■ '■ r \ ■ ■'^ OF SELF-EXECUTING LAWS. What has been said in the preceding chapter will seem to elucidate the meaninsj of the above two expressions, which, though in familiar use with political writers, have never yet been completely explained. The legislator should, say they, endeavour to unite interest with duty: this accomplished, they consider perfection as attained. But how is this union to be brought about ? What constitutes it ? To create a duty and affix a punishment to the violation of it, is to unite a man^s interest with his duty, and even to unite it more strongly than by any prospect of reward. But this is not, univer- sally at least, what they mean ; for if punishment alone were sufficient for the establishment of the desired connection between interest and duty, what legislator is there who would fail in its ac- complishment ? What would there be to boast of in a contrivance which surpasses not the ingenuity of the most clumsy politician ? In this phrase, by the word interest, pleasure or 'profit is understood; the idea designed to be ex- pressed is, the existence of such a provision in the law as that conformity to it shall be productive of certain benefits which will cease of themselves so soon as the law ceases to be observed. In a word, the union in question is produced whenever such a species of interest can be formed as shall combine \\\q force which is peculiar to pu- B. I. ch. IV.— union of interest with duty, &c. 25 iiishment with the cerlainly wliich is peculiar to reward. This connection between duty and interest, is to a high degee attained in the case of pensions and places held during pleasure. Let us suppose, for example, that the continuance of the pension is made to depend upon the holder's paying at all times absolute obedience to the will of his superior. The pensioner ceases to give satisfaction — the pension ceases; there are none of the embarrassments and uncertainties attendant on ordinaay procedure. There are no complaints of disobedience made against persons thus circumstanced. It is against the extreme efficacy of this plan, rather than against its weakness, that complaints are heard. In some countries, by the revenue laws, and par- ticularly in the case of the custom-house duties, it is not uncommon to allow the officers, as a re- ward, a portion of the goods seized by them in the act of being smuggled. This is the only mode that has appeared efifectually to combat the temptations to which they are perpetually exposed. The price which it would be worth while for individuals to offer to the officers for connivance, can scarcely equal, upon an average, the advantage they derive from the performance of their duty. So far from there being any apprehension of their being remiss in its discharge when every instance of neglect is followed by immediate punishment, the danger is lest they should be led to exceed their duty, and the innocent should be exposed to suspicion and vexa- tion. The legislator should enact laws ichich will exe- cute themselves. What is to be understood by this ? Speaking with precision, no law can execute itself. In a state of insulation a law is inoperative : to pro- duce its desired effects, it must be supi)ortcd and 26 B. 1. Ca. IV.— UNION OF INTEREST WITH DUTY, &c. enforced by some other law which in its turn requires for its support the assistance of other laws. It is thus that a body of laws forms a group, or rather a circle, in which each is reciprocally sup- ported and supports. When it is said, therefore, that the law executes itself, it is not meant that it can subsist without the assistance of other laws, but that its provisions are so arranged, that punish- ment immediately follows its violation, unaided by any form of procedure : that to one offence another more easily susceptible of proof, or more severely punished, is substituted. Mr. Burke's law, which has already been men- tioned, is justly entitled to be ranked under this head. The clause which forbids the ministers and treasurers to pay themselves till all other persons have been paid, possesses in effect the properties of a punishment annexed to any retardation of payments : a punishment which commences with the offence, which lasts as long as the offence, which is inflicted without need of procedure ; in a word, a punishment, the imposition of which does not require the intervention of any third person. Before the passing of this law, large arrears on the civil list w^ere allowed to accumulate ; their accumulation bore the character merely of a simple act of omission, which could not be classed under any particular head of offence, and the evil of which might moreover be palliated by a thousand pretexts. After the passing of this law, the ministers, it is true, might still, in spite of the law, continue to give to themselves a preference over the other credi- tors on the civil list : there is no physical force other than existed before to prevent them : but in virtue of this law, any such preference would be a palpable offence ; a species of peculation, which would be strongly reprobated by public opinion. B. I. ch. IV.— union of interest with duty, &c. 27 Another example is furnished by the laws respect- ing the payment of stamp duties. These laws are represented as among the number of those which execute themselves, and are panegyrized ac- cordingly. This is true with regard to so much of these taxes as is levied upon contracts and law proceedings. Let us explain their mechanism. The sanction given to private contracts, and the protection afforded by the law to person and pro- perty, are services which the public receives at the hands of the ministers of justice. The method in which these duties then are levied is this : these services are at first refused to all persons without exception ; they are then offered to all persons who, at the price set upon them, have the means and in- clination to become purchasers. Thus a protec- tion which might be considered as a debt due from the state to all its subjects, is converted into a reward, by means of the precedent condition an- nexed to it. This is not the time for examining whether this duty, which palpably amounts to the selling of justice, is a judicious tax: all that is here necessary to be observed is, that the payment is ensured by the security it affords, and the dan- ger with which the omission is accompanied. To range over the whole field of legislation, in order to ascertain the different cases in which this species of political mechanism has been employed, or in which it might be introduced with advantage, does not belong to our present subject : — general directions might easily be framed for the construc- tion of self-executing laws, and their application might occupy a place in " The recreations of legisla- tion" [ 28 ] CHAPTER V. MATTER OF REWARD — REASONS FOR HUSBANDING. If it be proper to be frugal in the distribution of punishment, it is no less proper to be so in the distribution of reward. Evil is inflicted in both cases. The difference is that punishment is an evil to him to whom it is applied : — reward, to him at whose expense it is applied. The matter of re- ward and the matter of punishment spring from the same root. Is money bestowed as a reward ? Such money can only arise from taxes or original revenue ; can only be bestowed at the public ex- pense : — truths so obvious, that proof is unneces- sary ; but which ought on all occasions to be re- collected, since, all other circumstances being equal, to pay a tax to a given amount is a greater evil than to receive it is a good. Rewards consisting in honour, it is commonly said cost nothing. This is, however, a mistake. Honours not only enhance the price of services, (as we shall presently see) they also occasion ex- penses and burthens which cannot be estimated in money. There is no honour without pre-eminence ; if then, of two persons, for example, who are equal, one profits by being made the higher, the other suffers in at least equal proportion by being made the lower of the two. With regard to honours which confer rank and privileges, there are com- monly two sets of persons at whose expense honour is conferred : the persons from amongst whom the new dignitary is taken, and the persons, B. I. Cii. v.— MATTER OF REWARD, &c, 29 if any, to whom he is aggregated by his elevation. Thus the greater the addition made to the number of peers, the more their importance is diminished ; the greater is the defalcation made from the value of their rank. The case is similar with regard to power. It is by taking away liberty or security^ that power is conferred ; and the share of each man is the less, the greater the number of co-partners in it. The power conferred in any case must be either new or old : if new, it is conferred at the expense of those who are subject to it ; if old, at the expense of those by whom it was formerly exercised. . Exemptions given in the way of reward, may appear at first sight but little expensive. This may be one reason why they have been so liberally granted by short-sighted sovereigns. It ought however to be recollected, that in the case of pub- lic burthens, the exemption of one increases the burthen on the remainder: if it be honourable to be exempted from them, it becomes a disgrace to bear them, and such partial exemptions at length give birth to general discontent. The exemptions from arrest for debt, enjoyed by members of parliament, are a reward conferred at the expense of their creditors. Exemptions from parish offices and military services are rewards conferred at the expense of those who are exposed to the chance of bearing them. The burthen of exemptions from taxes falls upon those who contri- bute to the exigencies of the state. A privilege to carry on, in concurrence with a limited number of other persons, a particular branch of trade, is an exemption from the exclusion which persons in general are laid under with reference to that trade ; the favour is shewn at the expense of the persons who are sharers in the privilege. 30 B. 1. Ch. v.— MATTER OF REWARD, &c. If there be an instance in which any modifica- tion of the matter of reward can be conferred with- out expense, it will be found among those which consist in exemption from punishment. When an exemption of this sort is conferred, the expense of it, if there be any, is borne by those who are in- terested in the infliction of the punishment: that is, by those in whose favour the law was made, which the punishment was intended to enforce. But if by the impunity given, the sanction of the laws is weakened and crimes consequently multi- plied, the pardon granted to criminals is dearly paid for by their victims. The evil of prodigality is not confined to the diminishing the fund of reward : it operates as a law against real merit. If rewards are bestowed upon pretended services, such pretended services enter into competition with real services. He suc- ceeds best, who aims not to entitle himself to the gratitude of the people, but to captivate the good will of him at whose disposal the fund of reward is placed. Obsequiousness and courtly vices triumph over virtue and genius. The art of pleasing is elevated at the expense of the art of serving. What is the consequence ? real services are not performed, or they are purchased at extravagant prices. It is not sufficient, that the price paid for them be equal to that of the false services ; be- yond this, there must be a surplus to compensate the labour which real services require. " If so much is given to one who has done nothing, how much more is due to me who have borne the heat and the burthen of the day ? — If parasites are thus rewarded, how much more is due to my talents and industry ?" — Such is the language which will na- turally be employed, and not without reason, by the man of conscious merit. B. I. Ch. v.— MATTER OF REWARD, &c. 31 It is thus that the amount of the evil is perpetu- ally accumulating". The greater the amount al- ready lavished, the greater the demand for still further prodigality; as in the case of punishment, the more profusely it has been dealt out, the greater oftentimes is the need of employing still more. When by the display of extraordinary zeal and distinguished talents, a public functionary has ren- dered great services to his country, to associate him vi^ith the crowd of ordinary subordinates is to degrade him. He will feel in respect of the fund of reward, in the same manner as the disposer of it ought to have felt. He will consider himself injured, not only when anything is refused to him, but when anything is bestowed upon those who have not deserved it. A profuse distribution of honours is attended with a double inconvenience: in the first place it dete- riorates the stock ; and in the next, it is productive of great pecuniary expense. When a peerage, for example, is conferred, it is generally necessary to add to it a pension, under the notion of enabling the bearer to sustain its dignity. It is thus that the existence of an hereditary nobility tends to increase the price necessary to be paid in the shape of reward : has a plebeian ren- dered such services to his country as cannot be passed by with neglect, the first operation is to distinguish him from men of his own rank, by placing him among the nobility. But without fortune, a peerage is a burthen : to make it worth having, it must be accompanied with pecuniary re- ward : the immediate payment of a large sum would be too burthensome : posterity is therefore made to bear a portion of the burthen. It is true, posterity ought to pay its share in the 32 B. I, Cti. V.-MATTRR OF REWARD, &c. price of services of which it reaps a share of the advantage ; but the same benefit might be procured at a less expense, if there were no hereditary nobi- lity, personal nobility would answer every purpose. Among the Greeks, a branch from a pine tree, a handful of parsley, — among the Romans, a few laurel leaves, or ears of corn, were the rewards of heroes. Fortunate Americans ! fortunate on so many ac- counts, if to possess happiness it were sufficient to possess every thing by which it is constituted, this advantage is still yours : preserve it for ever, bestow rewards, erect statutes, confer even titles, so that they be personal alone ; but never bind the crown of merit upon the brow of sloth. Such is the language of those passionate admirers of merit who would gladly see a generous emula- tion burning in all ranks of the community ; who consider every thing wasted which is not employed in its promotion. Can anything be replied to them ? If there can, it can only be by those who, jealous of the public tranquillity, as necessary to the enjoyments of luxury, and more alarmed at the folly which knows no restraint than at the selfish- ness which may be constrained to regulate itself, would have, at any price, a class of persons who may impose tranquillity upon those who can never be taught. In some states, the strictest frugality is observed in the distribution of rewards ; such in general has been the case under republican governments ; though it is true, that even in democracies, history furnishes instances of the most extravagant prodi- gality and corruption. The species of reward be- stowed by the people upon their favourites with the least examination is power; a gift more precious B. I. ch. v.— matter of reward, &c. 33 and dangerous than titles of honour or pecuniary rewards. The maxim, Woe to the grateful nation, \s altogether devoid of meaning, unless it be designed as a warning against this disposition of the people to confer unlimited authority upon those who for a moment obtain their confidence. After havinsf said thus much in favour of eco- nomy, it must not be denied that specious pre- tences may be urged in justification of a liberal use of rewards. That portion of the matter of reward which is superfluously employed, it is said may be consi- dered as the fund of a species of lottery. At a comparatively small expense a large mass of ex- pectation is created and prizes are offered which every man may flatter himself with the hope of obtaining. And what are all the other sources of enjoyment when put in competition with hope? But can such reasons justify the imposition or con- tinuance of taxes with no other view than that of increasing the amount of the disposable fund of reward ? — Certainly not. It vi^ould be absurd thus to create a real evil, thus to pillage the multitude of what they have earned by the sweat of their brow, to multiply the enjoyments of the wealthy. In a word, whatever may be thought of this lottery we must not forget that its prizes must be drawn before we can obtain any useful services. To the individual himself, active is more conducive to his happiness than idle hope, — the one develops his talents, the other renders them obtuse ; the first is naturally allied to virtue, the second to vice. In England, reasons, or at least pretexts, have been found for the arbitrary disposal of rewards, which would not exist under an absolute monarchy. The constitution of parliament gives occasion to the performance of services of such a nature as cannot 3 34 B. I. ch. v.— matter of reward, &c. be acknowledged, but which in the eyes of many politicians are not the less necessary. A certain quantity of talent is requisite, it is said, to save the political vessel from being upset by any momen- tary turbulence or whim of the people. We must possess a set of Mediators interested in maintain- ing harmony between the heterogeneous particles of our mixed constitution ; a species of Drill Serjeants is required for the maintenance of discipline among the undulatins: and tumultuous multitude. There must be a set of noisy Orators provided for those who are more easily captivated by strength of lungs than by strength of argument ; Declaimers for those who are controuled by sentimentalism ; and imaginative, facetious, or satirical Orators, for those whose object it is to be amused ; Reasoners for the small number, \vho yeild only to reason ; artful and enterprising men to scour the country to obtain and^ calculate the number of votes : there must also be a class of men in good repute at court, who may maintain a good understanding between the head and the members. And all this they say must be paid for — whether correctly or not, does not belong to our present discussion. It may be further said, that the matterof reward, besides being used for reward, may be used as a means of power, — and that in a mixed constitu- tion like ours, it is necessary to maintain a balance among its powers. Certain creations of peers therefore, for example, which could not be justified, if considered as rewards, may be justified as distri- butions of power. There is at least something in this which deserves examination ; but its exami- nation here would be out of place. Want of economy in the distribution of rewards may also be attempted to be justified, by com- paring the sum so expended with the expense in- B. I. ch. v.— matter of reward, &c. 35 curred in the carrying on of a war, I advise every one who has projects upon the public money, to employ this argument in preference to every other: when one calculates the immense sum ex- pended during a single campaign, either by land or sea ; when we reflect on the millions that vanish in sound and smoke, all other profusion sinks into insignificance. When we behold the treasures of a nation flowing away in such rapid torrents, can any great indignation be felt against those who, by art, or obsequiousness, or court favour, detach fromthe mass a single drop or a small stream for their own benefit ? If the people so readily lend them- selves to the gratification of political passions; if they part so freely with their gold and their blood, for the momentary gratification of their vengeance or their passion for glory, can it be expected they will murmur at the pomp they covet, and the few insignificant favours which their prince bestows ? \J^ilI they be supposed so mean as to be niggard with pence and lavish with millions ? This mode of comparison is not new to courts: it ought to have been familiar to Louis XIV. if it be true, as there is reason for believing, that the building of Versailles cost two thousand millions of livres. In respect of expense, this \Mas more than equal to a war ; but at least it was expended with- out bloodshed, there was no interruption of trade, on«the contrary it gave vigour to industry and shed lustre over the arts. What a fortunate source of comparison to the advocates of absolute monarchy ! There isyet another mode of estimating the just- ness of any public expenditure, another source of comparison somewhat less agreeable to the eyes of courtiers. Compare the amount of the proposed expenditure with an equal portion of the produce of the most vexatious and burthensome tax. In this 3. 36 B. I. Ch. v.— matter of reward, &c. country, for example, let the comparison be made with the produce of the tax on law proceedings, whose effect is the placing of the great majority of the people in a state of outlawry. The option lies between the abolition of this tax and the proposed employment of its produce. They thus become two rival services. It is a severe test for frivolous expenses, but it is strictly just. How disgraceful does wasteful luxury appear in the budget when thus put in competition with the good whose place it occupies, or the evil of which it prevents the cure ! From these observations the practical conclusion is, that the matter of reward being all of it costly, none of it ought to be thrown away. This precious matter is like the dew : not a drop of it falls upon the earth which has not previously been drawn up from it. An upright sovereign therefore gives nothing. He buys or he sells. His benevolence consists in economy. Would you praise him fgr generosity ? Praise also the guardian who lavishes among his servants the property of his pupils. The most liberal among the Roman emperors were the most worthless ; for example, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, Otho^ Vitellius, Conmiodus, Helio- gabalus, and Caracalla : the best, as Augustus, Ves- pasian, Antoninus, Marcus A urelinus, and Per tiriax, were frugal. (Esprit des Loix, liv. v. ch. xviii.) A most important lesson to sovereigns: it wajns them not to value themselves upon the virtue of generosity: in short, not to think that in their sta- tion generosity is a virtue. If not a strictly logical argument, it is, however, a popular and persuasive induction. " Esteem not yourselves to be good princes for a quality in which you have been out- stripped by the worst." o/ CHAP. VI. REMUNERATION EX POST FACTO. In the preceding chapter it was stated, that in accordance with the principle of utility, the costly matter of reward ought only to be employed in the production of service; and that, in accordance with that principle, a reward can only consist of a portion of the matter of reward, employed as a fnotive for the production of service. This would seem to exclude everything which can be called liberality, every act by which a reward may be bestowed upon any service to which it has not been promised beforehand. Such may appear the consequence at first sight. A reward, it may be said, ought only to be be- stowed upon the performance of the service to which it has been promised; since it is only where it has been foreseen that it can have operated as a motive. Why then bestow it upon a service, how useful and important soever, to which it has not been promised ? The service you would have been willing to purchase, at the expense of a certain reward, has been happily rendered without any engagement on your part to bear the expense. Why therefore should any reward be bestowed ? Why pretend to employ reward in the production of an effect which has been produced w^ithout it ? Is not this a useless employment of reward ? Is not this an expenditure in pure waste ? Certainly such an expense cannot be justified as a means of producing an effect, which has by the supposition already been produced ; but it may 213157 38 B.I. C». VI.— REMUNERATION EX POST FACTO. be justified as serving to give birth to other effects of a like nature, as likely to cause future services to be rendered, which will agree with those that are past ; at least in this, that they are services. A reward which thus follows the service may be stiled an ex post facto^ or unpromised reward. — The Society of Arts has recognised and employed this distinction. A reward bestowed in fulfilment of a promise, upon the performance of a specified service, is called o. premium. A reward bestowed without previous promise, is called a bounty. To make it a rule never to grant a reward which has not been promised, is to tie up the hands of true liberality, and to renounce all chance of re- ceiving any new kind of service. There is only one supposition which can justify this parsimony: it is, that every service has been foreseen and en- dowed beforehand. Whether legislation will ever attain this perfection, 1 pretend not to know. It lias not attained it as yet; and till it be attained, Sovereigns may reckon liberality amongst the number of their virtues. Rewards, which in this manner are the fruits of liberality, possess a great advantage over those which are awarded in virtue of a promise. These, confined to one object, operate only upon the individual service specified. The genial influence of the others extends over the whole theatre of meritorious actions. These are useful in deter- mining researches to a particular point; the others present an invitation to extend them to everything which the human mind can grasp. These are like the water which the hand of a gardener directs to a particular flower ; the others are like the dew which is distilled over the whole surface of the earth. A promised reward, bestowed upon one who has B.I. Cii. VI.— REMUNERATION EX POST FACTO. 39 not deserved it, is entirely lost. An unpromised reward, thus improperly bestowed, is not necessa- rily lost. The hand of liberality has been de- ceived, but the utility of the reward is not altoge- ther thrown away, whilst opj)ortunity is left for a better application of it in future. Had Alexander lavished upon the man who, to obtain his bounty, exhibited his skill in darting grains of millet through the eye of a needle, the rewards he bestowed upon Aristotle, it would have been a proof of prodigality and folly, whose effect would have been to mul- tiply the race of mountebanks and jugglers. In rewarding Aristotle he, without doubt, rewarded much jargon, of no greater value than this man's sleight of hand in darting millet ; but since, in the midst of this jargon, a certain quantity of useful, and at that time, new truth was found, the rewards which this celebrated philosopher received may justly be placed to the account of useful liberality — their tendency was to multiply the precious race of instructors of mankind — the race of philosophers. In fact, certain acts of liberality, which could not be justified, considered as promised rewards, may deserve more or less indulgence, may possess a sort of utility of the same kind as that which belongs to rewards not promised. Even the act regarded as service may not strictly deserve to be connected with reward, but the disposition dis- played by the distributing hand in awarding a recompense, may give birth to the expectation of similar rewards for really meritorious service. Rewardsbestowedin pursuance of a promise, may be considered as conferred, according to a law be- longing to the class of written laws; whilst unpro- mised rewards, though not productive of similar evils, may be considered as establishinga kind of law, 40 C.I. Ch. VI.— REMUNERATION EX POST FACTO. or rather tacit rule, analogous to that established by means of punishment, in what \s CAWed unwrilteii law. It would be fortunate, indeed, if the penal law might remain unwritten with as little inconve- nience as remuneratory law. In the penal, and even the commonly called civil branches, these unwritten laws develop themselves by a train of hardships, not to say of injuries, whilst the worst which can happen in the remuneratory branch of unwritten law is this, that, by reason of its being unknown, it may become a tissue of useless bounty. Catherine II. did not allow the remuneratory branch of her laws to be exposed even to this danger, from which there is so little to be feared. Had the hand of liberality been expanded — was the dew of reward poured out upon the head of merit — immediately inserted in the Gazette the notification of the reward connected with the name of the individual, and the service which had de- served it was resounded throughout the most distant and unfrequented parts of her vast empire. It would have been altogether glorious, had she hastened to give the same character of publicity and certainty to those other branches of unwritten law, in which it is required with so much greater urgency ; and had she never conferred favours which she would have blushed to see gazetted. In England, a noble example of reward, e^: post facto, was exhibited in connection with the first establishment of mail coaches. The manager of a provincial theatre having proposed to the minister this plan for the better conveyance of letters, the plan was received, and having been tried in one part of the kingdom, it was afterwards extended to the whole: and this service being in conse- quence performed with a celer'ty and economy B.l, C!i. VI.— REMUNERATION EX POST FACTO. 41 of which formerly there was no idea.* As a reward, the inventor was appointed Comptroller- General of the Post-office, with a salary of 1,600/. per annum, besides a proportion of the savings. A reward thus judicious and equitable, transports us to the year 2440. •]* It is equivalent to a pro- clamation to this effect: — " Men of genius and in- dustry, employ your talents for the service of your country ; exert yourselves to the utmost ; produce your plans ; their reception shall depend alone upon the opinion formed of their utility; your country will not grudge the labour necessary for their examination. Good intentions shall not be treated with contempt ; you shall not be nick- named projectors by the idle and the incapable. Your plans shall not be disregarded because of their authors ; they shall not be thrown aside because they are extraordinary, provided they be useful. Impartiality shall preside at their exami- nation, and their utility shall be the measure of your reward." There may appear at first sight a discrepancy between this and the immediately preceding chap- ter, but it is only in appearance. I say here, no less than heretofore, that the upright dispenser of public treasures gives nothing. life buys or he sells. With promised rewards he purchases be- spoken, clearly defined, and limited services; with unpromised rewards he purchases services unbe- spoken, indeterminate, and infinite. The difficulty in both cases consists in making a proper choice of the action to be rewarded. This choice will form the subject of subsequent consideration. * SeeTraites de Legislation, torn. 2. ch. xi. (Ed. 1820.) t L'art2440, by M. Mercierj a species of Utopian romance, of which the idea was ingenious, but the execution weak. [ 42 ] CHAPTER VII. MUNITION AND REMUNERATION THEIR RELATIONS. Wherefore, throughout the whole field of le- gislation, cannot reward be substituted for punish- ment ? Is hope a less powerful incentive to action than fear ? When a political pharmacopoeia has the command of both ingredients, wherefore em- ploy the bitter instead of the sweet ? To these natural but unreflecting enquiries, I reply by a maxim that at first view may appear paradoxical. " Reward ought never to be em- ployed when the same effect can be produced by punishment." And, in support of this paradox, I employ another — " Let the means be penal and the desired effect may be attained without giving birth to suffering : let the means be remuneratory, and suffering is inevitable." .The oracular style, however, being no longer in fashion, I shall in plain language give the solution of this enigma. When a punishment is denounced against the breach of a law, if the law be not broken, no one need be punished. When a reward is promised to obedience, if every body obey the law, every body ought to be rewarded. A demand for rewards is thus created : and these rewards can only be de- rived from the labour of the people, and contribu- tions levied upon their property. In comparing the respective properties of punish- ment and reward, we shall find that the first is in- ^nite in quantity, powerful in its operation, and cerlain\n its effect, so that it cannot be resisted. B. I. Cii. VII.— PUNITION AND REMUNERATION, &c. 43 That the second is extremely limited in quantity, oftentimes leeak in its operation, and at all times uncertain in its effect: tiie desire atier it varying exceedingly, according to the character and cir- cumstances of individuals. We mav remark a^ain that the prospect of punishment saddens, whilst that of reward animates the mind ; that punishment blunts, while reward sharpens the activity ; that punishment diminishes energy, while reward aug- men^;s it. It is reward alone, and not punishment, which a man ought to employ, when his object is to procure services, the performance of which may or may not be in the power of those with whom he has to do. This considered, were it necessary to draw a rough line between the provinces of re- ward and punishment in a few words, we might say, that punishment was peculiarly suited to the production of acts of the negative stamp, reward to the production of acts of the positive stamp. To sit still and do nothing is in the power of every man at all times : to perform a given ser- vice is in many instances in the power of one indi- vidual alone, and that only upon one individual oc- casion. This arrangement of nature suits very well with the unlimited plenitude of the fund of pu- nishment on the one hand, and the limited ampli- tude of the fund of reward on the other. The negative acts, of which the peace and welfare of mankind require the performance, are incessant and innumerable, and must be exacted at the hands of every man : the positive acts of which the perform- ance is required, are comparatively few, perform- able only by certain persons, and by them on certain occasions only. Not to steal, not to murder, not to rob, must be required at all times at the hands of every man : to take the field for the purpose of national defence, to occupy a place in the superior 44 B. I. Cu. VII.— MUNITION AND REMUNERATION, &c. departments of executiveor legislative government, are acts which it is neither necessary nor proper to exact at the hands of more than a few, or of them except on particular occasions. To discover a specific remedy for a disease, to analize a mineral, to invent a method of ascertaining a ship's longitude within a given distance, to determine the quadra- ture of such or such a curve, are works which, if done by one man, need never be done again. It is thus, also, with regard to such extraordi- nary services as depend upon accident : such as the giving of information when required, either in the judicial or any other branch of administration. Are you ignorant whether an individual is in pos- session of the information in question, or if in pos- session w^hether he is disposed to communicate it ? Punishment would most probably be both ineffi- cacious and unjust as a means of acquiring this knowledge : resort then to reward. In regard to extraordinary services depending upon personal qualification, the impropriety of punishment and propriety of reward is the greater, when the utility of the service is susceptible of an indeterminate degree of excellence ; as is the case with works of literature, of science, and the fine arts. In these cases reward not only calls forth into exercise talents already existing, but even creates them where they did not exist. It is the property of hope, one of the modifications of joy, to put a man, as the phrase is, into spirits, that is, to increase the rapidity with which the ideas he is conversant about succeed each other, and thus to strengthen his powers of combination and invention by pre- senting to him a greater variety of objects. The stronger the hope, so that it have not the effect of drawing the thoughts out of the proper channel, the more rapid the succession of ideas ; the more extensive and varied the trains formed by the prin- B. 1. Ch. VII.— PUNITION and REMUNERiTION, &c. 45 ciple of association, the better fed, as it were, and more vigorous will be the powers of invention. In this state the attention is more steady, the ima- gination more alert, and the individual elevated by his success beholds the career of invention dis- played before him, and discovers within himself resources of which he had hitherto been ignorant. On the one hand, let fear be the only motive that prompts a man to exert himself, he will exert him- self just so much as he thinks necessary to exempt him from that fear and no more : but let hope be the motive he will exert himself to the utmost, especially if he have reason to think that the mag- nitude of the reward, (or what comes to the same thing) the probability of attaining it, will rise in proportion to the success of his exertions. Such is the nature of extraordinary services, that it is neither practicable nor desirable for them to be performed by a large multitude of persons. If pu- nishment then were the means employed to induce men to perform them, it would be necessary to pitch upon some select persons as those on whom to im* pose the obligation. But of the personal qualifica- tions of individuals, the legislator, as such, can have no knowledge. The case will also be nearly the same, even with the executive magistrate, if the number of the persons under his department is considerable: for antecedently to specific experi- ence in the very line in question, a man's personal qualifications for any such extraordinary task are not to be conjectured, a priori^ but from an intimate acquaintance; such an acquaintance as it is im- possible a man should have with a large number. The consequence is, that among any multitude of persons thus taken at random, the greater number would not perform the task, because they would not be able to perform it. But in this case, by the supposition, they must all be punished : here there 46 B. I. ch. VII.— punition and remuneration, &c, would be avast mass of punishment laid on in waste, and perhaps the end not compassed after all : a mass of punishment imparting beyond comparison more pain than it would cost to provide a suificient quantity of rewards. On the other hand, let reward be employed, and not an atom need be spent in waste; for it may be easily so applied, and it is common so to apply it, that it shall be bestowed in those instances only in which the end is compassed : in those instances, in which not only a benefit is attained, but a benefit more than equivalent to the expense. By punish- ment, a great expense would be incurred, and that for the sake of a faint chance of success ; by reward, a small expense is incurred, and that not without a certainty of success. Again, punishment in these cases would not only be less likely to produce the requisite ef- fect, but would have a tendency to prevent it. How little soever the magistrate might be qua- lified to collect and to judge of appearances of capacity, for such appearances he would, how- ever, naturally keep some sort of look out. To exhibit those appearances would therefore be to run a chance of incurring the obligation and the punishment annexed to it. The consequence is obvious: to make sure of not appearing qualified, men would take care not to be so. We are told that, in Siam,whenamanhasatreeof extraordinary good fruit, it is seized for the king's use. If this be true, we may vvell imagine gardening does not make any very extraordinary progress in the neighbourhood of the court of Siam. Nature must do much, for art we may be certain will do nothing. We are told upon better authority of a time when it was the custom to give commissions to officers to look out for the best singers, and press them into the king's service : unless they were well paid at the same time, which B, I. Ch. VII.— PUNITION and REMUNERATION, &c. 47 • would have rendered the alarm occasioned by press- ing needless, one would not give much to hear the music of that day. That selection which in cases like these is so im- practicable in public, is not equally so in domestic life. To parents and other preceptors, it is by no means impracticable to make use of punishment as a motive. They are enabled to use it, because the intimacy of their acquaintance with their pupils in general enables them to give a pretty good guess at what they are able to perform. It may, perhaps, even be necessary to have recourse 'to this incen- tive : before the natural love of ease has been got under by habit, and especially before the auxiliary motive of the love of reputation has taken root, and while the tender intellect has not as yet acquired sufficient expansion and firmness to receive and retain the impressions of distant pleasure. I say perhaps, for it certainly might be practi- cable to do with much less of this bitter recipe, than in the present state of education is commonly- applied. All apparatus contrived on purpose might at least be spared. Towards providing a suffi- cient stock of incentives for all purposes, a great deal more might be done than is commonly done, in the way of reward alone ; by a little ingenuity in the invention, and a little frugality in the application ; by establishing a constant connection between en- joyment and desert ; granting little or nothing but what is purchased; and thus transforming into re- wards the whole stock of gratification, or at least so much of it as is requisite. If punishment should still be necessary, mere privations seem to afford in all cases a sufficient store. A complete stock of in- centives might thus be formed out of enjoyments ^lone: punishment, by the suspension of such as 48 B. I. ch. VII.— punition and remuneration, &c. are habitual : reward, by the application of such as occasionally arise.* But even when applied by parents and preceptors, punishment, how well soever it may succeed in raising skill to its ordinary level, will never raise it higher; one of the imperfections of punish- ment remains still insuperable. Accordingly, in the training of young minds to qualify them for the achievement of extraordinary works of genius, the business is best managed, and indeed, in a certain degree is commonly managed, by punishments and rewards together; in such sort, that in the earlier part of man's career, and in the earlier stages of the progress of talent, a mixture of punishments and rewards both shall be employed : and that by de- grees punishment shall be dropt altogether, and the force employed consist of reward alone. * See the chapter on Punishments and Rewards in Practical Education, by Maria and Lovell Edgworth, a 'vvork which ought to be in the hands of every parent. No one who takes any interest in the public welfare, can be unacquainted with the plans of education introduced by Mr. Lancaster. Among other contrivances to which his success may be attibruted, his system of rewards occupies a conspicuous place. His school-room resembled a toy shop — little carriages, wooden horses, kites, balls and drums, were suspended by ropes or hung upon the posts, and the walls were ornamented with halfpenny and penny prints. Every candidate for reward, thus, had always before his eyes the object of his desire, and he knew the piice he must pay for the possession of it. Among so large a number of boys it has, however, been found necessary to employ severer punishments than such as consist in a mere pri- vation of pleasure ; those selected by Mr. Lancaster depend exclusively upon the dread of shame, and have been made uni- formly emblematical or cliaracteristic. Their efficacy far ex- ceeds that of corporal punishment, which children are apt to make it a point of honour to brave, which they habituate themselves to suffer, or which inspires them with a decided aversion for study. B. I. Ch. VJI.— PUNITION AND REMUNERATION, &c. 49 There remain the case in which reward is pro- per, because punishment, at least punishment alone, would be unprofitable. By unprofitable, I mean not efficacious, but uneconomical, unfrugal : the interest of the whole community together being taken into the account, not forgetting that of the particular member on whom the burthen would be to be imposed, and consequently the punishment, in case of non-performance, be inflicted. This seems to be the case with all those offices which, standing alone, are offices of 7n ere burthen : whether the party favoured be the public at large, or any individual, or class of individuals: in all cases the labourer is worthy of his hire, and unless it be when every man must labour, no man ought to be made to labour without his hire. The common soldier no more than the general, the common seaman no more than the admiral, the constable no more than the judge. True it is, that take any man for example, it may with propriety be said, that the public has a right to his services, has a right to command his service's, for that the interest of any one man ought to give way to the interest of all. But if they be true as to any one man who happens to be first taken, equally true is it of any other, and so in succession of every man. On the one hand then, each man is under an obligation to submit to any burthen that shall be proposed ; on the other hand, each man has an equal right to see the burthen im- posed not upon himself, but upon some other. If either of these propositions are taken in their full extent, as much may be said in favour of the one of them as of the other. In this case, if there were no middle course to take, things must rest in statu quo, the scale of utility must remain in equi- librio, one man's interest weighing neither more nor less than another's ; the burthen would be borne by 4 50 B. I. ch. VII.— punition and remuneration, &c. nobody, and the immunity of each would be the destruction of all. But there is a middle course to take, which is, to divide the burthen and lay it inequal proportion upon every man. The principle is indisputable : the application of it is not free from difficulties. There are many cases in which the individual burthen cannot be divided ; an office, the duties of which it requires but one man to perform, cannot be divided amongst a thousand. But a mass of profit may be formed sufficient to counterbalance the inconvenience which a man would sustain by bearing the office. Let the requisite mass of profit be taken from the general fund, and the burthen is distributed propor- tionably amongst the different members of the community.* An expedient sometimes practised in these cases, is, instead of distributing the burthen of the office, to lay it on entire upon some one person, according to lot. This prevents the injustice there would be in laying it upon any one by design : but it does not correct the inequality. The mischiefs of partiality and injustice are obviated ; 'but not so the sufferings of him upon whom the unfortunate lot falls. The principle of utility is in this case only partially followed. It is one of those instances in which the principle of utility would seem to have given occasion to a wrong conclusion. According to this principle, it is said that the interest of the minority ought to be * This supposes the reward to consist in money : if a suffi- cient reward can be provided out of honour and power, or either of them without money, the burthen of it in the first case is distributed of course among all the members of the community over whom the honour gives him a precedence ; in the last case it may be distributed, according to the nature of the power, among all of them without distinction. B. I. Ch. VII.— PUNITION AND REMUNERATION, &c. 51 sacrificed to that of the majority. The conclusion is just, if it were impossible to act otherwise ; pal- pably false, if it is. But to charge this as a defect upon the principle itself, is as reasonable as it would be to maintain that the art of book-keeping is a mis- chievous art, because entries may be omitted. We are now prepared for establishing a compa- rison between punishment and reward. 1. Punishment is best adapted for restraint or prevention : reward for excitement and produc- tion : the one is a bridle, the other a spur. 2. In every case where very extensive mischief may be produced by a single act, and particularly in the case of such acts as may be performed at any time, punishment is the only restraint to be de- pended on ; such is the case of crimes in general. When the act endeavoured to be produced is in an eminent degree beneficial, it is proper to employ reward alone, or to combine punishment with re- ward, that the power of the governing motive may be doubled. 3. Considering the abundance of the one, and scarcity of the other, punishment is the only eli- gible means of regulating the conduct of people in general : reward ought to be reserved for directing the actions of particular individuals. By punish- ment, mischievous propensities are subdued; by reward, valuable qualifications are improved. Pu- nishment is an instrument for the extirpation of noxious weeds : reward is a hot bed for raising fruit, which would not otherwise be produced. 4. Necessity compels the employment of pu- nishment : reward is a luxury. Discard the first, and society is dissolved : discard the other, and it still continues to subsist, though deprived of a por- tion of its amenity and elegance. 5. In every case where the service is of such a 4. 62 B. I. ch. VII.— punition and remuneration, &c. nature as, that no individual possessed of the qua- lifications requisite for its performance can with certainty be selected, the denunciation of punish- ment would only produce apprehension and misery, and its application be but so much injury inflicted in wanton waste. In every such case offer a reward, and it travels forth in quest of hidden or unknown talents : even if it fail in its search, it produces no evil, not an atom of it is lost : it is given only when the service is performed, when the advantage obtained either equals or surpasses the expense. By the help of these observations, we shall be enabled to appreciate the opinion of those politi- cians, who, after a superficial examination of this subject, condemn legislators in general for the spar- ing use made of the matter of reward. The author of The Wealth of Nations^ who has displayed such extraordinary saofacity in all his researches, has upon this point been led away by mistaken notions of humanity. Fear (says he) is in almost all cases a miserable instrument of govern- ment * It is an instrument which has oftentimes been much perverted from its proper use ; but it is a necessary instrument, and the only one applica- ble to the ordinary purposes of society. A young king, in the first ardour for improve- ment, having resolved to purge his kingdom from all crimes, was not satisfied with this alone. His natural gentleness was shocked at the idea of em- ploying punishment. He determined to abolish it altogether, and to effect every thing by reward. He began with the crime of theft : but, in a short time, all his subjects were entitled to reward, all of them were honest. Everv day they were entitled * Wealth of Nations, 13. v. Ch. i. B, I. Ch. VII.— PUNITION and REMUNERATION, &c. 53 to new rewards, their honesty remained inviolate. A scheme for preventing smuggling was proposed to him. "Wise king/' it was said, " for every penny that ought to be paid into your treasury, give two, and the hydra is vanquished.^' The victory was certain, but he perceived that like that of Pyrrhus it would be somewhat costly. A distinction which exists between domestic and political government may be here worth no- ticing. No sovereign is so rich as to be able to effect every thing by reward. There is no parent who may not. At Sparta, a bit of black bread was the reward of skill. The stock of pleasures and of wants is an inexhaustible fund of reward in the hands of those parents who know how to employ it. [ 54 ] CHAP. VIII. REMUNERATION WHERE HURTFUL. A REWARD is mischievous when its tendency is to produce offences, or to give birth to noxious dispositions. To offer a reward to an individual as an induce- ment to him to commit an act prohibited by law, is to attempt to suborn him ; the offence may be called suhornation. Upon the present occasion, this illegal subornation is not the subject of con- sideration. The rewards, of which we are about to speak, have a corruptive tendency, but do not possess the character of crimes ; they are autho- rized by custom, sanctioned by the laws, and given and received without disguise, without criminal intention: the evil is done with a pure conscience, and often with the public approbation. They are the result of erroneous conceptions, the effects of universal prejudice, or long-established habits which, as Montaigne says, blunts the acute- ness of the judgment. The present is one of those extremely delicate topics, in respect of which it may be more pru- dent to put the reader in the path of truth, and leave him to travel by himself in quest of disco- veries, than going through the subject in detail to wound established opinions, or interfere with individual interests. Without restricting myself to any precise order, I shall therefore exhibit some few examples in which the mischievous tendency is too palpable to admit of denial, and 1 shall B. I. ch. VIII.— remuneration— where hurtful. 55 begin with an incontrovertible maxim, which will furnish the criterion of which we are upon the present occasion in search for distinguishing good from evil. Upon all occasions avoid bestowing anything in the shape of reward which ?nai/ tend to interfere with the performance of duty. According to this rule, a judge ought not to find himself interested in the prolongation of law proceedings — the minister of state in the promo- tion of wars — the superintendant in promoting expense — the moral preceptor in setting an exam- ple of insincerity — the man of letters in maintain- ing mischievous prejudices at the expense of truth. The more narrowly we scrutinize into the sources of public evils, the more thoroughly shall we be convinced that they ought to be attributed to the neglect of this fundamental rule. In support of this maxim, it is not necessary to ascribe to men in general an extraordinary procli- vity towards corruption. Ordinary prudence and probity are sufficient to enable a man to resist temptations to crimes, or to lead him to abstain from whatever is reputed dishonourable ; but it requires somewhat more than ordinary honesty and prudence to be proof against the seductions of an interest that acts with continual energy, and whose temptations are not opposed either by the fear of legal punishment, or the condemnation of public opinion : to yield to such temptations, it is only necessary for him to follow in the beaten track, in which he will be cheered by the presence of a multitude of fellow travellers, and encouraged by the example of his superiors. To resist these seductions, he must expose himself to the impu- tation of singularity, he must proclaim that he is better than others, he must condemn his col- 56 B. I. ch. viiL— remuneration— where hurtful. leagues and predecessors, and be bold enough to make an exhibition of his probity. Such magna- nimity is not altogether unexampled, but we must not reckon upon prodigies. There are even some cases in which by its secresy this seductive inter- est is so much the more mischievous ; it operates like a concealed magnet, and produces errors in the moral conduct against which there has been no previous warning. We have said that the iesfislator oudit to endeavour to combine interest with duty ; for a still stronger reason ought he to avoid as much as possible everything that yields to the public functionary a certain or a casual, a known or an unknown profit, resulting from the omission or violation of his duties ; we now pro- ceed to give a few examples. In England, the superior judges, beside their ample salaries, which it would be improper to grudge them, receive certain fees which it is im- possible not to grudge them ; since it is from this source alone that they can generally be considered liable to corruption, and that so much the more easily, since they may be subject to its influence without themselves perceiving it. These fees are multiplied in proportion to the incidents of proce- dure, the multiplication of which incidents pro- portionably increases the expense and delay of obtaining justice. In one case, a judge receives nearly 4/. for tying for six months, or a year, the hands of justice, and this in one of those cases in which indolence adds her seductions to those of avarice, and the whole is eflected in the presence of no other witnesses than such as are urged on- ward by a still stronger interest to aggravate the abuse. Another example from among a thousand : un- der the Lord Chancellor, there are twelve subor- B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. 57 dinate judges called Masters in Chancery. When an account is to be taken before them, the follow- ing is the mode of procedure : — The attornies on the one side and the other ought to appear before the master, either alone or in company, with counsel, as may be convenient. First summons; nobody appears. Second summons ; nobody ap- pears. At length, third summons, the parties appear, and the matter is put into train. Care, however, has been taken to allow only half an hour, or an hour, to each set of suitors. The parties are not always punctual; the matter is begun, the clock strikes, and then the matter is dis- missed. At the following hearing it is necessary to begin again. All this is matter of etiquette. At each summons, the fees to the judges and the counsel are renewed. All the world must live. Extortion, it is said, is to be banished from the dwellings of finance. At some future day, per- haps, it will not be found a fitting guest for the Temple of Justice — it will be deemed advisable to chase it thence. In England as elsewhere, it is asked, why law-suits are eternal? The lawyers say it is owing to the nature of things. Other people say it is the fault of the lawyers. The above two little traits, which are as two grains of sand picked up in the deserts of Arabia, may assist the judg- ment as to the causes of delay in such pro- cedures. 3. Previously to the year 1782, the emoluments of the paymaster of the army, whose duty as such consisted in signing, or knowing how to sign, his name, were considerably higher in time of war than in time of peace, being principally constituted of a per centage on the money expended in his 58 B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. department. This great officer, however, always found himself a Member of Parliament, and it is believed he was thus paid, not for signing, or knowing how to sign, his name, but for talking and knowing how to talk. Upon a question of peace or war, the probity of this orator must have found itself in somewhat an awkward predicament, con- tinually besieged as it must have been by Bellona with the offer of an enormous revenue, which was to cease immediately he suffered himself to be cor- rupted by Peace. When the question of econo- mical reform was upon the carpet, this place was not forgotten. It was generally felt at that time, that so decided an opposition between interest and duty was calculated to produce the most perni- cious consequences. The emoluments of peace and war were, therefore, equalized by attaching a fixed salary to the office, and the same plan was adopted with respect to various other offices. In running over the list of functionaries, from the highest to the lowest, one cannot but be alarmed at the vast proportion of them who watch for war as for a prey. It is impossible to say to what a degree, by this personal interest, the most important measures of Government are determined. It cannot be supposed that ministers of state, generals, admirals, or members of parliament, are influenced, in the slightest degree, by a vile pe- cuniary interest. All these honourable persons possess probity as well as wisdom, so that a trifle of money never can produce the slightest influence upon their conduct, not even the effect of an atom upon the immoveable mass of their probity. The mischief is, that evil-minded persons are not con- vinced by their assertion, but continue to repeat, that — " The honesty which resists temptation is B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. o9 most noble, but that which flies from it is most secure." * 4. In public and private works of all descrip- tions, it is customary to pay the architect a per centage upon the aggregate amount expended. This arrangement is a good one, when the sum to be expended is fixed : there is danger in the con- * " Judge A. has a noble soul," was one day said to me by one of his friends 5 " this is what he told me was the difference between himself and Judge B. Consider him well ; he will never listen to a single word which has the slightest connec- tion with any suit which may be brought before him, unless in open court ; he fears lest he should be misled, so weak is he : he has told me so himself. Whilst, as to me, a suitor might whisper in my ear, from morning till night, and might as well have been talking to a deaf man." I would not insinuate the least suspicion against the valorous judge ; had I been constrained to form one, it would have been dissipated by the elogium he bestowed upon his friend. The heroism of Lord Hale, the model of the English judges, took a contrary direction. It had been customary, when upon the circuit, for the judge to receive from the sheriff a certain number of loaves of sugar. On one occasion a sheriff, who happened to have a suit which was to be tried before him, waited upon his lordship, and, as was customary, presented his sugar : Hale would not receive it. The other judge, if he had been consistent, would have taken sugar from everybody. General Rule. — When an honest man is desirous of estab- lishing his honesty, he ought to employ proofs which will serTe only for this purpose, and not such as dishonesty alone can be interested in causing to be received. Before an assembly of the Roman people, it was required of Scipio that he should render his accounts. His answer was — " Romans, on such a day I gained a victory : let U3 ascend to the Capitol, and return thanks to the Gods." His quietus was granted immediately, and since that day, besides allowing that Scipio was a great warrior, all the historians have been assured of the correctness of his accounts. As to me, had I lived at that time, most probably I should have gone up with the rest to the Capitol, but I should always have attained a little curiosity with respect to the accounts. 60 B. [. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. trary case, since the greater the expense the greater is the architect's pecuniary profit. 5. Veracity is one of the most important bases of human society. The due administration of justice absolutely depends upon it; whatever tends to weaken it, saps the foundations of mora- lity, security, and happiness. The more we reflect on its importance, the more we shall be astonished that legislators have so indiscreetly multiplied the operations which tend to weaken its influence.* When the possession of the revenues, or other privileges attached to a certain condition of life, depends upon the previous performance of certain acts which are required at entering upon that condition, these privileges cannot fail to operate upon individuals as incentives to the performance of those acts : the effect produced is the same as if they were attached to such performance under the title of reward. If among the number of these acts, promises which are never performed are required under the sanction of an oath, these privileges or other advantages can only be regarded as rewards offered for the commission of perjury. If among the number of these acts it is required, that certain opinions which are not believed should be pretended to be believed, these advantages are neither more nor less than rewards offered for in- sincerity. But the sanction of an oath once con- temned, is contemned at all times. Oaths may afterwards be observed, but they will not be ob- served because they are oaths. In the university of Oxford, among whose members the greater number of ecclesiastical be- * See Traites de Legislation, torn. 2, ch. xviii. (Ed. 1820.) Emploi du mobile de la Religion. B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. 61 nefices are bestowed, and which even for laymen is the most fashionable place of education, when a young man presents himself for admission, his tutor who is generally a clergyman, and the vice- chancellor who is also a clergyman, put into his hands a book of statutes, of which they cause him to swear to observe every one. At the same time, it is perfectly well known to this vice-chancellor and to this tutor, that there never has been any person who was able to observe all these statutes. It is thus, that the first lesson this young man learns, and the only lesson he is sure to learn, is a lesson of perjury.* Nor is this all ; his next step is to subscribe, in testimony of his belief, to a dogmatical formulary composed about two centuries ago, asserted by the Church of England to be infallibly true, and by most other churches believed to be as infallibly false. By this expedient, one class of men is ex- cluded, while three classes are admitted. The class excluded is composed of men who, either from a sense of honour, or from conscientious motives, cannot prevail upon themselves publicly and deli- berately to utter a lie. The classes admitted con- sist — 1. Of those who literally believe these dog- mas — 2. Of those who disbelieve them — 3. Of those who sign them as they would sign the Alcoran, without knowing what they sign, or what they think about it. A nearly similar prac- tice is pursued at Cambridge, and from these two sources the clergy of the Church of England is supplied. Socrates was accused as a corrupter of youth. What was meant by this accusation 1 know not. * See further upon this subject in Mr. Bentham's work, entitled. Swear not at all. 62 B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. But this I know, that to instruct the young in falsehood and perjury, is to corrupt them; and that the benefit of all the other lessons they can learn can never equal the mischief of this instruc- tion.* 6. It may be enquired, whether rewards or other advantages ought to be offered for the defence of any opinion in matters of theory or science, or any other subject upon which opinions are divided?! If the question be one of pure curiosity, the worst that can happen will be that the reward will be ex- pended in waste. But if the opinion thus favoured happen to be a false one and at the same time mischievous, the reward will be productive of uri- mixed evil. But whether it be a question of curi- osity or use, if truth be the object desired, the chance of obtaining it is not so great as when the candidates for reward are allowed to seek it where- soever it may be to be found. If error is to be de- fended, to offer a reward for its defence, would be one if not the only method to be adopted. Who is there that does not perceive that to obtain true testimony, it is inexpedient to offer a reward to the witness who shall depose upon a given side ? Who does not know that the constant effect of such an offer is to discredit the cause of him who makes it? If then anything is to be gained by such partiality, it can only be by error ; truth can only be a loser by such partial reward. This practice is attended with another and more manifest inconvenience; it is that of causing opi- nions to be professed which are not believed ; of inducing a truculent exchange not only of truth, but of sincerity, for money. I do not know if governments ought even to * See Appendix (A) t See Appendix (B) B.I. Ch.VIIL— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. 63 permit individuals to offer rewards upon these con- ditions. To establish error, to repudiate truth, to suborn falsehood : these, in a few words, are the effects of all rewards established in favour of one system to the exclusion of all others. 7. Charity is ever an amiable virtue ; but if in- judiciously employed, is liable to produce more evil than good. Hospitals inconsiderately multi- plied ; regular distributions of provisions, such as were formerly made at the doors of many convents in Spain and Italy, tend to habituate a large pro- portion of the people to idleness and beggary. A reward thus offered to indolence, impoverishes the state and corrupts the people. Luxury (and I annex to this word whatever meaning, except that of pro- digality, people choose to give to it) luxury, that pretended vice so much reprobated by the envious and melancholic, is the steady and natural bene- factor of the human species : it is a master who is always doing good, even when he aims not at it ; he rewards only the industrious. Charity is also a benefactor, but great circumspection is required that it may prove so. 8. There is another manner in which reward may be mischievous : by acting in opposition to the service required, when, for example, the emolu- ments attached to an office are such as to afford the means and temptation not to fulfil the duties of it. In such a case, what may appear a paradox is not the less a great truth : the whole does less ihan a part; by paying too much, the sovereign is less effectually served. But this subject belongs natu- rally to the head of salaries, 9. Whatever weakens the connexion between punishments and offences, operates in proportion as an encouragement to the commission of offences. 64 B.I. Ch.VIII.-REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. It has the effect of a reward offered for their perpe- tration, for whether the inducement to commit offences is augmented, or the restraining motives are debilitated, the result in both cases is the same. Thus, a tax on justice is an indirect reward offered for injustice. The same is the case with respect to all technical rules, by which, indepen- dently of the merits, nullities are introduced into contracts and into procedure ; of every rule that excludes the evidence of a witness, the only de- pository of the fact upon which depends the due administration of justice. In a word, it is the same with everything that tends to loosen the connexion between injury and compensation, between the violation of the law and punishment. If we open our eyes we shall behold the same legislators establishing rewards for informers, and taxes and fees upon law proceedings : they desire that the first should induce men to render them services of which they stand in need, whilst the latter tend to weaken the natural disposition which is felt to render these same services. At the threshold of the tribunal of justice are placed a bait and a bugbear — the bait operates upon the few, the bugbear upon the multitude. 10. There are cases in which to avoid a greater inconvenience, it has been found necessary to dis- pose of the matter of reward in such manner as that it shall operate as a reward for the most atro- cious crime ; yet, in spite of the force of the temptation, this crime is almost unexampled. I allude to the rule established with respect to suc- cessions. Happily, whatever may be the force of the seductive motives in this case, the tutelary motives act in full concert with all their energy. B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. G5 There are many men who for a trifling personal benefit, for an advance in rank, or even to gratify their spleen, would, without scruple, use their utmost exertions to produce a war that would cost the lives of two or three hundred thousand of their fellow creatures ; while among these men there would not be found perhaps one, who, though he were set free from the dread of legal punishment, could be induced for a much greater advantage, to attempt the life of a single individual, and still less the life of a parent whose death would put him in possession of a fortune or a title. But though laws cannot be framed for its com- plete removal, nothing which can be done without inconvenience ought to be left undone towards the diminution of this danger. The persons most ex- posed to become its victims, are those who are ne- cessarily placed under the control of others, such as infants and women. It is under the guidance of this principle, that our laws in some cases have selected as guardians those persons upon whom no interest can devolve in the way of succession. Under the laws of Sweden, precautions of the same description are observed; and it has been else- where shown that this consideration furnishes one of the arguments in favour of the liberty of divorce.* Contracts relating to insurance furnish another instance of the same danger. These contracts, in other respects so beneficial, have given birth to a new species of crime. A man insures a ship or a house at a price greatly beyond its value, with the intention of setting fire to the house or causing the ship to be lost, and then under pretence of com- pensation for the loss of which he is the author, * Traites de Legislation, torn. i. p. 346 (Ed. 1S20). 5 66 B.I. Ch.VIIL— REMUNERATION-WHERE HURTFUL. claims the money for which the insurance is made. Thus one of the most beneficial inventions of civi- lized society is converted into a premium for dis- honesty, and a punishment to virtuous industry. Had the commission of this crime been attended with less risk, or been less difficult to conceal, this most admirable contrivance for softening inevitable calamities must have been abandoned. [ 07 ] CHAPTER IX. REMUNERATION — WHERE NEEDLESS. Factitious reward is superfluous, whenever natural reward is adequate to produce the desired effect. Under this head may be classed all inventions in the arts which are useful to individuals, and whose products may become articles of commerce. Tn the ordinary course of commerce the inventor vyill meet with a natural reward exactly propor- tionate to the utility of his discovery, and which will unite within itself all the qualities which can be desired in a factitious reward. After the most mature consideration, no sovereign can find ano- ther measure so exact as is thus afforded by the free operations of trade. All that the govern- ment has to do is to secure for a time, to the in- ventor, whatever benefit his discovery may yield. This is generally done by the grant of an exclusive privilege, or patent. Of this we shall elsewhere speak more in detail. Not many years ago a grant of 3000/. was made by Parliament to a physician for the discovery of a yellow dye. That money might, without doubt, have been worse employed: but the re- ward was unnecessary: — for this discovery, as for all others in the arts, the proper test of its utility would have been its use in manufactures and commerce. The grant of a determinate sum w^as a loss either to the inventor or to the public: to the inventor, if it were less than he would have gained under a patent : to the public, if it were more. In a word, wherever patents for inventions 5. 68 B.I. Ch.IX.— REMUNERATION— WHERE NEEDLESS, are in use, factitious reward is either groundless or superfluous.* 1 shall elsewhere treat of the encouragements to be given to the arts and sciences. Upon the pre- sent occasion all that 1 shall observe is, that the greater the progress they have made, the less ne- cessary is it to tax the public for their support. In this country, for example, if the exclusive pro- perty in his work be secured to an author, a reward is at the same time secured to him pro- portionate to the service he has performed ; at least in every branch of amusement or instruction that yields a sufficient class of readers. There is no patron to be compared with the public; and by the honour with its other rewards which it be- stows, this patronage has a decided advantage over any that can be received from any other source. With respect to the rewards, that in some Euro- pean states have been bestowed upon poets, the amount of them is so insignificant as to save them from the severe scrutiny to which they might, under other circumstances, have found themselves * Parliament has granted, in two several sums, W.OOOl. to Dr. .Tenner, so celebrated by his invention or introduction of the system of vaccination. This may be considered, per- haps, rather as an indemnification than a reward, at least than a reward proportionate to the service : I say indemnification, because the labour, the researches, the correspondence, the time employed in committing to writing, in teaching and in establishing, his new system, were so many sacrifices of the profits of his profession. As to the natural reward that he gained by his discovery it was nothing : it impoverished instead of enriching him. The liberality with which the physicians throughout Europe, have encouraged a discovery that has lopped off one of the most lucrative branches of their profes- sion, is a most honourable feature in the annals of medicine. When shall we see the lawyers entering into rivalship with them, by the discovery and propagation of the most simple and expeditious mode of legal procedure ? B.I. Ch. IX.— REMUNERATION— WHERE NEEDLESS. gQ exposed. There are some countries in which the relish for literature is confined to such small num- bers, that it may, upon the whole, be beneficial to encoura2:e it bv factitious rewards. But if we consider how intense are the enjoyments of the man born with poetic talents, the sudden reputa- tion that it produces, and the ample profit that it often yields, especially in the dramatic line, it will be found, that the natural rewards attached to it are far from being inconsiderable ; and that, at least, our attention ought, in the first place, to be directed to the department of the sciences, the approaches to which are repulsive and the utility of which are indisputable. Happiness depends upon the correctness of the facts with which our mind is furnished, and the rectitude of our judgment; but poetry has no very direct ten- dency to produce either correctness of know- ledge, or rectitude of judgment. For one instance in which it has been employed to combat mis- chievous prejudices, a thousand might be cited in which they have been fostered and propagated by it. Homer is the greatest of poets : where shall we place him among moralists ? Can any great advantage be derived from the imitation of his gods and heroes ? 1 do not condemn prizes for poetry where the object is to excite youthful emu- lation : I only desire that serious and truly useful pursuits may receive a proportionate encourage^ ment. [ 70 ] CHAPTER X. PROPORTION AS TO REWARDS. In conferring reward, the observance of exact rules of proportion is not nearly of the same import- ance, as in the infliction of punishment. These rules cannot, however, be neglected with impunity. If too great a reward be held out for a given service, competitors will be attracted from more useful pur- suits. If too little, the desired service will either not be rendered or will not be rendered in perfec- tion. Rule I. The aggregate value of the natural and factitious reward, ought not to be less than suffi- cient to outweigh the burthen of the service. Rule II. Factitious rewards may be diminished in proportion, as natural rev\'ards are increased. These two rules present three subjects to our observation — 1. The natural burthens attached to the service. 2. The natural rewards which either do or do not require factitious reward to supply their deficiency. 3. The drawback, more or less hidden, which in a variety of cases alters the ap- parent value of the reward. The natural burthens of any particular service, may be comprised under the following heads : the intensity of labour required in its performance, — the ulterior uneasiness which may arise from its particular character, — the physical danger at- tending it, — the expenses or other sacrifices neces- sarily made previously to its exercise, — the discredit attached to it, — the peculiar enmities it produces. The wages of labour in different branches of trade, are regulated in exact proportion to the combina- tion of these several circumstances. To the legis- B. I. Ch. X,— PROPOllTION AS TO REWARDS. 71 lator, however, except in cases where it may be necessary to add factitious to natural reward, con- siderations of this sort are in general subjects only of speculation.* That any particular service is more or less highly priced, is of little importance : it affects the indivi- duals only who stand in need of it. The competi- tion between those w^ho want and those who can supply, fixes the price of all services in the most fitting manner. It is sufficient that the demand be public and free. To assist, if necessary, in giving publicity to the demand and in maintaining reci- procal liberty in such transactions, is all that the legislator ought to do. 2. Natural rewards are liable to be insufficient in relation to services, whose utility extends to the whole community, without producing particular advantage to any one individual more than another. Of this nature are public employments. It is true, many public employments are attended by natural rewards in the shape of honour, power, the means of serving ones connections, and deserving the public gratitude, and when these rewards are suffi- cient, factitious rewards are superfluous. To their ambassadors and many others of their great officers of state, the Venetians never gave any pecuniary reward. In England, the public functions of she- riffs and justices of the peace, are generally dis- charged by opulent and independent individuals, whose only reward consists in the respect and power attached to those offices. 3. There are many circumstances which may diminish the value ofareward without being gene- rally known beforehand, but against all of which * In The Wealth of Nations, b. i. ch. 10. The circumstances which cause the rate of wages to vary in different employ- ments, arc analysed with the sagacity which characterizes the father of political economy. 72 B. 1. ch. X.— proportion as to rewards. it is proper to guard. Does tiie reward consist of money, its value may be diminislied by a burthen of the same nature, or by a burthen in the shape of honour. Honour and money may even be seen at strife with one another, as well as with themselves. By these means the value of a reward may some- times be reduced to nothing and even become negative. In this country where, properly speaking, there is no public prosecutor, many offences, which no individual has any peculiar interest in prosecuting, are liable to remain unpunished. In the way of remedy, the law offers from 10/. to 20/. to be levied upon the goods of the offender, to whoever will successfully undertake this function: sometimes it , is added, that the expenses will be repaid in case of conviction : sometimes this is not promised. These expenses may amount to thirty, fifty and even one hundred pounds ; it is seldom they are so iittle as twenty pounds. After this, can we be surprised that the laws are imperfectly obeyed ? It maybe added, that it is considered dishonour- able to attend to this summons of the laws. An in- dividual who, in this manner, endeavours to serve his country is called an informer, and lest public opinion should not be sufficient to brand him with infamy, the servants of the law and even the laws themselves have, on some occasions, endeavoured to fix the stain. The number of private prosecu- tors would be much more numerous if, instead of the insidious offer of a reward, an indemnification were substituted. The dishonourable offer being suppressed, the dishonour itself would cease. And who can say, when, by such an arrangement, the circumstance which offends it is removed, whether honour itself may not be pressed into the service of the laws ? There is another case in which, by the negli- B.I. Ch.X.— PROPORTION AS TO REWARDS. 73 gence of legal and official arrangements, a consider- able and certain expense is attached to and made to precede a variable and uncertain reward. A new idea presents itself to some workman or artist. Knowing that the laws grant to every inventor a privilege to enable him exclusively to reap the profits of his invention, he enjoys by anticipation his success, and labours to perfect his invention. Having in the prosecution of his discovery con- sumed, perhaps, the greater part of his property and his life, his invention is complete. He goes, with a joyful heart, to the public office to ask for his patent. But what does he encounter ? Clerks, lawyers, and officers of state, who reap beforehand the fruits of his industry. This privilege is not given, but is, in fact, sold for from 100/. to 200/.: sums greater perhaps than he ever possessed in his life. He finds himself caught in a snare, which the law, or rather extortion, which has obtained the force of law, has spread for the industrious inventor. It is a tax levied upon ingenuity, and no man can set bounds to the value of the services ; it may have lost to the nation. Rule HI. Reward should be adjusted in such a manner to each particular service, that for every part of the benefit there maybe a motive to induce a man to give birth to it. In other words, the value of the reward ought to advance, step by step, with the .value of the service. This rule is more accurately followed in respect of rewards than of punishments. If a man steals a quantity of corn, the punishment is the same whether he steal one bushel or ten ; but when a premium is given for the exportation of corn, the amount of the premium bears an exact proportion to the amount exported. To be con- 74 B. I. Crt. X.— PROPORTION AS TO REWARDS. sistent in matters of legislation, the scale ought to be as regular in the one case as in the other. The utility of this rule is put beyond doubt, by the difference that may be observed between the quantity of work performed by men employed by the day and men employed by the piece. When a ditch is to be dug, and the work is divided between one set of men working by the day, and another set working by the piece, there is no difficulty in predicting which set will have finished first. Hope and, perhaps, emulation are the motives which actuate the labourer by the piece: the motive which actuates the labourer by the day is fear: fear of being discharged in case of manifest and extra- ordinary idleness. It must not however be forgotten, that there are many sorts of work, in respect of which it is im- proper to adopt this mode of payment ; which tends indeed to produce the greatest quantity of labour, but at the same time is calculated to give birth to negligence and precipitation. This method ought only to be employed in cases where the quality of the work can easily be discerned, and its imperfections (if any) detected. The value of a reward may be increased or diminished, in respect of certainty as well as amount : when, therefore, any services require frequently renewed efTorts, it is desirable that each effort should render the probability of its attainment more certain. Arrangements should be made for connecting services with reward, in such manner that the at- tainment of the reward shall remain uncertain, with- out however ceasing to be more probable than the contrary event. The faculties of the individual emj)loyed will thus naturally be kept upon the B.I. Ch.X.— PROPORTION AS TO REWARDS. 75 full Stretch. This is accomplished when a com- petition is established between two or more per- sons, and a reward is promised to that one who shall render service in the most eminent degree, whether it respect the quantity or the quality of the service proposed. Rule IV. When two services come in competi- tion, of which a man cannot be induced to perform both, the reward for the greater service ought to be sufficient to induce him to prefer it to the less. In a certain country matters are so arranged, that more is to be gained by building ships on the old plan than by inventing better ; by taking one ship than by blockading a hundred; by plundering at sea than by fighting ; by distorting the established laws than by executing them ; by clamouring for or against ministers, than by showing in what manner the laws may be improved. It must how- ever be admitted, that in respect of some of these abuses, it would be difficult to prescribe the proper remedy. By what method can competition between two services be established? The individual from whom they are required must, either from personal quali- fications or external circumstances, have it in his power to render either the one or the other. It is proper to distinguish the cases in which this posi- tion is transient from those in which it is permanent. It is in thefirst that the fault committed, by suffer- ing disproportion to subsist, is most irreparable. During the American war, upwards of an hun- dred ships were, at one time, in one of the har- bours of the revolted colonies. It was of great importance that they should be kept in a state of blockade, since many of them were loaded with military stores. An English captain received 76 B. I. ch. X.— proportion as to rewards. orders to blockade them. Sufficiently skilled in arithmetic, and in proverbs, to know that two or three birds in his cage were worth a hundred in the bush, he acted as the greater number of men would have acted in his place. He stood off to a suffi- cient distance to give the enemy hopes of escaping : as soon as they had quitted the harbour, he re- turned, captured half-a-dozen, and the rest pro- ceeded to their destination. I do not answer for the truth of this anecdote; but true or not true, it is equally good as an apologue. It exhibits one of the fruits of that inconsiderate prodigality, which grants, without discrimination, the produce of their captures to the captors. Another example. A man who has influence obtains the command of a frigate, with orders to go upon a cruise. The command of a first-rate is accepted by those only who cannot obtain a frigate. It is thus that interest is put in competition with duty: cupidity with glory. There are doubtless not wanting noble minds by whom the seductions of sinister interest are resisted : but wherefore should they be so much exposed to what it is so difficult to resist ? It is true, that their ears may not be altogether insensible to the call of honour; the law has be- stowed pecuniary rewards upon the captors of armed vessels, — another example, where one in- stance of profusion has created the necessity of a second, — but these rewards are still unequal : the chase of doves is more advantageous than the pur- suit of eagles. The remedy would be to tax, and tax heavily, the profits of lucrative cruises, to form a fund of reward in favour of dangerous, or merely useful expeditions. By this arrangement, the country u. I. ch. X.— proportion as to rewards. '^'7 would be doubly benefited, the service would be rendered more attractive, and conducted with more economy. It may be true, that if this tax were deducted from the share of the seamen, their ardour might be cooled. Neither in value or in number are their prizes in this lottery susceptible of diminution ; but though this be true with respect to the lower ranks of the profession, ought we to judge in the same manner of the superior officers, whose minds are elevated as their rank, and on whose conduct the performance of the duty has the most immediate dependence ? In the judicial department, the service which belongs to the profession of an advocate, and the service which belongs to the office of a judge, are in a state of rivalry. They constitute the elements of two permanent conditions, of which the first among most nations is the preliminary route to the second. In England, the judges are uniformly selected from among the class of advocates. Now the interest of the country requires that the choice should fall upon the men of highest attainments in their profession, since upon the reputation of the judges depends the opinion which every man forms of his security. It is not of the same im- portance to the public that advocates should be supereminently skilful ; their occupation is not to seek out what is agreeable to justice, but what agrees with the interest of the party to which chance has engaged them. On the contrary, the more decidedly any advocate is exalted in point of talents above his colleagues, the more desirable is it that he should no longer continue an advo- cate. In proportion to his pre-eminence, is the probability that he will be opposed to the distri- bution of justice. The worse the cause of the 78 B. I. Ch. X.— PROPORTION AS TO REWARDS. suitor, the more pressing is his need of an able advocate to remedy his weakness. Per Annum. In England, the emoluments of the Lord Chan- cellor are reckoned at - - - £ 20,000 Those of the Vice-chancellor - - - 5,00O Those of the Master of the Rolls - - 4,000 Those of the Chief Justice of the King's Bench - 6,500 Those of the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas - 5,000 Those of the Chief Baron of the Exchequer - 5,000 Those of the Nine Puisne Judges - - 4,000 Now amongst the class of advocates, there are always to be found about half a dozen whose an- nual emoluments average from eight to twelve thousand pounds. Of this number there is not one who would not disdain the office of puisne judge, since his profits are actually two or three times as great as theirs. To these advocates of the first class may be added as many more, who would equally disdain these subordinate situations, in the hope every day of succeeding to the advocates who shall succeed to the principal situations. There are two methods of obviating this inconve- nience : the one by increasing the emoluments of the judges. (This course has been adopted upon many occasions, and they have been raised to their present amount, without success.) The other con- sists in lowering the profits of the advocates : a desirable object in more respects than one, but which can result only from rendering the whole system of the laws more simple and intelligible. In the department of education, there is a nearly similar rivalry between the profession of the clergy and the office of professor, as between the profession of advocate and the office of judge, in the department of the laws. In proportion as he is what he ought to be, in order to be useful, a B. I. Ch. X.— proportion AS TO REWARDS. 79 clergyman is a professor of morality, having for his pupils a larger or smaller number of persons of every class, during the whole course of their lives. On the other hand, a professor (as he is called) has for his pupils a number of select individuals, whose character is calculated to exercise the greatest influence upon the general mass of the people, and among their number the clergy are generally to be found. The period during which these individuals attend the lectures of the pro- fessor, is the most critical period of life ; the only period during which they are under obligation to pay attention to what they hear, or to receive the instruction presented to them. Such being the relation between the services of the two classes, let us see what is the proportion between the amount of reward respectively allotted to each. In England, the emoluments of the clergy vary from 20/. to 10,000/. a-year, while those of the professors in the chief seats of education — the universities, are between the twentieth and the hundredth part of the latter sum. In Scotland, the emoluments of the professors differ but little from what they are in England, but the richest ecclesi- astical benefice is scarcely equal to the least pro- ductive professorship. It is thus, says Adam Smith, that " in England the church is continually draining the universities of all their best and ablest members ; and an old college tutor, who is known and distinguished as an eminent man of letters, is rarely to be found," whilst in Scotland the case is exactly the reverse. It is by the in- influence of this circumstance that he explains how academical education is so excellent in the Scottish universities, and, according to him, so defective in those of England. 80 B. 1. ch. X.— proportion as to rewards. Between tw^o professions which do not enter into competition with each other (for example, those of opera-dancers and clergymen) a dispro- portion between their emoluments is not attended with such palpable inconveniences ; but when by any circumstance two professions are brought into comparison with each other, the least advantage- ous loses its value by the comparison, and the disproportion presents to the eye of the observer the idea of injustice. t 81 ] CHAPTER XI. CHOICE AS TO REWARDS. In making a proper selection of punishments, much skill is required : comparatively, much less is requisite in the proper selection of rewards. Not only are the species of rewards more limited in number than those of punishments, but the grounds of preference are more easily discover- able, and there are not, as in the case of punish- ments, any passions which tend to mislead the judgment. The qualities desirable in rewards are the same as in the case of punishments : we shall enumerate them, and then proceed to point out in what degree they are united in certain modes of remu- neration. A reward is best adapted to fulfil the purpose for which it may be designed, when it is — 1. Variable^ susceptible of increase or diminu- tion in respect of amount, that it may be propor- tioned to the different degrees of service. 2. Equable, that equal portions may at all times operate with equal force upon all individuals. 3. Commensurable, with respect to other spe- cies of rewards attached to other services. 4. Exemplary: its apparent ought not to dif- fer from its real value. This quality is wanting when a large expense is incurred for the pur- pose of reward, without its becoming matter of notoriety. The object aimed at ought to be to 6 82 B.l. Ch. XI.— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS. Strike the attention, and produce a durable im- pression. 5. Economical. More ought not to be paid for a service than it is worth. This is the rule in every market. 6. Characteristic : as far as possible analogous to the service. It becomes by this means the more exemplary. 7. Popular. It ought not to oppose established prejudices. In vain did the Roman emperors bestow honours upon the most odious informers ; they degraded the honours, but the informers were not the less infamous. But it is not enough that it does not oppose the prejudices, it is desirable that every reward should obtain the approbation of the public. 8. Fructifying: calculated to excite the per- severance of the individual in the career of service, and to supply him with new resources. In the selection from among the variety of rewards, of that particular one which most cer- tainly will produce any desired effect, attention must not only be paid to the nature of the service, but also to the particular disposition and character of the individual upon whom it is to operate.* In this respect, public regulations can never attain the perfection of which domestic discipline is sus- ceptible. No sovereign can ever in the same degree be acquainted with the dispositions of his subjects as a father may be with those of his chil- dren ; this disadvantage is however compensated by the larger number of competitors. In a king- dom, every diversity of temperament, and every * See Traites de Legislation, torn. 1. ch. ix. Des cir- constances qui influent sur la sensibilite. Or^ Theory of Morals and Legislation, vol. 1, ch. vi. B.I. Ch. XL— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS. 83 degree of aptitude may be found united together, and provided the reward be proportionate to the service, it will be of little importance what may be its nature: like the magnet, which out of a hete- rogenous mass attracts and separates the most hidden particles of iron, it will detect the indi- vidual susceptible of its attraction. Besides, the nature of pecuniary reward, which is adapted to the greater proportion of services, is such that every individual may convert it into the species of pleasure which he most prefers. To form a judgment of the merits and demerits of pecuniary reward, a glance at the list of desira- ble qualities will suffice. It will at once be seen which of them it possesses and of which it is deficient : it is variable^ equable, and commensura- ble ; it ought to be added, that it is frequently indispensably necessary ; there are many cases in which every other reward separated from this would not only be a burthen, but even a mockery, especially if the performance of the service has been attended with an expense or loss greater than the individual can easily support. On the other hand, pecuniary reward is not exempt from disadvantages : speaking generally (for there are many exceptions) it is neither exem- plary, nor characteristic, nor even popular,* When * " Alt defaut de n'etre pas dignes de la vertu, les recom- penses pecuniaires joignent celui de n'etre pas assez publiques, de ne pas parler sans cesse aux yeux et aux ccEurs, de dispa- roitre aussitot qu'elles sont accordees, et de ne laisser aucune trace visible qui excite Temulation en perpetuant I'honneur qui doit les accompagner." — Rousseau : Gouvernment de Po- logne, ch. xi. The phrase in italics is one of the too common exaggerations in the writings of Rousseau. It is more striking than just. In his letter to the Duke of Wirtemberg upon education, in 6. 84 B. I. ch. XI.— choice as to rewards. allowed to exceed a certain amount, it tends to diminish the activity of the receiver: instead of adding to his inclination to persevere in his ser- vices, it may furnish him with a temptation to discontinue them. The enriched man will be apt to think like the soldier of Lucullus, who became timid so soon as he possessed property to preserve. Ibit eo, quo vis^ qui zonam perdidit, inquit. HoR. Epist. II. Lib. 2. There are also cases in which money, instead of an attractive, may have a repulsive effect; in- stead of operating as a reward, may be considered as an insult, at least by persons who possess any delicacy in their sentiments of honour. A certain degree of skill is therefore required in the applica- tion of money as a reward : it is oftentimes desira- ble that the pecuniary should appear only as an accessary to the honorary, which should be made to constitute the principal part of the rew^ard.* Every pecuniary reward maybe, as it were, anni- hilated by its relative smallness. A man of inde- pendent fortune, and of a certain rank in society, would be considered as degraded by accepting a sum that would not degrade a mechanic. There is no rule for deterniining what is permitted or prohibited in this respect : custom has established the prejudice. But the difficulty it presents is which he shows that he had reflected much upon the unioa of interest with duty, he says, '' L'argent est un ressort dans la mechanique morale, mais il repousse toujours la main qui le fait agir." Toujours is an exaggeration. * Tel donne a pleines mains qui n'oblige personne. La fa9on de donner vaut mieux que ce qu'on donne. Le Menteur, Sc^ne 1. B. I, ch. xr.— choice as to rewards. 85 not insurmountable. By combining together money and honour, a compound is formed which is universally pleasing: medals, for example, possess this double advantage. By a little art and precaution, a solid peace is established between pride and cupidity ; and thus united, they have both been ranged under the banners of merit. Pride proclaims aloud, — " It is not the intrinsic value of the metal which possesses attractions for me ; it is the circle of glory alone with which it is sur- rounded." Cupidity makes its calculation in si- lence, and accurately estimates the value of the material of the prize. By the Society of Arts a still higher degree of perfection has been attained. A choice is com- monly allowed between a sum of money and a medal. Thus all conditions and tastes are satis- fied. The mechanic or peasant pockets the money. The peer or gentleman ornaments his cabinet with a medal. The apparent value of medals is in some cases augmented, by rendering the design upon them characteristic of the service on account of which they are bestowed. By the addition of the name of the individual rewarded, an exclusive certificate is made in his favour. The ingenuity displayed in the choice of the design has sometimes been extremely happy. A British statute gives to the person who ap- prehends and convicts a highwayman, amongst other rewards, the horse on which the offender Wd.9 mounted when he committed the offence. Possibly the framer of this law may have taken the hint from the passage in Virgil, in which the son of vEneas promises to Nisus, in case of the success of the expedition he was meditating, the very horse and accoutrements which Turn us had 86 B. I. ch. XI.— choice as to rewards. been seen to use.* It is equally possible, that the same knowledge of human nature, which sug- gested to the Latin poet the efficacy of such a reward, suggested it at once to the English law- giver. Be this as it may, this provision is com- mendable on three several accounts. In the as- signment of the prize, it pitches upon an object, which, from the nature of the transaction, is likely to make a j)articular impression on the mind of the person whose assistance is required; acting in this respect in conformity to the rule above laid down, which recommends an attention to the circum- stances influencing the sensibility of the person on whom impression is to be made. It also has the advantage of being characteristic as well as exem- plary. The animal, when thus transferred, be- comes a voucher for the activity and prowess of its owner, as well as a trophy of his victory. An arrangement like this, simple as it is, or rather because it is so simple, was an extraordinary stretch in British policy; in which, though there is generally a great mixture of good sense, there reigns throughout a kind of littleness and mauvaise honte^ which avoids, with timid caution, everything that is bold, striking, and eccentric, scarce ever hazarding any of those strong and masterly touches, which strike the imagination, and fill the mind with the idea of the sublime. Examples of rewards of this nature abound in * Vidisti quo Turnus equo, quibus ibat in armis Aureus ; ipsum ilium clypeum, cristasque rubentes Excipiam sorti, jam nunc tua praemia, Nise. JEn. ix. 269. Thou saw'st the courser by proud Turnus prest .^ That Nisus, and his arms and nodding crest And shield^ from chance exempt, shall be thy share. Dryden's Translation. B. [. Ch. XI.— choice as to REWARDS. 87 the Roman system of remuneration. For every species of merit appropriate symbolic crowns were provided. This branch of their administration preserved the ancient simplicity of Rome in its cradle; and the wreath of parsley long eclipsed the splendour of the crowns of gold. 1 was about to speak of their triumphs, but here I am com- pelled to stop: humanity shudders at that pride of conquest, which treads under its feet the van- quished nations. The system of legislation ought no doubt to be adapted to the encouragement of military ardour, but it ought not to fan it into such a flame as to make it the predominant pas- sion of the people, and to prostrate everything before it. Honorary rewards are eminently exemplary : they are standing monuments of the service for which they have been bestowed : they also pos- sess the desirable property of operating as a per- petual encouragement to fresh exertions. To dis- grace an honorary reward is to be a traitor to one's self; he that has once been pronounced brave should perpetually merit that commendation. To create a reward of this nature is not very difficult. The symbolical language of esteem is, like written language, matter of convention. Every mode of dress, every ceremony, so soon as it is made a mark of pre-eminence, becomes ho- nourable. A branch of laurel, a ribband, a garter, everything possesses the value which is assigned to it. It is however desirable, that these ensigns should possess some emblematic character expres- sive of the nature of the service for which they are bestowed. With reference to this principle, the blazonry of heraldry appears rude and unmeaning. The decorations of the various orders of knight- hood, though not deficient in splendour, are highly 88 B.I. Ch. XL— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS. deficient in respect of character : they strike the eye, but they convey no instruction to the mind. A ribband appears more like the finery of a woman than the distinctive decoration of a hero. Honorary titles have frequently derived a part of their glory from being characteristic. The place which has been the theatre of his exploits has often furnished a title for a victorious general, well calculated to perpetuate the memory of his services and his glory. At a very early period of their liistory, the Romans employed this expe- dient in addition to the other rewards which they conferred upon the general who completed a con- quest. Hence the surnames of Africanus^ Nu- onidicus, Asiaticus, Germanicus, 2Lnd so many others. This custom has frequently been imitated. Cathe- rine H. revived it in favour of the Romanoffs and Orloffs. Mahon, twice in the eighteenth century, furnished titles to its conquerors. The mansion of Blenheim unites to the eclat of the name a more substantial proof of national gratitude.* The Romans occasionally applied the same mode of reward to services of a different descrip- tion. The Appian way perpetually recalled, to the memory of those who journied on it, the libe- rality of Appius.f * When after a great naval victory, as an acknowledgment of his services, the freedom of the City of London was pre- sented to Admiral Keppel, in a box of heart of oak of curious workmanship, and enriched with gold, the present was characteris- tic 3inA popular ; allusion being evidently made to the song, which, whoever may have been the Tyrtoeus, has doubtless had, at times, no inconsiderable share in rousing British courage. t One of the noblest charitable institutions in London, Guy's Hospital, bears the name of its founder. It is true, it is not done with the intention of conferring a reward j but there are few who, of late years, have travelled in Great Britain, who have not spoken in praise of Mac Adam's systetn of constructing roads. B. I. Ch. XI.— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS. 89 The career of legislation may also furnish some instances of honours which possess this character of analogy. In the Digest of the Sardinian Laws, very praiseworthy care was taken to inform the people to which of their sovereigns they were in- debted for each particular law. It is an example worthy of imitation. It may have been intended as a mark of respect, as well for convenience of reference, that it has been customary to designate, by the title of The Grenville Act,, the admirable law which this representative of the people pro- cured to be enacted for the impartial decision of questions relative to contested elections. Had the statue of this legislator been placed in the House of Commons, from which he banished a scandalous disorder, it would both have been a monument of gratitude, and a noble lesson. It might have for its companion a statue of his noble rival, the Author of Economical Reform ; it is thus that the impartial judgment of posterity, forgetting the differences which separated them, delights to recollect the excellences which assimilated them to each other. It is thus that it has placed, side by side each other, Eschines and Demosthenes. The more men become enlightened, the more clearly will they perceive the necessity, at least, of dividing honour between those who cause nations to flourish by means of good laws, and those who defend them by their valour. Among the most obvious and efficacious means of conferring honorary rewards, are pictures, busts, statues, and other imitative representations of the person meant to be rewarded. These spread his fame to posterity, and, in conjunction with the history of the service, hand down the idea of the person by whom it was rendered. They are naturally accompanied with inscriptions expla- 90 B.I. Ch. XI.— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS. natory of the cause for which the honour was decreed. When the art of writing has become common, these inscriptions will frequently give disgust, by the length or extravagance of the elo- gium : and it will then become an object of good taste to say as much in as few words as possible. Perhaps the happiest specimens of the kind that were, or ever will be produced, are the two inscrip- tions placed under the statues of Louis XIV. and Voltaire : the one erected by the town of Mont- pellier, the latter by a society of men of letters, of whom Frederic 111. king of Prussia was one. A Louis XIV. apres sa niort. A Voltaire pendant sa vie: to the king, though no longer the object of hope and fear: to the poet and philosopher, though still the butt of envy. The business on occasions like these is not to inform but to remind: history and the art of printing does the rest. The greater number of the rewards of which w^e have spoken above, are occasional^ that is, ap- plied to a particular action. There are others which are more permanent in their character, such as the Hospitals of Chelsea and Greenwich, in England, and Uhotel des Invalides at Paris. Doubts have often been entertained of the utility of these establishments. Rewards, it has been said, might be extended to a much greater number of individuals, if the annual amount of the expenses of these places were distributed in the shape of pensions, and that the individuals would thus be rendered much happier; since men who have passed their days of activity, united in a place where they are no longer subject to the cares and labours of life, are exposed to the most ceaseless listlessness. I shall not dispute the truth of these observations, but on the other hand shall examine the effect of these establishments upon the minds B. I. Ch. XL— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS. 91 of soldiers and sailors. Their imaginations are flattered by the magnificence of these retreats ; it is a brilliant prospect opened to them all ; an asy- lum is provided for those who, having quitted their country and their families in their youth, have fre- quently in their days of decrepitude and age no other home in the world. Those who are muti- lated or disfigured with wounds, are consoled by the renown which awaits them in the hospital, where every thing reminds them of their exploits. It may also be for the benefit of the service more prudent thus to unite than to disperse them. It is a luxury, but it is rational, exemplary, and pos- sesses a character of justice and magnificence. These establishments being necessarily limited in respect to the number which can be admitted into them, may be considered upon the footing of extraordinary rewards, applicable to distinguished services. They would thus constitute a species of nobility for the soldiers and sailors. They would acquire an additional degree of splendour were their walls adorned by the trophies taken in war, which would there appear much more appropriately placed than when deposited in the temples of peace. The decorations of the chapel of U hotel des Inva- Udes are admirable. The flags suspended in the cathedral of St. Paul only awaken thoughts at variance with those of religious worship ; removed to Chelsea or Greenwich, they would be connected with natural associations, and would furnish a text to the commentaries of those who acquired them by their valour. It is not often that every desirable quality is seen to be united in one and the same reward ; this union however frequently takes place in an almost imperceptible manner. ^92 B.I. Ch. XI.— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS. ft An instance of a reward particularly well adapted to the nature of the service, is that of the monopoly which it is almost universally the custom to create in favour of inventors. From the very nature of the thing, it adapts itself with the utmost nicety to those rules of proportion to which it is most diffi- cult for reward artificially instituted by the legis- lator to conform. It adapts itself with the utmost nicety to the value of the service. If confined, as it ought to be, to the precise point in which the originality of the invention consists, it is conferred with the least possible waste of expense. It causes a service to be rendered, which without it a man would not have a motive for rendering ; and that only by forbidding others from doing that which were it not for that service it would not have been possible for them to have done. Even with regard to such inventions, for such there will be, where others, besides him who possesses himself of the reward, have scent of the invention, it is still of use, by stimulating all parties, and setting them to strive which shall first bring his discovery to bear. With all this it unites every property which can be wished for in a reward. It is variable, equable, commensurable, characteristic, exemplary, frugal, promotive of perseverance, subservient to com- pensation, popular, and revocable. C .A. :.> ' • i". .•-^'W^*— *1ikf [ 93 ] CHAPTER XII. PROCEDURE AS TO REWARDS- The province of reward is the last aslyum of ar- bitrary power. In the early stages of society, pu- nishments, pardons, and rewards were equally lavished without measure and without necessity. The infliction of punishment has already in mea- sure been subject to regulation ; at some future time rules will be laid down for the granting of pardons, and last of all for the bestowment of rewards. If punishment ought not to be inflicted without for- mal proof of the commission of crime, neither ought reward to be conferred without equally for- mal proof of desert. It may be allowed that in point of importance, the difference between the two cases is great : that punishment inflicted without trial excites universal alarm, whilst reward conferred without desert excites no such feelings; but these conside- rations only prove that the advantage of formal procedure in the distribution of reward is limited to the prevention of prodigality, and of the other abuses by which the value of reward is diminished. At Rome, if certain travellers may be believed, it is the custom when a saint is about to be ca- nonized, to allow an advocate, who in familiar language is called the advocate of the devil, to plead against his admission. If this advocate had always been faithful to his client, the calendar might not have been so full as at present.* Be this as it may, * '' Pope Urban VIII. having sufTered some ill treatment 94 B. I. ch. XII.— procedure as to rewards. the idea itselfis excellent, and might advantageously be borrowed by politics from religion. Ultalico valor non e ancor morlo : there are yet some lessons to be learned in the capital of the world. It is reported of Peter the Great, that when he condescended to pass through every gradation of military, rank from the lowest to the highest in his empire, he took no step without producing regu- lar, certificates of his qualifications. We may be allowed to suppose, that even with inferior recom- mendations to those produced by this great prince be would have succeeded. There was no advocate for the devil to contest the point, and even had there been one, his fidelity would have been doubt- ful : but had the qualifications of the Czar been as imperfect as, according to the history, they were complete, his submitting to produce them would have offered a noble lesson. In England, when a dormant peerage is claimed by any individual, the Attorney-general is consti- tuted the advocate for the devil, and charged to examine into and produce every thing which can invalidate his title. Wherefore is he not thus em- ployed when it is proposed to create new peers ? Why should he not be allowed to urge every thing which can be said against the measure ? Is it feared that he would be too often successful ?* from a certain noble Roman family, said to his friends, Questa gente e molto ingrata, lo ho bealificato uno de loro parenti, che non lo meritava." — Jortin's Miscellanies. * If the peers are interested in not suffering the value of their office to be lessened by sharing it with unintitled persons, the public have a more important interest in preventing pro- fusion, with respect to this modification of the matter of re- ward — in preventing the bestowment of a portion of the sovereign power upon persons who have not purchased such a trust by any service. But if merit is not to be regarded, and there are political reasons for preserving this prerogative tin- B.I. Ch. XII.— PROCEDURE AS TO REWARDS. 95 In the distribution of rewards, were it always necessary publicly to assign the reason for their bestowment, a restraint would be imposed upon princes and their ministers, to which they are unwilling to submit. There formerly existed in Sweden a custom or positive law, obliging the king to insert in the patent conferring a pension or title, the reason for the grant. In 1774 this custom was abolished by an express law inserted in the Gazette of that court, declaring that the individuals honoured by the bounty of theking, should be con- sidered as indebted to his favour alone. Did this monarch think that he stood in need of services which he would not dare publicly to acknow- ledge ?* In England, the remuneratory branch of arbi- controuled, the subject assumes another aspect, and its exa- mination here would be out of place. * Extract from the Courier of the Lower Rhine, 5th March 1774. — " Stockholm, 11th February. — It was formerly the custom when the king elevated any one to the rank of nobility, or conferred on hira the title of baron, to insert in the diploma the circumstances by which he had merited this distinction. But upon a late occasion, when his majesty ennobled M. de Geer, chamberlain of the court, he requested that the kind- ness and good pleasure of the king might be inserted in his di- ploma as the only reason for his elevation. His majesty not only complied, but directed that the Chancery should thence- forward follow this rule, as was anciently the practice under the sovereigns of the family of Vasa, till the reign of Christina." J have not seen any of these ancient diplomas of Swedish nobility, and I know not whether the facts they exhibited as the reasons operating upon the Sovereign were specific and detailed ; but whatever was the nature of this certificate, it served as a token of respect to public opinion, and a means of preserving undiminished the value of titles of nobility. This usurpation was scarcely noticed amidst the great revolution which the king had just accomplished. In the career of arbi- trary power, there are open conquests and clandestine acquisi- tions. 96 B.I. ch. XII.— procedure as to rewards. trary power has begun^to be pruned. Except in particular cases, the king is not allowed to grant a pension exceeding 300/. per annum, without the consent of parliament. Since the passing of the act containing this restriction, the candidates for pensions have been but few. When M. Necker undertook the administration of the finances in France, the total of the acknow- ledged pensions, without reckoning the secret gra- tuities, which were very considerable, amounted to 27 millions of livres. In England, where the national wealth was not less than in France, the pensions did not amount to the tenth part of this sum. It is thus that the difference between a li- mited and an absolute monarchy may be exhibited, even in fissures. In Ireland, the king upon his sole authority, in 1783, created an order of knighthood ; thus pro- fiting by what remained of the fragments of arbitrary power. No blame was imputed to him for esta- blishing this tax upon honour : had he levied a tax upon property the nation might not have been so tractable. Those who hoped to share in the new treasure were careful nottoraisean outcry againstits establishment ; those at whose expense this treasure was established, did not understand this piece of finesse ; they opened their eyes widely, but com- prehended nothing. The measure could not have been better justified by circumstances. Every day the crown found itself stripped of some prerogative, justly or unjustly the subject of envy. It was therefore high time to avail itself of the small num- ber of those, in the exercise of which it was still tolerated. Become independent of Great Britain, the honour of the Irish nation seemed to require a decoration of this kind. For what is a kingdom without an order of knighthood ? B. I. Ch. XII.-PROCEDURE AS TO REWARDS. 97 To enter into the consideration of the details re- quisite for the establishment of a system of remu- neratory procedure, comes not within the present part of our design : a very slight sketch ofthelead- ing principles on which it might be grounded, is the utmost that can here be given. The general idea would of course be taken from the system es- tablished in penal and civil cases. Between these systems, the most striking difference would, how- ever, arise from the interest and wishes of the agent whose act might be the subject of investigation, with respect to the publicity of the act. In the one case the consequences of such his act, in case it were proved, being pernicious to him, all his endeavour would be to keep it concealed : in the other, these consequences being beneficial, his en- deavour would be to place it in the most conspi- cuous light imaginable. In the first case, his en- deavours would be to delay the process and, if pos- sible, make it void : in the latter, to expedite it and keep it valid. The most striking point of co-incidence is the occasion there is in both cases for two parties. In the civil branch, there can hardly be a deficiency in this respect ; there being commonly two indivi- duals whose interests are opposite, and known and felt to be so. But in the penal branch, in one very large division of it, there is naturally no such opposition ; I mean in that which concerns of- fences against the public only : here, therefore, the law has been obliged to create such an opposition, and has accordingly created it by the establishment of a public prosecutor. In the remuneratory branch of procedure, there is a similar absence of natural opposition, and accordingly the grand desideratum is the appointment of an officer whose business it should be to contest on the part of the public, the title to whatever reward is proposed to be granted in 7 98 B.I. Ch. XII.— PROCEDURE AS TO REWARDS. this way. He might be entitled, for shortness, by some such name as that of Contestor-general. Without a Prosecutor-general, in the large and important division of cases above mentioned, there would not, unless by accident — I mean, when an individual is engaged in the task of prosecution by public spirit, or what is much more natural, by private pique — be any suit instituted, any punishment inflicted. For want of a Contestor- general there is not, unless by a similar accident,* any check given to the injustice of unmerited remuneration. Upon the whole then, the penal and civil branches of procedure, but particularly the penal, may in all cases serve either as the models, or if the term may be admitted, as the anti-models of the remuneratory branch of procedure. * I say by accident : for as in the case of offences against the public merely, accident will sometimes raise up a private pro- secutor in the person of a chance individual, so in matters of remunerative procedure, will accident sometimes raise up a contestor in tlie person of some member of the body by whose appointment the reward is bestowed. This supposes that the reward is to be in the appointment of a body ; so that if it be at the appointment of a single person, the chance of contesta- tion is altogether wanting. This chance will of course be the greater, the more numerous that body : but if the body be very small, especially if it be composed without any mixture of dif- ferent interests and partialities, and its deliberations held in secret, it will amount to nothing. If the business be confined to three, or four, or half a dozen who are intimately connected, the bargain is soon made: ''you serve my friend, I serve yours.'' Even be the assembly ever so numerous, the chance of contestation is but a precarious one. The task is at any rate an invidious task : he must be a man of more than com- mon public spirit, added to more than common courage, who unprompted by party jealousy and uncompclled by office, will undertake it : nor have instances been wanting when the most numerous and discordant assemblies have concurred unani- mously in the vote of rewards, which the majority have been known individually to disappro^ e. [ 99 ] CHAPTER XIII. REWARDS TO INFORMERS. The execution of a law cannot be enforced, unless the violation of it be denounced ; the assistance of the informer is, therefore, altogether as necessary and as meritorious as that of the judge. We have alreadv had occasion to remark, that with respect to public offences, where no one individual more than another is interested in their prosecution, it has been found necessary to create a sort of magistrate, an accuser-general, to carry on such prosecutions in virtue of his office ; but it is indispensably necessary that offences should be denounced to him before he can begin to act. In a well-ordered community, it would be the duty of every individual possessing evidence of the commission of a crime, to denounce the cri- minal to the tribunals, and such individual would be disposed so to do. In most countries, however, men in general are desirous of withdrawing from the performance of this duty. Some refuse to perform it from mistaken notions of pity towards the delinquent ; others because they disapprove of some part of the law ; others from the fear of making enemies ; many from indolence ; almost all from a disinclination to submit to that loss which would arise from the interruption of their ordinary occupations. In these countries, therefore, it has been found necessary to offer pecuniary rewards to informers. So far as my knowledge extends, governments 7. 100 B.I. Ch. XIII.— rewards to informers. have never been advised to discontinue this tice. It is supported by authority, but it is condemned by public opinion : mercenary infor- mations are considered disgraceful ; salaried in- formers, odious. From hence it results, that the reward offered by the law does not possess all its nominal value ; the disgrace attached to the ser- vice is a drawback upon its amount. The indi- vidual is rewarded by the state, and punished by the moral sanction. Let us examine the usual objections made against mercenary informations. 1. It is odious, it is said, toprojit hy the evil we have caused to others. This objection is founded upon a feeling of im- proper commiseration for the offender; since pity towards the guilty is cruelty towards the innocent. The reward paid to the informer has for its object, the service he has performed ; in this respect he is upon a level with the judge who is paid for passing sentence. The informer is a servant of the govern- ment, employed in opposing the internal enemies of the state, as the soldier is a servant employed in opposing its external foes. 2. It introduces into society a system of espionage. To the word espionage a stigma is attached : let us substitute the word inspection, which is uncon- nected with the same prejudices. If this inspec- tion consist in the maintenance of an oppressive system of police, which subjects innocent actions to punishment, which condemns secretly and arbi- trarily, it is natural that such a system and its agents should become odious. But if this inspec- tion consist in the maintenance of a system of police, for the preservation of the public tranquil- lity, and the execution of good laws, all its inspec- tors, and all its guardians, act a useful and salu- B.I. Ch. XIII.— REWARDS TO INFORMERS. 101 tary part; it is the vicious only who will have reason to complain ; it will be formidable to them alone. 3. Pecuniary rewards may induce false witnesses to conspire against the innocejit. It' we suppose a public and well-organised sys- tem of procedure, in which the innocent are not deprived of any means of defence, the danger resulting from conspiracy will appear but small. Besides the prodigious difficulty of inventing a coherent tale capable of enduring a rigorous exa- mination, there is no comparison between the reward offered by the law, and the risk to which false witnesses are exposed. Mercenary witnesses also are exactly those who excite the greatest distrust in the mind of a judge, and if they are the only witnesses, a suspicion of con- spiracy instantly presents itself, and becomes a protection to the accused. These objections are urged in justification of the prejudice which exists; but the prejudice itself has been produced by other causes, and those causes are specious. The first, with respect to the educated classes of society, is a prejudice drawn from history, especially from that of the Roman emperors. The word informer at once recals to the mind those detestable miscreants, the horror of all ages, whom even the pencil of Tacitus has failed to cover with all the ignominy they deserve : but these informers were not the execu- tors of the law: they were the executors of the personal and lawless vengeance of the sovereign. The second and most general cause of this pre- judice is founded upon the employment given to informers by religious intolerance. In the ages of ignorance and bigotry, barbarous laws having been enacted against those who did not profess the do- 102 B.l. CH.XllI.— REWARDS TO INFORMERS. minant religion, informers were then considered as zealous and orthodox believers ; but in proportion to the increase of knowledge, the manners of men have been softened, and these laws having become odious, the informers, without whose services they would have fallen into disuse, partook of the hatred which the laws themselves inspired. It was an injustice in respect to them, but a salutary effect resulted from it, to the classes exposed to op- pression. These cases of tyranny excepted, the prejudice which condemns mercenary informers is an evil. It is a consequence of the inattention of the public to their true interests, and of the general ignorance in matters of legislation. Instead of acting in con- sonance with the dictates of the principle of utility, people in general have blindly abandoned them- selves to the guidance of sympathy and antipathy : of sympathy in favour of those who injure ; of an- tipathy to those who render them essential service. If an informer deserves to be hated, a judge de- serves to be abhorred. This prejudice also partly springs from a confu- sion of ideas : no distinction is made between the judicial and the private informer, between the man who denounces a crime in a court of justice, and he who secretly insinuates accusations against his enemies ; between the man who affords to the ac- cused an opportunity of defending himself, and he who imposes the condition of silence with respect to his perfidious reports. Clandestine accusations are justly considered as the bane of society ; they destroy confidence, and produce irremediable evils; but they have nothing in common with judicial accusations. It is extremely difficult to eradicate prejudices so deeply rooted and natural. From necessity, the B.I. Cii. XIII.— REWARDS TO INFORMERS. 103 practice of paying public informers continues to be in use ; but the character of an informer is still re- garded as disgraceful, and by some strange fatality the judges make no efforts to enlighten the public mind on this subject, and to protect this useful and even necessary class of men from the rigour of public opinion ; they ought not to suffer the elo- quence of the bar to insult before their faces these necessary assistants in the administration of justice. The conduct of the English law towards informers furnishes a curious but deplorable instance of hu- man frailty. It employs them, oftentimes deceives them, and always holds them up to contempt. It is time for lawgivers at least, to wean them- selves from these school -boy prejudices, which can consist only with a gross inattention to the in- terests of the public, joined to a gross ignorance of the principles of human nature. They should settle with themselves once for all what it is they would have : they should strike, somehow or other, a balance between the benefit expected from the effects of a lavv, and the inconveniences, or sup- posed inconveniences, inseparable from its execu- tion. If the inconveniences preponderate, let there be an end of the law ; if the benefits, let there be an end of all obstacles which an aversion to the necessary instruments on which its efficacy de- pends would oppose to its execution. [ 104 ] CHAP. XIV. REWARDS TO ACCOMPLICES. Among informers, criminals who denounce their accomplices have been distinguished from others, and the offer of pardon or rewards to induce them thus to act, has been condemned as altogether im- proper. It must be acknowledged that, so long as there is any other means of obtaining the con- viction of a criminal, without thus rewarding an accomplice, this method is bad ; the impunity necessarily accompanying it is an evil. But if there be no other means, this method is good ; since the impunity of a single criminal is a less evil than the impunity of many. In relation, however, to weighty and serious crimes, no such rewards can with propriety be ap- pointed by a general law. A general law offering pardon and reward to the criminal who informed against his accomplices, would be an invitation to the commission of all sorts of crimes. It would be as though the legislator had said, " Among a mul- titude of criminals, the most wicked shall not only be unpunished but rewarded." A man shall lay plans for the commission of a crime, shall engage accomplices with the intention of betraying them ; to the natural profits of the crime, such a law would add the reward bestowed upon him as an informer. It is what has often happened under English law. It is one of the fruits of the maxim which prohibits the examination of suspected per- sons, respecting facts which may tend to criminate themselves. It is, however, criminals who can B. I. Cii. XIV.— REWARDS TO ACCOMPLICES. 105 always furnish, and who often can alone furnish, the light necessary for the guidance of Justice. J3ut the examination of suspected persons being forbid- den as a means of obtaining intelligence, there re- mains only the method of reward. But when the reward, instead of being bestowed in virtue of a general law, is left to the discretion of the judge, and offered only when necessary, this inconvenience does not exist. Advantageouscrimes can no longer be committed with security. Re- course being had to this costly method only when all other methods fail, there will always be a longer or shorter interval, during which every criminal will feel himself exposed to the punishment de- nounced against his crimes. The employment of reward in this manner having become usual, will exercise upon the security of criminals the effect of a general law : it might even be prescribed by such a law. This method would then possess all the advantages of an unconditional law without its inconveniences. Beccaria has condemned, without exception, every reward offered to accomplices. As the foun- dation of his opinion, he produces only a confused sentiment of disapprobation attached to the words " treason and faithlessness. '^ Voluntary conventions among men are generally useful to society. It would be in most cases pro- ductive of evil were they not considered bind- ing. Infamy has therefore become constantly at- tached to the terms treason and faithlessness. The acts, however, to which these terms are applied are only pernicious in as far as the contracts of which they are violations are at least innocent. To render the security of society (which crimes, were they to remain unpunished, would destroy) subordinate to the accomplishment of all manner of engagements, 106 B. I. ch. XIV.— rewards to accomplices. would be to render the end subordinate to the means. What would become of society, were it once established as a principle, that the commis- sion of a crime became a duty if once it had been promised ? That promises ought to be performed, is a maxim which without a limitation, excepting those the performance of which would be pernici- ous to society, ought to have place neither in laws nor in morals : it is doubtful which would be most injurious ; the non-performance of every promise, or the performance of all. Far from beinga greater evil than that to which it is opposed, it v/ould be difficult to shew that the non-performance of cri- minal engagements isproductiveof any evil. From the performance of such an engagement, an un- favourable judgment only can be formed of the character of the party : how can a similar judgment be formed from its violation ? — Because he has repented of having committed, or been willing to commit, an action injurious to society, and which he knew to be so, does it follow that he will fail to perform actions which he knows to be innocent and useful ? From the violation of engagements among crimi- nals, what evil can be apprehended ? — that unani- mity shall be wanting among them ? — that their enterprizes shall be unsuccessful ? — that their asso- ciations shall be dissolved ? It is proverbially said " there is honour among theives." The honour which cements their conspiracies is the pest of society. Why should we not seek to inspire them with the highest degree of distrust towards each other ? Why should we not arm them against each other, and make them fear lest they should find an informer in every accomplice ? Wherefore should we not seek to fill them with a desire to inform against and mutually to destroy each other ? So that B. I. Ch. XIV.— REWARDS TO ACCOMPLICES. 107 each one uneasy and trembling in the midst of his fellows, should fear his companions as much as his judges, nor be able to hope for security but in the renunciation of his crimes. This is exactly what the consideration of the public welfare would lead us to wish ; and if we are to be turned aside from the care of this object by regard to the fidelity of thieves and murderers to their engagements, for a still stronger reason, from humanity, ought we to abstain from punishing their crimes. Beccaria, upon just ground, condemns the sove- reigns and judges, who after having enticed an offender to become an informer, afterwards violate their promise and render it illusory. In this case we need not fear to give vent to the feelings of hor- ror and indignation which so mischievous a pro- ceeding inspires. It is mischievous in the highest possible degree. It destroys all future confidence in similar offers, and renders powerless this most necessary instrument. It cements, instead of weak- ening, the union of criminals among themselves; and causes government itself to appear as the guar- dian of their society, by adding mockery to the rigour of the law, by punishing the individual who has confided in its promises. But, says Beccaria, " Societi/ authorizes treason., detested even hy critninals among themselves,^' We have already seen what is to be understood by this treason. It is natural to criminals to detest it — it is their ruin : it ought to be approved by honest men — it is their safearuard. It loitl introduce crimes of cowardice and baseness. No, it will introduce acts of prudence, of penitence, and of public util- ity ; it will operate as an antidote to all crimes. These pretended crimes of cowardice are more in- jurious to a nation than the crimes of courage. The 108 B. I. ch. XIV.— rewards to accomplices. truth is exactly the reverse: which produce most alarm in society, privately stealing and swindling on the one side, or highway robJDery and murder on the other ? The tribunal ichich employs this ex- pedient^ discovers its uncertainty. It discovers that it can know nothing without having learnt it. By what means can a judge attain to certainty without witnesses? In what country is it customary for criminals to make the judges the confidants of their misdeeds and their plans ? The law exhibits its feebleness in imploring the assistance even of him who has broke?! it. The law seeks the offender who flies from it: if the means employed for his discovery are effectual, it only exhibits its wisdom. But if rewards are to be bestowed upon criminals who denounce their accomplices, Beccaria desires that it may be in virtue of " a general law, which should promise impunity to every accomplice who discovers a crime, rather than by a particular de- claration in each particular case." The reason he assigns is, that " such a law would prevent the combination of malefactors, by inspiring each of them with the fear of exposing himself alone to danger, and that it would not serve to give that boldness to the wicked who see that there are some cases in which their services are required." But we have already observed that the particular decla- ration equally serves to prevent this combination, and that it is the general law which tends to give boldness to the wicked, and even creates the belief that justice cannot be executed without them. " A law of this nature," adds Beccaria, " ought to join to impunity the banishment of the infor- mer." A condition of this nature could only serve to render the law inefficacious in a variety of cases, and also contains a contradiction in terms. A law B. I. Ch. XIV.— rewards to ACCOMPLICES. 109 joining banishment to impunity ! Is not banish- ment a punishment ?* * To the edition of Beccaria published at Paris in 1797, are added some notes by Diderot, unfortunately they are short and few. I translate those which relate to the present chapter. "The errors of courts of justice and the feebleness of the law, even when crimes are known to have been committed, are matters of public notoriety. It is in vain to endeavour to con- ceal them, there is nothing therefore to counterbalance the advantage of disseminating distrust among malefactors, and rendering them suspected and formidable to one another, and the causing them without ceasing to dread in their accomplices so many accusers. This can only tend to make the wicked cowards, and every thing which renders them less daring is useful." " The delicacy of the author exhibits a noble and generous heart : but human morality, of which laws form the basis, is directed to the maintenance of public order, and cannot admit among the number of its virtues the fidelity of malefactors among themselves, that they may disturb that order, and violate the laws with greater security. In open war, deserters are re- ceived, with greater reason ought they to be received in a war carried on amidst silence and darkness, and whose operations consist of snares and treachery." [ 110 ] CHAPTER XV. COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS. When a portion of the matter of reward is allotted for the purchase of services, ought the liberty of competition to be admitted ? In any and what cases ? What is the general rule, and what are the exceptions ? In the case of what species of service ? For what species of reward ? If popular opinion is to determine, the question concerning the general rule is already answered. In all cases in which no particular reason can be given to the contrary, the liberty of competition ought to be admitted upon the largest scale. Yet to this decision of the public, the practice of na- tions, that is of those who bear the sway in nations, is by no means uniformly conformable; there are privileges and there are exclusions: pursuits open to one set, closed to another set of men : all go- vernments have been more or less infected with that intermeddling disposition, which believes it can give perfection to particular species of service, by appropriating its exercise exclusively to particu- lar individuals. That there may be cases fit to be excepted out of the above general rule, is allowed ; but before we come to the consideration of the exceptions, let us see how the matter stands upon principle — whether the people are most right or their rulers. And in the first place, by way of illustration, let us stop a moment to examine the connexion there is upon this occasion between reward and punish- ment. Let us suppose, apprehensions are enter- tained of the prevalence of murder and incen- B.I. Ch.XV.— COiVIPETITION AS TO REWARDS. HI diarism. Against a particular person the suspicions are stronger than against any one else. There is as yet no law against either of those offences. The sovereign, intending to do his utmost to guard the state against those calamities, sends for the sus- pected person, and prohibits him from committing any such crimes, under such penalties as he thinks proper : for the suspected person, observe, and for him only ; there being as yet no general law pro- hibiting such enormities, and everybody else being left at perfect liberty. If it were possible that any such incident could have happened within time of history,shouid notwe pronounce atonce,thateither the nation could not yet have emerged from a state of the profoundest barbarism, or else that the sovereign so acting could not have been in his right mind ? Such however is the exact counterpart of the policy of him, who wanting a service to be performed of such a nature as that, for aught he can be certain, there are several competent to perform it, some better than others, and each man according to the motives thatare given him better than himself, commits the business to one in exclusion of the rest. If penal laws must be applicable to all, that there may be a chance of preventing all offences, the offer of reward ought to be general, that there may be a chance of obtaining all services, and of obtain- ing the best. If we enquire in detail for the reasons why com- petition for reward, and for everything else which can be bestowed in the way of producing service, should be as open and as free as possible, the question may be considered in two points of view : first, as it concerns the interests of those for whose sake the service wanted is to be performed ; secondly, as it concerns the interests of those by whom the service might come to be performed. 112 B. I. ch. XV.— competition as to rewards. With regard to the former set of interests; it has already been observed,* as a reason for the em- ployment of reward, as a fitter instrument than pu- nishment, for attaining a given degree of excellence, the idea of which has already been conceived by the person who wishes it to be attained, — that the chance is greater when reward is employed as the incitement, than when use is made of punishment ; because, punishment can only operate upon a few selected individuals, and should they be unequal to the task, would be altogether employed in vain. Whatever number you select, you forego all the chance which you might have of the service being performed by any one else. The case is equally the same when rewards are offerred to a selected few. Allowing the liberty of competition, you may propose rewards to any number without ex- pense : you pay it but to one : you do not pay it till the service is performed : and the chance of its being performed is in proportion to the number of persons to whom it is proposed. Another advantage which reward has over pu- nishment, as we have seen, is, that by means of the former the value of the service may be brought to an indefinitely high degree of perfection. But this can only be effected by means of a free competition. In this way, and this only, can individuals be led to exert their faculties. Were the reward proposed to one only, having rendered the degree of service suf- ficient to entitle him to the reward, he would stop there : to make the exertions necessary to carry it to any higher degree of perfection would be to trouble himself to no purpose. But let a reward be offered to that one of two competitors, for example, who best performs the service : unless either of them * Book 1, ch. vii. p. 51. B.I. Ch. XV.— competition AS TO REWARDS. 113 knows exactly the degree of skill possessed by the other, and knows it to be clearly interior to his own ; each will exert himself to his utmost, since the more perfect he makes his work, the better chance has he of gaining the reward.. The matter is so ordered, that for every part of the greatest degree of service he can possibly find means to render, there will be a motive to induce him to render it. The same reasoning may be applied to any other num- ber of competitors; and the chance of perfection will be increased, if the faculties of the competitors are equal in proportion to their number. Should he who has the disposal of the reward assert, " I am acquainted with an individual more competent than any other to perform the service in question, and with whom no one can be placed in competition," his assertion is exposed to this dilemma : upon a fair trial of skill, either this person will stand first, or he will not; if he stand first, the competition is not to his prejudice, but redounds to his honour; if another excel him, the advantage of a free competition is proved. Par- tiality is either mischievous or unnecessary. We next consider the question as it affects the interest of those who might be admitted as com- petitors. Reward in its own nature is a good ; all com- petitors think so, and that a balance of good remains even after deducting the evil of that labour, what- ever it be, which is expended in the performance of the service, or they would not be competitors. He who has the disposal of the reward thinks so, or he would neither offer it, or be so anxious as he sometimes istosecureitfor those to whom he wishes to give a preference. But when there is no special reason to the contrary, why should not all the members of a state have a chance of obtaining the 8 114 B.I. Ch. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS. goods to be distributed in that state ? To exclude any man from any chance he might have of better- ing himself, is at best a hardship; if no special rea- son can be given for it, it is injustice, and one of those species of injustice, which, if administered on pretence of delinquency, would openly bear the name of punishment. It may be objected, that if a free competition were allowed, that " the number of competitors would be very great, while the reward being con- fined to one or to a very small number, one only will be paid for his labour ; the lot of the rest would be lost labour and disappointment ; that the public would be losers, by their labours being di- verted from services of greater utility, and that the service would, without this competition, be per- formed in a sufficient degree of perfection, or if performed in any higher degree would be of no further use." The following considerations may serve as a reply to these objections. Where there is nothing more than the mere loss of labour to those who can afford to lose it, or of anything else to those who can afford to part with it, the possible amount of mischief, be it what it may, can afford no sufficient reason for narrowing competition. If there be the pain of disappointment after trial, there has been the pleasure of expectation before trial ; and the latter, there is reason to believe, is upon an average much greater than the former. The pleasure is of longer continuance ; it fills a larger space in the mind ; and the larger, the longer it continues. The pain of disappointment comes on in a moment, and gives place to the first dawning of a new hope, or is driven out by other cares. If it be true, that the principal part of happiness consists in hope, and that but few of our hopes are completely realized, B. I. Ch. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS. 115 it would be necessary, that men might be saved from disappointment, to shut them out from joy. It may further be observed, that the liberty of competition seldom includes so many, as if con- sidered with regard to the particular nature of the service it would seem to include. Where it is not restrained by institution, it is often restrained by nature, and that sometimes within very narrow bounds. Services depending on opportunity, are confined to those to whom fortune shall have given the opportunity ; services depending on science or on art, are confined to those whom education and practice have familiarised with the science or the art; services depending on station, are confined to one, or to the few, if there be more than one, who at the time in question are invested with that sta- tion. Thus the objection derived from the too great number of competitors is almost always with- out foundation. It also often happens that, independently of the reward given to the successful candidate, the ser- vice even of the unsuccessful pays itself. This is more particularly apt to be the case with regard to services of indefinite excellence which depend on skill. Some develop their talents; others obtain notoriety; one discourse obtains the reward; twenty candidates have improved their minds in endeavouring to obtain it. The athletic exercises which on such a vast variety of occasions were ce- lebrated throughout ancient Greece seem to have been open to all comers : it was but one at each game that could obtain the prize ; but even the un- successful combatants found a sort of subordinate advantage in the reputation of having contended, and the advances made by them in those energies, which at that time of day gave distinguished lustre to every one who excelled in them. 8. 116 B. I. Cii. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS. It may even happen, that the service of the suc- cessful shall be no object, and that the services looked to on the part of him who institutes the re- ward shall be those which are performed by the unsuccessful. The Grecian games just mentioned may be taken as an example. The strength of the successful combatant was no sensible advantage to the country : the object aimed at was the encou- ragement of personal prowess and skill. In this country, the prizes given at horse races have a si- milar sort of object. From the few horses who win, the public may reap no particular advantage ; but the horses which are beaten or never contend for the prize, are improved by the emulation to which it has given birth. By the English Government, very ample rewards are offered to him who shall discover the most per- fect and practicable mode of ascertaining a ship^s longitude at sea. One effect of this reward is to divert from their employments a multitude of artists and students in various branches of physical sci- ence, of whom a few only can have any recom- pence for their expense and labour. 1 o pay all that would try might probably be impracticable ; but the benefit of the service appears to counter- balance this inconvenience; and in point of fact, the persons who can suppose themselves qualified to contend in such a race are so few, that this in- convenience can scarcely be very considerable. Were the same reward to be given for running, boxing, or wrestling, the common businesses of life would be deserted, and all the world would become runners, boxers, and wrestlers. Amongst the Athenians, rewards not vastly in- ferior, considering the difference in the value of money and the common rate of living, were actu- allv fi'wen to such athletic exercises. But the B.I, Ch. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS. 117 Athenians were as much in the right so to do as we should be in the wrong to imitate them. In those days when success in war depended almost entirely upon bodily address and vigour, encouraging the performance of these exercises, was disciplining an army ; and the national wealth could suffer little, since the labours of agriculture were chiefly carried on by slaves. The advantages resulting from the most un- limited freedom of competition therefore are — 1. Chance of success increased accordinsr to the number of competitors. 2. Chance of the highest success increased by invigorating the increased efforts of each competitor. 3. Equality established. 4. Number of works multiplied. 5. Latent talents developed APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLE. The cases to which this principle may be applied are much more extensive than might at first view be imagined : it covers a great part of the field of legislation ; it may be applied to ecclesiastical, to fiscal, to administrative, and to constitutional laws. This rule is in direct opposition to the funda- mental principle of Hindoo legislation. In that country, every man belongs to a caste from which he cannot separate himself. To each caste belongs the exercise of certain professions : there is a caste of learned men, a caste of warriors, and a caste of labourers. Emulation is thus reduced within the narrowest bounds, and the energies of the people are stifled. This principle is opposed to those ecclesiastical regulations, by which all who refuse to sign certain articles of belief, or refuse to pronounce a certain number of words concerning theological subjects. IIH B.I. Ch. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS. are excluded from certain professions. The greater the number of individuals thus excluded, the greater the loss sustained by the diminution of competition in the performance of those services. This principle is in direct contradiction to a mul- titude of fiscal and administrative laws, establishing exclusive privileges in favour of certain branches of commerce and trade ; fixing the price of com- modities, and the places at which they are to be bought and sold ; prohibiting the entry or the exit of various productions of agriculture or of manu- factures. These are so many expedients limiting competition, and are injurious to the national wealth. The father of political economy has from this principle in a manner created a new science: the application he has made of it to the laws relating to trade has nearly exhausted the subject.* By two opposite competitions, prices are fixed. Competition among the purchasers secures to the producers a sufficient compensation for the outlay of their capital and labour. Competition among the sellers, serving as a counterpoise to the other, pro- duces a cheap market, and reduces the prices of commodities to the lowest sum for which it is worth while to produce them. The difference between a low price and a high price is, a reward offered to the purchaser by one seller for the service he will render to him, by granting what remains to be gained, to him instead of to his competitor who requires more. In all trades, and in all arts, competition secures to the public not only the lowest price but the best work. Whatever degree of superiority is possessed by one commodity over another of the same de- * Wealth of Nations. ■'} B. I. Ch. XV.— competition AS TO REWARDS. 1 19 scription meets with its reward either in the quan- tity sold, or in the price at which it is sold. As to stores of every description of which the public stands in need, why is not the competition left open to all who may choose to undertake the supply ? It is not difficult to find the determining reason : it is more convenient to serve a friend, a dependant, or a partizan, than a person unknown, or perhaps an enemy. But this is not an avowable reason : for the public, some other must be sought. Open competition would, it is said, produce a multitude of rash contractors. The terms in ap- pearance most advantageous to government would commonly be offered by some rash adventurer, who, in the end, would be found unable to fulfil his engagements. When the time came for the performance of his part of the contract, the stores in question would not be provided, and the service would suffer irreparable injury. It is important that the men with whom we deal should be well known. In some cases, these reasons may not be without foundation, but they are most frequently illusory.* * The following is the general outline of an arrangement by which all the above difficulties would be effectually removed : — Unlimited competition j with power to the minister, or to any competent authority, to reject the offer, which ought according to the general rule to be accepted : power also to the offerer to call upon the minister, or competent authority, to assign their reasons for such rejection. When all this is done publicly, no attempt would be luade to reject the offer of a man, who, together with his sureties, was known to be per- fectly responsible. A praise to which one of the most celebrated ministers in England is justly entitled, and about which there is no differ- ence of opinion, is the having, with more consistency than any of his predecessors, followed this principle. Mr. Pitt divested himself of this source of influence, so dear to ministers, and opened a free competition for all contracts and all loans. It is 120 B.I. Ch. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS. The very nature of the reward may sometimes render it necessary to depart from the system of competition. It is not every office that can be offered to every one disposed to undertake it. Ought the education of a prince to be offered to him who writes the best treatise upon that education ? No: such an office requires qualities and virtues, and particularly a knowledge of the world, which might not be possessed by the philosopher who had resolved the problem. Ought the office of master of the mint to be offered to any one who produces the best die? No: this important duty requires a probity, an exactness, a habit of regularity, which has no con- nexion with manual skill. This is a reason, and the only reason, for not offering such offices to all the world ; but it is no reason for not attaching to this service another reward to which all the world might aspire. Some services, which are not directly suscepti- ble of open competition, are so indirectly ; that is, by making the competition consist in the perform- ance of some preliminary service, the execution of which may serve as a test of a man's ability to per- form the principal service. This is what is done in the case of extensive architectural works, when artists are invited to give in their plans and their models: this is all that the nature of the service allows of.* unnecessary to point out the advantages resulting from this just and litjeral policy ; tliey are known to all the world ; and the example set by him has been a law to his successors. * Some years ago, it was thought desirable to have a gene- ral Index made to the Journals of the House of Commons j for if it be not yet desirable to have the laws themselves me- thodized, it has however been thought desirable to methodise the history of the proceedings of this branch of the legislature. It was an undcrtaiiing of very considerable difficulty, both in i B. I. Ch, XV.— competition AS TO REWARDS. 121 When, some years ago, it was designed to erect, in the neighbourhood of London, at the public expense, a Penitentiary House, the mode ot" unli- mited competition was adopted, in order to obtain plans tor it. The superintendants received sixty- five plans, from among which they had an oppor- tunity of making a selection, instead of the one which they would have received, had the system of favouritism been pursued. If, without reward, a plan superior to, the best of those thus obtained, has since been devised, it may be attributed to the share which chance has in every new invention : the offer of a reward may accelerate the develop- ment of new ideas, without enabling an individual to complete the arrangement of his plans at a given moment. When the British Parliament offered a reward of 20,000/. for the discovery of a mode of finding the consideration of its magnitude, and the variety of matter it embraced. How were fit persons to be selected for it ? Com- petition, in the usual mode, could not have been employed. The legislature could not say to men of letters, — Work, and the best workman shall be rewarded. Who, uncertain of being paid for it, would have devoted his life to so repulsive an em- ployment ? The course taken was this : The work was put into the hands of four men of letters, selected one knows not how, nor by whom, noi- why. The work was divided amongst them in such sort, that each of them received to his share such and so many volumes, according as he was most in favour. The result has been four indexes instead of one, all of them mate- rially varying in method and completeness, and rendering una- voidable the great inconvenience of consulting four volumes instead of one. If a plan analogous to that employed in the case of architectural works had been adopted, the course taken would have been to advertise a premium for the best essay on the art of index-making, and particularly as applied to the work in question. As a still further security, an index to one volume might have been required by way of specimen ; and to him who gave the greatest satisfaction upon both these points, the conduct of the work should have been committed. ] 22 B. I. ch. XV.— competition as to rewards. longitude, they were not guilty of the absurdity of confining the competition to the professors of natu- ral philosophy and astronomy at Oxford and Cam- bridge. To resolve the problem of the best system of legislation is more important and more difficult. Why, in mixed governments, has it been hitherto confined to the members of the legislative body, and in monarchies, to the chancellor ? The deter- mining reason is abundantly clear : those who are in possession of the power, those to whom it be- longs to propose this problem, are ashamed to make a public avowal of their own incapacity to solve it ; they carefully avoid all acknowledgments of their own incapacity or indolence ; they are willing that their labours should be rendered as little burdensome as possible, by following the ordinary routine, and not that they should be increased by the exhibition of the necessity of reform. In a word, they desire not to be advised, but to be obeyed. While subject to the influence of such circumstances, it can be considered no matter of surprise, that they should, as far as pos- sible, have made the science of legislation an ex- clusive monopoly. The interests of human nature cry aloud against this contemptible jealousy. The problem of the best system of laws ought to be proposed to the whole world : it belongs to the whole world to solve it. Frederic the Great twice attempted to make a general reform in the laws of his kingdom : both times he applied to a single chancellor. The first of them, too contented with himself to suspect he could stand in need of assistance from others, produced a work the most insignificant of any which has appeared.* The second, M. Von Carmer, * Some extracts from it may be seen. — B. iv. ch. 11. B.I. Cn. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS. 123 after having completed his labours, acted very differently and much better : before it received the authority of a law, he presented it to the public, with an invitation to learned men to com- municate to him their observations upon it; se- conding his invitations by the offer of rewards. It is with regret that I am constiained to ask, why did not he, who had, in this respect, thus far sur- passed all his predecessors, act still more nobly ? Why only ask for criticism upon a given work? Why not ask for the work itself ? Why limit the invi- tation to Germans alone, as though there were no genius out of Germany ? Why limit the reward to a sum below the price of those snuff-boxes which are presented to a foreign minister, for the service he performs in departing when he is re- called ? The richest diamond in his master's crown would not have been too great a reward for him who should thus have given to all the others a new and before-unknown splendour. On different occasions, public-spirited indivi- duals and societies have endeavoured to supply, from their slender resources, the neglect of govern- ments, and have offered larger rewards than the Chancellor of the Great Frederic. That which they could not offer, and which it did not depend upon them to offer, was the reward which the minds best adapted for the accomplishment of such an undertaking would esteem above every other. I mean the assurance that their labours would be judged by those who could give them authority, who could make them useful. In conclusion, I do not say, that with regard to certain services, sufficient reasons may not be found for altogether excluding competition, but that in every such case these reasons ought to be 124 B. I. ch. XV.— competition as to rewards. ready to be rendered, otherwise it ought to be Jawtul to conclude that they do not exist.* * With reference to Constitutional Law, hereditary succes- sion to the throne is established to prevent the competition of many pretenders. It is the principal exception to the principle, and the most easily justified. Another species of inheritance, of which the Egyptians had given an example, and the Indians have adopted, has found admirers even in our days. I refer to hereditary professions in particular families, where they can neither have two nor change their first. " Par ce moyen," dit Bossuet, " tous les arts venoient ^ leur perfection : on faissoit mieux ce qu'on avoit toujours vu faire, et a quoi Ton s'etoit uniquement exerce dbs son enfance." — Discours sur VHistoire Universelle. Robertson, in his Historical Researches respecting India, has warmly approved the institution of castes, and hereditary professions. He allows, however, that this system may hinder the exertions of genius, *'J3ut society is formed," says he, " for ordinary men, and not for men of genius," &c. — Jp- pendlv. If we look at a single art of Europe, that of painting for instance, its history will show, that very few artists have been born in a painting room. Among a hundred of the most cele- brated painters, the father of Raphael alone handled the pencil — Invito patre sidera verso was the device of the illustrious Bernouilli, who could only study astronomy in secret, and in opposition to the authority of his father. [ 125 ] CHAPTER XVI. REWARDS FOR VIRTUE. Beccaria accuses modern legislators of indif- ference to this subject. Punishments, says he, and, in many instances, unduly severe punishments, are provided for crimes ; for virtue there are no rewards. These complaints, repeated by a multi- tude of writers, are matter of common-place decla- mation. So long as they are confined to general terms, the subject presents no difficulty; but when an attempt is made to remove the ground of com- plaint, and to frame a code of remuneratory laws for virtue, how great is the difference between what has been asserted to be desirable, and what is possible ! Virtue is sometimes considered as an act, some- times as a disposition: when it is exhibited by a positive act, it confers a service ; when it is con- sidered as a disposition, it is a chance of services. Apart from this notion of service, it is impossible to tell wherein virtue consists. To form clear ideas concerning it, it must altogether be referred to the principle of utility: utility is its object^ as well as its motive. After having thus far considered services to be rewarded, that is to say acts of public notoriety, which fall not within the boundary of ordinary actions, it remains to be shown in relation to virtue — 1. What cannot be accomplished by gene- ral rewards. — 2. What it is possible to accomplish, 126 B. I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUE. either by particular institution, or occasional re- ward.* I. We may observe, in the first place, that those civil virtues, which are most important to the wel- fare of society, and to the preservation of the hu- man race, do not consist in striking exploits, which carry their own proof with them ; but in a train of daily actions, in an uniform and steady course of conduct, resulting from the habitual disposition of the mind. Hence it is precisely because these virtues are connected with the whole course of our existence, that they are incapable of being made the objects of the rewards of institution. It is im- possible to know what particular fact to select, at what period to require the proof, to what particular circumstance to attach the distinction of reward. 2. Add to these difficulties that of finding a suitable reward, which shall be agreeable to those for whom it is designed. The modesty and deli- cacy of virtue would be wounded by the formalities necessary to the public proof of its existence. It is fostered by, and perhaps depends upon, esteem ; but this is a secret which it seeks to hide from itself, and those prizes for virtue which seem to suppose that conscience is bankrupt, would not be accepted by the rich, nor even sought after by the most worthy among the poor. 3. Every virtue produces advantages which are peculiar to itself Probity inspires confidence in all the relations of life. Industry leads on to inde- pendence and wealth. Benevolence is the source * This will partly form an application of the principles laid down in Chap. 7- Punition and Remuneration — their relations. Mr. Bentham, apparently not having believed it necessary to enter into this detail^ I have attempted, by this chapter^ to supply this omission, if it were one. — Note by Dumont. B.I. Cn. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUE. 127 of kindly affections ; — and though these advan- tages are not always reaped, they generally follow in the natural course of events. Their effect is much more steady and certain than that of fac- titious reward, which is necessarily subject to many imperfections. In the reign of Louis XIV. a treatise was pub- lished " On the Falsity of Human Virtues." What is singular, and what the author probably never sus- pected is, that by some slight alterations it would be easy to convert this work into a treatise on their realiti/. The author appears to have considered them as false, because they were founded upon re- ciprocal interest ; because their object is happiness, esteem, security, and the peaceable enjoyment of life ; because men in their mutual intercourse settle with each other for their reciprocal services. But without these felicitous effects, what would virtue be? In what consists its reality} What w^ould it have to recommend it ? How would it be distin- guished from vice? This basis of interest, which to this author appears to have rendered it false, is precisely that which gives it a true and solid, and we may add, an immutable existence, for no other source of happiness can be imagined.* But if the most important class of virtues are already provided with sufficient motives to lead to their performance, either in the sufferings they prevent, or in the advantages to which they give birth, is it not superfluous to add factitious motives ? The interference of legislators is useful only in supplying the deficiency of natural motives. * The writer above alluded to, like all ascetics, unskilful in reasoning, injures the religion it was his object to serve. How strong an argument may we not derive from this coin- cidence between practical morality and happiness, in proof of design on the part of the supreme legislator ! 128 B.I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUE. 4. What would be our condition were things in a different state, were it necessary to invite men to labour, honesty, benevolence, and all the duties of their several conditions, by means of factitious reward ? Pecuniary rewards, it is evident, it would be impossible to bestow. Honour, it is true, remains ; but how would it be practicable to create, in the shape of honour, a sufficient fund of reward for the generality of human actions ? The value of these rewards consists in their rarity. So soon as they are common, their value is gone. In this case, as in so many other cases, there is an analogy between rewards and punishments. It is an imperfection common to both these sanc- tions, that they are applicable to actions alone, and exercise only a distant and indirect influence upon the habits and dispositions which give a colour to the whole course of life. Thus, rewards cannot be instituted for parental kindness, conjugal fide- lity, adherence to promises, veracity, gratitude and pity: legal punishments cannot be assigned to in- gratitude, hardness of heart, violations of friendly confidence, malice or envy, in a word, to all those vicious dispositions which produce so much evil before they have broken out into those crimes which are cognizable before legal tribunals. The two systems are like imperfect scales, useful only for weighing bulky commodities ; and as an indi- vidual, whose life has been less guilty than that of a man of a hard and false heart, is punished for a single theft, there is also often a necessity of re- warding a certain distinguished service, performed by a man who is otherwise little entitled to esteem. Thus, in regard to the moral virtues, which con- stitute the basis of daily conduct, there is no reward which can be applied to them by general institu- tion. All that it is possible to do, is limited to .1 B. I. Cn. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES, 129 seizing upon those striking actions, readily suscep- tible of proof, which arise out of extraordinary cir- cumstances, as opportunities of conferring occa- sional rewards. Rewards of this nature cannot be bestowed peri- odically : the occasions for performing eminent services do not regularly recur. It is the action, and not the date in the almanack, which ought to bring down the reward. The French Academy annually bestowed a prize upon theindividual who, among the indigent classes, had performed the most virtuous action. The judges had always one prize to bestow, and they had but one. They must occasionally have experienced regret at leav- ing unrewarded actions of equal merit, and some- times at being obliged to reward an action of an ordinary description. Besides, by the periodical return of the distribution, this prize would soon be rendered an object of routine, and cease to attract attention. The institution of La Rosicre de Salency may be produced in answer to the above observations: but it should be remembered, that a village insti- tution is of a different nature. The more limited a society, the more closely may its regulations be made to resemble those of domestic government ; in which, as we have already seen, reward may be applied to almost every purpose. It is thus that annual prizes may be established for agility, skill, strength ; for every other quality which it may be desirable to encourage, and of which the rudiments always exist. There is not a village in Switzer- land which does not distribute prizes of this nature for military exercises : it is an expedient for con- verting the duties and services of the citizens into fetes. Geneva, whilst it was a republic, had its naval king; its king of the arquebuss ; its com- 9 130 B.I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES. mander of the bow ; its king of tiie cannon. The conqueror, during the year of his reign, enjoyed cer- tain privileges, little costly to the state ; the public joy marked the return of these national exercises, which placed all the citizens under the eyes of their grateful country. La Rosiere de Salency^ designed to honour virtues, which ought to be perpetuated and renewed from generation to generation, might have a periodical return, like the roses of summer. The Humane Society^ es\.dih\'\s\\e(\ in England for the purpose of affording assistance to persons in danger of drowning, and providing the means of restoration in cases of suspended animation, distri- butes prizes to those who have saved any individual from death. In this case, the reward is not, as in the French Academy, confined to the indigent class alone: men of the first rank would consider it an honour to receive a medal commemorative of so noble an action. Besides, the mode of confer- ring these rewards has not been dramatised ; the retired habits of virtue have been consulted; there is no public exhibition to which it is dragged, to be confounded or humiliated. Greater eclat might, however, without adding to the theatrical efiect, be given to these rewards, were an efficient report made of them to the king and both houses of par- liament. An institution of a similar nature, for the reward of services rendered in cases of fire, shipwreck, and all other possible accidents, would still further contribute to the cultivation of benevolence ; and these noble actions, brought in the same manner under the eyes of the legislators, and inscribed in their journals, would acquire a publicity of much less importance to the honoured individual than to society in general. Indeed, though the reward applies only to one B.I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES. 131 particular action, the principal object designed is the cultivation of those dispositions which such actions indicate : and this can only be accom- plished by the publicity which is given to the example, and the public esteem and honour in which it is held. When, upon the site of the prison which had been the scene of an exalted instance of filial piety, the Romans erected a temple, they incul- cated a noble lesson : they proclaimed their respect for one of the fundamental virtues of their re- public* Independently of these eminently meritorious and always rare actions, governments might render publicity subservient to the perfection of a great variety of services, in the performance of which the regular discharge of duty is more important than the display of extraordinary virtues. This project might be realized by the formation of a comparative table of the subordinate administra- tions of cities, parishes, or counties. This table would require to be renewed at fixed periods, and might be made to show which districts were most exact in the payment of taxes, in which the fewest crimes had been committed, in which useful esta- blishments had been formed, in which the most liberal exertions had been made for the relief of calamity, what hospitals had been conducted with the greatest economy, and had been most success- * Humilis in plebe et ideo ignobilis puerpera, supplicii causS. carcere inclusa matre, cum impetrasset aditum, a jani- tore semper excussa, ne quid inferret cibi, deprehensa est ube- ribus suis alens earn. Quo miraculo matria salus donata pietati est, ambaeque perpetuis aliraentis, et locus ille eidem consecratus deae. C. Quintio M. Acilio Coss. templo Pietatis extructo in illius carceris sede. — Plin. lib. vii. c. 3G. '9. 132 B.I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES. fill in the cure of diseases ; * what tribunals had decided the greatest number of causes, and from which the smallest number of appeals had been made; in what instances efficacious precautions had been adopted for relieving any particular dis- trict from causes tending to render it unhealthy, — from mendicity, from smuggling, from vice, and from misery. Such official reports, independently of their poli- tical utility to the government, would, without parade, produce all the good effects of reward ; of that reward in honour which costs nothing to the country, and yet maintains all the moral energies in full activity. Every distinguished service might find a place in these annals; and the people, always prone to exaggerate the vigilance and means of information possessed by their governors, would soon be persuaded that a perpetual inspec- tion was kept up, not only with respect to their faults, but also their meritorious actions. This project is borrowed, neither from the Re- public of Plato, nor the Utopia of More. It is even inferior to what has in our time been carried into effect, in an empire composed of more than a hun- dred departments ; ■\ in which tables exhibiting, in columns, all the results of civil, economical, rural, and commercial administration, were formed with * In the report respecting 1' Hotel Dieu, by Bailli, a table of the mortality in different hospitals is given, and the process of his calculations. t I refer here to L' Analyse des Proces-verbaux des Conseils de Department ; a work in 4to, published in France in 1802. This work consisted of the answers to a series of questions, addressed to each department, by the minister of the interior. These tables have been discontinued. Such is the fact. I d(i not endeavour to ascertain the cause. f B.I. Cn. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES, 133 greater facility and promptitude than would have been experienced by any Russian noble, had he been desirous of obtaining from his superintendaiits an account of the state of his property. If rewards were established for virtue, when exhibited by the indigent classes, it would be im- proper to seek for striking instances of its display, or to suppose that they are actuated by sentiments of vanity, which operate feebly upon men accustomed to dependence, and almost constantly employed in making provision for their daily wants. Institu- tions of this nature, suited to small communities, ought to be adapted to local circumstances and popular habits. In a village or a tov\ni, for in- stance, it might be proper to assign a distinguished place in the church for the old men : this distinc- tion, united to a sentiment of religion, and granted with discretion, need bear no appearance of flat- tery, but might be a mark of respect towards old age, rendered honourable by the blameless life which had preceded it. There exist in England many charitable institutions for decayed trades- men, in which their situation is much preferable to that of the inhabitants of poor-houses: they have their separate dwellings, their gardens, and a small pension. Those only whose conduct has been generally honourable being admitted to these asylums, the metal badge which is worn in some instances, so far from being considered as a dis- grace, is regarded as a mark of honour. Different agricultural societies bestow rewards upon servants who have lived during a certain number of years in the same place ; this circum- stance being with reason considered as a proof of fidelity and good conduct. Some of these societies also give rewards to day labourers, who have brought up a certain number 134 B. I. ch. XVI.— rewards for virtues. of children without having received assistance from their parishes. This is an encouragement to economy, and all the virtuous habits which it im- plies : but as a means of remedying the inconve- niences arising from the poor laws, its effect is ex- tremely feeble. In both these cases the reward generally con- sists of money ; but the money is connected with honour ; the notoriety given to the reward operates as a certificate in favour of the individual in his particular district. By examining every thing which has been done in this respect in Holland, Switzerland, England, and elsewhere, we should become possessed of an assortment of remuneratory expedients, applicable to almost every class in society. Every thing depends, however, upon the mode of application. For this duty governments are entirely unfit. It is local inspection alone which can gain a know- ledge of circumstances and superintend the details. After all, just and discriminating public esteem, that is to say public esteem founded upon the principle of utility, is the most potent, the most universally applicable, of all the species of reward. If virtue be held in public estimation, virtue will flourish: let it cease to be held in such estimation, it will decline in the same proportion. The cha- racter of a people is the moral climate which kills or vivifies the seeds of excellence. An inquiry into the causes of the high respect in which, under certain governments, particular vir- tues were held ; why the virtues of a Curtius^ of a Fabricius,o^a Scipio, were nourished and developed at Rome ; why other countries and other times have produced only courtiers, parasites, fine gen- tlemen and wits, men without energy and without patriotism, would require a moral and historical B.I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES. 135 analysis, only to be completed by means of a pro- found study of the political constitutions, and particular circumstances of each people. The re- sult would, however, prove, that the qualities most successfully cultivated were those held in most general esteem. But public esteem, it may be said, is free, essen- tially free, independent of the authority of govern- ments. This copious fund of rewards is therefore withdrawn from the handsof the supreme authority 1 This, however, is not the case : governments may easily obtain the disposal of this treasure. Public esteem cannot be compelled, but it may be con- ducted. It requires but little skill on the part of a virtuous sovereign to enable him to apply the high reward of public esteem to any service which his occasions may require. There already exists a degree of respect for riches, honour, and power: if the dispenser of these gifts bestow them only upon useful qualities, if he unite what is already esteemed to what ought to be esti- mable, his success is certain. Reward would serve as a proclamation of his opinion, and would mark out a particular line of conduct as meritorious in his eyes. Its first effect would be that of a lesson in morality. Unrewarded, the same service would not ac- quire the same degree of notoriety. It would be lost among the multitude of objects soliciting public attention, and remain undistinguished from the pretensions, well or ill founded, respecting which public opinion is undecided. Furnished with this patent from the sovereign, it becomes au- thentic and manifest : those who were ignorant are instructed, those who were doubtful become decided: the inimical and the envious are rendered less bold, reputation is acquired, and becomes per- 136 [B. I. Ch. XVI.— rewards for virtues. manent. The second effect of the reward consists in the increase of intensity and duration given to public esteenQ. Imniediately, all those who are governed by views of interest, who aspire to honour or fortune ; those who seek the public good, but who seek it like ordinary men, not as heroes or martyrs, eagerly press into that career in which the sovereign has united private and public interest. In this manner a proper dispensation of favours directs the passions of individuals to the promotion of the public wel- fare, and induces even those who were indifferent to virtue or vice, to rank themselves upon that side which promises them the greatest advantage. Such being the power of sovereigns, he must be extremely inexpert in the distribution of ho- nours, who separates them from that public esteem which has so decided a tendency to unite with them. Nothing, however, is more common. In- stances may be found, in most courts, of splendid decorations of stars and garters in double and triple range, which do not even give a favourable turn to public opinion. They are considered as proofs of favour , but not as signs of merit. " Honours in the hands of princes resemble those talismans with which the fairies, according to the fables, were wont to present their favourites ; they lose their virtue whenever they are improperly employed."* * Helvetius. [ 137 3 CHAPTER XVil. ACCOMPANIMENTS TO REMUNERATION. After having exhibited in what manner the matter of wealth is ajDplicable to the purposes ot" reward, we proceed to show other uses derivable from it for the public service, which are not re- muneratory. The idea of reward will be much clearer when it shall have been distinguished and separated from these accessory uses, which have certain relations with it. 1. Wages necessary for the support of life. Ser- vants must be fed whilst they are employed, and there are cases in which it is necessary to feed them even before they begin to work. If the wages paid do not exceed what is necessary for this purpose, as is sometimes the case among the soldiery, and especially if the enrolments are involuntary, such wages, being absolutely necessary, are not reward. 2. The Instruction of Servants. Certain kinds of service require advances from Government for this object. If this instruction require much time, it is naturally begun at an early age, and is then called education. This employment of the matter of reward is sufficiently distinct from that which regards subsistence, with which however it is very frequently combined and confounded. If there are a sufficient number of individuals willing to bear this expense, so much the better; otherwise it is necessary that Government should bear it for them. This has almost everywhere been thought to be the case with respect to the church. It has 138 B.I.CH.XV1I.— ACCOMPANIMENTS TO REMUNERATION. also generally been considered necessary in new countries, or countries but little advanced in the career of prosperity with respect to the teachers and professors in most branches of science. In the war department, the corps of cadets is a nur- sery for young officers. The foundations of public schools are nurseries for the church. The greater number however of these foundations are owing rather to the good intentions of individuals than to the cares of governments. 3. Equipment. That an individual may be in a condition to render service, he must be furnished with the necessary equipments. The warrior wants his accoutrements ; the astronomer his observa- tory ; the chemist his laboratory ; the mechanic his machines; the naturalist his collections of natural history ; the botanist his garden ; the experimental farmer a plot of ground, and funds to enable him to improve it. 4. Indemnity. When an individual is only in- demnified, he is not rewarded : reward, properly- speaking, only begins when indemnity is complete — Do we wish for services ? we ought to recollect that b\' the person from whom we seek to obtain them, the inconveniences of every sort which compose the burthen of the service will be put into one scale, the advantages he finds attached to it into the other. To the head of indemnity be- longs everything necessary to produce an equili- brium between the two ; it is only the excess which is thrown into the scale of advantages which strictly belongs to the head of reward. 5. The assuring responsibility. In so far as the matter of reward is employed for this purpose, it is employed in laying a foundation for the inflic- tion of punishment. The stock of punishment is in itself inexhaustible; but when the body is B. I. ch. XVII.— accompaniments to remuneration . 139 withdrawn from the hands of the ministers of justice, corporal punishment cannot be inflicted, and all other punishments can be compensated. If a servant possess property of his own, so much the better; if he possess none, and a salary be given to him, he will always have so much to lose ; the loss of this salary will be a punishment he will always be liable to undergo, whatever may become of him. The principal use of this employment of the matter of reward, is in the case of offices which place property in the hands of those who fill them. If there are no other means of securing their probity, it would not be bad economy to make their appointments amount in value to but little less than the highest interest they could reap from the largest sum they ever have in their hands. This would be to make them assure against their own dishonesty. The diflPerence between the actual salary and the least salary they could be induced to accept, would constitute the premium. It is rarely that a distinct sum is appropriated to this purpose ; on the one hand, this end is partly effected by suretyship, and on the other, the sum considered requisite for the purposes of indem- nity and reward equals or surpasses what could be proposed to be allowed for it ; but this function is not the less distinct from all the rest. 6. A guarantee against temptations. Money, like the most valuable articles of the medical pharmacopeia, may serve either as a poison or an antidote, according as it is applied. This emplo}^- ment of the matter of revi^ard resembles that last mentioned, without being confounded with it. Money employed for assuring responsibility will produce its effect, though the individual be already corrupted. The use of money employed 140 B.I. Ch. XVII.— ACCOMPANIMENTS TO REMUNERATION. as a guarantee against temptation, is to prevent corruption. A less sum may suffice in this case than in the former ; in that, it was necessary that the revenue granted should preserve some propor- tion to the sum confided ; in this, such proportion is not required : the measure to be observed is only that of the wants of the individual placed in the rank that the office he occupies confers. In a word, salary, considered as a pledge, is only useful in the prevention of theft ; money, employed as an antiseptic, is equally useful in the prevention of peculation in all its forms, in the prevention of all improper conduct which can have for its motive the desire of money, and for its means the situation in which the individual is placed by his office. 7. The support of dignity. Public opinion ex- acts, it matters not by what reason, from every individual possessed of a certain rank, a certain expenditure ; his wants are thus increased in pro- portion to his dignity. Dignity, deprived of the wealth necessary for its support, furnishes in pro- portion to its extent an incentive to malversation, and at the same time generally furnishes the opportunity ; as an antidote to such temptations, money may therefore sometimes be bestowed for the support of dignity. The good of the service may also require the same thing. It is incontesti- bly true that between wealth and power there subsists an intimate and natural union. Wealth itself is power, it may be proper therefore that the support of the respect which it commands be not refused in favour of certain employments, in which much depends upon the place they hold in public opinion. 8. Another use of the matter of reward consists m the excitement of alacrity ; 1 mean the produc- B.I, Cu. XVII.— ACCOMPANIMENTS TO REMUNERATION. 141 tion of an habitual disposition to do what is required with pleasure. The greater the degree of mental enjoyment, the quicker and more lively are one's ideas, and the larger the quantity of work which can be performed in a given time. The mind, in a happy mood, acts with incompara- bly more ease than when agitated by grief; or even in its ordinary condition, when it is moved only by habit. It is the same with the bodily powers ; who knows not how much the powers of the muscles depend upon the energy of the mind ? What comparison is there between the labour of slaves and of free men ? It is upon this that the superiority of hired soldiers over unpaid and arbitrary levies depends. In the one case, as in the other, the motive which leads to exertion consists in the expectation of being treated ac- cording to their behaviour ; the motive is nothing else but the fear of pain. But in the first case there is the gratification of reward to sustain the alacrity; in the other, the labour has no other accompaniment but grief. The simple expectation of a reward, how large soever it may be, will not always produce the same effect as a reward previously bestowed. The condition of expectancy in which the indi- vidual finds himself in such a case, is a mixed and uncertain state, in which despair and hope may alternately predominate. The danger to be guarded against is, lest rewards previously bestowed should produce diversions little favourable to labour, either by suggesting the idea of some more favourite occupation, or by supplying the means of its pursuit. The progress of the thoughts may be accelerated, but the thoughts excited may be of a different nature; 142 B.I. Ch.XVII.-ACCOMPANIMENTS to REMUNERATION- the dull ideas of labour ma}'^ be supplanted by the enliveningconsiderations of shows and of pleasure. Whether or not it is proper to bestow such rewards, depends upon the character of the indi- vidual ; that character must be known, before it is possible to determine what will be their effect; but in every case there can be no greater folly than to waste in previous gratifications every thing which is destined for reward. In conclusion, these distinctions ought not to be abused. The expense of rewards need not be increased on account of each of these items; it is not necessary to appropriate a distinct sum to each. The same sum may serve for many, and even for all. That which suffices for assuring responsibility will, in general, suffice as a guaran- tee against temptations, and vice versa^ so far as ends so uncertain may be effected by such means, and will in every case suffice for indemnification. That which suffices for equipment, may serve in part for the support of dignity and the excitement of alacrity. That which suffices for the mainte- nance of dignity will be sufficient for almost all the other ends ; and the whole of whatever is employed for any other of these purposes, except equipment, cannot but serve for subsistence. RATIONALE OF REWARD. BOOK II. REWARDS APPLIED TO OFFICES. CHAPTER I. SALARY HOW A REWARD'. There are many species of service, and even services of a positive nature, ofwliich governments stand in constant and uninterrupted need : such for the most part are the duties of those who are em- ployed in the different departments of every go- vernment. The political state or condition, on account of which individuals possessing it are considered liable to render these services, is called a place, an office, or an employment. To these places it is both natural and customary to attach, under the title of emolument, certain portions of the matter of wealth. If such emolument be deter- minate in amount, and paid at regularly recurring periods, it is called a salary. It is the nature of a reward to operate as a mo- tive, and in that capacity to give birth to acts which, by the person by whom the reward is held up to view, are esteemed services ; the greater the reward, the greater is the motive it constitutes: the greater the motive, the more strenuous the 144 B. II. Ch. I.— SALARV-HOVV A REWARD. exertion it has a tendency to produce ; and if the value of the service be susceptible of an indefinite degree of perfection, the more strenuous the exer- tion to perform it, the greater, as far as depends upon the will of the party, will be the value of the service. Hence it follows that, if salary be re- ward, as far as funds can be found, salaries cannot be too large. How different the state of things presented to us when we consult experience ! We see small salaries, and the service admirably well performed: largesalaries, and nothing donefor them. In certain lines, we see the service regularly worse and worse performed, in proportion to the large- ness of the salary. Where then lies the error? In experience there can be none. In the argument there is none. The error lies in its not being pro- perly understood : and that in general it has not been properly understood, the bad management and weak measures so frequent in this line are but too pregnant proofs. To understand the argu- ment aright, two points must be observed : the one is, to consider, for illustration sake, that just in the same manner as punishment, and in no other manner, though with less certainty of effect, is reward capable of acting as a motive : the other point is, to consider what is really the service for which a salary is a reward. What then is the service with respect to which a salary operates as a motive ? The answer which would be generally given to this question is, the continued service belonging to the office to which the salary is annexed. Obvious as this answer may seem, it is not the true one. The service, and the only service, with respect to which a salary can operate as a motive, is either the simple instanta- neous service of taking upon one the office, or the permanent service of continuing to stand invested B. ir. Ch. I.— salary— how a reward. 145 with it. If the duties of the office — the services in the expectation of which the salary annexed to the office is bestowed, happen to be performed, it can not be owing merely and immediately to the salary: it must be owing to some other motive. If there were no other motive, the service would not be rendered. Nothing is done without a mo- tive : — what then is this other motive ? It must be either of the nature of reward or punishment. It may by possibility be of the nature of reward ; but if it be so, one or other of these rewards would seem superfluous : in common it is principally of the nature of punishment. In as far as this is the case, the service for which the salary considered as a reward is given, is the service of taking upon one the obligation constituted by the punishment; the obligation of performing the services expected from him who possesses the office. That the zeal displayed in discharging the duties of an office should not be in proportion to the salary, will now no longer appear strange. Expe- rience is reconciled to theory. This subject will receive elucidation, if we substitute punishment for reward, and consider what tendency such a motive would have to give birth to any service, if con- nected with it in the same manner as a salary is annexed to an office. Suppose a schoolmaster, intending to conduct the business of his school with regularity, were to make it a rule on a certain day, at the beginning of every quarter, to call all his scholars before him and to give each ten lashes, committing their behaviour during the rest of the quarter altogether to their discretion ; — the policy of this master would be the exact counterpart of the founder of the school towards the master, if he has sought to attach him to the duties of his office by bestowing 10 146 B.ll. Ch.I.— SALARY— HOW A REWARD. upon him a salary. Suppose the master, finding that under this discipline the progress of his scholars did not equal his expectations, should re- solve to increase his exertions, and accordingly should double the dose of stripes; — his policy in this case would be the exact counterpart of the founder, who by the single operation of increasing the master's salary, should think to increase his diligence. A salary is not a reward for any individual ser- vice, of the number of those which are rendered, in consequence of a man's acceptance of the office to which the salary is annexed. For the rendering of any one of these services, the salary presents him not with any motive which can come under the head of reward : the motives which it gives him belong entirely to the head of punishment. It is by fenr only, and not by hope, that he is impelled to the discharge of his duty ; by the fear of receiv- ing less than he would otherwise receive; not by the hope of receiving more. Though he work ever so much more or better than a man who liolds his office is expected to work, he will receive nothing more than his salary, if the salary is all that he has to hope for. By working to a certain degree less or worse, he may indeed stand a chance of having the salary, or a part of it, taken from him, or he may be made punishable in some other way ; but if he continue to keep clear of that extreme degree, in such case let him work ever so little or ever so badly, he will not, as far as artificial punishment is concerned, be ever the worse. He has therefore no motive, so far as the salary is concerned, for en- deavouring to pass the line of mediocrity ; and he has a motive, the motive of indolence or love of ease, for stopping as far short of it as he can with safety. B. II. Ch.I.— SALARY— HOW A REWARD. 147 Suppose, for instance, a salary of 4000/. a year annexed to the office of a judge: of all the ser- vices he may come to perform in the discharge of his function, of which one is this salary the re- ward ? Of no one whatever. Take any one of the causes which would regularly come before him for hearing ; though he were to attend, and to display ever so much diligence and ever so much ability in the hearing of it, he would receive no more that year than his 4000/. — though he were to absent himself altog^ether, and leave the business to his colleagues, he would receive no less ; in short, provided he does not so far swerve from his duty as to subject himself to fine or deprivation, whe- ther he perform his duty ever so well, or ever so ill ; whether he decide many causes or few ; whe- ther his attendance is constant or remiss ; whether he display ever so much or ever so little ability, his salary is the same. Not that a man in this exalted station is in any want of motives to prompt him to exert himself in the discharge of its duties: he has the pleasures of power to balance the pains of study ; the fear of shame to keep him from sink- ing below mediocrity ; the hope of celebrity to elevate him above it ; to spur him on to the high- est pitch of excellence. These motives are pre- sented to him by his station, but they are not pre- sented to him by his salary. The services, and the only services, with which the salary presents him a motive for performing, ^re, in the first place, the instantaneous act of taking upon him the station, that is, of subjecting himself to the obligations annexed to it, and in the event of his violating any of those obligations, to the punishments annexed to such violations : in the next place, the discharging of the smallest portion of those obligations which it is necessary 10. 148 B.ll. Ch. I.— SALARY— HOW A REWARD. he should discharge, in order to his receiving such or such part of the salary. Let it, for instance, be paid him quarterly : if the first quarter be paid him in advance, it will afford ^him no motive of the nature of reward for doing any of the business of that quarter. He has that quarter's salary; nor can he fail of enjoying it, unless, in the way of punishment, it be afterwards taken from him. If it be not paid him till the end of the quarter, the case will be still the same, unless proof of his having rendered certain services, the having at- tended, for example, at certain times, be necessary to his receiving it. With this exception, it may equally be said that, in both cases, for any other than the instantaneous act of taking upon him the burthen of the station for that quarter, he has no reward, nor any motive but what operates in the way of punishment. This distinction is of importance, for if the salary given were the inducement for performing the ser- vices, the chance of having them performed, and well performed, would be exactly as the magni- tude of the salary. If, for example, fifty pounds sterling a year sufficed to insure fifty grains of piety, assiduity, eloquence, and other sacerdotal virtues in a curate, five thousand of these same pounds ought to insure five thousand grains of these same virtues in a bishop or archbishop. But what everybody knows, is that this proportion does not hold ; on the contrary, it most frequently hap- pens that the proportion is inverse : the curate la- bours much, the bishop little, and the archbishop less. The chance of service is as the magnitude of the punishment ; and if the salary can be with- drawn, it is so far indeed as the magnitude of the salary ; but it may be equally great without any B.II. Ch.1.— SALARY— HOW A REWARD. 149 salary : by the substitution of any other punish- ment instead of loss of salary. We see, then, how it is that a salary, be it great or small, independently of the obligation which it pays a man for contracting, has not in itself the smallest direct tendency to produce services ; whilst experience shows, that in many cases, in proportion to its magnitude, it has a tendency to prevent them. [ 150 ] CHAPTER II. RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. Before we enter upon this subject in detail, it may be necessary to remark that, the proper appli- cation of the following rules will depend upon the nature of the service required, and its various local circumstances. It is only by observing the pecu- liar character assumed by abuse in each office, that appropriate remedies for each particular evil can be provided. Since it is impossible to make a com- plete catalogue of all errors, and to anticipate every species of abuse, the rules laid down may not con- stitute a perfect system. They may, however, serve as a warning against errors and abuses which have by experience been found to exist, and also against some which may be imagined likely to exist. It is useful to erect beacons upon rocks whose existence has been made known by the shipwrecks they have caused. Among the rules about to be given, some may appear so self-evi- dent as almost to seem superfluous : but if it can be shewn that errors have arisen from the neglect of them in practice, such rules, though not enti- tled to be considered as discoveries, must at least be regarded as necessary warnings ; they may teach nothing new, but they may serve to recall princi- ples which it is desirable should be constantly and clearly remembered. Rule I. Emoluments ought in such manner to be attached to offices, as to produce the most inti- mate connection between the duty and the interest of the person employed. B. fl. Cn.II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS, 151 This rule may be applied in insuring assiduous attendence on the part of the persons employed, in different offices, different services are required ; but the greater number of offices have this one circum- stance in common : that their duties may be per- formed, it is necessary that the individual holding the office should be at a certain time in a certain place. Hence, of all duties, assiduous attendence is the first, the most simple, and the most universal. In many cases, to insure the performance of this duty, is to insure the performance of every other duty. When the clerk is at his desk, the judge upon the bench, the professor in his school, if there be nothing particularly irksome in their duty, and they can do nothing else, rather than remain idle, it is probable they will perform their duty. In these cases, the service required being of the con- tinual kind, and in point of quality not susceptible of an indefinite degree of perfection ; the pay being required not for certain services, but for such ser- vices as may come to be performed within a certain space of time, it may without impropriety be given in the form of a salary. But even here, the policy of making reward keep pace with service* should be pursued as closely as possible ; and for this pur- pose the long continued mass of service should be broken down into as many separate services as possible : the service of a year into the service of days. In the highest offices, an individual, if paid by his time, should like the day labourer, and for the same reason, be paid rather by the day than by the year. In this way he is kept to his duty with more than the effect, and at the same time with- out any of the odium of punishment. In the station of a judge, it is not common to * Sec b. i. ch. x. rule 3. 152 B.II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. exact attendance by the force of punishment: at least not by the force of punishment to be applied in each instance of failure. But if it were, the in- fliction of that punishment for trivial transgres- sions, that is for one or a few instances of non-per- formance, would be thought harsh and rigorous, nor w^ould any body care for the odium of standing forth to enforce it. Excuses would be lightly made, and readily accepted. Punishment in such cases being to the last degree uncertain, would be in a great measure ineffectual. It might prevent con- tinual, but it would never prevent occasional, or even frequent, delinquency. But what cannot be etfected by punishment alone, may be effected by punishment and reward together. When the officer is paid separately for each day's attendance, each particle of service has its reward : there is for each particle of service an inducement to perform it. There will be no wanton excuses, when inconveni- ence adheres inseparably to delinquency without the parade of punishment. The members of the French Academy and the Academy of Science, notwithstanding all their dig- nity, are paid their salaries by the day and not by the year. And who are the individuals, how low or how high soever, who cannot, and who ought not to be paid ih this manner ? If pride has a legiti- mate scruple, it is that which refuses to receive the reward for labour which it has not performed. Whilst as to the objection which might arise from the minute apportionment of the salary, it is easily removed by counters given from day to day, and converted into money at fixed periods. In the act of parli'^ament for establishing Peni- tentiary houses, among other good regulations, this method of insuring assiduity of attendance has been adopted. The three superintendants receive, B.II. Ch.1I.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. 153 asthe whole of their emoluments, each a share of the sum of five guineas, which is directed to be distri- buted each day of their attendance equally among those who are present. A more antient example of this policy may be found in the incorporated society in London, for the assurances of lives. The directors of this esta- blishment receive their trifling emoluments in this manner ; and thus applied, these emoluments suf- fice. This plan has also been adopted as it respects commissioners of bankrupts, and by different asso- ciations. These examples ought not to be lost, and yet, from not having been referred to general princi- ples, they have not possessed the influence they ought to have. How often have regulations been heaped upon regulations without success ! How many useless decrees were made in France to in- sure the residence of the bishops and beneficed clergy. In England we have not, in this respect, been more successful, that is to say, more skilful. Laws have been enacted against the non-residence of the clergy. Laws badly contrived, and conse- quently useless. Punishment has been denounced and a fine imposed, which, being invariable in amount, has sometimes been greater and sometimes less than the advantage to be derived from the offence. For want of a public prosecutor in this, as in so many other cases, it has been necessary to rely upon such casual informer as may be allured by a portion of the fine : the love of gain has sel- dom proved a motive sufficiently strong to induce an endeavour to obtain this reward ; whose value, not to mention the expenses of pursuit, is de- stroyed by infamy. Till this motive is reinforced J 54 B. II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. by personal animosity, which bursts the bonds of infamy, these laws are powerless. Such cases, which may occur once or twice in the course of ten years, throughout the whole kingdom, are neither sufficiently frequent, nor well known, to operate as examples. The offence remains undiminished; the useless punishment constitutes only an additional evil : whilst such laws and such methods, powerless among friends, serve only to bring enemies into contact 1 When- ever it is desirable that a clergyman should live in the midst of his parishioners, that is to say, when they are amicable, the law is a dead letter ; its power is exerted only when they are irreconcilable enemies ; that is, in the only cases wherein its utility is problematical, and it were to be wished that its execution would admit of an exception. His return into his parish is a triumph for his ene- mies, and a humiliation for himself. Had the salaries, paid to the professors in the universities, been interwoven with their services, it might have been the custom for some of these pretended labourers to have laboured for their hire; and to be a professor, might have meant something more than having a title, a salary, and nothing to teach. A salary, paid day by day, has an advantage beyond that of insuring assiduity of attendance; it even renders a service agreeable, which, with an annual salary, will be regarded as purely bur- thensome. When reward, instead of being be- stowed in a lump, follows each successive portion of labour, the idea of labour becomes associated with pleasure instead of pain. In England, hus- bandmen, like other labourers, are paid in hard money by the week, and their labour is cheerfully B. II. Ch. II.— rules as to emoluments. 155 and well performed. In some parts of the conti- nent, husbandmen are still paid as they were for- merly in England, by houses and pieces of land given once for all ; and the labour is said to be performed with all the slovenliness and reluctance of slavery. Rule 11. — Emoluments ought in such manner to be attached to office, as to produce the greatest possible degree of excellence in theservice rendered. Thus far the subject has only been considered as applicable to insuring attendance in cases where assiduity of attendance appears to suffice for in- suring the performance of all other duties. There follow some cases, in which it appears possible to apply the same principle, either in the prevention of abuse, or in insuring an extraordinary degree of perfection in the employment of the powers which belong to certain stations. Instead of appointing a fixed salary, invariably of the same amount, as the emolument of the superintendant, or superintendants, of a prison, a poor-house, an asylum for orphans, or any kind of hospital, whose inhabitants depend upon the care of one, or a small number of individuals, whatever may be the difference in the degree of attention displayed, or the degree of perfection with which the service is performed, it would be well to make such emolument in some measure depend upon the care with which their duties have been performed, as evidenced by their success. In a penitentiary, or other prison, that the prisoners might be insured from all negligence or ill-treatment, tending di- rectly or indirectly to shorten their lives, make a calculation of the average number of deaths among the prisoners in the particular prison, compared with the number of persons confined there. Allow the superintendant each year a certain sum for 156 B.II. Ch. 11.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. each person of this number, upon condition, that for every prisoner who dies, an equal sum is to be withheld from the amount of his emolu- ments. It is clear, that having a net profit upon the lives of all whom he preserves, there is scarcely any necessity for any other precaution against ill-treatment, or negligence, tending to shorten life.* In the naval service, the laws of England allow a certain sum for each vessel taken or destroyed, and so much for every individual captured. Why is not this method of encouragement extended to the military service ? Is the commander of an army employed in de- fending a province — allow him a pension which shall be diminished in proportion to the territory he loses. Is the governor of an important place besieged — allow him so much for every day that he continues the defence. Is the conquest of a province desirable — promise to the general em- ployed, besides the honours he shall receive, a sum of money which shall increase in proportion to the territory he acquires, besides giving him a pension, as above, for preserving it when acquired. To the principal diity of taking and destroying those who are opposed to him, might be added, the subordinate duty of preserving the living ma- chines whose exertions are necessary for its accom- * " The managers of L Hotel Dieu were used to charge fifty livres for each patient who either died or was cured. M. de Chamousset and Co. offered to undertake the management for fifty livres, for those only who were cured. All who died were not to he reckoned in the bargain, and were to be at their expense. The offer was so admirable, it was not accepted. It was feared that they would not be able to fulfil their engagement. Every abuse which it is attempted to reform is the patrimony of those who have more credit than the Reformers." — Quest. Encycl. art. Charite. B.II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. 157 plishment. The method proposed for the preser- vation of prisoners, why should it not be enmployed for the preservation of soldiers ? It must be ac- knowledged, that no reward exclusively attached to this subordinate duty could, in the mind of a prudent commander, add anything to the weight of those arguments which arise out of the principal object. A soldier when he is ill, is worth less than nothing; a recruit may not arrive at the moment, may not arrive at all, and when he has arrived he is not like a veteran. If therefore it be proper to strengthen motives thus palpable, by a separate and particular reward, it ought at least to be kept in a subordination sufficiently marked with respect to the principal object. Thus much as to a time of war. In time of peace the propriety of this method is much less doubtful. It is then that the attention of a general should be more particularly directed to the preser- vation of his soldiers. Make him the insurer of their lives, and he will become the rival of Escu- lapius in medical science, and of Howard in phi- lanthropy. He will no longer be indifferent, whe- ther they encamp upon a hill or in a morass. His vigilance will be exercised upon the quality of his supplies, and the arrangement of his hospitals; and his discipline •will be rendered perfect against those vices of armies, which are sometimes no less de- structive than the sword of the enemy.* The same system might be extended to ships of war, in which negligence is so fatal, and in which general rules are so easily enforced. The admiral, or captain, would thus have an immediate in- * A slight sketch is all that can be attempted : the details would occupy too much space. A general might be made the insurer, as it respects those who die of disease, but not of those who are killed. 158 B.II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. terest in the preservation of each sailor. The admirable example of Captain Cook, who cir- cumnavigated the world, and traversed so many different climates and unknown seas, without the loss of a single sailor, would no longer be unfruitful. His instructions respecting diet, change of air, and cleanliness, would not be neglected. The British navy, it is true, is much improved in these respects, but who can tell how much greater per- fection might be attained, if to the already exist- ing motives, were added the influence of a con- stantly acting interest, which, without injuring any virtue, might supply the place of all, if they were wanting ? In the application of these suggestions, there may be difficulties : are they insurmountable ? It is for those who have had experience to reply. In the treaty made by the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, relative to the troops which the British s:overnment hired of him to serve in America, one stipulation was, that for every man not returned to his country, he should receive thirty pounds. I know not whether such a stipulation were cus- tomary or not, but whether it were or not, nothing could be more happily imagined, either for the fiscal interest of the sovereign lender, or the in- terest of the individuals lent. The spirit of party found in this stipulation a theme for declama- tion, as if its only effect were to give to the prince an interest in the slaughter of his subjects; whilst, if anything could counterbalance the mis- chievous effects of the treaty, it was this pecuniary condition. It gave to these strangers a security against the negligence or indifference of the bor- rowers, on account of which they might more wil- lingly have been exposed to danger than native subjects. The price attached to their loss would B.II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. 159 act as an insurance, that care should bo taken to preserve them. It has been said, that in some countries the emoluments of the commanders of regiments increase in proportion to the number of non-effec- tives : that is to say, that they receive always the same amount for the pay of his corps, though they have not always the same number of men to pay. Such an arrangement is precisely the opposite of what is recommended above. The number of non- etFectives increasing by death or desertion, the commander gains in money what he loses in men. Every penny which he is thus permitted to acquire is a reward offered, if not for murder, at least for negligence. Note. — The principles thus laid down by Mr. Bentham are susceptible of great diversity of application. When Mr. Whiibread brought into parliament his bill for the establish- ment of schools for the education of the poor, I flattered myself that I had discovered one instance to which they might very readily be applied ; and, in a letter addressed to Sir Samuel Romilly, from which the following paragraphs are extracted, I explained my ideas upon the subject. It will be perceived, that the whole plan depends upon the principles laid down in this chapter. " Mr. Whitbread has been fully aware of the necessity of superintendance in respect to the masters, — and he has pro- posed to commit it to the clei'gyman and justices of the peace j but it is not difficult to foresee, that this burthensome super- intendance will be inefficacious. No good will be effected un- less the interest of the master is constantly combined with all parts of his duty. The only method of accomplishing this, consists in making his reward depend upon his success ; in giving him no fixed salary ; in allowing him a certain sum for each child, payable only when each child has learned to read ; in a word, in paying him, as workmen are sometimes paid, by the work done. " When he receives a fixed salary, the master has only a slight interest in the progress of his pupils. If he act suffi- ciently well to prevent his being discharged, this is all that can reasonably be expected. 160 B.II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. " If he receive no reward till the service be performed, he has a constant interest in performing it quickly. He can relax his exertions only at his own expense. There is no longer any necessity for superintendance. The master will himself seek to improve the modes of instruction, and to excite the children to emulation. He will be disposed to listen to the advice, and to profit by the experience of others. " When he receives a fixed salary, every new scholar in- creases the trouble of the master, diminishes his exertions, and disposes him to complain. Upon the plan which I propose, it is the master who will stir up the negligent parents ; it is he who will become the servant of the law. Instead of com- plaining that he has too many pupils, he will only complain if he have too few. Should he have three or four hundred, or even as many as Mr. Lancaster, like him, he would find the means of attending to them all ; he would employ the most forward in instructing those who were less advanced, &c. &c. " Should a negligent or incapable master be appointed, he would be forced to quit his place. Substitute for this plan examinations, depositions^ and decisions, and see what would be the consequence. " There would be no difficulty in the execution of this pro- posed plan. It would be sufficient if, twice or thrice in the year, that the clergyman, and certain justices of the peace, or other persons of consequence, who were willing to promote so useful a work, should meet together for two or three hours at the school -house. The examination of each scholar would not occupy more than half a minute. The master himself might be trusted for selecting only such as were capable of un- dergoing the test, and an honorary would thus be added to his pecuniary reward, by the publicity given to his suc- cess." DUMONT. [ IGl ] CHAPTER III. FEES AND PERQUISITES — NONE. Another expedient is often emplo^'ed in the payment of public officers. 1 refer to the fees, which they are sometimes authorised to receive on their own account, from those who require their services. This arrangement is attended with a specious advantage, and a real danger. The advantage is, that the reward seems to be exactly and directly in proportion to the labour performed. The danger lies in the temptation given to such officers to increase their emoluments, by increasing the difficulties of those who need their services. The abuse is easily introduced. It is very natural, for example, that an individual who has been served withan extraordinary expedition, should add some- thing to the accustomed fee. But this reward, bestowed on account of superior expedition in the first instance, infallibly becomes a cause of delay in all which follow. The regulated hours of busi- ness are employed in doing nothing, or in doing the least possible, that extraordinary pay may be received for what is done out of office-hours. The industry of all the persons employed will be directed to increasing the profit of their places, by lending one another mutual assistance ; and the heads of departments will connive at the disorder, either for their share of the benefit, or out of kind- ness to their inferiors, or for fear of rendering them discontented. 11 16^ B.Il. Ch.III.— FEES AND PERQUISITES— NONE. The inconveniences will be yet greater, if they relate to a service covered with a mysterious veil, which the public cannot raise. Such is the veil of the law. The useless and oppressive delays in legal procedure arise from very complicated causes ; but it cannot be doubted, that one of the most considerable of these causes is the sinister interest which lawyers have in multiplying processes and questions, that they may multiply the occasions for receiving fees. Integrity is more easily preserved in public offices in which there are no fees, than those in which they are allowed. A lawful right often serves as a pretext for extortion. The distinction between what is permitted and what is prohibited, in many cases, is exceedingly minute ; and how many temptations may occur of profiting by the igno- rance of strangers, when circumstances will insure impunity! An easy method of detecting offences is a great restraint. Whenever therefore fees are allowed, a list of them should be publicly fixed up in the office itself: this will operate as a pro- tection to the persons employed against suspicion, and to the public against vexation. This mode of rewarding services supposes, that the individuals, who stand in need of them, should bear the expenses of the establishment : this is true only in case the benefit is solely for those in- dividuals; in all other cases fees constitute an unequal and very unjustly assessed tax. We shall have occasion to recur to this subject shortlv. [ 163 ] CHAPTER IV. MINIMIZE EMOLUMENT. Rule HI. — The amount of the salary, or other emoluments, attached to every office, ought to be the least that the individuals, qualified to execute its duties, are willing to accept for their perform- ance. The fair and proper price of any vendible com- modity is the least that anybody will take for it; so that the expectation of like payment shall be a sufficient inducement to the Jabour requisite to produce other like articles in future. The fair and proper price of any service is the least that any- body will do it for: so that if more were given, it would be done either not at all the better, or not so much the better as that the difference of qua- lity should be equivalent to the difference of ex- pense. In this proper and necessary price is in- cluded, of course, everything necessary to enable the individual to perform, and to continue to per- form, the service ; and also whatever is necessary, on account of the disadvantages attending the ser- vice, and on account of the chance which may be given up of the advantages that might be expected from other services. At the first establishment of an office, it may be difficult accurately to determine what ought to be the amount of its emoluments: in this, as is the case with every commodity when carried to market for the first time, we can only be guided by chance. 11. 164 B. ij. ch. IV.— minimize emolument. The number and character of the candidates will, however, soon determine whether the amount offered is too large or too small. According to this rule, the salaries paid to the judges in England, which appear so considerable, are scarcely enough ; since, as we have already seen, they are not sufficient to induce those, who are best qualified to discharge the duty, to under- take the office. In France, before the revolution, scarcely any salaries were paid to the judges; they were not drafted from the class of advocates, and no sacrifice was required of them when they entered upon their duties; it was not necessary that they should be possessed of much experience, and their reward consisted principally in the honour and respect attached to their station. In England, the number of judges is so small, that there is no place for ciphers: it is necessary that each judge should possess, from the first day he enters upon his office, that skill which, in the present state of immen- sity and obscurity in which the law is found, can only be the fruit of long stud}^ In France, among the enormous multitude of her judges, there w^as always a sufficient number endowed with the requisite skill; and the novice might, so long as he chose, preserve a Pythagorean silence. A method of ascertaining the proper amount of emoluments for any office, simple as it is effica- cious, is afforded by allowing the persons em- ployed to discharge their duty by deputy; if no one employs a deputy, the emoluments cannot be much too great ; if many individuals employ de- puties, it will be only necessary to observe what is paid to the deputies: the salary of the deputy is the proper salary for the place. B. II. ch. IV.— minimize emolument. 165 If this rule be applied to the emoluments of the clergy, and it be asked what is the proper price for their services, the answer is not ditlicult. It is, prima facie, the price given by one class of the clergy, and received by the other ; it is the current price of curacies. I say always prima facie, for, in reality, the current price is somewhat greater; part of the price being made up in hope. l"or insuring the due performance of all the duties of their office, this price is found to be sufficient. The possession of any greater emolument is not only useless but pernicious, inasmuch as it enables them to engage in occupations incompatible with the due performance of their function, and as it tends to give them a distaste for the duties of that function. The inequality observable in the emoluments of the established clergy, is also disadvantageous in respect to the greater number of ecclesiastics. The comparison which they make between their condition, and that of the rich incumbents, dimi- nishes still further, in their eyes, the value of what they receive. A reward so unequal for equal services, degrades those who receive only their proper portion. The whole presents the ap- pearance of a lottery, of favour and injustice, ill according with the moral character of their vocation. It is a good rule of economy to employ only real labourers, who do not think themselves superior to the work they have to perform. Dutch florists ought not to be employed in the cultivation of potatoes. It is well also fully to employ the time of the individuals employed. The duties of many public offices require only three or four hours attendance 166 B.IJ. Ch. IV.— MINIMIZE EMOLUMENT. daily. After the office hours are passed, such in- dividuals seldom are able profitably to employ their time. The leisure they possess increases their wants. Ennui, the scourge of life, is no less the enemy of economy. It is among this class, that those who are most discontented with their salaries, are generally found. [ 1^7 ] CHAPTER V. NO MORE NOMINAL THAN REAL. Rule IV. — The nominal and real amount of sa- laries ought to correspond. In other words, no deduction ought to be made from the real value of a salary without reducing its nominal amount. The practice whicli has fre- quently been adopted in England of reducing the real value of salaries and pensions by taxes and other deductions, while the nominal amount of the salaries has remained unaltered, has given rise to this rule. In some instances, the deductions thus made have amounted to one third of the nominal salary. No advantage arises from this arrangement, but its inconveniences are numerous. In the first place, it is an evil in so far as it spreads an exagger- ated idea of the sacrifices made by the public, and the expense incurred under the head of salaries. With respect to the public functionaries, it is an evil to possess an income greater in appearance than reality. The erroneous conceptions hence entertained of their wealth, imposes upon them, in deference to public opinion, the necessity of keep- ing up a corresponding establishment. Under the penalty of being considered niggardly, they are compelled to be extravagant. It is true the pubMc are aware, in general, that salaries and pensions are subject to deductions, but they are oftentimes only acquainted with a part of the deductions, and the}-^ seldom in such cases enter into minute calcula- tions. 168 B. II. Ch. v.— NO MORE NOMINAL THAN REAL. In this manner the diflference between the no- minal and real value of a salary, tends to produce an increase in the wants of the individual employed. Call the amount of his salary what it really is, and he will be at ease, but every nominal addition will prove a costly ornament. If the opportunity of illicit profit is presented to him, such nominal ad- dition will be an incentive to corruption, and should he not be dishonest it will prove a cause of distress.* The remedy is simple as efficacious ; the change need only be in words. * A further inconvenience frequently arises from the expense of collecting and managing all such peculiar contributions. [ 169 ] CHAPTER VI. COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT. EuleY. — The expenses of an office ought to he defrayed by those who enjoy the benefit of the services rendered by the office. The author of the Wealth of Nations, in inves- tigating* the manner in which the expense of ser- vices ought to be divided, has shewn that in some cases it ought to be defrayed by the public, in others, exclusively by those who immediately reap the benefit of the service. He has also shewn that there is a class of mixed cases in which the ex- pense ought to be defrayed partly by the public, and partly by the individuals who derive the immediate benefit. To this class belongs public education. The rule just laid down seems scarcely to stand in need of proof. It may, however, be useful to mention the modes in which it may be violated ; as, when for a service rendered to one person or set of persons, the obligation of payment is imposed upon another. This is partly the case of dissenters who support their own clergy, in so far as they are obliged to pay for the support of the clergy of that established sect from which they dissent. 2. When for a service rendered to a certain number of indi- viduals, the obligation ofpayment is imposed upon the public. For example, the expenses of a theatre, wholly or in part paid out of the public purse. 3. When for a service rendered to the * Book V. 170 B. II. Ch. VI.— COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT. public, the obligation of payment is imposed upon an individual. With respect to this third case, the examples are but too abundant. I. The most remarkable example will be found in the administration ofjustice. At first sight it may be thought that he who obtains a verdict in his favour reaps the principal, or even the only advantage to be obtained ; and therefore that it is reasonable he should bear the expense incurred ; that he should pay the officers ofjustice for the time they have been employed. It is in this man- ner that the subject appeared even to Adam Smith. (B. V. sec. 2.) Upon a closer examination, we shall discover an important error. The individual in whose favour a verdict is given, is precisely the indi- vidual who has received least benefit : setting aside the rewards paid to the officers ofjustice, how many other expenses, which the nature of things render inevitable, remain. It is he who, at the price of his time, his care and his money, has purchased that protection which others receive for nothing. Suppose that among a million persons there has been, for example, a thousand law-suits in a year; without these law-suits, without the judgments which terminate them, injustice would have had nothing to hold it in check, but the defensive energy of individuals. A million acts of injustice would have been perpetrated in the same time. But since, by means of these thousand judgments, a million acts of injustice have been prevented, it is the same thing as if each complainant had him- self prevented a thousand. Because he has ren- dered so important a service, because he has ex- posed himself to so many mishaps, to so much trouble and expense, does he deserve to be taxed ? B. II. Ch. VI.— COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT. 171 It is as though the militia who defend the fron- tiers should be selected to bear the expenses of the campaign. " Who goeth a warfare any time at his own charges ?" saith St. Paul. It is the poor litigant who makes war upon injustice, who pursues it before the tribunals at his own risk, and who is made to pay for the service which is rendered to him. When such expenses are thrown upon a defen- dant, unjustly dragged into the litigious contention, the case is yet worse ; instead of any thing having been done for his advantage, he has been tormented, and he is made to pay for having been tormented. If the expenses are altogether thrown upon the party who is found to have done wrong, (although it often happens, owing to the uncertainty either of the facts or of the law, that there has been no wil- ful wrong on either side,) this cannot be done at first ; this party can only be known at the termina- tion of the suit. But then such a judgment would be a punishment ; and there is a chance that such a punishment may not be deserved ; another chance, that the individual may not be in a condi- tion to support it ; another chance, that it will be either too great or too little.* II. As another violation of this rule, may be cited the practice of taking fees, as carried on in most custom-houses, and which constituted a great abuse in those of England, previously to the re- * There are many other objections to taxes upon law pro- ceedings, but they do not belong to the present subject. Un- der the head of procedure^ it might be shewn that these taxes oppose the ends of justice : under the head of finance, that they constitute a bad source of revenue. The subject has been more fully discussed in Mr. Bentliam's " Protest against Lata Taxes." 172 B.II. Ch. VI.— COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT. form introduced by Mr. Pitt. Many of the offi- cers, not receiving salaries sufficient for their main- tenance, were allowed to make up the deficiency by fees received for their own advantage. This custom had an appearance of reason. " We pass your merchandise through the custom-house," they might have said ; " and you ought to pay for this service." But this reason is deceptive. " Without this custom-house," the merchants might have re- plied, " our merchandize would have gone straight forward ; it is not for our advantage that this costly depot is established. It is for the general wants of the state. The state therefore, which you serve, ought to pay you, and not us, whom you torment with your services, which we should be very happy to do without." But, it may be said, this expense must be borne by somebody, why should it not be borne by these merchants as well as any body else ? Because it is a partial and unequal tax. Taxes upon merchandize are generally in proportion to the value of the goods ; this abusive tax seldom is so. A rich merchant does not feel it; he is reimbursed by the sale of his goods. A poor individual is oppressed by this second contri- bution, which he finds it necessary to pay to the clerk after he has paid what is due to the exche- quer ; and it with reason appears to him the more odious, because it is oftentimes arbitrary. III. In conclusion, as a last example of the violation of this rule, we mention the emoluments of the clergy, in so far as they consist of tithes. If the services of the clergy contribute to the main- tenance of public morality, and obedience to the laws, even those to whom these services are not personally directed are benefited by them ; they are useful to the whole state. Their expense, what- ever ought to be its amount, ought to be borne by B.II.Ch. VI.— COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT. 173 the whole community. Distributed as tliis expense isatpresent, under the systemof tithes, in such man- ner that every one knows how much and to whom he pays it, no advantage is derived from this know- ledge; whilst the inconveniences are but too mani- fest in that hatred which so frequently subsists be- tween the parishioners and their minister, the shep- herd and his flock ; by means of which his labours, so long as this enmity subsists, are rendered worse than useless. Were this expense to be defrayed from the general source of the public treasure, these scandalous dissensions would be avoided, and whether the revenues were more or less ample, it would be possible to preserve a more just propor- tion between them and the different degrees of labour; instead of floating as at present between ^20. and .£20,000. per annum, under the direction chance.* * Tithes considered as a tax are attended with other incon- veniences : they belong not to our present subject. They have been exposed by Adam Smith, with that force and precision which characterise that great master. [ 174 ] CHAPTER VII. BY EMOLUMENTS EXCLUDE CORRUPTION. Rule V. — In employments which expose the public functionary to peculiar temptations, the emoluments ought to be sufficient to preserve him from corruption. Setting aside all considerations of the happiness of the individual, the interest of the public re- quires that in all employments which afford the means of illicit gain, the individuals employed should be placed above want. If this important consideration be neglected, we ought not to be sur- prised that men urged on by perpetually recurring wants should abuse the powers they possess. Under such circumstances, if they are found guilty of extortion and peculation, they are less deserving of blame than that government which has spread the snare into which it was scarcely possible that their probity should not fall. Placed between the , necessity of providing the means of subsistence, and the impossibility of providing them honestly, they will naturally be led to regard peculation and extortion as a lawful supplement, tacitly autho- rized by the government. The examples of this mischievous economy, and of the inconveniences resulting from it, are more frequent in Russia than under any other European government. " M. de Launay (Farmer-General under Fre- derick II.) represented to the king that the sala- ries of the custom-house officers were too small for their subsistence, and that it would be but justice to augment them ; he added that he B. 11. Ch.VII.— BY EMOLUMENTS EXCLUDE CORRUPTION. 175 could insure to his majesty that every one would then discharge his duty better, and that the aggregate receipts in all the offices would be larger at the end of the year." — " You do not know my sub- jects," said Frederick, " they are all rogues where my interests are in question. I have thoroughly studied them, and 1 am sure they would rob me at the altar. By paying them better you would diminish my revenues, and they would not rob me less." — " Sire," replied M. de Launay, " how can they do otherwise than steal ? Their salaries are not enough to buy them shoes and stockings 1 a pair of boots costs them a month's pay ! at the same time, many of them are married. And where can they obtain food for their wives and families, if it is not by conniving at the smug- glers ? There is, sire, a most important maxim which, in matters of government, is too frequently neglected. It is that men in general desire to be honest; but it is always necessary to leave them the ability of being so. If your majesty will con- sent to make the trial I propose, I will engage that your revenues will be augmented more than a fourth." The maxim in morals, thus brought for- ward by M. de Launay, appeared to the king, beau- tiful and just, as it really is in itself — so much the more excellent from being in the mouth of a finan- cier ; smce men of this class are not in general reputed to know many such. He authorized the experiment, he increased the salaries of the officers by a half, and his revenues were increased a third without any new taxes.* A salary proportionate to the wants of the func- tionary operates as a kind of moral antiseptic^ or preservative. It fortifies a man's probity against * Thiebault. Mes Souvenirs de Berlin. Tome iv. p. 12G. 17G B.II. Ch.VII.— BY EMOLUMENTS EXCLUDE CORRUPTION. the influence of sinister and seductive motives. The fear of losing it will, in general, be more than equivalent to the ordinary temptations held out by illicit gains. But in the estimation of a man's v^^ants, it is not merely to what is absolutely necessary that our calculation ought to be confined. Fabricius and Cincinnatus are not the proper standards to be selected. The actual state of society ought to be considered. The average measure of probity must be our rule. Public opinion assigns to every public functionary a "certain relative rank ; and, whether reasonably or not, expects from him an expenditure nearly equal to that of persons in a similar rank. If he is compelled to act in defiance of public opinion, he degrades and exposes himself to contempt — a punishment so much the more afflictive, in proportion as his rank is elevated. Wants keep pace with dignity. Destitute of the lawful means of supporting his rank, his dignity presents a motive for malversation, and his power furnishes the means. History abounds with crimes, the result of this ill-judged policy. If a justification is required for the extraordi- narily high salaries, which it is customary to pay to the supreme magistrates, who are called Kings, it will be found in the principles above laid down. The Americans, by denominating their chief ma- gistrate a President, have thereby made a small salary, compared with what is paid in England to the sovereign, answer every purpose of a large one. Why ? Because the dignity of the presi- dent is compared with that of the other officers of the republic, whilst in Europe the dignity of the sovereign is measured by a sort of comparison with that of other kings. If he were unable to maintain a certain pomp amidst the opulence of ll. Cii. VII.— BY EMOLUMENTS EXCLUDE CORRUPTION. 177 his courtiers, he would feel himself tlegraded. Charles II., to relieve himself from the restrictions imposed upon him by the economy of parliament, sold himself to a foreign potentate, who offered to supply his profusion. The hope of escaping from the embarrassments into which he had plunged himself, drove him, like an insolvent individual, to criminal resources. This mistaken economy occasioned the expense of two successive wars, terminating in a peace more disastrous perhaps than either of the wars. Our strength was wasted in oppressing a necessary ally, instead of being employed in checking the ambition of a rival, with whom we had afterwards to contend, with dimi- nished resources. Thus the establishment of the Civil List, though its amount may appear large, may be considered as a measure of general securiti/. It is true that the sum necessary to prevent Charles II. from selling himself, or, in other words, the amount which in this instance would have operated as a moral antiseptic, or preservative, could not have been very accurately calculated. A greater or less portion of this antiseptic must be employed in proportion as there exists a greater or less proclivity towards corruption. Experience is the touchstone of all calculations in this respect. Provided these abuses are guarded against, a low scale of salaries can never be an evil ; it must be a good. If the salary be not a sufficient re- ward for the service to be performed, the office will not be accepted. If it be sufficient, everything which is added to its amount is so much lavished in pure waste. 12 I 17S ] CHAPTER VIIT. GIVE PENSIONS OF RETREAT. RuieYll. — Pensions of retreat ought to be pro- vided, especially when the emoluments allowed are not more than sufficient to meet the absolute wants of the functionary.* Pensions of retreat are recommended by consi- derations of humanity, justice, and good economy; they moreover tend to insure the proper discharge of duty, and constitute a source of responsibility on the part of the individuals employed. 1. There are many cases in which it is not de- sirable that a public functionary should continue to be employed after his activity and capacity have become impaired. But, since the infirmities of age tend to increase his wants, this is not the time in which he will be able to retrench his expendi- ture; and he will be induced by this consideration, in his old age and impotency, to continue to en- deavour to perform, with pain, and even with dis- grace, the duties of a station which, in his matu- rity, he had filled with pleasure and reputation. To wait till he voluntarily resigns, is to expect a species of suicide ; to dismiss him without a pen- sion of retreat is, in the supposed state of his faculties, a species of homicide. A pension of * The reader ought to be apprised that, having found in Mr. Benthani's MSS. upon this subject, only the memorandum " Pensions of Retreat," I have confined myself to the most simple exposition of the subject : its details would have been too widely extended. — Note by Dumont. B.ir. Ch. Vlll.— GIVE PENSIONS OF RETREAT. 179 retreat removes all these difficulties: it is a debt of humanity paid by the public to its servants. 2. By means of these pensions, the scale of all salaries may be lower than otherwise, without producing any ill effect upon the quality of the services rendered. They will constitute an item in the calculation which every individual makes: in the mean time, government will obtain from all, at a low price, services, the ulterior compensation for which, on account of the casualties of human life, will only be received by a few. It is a lottery, in which there are no blanks. 3. In all employments from which the indivi- duals are removable at pleasure, the pension of retreat, in consequence of the approach of the period at which it will become necessary or due, will add an increasing value to the salary, and augment the responsibility of the individual em- ployed. Should he be tempted to malversation, it will be necessary that the profit derivable from his malversation should compensate with certainty not only for the loss of his annual salary, but also the value of his future pension of retreat ; his fide- lity is thus secured to the last moment of his con- tinuing in office. 4. We ought not to forget the happiness, insured to thepersons employed, resultingfrom the security given to them by the provision thus made against that period of life, which is most menaced with weakness and neglect. Hence an habitual dispo- sition to perform the duties of their office with alacrity will arise ; they will consider themselves as permanently provided for, and fixed in a situa- tion in which all their faculties may be applied to the discharge of its duties, without being turned aside by vague apprehensions of future distress, and the desire of improving their condition, which 12. 180 B. II. Cu. VIII.— GIVE PENSIONS OF RETREAT. SO often leads individuals successively to try diffe- rent stations. Another advantage to the govern- ment ; instead of being badly served by novices, it will possess a body of experienced functionaries, expert and worthy of its confidence. The amount of these pensions ought to be regulated by fixed rules, otherwise they will become a source of abuse; offices will be bestowed for the sake of the pension, instead of the pension being bestowed for the sake of the office. They ought also to increase according to the length of service, leaving at all times an inducement to con- tinued exertion, without which precaution the services of experienced individuals, which it might be desirable to retain, would frequently be lost. [ 181 ] CHAPTER IX. OF THE SALE OF OFFICES. If it be desirable that the public servants should be contented with small salaries, it is more desi- rable that they should be willing to serve gra- tuitously, and most desirable that they should be willing to pay for the liberty of serving, instead of being paid for their services. Such is the simple but conclusive train of argument, in favour of the venality of offices, abstractly considered. Such an arrangement is attended with another advantage. A sum laid out in the purchase of an office renders the purchaser responsible in a higher degree than he would be were he to receive a salary equal to, or even exceeding in amount, the interest of the money he has paid. The loss of a salary paid by the public, is merely the cessation of so much gain ; the loss of an office which has been purchased, is the positive loss of so much capital which the individual has actually pos- sessed. The impression produced upon the mind by these two species of loss is widely different. The cessation of a gain is generally much less severely felt than a loss to a corresponding amount. The gain which depends upon external circum- stances is always precarious, it cannot be reckoned upon with certainty; on the other hand, if an individual have purchased an office with his own capital, he looks upon it as absolutely his own ; it comes to be reuarded as a certain, fixed, and 182 B.ll. Ch.IX.— OF THE SALE OF OFFICES. permanent source of revenue, and as identified with his original property upon which he has always reckoned. When a man purchases an office, it may be fairly presumed that he possesses appropriate apti- tude for the discharge of its duties. Are there pecuniary emoluments attached to an office — the office may be accepted for the sake of these emo- luments. Are there no pecuniary emoluments — the office can be desired only on account of its duties, or of the natural rewards of honour and power, which are inseparable from it. Such, at least, is the ordinary state of things. It is how- ever possible that such an office might be desired as a means of obtaining some hidden profit preju- dicial to the public ; but this would be a particu- lar case, whose existence ought to be established by proof. It is not by names alone that we can determine whether it is most advantageous for the public that offices should, without emoluments, be given away, or vi^hen with emoluments should be sold : this question can only be determined by an accu- rate account, exhibiting the balance of the sums paid and received. If, however, there be any offices without emoluments, for which purchasers can be found; were it possible to sell purely honorary appointments, offices connected with public pomp and show, it would be entirely con- sistent with good economy ; it would be to convert a tax upon honour, unfelt by any one, but established in favour of the purchasers, into hard cash. A tax would thus be levied upon vanity. The gain would be real, though the bargain, like that of the Lapland sorcerers, were only for bags of wind. B.ii. ch. i::.— or the sale or oifices. 18o As it respects offices of which the emoluments are fixed, the question of economy is simple ; the amount of the emoluments does not differ from a perpetual rent. But when an office is sold, the profits of which, whether received from the public, or levied upon individuals, are uncertain in amount, this uncertainty causes a presumption against the economy of the bargain: it is disad- vantageous to the public to be subject to uncer- tain expenses, and it is not probable that these uncertain profits will sell for so large a price as would willingly be paid for a salary equal to their average amount. Again, as to emoluments derived solely from indi- viduals, these are a species of tax often created and alienated at the same time in favour of the office. The general presumption cannot but be unfavour- able to taxes imposed under such circumstances. In former times, when the science of political economy was in its cradle, when taxes and the methods of collecting them were little understood, governments have frequently thus alienated large branches of the public revenue. Tempted by an immediate supply, they either did not or would not regard the extent of the sacrifices they made. The history of French finance is replete with instances of this kind. The customs of Orleans, which were originally purchased by a Duke of Orleans for 60,000 francs, afterwards yielded to his posterity a yearly revenue of more than u 1, 000,000 /rrmcs. The venality of offices in that kingdom had created an exceedingly complex, and consequently exceedingly vicious system. The sale of offices conferring hereditary nobility was especially mis- chievous, since this nobility enjoyed a multitude of exemptions. The nobles paid no taxes. Ilcuc6 184 B. II. ch. IX.— of the sale of offices. every creation of nobility vvasatax, equal in value to the exemption granted, thrown upon those who continued liable to pay them. Should the price for which an office is sold form a part of the emoluments of tlie head of the office, and not be received by the public, this would make no difference in the question of economy as respects giving and selling. That the produce of the sale is afterwards wasted, is an accident unconnected with the sale. The emoluments re- ceived by the head of the department may be too large or not. if not loo large, the public gains by the operation; since, in suppressing the sale, it would be necessary to increase his emoluments by other means. If too large, the excess might be made applicable to the public service. THE SALE OF OFFICES CONSIDERED W^TII RE- SPECT TO PARTICULAR DEPARTMENTS. Public opinion is at present adverse to the sale of public offices. It more particularly' condemns their sale in the three great departments of war, law, and religion. This prejudice has probably arisen from the improper use to which it has sometimes been applied ; but whether this be the case or not, the use of the word venal seldom, if ever, but in an odious and dysolgystic sense, has tended to preserve it. " He who has bought the right of judging will sell judgments," is the sort of reasoning in use upon this subject. Instead of an argument, it is only an epigram.* The members of the French * Vendere jure potest, emerat ille prius. Apply the reason- ing to ftnother subject : "He who has bought apples, will sell apples." The consequence docs not follow ; lor he may chance to eat or to give them away. » B.II. Cii.IX.— OF THE SALE OF OFFICES. 185 parliaments were judges, and they purchased their places ; it did not by any means follow that they were disposed to sell their judgments, or that they could have done so with impunity. The greater number of these parliaments were never even suspected of having sold them. Countries may however be cited in which the judges sell both justice and injustice, though they have not bought their places. The uprightness of a judge does not depend upon these but upon other circum- stances. If the laws be intelligible and known ; if the proceedings of the judges are public ; if the punishment for injustice surpass the profit to be reaped from it, judges will be upright, even though they purchase their offices. In England, there are certain judicial offices which the judges sell, sometimes openly, some- times clandestinely; the purchasers of these offices extract from the suitors as much as they can : if they had not purchased their places, they would not have endeavoured to extract less. The mischief is, not that this right of plundering is sold, but that the right exists. In the English army, the system of venality has been adopted. Military commissions, from the rank of ensign to that of lieutenant-colonel, are sold, with permission to the purchasers to re-sell them. The epigram upon the judges is not applied here. The complaint is, that the patrimony of merit is invaded by wealth. But it ought to be recollected, that in this career the opportunities for the display of merit do not occur every day. It is only upon extraordinary occa- sions that extraordinary talents can be displayed ; and when these occur, there can be no difficulty, even under this system, of bestowing proportionate and approi)riatc rewards. Besides, though the 186 B.II. Ch.IX.— OF THE SALE OF OFFICES. patrimony of merit should by this means be in- vaded by wealth, it would at the same time be defended from favouritism, a divinity in less esteem even than wealth. The circumstance which ought to recommend the system of venalty to suspicious politicians is, that it diminishes the influence of the crown. The whole circle over which it extends is so much reclaimed from the influence of the crown. It may be called a cor- ruption, but it serves as an antidote to a corruption more to be dreaded. It is the sale of ecclesiastical offices which has occasioned the greatest outcry. It has been made a particular sin, to which has been given the name of Simonij. In the Acts of the Apostles, we are informed that at Samaria, there was a magician named Simon, to whose gainful prac- tices an immediate stop was put by the preach- ing and miracles of Philip, one of the deacons of the church of Jerusalem, who had been driven to Samaria by persecution. Simon therefore, regard- ing Philip as a more fortunate rival, enrolled him- self among the number of his proselytes, and when the apostles Peter and John came down from Jeru- salem, and by the laying on of their hands commu- nicated to the disciples the gift of the Holy Ghost, Simon, desirous of possessing something more than the rest, offered to them money, saying, " give me also this power, that on whomsoever I lay hands, he may receive the Holy Ghost." Upon which Peter severely reprimanded him, and the magician, supple as he was intriguing, asked forgiveness, and thus his history closes. It is nowhere said he was punished. Upon the strength of this story, the Roman Catholic church has converted the act of buying or selling ecclesiastical benefices into a sin ; and B.ll. Cii. IX.— OF THE SALE OF OFFICES, 187 the English law, copying from the Catholic church, has constituted such an act a crime. As the Roman Catholic church, among catholics, is infallible, as to them it must have decided rightly when it declared such acts to be sinful. Our subject, how- ever, leads us only to the consideration of the legal crime ; and between this crime and the of- fence of Simon Magus, there is nothing in com- mon. Presentation to a living and the reception of the Holv Ghost' are not the same things. If it be the object of this law to exclude improper persons, more direct, simple, and efficacious means might be employed ; their qualifications might be ascertained by public examinations, their good conduct by the previous publication of their names, with liberty to all the world to object against them. Their moral and intellectual capacity being thus proved, why should they not be allowed to pur- chase the employment, or to discharge it gratui- tously ? An idiot, once admitted to priests' orders, may hold an ecclesiastical benefice, but were a man, gifted like an apostle, to give five guineas to be permitted to discharge the duties of that benefice, he would be borne down by the outcry against the simony he had committed. What then is the effect of these anti-simoniacal laws ? A priest may not purchase a benefice for himself; but his friend, whether priest or layman, may purchase it for him. He may not purchase the presentation to a vacant benefice, but he may purchase the right of presentation to a benefice filled by a dying man, or by a person in good health who will have the complaisance to resign, and receive it again with an obligation, again to resign whenever his patron requires it. In reading these self-styled anti-simoniacal laws, it is difficult 188 B.II, Ch. IX.— OF THE SALE OF OFFICES. to discover, whether they are intended to prohibit or to allow the practice of simony. Their only real effects are to encourage deception and fraud. Blackstone complains of their inexecution. He did not perceive that a law which is not executed is ridiculous. [ i«y ] CHAPTER X. OF QUALIFICATIONS. We have already seen that a salary may be em- ployed as a means of insuring the responsibility of an individual, and- as a moral antiseptic to preserve him from the influence of corruption. By the sale of offices, it has been seen that the actual expense of a salary may be diminished, and even reduced to nothing. It is therefore evident that the important circumstance is, that the individual should possess the requisite portion of the precious matter of re- ward, and not that it should have been given to him. If he possess it of his own, so much the better ; and the more he already possesses the less is it necessary to give him. In England, such are the attractions of power and dignity, that the num- ber of candidates for their possession has been found so large, that it has been thought desirable to limit the selection to the number of those who possess the required quantity of this moral antisep- tic; and this circumstance has given birth to what have been called qualifications. The most remarkable and important offices to which these pecuniary qualifications have been at- tached, are those of justices of the peace and mem- bers of parliament. A justice of the peace ought to possess at least 100/. per annum landed pfbperty. There is no reasonable objection against this law. The office is one of those for which an ordinarily liberal education is sufficient. It is at the same time such an office that the individual invested 190 B, n. ch. X.— of qualifications. with it might do much mischief were he not re- strained by powerful motives. As a quahfication for the more important office of member of parliament, the law requires of the member for a borough or city a similar qualifica- tion of 300/. per annum, and of the member for a county of 600/. per annum. This case differs widely from the other. Sufficient talent for carry- ing the laws into execution is possessed by a mul- titude of individuals ; but few are able to deter- mine what laws ought to be framed. The science of legislation is still in its cradle ; it has scarcely been begun to be formed in the cabinets of philo- sophers ; among legislators in name, scarcely any other practice can be found than that of children, who in their prattle copy what they have learned of their nurses. That a science may be learned, a motive is necessary ; that the science of legisla- tion may be learned, or rather may be created, motives so much the more powerful are necessary, as this science is most repulsive and thorny. For the pursuit of this study, an ardent and persevering mind is required, which can scarcely be expected to be formed in the lap of ease, of luxury, and of wealtJi. Among those whose wants have been forestalled from their cradle, among those who become legislators to gratify their vanit}', or relieve their ennui, there can scarcely be found one who could be called a legislator without mockery. How shall he who possesses everything without the trouble of thinking, be led to subject himself to the labour of thought ? If it be desirable that le- gislators should be men of enlarged and well-in- structed minds, they must be sought among those who possess but little wealth, among those who, oppressed with their insignificance, are stimulated B. II, ch. X.— of qualifications. 191 by ambition, and even by hunger, to distinguish themselves ; they must be sought among those who possess the habits of Cyrus and not otSarda- napalus. Among the children ot" luxury, of whom the great mass of senators chosen by a rich people will always be composed, there are but few who will undergo the fatigue of studying the lessons which, at the expense of so much labour, have been furnished them by Beccaria and Adam Smith ! Can it be expected, then, that from among their number the rivals of these great masters should be found ? Qualifications in this case tend to ex- clude the individuals endowed with the greatest moral and intellectual capacity. The reasons however in favour of qualifications are plausible. It is alleged, that the possession of a certain property tends to guarantee the indepen- dence of its possessor, and that in no other situa- tion is independence more desirable, than in that of a deputy appointed to watch over and defend the interests of the people against the encroachments of the executive power, supplied as that power almost necessarily is with so many means of seduc- tion. To this it may be replied, that it is not the poor alone who are liable to be seduced ; multi- tudes possessing property exceeding in value the qualifications required, are biassed by the seductive influence of places and pensions, whilst the poor remain unmoved. A law of this nature whose effect, were it strictly executed, would be to exclude the most capable, is made to be evaded, and in fact has constantly been evaded: among those who have acted the most conspicuous parts in the British House of Com- mons, many have been able to enter there only by an evasion of this law. Means might be provided which would afford a perfect guarantee against 192 B.II. Ch.X.— OF QUALIFICATIONS. such evasions, but happily upon this, as upon many other occasions, the veil that hides from human weakness the distant inconveniences of bad laws, hides also the means necessary for rendering such laws efficacious. Some years ago, a member, the honesty of whose intentions could not be doubted, proposed to aug- ment the qualifications for cities and boroughs from 300/. to 600/. per annum. The proposition, after having made considerable progress, fell to the ground. 1 know not whether this happened from a conviction of its trifling utility, or from one of those accidents which in that slippery path equally befal the most useful and most mischievous projects. When the greatest possible freedom is given to popular suffrage, and even when no corrupt influ- ence is used, the popular employment of wealth, being of all species of merit that of which people in general are best qualified to judge, and most disposed to esteem, there naturally exists an aristocracy of wealth. Is it desirable that this aristocracy should be rendered necessary and complete ? [ 193 1 CHAPTER XI. OF TRUST AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT. The capacity of the individuals to discharge the duties required of them having been ascertained, and the most intimate connection between their interest and the discharge of these duties having been estabhshed, the only desirable circumstance remaining is, to reduce the amount of the emolu- ments to be paid for the discharge of these duties to the lowest term. Suppose the amount expended in the purchase of a given service to be a certain sum, and that an individual equally capable of rendering this service, should offer to render it at jess expense, is there any good reason for refusing such an offer? 1 can discover none. The accept- ance of such a proposition is the acceptance of a contract ; the service thus agreed to be per- formed, is said to be contracted for, or let to farm. To this method, the mode of obtaining services by employing commissioners and managers, is op- posed. General reasonings upon this subject are insuffi- cient to determine which of these two opposite systems will be most advantageous in any particu- lar department : the nature of the service must be ascertained before the question can be decided. If we confine ourselves to general principles, contracts must be preferred to commissions. Un- der the system of contracts, the interests about which the individual is employed are his own ; whilst, under the system of commissions, the in- terests about which he is employed remain the 13 194 B.II. Cii.XI.— OF TRUST AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT, interests of the state, that is, the interests of another. In the first case, the sub-functionaries employed are the servants of .?.n individual, in the other they are the servants of the public — fellow- servants of those who are to watch over them. " But the servants of the most negligent master," says Adam Smith, " are better superintended than the servants of the most vigilant sovereign." If this cannot be admitted as an infallible rule, it is at least more frequently true than otherwise. Public opinion is, however, but little favourable to the system of contracts. The savings which result to the state are forgotten, whilst the profits reaped by the farmers are recollected and exagge- rated. Upon this subject the ignorant and the ])hilosopher, those who judge without thought, and those who pretend to have examined the subject, are nearly agreed. The objections which they bring forward against contractors (for they relate to individuals rather than to the system) are suffici- ently specious. I. The contractors are ricli. Iftlieyare so, this is not the fault of the system, but of the conditions of the bargain made with them. II. The contractors are ostentations and vain. And if they burst with vanity, what then ? Such in- appreciable, or rather imaginary evils, cannot be brought into political calculations. Their vanity will find a sufiicient counterpoise and punish- ment in the vanity of those whom they incommode, whilst their ostentation will distribute their wealth among those whom it employs. III. The contractors excite envy. This is the fault of those who are envious, and not of the con- tractors : it is another imaginary evil, in opposi- tion to which may be placed the pleasure of detrac- tion. Besides, if the contracts are open to all. n. II. Cn.XI.— OF TRUST AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT. 195 unless improvident bargains are made through favour, corruption, or ignorance, rapid fortunes will not often be accumulated by contractors. Should they siill become rich, it will be because they have deserved it. IV. Contractors never Jind the laws too severe to insure the collection of the taxes for which they have contracted. They will procure severe and sanguinary laws to be enacted. If the laws are severe and san- guinary, the legisla-ture is in fault, and not the con- tractors. Whether the taxes are managed by con- tractors or commissioners, it is equally proper that the most efficacious system of laws, for their col- lection, should be established ; and certainly se- vere and sanguinary laws are not the most effica- cious. Contractors, therefore, are not likely to seek the enactment of the most severe laws: there are many reasons for supposing the contrary will be the case. The better the law is executed, that is to say, the more certainly punishment follows the transgression of the law, the less severe need it be. But under the inspection of the contractor, who has so strong an interest in its execution, the law has abetter chance of being put in execution, than when under the inspection of a commissioner who has so little, if any, interest in the matter. Upon this point it is impossible to imagine by what means two interests can be more intimately con- nected, than those of the contractor and the state. It is the interest of the contractor that all who illegally evade the payment of the taxes should be punished: this, also, is the interest of the state. But it can never be the interest of the contractor to punish the innocent: this would tend to excite the whole people against him : of every species of injustice, this is one which is least likely to meet with tranquil and acquiescent spectators. 13. 1 96 B. II. Ch. XL— OF TRUST AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT. Adam Smith, who has adopted all these objec* tions, little calculated as they seem to me to ap- pear in such a work as his, also contends that " the best and most frugal way of levying a tax, can never be by farm.*" If this were true, it would be a conclusive reason against ever letting taxes to farm, and it would be useless to seek for others. When a fact is proved, it is useless to trouble one- self with prejudices and probabilities. It is true, without the hope of gain, no contrac- tor would undertake to collect the produce of a tax, and to make the advances required. But from whence ought the profit of the farmer to arise ? This is what Adam Smith has not examined: he supposes that the state would make the same pro- fit, by establishing an administration under their own inspection. The truth of this supposition is altogether doubtful. The personal interest of a minister is to have as many individuals, that is to say, as many dependants, employed under him as possible, that their salaries should be as large as possible; and he will lose nothing by their negli- gence. The interest of the farmer, or contractor, is to have as few individuals employed under him as possible, and to pay each one no more than he deserves; and he will lose by every instance of their negligence. In these circumstances, though no srreater amount should be received from the people than would have been collected by the state, a contractor might reasonably hope to find a source of profit. Adam Smith has attacked, with as much force as reason, the popular prejudices against the dealers in corn, so odious and so much suspected under the name of forestallers. He has shewn that the * Wealth of Nations, b. v. ch. 2. B. II. Ch.XI.— OF TRUST AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT. 197 interest of the public is most intimately connected with the natural, and almost necessary interests of this suspected class of merchants. He might with equal justice have extended his protection to far- mers of the public revenue, a class of men nearly as little beloved. In every branch of politics, and especially in so wide a field as his subject embraced, it was nearly impossible that he should examine every thing with his owrreyes. It was almost of neces- sity that he was sometimes guided by general opi- nion: this seems to me to have happened upon this occasion. He forgot in this instance to apply the principle already cited, and of which he had elsewhere made such beautiful applications. 1 had myself once written an essay against farmers of the revenue ; I have thrown it into the fire, for which alone it was fit. 1 know not how long I should have retained the opinions it advocated, had I not been better instructed by Adam Smith. Note. — In Burgoyne's " Picture of Spain/' vol. ii. page 4, &c. it is stated, that in that country Trust was found more economical than Contract management. But he does not state in what manner contracts were granted : whether favour or corruption did not preside at their disposal ; whether the trust management had not superior means of enforcing the payment of the taxes ; nor whether their increased produce was not, in part at least, owing to the increase of trade and. wealth. [ 1!)N ] CHAPTEli Xil. OF REFORMS, The emoluments annexed to any office being shown to be in excess, and the mischiefs resulting from such excess being ascertained, the next question which occurs is, What remedy ought to be applied ? The most obvious answer is a short one: strike them off at once. But thus unquali- fied, this answer is far from being the proper one. Reform is the practical conclusion expected as the reward for all the labour bestowed on the examination of these theoretic propositions. Upon this subject, nothing further remains but to point out one limitation, without which every reform can only be a greater abuse than the whole of those which it pretends to correct. This limita- tion is, tJiat no reform ought to be carried into effect without granting complete indemnity to those whose emoluments are diminished^ or whose offices are suppressed. In a word, that the only legiti- mate benefit to be derived by the public from economical reform, consists in the conversion of perpetual into life annuities. * Will it be said, that the immediate suppres- sion of these offices would be a gain to the public ? This would be a mere sophism. The sum in question would, without doubt, be gained by the public, if it came from abroad, if it were obtained by commerce, &c. but it is not gained when it is taken from individuals who form a part of that same public. Would a family be richer, because the father disinherited one of his children B, II. Cii, XII.— OF RliFUIlMS. 199 that he might the more richly endow the oth^r*^ ? In this instance, as the disinheriting of one cliiUI would increase the inheritance of the oth^-rs, the mischief would not be without some countervail- ing advantage; it would be productive of good to some part of the family. But when it relates to the public, the emoluments of a suppressed place being divided amongst the whole community, the gain being distributed among a multitude, is divided into impalpable quantities; whilst the loss, being confined to one, is felt in its entirety by him who supports it alone. The result of the operation is in no respect to enrich the party who gains, whilst it reduces the party who loses to poverty. Instead of one place suppressed, sup- pose a thousand, or ten thousand, or a hundred thousand, the total disadvantage will remain the same : the plunder taken from thousands will have to be distributed among millions ; your public places will be filled with unfortunate citi- zens whom you will have plunged into indigence, whilst you will scarcely see one individual who is sensibly enriched in consequence of all these cruel operations. The groans of sorrow and the cries of despair will resound on every side; the shouts of joy, if any such are heard, will not be the expressions of happiness, but of that male- volence which rejoices in the agony of its victims. By what means do individuals deceive them- selves and others into the sanction of such mis- chievous acts ? It is by having recourse to cer- tain vague maxims, consisting of a mixture of truth and falsehood, and which give to a question, in itself simple, an appearance of deep and mys- terious policy. The interest of individuals, it is 200 B.II. Ch.XII.— OF REFORMS. said, must give way to the public interest. But what does this mean ? Is not one individual as much a part of the public as any other ? This public interest, which is thus personified, is only an abstract term ; it only represents the aggregate of individual interests. They must all be taken into the account, instead of considering a part as the whole, and the rest as nothing. If it were proper to sacrifice the fortune of one individual to augment that of the others, it would be still more desirable to sacrifice a second and a third, and so on to any greater number, without the possibility of assigning limits to the operation ; since, what- ever number may have been sacrificed, there still remains the same reason for adding one more, la a word, the interest of the first is sacred, or the interest of no one can be so. " The interests of individuals are the only real interests. Take care of individuals, never molest them, never suffer them to be molested, and you have done enough for the public. "Among the multiplicity of human affairs, indi- viduals have often been injured by the operation of particular laws, without daring to complain, or without being able to obtain a hearing for their complaints, on account of this vague and false notion, that the interest of individuals ought to give way to the public interest. Considered as a question of generosity, by whom ought this virtue to be displayed ? By all towards one, or by one towards all ? Which then is the most selfish, he who would preserve what he already possesses, or he who would seize, even by force, what belongs to another? " An evil felt, and a good unfelt, — such is the result of those magnificent reforms, in which the B. II. Cn. XII.— OF REFORMS. 201 interests of individuals are sacrificed to those of the public."* The principles here laid down, it may be said, are applicable to offices and pensions held/or lij'e^ but not to offices and pensions held during plea- sure ; and which consequently may be revoked at any time. May not these be reformed at any time? No: the difference between the two is only verbal ; — in all those cases in which it has been customary for-those places, which are granted during pleasure^ to be held for life, though the possessor may have been led to expect other causes of removal, he has never expected this. " My superior," he has said to himself, " may dismiss me, I know ; but I flatter myself I shall never deserve to be dismissed ; I shall, therefore, retain my office for life." Hence the dismission of such an individual, without indemnity, is as great an evil, as much unforeseen, and equally unjust, as in the former case. To these reasons, arising from justice and hu- manity, may be added a prudential consideration. By such indemnification, the interests of indivi- duals and the public are reconciled, and a better chance of securing the latter is obtained. Assure those who are interested that they shall not be in- jured, they will be among the foremost in facilitat- ing reforms. By thus removing the grand obstacle of contrary interests, the politician prevents those clandestine intrigues, and private solicitations, which so often arrest the progress of the noblest plans. It was thus that Leopold, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, proceeded: — " Notwithstanding the mul- * This passage is extracted from Mr. Bentham's work^ Traites des Legislation, tome i. partic i. ch. 15. Ed. IS'20. 202 B. II. Ch. XII.— OF REFORMS. titude of reforms introduced by his royal highness since his accession to the throne, there has not been a single office reformed inTuscany, the holder of which has not either been placed in some other office {equal to that suppressed^ must be understood) or who has not received as a pension a salary equal in value to the emoluments of his office."* Upon such conditions, the pleasure of reform is pure : nothing is hazarded ; good only is accomplished ; at least the principal object is secured, and the happiness of no one is interrupted. * " Indication Sommaire des Reglemens de Leopold, Grand Due de Toscane." Bruxelles^ 1775. RATIONALE OF REWARD. BOOK III. REWARD APPLIED TO ART AND SCIENCE. CHAPTER I. ART AND SCIENCE DIVISIONS. A CLOUD of perplexity, raised by indistinct and erroneous conceptions, seems at all times to have been hanging over the import of the terms art and science. The common supposition seems to have been, that in the vj\\o\e.Jield of thought 3.ud action, a determinate number of existing compartments are assignable, marked out all round, and distin- guished from one another by so many sets of natu- ral and determinate boundary lines : that of these compartments some are filled, each by an art, without any mixture of science; others by a sci- ence, without any mixture of art ; and others, again, are so constituted that, as it has never hap- pened to them hitherto, so neither can it ever happen to them in future, to contain in them any thinsf either of art or science. This supposition will, it is believed, be found in every part erroneous ; as between art and science, in the whole field of thought and action, no one 204 B. III. ch. I.— apxT and science-divisions. spot will be found belonging to either to the ex- clusion of the other. In whatsoever spot a portion of either is found, a portion of the other may be also seen ; whatsoever spot is occupied by either, is occupied by both : is occupied by them in joint tenancy. Whatsoever spot is thus occupied, is so much taken out o^ the waste; and there is not any determinate part of the whole waste which is not liable to be thus occupied. Practice, in proportion as attention and exertion are regarded as necessary to due performance^ is termed art. Knowledge, in proportion as attention and exertion are regarded as necessary to attain- ment, is termed science. In the very nature of the case, they will be found so combined as to be inseparable. Man cannot do anything well, but in proportion as he knows how to do it : he cannot, in consequence of attention and exertion, know anything but in proportion as he has practised the art of learning it.,.^ Correspondent therefore to every art, there is nt least one branch o^ science ; correspondent to every branch o{ science, there is at least one branch of art. There is no determinate line of distinc- tion between art, on the one hand, and science on the other ; no determinate line of distinction be- tween art and science, on the one hand, and unar- tijicial practice and unscientific knowledge, on the other. In proportion as that which is seen to be done, is more conspicuous than that which is seen or supposed to be known: that which has place is apt to be considered as the work of art: in pro- portion as that which is seen or supposed to be known is more conspicuous than anything else that is seen to be done, that which has place is apt to be set down to the account of sc/ewcc. Day by day, acting in conjunction, art and science are B. III. Ch. I.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIVISIONS. 205 gaining upon the above-mentioned waste — the field of imartificial practice and unscientijic knoifledge* Taken collectively, and considered in their con- nection w^ith the happiness of society, the arts and sciences may be arranged in two divisions, viz. 1. Those of amusement and curiosity ; 2. Those of utility, immediate and remote. These two branches of human knowledge require different methods of treatment on the part of governments. By arts and sciences of amusement, 1 mean those which are ordinarily called the Jine arts ; such as music, poetry, painting, sculpture, archi- tecture, ornamental gardening, &c. &c. Their complete enumeration must be excused : it would lead us too far from our present subject, were we to plunge into the metaphysical discussions neces- sary for its accomplishment. Amusements of all sorts would be comprised under this head. Custom has, in a manner, compelled us to make the distinction between the arts and sciences of amusement, and those of curiosity. It is not how- ever proper to regard the former as destitute of utility ; on the contrary, there is nothing, the utility of which is more incontestible. To what shall the character of utility be ascribed, if not to that which is a source of pleasure ? All that can be alleged in diminution of their utility is, that it is limited to the excitement of pleasure : they cannot disperse the clouds of grief or of misfortune. They are useless to those who are not pleased with them : they are useful only to those who take pleasure in them, and only in proportion as they are pleased. By arts and sciences of curiosity, I mean those * The foregoing paragraphs are extracted from Mr. Ben- tham's " Chrestomathia^" part i. p. 508, 20G B.Ill. Ch.I.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIVISIONS. which in truth are pleasing, but not in the same degree as the fine arts, and to which at the first glance we might be tempted to refuse this quahty. It is not that these arts and sciences of curiosity do not yield as much pleasure to those who cultivate them as the fine arts ; but the number of those who study them is more limited. Of this nature are the sciences of heraldry, of medals, of pure chronology, the knowledge of ancient and barba- rous languages, which present only collections of strange words, and the study of antiquities, inas- much as they furnish no instruction applicable to morality, or any other branch of useful or agreeable knowledge. The utility of all these arts and sciences, — I speak both of those of amusement and curiosity, — the value which they possess, is exactly in proportion to the pleasure they yield. Every other species of pre- eminence which may be attempted to be established among them is altogether fanciful. Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetr\^ If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either. Everybody can play at push- pin : poetry and music are relished only by a few. The game of push-pin is always innocent : it were well could the same be always asserted of poetry. Indeed, between poetry and truth there is a natural opposition : false morals, fictitious nature : the poet always stands in need of something false. When he pretends to lay his foundations in truth, the ornaments of his superstructure are fictions; his business consists in stimulating our passions, and exciting our prejudices. Truth, exactitude of every kind, is fatal to poetry. The poet must see everything through coloured media, and strive to make every one else to do the same. It is true. B.iii. qll—art and science— divisions. 207 there have been noble spirits, to whom poetry and philosophy have been equally indebted, but these exceptions do not remove the mischiefs which have resulted from this magic art. If poetry and music deserve to be preferred before a game of push-pin, it must be because they are calculated to gratify those individuals who are most difficult to be pleased. All the arts and sciences, without exception, inasmuch as they constitute innocent employments, at least of time, possess a species of moral utility, neither the less real or important, because it is frequently unobserved. They compete with, and occupy the place of those mischievous and dan- gerous passions and employments, to which want of occupation and ennui give birth. They are excellent substitutes for drunkenness, slander, and the love of gaming.* The effects of idleness upon the ancient Germans maybe seen in Tacitus : his observations are ap- plicable to all uncivilized nations : for want of other occupations they waged war upon each other: it was a more animated amusement than that of the chase. The chieftain who proposed a martial ex- pedition, at the first sound of his trumpet ranged under his banners a crowd of idlers, to whom peace was a condition of restraint, of languor, and of ennui. Glory could be reaped only in one field : opulence knew but one luxury. This field was that of battle ; this luxury that of conquering or recounting past conquests. Their women them- selves, ignorant of those agreeable arts which mul- tiply the means of pleasing, and prolong the empire of beauty, became the rivals of the men in courage. * Traites de Legislation, torn. u. i^artle 4. (Ed. IS'iO.) "Des moyens indirects de prevenir les dclits." 208 B. ni. ch. I.— art and science-divisions. and, mingling with them in the barbarous tumult of a military life, became unfeeling as they. It is to the cultivation of the arts and sciences that we must, in great measure, ascribe the exist- ence of that party which is now opposed to war : it has received its birth amid the occupations and pleasures furnished by the fine arts. These arts, so to speak, have enrolled under their peace- ful banners that army of idlers which would have otherwise possessed no amusement but in the hazardous and bloody game of war. Such is the species of utility which belongs in- discriminately to all the arts and sciences. Were it the only reason, it would be a sufficient reason for desiring to see them flourish and receive the most extended diffusion. If these principles are correct, we shall know how to estimate those critics, more ingenious than useful, who, under pretence of purifying the public taste, endeavour successively to deprive mankind of a larger or smaller part of the sources of their amusement. These modest judges of elegance and taste consider themselves as benefactors to the human race, whilst they are really only the inter- rupters of their pleasure — a sort of importunate hosts, who place themselves at the table to dimi- nish, by their pretended delicacy, the appetite of their guests. It is only from custom and preju- dice that, in matters of taste, we speak of false and true. There is no taste which deserves the epithet good^ unless it be the taste for such employments which, to the pleasure actually produced by them, conjoin some contingent or future utility : there is no taste which deserves to be characterized as bad, unless it be a taste for some occupation which has a mischievous tendency. The celebrated and ingenious Addison has dis- B. III. ch. I.— art and science-djvisions. 209 tinguished himself by his skill in the art of ridi- culing enjoyments, by attaching to them the fan- tastic idea of bad taste. In the Spectator he wages relentless war against the whole generation of false wits. Acrostics, conundrums, pantomimes, puppet-shows, bouts-rimes, stanzas in the shape of eggs, of wings, burlesque poetry of every descrip- tion; in a word, a thousand other light and equally innocent amusements fall crushed under the strokes of his club. And, proud of having established his empire above the ruins of these literary trifles, he regards himself as the legislator of Parnassus ! What, however, was the effect of his new laws ? They deprived those who submitted to them of many sources of pleasure ; they exposed those who were more inflexible, to the contempt of their companions. Even Hume himself, in spite of his proud and independent philosophy, has yielded to this literary prejudice. *' By a single piece," says he, " the Duke of Buckingham rendered a great service to his age, and was the reformer of its taste!" In what consisted this important service ? He had written a comedy, I'lie Rehearsal, the object of which was to render those theatrical pieces, which had been most popular, the objects of general dis- taste. His satire was completely successful ; but what was its fruit ? The lovers of that species of amusement were deprived of so much pleasure; a multitude of authors, covered with ridicule and contempt, deplored, at the same time, the loss of their reputaion and their bread. As the amusement of a minister of state, it must be confessed, that a more suitable one might be found than a game at solitaire. Still, among the number of its amateurs was once found Potemkin, one of the most active and respected Russian 14 210 B. III. Cii.I.—ART AND SCIENCE— DIVISIONS. ministers of state. I see a smile of contempt upon tlie lips of many of my readers, who would not think it strange that any one should play at cards from " eve till morn," provided it were in company. But, how incomparably superior is this solitary game to many social games ; so often anti-social in their consequences ! Thefirst, a pure and simple amusement, stripped of everything injurious, free from passion, avarice, loss, and regret. It is gaming enjoyed by some happy individuals, in that state in which legislators may desire, but cannot hope that it will ever be enjoyed by all throughout the whole world. How much better was this minister occupied, than if, with the Iliad in his hand, he had stirred up within his heart the seeds of those ferocious passions which can only be gratified with tears and blood. As men grow old, they lose their relish for the simple amusements of childhood. Is this a reason for pride? It may be so; when to be hard to please, and to have our happiness dependant on what is costly and complicated, shall be found to be advantageous. The child who is building houses of cards is happier than was Louis XIV. when building Versailles. Architect and mason at once, master of his situation and his materials, he alters and overturns at will. Diruit, edificatj mutat quadrata rotundis. And all this at the expense neither of groans nor money. The proverbial expression of the games of princes^ may furnish us with strong reasons for regretting that princes should ever cease to love the games of children. A reward was offered by one of the Roman emperors to whoever would invent a new pleasure; and because this emperor was called Nero, or Cali- gula, it has been imputed to him as a crime : as if B. HI. Ch. I.— art and SC7ENCE— divisions. '21 1 every sovereign, and even every private individual, who encourages the cultivation of the arts and sciences, were not an accomplice m this crime. The employment of those critics, to whom we have before referred, tends to diminish the existing stock of our pleasures : the natural effect of increasing years, is to render us insensible to those which re- main : by those who blame the offer of the Roman emperor, these critics should be esteemed the be- nefactors of mankind, and old age the perfection of human liTe. In league with these critics are the tribe of sati- rists ; those generous men, who without other reward than the pleasure of humbling and dis- figuring everything which does not please them, have constituted themselves reformers of man- kind ! The only satire I could read, without disgust and aversion, would be a satire on these libellers themselves. Their occupation consists in fo- menting scandal, and in disseminating its poisons throughout the world, that they may be furnished with pretexts for pouring contempt upon every- thing that employs or interests other men. By blackening everything, and exaggerating every- thing (for it is by exaggeration they exist) they deceive the judgments of their readers : — innocent amusements, ludicrous eccentricities, venial trans- gressions and crimes, are alike confounded and covered with their venom. Their design is to efface all the lines of demarcation, all the essential distinctions which philosophy and legislation have with so much labour traced. For one truth, we find a thousand odious hyperboles in their works. Thev never cease to excite malevolence and anti- pathy : under their auspices, or at least under the influence of the passions which animate them, language itself becomes satirical. Neutral expres- 14. 212 B. III. Ch.I.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIVISIONS. sions can scarcely be found to designate the motives which determine human actions : to the words ex- pressive of the motive, such as avarice^ ambition, pride, idlenesr., and many others, the idea of dis- approbation is so closely, though unnecessarily, connected, that the simple mention of the motive implies a censure, even when the actions which have resulted from it have been most innocent. The nomenclature of morals is so tinctured with these prejudices, that it is not possible, without great difiiculty and long circumlocutions, simply and purely, without reprobation or approbation, to express the motives by which mankind are go- verned. Hence our languages, rich in terms of hatred and reproach, are poor and rugged for the purposes of science and of reason. Such is the evil created and augmented by satiric writers.* Among rich and prosperous nations, it is not necessary that the public should be at the expense of cultivating the arts and sciences of amusement and curiosity. Indivdiuals will always bestow upon these that portion of reward which is pro- portioned to the pleasure they bestow. Whilst, as to the arts and sciences of immediate and those of more remote utility, it would not be necessary, nor perhaps possible, to preserve be- tween these two classes an exact line of demarca- tion. The distinctions of theory and practice are equally applicable to all. Considered as matter of theory, every art or science, even when its prac- tical utility is most immediate and incontestable, appears to retire into the division of arts and sciences of remote utility. It is thus that medi- cine and legislation, these arts so practical, consi- * See further on this subject in Mr. Bentham's " Table of Springs of Action." B.III. Ch.I— ART AND SCIENCE— DIVISIONS. 213 dered under a particular aspect, appear equally remote in respect to their utility with the specu- lative sciences of logic and mathematics. On the other hand, there is a branch of science for which, at first, a place would scarcely have been found) among the arts and sciences of curiosity, but which- cultivated by industrious hands, has at length pre- sented the characters of immediate and incontes- table utility. Electricity, which, when first diso covered, seemed destined only to amuse certai philosophers by the singularity of its phenomena has at length been employed with most striking success in the service of medicine, and in the pro- tection of our dwellings against those calamities, for which ignorant and affrighted antiquity could find no sufficient cause, but the special anger of the gods. That which governments ought to do for the arts and sciences of immediate and remote utility, may be comprised in three things — I. To remove the discouragements under which they labour; 2. To favour their advancement; 3. To contribute to their diffusion. [ 214 j CHAPTER II. ART AND SCIENCE — ADVANCEMENT. Though discoveries in science may be the re- sult of genius or accident, and though the most important discoveries may have been made by individuals without public assistance, the progress of such discoveries may at all times be materially accelerated by a proper application of public en- couragement. The most simple and efficacious method of encouraging investigations of pure theory^ the first step in the career of invention, consists in the appropriation of specific funds to the researches requisite in each particular science. It may, at first sight, appear superfluous to re- commend such a measure as this, since there are few states which have not sometimes made such ap- propriations, and since all governments, in propor- tion as they have become enlightened, have been more and more disposed to reckon such expenses necessary. The most eificacious methods of em- ploying the large funds which ought thus to be appropriated, remain, however, to be examined. It would be necessary that the funds applicable to a given science, chemistry for example, should be confided to the students of chemistry themselves. They ought, however, to be bestowed in the shape of reward. Thus the chemist, who upon a given subject should have produced the best theoretic dissertation, might be put into possession of these funds, upon condition that he should employ them in makins: the experiments which he had pointed out. What more natural or useful re- B.lll. Cm, II.— ART AND SCIENCE— ADVANCEMENT- 215 ward could be conferred upon a philosopher, than thus to be enabled, with honour to himself, to satisfy a taste or a passion which the insufficiency of his own fortune would have rendered rather a torment than a pleasure ? His talents are rewarded, by giving him new means of increasing them. Other rewards often have a contrary effect, they tend to distract his attention, and to give birth to opposite tastes. Ifthis method of encouraging theoretic researches has been neglected, it has been because the inti- mate connection between the sciences and arts, between theory and practice, has only been well understood by philosophers themselves ; the greater number of men recognise the utility of the sciences only at a moment when they are applied to imme- diate use. The ignorant are always desirous of humbling the wise; gratifying their self love, by accusing the sciences of being more curious than useful. " All your books of natural history are very pretty," said a lady to a philosopher, " but you have never saved a single leaf of our trees from the teeth of the insects." Such is the frivolous judgment of the ignorant. There are many disco- veries which, though at first they might seem use- ^ less in themselves, have given birth to thousands of others of the greatest utility. It is in conduct- ing the sciences to this point, that encouragements might thus be advantageously employed, instead of beingbestowed in whatare generally called rewards. When the discoveries of science can be practically employed in the increase of the mass of general wealth, they receive a reward naturally propor- tioned to their utility: it is therefore for such dis- coveries as are not thus immediately applicable, that reward is most necessary. Of this nature are most of the discoveries of chemistry. Is a new 216 B. III. ch. II.— art and science— advancement. earth discovered ? a new air ? a new salt ? a new metal ? the utility of the discovery is at first confined to the pleasure experienced by those interested in such researches. This ordinarilv is all the benefit reaped by the discoverer: occu- pied in making fuither discoveries, he leaves it to others to reap their fruits. It is those who follow him who apply them to the purposes of art, and levy contributions upon the individuals, who are desirous ofenjoying the fruits of his labour. Ought the master workman, who sees no particular individual upon whom he may levy a contribution, therefore to go without reward. [ 217 ] CHAPTER III. ARTS AND SCIENCE DIFFUSION. The sciences, like plants, may expand in two directions ; in superficies and in height. The su- perficial expansion of those sciences which are most immediately useful, is most to be desired. There is no method more calculated to accelerate their advancement, than their general diffusion : the greater the number of those by whom they are cultivated, the greater the probability that they will be enriched by new discoveries. Fewer opportu- nities will be lost, and greater emulation will be excited in their cultivation. Suppose a country divided into districts, some- what similar to the English counties, but more equal in size, say from thirty to forty miles in dia- meter, the following is the system of establish- ments which ought to be kept up in the central town of each district. 1. A professor of medicine, 2. A professor of surgery and midwifery. 3. An hospital. 4. A professor of the veterinary art. 6. A professor of chemistry. 6. A professor of mechanical and experimental philosophy. 7. A professor of botany and experimental hor- ticulture. 8. A professor of the other branches of natural history. 9. An experimental farm. The first advantage resulting from this plan 218 B.lll. Ch. III.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. would be the establishment, in each district, of a practitioner, skilled in the various branches of the art of healing. An hospital, necessary in itself, would also be further useful, by serving as a school for the students of this art. The veterinary art, or the art of healing as ap- plied to animals, has only w^ithin these few years been separately studied in England. The farriers, who formerly practised upon our cattle, were ge- nerally no better qualified for their duty, than the old women whom our ancestors allowed to practice upon themselves. The establishment of a professor of the veterinary art in every district, might even be recommended as a matter of economy : the value of the cattle preserved would more than coun- terbalance the necessary expense. This professor- ship might, for want of sufficient funds, be united to one of the others. The connections of chemistry with domestic and manufacturing economy are well known. The professor of this science would of course direct his principal attention to the carrying this prac- tical part to its greatest perfection. His lec- tures would treat of the business of the dairy; the preservation of corn and other agricultural produc- tions ; the preservation of provisions of all sorts ; the prevention of putrefaction, that subtle enemy of health as well as of corruptible wealth ; the pro- per precautions for guarding against poisons of all sorts, which may so easily be mingled with our pro- visions, or which may be collected from the vessels in which they are prepared. They would also treat of the various branches of trade : of the arts of working in metal, of breweries, of the prepara- tion of leather, and the manufactures of soap and candles, &c. &c. Botany, to a certain degree, is necessary in the B.III. Cii.lII.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. 219 science of medicine: it supplies a considerable part of the materials employed. It has a similar con- nection with chemistry, and the arts which depend upon it. The combined researches of the botanist and chemist would increase our know- ledge of the various uses to which vegetable sub- stances might be applied. It is to them that we must look for the discovery of cheaper and better methods, if such methods are to be found : of giving durability and tenacity to hemp and flax for the manufacture of linens, ropes, and paper; for discoveries respecting the astringent matters applicable to the preparation of leather ; and for the invention of new dyes, &c. and so on, to infi- nity. Indeed, it is the botanist who must enable the agriculturist to distinguish the most useful and excellent herbs and grasses, from those which are less useful and pernicious. The professor of natural history would also furnish abundance not only of curious but useful information. He would teach the cultivator to distinguish throughout all the departments of the animal kingdom his allies from his enemies. He would point out the habits and the different shapes assumed by different insects, and the most efficacious methods of destroying them and pre- venting their ravages. It might, however, per- haps appear, were we fully acquainted with the history of all the animals which dwell with us upon the surface of this planet, that there would be found none whose existence was to us a mat- ter of indifference. I have placed in the last rank the institution of an experimental farm ; not because its utility would be inferior to all the others, but because its functions may be easily supplied by individual industry. In a country so well rej)lenished with 220 B.III. Ch. III.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. knowledge, wealth, and zeal, as England, there is no district which could not furnish an abundance of experiments in this dejDartment. Little more would be necessary than to provide a register into which they might be collected, and in which they might receive the degree of publicity neces- sary for displaying their utility. Such a register England once possessed in the work of the enlightened and patriotic Arthur Young. Such a register, however numerous and excellent as the hints dispersed throughout it were, was far from supplying the place, and rendering useless a system of regular and connected researches in which instruction should constitute the sole object.* In enumerating the branches of knowledge with ■which, on account of their superior utility, it is most desirable that the great mass of the people should be acquainted, it may well be supposed that I ought not to forget the knowledge of the laws. But that this knowledge may be diffused, a determinate system of cognoscible laws, capable of being known, is necessary. Unhappily, such a system does not yet exist: whenever it shall come to be established, the knowledge of the laws will hardly be considered worthy of the name of science. The legislator who allows more intelli- gible terms to exist within the compass of lan- guage, than those in which he expresses his laws, deserves the execration of his fellow men. I have endeavoured to present to the world the outlines of a system, j* which should it ever be * The Board of Agriculture, which, at the solicitation of Sir John Sinclair, was formed during the administration of Mr. Pitt, was designed to carry purposes similar to those recom- mended above into effect. t See An Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation. E.III. C'H.ril.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. 221 filled up, I flatter myself would render the whole system of laws cognoscible and intelligible to all. As to those arts and sciences which may be learned from books, such as the arts of legislation, history in all its branches, moral philosophy and logic, comprehending metaphysics, grammar, and rhetoric, — these may be left to be gathered from books. Those individuals who are desirous of al- leviating the pains of study, by the charms of de- clamation upon these subjects, may be permitted to pay for their amusements. There is however one branch of encouragement which the hand of government might extend even to these studies. It might establish in each district in which the lectures, of which we have already spoken, should be delivered, an increasing library, appropriated to these studies. This would be at once to bestow upon students the instruments of study, and upon authors their most appro])riate reward. I should not consider knowledge in these de- partments, at once so useful and so curious, ill acquired, were it even acquired at the expense of Latin and Greek, an acquaintance with which is held in such high estimation in our days, and for instruction in which the foundations are so abun- dant. Common opinion appears to have consi- dered the sciences more difficult of attainment than these dead languages. This opinion is only a pre- judice arising from the comparatively small number of individuals who apply themselves to the study of the sciences, and from its not having been the custom to study them till the labour of these other studies has been completed. But, custom and pre- judice apart, it is in the study of the sciences that young people would find most pleasure and fewest difficulties. In this career, ideas find easy access through the senses to the memory and the other 222 B.III. Cn.in.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. intellectual faculties. Curiosity, that passion which even in infancy displays so much energy, would here be continually gratified. In the study of language, on the contrary, all is abstraction; there are no sensible objects to relieve the memory ; all the energy of the mind is consumed in the ac- quisition of words, of which neither the utility nor the application is visible. Hence, the longest and most detailed course of instruction which need be given upon all the sciences before mentioned, would not together occupy so much time as is usually devoted to the study of Latin, which is forgotten almost as soon as learned. The know- ledge of languages is valuable only as a means of acquiring the information which may be obtained from conversation or books. For the purposes of conversation, the dead languages are useless, and translations of all the books contained in them may be found in all the languages of modern Europe. What then remains to be obtained from them, not by the common people, but even by the most in- structed ? I must confess, I can discover nothing but a fund of allusions wherewith to ornament their speeches, their conversations, and their books : too small a compensation for the false and narrow notions which custom continues to compel us to draw up from these imperfect and deceptive sources. To prefer the study of these languages to the study of those useful truths which the more mature industry of the moderns has placed in their stead, is to make a dwelling-place of a scaffolding, instead of employing it in the erection of a build- ing : it is as though, in his mature age, a man should continue to prattle like a child. Let those who are pleased with these studies continue to amuse themselves ; but let us cease to torment children with them, at least those children who B. III. Cii. III.— AFIT AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. 223 will have to provide for their ovvn subsistence, till such time as we have supplied them with the means of slaking their thirst for knowledge at those springs where pleasure is combined with immediate and incontestable utility. It is especially by a complete course of instruc- tion that the clergy, who might be rendered so useful, ought to be prepared for their functions. Within the narrow limits of every parish, there would then be found one man at least well in- structed upon all subjects with which acquain- tance is most desirable. In exchange for this know- ledge which constitutes the glory of man, 1 would exchange as much as might be desired of that con- troversy which is his scourge and his disgrace. The intervals between divine service on the sabbath might then be filled up by the communi- cation of knowledge to those, whose necessary avocations leave them no other leisure time for improvement. An attendance upon a course of physico-theology, it appears to me. would be a much more suitable mode of employing this time, than wasting it in that idleness and dissipation in which both health and money are so frequently lost. There are three causes which tend to strengthen an attachment to the dead languages. The first is, the utility which they formerly possessed. At the revival of letters, there was nothing to learn but Latin and Greek, and nothing could be learnt but by Latin and Greek. The period when this utility ceased having never been fixed, custom has led us to regard it as still subsisting. A second reason is, the time and trouble ex- pended by so many persons in learning them. The price of any thing is regulated not only by its utility, but also by the labour expended in pro- 224 B. III. Ch.III.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSIO N. curing it. Few would be willing to acknowledge that they had spent a large portion of their life in learning that, which when learnt was not worth knowing. There are many individuals who have learnt Latin and Greek, but have learned nothing else. Can it be expected that they should ac- knowledge these languages are useless ? As well might a knight-errant have been expected to ac- knowledge that his mistress was ugly ! The third cause is, their reputed necessity. This necessity, though purely conventional, is not * " En effet, la plupart de ces savans ne sentent plus les choses en elles-m6mes. lis sont comme ces imaginations faibles, qui, subjuguees par recl&,t des dignites et des richesses, admirent dans la bouche d'un grand ce qu'ils trouveraient pitoyable dans celle d'un homnie du commun. Ainsi, I'ancienne reputation et les langues savantes leur imposent, et changent tout a leurs yeux. Telle pensee qu'ils entendent tous les jours en Francois sans y prendre garde, les enleve s'ils viennent k la rencontrer dans un auteur Grec. Tout pleins qu'ils en sont, ils vous la citent avec emphase ; et si vous ne partagez pas leur enthousiasme, Ah! s'ecrient-ils, si vous saviez le Grec ! II me semble entendre le heros de Cervantes, qui, parcequ'il est arme chevalier, voit des enchanteurs oti son ecuyer ne voit que des moulins. " Tel est I'inconvenient ordinaire de I'erudition, et il n'y a que les esprits du premier ordre qui puissent I'eviter. L'igno- rance, me dira-t-on, n'a-t-elle pas aussi ses inconveniens? Oui, sans doute ; mais on a tort d'appeler ignorans ceux memes qui ne sauroient ni Grec ni Latin. lis peuvent mfeme avoir acquis en Fran9ois toutes les idees necessaires pour per- fectionner leur raison, et toutes les experiences propres a assu- rer leur godt. Nous avons des philosophes, des orateurs, des poetes: nous avons m6me des traducteurs oti Ton peut puiser toutes les richesses anciennes, depouillees de I'orgueil de les avoir recueillies dans les originaux. Un homme qui, sans Grec et sans Latin, auroit mis a profit toixt ce qui s'est fait d'excel- lent dans notre langue, I'emporterait sans doute sur le savant qui, par un amour der^gle des anciens, auroit dedaign^ les ouvrages modernes.'' — La Mothe, Reflexions sur la Critique, p. 148. B.III. Ch. III.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. 225 the less real. Public opinion has attached a de- gree of importance to an acquaintance with them, and he who should be known to be entirely igno- rant of them, would be branded with disgrace. So long as this law subsists, it must be obeyed. A single individual is seldom able to withstand or change the laws established by public opinion. As the public mind becomes enlightened, these laws will change of themselves. A sovereign may, however, hasten these changes if he believe them useful, and if he consider the attempt worth the trouble. He may reward individuals for teaching the arts and sciences, and thus establish a new public opinion, which shall at first compete with, and at length ultimately subdue the previous pre- judice. He may also attain the same end by another less costly, but more startling method. He may pre- scribe an attendance upon different scientific lec- tures, as a necessary condition to the holding of certain offices, and particularly of all honorary em- ployments. To those who have completed their course of attendance, an honorary diploma may be given, which upon all occasions of public cere- mony shall entitle those who possess it to a certain precedence. In the times of feudal barbarism, when war was the only occupation of those who did not belong to the commonalty or the clergy, the upper ranks in society were necessarily military. The knight was the warrior who could afford to fight on horse- back ; the squire was one who, not being so rich as the knight, could afford to be his principal at- tendant, and this constituted their nobility. In future times, when other occupations shall be pursued and other manners established, it is possi- ble that knowledge may confer rank in Europe, as 15 226 B.III. Cn. III.— ART AND SCIENCE-DIFFUSION. the appearance of it has for a long time past in China. Wealth, independently of any convention, possesses real power, and will always nningle with everything which tends to confer respect. The philosopher, to his title of honour, will unite the idea of an individual sufficiently wealthy to have supported the expense of a learned education: Knowledge, whether true or presumptive, might thus become a mark of distinction, as the length of the nails is in China. But it may be said, that something more than attendance upon a course of scientific lectures is necessary, if anj^thing is to be learned, and that the law which should bestow honour upon attendance would not insure study. If it were necessary to have a nobility composed of real philosophers, other methods must be pursued ; but when the .object in view is merely to change the species of knowledge in which they are to be instructed, from what is useless to what is useful, what more need be required ? When interesting objects of study are substituted for those which are uninteresting, they would not study less. I know that public examinations are powerful means for exciting emulation, but 1 have no desire to place additional obstacles in the way of a plan whose novelty alone would render it but too alarm- ing : a project v/hich to many will appear ro- mantic, need not be accompanied by an accessory whose aspect is alarming, and whose utility is problematic. The most stupid and inattentive could scarcely attend upon a long course of instruction without gaining some advantage ; they would, at least, be familiarised with the terms of art, which constitute not only the first, but the greatest difficulty ; they would form some idea of the principal divi- B.III. Cii. Iir.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. 227 sions of the country they traversed ; and should they ever be desirous of directing a more par- ticular examination to any particular division, they will at least know in what direction to seek for it. As all the world would then be occupied with the study of the sciences, they would pretend thus to employ themselves, and would be ashamed to be entirely ignorant of those things which were the subjects of general conversation. Russia is an instance of the ease with which a new direction may be given to the opinions of a whole people. Nobility of birth is but little respected ; official rank is the only ground of dis* tinction. This change has been effected by a few simple regulations. Unless he is an officer, no in- dividual, how rich or nobly born soever he may be, can vote, or even sit in the assembly of the no- bility. The consequence has been, that all classes have pressed into the service of the state. If they do not intend to make it their profession, they quit it when they have attained the rank which confers this privilege. Note. — If Mr. Bentham had consented to revise his MSS. which were written more than forty years ago, he might have seen reason to alter many of his observations. In England, much has been done in the interval. Public opinion has sensibly changed respecting the value of classical learning. It is highly esteemed at college, but elsewhere it is now only considered as an accessory ; the most enlightened parents regret that it is still the only object of instruction in our puplic schools. Since the establishment of the Royal Institution, many simi- lar institutions have been foimed, and a general desire for useful knowledge has been disseminated. The ladies have dis- played a persevering ardour in their attendance on these means of instruction, so much the more praiseworthy, as it has been uniformly excited by inclination alone. Elementary worka 15. 228 B.III, Ch. III.— ART AND SCIENCE-DIFFUSION, have been multiplied ; but all this has been done by the exer- tions of individuals^ without any encouragement from the state. As to public education^ it is more easy to create than to re- form. A good institution would be the best criticism upon the bad. If two or three colleges were founded in London, suited to the wants of the more numerous classes of those who are destined to the pursuits of art, trade, or commerce, in which not Latin or Greek (almost always useless in these avocations) should be taught, but the national language, which has gene- rally been neglected, together with all those branches of know- ledge, which if not absolutely necessary, are always useful and agreeable, we should soon see these seminaries draw together a crowd of scholars, and the old colleges would be obliged to correct their system in order to maintain their ground. It may be said, that private schools may supply the defici- ency 3 but there is a great difference between public and pri- vate establisliments. Private education can only succeed by a train of happy events, whilst in public education, a multitude of circumstances are overcome. Besides, domestic education is limited to the rich, whilst public instruction is adapted to the most moderate fortunes. — Dumont. RATIONALE OF REWARD. BOOK IV. REWARD APPLIED TO PRODUCTION AND TRADE. CHAPTER I. BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH. N.B. This fourth book was not included by the author, in his plan, as a part of a treatise upon rewards. It consists, however, of the most im- portant application of the principles laid down in the former part of this work, and particularly in Book 1, ch. 15, Competition as to Rewards. It is extracted from another of Mr. Bentham's ma- nuscripts, entitled, A Manual of Political Eco- nomy ; a work, which as it respects its foun- dations and its results, is the same as Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, but from w^hich it widely differs in plan and form. The Scotch Philosopher, having to discuss a new subject which presented a controversy at every step, thought it necessary to begin with an exposition of facts. His work is principally his- torical : he has described in a most admirable manner the progress of society, from its state of ** Translated from the French of Dumont. 230 B,;1V. Cn. I.— BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH. primitive poverty to its present condition of opulence; he has traced the march of industry in its natural course, from agriculture to manufac- tures, from manufactures to commerce, and from internal to foreign commerce. In the midst of these interesting pictures, the didactic part is only incidental : he seems to have been fearful of pre- maturely forming a system. He has collected the elements of knowledge, and he has left to the fermentation of time the care of bringing them to perfection, and extracting their consequences. The object of Adam Smith allowed of a happy diversity, and he has chosen the easiest and most ornamental method of effecting it; but it is neither the shortest nor the most favourable for the purposes of instruction. His movements are not progres- sive ; he often retraces his steps : active minds reproach him with being diffuse in argumentation, and pretend that each of his chapters forms a dis- tinct treatise. Mr. Bentham has chosen a narrower and more difficult path : he has considered the subject with a reference to legislation alone, and uniformly has confined himself to the practical part. This is what the law ought to be on this point : this is what ought to be done ; and above all this ought not to be done, if it be desirable that the national prosperity should be carried to the highest possible pitch : such is his design. His progress is marked by a didactic rigour: he advances from definitions to principles, and from principles to consequences. This difHerence in design is not the only one between the two works. Mr. Bentham has sim- plified his subject, by referring everything to one principle ; namely, the limitation of production and trade bi/ the limitation of capital: a principle which brings all his reasonings into a very small circle, B.IV. Ch. I.— BI^NTIIAM AND AUAM SMITH. 231 and which serves to unite into one bundle those observations which cannot be so easily grasped when they are disunited. His is not a new dis- covery. This principle pervades, and, so to speak, is diffused throughout the whole work of Adam Smith, but is nowhere announced as a governing principle: he has never directly employed it. Had he clearly recognized it, he would have made it the centre of his system: it would have been the foundation upon which he would have erected his whole superstructure, and he would have been spared a multitude of repetitions and windings. The Manual of Mr. Bentham would not tend to supersede the necessity of reading the Wealth of Nations. The historical part of that work, in exhibiting the origin of things; in leading us to reflect upon the phenomena of society ; in taking down its machinery and exhibiting each part se- parately, lays the foundation of the science. It is thus, that the knowledge of anatomy and physi- ology ought to precede the science of medicine, properly so called. I have extracted from Mr. Bentham's Manual, those parts which belonged to my present work, and which I could not have omitted without, in some respects, leaving it incomplete. It is not, however, for the learned that this part of the work is intended : they are above these elements. The study of political economy has become com- mon and familiar, in comparison with what it was when these writings were composed. Still, how- ever, in them errors are attacked which are yet far from being completely destroyed; and which have a continual tendency to be reproduced. The pas- sions of men are continually sowing in this field briars and poisonous plants, which it is necessary continually to extirpate. This little extract, which 232 J3. IV. Ch.I.— BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH. may be read in half an hour, places in a new light the grand principles of social order, security, the free exercise of industry, the energy of the at- tractive and remuneratory motives which induce free men to labour, the comparative weakness of the motives of constraint which induce slaves to exert themselves. New arguments are fur- nished wherewith to combat national jealousies, the desire for distant establishments, and other prejudices not less mischievous. In conclusion, political economy is a science, rather than an art. There is much to be learned respecting it and little to be done. Is it inquired what ought governments to do, that wealth may be increased — the answer is,- Very little, and nothing rather than too much. What ought to be done for the increase of popula- tion ?— Nothing. In the greater number of states, the best methods of augmenting population and wealth, would consist in abolishing those laws and regulations whereby it has been sought to increase them, provided such abolition were gradually and carefully accomplished. The art therefore is reduced within a small com- pass : securitif and freedom is all that industry requires. The request which agriculture, manu- factures, and commerce presents to governments, is modest and reasonable as that which Diogenes made to Alexander: " Stand out of my sunshine." We have no need of favour, we require only a secure and open path. In connexion with this Manual, I cannot omit the opportunity of making a remark in favour of those philosophers who have particularly culti- vated the science of political economy. They have taken no part in the dissemination of those splene- tic and odious paradoxes respecting the inequality B. IV. Cii. I.— BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH. 233 i)f ranks, the progress of wealth and civilization, the enjoyments of" luxury and arts. It is they, on the contrary, who have furnished the most solid ar- guments wherewith to refute these subversive opi- nions, and wherewith to justify social order. They have replied to declamation by reasoning; to the pictures of fancy, by facts ; to conjectures, by cal- culations. They have shown that men in society have a much greater number of interests in com- mon, than of interests opposed to one another; that ignorance alone separates them ; that the more they are enlightened, the more closely they be- come united ; that there is a sensible progression among the human race towards perfection, although its march may be irregular, and its movements even sometimes retrograde. What answer so victorious to the multitude of complaints respecting the misery of the poorer classes amongst us, as the real picture of the uni- versal indigence of primitive societies ! Poverty is not a consequence of social order: why is it con- sidered as its reproach ? It is a remnant of a state of nature. Wealth has been created by man : po- verty is the condition of nature. The division of ])roperty, of labour, the invention of machines, the application of the elements to the purposes of pro- duction, have increased the powers of the human race a hundred-fold, and have in like manner aug- mented the sources of abundance, so that famine, that almost habitual scourge of savage nations, is unknown among nations moderately well governed; they have even a sufficient superfluity for the sup- port of numerous classes who consume without reproducing. To this security respecting subsist- ence, the first benefit accruing from social order, add the pleasures of gradual acquisition ; that sweet association of industry with hope, that growing in- 234 B. IV. Cn. I.— BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH. terestof life when one advances towards the object of his desires ; that charm of property, the spur of youth and pillow of old age. This system of in- dustry is at the same time the foundation of mora- lity, of reciprocal wants, of relative bonds, and of public and private virtues. The objection apparently the most specious is happily found the most false. It has been pretended, that individuals could only enrich themselves by despoiling others ; that they were necessarily ene- mies, and lived, as gladiators, only by destroying one another. Trade has been confounded with gambling, in which the gain of one is always founded upon the loss of another. But on the contrary, in a social undertaking, all the adven- turers may reap their share of advantage ; since, all other things equal, the more labour there is, the greater will be the result. The sources of wealth, if the government be not very bad, are always in- creasing ; so that the number of the successful, among the candidates for fortune, always increases, and there are not any who are necessarily unsuc- cessful. The idea of beholding in those who enrich themselves, only more daring and expert plun- derers than others, is correct as that of the mis- anthropist, who considers its criminal calendar as an account of the habitual actions of the citizens of any country. Without stopping to refute in detail such absurd exaggerations, we shall only point out a single clear and palpable proof of the fact. When we look at North America, we may there behold society in almost all its stages; we may there trace the formation of wealth in the furrows of agriculture, and its distribution through the channels of industry. Industry, like an hy- draulic machine, raises the waters as they proceed B. IV. Ch.I.—BENTHAM and ADAM SMITH, 235 from their source ; it turns them back again, re- raises, and makes them circulate without cessation. There is no waste in the whole process. The wealth of one is so little founded upon the impo- verishment of others, that, on the contrary, the creation of one capital soon creates others, and the level of all conditions is elevated at the same time. The argument against civilization, drawn from the power and number of those swarms of barba- rians which issued from the north, is become, when judiciously examined, a direct proof in its favour. These barbarians had no home : deprived of everything which attaches man to the soil which gave him birth, they envied what they knew not how to create, and destroyed instead of imitating. The innumerable multitudes, which were gratui- tously supposed, have vanished when it has been considered that hordes, wandering in countries covered with forests, could not have increased above their narrow means of subsistence. Since civilization has penetrated into these countries ; since the means of enjoyment and combatting the disadvantaoes of the climate bv the resources of art have been multiplied, the people, more happy and more numerous, have assumed habitudes which have attached them to the possession of the soil. Famine no longer obliges them to pounce like vultures upon their wealthy neighbours: their necessary wants supplied, their manners have been softened. Production has supplanted pillage, and they have become incorporated in that great family of which they were the scourge. A culpable insensibility ought not, however, to be imputed to the admirers of social order, with respect to the evils which they have not yet known how to prevent. If happiness be produced by natural and constant causes ; if it greatly exceed 236 B.IV, Cm. I.— BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH. the evil; if it have a tendency to augmentation, their admiration is justified. Happiness is of ne- cessity; misery is accidental. Happiness arises from the order of nature, misery from the igno- rance of men. Happiness multiplies itself, and every instance of its increase produces more; misery carries with it its warning, and is its own antidote. These considerations, far from cooling our zeal in favour of the suffering part of society, leave those without excuse who turn away from assisting them. It is lawful to turn away our thoughts from incurable evils, but we are criminal if we allow those to exist which we can cure. Omnisque non solum cessatio ignavia est : sed etiam quaerendi defatigatio existimari debet turpissima, ubi id quod quaeritur est pulcherrimum.* * Scaliger. [ 237 ] CHAPTER II. WEALTH AND HAPPINESS— RELATION— INCREASE. That the reader may not be detained by a multitude of definitions, I shall confine myself to a few preliminary explanations. Under the general name of the matter of wealth,* every object is comprehended which can be desired by man ; which can be possessed by him ; which is actually fit for his use, or which can be made so. The wealth of a community is the aggregate amount of the matter of wealth belonging to the different individuals of which that community is composed. All wealth is either the spontaneous production of the earth, or the result of labour, employed in the cultivation of the earth, or upon the materials which it yields. Wealth may be employed in four ways: 1. For subsistence ; 2. For enjoyment ; 3. For security or defence ; 4. For increase. As the matter of wealih cannot be employed in any one of these ways, without being in a greater * The compound term, " matter of wealth," is employed to prevent ambiguity ; it carries with it a reference to quantity. There are many things which may constitute part of the matter of wealth, which, when taken separately or in small quantities, would hardly be called wealth. Thus the wealth of a stationer may consist of a mass of rags ; a small portion of which lying upon a dunghill few would call wealth ; none, however, could deny that they might constitute part of the matter of wealth. 238 B. IV. ch. II.— wealth and happiness, &c. or less degree consumed, the stock existing at any given period would be continually diminish- ing, if constant exertions were not employed in the increasing of it. Wealth, considered as arising at successive periods, is called income. That portion of it which is employed for the purposes of giving increase to its amount, is called capital. An individual who would in any manner em- ploy himself in the accumulation of wealth, ought to possess — 1. Materials on which to work ; 2. Tools wherewith to work ; 3. A place in which to work ; 4. Necessaries for his subsistence while at work. All these objects are comprised under the name o^ capital. In the order of history, labour precedes capital. From land and labour, everything proceeds. But in the actual order of things there is always some capital already produced, which is united with land and labour in the production of new values. When an article of the produce of land or labour, in place of being consumed or kept for the use of him who has made it, or caused it to be made, is offered in exchange, it then becomes an article of commerce: it is merchandise. The general wealth is increased : — 1. By the increased efficacy of labour. 2. By the increase of the number of workmen. 3. By the increase of capital. 4. By the more advantageous employment of capital. 5. By means of trade. In all civilised societies, a class of persons is found who purchase of the manufacturer that they may sell to the consumer. B. IV. Ch. II,— wealth and HAPPINESS, &c. 239 The whole of the operations of manufacture, and of sale, may be described by the general terms o{ production and trade. The spontaneous actions of individuals, in the career of production and trade, depend on three conditions : Inclination^ knowledge, and power. Inclination to increase in wealth by labour and economy may be wanting in some individuals, but it predominates in men in general, and needs no other encouragement than legal security for the possession of what has been produced by it. Knowledge, in the shape here in question, is a result of the inclination which naturally leads men to study, every one in his own concerns, the means of preserving and increasing his M'ealth. By power, in the shape here in question, I under- stand that which consists in pecuniary capital, which is in proportion to this capital, and cannot exceed it. As to inclination, government has no need to do anything for its increase ; any more than for the increase of the desire of eating and drinking. In respect of knowledge, it may contribute to extend it, not only by means of general in- struction, of which we have already spoken, but also by information respecting particular facts; respecting particular branches of production and trade, and respecting particular new discoveries to which it may give birth by reward and encou- ragement, and which it may communicate by publication. In respect of power, in so far as it consists in pecuniary capital, government cannot with advantage create it : whatever it gives to one individual it must have taken from another ; 240 B. IV. ch. II.— wealth and happiness, &c, but there is another species of power, which consists in liberty of acting, which government may grant without any expense: it has only to repeal restrictive laws, to take away obstacles ; in a word, to leave things to themselves. Such are the outlines of an analytical plan, by which, it is believed, it will be found, that a circle is drawn around the subject. I 241 ] CHAPTER III. PRODUCTION IS LIMITED BY CAPITAL. No kind of productive labour of any importance can be carried on without capital. From hence it •follows that the quantity of labour, applicable to any object, is limited by the quantity of capital which can be employed on it. If I possess a capital of 10,000/. and two species of trade, each yielding twenty per cent, profit, but each requiring a capital of 10,000/. for carrying them on, are proposed to me, it is clear that I may carry on the one or the other with this profit, so long as I confine myself to one, but that in carrying on the one, it is not in my power to carry on the other ; and that if I seek to divide my capital between them both, I shall not make more than twenty per cent ; but I may make less, and even convert my profit into a loss. But if this propo- sition is true in the case of one individual, it is true for all the individuals in a whole nation. Production is therefore limited by capital. There is one circumstance which demonstrates, that men are not sensible of this truth, apparently so obvious. When they recommend the encourage- ment of particular branches of trade, they do not pretend that they are more profitable than others ; but because they are branches of trade, and they cannot possess too many. In a word, they would encourage trade in general; as if all trade did not yield its own reward; as if an unprofitable 16 242 B.IV. Ch. III.— PRODUCTION IS LIMITED BY CAPITAL. trade deserved to be encouraged ; and as if a profi- table trade stood in need of encouragement; as if indeed, by these capricious operations, it were pos- sible to do any other thing than transfer capital from one branch of trade to another. [ 243 ] CHAPTER IV. CAPITALIST THE BEST JUDGE OF HIS OWN INTEREST. The quantity of capital being given, the increase of wealth will, in a certain period, be in proportion to the good employment of this capital ; that is to say, of the more or less advantageous direction which shall have been given to it. The advantageous direction of capital depends upon two things : 1. The choice of the undertak- ing ; 2. The choice of the means for carrying it on. The probability of the best choice in both these respects, will be in proportion to the degree of in- terest which the undertaker has in its being well made, in connection with the means he has of ac- quiring the information relative to his undertak- ing. But knowledge itself depends in a great mea- sure upon the degree of interest which the indivi- dual has in obtaining it; he who possesses the greatest interest will apply himself with the greatest attention and constancy to obtain it. The interest which a man takes in the concerns of another, is never so great as he feels in his own. If we consider every thing necessary for the most advantageous choice of an undertaking, or the means of carr3nng it on, we shall see that the official person, so fond of intermeddling in the details of production and trade, is in no respect superior to the individuals he desires to govern, and that in most points he is their inferior. 16. 244 15. IV. ch. IV.— capitalist the best judge, &c. A prime minister has not so many occasions for acquiring information respecting farming as a farmer, respecting distillation as a distiller, re- specting the construction of vessels as a ship- builder, respecting the sale of commodities, as those who have been engaged in it all their lives. ' It is not probable that he should either have directed his attention to these objects for so long a time, or with the same degree of energy, as those who have been urged on by such powerful motives. It is therefore probable that in point of information relative to these professions, he is inferior to those who follow them. Official persons, therefore, with fewer oppor- tunities of instruction, less attention to the affairs, and less practical information, are not in a condi- tion to form a better judgment than those who are interested, neither in the choice of the undertak- ing nor the means of carrying it on. If by chance a minister should become informed of any circumstance, which proves the superior ad- vantage of a certain branch of trade, or of a certain process, it would not be a reason for employing authority in causing its adoption. Publicity alone would produce this effect : the more real the ad- vantage, the more superfluous the exercise of a*uthority. To justify the regulatory interference of govern- ment in the affairs of trade, one or other of these two opinions must be maintained : that the pub- lic functionary understands the interests of indi- viduals better than they do themselves ; or that the quantity of capital in every nation being infi- nite, or that the new branches of trade not requiring any capital, all the wealth produced by a new and favourite commerce is so much clear gain, over and above what would have been produced if B.IV. Cii. IV.— CAPITALIST THE BEST JUDGE, &c. 245 these advantages had not been conferred on this trade. These two opinions being contrary to truth, it follows that the interference of government is al- together erroneous, that it operates rather as an obstacle than a means of advancement. It is hurtful in another manner: by imposing restraints upon the actions of individuals, it pro- duces a feeling of uneasiness — so much liberty lost, so much happiness destroyed. This indeed is not a conclusive objection against these laws, since it may be urged against the best laws. All laws are coercive ; but this is a reason for not making any laws, at least where their utility does not more than overbalance this incon- venience. A measure of government, which would be un- justifiable employed as a means of increasing the national wealth, may be proper as a means of sub- sistence (for example, the maintaining of maga- zines of corn), or as a means of defence (for exam- ple, encouragements given to certain branches of commerce considered as a nursery for seamen) ; but it is essential to know that it produces its de- signed end, and not to mistake a sacrifice for an advantage, a loss for a gain. Encouragements of this nature do not the less belong to the class of things which ought not to be done, when uncon- nected with imperious circumstances, which pro- duce the exception to the general rule. [ 246 ] CHAPTER V. FALSE ENCOURAGEMENTS LOANS. Of all the means whereby a government may give a particular direction to production, the loan of pecuniary capital to individuals, to be employed in any particular branch of trade, is the least open to objection. It ought, however, at all times, to be free from objection with respect to justice and prudence. All the treasure of the government, from whence does it arise but from taxes, and these taxes levied by constraint?* To take from one portion of its subjects to lend to another, to diminish their actual enjoyments, or the amount which they would have laid up in reserve, is to do a certain evil for an uncertain good ; is to sacrifice security for the hope of increasing wealth. If loans of this nature were always faithfully repaid, their injustice would be limited to a certain period. Let us suppose that the capital thus em- ployed is 100,000/., and that the whole sum has been levied in one year, the injustice of the mea- sure will have begun and ended in a year; and if tile money thus lent has produced an increase of industry, it is an advantage to be set in opposition to the evil arising from the tax. But these loans have a natural tendency to be ill employed, wasted, or stolen. Monarchs, and * At least where the revenue of the government is not the produce of land, or the interest of money formed by an accu- mulation of rent. Of this nature is a part of the revenue of the republic of Berne. B.IV. Ch.V.—EALSE ENCOURAGEMENTS— loans. 247 their ministers, are as liable to be deceived in the choice of individuals as in the selection of parti- cular branches of commerce. Those who succeed with them prove only that they possess the talent of persuasion, or understand the practices of courts ; but these are not the things which produce suc- cess in trade. It may be seen in the w^ork of Mirabeau, upon the Prussian Monarchy, that Frederick II., with all his vigilance and severity, was often deceived by the ignorance or dishonesty of those who obtained from his avaricious credulity loans of this nature. Thus, in the train of the first unjust tax for the formation of the capital lent, follow other taxes, rendered necessary to re- place the thefts and dilapidations to which the first has been exposed. It is also most probable, that the capital thus employed will only be applied upon branches of industry less productive than those towards which it would naturally have directed itself. What is the argument of the borrower? that the trade he wishes to establish is new, or that it is necessary to support an established trade : but why should the government intermeddle with it, if not because individuals who consider their own interests are not willing to meddle with it ? The presumption is therefore against the enterprise. Suppose even that, by chance, ihis loan should take the most advantageous direction possible, the loan is not justified by this profit : it was unnecessary. For employing capital in the most advantageous manner, it is only necessary that the most advantageous employment should be known. If it be not well employed, it is that a better employment is not known. It is know- ledge which is wanted : it is proper to teach and not to lend. If the government cannot tell which 248 B. IV. ch. v.— false encouragements-loans. is the most advantageous employment of capital, it is still less able to employ it well ; if it can tell which is the bestemployment, that is all it need do. If the money of government had not taken this' direction, that of individuals would, had they been instructed and left free. There are circumstances in which loans of this nature are always iustifiable: when thev are not employed for the encouragement of new enter- prises, but only to afford support to particular branches of commerce, labouring under temporary difficulties, and which need only to be sustained for a short time till the crisis of peril or suspen- sion is passed. This is not a speculation on the part of government, but rather an assurance against a calamity, which it seeks to prevent or to lighten. In such cases of distress individuals will not, of themselves, assist the merchants whose affairs are thus in danger: it is necessary, therefore, that assistance be supplied; and, when supplied, it is not in the way of regulation but of remedy. [ 249 ] CHAPTER VI. GIFT, OR GRATUITOUS LOAN. Were we to judge from the number of instances in which it has been adopted, we should conclude that gratuitous grants of capital for the encourage- ment of commerce were most excellent measures. Their inconveniences are of the same kinds as those of loans, but they greatly exceed them in degree. In case of a loan, if it be repaid, the same sum may serve the same purpose a second time; and so of the rest. The oppressive act by which the government obtained the capital need not be repeated. But if, in place of being lent, it be given, — so often as this favour is repeated, so often must the amount be levied by taxes : and upon every occasion it may be said, that the produce of the tax is lost, if we consider the use which might have been made of it in lightening the public bur- thens. Sometimes capital has been lent with this view, without interest; sometimes at an interest below the ordinary rate. In the first case, if it be repaid, it is not the capital which is lost, but only the interest ; in the second case, it is not all the inte- rest, but only the difference between the lower and the ordinary rate. It is still the same false policy as to its kind ; all the difference is in the degree. It may be observed, that gratuitous grants are more likely to be wasted than loans: it may be because, in the latter case, responsibility is always incurred ; it may be, because money received as a 250 B.IV. Ch. VI.— GIFT, OR GRATUITOUS LOAN. gift tends to produce prodigality: as it has been obtained without labour, it seems to have the less value. In some cases, capital has been given, not in the shape of money, but in that of goods ; by advanc- ing to a manufacturer, for example, those articles which he wants for the completion of his work. This plan may have the good effect of insuring the employment of the articles furnished upon the intended object. Those articles, however, with which the government interferes, are ordinarily dearer and worse in quality than those which the individual, with the same sum of money, could have obtained at his own choice. It is not the best method of treating men worthy of confidence ; and it will not succeed with those who are unworthy of trust, since, after they are put in possession of them, they can convert the articles into money, and spend the amount. There may be measures which would obviate this danger : inspection, suretyship, &c. ; but, when it regards a plan radi- cally bad, the discussion of the comparative incon- veniences of any particular scheme, whereby the risk may be diminished, is not worth the labour it would cost. [ 251 ] CHAPTER VII. BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION. This mode of encouragement much exceeds the two former in the career of absurdity. In the two former cases it was an expense, a risk, with- out sufficient reason for supposing it would prove successful, and even without sufficient reason in case of success. But a bounty is an expense in- curred with the certainty of not obtaining the object sought, and even because it is certain that it cannot be obtained. In the case of a bounty upon production, it is not only the end which is absurd, but the means also, which possess this particular character of con- tributing nothing towards the end. It is uniformly because the trade in question is disadvantageous, that it is necessary to bestow money upon its maintenance ; if it were advanta- geous, it would maintain itself. It is because the workman is not able to obtain from the buyer a price for his merchandise which will yield an or- dinary profit, that it is necessary that he should re- ceive from the government a bounty which shall make up the difference. Whether the kind of product upon which it operates be advantageous or not, the bounty has no efficacy in increasing the ability of the pro- ducer to augment it. Since it follows the produc- tion, since he receives it when the thing is done, and not before, it is clear that he has possessed other means of producing it. The bounty may 252 B.IV. Ch. VII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION. have operated upon his inclination, but it cannot have contributed to his ability. Bounties have been bestowed upon particular branches of trade for all sorts of reasons ; on ac- count of their antiquity, on account of their novelty, because they were flourishing, because they were decaying, because they were advan- tageous, because they were burthensome, be- cause there vv^ere hopes of improving them, and because it was feared they would grow worse : so that there is no species of commerce in the world which could not, by one or other of these contrary reasons, claim this kind of favour during every moment of its existence. It is in the case of an old branch of trade that the evil of such measures is most enormous, and in that of a new one that its inefficacy is most striking. A long established branch of trade is in general widely extended: this extent furnishes the best reason for those who solicit these favours for its support ; and, to give it effect, it ought at the same time to be represented as gaining and losing; gaining, that there maybe a disposition to preserve it ; losing, that there may be a disposition to as- sist it.* In the case of a new branch of trade or industry, the futility of the measure is its principal feature. Here, there is no reason which carries the mask of an apparent necessity — no pompous descriptions * It is true, though it may not be worth the expense of supporting it by bounties with a view to the increase of wealth, it may be proper to assist it as a means of subsistence or defence. It is still more true, that what ought not to be done with the intention of supporting an unprofitable branch of trade, may yet be proper for preventing the ruin of .the workman actually employed in such business : but these are objects entirely distinct. B.IV.Ch.VII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION. 253 of its extent. All which can be alleged is that, once established, it will become great and lucrative, but what it wants, is to be established. What then is done for its establishment ? measures are taken which can only operate after it is established. When the trade is established, it will have such great success that it will yield, for example, fifty per cent, profit ; but, to establish it, it requires such large advances, that it is doubtful if those who possess capital will make them, on account of the risks which are almost al ways i nseparable from every new undertaking. What course does the govern- ment pursue? does it give capital? no, this would be foolish. Does it lend capital? no, this would be to run too great risk ; it will give a bounty upon the article when it shall have been made: till then, it says, we shall give no money. Thus, to the fifty per cent, you will gain by your merchandize, we will add a bounty often percent — very well : and, according to this reasoning, at what time will you refuse assistance ? You refuse so long as the bestowment of it will be useful, you grant it in order that something may be done, and you do not give it till it is already done by means independent of you. Mistrust, shortsightedness, a suspicious disposi- tion, and a confused head, are very susceptible of union. Why are bounties preferred to advance capital ? they are afraid of being deceived in the latter case. If 10,000/. are given at once, nothing may perhaps be done : to avoid this risk they give, when the thing is done, 10,000/. per annum, which they will never receive again. Instead of being beneficial, the expense to the state becomes more burthensome in proportion as the trade becomes extended. The bounty insti- tuted for one reason, is continued on an opposite 254 B.IV. Ch. VII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION. account : at first it was given in order to obtain, in the end it is continued for fear of losing, the par- ticular branch of trade. What would have been necessary for its establishment was a trifle, what must be paid for its continuance, knows no bounds. The capital bestowed upon a new branch of in- dustry for an experiment, is always comparatively a small sum; but what is given as a bounty is always, or at least it is always hoped that it will be, a large one : for unless a large quantity of the merchandise is manufactured and sold, and conse- quently unless a large bounty is paid for its pro- duction and sale, the object is considered as un- accomplished : it is considered that the bounty has not answered its end. When the article is one which would not have been manufactured without the bounty, all that is paid is lost ; but if it be one of those which, even without the bounty, the manufacturers would have found it their interest to produce, only a portion of the bounty is lost. As it makes an addi- tion, and that a very sensible addition to the ordi- nary profit of the trade, it attracts a great number of individuals towards this particular enterprise : by their competition, the article is sold at the lowest rate, and the diminution of price is in pro- portion to the bounty itself (allowance being made for the necessary expenses of soliciting and re- ceiving it). In this state of things it would appear, at first sight, that the bounty does neither good nor harm : the public gains by the reduction of price as much as it loses by the tax, which is the effective cause of this reduction. This would be true, if the individuals who paid the tax in the one case were the same who profited by the bounty in the other, if the measure of this profit were exactly the measure of their contribu- B.IV. Cn. VIl.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION. 255 tion, if they received the one at the same time that they paid the other, and if all the labour lost in these operations had not cost anything. But all these suppositions are contrary to fact. There are not two taxes which affect all the members of the state : there is not one which affects them all equally. The tax is paid a long time before the indemnification, by the reduction of price, is re- ceived, and the expenses of this useless circulation are always considerable. After all that can be said, it is clear that a bounty upon production cannot, in the long run, produce an increased abundance of the article in question, whatsoever maybe thediminution of price which may result from it. The profit which the pro- ducer will obtain is not greater than before : the only difference is, that it comes to him from another hand. It is not individuals who give it him in a direct manner, it is the government. Without the bounty, those who pay for the article are those who enjoy it : with the bounty, they only pay directly a part of the price ; the rest is paid by the public in general ; that is to say, more or less, by those who derive no advantages from it.* Although a bounty upon production adds nothing to the abundance of any article of general consumption, it diminishes the price to the buyer. Suppose that, in Scotland, there were a bounty upon the production of oats, and that the bounty were paid by a tax upon beer brewed from this grain, oats would not be more abundant than before ; but they would be sold at a less price to the buyer (though the merchant would make the * Adam Smith has made a mistake in saying, that a bounty upon production was a means of abundance, on which account it was better than a bounty on exportation. 256 B.IV, Ch. VII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION. same profit), whilst the beer brewed with this grain would be proportionally dearer : the consumer of oats would not find himself richer than before, but for the same price he would have a greater quantity of this grain in the form of food, and less in the shape of drink. 1 speak here of relative abundance, in proportion to the ordinary consumption ; I speak of superfluity compared with habitual wants. The lower this commodity is in price, compared with others, the greater will be the demand for it. More will be produced in consequence of the increased demand, but more will not be produced than is demanded. The commodity, as it respects abundance, will re- main upon the same footing as before. If a su- perfluity is required, if a quantity be required ex- ceeding what is commonly produced, other mea- sures must be resorted to than a bounty on pro- duction. If a bounty upon production could be justified, it would seem that it ought to be so in the case where the article thus favoured was an article of general consumption — as, corn in England, oats in Scotland, potatoes in Ireland, and rice in India; but it would only appear so as a means of pro- ducing equality, and not under any other point of view. In fact, this measure does not tend to pro- duce abundance — what it does, is to take the money out of the pockets of the rich to put it into the pockets of the poor. A commodity of general consumption is always the most necessary of all the articles of life : it is always that of which the poor make the greatest use. The richer a man is, the more he consumes of other commodi- ties beside this universal commodity. Suppose, then, a bounty upon the production of oats in Scotland; if nothing is consumed there but oats, B. IV. Ch. VII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION. 257 or if there is only a tax upon oats, the persons who reap the advantage of the bounty would be those who bear the burthen of the tax, and that in the same proportion, inasmuch as the expense of levying the tax would be the only result of this measure. But commodities of all kinds are con- sumed in Scotland, and taxes are there levied upon a great variety of commodities. Oats, the commodity of the poor, being the object not of a tax but a bounty, and the articles consumed by the rich being the object not of a bounty but of a tax, from the produce of which the bounty upon the production of oats is paid, the result will be, that the poor will obtain the commodity of which they make the greatest use at a lower price. 1 a2:ree to this ; but does it follow that their condition will be bettered ? Not at all. Oats will be sold to the poor at a lower price, but they will have less money wherewith to buy them. All the means of subsistence in this class resolve themselves into the wages of labour; but the wages of labour necessarily depend upon the degree of opulence which a country possesses; that is, upon the quantity of capital applicable to the purchase of labour in connection with the number of those whose labour is for sale. The low price resulting from the bounty will produce no advantage to the labourers, whilst the wealth of the country remains the same: if the commodity be lowered in price, they will be less paid ; or, what comes to the same thing, as they work for a ration of oats, they will be obliged to give more labour for this ration if oats are at a lower price. All that relates to this mode of encouragement may be summed up in a few words. The natural course of things gives a bounty upon the application of industry to the most 17 258 B. IV. Ch. VIII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION. advantageous branches, a bounty of which the division will always be made in the most equitable manner. If artificial bounties take the same course as the natural, they are superfluous ; if they take a different course, they are injurious. [ 2-5y J CHAPTER VIII. EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXES ON PRODUCTION. An exemption from a tax capable of being im- posed upon any article in tiie hands of the maker or seller, is a modification of a bounty upon pro- duction ; it is a disguised bounty. This kind of negative favour may be extended to every species of tax upon trade. The methods of encouragement in this way are as numerous as those of discouragement. \i\ of two rival manu- factures, the one is weighed down by a tax, and the other free, that which is taxed is, in respect of that which is not, in the same situation as if both were free from taxes, and a bounty Vv^ere bestowed upon one. But each manufacture is a rival to every other ; if this rivalry is not special, it is at least general and indirect. For what reason ? — because the power of purchasing is limited, as to every indi- vidual, by his fortune and his credit. Every arti- cle which is for sale, and which he can desire, is in a state of competition with every other ; the more he expends for the one, the less can he spend for the others. Exemption from taxes upon production cannot be blamed absolutely ; for it is to be wished, if the thing were possible, that there were no taxes. But, relatively, any particular exemption may be blamed, when the article exempted has nothing which justifies this particular exemption. If it were equally fit for taxation, the favour granted to it is an injury to other productions. 17. 260 B. IV. Ch. Vlll.— EXEMPTION'S FROM TAXES, &c. That an object fit for taxation be exempt, is an evil. It renders necessary some other tax, which by the supposition is less proper, or it allows some injurious tax to remain. Whilst, as to advantage, there is none. If more of this untaxed merchandise is produced, less is produced of that which is taxed. The evil of an unjust tax is all the difference between a more or less eligible tax, and the worst of those which exist. [ 261 ] CHAPTER IX. BOUNTIES ON EXPORTATION. In the case of Bounties upon Exportation^ the error is not so palpable as in that o^ Bounties upon Production., but the evil is greater. In both cases, the money is equally lost : the difference is in the persons who receive it. What you pay for pro- duction, is received by your countrymen ; what you pay for exportation, you bestow upon stran- gers. It is an ingenious scheme for inducing a foreiofn nation to receive tribute from you without beins: aware of it ; a little like that of the Irishman who passed his light guinea, by cleverly slipping it between two halfpence. As a bounty upon production may sustain a disadvantageous trade, which would cease with- out it, by forming its sole profit, it is also possible that it may for a short time increase the profit of an advantageous trade, which would support itself without this aid. Does the bounty support a disadvantageous trade? It does not produce a farthing of profit more than would have existed without it. Left to itself, this trade would have ceased and made way for a better ; and the community loses the profits of a capital better employed in lucrative under- takings. Does the bounty support an advantageous trade? The evil, in the end, will be greater, because the extra profit drawing more rivals into this career, their competition will reduce the price so low, that 262 B.IV. Ch. IX.— BOUNTIES ON EXPORTATION. the bounty will constitute at last the whole profit of this trade. However, till the price is thus reduced, the bounty is a net gain for the first undertakers ; and, the consumers beins: our feliow-countrvmen, a part of this ill-employed money turns to their ad- vantage by the low price of the commodity. But in the case of a bounty upon exportation, the nation which pays it never receives any advan- tage : everything is lost, as if it were thrown into the sea, or at least as if it had been given to foreigners. Without this bounty, the article would have been exported, or it would not. It would have been exported, if foreigners were willing to pay a price which would cover the expense of the manufactur- ing, of exporting, and the ordinary profit of trade. It would not have been exported, if they did not offer a sufficient price. In the first case, they would liave obtained the article by paying its worth ; in the second case, this disadvantageous commerce would not have been carried on. Suppose a bounty upon exportation, what are its effects ? The foreigners who heretofore had found the article too dear, become disposed to pur- chase it : why ? Because you pay them to induce them to do so. The more government gives to the exporter, the less need the foreigner give. But it is clear that he will not pay more than the lowest price which will satisfy the exporter : he need not give more ; since, if one merchant refuses to sup- ply him at this price, another will be quite ready to do it. Suppose an article of our manufacture, already purchased by foreign nations without a bounty upon its exportation, what will happen if a bounty B.IV. Ch.IX.— BOUNTIES ON EXPORTATION. 263 is given? Solely the lowering of its price to the foreigners. A bounty of one penny for every pound in weight is given upon an article which sells for five pence per pound ; the manufacturer would not have found it worth while to have sold it for less than five pence per pound ; he will now, however, find the same profit in selling it for four pence, because his own government makes up the difference. He will sell at four pence, because, if he do not, some other will ; and, because, in this case, instead of selling for five pence, it may happen that he will not sell at all. Thus the whole which government gives is a net saving to the foreigners: the effect in the way of encouragement is nothing. The whole which is exported with the bounty is neither more nor less than would be without it.* Though a bounty does not render such a branch of trade more flourishing than it would otherwise have been, it will not render it /c5s flourishing; but the more flourishing it becomes, the greater will be the loss to the nation. Disadvantageous branches of trade are often spoken of. People are uneasy ; they fear that certain manufactures, left to themselves, will be unprofitable. It arises from error; it is not possible that any branch of trade, left to itself, can be disad- vantageous to a nation: it may become so by the interference of government, by bounties, and other favours of the same nature. It is not to the mer- chant himself that it can become disadvantageous ; for the moment he perceives there is nothing to be gained, he will not persevere in it ; but to the nation in general it may become so, — to the na- ■* The same effect is produced when it is endeavoured to favour the importation of corn, for example, by giving a bounty to the first importers. Its effect is to increase the price in foreign countries. 264' B.IV. Ch. IX.— BOUNTIES ON EXPORTATION. tion, in its quality of contributor ; and the amount of the bounty is the exact amount of the loss. The Irishman who passed his light guinea was very cunning; but there have been French and English more cunning than he, who have taken care not to be imposed upon by his trick. When a cunning individual perceives you have gained some point with him, his imagination mechani- cally begins to endeavour to get the advantage of you, without examining whether he would not do better were he to leave you alone. Do you appear to believe that the matter in question is advanta- geous to you — he is convinced by this circum- stance that it is proportionally disadvantageous to him, and that the safest line of conduct for him to adopt, is to be guided by your judgment. Well acquainted with this disposition of the human mind, an Englishman laid a wager, and placed himself upon the Pont-neuf, the most public tho- roughfare in Paris, offering to the passengers a crown of six francs for a piece of twelve sous. During half a day he only sold two or three. Since individuals in general are such dupes to their self-mistrust, is it strange that governments, having to manage interests which they so little understand, and of which they are so jealous, should have fallen into the same errors ? A govern- ment, believing itself clever, has given a bounty upon the exportation of an article, in order to force the sale of it among a foreign nation ; what does this other nation in consequence ? Alarmed at the sight of this danger, it takes all possible methods for its prevention. AVhen it has ventured to pro- hibit the article, everything is done. It has refused the six franc pieces for twelve sous. When it has not dared to prohibit it, it has balanced this bounty by a counter bounty upon some article that it ex- B.IV. Ch. IX.— BOUNTIES ON EXPORTATION. 265 ports. Not daring to refuse the crowns of six francs for twelve sous, it has cleverly slipped some little diamond between the two pieces of money, and thus the cheat is cheated. A strife of this nature, painted in its true colours, and stripped of the eclat which dazzles by the magnitude of the object and the dignity of the agents, appears too absurd to be possible ; but for one example among a thousand, we may refer to what has happened between England and Ireland respecting the trade in linens. [ 266 ] CHAPTER X. PROHIBITION OF RIVAL PRODUCTIONS. This pretended mode of encouragement can never be productive of good ; but it may produce evil : hurtful or useless^ such is the alternative. 1. I say useless. It is a particular privilege of this exercise of power, to be employed in certain cases without doing any harm; and these cases occur when the branch of production or trade which is prohibited would not have been intro- duced, even had there been no prohibition. In former times, it was declared felony in England to \ui\iOit pollards and crocards, a kind of base coin at that time. This prohibition is yet in existence, without producing any inconvenience. If, with the intention of encouraging the increase of poultry, or with any other similarly patriotic view, the im- portation and increase of phoenixes were prohi- bited, it is clear that the trade in poultry would neither gain nor lose much. Among all the species of manufacture which England, with so much anxiety, has prohibited to her colonies, there are many which, in comparison with agriculture, are no more suitable to the Americans than the breeding of phoenixes, the cultivation of pine-apples in their fields, or the manufacture of stuffs from spiders' webs. Were the articles of foreign manufacture, loaded with the expenses of importation, neither better in quality nor lower in price than the articles of home manufacture, they would not be imported ; the prohibition exists in the nature of things. B.IV. Ch.X.— PROHIBITION OF RIVAL PRODUCTIONS. 267 2. Hurtful. By the prohibition of a rival ma- nufacture, you wish to insure the success of a favoured manufacture, and you at once create all the mischiefs of a monopoly. You enable the monopolists to sell at a higher rate, and you di- minish the number of enjoyments ; you grant them the singular privilege of manufacturing inferior ar- ticles, or of ceasing to improve them ; you weaken the principle of emulation, which exists only when there is competition ; in short, you favour the enriching of a small number of individuals at the expense of all those who would have enjoyed the benefit; you give to a few bad manufacturers an excessive degree of wealth, instead of supplying the wants of ten thousand good ones ; you also wound the feelings of the people, by the idea of injustice and violence attached to the partiality of this measure. Prohibitions of foreign manufactures are most frequently applied to those objects which foreign- ers can supply less expensively, on account of some peculiar advantage arising from their soil or their industry. By such prohibitions, you refuse to participate in this natural advantage which they ^"joy ' you prefer what costs you more capital and labour; you employ your workmen and your capi- tal at a loss, rather than receive from the hands of a rival what he offers you of a better quality or at a lower price. If you hope, by this means, to support a trade which would otherwise cease, it may be supported it is true ; but, left to itself, capital would only leave this channel where its disadvantages are unavoidable, to enter upon others where it would be employed with greater advantage. The greatest of all errors is to suppose, that by prohibitions, whether of foreign or domes- tic manufactures, more trade can be obtained. 268 B.IV. Ch.X.— PROHIBITION OF RIVAL PRODUCTIONS. The quantity of capital, the efficient cause of all increase, remaining the same, all the increase thus given to a favoured commerce is so much taken from other branches. The collateral evils of this prohibitory system ought not to be forgotten. It is a source of ex- pense, of vexation, and of crimes. The expense most evidently lost, is that of the custom-house officers, the inspectors, and other individuals employed ; but the greatest loss is that of labour, both of the unproductive labour of the smuggler and of those who are, or who appear to be, employed in the prevention of smuggling. To destroy foreign commerce, it is only neces- sary to sell everything and to purchase nothing: such is the folly which has been passed off as the depth of political wisdom among statesmen. Among the transactions between nation and nation, men have consented, at great expense, to support disadvantageous manufactures, that they may not buy of their rivals. We do not see such monstrous extravagance on the part of individuals. If a merchant were to act thus, we should say he was hastening to ruin ; but his interest guides him much better. It is only public functionaries who are capable of this mistake, and they only when they are acting on account of others. Covetousness desires to possess more than it can hold. Malevolence likes better to punish itself than to allow a benefit to an adversary. To have its eyes greater than its belli/, is a pro- verb which nurses apply to children, and which always applies to nations. An individual corrects this fault by experience. The politician, when . once affected by it, never corrects himself. When a child refuses physic, mothers and nurses sometimes induce it to take it by threatening to B.IV. Ch.X.— PROHIBITION OF RIVAL PRODUCTIONS. 269 give it to the dog or the cat. How many states- men, children badly educated, persist in supporting a commerce by which they lose, that they may avoid the mortification of allowing a rival nation to carry it on. The statesman who believes he can infinitely extend commerce without perceiving that it is limited by the amount of capital, is the child whose eyes are larger than his belly. The statesman who strives to retain a disadvan- tageous commerce, because he fears another nation will gain it, is the child who swallows the bitter pill for fear it should be given to the dog or the cat. These are not noble comparisons, but they are just ones ; when errors cover themselves with an imposing mask, one is tempted to set them in a light which will show thein to be ridiculous. [ 270 ] CHAPTER XI. FIXATION OF PRICES. The limitation of the price of commodities may have two opposite objects: 1. The rendering them dearer: 2. The rendering them cheaper. The first of these objects is least natural: so many commodities, so many means of enjoy- ment : to put them within the reach of the largest number, is to contribute to the general happiness. This motive, however, is not unexampled, and in- toxicating liquors are an instance of its exercise. Legislators have often endeavoured, and not with- out reason, to increase their price, with the design of limiting their consumption on account of their dearness. But imposing a tax upon them suffices to increase their price ; there is no necessity for re- sorting to the method of direct limitation. Is the design of these limitations the obtaining of the article at a low rate — the method will scarcely answer its end. Before the existence of the law, the article was sold at what may be called its average or natural price ^ that is to say, it was confined within certain limits : 1. by the compe- tition between the buyers and the sellers: 2. by a competition between the branch of trade in ques- tion, and that of other branches to which the mer- chant might find it to his advantage to transfer his capital. Does the law endeavour to fix the price at a lower rate than this average or natural price — it may obtain a transient success, but by little B. IV. Ch. XI.— FIXATION OF PRICES. 271 and little this branch of trade will be abandoned. If the constraint is increased, the evil will grow worse, the constraint in fact can only act upon the existing stock ; this being sold at a forced price, the merchant will take care not to replace it. What can the law effect ? Can it oblige him to reple- nish his storehouse with the same comuiodities ? No legislator has ever attempted it, or at least no one has ever attempted it with success. This would be to convert the officers of justice into commercial agents, it would be to give them a right to dispose of the capitals of the merchants, and to employ the merchants themselves as their clerks. The most common fixation has been that of the rate of interest. It will form the subject of another chapter. The fixation of the price of wages (especially with regard to agriculture) has often been pro- posed, and even carried into effect, for the most opposite reasons : to prevent what is considered as an excess ; to remedy what has been regarded as a deficiency. In this latter point of view, this measure is liable to great objection. To fix the minimuin of wages, is to exclude from labour many workmen who would otherwise have been employed ; it is to aggravate the distress you wish to relieve. In fact, all that can be done, is limited to determining that, if they are emplo3'^ed they shall not receive less than the price fixed : it is useless to enact that they shall be employed. Which is the farmer, where is the manufacturer, who will submit to em- ploy labourers who cost them more than they yield? In a word, a regulation which fixes the minimum of wages, is a regulation of a prohi- bitory nature, which excludes from the com- 272 B. IV. ch. XI.— fixation of prices. petition all whose labour is not worth the price fixed. The fixation of the rate of wages, in order to pre- vent their excess, is a favour conferred on the rich at the expense of the poor ; on the master at the expense of the workman. It is a violation, with regard to the weakest class, of the principles of se- curity and property. •273 CHAPTER XII. TAXES EFFECTS ON PRODUCTION. Taxes ought to have no other end than the production of revenue, with as light a burthen as possible.* When it is attempted to employ them as indirect means of encouragement or discourage- ment for any particular species of industry, go- vernment, as we have already seen, only succeeds in deranging the natural course of trade, and in giving it a less advantageous direction. The effects of particular taxes may appear very complicated and difficult to trace. By considering the subject in a general point of view, and distin- guishing the permanent from the temporary effects of taxes, this complexity will be disentangled and the difficulty disappear. First question: What are the effects of a tax im- posed hij a foreign nation upon the articles of our manufacture ? Permanent consequences : — 1. If the exporta- tion is not diminished, the tax makes no differ- ence with respect to us : it is only paid by the consumers in the state which imposes the tax. 2. If the exportation is diminished, the capital which was employed in this branch of manufacture withdraws itself and passes into others. * This principle may admit some exceptions, but they are very rare; for example, a tax may be imposed upon intoxi- cating liquors, with the design of diminishing their consump- tion by increasing their price. 18 274 B.iv. ch.xh.--taxes~effects on production. Temporary consequences: — This dinminution of exportation occasions a proportional distress among the individuals interested in this species of in- dustry. The workmen lose their occupations; they are obliged to undertake labours to which they are unaccustomed, and which yield them less. As to the master manufacturer, a part of his fixed capital is rendered useless; he loses his profits in proportion as the manufacture is reduced. Second question : What are the effects of a tax, imposed by ourselves, upon the manufactures we ourselves consume I Permanent consequences : — 1 . If the consump- tion is not diminished, no other difference is pro- duced than the disadvantage of the tax to the consumer, and a proportional advantage for the public. 2. If the consumption is diminished, indivi- duals are deprived of that portion of happiness which consisted in the use of this particular ar- ticle of enjoyment. 3. Capital, in this as in the preceding case, re- tires from this branch and passes into others. Temporary consequences : — If the consumption is not diminished, the tax makes no difference: if it is diminished, similar distress, in proportion as in the case above. Third question : What are the consequences of a tax, imposed by ourselves, upon the manufactures of our own country consumed by foreigners ! Permanent consequences: — 1. Whilst the con- sumption is not diminished, the operation produces so much clear gain for us. The burthen of the tax is borne by the foreigner, and the profit is reaped by ourselves. B.IV. Ch, XII.—TAXES— EFFECTS ON PRODUCTION. 275 If the consumption is diminished, the capital which loses this employment passes into others. Temporary consequences : — Consumption not diminished, no difference to us : consumption diminished, similar distress in proportion, as in the former cases. It results from hence, that the permanent effects of these taxes are always of little importance as to commerce in general ; and that their temporary efJ'ects are evil in proportion to the diminution of the consumption. The evil is greater or less, according as it is more or less easy to transfer capital and labour from one branch of industry to another. The least hurtful of these taxes are those which bear upon our own productions consumed by foreigners. If the same quantity is exported after the tax as before, so far from being prejudicial, it yields us a clear benefit: it is a tribute levied upon them precisely as if it were raised out of the bowels of the earth. The tax imposed by us upon foreign importa- tions is paid by ourselves, and burthensome as any other tax would be to the same amount. If the consumption is not diminished, it would be better that the tax upon this article should be imposed by us, that we might profit by it, rather than the country which produced it, and which would otherwise enjoy the benefit. A nation, which has a natural monopoly of an article necessary to foreigners, has a natural means of taxing them for its own profit. Let us take tin for an example: England is the only country which has mines of this metal, at least all others are too inconsiderable to satisfy the demand. England might, therefore, lav a considerable tax upon the 18. -76 B. IV. Ch.XII.— TAXES— EFFECTS ON PRODUCTION. exportation of tin, without danger of smuggling, because it might be levied at the mine, or at the foundry. France could not impose an equal tax, because it would give too great an allurement to the smugglers. These principles are easy of application to com- mercial treaties : everything which is permanent, whether it be called encouragement or discou- ragement, has but little effect upon trade and commerce in general ; since trade and commerce are always governed by the capital which can be employed on them. But international precautions may be taken for the prevention of rapid changes, from which temporary distresses result. Let every nation make a sacrifice by refusing to impose taxes, or to augment them, upon articles of its own ex- portation: every nation would then receive indem- nification by a reciprocal sacrifice. Commerce would thus acquire stability; and that petty fiscal warfare would no longer be carried on, which pro- duces a dangerous irritation among the people, always greatly disproportioned to the importance of the object. The object of the first chapter of the Commer- cial Code ought to be to show the reciprocity of in- ternational interests, to prove that there is no impropriety, during the continuance of peace, in favouring the opulence of foreigners; no merit in opposing it. It may happen to be a misfortune that our neighbour is rich ; it is certainly one that he be poor. If he be rich, we may have reason to fear him ; if he be poor, he has little or nothing to sell to, or to buy of, us. But that he should become an object of dread, by reason of an increase in riches, it is necessary B. IV. Ch. XII.— TAXES— EFFliCTS ON PRODUCTION. 277 tliat this prosperity should be his alone. He will have no advantage, it" our wealth has made the same progress as his own, or if this progress has, taken place in other nations equally well disposed with ourselves to repress him. Jealousies against rich nations are only founded upon mistakes and misunderstandings : it is with these nations that the most profitable commerce is carried on ; it is from these that the returns are the most abundant, the most rapid, and the most certain. Great capitals produce the greatest division of labour, the most perfect machines, the most active competition among the merchants, the most ex- tended credits, and, consequently, the lowest price. Each nation, in receiving from the richest every- thing which it furnishes, at the lowest rate, and of the best quality, would be able to devote its capital exclusively to the most advantageous branches of industry. Wherefore do governments give so marked a preference to export trade } 1. It is this branch which exhibits itself with the greatest show and eclat : it is this which is most under the eyes of the governors ; and which therefore most strongly excites their attention. 2. This commerce more particularly appears to them as their work : they imagine they are creators ; and inaction appears to them a species of impotence. All these pretensions fall before the principle, that production is subordinate to capital. These new branches of trade, these remote establish- ments, these costly encouragements, produce no new creations ; it is only a new employment of a part of one and the same capital which was 278 B. IV. Ch.XII.— FAXES— EFFECTS ON PRODUCTION. not idle before. It is a new service, which is performed at the expense of the old. The sap which by this operation is strained through a new branch, being diverted from another, gives a dif- ferent product, but not an increase of produce. [ 279 ] CHAPTER XIII. POPULATION FORCED — INCREASE DESIRABLE? Many volumes have been written upon the sub- ject of population, because the means of promot- ing its increase have generally been the subject of examination. I shall be very short upon this subject, because 1 shall confine myself to shewing that all these means are useless. If anything could prevent men from marrying, it would be the trouble which is pretended lo be taken to induce them to marry. So much uneasi- ness upon the part of the legislator can only in- spire doubts respecting the happiness of this state. Pleasures are made objects of dread when con- verted into obligations. Would you encourage population ? render men happy, and trust to nature. But that you may render men happy, do not govern them too much. Do not constrain them even in their domestic arrangements, and above all, in that which can please only under the auspices of liberty. In a word, leave them to live as they like, under the single condition of not injuring one another. Population is in proportion to the means of subsistence and wants. Montesquieu, Condillac, Sir James Stewart, Adam Smith, the economists, have only one opinion upon this subject.* Ac- ♦ The name of Mr. Malthus, who will for the future oc- cupy the post of honour in political economy upon the subject of population, is not mentioned here, because this work was many years anterior to his. This chapter, with many other fragments, was communicated to the authors of the Bibliotheque 280 B.iV. Ch. XI II.— POPULATION FORCED— INCREASE, &c. cording to this principle, there is also a means of increasing population, but there is only one : it consists in increasing the national wealth, or, to speak more correctly, in allowing it to increase. Young womeii^ says Montesquieu, are 5^«^c^67^//j/ ready to marri/. How should they not be ? The pleasures, the avowed sentiments of love, are only permitted in this condition : it is thus only tha they are emancipated from a double subjection, and that they are placed at the head of a little em- pire. // is the young me7i, he adds, ivho need to be encouraoed. But whv ? Do the motives which lead men to marry want force ? It is only by marriage that a man can obtain the favours of the woman who, in in his eyes, is worth all others. It is only by mar- riage that he can live freely and publicly with an honest and respectable woman, and who will live only for him. There is nothing more delightful than the hope of a family, where proofs of the tenderest affections may be given and received; where power blended with kindness may be ex- ercised ; where confidence and security are found ; where the consolations of old age may be treasured up ; where we may behold ourselves replaced by other selves. Where we may say, I shall not en- Britannique, published at Geneva, and was inserted in the 7th vol., in 1798. If Mr. Malthus had known it, he might have cited it as an additional proof, that his principle relating to population was not a new paradox. But what was new, was to make a rational and connected application of it ; to deduce" from it the solution of so many historical problems; to .survey Europe with this principle in his hand; and to prove that it cannot be resisted without producing great confusion in social order ; and this is what Mr. Malthus has accomplished, in a manner as conclusive as respects his arguments, as in- teresting in respect of his style and his details. — Note by DUMONT. B. IV. tH.XllI.— POPULATION FORCED— INCREASE, &c. 281 tirely die. A man wants an associate, a confidant, a counsellor, a steward, a mistress, a nurse, a com- panion for all seasons. All these may be found united in a wife. What substitute can be pro- vided ? It is not among the poor that there is any aver- sion to marriage ; that is to say, it is not among the labourers; that class, in the increase of which, alone, the public is interested; that class which consti- tutes the strength and creates the wealth of a nation ; that class which is the last in the sense- less vocabulary of pride, but which the enlightened politician regards as the first. It is in the countr\^ especially, that men seek to marry. A bachelor does not there possess the re- sources he can find in a town. A husbandman, a farmer, require the assistance of a wife, to attend to their concerns at all hours of the day. The population of the productive classes is limited only by their real wants ; that of the un- productive classes is limited by their conventional wants. With regard to these, instead of inducing them to marry by invitations, rewards and menaces, as did Augustus, we ought to be well pleased when they live in celibacy. The increase of the purely consumptive classes is neither an advantage to the state nor to themselves. Their welfare is exactly in the inverse ratio of their numbers. If they should insensibly become extinct, as in Holland, where there is scarcely one citizen who does not exercise some occupation, where would be the evil ? A workman may in a moment be converted into an idle consumer. A good workman is not so soon made: he needs skill and practice; habits of industry are slowly acquired, if indeed, after a certain age, they can ever be acquired. On the 28'2 B. JV. Ch. XIII.— POl'ULAi ion fOHCED— I\< HEASi:, Ac. Other hand, when a consumer passes into the cla.ss of labourers, it is generally owing to a reverse in fortune, and he is in a state ofsuftering'. When a labourer is transported into the class of consumers, he is exalted in his own eyes and in the eyes of others, and his happiness is increased. On all these accounts, it is desirable that the class of idlers be not increased: their own interest requires it, and it is also a great good when their number is diminished, whether by celibacy or their cui]- version into labourers.* Convents have been con- * The author is consistent, and Montesquieu appears to nie not to be so. Book xxiii. ch. x. he has well explained the true principle, but he has not followed it. His elogium upon the regulations of Augustus respecting marriage, is extremely singular. Tiiey have pleased Montes- quieu by some vague idea of the protection of manners. Tiiey violate every principle of reward and punishment; they are neither analogous or proportional ; they punish a man because he is unhappy or prudenjt, they reward him because he is happy or imprudent; they coirupt marriage by mercenary and poli- tical views ; and, after all, the object aimed at is missed. Mon- tesquieu acknowledges the impotence of tliese laws. The be- nefit of the remedy being null, there remains only the evil. He blames Louis XIV. (ch. xxvii.) for not having sutSciently encouraged marriage, by only rewarding prodigies of fecundity. Louis XIV. did too much by his establisliuients for the poor nobility, and he has been too frequently imitated. Humanity was the motive of these foundations ; but this humanity was equally productive of evil as it respected those who bore the expense, and as it respected the class whom it was intended to relieve, and who were not relieved. On the contrary, the more the indigent of this order were assisted, the more tiiey increased. In fact, every individual requires a certain quan- tity of wealth to be in a state to marry. Does he mairv imprudently, his distress is without doubt an evil j but it operates as a warning to other persons of the same class. If you oppose this natural effect, if you institute foundations for families, if you grant pensions or other favours on account of marriage, what follows ? It is no longer an establi>hnient submitted to calculation, it i^ a luUery, u\ which h there ? Oftentimes he will lose his presence of mind, forget what he was about to say, stammer out some unconnected propositions, and findincj himself despised, indignant that his merit should be thus treated, he will retire, resolving never again to expose himself to such an adventure ; and even when he is not devoid of courage, there is nothing more different, though in certain points the connection may appear most intimate, than the talent of conceiving new ideas of certain kinds, and the talent of developing these same ideas: altogether occupied with the idea itself, the in- ventor is most frequently incapable of directing his attention to all the accessories which must be re-united before his invention can be understood and approved; his attention being entirely occu- pied with what is passing in his own mind, he is incapable of attending to what passes in the minds of others; incapable of arranging and directing his operations, so that he may make the most favour- able impression upon them. Thus the ingenious philosopher, who has deli- vered the most excellent instructions respecting the art of developing the thoughts of others, and who possessed in so perfect a degree the talent of developing his own, well knew how necessary it was, that in every career of invention, except that of eloquence, minds should be attended by an accoucheur. How many difficulties did not Diderot experience in effecting this development, he who possessed this talent in so excellent a degree, where the two parties were agreed, had a common interest and were equally well disposed ! How numerous were the difficultiesexperiencedby the ingenious artists of every description to whom he applied in making him comprehend the fruits 330 B.IV. Ch. XVI.— RATES OF INTEREST— EVILS, &c. of their studies, when they had for their interpre- ter the man the most capable and the best dis- posed to understand them ! How much more difficult would they have found it had they been applicants for the assistance necessary to render their projects available to a rich ignoramus, filled with the idea of the necessity which existed for his assistance, and puffed up with that pride which commonly accompanies wealth, when un- attended by that politeness which education teaches, and full of that distrust which a poor projector cannot fail to inspire in the mind of an individual favoured with the gifts of fortune ! Should the inventor succeed in making his plan understood, he will still find it difficult to make the interest of the capitalist accord with his de- sires : it is in this respect that the prohibition displays its mischievous qualities. How shall the poor inventor dare to propose a loan at the ordinary rate of interest? This rate may at all times be obtained without risk. Where then would be the advantage to the capitalist in such a bargain ? Is it possible that it could be otherwise than disadvantageous to him ? A loan at the or- dinary rate of interest cannot be hoped for ; it is only to a most intimate friend that such a loan would be granted. Deprived of this resource, how shall he dare to propose to the individual whose assistance he seeks, to expose himself to the rigour of the laws ? Scarcely daring to ask for the assistance he needs, upon the most secure and unexceptionable conditions, how shall he pro- pose conditions which the laws consider criminal ? Whilst there are laws against usury, it may be said, there will still be usury. Yes, and whilst there are laws against theft, there will still be B.IV. Ch. XVI.— KATES OF INTEREST— EVILS, &c. 331 thieves: does it follow^ that the laws which forbid theft are without effect, and that theft is as com- mon as if these laws did not exist r In the same proportion as the tendency of these prohibitory laws is unfavourable to true merit in the career of invention, is it favourable to the cheat which assumes the appearance of merit, were it only by the advantage given to imposture, by preventing merit from entering into the com- petition. The essential requisite is not merit, but the gift of persuasion : this gift most naturally belongs to the superficial man, who knows the world, half enthusiast and half rogue; and not to the studious and laborious individual, who is only acquainted with the abstract subjects of his studies. It is true, that at all times truth pos- sesses powerful advantages ; but these advantages are less in proportion as the career to which it relates is more removed from the ordinary routine, respecting which, ordinary minds are capable of forming a judgment upon what is presented to them. It has therefore happened, that of all pro- jectors, those have been treated with the greatest confidence, whose projects are now known to have been founded upon no basis of truth. Were it possible to ascertain the amount furnished under the existing laws against usury by capitalists, to the authors of useful and practicable projects, it would most probably be found less than the amount which in the same space of time has been drawn by the professors of alchemy from the ava- ricious credulity of the ignorant or half learned. Truth possesses, however, this advantage over error of every kind: it will ultimately prevail, how frequent or how deplorable soever may have been the disgraces it has undergone. This error respecting prohibitory laws is nearly discredited ; 332 B.IV. Ch. XVI.— RATES OF INTEREST— EVILS, &c. this source of delusion is nearly closed for ever. As the world advances, the snares, the traps, the pitfalls, which inexperience has found in the path of inventive industry, will be filled up by the fortunes and the minds of those who have fallen into them and been ruined : in this, as in every other career, the ages gone by have been the forlorn hope, which has received for those who follow them the blows of fortune. There is not one reason for hoping less well of future projects than of those which are passed ; but here is one for hoping better. The more closely the reasons, on account of which Adam Smith would have desired to dis- courage projectors, are examined, the more asto- nishing it appears that he should have so widely deviated from the principles he had himself laid down. It is probable, that his imagination had been pre-occupied with the idea of certain incau- tious or dishonest projectors, the history of whose proceedings had fallen under his own observation, and that he had a little too promptly taken these few individuals as exact models of the whole race. To preserve himself from the error of too hasty and indiscriminate generalizations, never to allow any proposition to escape without having made all the reservations necessary to confine it within the limits of the exact truth, is the last boun- dary, and even now the ideal boundary of human wisdom.* * Adam Smith, after having read the letter upon Projects, which was addressed to him, and printed at the end of the first edition of " The Defence of Usury," declared to a gen- tleman, the common friend of the two authors, that he had been deceived. With the tidings of his death, Mr. Bentham received a copy of his works, which had been sent to him as a token of esteem. B.IV. Ch. XVI.— RATES OF INTEREST— EVILS, Ac. 333 Nothing would more contribute to the prelimi- nary separation of useless from useful projects, and to secure the labourers in the hazardous routes of invention from failure, than a good treatise upon projects in general. It would form a suitable ap- pendix to the judicious and philosophical work of the abb^ Condillac upon Systems. What this is in matters of theory, the other would be in matters of practice. The execution of such a work might be promoted by the proposal of a liberal reward for the most instructive work of this kind. A survey might be made of the different branches of human knowledge ; and what each presents as most remarkable in this respect might be brought to view. Chemistry has its philosopher's stone ; medicine its universal panacea ; mechanics its perpetual motion ; politics, and particularly that part which regards finance, its method of liqui- dating, without funds and without injustice, na- tional debts. Under each head of error, the in- superable obstacles presented by the nature of things to the success of any such scheme, and the illusions which may operate upon the human mind to hide the obstacles, or to nourish the ex- pectation of seeing them surmounted, might be pointed out. Above all, dishonest projectors, impostors of every kind, ought to be depicted : the qualities of mind and character which they possess in common should be described ; their volubility, their rapi- dity, that lightness, natural or affected, with which they treat the arguments opposed to them; that manner which they have, and which it is neces- sary they should have, of declaiming, instead of analysing and reasoning; of flying off in tan- gents when they are pressed — of giving birth to incidents ; of pretending to be tired with the spe- 334 B.IV. Ch. XVI.— RATES OF INTEREST, EVILS, Ac. cies of opposition they experience; of attaching themselves to the manner in which questions and doubts, or arguments, are proposed to them, in- stead of to the foundations of things themselves; of complaining of the prejudices which they pre- tend are experienced against them ; and in quit- ting the ground under those circumstances, in which, if they were sincere, it would be most proper for them to maintain themselves there. But throughout the whole work, that tone of malignity, which seems to triumph in the disgraces of genius, and which seeks to envelop wise, .useful, and successful projects, in the contempt and ridicule with which useless and rash projects are justly covered, should be guarded against. Such is the character, for example, of the works of the splenetic Swift : under the pretence of ridiculing projectors, he seeks to deliver up, to the contempt of the ignorant, the sciences themselves. They were hateful in his eyes on two accounts: the one because he was unacquainted with them ; the other, because they were the work, and the glo- rious work, of that race which he hated ever since he had lost the hope of governing part of it. The projectors who seek to deceive ought to be unmasked ; those who are deceived, to be in- structed: the interestsof science and justice equally demand that they should be distinguished. I cannot discern what purpose ridicule can serve, if it be not to confound the distinction between useless and useful projectors. In conclusion, some general counsels might be added for the use of those who, little versed in the fundamental sciences in which the respective projects take their rise, may find themselves in a situation to be addressed by the author of a pro- ject, with the design of obtaining their assistance. B.IV. Ch. XVI.— RATES OF INTEREST— EVILS, &c. 335 In effect, it is true that the whole work would be a collection of more or less approved counsels ; but, in making the recapitulation, some general remarks might be added, which would not have been suitable elsewhere, but which might be par- ticularly useful here. They might, for example, be advised to apply to those learned individuals who would be able to supply their ignorance : the class of learned men who ought to be found com- petent judges in each department might be pointed out. Instructions might be furnished to enable them to judge of the counsels of the judges them- selves, by warnmg them of the interests and pre- judices, to the seduction of which these judges may themselves be exposed. 1 I I APPENDIX. (A.) Book I. ch. viii. p. 62. On Subscriptions to Matters of Opinion. Of the two English Universities, Oxford is the most ancient and most dignified. Of its numerous statutes which are penned in Latin, as many as fill a moderate duodecimo volume are published, as the title page de- clares, for the use of youth : and of these care is taken, (for the honour of the government let it be spoken) that those, for whose observance they are designed, shall not, without their own default, be ignorant : since, at every man's admission, a copy is put into his hands. All these statutes, as well those that are seen as those that are not seen, every student at his admission is sworn in Latin to observe, " So help me God," says the matriculated per- son, " touching as 1 do the most holy Gospel of Christ."* The barbers, cooks, bed-makers, errand-boys, and other unlettered retainers to the university, are sworn in En- glish to the observance of these Latin statutes. The oath thus solemnly taken there has not, we may be morally certain, for a course of many generations, per- haps from the first era of its institution, been a single person that has ever kept. Now, though customary, it is perhaps not strictly proper, as it tends to confusion and * Tu fidem dabis ad observandutn omnia statuta. privilegia, et con- suetudines hujus universitatis Oxon. Ita te Deus aojuvet, tactis sacro Sanctis Christi evangeliis.— Parecfcote sive Excerpta e Carport Statutorum, p. 250, Oxon. 1756. 22 338 APPENDIX, On Subscriptions to Matters of Opinion. to false estimates, to apply the term perjury, without dis- tinction, to the breach of an assertive and to that of a pro- missive declaration — to the breach of an oath and to that of a vow, and to brand with the same mark of infamy a solemn averment, which at the time of making it was certainly false, — and a single departure from a declared resolution, which at the time of declaring it might possibly have been sincere.* But, if they themselves are to be believed who have made the oath, and who break it, — the university of Oxford, for this century and half has been, and at the time I am writing is, a commonwealth of perjurers. The streets of Oxford, said (the first) Lord Chatham once, " are paved with disaffection." That weakness is outgrown : but he might have added then (if that had been the statesman's care) and any one may add still, " and with perjury." The face of this, as of other pros- titutions, varies with the time : purjurers in their youth, they become suborners of perjury in their old age. It should seem that there was once a time, when the persons subjected to this yoke, or some one on their be- half, began to murmur : for, to quiet such murmurs, or at «ny rate to anticipate them, — a practitioner, of a faculty now extinct, but then very much in vogue, — a physician of the soul, a casuist, was called in. His prescription, at the end of every one of these abridged editions of the statutes ; his prescription, under the title of Epinomis seu explaiiatioJuramentl,&iC. stands annexed.f This casuist is kind enough to inform you, that though you have taken an oath indeed, to observe all these statutes — and that without exception, yet, in ninety-nine instances out of a hundred, it amounts to nothing. What, in those instances you are bound to do is — not to keep your oath, but to take your choice whether you will do that or suffer — not to do what you are bid ; but, if you happen to be found out (for this proviso, I take for granted, is to be supplied) to b€ar the penalty. For — what now do you think your sovereign seriously wishes you to do, when he * " Statuimus," say these reverend legislators, " idque sub poena per- jurii," in a multitude of places. f The title at length is Epinomis seu Explanatio Juramenti quod de ebservandis Staiulis UniversHatis a singulis pretstari solet: ^uateuus scilicet, seu qiiousque oHigare jurantes eensendum est. APPENDIX. 339 On Subscriptions to Matters of Opinion. forbids you to commit murder? that you should abstain from murder at all events? No surely; but that, if you happen to be found out and convicted, you should sit quiet while the halter is fitted to your neck. Who is this casuist, who by his superior power washes away the guilt from purjury, and controuls the judgments of the Almighty? Is it the legislator himself ? By no means. That indeed might make a difference. The sanction of an oath would then not with certainty be violated; it would only with certainty be profaned. It was a Bishop Saunderson, who in the bosom of a Pro- testant church, before he was made a bishop, had set up a kind of confessional box, whither tender consciences repaired from all parts to heal their scruples. This institution, whether it were the fruit of blind- ness or of a sinister policy, has answered in an admira- ble degree some, at least, of the purposes for which it was probably designed. It has driven the consciences of the greater part of those by whom the efficient parts of government are one day to be filled, into a net, of which the clergy hold the cords. The fear and shame of every young man of sense, of spirit, and reflection, on whom these oaths are imposed, must at one time or other take the alarm. What! says he to himself, am I a perjurer? If he asks his own judgment, it condemns him. What then shall he do ? Perjury, were it only for the shame of it, is no light matter: if his education has been ever so loose, he has frequently heard it condemned ; if strict and virtuous, he has never heard it mentioned without abhorrence. But, when he thinks of the guilt of it, hell yawns under his feet. What then shall he do? Whither then shall he betake himself? He flies to his reverend in- structors in a state of desperation. " These men are older than myself," says he, " they are more learned, they are therefore wiser : on them rests the charge of my education. My own judgment, indeed, condemns me; but my own. judgment is weak and uninformed. Why may not I trust tc others ? See, their hands are outstretched to comfort me ' Where can be the blame in listening to them? in being guided by them ? in short, in surrendering my judgmen into their hands ? Are not they my rulers, my instructors 22. 340 APPENDIX. On Subscriptions to Matters of Opinion. the very persons whom my parents have appointed to take charge of me, to check my presumption, and to in- form my ignorance? What obligation am I under, nay what liberty have I to oppose my feeble lights to theirs ? Do they not stand charged with the direction of my con- science? charged by whatsoever I ought to hold most sa- cred ? Are they not the ministers of God's word ? the depo- sitaries of our holy religion ? the very persons, to whose guidance I vowed, in the person of my godfathers and godmothers, to submit myself, under the name of my spiritual pastors and masters? And are they not able and willing to direct me ? In all matters of conscience, then, let me lay down to myselfthe following as inviolable rules : — not to be governed by my own reason ; not to endeavour at the presumptuous and unattainable merit of consistency ; not to consider whether a thing is right or wrong in itself, but what tJiei/ think of it. On all points then let me receive my religion at their hands ; what to them is sacred, let it to me be sacred ; what to them is wicked- ness, let it to me be wickedness ; what to them is truth, let it to me be truth ; let me see as they see, believe as they believe, think as they think, feel as they feel, love as they love, fear as they fear, hate as they hate, esteem as they esteem, perform as they perform, subscribe as they sub- scribe, and swear as they swear. With them is honour, peace, and safety ; without them, is ignominy, contention, and despair." Such course must every young man, who is brought up under the rod of a technical religion, dis- tinct from morality and bestrewed with doubts and dan- gers, take on a thousand occasions, or run mad. To whom else should he resort for counsel ? to whom else should he repair? To the companions of his own age? They will laugh at him, and call him methodist : for many a one who dreads even hobgoblins alone, laughs at them in company. To their friends and relations who are advanced in life, and who live in the world ? The answer they get from them, if they are fortunate enough to get a serious one, is — that in all human establishments there are imperfections ; but that innovation is dangerous, and reformation can only come from above : that young >^en are apt to be hurried away by the warmth of their APPENDIX. 341 On Subscriptions to Matters of Opinion. temper, led astray by partial views of things, of which they are unable to see the whole : that these eifusions of self-sufficiency are much better repressed than given way to : that what it is not in our power to correct, it were better to submit to without notice : that prudence commands what custom authorises — to swim quietly with the stream : that to bring matters of religion upon the carpet, is a ready way to excite either aversion or con- tempt : that humanity forbids the raising of scruples in the breasts of the weak, — good humour, the bringing up of topics that are austere, — good manners, topics that are disgusting : that policy forbids our offending the incurious with the display of our sagacity, the ignorant with the ostentation of our knowledge, the loose with the example of our integrity, and the power- ful with the noise of our complaints : that, with regard to the point in question, oaths, like other obligations, are to be held for sacred or insignificant, according to the fashion : that perjury is no disgrace, except when it happens to be punished : and that, as a general rule, it concerns every man to know and to remember, as he tenders his peace of mind and his hopes of fortune, that there are institutions, which though mischievous are not to be abolished, and though indefensible are not to be condemned. A sort of tacit convention is established : " give your soul up into my hands — I ensure it from perdition. Surely the terms, on your part, are easy enough : exertion there needs none: all that is demanded of you is — to shut your eyes, ears, lips, and to sit quiet. The topic of religion is surely a forbidding enough, as well as a for- bidden topic: all that you have to do then, is to think nothing about the matter ; look not into, touch not the ark of the Lord, and you are safe." (B.) Book I. ch. viii. p. 62. Mischievousness of Reward latent — Exemplifications. When a reward is groundless, it may be either simply groundless, or positively mischievous : the act, which it 342 APPENDIX. Mischievousness of Reward latent — Exemplifications. is employed to produce, may be either simply useless, or pernicious. It would be a nugatory lesson to say, that reward should not be applied to produce any act, of which the tendency is acknowledged to be pernicious : and this, whether such act have been aggregated to the number of offences or not. The only cases which it can be of any use, in this point of view, to mention, are those in which the mischievousness of the act, or the tendency of the re- ward to produce it, is apt to lie concealed. To begin with the cases, which come under the former of these descriptions : those in which the mischievousness of the act is apt to lie concealed. One great class of pub- lic services, for which rewards have been or might be offered, are those which consist in the extension of knowledge, or according to the more common, though obscure and imposing phrase, the discovery and propa- gation of truth. Now there is one way in which rewards offered for the propogation of truth (that is, of what is looked upon, or yjrofessed to be looked upon, as truth) cannot but have a pernicious tendency : and that of whatever nature be the proposed truth. A point being proposed, concerning which men in general are thought to be ignorant or divided, if a man sincerely desired that the truth relative to that point should be as- certained, and in consequence of that desire is content to furnish the expense of a reward, the natural course is — to invite men to the enquiry. " How stands the mutter? Which of the two contradictory propositions is the true one?" To u qnestion of some such form as this, he requires an answer. The service then to which he annexes his reward, is the giving an answer to a ques- tion; such an answer as upon examination shall appear to be a true one, or to come nearest to the truth. The tendency of a reward thus offered, to produce the disco- very of the truth, is obvious: the tendency of it will, at least, be to produce the discovery of what to him, who puts in for the reward, shall appear to be truth. Whatelse should it tend to produce? My aim being to establish what to you shall appear to be the truth, what other means have I of doing this, but by advancing what appears to me to I APPENDIX. 343 Mischievousness of Reward latent — Exemplifications. be so? Accordingly, thus to apply the reward, is to pro- mote a sincere and impartial enquiry, and to pursue the best, and indeed only course that by means of artificial reward can be pursued for promoting real knowledge. Another course, which has been sometimes taken, is — to assume the truth of the one of two contradictory propositions, that may be framed concerning any object of enquiry, — and to make the demonstration of the truth of that proposition the condition of the reward. In this course the tendency of the reward is pernicious. The habit of veracity is one of the great supports of human society : a virtue which in point of utility ought to be, and in point of fact is, enforced in the highest degree by the moral sanction. To undermine that habit, is to un- dermine one of the principal supports of human society. The tendency of a reward thus offered is to undermine this virtuous habit, and to introduce the opposite vi- cious one. The tendency of it may be to produce what is called logical truth, or not, as may happen : but it is, at any rate, to produce ethical falsehood : it may tend to promote knowledge or error, as it may happen ; but it tends, at any rate, to promote mendacity. The proposition either is true or it is false : and, be that as it may, men are either agreed about its being true, or they are not. In as far as they are agreed, the reward is useless; in as far as they are not, it tends to make them act as if they were, and is pernicious. It may be said — no : all that it tends to do, at least all that it is designed to do, is to call forth such, and such only, whose opinion is really in favour of the proposition, and to put them upon giving their reasons for it : it is not to corrupt their veracity, but to overcome their indolence. But whatever may be the design, the former is in fact its tendency. On the one side, they have reward to urge them; on the other, they have impunity to permit them. For, when a man declares that his opinions on a given subject are so and so, who can say that they are other wise ? Who can say with certainty, what are a man's private opinions? And, if the effect is bad, what signifies the intention? Or how, indeed, can the intention be 344 APPENDIX. Mischievousness of Reward latent — Exemplijications. pure, if it be seen that the effect is likely to be a bad one? Thus would it stand, were it doubtful whether there are any persons or no, whose unbiassed opinions are on the opposite side to that on which the demonstration is sought to be procured. But the case always is, that it is clear there are such persons: that it is the very per- suasion of there being such, that is the cause of offering the reward ; and that the more numerous they are, the more likely it is to be offered, and the greater it is likely to be. Such then is the danger of promoting mendacity : to avoid which danger, it may be laid down in short terms, as a general rule, that Reward should be given, not for de- monstration, but for enquiry. More than this, a reward thus applied tends always, in a certain degree, to frustrate its own purpose ; and is so far, not only inefhcacious, but efficacious on the other side. It does as good as tell mankind — that, in the opinion of him at least by whom the reward is offered, the probability is, that men's opinions are most likely to be on the op- posite side; and in so far gives them reason to think, that the truth is also on that opposi>te side . " People in general," a man will naturally say to himself, " are not of this way of thinking : if they were, what need of all this pains to make them so ?" This then affords another rea- son why reward should be given — not for demonstration but for enquiry. Such, accordingly, has been the course pursued in relation to almost every branch of science, or supposed science. The science, or supposed science of divinity, furnishes exceptions, which are perhaps the only ones. What should we say to a man who should seek to pro- mote physical knowledge by such devices? What should we say to a man, who instead of setting men honestly and fairly to enquire whether, in regard to living powers, for example, the momentum were in the simple or in the duplicate proportion of the velocity ; whether heat were a substance, or only a quality of other substances ; whe- ther blunt or pointed conductors of electricity were the safest; should pay them for endeavouring to prove — that APPENDIX. 345 Mischievousness of Reward latent — Exemplifications. in living forces, the momentum is in the simple proportion only, that heat is only a quality, and that blunt con- ductors are the safest? In divinity, however, examples of this method of ap- plying reward are frequent. It may be said, that an exception ought to be made from the rule, in the cases wherein, whichever side the truth may be, the utility is clearly on the side thus favoured. Thus, there is use, for instance, in the people's believing in the being and attributes of a God : and that even in a political view, since upon that depends all the assistance which the political can derive from the relio-i- ous sanction : and that there can be no use in their dis- believing it. That there is use again, in the people's believing in the truth of the Jewish prophecies ; since upon that depends one argument in favour of the truth of that history, the truth of which is one main ground of men's expectation of the rewards and punishments be- longing to that sanction. This observation certainly deserves great attention. It exhibits a reason which there may be for making an exception to the rule. It does not, however, invalidate the arguments adduced, as above, in favour of it : it does not disprove the pro- bability of the mischiefs on the apprehension of which it is grounded. What it does, is to exhibit a benefit as to acting in balance against these inconveniences. If then the interests of religion be at variance with those of virtue, and it be necessary to endanger the one, in order to promote the efficacy of the other, — so then it must be. It is to be observed, that all the advantage which can accrue to the cause from this manoeuvre, is composed of the difference between what it may derive from these hireling advocates, and what, were there no such artifi- cial encouragement given, it would derive from volun- teers. On this head it may be worth considering, whether the calling forth of the one does not contribute to pre- vent the enlistment of the other. " What need is there for me, a stranger, to give myself the trouble, when there are so many others whose particular business it is, and who are so well paid for it?" Of this sort is the language. 346 APPENDIX. Mischievousness of Reward latent— 'Exemplificatwns. which a man will very naturally hold with himself on such occasions. A strange circumstance it would be indeed, — and one which would afford no very favourable presumption either of the truth or of the utility of the cause which it is meant to favour, — if all the unbiassed suffrages of any considerable majority in number or value of the thinking men should, if left to themselves, be on the op- posite side. Great, indeed, must be the penury of un- bought advocates, that can make it advantageous, — I da not say merely to the cause of truth, but to any cause, however wide of the truth, — to apply to mercenaries for assistance. Of how little weight the suffrages of the latter are in comparison of those of the former, — let any one judge, who has observed the superior eclat with which the work of a layman is received, when it hap- pans to be on the side of orthodoxy. But, however the matter may stand with regard to questions of political importance, in which utility is clearly on one side, — ^whatever reason there be for violating the law of impartiality in this case, it ceases altogether when applied to the merely speculative points, which form the matter of those articles of faith, to which, on a variety of occasions, subscriptions or other testimonies of accep- tation are required. These will serve as one set of in- stances of the other branch of the cases, where the mis- chievous effects of reward are apt to lie concealed : viz. where, in the case of a line of conduct produced by a reward, apparent or no, the tendency of the reward to produce it is apt not to be apparent at first glance ; inasmuch as it may escape observation, that the ad- vantage held forth acts to this purpose in the capacity of a reward. For an emolument to operate in the capacity of a reward, so as to give birth to action of any kind, it is not necessary that it should be designed so to do. When- ever any such connexion is established, between emolu- ment on the one part, and a man's conduct on the other, that by acting in any manner, he sees that he acquires an emolument, or chance of emolument, which without acting in such manner he could not have, — the view of APPENDIX. 347 Mischievoiisness of Reward latent — Exemplifications. such emolument will operate on him in the capacity of a reward. It matters not, whether it be the sole act which is to entitle him to the reward, or only one act amongst many. It matters not, whether it be the act to which the reward is professedly annexed, or any other act of which no mention is made. It may not be held up to view in that character -. it may even be not held up to view at all. In this unconspicuous way an emolument may operate, and in a thousand instances does operate, in the capacity of a reward, on a long and indefinite course of action; in short, on the business of a whole life. Whenever, on the part of the same person, two acts are so connected, that the performance of the one is necessary to his having it in his power to perform the other, a reward annexed to the latter operates eventually as if annexed to the former ; and, whether designedly or not, it promotes the production of the one act as much as of the other. In this case, the having performed the prior act is said to be a qualification for the being permitted to per- form the posterior. The emolument annexed to the act professedly rewarded, is therefore, in this case, as much a reward for assuming the qualification, as a reward for performing the act, for the performance of which a man is required to qualify himself by the performance of the other. In England (for I will go no farther) the subscribing a declaration of this sort is made a qualification for many of the principal emoluments to which a man can aspire : for every preferment in the church; for the liberty of engag- ing in the instruction of youth ; for admission to the benefits of that mode of education which is looked upon as most liberal and advantageous, and thereby to the enjoyment, or the chance of the enjoyment of any one of that ample stock of emoluments, which have been pro- vided in the view of inducing young persons to put themselves in the way of that favourite mode of educa- tion. The articles, or propositions, to which this sub- scription is required, are termed Articles of Religion. By subscribing to these articles a man declares, that he believes the truth of certain facts which they aver. Among these facts there are many, which, whetlvdr true 348 APPENDIX. Mischievousness of Reward latent— ^Exemplifications. or not (a point which is nothing to the present purpose) are plainly, in a political view, of no sort of importance whatsoever. I say of no importance ; since they con- tribute nothing to the furnishing either of any motive to prompt to action, or of any rule or precept to direct it. Be they true, or be they false, — nothing is to be done in consequence ; nothing to be abstained from. The mischievous tendency, which the giving a reward has in this case, is much more palpable than what it has in the other ; because the probability of its giving birth to falsehood is the greater. 1 . In the case of demonstrative lectures, all that it is absolutely necessary a man should do, is — simply to state the arguments, in favour of the proposition in question : he does not necessarily assert his own belief of the truth of it. " Such are the reasons," he may say, " which induce other people, and which, if attended to, may perhaps in- duce you to believe it : whether they are conclusive or not, it lies upon you to judge : as to myself, whether I my- self believe it or no, is another matter. I do not tell you : I am not bound to tell you." In the case of subscrip- tion, he directly, plainly, and solemnly says — I believe it. 2. In the next place, the probability of falsehood is much greater in this case than in the other. In the case of demonstrative lectures, men are reasoned with, lest otherwise they should not believe. In the case of sub- scriptions, men are rewarded for subscribing, because it is known many do not believe. Had men never disbe- lieved or doubted, they never would have been called upon to subscribe. It would have been useless and needless ; nor would any one have thought of it. Those who are inclined to place in the most favour- able point of view the political efficacy of subscriptions to such articles, have called them articles of peace : as if there were nothing more in saying, I believe this propo- sition, than in saying, I engage not to say anything that tends to express a disbelief of it. They would have been much better named had they been termed articles of war. In regard to speculative opinions, there are but two cases ip which men can be said to be at peace : — when APPENDIX. 349 Mischievousness of Reward latent— Exemplifications. they think about it, and are of the same opinion ; and when they think nothing about the matter : unless we reckon as a third, that of their thinking about it, and differing about it, and not caring about the difference. That the expedient in question has no tendency to pro- mote peace of the first kind has been already shown. It is equally clear, that it has none to produce peace of either of the two other kinds. The tendency of it is just the contrary. If left to himself, there is not one person in a hundred who would ever trouble himself about the matter. Of this we may be pretty certain. What motive should he have? What should lead him to it? What pleasure or what profit is there to be got by it? If left then to themselves, the bulk of mankind, — or, to speak more properly, the bulk of those whom it is proposed thus to discipline, — would think nothing about the matter. They would therefore be in a state of the profoundest and most lasting peace. If this should not be granted, at least it will be granted, that it would be possible for them to be so. Subscriptions render it impossible. For making peace between men, subscriptions are just the same sort of recipe, that it would be for making peace between two mastiffs, to set a bone before them, and then tie them to the same stake. When both parties are at liberty, both parties are at their ease, and there is peace between them. But when the stronger party says to the weaker, — " Stand forth and lie in the sight of God, or give up the choicest advantages of society, that we may engross them to ourselves," what sort of peace is it that can subsist between them ? Just that sort of peace which subsists between the house- breaker and the householder, when the one has bound the other hand and foot and gagged him. It is not to be denied, but that there may be some sort of uneasiness between them in the first-mentioned state of things : to wit, where, neither of them being sacrificed, they are both at liberty, and both of them protected. But what sort of uneasiness is this ? Just that sort of uneasiness which may, perhaps, subsist between two neighbours, at the thoughts that neither of them can break into the other's house. Against this sort of uneasiness, peace, it must be 350 APPENDIX. Mischievousness of Reward latent — Exemplificatiom. confessed, affords no remedy : but, from the possibility of there subsisting this sort of uneasiness between two neighbours, or two nations, who ever thought of speaking of them as not being at peace ? If this method of insuring peace were good in one case, how should it be otherwise in any other? Religion, or rather the nonsense which has been grafted on it — (for, the part that is capable of being made useful is not thus exposed to controversy) — religion, I say, is not the only topic which has given rise to controversy. So long as there is any man whose knowledge falls short of omniscience, and whose faculties are liable to error, men will have their differences : they will differ about matters of judgment, and about matters of taste : about the sciences, about the arts, about the ordi- nary occurrences of life : in short, about everything which has a name. It would then be making peace among the lovers of music to make them swear, before God, that they think the Italian style, or that they think the French style of music is the more pleasing : among the lovers of heroic poetry, that they think it best in blank verse, or that they think it best in rhyme : among the lovers of dramatic poetry, that the unities of time and place may be dispensed with, or that they must, at any rate, be observed. It would be making peace between an affectionate pair, to question them about every pos- sible point of domestic management, till some slight diversity were found in their opinions, and then force one of them to swear, before God, that he was convinced his own opinion was the wrong one. It would be making peace but surely by this time, the pacific tendency of this policy must be sufficiently understood. Another mischievous effect of this policy is the ten- dency it has to vitiate the understanding. Over a man's genuine opinion, such forms, it has been shown, can have no influence : either his veracity must give way, or his understanding, or both : he must deceive either him- self or others. A deceit of some kind or other he must put on somebody; either on himself or others. There is one thing which a man cannot do ; that is, destroy the force of arguments which are actually present to his AFPENDIX. 3^1 Mischievousness of Reward latent — Exemplifications. mind. There is another thing which he is enabled to do in a great measure ; that is, keep them from getting there. This, accordingly, is what, if the consciousness of falsehood sits uneasy on him, he will labour to do with all his might. To believe, is not in his power : for, when all the arguments that have ever been urged, or can be devised in favour of the proposition, are col- lected and applied to his mind, and make no impression, what help is there? What may perhaps be in his power, is — not to disbelieve : and that, if possible, he will do. But thus to shut the right eye, if one may so say, of the understanding, and keep open only the left, is not the work of a minute nor of an hour. He must make many ineffectual attacks, and return as often to the charge. He must wage war against the stubbornness of the understanding : he must bring it under the dominion of the affections. He must debilitate its powers : he must render it incapable of placing, in a clear light, the difference between right and wrong. In a word, he must instil into his mind a settled habit of partiality and bad reasoning: a habit of embracing falsehood with facility, and regard- ing truth, not with indifference merely, but with sus- picion, in the apprehension of being brought by it into trouble. One might imagine, that it could not have both these bad effects at once : that if it have the one, it cannot have the other: if a man disbelieves, his understanding, — • if he believes, his morals, — are yet safe. But, whoever thinks thus is led away by words : he does not understand aright the workings of the human mind. He supposes the mind fixed as between two rocks : whereas it is per- petually shaken, and tossed about, as by a thousand waves. He supposes a man at all times perfectly conscious of the state of his own mind : and aware of the momenta and directions of the incessantly fluctuating forces that are operating on him. But this is not the case with one man in a million, in any the least degree : nor perhaps with any man in perfection. Thus it is also with hypo- crisy and fanaticism : it might naturally be imagined, that the one excludes the other; but repeated expe- rience, and long continued observation, have at length 352 APPENDIX. 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