjust to cling longer to the land-tax as the basis of government
revenue." ^
Real Character of the System
Because of the great renown of the culture system ^ as a sort
of miracle in colonial history this summary of its character as pro-
posed is set before the reader. Not that any such programme may
be taken as a basis for the attempt to figure the plan in action ; it
merely throws light upon the motives of the system's adoption or
of the support accorded it by people who knew it only from its
prospectus. It looks philanthropic, but was in reality mercenary ;
in its application all the features that interfered with revenue
speedily dropped away. For example, the fifth of the people's work-
ing-time which was put under requisition lengthened out indefi-
nitely, and they often bore the land-tax besides, from which the
system was supposed to free them. Moreover the government
evaded shouldering the losses both by a specious use of the proviso
attached and otherwise ; and paid the natives, if at all, in the scant-
iest and stingiest manner. The system was unworkable in any way
profitable to all parties because of general ignorance of conditions,
poor organization of labor, injudicious selection of locations, and
lack of roads and vehicles sufficient in quantity and adequate in
quality to meet the needs of transportation.^
It is not to be understood that the system was universal in its
application either to products or in places. After experimentation
and exclusion of the least profitable cultures the government settled
down mainly to coffee, sugar, and indigo. The system was applied
1 Day, pp. 249-250.
2 Cf. Brunialti, pp. 161-162 ; and Keltic, p. 452, as examples of the prevalent view.
** Cf. Encycl. Ned. Ind., arts. "Nijverheid," "Wegen," etc.
476 COLONIZATION
chiefly in Java, but even here only partially ; and it never affected
all the population where it was introduced. " In 1845 the cultures
occupied about 5.5% of the total cleared land . . . , in 1854-57
about 3.2% of the total agricultural land of the native population." ^
Something more than one-half of the population in the districts of
its introduction came beneath the system. Elsewhere some close
approximation to the centuries-old arrangements persisted.
Even the selected products failed to pay except as the system
was turned into one of virtual enslavement of the natives ; to yield
profit the products had to be gotten for nothing or next to it. It
was really worse than this, for the actual damage done the natives
converted the fictitious or meager payment into a minus quantity,
and one of certainly great magnitude even though, like all such
social loss, it could not be measured in money. For the native
habits of steadiness and industry, such as they were, were demoral-
ized by insecurity and always imminent interference ; and the very
life of the people was imperiled by the failure of such crops as
sugar and indigo which had been made to replace native food-prod-
ucts.^ Moreover, the system worked out into an inequality of bur-
dens, despite the ostensible fairness of its principles ; some cultures
were more onerous than others and the same culture would vary
in its weight on the native with the ty]ie of the official who imposed
it. Again the native was required to api:)ly labor or to deliver prod-
ucts in places appointed by the government, a demand which could
not but impose great hardship. The result of all this was that the
native in his unenviable position lost all stimulus to industry ; he
gave his labor grudgingly and made no attempt to acquire skill or
check waste. These are characteristics of slave-labor ; the returns
of the government cultures were notably less than those of free
industry. Products also suffered deterioration in the factories, for
under governmental monopoly there was no competition and the
output was of inferior quality.
All this is the old policy of exploitation under a new form. A
further ear-mark of the old system is to be found in the treatment
accorded to private trade and production, which resembles that
beneath which they languished under the Company. Natives were
discouraged from the production of articles that might compete
with the government moncjpoly, and were hampered in the disposal
' Day, p. 259, note i. '
2 Cf. Encycl. Ned. Ind., arts. " Nijverheid," " Koffie," " Indigo," " Suiker," etc.
I-ATI'IK PHASES OF DUTCH COLONIZATION 477
of what did not thus compete. The same kind (jf ()l)struction was
offered to the European planter, with the result that the Dutch
who supported themselves in entire independence of the govern-
ment were very few in number; in 1856 in all Java and Madura
these numbered only 608 out of a total Dutch population, exclusive
of soldiers, of about 20,000 ; foreign Europeans engaged in gainful
occupations numbered in the same year less than a hundred. With-
out entering further into detail it may be said that the incentive
to the development of individual enterprise and of actual settlement
in the colony was about as small under the government as it had
been under the Company.
A further evidence of the similarity of old and new systems was
the ease with which the Dutch Trading Company slipped into the
position of the old Company when once the culture system was
well started. Before that time it had languished ; now it became
the sole agent of the monopoly -holding government, transporting
its products to the Netherlands and selling them there on the ac-
count of its principal. Great gains were thus made, as in former
days, at the expense of private enterprise and public interest.
Oppression and Corruption
It is plain from the above that the Dutch were still endeavoring
to reconcile the two historically inconsistent functions of trade and
government. In its original programme the culture system bore
the aspect of a benevolent attempt to secure a good return to the
government through assuring the natives a life of opportunity and
advance. It was the very betterment of the natives which was to
place their relation with their rulers upon such a plane as to render
the new system profitable to the latter. The whole scheme was a
" prosperity-policy " which, with the minimum of pain, was to secure
general satisfaction for all parties. But the nature of human life
is such that losses and gains are balanced, and that the strong
inevitably utilize their power to seize the latter and shift off the
former, even though this may mean, in the end, losses for both
sides. And since the advantages which the Dutch were contem-
plating in their relations with the Javanese were still pecuniary,
and not composed to any extent of pleasurable sensations to be
experienced in the discharge of a civilizing and humanitarian func-
tion, their governing activity was regularly subordinated to the
478 COLONIZATION
commercial. Hence the relative unimportance of Dutch " colonial
administration" during the period under survey.
The land-tax was continued as a source of revenue, and was im-
posed not only upon the districts where the culture system had
been introduced, but also upon the natives who, by coming under
the system, had in form released themselves from the land-tax. " It
is certain that many, probably most, of the natives bore the double
burden of culture services and taxes too." ^ Outside the region of
the cultures the land-tax continued in the old way, meeting the
passive resistance of the natives and growing in its yield at about
the same rate as formerly. Its collection was mostly in the hands
of natives, for the government's attention was for the time concen-
trated upon the system newly introduced, and was haphazard and
irregular. The most important change for the natives not under
the culture system was the increased demand for labor services
which they had to meet. The government spent ready money with
chagrin and found it much cheaper to pay nominal wages for re-
quired native labor ; and officials wasted a great amount of such
labor in the effort to exhibit zeal before their superiors. One esti-
mate reckons the time of the natives which was taken up in services
as at least a cjuarter of their working hours. And the waste was
the greater for utter lack of organization, and for general capri-
ciousness, inefficiency, and lack of good will on the part of the
directors of labor.
The system of administration was thoroughly bad, as it had been
before ; greed and parsimony vied with inefficiency and infidelity
to trust. The welfare of the natives, so speciously proclaimed as
the real object of the culture system and so thoroughly advertised,
especially among foreigners, as being a result of it, formed no part
of the working programme of the system. Practically nothing was
done for the natives. In general the whole preoccupation of the
government was commercial, not administrative ; it was willing to
multiply functionaries in the revenue service, but would make no
extension of the purely governmental departments. " Officials soon
learned that their careers depended on the fiscal showing their dis-
tricts could make ; they attended to the business of raising revenue,
and did not worry the government overmuch with accounts of the
sacrifices of the natives." ^ The fact that a percentage upon the
product of a district was divided among the directing officials,
1 Day, p. 281. 2 Id., p. 293.
LATER PHASES OF DUTCH COLONIZATION 479
tended to focus the att }ntion of all upon the yield of the govern-
ment cultures ; purely administrative duties became flat and irk-
some, and the function of government constantly dwindled as its
parallel and inconsistent function of trade increased. " Neither in
the training of officials nor in the regulation of their careers by
promotion did the government take any measures sufficient to
counteract the bad influence of its fiscal policy upon them. In
character and abilities they were below standard." ^ Favoritism
played a great role in their selection and location ; they were de-
moralized by the presence of many sources of illicit gain, as well
as by the culture-percentages. All this could not have failed to
exercise a malign influence upon the native officials, who, in gen-
eral, were apter to acquire the vices than the virtues of their Euro-
pean superiors. To these regents, besides, the system of Van den
Bosch had restored a considerable portion of the power which
Raffles and his immediate successors had desired to take from
them ; they gradually acquired land-grants in return for services
to a government always reluctant to pay in cash, and, since the
grants carried rights of taxation over the natives that lived upon
them, the people were thus turned over again to the mercies of
their own chiefs under the old native customs. The main differ-
ence between the conditions of this restoration as compared with
the old aboriginal status was that the chiefs had taken during their
period of eclip.se a course in luxury, greed, and dishonesty on the
European model. And the subordinate native officials, who had
always been poorly paid, were not behind in practicing on the petty
scale what their superiors did on the large. Every demand of the
European government increased as it passed through native hands.
" They multiplied tenfold and more the demands which the govern-
ment in theory allowed them to make on the labor services of the
population ;" 2 and the Dutch officials, though on oath to protect
the natives against their chiefs, could do little, even when they
willed, in the face of governmental greed and apathy.^ All this
demoralization had its effect upon the village government and thus
penetrated still more intimately into native life. Up to 1840 the
1 Day, p. 294; Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Opleiding van Indische .Ambtenaaren."
2 Day, p. 300.
3 Cf. the career of Max Havelaar in the story of that title, by Edouard Douwes
Dekker. For a picture of the dissoluteness of the Dutch and native officials, and the
suffering of Europeans as well as of the Javanese in consequence of it, see Van
Wijk's story, De Goeie Jo.
4i) of their princes and chiefs." Van der Aa,
" Koloniale Politiek," De Gids, i860, I, 461. 2 cf Keller, Sociol. View, etc.
^ For the recent system of the Dutch in Java, Day (chaps, x-xii) remains the chief
authority ; cf. also Id., pp. 1-4.
LATKR PHASES OF DUTCH COLONIZATION 487
was to set over against the vaguely perceived discomforts of future
labor the present lure of immediate material benefits, and when
the bait had been unintelligently but voluntarily taken, to insist
upon the fulfillment of the contract ; as high as three years' wages
were thus advanced against future services, which then became
compulsory. In form, of course, this is merely a subterfuge ; and
doubtless it often proved so to be in reality, despite the provi-
sions as to limitation and recording of contracts and the like. Such
provisions were in force in the coolie-system, ^ but they did not
prevent abuses sufficient to cause the Chinese and British authori-
ties, and those of the Dutch themselves to repudiate it, at least
so far as allowing their subjects to serve in colonies of foreign
powers was concerned. The system was in reality one of debt-
slavery, and as such was perfectly comprehensible to the native,
who had known it under what the Dutch called pandclingscJiap '^ for
many preceding periods of his history. Debt-slavery to one's chiefs
is common enough among uncivilized peoples, but is generally
mitigated by the irregularity or mildness of the service imposed ;
Europeans, with a different and more energetic temperament, and
intent on speedy gain, are likely to insist upon a strenuosity and
accountability which effect a total metamorphosis of the institution.
But reiterated complaints as to the capricious breaking of contracts
by natives leave us to understand that in Java the compulsion was
not rigorous enough for the system still to deserve the name of
slavery ; indeed the very lamentations that denote the absence of
coercion indicate a return to the original dilemma of tropical pro-
duction. The problem of tropical labor seems still to be set for
the Dutch in its original terms — terms which are, indeed, more
unfavorable if anything than at first, because of the results of sev-
eral centuries of crude and inapt manipulation.
Yet, despite all theory, in practice a good deal of compulsion
along old lines is exercised over the natives to bring them as pro-
ducers under the modern economic system. For though the gov-
ernment allows to the landed proprietor no such powers utilizable
for oppression as he formerly possessed, yet he still holds " a semi-,
public position ; he exacts dues in labor and in kind from the na-
tives, and, subject to the approval of the State, he appoints and
pays the head-men who exercise the most important function of
1 Cf. Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Koelie."
2 Cf. Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Pandelingschap."
488 COLONIZATION
communal government." ^ Abuses must arise under these condi-
tions ; the government plainly recognizes their existence, though
it has as yet devised no means for their eradication.
The Chinese
The most effective and natural agency for the economic educa-
tion of the natives, in Java and elsewhere, is formed by the Chinese.
It has been shown ^ that Coen and others early recognized their
importance and favored their immigration ; and then how they be-
came hated and were subjected to persecution. Their peculiar value
as educators of less-developed races lies in the fact that they are
culturally near enough to them to understand that in their lives
which is a closed book to the European. They are natural media-
tors between two diverse types of civilization.^ A Javanese could
hope and desire to attain to what of superiority the Chinese has,
while he could not even regard as desirable or superior much of
that for which the European strives. Moreover, the Chinese were
long experienced over all the East before the European arrived.
Their intelligence, industry, and reliability led to the delegation to
them of functions like that of the tax farmer, where they were op-
pressive indeed, under a conniving government, but effective for
its purposes. " Even in the eighteenth century they were recog-
nized as indispensable in their capacity of manufacturers, traders,
and money-lenders ; they alone showed the ability to stimulate pro-
duction, not by political pressure, but by economic means such as
characterize the modern system of labor.
" In modern times the Chinese have lost much of their impor-
tance as tax farmers, but their place in the commercial organiza-
tion is secure."^ Thus they continue to come into constant and
close contact with the natives ; they are the peddlers, the small-
scale suppliers who depend for their existence upon the stimulation
of those petty demands which precede others and larger. Their
work is in many striking respects a counterpart of that of the
Phoenicians or the mediaeval Jews ; they are similarly hated, bear-
ing as they do a like reputation. But these " Phoenicians of the
East " are exerting an analogous influence because their point of
attack is, like that of their prototypes, the only logical one ; it is
1 Day, p. 368. 2 I'p. 437 ff., above.
8 Cf. Keller, Sociol. View, etc. ; Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Chineezen."
* Day, p. 362.
LATER PHASES OF DUTCH COLONIZATION 489
the industrial organization alone that they influence, and that in
simple, understandable ways, and holding out benefits which, though
dearly purchased, seem worth the price. The Chinese really extract
products from the natives ; " the petty trader should have the credit
for the total amount produced for export by the industrial natives,
and for a large proportion of that which is produced by natives
under European direction." ^ Thus are the natives being gradually
drawn into the outskirts of the world-market and afforded some
hope of such adaptation to modern conditions as will allow them a
modest share in its system and perhaps ultimately save them from
the extinction that follows failure to conform.
In this process the Dutch have had little share ; nevertheless
their recent efforts to improve the native's position, whatever the
results, must not be overlooked. The general easing-up on services,
and other measures dating from about the middle of the nineteenth
century, were followed by attempts to better the education not
only of the colonial service but of the natives as well. Likewise
an increased attention was given to religious matters, although
" among the Javanese the opinion is dominant that the government
does not wish a chief {hoofd) to become a Christian." In 1770
there were 500,000 native Christians in the domain of the Com-
pany, and at its fall 70,000 within the area of the present Nether-
lands-India. In 1903 there were 445,950 native Christians in the
same region, of whom 28,368 were Catholic. Naturally the Dutch
have steadily opposed the extension of the Roman faith from the
time they succeeded to the Portuguese and Spanish.^
Recent Fiscal and Other Conditions
If the government intended to see the natives rightly treated
according to modern criteria, it could not hope for the old fiscal
returns. But it was unwilling, naturally enough, to surrender
these; after 1864 the home government fixed the Indian budget,
and for some years the contributions ranged between 10,000,000
and 40,000,000 guilders a year. But, in consequence of the Atjeh
1 Day, p. 365. The total number of Chinese in Netherlands-India is given (for
1893) as 443,945, of whom 290,449 are males. Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Chineezen."
2 Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. " Christenen " ; cf. arts. " Onderwijs," " Opleiding van
Indische Ambtenaaren," " Heerendiensten," " Eeredienst," " Evangelisatie," "Zen-
ding." For the character of training for the colonial service, see Lowell, chap, ii, 113 ff.,
and Bourne, Col. Civ. Serv.
490 COLONIZATION
War which broke out in 1873, this Indian surplus decHned and, in
1878, had disappeared. Later schemes regarding the budget " have
had in common the idea that the Indies should be held to contrib-
ute each year a fixed sum which should recompense the home
government for its expenditures on colonial account, while any
surplus above that should be appropriated by the States General
to objects of direct interest to the i^eoj^lc in the East." ^ Recent
budgets seem to indicate a considerably increased attention to the
formerly neglected public works, local administration, native wel-
fare, and the like.
In considering the source of the government revenues, return
is made from another standpoint to the modification of the culture
system. After the less important cultures were abolished those
of sugar and coffee alone remained. In the case of the former
a gradual transition from forced- to wage-labor was begun in 1870,
and by 1890 the transition was fully effected. The taxes levied
from the planters were sufficient for some years to cause the
government but slight loss ; but misfortunes, entirely apart from
the change of system, which overtook the industry toward the end •
of the century brought heavy loss to the planters and led to the
abolition of the sugar-tax, after some years of suspension, in 1898.
The coffee-culture is still continued ; to it the government held
because of its productiveness, striving to remedy abuses and in-
crease efficiency by changes of detail. It was seen that, since the
industry was, unlike that of sugar, almost entirely in native hands,
there would be little production for export under a free system ;
the European entrepreneur was lacking and so could not be made
responsible or taxed. Culture-percentages for European officials
were abolished, however, in 1865, although those for native super-
visors were continued. But the industry is rather feebly carried
on ; fall of coffee-prices leaves the culture less desirable and des-
tined to pass away. The coffee-culture, like all the rest, could have
been abolished any time the government chose to forego the revenue
derived from it.
Thus far little has been said of mining ; but although it formed
no very considerable part of the interests of the Dutch up to 1867,
and contributed therefore but slightly to the labor question, it de-
serves some reference in view of present-day conditions. In early
times Java had the reputation of a "gold and silver island," and
1 Day, p. 384.
LATER PHASES OF DUTCH COLONIZATION
491
the precious metals were a sort of vague secondary lure to the
European discoverers ; but the Portuguese and Spanish found
little to attract them, and the East India Company, after some
experimentation, allowed such enterprise to drop. In the course
of time, however, the extension of information about the Dutch
possessions recalled attention to their metal wealth ; for, in accord
with more modern ideas, it was now possible to conceive of such
resources as consisting of something besides gold and silver. There
is gold in Netherlands-India, but the metallic attraction has come
to be the more useful ores, and, above all, tin ; to have tin mines
in their colonies is for the Dutch a rather unique distinction, and
a profitable one. This ore occurs chiefly in the islands of Banka
and Billiton, and is mined through the agency, under the resident
of Banka, of Chinese resident communities {kotig-si)} Concessions
for mining have been granted in considerable numbers since 1873,
but only to Netherlanders or subject natives or to companies formed
in the Netherlands or in the Dutch islands. The exigencies of steam-
navigation have lent importance to the mining of coal ; and iron
and petroleum seem to promise well. Thus in the field of the ex-
tractive industries, as of the productive, the center of gravity is
moving away from the costly and luxurious toward the cheap and
practical. 2 In any case mining in Netherlands-India has never cost
the native, in loss of vitality and in misery, what it wrung from the
Indians in America.
With the decline of forced services ^ of all kinds the Dutch have
come to look to taxes on the European model as sources of rev-
enue. The land-tax was the chief of these, and it has remained
in approximately its old form, although growth of population and
strengthening of the administration have contributed to make it
more endurable. The Dutch are now engaged upon an investiga-
tion of the whole tax system, which will probably end by sweep-
ing away the greater part of the survivals of antique and poorly
1 Cf. p. 25, above.
2 Cf. Encycl. Ned. Ind., arts. " Mijnbouw," " Billiton-maatschappij," " Petroleum,"
" Steenkolen," " Tin," " Ijzer," etc.
^ Another species of service demanded by the government as a sort of commuted
tax was that which included labor on public works, maintenance of order, labor for
the personal enterprises of native government i^pantjen services) and village officials.
These services were wasteful and ineffective, as they were given grudgingly and
directed inefficiently. From 1864 to 1890 they were progressively restricted; then it
was realized that general regulation was ineffective, and since 1890 forced services
have been prescribed according to the local conditions of the various residencies.
492
COLONIZATION
adapted measures. It would appear from all this that they have
finally decided for the formerly neglected alternative in the dual
policy of trade and government ; they have certainly moved in
that direction since the days of the Company. Yet there are
those who assert that the Dutch policy is still that of greed and
gain. It is stated, for example, with a good deal of evidence,
that the government is actively fostering the greatest curse of
the East, the opium-traffic, and that, though the form of the
drug's disposal has been changed from time to time, it is being
offered to, or rather forced upon, an increasing number of East
Indian districts. ^ It would be strange indeed if some such ugly
aftermath of the old mercenary policy did not persist. No one
believes all the protestations of parliamentary speeches, least of
all those of defenders of their own policy. But for the present it
is safe to say that in recent years the colonial policy in Java has
certainly more closely approached the modern type, where meas-
ures are, openly at least, based less upon considerations of gain.
In pursuance of the early policy of exploitation one of the
strongest persuasions of the Dutch was that foreigners should
be rigidly excluded from the entire archipelago ; and it has been
seen how they forced an entry and finally for a time held almost
the whole of the Dutch possessions. Of course the modern ideas,
based upon the working of a modern system with its developed
communication and transportation, no longer allow of a closed
monopoly or an attempt at one. Nevertheless the Dutch are yet
strict in such measures as are calculated to discourage foreign
enterprise in their own territories, or, what is much the same
thing, to restrict the relations between foreigners, European and
Oriental, and their native subjects. "According to a formula
which has been framed to describe the policy of the Dutch, the
native is major in his relations to the other natives ; he is a minor
in his relations to the rest of the world." ^ For example, there can
be no valid sale of land-rights from a native to a foreign Oriental
or European ; ,the most the alien can hope to get, on land culti-
vated by natives, is a short-term lease, and this is hedged about
with varied restrictions. The theory of the relations of natives to
foreigners is that the former are not yet able to hold their own in
bargaining with Chinese or Europeans ; hence government activity
1 J. F. Scheltema, in Aiiter.Jr. of Sociology ; cf. Encycl. Ned. Ind., art. "Opium."
2 Day, pp. 372-373.
LATER PHASES OF DUTCH COLONIZA'IION 493
in keeping the foreigner at his distance is viewed as an expression
of benevolent paternalism.
As regards their Malay possessions, and chiefly Java, the Dutch
have in later years developed a far more intelligent and modern
view-point in respect to the improvement of means of defense, com-
munication, and the like. One of the great evils which they had
to combat was the prevalent piracy of the Malays ; in fact they
were obliged, like the Spanish, to increase their local navy, and, in
particular, to introduce steam-boats (1835), in order to put an end
to this menace of trade. The Spanish efforts against J0I6 (Sulu)
had by 1876 afforded considerable relief to the Dutch, and since
1888 the pirates have been practically suppressed. Moreover, to
aid navigation the Dutch have directed attention to the charting
of sea-ways and the erection of lighthouses ; and by the, lowering
of duties and the establishment of free harbors they have done
commerce a service scarcely inferior. Posts and telegraphs have
been multiplied. The organization of scientific expeditions and
the establishment of many journals and newspapers dealing with
Netherlands-India have all contributed to a better knowledge of
the country and to the extension of scientific information along
various lines. ^
The East Indies other than Java ; the Atjeh War
Apart from Java, which, as the center of activity and interest,
has claimed so large a share of the foregoing, the history of the
Dutch possessions in the nineteenth century is relatively unimpor-
tant. But the narrative returns to them briefly in order to gather
up a few of the aspects of Dutch colonization as exhibited outside
of Java. After the Napoleonic wars practically all the Dutch East
Indies were restored ; but in the exhaustion of the Netherlands
little effort could be expended where it did not return or promise
the maximum of result. Elsewhere than in the region of appHca-
tion of the culture system an ineffective extension of trade and
administration after the eighteenth-century model persisted. In
the perpetuation of the trade-motive there had been but little
interest taken in those regions whose productions did not figure
1 Cf. Encycl. Ned. Ind., arts. "Kaarte," " Kaartebeschriving," " Stoomvaart,"
"Scheepvaart en Handel," "Post en Telegraafdienst," " Rechten (In-, uit- en
doorvoer-)," " Sumatra-E.xpeditie," "Triangulatie," " Tijdschriften," " Vrijhavens,"
" Wegen," " Zeekarten," "Zeemacht," "Zeeroof."
494 COLONIZATION
profitably in the world-market. Thus a good deal of attention had
been accorded the Spice Islands, much to their detriment. The
Dutch never penetrated very deeply into Borneo, Celebes, and the
islands to the eastward, but exercised over their local chiefs a
species of protectorate, exacting a certain tribute in the form
chiefly of contributions in products. Treaties were made from
time to time and formed the basis of a loose relationship between
Dutch and natives. Naturally uprisings were frequent and, though
often brief of duration, cut deeply into the income of the govern-
ment. The most disastrous of these was the war with Atjeh,
which began in 1873 and whose history is a tyj)e on a larger scale
of many of the conflicts that took place in the "Outer Possessions." ^
At all times the Dutch, and the Portuguese before them, had
suffered at the hands of this relatively strong native state. They
had proceeded on the plan of treaties and agreements which the
native princes promptly broke when it seemed to their advantage;
Dutch relations with Atjeh were in many respects, and for similar
reasons, like those of the Spanish with the Moros." Under the
Company, Sumatra was but little regarded, and it was not until
1824 that Van den Bosch developed the idea of reducing the whole
island. This project was realized in but slight degree, but the
faltering efforts put forth did not add to the good feeling of the
natives. When now, with the development of trade, the piratic
propensities of the people of Atjeh had come to be a distinct
menace to all nations alike, it became necessary for the Dutch to
put an end to their depredations unless they wished some other
powers, by doing so, to gain claims to indemnity and so to ter-
ritory. It was plain that the sultan, even if he so desired, was
unable to check his subjects in their deeds of violence ; despite
the treaty of 1857 covering these matters, they continued to prey
upon peaceful traders and to keep up a constant turmoil among
the native adjacent states. It was also clear that there was double-
dealing on the part of the native government ; in 1868, for example,
it tried to yield its allegiance to the sultan of Turkey, and later,
while negotiating with the resident of Riouw over a new treaty, it
was secretly dealing with the agents of foreign powers at Singapore.
In consequence of these and other reasons war broke out with the
sullan in 1873 ; and the Dutch, wlio had miscalculated the strength
' Cf. Vetli, Atchin ; in particular the chapter on the causes of the war (pp. 104 ff.) ;
Encycl. Ned. Ind., arts. "Atjeh," "Sumatra." ■^ Cf. pp. 344-345, above.
LATER PHASES OF DUTCH COLONIZATION 495
of the natives, suffered immediate and costly reverses, which have
been repeated at intervals up to the present day. The effect of
all this upon the Netherlands-India budget has been alluded to ;
war expenditures, chiefly with Atjeh, have been the significant
item for many years. But the Dutch, like so many other colonial
powers, have comforted themselves with the reflection that they
are fighting the battles of civilization and humanity against barbar-
ism and savagery, and continue to spend money and lives with but
slight prospect of securing a decisive and enduring result.
With this sort of thing the student of modern colonization is
sufificiently familiar. The Dutch present other instances on a
smaller scale. ^ In general the history of the Dutch in their " Outer
Possessions " is fragmentary and unessential. It cannot be summed
up except in the statement that it has varied with different locali-
ties ; a description even of administration and regulation must go
into endless detail if it is not to misrepresent.^
In short, the Dutch tropical lands are, like those of other nations,
practically undeveloped ; and that by reason at bottom of the same
deterring element — climate — which has prevented other nations
from such consummation. For, as has been shown, ^ the climatic
conditions draw others in their train which effectually, as yet, check
the activity of the dominant races from attaining in the tropics
anything comparable to its results in the cooler zones. Doubtless
the shortsightedness and selfish preoccupations of the Nether-
landers have cost them much. But even these were natural in their
time ; and the more enlightened policies of other nations have not
brought them appreciably nearer the common goal, namely, the
inclusion of the tropics within the world-market.
1 See Knoop, W. J., " Bijdrage tot de Kennis der Indische Krijgszaken,"Z>^ Gids,
1S49, II, 245 ff.; "Indische Krijgsgeschiedenis," Id., i860, II, 189 ff.; arts. "Bali,"
" Borneo," " Nieuw-Guinea," etc., in Encycl. Ned. Ind. New Guinea is now divided
between Dutch, Germans, and British, in the percentages 48.6, 28.3, and 23.1
respectively.
2 De Louter, pp. 355-366; cf. pp. 220, 433, 477, etc.
3 Cf. pp. 4 ff., above.
CHAPTER XIII
THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS
The colonial history of the Norwegians and Danes, unimportant
though it is from most standpoints, yet possesses, a peculiar inter-
est to one who would understand colonization as the process of
founding new human societies. For here again he has an experi-
ment performed for him, — the old problem set in different terms.
I litherto the colonizing peoples have been prevailingly southern Eu-
ropeans, and their colonizing enterprises have been directed mainly
along their own lines of latitude or toward the south. In the case
of the Scandinavians, however, we have, first, attempts at tropical
colonization on the part of northern Euroi)eans ; and then the
striking case of colonization in polar regions. Therefore, although
historical data be meager and somewhat vague, it is with a peculiar
interest that one turns to the Danish West Indies and to Danish
Iceland and Greenland.
The Danish East India Company
The Danes early entered the competition for the trade of the East,
and a word upon their East India Company may serve to align their
enterprises with those of the peoples whose colonial history has
been sketched. This organization {Dansk-Ostindiske Compagni) was
chartered in 1616, and in 161 8 the India voyage was attempted on
its account. Seafaring folk that they .were, the Danes were not
without some experience even in the remote East ; but as ft)r the
Company, many of its functionaries and servants were Dutch. In
1620 the fort of Dansborg was founded on the Coromandel coast;
in 1625 a rather important station was established in Macassar;
in 1633 a factory in Atjeh. Other stations were located here and
there in the archipelago. The Danish programme was trade pure
and simple ; it included no political aims of any kind. A certain
amount of gain was made, much of it in smuggling and in other
ways detestable to the Dutch East India Comj)any. And since the
Danish Company received at most lukewarm support from home,
496
THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS- 497
it was entirely unable to withstand the pressure of the Dutch.
Thus the Danes were gradually crowded out and by 1682 were
virtually excluded from the archipelago and the East.^ The last
Danish possessions in the East were transferred in 1845 to the
English East India Company. At its dissolution in 1634 the first
Danish Company was just able to pay its debts ; but a second was
organized at once, a third in 1686, and a fourth, with extraordinary
privileges, in 1732. In general, the Danes prospered when stronger
rivals were at war; thus Company shares issued at 500 rose in
1782 to 1800 and 1900, to descend, by 1790, to 420. Both Danes
and Swedes held certain isolated way-stations on the west coast of
Africa, as their predecessors and models had done ; the Danish
forts in this region were sold to England in 1850 for ^50,000.^
THE DANISH WEST INDIES
The operations of the Danes in the eastern tropics were thus in-
cidental and short-lived, never advancing far toward the deserving
of the name colonization. In the West Indies, however, they did
create a miniature "empire," which they hold at the present time.
And because of the fact that, though it is a miniature empire, it
yet reflects in perhaps the more striking" simplicity some of the
fundamental phases of tropical colonization, and because, likewise,
its history is especially difficult of access, the present treatment
enters into somewhat more of detail than is usual, and allots a dis-
proportionate amount of space to a relatively insignificant subject.^
There was no pressing reason for Denmark's colonial activity in
the seventeenth century. No overplus of population or capital de-
manded new fields into which to expand ; no religious or political
strifes existed in the home-land, to create a body of exiles to foreign
parts. Commerce was not such as to rec[uire new regions of supply
1 0verland, IV, 786 ff., 800 ff. ; also sub " Ostindien" in indexes ; art. " De Denen
in den Maleischen Archipel," in Encycl. Ned. Ind. ; p. 418, above.
2 Keltie, pp. 68, 77 ; cf. also Lind.say, I, 345-347, on the shipping of the Danes.
A Swedish company formed in this period (cf. p. 411, above) was dissolved in 1671
with a considerable deficit. Roscher, p. 278; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 182-1S4.
The most recent book upon the Danes in the East — inaccessible to the author
at the time of writing — is that of Larsen.
■'' The following matter on the Danish West Indies is from an article by the author,
entitled " Notes on the Danish West Indies." This study has been checked and supple-
mented by an examination of an unpublished (Yale) thesis of Dr. H. J. Thorstenberg,
and of the treatise of Knox. The bibliography of the original article, with some addi-
tions, will be found in the general bibliography. Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 182-185.
498 • COLONIZATION
and demand. The acquisition of the islands St. Thomas and St.
John, and later, St. Croi.x, was due very largely to a desire to imi-
tate the activities of Holland and England, and to reap, if possible,
the direct and indirect results of such a policy. The movement is
an artificial one, therefore, at the very outset ; as far as Danish
trade with the tropics was concerned, it could hope for little ad-
vance of jM-ofit under the new conditions.
St. Croix, the largest of the islands, was occupied by the Danes
in 1733 ; already it had been successively in Dutch, English, Span-
ish, and French hands. Under Colbert a company, invested with
the usual trade-monopol)', was formed, which, however, had been
compelled to turn to the king for aid ; and the island had been
deserted (1695) by the 147 whites and 623 slaves who had in-
habited it. For thirty-eight years it had been neglected and mas-
terless. St. Thomas, the second in size of the Danish islands, was
seized in 1667 by the English, and its few Dutch colonists were
forced to depart ; e.xcept for the visits of pirates, the island was
then deserted until 167 1. In that year there was formed the Dansk
Guineisk-Vestindiske Compagni, under whose auspices St. Thomas
was at once occupied by the Danes, in spite of England's protest.
This Danish Company was managed by six directors, who were
required to invest two thousand rigsdaler ^ in the enterprise ; shares
were sold at one hundred rigsdaler. The first governor, Iversen,
reached the island in 1672. His earliest proclamation dealt, in its
first articles, with religious matters: fines were fixed for non-
attendance at divine service, for Sunday labor, and the like. There
follow strict prescriptions as to drill and use of arms in defense. All
persons were forbidden to leave the island, or take anything away
from the island without the governor's permission. Heavy fines ^
were to be exacted for attempts to entice away another's indentured
servants, i.e. whites who had sold their liberty for passage. Negroes
were not allowed to leave a plantation after dark ; if a strange
negro was found on a plantation at night, he was to be arrested,
taken to the fort, and punished. Other injunctions calculated to
insure internal cohesion and order, and an efficient defense, were
published. The necessity of such defense was made apparent by
the robberies of the Spanish from Puerto Rico, and by the pres-
ence of French and English buccaneers on the island of Tortuga.
1 The specie rigsdaler was worth, at the end of the seventeenth century, about
J^i.02. It rose a few cents in value during the ensuing period and was worth, in 1844,
$\.\\. 2 All fines were payable in tobacco, the natural currency of the colony.
THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS 499
Early Conditions : the West India Company
To tlic Danes, now in possession of their tropical islands, the
familiar difficulty of tropical colonization — lack of an adequate
labor su]ii)ly — began to make itself felt as early as 1679. Com-
plaint was made to King Christian V, who promptly established
slave-stations on the Gold Coast, and under pressure increased the
number of shareholders of the Company in Copenhagen ; a tax was
levied on coaches, for example, when the owners could not show
certificates of participation to a certain figure in the Company. Natu-
rally enough, the importation of slaves into the islands increased
perceptibly and with it the prosperity of the plantations. The
slaves came, however, of restless and unruly stocks, and in an ex-
ceptionally short time the Danish islanders are found to be in terror
of revolts and deeds of violence ; laws were enacted which could
not have been enforced, else all the slaves would have perished
by the halter. The evil, because of the essential weakness of the
Danish Company, was not at this time of such proportions as it
later displayed. Possessing meager capital, the Company could
send but one ship a year to the African coast ; this vessel trans-
ported slaves to St. Thomas and then loaded with colonial wares
for Denmark. For the purpose of increasing trade and also to en-
courage the settlement of the colony, a thirty-year treaty was con-
cluded with the duchy of Brandenburg, in accordance with which
a trading-company of Germans, most of whose shares, however,
were in Dutch hands, was to undertake settlement. The immediate
result of this movement was the appearance of fifty workmen in
the islands and of five ships, sailing on the Company's account. This
company suffered much from French pirates shortly after its erec-
tion, but made such large gains as to excite the envy of the Danes,
to whom small consideration was shown. Its privilege ran out in
171 5 and was not renewed ; members of the Company who desired
to stay were required to take the oath of allegiance.
After the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) the islands
were fortunate enough to receive as settlers a number of Hugue-
not fugitives from St. Christopher ; these were noted, as usual,
for frugality, industry, and fear of God. In general during all this
period efforts were being made to attract a larger immigration ;
at one time young unmarried women were forbidden to leave the
colony without special permission. A number of privileges were
500 COLONIZATION
guaranteed to settlers, including religious tolerance, freedom from
taxes for eight years, grants of as much land as could be put under
cultivation, needed aid in agriculture, etc. Imported and exported
products were. to be free of customs for eight years. The policy was
liberal and the results were good; in 1688 St. Thomas numbered
ninety plantations, with 317 whites and 422 slaves. To show the
ethnic mixture in the population, it may be mentioned that of the
white families, nineteen were Danish, sixty-three Dutch, thirty
English, seventeen French, three Swedish, two German, and one
Portuguese ; this diversification was maintained into the nineteenth
century, and was plainly evident to an observer in the forties.^
Many local names on the island recall to mind the varied nationality
of its early settlers.
The monopolistic trading Company, as time went on, did not
fail to prove its kinship with its prototypes ; it ran the usual course
of inglorious inefficiency. In 1692, as a relief measure, the island
of St. Thomas was leased to a merchant, Thormohlen by name,
for ten years ; the lessee was to maintain a garrison and was to have
full control of all the island's affairs and income. The character-
istic independence of the colonial society was here witnessed, for
the colonists resolutely refused to pay taxes to Thormohlen, whose
activity was not prolonged beyond the original period of lease.
After the disappearance of this adventurer, the Company led a
humdrum existence for some years. In 1736 it was found that,
to keep itself above water, it had in the matter of trade consist-
ently favored the Dutch and excluded its own countrymen ; eight
Dutch ships were engaged in the trade to one Danish. A counter-
movement of merchants in Copenhagen succeeded in forcing an
entrance into the West India Company and the Dutch were in
turn excluded. But the Company was nearing its end. The burdens
which its manipulations had laid upon the colonists were intoler-
able, and frequent complaints were lodged with the king. The
Company had secured a thorough-going monopoly of raw sugar
in Denmark and, by opening a refinery there, virtually commanded
the market ; prices were driven very high and sugar became a
luxury no longer in common use. The shortsightedness and greed
of this policy impressed themselves upon the government and in
1755 King Frederik V bought out the Company's entire jilant,
including the islands, the ecjuipment, and the Copenhagen refinery.
^ iMindringt-r, otc., \^. 150.
THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS 501
The price paid (1,418,000 rigsdaler) was entirely incf)mmensurate
with the good effects that appeared at once, and with the general
gratitude of the oppressed colonists.
Purchase by the King
One of the chief causes of rejoicing to the planters was the
removal of the restrictions laid by the Company on the importation
of slaves. Slaves were a necessary evil, and one with which the
colonists played as with fire. Early in the eighteenth century and
before, precautions had regularly to be taken regarding runaways
and fear of uprisings was constantly displayed. All the boats, for
instance, were drawn up at night under the guns of the fort. The
Spanish of Puerto Rico enticed the runaways and hypocritically
explained, in answer to complaint, that the slaves had come " to be
baptized." The fear of the blacks had grown until the colonists
had become panicky, and consequently needlessly cruel and arbi-
trary. In 1733 an edict appeared which betrayed this terror;
such punishments as branding, loss of limbs, hanging, and break-
ing on the wheel were threatened for what appear to us to be com-
paratively trivial offenses. By this cruelty an uprising was brought
about late in 1733 on the island of St. John, for the suppression
of which it was found necessary to call in the French from Mar-
tinique. The desperation of the negroes is shown by the fact that
they preferred death to capture ; a body of three hundred, finally
shut in and sure to be taken, deliberately shot each other, so that
the victors found their dead bodies lying in a circle about their
last camp. The suppression of this revolution cost 7900 rigsdaler,
besides costly gifts to the French officers. But the St. John
planters refused to bear a share in the expense, asserting, among
other things, that the fort was poorly prepared for resistance.
When the king had taken over the powers of the Company and
slaves began to come in with greater rapidity, the native question
became still more threatening. Partially in consequence of this the
slave-trade was declared illegal (1792). Thus the Danes became
the forerunners of the great philanthropic movement of the early
nineteenth century ; the slave-trade went on, none the less, with
the connivance of the authorities, for half a century.^ Finally, on
1 After 1792 slaves were continually imported, and premiums were paid for strong
and healthy ones. Burt, En Stemme, etc.
502 COLONIZATION
the queen's birthday, June 28, 1847, '^'l children born of slaves
were declared to be free ; the whole slave system was to be abol-
ished in twelve years. But this move failed to win the confidence
of the slaves, who were suspicious of the twelve-year term. Indi-
cations of a conspiracy appeared in 1848 and an incipient and
dangerous revolt in St. Croix, in July of that year, encouraged by
English sailors, forced an immediate emancipation; 1892 whites
were opposed to 22,000 negroes in desperate mood, who carried
the English flag as a symbol of freedom.
Administration ; Social Conditions
We have here, then, with unimportant variations, the stock
history of tropical labor up to emancipation ; the measures that
followed were likewise of a familiar general type. Contracts for
paid labor were to date from October i of each year, and would
be renewed only at that time ; notice of such intention was to be
given in August. No discharge was to be without ground, and no
strikes were to be allowed ; work was to last from sunrise till sun-
set, as a rule, and for only five days in the week, liberal allowance
of time for meals (three hours) being granted. The laborer was
given a small plot of ground and was to be paid per day fifteen,
ten, or five cents according as he belonged to the first, second, or
third grade of workmen. Extra labor during harvest was to be
compensated, and no one was to be forced to work on Saturday ;
a maximum wage of twenty, thirteen, or seven cents was to be
paid for voluntary Saturday labor. Fines, levied in labor, for
absence and tardiness, were designed to oppose the tendency to
vagabondage. Women were to be excused from work for seven
weeks after confinement. Other provisions dealt with the treat-
ment of the sick and weak, and with the punishment of those who
incited a stoppage of labor. Certainly these St. Croix provisions
were mild ones as they appear on the statute books. It is likely
that they represent the actual treatment of the freedmen with
approximate correctness. The conditions of forced labor of all
kinds have been regularly harder on islands than upon the main-
land where escape was easier ; but, inasmuch as the position of the
Danish islands favored evasion, it is likely that the planters, priz-
ing their comparatively few laborers higher, took pains to retain
them. The absence of the coolie system is scarcely remarkable,
THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS 503
when one realizes the poverty of Denmark and the generally dis-
couraging attitude of the British, Dutch, and Chinese governments
toward this form of semi-slavery.
In spite of the laws, vagabondage, and with it crime, increased
notably, especially in the towns of St. Thomas. In the country,
master and former slave often worked side by side, winning a pre-
carious existence under a somewhat disjointed system. For a long
time no indemnity to former slave-owners was granted, owing to
embarrassments of the home-country during the Slesvig-Holstein
war.i In 1855 the working classes of St. Thomas were earning
from five to twenty dollars per month. Many of them were great
bunglers ; few felt much obligation or displayed much fidelity to
their masters. The regular effects of emancipation upon the char-
actor of the negro did not fail to appear ; work was felt to be
lowering ; the negroes held the conviction that to be a " gentle-
man " one must command others and exact obedience. Domestic
tyranny and cruelty resulted when this wish could not be grati-
fied otherwise. Shameless begging was preferred to labor, and
no attempt was made to provide for old age ; alms of less than a
dollar were regarded as petty, and the donor was despised. Aid
was asked by able-bodied men as a matter of course. Vanity was
a characteristic all too common ; servants would not appear on
errands until time had been taken to append to the person all the
finery the individual in question possessed. Marriage was most lax,
among the higher as well as the lower classes, and three-quarters
of the children born on the island were illegitimate. The sentiment
1 Under date of August 24, 1852, we have a letter of considerable interest, written
by a St. Croix planter to the Danish Parliament (J. H. Burt, Jr., En Stemme, etc.).
The author, after recalling the prosperity of the islands during the European wars,
states that they are now struggling for existence : labor is insecure, insufficient, and
costly ; production is declining, and prices are low. He regards the labor regulations
mentioned above as wise and beneficial, but explains that the planters could not
have carried out the provisions demanded of them unless the labor supply had been
made steady and secure. The main contention of the letter is that the Danish
government should not so far prove false to its honor as to refuse indemnification to
slave-owners after emancipation. The planters had been to considerable expense in
the erection of schools, etc., for the betterment of the negroes, and yet it was pro-
posed by some that they should in addition bear the entire amount of the loss inci-
dent to the freeing of the slaves. Any distinction between Danish and foreign
planters in the matter of indemnification, such as seems to have been proposed, was
doubly dishonorable. Other grievances of the colonies are touched upon, the letter
concluding with the following paragraph : " A just indemnification, a sufficient immi-
gration of free labor, an influential Colonialraad, and a strong government av^ the
fundamental points upon which the future well-being of the colonists rests."
504 COLONIZATION
of the Danes seems to have been decidedly against formal mar-
riages with blacks or mulattoes.^
The government of the islands after the fall of the Company
appears to have been of a careful and reasonable type. Desire
for an expansion of territorial possessions and a wish to aid the
Company had led Christian VI to purchase St. Croix (1733) from
the French. The price paid was 750,000 livres.^ The miserable
administration of the Company on this island conspired with the
rest to bring about the purchase of its rights by Frederik V. In
the negro troubles that followed, the government seems to have
displayed clemency and thereby to have saved itself much expense
and its island-citizens much loss of life and property. Complaints
were not lacking, however, and the government became passive,
rather than active, in later times. No successful effort was made
to further education in the colonies, nor to establish adequate sea-
connections. The school-fund was used up in St. Croix, and Sun-
day schools, maintained by private persons, formed almost the sole
educational agency in the other two islands. Postal arrangements
were particularly inadequate ; letters were left at the nearest store
and often lay there for long periods, until the recipient happened
to be apprised of their presence. Many were lost ; how letters
from North America, coming always via Havana, managed to
reach their destination has remained something of a mystery to
the islanders themselves. Other details of administration were
better managed. Tolls, harbor dues, etc., seem rarely to have been
excessive under the royal government. The first Colonialraad
was formed in 1852, under the governor as presiding officer. Its
members were twenty in number, four from the king's selection
and sixteen elective in the islands. Municipal affairs were in the
hands of a council of five citizens, who received no remuneration
save honor, and were not responsible to any one ; they were regu-
larly selected from the best men of the islands and seem to have
served with fidelity and economy, although they held no open
session, but simjjly submitted an annual report. The governor
received under the Company a very small salary, but his position
carried with it, of course, a number of fees and perquisites. In
spite of economy, however, the royal budget of the islands shows
for 1850-185 I a deficit of $48, 662. ^
1 Krindringer, etc., pp. 1 14 ff. ^ xhe livre of Uie period was worth .iboiit 19.^ cents.
3 p'yr njodern administrative and fiscal conditions, see Tooke.
THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS 505
The climate of these islands is well known. Its baleful effect
upon the morals, and so the health, of the Danish cf)lonists, was
pronounced. Intemperance of all kinds was prevalent, and gam-
bling for high stakes aided in the general demoralization. Of the
diseases noted by the Danes, malaria, yellow-fever, influenza, and
small-pox were the most serious, fatalities occurring chiefly among
the lower classes of the population. Tables of mortality for the
years 183 5-1 8 50 inclusive show an average yearly death-rate of
about 38 per thousand, or 416 in an average population of 1 1,000.
Earthquakes are frequent, though hitherto harmless ; but hurricanes
are prevalent (127 in the 352 years from 1494 to 1846), and very
destructive ; the islands are in the direct track of these storms.
Trade-Conditions
The trade-history of St. Thomas, which stands as a fair type for
the other colonies, exhibits certain characteristics incident to its
geographical location and political history. It is to be noted, first
of all, that the harbor of St. Thomas formed an admirable haven,
entirely adapted to the safe concealment that was so often a desid-
eratum in the days of privateering and contraband traffic. This
harbor was situated at the cross-ways of the trade-routes of that
day. To these natural advantages were added others of a political
nature : an almost constant neutrality and a free-haven status.
The abbe Labat, writing in 1701, notices these favorable conditions,
and states that the Danes derived great profits from the constant
European wars, as prizes of both sides, and of freebooters, were
brought in to be sold ; the island also enjoyed benefits from the
silver-trade with South America. St. Thomas was, in a word, a
West Indian market-place of the first rank. The production of the
island, with its light soil, was small, and prices were regularly
high ; but on the other hand, acquisition of wealth was easy and
many resident foreigners had already grown rich. Though St.
Thomas's harbor was declared a free haven for the first time in
1724, it had been so in reality for years.
The Company's influence upon the island's prosperity has been
noted ; an indirect evil result was seen, when, at the demise of this
organization, Danish merchants were for some years too timid to
seize upon the palpable advantages of the trade ; during 1756 not
one Danish ship entered the harbor. In fact, a number of mer-
chants left the island, and circulating currency became so scarce as
5o6 COLONIZATION
to lead to an issue of paper money for which the authorities were
responsible. Depopulation was so much feared that a law was pub-
lished according to which any one who left the island must surren-
der to the government 2~ per cent of his income and real ])roperty.
In 1773 St. Thomas had 39 sugar and 43 cotton plantations, and
4233 inhabitants ; of these 265 whites, 336 colored, and 1067 slaves
lived in the town. St. John boasted 104 whites and 2330 slaves.
Expenses slightly exceeded income; from 1755 to 1792 trade
amounted to little. In 1 792, however, a great change occurred, coin-
cidently with European w^ars ; trade rose to unhoped-for heights, and
between 1792 and 1801, 1569 foreigners were naturalized in the
island. A number of fugitives likewise came from San Uomingo,
and at the end of the century the population numbered about 7000.
But between 1801 and 18 15 the advantageous neutrality of the
Danes w-as broken by forces which they could not control ; from
April, 1801, to February, 1802, St. Thomas was in British hands,
and though trade revived again promptly after the restitution, a
second violent break came in 1807. The Danes having refused
England's proffered defensive alliance, the islands were seized and
held until 181 5. That some, at least, of the Danes valued their pos-
sessions highly in 1801 is shown by contemporary authority; ^ the
feeling against England was exceedingly bitter. During the English
occupation, English merchantmen alone were to be seen in the har-
bor and trade was very small. American products Were diverted and
passed over St. Bartholomew,^ which at this time enjoyed an ephem-
eral importance ; St. Thomas retained the direct trade of British
North America alone.
Decline of the Islands
After 181 5 events again conspired to render St. Thomas prosper-
ous. During the wars of emancipation of the Spanish continental
1 Werfel, for example. Oxholm gives considerable detail as to the condition of
the islands at the end of the eighteenth century. Mis book is an answer to certain
" Breve fra St. Croix" containing articles upon the management of the islands.
2 This diminutive island was the one venture of Sweden in tropical colonization.
Cf. Euphrasen and Dahlman for some details of its conditions and history. The
latter author is hopeful that the Swedish island may yet emulate the at his time
enviable position of St. Thomas. For "The Swedish Legend in (niiana," see Edmund-
son under that title. There were some Swedish stations on the west coast of Africa,
and several Swedish settlements in Delaware and New Jersey. The latter were taken
by the Dutch in 1655, the African stations declined, and St. Bartholomew was ceded
back to France in 1878. See Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 182-185.
THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS 507
colonies, many native Spaniards emigrated to the island, and the
harbor was a resort of freebooters flying the flags of Buenos
Ayres and Colombia; the year 1824 has been regarded by some
as the culminating pojnt of St. Thomas's prosperity. But the con-
ditions which created this status were short-lived. The evil day
was delayed for some years by the opportunities afforded for trade
with the neighboring Puerto Rico and for the financing of its early
development ; many sugar-raisers in Puerto Rico could not have
begun or prosecuted their industry without the credit afforded
from St. Thomas. But as soon as this aid was no longer indispen-
sable it was rudely put aside by the levying of heavy import-dues
against the Danish island, and otherwise. In 1855 imports to
St. Thomas (half from Europe and half from America) were valued
at $5,000,000; St. Thomas merchants still continued to finance
Puerto Rico to some extent, but the Danish island was evidently
and surely on the decline. Denmark has been willing to part with
her colonial possessions for a sufficient consideration several times
since the middle of the nineteenth century ; later years have wit-
nessed no revival of trade. And this appears only natural when
one reflects on the conditions which lent the former prosperity.
The rise of modern transportation facilities, and the substantial
peace of the world, implying as they do the passing of the narrower
system of the former centuries, render a free, neutral harbor, and
even a harbor of such central position as that of St. Thomas, of
comparatively less importance. Way-stations and hiding-places are
less in demand. Even the piercing of a waterway between the
continents does not promise much for the future of these islands.
As the city of small harbors has given way to the port like New
York, which possesses, virtually, no harbor in the old sense of the
term, so the small and local way-station has fallen away in a com-
merce on a grand scale in world-wide markets. True colonization
in the West Indies was clearly beyond the strength of Denmark,
as it was beyond the strength of the Portuguese in India. The
mother-country was too remote and too small, the competition of
greater peoples was too strong. A decision to part with the islands
would seem to be the conclusion of wisdom, and considerations of
national pride alone can oppose it.
This exceptional experiment in tropical colonization by a Scan-
dinavian people runs, therefore, through most of the characteristic
phases to which the student of colonies is used. In so far, it goes
5o8 COLONIZATION
to show that the general course of events has followed the order of
a natural and inevitable evolution. No particular virtue in avoiding
stock errors, nor vice in committing peculiar and unusual mistakes
is to be found in the Danes above other nations ; economic evolu-
tion runs its course for them all alike, and they submit, each in
his own way, to inevitable conditions and movements. In isolated
cases, such as that of the Danes, though the local setting of the
experiment is of curious rather than of vital interest, essential
economic and political truths are not unlikely to emerge with
especial simplicity and dcfiniteness.
POLAR COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS
The history of the Danish colonies of Iceland and Greenland
affords what is in some respects a distinct anomaly in colonization ;
and so, though of little practical importance, these dependencies
may deserve some notice. Colonization toward the far north is an
unprecedented enterprise and its annals cast a certain side-light
upon the general process of the movement and re -formation of
human societies.
Population and Life-Conditions of Iceland
Strictly speaking, the first settlement of Iceland ^ was the result
of emigration rather than of colonization. Discovered toward the
end of the eighth century, about seventy years passed before it
began to receive attention on the part of the Norse (860-870 a.d.);
but within the subsequent si.xty years, in consequence of a mass-
emigration of political malcontents, the island had its full quota of
population, that is, all that it could support upon that stage of the
arts of life. This settlement was due largely to the movement
toward state-integration in Norway by which losing factions were
forced into exile ; the settlers were prevailingly Norwegians. But
owing to the very exigencies of the situation the emigrants recog-
nized no bond of dependency, and, because of the natural isolation
of Iceland, imposition of rule was all but impossible. Hence a
rude and hardy race, schooled to courage and independence by the
severity of the struggle for existence, at home as well as in the new
land, took its fate into its own hands and formed a republic which
^ On ancient Iceland the authorities here used are Maurer and Sars ; for more
modern conditions they are Otte and 0verland (passages referred to under " Island"
in the indexes).
THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS 509
remained independent up to the year 1262. During the early part
of this period the Norwegian kings had made several ineffectual
attempts to persuade the Icelanders to acknowledge their sway ;
their purpose was resisted, but, by setting leader against leader,
and through the partisanship of the clergy, they had gradually
gained an ever greater influence. The internal government of the
island was by the end of the thirteenth century in a state of de-
moralization, and the various districts yielded one by one until,
between 1262 and 1264, a general fealty was sworn to the Norwe-
gian King Haakon. 1
It does not fall within the scope of the present book to describe
the organization of the republic which the Icelanders created out
of the confusion of their beginnings ; ^ it is enough to say that the
type of the society was Norse and that political coalescence with
the land of origin was in the order of events. " Such a conformity
cannot have been a chance one ; it goes to show that the two
societies, of which the one proceeded out of the other, . . . con-
tinued to belong together ; that their public life was nurtured from
the same source, and rested essentially upon the same foundation ;
that antitheses between republican Iceland and monarchical Nor-
way were more seeming than real ; and that the aristocracy of
birth . . . continued to be, in later times as well as in earlier, in
Norway as in Iceland, the actual support of the life of the state
and society." ^ Here then we have in Norway a metropolis which
has attained the political integration and the influence necessary
to take to itself independent settlements of its own emigrants. Ice-
land was now a true Norwegian colony, and it so remained until
1380 ; thereafter it became a Danish possession and was destined
so to remain when Norway had become united with Sweden and
finally had attained independence.^
The interest of the student of colonization leads him to con-
sider first of all the life-conditions of such a colony and to seek the
1 Cf Overland, III, 421 ff.
2 Details of the organization of the republic and its decline are to be found in
Maurer and in Sars, I, chap. vii.
3 Sars, I, 196. "The colonial character of the Icelandic society — the whole un-
broken spiritual cohesion in which it remained with the rest of the Norwegians —
appears most clearly in the way in which Icelanders write Norway's history. For it
is seen that they never regard her history otherwise than as their own, that they have
conceived the whole in the same manner as do all other Norwegians, and have fully
shared the sentiments and opinions that prevail in Norway." Sars, II, 325.
* Sars, II, chap. vi. Danish rule was rather easily established. 0verland, IV, 440.
^lo COLONIZATION
motives which lay behind the policy of the mother-country toward
it. The population of Iceland was small in earlier times and has
so remained ; as late as 1870 its 40,000 square miles supported not
quite 70,000 souls ; and in 1890 there were but a thousand more.
The island is one-quarter desert and only a third of it can support
sheep even in the summer ; two-fifths arc of better quality, but the
cultivation of even the hardiest grains is precarious ; all bread-
stuffs are still imported. ^ In 1853, a year nearly normal, there
were in Iceland 23,663 horned cattle', 40,485 horses, and 516,853
sheep. Fishing is one of the most profitable occupations ; in 1853
the islanders owned 3506 boats. Other food-supply than flesh and
fish is of a primitive character ; the eggs of sea-birds may be mcn-
tioned.2 jhe isolation of the country militates against trade : com-
munication has been of so faulty a character that the shortest and
cheapest route between certain parts of the island has been via
Copenhagen ; in the favorable season sailing-vessels take six to
eight weeks to reach Iceland, and in winter it is practically cut
off from the world.^
Evidently the Norwegian colonists were an industrious people,
and chiefly sheep-raisers, desiring above all, from the government
to which they had sworn allegiance, conditions of peace and order.
In type the settlements represented the "farm colony"; * there were
no precious metals, no native-question, no large staple products;
the emigrants were of both sexes and in general had come to found
homes ; in the absence of natives the society fostered no half-breed
stock. Naturally, however, environing conditions precluded any
development of numbers ; hardships had their inevitable effect in
keeping down the standard of living ; and other local factors con-
spired to render the society but a feeble representative of the flour-
ishing farm colony. Indeed, the absence of agriculture itself makes
the term " farm colony," except as it connotes a type of social
organization, a misnomer. There has been a possibility of but
little favorable change in the economic life of Iceland up to the
1 Otte (p. 203) says nine-tenths of Iceland are unfit for human habitation.
2 Maurer, pp. i-i i, 16-19 ; Otte, pp. 203 ff. The Statesman's Year-Book (for 1906 ;
sub " Denmark ") gives the proportion of the population in 1S50 which was depend-
ent upon cattle-raising and fishing as 82 per cent and 17 per cent respectively; in
1890 these had changed to 64 jier cent and 18 per cent.
" The death of Frederik VII (November 15, 1863) was reported in Iceland upon
April 4, 1864; meanwhile the late king's island-subjects had been praying all winter
in orthodo.x fashion for his health. Maurer, p. t,2>-
* Cf. pp. 4 ff., above; 0verland, III, 504.
THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS 511
present time ; indeed, there has been in several periods a distinct
retrogression. Iceland has been frequently visited by famines and
pestilences, those scourges of a population pressing overhard upon
land ; and volcanic outbursts followed by copious lava-flows have
destroyed large sections of habitable country. In 1786 the deser-
tion of the island was seriously considered.^ Few resources have
been added to elevate the standard of living. The salting of meat
and of salmon has provided some extra employment and gain, and
certain sulphur-deposits have been worked. The latter, however,
were leased to an English company in 1872 for fifty years. Since
the early seventies there has been a relatively large emigration from
Iceland to Canada, especially to the province of Manitoba ; mean-
while the population (1901) had increased to nearly 78,500, a con-
junction of facts calculated to show the society able to more than
reproduce itself.
Government
When Iceland came under Norwegian rule there was made a pro-
viso — -whose terms bespeak the severity of life-conditions — that
the new king should send at least six ships every year with meal and
like necessities. It was partly by reason of this condition that the
later Norwegian rulers, and, after the personal union with Den-
mark (Kalmar-union,^ I397), the Danish sovereigns, came to regard
the trade with Iceland as their own prerogative and sold or leased
it at will. Until the fourteenth century the trade of the island
had been in the hands of the Icelanders and Norse ; during the
fifteenth the English and during the sixteenth the Hanseatics had
secured a large proportion of it. But it had been subject to little
restriction, and the royal monopoly came gradually to press hard
upon the struggling islanders.
To follow the history of Iceland during the centuries of its sub-
jection to Norway and Denmark is a rather profitless task. Nor-
wegian rule seems to have brought a period of decline which
is not all referable to plagues and other such calamities.^ The
impression gained from reading scattered notices of Iceland in
^ In 1783 occurred an eruption of the Skaptar Jokull, which over%vhelmed plains
and inhabited villages and caused the death of 9500 out of 50,000 inhabitants. Barney,
p. 38, note. The second eruption of the same volcano, in 1873, ^^'^^ ^"^ °^ ^^^ prin-
cipal causes for the ensuing emigration. 2 Sars, III, chap. ii.
^ 0verland, III, 716 ff. For a list of plagues, volcanic eruptions, etc., between 1284
and 1390, see id., p. 507.
5 1 2 COLONIZATION
histories of Norway is that the island was treated with indifference
except in so far as it might provide a small increment to the royal
revenues. Later times have seen the development of a more liberal
policy; in 1854 the trade-monopoly was renounced and commerce
was made free. In 1874 Iceland was restored to virtual inde-
pendence and remains locally republican in its government, though
nominally ruled by the king in conjunction with a legislative as-
sembly. It is designated as an inalienable part of the Danish
monarchy and its legal system is mainly Danish. The Icelanders
have endured much from their rulers in the past, but have insisted
upon their rights with the characteristic steadiness and firmness,
yet with the same remarkable self-restraint exhibited by the Scan-
dinavian peoples on the occasion of the recent separation of Nor-
way and Sweden. Iceland is civilly and nationally independent in
all but form, and constitutes a strong if small society, singularly
free from crime and intensely attached to its inhospitable island-
home. The religion has been of the reformed type since the early
part of the sixteenth century. ^ Denmark gets no gain from her
Norwegian-founded colony : the average annual revenue is 200,000
kroner and the expenditure 188,000; in the former item was reck-
oned for many years a Danish subsidy of 60,000 kroner. Imports
for 1904 were valued at 2,466,000 kroner and exports at 3,417,000.
It would be an evidence of narrow interest on the part of any
narrator of Icelandic affairs to neglect to mention the astonishing
intellectual and especially literary productiveness of these northern
islanders. An antique tongue has been safeguarded by them and
they have originated or preserved ancient sagas that are a heritage of
the race. They are more Norse than the Norse. In modern times
they have furnished their full share of men superior in learning and
otherwise. Taking into consideration the drawbacks of environment
and the necessary depression of the standard of living, Iceland's
contribution to the world ranks with the most notable.
COI.ONIZATION AND LiFE-CONDlTIONS OF GREENLAND
Greenland '^ presents another instance of polar colonization by the
Norwegians whose fruits, such as they are, have fallen to the Danes.
1 For the Reformation in Iceland, cf. 0verland, IV, 422 ff.
2 The chief authority for the history of (Greenland is Kink. Some use has lieen
made of Crantz, Gravier, Peyr^re, Wilhelmi, Olte, and 0verland (references si/f>
•'Gr0nland" in indexes). For more modern conditions Nansen has been followed.
THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS 513
The only striking point of difference between the case of Greenland
and that of Iceland is that in the former colony there have existed
conditions of race-contact and mixture. The discovery of Green-
land goes back probably into the eighth century, and was made from
Iceland, according to old chronicles, by Eric the Red ; it then served
as an intermediary station for the attainment of America. Chris-
tianity was introduced about the year 1000 and in 1023 the coun-
try was tributary to Norway; an attempt at revolt (1256) led to
its full subjection with the aid of the Danish king, in 1261. After
this time but Httle attention seems to have been accorded to Green-
land, and concern in Europe over the ravages of the Black Death
(i 347-1 351) reduced that little to nothing ; decades of virtual obliv-
ion followed. It was only with the discoveries of Columbus that
interest was reawakened in possible lands or passages toward the
west. Succeeding Frobisher (1578) and Davis (1585), the Danes
— for Norway was now under Danish rule — made some ineffectual
attempts to reach the old settlements ; a Greenland Company was
formed in 1636 and dispatched vessels. But what little hold the
Norwegians had possessed was now lost : the Eskimo, and even
Atlantic pirates, had done their share to effect general ruin.^ And
it appears that during the long period of neglect the royal power,
jealous of even its well-nigh valueless monopoly of the Greenland
trade in oil, ivory, and furs, had prohibited the approach of private
adventurers to the region.^
The re-colonization of Greenland took place largely as a result
of the activities of a clergyman, Egede, who had been for years
agitated over the fate of the Norwegians and their descendants
left in the old settlements. In 1721 Frederik IV was led to
found Godthaab (Good Hope) and Egede began his religious
labors in Greenland. Since that time the natives have had Chris-
tianity preached to them, often not wisely but too well; in 1733
the Moravian Brothers took up Egede's work.^
1 Nansen (pp. 1 1-12) does not believe that the Eskimo waged a war of annihilation
against the early settlers.
2 " All these details are confused and contradictory. But there emerges, never-
theless, one fact : the pirates made common cause with the cold, the Eskimo, the
pest, and the lawyers of Margaret [of Denmark] in ruining the colonies founded by
the Scandinavians on the coasts of America and of Greenland." Gravier, p. 223.
Cf. Rink, pp. 20 ff., 29 ff.
3 Crantz's book is mainly a chronicle of the Moravians' religious work. From the
time he reaches this topic (I, 315) his book loses all interest for the scientist or his-
torian. The missionaries spent a deal of misdirected 2eal in " correcting " native
514 COLONIZATION
The life-conditions in Greenland are an extreme variation upon
the Icelandic type ; even the hardy vegetables fail to thrive, and
the dog is the only domestic animal of any value. ^ Europeans are
interested only in trade or in the mission ; the former yields a
"trifling but sure profit." Under the royal monopoly, dating
from 1774, prices have been fixed, the Danes paying to the
Greenlanders about 22 per cent of the value of their products
(train-oil, whale-bone, pelts, etc.) in the European market ; it is
said that the gain on goods sold to the Eskimo is not exorbitant,
reaching only 20 per cent as a maximum. Erom 1870 to 1874 the
mean annual value of products received from Greenland was about
$228,000 ; that of cargoes destined for Greenland, about $120,000.
The representatives of Denmark are mainly factors whose duty lies
in the drumming-up of trade; there were in 1877 eleven agents
and eighteen clerks. The net revenue of the Greenland trade for
the period 1853-1874 was about $705,000, the cryolite tax for the
same years amounting to $295,000. "The whole amount of net
revenues from the present Trade during the period from 1790 to
1875, the interest of the capital as well as the income from the
cryolite being subtracted, has been estimated at about 160,000 1." ^
Race-Contact
There have never been many Scandinavians in Greenland. In
early times some criminals were deported there, and later orphan
boys were sent out to become teachers or to recruit the inferior
clergy. But as late as 1881 there were only 200 Danes among a
native population of some 10,000; in 1870 there were 237 Euro-
peans, of whom 95 were traders, 19 missionaries, and 38 employed
in the cryolite mines. Until the time of the missions there were
practically no white women in Greenland, and there have been
very few since ; thus Greenland has never become a settlement-
colony like Iceland. In fact, the p()i)ulation-conditions more closely
habits which really represented a natural adaptation to the local environment ; they
tried, for instance, to render the Eskimo sedentary and to force them to wear cloth-
ing in their ii^loos or huts. They ruthlessly annihilated the often harmless or even
beneficent influence and the respectability of the aii,::^(ikoks or medicine-men. Cf.
Rink and Nansen, /r/j.f/w, and Rink, p. 143.
1 There were in Greenland, in 1855, 30 to 40 horned cattle, 100 goats, and 20 sheep.
Rink, p. 97.
2 Rink, pp. 138, 280-282, 312, 313 (quoted).
THE COLONIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS 515
resemble those of the tropical colony: the natives are indispensable
to the whites and if they died out, Greenland would become unin-
habited. Here likewise is found a wholesale miscegenation ; it is
difficult to find a pure-blooded Eskimo on the west coast. Half-
breeds were reckoned as constituting 14 per cent of the population
in 1820, and 30 per cent in 1855 ; the blending has now become
imperceptible. The native women prefer the worse Dane to the
best Greenlander and the half-breeds are the more eligible for
their strain of white blood ; illicit relations with white men are
rather a glory than a disgrace.^ The Danish government favors
the race-mixture ; even at the present time officials are not dis-
couraged from marrying Eskimo women, although upon return to
Denmark under pension they must leave wife and children behind.
The mongrels resulting from these mixed unions appear to form
no very great improvement upon the native stock.
Relations between the two races, aside from intermarriage, be-
gan with the absurd and often cruel interference of the mission-
aries ; but they have been on the whole so friendly as to be almost
unique. Doubtless this was due in part to the kindly temperament
of the natives, and also to a realization often brought home to the
Europeans, of their dependence upon a clever and generous people.
Nevertheless, despite such friendliness, the Eskimo have declined
in number and degenerated in their habits of life. Egede reckoned
30,000 as the number of natives ; allowing a large discount for
ecclesiastical mendacity, the decline is evident and rapid. Both Rink
and Nansen advert repeatedly to the feeling of superiority of the
European toward the native as in some sense a key to the situation,
and both refer to the missions in sHghting terms. It is shown,
especially by Nansen, how the very gifts of the white men have
occasioned a decline in native prowess, inventiveness, and the like ;
the rifle, for example, is a curse in that it renders possible a reck-
less slaughter of wild animals for purposes of momentary gain.
Also, although the Danish government prohibits the sale of brandy
to the natives, other European products, notably coffee, have pro-
duced ill effects. The increase of native population in late years is
said to be illusory, and the Greenland Eskimo appear to be on the
highroad to extinction, at least as a pure race.^
1 Rink, pp. 166, 169, 175, 162, 296 ff., 163, 151 ; Nansen, pp. 12, 20, 165.
^ Rink, pp. 145 ff., 15S ff., 168, 227-228, 283, 286; Nansen. pp. 88, 97, 105 ff., 166,
307-308; chap. XV ; pp. 313, 328 ff., 342 ff.
5l6 COLONIZATION
The natives are all nominally Christians ; they are by nature
happy and contented, peaceable and harmless, and thus tractable
in an extraordinary degree. Owing to the efforts of Rink they
have some voice through their local councils in the administration
of their villages.^ Admirably adapted as they have become, through
centuries of vicissitudes, to a difificult environment, their continu-
ance, or at least the retarding of their disappearance, seems to hang
upon their power to exist and propagate where the dominant race
cannot. The purity of their blood may be threatened or sacrificed,
but for the present their manner of life and other tribal character-
istics seem likely to persist for an indefinite period to come.
1 Nansen, pp. 321-322.
CHAPTER XIV
MODERN ITALIAN AND GERMAN COLONIZATION
ITALIAN COLONIZATION
The history of the colonial ventures of modern Italy is brief and
inglorious ; at the present time, after much bloodshed and expense,
it can hardly be said that Italy possesses any real colonies from
whose administration and development an economic or political
lesson or warning can be gained. And yet the struggles of Italy,
during the latter part of the nineteenth century, to found a colonial
empire after the manner of other European states possess a pecul-
iar interest for the student of colonization ; for she seems to have
approached the self-appointed task in a novel, and, as the result
proved, a disastrous way. Italy is a nation which hoped, by taking
thought, to add unto her stature. Granted that England's greatness
is emphasized and augmented by her colonial possessions, it is at
best a logical non scquitur to conclude that Italy, by acquiring
colonies and possessions, will thereby take her place among the
Powers. And yet the Italians seem to have believed it possible to
substitute for the long and toilsome road from cause to effect a
convenient short-cut from effect to cause. Colonies were not only
to increase Italy's political importance ; they were also to build
up her trade, develop her merchant marine, and make her rich.
Thus the normal order of evolution was reversed in this suddenly
evoked colonial policy, and the consequences, in this case little
ameliorated by circumstances, ran out into the usual misery of
confusion and humiliation.
Disqualifications of Italy
This is the fundamental judgment to be passed upon the Italian
so-called colonization. Italy was not prepared to take her place
among colonizing states ; she lacked the internal cohesion and
organization necessary to the political unit that turns its arms
against the outside world. On the eve of her colonial efforts the
517
5l8 COLONIZATION
nation was united in no such way as were England, France, the
Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, just before their colonial expan-
sion. Italy lacked capital and, in a certain sense, superfluous popu-
lation for external colonization ; what forces she had could better
have been used for internal development, which, in turn, would
have aided national organization and prosperity. She lacked the
objective knowledge of lands, peoples, and processes which most
of the great colonizing nations had attained from the actual experi-
ence of their traders and navigators before their colonial empires
were even begun. She was unfit for colonization because she was
without those things which she hoped the possession of colonies
would bring her.
One more disqualification must be noticed in order to get a per-
spective of the short and disastrous history of Italian expansion :
the Italians, together with the other Latin nations, suffer from a
race-temperament unfortunate in colonizers. They are generally
dominated too much by feeling and too little by judgment ; they
are attracted too much by abstract theory, military glory, and all
that which caters to national vanity ; they cannot accept defeat
with dignity, renounce a high-sounding ideal, and bide their time
in patience. They have shown themselves incapable of such steadi-
ness and foresight as, for instance, was exhibited in the withdrawal,
quiet preparation, and final overwhelming return of England in the
Egyptian Sudan. ^ Italy's colonial development, however, retarded
by so many wars, has not as yet reached that stage of civil admin-
istration where the characteristic defects of Latin policy are wont
to appear ; judging from the organization of the Red Sea posses-
sions during a short period of peace and security, the Italians
might have been expected to adopt a somewhat better adapted
policy than did Spain, Portugal, or France.
Motives of Expansion
It is significant that poverty, rather than overflowing wealth,
first caused United Italy to desire a colony. The individual emi-
grated because of poverty and misery ; the state sought a penal
colony because of poverty and social disorder. On March i 3, 1865,
the Chamber of Deputies abolished the capital penalty, and a sub-
stitute was at once considered. The example of England was cited
1 Cf. De Saussure, chap, xi, p. 208, etc.
MODERN ITALIAN COLONIZATION 519
in support of adopting deportation, and the position of those who
favored this substitute was strengthened by the grave condition
of pubHc security in the sixties and seventies. Prison population
grew by more than 1500 annually, and increased from 52,000 in
1862 to 67,000 in 1870, averaging 104 per 100,000 population.
Prisons were insufficient in number and all in wretched state ; it
was estimated that 100,000,000 lire and twenty years' time would
be necessary to construct new edifices. Deportation seemed .an
anchor of safety. A hot controversy was waged over the employ-
ment of this penalty, and for a long time desire for such a place
of e.xile formed the chief motive for acquisition of external posses-
sions. A government agent tried to get possession of locations in
the Far East suitable for penal establishments, and other private
or semi-official travelers reported on the same project. But in 1874
the enemies of deportation had increased in number, and conditions
in Italy were ameliorated; discussion lasted on till 1888, when it
was dropped.^ The question of deportation was therefore a tem-
porary one, not connected with later developments, except as it
directed the attention of the Italians to conditions without ; depor-
tation was never popular. Prospecting for a commercial or naval
station, which to a certain extent accompanied the search for a
penal colony, was even more feeble, vague, and unproductive. Up
to 1880 expansionists talked to the empty air. Even the opening
of the Suez Canal (November, 1869) effected little, though through
the urgency of a small party, who insisted upon the necessity of a
station on the new Indies route, the government half-heartedly ac-
quiesced in the purchase of Assab, a sterile tract on the Red Sea
coast. ^
"The search for colonies, therefore," Brunialti says, "had con-
ducted to no serious conclusion"; further efforts were made to
arouse interest, but "we sang to the deaf." After 1873 there was
no more talk of colonies and even Assab fell into oblivion ; in 1882
1 Brunialti, pp. 271 ff., 527 ff. Brunialti's book affords, besides a sketcii, chiefly his-
torical and pohtical, of the colonies of modern Italy, also a history of the medieval
Venetian and Genoese trading-colonies and an account of the great Italian navigators
of the period of Discoveries. The author treats the modem possessions from an
authoritative position, inasmuch as he was personally involved in the discussions and
projects which preceded and accompanied the late colonial policy.
2 Through the agency of the Rubattino Steamship Company for 15,000 Maria-
Theresa dollars (about ^16,000), with some extra fees and payments to recalcitrant
sheiks. Brunialti, pp. 324, 532.
520 COLONIZATION
Italy refused an advantageous opportunity to cooperate with Eng-
land in reducing Egypt, explained her acticMi to Europe with vir-
tuous self-complacency, and wished to have nothing to do with
Africa.^
Suddenly, in Eebruary, 1885, in consequence of the massacre of
the Italian scientific party of Bianchi, the government at Rome
roused itself and occupied the port of Massowah. The effect upon
the national mind was unexpected and astonishing, affording a
marked illustration of the changefulness of public opinion. Before
the occupation, "the less enthusiastic were precisely those who had
a more exact idea of colonial policy and its exigencies, who feared
that public opinion would cast itself upon this acquisition, increase
its importance, and make an unique objective of what ought to be
a small episode and nothing else." This fear was realized, for the
country faced about from indifference to military ambition, parlia-
mentary calculation, and political delirium ; there resulted " a whole
artificial elaboration of public opinion, such as would scarcely be
believed possible in a free and civilized modern state." ^ These
are the symptoms of " colonial fever," which was not slow to dis-
cover itself in pronounced form ; nor was the country, smitten
with the passion for expansion, tardy in presenting reasons to jus-
tify the satisfaction of that passion. Were not the Romans the
first of colonizers } Could the Italians acknowledge themselves de-
generate sons of those hardy Venetians, Genoese, and Pisans who
were the mediaeval lords of trade and of commercial factories }
This pride of ancestry was united with what Laveleye and others
call " megalomania," as the main motive forces in a disastrous ex-
pansion.^ With the eye ever upon England and the Netherlands,
the endeavor was made to construct a Greater Italy. To these high
ambitions, however, were joined the most absurd fears, an unsettled
j)olicy, and general weakness and indecision — qualities seldom ex-
hibited in any degree by a people ripe for colonization.'*
Attention, it has been said, turned to emigration, the merchant
marine, and national production. As for the first of these, a brief
study of Italian emigration suffices to show it an unstable founda-
tion upon which to build a colonial edifice. During the early days
of the colonial agitation, the Italian consul at Nice, one of those
1 Brunialti, pp. 323-326, 422 ff. 2 jj., pp. 15 ff., 433.
8 Cf. the articles of Laveleye, Nash, Mezzacapo, and Pitt;ihiga.
* Brunialti, pp. 228 ff., 261-297.
MODERN ITALIAN COLONIZATION 521
whose opinion concerning the new policy was officially asked, op-
posed such a movement, saying that for colonization, capital, heads,
and hands were needful, but that Italy possessed only the last
of these requirements.^ This concisely expresses the character of
Italian emigration ; only the poverty-stricken and the ignorant emi-
grated, and their exodus was a species of flight. It may be true
that unprincipled agents worked upon the credulity of the over-
taxed and underpaid contadmi and often allured them to a fate even
more wretched than that of remaining in Italy ; but it is signifi-
cant that whole villages were ready to emigrate, with their parish
priests at the head, while acres of productive ground were falling
into waste in the home-land. This emigration of Italian labor can-
not be regarded as a natural and inevitable flow, due to purely
natural conditions of population and land ; private initiative counted
for little ; the emigrant would in most cases have stayed at home
if, after paying his heavy dues, he had had enough to eat.^
Not until 1884 was the Italian marine able to provide proper
postal facilities for the settlements along the Red Sea ; its condi-
tion, then, can be imagined, during those years when the govern-
ment was vaguely seeking, even from Denmark in Greenland, and
from Russia in Behring Straits, those colonies which should by
some magic set commerce upon its feet. The Italians awakened
to find their wooden sailing-ships contending in a losing competi-
tion with modern vessels of iron, propelled by steam. Italy had
at her disposal neither coal nor iron, neither mechanics nor engi-
neers. To wait for trade to develop its carriers was too slow a
process ; the marine called for colonies, which would then call for
a marine ; and the government began to spend large sums in sub-
ventions and other aid.^
The remaining reason for Italian expansion was economic ; the
growth of protection in Europe and America seriously threatened
Italy's trade, and colonies were sought as outlets and markets.
The government was also in the search for stations in the Far
East in order to profit by treaties concluded in the sixties with
China, Japan, and Siam.* This was, perhaps, the most rational of
the reasons assigned for the development of the colonial policy.
1 Brunialti, pp. 231, note, 289. ^ jj^ pp 261 ff. ; Laveleye.
^ Brunialti, pp. 283 ff. ; "The Merchant Marine of Italy," The Nation, August 31,
1882, XXXV, 171.
^ Brunialti, p. 524.
52 2 COLONIZATION
At all events, Italy became aware in 1SS5 of the fact that she
had lost Tunis to the French, after most favorable beginnings, had
childishly refused England's offer, fraught with possibility, of a
dual campaign in Egypt, and had sacrificed numerous possible pos-
sessions in the Far East. She fixed her eyes on Tripoli and gave
more attention to the flourishing natural colonies in the Plata region
of South America ; though, sad to say, she allowed these districts
to take an entirely secondary place in relation to the new acquisi-
tions in eastern Africa.^
I
The African Acquisitions
Real expansion, then, began with the occupation of Massowah.
Assab had cost in all about two-thirds of a million lire, the terri-
tory extending thirty-six miles along the coast and having an area
of about two hundred and forty square miles. But after Massowah
had been occupied by force, the method of purchase lost all popu-
larity ; the way of conquest was more " essential to our position
as a Great Power " — it was more theatrical.^ Little attention was
paid to the safeguarding of an indispensable friendship with the
Negus, or King of Kings, of Abyssinia. There followed in rapid
succession the occupation by force of Ilabab and Beni-Amer (1887),
Cheren and Asmara (1S89), Cassala, Coatit, and Senafe (1894),
and Tigre (1895), until the Italian possessions comprised about
96,000 square miles, with 200,000 native and 3500 European in-
habitants.''^ In 1889 a protectorate was assumed over the sultans
of Obbiaand Migertini ; and by the treaty of Ucciali (May 2, 1889)
the whole kingdom of Abyssinia came under Italian influence. A
protectorate was officially recognized in Europe, and, to a certain
extent, by the Negus ;* later, however, the latter repudiated the
article of the treaty upon which Italy based her claim to a protect-
orate, alleging misrepresentation and fraud. Under such strains,
and because the Abyssinians were incensed at the occupation of
their ancient capital, Adowa, in the holy country of Tigre, war
speedily broke out; and on March i, 1896, Italian expansion was
brought to a sudden close in the battle of Abba Garima, where
^ T?runialti, chap, xi ; pp. 298 ff., 422. 2 j^^ pp ,f,^ ^09, 430.
^ Id., p. 466; Ap])leton'.s Ann. Cyc, 1895, •f'"'' "Abyssinia."
* This made the total area under Italian influence about 550,000 square miles, with
more than 6,000,000 inhabitants. Cf. Statesman's Vear-Book, 1S91 ; Appleton's Ann.
Cyc, as above.
MODERN ITALIAN COLONIZATION 523
12,000 Italians rashly attacked the Abyssinian army of 80,000 and
were almost annihilated.^ In the treaty that followed, the protect-
orate over Abyssinia was given up, Cassala was ceded to Egypt,
the Abyssinian territory which had been occupied was evacuated,
and Italy paid a heavy indemnity for the maintenance and return
of prisoners. This decisive check may be considered as bringing
the ten years' period of Italian expansion to a close, for since 1896
no further move toward aggrandizement in Africa has been at-
tempted. Indeed, it is said that the tenure of Italian Somaliland,
in view of the attitude of Menelek, is precarious.
From the military and political standpoints, therefore, Italian
expansion was a failure. Results also failed to meet the expecta-
tions of those who were looking for a more profitable regulation
of emigration, a development of commerce and of the marine, and
a notable spread of civilization. Here one must do justice to the
small minority of clear-headed statesmen who constantly opposed
the current of popular folly, or with it were unwillingly and resist-
ingly borne along. It was in vain that they reiterated objections
against the popular projects — objections since proved only too
valid. In fact, as was at the time pointed out, only those parts of
Africa were allotted to Italy which fall to the weak late-comer ;
while England, the generous giver, drew considerable advantages
from occupation by a friendly nation. These possessions, which
from Crispi received the pompous collective name of Eritrea, were
entirely unsuitable for agricultural or plantation colonies. The soil
is, in general, arid, sandy, and unproductive ; rain is infrequent ;
even drinking-water is extremely scarce and brackish. The climate,
especially near the coast, is almost insupportable for Europeans ;
the Italian army was forced by the heat to take refuge upon the
interior plateaus. The sharp contrast of temperature between night
1 This battle and other reverses were due largely to the ambition of the Crispi and
preceding ministries, which needed victories to hold their place ; it was also due to
gross geographical and ethnographical ignorance and insufficient preparation. Brunialti
says the Italian statesmen had "a sacred horror of geography," and that one of the
most responsible could not "read a geographical chart in the proper manner." Upon
Crispi, however, falls the heaviest weight of indignation and contempt: he called the
war " my war," and, according to Brunialti, his chief reason for desiring it was that
his " personal necessities . . . impelled him to hide too many things, and himself as
well, behind a series of victories." The war was very unpopular in its later stages ;
protests came in from the women of Pavia and other cities ; troops were transported
in secret, " in the dead of night, through a window or down an exterior stair," and " de-
spatched hurriedly by goods-trains to Naples for embarcation." Brunialti, pp. 435,
497, 506 ff. ; art. by " Ouida."
524 COLONIZATION
and day affects cattle disastrously. The flora is meager, consist-
ing mostly of acacias and the like, and the better parts of the
country are infested by destructive and dangerous wild beasts.^
Yet even these unalluring prospects were less discouraging than
the ethnic environment. The Italians found themselves face to
face with the only strong and organized African state — a state
whose warlike population prided itself upon its independence and
its successes against invaders ; the Italians, however, looked upon
the Abyssinian army as a " horde," an easy prey for five hundred
Italians with a little artillery. They found it armed with rapid-fire
guns and drilled by French tacticians.'^
Policy and Administration
In such a state of affairs the security necessary for the develop-
ment of permanent agricultural settlements was never attained.
All experiments resulted in dismal failure ; emigration could not
be attracted from America. Under the best conditions of peace,
with gratuitous concessions of land, subsidies in nwncy, intelligent
direction and disinterested counsels from men who knew the Italian
peasants well, all attempts to settle them in Eritrea came to naught.
Harvests failed to meet expectations and life in Africa could de-
velop no alluring features ; the contadini could exist there, as in
Italy, and no better. There was no prospect of making one's
fortune, that chance which prompts one to choose a dangerous pos-
sibility in place of a tame certainty, and which has regularly led
Italians to brave the unknown in America. " Therefore the coloni-
zation of Eritrea was ever an official project, a work of beneficence,
and as such could yield no serious and important result, even though
the fortune of arms had been quite different." The case was worse
than a negative one ; destitute emigrants were sent out, on the
verge of the great disasters, to " do homage to the ideas of the
government regarding the future of the Eritrean colony, to make
believe that Africa, through so many years ignored and feared,
had become all at once the land of Bengodi." ^
But if a producing colony, receptive of a large and successful
emigration, was impossible, there still remained the alternative of
developing a trading-settlement. Even if this aided emigration
1 Arts, by Rossi, Edwards, and Capucci. ^ Brunialti, p. 449; Frassati.
2 Brunialti, p. 472 ; Rossi.
MODERN ITALIAN COLONIZATION 525
little, it would yet assist the home-country's commerce and marine.
It was claimed by the sponsors of Eritrean expansion that Assab,
and to a greater extent Massovvah and Cassala, were the keys to
the trade of the eastern Sudan, Abyssinia, and central Africa; it
was expected that carav^ans would make an easier passage to these
stations than to others, and it was proposed to afford facilities in
the shape of roads, magazines, etc., and to remove hindering trade-
restrictions.^ To a certain degree this more modest purpose suc-
ceeded, though, of course, trade never attained the proportions
expected. Assab and Massowah are good harbors, protected from
the prevailing monsoons ; the commerce of Assab rose from nil in
1880 to some 525 each of arrivals and clearances in 1883 ; as for
Massowah, the value of its imports fell from 1887 to 1893, then to
rise with some rapidity. The figure for 1896 is the largest, show-
ing an increase of more than 100 per cent over 1895.^ Some valua-
ble roads were opened, and a salt industry, founded at Assab, was
very important as looking toward trade with the interior. Had
peace prevailed and security been permanently maintained, it seems
likely that Italy would have gotten a modest share in the interior
trade. But capital refused to emigrate; in 1887 Massowah had
not a single merchant house. Many were afraid of finding in Masso-
wah a "new Tonkin"; it had "all the disadvantages and none of
the advantages of a territorial colony." ^ It is evident that Italians
at the present time cherish no enthusiasm for the Eritrean trade,
and that the powerful neighbors of Eritrea fear and envy its com-
merce but little. The development of the marine and of home pro-
duction would seem not to have been greatly stimulated as a result
of the African colonial career.*
The brighter pages of the history of Eritrea are those which
deal with the organization and incipient administration of the
colony, especially under General Baratieri. The Italians were a
bit theoretical withal, but set out to avoid " Spanish formalism,
Dutch egoism, French concentration, and the too diverse conditions
1 Brunialti, pp. 409 ff., 416, 430 ff.
2 Brunialti, pp. 4i4ff.; Statesman's Year-Book, 1890 and following years ; Alma-
nack de Gotha, 18S9 and following. 3 Brunialti, pp. 446-44S ; Rossi.
* From 1884 to 1896 the total tonnage of Italian seagoing vessels slowly declined;
but during the same period the tonnage of Italian steamships rose from 107,542 to
220,508. Something over one-half of the vessels entering and clearing from Mas-
sowah were under the Italian flag. Entries to Italian ports increased slowly during
the period. Statesman's Year-Book, 18S5-1896; Almanach de Gotha, same years.
526 COLONIZATION
of English colonization." They regarded the first need of a coun-
try barely out of savagery as that of a simple justice, with rapid
and economic procedure, without distinction of legal qualifica-
tion and backed up by a prompt and vigorous execution. They
intended to respect religion, family relations, etc., where not irrec-
oncilable with morale universale, and to maintain a full and severe
custody of public order ; they hoped to become non dominatori,
non tiitori, non iunovatori, via aviici ed aiiitatori, guiding new
fellow-citizens toward a betterment that was comprehended and
desired. Certain high-sounding phrases about making the Italian
name a synonym for honesty and loyalty, concerning Italian sym-
pathy with others' patriotism, and so cm, were declaimed ; but
they were mere words, most clearly set at naught in the dealings
with the Negus. For " the Italian government always proceeded
towards Abyssinia as toward a people ignorant and barbarous,
whom they thought it not only allowable, but easy to deceive." ^
Before 1892 the colonial government was rather chaotic; a
municipal and military ta.x imposed in 1888 by the military gover-
nor was stoutly resisted. The military was rei)laced by a civil
government in 1890, troops were withdrawn, and an attempt was
made to organize commerce and profitable cultivation ; the condi-
tion of the colony was far from satisfactory, however, and in 1891
the minister, Di Rudini, initiated the non-extension policy and sent
a commission to examine matters in Eritrea. On February 8, 1892,
General Baratieri was appointed civil governor of the province.
The condition of the colony changed at once for the better. Bara-
tieri was well fitted for the ofifice conferred upon him, being famil-
iar with the region and well versed in the duties required. He
appointed picked men as the leaders of native troops, established
friendly relations with the Negus Menelek and all the chiefs who
proffered friendship, and he incited Italian residents to a sharp
watch over all " protected " territories. He established within a
short time stations of carabinieri with natives under them, dis-
pelled all fear of raids, set about making roads, and, the oppor-
tunity presenting itself, dealt the slave-trade a crushing blow.
" The colony was divided into the district of Massowah, where the
administration, judicial, social, and political, is carried on as in
Italy, and into dependent territories, where the native laws and
usages are respected and a])plicd as far as possible ; tribunals of
J Brunialli, pp. 409-412, 448.
MODERN ITALIAN COLONIZATION 527
arbitration were set up at Cheren and Asmara, judges of the peace
in the villages, and everywhere residential officials bound to keep
the governor ' up to date ' on all military and local matters." The
roads were made chiefly by native labor, and artesian wells were
driven and lighthouses erected by the same means. Hygiene was
attended to ; water was analyzed and food inspected. Cisterns
were built to preserve the scanty rains and in house-building stone
succeeded straw. Schools were established for girls and boys,
teaching Italian, Arabic, arithmetic, hygiene, and gymnastics. The
division of lands was commenced, defining tribal and ecclesiastical
property, and marking out such parts as the state could take pos-
session of and distribute to the natives and to Italian emigrants.
The entire military department was reorganized ; Baratieri insisted
that if Italy were to succeed in Africa, it must be with native troops
under Italian officers. The governor did not stay in Massowah ; he
lived with his soldiers ; he had a strong influence over the natives,
and suffered no defections of the indigenous forces in battle.^
Creditable Success
The right man in the right place, evidently ; in November, 1892,
the crown expressed itself as well pleased that the colony had
been entirely pacified and was ceasing to be a drain on the finances
of the mother-country. Baratieri had aided agriculture and com-
merce and systematized the public service ; it was hoped that
the time was not far off when the costs of civil management in the
colony would be paid with the colony's own products. The influence
of the Italians was extending peacefully, and the neighboring tribes
were attracted to them by gifts, by the surety of order and peace
and of impartial and prompt justice. Brunialti ^ calls this a modest
but true success, without exaggeration, uncertainty, or weakness.
A special budget was instituted for the colony and attached to
that of Foreign Affairs. On December 8, 1892, the powers exer-
cised by the minister of the marine over civil services in Eritrea
were withdrawn and the corresponding funds inscribed in the
colonial budget. Gradually there were added to this budget other
expenses formerly charged under the heads of finance, treasury,
posts and telegraph, public works, etc. In consequence, an ex-
penditure of 8,000,000 lire was recognized as necessary for all the
^ Brunialti, pp. 464 ff ., 473 ff. ; " Italy in Africa," The A^ation, March 7, 1 895, LX, 1 79.
2 Pp. 474, 480.
528 COLONIZATION
services for which provision had at first been made fragmcntarily,
and which finally were to come under the oversight and responsi-
bility of the governor. A distinction was made between civil and
military expenses, by which ministerial control and responsibility
to parliament were made less difficult. Attention was directed to
tax and customs reforms, security and justice were more firmly
established, and public instruction made an advance, to the ad-
vantage of both Italians and natives. The Massowah Chamber of
Commerce heartily cooperated, suggesting plans for the develop-
ment of local trade and industry for the benefit of Italy. More
roads, commercial as well as strategic, were laid out ; a bank of
credit was founded at Massowah ; construction of markets, maga-
zines, and better facilities for ships were regarded as paramount
objects. The abolition of customs dues ; more frequent postal and
caravan communication between Italy and Massowah, Massowah
and the principal centers of Abyssinia ; the protection of interests,
which was always efficacious — all these advantages worked toward
civilization and success. The population seemed to have perfect
faith in the government and a beginning of agriculture was made,
even among the native nomads. The suggestions of the governor
to the ministry show a clear comprehension of the situation and
its needs. Among other desiderata he wished the lands to be
studied so that the most successful methods of working them might
be developed ; he also insisted that holdings, assigned by choice
or l(jt to Italians, individual or in common, should be guaranteed
against the evils of speculation. Anticipations of money without
interest, a regulated water supply, paternal care of Italian settlers,
including religious and medical attention — these were among the
suggestions of the governor, and many of them were promptly
adopted. By 1894 the Eritrean administration was autonomous
and the management of its finances independent. The imperial
government was represented only by the civil governor and three
counselors, all royally appointed. Military and naval commanders
were, of course, under direction from the Italian ministry.^
Considering the ground she had to work on, Italy had certainly
made a creditable showing. But it must not be imagined that this
liberal administration cost nothing ; deficits appeared annually in the
colonial budget and the lower ones of prosperous years were inade-
quate to keep down a very high average when the whole period
^ Brunialti, pp. 472 ff., 480-484; Statesman's Year-Book, 1894, etc.
MODERN ITALIAN COLONIZATION 529
of colonial possession is considered. There have been repeated
struggles to reduce the yearly expenses of the colony to 9,000,000
or 8,000,000 lire ; no such scheme seems to have succeeded. The
deficit has averaged considerably more than this figure ; during
the whole period of colonial expansion up to 1896, losses are esti-
mated by Brunialti ^ as 10,000 men and 500,000,000 lire. For a
country whose debt was in the thousand millions, which, out of every
hundred lire expended, paid thirty-three lire interest on debt and
thirty-three lire for the maintenance of army and navy, this colonial
policy was certainly what one of its opponents called it, nne poli-
tique de luxe?' For a rich nation to expend great sums in the work
of civilization or extermination may be wastefulness ; for a poverty-
stricken, debt-burdened nation, full of internal strife and uproar,
it is almost suicide. If the disaster inflicted by Menelek has taught
this lesson, perhaps the experience was not too dearly bought.
" Megalomania," however, was not yet cured ; the incident of
San Mun Bay, where Italy thought of taking another useless burden
upon her shoulders, in order to prove herself a Power, is a happen-
ing of the more recent past.^ In this case, however, right counsels
prevailed, and perhaps the fever has abated. As for Eritrea, little
enthusiasm is expressed regarding it ; since the shock of 1896 the
colony has come under discussion from time to time, and if it is
not restricted to narrower boundaries or quite abandoned, it is
largely because of national pride. In 1897 an attempt was made
to take up again the organization of the district and the stimulation
of industry, but the colony has never fully recovered ; it is accepted
as an inevitable burden which some would gladly exchange for a
share in the nearer and more congenial Tripoli. "^ Whether Eritrea
1 P. 519; it is elsewhere stated that about 125,000,000 lire were spent in the mili-
tary operations of 1895-1896. The budget for 1895-1896 is given as follows (in lire):
Receipts: from colonies, 1,700,000; from state, 10,000,000.
Expenses: colonial troops, 9,351,000 ; other expenses, 2,349,000.
It is difficult to get exact information on these particulars, but the above figures show
general conditions. Even with elimination of the heavy military expense, the colony
is far from paying its own way. See Statesman's Year-Book and Almanach de Gotha,
1897, etc.; Appleton's Ann. Cyc, 1898.
2 " The Financial Condition of Italy," The iVation, October i, 1891, LIII, 255; arts.
by "An Observer," "Ouida," Geffcken, and Rossi.
3 See Lombroso, art. in the Ntiova Antologia, as well as various other articles and
editorial comment in the earlier issues of this publication for 1899.
* " Rassegna Politica," in Ntiova Antologia during 1897; little interest in Eritrea
has been exhibited since that year; Brunialti, pp. 516 ff. ; Traversi, Primerano, Rossi,
and Capucci.
530
COT.ONI/ATIOX
is in the future even to pay for itself, remains to be seen ; it is
hoped rather than expected.
Italy's " Natural " Colonies
If Italy were intent upon the essence of colonization rather than
the name, her field of action would not be far to seek ; she has a
series of natural colonies in America, surrounding the lower course
of the Plata River, which evince a vigor of growth and a prosperity
that ought to have been the pride of the mother-country while she
was squandering resources on the sand-dunes of the Red Sea coast.
The essence of the mutual sympathy of two countries lies, not in
political union, but in those racial affiliations of blood, language,
religion, customs, and manners, the mutual possession of which
renders intercourse between groups of men easy and enjoyable.
After the Revolution the American republic turned, not to
France, but to England with her favors of trade and intercourse.
So the Plata settlements, with no serious encouragement, and with
memories not the most pleasant of the native land and its extor-
tions, have nevertheless benefited Italy commercially to an infinitely
higher degree than did Eritrea at its best. As an illustration of
the normal growth of national offspring, the development of these
perhaps happily neglected settlements deserves a paragraph of com-
parison with the above-described "colony for a purpose." First
and most important, the Italians have succeeded there, and that
without aid, as nowhere else in the workl. They were the first to
own inns, cafes, boats, etc., and have kept industrially in advance
of a people inferior to themselves in culture. Italians have founded
and operated banks, and in Buenos Ayres they owned in the nineties
62 per cent of the businesses. The Italian language is spreading,
and Spanish is supreme only in jjublic administration ; ])robably one-
fourth (4,000,000) of the po})ulation of Argentina have Italian blood
in their veins. The current of emigration to these regions is grow-
ing ever stronger, and in its wake are following advantages to Ital-
ian trade and industry; in 1889 the importation from Italy to the
Argentine Rei)ublic represented 5 per cent of the total; in 1894,
9 per cent. In later years of crisis (i 889-1 894) Italian trade suf-
fered less than that of any other nation. And it is seen that the
Italian emigrants, who are largely from the north of Italy, do not
lose their native good qualities in the new country, but transmit
MOni':RN CU'^RMAN COT.ONJZA'I ION
531
them, along with Italian ideas and tastes, to a peo])le who need
them and are able and often willing; to profit by them.^
It is toward this Plata region that some of Italy's more responsible
advisers have long been attempting to direct her attention, not with
a view to the extension of imperial power — for sufificient barriers
exist, fortunately for the colonies, to restrain any such interference
— but in the hope of developing, without expense or bloodshed, close
commercial and industrial relations and a national sympathy which
may some day assist in assuring existence to that which is Italian.
The Italians, like other Latin peoples, feel a sense of weakness
before the tremendous energy and the power of expansion and
of assimilation displayed by the Anglo-Saxon race. To the end of
establishing these desired relations, a more strict supervision
of emigration and a more developed consular service are advo-
cated ; the ideal is that the South American colonies shall stand
to Italy as the United States to England. At present, and neg-
lecting the crying necessity for the internal reorganization of Italy,
this idea seems by far the most practical and realizable of Italian
colonial projects.
GERMAN COLONIZATION
Among German writers on colonization there has existed a con-
sensus of opinion as to the tardiness of Germany's entrance upon
the colonial field. The common cry of " Too late ! " has been voiced
in all accents, from those of the reproachful complainer to those of
the belligerent partisan and agitator. Among certain of these par-
ties there has been manifested a disposition to hold some person
or policy responsible for such national backwardness ; others have
disdained to assail the past, have accepted the situation as inevi-
table, and have directed their thoughts and efforts toward the future.
Upon reflection it is seen that Germany's past indifference toward
organized expansion and colonization has been perfectly natural,
and could hardly have been otherwise. During the last few cen-
turies and up to the borders of our own generation Germany has
been in no position to devote attention and effort to matters of this
1 Brunialti, chap. x. The official figures of the commissioners of immigration for
1857-1889 give for the number of Italiaji immigrants 646,086 as against 144,654 for
the Spanish and 91,719 for the French. The Italians have regularly maintained the
lead in numbers, and have figured for 70 per cent of the total. Daireaux, I, 45-46 ;
II, chaps, i and ii ; especially y). 11.
532 COLONIZATION
kind ; internal conditions and external relations have alike impeded
the development of colonial activity in distant lands. Periodically
through the earlier centuries and during part of the nineteenth, fre-
quent, long-continued, and devastating wars reduced the population
and destroyed accumulated wealth ; industrial development was in-
definitely postponed ; political centralization and national iniity were
rendered impossible in a continuous strife of petty local interests.
External relations were such as to discourage and cripple the trade
of a country whose geographical position was and is most unfavorable
to the development of shipping and trans-oceanic commerce. Every-
thing was narrow, local, and self -centered ; horizons were limited,
and ignorance of the external world was dense. Whatever may
have been the intellectual life of the higher classes as exemplified
in Humboldt, Goethe, and others, the masses of the people had
acquired no such cosmopolitan freedom of outlook, nor such enter-
prise and experience of the outside world as distinguished the in-
dustrial and commercial population of England and Holland during
the same periods.^ Germany was looked down upon by many of
her own greatest men as irretrievably provincial and uncultured.
Earlier Colonial Projects
The impracticability, in the earlier periods, of German colonial
ventures across the seas is shown by the history of an actual at-
tempt at colonization dating from the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury.2 Frederick William, the Elector of Brandenburg, a man of
theories, who had picked up many foreign ideas during a period of
study in Holland, conceived the scheme of making Prussia pros-
perous by creating colonies after the manner of the Dutch. He
maintained a fleet under the command of a Dutch pirate, Raule,
in order to secure his prospective commerce from the depreda-
tions and tyranny of the Swedes and Danes. After the peace of
St. Germain (1679), finding his hands free from war, he turned his
whole attention to colonization ; the Guinea coast of Africa was
1 This condition lasted far down into the nineteenth century. See Wohltmann in
the Indisclie Gids, 1897, II, 1387.
2 Germans like to recall also the memory of how the famous Augsburg Welser
undertook to develop and colonize Venezuela. This was a sort of miniature aui« ; Loeb,
pp. 45 ff. ; Schmidt, II, 194; Meinecke, p. 14. Of late there has been a movement
looking to the adoption of English and French systems of colonial government ; the
establishment of the local council and the indejiendent colonial Ijudget have been
much discussed. Annuls Amcr. Acad. Pol.iuui Soc. Sci, XIX, No. i (January, 1902),
p. 162. '' Von Stengel, pp. 97 ff.
MODERN GERMAN COLONIZATION 565
Togo and Kamerun. The tariff on imports is levied on a revenue
basis, and seldom exceeds a low percentage (I0-20 per cent) ; many
and important articles are placed on the free list at both ends.^ Pro-
hibitions affect only arms and ammunition, and spirituous liquors.
It will be noted also that some of the German territory comes under
the rulings of the Berlin conference,^ by which the conventional
basins of the Congo and Niger were opened to free navigation by
the ships of all nations. Freedom of trade was established and
only such duties \^ere to be levied as would pay expenses incurred
in the interests of trade, no differentials being allowed. These
provisions are, of course, active to a limited degree only in the
German possessions.
Population
The settlement of the new colonies has not proceeded apace.
It is generally recognized that, with the exception of Southwest
Africa, they are unfitted to receive any permanent European
settlement ; their lot is that of the trading or plantation colony,
supporting a shifting population of European traders and plan-
ters, whose interest in the country can never be that of a people
for its home. Southwest Africa, as far as climate is concerned,
might allow of European settlement ; but, as has been seen, the
region is anything but inviting to the settler ; and in addition to
this, the action of the Company for Southwest Africa has interposed
artificial obstacles of the most serious kind. Where it has not
itself pursued the selfish policy of appropriation of the best lands,
it has allowed speculators to gain possession ; the price of land ^
1 Details in Fitzner, passim ; Der Deutsche Export, pp. 34ff., 41 ff. ; Loeb, pp. 59 ff.
The customs-dues of Togo were admittedly modeled upon those of the English Gold
Coast colony. Klose, p. 547. Scientific apparatus, the property of the missions, etc.,
were regularly free.
2 Keltie, chap. xiv.
3 The government price is i M. per ha. for the lands it has retained. The South-
west Africa Company charges about the same. Other companies ask a prohibitive
price, as they are waiting for a rise. Prices are reckoned in lump-sums with no regard
to the quality of the land, of which, indeed, the companies are oftentimes as ignorant
as the settlers. The conditions of payment are very hard (10 per cent down, two years
free, then 10 per cent a year). Hermann, who gives this information from personal
experience, says that, considering the defective protection of the government, the arid
quality of the land, etc., the price should be put down to 50 pf. (to cents) per ha., to
be paid up in fifty years. There are only two settlers near Windhoek who deserve the
name, and, though economical and industrious, they find it hard or impossible to pay.
Hermann, pp. 5-1 1.
^66 COI.OXIZATION
is, in view of existing ctjnditions, excx'edingly high, and the pur-
chaser can never be sure that his title is secure and that the land
he has bought is not an arid sandhill. Worst of all, the delays and
expense incident to settlement are so great that immigration of the
German peasant is out of the question. The expenses due to delays
alone (in journeying by ox-wagon to Windhoek and there waiting
on the convenience of the far from strenuous Company official) is
estimated by a competent critic at $ioo; the same writer asserts
that a capital of over $2300 is indispensable, ami that, even with
this, and neglecting the never remote possibility of drought, "rinder-
pest," and bad years, the settler would still be in debt $800 in the
hfth )ear of his cattle-raising activity. ^ Agriculture on any respect-
able scale is debarred by physical conditions ; in the neighborhood
of Windhoek, where prices are extremely high, it is only with great
painstaking that horticulture on the small scale can be made to pay.
The fact of the matter is that the German emigrant avoids the Ger-
man possessions because of the virtual extension thither of the
national "system." Often this system is exactly the incubus which
he is trying to throw off ; why should he subject himself anew to
military conscription and petty regulation when so many of his fel-
low-countrymen are leading free and prosperous lives across the
Atlantic ? It is no doubt true that labor is deterred from entering
Southwest Africa, the only German colony possible of settlement,
because it is well known that the competing native of that colony
will work (after a fashion) for merely food and drink — or the latter
alone ; but at bottom, the attempted artificial direction of German
emigration is ineffective against the innate desire of man to be his
own master.'-^
According to late official statistics, the total white population of
the German dependencies is not above 7000 ; of these the greater
1 Hermann, pp. 2 ff., 13 ff. This author, himself a settler in Southwest Africa, has
several times come into collision with the Company and its powerful manipulators in
Herlin (see Giesebrecht, p. 121). lie writes a very interesting and detailed account
of the productive possibilities of Southwest Africa. Novelties proposed and partially
adopted are ostrich-raising and the culture of the silkworm (Hermann, pp. 63-64).
2 Hermann, pp. 1-2 ; cf. The A'aiion, LXV, 471. Engler (pp. 98-99) distinguishes
si.\ classes of emigrants to the colonies : (i) merchants in the colonies and their sup-
porters at home ; (2) enterprising youths, tired of home, and on their travels ; (3) former
soldiers, who are weary of garrison life and impatient of slow promotion, and who
want to fight ; (4) young men through school, who covet rank and honors unattainable
at home ; (5) older men who want to be something at home and cannot — who wish
to speak or write ; (6) merchants who want to get into political life.
MODERN GERMAN COLONIZAIION 567
part are officers, officials, and traders. In Southwest Africa, the
Ko/ojiial-Handbuch claimed before the recent uprising of the natives
3388 German and foreign settlers.^ It should here be mentioned that
the Germans have anticipated for some years, and with a mixture of
feelings, the influx of a large Boer population into the Southwest
African colony. The Boers are hardy enough, and rich enough in
cattle, to become a permanent and increasing element of the popu-
lation ; but the Germans dislike their character and hav^e regularly
repelled advances looking to the establishment of a German pro-
tectorate over certain regions farther to the south. ^
Colonial Trade
In the development of the colonial trade,^ Germany has suc-
ceeded little better than in the attempt to direct emigration. The
companies did practically nothing toward opening up their respec-
tive regions by means of road-making, clearing of river-courses, and
the like. They did not attempt to minimize the risks of commerce
by the erection of lighthouses, the making of charts, and the dredg-
ing of harbors. Communication with the outside world, especially
for New Guinea, was fitful, being rendered possible, for the most
part, by Dutch and English vessels. Only as the imperial govern-
ment came forward with subsidized lines, was regular communica-
tion with Europe established. All these works were beyond the
strength of the companies, and, it may be said, considering their
actual political nature and purpose, beyond their province ; they
were to hold the colonies and try to pay expenses some way till
the government could relieve them. There was really no incentive
for the investment of capital in Southwest Africa and New Guinea,
for they provided neither supply stations nor markets ; ^ a scanty
and inelastic export of hides and ivory from Southwest Africa, and
of copra from New Guinea, was all that could be reckoned on. The
crudeness of the means of communication in these two possessions
1 Fitzner, p. 141. These estimates agree, except in the case of Southwest Africa,
with those of the Statesman's Year-Book {1901). The latter gives the number of
Europeans in Southwest Africa as 1840 (1557 Germans), which seems a morereason-
able estimate than that of the (perhaps inspired) Kolonial-Handbuch. Hauser says
(p. 114) that there are not over 3400 Germans, functionaries and all, in the Schutzgebiete.
2 Biittner, p. 105 ; Engler, p. 112; Hermann, p. 12 ; Globus, LXXIX, 3 (January, 17,
1901). 3 See Fitzner, /rtjj/>«, for details; also Der Deutsche Export.
* The Germans call Southwest Africa their " Schmerzenkind." Hauser, p. 41 ;
Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 324.
568 COLONIZA'IION
and llie distance of the latter colony were fatal obstacles to the
development of trade. Valuable woods in New Guinea could not
be transported to the coast and still yield a profit, and the cotton
of the island, though of splendid quality and long staple, could not
realize a price on European markets which would cover the cost of
production and freight charges,^ and still leave a reasonable margin
of profit. In Togo ^ and Kamerun trade-interests had long existed,
and from East Africa also many valuable products could be drawn ;
choice woods, palm-oil and kernels, tropical fruits, copra, sugar,
ivory, and caoutchouc wore among them, although the last two
articles named were becoming more and more scarce under a sys-
tem of ruthless exploitation. Cacao, coffee, tea, and a promising
quality of tobacco (from New Guinea) were raised in the several
tropical colonies, and seemed to point to future gains as recompense
for present toil and sacrifice. As a supply region, then, the colonies
were eminently unsatisfactory ; nor did they afford a profitable mar-
ket for German wares. The native peoples either had little to give
in exchange for German goods, or their needs were so few and their
improvidence so great that they did not care to take advantage of
resources which they possessed. This was the case particularly in
Southwest Africa and New Guinea. The Herero of the former
country clung to their one form of wealth, cattle, with religious
fervor, and would sell only those beasts that were old, sick, or be-
witched ; ^ the Papuans of New Guinea were quite satisfied with
their lot, and desirous only of such minor articles as iron hatchets
and knives."* Most of the native peoples under the German flag
confined their demand to powder and guns, and to alcoholic spirits,
goods which the government was unwilling to supply.
1 Blum (p. 103) .says the pltts in the transport costs must be made up for by a iiiiitm
in the cost of production or a melius in quality of product — for all of which practice
and experience are needed. The wide fluctuations of the European markets are ex-
ceedingly harmful to the development of cotton-raising (p. 171). Cf. Schmidt, II, 409.
2 An exceptionally full treatment of the economic possibilities of Togo is given by
Klose, pp. 547 ff. ^ Biittner, pp. 25 ff., 86.
* For ages Papuans have traded only when absolute need has frightened them out of
their laziness. This trade was carried on by means of periodical, rotating markets and
festivals. As usual, the folk of the smaller islands have become the industrial special-
ists and traders. Papuan manufactured articles of export are largely " objects of
ethnological interest." Hagen, pp. 214 ff.
One of the irritating features of the native trade is the amount of dickering neces-
sary. T>ong discussions are to the native a favorite diversion ; he insists u])on barter-
ing each article separately and prolongs his enjoyment to the despair of the unhappy
German. Schmidt, I, 187.
MODERN GERMAN COLONIZATION 569
East Africa and Kamerun present certain additional trading
conditions which entitle them to separate mention. In Kamerun
the Germans were long irritated by the Dualla tribe, a people of
middlemen, who insisted upon retaining for themselves the privi-
lege of trading between widely diverse conjunctures — the essential
advantage of the frontier-trade. During the earlier years of occu-
pation, they offered much open and covert opposition to the expan-
sion of German trade with the interior ; of late, however, their
power has been weakened by the extension inland of the imperial
arms. In East Africa trade has remained for centuries in the
hands of Arabs and natives of India, and attempts of the East
Africa Company to lay hands upon the commercial routes and
caravans for purposes of trade and taxation have been, for the
most part, futile.^ The tremendous inertia of custom and the re-
doubtable power of Islam, vested in the sultan of Zanzibar, have
been encountered, in active or passive resistance, at every turn ;
the East Africa Company never got much beyond the invasion
stage. ^
On the whole, then, the trade of these new possessions has not
justified the eager expectations, nor satisfied the longings, of the
acquisition-period. The possession of " colonies " seems to have
been as unsatisfactory in the solution of commercial problems as
of those of emigration. Nor has the development of commerce
with the colonies been such as to afford any convincing instances
to those who asserted that trade would follow the flag. If truth
be told, the tendency of trade seems to have been to follow the
British, and for obvious reasons. It was only by the use of English
trade-marks, for example, that the Germans managed to get any
hold at all in Southwest Africa ; their goods were regarded as
" German trash," ^ and the demand for them under their own
mark and form was very small. Here again the Germans brought
up against the barrier of century-old and time-hallowed custom,
as well as against the superior elasticity and development of
the British commercial system. The tariff regulations mentioned
above, however moderate, could not but have had their effect
upon an incipient trade which called for the utmost freedom of
1 The Indians (especially the Banians) are sly and bad, but indispensable to the
Germans for the present. Schmidt, I, 181.
2 Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 327.
^ This was about 1840, when Germans first appeared as merchants in Southwest
Africa. Keltie, p. 171.
570 COLONIZATION
development. 1 Statistics of Germany's trade with her colonies ex-
hibit, on the whole, an uninteresting dead-level. It is found that
while exports have remained practically stationary, imports, espe-
cially of manufactured wares, have increased somewhat in volume.
The decline of caoutchouc and ivory under a system of ruthless
destruction has already been alluded to. In general, Germany's
share in the exports and imports of the Schutzgebiete is insignifi-
cant ; it appears, however, to be on the increase.^ But, though
the development of the German colonial trade has not been such
as to satisfy the inflated hopes of the colonial party, the recital
of its story need cause no shame to the Germans. They were
working against overwhelming odds. The companies, however
culpable, cannot with justice be held to full account for all the
mismanagement and mistakes incident to their performance of
temporary and inconsistent functions ; even if the directors were
seriously at fault, the evil occasioned was rather local than gen-
eral in its incidence. There was a singular moderation and care
displayed by the government in the whole matter ; this, again, in
all probalMlity, must be referred to the influence of Bismarck ; fortu-
nately for the Germans, the governor of the mechanism seems to
have discharged its function with rare precision.
Internal Improvements ; Budget
After the government had gathered the reins of power into its
own hands, commercial matters were set at once upon a better
footing. The companies themselves, especially that of East Africa,^
began to feel themselves more nearly equal to the discharge of
their business functions now that the incubus of administration
had been removed. The imperial government operated, if not witli
skilled hand, certainly with farsighted purpose. Scientific expe-
ditions were systematically organized and experiment stations were
1 The manufactured articles imported into East Africa are mostly from England,
America, Switzerland, and India. Arms and (inferior) powder are about the only
articles demanded of the Germans. Schmidt, I, i79ff. I'hilippson (pp. 32, 44) had
predicted (1880) that colonies could not he permanently retained by a country of such
unfortunate geographical position as Germany ; he prophesied that they would fall
into England's market.
2 The import trade of Germany with West Africa attained its higli-water mark in
1891 (M. 5,600,000). Since 1896 its rise has been due to imperial subventions, espe-
cially for Southwest Africa. The statistics here involved are admittedly poor and
corrupt. Only general tendencies can be shown. For details, see Der Deutsche Ex-
port, pp. 56 ff . ; Fitzner; Statesman's Year-Book, etc. ' Schmidt, I, 122 ff.
MODERN CxERMAN COLONIZATION 571
founded for the investigation of conditions of soil, climate, etc. ;
the acclimatization of various grains, vegetables, and fruits became
a subject for study and experiment. The Hinterland of West and
Southwest Africa had been vigorously opened up in the early years
of the imperial government ; East Africa, and later New Guinea,
now offered a fresh field for exploits and advance. Military and
commercial roads were built and carefully patrolled.^ In general,
however, trade from the interior still passes over the narrow native
" paths," as it has done from time immemorial ; ^ the solution of
the cjuestion of communication still looms up as a sine qua non of
effective occupation and development. The imperial coin has been
made legal tender in most of the colonies. In Southwest Africa,
it is said, the once prevalent British coin is becoming more scarce ;
but in Togo, where trade-interests have been better developed,
British currency is much preferred.^
In the matter of transmarine communication, the government's
hand has been active from the first. Liberal subventions ^ were
granted to African lines, and by the early nineties fair communi-
cations had been established. New Guinea and the Bismarck
Archipelago were dependent solely upon Dutch and English lines
until recently ; the New Guinea Company did nothing to facilitate
local or European connections and the government could, at that
time, accomplish little. At present the German colonies do not
suffer to any great extent from absence of external communi-
cation.^ Railroads in the colonies are a more crying need, and are
no more than in their beginnings. Railroad development can do
much for Southwest Africa, where the chief obstacles to the
opening-up of the interior lie in the time, danger, and cost of
transport across the sandy desert that borders the coast. Cable
connection is now made with all the African protectorates and
1 They have generally been of an unnecessary width and quality, inasmuch as
length and penetration have been sacrificed. Natives of Togo cannot see the use of
a road several meters in width ; they solemnly march in "goose-order" along the
edges, in the good old ancestral way. Meinecke, p. 16.
2 Cf. Hauser, p. 13. Where there are no native paths (e.g. in parts of New Guinea)
a passage has to be hacked out, step by step, through the dense jungle. Krieger,
p. 243-
3 Loeb, p. 53 ; Meinecke, p. 43 ; Klose, p. 127.
* The first subvention was legalized April 6, 1885 ; after this time subventions
became more and more common. Der Deutsche Export, pp. 47-4S.
^ Fitzner, I and II, passim. An account of then existing connections is to be
found in Globus, LXXIX, No. 9 (March 7, 1901), p. 146.
572
COLONIZATION
limited telegraph and telephone lines (largely military) are found
in all the colonies.^
On the whole, considering the obstacles which the Germans
have had to meet, and their inexperience in governing dependen-
cies, it must be admitted that they have coped manfully with an
extremely troublesome situation, sparing neither money, effort, nor
lives in the solution of commercial and other problems, presented
in their most forbidding forms. Throughout, the attitude of the
colonizing power has been that of modesty and of dogged perse-
verance, of willingness to learn and to correct errors. There has
been no extravagance countenanced, and yet the expense has been
grievously heavy. Many brave lives have been lost in battle, and
many more sacrificed to the deadly climate, with its fatal fevers
and dysentery.^ In comparison with such irreparable losses, ex-
penses of administration may seem slight ; but, as has been seen,
they were such as to discourage the enthusiastic and reasonably
strong colonial companies. From the time of their annexation
until the late nineties, Togo and Kamerun managed to pay their
own way ; since that time, however, they have been the recipients
of rapidly increasing imj^crial subventions. The small Jaluit Com-
pany is the only one which has regularly balanced its budget with-
out state aid. The expense incurred by the empire in the entire
or partial administration of East and Southwest Africa and New
Guinea has been heavy from the first, and manifests a tendency to
increase steadily.^ The heavy debt item of the budget is, of course,
the expense of military occupation. The credit items consist of
the subventions, and of various taxes, — e.g. on natives, on business
firms, etc., — customs dues, income from railroads, and other minor
income. The receipts from the customs form by far the largest of
these items, excepting always the subventions.
1 Fitzner, I and II, passim. All the Schutzgebiete are in the Welipostverein.
2 The story goes that there were always two governors en route between the
English West African possessions and the home-land ; one, in his coffin, being carried
home for burial, and the other hastening to take his vacant place.
* According to Loeb (p. 6 1), expenses in behalf of the colonies rose from M. 9,497,000
in 1896-1897 to 25,200,000 in 1899. The full estimates, he says (p. 63), were never
allowed by the imperial legislature. He notes (p. 70) the interesting fact that Kamerun
alone has been required to repay subventions, on a basis of annual installments, to
the imperial treasury. The budget and debt-contracting powers have been in the
hands of the imperial legislature since 1892, although here the emperor's hand is still
very powerful (p. 48 ff.). P"or details, see Fitzner, I and \\, passim, and l.oeb, pp. 56 ff.
In the former are to be found details of taxation, tax-collection, expenses of various
kinds, and the like.
MODERN (;ERMAN COLONIZATION 573
To the Germans, then, as well as to other peoples, world-domin-
ion has proved itself to be an expensive luxury. They seem to
regard it as worth the cost ; indeed, it has been charged by certain
recalcitrants^ that the popular mind is unsettled in the matter of
the colonies to the verge of megalomania. The criticism is made
that improvements of unquestioned value at home are delayed by
reason of excessive and imprudent grants for questionable enter-
prises in the colonies. But by this lavishness the Germans thought
to raise the importance of the empire in the eyes of the world.
The " Native-Question "
The native-question in any colony is one which, for the attain-
ment of any adequate results, must be attacked at the same time
from the general and from the specific points of view. Its satis-
factory solution, if such solution is ever possible, must call into
requisition the results of the most advanced thought in ,the fields
of ethnology and the science of society. In this place, however, a
specific study, with but casual reference to general principles, is
less out of place, because of the homogeneous character of the
natives of the German colonies ; the typical virtues and defects of
the German system stand out, therefore, more consistently, and
lend themselves to a briefer and less involved treatment.
As in other issues of colonial policy, so here, the successes and
failures of the Germans are intimately bound up with the national
character and disposition. Theoretically, German administrators
should have known a great deal about native peoples and their
life ; if they remained ignorant in any cases, it was certainly not
for lack of portly volumes on these subjects, constructed with the
usual laborious GribidlicJikeit. An acquaintance with such sources,
on the part of colonial administrators, is far from exceptional ; but
the most important contribution of scientific training to the han-
dling of the native-question, as presented to the Germans, appears
in the distinctly sane view which the administrators as a class are
enabled to take before this troubled issue. Most of them have
realized that the German possessions, in common with all other
tropical countries, find in the presence of native races an essential,
even though variable, and often merely potential, factor in public
wealth. Years have served to strengthen the conviction that the
1 Speech of Herr Richter in the Reichstag (New York Times, January ,10, 1902).
574 COLONIZATION
Germans are thrown back upon the native peoples for what assist-
ance they are to get, even though that be shght, in the development
of colonial resources. ^ Little false sentiment is to be found and
few grandiloquent expressions of purely humanitarian aims. The
problem is approached with 'cool head and with a method that is
scientific, even though over-academic in its first expressions.
This promising attitude was compromised first by the eminently
temporizing policy of the chartered companies, and, later, by bu-
reaucratic narrow-mindedness and military rigor. The administra-
tion of the companies, with its shifty and uncertain policy, was about
the worst system to which the fate of the native could have been
intrusted. They exercised both too much and too httle power;
they imposed upon and irritated the native, without being able to
enforce wholesome discipline, or, indeed, caring to do so. They
were in the field for very tangible and immediate ends, and had
no inclination or ambition to foresee the future and prepare for it.
No predetermined and settled policy existed under their regime ;
they took little or no account of the character and customs of the
native peoples of their districts. In New Guinea and the Pacific
islands the results of their inefficiency were, of course, less notice-
able, amounting only to the death of a number of brave men ; but
in Southwest and East Africa the outcome has been more momen-
tous. The losses occasioned by the hostility of Witbooi and of
Maharero may not have been directly chargeable to the arrogance
and stupidity of Company officials ; ^ the uprising in East Africa,
however, which finally cost the local Company its political existence,
had its immediate cause in tactless and oppressive measures, mo-
tived by a curious combination of greed, timidity, and parsimony.
No attention was paid to the warnings of British officers who knew
well the dangerous mood of the Arabs and Swahili ; these resentful
1 The value of the native peoples is recognized by almost all the authorities ; the
case is stated most strongly by Blum, pp. 47, 102, 162 ; Pfeil, Vorschlage, 60 ff. ; Her-
mann, p. 82.
2 The earlier uprisings have been, of course, relatively overshadowed by the troubles
in Southwest Africa which have been going on now for some years and at a grave
cost of resources and lives. Military operations against the Herero and their allies
have been most difficult owing to the physical character of the colony ; and despite
the adoption of the arduous "hunting out" style of campaign, the end is not nearly
in sight. The voting of extra credits for Southwest Africa has cost the Kaiser and
his ministers much trouble from the opposition. The modest progress that the colony
showed is now set back for an indefinite period to come, and the whole colonial pro-
gramme has been rendered distasteful to a large number of Germans.
MODERN GERMAN COLONIZATION 575
peoples were handled with entire lack of caution and of fair con-
sideration, and were not long in discovering and profiting by the
essential weakness of their oppressors.^
Severity and Cruelty : Maladapt ability
The companies had no native policy, therefore ; but with the
entrance of the imperial rule there appeared, full-fledged, a most
simple and definite system. The invincible Prussian army would
put these reckless and insubordinate savages down, once and for
all. This was, again, the military spirit fostered by German life
and training ; and it was not without its salutary effect in the case
in hand. Much objection may be had to the bureaucrat, with his
petty powers and small tyranny, who followed along with the im-
perial rule, but little can be urged against the German doctrine of
force. The native understands force ; it is about the only thing
that is permanently and wholesomely imposing to him ; and any
colonizing people does well to flash the blade from out the scab-
bard now and then. The effect can generally be produced without
striking often and cruelly ; in the case of the Germans, however,
it appears that resort to actual bloodshed has shown itself to be
necessary again and again. Dismissal of incompetent and insolent
company officials and of '■'■ scJineidige Lieutenants" would, doubt-
less, have been in the nature of the ounce of prevention, but, under
the circumstances, these were an inevitable incubus of the system.
Much must be set down to the account of inexperience of contact
with native races, and consequent ignorance of and contempt for
their customs and prejudices, on the part of the average colonial
functionary ; taken all in all, however, this severity was far better
than a wavering policy and indecision.^
Too often, however, condonable military strictness has been
called upon to account for conspicuous examples of individual
1 F. Fabri, Fiinf Jahre, etc., pp. 65 ff., 85 ff. ; Keltie, pp. 254 ff. ; Johnston, p. 256 ;
Keane, Africa, II, iSo; Dove, pp. i6off., 178; Globus, LXXIX, No. 9, p. 134. The
native princes felt that they had been hoa.\ed by Peters and others in the matter of
the " treaties " in which they had signed away land and power. They had never under-
stood the import of these documents, which were, indeed, of the most flimsy sort.
Schmidt (I, 12-13) gives a typical example of Peters's treaties.
2 F. Fabri, Fiinf Jahre, etc., p. 1 1 1 ; Pfeil, Vorschlage, pp. 65 ff. ; Studien, etc.,
p. 256 ; Boshart, p. 184. Keltie (pp. 259-262) compares German activity in East Africa
with the efforts of the British in the same region, to the great disadvantage of the
latter.
576 COLONIZATION
cruelty. From time to time tales of indescribable tortures inflicted
upon natives in the Kamerun region have shocked the civilized
world. Insignificant faults have been punished with wanton and
senseless cruelty. Flagrant cases of the eighties seem to have
found their aftertypes at the beginning of a new century.^ The
Germans seem to feel that there is something abnormal about these
bursts of murderous rage. They are not countenanced, ^ and the
feeling of the responsible administrators and colonists about them
is one of anger and shame. They are regarded by some as evidence
of a distemper for which the significant term Tropenkollcr has
been coined.^ There really appears to be something pathological
about these cases. No doubt the German subordinate officer is
inclined to be tyrannical in the exercise of petty power, — the
German system is hardly calculated to instill ideals of self-restraint
in the treatment of inferiors, — but it is hard to believe that any
man in his right mind could enjoy poking a ramrod down a defense-
less negro's windpipe, or that he would feel it necessary, for the
sake of discipline, to whip numbers of women publicly and brutally,
before the eyes of their men. This is not the wild burst of sudden
anger ; it is barbarous and insane torture. These examples are not
the worst. And a reasonable physical cause for it all is really not
far to seek : the Germans are naturally maladaptable to an unfa-
miliar physical environment, and, as a rule, take no pains to neu-
tralize this weakness by artificial adaptation. All experience of the
white race with equatorial Africa goes to show that it is about as
unlikely a region in which to keep health and sanity as any on the
globe ; the Belgian Congo State, as well as the German protector-
ates, has its tale of shame to tell. Here is a region, then, where
special care in matters of tropical hygiene and dietary are de-
manded of a European population, even though it come from the
1 New York Times, December 22, 1901. The earlier cases were those of Leist,
Wehlan, and Peters; in Giesebrecht's collection are found letters from a number of
scientists and administrators, condemning the above native-torturers, together with a
communication from Peters, in which he seeks to defend his course. The case of
Peters has received special attention because of his prominence in German colonial
history. See also Schmidt, II, 96 ff.; Johnston, p. 25S ; Hermann, p. 84 ; New York
Times, April 15, 1894. Giesebrecht (p. 23) mentions a study of his own on " Kolonial-
greuel," in jVeiie Deutsche Rimdschau, 1S95, Heft ii.
2 The three culprits mentioned above were cashiered. The New York Times
(December 15, 1901) reports light punishments, but according to Sir H. H. Johnston,
(p. 25.S), publicity was given to these cases, prosecution w.ts vigorous, and the punish-
ments proportional to the offenses. Later years exhibit the same policy.
8 Der Deutsche E.xport, p. 91 ; Schmidt, II, 74-76; Pfeil, Studien, etc., p. 252.
MODERN C.RRMAN COLONIZATION 577
Mediterranean states. With the Germans, much more of caution
IS necessary, for they are a people that has always acclimatized
poorly in low latitudes, as statistics, even of Algeria, will show.^
However, either from ignorance or from willfulness, the Germans
are found to have neglected certain prime essentials of tropical
hygiene. The more self-evident rules, regarding clothing, marching
in crowded ranks, and the like, were perforce observed, but, as the
reports of importations into the German colonies and the tales of
eye-witnesses unite to show, the German absolutely refused to re-
nounce in tropical colonies the heavy alcoholic drinks of the father-
land. No people can endure the continued use -of these liquors
under the equator ; the Spanish and Portuguese had to learn to
be sparing in the use of even the light wines to which they had
been accustomed. Doubtless heat, hardship, and coarse food do
their share in wrecking the digestive and nervous systems, but in-
temperance in the tropics — and this may well be temperance at
home — must certainly be taken into grave account. It should be
reckoned in with the climatic agents which induce such frequent
melancholia and consequent insanity or suicide in the equatorial
districts of Africa.^ Another unfortunate factor is present in the
iron inflexibility of the social system in the colonies. Distinctions
of rank, social position, and the like are rigorously maintained ;
nothing short of imminent annihilation seems likely to modify the
strictness of etiquette and caste. There are no "clubs" in the
German colonies ; each military circle of a few members herds by
itself and gulps down its steins of Bavarian beer in lonely and
dignified seclusion. Homesickness plays its familiar role in in-
ducing gloom and despair, and consequent deterioration of resistive
power. It is generally admitted that a cheerful disposition and
good-fellowship do much to ward off maladies in any part of the
earth, and especially in the tropics, where home influences and the
society of women and of friends are but rarely to be enjoyed. ^
These are some of the factors that render the German less master
of himself in the colonies than he is at home, and predispose him
to gusts of passion on slight occasion. They also accentuate the
irritable and petty tendencies of a shortsighted bureaucracy, and
are, to a great extent, responsible for an ill grace of manner which
is sure to awaken resentment in a native population, particularly
1 Bordier, Col., pp. 55, 91, 155-157, 184-187; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 383.
2 Boshart, pp. 225 ff. ^ Bigelow, in Harper's, C, 577-590.
578 COLONIZATION
if the latter is already restive under a brand-new harness of ill fit-
ting, cramping, and generally trivial restrictions. The contact of
such a bureaucracy with a savage or semi-civilized population can
easily be figured in imagination ; police regulations calculated for
Berlin, bundles of acts whose transgression is a matter of daily
occurrence among the unwary sojourners in German towns — all
these formed a system whose application to the Sudanese and Ban-
tus was incongruous even to the local ofificial.i Reiterated appeals
on the part of opponents of this system, so ill-suited to its environ-
ment, have not failed entirely of effect.
Strenge MIT Gerechtigkeit
A change which created, as it were, a new ideal of the treatment
of the natives came with the downfall of the companies and the
consequent presence in the colonies of well-chosen imperial com-
missioners and commanders. The typical case is that of Wiss-
mann, in East Africa, where the expiring Company had, by its
oppression and its indiscreet attitude toward native and Arab prej-
udices, roused a rebellion with which it was utterly unable to cope.
To this scene of disorder and uproar Bismarck sent the scientist and
explorer. Dr. von Wissmann, a man chosen rather for his knowl-
edge and personality than for any distinctive military achievements.
He quelled the insurrection in a masterly manner, promptly execut-
ing the leader. Not only that ; he gained the confidence of the
natives, together with their wholesome respect, so that his succeed-
ing administration of the colony in peace only added to his reputa-
tion as an ''Aft-ikakcmier." ^ His successes led to imitation of his
methods on the part of his subordinates and brother-administra-
tors ; there was established a new fashion, as it were, in colonial
management. The formula of this system was simplicity itself :
" sternness with justice." In dealing with the rebels in East Af-
rica, Wissmann's first object was to teach a "■ griindlicJie LcJirc^'
to make an imposing display of European superiority and power.
The effect upon the native population was instantaneous.^ This
1 Boshart, pp. 182-183, 186 ; Globus, LXXIX, No. 9, p. 134.
2 IJismarck referred to Wissmann as "the man who knew how to deal with natives."
Poschinger, p. 244.
•'' The natives said of his rule : " Bisher war bei euch Deutschen alles Spielerei,
jetzt sieht man doch, dass euer Sultan ernst macht und da wird es euch gelingen,
wirklich die llerren des Landes zu werden." Schmidt, I, 64; cf. Geffcken, in The
Forum,
MODERN (GERMAN COLONIZATION 579
administrator knew also how to temper severity with mercy and
to use his prestige to secure in time of peace what he had gained
in war. The " Wissmann system " has been complained of by those
whose humanitarian feelings are wounded by violence of any kind in
dealings with the noble savage ; but it is not without its sound ele-
ments of common sense and science. Where practices abhorrent to
the civilized world were found to exist, they were resolutely erad-
icated ; Wissmann dealt blows to the slave-trade of East Africa
from which it will scarcely recover.^ In less essential matters,
however, a wise moderation was displayed ; the bureaucratic system
was discouraged and no attempt was made to interfere with cher-
ished institutions and customs of the indigenous tribes. The Arab
wall and kadi were retained ; and, while German discipline was
enforced, it was rather along general lines than in matters of de-
tail.'-^ The system rested upon a correct recognition of conditions,
intelligent judgment, and respect for the natives' rights and for
their chiefs' authority. The gifts and geniality of Wissmann him-
self played a great part in his successes ; he possessed the qualities
both of leader and organizer. He had the reputation of selecting
realizable aims, and always realizing them, and his prestige was
marred by no fiasco of any moment ; his subordinates were held
strictly to duty and were at the same time assured of power to ful-
fill the task assigned. Their loyalty to this leader is something
exceptional, taking into account the extreme hardships of the serv-
ice in the East African country. It speaks well for the Wissmann
system that it has made out of this difficult district a relatively
peaceful colony ; later difficulties in the attempted application of
civil rule in East Africa led to the re-adoption and consequent vin-
dication of this system. At the accession of Hohenlohe, Wissmann,
who had been recalled by Caprivi, was returned as governor-
general of the protectorate.^
1 Giesebrecht, p. 22 ; Schmidt, I, 188 ff., 224 ff. An interesting passage in F. Fabri
(Fiinf Jahre, etc., p. 55) shows how a development of methods of transportation in
East Africa will necessarily bring about the complete downfall of the slave-trade.
■■^ Bitter complaint is made that the German functionaries take no pains to learn
the native languages, not even spending the time on shipboard on the long journey
to New Guinea in study. The Germans revolt at the " pidgin English " that forms
the only universally understood language of New Guinea and environs. They combat
it also in Africa. Blum, pp. 165-166; Engler, p. 114; Keane, Africa, II, 19; Pfeil,
Studien, etc., pp. 128-130; R. L. Stevenson, In the South Seas, chap. ii.
3 Schmidt, I, 232 ff., 243-244 ; Giesebrecht, pp. 19 ff. More tact has been displayed
of late by the German officers. Johnston, pp. 257-258. It appears that the climate
580 COLONIZATION
A number of writers who ha\e criticised the nd ministration of
the German colonies have com}iiained of an insufficient display of
military and naval power on the part of the home-government.
They have also asserted that the opening up of the Hintcrhnui
has followed no settled plan and has worked from no stable and
selected base of ()j:)crations.^ The number of imperial troops has
indeed been small ; but since the time of Wissmann, and especially
in East Africa, it has been the policy of the government to utilize
native auxiliaries abcnit a relatively insignificant nucleus of regulars.
The warlike tribes who would, in any case, lend themselves unwill-
ingly to the regime of industry, are glad to be mustered in and to
fight under European officers. The Sudanese have been particu-
larly useful in this line, com))letely outclassing the Bantus ; and
the Solomon Islanders are also regarded as suitable material for
the same ends.^ The idea is that the warlike tribes shall hold the
more docile natives to work, thereby effecting a division of labor
of which all shall reap the good results.^
The Tropical Labor Issue
Here we touch upon the question of labor in tropical colonies ;
it is rightly recognized as the vital issue, and strenuous, if unsuc-
cessful, efforts have been put forth in attempts at its solution. It
is a modern riddle of the Sphin.x at which the various nations have
guessed, each in its characteristic way. The conclusions of the
Germans, as a well-informed people, new to the subject, singularly
free from bias and open to new truth, possess an especial and pecul-
iar interest to the student of this vexed problem. It seems, in the
and hardships finally told upon Wissmann so as to impair health and temper, and to
a certain extent, former reputation.
1 See Schmidt, I, 94; Boshart, p. 183; Pfeil, Vorschliige, p. 43 ; F. Fabri, Fiinf
Jahre, etc., pp. 71 ff.; Sievers, Afrika, p. 405. Complaint is also made of governmental
parsimony, which F. Fabri (p. 89) declares to be false economy ; " es geht in solchen
Dingen haufig wie beim Ankauf der sibyllinischen Biicher."
2 Unfortunately the Sudanese insist upon the presence of their families on any e.x-
tended expeditions. While the women are useful in some ways, they form an unde-
sirable camp-following. It is noted that the negro soldiers, although they were soon
able to manipulate the mechanism of the breech-loading rifles, are likely to shoot high
and erratically in action. Apparently they have not as yet full confidence in the new
weapon. See Schmidt, II, 374, 385; Pfeil, Vorschliige, pp. 66 ff.
'* Pfeil, Vorschliige, pp. 60, 67 ; cf. vStudien, etc., p. 239. No .satisfactory system of
taxing the natives has been devised. The Germans have decided, however, in favor
of a hut-tax versus a poll-tax ; the hut, they say, is something that cannot evade taxes
by a timely disappearance. A small portion only of the colonial income is derived
from this source.
MODERN GERMAN COLONIZATION 581
first place, that the Germans have been regularly unsuccessful in
creating a supply of free labor by the stimulation of wants ; the
ground upon which they work is unpropitious, and no support for
their economists' theories, in the shape of actual results, is yet
forthcoming. The natives are almost all tropical peoples, whose
needs are few and will continue so to be, except in the matter of
intoxicants and implements of war which the sentiment of the
civilized world refuses to supply. ^ The native, as a factor in eco-
nomic supply and demand, is, as has been seen, a virtual nonentity.
There is need of ages of slow development, or of some effectual
forcing process, before the Papuan and his ilk begin to respond
to stimuli which are calculated to appeal to anything higher than
momentary desire or caprice. But the tropics, ex hypotJiesi, must
be developed, and Europeans are, of themselves, unable to effect
such development ; if this be granted, nothing remains as alterna-
tive except the adoption of some form of compulsory labor imposed
upon the tropical peoples. Avowed slavery is, of course, inhibited
by forces too strong to be opposed. Substitution of more advanced
races is costly and has been rendered well-nigh impracticable by
the attitude of the governments which sway the fates of the peoples
available for coolie service. The system of compulsory labor
under contract remains ; a system which, like coolie labor, is a
partial return, in the form of semi-slavery, to the rough-and-ready
methods of the ancient world.
The Germans did not reach this alternative, which seems to
so many of their competent writers a last and inevitable resort,
without exploring all the culs-de-sac along in the way, in the hope
of discovering some other solution less repugnant to themselves
and others. The attempt to introduce a wage system was early
shown to be futile ; what little labor was thus secured was both
low in efficiency and extremely irregular. Even the Krumen who
were available along the Togo and Kamerun seaboard refused to
enter upon contracts of over one year's duration ; at its expiration
they insisted upon returning to their own tribes with what they
had earned, and it was only in consequence of the reckless ex-
penditure which ensued that a labor force could again be recruited
from this source.^ The labor supply was similarly intermittent
in the rest of the African colonies, while in New Guinea it was
^ Cf. Finsch, Samoafahrten, pp. 26, 62.
2 The labor of the Krus was relatively expensive, and its cost was enhanced by
the periodic need of double transportation. See Keane, Man, etc., pp. 53-54;
582 COLONIZATION
practically impossible to enlist any workers whatsoever under a
voluntary system.^
After this disillusionment, recourse was had, especially in East
Africa and New Guinea, to imported labor of various types. In
the latter protectorate the system was really one of slave-transfer,
whereby the ruling chief of a limited area, or the old men of a
village, sold the vital forces of captives or subjects (debtors, often-
times) for a consideration ; that some form of compulsion on the
part of the Melanesian native authorities was usually i^resent, even
though it was not actually demonstrable, is commonly conceded
by the German writers themselves. This system of slavery for a
term, which carried with it the so-called " Labor Trade," had been
shamefully abused by the Queenslanders, and was already under
universal condemnation ; the missionaries in the South Sea were
bitterly opposed to it. The Germans honestly attempted, there-
fore, to carry out regulations which would give the appearance, at
least, of fairness and humanity.^ They intended also to keep clear
of the many possible misunderstandings with the native j^eoples, and
thus avoid the inevitable vendetta with its consequent unpopular
punitive expeditions, and other evil and dangerous consequences.^
An attempt was made to give Kaiser Wilhelmsland a better repu-
tation among those islanders whose services could be secured.*
But results were not commensurate with the effort put forth ; the
death-rate of the laborers, though lowered, was still believed to be
high, and the " trade " in natives still continued to be carried on
in unseaworthy ships. Inadequacy of transport facilities often left
Keichenow, p. 44. Hermann (p. 86) says that native labor has been relatively over-
paid in Southwest Africa.
1 The best reports of native labor come from Togo and Kamerun, but even here
it is found that the natives regularly choose such minor occupations as demand little
physical effort. The Dualla were always energetic traders, and continue to be so,
but there is a conspicuous absence of smiths, wheelwrights, etc. See Pfeil, Vor-
schlage, pp. 54 ff. ; Schmidt, II, 89-90, 168 ff.
2 Pfeil, Studien, etc., pp. 24 iff. ; Finsch, Samoafahrten, p. 26; Egerton, p. 396;
Blum, pp.47, 78; Schmidt, 11,410-412. Krieger enters somewhat upon the details
of the labor trade (pp. 244 ff.). The native never believed in the Airn'ohcvioJus.
Blum, p. 162.
^ If a native died during his term, the vendetta came at once into play, and the
next Kuro])eans to meet the relatives of the deceased were exposed to unexpected
attack and murder. Money-commutation for such a death, together with accrued
wages, were, as a rule, promptly forwarded to the relatives or vill.ige authorities of
the dead man. Krieger, pp. 244-245.
■* The native laborers said of Kaiser Wilhelmsland: " No haiL-ni [food], no sun-
day, |)lcnly fight, plenty die." Blum, p. 135.
MODERN GERMAN COLONIZATION 583
the government burdened with an unruly crowd of recruits : those
who had arrived previously and whose wages must be paid from
the time of arrival, and those whose terms were served out and
who were eager to leave the neighborhood of the whites forever.
Few cases of renewed contracts are to be found. ^ And when all
these difficulties had been somehow met or evaded, the charac-
ter of the labor supply was, after all, completely inadequate. The
natives could be forced to an occasional activity in fetching and
carrying, and could be induced to dig the earth in a more or less
desultory fashion, but for the finer kinds of labor, in the raising
of coffee and cacao, it was necessary from the first to empltjy the
higher-class labor of the Javanese and Chinese.^
Moreover, the problem of holding the native to labor, when
his presence had been secured, was not yet solved. '"^ The Mela-
nesian could not be effectively controlled by a system of fines ; he
had no idea of the value of money, and whether he received a
little more or a little less was a matter of complete indifference
to him. In any case his earnings went to the authorities of his
native village. And it was found that penalties in the form of
extra hours taxed the European overseer far more than they
did the nonchalant native ; the unsophisticated functionaries were
likewise astonished to find that the orthodox German system of
imprisonment was absolutely ineffective. "To lie eight days long
upon his back, to receive his meals regularly, and every other day
to take a walk, is, for the Kanaka, a life of good cheer ; and one
can easily conceive the wrath of the settlers when protracted
and costly legal proceedings found their conclusion in such a
1 The natives reckoned their terms by "fellow-moons," of which they counted ten
to the year; this difference of standard led to frequent misunderstandings. Blum,
p. 135. Too much seems to have been made of a few cases of renewed contracts.
2 Blum, p. 166. The government was also obliged to furnish a particular kind of
food to the Melanesian coolies : yams and taro. Pfeil, Studien, etc., pp. 238, 242.
Blum (p.- 136) thinks the natives may be educated through the agency of Chinese and
Malay overseers and middlemen. Not long ago it was announced (New York Times,
March 30, 1902) that the Tuskegee Institute had been called upon by the German
Colonial Economic Society to send five graduates to Togo ; these young negroes were
to assist three predecessors, sent eighteen months before, in teaching the natives
the arts of agriculture.
3 Some German writers have accused the authorities of spending their time in
deciding how to hold the native to labor, when the vital question was how to secure
the native at all. The Germans seem to have had a way of settling a problem before
they were perfectly sure of the actual terms in which it was to be presented. Pfeil,
Vorschlage, p. 60 ; F. Fabri, Fiinf Jahre, etc., p. 79.
584 COLONIZATION
chastisement." ^ The planters, naturally enough, insisted upon the
right of private corporal correction. The courts were distant and
uncertain, and the struggle for commercial existence near and
sure. Beating exactly met the natives' ideas of punishment, and,
as a rule, no grudges were cherished if the causes for such correc-
tion had been set forth with requisite clearness and emphasis. But
the grant of such privilege would amount to the legalization of
one of the most characteristic and most odious marks of slavery.
Humanitarian sentiment would be wounded in distant Europe ;
and thus what the actors on the spot, with few exceptions,
regarded as necessary, could not but be permanently disallowed.
Infringements of this prohibition have doubtless occurred, but
they have been relatively few ; the missionaries are alert to de-
nounce any possible faults of the system. It is no wonder that the
situation has remained unaltered for some years back.^ In this em-
barrassing and hopeless situation, the government turned to the
time-honored coolie system. Javanese and Chinese were enlisted in
Batavia and Singapore ; and, though the costs, including, of course,
double transportation, were excessive, the new arrivals seemed to
promise much for the future of the colony. Political complications
and national jealousies, however, have closed the several sources of
supply. In the early nineties, alleging the unhealthfulness of the
New Guinea settlements, both Holland and England forbade the
further export of coolies from their colonies, after having rendered
that export as costly and as inconvenient as possible.^ The Germans
later cherished some hopes of deriving a supply of labor directly
from China ; but the well-known hostility of the Chinese authori-
ties to the coolie system soon put an end to this expectation.'*
1 Pfeil, Studien, etc., p. 254; for the other a.spect.s of the question of punishment,
see pp. 252-256, passim.
2 According to Pfeil, an officer of long experience (see Giesebrecht, p. 130), in
view of the failure of coolie importation, the defective system just described must
be maintained, with all its difficulties, for some time to come. Studien, etc., p. 244.
'^ The resentment of the Germans attaches with especial bitterness to the British ;
tales are not lacking which, if true, establish serious charges of the breaking of
neutrality, of the stirring up of native passions, etc. British missionaries come in for
a good share of this accusation. As for the coolie question, it is asserted that the
British were especially proficient in the selection of crippled and diseased natives,
whose subsequent deaths or ailments were then charged to the deadly climate of
New Guinea. Blum, pp. 118, 168; Schmidt, II, 66 ff. ; Pfeil, Studien, etc., p. 240;
Egerton, pp. 400-402 ; Krieger, p. 250.
••Blum, p. 166. Krieger (pp. 236ff.) gives facts concerning the enlistment of
Javanese and Chinese coolies and their life in the colonies.
MODERN GERMAN COLONIZATION 585
Compulsory Labor
Nothing remained, then, if the colonies were to be developed —
and Germany would scarcely renounce this object so close to her
heart without a struggle — but to organize some system of forced
labor, and render it as palatable as possible to European tastes.^
Many of the best administrators and writers on colonial questions
openly support this system and justify their views by fairly con-
sistent lines of argument. The orthodox position, viz., to renounce
all force, is represented chiefly in the writings and utterances of
the older scientists and missionaries,^ though several of the latter
have come out strongly for the enforcement of regular labor as, in
any case, indispensable for the natives' advancement in civilization.^
The model before the eyes of the advocates of forced labor was
the overrated culture system of the Dutch, as developed chiefly
on the island of Java.^ They wish, in effect, to enforce native
labor through the agency of already constituted native authori-
ties, whether those authorities are chiefs or village elders.^ But
1 A brief account of attempts to do away with the virtual slavery existing in East
Africa, by allowing the purchase of '■^Freilu-iefe,'" is given in Annuls Anier. Acad, of
Pol. ajul Soc. Science, XIX, No. 2, p. 164.
2 A collection of opinions on the native question has been made by Giesebrecht ;
this work has been done very completely, and appended biographical sketches of the
various contributors enable the reader to make correction for the personal factor with
some ease. Expressions were elicited from prominent scientists, colonial officials,
and missionaries; the whole collection is extremely valuable and readable. Accord-
ing to the author, the question is still sitb jiidice ; he believes that the more favor-
able views of the older scientists are due to the fact of their having met the native
before he had been irritated and rendered hostile by contact with Europeans. The
more modern officers, administrators, and travelers are unanimous in advocating strict-
ness and sternness, though they all insist upon pairing these with justice ; Strenge
viit Gerec/itigkeit is the typical formula. It is curious how the opinions differ
according as the writer is a military man, a missionary, or a planter. Some of the
judgments rendered are exceedingly strong pieces of work, notably those of Pfeil,
Denhardt, Holub, Peters, and Hiibbeschleiden. Though the author professes to
have reached no definite conclusions, it seems to the present writer that the impres-
sions left by the work, though perhaps a little indistinct because of minor differences
and contradictions, are of undeniable value to the colonial administrator and the stu-
dent. Cf. Miiller, p. 32. Finsch (Samoafahrten, pp. 64 ff.) says he had little difficulty
with the New Guinea natives, for he followed in the steps of the " moon-man," the
Russian scientist, Miklukho-Maclay, who always got along well with native peoples.
? Besides the opinions in Giesebrecht's collection, see especially Pfeil, Vorschlage,
p. 64.
* Cf. pp. 473 ff., above. Pfeil (Studien, etc., pp. 248 ff.) is an advocate of this system.
^ The idea of holding the more tractable tribes to work under compulsion
exercised by more warlike natives, officered by Germans, is likewise a part of the
586 COLONIZATION
conditions in the German protectorates differ so widely from those
in Java that the outcome of such a system must remain an enigma
until it is tried ; the Bantus and Papuans have, as a rule, no chiefs
of an extended and despotic power, ^ and it is extremely doubtful
if any of the native peoples subject to Germany could be managed
under the Dutch system. The islander of the Dutch possessions
is a great advance in character and civilization over anything the
German colonies can produce. The blacks of the latter districts
do not understand what is demanded of them ; they are incorrigibly
improvident. The prevailing conviction among the natives of New
Guinea was that the foreigners would soon depart, — indeed, a
j)reliminary division had already been made of the habitations and
the personal effects likely to be left behind. The negro believes
that the white man will soon grow weary of all this useless activity
and let things return to their former and natural course.-
No system of forced labor has yet been organized ; such a move
would undoubtedly encounter bitter opposition among philanthro-
pists at home and abroad. But the reasons for their faith have
been set forth so clearly and convincingly by some of the most
capable administrators, that they cannot fail to find converts to
their views as time goes on and conditions grow more intolerable.
Given the need, real or imaginary, of developing tropical colonies
under German rule, and, in consequence of considerations already
stated, the inevitable outcome is compulsory labor. A compulsory
labor system, though abhorred as an infringement of the " rights
of man," is, it is claimed, from the standpoint of society's life and
weal, perfectly justifiable. No more is required of the savage than
proposed system. Pfeil is a special advocate of a rotating labor supply, whereby
certain sections of a village population are drawn upon in successive periods. Much
difficulty has been experienced in " localizing " the labor supply, and this had led to
a curious proposition involving the resurrection, in certain respects, of the charac-
teristic provisions of the Spanish encomienda system, as developed in America. The
experience of the Germans goes to show that colonizing powers are rarely able to
invent anything new and revolutionary in the treatment of century-old problems,
even when the sum of modern science and historical research can be drawn upon.
Pfeil, Vorschlage, pp. 57, 69 ff. ; Hermann, p. 88.
^ If there is no chief to exercise compulsion, force of some other nature must be
called into requisition. Pfeil, Vorschlage, p. 72. It is occasionally stated that this or
that people possesses a tribal organization which is comparable to that of the Java-
nese, but, inasmuch as nothing has been made out of these tribes, it is probable that
the eagerness of hope has led to exaggeration. See Blum, p. 21 • Pfeil, Vorschlage,
p. 60; Gldhiis, LXXIX, No. 9, p. 134 ; Schmidt, I, 160 ff. ; Sievers, p. 409.
2 Pfeil, Studien, etc., pp. 238 ff.; lUum (p. 102) says that the labor force of New
Guinea must come from elsewhere.
MODERN GERMAN COLONIZATION 5S7
has been and is demanded of his civilized su))eri(jr ; there is no
more reason why black drones should be tolerated in the hive than
white drones ; vagabondage is, in any case, a disease in the body
of society. European philanthropists have no compunctions about
enforcing industry at home and coercing each member of society
to render his share of service to the public ; but as soon as a hand
is outstretched to impel the distant, and therefore somewhat ideal-
ized, savage to vary his life of tranquillity, the cry of "Taboo ! "
is heard at once. But labor, say these writers, is the basis of all
advance in civilization ; the experience of years has persuaded all
rational missionaries of this.^ Only hy forcing in the thin edge of
the wedge can you open up the possibilities of a higher civilization.
Moreover, along with this alternative of advance, the native stands
unwittingly before another and more serious one, not less to be
dreaded by his friends : that of more or less speedy degradation
and retrogression, if not extinction. It is useless to rail at the
presence of a new human environment which means for the native
the necessity of unwonted activity and the pain of change ; it is
present in response to the action of nature-forces, and the con-
sequences are inevitable. The most valuable service is rendered
to the native by him who will force him, as a child is forced, to
live up to the requirements of the next stage of growth. This is
the gist of the arguments of the advocates of forced labor ; ^ in
theory, at least, they do not lack a certain convincing force, and
^ Especial attention has been directed to the activity of the veteran Hahn in
Southwest Africa. After some years of disappointing experience, he frankly gave up
the attempt to influence the natives through purely religious means. He felt and
acknowledged that an impulse must first be given to the economic life of the native
people, and so devoted his efforts almost exclusively to the teaching of trades and
the improvement of material conditions. Schmidt, II, 280 ff. ; Biittner, pp. 51 ff.
■■^ The arguments of Pfeil carry the most weight, not only because of his high repu-
tation as an administrator, but because of the clarity and vigor of his statement and
the exceptionally pleasing quality of his style. He was one of Peters's coadjutors in
the seizure of East Africa, and has been active in the colonial service ever since.
His arguments are to be found in Vorschlage, pp. 60 ff. ; Studien, etc., pp. 238 ff. ; and
in his letter in Giesebrecht's collection (p. 130). Cf. Dove, pp. 239 ff. 1 Pfeil says of
his own successes: "Dies erklare ich mir nur daraus, weil ich im Principe streng,
im Einzelnen stets mild war und allezeit mich bemiiht habe, gerecht zu sein. . . .
Aber ich habe den Muth als Princip Ernst und Strenge aufzustellen : 6 /xt; dapeU
Avdpwiroi ov waiSeOeTai." Vorschlage, p. 74. This view is expressed more sternly else-
where : " Wir verlangen eine Gegengabe (i.e. service) fiir unseren Verzicht auf das
Recht des Starkeren im Kampfe ums Dasein." Studien, etc., p. 246. Boshart is, as
usual, radical to the extreme, and sees nothing before the native population except
annihilation, which he is not adverse to furthering (pp. 181 ff.). See also Geffcken,
in T/ie Forum ; Finsch, Samoafahrten, pp. 170-172; Dove, pp. 44-45.
588 COLONIZATION
in practice, as far as the German has exercised a master's power,
he seems, with comparatively few exceptions, to have wielded it
well. The present labor conditions are thoroughly unsatisfactory ;
whether a better system can be devised and carried out, is for the
future to show. The Germans are well fitted in many ways to
deal with this most difficult and probably insoluble question.
Missions and Education
It must not be thought that the natives have met only officers
and soldiers in the colonies ; they have been longer acquainted
with the bearers of the staff and scrip than with the wearers of
the sword. German missionaries early extended their activity to
those parts of Africa which later became German colonies. Their
" converts " have been few,^ but their efforts looking to the ad-
vance of material civilization have been far from fruitless. With
the exception of certain visionaries, whose folly and ridiculous
results are recorded,^ they have taken an exceptionally sensible
view of their own activity and its prospects, and are almost uni-
versally commended by the colonial administrators.^ They have
also, though in far less degree than the British missionaries, labored
for the political predominance of the fatherland. Some friction
with the government has been caused by their sectarian squabbles
in the South Sea possessions, and also by their abuse of privileges
and exemption from customs dues, a grant which they utilized in
a way calculated to retard the advance of trade.^ On the whole,
however, they seem to share in a remarkable degree the freedom
from ultra-conservatism and dogma which characterizes the general
attitude of the Germans toward the native tribes.
1 Finsch (Samoafahrten, p. 171) says that in seven years 215 natives of Kaiser
Wilhelmsland had been "converted," at an expenditure of 350,000 marks. From
1842 to 1861 not one Herero, in Southwest Africa, was baptized, for here ability to
read and write formed a condition of baptism. This wise and exceptional condi-
tion seems characteristic of German missionaries; in their freedom from the wor-
ship of numbers of baptisms, confirmations, etc., they form an edifying contrast to
their Anglo-Saxon brethren. See Meinecke, p. 37 ; Boshart, p. 173; Krieger, p. 248;
Schmidt, II, 289; IJlum, pp. 63 ff. 2 pfeil, Studien, etc., pp. 247, 262 ff.
" Pfeil, Studien, etc., pp. 246 ff. ; Finsch, Samoafahrten, p. 170; Krieger, pp. 247 ff.;
F. Fabri, Fiinf Jahre, etc., p. 82 ; Schmidt, I, 237-241 ; II, 288-289 ; cf. lUittner, p. 1 20.
They enjoy an especially high reputation with both Germans and natives in South-
west Africa ; they can carry on a peaceful commerce with both sides, at all times.
Biittner, p. 1 18.
* Schmidt, II, 403; Miiller, pp. 33-35; I'feil, Studien, etc., pp. 11-12; Blum,
pp. 63 ff., 76-83 ; Dove, p. 26.
MODICRN CERMAN COLONIZAI'ION 589
The education of the native has not proceeded ai)ace. Schools
in the colonies are of two types, governmental and missionary.
The latter were, of course, of earlier establishment. In the govern-
mental schools in East Africa attendance has been made com-
pulsory between the ages of si.x and fifteen ; two hours per day
for about ten months in the year. The Mohammedans of East
Africa at first opposed the requirements of school-attendance, fear-
ing that their children would be instructed in Christian doctrines ;
the governmental schools are, however, non-sectarian, and of late
attendance has increased. The "curricula" are generally rational
ones; the rudiments — reading, writing,^ etc. — are taught, and
supplementary education is generally along the line of trades.
Negroes who can play the piano and converse on such esoteric
subjects as the Shakespeare-Bacon controversy are at a discount
with the Germans ; they think they are considerably ahead of the
British here, and boast that in teaching they do not insist upon
German political history, the dates of the Crusades, and the like.
Their experience is that a highly educated negro is a rascal and
absolutely useless for all practical purposes, and they do not mean
to turn out such products.^ The Germans, in their first contact
with African peoples, made some embarrassing and regretted errors
in their fulsome treatment of native " kings' " sons,'^ but these mis-
takes have been speedily recognized, and they seem to be settling
down into an earnest and intelligent attitude toward the grave com-
plexity of difificulties inherent in the contact of widely separated
stages of culture.^
^ German is the language of instruction in one school only (Victoria, Kamerun) ;
elsewhere it is merely a branch of instruction. Globus, LXXIX, No. 9, pp. 1 40-1 41 ;
Engler, p. 114.
2 The other colonizing nations accuse the Germans of insincerity in the alcohol-
prohibitions ; they say that the colonies are inundated with Schnaps. This view is
resented by the Germans, who assert that the increasing import of alcoholic drinks
is for German consumption, however much they deprecate that; they say that, at any
rate, conditions are no worse than in the colonies of other nations. Der Deutsche
Export, pp. 67 ff. ; Schmidt, II, 291-292. In the German colonies it is often hard to
refuse the natives whisky and tobacco when these are the only rewards for which
they will put forth real effort in labor. Schmidt, II, 228.
3 Schmidt, II, 90-92 ; Meinecke, p. 25.
* For these questions of native education and kindred topics, see Meinecke, p. 37 ;
Schmidt, II, 91-92. The government schools are designed in part to fit natives
for the discharge of minor duties in the colonial service. Globus, LXXIX, No. 9, pp.
140-141.
590
COLON I ZAl' ION
The Colonial Service
The general character of the colonial service has already been
indicated ; it was found to possess both the virtues and the defects
of a rigid disciplinary system. Relatively little favoritism appears
in the selection of either the superior or the subordinate imperial
officials. At first there were, of course, no facilities ior securing
a special education for the prospective colonial servant ; the earlier
officials of the government had been, as a rule, subjected to a
rather strict and technical military training, but it is hard to say
whether this was an advantage or a disadvantage in the colonies.
If the service was performed in a spirit more cosmoj)olitan and
enlightened than such training would lead one to e.xpect, it was
doubtless due to the incidental and unprofessional education which
all Germans received. As time went on, the universities attempted
to meet a newly felt need by improvising courses of instruction bear-
ing on the colonial career. The Oriental Seminar in Berlin under-
took training in languages ; scientific investigation was directed
and regulated, and lectures were arranged on tropical hygiene and
kindred subjects. This training was likely to be over-academic in
character ; practical ends were subordinated to the establishment
of " principles," and to elaborate schematization. In the forma-
tion of the colonial personnel too much importance was at first
attached to superficial "experts"; too little weight was given to
personal qualities indispensable in administrators. The essential
qualifications of youth and health were too often overlooked. In
the course of time, however, these errors were detected and recti-
fied ; they were the results, for the most part, of misconceptions
inseparable from incipient activity in an entirely new and strange
field. 1
It was not until the year 1 899 that a special colonial school was
called into existence. It was founded at Witzenhausen, near Gottin-
gen, by a corporation with limited liability, under the protection of
the Prince zu Wied. The semi-private nature of the enterprise, it
was hoped, would make for such unrestricted opportunity and un-
hampered development as would be impossible under a rigorous
1 Schmidt, I, 278 ff. ; II, 74 ff. ; Andler, pp. 281-282 ; Pfeil, Vorschliige, pp. 32 ff. ;
T/ie Nation, LXXII, No. 1S60, p. 158; l^. S. Con. Reports, No. 1285 (March 10, 1902),
p. 2. F. Fabri (P'iinf Jahre, etc.), writingin 1889, .says that up to that time otificers had
been selected at random ; there was no thought of special training. Dove (p. 174) -says
conditions of rank and title have too often outweiglied those of personal qualification.
MODERN GERMAN COLONIZATION 591
governmental direction. This hope has been, at least partially,
realized in the brief period of the institution's existence. The
school was modeled after what was considered the best and wisest
in the English, Dutch, and F'rench types ; and its avowed object
is to train up experts in plantation-agriculture, commerce, mining,
etc. The institution is open, however, to evangelical missionaries
and to government officials who wish to qualify in a more special
manner for the colonial service. It has been found that the demand
for experts, such as the school proposes to turn out in years to
come, has been far in excess of the supply. Requests for trained
overseers and managers have poured in, not alone from the German
protectorates but from Brazil and Central America, where, as is
well known, considerable settlements of Germans are to be found.
Up to October, 1900, a year and a half after the founding of the
school, of sixty-four young men who had matriculated, sixteen were
already active in foreign parts. The greatest importance is attached
to the character of the finished product, and several dismissals of
unsatisfactory novices are already recorded, for the institution, to
judge by its motto, professes to work
Mit Gott fiir Deutschlands Ehr'
Daheim und iiberm Meer !
It forms, therefore, one more of those expedients which are calcu-
lated to keep alive a sense of German nationality and love of the
fatherland, among emigrants in foreign parts. ^
Other Colonial Possessions
To complete the picture of German colonization, it remains to
speak of the smaller possessions of the East. Among these, Samoa
alone approaches the type of settlement-colony ; Germans have
long had substantial interests in these islands and have contributed
largely to their European population. Great complaint has been
made in Germany because the archipelago was not annexed in
1877; instead of that, a tripartite agreement, insuring neutrality
of the islands, was concluded with Great Britain and the United
States (1889), succeeding the several treaties of friendship and
trade of the late seventies. It is well known how the strifes of
rival kings all but drew these interested parties into hostilities,
1 For a somewhat detailed description of the school, see Globus, LXXTX, No. 9,
pp. 144-146.
592 COLONIZATION
and how the archipelago was finally peaceably divided.^ The pos-
sessions of Germany in the South Sea were augmented in 1899 by
the purchase from Spain of the Caroline, Palao (Pelew), and Ladrone
(Marianne) islands, for which 16,750,000 marks were paid.^ None
of these islands promise much for the future as colonies or markets ;
their value lies in their position.^ They are coral formations with
a small population and few valuable products. Their lot and pur-
pose fall in with those of Kiautschou. This port, " leased " in 1898
for ninety-nine years, was seized (1897) to meet the need of a foot-
hold in China after the Chinese-Japanese war; the murder of two
German missionaries formed the pretext for seizure.* Here, again,
we have a possession which can scarcely become a colony in
the strict sense of the word. The district of Shantung is one of the
most populous of the Chinese provinces, but no success in the
settlement, even of merchants, has been attained. For very slight
material prospects an enormous price has been paid.^
These late acquisitions have been held for too short a period for
any sweeping approval or condemnation to be passed. In the islands
conditions are not materially altered since the German occupation ;
in Kiautschou, however, considerable activity has been displayed.
The testimony as to results is conflicting ; it seems, however, that
the military system has been introduced in all its strictness, and
that the "red devils" are already cordially hated by the natives.
Among the Germans themselves there is considerable diversity of
opinion about Kiautschou ; this disagreement is due, it appears,
to the different points of view, economic and political, occupied by
those passing judgment. As sources of direct commercial gain,
and as localities for settlement, it is evident that the late acquisi-
tions are a failure. There may be some development of the coal-
fields back of Kiautschou, which may thus form an admirable naval
1 F. Fabri, Fiinf Jahre, etc., pp. 146 ff. ; Schmidt, II, 413 ff. ; Illiistrierte Zeitfra^s^en :
Samoa, Leipzig, 1900; Statesman's Year-Book, 1901 ; Hauser, pp. 87 ff . ; Thilippson,
pp. 61 ff.
2 Germany and Spain disputed the possession of the Carolines in 18S5, but the
Pope, selected as arbiter, decided for S])ain. Blum, p. 88. ^ Engler, p. i6j.
* " The event gives rise to the solilocpiy attributed by a comic paper to the German
Emperor, 'If my missionaries only hold out, I shall soon own the earth.'" Kigelow,
Harper's, C, 577-590.
^ The subventions have been regularly very large. Trade is mostly in cheap
Japanese wares, imported by Chinese middlemen. Local companies are always in
need of government aid; to a bankrupt electric company, for example, there was
recently projjosed a government credit of 350,000 marks. New York Tiincs, January
10 and 29, 1902 ; Ilauser, pp. 102 ff.
MODERN GERMAN COLONIZATION 593
station ; and it is possible that some minor outlet may be formed
for Chinese foreign trade. But Hong-Kong and Shanghai will con-
tinue, for very conclusive reasons of all-around superiority, to pro-
vide the main channels for the movement of products.^ There is
another, however, and more grandiose way of looking at these
matters, and for those who possess this second-sight, the outlook
is nothing if not brilliant and promising. For the fatherland now
possesses a "naturally rounded-out area in the Pacific" — a series
of bases of operations on the long sea-way. Having the way-stations,
it will be less difficult, it is thought, to secure the terminals.^ Such
political advantages, together with the opportunity of infusing the
genuine '■'■ deutscJie Sitte" into uncontaminated aboriginal minds,^
far outweigh the unproductiveness and costliness of the new pos-
sessions, as of the old.
Colonial Prospects
But what are to be the termini, the ultima ratio of all this sacri-
fice and endeavor 1 The occupation of Kiautschou is significant of
German ideas in this direction. Germans have seen clearly enough
how national juvenility deprived them of a full share in the earth-
division of the eighties ; they are tired of tropical " leavings "
and desire to feed upon the real loaf. They have realized that no
further division of unoccupied land is possible ; but they have seen
the probability of a ne\V kind of division in the Far East. China
is a country of endurable climate and might afford opportunity for
1 Native proprietors were displaced under the payment of valuations fixed by the
German authorities (Bigelow). Kiautschou is a "free port " and is governed under the
Department of the Marine. Meinecke, pp. 96 ff. ; Globus, LXXIX, No. 9, pp. 141-
143. Richthofen (Shantung, etc.) gives much detail concerning the province; his
view seems to be more sanguine than that of Hesse- Wartegg (Shantung, etc.). The
latter (p. 29) says, " Ich habe nunmehr Deutsch-China in fast alien seinen Teilen
durchzogen und weiss aus eigener Anschauung, dass dort nichts fiir Europa zu holen
ist." Richthofen (id., p. 242) regards Kiautschou as a valuable port of entrance into
northern China.
2 Blum (p. 62) congratulates his countrymen that New Guinea is on the road from
Australia through the Pacific to Asia, and adds, " mcichte die Zukunft diese neue Strasse
des Weltverkehrs weiter ausbauen, und iiber die nunmehr deutschen Karolinen gen
Japan, iiber Samoa nach dem deutschen Siidamerika fiihren — aber unter deutscher
Flagge ! " Hesse-Wartegg (Samoa, etc.) makes a great effort to arouse enthusiasm
over the Pacific colonies. His position is bitterly hostile to Great Britain. Cf. Hauser,
pp. 69 ff.
3 The " culture mission" of the Germans is, of course, one of the most portentous
watchwords of the colonial pai;ty ; the floutings and the damaging facts of the opposi-
tion diminish its effectiveness but shghtly. Cf. T. Fabri, p. 12.
594 COIX^NIZAJION
trade, if not for settlement. The bitterness of national loss by emi-
gration to the Americas is in nowise ameliorated of late, and, in
view of a possible share in land where Germans rt^/^/c/ go and settle,
it has seemed best to secure a "front seat" in Kiautschou. It is
hoped that future gains will compensate for the costly holding of
this point of vantage.^ Germany is weary of the tropical colony ;
golden dreams of new spice monopolies and metal treasures have
been rudely broken. The signs of the times are anxiously scanned
for indications of weakness in the tenure of present holders of tem-
perate lands : if the bonds of the British Empire should loosen,
Germany would expect to emerge from the ensuing scramble far
from portionless ; the status of Brazil and other South American
countries, with a large and unassimilated German population,'-^ are
narrowly watched ; the Monroe Doctrine is only as strong as the
power that stands its sponsor. A peculiar interest attaches to
German imdertakings and hopes in the old culture -land of Meso-
potamia ; there may be undefined designs on Transylvania and
Turkey, but something has already been done in the Euphrates
valley. Certain railroad concessions are in German hands and
trade-interests are carefully fostered ; there are not lacking those
who insinuate that the Kaiser's pilgrimage to Palestine several
years ago had other than religious and artistic motives. Here, cer-
tainly, is a wholesome climate, and a soil which should respond to
modern methods, taking into account its former exceeding fertility
under crude and shortsighted management.*^
The time is full of possibilities, and the German people are en-
dowed with steadfastness and tireless energy. Who can say what
the future will bring forth ? The Germans have a high reputation
as settlers, and, in the opinion of most rivals, need only the chance,
to become great colonizers. To the weaker nations they stand as
a sort of international safeguard against the predominance of Great
1 The Nation, LXXI, 46; New York Times, March 16, 1902.
2 It i.s observed, however, that the German population of Brazil looks with little
favor on these projects ; they do not wish to " replace themselves under the sway of
the police and drillmasters of Prussia." Spectator, I^XXXI, 481, October 8, 1898.
3 Spectator, LXXXI, 481, October 8, 1898; Geffcken, The Forum, XIII, 200; F.
Fabri, P'iinf Jahre, etc., pp. 135-139; Advanced Sheets, U. S. Con. Reports, Nos. 1273
and 131 5 (1902); New York Times, March 16, 1902 ; Hau.ser, pp. 1 15 ff., 127 ff.; Leroy-
Beaulieu, I, 332. Engler (p. 164) exhorts his fellow-countrymen (in 1889): "...
schauen wir uns jetzt schon recht sorgsam nach den Kolonien alien um und widmen
wir ihnen ein besonderes Studium, damit wir bei Gel^genheit audi wissen, wo zuzu-
greifen isl und wir nicht vorher noch lange tasten und sondiren miissen."
MODERN GERMAN COLONIZATION 595
Britain. The Dutch desire their presence in the East, the Italians
cUng to alHance with them and beheve in their future, and even the
Frencli view their activity with complacency and a certain scien-
tific approval.^ Russia must perforce bear witness to the effective-
ness of their presence as settlers;^ a high respect for the German
components of their population is freely acknowledged by the sev-
eral important states of the New World. Even the British, forget-
ting the grievances of the eighties, say flattering things of them.'^
Whatever may be the fate of their colonies,* the Germans are des-
tined to accomplish their full share in the settlement of new coun-
tries and in the formation of the effective races of the future.
1 " Duitschland als Kolonisierende en Koloniale Mogendheid," in Tijdschrift voor
NederlandscIi-hiJie, No. 13, 2, pp. 218-220; Brunialti, p. 168 ff. ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I,
333. Some French writers congratulate themselves on the increasing attention given
by the Germans to a study of French colonial methods and policy. Hauser, p. viii.
It is a striking commentary on this view when a prominent and popular German writer
on colonies is found urging his fellow-countrymen to renounce the British model and
imitate the French. He says that neither the French nor the Germans have succeeded
in their efforts to adapt British methods. " Die britischen Einrichtungen haben bei
der Verpflanzung stets eine vollstandige, oft ihr innerstes Wesen zerstiirende Umwand-
lung erfahren." This is the case above all with the British system of self-government
in the colonies. Zimmermann, IV, Vorwort.
2 See the novels of Russian writers, especially of Tolstoi and Turgenev ; Tikhomi-
rov, I, 85 ff.
3 Keltie (p. 333) says that Germany has scarcely gotten beyond her Sturtn and
ZJrrtWi,'- period in colonization; that there is no reason for discouragement. Johnston
(p. 258) looks upon the unmixed Teutons as good colonizers ; the German in particular
" is on first contact with subject races apt to be harsh and even brutal, but ... he is
no fool and wins the respect of the negro or Asiatic, who admire brute force, while
his own good nature in time induces a softening of manners when the native has ceased
to rebel and begun to cringe. There is this that is hopeful and wholesome about the
Germans. They are quick to realize their own defects and equally quick to amend
them. As in commerce, so in government, they observe, learn, and master the best
principles. The politician would be very shortsighted who underrated the greatness
of the German character, or reckoned on the evanescence of German dominion in
strange lands." It is a little hard to subscribe to all of this. A curious mood of self-
depreciation in comparison with other nations seems of late to have taken possession
of many British writers and travelers. But it is undeniable that, with all their faults
and lack of experience, the Germans can well stand comparison with all colonizing
peoples except the very most successful.
* A strong and bitter opposition to colonial expansion has regularly been encoun-
tered in the Reichstag, — especially from the Socialists. Bebel and Richter have said
many damaging things about the colonies, and the recent disclosure of corruption in
the Colonial Office, taken together with the disasters in Southwest Africa, has added
strength to the opposition. This does not, however, seem to prevent the realization
of the imperial programme in most of its details. The Kaiser is determined and
resourceful, qualities never more clearly shown than by his recent elevation of a
business man, reputed to be a Hebrew, Director of the Colonial office, and later
Secretary of State for the Colonies.
APPENDIX
MONEY-EQUIVALENTS
The difficulty of fixing upon coin- and price-equivalents is alluded to in
note I, p. 94. The following valuations are taken mainly from Dye's Coin Ency-
clopaedia,^ and agree fairly well with the isolated equivalents given here and
there by the regular authorities quoted. No attempt has been made to attain
corrections for contemporary purchasing-power or the like, as most of the
sums quoted are estimates in modern money. Cf. Note at end of Chapter IV.
Where dollars are quoted in the text, the estimate is generally that of the
authority used. The more unusual valuations have been noticed in the foot-
notes. Figures are, of course, only roughly approximate.
Conto (of reis)
=
$
1000.00
Lira
=
#0.20
Cruzado
=
0.40
Maravedi
=
0.0025
Ducat
=
2.25
Mark (M.)
=
0.25
Duit
=
0.0025
Milreis
=
1. 00
Duro (see Peso)
Peseta
=
0.20
Florin (see Guilder)
Peso
=
1. 00
Guilder
=
0.40
Piaster (see
Peso)
Gulden (see Guilder)
Real
=
0.05
Krone
=
0.27
Stiver
=
0.02
1 Dye, J. S., Coin Encyclopaedia, Philadelphia, 1883; Cf. F. W. Clarke, Weights,
Measures, and Money of All Nations, New York, 1875. Lea (Inquis., I, 560-566) gives
a detailed account of Spanish coinage.
597
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Note. In this book, based upon such lines ^ and covering a field so wide, it has
not been thought necessary in general, nor indeed has it been possible, to go behind
a fairly limited number of secondary authorities, when these had once been selected
with an eye to their essential correctness; in fact, the book is based almost entirely
upon treatises rather than sources. The aspects of colonial history essential for
the present purpose have been developed satisfactorily by writers (Colmeiro, for
example) whose lesser statements may have been shown to be inaccurate by later and
technically better equipped scholars. There has been, then, no attempt made to
cover a comprehensive bibliography ; the great aim was to get at what was wanted as
speedily and economically as possible. Hence the number of titles of works consulted
bears in general an inverse relation to the accessibility of information ; and so the
bibliography of the several sections will be seen to be uneven as respects quantity.
For example, it was found necessary to read almost everything that one could lay
hand to in writing of the Portuguese and Danish colonies ; while, on the other hand,
although the Hooykaas-Hartmann Repertoriiim was at hand, and although the Dutch
publishing houses put forth thick volumes merely of titles of works on the Dutch
colonies, it was thought sutiticient to rely upon Blok, De Reus, Van Rees, Day, Pier-
son, and a few others for the essentials of the subject.
Certain books are referred to over several sections of the text, but these have
been set down under that section of the bibliography to which they seem chiefly to
belong. The titles of the authorities most frequently used by the present writer are
preceded by an asterisk. Abbreviations of titles used in the text are self-explanatory,
except in a few cases to be indicated in the following bibliography.
GENERAL WORKS
American Economic Association. Essays in Colonial Finance. Third Series,
I, 3. August, 1900.
D'Avenel, G. Histoire economique de la Propriete, des Salaires, des Denrees
et de tous les Prix en general depuis Tan 1200 jusqu'en I'an 1800. 4 vols.
Paris, 1894, 1894, 1898, 1898.
Bordier, A. Gdographie Medicale. Paris, 1884.
La Colonisation Scientifique et les Colonies Frangaises. Paris, 1884.
Bourne, E. G. A Trained Colonial Civil Service. Notili American Review
(1899), CLXIX, 528.
Cheyney, E. P. European Background of American History, 1300- 1600.
New York, 1904.
Clarke, F. W. Weights, Measures, and Money of All Nations. New York,
1875.
1 See the Introduction.
599
6oo COLONIZATION
Darwin, C. The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. 2d edition.
New York, 1S98.
The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation
of Flavored Races in the Struggle for Life. P>om sixth and last English
edition. 2 vols. New York, 1898.
The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication. 2 vols. New
York, 1899.
Day, C. A History of Commerce. New York and London, 1907.
Dye, J. S. Coin Encyclopicdia. Philadelphia, 1883.
Egerton, H. E. A Short History of British Colonial Policy. London, 1897.
Essays in Colonial Finance. By Members of the American Economic Associ-
ation. New York, August, 1900.
Galton, F. Hereditary Genius : An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences.
New York, 1870.
Griffin, A. P. C. List of Books (with references to periodicals) relating to the
Theorj' of Colonization, etc. 2d edition. Washington (Library of Con-
gress), 1900.
Gumplowicz, L. Der Ras.senkampf. Innsbruck, 1883.
Ireland, A. Tropical Colonization. New York and London, 1899.
Johnston, H. H. A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races.
Cambridge, 1899.
Keane, A. H. Africa. In Stanford's Compendium of Geography and Travel.
2 vols. London, 1895.
Man Past and Present. Cambridge, 1900.
Keller, A. G. A Sociological View of the " Native Question." Yale Re7>iew
(November, 1903), XII, 3.
Keltic, J. S. Africa. The History of Nation.s, Vol. XIX. Edited by A. G.
Keller. Philadelphia, 1907.
The Partition of Africa. 2d edition. London, 1895.
(References to Keltic are to the second of the above, excepting when the
present author refers to his supplementary chapter in the first.)
Lancs.san, J. M. A. de. Principes de Colonisation. Paris, 1897.
Lavisse et Rambaud. Histoire Gdndrale du Quatritnie Siccle k Nos Jours. 12
vols. Paris, 1893-1900.
Le Bon, G. Lois P.sychologiques de 1' Evolution des Peuples. Paris, 1894.
*Leroy-Beaulieu, P. De la Colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes. 5th edition.
2 vols. Paris, 1902.
Letourneau, Ch. L'Evolution du Commerce dans Ics diverses Races Humaines.
Paris, 1897.
Lewis, G. C. An Essay on the Government of Dependencies. London, 1891.
Lindsay, W. S. History of Merchant Shipping and Ancient Commerce.
4 vols. London, 1874- 1876.
Lippert, J. Kulturgeschichte. 2 vols. Stuttgart, 1886.
Lowell, A. L. Colonial Civil Service. The Selection and Training of Colo-
nial Officials in England, Holland, and France. New York and London,
1900.
Payne, E. J. Age of Discovery. In Cambridge Modern History, I, Chap. I.
Cambridge, 1902.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 60 1
Peschel, O. The Races of Man and their Geographical Distribution. New
York, 1896.
Ratzel, F. History of Mankind. 3 vols. New York, 1896- 1898.
Politische Geographic. Miinchen und Leipzig, 1897.
Reinsch, P. S. Colonial Government. An Introduction to the Study of Colo-
nial Institutions. New York and London, 1902.
*Roscher, W., und Jannasch, R. Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung.
3d edition. (Third part by Jannasch.) Leipzig, 1885.
*Ruge, S. Geschichte des Zeitalters der Entdeckungen. Berlin, 1881.
Saco, J. A. de. Historia de la Esclavitud de la Raza Africana en el Nuevo
Mundo, etc. Barcelona, 1879.
Schaffle, A. Deutsche Kern- und Zeitfragen (pp. 168 ff.). Berlin, 1894.
(Reference and summary of his classification of colonies in Reinsch,
pp. 19-20.)
Schallmayer, W. Vererbung und Auslese im Lebenslauf der Volker. Jena,
1903.
Smith, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
Cannan's edition. 2 vols. London, 1904.
Statesman's Year-Book.
Sumner, W. G. Folkwa5's. A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages,
Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals. Boston, 1907.
Unpublished Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the Renaissance
Period.
Tylor, E. B. Anthropology : an Introduction to the Study of Man and Civili-
zation. New York, 1903.
United States Daily Consular Reports.
THE ORIENTALS, ANCIENTS, AND MEDIEVAL ITALIANS
Arnold, W. T. The Roman System of Provincial Administration to the Acces-
sion of Constantine the Great. London, 1879.
*Beloch, J. Griechische Geschichte. 3 vols. Strassburg, 1 893-1904.
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Cicero, M. T. De Lege Agraria (Contra Rullum).
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Cicero, M. T. De Re Publica.
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1876.
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Meyer, E. Article "Phoenicia"' in the Encyclopaxlia Biblica.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 603
Raoul-Rochette, D. Histoire Critique de rEstablissement des Colonies Grec-
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*Ratzel, F. Die Chinesische Auswanderung. Eiii Beitrag zur Cultur- und
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Adams, G. B. Civilization during the Middle Ages. New York, 1894.
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*Martins, J. P. O. Historia da Civilisagao Iberica. 3d edition. Lisboa, 1885.
*Historia de Portugal. 6th edition. 2 vols. Li.sboa, 1901.
*0 Brazil e as Colonias Portuguezas. 6th edition. Lisboa, 1888.
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6o4 COLONIZATION
Nevinson, H. W. A Modern Slavery. New York and London, igo6.
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Stephens, H. M. The Story of Portugal. New York, 1891.
*Varnhagen, F. A. de. Historia Geral do Brazil. 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro,
1854 and 1857.
Vasconcellos, E. J. de C. e. As Colonias Portuguezas. Li.sboa, 1897.
*Watson, R. G. Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial
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THE SPANISH
Aimes, H. H. S. A History of Slavery in Cuba. 151 1 to 186S. New York
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Blumentritt, F. Die Philippinen. \\\ Saininlung ge»ieinvcrstdiidlicher luisscn-
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*Encyclopa2die van Nederlandsch-Indie. Met Medew'crking van verschillende
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Jameson, J. F. William Usselinx. Am. Hist. A.ssociation, II, 3. New York
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Knoop, W. J. Bijdrage tot de Kennis der Indische Krijgszaken. De Gids,
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Indische Krijgsgeschiedenis. De Gids, i860.
Louter, J. de. Handleiding tot de Kennis van het Staats- en Administratief
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*Pierson, N. G. Koloniale Politick. Amsterdam, 1877.
Pringsheim, O. Beitrage zur wirtschaftlichen Entwickelungsgeschichte der
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Scheltema, J. F. The Opium Trade in the Dutch East Indies. American
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Theal, G. McC. Hi.story of South Africa. 5 vols. London, 1 888-1 893.
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*Van Rees, O. Staathuishoudkunde. Vol. II: Geschiedenis der Koloniale
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Van Wijk, G. O. De Goeie Jo ; Roman uit het Indische Leven. Amsterdam,
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Veth, P. J. Atchin en zijne Betrekkingen tot Nederland. Topographisch-
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Wallace, A. R. The Malay Archipelago. London, 1872.
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THE SCANDINAVIANS
Acrelius, I. Histori af Nya Swerige. English Translation in Memoirs of the
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6o8 COLONIZATION
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THE MODERN ITALIANS
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Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia. Article "Abyssinia." 1895.
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1897.
Traversi, Dottor. L' Etiopia d'oggi e 1' Eritrea. Nuova Antologia, May 16,
1897.
THE GERMANS
Andler, C. Le Prince de Bismarck. Paris, 1899.
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XIX,
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[Bastian, A.] Einiges aus Samoa und anderen Inseln der Siidsee. Mit ethno-
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Bigelow, P. Germany's First Colony in China. Harper''s Magazine, C, 577.
*Blum, H. Neu-Guinea und der Bismarck-Archipel. Berlin, 1900.
6io COLONIZATION
Boshart, A. Zehn Jahre afrikanischeii Lcbeiis. Leipzig, iSqR.
Biittner, C. G. Das Hinterland von Waltischbai und Angra Lcquena. Heidel-
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Davis, R. H. Along the East Coast of Africa. Scribner's Magazine^ XXIX,
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Dove, K. Siidvvest-Afrika. Berlin, i8g6.
Ehrenberg, R. Das Zeitalter der Fugger. 2 vols. Jena, 1896.
Engler, G. Koloniales. Eine umfassende Darstellung der Colonialverhaltnisse
des Deutschen Reiches und der iibrigen europaischen Staaten. Hamburg,
1889.
Export (Der deutsche) nach den Tropen und die Ausrijstung fiir die Kolonien.
G. Meinecke, editor. Berlin, 1900.
Fabri, F. Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien ? Eine politisch-okonomische
Betrachtung. Gotha, 1879.
Fiinf Jahre deutscher Kolonialpolitik. Gotha, 1889.
Fabri, T. Kolonien als Bediirfnis unserer nationalen Entwickelung. Heidel-
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Finsch, O. Ethnologische Erfahrungen und Belegstiicke aus der Siid.see.
Wien, 1893.
Samoafahrten ; Reisen in Kaiser-Wilhelmsland und Englisch Neu-Guinea
in den Jahren 1884 und 1885. Leipzig, 1888.
(Any references to the author's name alone are to the latter.)
Fitzner, R. Deutsches Kolonial-Handbuch. 2d edition. 2 vols. Berlin, 190 1.
Geffcken, F. H. The Germans as Emigrants and Colonists. TJie Foriim,
XIII, 200 (1892).
Giesebrecht, F. Die Behandlung der Eingeborenen in den deutschen Kolonieen.
Berlin, 1897.
Globus. LXXVII, 229 (1900); LXXIX, 3 (1901); LXXIX, 9 (1901).
*Hagen, B. Unter den Papuas. Wiesbaden, 1899.
Hauser, H. Colonies Allemandes Imperiales et Spontandes. Paris, 1900.
Hermann, E. Viehzucht und Bodenkultur in Siidwestafrika. Berlin, 1900.
Hesse-Wartegg, E. von. Samoa, Bi.smarck-Archipel und Neu-Guinea, 1902.
Shantung und Deutsch-China im Jahre 1898. Leipzig, 1898.
Illustricrte Zeitfragen : Saiiioa. Leipzig, 1900.
Jannasch, R. See Roscher, W.
Keller, A. G. Essays in Colonization (incorporated in the present volume).
New Haven, 1902.
Klose, H. Togo unter deutscher Flagge. Rei.sebilder und Betrachtungen.
Berlin, 1899.
Krieger, M. Neu-Guinea. Berlin, 1899.
Loeb, I. The German Colonial Fiscal System. In Essays in Colonial
Finance, q. v.
Lowe, C. Prince Bismarck. 2 vols. New York, 1886.
Meinecke, G. Die deutschen Kolonien in Wort und Bild. Lcii)zig, 1900.
See also " Export."
Miiller, G. Land und Lculc in Bismarck- Archipel. Leipzig, circa 1893.
Nation, The (New York). LXV, 471 ; LXXII, i860.
Oberlander, R. Deutsch-Afrika. Leipzig und Berlin, 1885.
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Perr}', H. A. The Traditions of Gennan Colonization. Maanillan s Magazine,
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*Pfeil, J., Graf. Studien und Beobachtungen aus der Siidsee. Braunschweig,
1899.
*Vorschlage zur praktischen Kolonisation in Ost-Afrika. Berlin, 1888.
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Poschinger, H. von. Conversations of Prince Bismarck. Edited by Sidney
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Reichenow, A. Die deutsche Kolonie Kamerun. Berlin, 1884.
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Sievers, W. Afrika. Leipzig und Wien, 1891.
Spectator, The. LXXXI, 481 (October 8, 1898).
*Stengel, K., Freiherr von. Die Rechtsverhaltnisse der deutschen Schutzge-
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Stevenson, R. L. In the South Seas. New York, 1901.
Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-htdic. Duitschland als Kolonisierende en Kolo-
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Times, The (New York). Speech of Herr Richter. January 10, 1902.
On Kiautschou. January 10 and 29, and March 16, 1902.
Tuskegee Graduates called to Togo. March 30, 1902.
Vane Dene, S. Duitschlands Kolonien. Indische Gids, 1888, i, 134.
Weber, E. von. Die Erweiterung des deutschen Wirtschaftsgebietes und die
Grundlegung zu iiberseeischen deutschen Staaten. Leipzig, 1879.
Witt, R. C. An Experiment in Colonization. Blackwood's, CLXIII, 788.
Wohltmann, Dr. Over de Duitsche Koloniale Politiek. Indische Gids, 1897,
ii, 1387.
Zimmennann, A. Die Kolonialpolitik Frankreichs. Vol. IV of Die Euro-
paischen Kolonien. Berlin, 1900.
INDEX
Abba Garima, 522
Absenteeism, 11, 13, 14, 340, 456
Abyssinia, 89, 522, 528
Acapulco, like Seville, 348. See Nao
Acclimatization, 4, 6, 77, 105, 137, 141,
333. 340, 346, 459- 495' 546, 547. 572,
576,577; sanatoria, 546. ^ee Environ-
menial conditions ; " Amative question " ;
Prodiutioit, tropical; Race-contact, etc.
Adaptability, 4, 35. ^eejezus, J'/ianicians,
Spanis/i, etc.
Adelantado, 302
Aden, 95, 100
Adowa, 522
Adriatic Sea, 31
Adventure. See Discoveries, Portuguese,
Spanish
yEgean Sea, 31, 63
Africa, circumnavigation, see Cape-route,
Da Gaina, jVec/io, etc. ; colonies in, see
Colonies; partition, 545; voyages down
west coast, 87
Agriculture in colonies, 4, 8. See Produc-
tion, tropical, and sub Spanish America,
etc.
Aguinaldo, 364
Albuquerque, 97, 116, 117, 285; adminis-
tration, 100; "colonies "of, 105; person-
ality, 10 1 ; policy, 104, fixes Portuguese
policy, 105
Alcabala, 194, 284, 314, 341
Alcaldes, 274, 283
Alcaldes ynayores, 356
Alcoholic drinks, 7, 271, 577. See Accli-
matization, Pace-contact, etc.
Aldeias, 153, 290
Alexander the Great, 34, 65, 104
Alexandria, 95, 383
Algeciras Conference, 365
Algeria, French in, 52; Germans in,
577
Aljubarrota, 83
Allegiance, 43. See Metropolis, relation of
colo)iy to
Almaden mines, 208
Almagro, 303, 316
Almeida, 96, 117; his policy vs. Albu-
querque's, 97
Alva, Duke of, 371, 378, 3S0
Amalfi, 61
Amboina. See Moluccas
"Amboina Massacre," 419
Americaasthe"East,"6o. See Columbus,
Spices, Trade-areas, etc.
Amsterdam, 376, 388, 412, 447
Anda y Salazar, 359
Anglo-Boer conflict, 446
Anglo-Saxons, 163, 531
Angola, 127; missions, 128; public works,
128
Angra Pequena, 542
Annate, 298
Annobom (Annobon), 365
Anson, 349
Antilles, 265, 281. See Spanish America,
Espanola, etc.
Antwerp, 375, 381, 385
Anwerbemodus, 582
a-KOLKla., 41, 42
Arabian Sea, 31
Arabs, 2, 91, 96, 439, 574
Aragon, 169
Araucanians, 260
Arbitristas, 190
Archangel, 383
Argentina, i, 219, 316, 324, 328, 539. See
Buenos Ay res, Plata, etc.
Aristocracy, in colonies, 17. See sub Brazil,
Spanish America, etc.
Armada, Invincible, 193, 243, 252, 254,
256, y-3^ 324, 382
Asientooii-jiT,, 249, 223
Asientos, 249, 281
Asiinilistas, 363
Assab, 519
"Assimilation," 22, 56, 76, 562
Assyria, 30
Astrolabe, 93
Asuncion, 291
Athens, 49, 63
Atjeh, 120, 416, 496; Atjeh war, 489, 493
Audiencia, 306; a check on the viceroy,
308 (see sub Spanish America); in the
Philippines, 356
Augusti, 364
Augustin I, 327
Australia, 8, 12, 30, 539
Auto-da-fe. See Imjuisition
Aviles, 230
Azores, 87
Aztecs, 260. See Indians
" Back-freight," 62
Bahia, 135
613
6i4
COLON! /.ATION
Baili, 65
Banda Islands, 416, 420, 422, 439. See
Mohtcicis
Banishment. See Deportation
Banka, 491
Bantam, 3S7, 402, 416, 430
Bantus, 444, 5S0, 586
Barmii^ar, 356; Cabeza lic, 356
Baratieri, 525
Barbados, 25, 223, 335, 341
Barbary coast, 63
Barca, 45
Barcelona, 171
Barter-trade, 223
Bastaards, 444
Batavia, 416, 433, 435, 584
Batavian Republic, 463. See A'etherlands
Batig slot, 473, 481
Bayona, 230
Beaterio, 292
Bebel, 595
Berlin Conference, 545, 565
Bilbao, 230
Billiton, 491
Bismarck, 535, 538, 539, 543, 545, 553, 555,
563. 570, 57 1' 578
Bismarck Archipelago, 544, 545
Black Sea, 31, 46
Blanco, 362
Blok, 381
Blum, 55S
Blumentritt, 347
Boards of trade, 66. See Consoli dei Jiier-
caiiti, Cdsa da htdia, Ccisa de Coiitra-
tacion
Boers, 444; degeneracy, 446; in German
Southwest Africa, 567; piety, 446
Bogota, 309, 310
Boletus, 348
Borneo, 416, 494
Boshart, 559
Both, Pieter, 417
Bourbons, 306
Bourne, 233, 267, et al
Brabant, 375, 380
Braganzas, 161
Brandenburg, 499
Brazil, centralization in, 136; colonial
service, 158; discovery, 131 ; emigration
to, 132, 141, 150, 152; foreign aggres-
sions, 146; Ciermans in, 594; gold and
diamonds, 139, 149, 165; independence,
factors leading to, 158; industry and
trade, 136; Inquisition, y.7'.; mission.s,
153; natiyepolicy, 142, 143, see /iidians;
North vs. South, 132, 152, 159, 321;
population, 134, 140, 142, 158; Portu-
guese achievements in, 162; revenues,
151,165; slave-raids, 143 (see I'tiiilistds);
slavery, 142, 157; social conditions,
140; taxation of mines, 151 ; transfer-
ence of Portuguese king to, 161 ; vs.
Africa and India, 163. See Captaincies,
/iidiiiiis, Jesuits
Bremen, 535
Britain, 28, 45
British, see F.uglish
British Empire, 39, 60
Brugge (Bruges), 375
Brunialti, 519, 523, 527, 529
Buccaneers, 247, 253, 282, 498
Buenos Ayres, 217, 222, 235, 240, 246,
291, 310, 315, 323, 343, 522, 530; con-
trasts with northern colonies, 319. See
Ari^eittiiia
Bull of Alexander VI, 89, 175
Bureaucracy, in a colony, 161,554,562, 563.
See sub India, Spa)iisli America, etc.
Bushmen, 550
Byzantium, 61
Cahallero, 195, 198, 2IO, 211, 220
Cabildos, 310, 312
Cabot, John, 74
Cabral, 92, 131
Cacao, 25, 236
Cacique, 262
Cadiz (Gades), 32, 171, 227, 231, 241, 250,
330
Cairo, 95
Calicut, 89, 95
Callao, 360
Caml)odia, 24, 347
Campeche, 245
Canada, 338
Canary Islands, 236, 365
Cannanore, 92
Cannibalism, 260
Cape Mom, 240, 319, 412
Cape of Good Hope, 41 2 ; British capture
of, 445
Cape route, 79, 86, 87 ; discovered by
Pha-nicians (?), 32; by Portuguese, 70;
Diaz and Da Gama, 88; "theoretical
discoverer" of, 88 ; effects of discovery,
109, 376. See Monopoly, Venice, etc.
Cape settlements, 442; population, 443.
See Boers, Dutch East India Company,
sub Companies
Cape Verde Islands, 87, 383
Capital, accumulation of, 71, 3S3, 385;
concentration in companies, q.T., 456
(see Corporate enterprise) ; in king's
hands, see King
Captaincies, 87, 132
Carabinieri, 526
Caracas, 213, 222, 225, 236, 246, 251, 308,
315.324 '
Caril)s, 260
Caroline Islands, 365, 592
Cartagena, 230
Carthage, 30, 34, 36
INDEX
615
Casa da India, 66, 124, 228, 393
Casa de CoiUratacion, 66, 228, 231
Casa de Gitine, 228
Cassala, 522, 523
Castas, 218, 220, 282; classification by
color, 220
Caste-system, 17
Castel-Fuerte, 267
Castile, 169
Castro, J. de, 1 17
Castro, V. de, 277, 307
Catchword, political, 536
Catholic sovereigns, 169, 226, 254, 258.
See Isabella
Cattle-raising, in a colony, 8. See Spanish
America, Cape settlements, etc.
Cavendish, 386
Cavite, insurrection of, 360
Cayenne. See Guiana
Ceara, 454
Cedilla personal, 357
Celebes, 423, 494
Central America, 218
Centralization, political. See Integration,
Brazil, India {Portuguese), iVetherlands-
htdia, etc.
Cervera, 340
Ceylon, 98, 429, 435, 439
Chalkis, 44
Chance, influence of, 90, 108, 109
Chancellor, German, 564. See Bismarck
Channel Rovers, 248
Chapetones, 216, 312
Charles III (of Spain), 191, 237, 241, 268,
279. 323' 330
Charles V (Carlos I of Spain), 182, 209,
212, 226, 229, 232, 242, 246, 275, 276,
284, 342, 368, 377
Cheribon, 430
Chersonese, 50
Chile, 178, 217, 235, 240, 309, 310, 315,
326, 338
China, 5, 416, 487, 593
Chinese, acclimatization, 25, 77; adapta-
bility, 25; character, 25; economic role,
24; educators of lower races, 489; emi-
gration, 24; in Cuba, 334; in Farther
India, 24; in German colonies, 583,
584; in Japan, 24; in Netherlands-
India, 416, 433, 436, 437, 439, 459, 488;
in the Philippines, 24, 355; like Jews,
488; over-population, 23; republican
communities {kong-si'), 25; trade, 24;
treatment of, 25
Chio3<| 72
Christianity, 39, 73 ; fetichistic, 128. See
sub Colonies, India, Spanish America,
church, conr'ersion, missions, etc.
Church. See sub Colonies
Cicero, 47
City-economy, 48, 61, 68, 75, 460
Civilization. See Culture
Classes, in colonies, 14. See sub Colonies
C lergy . See sub Colonies, Dutch , Spanish ,
Portuguese, etc.
Cleruchy, 49, 53
Climate, 4
Cochin, 91
Coen, 404, 416, 419, 420, 422, 423, 433,
434, 437
Colbert, 461, 498
Colmeiro, 266, 328
Colombia, 217, 229, 309, 327
Coloni, 53
Colonia, 2, 49, 75, 288, 305 ; administration,
58; communications, 54; expedient in
conquest, 51; nature, 52; public works,
54; trade, 52. See Culture d-issemina-
tiou, Rome, Romanization, etc
Colon iaje, 302
"Colonial fever," 520
"Colonial pact," 332
Colonial policy. See stib Gertnany, Spain,
etc., and Colonies
Colonial revenue, service, etc. See sub
Colonies
Colonial systems. See sub Portugal,
Spain, etc., and Colonies
Colonialraad, 503
Colonies (Colony), agricultural, 9; clas-
sification, 3; classification by Roscher
and Leroy-Beaulieu, 9 ; clerical control,
297, 349, 364; conquest colony, 9, 257;
crown colony, 16, 555; definition, 2, 31,
546; destiny (political), 15; exploitation
colony, 9, 12,322 (see Plantation colotiy);
expedients in conquest, see Colonia ;
farm colony, q.v.; (colony) "for a pur-
pose," 530; garrison (military) colony,
52, 53; governmental control, 75 (see
Co/nmunication) ; industrial organiza-
tion, 8; mining colonies, 12; "mixed
colonies," 9; "natural colony," i, 42,
530; neglect of, 16, 19, 134, 137 ; origin
in trade, 8, 27, 75 (see Trading-stations) ;
penal, see sub Colonization; plantation
colony, q.v. ; polar, 5 (see Greenland,
Iceland); policy suited to, 559 (see
Frontier-society) ; political contrasts in,
15; population-contrasts, 7, 8; products
complementary to those of metropolis,
q.'t'., 13, 28, 44, 49; settlement colony,
see Farm colony; slavery in, 13; society,
types of, 14 (see Frontier-society); tem-
perate colony, see Farm colony; trading
colony, 9 (see Trading-stations); tropical
colony, see Plantation colony ; types, see
classification, above ; vital conditions, 4.
See Acclimatizatioti, Fnvironmental
conditions. Companies, etc., and below
Chinese, conquest, 22 ; emigration,
23; government policy, 23
6i6
COLOXI/.VnON
Danish. See Danish West Indies,
Greenland, Iceland
Dutch, see Companies, A'et/terlands-
India, etc.; influence, 45S
German, acquisition late, 531 ; admin-
istration, 558, 559, 562; agitation for,
535; budget, 564, 570, 572; bureau-
cracy, 554, 559, 562, 577; chancellor,
564 (see Bismarck) ; character, 546;
colonial prospects, 593; colonial serv-
ice, 590; commercial position, 564;
communications, 549, 567, 571; com-
panies, q.z: ; coolie system, 5S i ; cruelty
to natives, 545, 575, 576; early enter-
prises, 532; education, 5S9; emigration
to, 566; governor, 564; in East Africa,
544,546,550,569; insurrection, 561; in
Southwest Africa, 547, 548, 559, 567;
insurrection, 574; in West Africa, 543,
546; internal improvements, 570 (see
Companies, Kamerun, Toi^o, Kiautschoii,
/Ve-a Guinea, Qic); mining, 549; minor
possessions, 591 ; missionaries, 546; mo-
tives for acquisition, 536, 537 (see Ger-
mans, emigratio7i); native policy, 578,
583; natives, 549; cruelty to, 545, 575,
576 ; education of, 589 ; taxation of,
580; navigation-conditions, 567; over-
regulation, 578; policy, 551 ; population,
565; production, 568; "scientific" atti-
tude toward, 553 (see Germans); sub-
ventions, 570, 572; tariff-regulations,
569; trade, 567, 569; vs. Italian colo-
nies, 551; "Wissmann system," 579
Greek, airoiKla., i"/or colonisation, sub
Colonization
Constantinople, 63, 68, 3S3
Contadini, 521, 524
Contingents, see sub Companies, Java,
A 'et/i er lands- In dia
Contraband traffic, see siib Colonies,
Companies, jMonopoly policy, Trade-
7-estriction
Contract-labor, see Slavery, substitutes for
Conuco, 292
Convenio, 337
Conversion, 86. See sub Colonies
Coolie system, see sub Colonies, Slavery,
substitutes for
Copenhagen, 510
Corcyra, 43
Corinth, 42, 43, 44
Coromandel coast, 439, 496
Corporate enterprise, see Capital, Com-
panies, etc.
Cortes, 177, 222, 260, 262, 265, 268, 343
Cortes, The, 304
Coruna, 230
Corvo, 130
Coulanges, F. de, 55
Council of the Indies, see sub Spain
Counter-selection, 5, 24, 82
Covilhao, 88
Coxinga, 416
Creoles, exclusion from political power,
see sub Spanish America, Cuba, Philip-
pines
Crete, 44
Criollos, 217
Crispi, 523
Cromwell, 253
Croton, 45
"Crusade in the East," 96
Crusader-states, 66; relations to Italian
communes, 64
Crusades, 60, 63, 65, 70, 73, 79, S3, 175,
285; Moorish wars as, 83; relations of
Italians to, 62
Crusading spirit, So, 86, 91, 96, 99, 106,
loS, 16S, 174, 2 58
Cuba, 178, 217, 223, 239, 309, 329, 341,
35'"^' 3(^2,^ 482; after iSoo, 331 ; budget,
338; Chinese, (/. 7'. ; classes, 331; coolie
system, 335; corruption, 336; Creoles
excluded from power, 336 ; deportation
of malcontents, 337 ; exploitation, 336,
338; geographical advantages, 330;
insurgents, 336, 337, 338; labor supply,
2)33 ■' population, 331; its constituents,
334; relations with the United States,
339; Spanish policy, 335; tariffs, 335;
taxation, 337; trade, 333; trade of Spain
with, 330; trade-restrictions, t,t,3
Culture dissemination, mainly via trade,
29. 30, 38, 46, 57, 70, 73, 76, 459. See
I/ellenization, Komanization; also sub
Colonies, education, missions, etc.
"Culture Mission," 38, 57, 72, 76, 495,
593
Culture system, 432, 473, 493, 585; char-
acter, 475; colonization under, 477;
corruption, 477; decline, 484; modi-,
fication, 490; native policy, 477, 480;
not universal, 475; plan, 474; reputa-
tion, 481; uncontrolled, 4S3. See sid>
A'et her lands- India
Cultures, forced, see stib Colonies, Com-
panies, Dutch ; in Philippines, 350
Cultuur stelsel, 473
Cumx', 45
Cumana, 315
Curasao, 250
Currency depreciation, see Spain, causes
of decline; in Cuba, 336
Cyprus, copper of, 28
Cyrenaica, 45
C'ythera, 31
Daendels, 463
Damaraland, 548
Danes, 418,440, 496, 508; in Netherlands-
India, 438
Danish West Indies, 497; decline, 506;
diseases, 505; education, 504; emi-
gration, 499; English, French, and
Germans in, 500; governor, 504; in-
deninitication for slaves, 503; not
needed, 497; Portuguese in, 500;
slavery, negro, 498; slave-trade, 499,
501; Spaniards and Swedes in, 500;
taken by English, 506; trade-condi-
tions, 505
Dansborg, 496
Dares-Salaam, 548
D'Avenel, 94
Day, Clive, 464, 473, 483
Dekker, E. D., 479, 484
Delagoa Pay award, 129
Delaware, 506
INDEX
619
Delaware river, 449
Delft, 390, 397
Demarcation line, 90, 123, 133, 159, 175,
342. See 'J'orddsillas
Democracy in colonies, i8
Denmark, 25, 374, 521
Dependency, i
Deportation, see Colonization, penal; of
malcontents, see sub Cuba., Philippines
Derivation of ideas, 74
Dernburg, 595
" Dcnlsc/te Sitte,'" 593
Diniz, 84
Dionysios I, 45
Discoveries, complicate colonization, 78,
170; comparison of Spanish and Portu-
guese, 172; effect of, 82 ; Italians in,
73 ; period of, 73, 74. See Cape-route,
Columbus, '■'■Thalassic" trade, etc.
Discovery of America, effects of, 174,
376
Disease, see Race-contact
Diu, battle of, 97
Divide ut itnperes, 312
Doafoes, see Captaincies
Docirina, 298
Doge, 63, 65
Dom Pedro, 161
Domestication, see Selection, artificial
Dominica, 233
Dominicans, in Spanish America, 298
Do)iatarios, 133
Drake, 248, 386
Draper, 359
Druidism, 58
Dualla, 569, 582
Dutch, see A^etherlanders
Dutch East Indies, see Netherlands-
India
East and West, see Trade-areas, com-
plementary
East India Companies, see sub Com-
panies
East Indians, see sub Colonies, Dutch,
Port2igiiese
Economic need vs. religion, 138, 258
Ecuador, 218, 349
Edict of Nantes, revocation of, 443, 449,
452, 499
Education, see sub Colonies, Greek, etc.
Egede, 513, 515
Egmont, Count, 378
Egypt, 27, 63, 95, 520; Turkish conquest
of, 69
El Dorado, 302
Elector of Brandenburg, 545
Emigration, i, 7, 52; direction of, 534,
5';6; motives for, 13, 18, 61, 75, 534,
566; quality of, 17
Kncomendar, 264
Encotnienda, 264; a product of environ-
ment, 586. See sub Colonies, Spanish,
Slavery, substitutes for
England, 382, 518
Engler, 550
English, 84, 124, 248, 253, 296, 320, 323,
452, 482, 498, 526, 591, 595; adapt-
ability, 19; capture Havana, 330;
colonial policy, 19 ; develop states out
of colonies, 19; excluded from East
Indies, 426; imitation of methods of,
595; in Netherlands-India, 419, 438,
439; in North America, 7
Enkhuizen, 390, 397
Enlightenment, 312, 361 ; a foe to seclu-
sion system, 289. See' sub Colonies,
Dutch, Spanish
Enterprise, private, see Companies
Entrada, 286
Environmental conditions, 3, 10, 26, 28,
37, 39, 46, 65, 77, 105, 159, 171, 215,
223, 245, 262, 269, 296, 299, 312, 321,
331. 346, 350, 353, 372, 374, 413, 428,
436, 443' 445' 44S, 459. 495' 505. 5^3-
532.. 534. 546, 548, 555, 559, 563, 570, 587
Equality, in colonies, 18
Erasmus, 370
Eretria, 44
Eritrea, 523,529; budget, 527 ; civil gov-
ernment, 526; education, 527; emigra-
tion to, 524; native policy, 526; public
works, 527; settlement assisted, 528;
trade, 525
Eskimo, 513, 515
Espaiiola, 17S, 214, 253, 262, 266, 309,
315, 506; depopulation of, 266
Etruscans, 37
Euboea, 31, 50
Evolution, 297. See Selection
Excesses, in colonies, 7. See Acclimati-
zation
Exclusion policy, 16, 33, 243. See sub Col-
onies, Pha-nician, etc.. Monopoly Policy
Expansion, see Colonization
Experimentation, social, see Isolation of
social factors
Exploitation of the tropics, 11, 12. See
Colonies, Dutch, etc.
Ezekiel, 29
Fabri, F., 536, 550, 551
Factories, see Tradi)ig-stations
Fair, 119; at Puerto Bello, 234. See Fleet
system
Family, in colonies,7, 14. SeeMiscege^iation
Farm colony, 4, 9, 41, 48, 77, 297, 317, 319,
321, 324, 332, 340, 411; degeneracy in,
445; its independence (economic, 12;
and political, 17, 18), 41, 49, 159, 160,
296,320,322, 510; not desired by Spain,
177; unit of population, 14
620
COLONlZA'llON
Farnese, 3S1
Farther India, 416
Fecundity, in colonies, 6
Fernando I'o, 365
Fetichism, 378, 462. See Loyalty
Feudal system, 73
Fiefs, 313
Fifths, the royal, see sub Brazil^ Spanish
America, rcz'enue, taxation, etc.
Filibusters, 247
Filipmas, 341
Filipino names, 346
Filipinos, 352. See sub Philippines
Finsch, 550
" Fire water," 271
Fiscal system, see sub Colonies, revenue
Flanders, 84, 366, 370, 371, 375, 380
Fleet system, 139, 23S, 240, 255, 348;
a cruder form of trade, 234 ; fleets
and fairs, 232 ; fleets and galleons,
232
Florida, 178, 315, 327
Flotas, 233
FonJaco, 27, 63
Fonseca, 307
" Forced deliveries," see sub Colonies,
Dutch
Forced labor, a service to the native,
587. See sub Colonies
Foreigners, attitude toward, see Exclu-
sion policy
Foreman, 364
Formosa, 24, 359, 416, 429
France, 382, 518
Franciscans, in Spanish America, 298
Frederick William, 532
" Free labor," 486. See Slavery, sub-
stitutes/or
" Free sea," 394, 419
Freedom of trade, see sub Colonies,
Trade-restriction
Freeman, 75
French, 251, 323, 454, 463, 498, 501, 524,
525, 549, 591 ; attempt reduction of
Surinam, 455; at the Cape, 443; in
Brazil, 146; in Florida, 244; in Nether-
lands-India, 426, 438
French Revolution, 323
Friars, see Clergy
Friesland, 381
Frontier-society, 49, 559, 563. See Colonies
Frontier-trade, 27, 29, 114, 443, 574. See
Middlemen
Fugger, 208, 212, 242
Gachupines, 216. See Chapetones
Galconcs, 233
Galla, 550
Galleons, see Fleet system
Galvez, 268, 279, 323
Gambia, 29
Gasca, P. de la. 277, 304
Gaul, Romans in, 55
Gelderland, 381
Genoa, 61, 67
Genoese, 97, 520
Gente de razoti, 289
Geography, commercial, see Environ-
mental conditions. Trade, etc.
Germans, 97, 452, 499, 531, 576, 595;
anti-e.\pansionists, 538; bureaucracy,
554, 562, 563, 577; character and dis-
position of, 573; colonial acquisitions,
522, 543; colonial minister, 564; colo-
nial policy, general character of, 551;
colonial prospects, 593; colonial school,
590; colonial societies, 436, 539, 555,
562 ; colonization, early unfitness for,
532; emigration, 2ig, 534; emigration,
character of, 550; emigration, motives
for, 53S; emigration to United States,
536; maladaptability, 575, 576; mission-
aries, 592; Oriental seminar, 590; rela-
tions to England and France, 544, 545;
"scientific" colonizers, 553; socialists,
595; trade-interests, 541
Gesellschaft filr deutsche Kolonisation,
^ 544
Goa, captured, 100
Goa Dourado, 117
Gobcrnador, 292
Gobernadorcillo, 356
Godthaab, 513
Gold, see Metals ; also sub Colonies,
exploitation, Mining, Monopoly, etc.
" Gold and Silver Islands," 86, 490
Go7'crnador, 99
Government and trade, inconsistency of,
458, 492, 559, 560. See sub Colonies,
Dutch, Spanish, etc.
Gracchi, 53
Gran Reunion Americana, 323
Granada, reduction of, 80, 16S, 175
Cirand Khan, 258
Great man in history, 85, 87
Greeks, 35, 37; adaptability, 47, 48; in
Egypt, 46 ; sense of nationaHty, 48
"Green baize," 558, 562
Greenland, 496, 521; colonization and
life-conditions, 512, 514; Danes in,
512; monopoly, 514; Norse in, 512;
recolonization, 513; revenue, 514
Grenada (West Indies), 253
Groningen, 381
Griindliche f.chre, 578
Guadalajara, 310
Guadeloupe, 338
Guarani, 153, 291, 294
Guardia civil, 338, 363
Guatemala, 217, 240, 310
Guaxaca, 268
Guayaquil, 360
INDEX
62.1
Guiana, 222, 252, 454
Guinea coast, 532
Gustavus Adolphus, 411
Haakon, 509
Haiti, 282
Half-breeds, see Miscegenation
Hamburg, 375, 535
Hanse, see Haiiseatic League
Hanseatic League, 80, 367, 375, 384, 511
Hansemann, 543, 558
Hapsburgs, 183. See Spain, A'etherlands
Harbors, 507
Havana, 223, 233, 245, 253, 338, 504;
taken by English, 329
Havelaar, Max, 479, 484
Hawkins, 300
Hebrews, see yetvs
Hegemony, 30, 35, 37
Hellenization, 48
Henegouwen, 371
Henry the Navigator, 74, 85, 172
Herero, 550, 568
Hidalgo, see Caballero
Hcheitsrechie, 559, 561
Honand,37 1,376,381,382,388,390,41 1,413
Holy Land, 63
" Home," 18
Homeric Age, 26, 39
Homesickness, 269, 547. See Acclima-
tization
Hong-Kong, 364, 593
Hoofd, 4 89
Hoorn (district of Netherlands), 397,
398- 447
Hoorn, Count, 378
Hottentots, 442, 444, 549
Houtman, 387
Hudson, Hendrik, 447
Hudson river, 449
Huguenots, see Edict of Nantes
Humanitarianism, as a cloak-motive, 38.
See Conquest, ^'■Culture Mission," J^ace-
contact, Slavery, substitutes for, etc.
Humboldt, 208, 217, 266, 267, 280, 312,
333. 339. 532
Hume, 303
Hysteria, political, 520, 536. See Mega-
lomania
Iberians, 46; character, 80; colonization
by,8o; kings, 82. ^ee Portuguese, Spanish
Iceland, 496, 508; communications, 510;
government, 511; life-conditions, 508;
population, 510; revenue, 512; society,
colonial character of, 509
Inca, 207, 267, 268, 286, 291
Indented servants, 17
India, 219 ; British in, 52, 57
Portuguese India (= Empire in the
East), 7; administration, corrupt, 115;
Albuquerque initiates and fixes Por-
tuguese policy, 105 ; army and navy,
107, 109; Church, 118, 121; colonial
service, 102; coolie system, 125; cor-
ruption, 115; cruelties, see Race-con-
tact; "Crusade in the East," 96;
defense of monopoly, 94, 108; de-
moralizcltion, no; emigration to, 104,
115; exploitation, 115; extent, 106, 107 ;
favoring conditions, 90; infringement
and collapse of monopoly, 123; Inqui-
sition, q.v.; islands, 126; mendicancy,
118; metropolis demoralized, 113; mis-
sions, 122; monopoly, 94; monopoly
policy, no; native policy, 103, 119;
navigation, conditions of, 87, 88, 92,
108, 109; profits of trade, 113, 114; re-
lations with natives, 119; sale of offices,
117; social conditions, 117. See Albu-
querque, Almeida, Goa, Moluccas, etc.
Indians, American, temperament of, 263;
in Brazil, 142 ; enslavement, 143, 144 ; in
New Netherlands, 451. See sub Brazil,
Spanish Atnerica, clergy, education,
missions, Jesuits, Race-contact, etc.
In Spanish America, adult children,
294 (see missions); conversion, 258,
264, 285, 291 ; degradation, 280; depop-
ulation and its causes, 263, 265, 266,
269, 271; in earlier period, 272; edu-
cation, 265, 287, 290 ; elevation of
natives, methods of clergy, 288; en-
slavement, 258, 259 (see Slavery, sub-
stitutes for); exclusion policy, 289, 293;
indulgence of, 286; infanticide, 272 ; in
northern and southern Spanish Amer-
ica, 260, 319; laws, benevolent and
scrupulous, 274, 275; the "New Laws"
of 1542, 275; minors, 279, 284, 294;
numbers, 217, 218, 317; permanent ele-
ment in population, 216; personal serv-
ices, 279; protective legislation, 212,
272; protective legislation ineffective,
257, 276 (cf. 356) ; protective legislation
uninforced, 274 (see Z^rj Casas); "Pro-
tector of the Indians," 274; seclusion,
289, 293; slavery, 261; slavery abol-
ished, reabolished, 275, 276; social
position, 261 (see Castas, Classes, etc.);
subjugation, 260 ; suicide, 272; super-
stitions, 179, 262; tribute, 262; village
life, 2S3 (see Pueblo) ; wage-system, 263,
276. See Clergy, etc., as above
Indigo, 425, 475
Indios, 217, 258
Indios reducidos, 286
Industrial organization, in colonies, 3, 4,
8, 10, 76
Industry and trade, contempt for, 211, 313
Ingratitude, 307, 342. See '■'■ Spanish
gratitude "
622
COLONlZAllUN
Inquisition, m Brazil, 148, 163; India, 121,
122; Netlierlands, 386; Philippines,
354; Portugal, 82; Spain, 82, 212;
Spanish America, 244, 287, 300. See
S/'ii/fi, causes for decline
Inspiration, 173
Institutions, colonial, contrasts in, 19;
natural, in setting of time, see Monop-
oly, etc.
Integration, political, 19, 30, 31, 34, 36,
62, 75, 80, 84, 96, 16S, 172, 181, 200,
304. 367. 36S, 379, 389, 397, 509, 517,
535- 550
Intemperance, 577
Intermediary function. See Middlemen
Irala, 316
Isabella, 285, 299, 304. See Catholic
Sovereigns
Islam. See Mohammedans
Isolation. See sub Spanish America,
Philippines, etc., cotntnunications
Isolation of social factors, 21, 25, 38, 50,
74. 459
Italians (media;val), adaptability, com-
mercial and financial devices, 71; imi-
tated, 71; in Discoveries period, 73;
relations to Crusaders, 62 ; taxed by
Turks, 69; trade-restriction, 66, 71.
See Colonies, Fondaco, etc.
(Modern), see Italy
Italy, 328, 517, 528, 595; anti-expansion-
ists, 523; debt, 529; disqualifications
for colonization, 517, 518; emigration,
219; its character, 521 ; ignorance in,
523
Iturbide, 327
Iversen, 498
Jacatra, 433
Jamaica, 215, 250, 335
Japan, 347
Java, 219, 343.3''^7. 473- 477. 482; British
dominance, 466 ; dependency of British
India, 464 ; population, 4S2
Javanese, 423, 431, 477, 485, 583, 584
Jerusalem, 63
Jesuits, 155, 292, 293; in Brazil, 138, 144;
expulsion from IJrazil, i 53; reasons for,
155; in India, 119; expulsion from,
119; in Spanish America, 299; am-
bition, 294 ; expulsion from Spain and
Spanish America, 294; in Philippines,
353; insight, 292; Reductions in Para-
guay, 291 ; services, 1 56
Jews, 35, 81, 82, 454, 488; in India, 121;
in Brazil, 132
Jingoism, 537
John [, 84
Johnston, II. II., 576, 505
jolo, 344, 493
Juda;a, 57
Junta, 325
Junta Patriotica, 364
Juros, 192, 193
Justice, see administration
A'ddi, 579
Kaffirs, 444
Kaiser W'ilhelmsland, 544, 5S2
Kalmar-union, 511
Kamerun, 543, 546, 54S, 555, 569, 576
" Kamerun," synonymous with " colony,"
561
Kanaka, 583
A'atipunan, 362
Keane, A. H., 550
Kiautschou, 592
Kieft, 451
Kilima Njaro, 546
King as capitalist, 87, 457; merchant-in-
chief, 94 ; powder of, see Integration,
political. See Capital, Companies
" King and Church," 378
KXijpovxici, 49
A'olonialmenschen, 539, 541, 552
A'ong-si, 2, 491
Krumen, 581
Labat, Abbe, 505
Labor force, in colonies, see sith Colonies,
" iWative question,^'' etc.
" Labor trade," 582
Ladrone Islands, 362, 365, 592
Land-grants, see sub Colonies, Companies
/.andeshauptmann, 558
Laredo, 230
Las Casas, 265, 275, 281
Latifundia, 17
Latin, 58
Latin nations, 7, 518
I>a Torre, 360
Lea, H. C, 82, 257
Legazpi, 343, 350
Le Maire, 402, 404, 409
Lomos, (iil de, 313
Lepanto, 254
Leroy-Beaulieu, 11, 105, 215, 239, 244,
279, 299, 321, 330, 332, 337, 339, 341,
343' 36^'. 557
Lesbos, 44
Levant, 61 ; Italians in, 61
Lima, 213, 235, 299, 310, 318
Liniers, 320
Linschoten, 385, 386
Lisljon, 61, 229, 367, 384
Lithuania, 534
Livre, 504
Llamas, 267
Loanda, S. Paulo de, 127
Loreto, 291
Louisiana, 178, 315, 330
Low Countries, see Netherlands
INDEX
623
Loyalty to king and faith, see Inte-
i^ralioH, political, Uiiifuation, religions
Liibeck, 375
Liideritz, 542
Luther, 371
Luxuries, see Production, tropical
Luzon, 343
Macao, 125, 416
Macassars, 423, 496
Macedonian settlements in the East, 50
Madeira Islands, 87
Madura, 477
Magellan, 1 23, 1 76, 3 1 6, 34 1 ; voyage of, 88
Magna Grascia, 45, 47
Maharero, 574
Mahrattas, 125
" Mailed fist," 554
Mainmorte, see Mortmain
Malabar coast, 98
Malacca, ipo, 359, 416, 433; Straits of,
418, 439
Malaga, 230
^l3.\?iyif:, see sitb Colonies, Dntc/i, Portuguese
Mamelukes, 95, 98
Manchuria, 23
Manhattan Island, 447
Manila, 253 ; captured by English, 359
Manor, \-j, 73
Manuel, " the Fortunate," 94
Manufacture in colonies, 12. See sub
Colonies, Industrial organization
Maona {A/a/iona), 72
Maracaibo, 315
Maranhao, 147
Maria-Theresa dollar, 519
Marin Sanuto, 69
Marmora, sea of, 46
Marriage, in colonies, 14
Marrons, 456
Marshall Islands, 545, 562
Martinique, 223, 335, 338
Massachusetts, 450
Massilia (Marseilles), 37, 45
Massowah, 520, 522, 528
Mastic, 72
Mataram, 423
^[ate, 292
Matelief, 416
Mauritius, 23S, 435
Maurits of Nassau, 382, 387, 391, 398
" Max Havelaar," 484
Jllayorazgos, 224
Mecca, 95
Mechoacan, 268
Mediterranean, 28, t^J,-, 69, 96, 459; trade
of, 44. See Trade
" Megalomania," 520, 529, 537, 573
Megara, 44
Melkarth, 34
Mendoza, 276, 308
Menelek, 523
Mercantile system, 71, 246, 426; in Spain,
202
Mesopotamia, 594
Mesta, Consejo de la, 171, 190
Mestizo, 217, 218, 220, 317
Mestizo privilegiado, 346
Mestizo de sangley, 346, 355
Metals, 28, 259, 262,491, 510; from Amer-
ica, 203; yield of, in Brazil, 166; in
German colonies, 549. See Mining,
Alonopoly, etc.
Met ropolis, influence of colonization upon,
48, 113, 200, 46c; relations of colony
to, 33,42, 65, 66, 75, 161, 164; inverse
relation to colony, 161. See City-
economy, Porttigal, Spain, etc.
Mexico, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 260,
266, 268, 274, 276, 279, 281, 300, 303,
308, 310, 327, 346, 349, 357
Middleburg, 412
Middlemen, Chinese, 437 ; Dutch, 373,
374, 3S5; Greeks, 44; Italians (medi-
aeval), 61,70, 79; PhcEnicians, 27. See
Frontier-trade
Mikado, 362
Miletos, 44, 46
Mi Hones, 193
Minas Geraes, 151. See Sao Paulo
Mindanao, 344
Ming dynasty, 24
Mining, in colonies, 8, 12, 13, 504 (see
sub Brazil, Spanish A tn erica, jVet/ier-
Ia7ids-India, etc.) ; royalties, .see sub
Colonies, re7i
Missions, in colonies, i ^. See sub Colonies,
Dutcli, Portuguese, eic, /esuits
Mita, 279
Mitre, B., 325
Mogul Empire, 91
Mohammedans, 64, 86, 88, 96, 99, 103,
107, 121, 129, 169,258, 264, 344, 374,
429, 459, 550, 569, 589. See Moorish
JFars, Moriscos, AForos
Moluccas (Spice Islands), 107, 123, 176,
34^, .347, 402, 409, 416, 419, 420, 422,
429, 439, 494
624
COLONIZATION
Monarchy, strengthening of. See Inte-
gration, political
Money equivalents, 597
Money values, 94, 597
Mongolia, 23
Alonjas, 292
Monks, see Clergy
Monopoly, 14, 476, 561; abuse of, 457;
Danish, 500; Dutch, collapse of, 461;
idea of, sanctioned by the Pope, 176,
243 (see Bull of Alexander I' I, De-
marcation Line); necessary expedient,
392 (see Capital, Companies) ; I'hceni-
cian, 34; Portuguese, iii, 327; its in-
fringement and collapse, 123, 124;
its papal sanction, annulled by Refor-
mation, 385, 387; its profits, 94, 113,
238; of Seville, 227, 228,238, 304; Span-
ish, 212, 227; infringement andcollapse,
247, 327 ; of Venice, 79, 86, 327. See
Colonies, Companies, Spices, Venice, etc.
Monopoly policy, 16; before Discoveries,
T,^, 34, 41, 61, 66, 69; Danish, 500, 511,
513, 556; Dutch, 392, 419, 423, 448, 457,
461 ; Portuguese, 79,89, 1 10,1 24,139,385;
Spanish, 236, 278. See Colonies, Com-
panies, '■^Secret commerce," Spices, etc.
Monroe Doctrine, 327, 531, 594
Montevideo, 320
Montezuma, 207, 303
Moorish Wars, 80, 83, 264 ; as crusades, 83
Moors, see Mohammedans
Morale universale, 526
Mores, 76, 287, 469, 481
Morgan, 253
Moriscos, Si, 82, 171; expulsion of, 186
Morocco, 365
Moros, 344, 351, 494
Mortmain, 299, 353
Moses, Bernard, 219
Moucheron, 386
Mozambique, 127, 129
Mulatos, 217
Mulattoes, 317. See Miscegenation
" Multatuli," 484
Miinicipitnn, 53
Miinster, Treaty of, 249
Murex hrandarts, 28
Mykale, 40
Nachtigal, 544
N'ansen, 515
A'ao, 348, 360
Napoleonic wars, influence of, 125, 160,
192, 320, 324, 359, 463, 466, 493
Nassau, Count, 414, 453. See Brazil,
Portuguese in
Native labor, see Indians, "■ iVative ques-
tion," A'ative policy. Tropical production
Native policy, before Discoveries, 76. See
sub Colonies, Miscegenation, Hace-contact
"Native question," 10, 486; in Brazil,
137, 142; in Danish West Indies, 510;
in German colonies, 573, 580 ; in
Netherlands-India, 470, 486, 487; in
Philippines, 350. See Environmental
cofiditions, Hace-contact, Slavery, Trop-
ical production
Natives, as producers and consumers, see
'■'■ Xative question," Race-contact, etc.;
causes of decline, 269 ; need of their
labor, see Forced labor. Tropical pro-
duction; treatment of, see sub Colonies
"Natural" colonies, 1,42, 522; of Italy, 530
Navigation, in a mediterranean, 28. See
sub Colonies, Communications
Navigation Acts, 461
Naxos, 45
Neapolis (Naples), 45
Necho, expedition sent by, 32
A'ederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij, 472
Negroes, 145, 218, 220, 317, 522, 526. See
'■'■Xative question," Slave-trade, Tropical
production, etc.
iVegros, 217
Netherlanders, 87, 124, 249, 482, 525, 571,
591, 595; adaptability, 378 (cf. 459);
as colonizers, 453 ; ignorance of colo-
nial affairs, 482; in Brazil, 146^ expul-
sion from, 147; in Java, 7 (see yi/rw);
restrained from voyage to East, 384.
See Companies, iVet/ierlands, etc.
Netherlands, 367, 373, 382, 518; abolition
of Catholicism, 381; accumulation of
capital, 385; Bourbons, 369; Burgun-
dian rule, 367; Calvinism, 371; Charles
V, 368; Church, 371; clergy, 375, 378;
communications, 374; Council of the
Asiatic Possessions, 463; Council of
the Colonies, 415; Crusades, their
effect, 372; decline of the South, 376;
economic strength, 372; forced to de-
velop shipping, 367; Hapsburgs, 369;
indifference to Church, 370; influence
of colonial career, 460; "King and
Church," 378 ; merchant fleet seized
by Philip II, 386 ; movements toward
independence, 379; navigation con-
ditions, 376, 384; "North-Quarter,"
398; North vs. South, 375, 380; Pacifi-
catie,q.v.; peace with Spain (1609) ^^^
itseffects, 389, 41 1; Philip 11,382; popu-
lation, 374; "pragmatic sanction," 369;
"preparation" for colonization, 367,
370, 372; Protestantism, 371; resist-
ance to Spanish policy. 377; revolt, at-
titude of France and England toward,
382 ; struggle for religious freedom, 370 ;
taxation, 379; trade, competed for by
Spain and Portugal, 373, 384; Unie,
q.v.; unification, 367; voyage to India,
386. See Holland, Zeeland, etc.
INDEX
625
"Netherlands" as limited in this book, 382
Netherlands-India, administration, 463,
468, 478; army, 427; budget, 481; cen-
sorship, 482; centralization, 465; Chi-
nese, q.v.\ colonial constitution, 483;
colonial service, 471, 479; commission
of 1816, 470; commissions, 463; Com-
panies, q.v.\ company-policy, reaction
vs., and reversion to, 463, 471; con-
tingents, 465, 467, 478, 494 ; contraband
traffic, 427, 496 ; conversion, 489 ; coolie
system, a virtual slavery, 476, 487; cul-
ture-percentages, 478; culture system,
q.v.\ demoralization, 479; Dutch Trad-
ing Company, c].v.\ emigration to, 434,
473; emigration of women, 436; ex-
clusion-policy, 472, 492; exploitation,
464, 466, 473, 475, 476; forced cultures
and services, 472, 491 ; freedom of cul-
tivation and trade, 467; "free labor,"
see Slavery, substitutes for \ governor-
general, 441 ; government cultures and
monopoly, see Culture system ; govern-
ment vs. trade, 463 ; land-tax, 468, 470,
471, 474, 475, 478, 491; merchant-
marine, 427; mining, 491 ; miscegena-
tion, q. V. ; missions, 489 ; native a minor,
492; native policy, 465, 467, 469, 477,
480, 484, 492; native policy vs. Span-
ish and Portuguese, 481; "Outer Pos-
sessions," 494, 495; passports, 485;
personal services, 430; press-regula-
tion, 483; public works, 490; reaction
vs. company-policy, 463; recent con-
ditions, 489; reform, 483; regents, 465,
467, 469, 471, 479, 485; reorganization,
463, 466; residents, 469, 47 1; restora-
tion, 470; revenue, 467, 474, 478, 490;
revenue system in Java, 467; reversion
to company-policy, 474; revolts, 482;
slavery, 431; slavery for debt, 48 7 ; slave-
trade, q.v., 421, 485; Spanish in, 493;
subventions, 481; trade-restrictions,
434, 467, 476; wages, 427. See Coen,
Companies, Culture disse?nination, Cul-
ture system, Daendels, Java, Race-con-
tact, Raffles
New Amsterdam, population, 452
New England, 450
Newfoundland, 412
New Granada, 240, 315
New Guinea, 107, 545, 548, 549, 567, 57 1, 584
New Jersey, 506
New Spain, 233, 245, 308, 315
"New states," 17, 311; mainly British, 19
New Sweden, 452
Niger, 565
Nile, 95 ; proposed diversion of, 99 ;
" Western Nile," 89
North Star, 32
Northeast Passage, 386
Northwest Passage, 447
Norway and Norwegians, 374, 496, 509, 5 1 2
iVostalgia, 269, 547
Nova Zembla, 386
Novelists, Russian and Polish, 533, 595
Odyssey, 40
Officialism, see sub Colonies, bicreau-
cracy
Offlciutn Gazariae, 66
Oficios viles y baxos, 195
oiKKTT-^i, 42, 48
"Old Spaniards," 313
Oldenbarnevelt, 383, 388, 390
Opium, 425, 430
Orange, Prince of, 377,380; assassination,
383
Orden publico, 338
Order of Christ, 86
Orellana, 302
Orinoco, 246, 248
Ormuz, 95, 100, 131
Ottomans, see Turks
Ovando, 264, 285
Overijssel, 381
Pacificatie of Ghent, 381
Palao (Pelew) islands, 592
Palestine, 594
Panama, 218, 235, 245, 248, 310; isthmus,
233. 246
Pandelingschap, 487
Pantjen, 491
Papuans, 550, 586
Paraguay, 159, 539; Jesuit Reductions
in, 291
Parana, 291
Parentela spiritualis, 286
Parma, duke of, 381
Patagonia, 309
Patino, 253
Patroon, 448
Paulistas, 143, 152, 160, 293
"Pax Romana," 57
Peace of Breda, 419, 438; of St. Germain,
532
ireipaTai, 89
Peninsular, see Spanish, Portuguese
Pepper, see Spices
Pemambuco (Recife), 147, 454
Peru, 12, 140, 213, 215, 218, 223, 240, 260,
266, 267, 300, 303, 308, 314, 315, 323,
326, 346, 349
Peschel, 266
Peso, 207
Peters, Karl, 544, 575, 576
Pezagno, 74
Pfeil, 544, 585. 587
Philip II, 124, 184, 200, 212, 233, 377, 385,
418; his unpopularity in the Nether-
lands, 369
626
COLONIZATION
Philippines, 107, 235, 257, 315, 325, 341,
418; administration, 356; American
rule, 353; anti-clericalism, 361; Chinese
products in, 347; class-discrimination
(political), 360, 363 (see Ovc/cj); Church
predominance, 350, 352; clergy, 364;
clergy, native, 354; communications,
35S ; conquest, 343 ; constituents of
population, 345, 346; "conversion" of
natives, 352 ; corruption, 356, 35S ;
deportation of malcontents, 362 ; emi-
gration of Spaniards to, 345, 346; tv/-
<-(W//tv/(/(/.r, 350 ; exclusion policy, 349;
forced cultures, 350; foreign aggression,
358; grievances of Filipinos, 360, 363;
ignorance (Spanish) of, 357 ; industrial
organization, 347 ; Inquisition, Spanish America,
missions
Reformation, 243, 370, 380. See Protes-
tantism
Regidencia, 116, 307
Regidores, 283
Reichenow, 550
Reichstag, 540, 555, 558, 595
Religion in colonies, 15, 73, 75 (see
sub Colonies, conversion, missions) ;
as a cloak-motive, 15, 38, 277, 286
(see Slave?-}', substitutes for, Piracy,
sub Colonies, exploitation, etc.); as a mo-
tive for emigration, q.v., 75 ; as a polit-
ical bond, T,2, 48; vs. economic need,
258
Rents, in colonies, 18
Repartityiiento, 264, 277
Repartir, 264
Residencia, in Philippines, 356; in Span-
ish America, 307, 357
Revolution, American, 323 ; French,
4,19
Rhine, 374
Rhodes, 44
Riches, desire for, 213, 259; vs. humani-
tarian feeling, 281; vs. religion, 258.
See Companies, Monopoly, Race-contact,
Spice-trade, etc.
Richter, 595
" Rights of man," 586
Rigsdaler, 498
Rink, 515, 516
Rivera, de, 363
Rizal, 362
Rogers, 95
Romanization, 55
Romans, 37, 520; adaptability and toler-
ance, see Romafiization
Rome, 37, 59
Roscher, 8, 9, 257, 297
Rotterdam, 390, 397
Royalty, see King
Ruga, 64
Russia, 323, 375, 521, 595
Saco, 281 •
St. Bartholomew, 506
St. Croix, 498
St. John, 498, 501
St. Kitts, 251
St. Lucia, 253
St. Thomas, 498, 500, 507, 533
St. Vincent, 253
Salamanca, 227
Salcedo, 343
Samoa, 591
San Gabriel Arcangel, 288
San Mun Bay, 529
San Sebastian, 230
Santo Domingo, 223. See Espanola
Sao Paulo, 132, 152, 159, 321
Saracens, 62
Sardinia, 32
Savannas (of Sudan), 8
Scandinavians, colonies of, 496 ; polar
colonies of, 508
Scheidnagel, 358
Schelde, 374
Schmidt, 539, 550
Schnaps, 589
Schutzgebiete, 564, 570
" Sea-caravans," see Fleet system
Secrecy, 356. See stib Colonies, admin-
istration
"Secret Commerce," 67, iio, 441. See
Monopoly
Selection, artificial, 29; natural, 5, 269.
See Counter-selection
Self-government, 16
Senegal, 29
Sergipe, 454
Serj'icio, 193
Seville, see Monopoly
Seymour, 26
Shanghai, 593
628
COLONIZATION
Shantung, 592
Ships and sliipping, see sub Colonies,
Hiivigalioii, communication
Siam, 24, 347, 416
Sicily, 32, 37, 44, 49
Sidon, 30, 35, 63
Silver Fleet (Spanish), 209, 239, 252, 413
Singapore, 5S4 ; Straits of, 416. See
Malacca
Situados, 3 1 5
Slave-labor, 476
Slavery, for debt, 1 1 ; in New England,
13; substitutes for, 11, 335, 486, 4S7,
581. See "Compulsory labor,'^ Coolie
system. Culture system, sub Colonies,
etc.
Slave-trade, 10, 13, 30, 70, 127, 130, 147,
157, 248, 332, 333, 421, 455, 485, 501.
526, 563, 579. See Asientos, sub Col-
onies, Companies
Smith, Adam, 226, 458
Smuggling, see sub Colotties, Cotnpanies,
contraband traffic
Societies, colonial, types of, 3, 14
" Sociology," etymology of, 48
Sofala, 87, 127
Solomon Islanders, 545, 550, 580
Somaliland, 31 ; Italian, 523
Souza, 136
Spain, 28, 32, 54, 456, 518; bankruptcy,
194; Church, power of, 197 ; church-
holidays, 199; colonization, condition-
ing factors, 80; conservatism and
consistency, 206; contempt for in-
dustry and trade, 195; Council of the
Indies, 232, 298, 305 ; decadence and
its causes, 183, 185, 187, 189, 192, 195,
197, 200, 240; decline of population,
188; of sea-power, 254 (see Armada);
economic strength, 80, 81, 170, 181;
foreigners, treatment of, 187 ; govern-
mental regulation, i8g; Indian legisla-
tion, see Indians ; its benevolence, 257,
295; inflow of bullion, 203; influence of
colonial career, 200 ; Inquisition, (j.v. ;
isolation policy, 346 (see Monopoly) ;
Jews, ij.v.; kings of, 310, 356; law-
codes, 212 ; mercantile system in, 202;
military spirit, 80; Ministry of the
Indies, 306; Moriscos, r/.?'. ; reform
attempted, 191 ; relation to former col-
onies, vs. that of Portugal, 241; repu-
tation, 243, 252; sea-power overrated,
243; taxation, 192 ; trade, liberal policy
toward, 241; restriction of, 206, 226,
237, 318; union with Portugal, 453. See
Casa de Contratacion, sub Colonies,
Moorish wars, Spanish, etc.
Spanish, 69, 498, 525; as soldiers, 178;
avoid temperate regions, 316; char-
acter, 313; conquests, 177; coloniza-
tion and discoveries, contrasted with
Portuguese, 139, 172 ; maladaptability,
201,311,358. '6t^ Iberians
Spanish America, administration, 283,
302; its secrecy, 305; agriculture, 222;
its regulation, 224; aristocracy, arti-
ficial, 313 ; audieficia, q.v.\ bureaucracy,
312, 313; cattle-raising, 224; censor-
ship, 300; census, 269; Church, its
dominance, 301; its establishments, 298;
its subjection to crown, 298; its toler-
ance, 300; classes, discrimination of,
282, 312, 325, 336; interrelation of, 216,
220; mutual antipathy of, 313 (see Cas-
tas, Creoles, Mestizo); clergy, 259, 283,
307; its numbers, 198; its organization,
297; its policy and influence, 299; its
tact, 288; its tolerance, 300; colonial
policy in, anachronistic, consistent,
maladaptable, 426, 323, 311 ; communi-
cations, 245, 251, 278, 305, 318; neglect
of, 246; conquests, 177 ; Co7iquistadores,
303; contempt for labor, 313; contra-
band traffic, 236, 248, 282, 319 (see
Asientos); contrasts between northern
and southern districts, 319; counter-
balancing of officers, 308, 310; Creoles,
212, 217, 220, 325, 336; Creoles excluded
from political power, 312; dependence,
220; education, 301 ; emigration to,
210, 213, 229, 319, 328, 340 ; emigration
assisted, 214; emigration restricted,
211, 229, 233; emigration of women
discouraged, 213, 214; encomiendas,
264, 276, 586; abolished, 279; limited,
273; regulated, 278; entails, 313; exclu-
sion policy, 206, 242, 305, 322 ; ex-
ploitation, 211, 225, 271, 273; exporta-
tion to, 227; fairs, 232; fiefs, 313;
fleet system, q.i'.; foreign aggressions,
251 ; grievances of colonists, 325 ; har-
bors, 245 ; inaccessibility, 245 ; inde-
pendence, movements toward, 322 ;
Indians, q.v. ; industrial organization,
221; Inquisition, q.v.; isolation, 322;
fruits of, 320; isolation penetrated by
contraband traffic, 323; Jesuits, q.'c'.;
king of Spain, relation to, 298, 304;
land-tax, 299; limitation of term of
office, 273, 307; manufactures, 224 ;
tnestizo, q.v.; mines, 208, 221, 222, 261,
262, 265, 266, 269, 281 (see Mininif);
miscegenation, q.7'. (see Race-contact) ;
missions, 261, 283, 287, 288, 290, 292 ;
their basis industrial, 288; their char-
acter, 288; their discij^line, 287; their
exclusion of luiropeans, 283; their in-
dustry and trade, 288 (see Reductions);
monopoly, 244; its infringement, 247;
monopoly policy, 278; native policy,
257, 295 (see Indians); attacked by
INDEX
629
Las Casas, 275 ; vs. Dutch policy, 481 ;
vs. English policy, . 296 ; population,
245; its coherence, 215; its constit-
uents, 215 (see Ci'iisses); its distribution,
223 ; population, dominance of native
strain, 216; population, women, 213;
professions, 225; reductions, 292, 351 ;
of Jesuits in Paraguay, 291 ; regulation,
governmental, 212, 229, 310; resideii-
cia, q.v.\ restrictions, disintegration of,
240; revenue, 207, 208, 314; Revolu-
tion, 325; sale of offices, 310, 314 ; self-
government not learned, 311; slave-
raids, 260; slavery, 261, 275 (see
Indians); slavery of negroes, 265, 2S0
{se&i\'egroes)\ its connection with sugar-
production, 2S2 ; societies, type of, 31 1 ;
vs. English, 276; "old societies in a
new country," 314; Spanish influence,
328; taxation, 269, 271, 314; taxation,
the royal fifths, 209; trade-restriction,
226, 235 ; its disintegration, 240 ; its
results, 237 ; viceroys and governors,
306 ; their reports, 267 ; their terms
abridged, 273, 307 ; their salaries, 308.
See Buenos Ayres, Mexico, Alonopoly,
Xew Spain, Perti
Spanish-American race, 295
Spanish-American War, 340
" Spanish Fury," 378
" Spanish gratitude," 342
Speculation, 14, 460. See Companies,
Monopoly, etc.
Sphere of Influence, 16
Spices and spice-trade, 12, 18, 94, 99,
III, 113, 176, 259, 342, 388, 402, 414,
420, 421, 424, 485, 561. See Monopoly
Spitzbergen. 386
Stadhouder, see Maurits
Staple (port), 229, 440. See Lisbon,
Seville
States-General, see Companies, Dutc/i,
A^et her lands- India
Stephens, H. M., 83
Strand-law, 93, 1 71, 375
Sfreftge mil Gerechtigkeit, 578, 585
Strength, economic, see Colonization,
^^preparation'''' for, and stcb Spain,
iVetkerlands, etc.
Stuyvesant, 451
Subsidio, 194
Sudan, 525
Sudanese, 550, 580
Suez, isthmus, 69, 95 ; project to pierce,
69
Sugar and sugar-production, 281, 335,
340, 425, 475, 482, 490. See sub Span-
ish America, slavery
Sultan (of Turkey), 494. See Mamelukes
Sulu, see /old
Sumatra, 494. See Atjeh
Sumner, W. G., 3, 62, 70
Sunda, Straits of, 418
Superunda, 267
Surinam, 454
Suspicion, 116, 244, 356. See sub Col-
onies, administration, limitation 0/ term
Swahili, 574
Svvakopmund, 548
Sweden, 251, 328, 375, 411, 506
Sybaris, 45
Syracuse, 42, 45
Syria, 65
Tarentum, 45
Tartessus (Tarshish), 46
Tatars, 69
Taxation, see siib Colonies, Companies
Ternate, see Moluccas
Teutonic Knights, 533
" Thalassic " trade, see Trade
" The Nineteen," 412
"The Seventeen," 417
Thessalonica, 63
Thormohlen, 500
Thorstenberg, 497
Thrace, 31, 50
Thucydides, 41
Tibet, 23
Tidore, 416
Tiende penning, 380
Tierra Firme, 233, 242, 245
Tier r as de ningun provecho, 316
Timor, 418, 439
Tlaxcala, 268, 278
Tobago, 253
Togo, 543. 546, 555. 583
Tonkm, 23, 525
Tordesillas, treaty of, 90, 123, 159. See
Pope
Towns, in colonies, 18
Trade, 8 ; civilizing influences of, see
Culture dissemination; profits of India
trade, 113, 114; "trade and the flag,"
75' 569; "trade and the English," 569;
vs. government, see Government vs.
Trade; vs. war, see War vs. Trade; vs.
religion, "jt,; "thalassic" (or mediter-
ranean) and oceanic, 69, 79, 88, 89, 93,
165, 173 ; trade wars, 35, 45 (see Venice).
See sub Colonies, Companies, Monopoly,
Spice-trade, etc.
Trade-areas, complementary, 10, 60, 70,
76, 79. 339
Trade-routes, before Discoveries, 27, 28,
31, 39, 44, 60, 69; Portuguese, 95, 100.
See Cape-route, sub Colonies, communica-
tions, etc.
Trading-Company, see Companies
Trading-stations, 28, 32, 42, 61, 64, 75,
105, 388, 416, 433, 443, 447. 498, 514.
519, 537, 541, 544, 592. See Fondaco
6;;o
COLONIZATION
Transvaal, 446
Transylvania, 594
Trapiclte, 2S2
"Tributaries," ratio to persons, 267
Tribute, i^, 43
Tripoli, 63, 522, 529
Tropenkoller, 576
Tropical diseases and hygiene, see Accli-
matization
Tropical labor, 10, 486, 580. See '■'^ Native
question "
Tropical production, 10, 2S1, 295; limi-
tation, specialization, 10, 12,510; waste-
fulness, II. See sub Colonies, "A'ative
question,'''' etc.
Tropics, development of, 495 (see Accli-
matization, Culture system, sub Colonies,
Eiivij-onmental conditions, ^^jVati^'e
question^' Plantation cohniy. Tropical
production. Race-contact, etc.); more
attractive than temperate regions, see
Trade-areas, coinplementary
Tsetse fly, 547, 548
Tunis, 63, 522; Romans in, 57
Tupac Amaru, 268
Turkey, 594
Turks, Ottomans, 68, loi, 104, 254. See
Matnelukes
Tuskegee Institute, 583
Tyre, 30, 35, 63
Ucciali, treaty of, 522
Unie of Utrecht, 381, 388, 390
Unification, under pressure, 36, 45 (see
Integration) ; religious, 80, 96, 168, 200,
370
Union of Spain and Portugal, 123, 343
United Netherlands, 396; Republic of, 3S3
United States of America, 2, 48, 296, 327,
335' 364, 531. 538. 539. 551' 591
United States of Me.xico, 327
Uruguay (Randa Oriental), 320
Usselincx, Willem, 410, 414
Utica, 32, T,},
Uti possidetis, 389
Utrecht, 371, 381; peace of, 249; union
of, see Unie
Valckenier, 437
Valladolid, 227
Valuations, 94
Van Aerssen, 455
Vandals, i
Van den Bosch, 474, 484, 494
Van der Capellen, 472
Van Imhoff, 435
Van Overstraten, 439
Van Rees, 453
Velasco, 266
Vendetta, 582
Venezuela, 178, 218, 309, 532
Venice, 61, 67, 79, 80, 95, 366, 373, 520;
reputation, 79
"Venice of the North," 376
Vera Cruz, 213, 220, 226, 234, 236, 245
/ 'ereenigde A'ederlanden, 389
Vernon, 253
I 'ice-comites, 65
Vic us, 64
Vilayets, 2
Villegagnon, 146
Virginia, 450
Virginius episode, 340
Visitadt>r-general, -279
Vivaldi, 74
Wages, in colonies, 18. See sub Colonies,
native policy, Indians, '^A'atiz'e ques-
tion," etc.
Walfisch Bay, 548
IVali, 579
Wappaus, 312
War and trade, inconsistency of, 406,
412. See Government and Trade
W^ar as a consolidating factor, see Inte-
gration, political, LJnificatio)i, religious
War of the Seven Reductions, 294, 320
Weber, von, 536
Welser, 212, 242, 532
IVeltpostverein, 572
West and East, see Trade-areas, etc.
\Vest India Company, see Companies
West Indies, Danish, see Colonies, Danish
W^ilhelm II, 545, 594, 595
Windhoek, 566
Wissmann, von, 547, 578
" Wissmann System," 579
Witbooi, 574
Witzenhausen, 590
Women, in colonies, 7, 14, 122, 213, 214,
433, 436. See sill) Colo7iies, emigration
to, exclusion, etc.
Worcester, 358
World-market, 89, 495. See Trade
Xavier, 122
Ximenes, 275
Yucatan, 213
Yucatecs, in Cuba, 334
Zamora, 227
Zamorin, 82, 416
Zanzibar, 127, 569
Zaragoza, convention of, 123
Zealand, 371. 373, 381, 388, 390, 397,454
Ztvwwrt-system, 118
Zollausland, 564
MAPS
Note. The following set of specially prepared maps is designed
to cover all portions of the text. No references to the maps occur
in the footnotes, but it is supposed that the teacher, upon whom
the vital importance of the constant use of charts must have been
impressed by experience, will desire to make consistent use of these
aids to study. The arrangement of the maps follows roughly the
main divisions of the text ; however, to secure compactness, the
conditions of different historical epochs are sometimes indicated
upon the same sheet.
63 T
LIST OF MAPS
I. Mediterranean Colonization
II. Colonies in the Far. East
III. Spain, Portugal, and The Netherlands
IV, Colonial Possessions, Sixteenth to Nineteenth Century
V. Mexico and the Antilles
VI. African Colonies, 1908
632
.^a^_____
X I) I -I ^ ^ ^ -?^'"^ ^
r.onpitude East 130
\ ■'
:-.o.p,.
COLONIAL POSSESSIONS
SIXTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURY
Early Spanish Territories I 1 Early Portuguese Territories
Spanish Trade Routes Portuguese Trade Routes
Arab Routes Winds of the Northern Summer •— »
500 1000 2000
.•; o Scale of Miles of Central Section
ngitude 20 East from 40 Greenwich 60
fO
100
120
Lambert's Azimuthal Projection
MED
30 ^ Longitude
'I'ort Elizabeth
(/^■^^'
■■-._i>^-^
Date
5 Due
UC SOUTHE
Mi^zcr-
AA C
''N i^'-^ W
MH 2
3 15--
.IAN 2 2
9r:^
FEB 1 i
1968
-EEfi_6_
1968 3
FEB '^i
\m J
MAR
1 8 1976 "
0£C
EC 1 3 198;
1
1 Iflftn
i f483
> U,yAA/V
Library Bureau Cat. No. 1137
1^-AX
3 1210 00436 3675