IBRARY DIVERSITY *N DIEGO o THE EISE AND THE FALL; OK, THE ORIGIN OF MORAL EVIL. IN THREE PARTS. PAET I. THE SUGGESTIONS OP REASON. H. THE DISCLOSURES OF REVELATION. HI. THE CONFIRMATIONS OF THEOLOGY. NEW YORK: PUBLISHED BY HURD AND HOUGHTON. 459 BKOOME STREET. 1866. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1866, by HURD AND HOUQHTON, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE: STEREOTYPED AND FEINTED BT H. 0. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY. PREFACE. IT is not intended in the following pages to di- rectly answer the age-old and still vexed problem, " Why must and does evil exist under the govern- ment of a benevolent God ? " With whatever of mystery that inquiry may be obscured, the two great facts remain unquestioned, God is benevo- lent, and yet evil exists. Perplexing, then, as our reason may imagine the explanation to be, the two cannot be incompatible ; yet how is it that after so many centuries of discussion there is as yet no universally accepted solution ? Can it be that the premises, upon which the thousand theories pro- ceed, need re examination ? No harm can be done, at least, by such review, if it is conducted in a proper spirit ; and it is such a discussion that we have here attempted. The first inquiry that meets us is one of histori- cal fact. In what way, and under what circum- stances, was moral evil originated in, or introduced into, the world ? And the only authentic informa- iv PREFACE. tion which we possess upon this question is con- tained in that remarkable narrative, the first three chapters of Genesis. To this (having no higher authority) we must refer as an infallible record, and seek, through a critical examination, its real meaning and purport. Should the result of our studies seem to differ from the customary interpre- tation, it will be proper to test our view farther by scrutinizing it in the light of rational and theo- logical principles. Should it prove consistent with and even confirmed by these, we shall be more likely to accept it as truly setting forth the real meaning of the story. Accordingly, in these pages the train of reason- ing which precedes the exposition of our view, for the purpose of suggesting in advance its probabil- ity, and also the brief and imperfect comparison of theological doctrines by which it is followed, are both to be regarded as of no higher importance than as attempted corroborations of the view itself, as deduced from the narrative in Genesis. How- ever unsatisfactory, therefore, they may prove, in whole or in part, their imperfection should not prejudice the main argument, which is contained in Part II, and to which they are only subordinate. October, 1857. PREFACE. V EIGHT years have passed since the above Pref- ace was written with the expectation that the fol- lowing pages would then be shortly published, and they have not yet been given to the public. The delay has arisen from various causes, but princi- pally from the author's unwillingness to put forth a work advancing views or suggestions which more mature reflection might make him desirous to with- draw. Having come, however, to find himself strengthened by subsequent thought, in the views herein set forth, and to see the course of Biblical criticism and of theological discussion (both of which have greatly improved in character during the last ten years) more and more tending to their support and confirmation, he ventures to believe that their presentation now will not be destitute of interest and value. The book is printed without material change : a very few paragraphs and two or three references to authorities met with since the original writing, are all that have been added. This will explain the absence of all reference to many recent and valuable works which might have been cited or quoted with advantage, had the book been rewritten. January, 1866. CONTENTS. PART I. THE SUGGESTIONS 01? REASON. CHAPTER I. PAGE INTRODUCTORY 1 CHAPTER II. OF THE SOURCES OF THE MORAL FACULTY .... 6 CHAPTER III. OF THE OFFICE OF THE MORAL FACULTY IN THE MENTAL ECONOMY 17 CHAPTER IV. OF THE ULTERIOR EFFECTS OF THE MORAL FACULTY . . 30 CHAPTER V. THAT THE MORAL FACULTY IS A DISTINCT AND INDEPEN- DENT FACULTY 41 CHAPTER VI. THAT MAN HAD NO OCCASION FOR THE MORAL FACULTY AT THE OUTSET OF HIS EXISTENCE 50 CHAPTER VII. THAT GOD MIGHT PREFER TO MAKE MAN'S MORAL AGENCY THE CONSEQUENCE OF HIS OWN ACT 59 Viii CONTENTS. PART n. THE DISCLOSURES OF REVELATION. CHAPTER I. PAGE MAN'S CREATION AS A MORAL BEING NOT ASSERTED IN REV- ELATION 71 CHAPTER II. INDIRECT EVIDENCE THAT MAN WAS NOT ORIGINALLY A MORAL BEING, DRAWN FROM THE ACCOUNT OF HIS CREATION AND PRIMITIVE HISTORY 80 CHAPTER III. DIRECT EVIDENCE TO THE SAME EFFECT DRAWN FROM THE SAME NARRATIVE. THE COMMAND 93 CHAPTER IV. EFFECT OF THE FOREGOING, AND OBJECTIONS TO IT CONSID- ERED 104 CHAPTER V. EXAMINATION OF THE NARRATIVE CONTINUED. THE DISOBE- DIENCE 114 CHAPTER VI. EXAMINATION OF THE NARRATIVE CONTINUED. THE EFFECTS OF THE FORBIDDEN FRUIT 128 CHAPTER VII. EXAMINATION OF THE NARRATIVE CONTINUED. THE SEN- TENCES NOT PUNISHMENTS 139 CHAPTER VIII. THE SENTENCE OF EVE ... . . . . . . 151 CHAPTER IX. THE SENTENCE OF ADAM 170 CHAPTER X. ELUCIDATION BY HYPOTHESIS .187 CONTENTS. IX CHAPTER XI. PAGE REVIEW OF OBJECTIONS FROM THE FIFTH CHAPTER OF ROMANS 200 PART HI. THE CONFIRMATIONS OF THEOLOGY. CHAPTER I. THE COMMON VIEW STATED AND COMPARED .... 223 CHAPTER II. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE COMMON VIEW, AND THEIR SOLUTION 240 CHAPTER in. THE COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED WITH RE- SPEC." TO THE METHOD OF ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE RACE 257 CHAPTER IV. THE COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED WITH REFER- ENCE TO ITS DOCTRINE THAT MANKIND IS A FAILURE . 275 CHAPTER V. OUTLINES OF THE PROGRESSIVE MORAL SYSTEM . . . 288 APPENDIX . .... 305 THE EISE AND THE FALL; OR, THE ORIGIN OF MOEAL EVIL. PART I. THE SUGGESTIONS OF EEASON. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. IT is no wonder that in all ages the presence of Moral Evil in the world has confounded the minds of men. When they looked forth upon the mate- rial universe, whether with the searching ken of the philosopher, or the superficial glance of the ignorant, they beheld its grandest and its minutest phenomena alike obedient to general, defined, and immutable laws. In systems and in atoms, from Nature's farthest verge to the depths of her most secret cells, was manifested the truth, irresistible by the most stupid or the most perverse, of a single Creator, and an all-pervading and wondrous unity of design and government. Recognizing with rev- erent awe in this sublime harmony of creation the 1 2 THE RISE AND THE FALL. presence of that Eternal Mind, which, sole and almighty, in the depths of his benevolent wisdom, fashioned and controls it, they have turned to the contemplation of his moral kingdom, to view there a spectacle, how different ! Instead of an adjusted plan, whose beneficence and perfection should be- token God's goodness and love, even as the voice of Physical Nature proclaims his wisdom and power, there seems to be disclosed only a chaos of chance, of disorder, of injustice, and of woe ; a sight, indeed, in appearance so unworthy of a good, or even an intelligent ruler, that its observers have fallen back, bewildered and alarmed, to the physical creation, to vindicate their belief in even that ruler's existence. To reduce this mingled mass of contradictions to a system, and to reveal the harmonious principles which the mind instinctively feels must be hidden beneath it, just as all apparent confusions in the material universe are constantly unfolding them- selves into order, are the true aims of moral philos- ophy, and have worthily engaged many of the no- blest intellects of all time. Yet strangely diverse has been the success of ethical from that of physical investigation ; for, while the researches of the latter have discovered only light and beauty and uni- formity of plan, in the former, the more extended the labors, the more various have become the theo- ries, and the deeper the confusion. Even the rev- elations from the Deity himself, which declare the main principles and general outline of his moral INTRODUCTORY. 3 government, have not dispelled the difficulties which surround it, nor shown in clear though distant vis- ion, the range of its eternal truths, in their bright, connected chain, towering above the mists of soph- istry and prejudice. Still, the admitted facts are unreconciled with each other ; still, the essential facts themselves are differently understood or pos- itively denied ; for still, the origin of SIN, the dis- turbing element, and the mode, effects, and purpose of its introduction, remain the topics both of funda- mental importance, and of irreconcilable diversity. May it not be that in these inquiries the same error has prevailed which for so many generations retarded the advance of physical science and phi- losophy, the resort to speculation rather than fact, as the basis of theory ? May not the philosophy of Moral Evil be elucidated in some degree by a more careful examination of the circumstances connected with its origin, as these are revealed in the only authentic relation of them, the inspired narrative in Genesis ? It is true that this story, under an exposition established by venerable au- thority and the general acquiescence, has been almost excluded from the domain of ethics, and abandoned to the theologians, as if here, at least, Reason and Revelation had but doubtful accord- ance. Even so Science and Genesis were supposed to be antagonistic, until traditionary interpretation ceased to becloud the Mosaic cosmogony. Then, that remarkable narrative of the Creation, so long 4 THE RISE AND THE FALL. scoffed at as unscientific and absurd, was seen to be radiant with the light and truth of Him who is the great Author both of Nature and of Inspiration, and whose word is ever consistent with his works. We are not without hope that, by a like means, a similar mutual support and illustration may be dis- covered between the established principles of Moral and Mental Philosophy and the Scripture account of " the Origin of Evil." It is with such a view that we propose to exam- ine, in some of the few pages that follow, that por- tion of Genesis in which are related the facts attending the origin of Moral Evil in our world. Our argument rests chiefly in the construction of the historical record ; but since it is plain that the existence of sin must depend upon the existence of the moral agency or capabilities of man, our brief investigation into the manner of its birth may be properly introduced by tracing the sources, office, and effects of the moral element in the mental economy. We will look for its sources, by inquir- ing what other mental qualities or powers demand it as a desirable and even an essential attendant, thus discovering the necessities of man's nature from which it springs ; its office, by remarking the manner in which it supplies these necessities, through the salutary influence which it is designed to exert, and does exert, upon the whole mind and charac- ter ; and its effects, by showing that while it is the chief means of preserving the entire physical and INTRODUCTORY. 5 mental being of man from lapsing into speedy and inevitable ruin, it also expands and ennobles it, alone enabling it to rise to the glorious destiny of its highest exaltation. These preliminary discussions will, of course, treat of the moral faculty simply as a part of the natural constitution of the mind, and will have no regard to man's connection with the Divine Gov- ernment, or to his future moral accountability. Our purpose is simply to show that Conscience is a natural and necessary part of the creature Man, without which his being would be incom- plete, and the analogies of nature, in the laws of animal being, violated. We shall remain, there- fore, within the province of Mental Philosophy, and repose therein upon principles universally admitted or thoroughly established. THE RISE AND THE FALL. CHAPTER H. OF THE SOURCES OF THE MORAL FACULTY. IN seeking the sources of the moral faculty, our plan leads us to notice the identity of Mind, and the uniformity of its laws in all creatures, so far as it is developed in them respectively. Our attention will be directed more especially to those depart- ments of it in which originates conduct, and which, therefore, occasion the necessity for the moral fac- ulty (or conscience), by giving rise to the thoughts and acts of which this has jurisdiction. There has been little variance among mental philosophers in their general analyses of the mind, and probably its division into the three departments of the Sensibilities, the Intellect, and the Will, as it is the most usual, will be seriously objected to by none. Of these, the Sensibilities, which include the appetites, desires, and affections, lie at the basis of the mind, and are the springs of its every move- ment. There can, in fact, be no mental operation which does not originate in the Sensibilities ; for there must be a desire to act before action can be put forth. Some appetite or desire is awakened, prompting to a particular course of conduct : the OF THE SOURCES OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 7 Intellect considers upon the effect of such suggested conduct, and the Will determines for or against its pursuit. Such is the history of every conceivable human act or thought, whether for good or for evil. Nor is it the history of every human act merely, but of every act of every other creature as well. At this day, doubtless, the analysis we have refer- red to will generally be agreed to be as applicable to the psychology of brutes as of men. Such an organization of mind, indeed, seems from the nature of things unavoidable, and these three departments or agencies, inseparable from any mental constitu- tion, however imperfectly developed. We do not mean that they should be displayed in all creatures in similar proportions, for it is in great measure the dissimilarity of their relative development that con- stitutes the mental diversities of races and of indi- viduals. Thus, in the brute creation the Sensibil- ities, or lowest department of the mind, predominate. The Intellect and Will, though manifest, are feeble in their operations. Brutes reason little, and are not capable of forming settled mental purposes. With Man, on the other hand, though his Sensibili- ties are far more powerful than those of the creat- ures below him, yet the Intellect (the next higher department of the mind) is expanded in a vastly greater ratio, and is in him the characteristic mental feature. His Will, also, is greatly developed and strengthened beyond that of the inferior creatures, 8 THE RISE AND THE FALL. but not in the same degree as the intellectual pow- ers. Few of the race have that firmness of purpose in any endeavor or course of action, that they are constantly through life superior to every enticement from its pursuit. What we call human greatness, or a mental elevation above the average scale of humanity, is generally marked by an extraordinary power of Will. We may suppose, therefore, that in another and higher stage of being, here will be the principal change that the soul will undergo. It will rise to the full development of the Will, (the last and highest department of the mind,) and through the ages of eternity will know no temptation or allurement strong enough to beguile its affections, for an instant, from the conduct which it loves, or its gaze and efforts from the destiny to which it aspires. We may assert, therefore, as a general truth, so far at least as our observation can extend, that, in the natural history of mind, Nature observes her usual analogies, and that its development in the dif- ferent races of creatures maintains a correspondence with the progressive steps of their physical organ- ization. Consciousness, instinct, reason, all are mind, either in the germ, the bud, or expanded growth ; and though some would believe that the difference is both radical, and almost boundless, between the human and brute intelligences, yet, when we follow down the scale of human intellect through the va- rious classes and races of men to its lowest limit, OF THE SOURCES OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 9 such imaginings are dissipated. We only find, as between man and the brutes, just as in their physi- cal structures, a wide distinctioa in perfection of organization and degree of capability, but none that is apparent, in their nature or general principles of psychological constitution. Descending now from the general identity of mind in all creatures, to that particular department, in which, as we have seen, originates conduct, we discover, as might be expected, that in this, the lowest department of mind, this similarity between man and the brutes is most marked. A careful examination into the habits of animals reveals the truth, now generally admitted, that there is probably not one of the sensibilities, not one of the " springs of action " to any conceivable human act, which is not also implanted, in some degree, in the minds of the brutes. These springs of action, indeed, these emotions, desires, and affections, (including the bodily appetites,) are a necessary part of the animal nature of the creature, inseparable from its consti- tution, and essential to its mental being. They have been divided into two classes, the benevolent and malevolent affections. Of these, (though writ- ers differ somewhat in their enumeration of the sim- ple affections,) among the former class have been placed love, friendship, patriotism, gratitude, pity, &c. Among the latter class, hatred, jealousy, envy, resentment. Probably these lists might be reduced in number by a closer analysis ; but this is imma- 10 THE RISE AND THE FALL. terial to our present argument. Even taking the enumerations we have given, we think it would be easy to show, by multiplied instances if necessary, that whatever appetites, sensibilities, or emotions are implanted in man, will be found also in the mental economy of the brutes, performing their more humble, yet similar, appropriate, and neces- sary functions. The distinction has been made, indeed, as be- tween the lower animals and man, that these natu- ral propensities are possessed by them for the sole purpose, and only to the degree, necessary for self- preservation. Such a view, however, is not sanc- tioned by even our daily observation. On the con- trary, they are constantly seen exhibiting themselves in the brutes, in manifestations closely resembling the qualities and actions of men. We refer not now to the peculiar instincts of species, such as the ferocity of the tiger, the cunning of the fox, &c. ; but to those features of mind or disposition which mark individual character. We behold such in the brutes, displayed in their mutual friendly intercourse, or their outbreaks of enmity, variously developing in them from the moment of birth, as individual pecu- liarities, and even perpetuated, as family traits, by hereditary transmission. So we speak of " the vir- tues " and u the vices " of animals, with a meaning not very different from that of the same language when applied to men. Nay, we often seem to dis- cover in them a sort of dim foreshadowing of the OF THE SOURCES OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 11 moral sense, in an apparent vague perception on their part, of the praiseworthiuess, or blame worthi- ness of certain actions. Of such impressions, how- ever, if such in fact exist, we can only say that it is doubtful whether they are instinctive, and is certain that they are not of a kind to entail moral respon- sibility, and that they cannot be abstracted from particular acts into general ideas of duty. Hence, though they may suggest and foreshadow the human conscience, they come far short of it in nature and essential characteristics. They are analogous, in- deed, it would seem, to those rudimentary organs which philosophers tell us are sometimes found in lower animals, useless in them except as represent- ative of serviceable members in higher organiza- tions. 1 As such, they are an interesting object of notice in tracing the similarity between human and brute emotions. But though it is thus true that the springs of action (the sensibilities) are in all creatures sim- ilar, and produce similar manifestations, it would of course be the case that in degree of development 1 Man, in short, is preeminently what a theologian would term the ante-typical existence, the being in whom the types meet and are ful- filled. And not only do typical forms and numbers of the exemplified character meet in Man, but there are not a few parts of his framework which, in the inferior animal, exist as mere symbols of as little impor- tance as dugs in the male animal, though they acquire significancy and use in him. Such, for instance, are the many-jointed but move- less and unnecessary bones, of which the stiff, inflexible Jin of the du- gong and fore-paw of the mole consist, and which exist in his arm as essential portions, none of which could be wanted, of a flexible instru- ment. Hugh Miller, Testimony of the Hocks, p. 231. 12 THE RISE AND THE FALL. they would vary with the different grades of mental organization. The higher the nature and intelli- gence of the creature, and the more expanded and diversified its faculties and relations, by so much the more powerful would be its emotions, and the more varied and complex their combinations, as well as the actions in which they would result. Herein lies the difference between man and the brutes in respect to the sensibilities, and their man- ifestations in conduct, except so far as these differ in the moral characteristic. Man, with a similar animal nature, has a thousand-fold more capabilities for passion, and a thousand times more forms of its expression. Accordingly, as a mere animal, had he no moral nature whatever, whatever of good or evil could come from his sensibilities would be ex- hibited in vastly greater force, and with vastly greater extent and variety of good or evil effects. Acting out his mere animal nature, therefore, without restraint, Man is a much more dangerous creature, both to himself and to the Universe, than any other ; and this, not from any peculiarity of plan in his mental constitution, but because his superior development creates an increased capacity for passion, and a more tremendous scope and power in its exercise. The application of these remarks becomes ob- vious when we pass to consider the range of the Sensibilities in the different animal races, with the similar forms of action and conduct which they OF THE SOURCES OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 13 develop in all. As we have suggested, the danger from these " springs of action " arises from their active and expansive nature. Implanted for neces- sary and benevolent purposes, they are, in their normal and balanced action, not only essential to the existence of the creature, but conducive to its happiness. Yet, as in the material universe we be- hold the same forces at one time gently wafting fragrance to the flower, and moistening with dew its delicate petals, and at another, rising into fear- ful agencies of evil to sweep the earth with ruin and terror ; so the kindly and healthful appetites, at times advancing with unregulated energy, expand into raging passions, and draw havoc and destruc- tion in their train. Nor are these tendencies and results peculiar to human sensibilities. Thus it has ever been since sentient beings were first created. The records of Earth's historic tablets teach us, that, thousands of ages before man waked into exist- ence, nature had armed insects and rejptiles with weapons of warfare and torture, which they wielded against each other in the deadly encounters of pas- sion. Epoch on epoch came and went while the slow-forming world was preparing for its human tenants, which saw its seas daily lashed with mortal conflicts, and heard amid its primeval forests the fearful cries of rage, of suffering, and of violent death. So from those distant periods down to the present hour, passion, with the thousand miseries it occasions, has marked the history of all creatures, 14 THE RISE AND THE FALL. human and brute alike, in proportion to their re- spective capacities and opportunities for its exer- cise. Hence it appears that man is not alone in the distress, ruin, and death which he suffers from natural appetites, and which we frequently, and in one sense properly, speak of as the effects of sin. The same evils prevailed long before sin became an inmate of creation, and still prevail among the animals which never sinned, and upon which no curse was ever denounced. Man's experience in these respects, therefore, is the same with that of all sentient beings, and in entire accordance with the laws of life, established with its first awakening in the universe. 1 1 In Hugh Miller's Testimony of the Rocks occurs the following passage (page 102): " This early exhibition of tooth, and spine, and sting, of weapons constructed alike to cut and to pierce, to unite two of the most indispensable requisites of the modern armorer a keen edge to a stiff back nay, stranger still, the examples furnished in this prime- val time of weapons formed not only to kill but also to torture, must be altogether at variance with the preconceived opinions of those who hold, that, until man appeared in creation and darkened its sympa- thetic face with the stain of moral guilt, the reign of violence and outrage did not begin, and that there was no death among the inferior creatures, and no suffering. But preconceived opinion, whether it hold fast with Lactantius and the old Schoolmen to the belief that there can be no antipodes, or assert with Caccini and Bellarmine that our globe hangs lazily in the midst of the heavens, while the sun moves round it, must yield ultimately to scientific truth. And it is a truth as certain as the existence of a southern hemisphere, or the motion of the earth around both its own axis and the great solar centre, that, untold ages ere man had sinned and suffered, the animal creation exhibited exactly its present state of war : that the strong, armed with formid- able weapons, exquisitely constructed to kill, preyed upon the weak; OF THE SOURCES OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 15 The only difference, then, between man and the brutes, in regard to these phenomena of the pas- sions, lies in the circumstance that in him their allowance is invested with a moral character, which in them it does not possess. It is now generally agreed by moralists that it is the act of the Witt, permitting the undue sway of passion, to which the moral quality attaches, and not to the passions themselves. We should carefully distinguish, there- fore, between the passions with their evil conse- quences, (which are common to all creatures,) and the moral character, with which, in the human race, their permitted supremacy is associated. Disturb- ance, suffering, and death, their usual attendants, as we have seen, are not peculiar to man, nor ascribable to his moral relations. Strictly, there- fore, these evils are not the consequences of Sin^ if by sin we mean that feature connected with the propensities which is peculiar to man, to wit, the and that the weak sheathed, many of them, in defensive armor, equally admirable in its mechanism, and ever increasing and multi- plying upon the earth far beyond the requirements of the mere main- tenance of their races were enabled to escape as species the assaults of the tyrant tribes, and to exist unthinned for unreckoned ages. It has been weakly and impiously urged as if it were merely with the geologist that men had to settle this matter that such an economy of warfare and suffering of warring and of being warred upon would be, in the words of the infant Goethe, unworthy of an all- powerful and all-benevolent Providence, and, in effect, a libel on his government and character. But that grave charge we leave the objectors to settle with the great Creator himself. Be it theirs, not ours, to " Snatch from his hands the balance and the rod, Kejudge his justice, be the god of God." 16 THE RISE AND THE FALL. guilt attending their permitted excess. They are the effect of passions, the yielding to whose sway is sinful, but not the effect of this sinfulness ; of pas- sions whose existence, operation, and results are independent of moral accountability ; and which in man, as in the brutes, would be undistinguished from the rest of his animal nature, but for a new perception implanted in his breast, through which he recognizes them as entailing upon him a moral responsibility for their government. Here, then, is where Conscience (this new per- ception) has its sources : since its functions relate exclusively to the right regulation and control of the human Sensibilities. We have established the fact, that in that department of the mind which thus gives occasion for its exercise, and over which, therefore, it in a manner presides, Man is organized substantially like other creatures, and under similar conditions of existence. We shall next inquire into the office which the conscience thus performs in the natural (not the moral) economy, and how far the anal- ogies and necessities of being demand it, or some equivalent for it, as a part of the animal nature. OFFICE OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 17 CHAPTER III. OF THE OFFICE OF THE MORAL FACULTY IN THE MENTAL ECONOMY. HITHERTO we have considered the active powers of the mind, the energies which give it movement and direction. We have seen that these are, in plan and operation, the same in all creatures ; that they are both necessary, and, in their legitimate use, pro- motive of happiness ; but that when in any being they transcend this limit, they become the baleful agents of misery and ruin. We shall now inquire after the forces, if any, which Nature has provided as offsets and safeguards against these liabilities to passionate excess, for the preservation of the creat- ure ; what influences of a restraining tendency she may have furnished to check the rising excitements of the susceptibilities, and to control their ordinary movements within safe and natural bounds. We assume at the outset the existence of such provisions ; for, from the phenomena which Nature displays in the material creation, we are led by the laws of her usual analogies to look for a system of forces and balances, of impulses and counteractions in the mental universe. In the motions of the spheres, in the changes and influences of the differ- 18 THE RISE AND THE FALL. ent seasons, in the action of the elements, in the development and laws of animal and vegetable existences, wherever, in fact, we behold life and movement in the physical domain, we see energies working under the control of counter-energies, a system of forces and counter-forces, whose mutual regulation educes general harmony. Yet not here, more than in the field of mind, are the adjustments so perfectly preserved as to preclude all irregulari- ties ; for often some element or force will break like a swelling passion through its surrounding barriers, and sweep creation with havoc, until its power is spent, or it is brought again under control.* Where then, in the universe of mind, do we find these restraining forces for which we inquire ? What in- fluences do we discover which operate as checks and brakes upon the onward driving propensities, serving to moderate and determine their otherwise headlong course ? The inquiry relates not to the being of man merely, but to that of all creatures in which these propensities subsist. We should expect, in conformity with a general principle of Nature, that such checks in the differ- ent classes of being would be proportioned, in num- ber and strength, to the degree of necessity which they might respectively require ; in other words, that they would be provided, in different creatures, in increased or diminished ratio, according to the power of their respective appetites, and the circum- stances surrounding them, which are likely to draw OFFICE OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 19 out those appetites in passionate excess. Thus the insect or the worm which feels probably little more than the mere consciousness of existence, and is, so far as we know, almost isolated from its fellows, as regards the interchange of sentiment, needs few in- fluences to restrain 'passions which it can hardjy be thought to possess. And even with the brutes of the higher grades, so few and simple, at best, are the emotions of which they are capable, so limited and vague are their relations to each other, and so few their opportunities, means, and topics of mutual communication, that their intercourse is reduced to the simplest character, little likely, to elicit or foster the passions beyond their natural and proper growth. Add to these natural limitations, their temperate and equable habits and modes of life, their plain and natural diet, and the facility with which their few wants are satisfied, together with their various in- stincts, and the effect wrought by changes of the seasons upon their feelings and desires, and we can readily perceive that in these provisions, together with others of a general character, to which we shall hereafter advert, Nature has amply guarded against the perversion and overgrowth of the propensities, hedging them in as she has, by so many circum- stances unfavorable to their expansion. Accord- ingly, we find that animals in their natural sphere of life, are generally more noble in their natures, and much more free from indulgence in the grosser passions, than when brought into an artificial condi- 20 THE EISE AND THE FALL. tion of existence, and surrounded by unnatural in- citements. Yet, even in their best estate, in their mutual intercourse, however simple it may be, clash- ings of interest, or promptings of opportunity occur to disturb the nicely poised balance of restraint, and to excite the energies of passion to vigorous and destructive activity. Thus carefully, then, has Nature guarded the sus- ceptibilities of the brutes, but what protections has she provided for man, who, as regards danger from his passions, stands in a vastly more exposed and perilous situation ? For him, scarcely one of the natural barriers to which we have before referred exists. His active and enlarged faculties ; his bound- less capabilities of imagination and feeling ; his ex- tended, complex, and ever-varying social and politi- cal relations; his intimate associations and intercourse with his kind, with their various and controlling in- fluences on his character, involving him in a constant struggle of emulation, rivalry, and antagonism ; his quick and powerful appetites, unrestrained by any natural checks, but fanned and fed into ceaseless flame by artificial and irregular modes of life, by the thousand excitements and allurements by which he is surrounded, by the desires which they gener- ate, and the proffered means of their gratification, all conspire to render almost impossible an equable or tranquil existence. They create the most immi- nent danger that he will succumb to unregulated passion, and the highest necessity for safeguards far OFFICE OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 21 snperior, both in number and in kind, to those of the creatures below him. How far Nature has re- sponded to this necessity, will be best understood by enumerating the more important of the protections which she has provided. First. One protecting influence is derived from the sensibilities themselves, in the counterpoise of the emotions against each other, so that the strength of one class of affections oftentimes counteracts the rising violence of another class. Thus anger could o o hardly grow inordinate against a being who was at the same time deeply loved, reverenced, or pitied ; or whose favor was necessary to be acquired or re- tained for some ulterior end. These influences are common to both man and the brutes, (though affect- ing the latter, of course, to an inferior degree,) since the mutual intercourse of all creatures is based on their common sympathies, necessities, or interests. In human society, how often is cruelty, or greed, or lust, restrained in its inception by self-interest, or pride, or some other, perhaps more honorable, senti- ment ! How many severe and rugged natures, how many selfish and depraved hearts, invulnerable to all other influences, have been softened and reformed by the gentle power of companions or friends, lov- ing and beloved! In these, as in other cases of opposing sensibilities, man's social relations, while they enhance the danger, also greatly strengthen the preventives of evil. The sensibility, however, which merits special 22 THE RISE AND THE FALL. notice, as perhaps the most important of these checks upon the appetites, is fear. In all creatures, whose passions crave undue gratification, the fear of con- sequent inconvenience or suffering of some sort, of retaliation or retribution from some quarter, operates as a powerful restraint. Even in the lower animals its effect is marked, but in Man, with whom expe- rience and forecast have a distinguished influence upon conduct, it becomes an eminent bulwark of virtue. It is to this that human codes universally appeal, and it is through this, in great measure, that the Divine law enforces its authority. For, apart from the apprehension of punishment in a future state, experience shows that morality cannot be sacrificed to passion with impunity, even in this life ; since diseases, pains, and suffering, in a thousand forms, follow inevitably and naturally the violation of Nature's laws. In this conspicuous and tremen- dous truth, we find the solution of the mystery attending the presence of physical suffering in the world of a benevolent God. The sensitive nerves of our bodies are formed that their exquisite powers of torture may keep us from violating the rules of health, thus to secure through the soundness of our systems, the mental and physical preservation of the race. Hence the physical woes, of which the world is full, whose wide-spread evils affect even remote posterities, are designed to warn and deter man- kind by an appeal to every natural affection and motive, from the fatal indulgence of the passions, OFFICE OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 23 of which such evils are made the inevitable conse- quence. How many would there be, temperate, continent, or cleanly, were not the frightful fruits of opposite conduct confronting men on every side, in blighted intellects and defective bodies, in diseases and death, whose flying shafts find victims among the innocent as well as the guilty ? Where would be the civilization, the progress, nay, the very exist- ence of the race, were there no stronger incentives to purity, to industry, and to mental cultivation, than to filthiness, ignorance, and sloth ? If exist- ence, with health and advancement, be a blessing, and cannot be so without these conditions, then there can be no more real benevolence than that which seeks to prevent, by the penalty of physical suffering, the far greater evils of the debasement or extinction of the race. Nor does the fact, that the unoffending are often involved in the effects of guilt, offer any refutation of this principle. The execu- tion of human laws is not stayed, because it will bring affliction and distress to others besides the criminal; and it is the consideration of this very truth, both in the human system and the divine, that keeps men back from crime, who might other- wise think to brave merely personal calamities, or elude them by self-destruction. Secondly. A farther restraint upon the appetites is derived from the intellectual powers of man, in the suggestions of his reason. The mind, contem- plating the passions in the light of experience, and 24 THE RISE AND THE FALL. under the conviction of its own high nature and destiny, recognizes them, if not controlled, as not only dangerous to the individual and society, but as impediments in the way of man's advancement to his highest development and happiness. As the dictate of reason, therefore, he is interested to re- linquish their present gratification for a higher good, and even to engage in many a painful struggle to attain to their discipline and conquest. Upon this principle were based some of the most prevalent systems of ancient philosophy, and even with the most imperfect reasoners, something of the same conviction has its influence. So, too, carrying the principle still farther, we not only endeavor to con- trol ourselves, but, organizing Society in order to promote the general progress, we make laws to regulate those who will not exercise a due self- government ; not only punishing crime, but exclud- ing from our midst the sources of temptation to its commission. Thus reason, rightly employed, ren- ders valuable counsel for the control of the passions ; yet experience has shown that it exerts but an imperfect efficiency over mankind for virtue, since human tempers are in general too gross to be com- pletely swayed by its refined and elevated teach- ings. Indeed, we hardly need look abroad upon the actual moral condition of man, to see, were there no other guards over the human passions than those we have enumerated, how inadequate they would OFFICE OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 25 prove in experience. Beneficial as they have been, and considerable as has been the evil they have prevented, how small is the relative degree of their control ! How vast is the proportion of human folly and wickedness which would break over the better impulses of the heart, and the strongest ap- peals of reason and interest ! Nay, how often is it that reason and self-love themselves, beguiled, blinded, and depraved, are enlisted by passion in its service, and do battle in its behalf! Surely, He who had so carefully guarded the half-formed appetites of the brutes, would not leave man with- out more adequate protection against their untram- melled energies. Far indeed has been the Divine Author of man's being from overlooking this necessity. With spe- cial provision for it, he has implanted in the hu- man mind a new and wonderful faculty, whose express purpose is the regulation of the mind's in- ferior principles ; and this, the most important of its restraining forces, lying-in fact at the basis of all others and imparting to them their influence, occupies the governing seat in the soul. It is " the conscience," or " the moral sense ; " a faculty which we shall hereafter discuss from other points of view, but which we here refer to, simply as the great conserving element in man's mental organiza- tion. It is this, as before suggested, upon which repose, more or less immediately, (at least for their strongest bearings on human conduct,) those influ- 26 THE RISE AND THE X F ALL. ences of control to which we have already ad- verted, affection, fear, and reason. But its direct action on the mind is far more important and infal- lible than that through any subordinate agencies. Unlike these, it keeps constant and vigilant guard over the first movements of the appetites, not waiting until they have so far attained mastery over the creature as to be planning some open and flagrant demonstration. While thus watching the germs of evil, it is yet not incapable of grappling with the more formidable forms of passion, but en- counters them with a potent and unyielding resist- ance. Instinctive in its nature, and independent in its judgments, it acts with the rapidity of thought, and with the force of a divine mandate. Of all the mental faculties it matures the earliest, and though by a long course of opposition and neglect it may be perverted or stupefied, it is never entirely blinded or destroyed ; but sooner or later it will start from the dust to exact against its betrayer a terrible vengeance. Thus the soul hears its admo- nitions and obeys them alike with reverence and with fear, its still but solemn whisper, at once breathing the Divine affection, and suggesting the terrors which it reserves for disobedience in the agonies of remorse. It may Be thought that we have overstated the influence of conscience as a natural restraint on the passions, inasmuch as among races or classes destitute of moral training, its teachings are neither OFFICE OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 27 so powerful nor so unerring as we have implied. Undoubtedly man has more capability than any other creature, by education or habit, to affect the development of his faculties, and of this among the rest ; and it cannot be denied that he may become so imbruted by barbarism or vice, as to be almost unconscious of any better nature within him. So particular tribes have their reasoning powers so blunted by disuse and degradation, that they seem little if any, superior to the brutes ; yet it is none the less true that the intellectual faculty is the dis- tinguishing and exalted characteristic of man. And it would also be wrong to say, even of the most hardened votaries of vice, that they are quite be- yond the actual influence of the moral sense. There are few human beings, however degraded or depraved, that do not recognize with the com- mon approbation some acts to be emulated, as no- ble, generous, and just, and despise others as to be avoided, because they are base, atrocious, or vile. Thus such distinctions more or less affect their conduct : but it is not merely by its power within the individual breast that this faculty operates to repress the evil outgrowth of the passions. Its influence pervading society, gives rise to laws, how- ever rude and imperfect, and creates that right public sentiment more powerful than laws, which men fear more than death itself, for who dare face the conscience of the World ? Even the moral sense of a single honored friend will often have 28 THE RISE AND THE FALL. more strength than the strongest temptation ; and men whose elevated position places them as if above the control of human influence, nay, even communities and nations in their collective capac- ity, whose united passions might seem able to create a sustaining public sentiment in behalf of some evil course, tremble and pause before the apprehended verdict of a distant posterity ! The conscience, then, the moral sense, is incom- parably the strongest influence in the human mind to protect it from the excesses of appetite. If we doubt it, let us suppose for a moment that this fac- ulty were obliterated, and the distinction between right and wrong abolished in every human breast. Where then would be reason and the kindly affec- tions as effectual resistants to the passions ? What would there then be to awaken against temptation the emotion of fear ? How long would opposing laws continue to be enacted, or if enacted, ob- served ? But the mind refuses to dwell on the supposition. The imagination shudders to contem- plate the flood of horror and desolation which would then sweep over the earth and change its face to the semblance of Hell ; before which, what- soever is true, is lovely, or of good report, every- thing which gives us pleasure to behold or joy to experience, learning, art, civilization, even the race itself, would be swept through terror, anguish, and despair into inevitable extinction. Thus it appears that when the Creator, having OFFICE OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 29 organized the inanimate universe with its method of forces and counter-forces, and formed the lower orders of animals, grade after grade, under the like system of impulses and checks in their subjective and objective conditions of being, came to create man, he constituted him upon no new principles, but, both in his bodily structure and in his psy- chological system, in pursuance of this uniform and well-considered plan. Even his distinguishing characteristic, the moral faculty, is in strict con- formity with its requirement of a regulating and balancing force in the mind. But as the whole physical and mental being of man is upon a vastly more noble and perfect scale than those of the ani- mals which preceded him, so this new conserving force is of a nature far different from and superior to any ever before implanted, not performing that office merely, but affecting the soul with other and grander influences peculiar to humanity. These peculiar effects and influences of the moral faculty it devolves upon us now to consider. 80 THE RISE AND THE FALL. CHAPTER IV. OF THE ULTERIOR EFFECTS OF THE MORAL FACULTY. APART from Man's moral history there is, as we have seen, nothing to indicate that he exists under different relations or laws of being from the races which preceded or surround him. Up to this point we have viewed him simply as an intellectual ani- mal, the latest formed in the historical series, and the highest in the ascending scale. We have re- garded his moral faculty merely in its aspect of a natural curbing force on his passions, and as such in exact correspondence with similar provisions in other creatures. But when we come to consider the na- ture of that curbing force, the new relations and responsibilities in which it involves its owner, and the other ulterior consequences of its possession, we enter a field beyond the line of discoverable analo- gies, and exclusively pertaining to Man. Of the nature of the moral faculty or conscience (of which, more hereafter) we need only say, in this place, that it is \vell defined by Webster to be that " faculty, power, or principle within us, which decides on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of our own actions or affections, and instantly approves or condemns them." We have already discussed the ULTERIOR EFFECTS OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 31 identity of " the springs of action " in all creatures, and seen that the feelings and actions which they inspire have a common resemblance. Hence any pernicious indulgence of passion is the same act in a brute as in man, and is attended with the same evil natural results, and yet, by a common and in- stinctive impulse, we view the act in the two cases in totally different lights. In the human animal we regard it as abhorrent, censurable, and degrading, while in the other, we contemplate it with no such emotions. The reason is familiar. The moral sense which the man is known to possess, invests the act in him with a character, which, without such a faculty in his breast, it could not have ; and we intui- tively feel that it is the possession or non-possession of the moral sense that makes the act in the perpe- trator criminal or blameless. Thus, through the moral faculty, man comes to recognize the unregu- lated movement of appetite within himself, under a new and revolting aspect, and denominates it SIN. Much obscurity, and confusion has arisen, we con- ceive, in moral and theological discussions, from a neglect to observe the distinction between the ab- O stract and the concrete meanings of this word, Sin. A full consideration of the foregoing principles leads us to conclude that SIN, strictly speaking, is neither the unduly indulged human desires or affections, nor even their undue indulgence, but the. criminality or guiltiness attaching to such undue acts or course of conduct, or rather the criminal or guilty principle 32 THE EISE AND THE FALL. which invests them. Thus if we can conceive of such undue indulgence under such special circum- stances of ignorance or other exculpation, as divest it of its criminality, it ceases to be sin. We may, perhaps, find examples of this, in practices common in less enlightened ages, among even the holiest of men, as polygamy among the Patriarchs, a prac- tice of intolerable turpitude in a Christian age and country, but which, in those earlier days, did not partake of sin. So, too, we speak of men refrain- ing from certain pleasurable acts through dread of the sin involved in them, and of all men as tainted with sin, though all be not at this moment engaged in its commission. This then is sin in the abstract, or that which gives its character to the actual deed. Sin in the concrete is the act thus criminally charac- terized ; and is the voluntary undue indulgence by a moral agent of any of those natural affections or desires which are common to all created beings. The commission must be by a moral being, and must also be voluntary ; because without both these con- ditions it could not be criminal, and hence could not be imbued with the character of sin. It will be observed, too, that the undue expres- sions of emotions or affections in acts which become sins, are such as are or may be displayed by all creatures, and are sinful only when put forth by mor- ally accountable beings. 1 Had there never been, and 1 We here assume, what we have before suggested, that every sin is resolvable into the undue action of some natural and innocent propen- ULTERIOR EFFECTS OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 33 could there never be, any such over-indulgence, ex- cept by moral beings, and so, none unattended with sin, the distinction might be of little moment ; but in view of the actual history of all created beings, an inquiry into the origin and effects of sin, finds it a wide and important distinction, and one that should be clearly recognized. $m, says Webster, (though the definition is applicable only to sin as a concrete term,) " is the voluntary departure of a moral agent from a known rule of rectitude " ; but perhaps it might be more fully expressed to be " the voluntary neglect of a moral agent to control any natural pro- pensity within the limits prescribed by conscience," or, in other words, "the voluntary disregard by such being of the admonitions of his moral sense, prompt- ing to the due regulation of any natural appetite." Hence, it consists in the disobedience of the moral sense, and cannot be predicated of any indulgence of passion, however gross, extensive, or deliberate, where the moral sense is wanting, to interpose its light and remonstrances. Now, while it is this disobedience of conscience sity. This is not only sustainable on philosophical grounds, but is sanctioned by Scripture authority. Thus the Apostle James (i. 14, 15) says: " When lust (ewieu/xia, which means any strong desire, generally used in the New Testament for innocent desire) hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin," making sin to be the final result of a preexisting, and, of course, innocent propensity or affection. ( See Scott's Commen- taries on this passage.) As an illustration: the sin of doing evil that good may come, where the inspiring motive or desire might seem to be disinterested, consists in the indulgence of pi-ide, in preferring our own ideas of policy to the plain teachings of conscience and Revelation. 3 34 THE RISE AND THE FALL. which imparts a moral character to the commission of any act of passion, it is, nevertheless, the act itself, irrespective of its moral character, the pas- sions themselves, thus predominating over rational self-control, which bring discord and suffering into the natural world. Such evils, it may therefore be said, are the result of passions which, as devel- oped and expressed in action, are indeed sinful, but not of their sinfulness. While then it is in one sense true that Sin (i. e., Man's voluntary over-indulgence of appetite) produces human mis- ery and ruin, it is no less true that, just as the same evils did prevail as the fruits of the same passions before man was formed, and do still prevail among the inferior and sinless creatures, so they would doubtless have existed among men to a still greater degree than they do, had the turpitude of these pas- sions continued unrevealed to the eye of a moral sense, and so, sin never have become an inmate of creation. It will not be inferred that these remarks repre- sent sin in any sense as a blessing, or even as the mitigation of other evils. On the contrary, it ap- pears that Sin itself, even in the concrete, (man's actual voluntary self-subjection to appetite against the appeals of conscience,) involves the soul in a degradation and guilt, additional to, and infinitely more sad and fearful than the merely natural evils which result from inordinate passions. Sin, there- fore, in its commission, so far from diminishing the ULTERIOR EFFECTS OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 35 amount of evil and sorrow in the world, vastly enhances it ; for it adds a new woe to the natural miseries that spring from the acts to which it apper- tains, and so, wherever it exists as a realized actual- ity, is a curse and only a curse to the universe. Yet the origination of Sin in its commission, as an actual thing is to be distinguished from its prior origina- tion as a possible thing ; or, to change the order of the terms, its first appearance as a mentally con- ceived abstraction, from its first appearance as an accomplished fact. And we shall perceive, with little reflection, that while the latter event, effected by Man, was a dreadful and sorrowful epoch in the history of the race, the former, prior in time, and effected by the Creator when he conferred the moral faculty, though momentous in its nature and effects, yet tended to the benefit and elevation of humanity. First ; we say it tended to the benefit of humanity, and in a previous chapter we have shown that it does, in fact, immensely promote such benefit as a curb upon unlawful appetite. Sin, terrible and hateful foe as it is to our happiness and welfare, is brought to our view and comprehension not as a hideous yet harmless phantom, powerless, therefore, for good as well as evil, but as a real and dangerous destroyer, in order, doubtless, that both by its de- formity and the reality of our peril, it may deter us from self-ruin, and promote our advancement. Thus sin in the abstract, (by which we mean sin existing as an object of mental conception,) like threatened 36 THE RISE AND THE FALL. diseases and death and other recognized punish- ments of passion, is designed and calculated to aid toward our permanent and highest well-being, and \vas doubtless for this end introduced as a possibility into the world. In accordance with this benevolent purpose, we find the moral instinct, which, like a divinely lighted beacon, reveals sin only to warn from it, exerting its beneficent office in every human breast, even in those to which in their ignorance and darkness its nature and its objects are an unregarded or an un- fathomable mystery. Though greatly assisted and enlightened by the revelation of man's relations and duties to his Creator, it is yet not dependent on this for its awakening ; for it shines, dimly perhaps, but really, in minds which never heard of God, and never conceived a system or even an idea of duty. Every man recognizes not only in the world, but more or less clearly within himself, two great antag- onistic elements or forces, in constant contention for the supremacy, " the law of his members, warring against the law of his mind," till the agonized soul, not of the Christian apostle merely, but even of the uninstructed Pagan, exclaims in dismay, " Oh, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death ! " " Si possem sanior essem, Sed trahit invitum nova vis : aliudque cupido, Mens aliud suadet. Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor." i i Ovid. ULTERIOR EFFECTS OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 37 Again, we say it tended to the elevation of hu- manity, for so far as man avails himself of his moral faculty for its intended purposes, and submits him- self to its control, it exalts him in the scale of being. No less true is it, that when he neglects its use and yields to the cravings of lawless appetite, he de- scends^ in consequence of its possession, to a level more degraded than if he had never been capable of moral distinctions. That he fails, however, so far as he does, to use it rightly, does not militate against the benevolence of its design, nor make it other than the most glorious of his attributes. That it is an elevating endowment, indeed, would seem to follow from the very fact that it awakens the mind to new perceptions and powers, and thus en- larges the scope of the human nature. But in addi- tion to this, it opens to man, through these new perceptions and powers, the loftiest honors, and the purest delights of which he is capable. It places him upon the same high stand-point from which God himself views his moral creation, and there brings him into communion with his Maker, and into sympathy with his plans. It raises his soul to the contemplation of those infinite subjects, and to participation in those exalted joys, that throng around such divine revelations. It expands his mental vision, to take in a new Universe of Truth, and like the celestial inhabitants, to behold its great and radiant orbs, wheeling their everlasting circuits about the Right, and steadfastly obeying its immutable laws. 38 THE RISE AND THE FALL. To no eyes but to those endued with moral percep- tions, can these sublime harmonies be revealed ; and his will be the highest joys, and the loftiest eleva- tion of soul, who shall most clearly comprehend the order and method of these eternal Systems, even as He understands and rejoices in them, who presides over their perfect, yet often mysterious workings. It appears, then, that " the introduction of Sin into the World " was a blessing or a curse, accord- ing as we refer to one event or another, by the ex- pression. If we conceive of man as at the outset created, and for a time continuing, a noble intellect- ual being, indeed, but like all other earthly creat- ures, destitute of the faculty which distinguishes between right and wrong, then we imagine a world " without sin " in every sense of the term. It is obvious, that whatever might be under such circum- stances, his course of life, whether he should pre- serve his normal purity and rational self-government, or become like the brutes, selfish, grovelling, and beastly, still like them, he must be innocent, with- out sin, because without responsibility. As his obe- dience to any law of God, whether speaking within him by the voice of nature and reason, or uttered to him by direct revelation, would be without merit as holiness, so his disobedience of any such com- mand would be without turpitude as sin. And so, neither holiness nor sin could be found in the world, either in actual or possible experience, nay, even in possible conception. We do not mean, of course, ULTERIOR EFFECTS OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 39 that they would not exist as recognizable principles in the mind of God, and of other moral beings. We only mean that they would have no place in the lower world as actual or possible facts or influences, just as gravity may be conceived of as an existing force in some other Universe, and absent from ours. Upon such a creature, let now the moral sense be suddenly conferred, and his mind opened at once to the recognition of right and wrong, both in the ab- stract, and as capable of being illustrated in his own thoughts and conduct. It is apparent that imme- diately a new force, influence, or principle, is brought into the world. Sin, as a possibility in experience, and hence a reality, to the extent of exciting appre- hension, and of exerting influence, becomes an in- mate of creation ; and this, none the less truly, whether man avoid or not its actual commission, just as gravity is an actual force, a reality, produc- ing effect, (and what but a reality can produce effect .?) as well upon the balloon which overcomes it, as upon the stone which it enchains. Hence, even though man should still hold himself pure and intact from sin's contamination, yet he begins to re- gard those natural outgoings of passion which, under the guidance of conscience, he resists and controls, as the innate tendencies of his nature to " corrup- tion " and " depravity," and bemoans their terrible force. But though the applicability of these sad terms to his nature is thus consequent upon the re- ception of the moral faculty, that new gift has not 40 THE RISE AND THE FALL. debased but exalted him in the scale of being and in the means of happiness. It is not until, in his weak- ness and folly, he suffers passion to override the ap- peals of duty, and falls into the actual commission of Sin, that degradation begins. 1 Then, and only then, enters the curse of Sin, and to a vast and woful curse, alas ! has man allowed it to grow, notwith- standing the immense and blessed influence of the moral sense for its prevention and restraint. It is this mournful result, perhaps, thus following the conferment of the moral faculty upon mankind, which has tended, more than anything else, to ob- scure the distinction between the first appearance of sin as a thing comprehended, and its first appear- ance as a thing committed. And, indeed, (if the distinction is fairly borne in mind to prevent confu- sion,) the unhappy fact, no less than a correct phi- losophy, will justify us in speaking of sin as being first introduced into the world by the bestowal of the moral sense ; for as it could never have been manifested in man without that previous gift, so it was then that he began to feel and recognize its presence and power within him ; and finally, its subsequent prevalence has been, though not by a logical necessity, yet by historical result, the conse- quence of such bestowal. 1 See Payne's Lectures on Original Sin, p. 226. MORAL FACULTY DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT. 41 CHAPTER V. THAT THE MORAL FACULTY IS A DISTINCT AND INDE- PENDENT FACULTY. THE object of the foregoing chapters has been to show that the moral sense exists as a part of man's natural constitution, subserving a necessary and use- ful purpose in his animal economy, and that its presence within him is in strict conformity to Na- ture's laws and analogies ; also, that it is an elevat- ing and beneficent endowment, preventing a vast amount of sorrow, suffering, and evil, which would otherwise prevail ; and finally, that while without it, man would not have possessed his present opportu- nities for the highest progress and happiness, neither would he, on the other hand, have been a being capable of sin, or in any way morally responsible. We are now prepared to enter on another inquiry, namely, Does Philosophy offer any suggestion as to the period of Man's career when he was first in- vested with this noble, yet solemnly momentous gift ? In response to this inquiry, probably the first im- pulse of every mind would prompt the answer which accords with the general idea, that doubtless the progenitor of the race received the moral faculty at his creation, as a part of his original constitution, 42 THE RISE AND THE FALL. and so transmitted it to his descendants. Scripture, perhaps, would be appealed to in support of the theory. The teachings of Scripture, however, will be the subject of future examination. That they do not support such a doctrine, we think we shall be able to show. We are now seeking the intimations of Philosophy alone, and shall attempt to prove that if these do not (as indeed they cannot) establish, they at least do not discountenance the supposition that the moral faculty may have been conferred upon Man (that is, upon the first or representative man of the race) at a period subsequent to his creation, and after the reception of his other mental powers. If we recall in this connection the fact, that in every child, other mental faculties unfold, in a considera- ble degree, before we discover the conscience, (z. e., the capability of distinguishing the moral difference between right and wrong,) although this faculty once awakened, matures more rapidly than the rest, we shall, perhaps, perceive in the outset an argu- ment of analogy in favor of such a theory. We shall further support it by maintaining three propo- sitions, viz. : 1st. That the moral faculty is a distinct and inde- pendent faculty of the mind, not growing out of, nor necessarily associated with, its other powers ; but separable, and therefore capable of being conferred at a period subsequent to the rest, just as we might suppose the faculty of sight imparted to a blind man, or of reason to an idiot. MORAL FACULTY DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT. 43 2d. That this faculty was not required for man's use at the outset of his existence, and there is there- fore nothing improbable or derogatory to his origi- nal nature in supposing him at first destitute of it. 3d. That reasons connected with the moral re- sponsibility which became imposed on man through his reception of the moral sense, and the other mo- mentous consequences which necessarily, or in fact, hung upon it, may lend strong ground for an in- ference that his Maker would prefer to impart this faculty to man, at a period subsequent to the recep- tion and partial cultivation of his other mental powers. Of these propositions, the first will, in this chap- ter, receive our attention. The theory that the moral sense is a distinct and independent faculty of the human mind, and one not capable of being developed from its other pow- ers, is one so generally accepted by moral philoso- phers, and so fully and ably established in many works, that it need hardly be discussed in these pages. That our argument, however, may be com- plete, we will endeavor to enforce it by a few sug- gestions. 1st. The moral sense, as we have before remarked, has but a partial resemblance to, or connection with, the other mental faculties in its development and operations. It matures more rapidly than any other, and with less cultivation, and as a general rule, it survives the decay of all the rest. We would not be understood as asserting that the conscience is 44 THE RISE AND THE FALL. totally dissimilar from the rest of the mind in its phenomena, or entirely independent of its influences and laws. Yet it undoubtedly does act, to a certain degree, upon distinct principles, and in a manner diverse from the other faculties of the mind. It stands apart from them in the motives which it urges for conduct, and draws its arguments and its appeals from sources exterior to the man, as if it belonged not to himself, but were the embassador and functionary of some external power. Hence it often, nay generally, finds itself in opposition to the other faculties of man's being, and though, like 3, minister resident at a foreign court, it is too often affected by the influences and bribes of those with whom it has to deal, yet there still remains enough of general fidelity to its mission to vindicate at least the independence of its origin. 2d. That the discernment exercised by the moral faculty, or the distinction it recognizes between right and wrong, can be reached by it alone, and is not attainable by the Reason, is another evidence of its distinctness of nature. This distinction is one so peculiar and so unlike any of the deductions of In- tellect, that not even when clearly perceived and comprehended, can it be explained or illustrated by the Reason, or even be reasoned about, without mak- ing use of terms that imply a previous conception of it, and which are incapable of definition without such previous conception. The intellect, indeed, pronounces upon acts or thoughts simply as accord- MORAL FACULTY DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT. 45 ant or inconsistent with reason. Single deviations it pronounces errors ; habitual and systematic aber- rations, insanity ; but here the intellect stops, and the moral sense alone is put in requisition to affix to such errors or insanity the character of innocence or guilt. We can lay down no series of premise and inference, whereby this distinction between right and wrong, even with our present instinctive appre- hension of it through the conscience, can, without its aid, be reached by the other intellectual powers. Still less can we conceive any by which it might have been by them alone originally discovered. That the unchecked sway of the passions in man must be a source of disorder to himself and the universe, and that true self-interest required their restraint, man might doubtless have perceived upon sober and just reflection. Yet even this conviction would require the teachings and the test of experience, as well as some previous cultivation and practice of the reasoning powers. Even when attained, he could only regard it as the result of speculative conject- ure, or as the deduction of logic, which, if pursued further or with more acuteness, might have brought him to a different conclusion. How conflicting, im- perfect, and unsatisfactory, would be merely intel- lectual searchings for moral truth, is strikingly illus- trated in the benighted gropings in that direction of the ancient philosophers. Centiiry after century, men of the brightest intellectual powers and culti- vation, with all their zeal and interest to discover 46 THE RISE AND THE FALL. new foundations for peculiar schools, and with the light of the natural moral sense besides, disputed and doubted whether between right and wrong there existed any genuine distinction or no. Socra- tes and Plato, indeed, seemed almost to walk in the light of a true moral and spiritual illumination, yet even these discerned their way but doubtfully ; while others, though with the benefit of their teach- ings, could scarcely agree that there existed between virtue and vice any more definite distinction than marks the difference between " the beautiful " and " the deformed." 3d. That the moral sense is not the offspring of the intellect further appears, from the fact that its movements are instinctive, or, in other words, that it acts without the intervention of reason. Indeed, necessity requires that such should be its character, in order to answer its design as a conservative force over the passions. That it is instinctive, we gather from our own experience of its movements, and from our observation of it in children, at a period of their lives too early for it to be possibly suggested by the reasoning powers. Nor is this all. We see it often act with energy and influence in opposition to the efforts of Reason. It repudiates the conclu- sions of logic which would philosophize away the distinctions of right and wrong, and has saved many an honest soul from ruin by the sophistry which he could not refute. The reasoning of temptation may satisfy the intellect, yet there is an internal, an in- MORAL FACULTY DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT. 47 stinctive conviction, which rejects and defies its re- sults. That as a conservative power it needs to be instinctive, is plain, when we consider the nature of the forces with which it has to do. An intellectual process, however conclusive, would be useless to the soul as a defence against the electric and shifting attacks of passion. While bringing out its slow machinery of premise and inference, the victory over it would be won. The instinctive and active appetites must be combated not only, they must be unremittingly watched by a sentinel of equally in- stinctive vigilance, one that will start at their slightest movement, and thunder its warning voice in the ear of the soul with the commanding tone of Divine authority. 4th. Another essential difference is thus sug- gested between the conscience and the judgment, in that it speaks, not as from its own convictions, however conclusive, but as an echo of the awful voice of Deity itself, commanding obedience, enforc- ing it thus with the whole weight of his law, and with all its tremendous sanctions. Without this idea of obligation, there might be such terms as " expedient " and " inexpedient," but none like " ought " and " duty," right " and " wrong." Even the direct command of God, enforced by a threatened penalty, could not suggest this " duty " of obedience, unless addressed to a moral concep- tion. 1 Man might submit from fear, from love, 1 See McCosh On Divine Government, p. 300, &c., &c. 48 THE RISE AND THE FALL. from discipline, from disinterested desire for the general good, or from all combined ; but there is nothing in these that resembles that controlling THEIR SOLUTION. 241 moral failure on all other points, he was left without any special divine influence to guard him against taking the forbidden fruit. Still his mind was in a perfectly holy state ; the disposition to obedience remained in all its pristine vigor up to the moment of temptation ; he had the strongest conceivable motives to resist it ; the destinies of the entire race were in his keeping ; he must ruin himself and his race if he did not stand fast in his integrity. And yet he fell ! Man in innocence and holiness, sank ; and sank just at the point, too, where he was left, as I conceive, to the unaided support of his vigorous and perfect moral powers." 1 In this passage, how- ever, forcible as it is, the difficulty to which we now refer is only dimly suggested. If Adam's "mind was in a perfectly holy state, the dispo- sition to obedience in all its pristine vigor," by what possibility could he be brought at once voluntarily to act in opposition to this mental state and disposi- tion ? The supposition that he was left unsustained by special divine aid at this particular point does not account for it ; for he is said to have had, nevertheless, his natural holiness both of disposition and habit to oppose to temptation. This difficulty is no imaginary one in metaphysics. " The ques- tion," says Dr. Dwight, " How can a holy being become sinful ? or, How can a holy being transgress the law of God ? is a question to which, perhaps, no satisfactory philosophical reply can be given." a 1 Payne's Lectures, p. 98. 2 Dwighfs TheoL, Vol. I. p. 410. 16 242 THE RISE AND THE FALL. So also Dr. Harris : " How sin is metaphysically possible in a perfect being we know not. Innumer- able solutions have been attempted." l And he adds, in a note quoting Dr. A. Neander : "Accord- ing to my conviction, the origin of evil can only be understood as a fact, a fact possible by virtue of the freedom belonging to a created being, but not to be otherwise deduced or explained." The difficulty may be thus stated : If Adam was a being entirely occupied and directed by a holy disposition, this holiness of disposition or " holy principle " must have prevented the rise of incli- nation to sinfulness. And if he could thus have had no inclination to sin, how can he be conceived to perpetrate sin ? The problem springs from the doctrine that that which constitutes a man's con- trolling principle of action determines his conduct in every given case. " Upon this foundation," says Dr. Dwight, " the inquiry [how could Adam sin ?] is made ; and if the foundation be solid and just, the inquiry cannot be answered, because in the actual case there was no other principle of action than a holy principle." 1 Man Primeval, p. 404. To the same effect see Muller's Christian Doctrine of Sin, Vol. II. p. 396. " We are not at all able to see how the possibility of evil for the personal creature could have been present from the beginning, (of -which we have the most striking proof in the same having become a reality,) if directly at the beginning he was pos- sessed of moral perfection." And again: " The possibility of the fall is not reconcilable with the moral perfection of the personal creature, consistently with a correct insight into the notion of creaturely free- dom." DIFFICULTIES AND THEIR SOLUTION. 243 Should any insist, however, that a free agent must necessarily have the power of acting in oppo- sition to the prevailing " principle " of his mind, and that it is therefore no impossibility for a holy being to sin, we may present the inquiry to such in another form. Suppose the temptation just sug- gested to Adam in his imagined state of intelligence and virtue. It is the first approach of sin to that clear and holy mind ; and in itself considered, there- fore, must be repulsive and alarming. We learn that he was not taken by surprise, but deliberately surveyed and weighed the criminal proposal. His appetites are in perfect repose and in normal sub- ordination to reason and conscience ; hence there is nothing here to incline to the sin whose deformity is so manifest and so odious. Through his moral intelligence and reason he is fully conscious of and weighs all the inducements that can be offered for and against compliance, and finds the motives for refusal to be paramount. 1 Thus disposition, con- science, and reason all unite to influence him to a particular course. Now is it conceivable that a rational and virtuous being will, after such a debate and such a conclusion, immediately proceed to sin, 1 It may be objected that this was not the conclusion he arrived at, having been deceived into committing the act by the expectation of greater advantage than would follow abstaining. But had he been truly under the influence of holiness, his desires duly subordinated to his duty, he would not have been deceived into this expectation ; or if he had, it would not have proved a sufficiently powerful induce- ment to sin. We are supposing him to have been under such influ- ences, and to have reasoned accordingly. 244 THE RISE AND THE FALL. not only without motive but against motive and against desire ? Is not such a result as inconceiv- able as if it were an actual impossibility ? Without engaging in a metaphysical discussion of the bare power of a free agent under such circumstances, we cannot doubt a ready admission that to believe man would thus exert it for his own misery and destruc- tion would be irrational and absurd. From such considerations as these, therefore, the theologians, finding themselves unable to explain the occurrence of Adam's sin, under the theory of his prior moral agency and virtue, adopt with Dr. D wight the con- clusion that " a cause exists, though indefinable and unintelligible to ourselves. In other words, the cause is unknown except by its effects." We are aware that some have sought for an argu- ment, or at least for a suggestion, under the em- barrassment in question, by referring to the fallen angels as a proof that holy beings have sinned, and that the alleged difficulty, therefore, must be merely in appearance. Such a course of reasoning, how- ever, is worthy of no consideration. Admitting that there is Scriptural proof that such beings exist as we mean by " fallen angels," how much do we know of their nature or history ? Where do we find such definite or positive evidence that they were originally holy, or respecting the circumstances of their defection, as suffice to demonstrate an analogy ? Revelation furnishes us with little information re- garding them, even of a vague and almost mythical DIFFICULTIES AND THEIR SOLUTION. 245' nature ; enough, indeed, for speculation and conject- ure, but nothing for the purposes of argument. Whether their moral nature and relations resembled those of man ; whether their intellectual and emo- tional being were similar to his ; amid what circum- stances and influences they were placed ; what led them to disobey their sovereign, and what were the character and the consequences of that disobe- dience, all these are wrapped in obscurity. To cite them in the present discussion, is an attempt to elucidate the unintelligible by a resort to the unknown. No one can say that were they fully disclosed, they would throw any light on the ques- tion, and would not even enhance the difficulty, instead of relieving it. In the discussion of matters pertaining to our own moral career and relations, let us confine ourselves to the facts and principles which our Maker has placed within our knowledge and comprehension, for our instruction and guid- ance. If mysteries arise which these cannot remove, let us frankly admit them, but let us not seek refuge or concealment in that which is still more obscure or uncertain. We ought not to leave this topic without making one point more, even at the risk of repeating some- what upon previous pages, for the consideration of those who may still believe that a holy being might possibly sin, or who may not admit that Adam had such kind or degree of holiness as should have proved a preventive. Let these explain, then, if 246 THE RISE AND THE FALL. they can, how Adam with the least virtue of dispo- sition, nay, with the faintest spark of prudence or of reason, could, situated as he was, have yielded so readily to so slight a temptation, against such over- whelming responsibilities and influences. Let us quote from another the circumstances of the act : " Adam was left, in regard to the prohibition of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, to the unaided strength of his own mind, a mind in the full ma- turity of its powers, and in a perfect moral state. . . . The consequences which were to follow transgres- sion were of two kinds, personal and relative. He himself was to die if he took the forbidden fruit ; his posterity also were to die with him. How tre- mendous the responsibility which rested upon him ! How unparalleled the force of the motives which were brought to bear upon him ! How incredibly superior in inherent power to those which have been brought to bear upon any other man except the God-man, Jesus Christ. We may plunge our- selves into ruin, eternal ruin. We may indirectly bring such ruin upon those who spring from us to the latest moment of time ; but we cannot plunge a world into ruin ! Adam was, however, placed in circumstances in which this was possible to him. The condition of the whole race was practically in his hands. He could bless the world or destroy the world, and he chose to destroy it ! He put forth his hand and took the fruit, an expression which denotes the spontaneity of the act, and ate it, and DIFFICULTIES AND THEIR SOLUTION. 247 brought death upon himself and the race. I marvel that even the infidel himself does not blush when he talks of ' the little sin ' of eating the apple ! Can any sin, I ask, even the sin of Judas in betraying his Lord, or the sin of the Jews in crucifying him, be compared with the atrocity of the sin of Adam in eating this apple? Transgression gathers its guilt from the magnitude of the motives to avoid it ; and that again from the amount of ruin and wretch- edness into which it plunges. Who then can calcu- late the guilt contracted by Adam when he ate the forbidden fruit ? " 1 And yet this atrocious this enormous sin com- mitted in the face of such unparalleled motives to obedience, it is alleged, was the deliberate, spon- taneous act of a holy being, assailed for the first time by temptation ! And how great was that temp- tation ? The inducements which could lead Adam to set aside these influences and restraints, ought, according to all known rules of cause and effect, to have been correspondingly alluring, at least in ap- pearance. How despicably insignificant, under any view of them, and how little calculated to persuade a reasoning creature they were in fact, we have seen in another part of this work. But if Adam thus fell into guilt, beside which even that of Judas grows dim, he the holy man, except in this one fault must surely have felt afterwards a remorse not less than that of the corrupt and hardened traitor ! And 1 Payne's Lectures on Original Sin, p. 47. 248 THE RISE AND THE FALL. yet we find in the narrative no hint of anything more than a natural timidity in the presence of his disobeyed sovereign. Is it credible, is it conceiva- ble, we ask once more, that a crime so enormous, against motives so overwhelming, could have been perpetrated by a holy being with so little hesitation and so little remorse ? It is quite manifest, then, that the difficulty we are considering is inseparable from the doctrine of Adam's original virtue and subsequent fall, under whatever modifications it may be presented. The only escape is by abandoning the idea of his original moral perfection, and this, as we have before seen, implies the relinquishment of all moral agency. Then of course disappears also the idea of sin in the transgression ; and now the question at once arises, If Adam was not a moral agent, and did not sin in his disobedience, what was the nature of that act and its consequences ? a question to establish whose answer these pages have been written. Here the whole mystery, in fact the whole problem, is resolved. Nor does any other equally inexplicable assume its place, as so often occurs. We easily ac- count for Adam's disobedience in the circumstances in which we suppose him. For it is plain, as we have before exhibited in our chapter on the Trans- gression, that to suppose a disobedience of God's commands by one who had only reason to oppose to the seducer, involves no such mystery as that of a sin by a holy and intelligent being, who acts against DIFFICULTIES AND THEIR SOLUTION. 249 the remonstrances alike of reason, inclination, and conscience. A second difficulty which grows out of the doc- trine of Adam's moral agency, and his moral proba- tion in the command which he disobeyed, arises from the plain and admitted principle, that as such moral agent he must have been " under the indispensable obligation to keep the whole moral law," while it is also indisputable that " his acceptance, justifica- tion, and reward were suspended upon the single point of his abstaining from the forbidde'n fruit." Both these propositions are taken from Dr. D wight, and both are, in some form or other, repeated by other theologians ; though President Edwards, and those of his views, consider that the " acceptance, justification, and reward," thus suspended upon Adam's obedience to the special mandate, were only the acceptance, etc., which were to include his pos- terity. They insist that, upon all other matters, his obligations and responsibilities were purely personal ; that in this alone he stood in a representative or federal capacity. With this qualification, they en- tirely sustain the proposition above cited from Dr. Dwight. Thus Dr. Payne, in his able " Lec- tures on Original Sin," says : " Little room is left for doubt that obedience, on other points, was ren- dered certain, by sovereign sustaining grace pre- venting failure, and that in no point was his obe- dience contingent but in reference to the condition of the charter. The Holy Spirit, dwelling in the 250 THE RISE AND THE FALL. mind of Adam, may easily be conceived to have secured by special influence, yet in a manner per- fectly compatible with free agency, obedience to other precepts, while He put forth no such influence to secure obedience to the interdict." (p. 73.) And we may cite upon the same point, Dr. Harris (" Man Primeval," p. 395) : " The law implies that every avenue of evil was for him closed up one excepted. For surely it was not to be understood that he might violate every other obligation, natural and moral, with impunity. Left to himself, ' he was a free agent, capable of self-government, and held responsible for a life of obedience.' ' The doctrine, then, clearly is, that Adam was a free moral agent in respect to all duties, yet under a dispensation which insured him against the viola- tion of all except one. Now we are free to confess that we cannot see how both these things can be true. No man can be at the same time morally free, and yet be by some external power prevented from moral dereliction. The " security of heaven," to which Dr. Harris, as we have before seen, com- pares the state of the first man, guarded from sin without violation of free agency, consists in the inherent, self-sustaining strength of the beings who remain untouched by sin, and is consistent with their free agency, because it results from the con- stant exercise of that free agency. There is no resemblance between this and the supposed condi- tion of Adam, protected not by his own inherent DIFFICULTIES AND THEIR SOLUTION. 251 moral strength and preference, but by some spell or influence from without, from yielding to temptation. It is impossible to conceive of any species of " spe- cial influence " whereby the Holy Spirit could secure Adam's general obedience consistently with his free agency. Besides, to say that he remained a free agent in respect to other matters, implies a respon- sibility connected therewith, that he was (either personally or federally) on trial with relation thereto. To make a single test his sole condition of accept- ance, is either to discharge him from all others, which leaves him without a moral responsibility and trial, or to guarantee him against all other tempta- tions, i. e., to prevent him from exercising free agency in any other matter, which is to that extent to annihilate free agency. Says Dr. Payne, " Im- munity from temptation, or from the possibility of being vanquished by it, is utterly incompatible with a state of moral trial " ; * and again, " a being sus- tained by sovereign effectual grace cannot be in a state of probation." 2 To say, then, that but one condition of accept- ance was imposed upon man, yet that he still con- tinued subject to many obligations, is not a mystery but a contradiction. Equally so, that he was a free moral agent, (i. e., uninfluenced from without, and on full moral trial,) and yet was specially secured by the Holy Spirit with relation to all points but one, so that, except as to that point, he was not free 1 Payne's Lectures on Original Sin, p. 349. 3 Ibid. p. 75. 252 THE RISE AND THE FALL. and not on trial. We have seen that the difficulty is not avoided by the Edwards theory, that Adam was individually accountable as to his general du- ties, and federally accountable as to this particular interdict ; that in relation to his personal duties he was specially guarded, but that in relation to his representative duty he was left to himself; in other words, that he was a free agent only as respected the special prohibition, and in his federal capacity. Apart from the fact that this does not relieve the difficulty, we may inquire, with regard to the view itself, what Scripture ground is there for it ? Where is the least suggestion of such a distinction ? or any recognition of it, either before or after the disobe- dience ? Where is the probability of it ? for why should Adam be so carefully protected as respected his personal welfare, and be left exposed as to the vastly more important interests of the race ? More- over, supposing Adam to have delayed or refrained from partaking of the forbidden fruit, how long, upon this view, were this arrangement and his per- sonal exemption from moral liability and free agency to continue ? The view seems to consider his per- sonal free agency, at some time of his life, as essen- tial ; when was it to be resumed ? And after its resumption, if ever, should Adam happen to sin personally, but never federally, or conversely, how was he to be punished, and in what way would his posterity be affected ? If there is enough in the narrative to suggest any such complex arrangement DIFFICULTIES AND THEIR SOLUTION. 253 as the view asserts, there must be enough to suggest some hints in reply to these inquiries. We think, however, it must be evident that the scheme itself is only an ingenious but improbable invention, to- tally devoid of authority. The difficulty, then, which we are considering, meets us irresistibly, either alone or in concert with others, upon any theory which views Adam as a moral agent before the transgression. 'It yields only with the relinquishment of this idea, but then it yields entirely. There is then seen to be no vari- ance between the plain teaching of the Word, that but one command was laid upon man as law for his obedience, and that that was made the pivot of his moral destiny, and the equally plain dictate of rea- son, that a moral being must be subject to the whole moral law, as fully free to break it as he is free and accountable to keep it in all its provisions. It may be worth remarking here, as a feature of improbability in the common view, that it exhibits Adam, whose natural disposition for holiness and constant association with God fitted him to endure a far more severe probationary test than his poster- ity, as subjected to one which is singularly insignifi- cant, while his descendants, weak, corrupted, and environed with sin and sinful influences, are placed for their trial under the manifold requirements of the whole moral law, and left to combat with every conceivable temptation. If the conditions imposed upon us be no more difficult than moral beings re- 254 THE RISE AND THE FALL. quire, why was the first man shielded from these and admitted to less ? If the test applied to Adam were sufficient, why are we subjected to one of so much greater severity ? The purpose of any pro- bationary trial is (probare) to prove the moral firm- ness of the creature, and to strengthen his moral powers by discipline and exercise. It would seem, then, that he who has the greatest original advan- tages should encounter the most arduous trial, and that he who has the fewest aids to success should be most easily dealt with. It has been replied, in- deed, to this objection, that in the case of Adam, who was, at least in this matter, the representative not only of himself but the race, the test was pur- posely made insignificant, in order that he (and through him the race) might have the greatest pos- sible chance of success and of after-acceptance and blessedness. It is surely, however, a sufficient an- swer to such a position, that the very insignificance of the test must have also destroyed its value. If it were intended to be sole and final, as respected Adam or the race, what would have been estab- lished or effected had Adam succeeded in abiding it ? So slight a victory would neither have proved man's moral fidelity, nor have availed as a means of his moral development. When God tempted Abra- ham, it was with no easy trial, and surely Adam should have been as secure in virtue as the patri- arch, his " degenerate " descendant. But if the test were not intended to be sole and final, but only DIFFICULTIES AND THEIR SOLUTION. 255 preliminary to successive and more difficult trials, then of course this particular experiment could not have been the turning-point of man's moral destiny, according to the universal doctrine, as well as the clear import of Revelation itself. Thus, at every turn, we encounter objections to be avoided only by returning to our starting-point, and taking a differ- ent path from the outset. We may also remark, that in the foregoing con- siderations we touch the ground of certain com- plainings which the received view of Adam's trans- gression and fall has awakened among men in all ages, against their Maker and his moral system. How often do we hear objectors complain that God has made an unreasonable difference between them and Adam, as respects their opportunities of accept- ance and life ! that Adam's posterity have never had so favorable terms of probation as he, and that God did not deal fairly by the race in making Adam their federal head, since there must have been in him a special deficiency of moral firmness, to have so easily fallen ! " Why," they will say, " why was not some Abraham first created and deputed to encounter for the race this test, so easy in itself, yet so momentous in its consequences ? Nay, why should not I myself have been offered a similar trial ; for it surely seems hard that I should be ruined by Adam's failure in a trial which it seems incredible that / could not have endured ? " Thus has grown up in human hearts an unfilial feeling of bitterness not only toward God, but to- 256 THE RISE AND THE FALL. ward our first progenitor ; and, indeed, it does seem unaccountable that the normal man, fresh from the hands and society of God, should not have been able to withstand a temptation far less trying than many which thousands of his " depraved " descendants have triumphantly resisted. No less reasonable, also, in one point of view does it appear, to expect that God should permit all men to enter upon pro- bation on uniform terms and under equally favorable conditions. And it is therefore worthy of notice, that of all the complaints and cavils to which we have alluded our view finally disposes. It exhibits the transgression not as an act of moral weakness and folly at once imbecile and disastrous. It represents it as an act which any being in Adam's situation would have undoubtedly committed, an act not sinful nor necessarily productive of sin, and not intrinsically evil to mankind ; but one, on the contrary, which elevated man in the moral scale, and opened to him opportunities of exaltation and glory otherwise unattainable. It reveals, too, the fact that no difference has been made between Adam and ourselves in the terms of probation, unless in our favor ; for it shows him entering upon his moral career, after the transgression, with precisely the same nature and under the same obligations as every other being of the succeeding race ; and that the only difference between him and ourselves, in moral circumstances, is found in the vastly greater advan- tages by which we are surrounded, to attract and keep us in the path of rectitude. COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED. 257 CHAPTER ITL THE COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED WITH RESPECT TO THE METHOD OF ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE RACE. ANOTHER recommendation of the view which we urge is, that it simply and comprehensibly explains the nature and method of that radical change in man which is universally agreed to have taken place at the disobedience. It has been generally insisted that this change was some kind of a "fall," a de- terioration or prejudice of some sort, sustained by Adam and transmitted to his posterity, either in his nature, character, or relations to God. We propose to examine this doctrine, and to show, if possible, that no such deterioration or " fall " can be believed to have attended the act of transgression, as a result O * involved in its commission. We do not deny, as we have before intimated, that there was a fall by Adam, subsequently to and independently of the disobedience, into sinfulness and alienation from God, the same "fall" or "apostasy," in fact, of which every one of his descendants has been individually guilty. The " fall," against the prob- ability of whose occurrence we shall offer some con- siderations, is such an one as the common view 17 258 THE RISE AND THE FALL. supposes to have been associated with and effected by the act of transgression itself. Let us inquire in the outset, " Wherein consisted that supposed * change for the worse ' in man's con- dition, alleged to have occurred at and through the disobedience ? " The number and diversity of the replies furnished to this inquiry by the different schools of Theology, of themselves indicate the difficulty contained in it. One party insists that by the transgression man lost all " natural ability " (i. e., all inherent power) to keep the law of God. Another declares that by it he only lost the " moral ability " to keep it ; meaning thereby that the dis- obedience, without taking away man's power of obedience, effected such a loss of disposition thereto as rendered it certain that he never would entirely submit to its requirements. But these, after all, are rather statements of effects than of the mode. The question still recurs, what was the change in man which left him thus naturally or morally un- able to keep the law ? That no satisfactory reply has ever been made to this is evident from the fact that it is still as much as ever a subject of dispute and discussion. Perhaps the most rational and in- telligible answer, however, that has been offered, is contained in a theory already alluded to ; that, in consequence of the disobedience, God withdrew his Holy Spirit from man, who had been thereto- fore under its influence, and so left him without " spiritual life " and the restraining power of the COMMON" VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED. 259 Divine indwelling, against the assaults of sin. 1 To the same effect Dr. Bushnell says : " It is not that man fell away from certain moral notions or laws, but it is that he fell away from the personal inhabi- tation of God, lost inspiration, and so became a dark, enslaved creature, alienated, as the Apostle says, from the life of God." 2 This seems clear and explicit, and partly satisfies our inquiry. Yet we still are constrained to ask, What happened to man, that caused God thus to withdraw his Holy Spirit from him, to cease his personal inhabitation, to deprive his creature of " spiritual life " ? There must have been some reason for so sad and fatal a visitation, and what was that reason ? It is urged, indeed, by some of the advocates of the particular doctrine in question, that these spirit- ual blessings, of which Adam and the race are O 7 supposed to have been thus deprived, were " char- tered privileges " ; 3 meaning thereby advantages ' not naturally or originally pertaining to humanity, and specially granted only on certain conditions ; so that on the breach of these they might be with- drawn without injustice and without prejudice to the race, since men were not thereby placed in any lower or worse condition than if this special oppor- tunity had never been permitted. Yet, even upon this theory, unless this experiment with Adam were 1 Payne's Lectures on Original Sin, p. 144. 2 Sermons on the New Life, p. 36. 8 Payne's Lectures on Original Sin. 260 THE RISE AND THE FALL. totally without meaning and without purpose, we must suppose that there was some real and neces- sary connection between his transgression and the withdrawal from him of these " chartered blessings," so called. Doubtless when conferred it was the sincere desire of the Giver that they should be preserved by man. Is it conceivable, then, that their continuance was made to depend upon some- thing which had not, in itself, the slightest bearing upon it ? If not, why was Adam's disobedience incompatible with this continuance ? Why, and from what motive, were they withdrawn when this disobedience occurred, and never again offered to the race ? These are the questions which we pur- pose to investigate. Obviously, this final withdrawal of blessings from the race, in the manner supposed, must have been either the direct act of God, not necessarily occa- sioned by the transgression, or the necessary effect of the transgression itself. If the direct and un- necessary act of God, it must have been either with displeasure or without displeasure ; and in this latter case it must have been intended either for man's benefit, or have been without any reason at all. But inasmuch as the withdrawal was, by the hy- pothesis, a great loss and evil to mankind, and inas- much as God cannot be believed to have acted from mere caprice, the last suggestion may be dismissed, and we may consider the supposition that the with- drawal was the unnecessary act of God, merely COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED. 261 from displeasure at Adam's disobedience to his command. We should, perhaps, be less likely to discuss this at length, but as it closely borders upon a view supported by some theologians, that man- kind by the fall fell into a state of disfavor with God (though without explaining the nature of that disfavor), and as the same considerations will apply to both hypotheses, we shall consider it somewhat fully. Was this final withdrawal, then, (or this disfa- vor,) occasioned by a mere feeling of Divine anger at this personal act of Adam, a feeling extending from him to his posterity; so that although there was no inherent obstacle to the continuance of his former blessings (or favor), yet, in consequence of this displeasure, they were forever withdrawn both from Adam and his race ? It will be readily seen that were this supposed displeasure and its conse- quences confined to Adam, there would be little difficulty in accepting an affirmative answer. The trouble arises from the doctrine that they extend to his future race in all generations, who had no par- ticipation with him in the guilty act. If this be true, then, unless we believe that such divine dis- pleasure against Adam's posterity on account of his act was without reason on the part of God, (a doc- trine out of the question,) we must account in some way for its existence, and there are but two methods of doing so. Either it is because they are his pos- terity, though not in any sense responsible for his 262 THE RISE AND THE FALL. sin, or because they are regarded by God as impli- cated in the guilt of his disobedience. That God does not cherish displeasure or disfavor against us for Adam's act, simply because we are his descendants, while admitting that we are in no way responsible for his conduct, we ought not to feel obliged to argue. Such a displeasure would be a mere resentment, alike unphilosophical and unjust. That God would harbor such vindictiveness toward a race of innocent beings, simply because they were that which He himself had made them, thus pun- ishing them for his own act, is utterly incredible and revolting. Apart from its intrinsic impossibil- ity, God himself expressly declares that he does not punish the children for the sins of their fathers, though undoubtedly, under the inflexible laws of his material universe, the natural consequences of sin may extend beyond the perpetrator. Nor is the injustice implied in such a view the only argument against it. We are led to inquire why, if God foresaw that the whole human race were to be thus displeasing to him, he did not refrain either from their original creation or from their continuance after the transgression of Adam. It can hardly be believed that he would preserve the existence of a race in which every new birth awakened new sentiments of disfavor and displeasure. Is, then, this imagined displeasure of God against us on account of Adam's act, because he holds us responsible for it, or implicated in its guilt ? If it COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED. 263 be so, either man must be regarded as having (by virtue of his descent) participated with Adam in his act of disobedience ; or else, by virtue of that descent, the guilt of that act must be imputed to him, though he be not regarded as having partici- pated in the act of transgression. We confess that in stating these propositions, which we do because they form received topics of theological discussion, the obscurity which would be admitted to invest them were they anything but theological dogmas, does not seem to us much relieved by the fact that they are such. But to consider them fairly and in their order : It is perfectly manifest that, if our descent from Adam identifies us in any way with his act as participators in it, then such participation consists in or arises from the fact of such descent, some- thing, therefore, of which God alone is the author. Consequently, if he may be justly displeased with us and hold us responsible as participators, he should also be displeased with himself, for at least sharing in such participation. If he is not so dis- pleased with himself, then he cannot be with us ; and if he is so displeased, then follows the absurd- ity that, having been pleased to create us and being displeased that we are created, he is both pleased and displeased at the same thing. We need not dwell on a proposition which leads to such conclu- sions ; and therefore turn to the inquiry whether, by virtue of our descent from Adam, the guilt of his act is imputed to us, though not participating in 264 THE RISE AND THE FALL. the act. As the advocates of this view themselves admit it to be " a mystery," we shall not be ex- pected to see plainly the method or the justice of thus imputing guilt to perfect innocence. But it is evident that this proposition, though in a different form from the last, is substantially the same thing. For if this " imputation " is in consequence of our descent from Adam, then it is this descent which constitutes our guilt. In other words, we are held guilty for the act of God himself. God then shares in the guilt of Adam's sin, and, being holy in all his acts, is both holy and guilty at the same time. Such are some of the inconsistencies in which the doctrine of God's displeasure with, or disfavor to- ward the posterity of Adam, on account of his trans- gression, involve us. It seems incredible, therefore, that this supposed final withdrawal from the race of the blessings previously enjoyed by it, could have been the unnecessary act of God. We now proceed to inquire whether it resulted as a neces- sary consequence of the transgression itself. Did, then, this " deprivation " ensue, as is more commonly and rationally believed, because by the disobedience some change had occurred in Adam (to be by natural transmission perpetuated in his descendants), impairing and corrupting his mind and character ; unfitting man, therefore, for God's personal inhabitation ; of itself excluding the Holy Spirit, and so destroying " spiritual life " in the soul ? If this be so, if the relations either of COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED. 265 Adam alone or of man in general were really prej- udiced by the disobedience, if that act of itself tended to separate the race from God, it must have been by producing some radical and permanent de- terioration, either in the actual moral character of mankind, or in those qualities of the mind which lie at the basis of character and go to its formation. Let us see, therefore, how far these suppositions respectively are admissible. That this act so impaired the moral character of man (irrespective of any change in his faculties or disposition) that God could no longer abide in his soul, in other -words, such that had no other sin been ever committed by Adam or by any of his descendants, and this particular sin been fully for- given by the Creator, still the corruption left by this single act would have tainted men in all gener- ations and rendered them unacceptable to God, has been sometimes inculcated. Thus the Westminster Catechism teaches that "the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of the whole nature, which is commonly called original sin." How far Adam's descendants can be justly held accountable for his personal act, we have already considered : at present we confine ourselves to the latter part of the proposition, which speaks of the want of original righteousness and the corruption of the whole nature, as being them- selves of the nature of " sw," an ^ implies that every 266 THE RISE AND THE FALL. man comes into the world, not merely destitute of " original " (i. e., native) holiness of character, but with an " original " character of sinfulness, even before he has thought, spoken, or acted. " Charac- ter," then, in the sense here used, means something separate from " disposition" or " tendencies." Prop- erly, it is the moral tone, or hue, which invests a man's life, thoughts, or actions. It is absolutely requisite for its existence, therefore, that there should be moral faculties already existing, as well as life and acts, for a brute has no character, nor an idiot, nor a man that never thought or acted ; while " disposition " may exist in the brute or the idiot, entirely separate from moral agency. By the proposition of the Westminster Catechism just stated, however, man possesses a character before he enters on moral agency, a character anterior to moral agency, and anterior, therefore, to the possible com- mencement of character, which is absurd. In fact, the principle that man can have no character except through acts in which he personally participates, is one too plain to need discussion. It is universally recognized in the ordinary affairs and judgments of life, and is questioned nowhere except in the domain of theology, and survives even there in connection with no other subject than this transgression of Adam. Probably it would have forsaken this re- treat also, were it not retained as a refuge from other difficulties of greater magnitude, which the ordinary view must encounter in its absence ; a COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED. 267 necessity which should excite suspicion of the theory which is compelled to resort to it. If, then, this supposed deterioration or fall of man was not of the nature of a change in his moral O character, apart from his disposition, will, or action, it must have been in the disposition or will them- selves, that is, in those mental qualities or facul- ties which are concerned in the determination of conduct and character. Such alteration, if it oc- curred, was necessarily either by the absolute or relative weakening of the will, rendering man to that degree incapable of rendering perfect obedi- ence ; or in such loss of disposition thereto, as ren- dered him thenceforward unwilling to render such obedience, that is, a change from both a natural and moral ability for holiness, to a natural or moral inability, or both. In what way, then, could any such change have been produced ? Evidently it could have been effected only either by a supernat- ural or a natural process of mental alteration ; that is, either through the direct interposition of the Creator, acting upon the mind thus to impair and degrade its properties and powers, or as an ordinary and necessary consequence of the state or condition in which the mind was at the time of the trans- gression. That it was not the former, we need hardly insist. That God would deliberately mar his own work, no intrinsic necessity existing for it, is incredible. " Previous to the disobedience," says a recent writer, "Adam appreciated the perfections 268 THE RISE AXD THE FALL. of God and loved his attractions. After that act, these perfections presented no loveliness, elicited no affections. Light, and love, and filial trust, yielded to darkness, enmity, error, and despair ! This could not have been effected by the direct act of God. It is impossible to conceive that Jehovah did or could deface the spiritual beauty with which He himself had adorned the soul of Adam." * To have done so, we may add, and to have inflicted upon man a mental and moral prostration, rendering him more liable than before to sin, and inevitably de- termining his subjection by evil, a condition to which his own act would not have naturally reduced him, would have been to relieve him of the chief share of responsibility for the prevalence of sin in the world, since such prevalence would have been then attributable, not to man's disobedience, but to God's intervention. We must conclude, therefore, that whatever evil effects upon the human mind were produced by the transgression were natural effects alone. These natural effects, as we have before sug- gested, must have consisted in either the absolute or relative weakening of the will or disposition, as respected resistance to evil ; and must have been either a natural diminution of power in the will or disposition, or a natural augmentation of strength in the appetites and passions, or a natural deprecia- tion of the influence exerted upon the will or dis- 1 Payne's Lectures, p. 144. COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED. 269 position by the moral faculty. Let us consider, first, whether it could have consisted in a mere natural accession of new force to the propensities, or a mere natural enervation of the disposition or will. We submit that it cannot be placed upon either of these grounds, because, 1st The change supposed to have been produced was by far too immediate and too great to be as- cribed to any such naturally produced " tendency to repetition," 1 as the commission of all acts creates. This " tendency to repetition," in other words^ " the influence of habit," is not one that becomes suddenly manifest, since an act must have been done a considerable number of times before it is felt as a " habit." That a single commission tends to the formation of a habit, cannot be disputed, just as it cannot be denied that a drop of water must raise the level of the lake, but the truth is recognized rather by the reason than the senses, so slight is the actual result. " As the snow gathers together, so are our habits formed. No single flake that is added to the pile produces a sensible change ; no single action creates, however it may exhibit, a man's character ; but as the tempest hurls the avalanche down the mountain and overwhelms the inhabitant and his habitation, so passion, acting upon the ele- ments of mischief, which pernicious habits have brought together by imperceptible accumulation, l Harris's Man Primeval. 270 THE RISE AND THE FALL. may overthrow the edifice of truth and virtue." 1 Hence the effect of habit can only be exhibited after time and repetition ; and should repetition never occur, no appreciable force or influence will have been created. Indeed, it not unfrequently happens that the commission of an act, so far from inciting to repetition, actually deters from it, in view of the remorse and distress, or other evils which follow as its consequence. This would certainly seem as likely to be the result in the case of holy beings as in any other; and the idea is confirmed by our observations of human character, so far as we can derive instruction from them. 2d. The various appetites, like other mental fac- ulties or properties, are, to a considerable extent, distinct from each other, and are, for the most part, affected, each for itself, independently of the rest, and only by their respective gratifications. In other words, the indulgence of one propensity does not ordinarily foster or strengthen another of an entirely different character. If this be questioned, as re- spects the effect of habitual indulgence, it is suffi- cient for our purpose to confine our proposition to that of a single vicious gratification. We think it will hardly be claimed that a man's single and only act of intemperance has left him more cruel or more deceitful than he was before he committed it. Now, if it be admitted that Adam's transgression was prompted by some evil appetite or desire, even this, 1 Bentham. COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED. 271 though it might explain an augmentation of that particular propensity, would not account for what is alleged to have resulted, the entire corruption of his whole heart and being. It is allowing much, even for the sake of the argument, that the single and slight outbreak of passion here described (sup- posing it to be such) could give that particular pro- pensity a preponderating influence in the human heart for all generations. It is far more than reason or experience will admit, that such an act could, by a mere natural consequence, place at once and for- ever the whole tribe of evil passions upon the throne of human character. 3d. Had the transgression simply produced a merely natural growth or development of appetite, or a merely natural effect upon the disposition or will of the race descending from Adam, as yet in his loins, the same results must have been conse- quent upon any other evil indulgence of any other evil propensity. This is manifest. Yet the narra- tive plainly teaches that the effects of the disobe- dience depended upon that particular act, and no other ; and that no different violation of duty, how- ever flagrant, could or would have been followed by the same consequences. This fact alone seems fatal to the idea that the supposed " deterioration " or " fall," in man's condition, whatever it may be im- agined to have been, could have consisted in any natural change produced by the transgression, at least in any of his intellectual faculties. 272 THE RISE AND THE FALL. We come next to inquire whether man's moral sense, or his conscience, may not have been en- feebled or blunted, either in its energies or its in- fluence over human conduct, through which loss of power or influence the race became thenceforth less able to cope successfully with its own inherent ten- dencies to self-indulgence. In reply to this portion of our inquiry, we may refer to substantially the same considerations as just have engaged our attention. It can hardly be believed, in the first place, that a single disregard of conscience would have been equivalent to its perma- nent overthrow, and have accomplished its incapac- ity farther to dispute the field successfully against all the propensities. Such a sweepingly disastrous result does not agree with our observations, nor is it conformable to the expectations we should naturally form respecting a divinely implanted monitor over human conduct. Repeated violations of conscience will undoubtedly, in time, blunt and deaden its force ; but a single commission of a single sin does not, so far as we have reason to believe, permanently and effectively undermine its influence within us, or render it perceptibly less active or efficient in its op- position to indulgences of a different character. Still less are future generations so influenced by the acts of their ancestors, that in consequence of a single sin they are born into the world perceptibly deficient in moral faculties. Such a theoiy would require a continual and progressive depreciation in the moral COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED. 273 powers of the race, and this we know is far from being exhibited in fact. And in the second place, could we believe that any such consequence natu- rally ensued to the conscience or its influence, by the disobedience, there would have been no reason why any other sin, actually committed by Adam, should not have produced a similar result. The story, however, shows that this could not have been the effect of any other act, however repugnant to the conscience ; and for this, with the other reasons we have urged, we are driven to conclude that the supposed " fall " of Adam and his race, did not consist in the natural loss of moral strength or in- fluence. We have thus exhausted, as we believe, all the grounds upon which the doctrine of a " deterio- ration " or fall in man at the transgression, or his loss of God's favor, or Holy Spirit, at that time, can be rested. If no such change for the worse can be made out, and if it cannot be believed that he could fall under God's displeasure or disfavor without some such adequate cause, then we seem compelled to explain the undoubted cessation of the Divine intimacy and companionship which ensued, by sup- posing it to have been unattended by displeasure on the part of the Creator. This conclusion coincides with the view we are urging in these pages. We suppose that man, by the transgression having ac- quired a conscience, was no longer in need of God's personal indwelling or influence to. direct his con- 18 274 THE RISE AND THE FALL. duct ; that he was now prepared to walk alone in the path of duty, and was accordingly left by his Maker to put forth those unsupported movements in the formation of moral character, which were neces- sary for his strength and discipline as a free moral agent. Adopting this view, the difficulties which we have noticed as embarrassing the common doc- trine are met no longer. Discovering that the evils necessarily incident to humanity are not of the na- ture of penalties, and that we are, therefore, not punished for Adam's disobedience, we are no longer driven to believe that we are in any way held ac- countable for it, or for the nature with which the Creator has endowed us. While insisting that we are judged for our own acts alone, in accordance with the plain and admitted rules of justice, we yet do not ignore any of the facts of experience or of Scripture, nor deny that in consequence of Adam's transgression death was entailed upon all his poster- ity forever. All the difficulties, the inconsistencies, and the impossibilities which we have been discuss- ing, take their rise directly or indirectly in the doc- trine that Adam's transgression was a " sin," and that the burdens imposed upon him in consequence were " penalties " to which his race were " sen- tenced " therefor. While this ground is adhered to, they are unavoidable, and can never be fully disposed of without either abandoning this founda- tion, or the doctrine of God's benevolence, as well as the first principles of justice and reason. MANKIND NOT A FAILURE. 275 CHAPTER IV. THE COMMON VIEW OF THE FALL EXAMINED WITH REFERENCE TO ITS DOCTRINE THAT MANKIND IS A FAILURE. OUR limits will permit us to refer to but one more difficulty to which the common view gives rise. It is of scarcely inferior magnitude to those which we have discussed, though of perhaps less practical mo- ment. The view represents to us God creating Man in a high and responsible condition as a moral being, his native character and faculties, his rank in the universe, his relations to his Maker, and his prescribed destiny, being far more exalted than they have at any time since been exhibited. It tells us that scarcely had he been formed in this perfect mould, and inaugurated in this lofty place and mis- sion, scarcely had his Maker pronounced him " very good," and begun to lead him upward in his destined path of greatness and glory, ere, by a sin- gle step, he fell from his high estate, and sank into corruption, wretchedness, and ruin. It is not merely that he failed to become all that his opportunities might have made him. " It is on all hands ad- mitted," says one of our strongest modern theolo- gians, " that the fall of Adam involved the race in RUIN ! " Man, at the very outset, broke down in fail- 276 THE RISE AND THE FALL. ure ! For this, the system of the universe offers no analogy. All created things are in the divine wis- dom made of temporary continuance. By their very constitution, being formed to fill a particular sphere, and accomplish a particular end, having answered their object they fall into decay and disappear. All this we see without impeachment of the divine power or foresight, for here is a manifest fulfilment of design, a purpose, a progress, and a consumma- tion. Nowhere among all the kingdoms of Nature can an object be found which is stamped with the mark of its own failure and of God's disappointment. But theology insists that one must be excepted. In man, it declares, in man we behold a work which, as originally made, was the last, the noblest, and the best of God's creating. He was the work upon which God entered with a special solemnity, and which, w-hen finished, he displayed as the master- piece of his wisdom and power ; a creature which he cherished with affectionate and careful attention, and which he destined for a career as splendid in the illustration of his character as its nature was glorious by the reflection of his image. And this creature, so glorious, so perfect, so tenderly guarded and instructed, before it has fairly started on its course, falls into sudden and hopeless RUIN ! In- stead of remaining in and reflecting his holiness, it sinks at once into corruption and sin ! Instead of preserving its harmony and friendship with him- self, it repels him from the very beginning of temp- MANKIND NOT A FAILURE. 277 tation with hostility and hatred ! Its normal state has scarcely been disclosed ere it has disappeared ; its purposed destiny, even before it is fully revealed, is forfeited ; the joy and love which were to mark its career are changed to gall and bitterness, its intended glory to shame and contempt ! We will not assert that here is implied a disap- pointment, a thwarting of God's plans and ex- pectations. We will not deny that man might possibly have been created for the very purpose of having him thus miserably and deplorably fail of his natural destiny. We will not dispute that God might be conceived to have thus formed him noble, holy, and angelic, with the full design that he should sink immediately into a state earthly, sen- sual, and devilish. But what we insist is, that if here was not a disappointment of God's original plan, if man's failure was really accordant with his first scheme, then the moral system pre- sents a stupendous anomaly in the universe, a strange and terrible departure from the otherwise invariable divine methods of progress and order. In it we see what nowhere else is displayed to us, the Deity working by retrogressions, retreats, and corrections. We behold Him, after creating man to his satisfaction, after pronouncing him " very good," (i.