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 CAMPBELLS POPULAR HANDBOOKS. 
 
 HANDBOOK OF ENGLISH SYNONYMS; 
 
 WITH AN APPENDIX 
 SHOWING THE CORRECT USES OF PREPOSITIONS. 
 
 By LOOMIS J. CAMPBELL. 
 
 160 pages. Neat cloth binding. Price 50 cents. Mailed on receipt of the money. 
 
 This compact little volume contains about 40,000 synonymous words printed in 
 clear, distinct type. 
 
 It is a work which will substantially aid speakers, writers, teachers, and students, — 
 in fact, all who would gain a more copious vocabulary, and increase their power of 
 expression. 
 
 It includes the really important matter of the more bulky volumes which are com- 
 monly sold for two dollars or more. 
 
 A great choice of words is here placed at the sen-ice of the writer and the speaker. 
 
 The Appendix, containing " Prepositions Compared and Discriminated, and " A 
 List showing what Prepositions to use after Certain Words," is a trustworthy guide in 
 a great number of cases of doubtful usage. A writer's knowledge of English idiom 
 and his style are best shown by his use of these little hinges of the language. 
 
 From the Boston Journal, April S, rSS/. 
 
 " It is prepared on the wultiim In parvo principle, and it would not be easy to find 
 a book of its size which contains more information of a useful sort. Clearly printed 
 and well arranged, it is adapted to help any one who writes much, to enrich his vocab- 
 ulary, vary his expressions, and secure accuracy in conveying his thought. The appen- 
 dix, explaining and illustrating the correct use of different prepositions, is a particularly 
 valuable feature." 
 
 Front the Journal of Education, Boston, April, iSSr. 
 
 " For writers and teachers this is one of the most useful and convenient Hand- 
 books of Synonyms we have ever seen." 
 
 PRONOUNCING HANDBOOK 
 
 OF WORDS OFTEN MISPRONOUNCED, AND OF WORDS AS TO 
 WHICH A CHOICE OF PRONUNCIATION IS ALLOWED. 
 
 By LOOMIS J. CAMPBELL and RICHARD SOULE. 
 Price 50 cents. Cheap edition, 35 cents. Mailed on receipt of the money. 
 Designed to report the Current Usage of the Best Speakers, after a careful 
 comparison of those bulky standards 
 
 WEBSTER AND WORCESTER, 
 and due consultation with the works of the best English lexicographers and orthoe- 
 pists. Also, to record such Words as May be Pronounced in either of Two 
 Ways without offence to good taste. , . 
 
 It is Concise, Explicit, and Wastes no Words. We venture the prediction 
 that Ninety-nine Persons out of every Hundred who should look the book 
 through would be greatly surprised to find how many words they are mispronouncing 
 every day. 
 
 It is adapted for use as a text-book for schools, and has already found its way into 
 a large number. 
 
 This book is a standard authority upon the subject of pronunciation, and an inval- 
 uable aid to teachers. 
 
 From hundreds of testimonials as to accuracy, usefulness, and handiness, we have 
 room but for the following as specimens : — 
 
 From Wm. A. Wheeler, Editor of Webster's Series of Dictionaries: 
 " This Handbook really meets a public want which has never been adequately met 
 before." 
 
 Prof. W. D. Whitney, Yale College: 
 " I should think it would attract general attention, and fill the needs of many." 
 " The editors have performed their work with judgment and good taste, and it will 
 be found a very desirable assistant in an essential accomplishment." 
 
 — The Christian Intelligencer. 
 
 »* Sold by all booksellers, and sent by mail, postpaid, on receipt 0/ price. 
 
 LEE AND SHEPARD, Publishers, 47 Franklin Street, Boston.
 
 ENGLISH 
 
 SYNONYMS DISCRIMINATED 
 
 
 UOBAWGffltK^- : - CAL " 
 
 BY 
 
 RICHARD WHATELY D.D. 
 
 ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN 
 
 fom ©tottion 
 
 c c 
 
 
 BOSTON 
 LEE AND SHEPARD, PUBLISHERS 
 
 NEXT OLD SOUTH MEETING-HOUSE 
 
 No. 10 Milk Street 
 
 1887
 
 Cok, I 
 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 This little work has been carefully revised by me, 
 throughout; and though I am far from presuming 
 to call it perfect, it is, I am confident, very much 
 the best that has appeared on the subject. 
 
 Of the importance of that subject itself, very 
 different opinions will probably be found to exist. 
 Some advantage, indeed, all will acknowledge, in 
 the cultivation of correctness and precision in our 
 expressions. But the importance of this, and of 
 all that relates to language, will be much less 
 highly estimated by those who have adopted the 
 metaphysical theory of ideas, and who consider 
 the use of language to be merely the conveying 
 our meaning to others, than by those who adhere 
 to the opposite — the nominalist — view, (which I 
 have set forth in the Introduction to the Logic, 
 § 8,) and who accordingly regard words — or some 
 kind of signs equivalent to words — as an indis- 
 pensable instrument of thought, in all cases, where 
 a process of reasoning takes place. 
 
 Richard Dublin.
 
 PREFACE, BY THE AUTHOR. 
 
 In offering a collection of synonyms to the public, 
 a few words of explanation may be necessary. 
 
 It is scarcely needful to remind the reader that 
 the word ' synonym ' is, in fact, a misnomer, as 
 applied to words of the description in question. 
 Literally, it implies an exact coincidence of mean- 
 ing in two or more words : in which case there 
 would be no room for discussion ; but it is generally 
 applied to words which would be more correctly 
 termed pseudo-synonyms — z. e., words having a 
 shade of difference, yet with a sufficient resem- 
 blance of meaning to make them liable to be con- 
 founded together. And it is in the number and 
 variety of these that (as the Abbe Girard well 
 remarks) the richness of a language consists. To 
 have two or more words with exactly the same 
 sense, is no proof of copiousness, but simply an 
 inconvenience. A house would not be called well 
 furnished from its having a much larger number of 
 chairs and tables of one kind than were needed, 
 1* [5]
 
 O PREFACE. 
 
 but from its having a separate article for each dis- 
 tinct use. The more power we have of discrimi- 
 nating the nicer shades of meaning, the greater 
 facility we possess of giving force and precision 
 to our expressions. Our own language possesses 
 great advantages in this respect; for being partly 
 derived from the Teutonic, and partly from the 
 Latin, we have a large number of duplicates from 
 the two sources ; which are, for the most part, though 
 not universally, slightly varied in their meaning. 
 
 These slight variations of meaning add to the 
 copiousness of the English language, by affording 
 words of more and less familiarity, and of greater 
 and less force. This may be easily understood, if 
 we consider that the branch of the Teutonic, spoken 
 in England during the Anglo-Saxon period, never 
 became extinct, but that three fourths of the Eng- 
 lish language at present consist of words altered 
 or derived from that ancient dialect; that these 
 words usually express the most familiar ideas, such 
 as man, house, land, &c. ; and that the French terms 
 gradually introduced, being those of a more highly 
 civilized people, were adapted to express the more 
 refined ideas. This is true even of physical objects ; 
 thus, for instance, most of the names of the animals 
 used for food are still Teutonic, such as ox, sheep, 
 swine, &c. The Anglo-Saxons, like the modern
 
 PREFACE. 7 
 
 Germans, had no objection to say ox-flesh, sheep- 
 flesh, sivine's-flesh, — but the Norman conquerors, 
 introducing a more refined cookery, introduced with 
 it French words for the flesh of the animal ; hence 
 we have beef, mutton, pork* 
 
 We have entirely lost such compounds as ox-flesh, 
 sheep-flesh, but we still retain swine' s-flesh, with a 
 peculiar modification of meaning, when we speak 
 of it as one of the meats prohibited f by the Mosaic 
 Law, in which case it is plain that it presents to the 
 mind a gross idea, which pork does not. 
 
 In the case of such duplicates as have no assign- 
 able difference, it may happen, from the mere fact 
 of the greater or less familiarity which one word 
 presents to the mind, that although it be in most 
 cases indifferent which we use, yet in some instances 
 custom, founded on the facts above mentioned, 
 makes a difference in their employment. (See the 
 articles ' Liberty, Freedom,' ' Righteous, Just,' &c.) 
 
 It has not been the design of this work to notice 
 all the synonmys in our language; which would, 
 indeed, be an almost endless task ; but merely 
 (after excluding technical terms, and words which 
 do exactly coincide) to select a few of those groups 
 
 * See the amusing remarks on this subject in the second chapter 
 of Scott's Ivanhoe. 
 
 t Isai. Ixv. 4 ; lxvi. 17. 2 Mac. vi. 18.
 
 8 PREFACE. 
 
 of words which are in most frequent use, and are 
 most liable to be confounded. 
 
 Many persons imagine that two words must either 
 coincide precisely in their meaning, so as to be, in 
 the primary and strict sense of the word, ' synony- 
 mous,' or else stand for two (more or less) distinct 
 things. Indeed, it would often be regarded as almost 
 a truism to assert this ; but those who maintain such 
 an opinion overlook the fact, that two words, without 
 exactly coinciding in sense, may nevertheless relate 
 to one and the same thing, regarded in two dif- 
 ferent points of view. An illustration of this is 
 afforded in the relation which exists between the 
 words 'inference' and 'proof.' Whoever justly 
 infers, proves ; and whoever proves, infers : but the 
 word ' inference ' leads the mind from the premises 
 which have been assumed, to the conclusion which 
 follows from them: while the word 'proof follows 
 a reverse process, and leads the mind from the con- 
 clusion to the premises. We say, ' What do you 
 infer from this?' and 'How do you prove that?'* 
 Another illustration may be quoted in the synonyms 
 'expense' and 'cost' — considered elsewhere more 
 at length. The same article may be expensive and 
 
 * See Whately's Logic, book IV. chap. iii. § 1, in which the above 
 is illustrated by the difference between the road from London to 
 Fork, and the road from York to London.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 9 
 
 costly; but we speak of expense in reference to the 
 means of the purchaser; of cost, in reference to the 
 actual value of the article. 
 
 We have seldom in the following pages intro- 
 duced, — what are usually considered so closely 
 connected with the subject of synonyms as to 
 demand a prominent place in a work of this kind, 
 — namely, etymologies ; which are generally ap- 
 pended to every group of synonyms as an almost 
 essential part of it. 
 
 But it may be doubted whether this procedure 
 does not tend to confuse the subject it was intended 
 to clear. The history of the derivation of words 
 is, indeed, one which offers a most interesting and 
 important field of inquiry, and one which may 
 accidentally throw light on their meanings ; but 
 the two questions are in themselves completely 
 distinct ; and, in inquiring into the actual and 
 present meaning of a word, the consideration of 
 what it originally meant may frequently tend to 
 lead us astray.* 
 
 * The following notice is extracted from the Common-place Book 
 of the late Bishop Copleston : — 
 
 * Words apparently synonymous — and really so in the great major- 
 ity of instances — have nevertheless each an appropriate meaning, 
 which on certain occasions is made to appear. The propriety of 
 meaning is known, a priori, by the scholar who is acquainted with 
 the etymology of the word, but the person who has collected its 
 meaning only from its use is ever liable to mistakes, and often t«
 
 10 PREFACE. 
 
 It is curious, and illustrative of national charactci 
 and customs, to observe how completely words, 
 radically the same, modify their meaning in the 
 various languages which branch out from one com 
 raon source. Who would expect to see words, so 
 nearly the same, differ so widely in meaning as our 
 English word altered (changed,) the French ' aitere,' 
 (overheated or thirsty,*) and the Italian 'alterato' 
 (angry) : and then, again, our English word alter- 
 ative, (a choice between two courses,) and the 
 Spanish ' alternativa,' (the social circle in which a 
 person moves,) all these different words springing 
 from the Latin 'alter' (another) ? Who would sup- 
 pose that the same word, the French ' defendre,' 
 should signify 'to defend' and 'to forbid?' or that 
 
 the most ridiculous mistakes ; because, perhaps, in the course of 
 his experience, it has never been used in such a manner as to 
 demonstrate its peculiar signification. E. g., Benevolence and Phi- 
 lanthropy are frequently synonymous — they might, nine times out of 
 ten, be substituted for one another; and an illiterate person, recollect- 
 ing that each term is applied to characters and actions of kindness, 
 mercy, and humanity, will indiscriminately use them, even when that 
 humanity is shown towards the brute creation, than which mistake 
 nothing could be more ludicrous.' 
 
 Many other words, however, are now used habitually with impro- 
 priety, as far as regards etymology, — as wine, tea, codec, which 
 originally signified liquors drawn from particular plants, and are now 
 applied to any imitations of these liquors, as ' sage-tea,' * ginger- 
 wine.' 
 
 * It originally meant, altered for the worse — then, angry or excited 
 — thence, heated — and, lastly, thirsty.
 
 PREFACE. ll 
 
 one word, honesty, (honnetete,) should imply civility 
 in France, and probity in England ; and another 
 (virtus,) valor in Latin, and excellence in the arta 
 in Italian ? or that the three words ' substantia,' 
 
 * understanding,' * ' hypostasis,' should all three have 
 corresponding origins, though so widely different in 
 their signification? 
 
 Again, it is curious to observe what different ideas 
 originally suggested the words which now mean 
 precisely the same thing in different languages. 
 The word ' Heaven,' for instance, conveyed with 
 it the idea of something licaved or lifted up, as 
 also the old word i 'lift* and the German i lufU 
 
 * Ccelum,' again, referred to something hollowed 
 out or vaulted, being derived from the Greek word 
 koilon, hollow, our own word ' coiled ' being probably 
 of the same origin. ' A torrent,' again, signified in 
 Latin a stream, which was burnt up in summer, 
 while the Greek word referred to its flowing (only) 
 in winter. 
 
 All these variations of meaning help to elucidate 
 national manners and habits of thought, and as 
 such are valuable and curious; but though they 
 may occasionally help us, they must not be allowed 
 
 * Understanding (' oiiderstonding ') in Dutch, is help. ' Give me 
 understanding that I may keep thy law ' — would to a person com- 
 paring Dutch (as a cognate dialect) suggest, ' Give me help.'
 
 12 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 to influence our decisions with respect to the signi- 
 fications of words. Our question is, not what ought 
 to be, or formerly was, the meaning of a word, but 
 what it now is ; nor can we be completely guided 
 by quotations from Shakespeare or Milton, or even 
 from Addison or Johnson. Language has under- 
 gone such changes, even within the last sixty or 
 seventy years, that many words at that time con- 
 sidered pure, are now obsolete; while others (of 
 which the word ' mob ' is a specimen,)* formerly 
 slang, are now used by our best writers, and 
 received, like pardoned outlaws, into the body of 
 respectable citizens. The standard we shall refer 
 to in the present work, is the sense in which a 
 word is used by the purest writers and most cor- 
 rect speakers of our own days. 
 
 A few observations may be added on the subject 
 of conjugate or paronymous words; by which is 
 meant, correctly speaking, different parts of speech 
 from the same root, which exactly correspond in 
 point of meaning: for example, the adjective 'ex- 
 pensive ' is conjugate or paronymous with the 
 substantive 'expense;' the verb 'to restrain' with 
 the substantive 'restraint,' &c. 
 
 * The word ' flimsy ' affords another instance of a word which was 
 formerlj a slang expression ; it was a corruption of film-sy. It would 
 not be found in Johnson's Dictionary.
 
 PREFACE. 13 
 
 But, like the word ' synonym,' this designation 
 has been somewhat corrupted in its use ; words 
 being called ' conjugate,' which are in fact pseudo- 
 conjugate — i. e., which coincide in point of gram- 
 mar and derivation, but not precisely in meaning. 
 Such are ' sorrow ' and * sorry,' ' fright ' and ' fright- 
 ful,' and many others. 
 
 Where the conjugates exactly and completely 
 correspond, we have sometimes used them indif- 
 ferently in this work, as in the instance of ' expense ' 
 and ' cost,' answering respectively to ' expensive ' and 
 ' costly ; ' but where there is a shade of difference, 
 it has been noticed, as being an important branch 
 of the subject. 
 
 In order to avoid confusion, we have thought it 
 best to divide the groups of synonyms according 
 to the parts of speech — viz., into particles nouns, 
 adjectives, and verbs. 
 
 a
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 ADVERBS, PRONOUNS, PARTICLES. 
 
 Which, that ..... 
 
 In spite of, notwithstanding .... 
 
 While, though ..... 
 
 Nearly, almost ..... 
 
 Completely, entirely, and ) 
 Scarcely, hardly, J 
 
 With, through, by . . . . 
 
 But, hjwever, yet, still, notwithstanding, nevertheless 
 Also, too, likewise, besides .... 
 
 Voluntarily, willingly .... 
 
 Therefore, wherefore, then, accordingly, hence, thence, 
 sequently ... . 
 
 Because, since, inasmuch as, for, aa 
 
 Amid, amidst, among, amongst . . 
 
 Betwixt, between .... 
 
 Though, although ..... 
 
 Indeed, nay ...... 
 
 Only, solely, alone, merely, simply 
 
 Except, excepting, but, save .... 
 
 so, con- 
 
 Pagi 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 23 
 
 23 
 
 24 
 25 
 26 
 27 
 
 28 
 29 
 81 
 81 
 82 
 32 
 83 
 84 
 
 VERBS. 
 
 To allow, permit, suffer, tolerate . . . .85 
 
 To confess, acknowledge, own, avow .... 85 
 
 To charm, enchant, enrapture, captivate, facinate, attract . 87 
 
 To contemn, or show contempt, despise, scorn, disdain . 38 
 
 To conquer, subdue, vanquish, subjugate . ,39 
 
 [15]
 
 16 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 To ask, request, beg, beseech, supplicate, entreat, 
 solicit ..... 
 
 To bear, sutler, endure .... 
 
 To puzzle, perplex, embarrass . . . 
 
 To forbid, prohibit ..... 
 
 To guide, direct, sway .... 
 
 To mislead, delude ..... 
 
 To think, believe, surmise, suppose, presume, conjecture 
 To abandon, desert, forsake .... 
 
 To abdicate, resign, relinquish . . • 
 
 To distinguish, discriminate . . • . 
 
 To teach, instruct, inform, educate . . 
 
 To alleviate, mitigate, relieve . . . 
 
 To announce, proclaim, declare . . . 
 
 To renounce, recant, adjure . . . 
 
 To understand, to comprehend 
 
 To praise, to admire, to commend, to extol, to eulogize 
 To promote, to forward .... 
 
 To be, to exist ..... 
 
 To remark, to observe .... 
 
 To endue, to endow ..... 
 
 To shun, avoid, elude .... 
 
 To amaze, to astonish .... 
 
 To employ, to make uso of . . . 
 
 Shall, will ...... 
 
 To rend, to tear ..... 
 
 implore, 
 
 40 
 41 
 41 
 42 
 42 
 43 
 43 
 45 
 45 
 46 
 46 
 48 
 48 
 49 
 50 
 50 
 51 
 51 
 52 
 52 
 52 
 63 
 54 
 54 
 56 
 
 ADJECTIVES. 
 
 Civil, polite, courteous, polished, well-bred 
 Graceful, elegant .... 
 
 Beautiful, handsome, pretty, lovely, fine 
 Sincere, honest, upright . . . 
 
 Wonderful, strange, surprising, admirable, curious 
 Silly, foolish, absurd, weak, stupid, simple, dull 
 Joyful, glad, pleased, delighted, gratified . 
 
 Idle, lazy, indolent, slothful . . 
 
 Grateful, thankful .... 
 
 Fruitless, useless, ineffectual, vain . . 
 
 58 
 59 
 61 
 62 
 63 
 64 
 65 
 66 
 67 
 67
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 17 
 
 Frank, open, candid, ingenuous . 
 
 Rash, fool-hardy ..... 
 
 Transient, transitory, fleeting .... 
 
 Bright, shining, sparkling, brilliant, glistening, glittering 
 
 Timid, cowardly, timorous, dastardly 
 
 Mild, gentle, meek, soft . . . 
 
 Different, unlike, dissimilar, distinct . . 
 
 Romantic, sentimental 
 
 Authentic, genuine .... 
 
 Secret, hidden, concealed, covert 
 
 Everlasting, eternal .... 
 
 Durable, lasting, permanent . 
 
 Continual, continuous, perpetual 
 
 Talkative, loquacious, garrulous . . 
 
 Strong, powerful, vigorous, forcible, potent 
 
 Inconsistent, incongruous 
 
 Cruel, barbarous, inhuman, savage 
 
 Sublime, magnificent, splendid, grand, superb 
 
 Pleasing, agreeable, pleasant 
 
 Calm, tranquil, quiet, placid . 
 
 Delightful, delicious .... 
 
 Obstinate, stubborn .... 
 
 Fickle, capricious, variable, changeable . . 
 
 Deep, profound .... 
 
 Weighty, heavy .... 
 
 Faultless, blameless, spotless, innocent . 
 
 Wicked, sinful, criminal, depraved, guilty 
 
 Benevolent, beneficent, charitable, munificent, liberal, bountiful 
 
 philanthropic ..... 
 
 Benignant, kind, good-natured . . 
 
 Neglectful, negligent .... 
 
 Absent, abstracted .... 
 
 Trifling, trivial ...... 
 
 Fatherly, paternal; motherly, maternal; brotherly, fraternal 
 
 kingly, regal ..... 
 
 Friendly, amicable ...... 
 
 Righteous, just ... . 
 
 Calculated, fit, suitable, apt ... 
 Accurate, exact, precise . 
 2* 
 
 Pagb 
 68 
 69 
 69 
 70 
 71 
 71 
 73 
 74 
 75 
 75 
 76 
 76 
 76 
 77 
 77 
 79 
 80 
 80 
 82 
 82 
 83 
 84 
 84 
 85 
 85 
 86 
 86 
 
 90 
 90 
 91 
 91 
 
 92 
 92 
 92 
 93 
 93
 
 18 CONTENTS. 
 
 Pagb 
 Famous, celebrated, illustrious, renowned . . 94 
 
 Sly, cunning, crafty, deceitful .... 94 
 
 NOUNS. 
 
 Diligence, industry . . . . . .96 
 
 Contentment, .satisfaction ..... 96 
 
 Anger, indignation, displeasure, resentment . 97 
 
 Recompense, reward, meed ..... 98 
 
 Approval, approbation . . . . . .99 
 
 Timidity, bash fulness, shyness, diffidence ... 99 
 
 Sorrow, grief, affliction, distress, regret, sadness, melancholy . ICO 
 Fear, fright, terror, alarm, dread, apprehension . . 102 
 
 Patience, fortitude, resignation ..... 105 
 
 Utility, usefulness ...... 106 
 
 Expense, cost ....... 106 
 
 Wisdom, prudence ...... 107 
 
 Self-conceit, pride, vanity, arrogance, haughtiness . . 108 
 
 Effects, consequences, results .... 110 
 
 Conflict, combat, contest, contention . . . .111 
 
 Detestation, aversion, antipathy, dislike, abhorrence, hatred, 
 
 repugnance ...... 112 
 
 Enemy, antagonist, adversary, opponent . . .113 
 
 Reproof, rebuke, reprimand, censure, remonstrance, expostula- 
 tion, reproach ...... 114 
 
 Answer, reply, rejoinder . . . .116 
 
 Command, injunction, order ... . 116 
 
 Deference, respect, veneration . . . . .117 
 
 Illusion, delusion ...... 118 
 
 Falsehood, falsity ...... 118 
 
 Deceit, Deception, fraud ..... 118 
 
 Admittance, admission ...... 119 
 
 Compulsion, coercion, restraint, constraint . . . 119 
 
 Determination, resolution, decision .... 121 
 
 Narration, narrative, relation, account, history, tale . . 122 
 
 Display, show, parade, ostentation .... 123 
 
 Imagination, conception, fancy .... 124 
 
 Conviction, persuasion . . . .   . .126 
 
 Goodness, virtue ...... 127
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 iy 
 
 Hinderance, obstacle, impediment 
 
 Allegiance, loyalty 
 
 Security, safety, surety 
 
 Reformation, reform . 
 
 Faith, belief, certainty 
 
 Forgiveness, pardon 
 
 Feelings, sentiments . . 
 
 Speech, oration, harangue, discourse 
 
 Pity, compassion, sympathy 
 
 Modesty, diffidence, humility . 
 
 Austerity, severity, rigor, sternness, strictness 
 
 Genius, wisdom, abilities, talents, parts, ingenuity, capacity 
 cleverness 
 
 Fortitude, courage, valor, bravery, intrepidity, gaEantry, hero- 
 ism .... 
 
 Law, statute, rule, regulation 
 
 Consolation, comfort, solace 
 
 Gift, present, donation 
 
 Reason, cause, source, origin 
 
 Self-love, selfishness 
 
 Discipline, trial ..... 
 
 Attachment, affection, tenderness, fondness, love, liking 
 
 Reason, sense, understanding 
 
 Gayety, liveliness, animation, vivacity . 
 
 Misfortune, calamity, disaster . . 
 
 Envy, emulation, jealously 
 
 Privacy, retirement, solitude, seclusion, loneliness 
 
 Earth, world, globe .... 
 
 Profit, gain, emolument .... 
 
 Import, meaning, sense 
 
 Amusement, entertainment, diversion, recreation 
 
 Usage, custom .... 
 
 Dexterity, address, skill .... 
 
 Help, aid, assistance ... 
 
 Act, action, deed ..... 
 
 Anger, wrath .... 
 
 Tyranny, despotism .... 
 
 Liberty, freedom . . . . 
 
 Vestiges, traces ..... 
 
 I\agb 
 128 
 128 
 129 
 129 
 130 
 131 
 132 
 132 
 132 
 133 
 135 
 
 136 
 
 138 
 
 139 
 
 140 
 
 140 
 
 141 
 
 143 
 
 144 
 
 145 
 
 147 
 
 148 
 
 149 
 
 149 
 
 153 
 
 154 
 
 156 
 
 156 
 
 157 
 
 158 
 
 158 
 
 159 
 
 159 
 
 160 
 
 161 
 
 162 
 
 162
 
 20 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 Chastisement, punishment, penalty 
 Project, design, scheme, plan 
 Purpose, intent, intention 
 List, catalogue . . 
 
 Brevity, conciseness 
 Tolerance, toleration . 
 Confidence, trust, reliance 
 Error, mistake, blunder 
 Malice, spite . . . 
 
 Occupation, business, avocation 
 Novel, romance . . . 
 
 Poverty, indigence, pauperism 
 Matter, subject 
 
 Lauguage, words, terms, expressions 
 Suggestion, hint . . 
 
 Moment, instant 
 
 Paob 
 163 
 164 
 164 
 165 
 166 
 166 
 166 
 167 
 167 
 168 
 168 
 169 
 170 
 170 
 171 
 171
 
 SYNONYMS. 
 
 ADVERBS, PRONOUNS, AND PARTICLES. 
 
 WHICH, THAT. 
 
 'Which ' and ' that' are very often used synonymously ; 
 but there are some cases where either particle might be 
 used, but where the sense of the whole would be materially 
 altered by the choice made. 
 
 1st. 'Which' is used in speaking of a class generally, 
 and ' that ' when we mean to designate any particular indi- 
 vidual of that class. For instance, in this sentence : ' A 
 person who declines investing his money in a railway specu- 
 lation which is highly advantageous,' we should imply that 
 a railway speculation in general is an advantageous thing ; 
 but if we say, ' in a railway speculation that is highly ad- 
 vantageous,' we mean that the particular speculation we are 
 speaking of is so. Again : ' The South- American Indians 
 make great use of horses, which are very serviceable ani- 
 mals.' * Which,' here implies that we are speaking of the 
 class horse ; if we said ' that,' it would seem to allude to 
 some individual horses. 
 
 2dly (and, indeed, this second rule follows from the 
 first). « That ' is applied to the antecedent immediately pre- 
 ceding the relative, and ' which ' to an antecedent sentence 
 
 [21]
 
 22 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 or part of a sentence. For instance : 1 1 should be unwil- 
 ling at this juncture to introduce a new question which 
 might raise objections.' This would imply that the introduc- 
 tion of any question might raise objections, whatever its 
 purport might be; if we said ' that might raise objections,' it 
 would imply that this individual question itself might raise 
 them. 
 
 IN SPITE OF, NOTWITHSTANDING. 
 
 4 Notwithstanding ' is a milder expression than * in spite 
 of.' 'In spite of implies some decided obstacles *x> be 
 overcome. ' Notwithstanding ' simply indicates the pres- 
 ence of some circumstance which may be supposed to be 
 an impediment. If we say, ' Notwithstanding his youth, 
 he has made great progress in his studies,' this would gener- 
 ally imply that the tender age which might have been an 
 impediment to him, did not prove to be one ; but when we 
 say, ' In spite of a bad education, his attainments are of a 
 very high order,' we point out that the bad education was a 
 real obstacle and impediment, which he was able to break 
 through and overcome, but which could not be regarded as 
 otherwise than an impediment. They are, however, often 
 used synonymously ; but ' notwithstanding ' generally ap- 
 plies more to negative hinderances, passive difficulties ; and 
 ' in spite of to active opposition. We should say, ' He was 
 dragged along in spite of his resistance,' rather than ' not- 
 withstanding.' Again, it would be a more polite form of 
 expression to say, ' Notwithstanding what you have said, I 
 still think,' than ' In spite of what you have said.' 
 
 To act in spite of experience, is to go against the lesson 
 it teaches. But if we were to say, ' Notwithstanding his 
 experience, he acted thus,' we should imply that the person 
 alluded to had not gained any such lessons by his experi- 
 ence.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 23 
 
 WHILE, THOUGH. 
 
 4 Though ' implies more of contrast in the parallels made 
 than ' while.' For instance, we should say, ' While 1 
 admire his courage, I esteem his mildness and moderation ; ' 
 but ' Though I admire his courage, I detest his ferocity.' 
 ' While' might be used, indeed, in both cases, but 
 4 though ' necessarily implies contrast. 
 
 NEARLY, ALMOST. 
 
 These words are often used synonymously, but there is a 
 slight differenece between them ; ' nearly is applied rather 
 to questions of quantity, time, and space : as, ' It is nearly 
 eight o'clock' — ' This child is nearly ten years old' — ' I 
 walked nearly two miles.' ' Almost ' might be used in the 
 same way, but it is less frequently so employed, and more 
 commonly appropriated to questions of degree ; as, for in- 
 stance, ' It is almost as white as snow ' — ' He is so plain as 
 to be almost ugly.' In this sense we should not say ' near- 
 ly.' ' Almost ' is never used with a negative. We should 
 say, ' She is not nearly so handsome as her sister ; ' in this 
 case, ' almost ' could not be applied. 
 
 COMPLETELY, ENTIRELY. SCARCELY, HARDLY. 
 
 These two pairs of adverbs bear very much the same 
 relation to each other as ' nearly ' and ' almost.' * Complete- 
 ly,' like ' almost,' is used in questions of degree ; ' entirely ' 
 in those of quantity. They are often used synonymously, 
 but still we should say, ' I am completely tired,' not * I am 
 entirely tired,' and ' The space was completely (not entirely) 
 rilled up.' ' Scarcely,' again, relates to quantity ; 4 hardly ' 
 to degree. We say, * He is scarcely ten years old,' ' it is 
 scarcely a mile off ; ' but, 4 1 shall hardly be able to finish 
 this work,' &c.
 
 24 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 AVITII, THROUGH, BY. 
 
 4 By ' and ' with ' are in many cases used synonymously, 
 but there are also many cases in which they convey a dis- 
 tinct meaning to the mind. 
 
 Whenever a certain effect is implied as proceeding from 
 two causes, the remote and original cause is expressed by 
 the use of ' by,' and the immediate one by ' with.' For 
 instance : ' The tree was cut down by a woodman with an 
 axe.' If we said ' by an axe,' it would imply some free 
 agency on the part of the axe. ' With a woodsman,' on 
 the other hand, would imply that the woodsman was an un- 
 conscious instrument in the tree's destruction. On the other 
 hand, whenever a conscious agent is implied, we use the 
 word ' by.' 
 
 This was not the case in old English : Shakespeare uses 
 the expression, ' marred with traitors.' In modern speech 
 it would be ' by traitors ' — but marred with the swords of 
 traitors or with the wounds inflicted by them. In general, 
 * with ' is improper, not only when a conscious agent is sup- 
 posed, but when the agent is personified to a certain degree 
 in our own minds, from its action being apparently volunta- 
 ry. For instance, we hardly ever say ' struck with light- 
 ning ' or ' with a thunderbolt,' but ' by : ' although if another 
 agency were poetically or mythically introduced, the expres- 
 sion would again be changed to ' with,' as ' Jupiter struck 
 him to the ground with a thunderbolt.' 
 
 ' By ' and ' with ' are often used when no agent is spoken 
 of, but a certain object is said to be accomplished by certain 
 means. But in this case, ' by ' implies that the means used 
 are essential ; ' with ' only that they are useful in aiding our 
 endeavors. The two following phrases, ' By patience and 
 perseverance the work will be completed,' or ' with patience,' 
 &c, would be equally correct : but the word ' by ' implies
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 25 
 
 that patience and perseverance are the chief instruments in 
 accomplishing the work ; while ' with ' points out merely 
 that they will prove useful auxiliaries in its prosecution. 
 
 ' By ' and ' with,' however, have each separate meanings 
 of their own, completely distinct from those we have just 
 mentioned, but tending to throw additional difficulty on the 
 subject of their relation to each other. 'With' implies 
 companionship as well as instrumentality ; and ' by ' — 
 without reckoning the cases in which it is synonymous with 
 ' beside ' — is also applied to designate the mode of per- 
 forming some act ; as, ' this is locked by a key, tied by a 
 string, shut by a clasp ; ' 'we travelled by railroad ; ' ' the 
 letter was sent by express.' In Greek and Latin, ' with ' 
 was expressed by the dative or ablative case ; ' by ' the 
 word ' hypo ' in Greek, (with a genitive,) and a or ah in 
 Latin (with an ablative.) 
 
 ' Through ' is somewhat different from the other words 
 mentioned. It often implies that the means used are the 
 appointed channel for the conveyance of the objector advan- 
 tage specified ; as ' I heard the news through such a person ; ' 
 * I received a remittance through the bank.' 
 
 BUT, HOWEVER, YET, STILE, NOTWITHSTANDING, 
 NEVERTHELESS. 
 
 ' But,' like its corresponding conjunctions in French, 
 Italian, and Greek, has two distinct meanings, one in a 
 certain sense conjunctive, and the other disjunctive. The 
 one would be expressed at full length by ' but yet,' the other 
 by ' but on the contrary.' For instance : ' This is not sum- 
 mer, but it is almost as warm,' would express the first ; and 
 ' This is not summer but winter,' the second. Home Tooke 
 was so struck with the difference of these two meanings 
 of ' but,' that he referred the word to two separate roots, one 
 being ' boot,' (besides,) the other ' be-out," 1 (left out.) Inge- 
 3
 
 26 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 nious as this theory is, it is hardly tenable ; for not only 
 in French and Italian, but even in Greek, there is but one 
 conjunction to express these two different meanings.* In 
 German, Spanish, and Latin, we find a conjunction for each 
 of these two meanings ; the German abcr, the Spanish pero, 
 the Latin autem, answering to ' but yet ; ' and sondern, sino, 
 and sed, to ' but on the contrary.' 
 
 The other words in the group before us all correspond to 
 the first of these two meanings (' but yet'). The weakest 
 of them all in disjunctive power is ' however,' which seems 
 rather to waive the question than to qualify or alter it. 
 ' This, however, is not essential,' differs in force from ' but 
 this is not essential ; ' the latter rather implying that it might 
 be thought essential. 
 
 • Yet ' is stronger than ' but,' and ' still ' even stronger 
 again, as it indicates an exception to what has been said 
 before. It seems an abbreviation of ' not removed.' ' All 
 you say is true, still I think ' — this implies that full weight 
 is given to the opponent's arguments, but that they do not 
 remove the difficulty in the mind of the objector. ' Not- 
 withstanding ' and ' nevertheless ' are, again, stronger than 
 ' still.' ' Nevertheless ' is strongest of all. 
 
 ALSO, TOO, LIKEWISE, BESIDES. 
 
 ' Too ' is a slighter, and a more familiar expression than 
 
 •'Boot,' however, is probably the origin of 'but,' as 'alios,' 
 (another,) is of ' alia,' (but,) in Greek. So in Latin ' caeterum ' sig- 
 nifies ' but.' Home Tooke may have intended to allude to a third 
 sense of the word ' but,' where it bears the same meaning as • ex- 
 cept,' whish does literally imply 'left out.' And even this third 
 meaning is probably derived from ' boot,' (first implying addition, 
 and afterwards exception,) just as in old English we sometimes see 
 the word ' beside ' loosely used for ' excopt,' as ' all beside him.' The 
 Greek pleen, except, was probably derived from pleion, more.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 27 
 
 ' also,' which Las something in it more specified and formal. 
 This is the only difference between the two words. ' Like- 
 wise ' has a rather different meaning. Originally it meant, 
 ' in like manner,' and it has preserved something of that 
 signification. It implies some connection or agreement 
 between the words it unites. We may say, ' He is a poet, 
 and likewise a musician : ' but we should not say, ' He is a 
 prince, and likewise a musician,' because there is no natural 
 connection between these qualities : but ' also ' implies 
 merely addition. 
 
 ' Besides ' is used rather when some additional circum- 
 stance is named after others ; as a kind of after-thought, 
 and generally to usher in some new clause of a sentence ; 
 as, ' Besides what has been said, this must be considered,' 
 &c. 
 
 VOLUNTARILY, WILLINGLY. 
 
 4 Voluntarily ' is more restricted in its sense than ' wil- 
 lingly ; ' it simply means that the thing done is not per- 
 formed under immediate compulsion, nor without intention. 
 All our outward actions are voluntary, — for that cannot 
 be called an action which is not voluntary ; but they are not 
 necessarily performed willingly ; for this implies that our 
 wishes and inclinations go along with the action performed. 
 There are many things which are done voluntarily, but are 
 much against the wishes of the agent. For instance, in 
 Roman-catholic countries a girl who takes the veil must do 
 so voluntarily ; but it frequently happens that she is far 
 from doing it willingly ; the entreaties and threats of her 
 friends, unhappiness at home, despair of a better fate, will 
 often induce her to decide on taking a step which neverthe- 
 less is quite against her inclination. Originally, however, 
 these words, ' willingly ' and ' voluntarily,' must have had the 
 same meaning.
 
 28 A COLLECTION OP 
 
 THEREFORE, "WHEREFORE, THEN, ACCORDINGLY, HENCE, 
 THENCE, SO, CONSEQUENTLY. 
 
 All these arc what are called illative particles — i.e., 
 particles which denote that which in some way follows from 
 what has hecn previously said ; but they denote this in dif- 
 ferent way-. 
 
 1 Therefore ' and ' wherefore ' are nearly alike, but ' there- 
 fore ' may indicate a conclusion from several reasons 
 adduced ; ' wherefore ' refers only to something immedi- 
 ately preceding. We might say — ' This and that and the 
 other difficulty will attend such a procedure ; I cannot, 
 therefore, approve of this measure.' And again : ' I found 
 his testimonials insufficient, wherefore I refused to appoint 
 him.' ' Wherefore ' is, however, rather obsolete. In old 
 English, it was used to signify not only ' for which cause,' 
 but also * for what cause;' as 'the more part knew 'not 
 wherefore they were gathered together.' (Acts, xix. 32.) 
 
 * Then ' bears the same relation to ' therefore ' that ' as ' 
 docs to ' because ; ' it is less formally conclusive, and is 
 used more by the way and incidentally than ' therefore.' 
 Whenever the main object is to establish a certain propo- 
 sition, the word ' therefore ' is used ; when this point is 
 subsidiary, ' then ' is to be preferred. In establishing a pro- 
 position of Euclid, it would be inappropriate to say, ' the 
 angles of a triangle are then equal,' &c. : ' therefore ' would 
 be the proper word. In using ' then,' we often imply that 
 the proposition on which our argument is based is taken for 
 granted ; it seems to say, ' Recollect this has been proved.' 
 
 In old English, ' therefore ' is used where ' then ' is now ; 
 as ' Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace,' &c, 
 we should now say, ' Being then justified by faith,' as the 
 question had been already discussed and fully established. 
 4 Hence ' and ' thence ' resemble ' then ' more than ' there-
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 29 
 
 fore ; ' they answer nearly to 'this ' and ' that,' the one indi- 
 cating an antecedent reason close at hand ; the other, one 
 more remote. 
 
 ' Accordingly ' is something like ' therefore,' but more 
 limited in its meaning. ' Therefore ' includes both inference 
 and proof* — both physical and logical sequence ; ' accord- 
 ingly,' only the former. We might say, ' It has rained, 
 therefore — or accordingly — the ground is wet ; ' and ' It is 
 wet, therefore it has rained : ' in this last sense we could 
 not use ' accordingly.' ' Therefore,' ' accordingly,' and 
 ' then,' often indicate a practical course of action following 
 from certain causes or reasons; 'hence' and 'thence' are 
 applied exclusively to reasoning. For instance, ' I deter- 
 mined not to act hastily, and therefore consulted the best 
 advisers. Such an one's opinion seemed to me the most 
 just, and accordingly I adopted the course of action he 
 recommended ; I fixed then upon this plan,' &c. In such 
 a sentence, ' hence ' and ' thence ' could not be used ; but 
 we say, ' hence we may infer,' or ' thence we may conclude.' 
 
 • So ' is something like ' then,' but slighter and more col- 
 loquial. 
 
 'Consequently' is the most formally and deliberately 
 conclusive of the whole group ; it is generally confined to 
 a. practical sequence or conclusion, and is seldom used in 
 mere speculative argument. 
 
 BECAUSE, SINCE, INASMUCH AS, FOB, AS. 
 
 These are all causal particles ; i. e., they indicate a pro- 
 position from which something follows ; they correspond, 
 conversely, to the illative, which point out that which does 
 follow. 
 
 ' Because ' (by cause) would seem from its etymology tc 
 
 * See Whately's Logic — Inference and Proof. 
 3'
 
 30 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 have orignally referred only to physical sequence, hut is 
 now used as an answer to ' why ? ' in the three senses in 
 which it may be asked, 1st, indicating physical sequence, 
 (from what cause ? ) as, ' Why are -the days longest in sum- 
 mer ? ' 2dly, logical sequence, (how is it proved ? ) as, 
 * Why is this line equal to that ? ' and 3dly, ' For what pur- 
 pose ? ' as, ' Why did you go to London yesterday ? ' 
 
 • Since ' is more incidental and less formal than ' because ; ' 
 it also generally begins the sentence, or is understood as the 
 beginning. 
 
 ' Inasmuch as ' has something of a qualifying power, 
 which the others do not possess ; it is nearly the same as 
 ' in as far.' This sentence, for example, — ' I approve of 
 his sentiments, inasmuch as they are patriotic,' would imply 
 that they are approved only so far and no further. If we 
 substituted • because,' we should be accounting for instead 
 of qualifying, our approbation. 
 
 * As ' is even more incidental than ' since,' and seems to 
 take for granted what is stated ; for instance, in saying, 
 ' As I know him to be dishonest, I must take these precau- 
 tions ' — the fact of the dishonesty is merely noticed in 
 passing, as something already established ; just as in the 
 relation of ' then ' to ' therefore.' ' As ' seems to suppose 
 its corresponding word ' so ' to follow. In our earlier wri- 
 ters ' so ' is generally expressed ; but unless some very strict 
 comparison is intended, it is commonly omitted by mod- 
 ern s.* 
 
 ' For ' is a slighter ' because.' In the older writers, as 
 Shakespeare, we may find it used as ' because*' would be 
 now : ' I hate him, for he is a Christian.' — (Merchant of 
 
 * Thus in a letter of Sir F. Walsingham to Harleigli : * As your 
 gtudie in these things is very commendable, so I thank you for tho 
 same ;' in modern language this would be, 'as your studie, &c, I 
 thank you.'
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 31 
 
 Venice). Cowper has accordingly introduced it into John 
 Gilpin, which is an imitation of the antique style, ' for that 
 wine is dear,' &c. 
 
 AMID, AMIDST, AMONG, AMONGST. 
 
 These words preserve much of their etymological signi- 
 fication. ' Among ' originally signified ' one out of many : ' 
 'amid' and 'amidst,' 'in the middle of.' Hence, then, 
 4 among ' and ' amongst ' always imply number, ' amid ' and 
 ' amidst ' generally quantity. We should say, — ' Among ' 
 (not ' amidst ') ' all these books I cannot find the one I want ; ' 
 but not, 'I was out among snow and rain : ' in this last case 
 ' amidst ' would be the correct expression. 
 
 ' Amid ' and ' amidst ' also indicate that the thing specified 
 is of a different class from those around it ; while ' among ' 
 and ' amongst ' are oftener (though not always) applied to 
 objects surrounded with those of the same class. We speak 
 of ' a rose amidst nettles,' but not of ' a tree amidst the 
 forest ; ' we are said to be ' among friends,' but ' amidst 
 enemies.' * 
 
 BETWIXT, BETWEEN. 
 
 4 Betwixt ' is ordinarily confined to places ; • between ' has 
 
 *In poetry these rules are not strictly adhered to. See Milton's 
 description of the seraph Abdiel : — 
 
 ' faithful found, 
 Among the faithless faithful only he : 
 Among innumerable false, unmov'd, 
 Unshaken, unse^'iced, unterrified, 
 His loyalty he kept, his love, his zeal : 
 Nor number, nor example, with him wrought 
 To swerve from truth, or change his constant mind 
 Though single. From amidst them forth he pass'd.' 
 
 Paradise Lost, Book V. 
 Here the two words are used indifferently.
 
 82 A COLLECTION OF v 
 
 a much more extended signification. We speak of — ' what 
 may happen between morning and evening,' of ' hesitating 
 between opposite courses : ' we could not use ' betwixt ' in 
 these senses ; but ' betwixt the chair and the table,' ' betwixt 
 the road and the mountain,' would be quite correct. In 
 poetry, however, 'betwixt' is used much as 'between' is 
 in prose : as in Scott's ballad of ' Alice Brand,' — ' Betwixt 
 night and day,' &c. 
 
 THOUGH, ALTHOUGH. 
 
 These particles nearly approach each other in meaning ; 
 but ' although ' is the stronger and more emphatic of the 
 two, and is therefore generally chosen to begin a sentence : 
 as, — ' Although my difficulties are great, I hope to succeed.' 
 It seems to imply that full weight is allowed to the former 
 clause of the sentence, and to answer to the additional ' all ' 
 so often introduced into old English, as, ' all too soon,'* a 
 combination still preserved in German, — ' all zu-wohl,' or 
 * gar zu schon.' 
 
 INDEED, NAT. 
 
 ' Indeed' still preserves its original etymological meaning, 
 which is nearly the same as — 'in reality,' ' in fact,' ' in 
 truth.' When used synonymously with ' nay,' it generally 
 adds to the force of the second clause of the sentence, — as, 
 4 1 know it, indeed I am sure of it.' ' Nay ' has this force 
 in a much more intense degree, and makes the second 
 clause even stronger in proportion to the first than 'indeed,' 
 — as, 'I think, nay, I am sure.' In '.id English, ' yea ' had 
 nearly the same sense as ' nay ' has now, — as in Cor. ix., 
 'yea, I judge not mine ownself : ' in modern English the 
 
 * The particle 'alto,' likewise use<l in old English, and meaning 
 ' entirely,' is sometimes confounded with this expression. But in ' all 
 too soon,' ' entirely ' could not have been meant.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 33 
 
 word ' nay ' would have been here employed Each of 
 them signifies, 'this is not all, for — ;' or, not only this, 
 but — .' These ellipses were often expressed in Greek by 
 ' alia' (but) or ' gar ' (for). An instance where this ellipse 
 was mistaken by our translators occurs in 1 Cor. xv., — ''for 
 one star differeth from another in glory.' The Greek word 
 used is the one usually translated ' for ; ' but ' nay,' or 
 ' indeed,' would have been the correct rendering of the idea 
 in English. 
 
 ONLY, SOLELY, ALONE, MERELY, SIMPLY. 
 
 ' Only ' (preserving its etymology, one-ly) relates to cases 
 of number, time, or quantity, which none of the others do : 
 as, ' I have only one left ; ' ' he only left me just now.' 
 
 But when ' only ' relates to questions unconnected with 
 time, number, or quantity, ' solely ' approaches the nearest 
 to it in sense. It differs, however, in being more emphatic 
 and deliberate, and in marking more distinctly the excep- 
 tion indicated. For instance, the phrase, ' I resolved to 
 attend only to this case,' draws the attention to the abandon- 
 ment of all others ; wbile ' I attended solely to this,' points 
 out the circumstance of one being singled from the rest. 
 Or we might say, ' This I have mentioned is only one out of 
 many reasons ; ' but, ' I have been influenced solely by this 
 consideration.' In the former sentence the word ' only ' 
 could not be substituted. 'Alone,' when used as a particle, 
 has nearly the same meaning as ' only.' 
 
 ' Merely ' and ' simply ' somewbat resemble each other ; 
 but ' merely ' conveys (at present) the sense of ' no more 
 than ; ' while ' simply ' seems (according to its original 
 meaning) to convey a disavowal of complex acts or motives 
 in the speaker. The former implies no addition — the 
 latter, no admixture. For instance, ' this is merely a per- 
 sonal argument,' implies that nothing more is urged : ' this
 
 34 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 is simply a statement of facts,' excludes the idea of any 
 comment accompanying it. 
 
 1 Only ' might be used for any of the other three parti- 
 cles.* 
 
 EXCEPT, EXCEPTING, BUT, SAVE. 
 
 ' Except ' and ' excepting ' are nearly the same, the latter 
 being more cumbrous and less in use. 
 
 The chief difference between them and ' but ' is, that 
 • except ' seems to imply a more decided and emphatic 
 exclusion of the case specified than ' but.' ' I have written 
 all my letters hut one,' conveys a less marked exception 
 than ' all except one.' * Save ' is almost exclusively limited 
 to poetry. 
 
 ' I only meant 
 To show the reed on which you leant, 
 Deeming this path you might pursue 
 Without a pass from Roderick Dim.' 
 
 Scott's Lady of the Lake, Canto v.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 35 
 
 VERBS. 
 
 TO ALLOW, PERMIT, SUFFER, TOLERATE. 
 
 ' To allow,' and ' to permit,' are often used synonymously ; 
 but ' to allow ' is used rather more in the active, — ' permit,' 
 in the passive sense. In saying, ' I allow him to walk in my 
 garden,' we seem to give a positive sanction to the action ; 
 4 1 permit him,' simply implies that ' I do not hinder him.' 
 
 ' To suffer ' is more passive than either. It implies rather 
 tolerance than sanction. An indolent and careless teacher 
 will suffer his pupils to negect their lessons ; if we said, he 
 allowed or permitted them, it would imply that he formally 
 gave them leave to be idle. ' To tolerate ' is always used in 
 the sense of permitting something unpleasant or otherwise 
 objectionable to the tolerator ; thus, we speak of tolerating 
 differences in religion, &c. 
 
 TO CONFESS, ACKNOWLEDGE, OWN, AVOW. 
 
 ' To confess ' is to make a declaration of some action we 
 have done, which is not known to the persons to whom we 
 speak ; as a Roman-catholic penitent confesses his sins to 
 his priest. If the action is already known, but not the 
 author of it, the declaring ourselves to be the doers of it 
 would be called acknowledging, or owning. Or again, if 
 both the action and the doer of it are known, we acknow- 
 ledge it, by declaring our consciousness of it, as for instance, 
 we acknowledge or own a fault which we are already known 
 to have committed. Hence we speak of a person's ' refus- 
 ing to acknowledge himself in the wrong,' which implies
 
 815 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 that his fault is already known ; but we should speak of 
 ' extorting a confession,' not ' an acknowledgment,' from a 
 criminal ; — because his confession would be a statement of 
 facts not supposed, at least, to be known to others. 
 
 We sometimes speak of ' acknowledging ' or ' confess- 
 ing ' — indifferently — some fault : but in using the word 
 confess, we are pointing out the fact that we are not known 
 to be the doers of the action ; while in using the word 
 acknowledge, we are rather adverting to the fact that the 
 action itself is known. If both the action and the doer of 
 it were known, we could not speak of ' confessing it.' We 
 do indeed speak of ' confessing our sins to God,' to whom 
 all must be known ; but this is rather said figuratively, — 
 as Ave are commanded in the Scriptures ' to make our re- 
 quests known ' to Him, though of course they must be 
 known already before we make them. But in both these 
 cases the words used refer to our own state of mind. 
 
 Confessing is oftener applied in reference to a fault than 
 either owning or acknowledging : indeed, strictly speaking, 
 it almost always implies some error. ' To avow ' is never 
 used in the sense of confessing a fault, though the noun 
 avowal sometimes is. But ' to avow ' implies a bold, frank 
 acknowledgment of the truth. We never avow what we 
 are ashamed of ; but we avow our motives, the reasons of 
 our conduct, our opinions, &c. We confess our weakness, 
 errors, or faults — we acknowledge or own what we are 
 charged with. 
 
 The conjugate word ' confessor,' * is used in two senses, 
 both very unlike those implied by the verb ; first, indicating 
 
 * It is curious that this word and one other — i. e., * prisoner ' — 
 present almost the only exceptions to the general rule in our lan« 
 guage, that the terminations   or ' and ' er ' indicate an agent, and 
 not a passive recipient. 
 
 v: .
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 37 
 
 one who receives a confession, and secondly, one who has 
 boldly avowed his religious faith, (whether previously known 
 or not,) and has suffered for that avowal. This last employ- 
 ment of the word probably grew out of the older and less 
 defined use of the verb ' to confess,' which, as we may see 
 in our translation of the Bible, was often formerly used 
 where we should now substitute the word ' avow,' or ' ac- 
 knowledge.' 
 
 TO CHARM, ENCHANT, ENRAPTURE, CAPTIVATE, FASCI- 
 NATE, ATTRACT. 
 
 ' To charm,' ' to enchant,' and ' to enrapture,' have a 
 considerable resemblance in meaning. They differ chiefly 
 in point of force ; ' enchant ' being stronger than ' charm,' 
 and ' enrapture ' stronger still. This last Avord is distin- 
 guished also from the other two, by implying a powerful 
 excitement of feeling, as well as of taste or fancy ; and by 
 being very rarely, if ever, applied to the feelings awakened 
 by persons. 
 
 * To attract ' is to draw after one, — to win upon a person's 
 liking, — to inspire an inclination. It is used generally for 
 persons ; whereas the other three terms apply equally well 
 to things. We are charmed or enchanted with beautiful 
 poetry, music, or scenery, by personal beauty or agreeable 
 manners, — we are attracted by person and manners only. 
 The conjugate word 'attraction' is less limited in specifi- 
 cation ; we speak of places, pursuits, &c, as having a 
 ' strong attraction.'' 
 
 ' To captivate ' and ' to fascinate ' have nearly the same 
 meaning as ' to attract ; ' but they are stronger terms, and 
 the latter implies something of design ; we use it in speak- 
 ing of the manners of an accomplished woman of the world, 
 who knows and uses her power. The conjugate adjective 
 ' fascinating ' does not convey so unfavorable a meaning, 
 4 A<>\(o(=>
 
 38 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 though it generally implies more of art than ' captivating 
 or ' attractive.' 
 
 TO CONTEMN OK SHOW CONTEMPT, DESPISE, SCORN, 
 
 DISDAIN. 
 
 ' To contemn' is less commonly used than its conjugate 
 noun, contempt. This word is nearly the same in its mean- 
 ing as ' to despise,' or rather it may be said that despise is 
 the verb, and contempt the noun belonging to it. A proud 
 man despises or feels contempt for those beneath him. Both 
 imply looking down upon others, considering them as un- 
 worthy of notice. ' To contemn ' is rather different in its 
 meaning, both from ' to despise ' and also from its own 
 conjugate, ' contempt.' We never speak of contemning an 
 individual; the expression is exclusively applied to quali- 
 ties. We may despise, or feel contempt for persons who 
 act in such or such a way ; we only contemn their actions, 
 or the dispositions which lead to those actions. 
 
 ' To scorn ' and ' to disdain ' are used in a stronger sense 
 than the words before mentioned. These verbs, like ' con- 
 temn,' are never properly used towards persons, though 
 their conjugate nouns are. We are said to treat an inferior 
 with scorn or disdain, but not to scorn or disdain him. Dis- 
 dain implies a feeling of haughty indignation. The Italian 
 sdegno is evidently from the same root, and somewhat 
 resembles in its meaning our own word, though it is more 
 frequently used to designate anger. Disdain is shown by 
 a haughty supercilious manner, — contempt often shows itself 
 in good-humored condescension. Scorn implies a mocking, 
 scoffing spirit, — it forms a kind of link in its meaning be- 
 tween contempt and ridicule. 
 
 We have said that the verbs ' to scorn ' and ' to disdain ' 
 are used rather towards things than persons. We speak of 
 * disdaining ' or ' scorning ' a proposal or course of action ;
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 39 
 
 but there is a shade of difference in the meaning. We 
 disdain something which we consider beneath our station, 
 capacity, or powers ; we scorn what is in itself disgraceful 
 or contemptible. Alexander disdained to share the Persian 
 Empire with Darius, though it was a compromise very 
 fitting for Parmenio : he would have scorned to do anything 
 unworthy of a Macedonian. 
 
 TO CONQUER, TO SUBDUE, VANQUISH, SUBJUGATE. 
 
 4 To conquer ' is less individual and more general in its 
 meaning than ' to vanquish : ' we vanquish an enemy who 
 attacks us ; we conquer a country. 
 
 ' Vanquish ' is always used for combat, generally with 
 some personal enemy; 'conquer' for a series of comhats. 
 We speak of vanquishing an enemy in a single encounter, 
 but of conquering a country. Achilles vanquished Hector 
 before Troy ; Napoleon, in his campaigns, conquered great 
 part of Europe. 
 
 ' To conquer ' is oftener used metaphorically than ' to 
 vanquish ; ' we talk of conquering evil inclinations, con- 
 quering oneself, &c. But in this last sense, ' to subdue ' is 
 oftener used. ' Subdue ' implies a more continued pressure, 
 and a more gradual, but surer and final victory. 
 
 When a nation has ceased to resist, we say it is subdued. 
 ' Subjugate ' (which originally means, to bring under the 
 yoke) implies external and continued restrictions. We 
 subdued the French, but we did not subjugate them. Poland 
 is subjugated — that is to say, kept under by a continuous 
 pressure from without ; but its spirit remains unsubdued. 
 
 'Subjugate' is always used in speaking of nations — 
 never of individuals, and never in an abstract sense. ' Sub- 
 due ' may be applied to individuals even in a literal sense, 
 but always indicates mental as well as physical conquest. 
 A child, or a captive, is said to be completely subdued by
 
 40 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 severe treatment, when the spirit is broken and the mind 
 enfeebled, or cotocd, as it is sometimes expressed. 
 
 TO ASK, KEQX7EST, BEG, BESEECH, SUPPLICATE, ENTHEAT, 
 IMPLORE, SOLICIT. 
 
 1 To ask ' (not in the sense of inquiring) is the simplest 
 form of making a request. ' Request ' is merely a moro 
 polite form of asking. ' To beg ' is stronger ; a starving 
 man is said to beg, not to ask, for alms. 
 
 ' To beseech ' is the same as to beg, but stronger still, 
 and more high-flown than poetical. ' To entreat,' again, is 
 nearly the same ; but beseeching is more urgent — entreating 
 more argumentative : we entreat an equal ; we beseech a 
 superior ; we entreat a person on whom we are urging ad- 
 vice, when he is, in fact, receiving a favor from us : in this 
 sense it is merely to urge strongly. 
 
 ' To supplicate ' and ' to implore ' both imply extreme 
 distress and urgency of entreaty ; but we implore equals — 
 we supplicate superiors. Supplication generally implies a 
 state of humiliation and abject inferiority ; a slave will sup- 
 plicate pardon of his master — a captive supplicate a con- 
 queror to spare his life. These two last verbs are stronger 
 than any of the other mentioned. ' To solicit,' on the other 
 hand, is simply to make a request to some one whom we 
 address as our superior. 
 
 The government of these eight verbs is somewhat different. 
 * To ask,' ' to beg,' ' to request,' govern commonly, though 
 not always, the object sought ; the other five, generally the 
 person to whom the request is made. We ask a favor, a 
 mendicant begs his bread ; but we implore or supplicate 
 some one to grant us our request. This rule, however, does 
 not universally hold good : we may ask a person for some- 
 thing, entreat a favor, implore pardon.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 41 
 
 TO BEAK, SUFFER, ENDURE. 
 
 ' To suffer,' when used as an intransitive verb, implies 
 simply to bo in pain or distress of body or mind. ' To 
 bear' or 'endure,' is to support tbat distress with fortitude. 
 It is true that the adverbs, ' patiently,' ' firmly,' ' resolutely,' 
 are generally added to the verbs ' to bear ' and ' to endure ; ' 
 but still they have not so decidedly a negative action as ' to 
 suffer : ' we may say, ' He suffers a great deal, but has no 
 idea of bearing pain ' — ' it is impossible to bear (or endure) 
 such distress,' &c. ; meaning, to bear with fortitude. ' En- 
 dure ' is often used synonymously with ' bear,' but it gen- 
 erally implies bearing for a long continuance. ' To suffer,' 
 when transitively used, is nearly the same as 'to tolerate.' 
 
 I have called the verb ' to suffer ' an ^transitive verb 
 when applied to the endurance of pain or distress; for 
 though it is true that we often speak of ' suffering pain,' 
 &c, yet it seems to be rather an elliptical expression for 
 ' suffering under or from pain,' as no action takes place ; 
 and we could not reverse the expression, and speak of pain 
 ' being suffered,' though we often speak of its being borne 
 or endured. This seems to show the intransitive character 
 of the verb ' to suffer,' in the sense under consideration. 
 
 TO PUZZLE, PERPLEX, EMBARRASS. 
 
 We are puzzled when our intellectual faculties are con- 
 fused, and we cannot comprehend what is proposed to us : 
 we are perplexed when the feelings and will are brought 
 into play as well as the intellect, and we are at a loss what 
 to decide or how to act. We are embarrassed by some hin- 
 derance or difficulty which impedes our powers of thought, 
 speech, or action. This need not necessarily be an intel- 
 lectual hindcrance ; it is generally either of a kind which 
 affects the feelings, as timidity or bashfulness, or a material
 
 12 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 obstacle which hampers us, such as an impediment in the 
 speech. A schoolboy is puzzled with a difficult sum : a 
 riddle puzzles those who try to guess it : we are perplexed 
 by the subtleties of a casuist, or in the midst of conflicting 
 opinions : a rustic is embarrassed in the presence of his 
 superiors, or a traveller when trying to speak a foreign lan- 
 guage he knows but imperfectly. It is the characteristic of 
 embarrassment to take away our presence of mind. 
 
 The French use the word ' embarrass,' not only in our 
 sense, but also as we should use the expression ' hampered ' 
 or encumbered. We use the word in this sense when we 
 speak of ' embarrassed circumstances.' 
 
 TO FORBID, PROHIBIT. 
 
 The expression ' to prohibit ' has more of an official 
 character than is implied by ' to forbid,' which is oftener 
 used in relation to private life. A government prohibits 
 contraband goods : a schoolmaster forbids his pupils to 
 break the rules of the school. 
 
 TO GUIDE, DIRECT, SWAT. 
 
 * To guide ' and ' to direct ' are words similar to the 
 results which they indicate, but not similar in the means by 
 which these results are attained. We may be directed 
 from a distance : a guide must accompany and keep close 
 to us. 
 
 A person in a road unknown to him requires directions. 
 A blind man needs a guide. A general may direct the 
 movements of his army from head- quarters : a ship is not. 
 directed, but guided, by the pilot or steersman. Directions 
 are often nearly equivalent to commands, with this differ- 
 ence, that they always imply instructions how to act in 
 some particular case, and not merely a positive order. We 
 may command a person to be silent, or to speak : we could
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 43 
 
 i 
 
 not, in such a case, be said ' to direct ; ' we direct a child 
 or scholar to perform the prescribed task. 
 
 * To sway ' implies a propelling force, which neither of 
 the other words do, and also implies that the person who 
 sways is himself the propelling force. It is most generally 
 used in an abstract or moral sense, and in such cases, 
 always indicates an exertion of the lower faculties. A man 
 is guided or directed by his reason or intellect, but swayed 
 by his passions or interests. 
 
 TO MISLEAD, DELUDE. 
 
 To mislead ' is, simply, to lead astray in any manner . 
 4 to delude,' is to mislead by acting on the imagination. A 
 man may be misled by any one who gives him bad advice ; 
 Mahomet deluded his followers with his visionary tales and 
 pretended inspiration. 
 
 ' To delude ' always implies some intention to deceive ; 
 when we speak of being ' deluded by passion or vanity ' we 
 personify the qualities mentioned, and speak as if they were 
 agents with evil intentions. ' To mislead ' does not neces- 
 sarily imply design : we may be misled by the obscurity of 
 writing on a sign-post, or by a mistaken interpretation from 
 a foreign language ; the word deluded could not be used in 
 such a case. 
 
 TO THINK, BELIEVE, SURMISE, SUPPOSE, PRESUME, 
 CONJECTURE. 
 
 'To think ' is used in three senses. 
 1st. To express the ordinary operations of the intellect. 
 2d. An opinion formed in the mind ; and, 
 3d. A belief in something as nearly, but not quite cer- 
 tain. 
 
 The three following sentences are specimens : — 
 ' Thinking is a useful exercise for the mind.'
 
 44 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 • I think this a sensible book.' 
 
 4 1 think such and such an event has happened, but I am 
 not sure.' 
 
 'To believe' has also two meanings; one, a decided faith 
 in some opinion ; the other, nearly synonymous with the 
 third meaning of ' to think ; ' as, 'I believe, but am not 
 sure,' which is nearly the same as ' I think,' but expresses 
 a rather stronger conviction. 
 
 ' To suppose ' has also two senses ; one in which we 
 assume a thing for the sake of argument ; the other, in 
 which \vc conclude it to be most likely. ' We will sup- 
 pose such a thing to be the case.' ' I suppose this must 
 be true.' 
 
 ' To presume ' is to go upon a supposition, to consider the 
 4 burden of proof ' as on the other side. (See Whately's 
 Rhetoric.) Presumption is not quite conjugate to the verb 
 4 presume,' being weaker. ' There is a presumption in 
 favor of his guilt, because he is a bankrupt,' is different 
 from, ' Wc may presume he is guilty.' ' To conjecture ' and 
 ' to surmise,' with their respective substantives, which are 
 strictly conjugate to the verbs, are nearly, but not quite 
 alike. We conjecture in a case in which we have little or 
 no direct evidence to go upon. ' To surmise ' is nearly the 
 same, but differs — 
 
 First, in being always practical. We may form conjec- 
 tures about the volcanoes in the moon, or the immateriality 
 of the soul : we can only surmise the truth of some prac- 
 tical transaction, as the reality of a crime being committed. 
 
 Secondly, a surmise is a strong conjecture, and must be 
 founded on more evidence. We might say, ' I can form no 
 surmise in a case like this ; it must be a matter of mere con- 
 jecture.' 
 
 Thirdly, a surmise is always expressed and brought for- 
 ward : a conjecture may be kept to ourselves; and, lastly,
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 45 
 
 a surmise is generally unfavorable. We may conjecture the 
 innocence of a suspected criminal : we surmise his guilt. 
 
 TO ABANDON, DESERT, FORSAKE. 
 
 We may abandon not only persons but things : we can 
 only desert a person or a cause. A man abandons house, 
 lands, and wealth ; he deserts his friends, his country, or 
 his standaxd. 
 
 'To abandon' is generally, though not always, blameable. 
 It usually implies that the thing or person abandoned suffers 
 some loss ; hence, it must imply blame, except in an abstract 
 case, such as ' abandoning a useless pursuit or hopeless un- 
 dertaking.' ' To desert ' is always disgraceful, even when 
 used in an abstract sense. ' To desert ' a cause, is to aban- 
 don it in a case where it cannot be abandoned without dis- 
 grace. A soldier who abandons his standard shamefully 
 deserts his duty. 
 
 'Forsake' is rarely, if ever, used in reference to any- 
 thing abstract : we may forsake a house, friends, or coun- 
 try; but not fortune, rank, or station. It is also distinguished 
 from the other two words by implying no blame. An early 
 Christian might forsake his family and friends for his reli- 
 gion : he would not be said to abandon them, except when 
 reproached by his heathen enemies. It likewise implies no 
 loss to the person or thing forsaken. 
 
 The conjugate particles are all more or less different: 
 ' forsaken ' is nearly the same as deserted, and both imply 
 loss or bereavement ; they in fact nearly correspond to the 
 verb ' abandon.' To abandon a place is to leave it de- 
 serted. 
 
 TO ABDICATE, RESIGN, RELINQUISH. 
 
 We can only abdicate a high dignity or station ; we may 
 resign any situation, high or low — or indeed any advan-
 
 46 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 tage. A king abdicates his crown : a private person may 
 resign wealth or station ; a servant may resign his place : 
 in short, any benefit may be resigned. ' To relinquish ' is 
 oftener used for claims of some kind — something whose 
 possession is disputed or struggled for ; as, for example, a 
 contested inheritance. But it always implies yielding after 
 a struggle. We might say, * He would not resign his claims 
 to the property without an effort ; but after a long struggle, 
 he was compelled to relinquish his object.' 
 
 TO DISTINGUISH, DISCRIMINATE. 
 
 ' To distinguish ' is merely to mark broad and obvious 
 differences ; ' to discriminate ' is to notice minuter and more 
 subtle differences. The generality of people can distinguish 
 color ; but many who possess the faculty to a certain point 
 do not really discriminate between the nicer shades. An 
 ignorant man can distinguish a rose from a lily : only a 
 botanist can discriminate between the varieties most closely 
 allied and nearly resembling. The faculty of distinguishing 
 belongs to every one whose intellect is above that of a child 
 or a brute : it is only those who are skilled or well informed 
 in any particular department who can discriminate clearly. 
 
 TO TEACH, INSTRUCT, INFORM, EDUCATE. 
 
 Of these words the first two are often used synonymously, 
 but they have also a distinct meaning. ' Teaching,' strictly 
 speaking, when distinguished from instruction, is applied to 
 the practice of an art or branch of knowledge : instruction to 
 the theory. A child is (correctly speaking) instructed in the 
 grammar of a language, and taught to speak the language. 
 Thus, teaching may be merely mechanical ; while ' instruc- 
 tion ' implies a degree of understanding in the pupil, as well 
 as the master. A child who has been taught to learn les- 
 sons by rote, without understanding them, will find difficulty
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 47 
 
 in comprehending instruction in the principles of what he 
 has learned. Hence, we speak of teaching a brute., but 
 never of instructing it. 
 
 Information* again, is distinguished from instruction, in 
 relation to the truths conveyed by it. Matters of fact, made 
 known to one who could not have known them before, are 
 called information : instruction elicits new truths out of 
 subject-matter already existing in the mind. (See Whately's 
 Logic, Book iv. § 1.) 
 
 A traveller gives us information respecting foreign coun- 
 tries ; a metaphysician instructs us in the principles of moral 
 science — principles drawn from facts already known to us. 
 The two processes may take place at the same time ; a 
 child in learning a lesson receives both information and 
 instruction ; he is taught things he never knew before, and 
 also taught to apply and make use of what he does know 
 already. In fact, pure mathematics is the only branch of 
 instruction which includes no information, as the propositions 
 are all based on principles, previously assumed. 
 
 In short, a person who is informed, knows something he 
 did not know before ; one who is instructed, understands 
 something he did not before ; one who is taught, can do 
 something he could not do before. 
 
 Education is more comprehensive than any of the other 
 words before us. It includes the whole course of moral and 
 intellectual teaching. One who gives occasional lessons is 
 not said to educate. To educate, (agreeably to its derivation, 
 from ' e-duco,' not ' in-duco,') includes the drawing out of 
 the faculties, so as to teach the pupil how to teach himself ; 
 which is one of the most valuable of arts. 
 
 Moral training, considered by itself, is called ' teaching ; 
 
 * We have here used the nouns instead of the verbs for convenience' 
 sake, as they precisely correspond.
 
 48 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 this constitutes no exception to the rule laid down, as its 
 object is to enable us — not to know — but to do -what is 
 right. Wc see an example of this in Kenn's well-known 
 evening hymn, — 
 
 Teach mo to live, that I may dread, &c. 
 
 TO ALLEVIATE, MITIGATE, BELIEVE. 
 
 The first two words express a more limited action than 
 che third ; or rather, to speak more correctly, the verb ' to 
 relieve ' includes both a limited and a complete action ; 
 while ' to mitigate ' and ' to alleviate ' have only a limited 
 one. Pain or grief is said to be relieved when it is either 
 lessened or entirely removed ; when it is alleviated or miti- 
 gated, it is only partially removed. We might say, ' I hope 
 this remedy will mitigate your sufferings, even if it cannot 
 entirely relieve them.' ' To relieve ' may also be applied 
 either to persons or things. We speak not only of ' reliev- 
 ing a sufferer,' but of ' relieving pain or distress.' 
 
 ' To mitigate ' and ' to alleviate ' resemble each other 
 very nearly ; but there is a slight shade of difference. ' To 
 alleviate ' is only used to describe what is done to others ; ' to 
 mitigate ' is rather oftener applied to ourselves. We may 
 pursue some course of action to mitigate our oivn sorrow 
 and anxiety ; we endeavor to alleviate the sorrow of an- 
 other. 
 
 ' Alleviate ' is only applied to suffering or distress ; ' miti- 
 gate ' may be used in speaking of the severity of the laws. 
 
 TO ANNOUNCE, PROCLAIM, DECLARE. 
 
 The arrival of a distinguished person is announced — the 
 tidings of a victory are proclaimed — a man on trial de- 
 clares his innocence. ' To announce ' is applied to persons 
 and tidings, but not to opinions ; ' to declare ' and ' proclaim,' 
 to tidings and opinions, but not to persons. ' To announce,'
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYiUS. 49 
 
 extends not only to the present, but to things a little future, 
 or just at hand; an approaching marriage, for example, is 
 announced, but ' to proclaim' and ' to declare ' only apply 
 to the present and what is j ust past. A determination may 
 be either announced, proclaimed, or declared ; but when 
 announced, it is merely noticed as about to take place ; when 
 proclaimed, published to the world at large, and as it were 
 officially, (a thing can only be proclaimed to a number) ; 
 when declared, merely stated openly. 
 
 Formerly, ' to declare ' meant, to make clear, or to prove : 
 as we may see in the 22d Article of our Church, ' unless it 
 may be declared that they be taken from Scripture.' 
 
 TO RENOUNCE, RECANT, ABJURE. 
 
 ' To renounce ' is simply to give up or throw aside a pos- 
 session, a pursuit, or an opinion ; we may even renounce a 
 thing we never had, or a pursuit we never followed, if we 
 are capable of having it, are supposed to have had it, or are 
 liable to have or follow it ; as when a child has the prom- 
 ise made for him at his baptism, of ' renouncing the world,' 
 &c. ' To recant ' is limited to opinions, and implies change ; 
 and not only this, but an open declaration of having changed 
 the opinion in question, and almost a confession of error. 
 ' To abjure ' is applied both to opinions and to allegiance or 
 adherence to any person or party ; and it does not necessa- 
 rily imply any change, as is shown by the formula of abjur- 
 ing all allegiance to the Pope, &c. 
 
 Perhaps it may be added, that to abjure, properly speak- 
 ing, is an act professing to be performed readily and of free 
 will, while a recantation or renunciation may be forced. 
 We might say, ' these two men have changed in a very dif- 
 ferent way ; the one has altered his sentiments and abjures 
 his opinions ; the other, rather than renounce certain privi- 
 leges, was induced to recant.'
 
 50 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 1 To abjure ' also preserves much, of its original meaning, 
 (ab-juro, to swear against) ; it always implies a solemn and 
 strong protest against the thing abjured. We may renounce 
 what we think good-for-nothing, or even what we still value ; 
 we may recant opinions we in our hearts approve of; we 
 abjure what we detest, or are supposed to detest. 
 
 TO UNDERSTAND, TO COMPREHEND. 
 
 The former of these verbs is used in a much more ex- 
 tended sense than the latter. Whatever we comprehend, 
 we understand ; but ' to understand ' is used on many occa- 
 sions in which to comprehend would be inadmissible. We 
 never speak of ' not comprehending a foreign language,' or 
 indistinct speech ; in these cases ' understand ' would be the 
 correct word. But we may comprehend the sense of some 
 deep and abstruse discourse or problem, though ' understand ' 
 might also be employed in this sense. It woidd be quite 
 correct to say, « I did not comprehend his exposition, or his 
 arguments, although I understood the language, and the 
 grammatical import of each sentence.' 
 
 Some deep and- rather hidden meaning seems to be im- 
 plied by the word ' comprehend ; ' it preserves something of 
 its old etymology, * to take in ' ; and in this sense many 
 English readers are accustomed to take for granted that the 
 word ' incomprehensible ' in the Athanasian Creed, implies 
 a deep mystery which cannot be comprehended : whereas 
 the word used is an obsolete and now incorrect translation 
 of the Latin ' lmmejisus,' and should be rendered 'Infinite.' 
 
 TO TRAISE, TO ADMIRE, TO COMMEND, TO EXTOL, TO 
 
 EULOGIZE. 
 
 We praise or commend a person for what he does ; we 
 admire him for what he is ; we praise his actions ; we ad- 
 mire his natural qualities. No natural endowment can be
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 51 
 
 correctly praised or commended. Secondly, ' to admire ' 
 relates to feeling, rather than to the expression of that feel- 
 ing ; while ' to praise ' or ' commend ' is the outward expres- 
 sion of sentiments of esteem or approbation. We are said 
 ' to praise ' a person in verse ; we could not be said to 
 admire him in verse, but to only give utterance to our admi- 
 ration. 
 
 ' To praise ' has also a second and religious meaning, 
 which is the. chief distinction between it and the verb ' to 
 commend.' In ' praising God,' it would be impious to con- 
 ceive that any idea of approbation or commendation could 
 be intended ; the expression is nearly synonymous with 
 ' glorify ' or ' magnify.' 
 
 ' To extol ' is to express either praise or admiration in a 
 vehement and high-flown manner : ' to eulogize,' is to do the 
 6ame thing in a set discourse. The substantive ' eulogy ' 
 may be considered as a conjugate to both these verbs. • 
 
 TO PROMOTE, TO FORWARD. 
 
 The words are often, but not uniformly, synonymous. 
 
 1st. ' To forward ' applies to the means ; ' to promote,' to 
 the end. A philanthropist is said to promote, not forward, 
 the welfare of mankind : he endeavors to foncard those 
 objects which are undertaken with this view. 
 
 2d!y. ' To promote ' is often used in relation to some 
 effect which is only beginning to be produced, while ' to for- 
 ward ' would be used when the cause was actually in opera- 
 tion. For instance: ' I have taken great pains to promote 
 education ui an uncivilized and ignorant district, and the 
 contributions of my friends have done much to forward my 
 views.' 
 
 TO BE, TO EXIST. 
 
 These two verbs are often used in a nearly similar sense : 
 but ' to exist ' refers more to the original nature of things
 
 52 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 than ' to be.' If wc say, ' there could not be freedom of 
 the press under a despotic goverment,' we merely imply 
 that it would not be allowed ; but the phrase ' freedom of 
 the press could not exist under a despotic government,' 
 would imply an inherent incompatibility in the nature of the 
 'wo institutions. 
 
 TO KEMARK, TO OBSERVE. 
 
 These verbs are used sometimes to describe the act of the 
 mind, and sometimes the expression of that act : in this last 
 sense they are nearly if not quite synonymous. 
 
 But where the mental act is the thing referred to, the verb 
 ' to observe ' is more general, ' to remark ' more particular. 
 We should say, in reference to any natural phenomenon, ' I 
 observe that such and such a law generally prevails ; I re- 
 marked several instances of it.' 'I observe he has a harsh 
 and cold demeanor ; if you watch you will remark proofs of 
 it.' in this last clause, ' to observe ' might have been used 
 instead of ' to remark : ' but we do not usually speak of 
 4 remarking ' a general principle. 
 
 We speak of ' a habit of observing ; ' of ' the advantage 
 of knowing how to observe,' die. ; in neither of these cases 
 could the verb ' to remark ' be substituted. 
 
 TO ENDUE, TO ENDOW. 
 
 ' To endue ' is limited to mental qualification : ' to en- 
 dow ' also includes physical and worldly ones : indeed, prima- 
 rily it refers to property, and is only figuratively extended 
 to qualities of the mind or person. An institution is richly 
 endowed ; a person is endowed with beauty, strength, tal- 
 ents, &c. : he is endowed only with mental qualifications. 
 
 TO SHUN, AVOID, ELUDE. 
 
 We shun a person we dislike or dread : we avoid either
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 53 
 
 a person, a thing, an action or course of action ; we elude 
 search or pursuit only. ' To elude ' always implies literally 
 or figuratively an attempt to defeat efforts to seek or follow 
 us ; and it also implies (as its root e-ludo does) a round- 
 about and indirect way of escape. The prisoner we read 
 of, who was set by the Indians to run for his life, would not 
 be said to elude pursuit as long as his course was on an 
 open plain ; as soon as he had recourse to the bushes and 
 sought concealment, the word might be applicable. 
 
 To shun or avoid, on the other hand, are hardly ever used 
 when a search is implied. To shun is always personal ; for 
 when we speak of ' shunning vice,' &c, a personification is 
 always implied. It also indicates a more pointed and 
 marked endeavor to keep out of a person's way than ' to 
 avoid.' ' To avoid ' is used in a more abstract sense than 
 either ' shun ' or ' elude ; ' we not only avoid persons and 
 things, but trouble, thought, &c. 
 
 Lastly, ' to avoid ' * and ' to elude ' both generally, if not 
 always, imply success : which ' shun ' does not. ' To shun ' 
 is only to seek to avoid. We might say, ' I have constantly 
 shunned him, but I cannot avoid meeting him sometimes, 
 for I cannot elude his continued pursuit of me.' 
 
 TO AMAZE, TO ASTONISH. 
 
 * To astonish ' merely implies, to affect very strongly with 
 overpowering wonder. ' To amaze ' generally conveys the 
 impression of some degree of perplexity or bewilderment. 
 It may be said, to use a colloquialism, that we ' do not know 
 what to make ' of anything that amazes us. We are aston- 
 ished at some marvel of nature or art : we are amazed when 
 a person's conduct is quite different from what we expected. 
 
 The immediate root of this last verb — the word ' maze ' 
 
 * Originally, to make void, or of no effect. 
 6*
 
 54 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 — conveys the idea of entanglement and bewilderment, 
 whether mental or material. 
 
 In the West of England, ' mazed ' is the expression used 
 among the common people for ' mad,' still implying the 
 same notion of entanglement in the brain. 
 
 TO EMPLOY, TO MAKE USE OF. 
 
 ' To employ ' generally, though not always, implies some 
 degree of co-operation, or at least of consciousness in the 
 agent. ' To make use of ' implies a passive agency. We 
 employ an amanuensis — we make use of a pen. Hence, 
 when a person is said to ' make use ' of another, it generally 
 implies an idea degrading or insulting towards the agent ; 
 which would not be conveyed by the word ' employ.' A 
 person is made use of unconsciously, or perhaps even against 
 his will. A confidential second is employed by his superior: 
 a tool in the hands of an intriguer is made use of. Hence, 
 we speak of a person's employing himself, but making use 
 of his faculties. 
 
 Both these words, correctly speaking, imply the use of 
 means to an end, and do not apply to any act which is itself 
 the end. Hence the expression common among the lower 
 classes of Irish, ' to make use of food,' sounds anomalous in 
 the ears of strangers. It is true that the act of taking food, 
 and of inhaling air, is a means used for the purpose of sup- 
 porting life ; but in breathing and eating this is not contem- 
 plated at the moment, these acts being instinctive : there- 
 fore, the expression ' to make use of ' does not apply to 
 them. 
 
 SHALL, "WILL. 
 
 These two verbs have undergone curious alterations. In 
 very old English, ' shall ' indicated simple futurity, and 
 ' will ' intention.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 55 
 
 At the time our Bible translation was made, the language 
 in this respect was in a state of transition ; in some cases, 
 the two verbs were used in the old sense, while in others 
 they were applied nearly in our modern acceptation. For 
 instance, in 2 Kings, we read — ' Ahab shall slay me ; ' and 
 in Gal. v., « Walk in the spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts 
 of the flesh.' 
 
 In both these sentences, ' will ' would be used in modern 
 English ; and in many others a misapprehension of the real 
 meaning of the sacred writers is induced by a forgetfulness 
 of this difference. But then, again, in John xvi. 2, we have, 
 ' Whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God ser- 
 vice : ' ' will ' is here employed exactly as it would be in 
 modern English. 
 
 It is difficult to define intelligibly to a foreigner the 
 modern use of these two words, though throughout the 
 whole of England no misuse of them can be observed, 
 even among the lowest of the people.* But in Ireland they 
 are constantly reversed, and in Scotland ' will ' is used im- 
 properly, though ' shall ' is not. 
 
 In our modern use of these verbs, we have curiously 
 divided the persons of each. 'J will, you shall, he shall, 1 
 denotes a futurity connected with the will of the speaker : 
 while, ' 7 shall, you will, lie will,' implies a futurity uncon- 
 nected with the speaker's resolve. For instance, we should 
 say, ' I will go, you shall go, he shall go ' — but ' I shall 
 die, you will die, he will die.' 
 
 We always say, ' I shall attain such an age next birthday : ' 
 if ' will ' were substituted, it would imply a power of volun- 
 
 *The expression common in the West of England, * I will if I shall,' 
 cannot be considered an exception ; for it is an ellipss for ' I will if 
 you say that I shall.
 
 56 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 tarily determining our age. ' You shall have some money 
 to-morrow ' implies ' I will procure it for you.' ' You will 
 have it,' indicates an expectation quite independent of the 
 speaker's intentions. When, however, will is emphatic, so 
 that one would write it underscored, or in italics, as denoting 
 resolute determination, it has the same sense in all three 
 persons ; as for instance, — ' I [or you, or he] will take 
 this course, whatever may be said to the contrary.' The 
 opposite to ' will ' in this sense, is not ' shall ' but ' must ; ' 
 as, ' I [or you, or he] must submit to this, however un- 
 willingly.' 
 
 There are some cases in which either ' shall ' or ' will ' 
 might be used, but in which the meaning would be modified 
 according to the word employed. In answering a request, 
 ' I will,' indicates compliance ; ' I shall ' would convey an 
 intention of doing the thing asked, quite independently of 
 any wish to gratify the asker. ' I shall go,' indicates simple 
 futurity ; ' I loill go,' both futurity and a determined inten- 
 tion. ' I shall go,' in a case where we are determined, 
 expresses therefore less than we mean : and we sometimes 
 use this form of under-stating our meaning, — or what the 
 Greeks called Eironeia, — to express very strong resolution. 
 Hence the common expression — ' I shall do no such thing ' 
 — ' He won't make me do so ' — which are often used to 
 convey the strongest idea of determination, and therefore, 
 at first sight, appear exceptions to the rules here laid down. 
 
 TO REND, TO TEAK. 
 
 ' To rend ' differs from ' to tear ; ' first, in implying volun- 
 tary action, never accidental, while ' tear ' may apply to 
 either. We may tear a dress in falling down : an eastern 
 mourner rends his garments to express grief. We do, in- 
 deed, speak of rocks being rent by an earthquake, or sails
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 5? 
 
 by the wind ; * but the natural agent is always supposed to 
 be personified. 
 
 Secondly, ' to rend ' always implies splitting or dividing : 
 we are said to tear, not rend the hair : an exile is torn, not 
 rent, from his native land. A tree is rent by lightning, 
 and torn up by the roots by a high wind. 
 
 * See the lines in Scott's Alarmion, canto vi. : — 
 * The pennon sunk and rose ; 
 As bends the bark's mast in the gale, 
 When rent are rigging, shrouds, and sail, 
 It wavered 'mid the foes.'
 
 68 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 
 ADJECTIVES. 
 
 CIVIL, POLITE, COURTEOUS, POLISHED, WELL-BRED. 
 
 Civility is now something less than politeness or courtesy. 
 In old English it was used for elegance, or polish in general 
 (see Pilgrim's Progress). It now implies that attention to 
 others which is absolutely necessary, and no more. If a 
 servant-maid, or a workman, is spoken of as being civil, it 
 is considered as a term of approbation, because no more is 
 expected from them ; but with the higher classes civility 
 ought to be taken for granted, and something more of pre- 
 venance and polish of manners is expected. 
 
 The difference between ' courtesy ' on the one hand, and 
 ' politeness ' and ' polish ' on the other, is, that courtesy has 
 more reference to others, politeness to ourselves. We may 
 say indifferently, * He received me courteously,' or ' He re- 
 ceived me politely ; ' but in the one case we should be 
 dwelling on the attention he was paying to ws, as a part 
 of his duty to us ; and in the other, on the behavior as- 
 sumed by him from proper self-respect. Courtesy, then, 
 seems to imply more kindliness of feeling. Politeness has, 
 indeed, been defined as 'benevolence in trifles'; but this 
 outward benevolence may spring merely from outward 
 regard for the opinion of the world, without real kindness 
 of heart. Hence, St. Peter does not recommend us to be 
 « polite,' but to be ' courteous,' because he is treating of our 
 duty towards our neighbors, not of what is due to ourselves. 
 In short, a man is polite for himself — courteous for others.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 59 
 
 Polish refers even more completely to ourselves than 
 politeness. We should not speak of ' behaving to such a 
 person in a polished manner,' but ' politely.' In short, 
 • politeness ' occupies a place half-way between ' polish ' and 
 ' courtesy.' ' Polish ' also implies a high degree of elegance 
 and refinement, and cannot exist without considerable culti- 
 vation ; it seems, as it were, to belong to artificial life. 
 
 ' Well-bred ' is rather referable to general conduct than 
 to particular actions. A well-bred person will behave po^ 
 litely to others. It also implies general propriety of beha- 
 vior whether connected with others or not. ' Ill-bred,' on 
 the other hand, is oftener applied to individual actions than 
 ' well-bred,' though it applies equally to general conduct. 
 We say, ' that is a very ill-bred speech,' but we should not 
 speak of a well-bred speech, but rather of well-bred conduct 
 and deportment. It originally referred to a good early edu- 
 cation, and still indicates that conduct and those manners 
 which would be the natural effect of such an education. 
 
 GRACEFUL, ELEGANT. 
 
 Grace is in a great measure a natural gift ; elegance 
 implies cultivation, or something of a more artificial charac- 
 ter. A rustic, uneducated girl may be graceful ; but an 
 elegant woman must be accomplished and well trained. It 
 is the same with things as with persons ; we talk of a grace- 
 ful tree, but of an elegant house or other building. Animals 
 may be graceful, but they cannot be elegant. The move- 
 ments of a kitten, or a young fawn, are full of grace ; but 
 to call them elegant animals would be absurd. Lastly, 
 4 elegant ' may be applied to mental qualifications, which 
 ' graceful ' never can. Elegance must always imply some- 
 thing that is made or invented by man. An imitation of 
 nature is not called so ; therefore we do not speak of an 
 ' elegant picture,' though we do of an elegant pattern for a 
 gown, an elegant piece of work.
 
 60 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 With respect to the other fine arts, it is a curious fact, 
 that though music and poetry are both reckoned as the 
 offspring of the mind, yet the term ' elegant,' which is con- 
 stantly applied to a poem, is not admitted in speaking of a 
 piece of music. The reason of this may perhaps be, that 
 poetry is really more emphatically the production of the 
 mind than music. If disagreeable images, or discordant 
 metres, are introduced, the poetry is bad, but still it is 
 poetry, and the fault that we find with it rests on the very 
 fact of its being such. On the other hand, music >is called 
 bad if it is feeble, heavy, or tasteless ; but unless the 
 musical notes are selected in obedience to certain laws, 
 they are not music. Strictly speaking, false chords should 
 not be denominated ' bad music,' but no music at all. The 
 laws of melody and harmony are laws of nature, as immu- 
 table as the laws of gravitation. The musician has a large 
 choice of various combinations, but not an unlimited one ; 
 he must adhere to these laws, and is not permitted to invent 
 any combination of notes at variance with them. 
 
 But whether this difference between music and poetry be 
 considered as altogether holding good or not, certain it is 
 that music seems to be regarded as belonging more to nature 
 than to art. Melodies are discovered, rather than invented ; 
 and hence, while ' graceful ' is a term often used in refer- 
 ence to them, ' elegant ' is not. 
 
 When used in connection with the productions of the 
 intellect,' * elegant ' is always applied to the lighter branches 
 of study. * An elegant scholar,' ' elegant literature,' are 
 terms always implying a reference to the Belles Leltres. 
 Lastly, ' elegant ' is applied to a kind of merit which con- 
 sists rather in the absence of glaring faults than in striking 
 beauties. An elegant poem is smooth and well constructed, 
 but not a work of original genius. ' Graceful,' on the other 
 hand, is frequently applied to bodily movements ; which
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 61 
 
 scarcely ever is the case with elegant. Even in speaking 
 of movements which are acquired, and therefore to a cer- 
 tain extent artificial, the word ' graceful ' is used instead of 
 ' elegant ; ' as a graceful dancer ; a graceful manner of 
 doing the honors of a table. This sense of the word forms, 
 perhaps, an exception to the general rule — that elegance is 
 the characteristic of art, and grace of nature. 
 
 ' Grace ' originally meant ' favor,' and the derivative, ' gra- 
 cious,' has preserved the same meaning. The religious 
 sense of the word was evidently from the same origin. 
 
 t. 
 
 BEAUTIFUL, HANDSOME, PRETTY, LOVELY, FINE. 
 
 ' Beautiful ' includes all the other terms of admiration 
 mentioned here : and is stronger than any of them, except, 
 perhaps, ' lovely.' From being generally opposed to the 
 sublime, it has gradually come to imply a certain degree of 
 softness and delicacy which makes it inapplicable to a man, 
 for whom the only terms of admiration are ' handsome ' 
 and * fine.' 
 
 ' Handsome ' implies — 1st. Not exactly an artificial beau- 
 ty, but the beauty of some person or thing which is trained 
 or cultivated. We speak of a ' handsome ' man or woman, 
 a ' handsome ' house, a ' handsome ' horse, or dog, or tree ; 
 but we should not speak of a ' handsome ' wild animal, or a 
 4 handsome ' prospect : (though these expressions are incor- 
 rectly used by the Irish and Americans.) 
 
 2dly. 'Handsome' implies beauty on a large scale. A 
 lady who is very petite and slight in figure, an infant, or a 
 small animal, is never called ' handsome.' 
 
 3dly. It excludes the highest degree of beauty ; and the 
 Fame is the case when applied to moral conduct. ' Hand- 
 some behavior ' is behavior that is liberal, fair, right, honor- 
 able ; but a heroically generous action would never be 
 called ' handsome.' 
 G
 
 02 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 • Pretty ' is applied to external beauty on a small scale, 
 and never of a very high order. It implies softness and 
 delicacy, and is therefore never used for a man except in 
 contempt. 
 
 ' Lovely ' implies something more than mere external 
 beauty. It may be applied to the mind as well as the per- 
 son. We usually understand by it personal beauty and 
 pleasing manners combined. A woman who is disagree- 
 able and ungraceful would never be called a ' lovely ' 
 woman, however faultless her features may be. 
 
 ' Fine ' is perhaps a more puzzling word than any of the 
 group. Its original sense was that of something delicate, 
 subtle, slender, fin, in short ; and this has been preserved 
 in one sense of the word, in speaking, for example, of a 
 • fine ' edge, a ' fine ' sense of touch or hearing, a ' fine ' 
 thread, &c. But its other and commonest meaning is, — 
 beauty of rather a large and coarse kind — the reverse of 
 delicate. A ' fine ' face is one with a bold and strongly 
 marked contour ; a ' fine ' child is a stout, rosy, healthy 
 child ; a ' fine ' woman is one whose features and figure are 
 rather on a large scale. 
 
 ' Fine ' in its third sense implies over-fastidious, proud, 
 ready to give oneself airs. The conjugate word, finery, is 
 nearest to this sense of the word. Its origin was probably 
 the Latin finis, an end ; it was first transferred to an edge 
 or sharp point, and thence to something subtle and delicate. 
 
 ' Fine ' in the sense of an amende, a sum of money paid 
 down as a penalty, has probably the same root ; the end of 
 a trial or lawsuit being the payment of the forfeited sum. 
 
 SINCERE, nONEST, UPRIGHT. 
 
 * Sincerity ' may be used in two senses ; and this leads to 
 much ambiguity in reasoning. It may either mean, on 
 the one hand, reality of conviction and earnestness of pur*
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 63 
 
 pose, — or, on the other, purity from all unfairness or dis- 
 honesty. Many people overlook this ; they will speak of 
 a man's being ' sincere,' when they mean he has a real 
 conviction that his end is a good one, — and imagine this 
 must imply that he is ' honest ; ' whereas, he may be ' sin- 
 cere ' in his desire to gain his end, and dishonest in the 
 means he employs for that end. ' Honest,' on the other 
 hand, is not an ambiguous term ; it implies straightforward- 
 ness and fairness of conduct. ' Upright,' implies honesty 
 and dignity of character ; it is the opposite of ' meanness,' 
 as ' honesty ' is of ' shuffling ' or ' insincerity.' * 
 
 WONDERFUL, STRANGE, SURPRISING, ADMIRABLE, CURIOUS. 
 
 We admire what is excellent, noble, glorious, eminent ; 
 we are, properly speaking, surprised simply at what is 
 unexpected ; we iconder at what is extraordinary, lofty, 
 great, or striking, although it may not be unexpected. 
 
 An intelligent mind will be filled with wonder while con 
 templating many of the works of nature, although they may 
 be well known, and even familiar. 
 
 The word ' strange ' refers, as well as ' wonderful,' to 
 something in itself uncommon ; but ' wonderful ' is applied 
 to something great or noble, something, in short, above the 
 common ; while ' strange ' signifies rather what is beside 
 the common — in short, something odd. We should not 
 say, in speaking of the higher and more sublime phenomena 
 of the creation, that they are ' strange,' but that they are 
 ' wonderful ; ' but any oddity or freak of nature, on a 
 smaller scale, we call ' strange.' 
 
 Nothing that awakens any feeling of awe or sublimity, or 
 my poetical feeling, would be called ' strange ; ' hence it 
 
 * • Upright ' may be considered as the conjugate of the substantive 
 ' rectitude.'
 
 64 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 often happens that new and remarkable natural phenomena, 
 or striking discoveries, awaken a sentiment of wonder in 
 thoughtful and inquiring minds, while the vulgar and 
 thoughtless designate them as ' very strange.' 
 
 Lastly, what is positively unpleasant to the eye or mind 
 may be ' strange,' but not ' wonderful.' We speak of ' won- 
 derfully beautiful,' but of ' strangely ugly.' 
 
 ' Curious ' means something ' wonderful ' on a small scale; 
 it is perhaps nearer to ' strange ' in its meaning, but does 
 not exclude the idea of beauty. The minute parts of a leaf 
 or flower are at once ' curious ' and beautiful. In old 
 English, ' strange ' was used where ' wonderful ' would now 
 be employed. Shakespeare speaks of ' strange swiftness.' 
 
 SILLY, FOOLISH, ABSURD, WEAK, STUPID, SIMPLE, DULL. 
 
 ' Silly' is most commonly applied to words, writings, 
 manners, or character ; ' foolish ' to actions. We speak of 
 a ' silly ' book, a ' silly ' speech, a ' silly ' manner ; but 
 seldom of taking a ' silly ' step, committing a ' silly ' action ; 
 in these last cases, we use the word ' foolish.' ' Silly ' very 
 frequently, though not always, implies deficiency of intellect 
 or feebleness of character ; ' foolish ' an abuse of intellect. 
 A ' foolish ' man is one who does not make use of the 
 sense he possesses. More of blame is implied in the word 
 ' foolish ; ' more of contempt in ' silly.' 
 
 ' Weak ' implies some moral deficiency ; a weak man is 
 one who either wants sufficient firmness to maintain his 
 principles, or wants clearness of moral sense to perceive 
 distinctly what is right. 
 
 ' Absurd ' applied to an action, implies something laugh- 
 able. An absurd person is one who commits ridiculous acts 
 of folly. 
 
 ' Stupid ' is used merely to express a lumpish, heavy,
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 65 
 
 cloudy perception of every thing proceeding from a want of 
 intellect. It is entirely a negative quality. 
 
 ' Dull ' is not quite the same ; it implies slowness, but not 
 necessarily deficiency of intellect. A boy who is slow and 
 dull in learning, may, nevertheless, be not wanting in sense, 
 and may be able to understand a subject well, when once 
 he has mastered its difficulties. 
 
 ' Simple,' when it is applied to an act of folly, implies a 
 want of quicksightedness — of what the French call savoir 
 faire, springing either from natural deficiency or want of 
 experience. The French bonhommie and the Greek Euthcs 
 are used to signify the same thing. 
 
 JOYFUL, GLAD, PLEASED, DELIGHTED, GRATIFIED. 
 
 'Joyful,' and its conjugate word, 'joy,' are used for the 
 highest degree of pleasure, and always for pleasure excited 
 by some external event. They are in their nature transient ; 
 though 'joys ' is used in a different sense, implying a very 
 high degree of pleasure, whether externally excited at the 
 moment or not. 
 
 ' Glad ' is the lowest degree of pleasure ; it answers to 
 ' sorry,' as an opposite term — like ' sorry,' too, it was used 
 in a stronger sense in old English : ' Then are they glad, 
 because they are at rest.' (Psalm cvii.) 
 
 ' Pleased ' may imply either gladness or approbation. 
 ' Delighted ' is a much stronger expression of the same feel- 
 ing. 
 
 ' Gratified ' always refers to a pleasure conferred by some 
 human agent, but is not the same as ' grateful.' ' Grate- 
 ful ' refers to the feeling of the recipient towards the donor; 
 ' gratified ' implies a sense of pleasure modified by the con- 
 sideration that in part we owe it to another. 
 
 Conjugate words. — ' Joyous ' is used for a mood of the 
 mind — a state of feeling occasioned by high animal spirits 
 6*
 
 66 A COLLECTION OP 
 
 4 Enjoy ' is used in a lower sense ; it merely implies a 
 sense of the pleasures around us. ' Enjoyment,' when 
 used alone, is rather lower still — more connected with the 
 pleasures of the senses. A cow grazing in a rich pasture 
 would be said to le in a state of ' enjoyment.' 
 
 'To rejoice' is nearly the same as 'to bo glad,' but 
 stronger. ' To gladden ' is decidedly stronger than ' glad : ' 
 it preserves move of the early meaning of the word ; and so 
 does ' gladness.' 
 
 ' Gratification ' is not exactly the same as ' gratified ; ' it 
 does not necessarily imply that the pleasure is conferred by 
 another person. It is frequently used for sensual enjoy- 
 ment — as, ' the gratifications of the palate.' ' To gratify ' 
 is sometimes used for satisfying a desire — as, ' to gratify 
 the appetite ; ' still more for a mental passion — as, ' to grat- 
 ify vanity or ambition.' 
 
 IDLF., LAZY, INDOLENT, SLOTHFUL. 
 
 ' Slothful ' and ' indolent ' are applied to a general slow- 
 ness and languor, and hatred of movement or exertion. An 
 ' indolent ' person likes always to remain quiet. A ' lazy ' 
 person is one who is disposed to be idle. It is more applied 
 to the disposition itself: ' idleness ' to a tendency to yield 
 to it. But an ' idle ' person may be active in his way ; he 
 may even be very persevering in following up some scheme 
 of his own ; but he will be reluctant to force himself to do 
 what he docs not like, and he will seldom like continuous 
 exertion of any kind. Many idle boys will work very hard 
 at their own sports, and take great pains to leap, run, or 
 play at games ; but neglect their lessons. A lazy person, 
 on the other hand, may employ himself, but will dislike the 
 trouble of getting up to fetch a dictionary if he is learning 
 a lesson, or of going to consult some person who might help 
 him in the business he is transacting ; and to spare himself
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 6i 
 
 the exertion, he will be obliged to work harder in the end : 
 hence the proverb, that ' lazy people take the most trouble.' 
 ' Lazy ' may be considered as the opposite to ' alert.' 
 ' Slothful ' and ' indolent' as opposed to ' active.' 
 • Idle ' as opposed to ' busy,' and ' negligent ' to ' dili- 
 
 GRATEFUL, THANKFUL. 
 
 ' Grateful ' is an expression most commonly used in refer- 
 ence to a human agent who has conferred some special 
 favor on us. ' Thankful ' is more commonly applied to 
 express our feeling of the goodness of Providence. One 
 who makes an ill return for the kindness of a benefactor is 
 ' ungrateful ; ' one who is forgetful of the mercies shown 
 him by his Creator is ' unthankful.' ' Thankfulness ' and 
 ' unthankfulnsss ' are more used to describe the state of a 
 person's mind : ' gratitude,' and still more, ' ingratitude,' 
 for the conduct springing from the state of mind. This, 
 perhaps, follows from the first proposition, as we cannot 
 make any return for the benefits of Providence, and can 
 only prove our gratitude by the state of our minds. ' Grate- 
 ful,' however, is more applied to disposition, and less to 
 conduct, than ' ungrateful.' 
 
 FRUITLESS, USELESS, INEFFECTUAL, VAIN. 
 
 ' Fruitless ' is generally applied to an undertaking which 
 fails, not from its being ill-calculated to produce good effects, 
 but from some unexpected hinderance or calamity arising to 
 frustrate it. For example, ' Such an one has made a fruit- 
 less attempt to dissuade his friend from the rash step he was 
 about to take : ' here the attempt is supposed to fail, not from 
 its being unwise or ill-judged, but from the obstinacy or 
 folly of the person advised.
 
 68 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 ' Useless,* on the other hand, is applied to undertakings 
 which are in themselves ill-calculated for success. 
 
 We should say to a very self-willed person, ' It is useless 
 to advise you ' — meaning, ' your character makes such 
 attempts utterly hopeless, and it is ill-advised of any one 
 who knows you to make them.' 
 
 A bad crab-tree, and an apple-tree spoilt by a blight, are 
 equally unlikely to produce good fruit ; but the first it is 
 ' useless,' the second ' fruitless,' to attempt to improve. 
 
 ' Ineffectual ' nearly resembles ' fruitless,' but implies a 
 failure of a less hopeless character. We might say, ' I de- 
 sisted, finding all my efforts fruitless : ' but ' after several 
 ineffectual efforts I at last succeeded.' 
 
 ' Vain,' in the sense in which we are now considering it, 
 is nearly synonymous with ' fruitless.' 
 
 • FKAXK, OPEN, CANDID, INGENUOUS. 
 
 ' Open ' is generally applied to dispositions, not to speeches. 
 An ' open ' disposition merely implies a disposition to speak 
 out what is in the mind — a difficulty in concealment. 
 
 ' Frank,' on the other hand, is oftener applied to Avords or 
 manners, though a disposition is sometimes called ' frank.' 
 It is a more active quality, so to speak, than ' openness.' 
 A timid person may be open ; one who is ' frank ' must be 
 bold and fearless : it is sometimes used for a freedom of 
 speech that borders on bluntness. 
 
 ' Ingenuous ' implies a moral quality ; it includes both 
 openness and candor. A person who is open merely from 
 deficiency in natural reserve, would not be necessarily 
 called ' ingenuous ; ' and ' disingenuous ' is always used as 
 a term of blame. 
 
 * Candor ' signifies fairness of mind — readiness to ac- 
 knowledge an error. One who can see what is right, and
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 69 
 
 cast aside all prejudice in owning it, is ' candid.' It implies, 
 indeed, nearly the same disposition as ' ingenuous.' * 
 
 HASH, FOOL-HARDY. 
 
 ' Rashness ' is, correctly speaking, applied to some risk 
 encountered for the sake of something in itself important, 
 though not so as to be adequate to the danger incurred. 
 To be ' fool-hardy,' on the other hand, is to run a risk for 
 the sake of some trifling and unimportant object, or from 
 mere wantonness. For instance, a soldier who should 
 charge an overwhelming body of the enemy at the head of 
 a handful of men, would be ' rash : ' but one who should 
 expose himself to a battery of cannon, merely to obtain a 
 draught of water, would be ' fool-hardy.' 
 
 TRANSIENT, TRANSITORY, FLEETING. 
 
 What is ' transient ' is in itself momentary and short in 
 duration ; what is ' transitory ' is liable to pass away. The 
 one expression directs attention to its shortness, the other to 
 its uncertainty. All earthly pleasures are ' transitory ; ' the 
 diversions which yield but momentary amusements are 
 transient,' or ' fleeting.' These two words are nearly 
 alike : but ' fleeting ' refers rather to the fact of their being 
 in the act of passing away, ' transient ' to their shortness of 
 stay. ' Transient ' and fleeting ' may also be applied to 
 objects of sight, as light or colors : ' transitory ' only to 
 abstract things. 
 
 * The Greeks do not appear to have had any word answering to 
 ' candid.' In the Greek Testament the word gennaios, noble, or gen- 
 erous, is used in describing the fairness of mind with which the Bereaug 
 searched the Scriptures.
 
 70 A. COLLECTION OF 
 
 BRIGHT, SHINING, STARKLING, BRILLIANT, GLISTENING, 
 
 GLITTERING. 
 
 Of these words, two, 'sparkling ' and 'brilliant,' especially 
 the latter, are very frequently used in a figurative sense. 
 We speak of * brilliant talents ' as often as of a ' brilliant 
 gem.' The two first words, on the other hand, ' bright ' 
 and ' shining,' are usually applied only to the literal effects 
 of light ; though they, too, are occasionally used figura- 
 tively. * Bright ' has the most extended signification of 
 all these words, and includes them all. ' Shining ' is most 
 commonly applied to the effect of light on a smooth or 
 polished surface. 
 
 ' Sparkling ' is used for the fitful and rapid emission of 
 points or flashes of light. It is figuratively applied to those 
 mental powers which show themselves in rapid, sudden scin- 
 tillations : as ' sparkling wit,' or gayety. A diamond, or 
 finely cut piece of crystal, is ' sparkling ; ' the sea often 
 sparkles in the sun ; a plate of polished metal is ' shining ; ' 
 but both would be called ' bright.' 
 
 ' Brilliant ' is a stronger expression than ' bright,' when 
 used in its literal sense. ' Bright ' and ' shining ' are now 
 scarce ever used figuratively, (unless the modern expres- 
 sion, ' a bright face,' ' a bright smile,' be considered as 
 such,) except in a negative sense, as ' he is not very bright,' 
 ' he has no shining talents.' 
 
 ' Glittering ' implies a fitful, scintillating light, but less 
 concentrated and intense, and more broken and scattered 
 than what ve describe as ' sparkling.' An icicle is ' glitter- 
 ing ; ' a diamond is ' sparkling.' The human eye is not 
 usually said to ' glitter,' but to ' sparkle,' except when a 
 wild, unsteady glance is indicated. 
 
 ' Glistening,' on the other hand, implies a soft and yet
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 71 
 
 fitful light, modified by moisture. The moonbeams ' glis- 
 ten ' on the water, the eyes through tears. 
 
 TIMID, COWARDLY, TIMOROUS, DASTARDLY. 
 
 4 Timid ' is applied both to the state of mind (sometimes 
 transient) in which a person may happen to be at the mo- 
 ment, and to the habitual disposition ; ' timorous,' only to 
 the disposition. ' Timid ' is therefore, the more extensive 
 term, and comprehends the meanings of ' timorous ' as well 
 as its own. Both are equally applied to a dread of personal 
 danger ; but ' timorous ' is oftener used for moral danger 
 than ' timid.' Both are equally applied to character. 
 ' Cowardly ' and ' dastardly ' are used alike for character 
 and conduct, and both as terms of strong reproach. ' Das- 
 tardly implies meanness as well as cowardice. ' Cowar- 
 dice ' is merely timidity carried into action. A timid man 
 may be led by strong motives to perform individual acts of 
 bravery ; a timid mother will often incur great risks for her 
 children ; but a cowardly person can never on any occasion 
 act bravely ; ' cowardice,' therefore, implies a character 
 more completely governed by fear than mere ' timidity.' 
 ' Timid,' in short, may be said to denote the disposition, 
 and ' cowardly ' the habit. 
 
 ** MILD, GENTLE, MEEK, SOFT. 
 
 Of these four words, ' meek ' is the only one which is 
 exclusively employed in a moral sense ; the other three may 
 be either moral or physical in their signification. 
 
 4 Soft ' denotes an influence which is weak but pleasant. 
 A soft voice, a soft light, are in themselves agreeable. But 
 it is not consistent with the highest degree of power, or 
 indeed, with great force of any kind. A powerful voice, 
 however sweet-toned, would not be commonly denominated 
 ' «oft.' A soft color cannot be bright or intense. The
 
 72 A COLLECTION" OF 
 
 term ' soft music ' is applied generally to music which 
 pleases without exciting or enrapturing. Milton has pre- 
 served this meaning in his Allegro — 
 
 • Lap mc in soft Lydian airs.' 
 
 In this line he describes music as an agreeable accompani- 
 ment to other pleasures ; he uses very different language 
 when he describes in the Penseroso the higher effects cf 
 music. 
 
 1 Mild ' and ' gentle ' are more negative in their meaning. 
 In their primary sense, they merely imply an influence 
 which does not act with an unpleasant force. A gentle 
 voice is one that is not loud ; mild air, air that is not sharp, 
 or cold. If there is an exception to this rule, it is in the 
 case of disposition or temper, in which ' gentleness ' seems 
 to imply a more positively amiable and pleasing quality than 
 k mildness.' (The substantives and adjectives have here 
 exactly corresponding meanings.) 
 
 In manners, ' mildness ' and ' gentleness ' are consistent 
 with dignity of deportment, which ' softness ' is not. 
 
 ' Meekness ' differs from the other three words in being 
 applied to the temper only, never to mere manners and 
 deportment. It is a word which has undergone some change. 
 In former times, (as may be seen from the use made of it 
 in the Bible,) it denoted a religious patience and submission 
 to injuries and humility before God. It is evidently in this 
 sense that Moses is spoken of as the ' meekest of men.' 
 In modern times, it may be said to be used in two different 
 senses, and while the strictly theological meaning (if we 
 may so express it) is pretty much what it formerly was, its 
 secondary and ordinary colloquial meaning, in conformity 
 with the tendency to degenerate which may be observed in 
 a.l words descriptive of virtues, has come to signify a (es- 
 pecially when applied to a man) somewhat excessive dispo- 
 sition to yield and submit.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 73 
 
 This ambiguity is perhaps to be regretted, as it attaches 
 a ludicrous or contemptible signification to a word, which 
 originally and properly denoted a virtue peculiarly belonging 
 to the people of God. In its oldest and most correct reli- 
 gious sense, it always implied humility ; in which it was 
 distinguished from the other three words under considera- 
 tion. A person may be soft and mild in manners, without 
 real humility or sweetness of temper. Many think that a 
 woman whose manners are very soft must necessarily be 
 meek, whereas softness is consistent even with self-will and 
 obstinacy. 
 
 DIFFERENT, UNLIKE, DISSIMILAR, DISTINCT. 
 
 The word ' different ' calls the attention to the separation 
 into classes. Things are called ' different,' from the cir- 
 cumstance that they cannot be mistaken for each other, or 
 confounded together ; they are not viewed as necessarily 
 opposed, but as having qualities wbich keep them apart. 
 We may say, ' These things are different, and yet not 
 unlike.' The word ' unlike ' calls the attention to opposition 
 or contrast in the things compared ; and this more particu- 
 larly when they do not belong to separate classes. We 
 should say, ' These two sisters are so unlike, that one would 
 suppose they belonged to different families.' In short, 
 things are said to be unlike,' when they might be expected 
 to be ' like ; ' ' different,' when non-resemblance is in the 
 natural course of things. 
 
 ' Different,' however, is rendered more puzzling by its 
 having, in fact, two meanings, corresponding exactly to the 
 two meanings of the word same,* one of which implies 
 similarity, the other identity. The two senses of the 
 word ' different ' are precisely opposed, relatively, to these 
 
 * See Appendix to Whately's Logic.
 
 74 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 meanings of ' same ' — one, signifying non-identity ; the 
 other, non-similarity. In the first sense, we might say, 
 « These are two different dresses, made of exactly the 
 same material ; ' in the other, * They are of very different 
 
 colors.' 
 
 ' Dissimilar ' is nearly the same as * unlike,' but less 
 strong, as is generally the case with words of Latin origin, 
 when contrasted with Saxon ones. 
 
 * Distinct ' is nearly the same as ' different,' but is chiefly 
 used with abstract terms. 
 
 KOMANTIC, SENTIMENTAL. 
 
 Both these terms are used to express the effects of ill- 
 directed or excessive feeling and imagination ; but in 
 romance the imagination, in sentiment the feelings have 
 the predominance. A ' romantic ' scheme is one which is 
 wild, impracticable, and yet contains something which cap- 
 tivates the fancy. A romantic mind loves to dwell on 
 adventures and dazzling enterprises, and on such incidents 
 as would grace a wild fiction or a poem, and delights in 
 every action, every event, that can be invested with a pic- 
 turesque or dramatic character.* 
 
 A ' sentimental ' mind, on the other hand, is rather prone 
 to over-wrought feeling and exaggerated tenderness. The 
 sickly compassion or benevolence which expands itself in 
 lamentations instead of actions — the weak and foolish 
 manifestations of love or friendship, come under the head 
 of ' sentimentality.' . 
 
 The ' romantic ' may be considered as the less dangerous 
 of these two tendencies : a certain degree of romance is 
 commonly found in young people when the imagination is 
 active and the temperament enthusiastic ; and it is then 
 
 * See Foster's Essay on this word.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 75 
 
 easily subdued by experience and reason. ' Sentimentality 
 is the characteristic of a weaker mind, and is therefore less 
 curable. It is easier to correct an abuse of imagination 
 than abuse of feeling. 
 
 AUTHENTIC, GENUINE. 
 
 Bishop Watson thus distinguishes between things ' authen- 
 tic ' and things ' genuine.' 
 
 ' A genuine book is that which was written by the person 
 whose name it bears, as the author of it. An authentic book 
 is that which relates matters of fact as they really happened ; 
 a book may be genuine without being authentic, and a book 
 may be authentic without being genuine. The books [writ- 
 ten by] Richardson and Fielding are genuine books, though 
 the histories of Clarissa and Tom Jones are fables. The 
 history of the Island of Formosa is a genuine book : it was 
 written by Psalmanazar ; but it is not an authentic book, 
 (though it was long esteemed as such, and translated into 
 different languages ;) for the author, in the latter part of 
 his life, took shame to himself for having imposed upon the 
 world, and confessed that it was a mere romance. Anson's 
 Voyage may be considered as an authentic book : it proba- 
 bly contains a true narrative of the principal events recorded 
 in it ; but it is not a genuine book, having not been written 
 by Walter, to whom it is ascribed, but by Robins.' 
 
 { 
 
 SECKET, HIDDEN, CONCEALED, COVERT. 
 
 What is ' secret ' may be accidentally or unintentially so : 
 ' hidden ' and ' concealed ' imply something intentionally 
 kept secret. We speak of ' a hidden plot,' a ' concealed 
 intention.' ' Covert ' is something not avowed. It may be 
 intended to be seen ; ' a covert allusion ' is meant to be 
 understood, but is not openly expressed. 
 
 ' Secret ' is opposed to ' well-known ; ' ' hidden ' and ' con« 
 ccaled ' to ' open ; ' ' covert ' to ' avowed ' or ' displayed.'
 
 76 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 EV l.RLASTING, ETERNAL. 
 
 Both these terms imply endless duration : but ' eternal ' 
 extends to something more — that, viz., which has always 
 existed. Many infidel writers hold that the world is ' eter- 
 nal ' — that is, that it never had a beginning. The heathens 
 believed that their gods were ' everlasting ' — i. e., immortal, 
 but not ' eternal,' for their birth and origin were always re- 
 corded. 
 
 ' Everlasting ' is, in old English, used improperly for 
 ' eternal ; ' as in the Psalms, ' Thou art from everlasting," 
 &c. 
 
 DURABLE, LASTING, PERMANENT. 
 
 • Lasting ' is generally applied in an abstract sense — as, 
 4 a lasting remembrance,' ' a lasting effect : ' ' durable ' often- 
 er to sensible objects — as, ' a durable material ; ' ' perma- 
 nent,' to both, but with different varieties of meaning. When 
 applied to abstract subjects, and compared with ' lasting,' it 
 implies something which is established and intended to 
 remain — not intended to be removed or changed ; as, 'a 
 permanent situation,' * a permanent resting-place.' When 
 applied to tangible objects, on the other hand, and contrasted 
 with • durable,' ' permanent ' means something that remains 
 as it is, and will not wear out of itself. ' A permanent dye ' 
 or color in painting is one which will not fade or be changed 
 by time. « Durable,' on the other hand, is oftener applied 
 to texture, and always to something which will endure, not 
 time alone, but wear and tear ; a ' durable ' stuff will bear 
 rough handling, and can be worn long. 
 
 CONTINUAL, CONTINUOUS, PERPETUAL. 
 
 A ' continuous ' action is one which is uninterrupted, and 
 goes on unceasingly as long as it lasts, though that time
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 7) 
 
 may be longer or shorter. ' Continual ' is that which is con- 
 stantly renewed and recurring, though it may be interrupted 
 as frequently as it is renewed. A storm of wind or rain, 
 which never intermits an instant, is * continuous ; ' a succes- 
 sion of showers is ' continual.' ' If I am exposed to contin- 
 ual interruptions, I cannot pursue a continuous train of 
 thought.' 
 
 ' Perpetual ' is sometimes used in the sense of ' continual,' 
 but has rather a stronger signification, implying something 
 which is still more constantly recurring. It also means 
 something which is at once continuous and lasting ; as ' the 
 perpetual motion.' 
 
 TALKATIVE, LOQUACIOUS, GARRULOUS. 
 
 A little child just learning to speak may be ' talkative ; ' 
 a lively woman may be * loquacious ; ' an old man in his 
 dotage is often ' garrulous.' ' Talkative ' implies a continual 
 desire to speak, which may exist without ever saying much 
 at a time ; ' loquacious ' includes this, and also implies a 
 great flow of words at command. A ' garrulous ' person 
 indulges in prosy, tiresome, and lengthy talk, with frequent 
 repetition and needless minuteness of detail. Justice Shal- 
 low is represented as ' talkative,' having little or nothing to 
 say, but constantly speaking. Miss Mitford, in her picture 
 of ' the talking lady,' gives an exact picture of a ' loqua- 
 cious ' person. Homer represents old Nestor as ' garrulous.' 
 ' Talkativeness ' and ' loquacity ' often proceed from high 
 animal spirits, and often, also, from that combination de- 
 scribed by phrenologists as an active temperament with an 
 inferior mental development. ' Garrulity ' generally arises 
 from feebleness of mind and uncontrolled egotism. 
 
 STRONG, POWERFUL, VIGOROUS, FORCIBLE, POTENT. 
 
 Of these five terms, the first two alone are applied tc
 
 78 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 physical force. But they are applied to it in somewhat dif- 
 ferent senses ; * strong ' being the more comprehensive of 
 the two. A ' powerful ' man must be strong,' but a 
 • strong' person is not necessarily ' powerful.' ' Strong' is 
 more appropriately used to describe a person of sound, firm 
 constitution, capable of enduring fatigue; 'powerful,' one 
 who is.able to exert his physical force actively, and to per- 
 form feats of strength. ' Power ' is almost always active in 
 its signification. ' Strength ' is both active and passive. 
 (The two substantives exactly correspond to their adjectives, 
 ' strong ' and ' powerful.') The same analogy is preserved 
 when the words are applied to mental qualifications. A 
 1 strong ' mind is firm, capable of sustaining shocks — not 
 easily shaken ; a ' powerful ' mind is something more — ca- 
 pable of great active efforts, as well as passive endurance, 
 and fitted to command and influence others. 
 
 ' Vigorous,' in accordance with its root ' vigere,' implies 
 powers (either of mind or body) in an active state : hence 
 we speak of a vigorous (not powerful) shoot of a tree. 
 Thus, too, it is applied to temporary conditions ; we might 
 say ' he has a powerful (or strong) mind, but it was not then 
 in a vigorous state.' A powerful style, implies great ability ; 
 a vigorous style, the exertion of that ability. 
 
 4 Forcible ' is never used to describe qualities of either 
 mind or bod)', but only the individual efforts which those 
 qualities may call forth ; it is generally applied to mental 
 efforts ; we speak of a forcihle argument, a forcible illustra- 
 tion ; but it is sometimes applied as the adjective correspond- 
 ing to the noun force, implying coercive violence, as * to 
 make a forcible entry,' &c. ; the adverb ' forcibly ' is also 
 used in this sense. There is, however, a difference between 
 the mental efforts designated as ' strong ' and ' forcible.' A 
 'forcible' expression is one both strong and to the point 
 A ' strong ' expression is merely vehement.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 7& 
 
 ' Potent ' is occasionally used for reasoning, but generally 
 when speaking of the properties of drugs, poisonous, medi- 
 cinal, or intoxicating, as ' a potent drug,' a ' potent dram.' 
 
 INCONSISTENT, INCONGRUOUS. 
 
 ' Inconsistent ' is almost always applied either to character 
 or conduct, though we sometimes speak of ' two inconsistent 
 opinions or propositions.' But a proposition can only be 
 inconsistent as compared with another proposition ; if we 
 speak of an inconsistent opinion, it is always as compared 
 with some other, previously alluded to, or understood as 
 being held by the same person. A man is sometimes taxed 
 with inconsistency, from having changed his opinions ; a 
 charge, which, if true, would cause every person to be 
 inconsistent, who was neither foolishly obstinate nor born 
 perfect. The real inconsistency is, not the ' being wiser to- 
 day than we were yesterday,' but the holding at the same 
 moment contradictory opinions, or implying by our conduct 
 that we do not hold them. 
 
 At first sight it would seem as if consistency in conduct 
 was impossible, since every one who professes to act on 
 principle must more or less fall short of the standard of per- 
 fection ; and in this sense all mortals are inconsistent. But 
 what is generally regarded as emphatically inconsistent, is 
 not the falling occasionally into faults, but the holding two 
 different standards of action, — aiming at one thing and pro- 
 fessing another ; as when a person professes, in the abstract, 
 a great horror of falsehood, and yet holds that it is allowable 
 to lie on certain occasions, or for certain reasons. One who 
 is at the same time religious and worldly in his conduct, pre- 
 sents the commonest example of this kind of inconsistency. 
 There is a difference between ' serving txco masters,', and 
 serving one from whom we may sometimes stray. 
 
 ' Incongruous ' is generally applied to some production,
 
 80 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 viewed as a whole, whose parts do not agree with each 
 other. A mixture of architectural styles in one building — 
 a dress which is in part homely, in part elaborate — or a 
 selection of colors which do not harmonize, are all incon- 
 gruous. Thus the term is applied to all works of art or 
 skill in which this defect is perceived. 
 
 CRUEL, BARBAROUS, INHUMAN, SAVAGE. 
 
 A ' cruel ' man is one who takes pleasure in another's 
 pain. A ' barbarous ' man is one who inflicts pain, whether 
 from spite, revenge, or interest, in a wild and violent man- 
 ner. ' Savage ' is much the same as ' barbarous,' but rather 
 an exaggeration of it, implying even more violence. 
 
 One who is ' inhuman,' again, is utterly dead to compas- 
 sion — he may not take delight in purposely inflicting suffer- 
 ing ; but he cither inflicts it if he sees cause, or endures the 
 sight of it without either compunction or pity : — he is hard- 
 hearted. 
 
 SUBLIME, MAGNIFICENT, SPLENDID, GRAND, SUPERB. 
 
 ' Sublime ' is the highest and strongest of these words. 
 When applied to the productions of genius, whether in art 
 or literature, it is always limited to such as arc in the loftiest 
 style of excellence — of such kinds as inspire awe rather 
 than delight. In natural scenery it is the same ; those land- 
 scapes which are called ' sublime ' must be characterized by 
 the most awful and lofty character, and it is never applied 
 to anything on a small scale, whether in art or nature.* It 
 also differs from all the other words under consideration, in 
 being applied to human actions and sentiments ; heroic con- 
 duct or an elevated tone of feeling or principles of morality, 
 are sometimes called ' sublime.' 
 
 *See Burke's remarks in the Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 8i 
 
 ' Magnificent ' is also applied to objects of beauty on a 
 large and grand scale, but it is never properly applied to 
 human conduct, nor to productions of the fine arts, (except 
 architecture,) or of literature. It is only correctly used to 
 qualify — 1st, scenery and natural objects, such as birds and 
 beasts, and even human beings, considered only in reference 
 to their personal and material endowments ; and, 2dly, those 
 artificial productions which belong rather to the costly, 
 pompous, and luxurious in the artistic class ; as buildings, 
 furniture, jewelry, &c. For example, we should not speak 
 correctly of a statue or picture, when considering it in the 
 light of a work of art, as being magnificent, but we might 
 speak of a magnificent palace or set of jewels. On the 
 other hand we might speak of a beautiful woman, if on a 
 large scale, so that the material is prominent, as ' magnifi- 
 cent.' We might also call her voice, if possessing much 
 volume and richness of tone, ' magnificent,' but not her style 
 of singing. 
 
 Architecture forms an exception to the other fine arts, in 
 this respect ; the terms ' magnificent ' and ' splendid ' may be 
 applied to it ; but it does not in reality form an exception to 
 the rule before mentioned ; as a simple and grand style 
 of building would never be called ' magnificent ; ' it is only 
 in so far as its gorgeous and costly character strikes us that 
 we use that term, as in the rich and complicated florid Gothic 
 architecture. 
 
 ' Splendid ' is like ' magnificent,' but rather less strong in 
 its signification ; it differs also in this point, that it is applied 
 to abstract qualities, which ' magnificent ' never is ; we 
 speak of ' splendid talents,' ' a splendid display of genius,' 
 &c. It always implies something brilliant, gorgeous, or 
 striking. 
 
 ' Grand ' is merely used for something in a great or loft) 
 style.
 
 &2 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 ' Superb ' is nearly the same as 'magnificent,' but has been 
 less completely adopted into our language, being still some- 
 what Frenchified. 
 
 . PLEASING, AGREEABLE, PLEASANT. 
 
 ' Pleasing ' is generally applied to manners and personal 
 appearance. ' Agreeable ' is used in a more extended sense; 
 when applied to manners and conversation it differs from 
 4 pleasing,' and means rather clever and entertaining, than 
 winning or attractive. Many persons are ' agreeable ' who 
 arc not ' pleasing ; ' and a ' pleasing ' person may not have 
 sufficient spirit, or variety of conversation, to constitute him 
 ' agreeable.' ' Pleasing ' refers more to the person himself; 
 ' agreeable ' to the impression made on others. 
 
 ' Pleasant ' was formerly used to describe merry and 
 playful conversation, or a jocose and lively person ; now it 
 is in a great measure withdrawn from persons and applied 
 to things, — to weather, scenery, situations, &c. 
 
 ' Pleasantry ' is a relic of the old meaning. The French 
 plaisant lias changed in a reverse way. Formerly it meant 
 what we now call ' pleasant,' as may be seen from the ' La- 
 ment of Mary Queen of Scots : ' — 
 
 ' Adieu, plaisant pays de France ! ' 
 
 Now it has come to mean, as it formerly did with us, ' funny' 
 or 'jocose.' 
 
 CALM, TRANQUIL, QUIET, PLACID. 
 
 ' Calm ' applies either to the outward manner, to the 
 temperament, or to the mood of mind at the moment. 
 k Tranquil,' properly speaking, only to the mood of mind. 
 There is also a difference in the state which they describe. 
 
 Tranquillity implies not only outward serenity, but ease 
 of mind. If we exhort a person ' to be calm,' we arc merely
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 8J> 
 
 advising him to practise self-control : the expression, ' you 
 may be tranquil,' implies, ' you need feel no alarm.' A 
 strong-minded person will be calm in the midst of dangers 
 and calamities ; but if we say, ' He saw his country ruined 
 with a tranquil eye,' it would imply, not firmness of soul, 
 but apathy. 
 
 ' Quiet ' is more applicable, in general, to external circum- 
 stances than to temper or manner ; when applied to these, 
 it implies a silent, retiring disposition. 
 
 ' Placid ' is something like ' tranquil,' but implies less of 
 quiescence, and more of cheerful ease and smoothness. If 
 we speak of ' a placid sea,' it implies a more settled state 
 than ' tranquil.' The sea might be both tranquil and 
 gloomy. 
 
 DELIGHTFUL, DELICIOUS. 
 
 ' Delightful '/is applied both to the pleasures of the mind 
 and those of the senses : ' delicious ' only to those of the 
 senses. An excursion, a social circle, a place of abode, 
 may be ' delightful ; ' a perfume, or a fruit, ' delicious.' 
 ' Delightful ' may be used, however, for all pleasures con- 
 nected with the bodily senses, except taste ; a climate, a 
 breeze, a scent, may be either ' delightful ' or ' delicious.' 
 ' Delicious ' is limited, in general, to the lower senses — 
 taste, smell, or feeling. 
 
 Some people do sometimes speak of music as ' delicious ; ' 
 but they are generally those who regard music chiefly as a 
 sensual pleasure, or what the Germans call an ohrenschmaus, 
 or banquet for the ears — something that does not concern 
 the mind. No one possessing a musician's soul ever de- 
 nominated music as ' a delicious art.' 
 
 ' Delighful ' is also applied to moral gratification. A 
 well-ordered and happy family — a joyful reunion — are 
 delightful to witness.
 
 84 A COLLECTION OP 
 
 OBSTINATE, STUBBORN. 
 
 ' Both obstinacy and stubbornness imply an excessive and 
 vicious perseverence in pursuing our own judgment in oppo- 
 sition to that of others ; but to be obstinate implies the 
 doing what we ourselves chose. To be stubborn denotes 
 rather, not to do what others advise or desire. An obstinate 
 man will pursue his own foolish purpose, in spite of the 
 wisest and kindest counsel. A stubborn child will not com- 
 ply with the advice, or obey the commands of a parent. 
 Obstinacy requires a positive idea ; stubbornness merely a 
 negation. Obstinacy is generally applied to the superior; 
 stubbornness to the inferior. An obstinate king, under a 
 false appearance of firmness, brings ruin on his country ; a 
 stubborn people is insensible to benevolence, and can only 
 be subdued by punishment. Obstinacy refers more to out- 
 ward acts, and stubbornness to disposition.' — Sin J. Mack- 
 intosh. 
 
 fickle, capricious, variable, changeable. 
 
 The first two of these adjectives are, properly speaking, 
 limited to persons, and only applied to things by a kind of 
 metaphor : the two latter are applied indifferently to persons 
 and things. 
 
 The chief difference between ' fickle ' and ' capricious ' 
 is, that ' fickle ' refers rather to a want of constancy, whether 
 in tastes or attachments — while ' capricious ' not only in- 
 cludes this, but also a disposition to take violent and short- 
 lived fancies or antipathies to persons or things. 
 
 A friend whose affection cools speedily is ' fickle ; ' one 
 who takes sudden and unreasonable likings or dislikes is 
 ' capricious.' In short,' ' fickle ' conveys the idea of a pre- 
 ference being short-lived ; ' capricious ' of its being also 
 suddenly formed, and Avithout sufficient cause.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMb. St 
 
 ' Variable ' and ' changeable ' refer for trie most part to 
 climate ; when applied to persons they preserve an analogy 
 to their original meaning, implying a change rather in the 
 mood of mind than in the affections ; a variable tempera- 
 ment is distinguished rather by rapid transitions from 
 grave to gay, from hot to cold, than by actual want of con- 
 stancy. 
 
   Changeable ' is, however, often used to describe that 
 kind of fickleness or caprice, which is also denominated 
 ' whimsicality.' 
 
 DEEP, PROFOUND. 
 
 4 Deep ' and ' profound ' are often, but not always, synony- 
 mous. They differ, first, in this respect — that ' profound ' 
 is almost limited to abstract subjects, while ' deep ' includes 
 also natural objects. We may speak indifferently of 'a 
 deep well,' ' a deep color,' or ' a deep feeling,' ' deep learn- 
 ing.' ' Profound ' could only be applied in these last 
 cases. 
 
 In matters of sentiment and reflection ' deep ' is generally, 
 though not uniformly, preferred to ' profound ; ' in cases in 
 which the particular intellectual faculties are in question, 
 ' profound ' is more generally used. We speak of ' deep 
 sorrow,' ' deep thought,' — but of l profound contempt,' 'a 
 profound knowledge of a subject.' 
 
 WEIGHTY, HEAVY. 
 
 These words bear somewhat the same relation to each 
 other as 'deep' and 'profound.' We speak of 'weighty 
 reasons,' but ' heavy cares.' As a term of blame, ' heavy ' 
 is always the word employed ; we should say, ' This man's 
 speech contained weighty arguments, but his opponent's 
 was a very heavy discourse.' 
 8
 
 86 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 FAULTLESS, BLAMELESS, SPOTLESS, INNOCENT. 
 
 A ' faultless ' character is not only free from imputation 
 of evil, but also free from defects : one who is blameless or 
 spotless is one whose character has never had any charge 
 brought against it. 
 
 Spotless and faultless apply to the general character only ; 
 blameless may be used in reference to particular points. 
 We might say, ' He is blameless in this respect ' — 'in this 
 instance I can declare that I am blameless ' — in such 
 phrases we could not use the words ' faultless ' or ' spotless.' 
 
 ' Faultless ' may also be applied (which the other two 
 cannot be) to personal appearance as well as mind. 
 
 ' Innocent ' is sometimes used to indicate a state of utter 
 ignorance of evil, like that of a child ; at other times it is 
 used in opposition to ' guilt ' — to imply that a person is 
 free from the fault with which he is charged. Innocent, in 
 this last sense, (like guilty,) is used in reference to actions 
 and not feelings or intentions : thus differing from ' spotless ' 
 and ' faultless.' 
 
 Our first parents were innocent till the moment of their 
 tasting of the forbidden tree ; but they could* not be called 
 ' spotless ' or ' faultless,' since as sin evidently lies in the in- 
 tention, they incurred it as soon as the wish to commit the 
 act had been fully formed. From a want of comprehension 
 of this, and an inattention to the meaning of the word inno- 
 cent, much confusion of thought is produced. Adam and 
 Eve being often spoken of as if they were not only innocent, 
 but faultless and spotless, before the fall. 
 
 WICKED, SINFUL, CRIMINAL, DEPRAVED, GUILTY. 
 
 The word ' wicked ' affords a curious exemplification of 
 (he kind of change, through which words now indicative 
 of evil have frequently passed. It originally meant ' alive,'
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 8< 
 
 a.-. ' wick ' still does in the north of England. The ' wick ' 
 of a candle has the same origin, meaning the living or flam- 
 ing part of it ; and the word ' quick ' was the same. From 
 ' alive ' and ' lively,' ' wicked ' came to signify restless and 
 turbulent, and at last assumed its present sense, expressive 
 of unmitigated moral evil, either of character or actions. 
 
 ' Criminal ' always implies the commission of some fault 
 which is considered as such in the sight of man ; and gen- 
 erally, with reference to human laws, supposed to be just ; 
 for transgressions of iniquitous laws, though in one sense 
 they may be termed crimes, are not correctly designated as 
 criminal. Under the earlier Roman emperors, the profes- 
 sion of Christianity was punished as a crime : but it would 
 never be described as criminal. The laws to which such 
 actions are ideally referred, must be supposed, then, to be 
 just and equitable. 
 
 Whatever, in this sense, then, is criminal, must also be 
 sinful ; but ' sinful ' designates faults only as they incur the 
 divine displeasure ; hence the word is far more extended in 
 meaning than ' criminal : ' it extends to thoughts and words 
 as well as actions ; while ' criminal,' if ever used in reference 
 to thoughts, is only so employed in as far as they are sup- 
 posed to lead to actions. 
 
 We occasionally speak of ' a criminal thirst for ven- 
 geance,' &c, but it is always with reference to this passion 
 as naturally leading to the crime of murder : and the con- 
 jugate word crime is never correctly used except to designate 
 an action ; while the word ' sin ' may not only refer to a 
 thought, but even quite as frequently to general evil propen- 
 sities and tendencies. 
 
 ' Depraved ' implies not only positive wickedness, but an 
 entire corruption of nature. 
 
 One who is depraved must originally have been capable of
 
 88 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 something better.* It is extended to character as well ss 
 actions. 
 
 * Guilty,' like ' criminal,' always has reference to some 
 positive action, and to human condemnation ; whereas 
 1 wicked ' and 'depraved ' may apply to the whole character, 
 as well as to individual acts. But « guilty ' refers chiefly to 
 the question of a person's having or not having actually 
 committed a certain action, while ' criminal ' may he con- 
 sidered rather as describing the character of that action. 
 We might say. ' He is guilty of such and such a fault ; but 
 he is not as criminal as some of his companions in so acting.' 
 Guilt docs not admit of degree, though it docs of amount. 
 A person may be guilty of more or of less crime, but can- 
 not be more or less guilty in what he has committed; though 
 he may be more or less wicked, sinful, or criminal."!' 
 
 BENEVOLENT, BENEFICENT, CHARITABLE, MUNIFICENT, 
 LIBERAL, BOUNTIFUL, PHILANTHROPIC. 
 
 Benevolent and beneficent, together with their conjugates, 
 have curiously diverged from their original meaning. Ety- 
 mologically, ' benevolent ' implied merely wishing well to 
 others, and ' beneficent ' doing well ; X now, ' benevolent ' 
 includes both kinds of feelings and actions, and ' beneficent' 
 is restricted to acts of kindness on a great scale, and gen- 
 erally performed by some one of exalted station and char- 
 acter ; hence we speak of the ' beneficence ' rather than 
 the ' benevolence ' of the Creator. It may perhaps be said 
 to follow from this, that ' benevolent ' draws our attention 
 more to the character of the agent, ' beneficent,' to that of 
 
 * It is in this sense that we speak of the depravity of human nature. 
 It was a fall from a better state. 
 
 t See Archbishop Whately's Charge on Infant Baptism. 
 % The French uso the corresponding words ' bienveillance ' and 
 * bienfaisance ' more correctly according to their etymology.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 8\ 
 
 the act performed ; retaining, so far, a tinge of their ety- 
 mology. 
 
 ' Charitable ' (when not used in reference to a mild and 
 candid judgment of others) seems to be restricted to one 
 kind of benevolence, that which consists in almsgiving. 
 
 ' Munificent ' resembles ' beneficent,' in referring always 
 to favors on a large scale, and conferred by superiors ; but 
 there is this important difference, that * beneficent ' always 
 implies some real and essential good done, while ' munifi- 
 cent' (as its derivation implies) may be applied equally to 
 any gift, whether really useful or not.* One who makes a 
 present of jewelry or pictures to a friend is munificent, 
 but would not be called ' beneficent.' If he raised a dis- 
 tressed family from starvation, the word ' beneficent ' would 
 be more appropriate. But one who gives largely to the 
 public, or to some institution, is called munificent. It seems 
 to convey the idea of splendor ; no one can be called muni- 
 ficent who does not give on a large scale. 
 
 Any one who is ready to give freely, as the etymology 
 implies, on whatever scale, is ' liberal.' ' Bountiful, ' again, 
 is stronger than ' liberal,' and implies giving in abundance ; 
 it also differs from ' liberal,' in being restricted to giving ; 
 while ' liberal ' is applied to any easy style of expenditure 
 in general ; to the reverse, in short, of ' stingy,' or * miserly.' 
 Many people live in a liberal style, who are very far from 
 being ' bountiful.' Bountiful always seems to imply, giving 
 out of an ample store. 
 
 * Philanthropic ' (as its etymology indicates) implies benev- 
 olence solely in reference to the human race — and always 
 to masses, not to individuals. One who devises some plan 
 to benefit numbers is called ' philanthropic ;' but we should 
 
 * ' Munificent ' nearly answers to the Greek word megaloprepes, as 
 described by Aristotle. 
 8*
 
 90 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 not talk of ' philanthropically giving a loaf to a hungrj 
 child.' — [See note to Preface.) 
 
 BENIGNANT, KI.V1), GOOD-NATURED. 
 
 * Benignant' is an expression more generally used to 
 describe manner than actions ; and almost always refers to 
 the manners of a superior. It seem to imply a conde- 
 scending amenity of deportment. ' Kind ' is used to de- 
 scribe both manners and conduct, and has by far the most 
 extended signification of the three words : it includes almost 
 every manifestation of benevolence, small or great. ' Good- 
 nature,' on the other hand is limited to its lowest exercise, 
 to kindness in trifles, and always to kindness springing from 
 constitutional obligingness and amiability. A person who is 
 kind from conscientiousness alone, is never called ' good- 
 natured.' 
 
 The old original word was ' ?^eZ/-natured,' which is gram- 
 matically more correct than the modern word ; for the 
 adverb is properly used to qualify the adjective. We speak 
 of ' well-born,' ' well-bred,' not of ' good-born,' &c. A 
 person of a good disposition is said to be a;e7/-disposed, not 
 "•oorZ-disposcd. In old English, the word ' we7/- tempered ' 
 was used instead of '■good- tempered.' 
 
 yi*i 
 
 TEGLECTFUL, NEGLIGENT. 
 
 ' Neglectful ' has reference generally to our conduct 
 towards persons ; ' negligent ' towards things. A person 
 is said to be neglectful of his friends ; negligent of his 
 business. A negligent correspondent is one who is careless 
 in writing, mislays letters, and forgets whether he has 
 answered them or no ; a neglectful correspondent is one 
 who forgets his fiiends when away from them, a~td acts 
 on the maxim — « Out of sight, out of mind.' 
 
 Hence, if we reproach a person with neglect ('.he sub/
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 91 
 
 stantives ' neglect ' and ' negligence ' correspond witiL the 
 adjectives), we are supposed to charge him with real un- 
 kindness or coldness ; while only carelessness is implied if 
 he is charged with negligence. 
 
 The verb ' to neglect ' is a conjugate of both these adjec- 
 tives and substantives. We might say, ' He did not use to 
 neglect his business, but he has been very negligent of it 
 lately ; ' ' I did not think he would neglect his friends, but 
 he has been very neglectful of me.' 
 
 ABSENT, ABSTRACTED. 
 
 ' Absent ' refers merely to the circumstance of the atten- 
 tion being withdrawn from outward objects; 'abstracted' 
 implies also concentration of the thoughts on something 
 foreign to what is before us. One who is ' absent ' does not 
 attend to what is around him — it may be from languor of 
 mind or carelessness ; but one who is ' abstracted ' is inat- 
 tentive because he is thinking of something else. ' Ab- 
 sence ' is therefore a habit; 'abstraction' an accident. We 
 do sometimes, indeed, speak of an habitually absent person 
 as ' abstracted ; ' but one who is from any particular cause 
 in an abstracted state of mind would not be called an ' ab- 
 sent ' person. Byron's Dying Gladiator, who 
 
 * Heard it, but he heeded not ; his thoughts 
 Were with his heart, and that was far away, 
 
 was then abstracted ; but to call him absent would be ludi- 
 crous. j? 
 
 "^/TRIFLING, TRIVIAL. 
 
 \-4riJling matter is one merely of small importance : a 
 trivial matter is a small matter made too much of. The 
 word ' trivial ' implies contempt, which ' trifling ' does not. 
 By saying, ' He never neglects a trifling matter,' we are 
 rather supposed to praise ; but in blaming a person foi
 
 92 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 frivolity,' we often say,' ' He is always engrossed with trivial 
 concerns.' The substantive ' trifle' is conjugate to both. 
 
 FATHERLY, PATERNAL ; MOTHERLY, MATERNAL ; BRO- 
 THERLY, FRATERNAL J KINGLY, REGAL. 
 
 These pairs of words are formed from corresponding 
 roots in Latin and Saxon ; and, as has been already observed, 
 they all bear nearly the same relation to each other ; the 
 Latin word being the more polite and cold, the Saxon the 
 more hearty and cordial. In these groups of words, also, 
 the Latin word is always used to express the office, the Saxon 
 the manners and deportment. We speak of ' a paternal 
 government ' — '■maternal duties ; ' but of ' a fatherly kind- 
 ness of manner ' — 'a motherly tenderness.' The same 
 may be said of the relation between the words ' kingly ' and 
 ' regal.' We speak of the ' regal state ' — the ' regal pre- 
 rogative ' — but of a ' kingly deportment ' — ' kingly splen- 
 dor.' 
 
 FRIENDLY, AMICABLE. 
 
 The same relation exists between these two words ; 
 neither denote any strong affection, neither are conjugate to 
 the noun ' friendship ; ' but ' friendly ' implies something of 
 real cordiality, while ' amicable ' hardly signifies more than 
 that the persons specified are not disposed to quarrel ; thence 
 we speak of ' amicable relations between foreign States.' 
 
 RIGHTEOUS, JUST. 
 
 We have here again a Saxon * and a Latin term, whose 
 roots exactly correspond in meaning ; but they have even 
 more curiously diverged than many other pairs of words. 
 
 * The root of the word ' righteous ' is, in fact, both Latin and 
 Saxon, the words 'rccht' and 'rectus' being evidently cf kindred 
 origin.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. J3 
 
 ' Righteous ' is now exclusively applied to rectitude of 
 conduct drawn from religious principle, while 'just' is 
 simply used for moral uprightness. A heathen or atheist 
 may be called just, but not righteous. But many are apt to 
 overlook the fact, that these words were really and originally 
 the same. For instance, in the Douay version of the Bible, 
 made from the Vulgate, the words of Latin derivation are 
 invariably preferred to the Saxon; and we find 'just' con- 
 stantly used for ' righteous,' as the translation of the Greek 
 dikaios. 
 
 CALCULATED, FIT, SUITABLE, APT. 
 
 ' Calculated ' is always so employed as not to lose the 
 force of the figure. It must be read with an emphasis, and 
 followed by words which direct and qualify its meaning, or 
 explain its application ; as ' These plants are calculated for 
 our climate.' 
 
 ' Suitable,' and ' fit,' may be used by themselves, which 
 could not be the case with ' calculated.' We might say in- 
 differently — ' Do you think him calculated — fit — or suit- 
 able, for this situation ? ' but we might also say more briefly, 
 ' Do you think him suitable or fit ? ' In this last case, ' cal- 
 culated ' would be inadmissible. ' Calculated ' must also 
 be differently qualified : we speak of ' very fit ' — but of 
 ' very well calculated.' 
 
 ' Apt ' is somewhat different from the others. It rather 
 implies readiness than suitability : and it is used to qualify 
 a simile or illustration ; in which sense it implies not only 
 ' suitable ' but ' happy ' — or ' pointed.' It is also used in 
 the sense of ' liable,' as, ' 1 am very apt to forget.' 
 
 ACCURATE, EXACT, PRECISE. 
 
 What is accurate must be exact ; but exactness does not 
 necessarily imply accuracy. An account of any transac-
 
 94 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 tion may be accidentally exact, but to be accurate, care 
 must have been bestowed. An accurate writer is one who 
 aims at exactness. 
 
 We speak of an ' exact coincidence,' — we should not 
 use the word ' accurate ' in this sense. ' Precise,' when 
 applied to things, is nearly tbe same as ' exact,' but less 
 extended in signification. A likeness may be exact, but 
 could not be precise. It is most correctly applied to any- 
 thing which is within certain defined limits, thus adhering 
 to its etymology, which signifies, ' cut to a patern,' (from 
 the Latin prcc-cido.} 
 
 It is curious tbat the expression, ' an exact person,' is 
 synonymous with ' an accurate person ; ' but ' a precise per- 
 son ' always implies one who is over-strict and scrupulous 
 in trifles. 
 
 
 ^FAMOUS, CELEBRATED, ILLUSTRIOUS, RENOWNED. 
 
 Famous and celebrated approach the nearest to each 
 other in meaning of this group ; but ' famous ' seems to 
 convey the idea of a name being more ' blazoned abroad,' 
 and loudly praised, than ' celebrated.' ' Illustrious ' always 
 implies fame of a lofty and elevated character. We may 
 speak of 'a famous juggler,' 'a celebrated chess-player,' 
 but we should not call them illustrious. ' Illustrious ' is also 
 used for distinguished rank and station. 
 
 ' Renowned ' resembles ' famous,' but, like illustrious, is 
 used for a high and dignified kind of reputation. ' A re- 
 nowned chess-player ' could be so called only in irony. 
 
 SLY, CUNNING, CRAFTY, DECEITFUL. 
 
 ' Sly ' differs from ' cunning ' and ' crafty,' first, by in- 
 dicating manifestations of deceit on a small scale, and, 
 secondly, from its being generally of a negative character, 
 implying rather concealment than invention. We speak of
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 95 
 
 ' sly humor ; ' this seems to imply humor that is furtive and 
 covert, in opposition to ' broad humor.' 
 
 ' Cunning ' has departed, in some degree, from its origi- 
 nal meaning, ' knowing ' (from a word cognate with the 
 German kennen, to know,) and now implies deceit, united 
 with a low kind of skill or cleverness. 
 
 ' Crafty ' (according to its etymology) implies some high- 
 er degree of mental power, united with, deceit. A states- 
 man is called crafty ; a fortune-teller, cunning ; a child, sly. 
 
 ' Deceitful ' differs from these in applying more to char- 
 acter than to individual acts ; while the three other words 
 would equally suit both. It may also (like the substantive 
 ' deception,' which is in fact its real conjugate) be applied 
 to illusory appearances. 
 
 We might say, ' These appearances are deceitful ; the 
 cause of the deception is so and so.' — (See the head de- 
 ceit, DECEPTION.)
 
 96 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 NOUNS. 
 
 DILIGENCE, INDUSTRY. 
 
 ' Industry ' includes ' diligence ; ' but it includes also some- 
 thing more. An industrious * man not only labors perse- 
 veringly at any given task, but is constantly on the watch 
 for opportunities to improve his condition or his mind, as the 
 case may be. The term is therefore applied to the design, 
 as well as to the execution. The industrious man is always 
 ready for employment — always looking out for fresh work. 
 The diligent man merely performs steadily the individual 
 task he may be set. No one could be called industrious 
 who was not also diligent in the execution of his task ; but 
 if we set a child some lesson to learn, we do not usually 
 exhort him to ' industry,' but to ' diligence.' They are often, 
 however, used synonymously. 
 
 contentment, satisfaction. 
 
 ' Contentment ' may be classed among those words in 
 the English language which adhere strictly to their etymol- 
 ogy. Its root was undoubtedly the verb ' to contain,' and 
 the substantive and its adjective have not departed from this 
 meaning. A contented person does not indulge in fruitless 
 wishes for what is beyond his reach ; his desires are limited 
 by what he possesses. 
 
 ' Satisfaction implies more : this word has likewise re- 
 tained the signification of its root, and means that we have 
 
 * The nouns and adjectives here correspond.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 97 
 
 obtained all we want ; not that our desires are limited, but 
 that they have been gratified. A poor and needy man 
 may be ' contented,' but he cannot feel ' satisfaction ' with 
 his condition. We might say, ' Since I cannot obtain satis- 
 faction, I must be content without it.' 
 
 ' Satisfaction ' also implies an amende honorable. Some- 
 times, when applied to conduct, it indicates approbation — 
 as, ' Your behavior gives me great satisfaction.' 1 ' Satisfied ' 
 implies a less amount of gratification : ' I am satisfied with 
 your conduct,' implies less of praise than, ' It gives me satis- 
 faction.'' 
 
 ' Not content ' and ' not satisfied ' differ in this in modern 
 usage, that the latter often signifies not being pleased at all, 
 which the former does not in English, though it does in 
 French. The Pope was not satisfied with the Reformation 
 of Henry VIII. ; but the reformers were not content with it. 
 
 ANGER, INDIGNATION, DISPLEASURE, RESENTMENT. 
 
 The difference between ' anger ' and ' indignation ' is, 
 that ' anger ' is always personal, and always applies to in- 
 juries inflicted, or supposed to be inflicted, on ourselves, or 
 on others so nearly connected by ties of kindred or friend- 
 ship, as to be regarded almost as a part of ourselves. 
 
 ' Indignation ' is more generally used in reference to 
 some injustice or oppression shown to others, whether to 
 strangers or friends ; though it also includes anger on our 
 own account. It may be considered as denoting sympathetic 
 anger ; — a feeling that such and such conduct might justly 
 provoke anger. And hence it is that a person, under the 
 influence of anger at some wrong done him, often prefers 
 describing himself as feeling 'indignation;' meaning there- 
 by to disavow selfish personal feelings, and to imply that he 
 is affected merely by the character of the act in itself, just 
 9
 
 98 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 as he would have been, had the wrong been done to a 
 
 stranger. 
 
 • Displeasure ' is a calmer feeling than either ' anger ' 01 
 
 * indignation.' It implies a sentiment scarcely stronger 
 than simple disapproval, and is generally applied to the 
 faults of an inferior, either in age or station. We should 
 not speak of being ' displeased ' at the conduct of a supe- 
 rior, however ill we might think of him. 
 
 ' Resentment ' is a stronger feeling than any of those 
 before mentioned. It generally implies a long-continued 
 feeling. It may be defined as a long-continued anger felt 
 against some one who has knowingly injured us ; in no other 
 case can the word be correctly applied. 
 
 We may feel ' anger ' against a child for behaving ill, 
 though his conduct may do us no harm ; we may be angry 
 with some one who is the innocent cause of annoyance to 
 us ; but in neither of these cases should we be said to feel 
 ' resentment.' 
 
 RECOMPENSE, REWARD, MEED. 
 
 A ' recompense ' implies a reward equivalent to the action 
 done (etymologically, a compensation). 
 
 A ' reward ' includes a recompense, but does not imply it 
 — its simple, primary meaning is merely a pleasure or 
 benefit (whether adequate or not) conferred in return for 
 some action. We may say : 'I cannot recompense you for 
 this ; ' meaning, ' I cannot make any fitting return to you.' 
 Hence it is incorrect to speak of recompensing a child 
 for good behavior ; ' reward ' would be the correct term. 
 
 * Meed ' is a reward which we earn by our own exertions, 
 and to which we are fairly entitled : A free gift cannot be a 
 meed.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 99 
 
 APPROVAL, APPROBATION. 
 
 * Approbation ' is used in a much more extended sense 
 than ' approval.' ' Approval ' generally implies a formal 
 sanction of some plan or mode of action ; as, ' I proposed 
 such a measure to the Prime Minister, for his approval.' It 
 implies also such a sanction as can only come from a supe- 
 rior ; whereas, ' approbation ' requires no such distinctions. 
 A private man may give his ' approbation ' to the measures 
 of government ; but we could not say that he gave them his 
 ' approval.' 
 
 Lastly, some consequences must follow for an ' approval ; ' 
 while ' approbation ' does not necessarily imply anything of 
 the kind. 
 
 TIMIDITY, BASHFULNESS, SHYNESS, DIFFIDENCE. 
 
 ' Timidity ' implies a liability to fear of any kind, whether 
 personal or moral. ' Bashfulness,' ' shyness,' and ' diffi- 
 dence,' all refer to the fear of blame or disapprobation. But 
 a person may be shy or bashful without being diffident. 
 ' Diffidence ' implies a real distrust of our own powers, 
 combined with a fear lest our failure should be censured ; 
 for a dread of failure unconnected with censure is not usu- 
 ally called ' diffidence.' We should not say that Robinson 
 Crusoe on his island, if he distrusted his own powers of 
 building a canoe, was diffident. The word seems to imply 
 spectators, and the companionship of others. It is generally 
 applied to a reluctance to attempt some undertaking, or a 
 fear of exhibiting our own powers ; but ' shyness ' and 
 1 bashfulness ' are more applicable to general deportment 
 and manners. 
 
 ' Bashfulness ' is generally applied to an awkward, sheep- 
 ish kind of ' timidity ; ' ' shyness ' to an excessive self- 
 consciousness, and a continual impression that every one ig
 
 100 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 looking at us. Bashfulncss would be shown by hanging 
 back timidly, or sitting silent and stupefied. Shyness is 
 often manifested by an apparent haughtiness and statcliness 
 of manner, (hence it is almost proverbially mistaken for 
 pride,) or, still oftcner, by an affected smile, and a frequent 
 forced laugh. 
 
 In short, ' shyness ' invariably arises from thinking too 
 much about oneself, ' diffidence ' generally from underrat- 
 ing one's own powers, (which is compatible with perfect self- 
 possession,) and ' bashfulness ' and ' timidity ' from a fear- 
 ful disposition and a want of presence of mind. Shynesa 
 and bashfulness, however, imply awkwardness, which tim- 
 uiitj does not. 
 
 SORROW, GRIEF, AFFLICTION, DISTRESS, REGRET, 
 SADNESS, MELANCHOLY. 
 
 'Sorrow' and 'affliction' are used generally — 'grief 
 only for particular cases. We speak of ' such an one having 
 known sorrow ' or ' affliction,' but not of ' having known 
 grief.' 'Grief is usually applied to 'sorrow' for some 
 definite causes, and always for the past. We speak of feel- 
 ing ' grief ' for the death of a friend, but not for his illness 
 or misconduct at this present moment. In such a case, ' sor- 
 row ' or ' affliction ' would be better words. 
 
 ' Sorrow ' and ' grief always imply mental distress ; ' af- 
 fliction ' is used in a more extended sense, and is sometimes 
 applied to one class of bodily evils, — to those, namely, 
 which are occasioned by the privation of a sense, or the loss 
 of a bodily power. Pain and sickness, however severe, are 
 not called afflictions, though a person suffering from them 
 may be said to be afflicted ; but blindness, deafness, or loss 
 of the use of any of the limbs, are constantly spoken of as 
 ' afflictions.' 
 
 ' Distress ' may be used either generally, or particularly.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 101 
 
 It includes a wider range of evils than affliction, — foi 
 poverty, sickness, and pain, come under this head. When 
 applied in particular to any one kind of evil, it usually ex- 
 presses an uneasy, restless suffering, whether of hody or 
 mind — or else very pressing, griping poverty ; — and it 
 almost always implies a struggle. One who is sunk in 
 despair would not be said to be in ' distress.' 
 
 ' Sadness ' and ' melancholy ' are both applied to moods 
 of the mind exclusively. 
 
 ' Regret ' is used for a slighter kind of sorrow than any 
 of the words above mentioned ; when used in speaking of 
 losses by death, it implies the mildest degree of sorrow. In 
 its stronger sense, it is chiefly used when speaking of our 
 past conduct, and in tbis case its meaning is very limited. 
 We feel remorse or repentance for deep and heavy faulte, 
 ' regret ' only for follies or carelessness. But ' regret ' has 
 a special reference to one particular kind of repentance — 
 that which is felt for having lost an opportunity. 
 
 Conjugate words. — ' Grief ' was formerly used in the 
 sense of the French ' grief,' for a subject of complaint or 
 injury. It has preserved this sense in two of its pseudo- 
 paronymes, or conjugates — ' to aggrieve ' and ' grievance.' 
 4 Grievous ' was formally used for an illness or accident, 
 where we now say ' severe,' and now is used to qualify an 
 event at which we feel ' sorrow ' mingled with a degree of 
 vexation. Grieved is a far less strong expression than 
 ' grief.' We say to a child who has behaved ill, — ' I am 
 grieved at your conduct,' but we should not speak of being 
 in grief for such a cause. 
 
 ' Sorry,' again, is a much weaker expression than ' sor- 
 row.' The description once given by a foreigner of the 
 grief of some friends of his for the loss of their only child 
 — ' They are very sorry' would almost raise a laugh in 
 England ; and yet in old English, as we see by our Bible 
 9*
 
 102 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 translation, ' sorry ' was regarded as answering (o ' sorrow. 
 * And when his fellow-servants heard that, they were ver) 
 sorry.' 
 
 ' Afflicted has a double meaning. It is used for * being 
 visited with affliction,' or, for the state of mind naturally 
 produced by it — the state of ' grief ' or ' sorrow.' This 
 last meaning is applied by metonymy, just as the adjective 
 ' melancholy ' was formerly used for a sad disposition, and 
 now for incidents or speeches which may occasion ' sadness.' 
 Sad has also acquired this secondary meaning. This word 
 has undergone some curious changes. Being derived from 
 the verb to sit, it was formerly used very much in the sense 
 of settled, as now applied to conduct ; indeed, in old 
 times it signified firm, as in Wickliffe's translation of the 
 Bible, where the ' house built upon a rock,'' is said to be 
 built upon a sad stone. Hence it came to signify serious- 
 ness, both of character and of material objects ; thus sad 
 garments, for what the French called un habit serieux. Its 
 meaning at present, as well as that of the noun, still verges 
 upon the idea of earnestness, as in the rather old-fashioned 
 expression, ' in sober sadness," 1 — that is, ' in collected ear- 
 nestness.'' 
 
 FEAR, FRIGHT, TERROR, ALARM, DREAD, APPREHENSION. 
 
 ' Fear ' is a general term, which includes many of the 
 rest. It is sometimes spoken of as a passion ; sometimes as 
 a mere intellectual consciousness of danger. It is also used, 
 as far as this latter is concerned, in two senses : 1st, the ap- 
 prehension of actual danger ; 2dly, the hypothetical appre- 
 hension. For instance, ' I have a great fear of catching 
 cold,' implies the actual apprehension of an evil — i. e., 
 ' catching cold ; ' but f I have a great fear of being out in 
 the rain,' implies a hypothetical apprehension. What is
 
 ENGLISH 6TN0NYMS. 10b 
 
 understood by it is, ' I have a fear of the evil which may be 
 produced by going out in the rain — viz., catching cold.'* 
 
 ' Fright ' implies a degree of fear which paralyzes and 
 takes complete possession of the mind. ' Terror ' is the 
 same thing in a stronger degree. ' Alarm ' merely signifies 
 a sudden apprehension of immediately-impending danger, 
 probably derived from the Italian ' AlV armi ! ' a common 
 cry of soldiers when surprised. A brave man may be 
 ' alarmed,' (for it implies nothing unreasonable or cowardly 
 in its primary sense,) and he may feel ' fear ; ' but he could 
 not be ' frightened.' 
 
 ' Dread ' differs from ' fear ' in being more definite and 
 more intense : we may speak of ' being in a state of fear ' 
 without reference to the object feared; but not, of ' being in 
 a state of dread.' \ 
 
 ' Fear,' ' fright,' and ' alarm ' are, in general, only used 
 for apprehension of some painful or destructive physical 
 evil ; the two last constantly : but ' fear ' is often used in 
 reference to tbe opinion of others, especially those whom 
 we respect. Men are said to be ' governed by the fear of 
 the world, the fear of their superiors,' &c. ; and ' fear ' has 
 always been the most appropriate expression that is used in 
 reference to our Creator. 
 
 The conjugate verbs, ' to fear' and ' to dread,' do not 
 exactly correspond with the nouns. ' To fear ' is gener&lly 
 used for a hypothetical apprehension ; and ' to dread ' is 
 mostly applied in reference to some impending evil. The 
 expression, ' I dread crossing the sea,' would imply that we 
 
 * The adjective • afraid ' has the same varieties of meaning. It 
 maybe said to be conjugate to the noun 'fear.' 'To be afraid,' 
 however when used alone, means nearly the same as ' to be frightened.' 
 
 t ' Dread ' was formerly used more as ' fear ' is now. It was used 
 towards the Deity, as we may see in our liturgy.
 
 104 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 expected soon to cross. « To dread ' may also be applied to 
 any evil, whether connected with positive pain or danger, or 
 not. « I dread the meeting with such an one,' might he used 
 by one who expected to be afflicted with sorrow or agitation 
 at the meeting. ' I fear meeting him,' would imply that the 
 meeting would be the cause of some physical evil or danger. 
 We should not say, ' I fear committing a crime,' unless we 
 meant that we feared the punishment the crime might bring 
 on us ; if our fear was based on conscientious or honorable 
 motives, we should use the word ' dread.' * With regard 
 to the faults of others, however, we say ' fear : ' ' I fear he 
 be may be led into such and such an action.' 
 
 ' Apprehension ' simply implies the consciousness of dan- 
 ger. It is a word which has undergone some change in its 
 meaning. Originally, it was used merely to express expec- 
 tation, or simple consciousness, without implying necessarily 
 the expectation of consciousness of danger ; and this original 
 sense has been preserved in its derivative or conjugate verb, 
 ' to apprehend.' By degrees, the idea of fear or danger 
 came to be understood in ohe case of the noun substantive, 
 and also the adjective, 'apprehensive.' 
 
 The conjugates belonging to this group have most of them 
 preserved their original meaning ; but ' fearful ' may either 
 be applied to one who feels fear, or to circumstances calcu- 
 lated to inspire the feeling. And ' frightful,' which is now 
 limited in its meaning to that which is likely to inspire 
 fright, was formerly used in speaking of persons who were 
 easily frightened. This change of expression by metonymy 
 has taken place with many words in our language. 
 
 *The expression * to be afraid,' conveys the same idea as   dread,' 
 with respect to committing a fault. A brave and conscientious persoc 
 will be ' afraid ' of nothing- so much as of doing: wrong;.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 105 
 
 PATIENCE, FORTITUDE, RESIGNATION. 
 
 ' Fortitude ' may be classed in two ways : it may either 
 be reckoned with courage, intrepidity, &c, on the one hand, 
 or with ' patience ' and ' resignation ' on the other. It may 
 be called a link between two classes of virtues. It is always 
 used, however, in the same sense ; as, a resistance to evil 
 rather than a submission to it ; it is shown in sustaining 
 firmly some violent and overwhelming shock, whether bodily 
 or mental. ' Patience,' on the other hand, implies a gentle 
 submission to the lesser evils of life, and an endurance of 
 continuous suffering, whether of body or mind. 
 
 ' Fortitude ' would be shown in sustaining some great 
 calamity or sudden reverse of fortune, or in enduring a severe 
 operation without a groan. 
 
 ' Patience ' is manifested rather in bearing a lingering 
 illness with serenity and gentleness — in enduring some 
 continuous and wearying, though not violent pain — or trials 
 from the bad temper or ill conduct of others. It is also 
 applied to unremitting perseverance in some disagreeable or 
 discouraging task or duty. A person is spoken of as being 
 a patient teacher of stupid or inattentive pupils — as not 
 losing ' patience ' when trying to conquer some difficulty. 
 In this sense, ' patience' is active; but 'fortitude' is always 
 passive. 
 
 The opposite of ' fortitude ' is the weakness which yields 
 and is conquered by circumstances : a want of it is mani- 
 fested by* giving/ way to uncontrolled grief, terror, or out- 
 ward expressions of pain. The opposite of ' patience,' on 
 the other hand, is irritability, querulousness, or peevishness. 
 Both are equally necessary, but ' patience ' is more frequent- 
 ly so than ' fortitude.' The common evils of life should be 
 submitted to ; the greater and rarer ones require to be met 
 with resolution.
 
 100 A COLLECTION OP 
 
 ' Resignation ' more nearly resembles ' patience ' than 
 'fortitude,' inasmuch as it implies submission, and not resist- 
 ance ; but, on the other hand, it is always passive. It is 
 generally applied either to those mental evils commonly 
 called afflictions, or to bodily evils, which, being of a nearly 
 hopeless character, are also classed under the same head. 
 A person is not said to be resigned under a violent tooth- 
 ache ; but under hopeless blindness, or incurable illness, the 
 term would be properly applied. It therefore refers more to 
 the mental suffering which accompanies these evils than to 
 the evils themselves ; and, in particular, it implies a readi- 
 ness to resign hope. ' Resignation ' always implies a relig- 
 ious submission ; in this, it differs from the two words be- 
 fore mentioned. A stoic might display fortitude ; patience 
 is often the result of a sluggish tameness of character ; but 
 nothing short of Christian principle can inspire resignation ; 
 its essential character is submission to the will of our 
 Maker. 
 
 UTILITY, USEFULNESS. 
 
 * Utility ' is employed in a more general and abstract 
 sense than ' usefulness.' "We speak of the ' utility ' of an 
 invention or discovery ; of the ' usefulness ' of the article 
 discovered or invented : of the ' utility ' of a society or in- 
 stitution ; of the ' usefulness ' of an individual. * Usefulness,' 
 however, is sometimes employed in the sense of ' utility ; ' 
 ' utility ' much seldomer in the sense of ' usefulness.' The 
 abstract quality is always called ' utility.' ' Beauty and 
 utility,' for example, are placed in opposition to each 
 other. 
 
 EXPENSE, COST. 
 
 Strictly speaking, ' expense ' should be applied to the 
 purchaser, and ' cost ' to the thing purchased. A splendid
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 10? 
 
 carriage is a costly article ; the person who bought it is an 
 expensive liver, or one of expensive habits. But the original 
 meaning of these words (both adjectives and nouns) has 
 been so corrupted, that they are now used almost indiscrimi- 
 nately one for the other. Still, ' expensive ' is generally 
 and most correctly used with reference to the means of the 
 purchaser ; and ' costly ' with reference to the value of the 
 article bought. Many persons are tempted to buy articles 
 of dress or furniture because they are not costly, forgetting 
 that, if their means are small, these purchases may still be 
 too expensive; and, generally speaking, there are few ways 
 in which more ' expense ' is incurred than in constantly 
 buying what are called ' great bargains.' 
 
 WISDOM, PBUDENCE. 
 
 ' Wisdom,' in the words of one writer,*" ' consists in the 
 ready and accurate perception of analogies : ' and in those of 
 another, ' in the employment of the best means for the 
 attainment of the most important ends : ' the one being the 
 description of the faculty, the other of its operation. 
 
 ' Prudence ' is a lower kind of ' wisdom : ' it consists in 
 the employment of the best means for the accomplishment 
 of any one particular ead, whether it be important or no. 
 A man may therefore be prudent in some things and not in 
 others ; for example, if his careful and diligent pursuit of 
 riches should peril his soul. Prudence, again, is of a more 
 negative character than wisdom : it rather consists in avoid- 
 ing danger than in taking a decided step for the accomplish- 
 ment of any object. A prudent general is one who will 
 not let himself be surprised or taken at disadvantage ; but 
 not always one who gains victories. A prudent statesman 
 will keep out of war and debt, but will not always pass 
 
 * See Archbishop Whately's Rhetoric.
 
 108 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 important laws or make improvements. He may not even 
 show foresight in respect of very distant evils. Sir Robert 
 Walpole appears to have been a prudent statesman for his 
 own clay ; but he showed a want of real wisdom in taking 
 no measures to allay the irritation which existed in the High- 
 lands, and which, though it did not break out in his time, 
 was a source of great evils a few years afterwards.* 
 
 ' Prudence,' in short takes a lower range than ' wisdom.' 
 The Greeks had only one word for both, phronimos. The 
 word sophos is sometimes translated ' wise,' but incorrectly : 
 it meant rather ' skilful in the arts ; ' and, used as a general 
 term, answered to what we call philosophical. 
 
 SELF-CONCEIT, PRIDE, VANITY, ARROGANCE, HAUGHTINESS. 
 
 To be ' self-conceited,' is to entertain an overweening 
 opinion of oneself. A person, however, may be conceited 
 in some things and not in others ; he may greatly overrate 
 his own capacity in some one particular point, while in 
 others he has a just estimate, or even perhaps too low an 
 estimate of himself. 
 
 ' Pride,' on the other hand, may be defined as a disposi- 
 tion to rate one's own claims to respect or attention too 
 highly, and to disdain others — viewing our equals as our 
 inferiors, and our superiors as our equals. A proud man, in 
 short, rates very highly what he himself really possesses — 
 a self-conceited man imagines himself to possess what he 
 really does not. An so, the term ' pride of birth,' ' pride 
 of wealth or rank,' &c, means, rating the claims of birth or 
 rank very highly. Hence we may see men of high rank 
 and great wealth who look down on those who are far su- 
 perior in mind to themselves ; this does not proceed from 
 their overrating their own abilities, but merely from their 
 
 * See Macaulay 's Essay$.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 109 
 
 overrating the claims of that very wealth and rank, and 
 thinking it entitled to more respect and veneration than the 
 greatest talents or the most eminent virtues. 
 
 ' Haughtiness ' proceeds from pride, but is applied almost 
 exclusively to manners and deportment. A proud dispo- 
 sition will often show itself in haughty manners. 
 
 ' Vanity ' may exist along with pride or self-conceit, but 
 is not implied by either of them. It is a word which has 
 undergone a great variety of changes. Originally it meant 
 emptiness, hollowness, (from the Latin vanus,) thence it 
 came to signify something unreal, fictitious, false. This 
 was its meaning in Shakespeare's time ; he speaks of ' lying 
 vainness. 1 By degrees its meaning was modified, till it 
 came to be used in the sense which it has now acquired — 
 an excessive desire of applause and approbation for qualities 
 we do possess, as well as for those we do not. Persons are 
 said to be vain of their talents or beauty, when they really 
 possess these qualifications. 
 
 Many extremely vain persons nevertheless underrate 
 themselves ; indeed, a high opinion of oneself acts rather as 
 a check than an incentive to vanity. 
 
 ' Arrogance ' is often confounded with self-conceit, though 
 totally different from it. The quality is, in fact, consistent 
 with a very low opinion of oneself, and a high admiration 
 and respect for others. It has been defined * as ' an habitual 
 and exclusive self- deference.'' An arrogant man is without 
 deference, even for those of whom he himself thinks most 
 highly. He may say, and think, that he is extremely in- 
 ferior to certain persons ; he may hold them in the highest 
 esteem and admiration, but were they to differ from him on 
 any point, even in a matter in which they were fully con- 
 
 *See Archbishop Whately's Rhetoric, 7th edit. p. 119. See also the 
 article in this work under the head deference, &c. 
 10
 
 110 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 versant and he wholly ignorant, he would set their opinions 
 utterly at nought. He may not have a high estimation of 
 his own powers in general ; but practically, on each par- 
 ticular occasion, he appears to consider himself infallible : 
 and this is what leads many to attribute to self-conceit what 
 in reality springs from arrogance. 
 
 EFFECTS, CONSEQUENCES, RESULTS. 
 
 ' Effects ' are the genus, — ' consequences ' and ' results ' 
 the species, — therefore ' consequences ' and ' results ' must 
 also be ' effects,' — since the species includes the genus, — 
 but ( effects ' are not necessarily ' consequences ' or ' results.' 
 ' Effects,' as distinguished from the other terms we have 
 mentioned, are applied to something which immediately 
 follows from any cause, whether mental or physical. They 
 can therefore be to a certain extent calculated on before- 
 hand. ' Consequences ' are more remote, and spring less 
 directly from causes ; they rather follow in the train of an 
 event. We may foresee the ' consequences ' of any thing, 
 but we always act with a view to its ' effects.' For instance, 
 the effect of wearing clothes, is to cover one ; the conse- 
 quence is, that they wear out ; we foresee this consequence 
 in buying them, but it is with a view to the immediate effect 
 (the covering us) that we act. 
 
 Again, we should say, ' His conduct had a bad effect on 
 those around him ; ' but not ' bad consequences,' although 
 we might add, ' that the consequence of this conduct was, — 
 such and such an event.' Hence we see how much more 
 remote are ' consequences ' than ' effects,' simply so called, 
 although a ' consequence ' must be an ' effect,' as before 
 stated. ' Effects ' likewise often imply some direct agency 
 or design, which ' consequences ' never do. 
 
 ' Results ' are still more remote than ' consequences.' 
 ' Consequences ' and ' effects ' are both applied to a change
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. Ill 
 
 which is in the act of taking place, while ' result ' implies 
 the state of things when the change has taken place. 
 Hence, it is both more remote and more general than 
 either ' consequences ' or ' effects.' We should say, ' My 
 entreaties produced a powerful effect on him, and the result 
 was that he granted my request.' The ' effect ' of plough- 
 ing is the loosening of the soil ; the ' consequences ' are 
 that seed can be sown on it ; the ' result ' is, the fertility of 
 the land. 
 
 CONFLICT, COMBAT, CONTEST, CONTENTION. 
 
 Formerly, the first two of these terms were applied to the 
 striving together of foes in battle ; now, ' combat ' is the 
 only one used in this sense, though it is sometimes also 
 applied figuratively to the strife of words, or of mental and 
 moral feelings and emotions. But 'conflict' has almost 
 entirely lost its original meaning of a battle or skirmish, and 
 is only applied to it figuratively. A ' contest ' was never 
 used for fighting. ' Contest ' is generally used for a hot 
 argument or verbal dispute. A ' conflict ' is now more 
 frequently applied to an inward struggle of the mind, — to 
 the strife of contending opinions or feelings. We speak of 
 ' undergoing a mental conflict ' — 'of conflicting passions,' 
 &c. ; but it is sometimes, though more rarely, used in the 
 sense of ' contest.' 
 
 ' Contention ' was formerly used in the same sense as ' con- 
 test,' as in Acts, xv. 39 : — ' and the contention was so sharp 
 between them,' &c. Now, ' contest ' is used for the act of 
 disputing or quarrelling, and ' contention ' for the habit. We 
 speak of ' a spirit of contention,' (meaning a tendency to 
 habitual striving and disputing,) or of 'a contentious dispo- 
 sition ; ' but never of a ' spirit of contest.'
 
 112 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 DETESTATION, AVERSION, ANTIPATHY, DISLIKE, ABHOR- 
 RENCE, HATRED, REPUGNANCE. 
 
 * Aversion' is merely a stronger form of ' dislike ; ' they 
 differ only in degree, not in kind. We have a dislike to 
 what is unpleasant to us — we have an aversion to some- 
 thing that shocks, disgusts, or inspires us with horror. 
 
 ' Antipathy ' is always used for a causeless ' dislike,' or 
 rather for one of which we cannot define the cause. Many 
 persons have an ' antipathy ' to a cat ; this is perhaps not 
 utterly without cause, and may be accounted for by the 
 electricity which resides in that animal ; but being without 
 any certain and obvious reason, and unaccountable even to 
 the person who feels it, it is denominated an ' antipathy.' ** 
 
 ' Repugnance ' is a feeling akin to disgust ; but it is often 
 applied to an extreme reluctance, or shrinking from some 
 particular course of action. 
 
 ' Hatred ' implies enmity, or a desire for the destruction of 
 its object. It is generally applied to qualities of a personal 
 kind, though not always strictly personal. It may be 
 directed against abstractions of qualities ; as for instance, 
 we may hate a liar, a traitor, an ungrateful man, in the ab- 
 stract ; but it is rarely directed — perhaps never correctly 
 — against qualities belonging to things, whether in the ab- 
 stract or otherwise. In this respect it differs from some of 
 the other words classified here, j" 
 
 * When the discoveries of science shall have thrown more light on 
 the subject, an explanation will doubtless be afforded of many at 
 present unaccountable antipathies, both with regard to persons and 
 things. 
 
 t Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, has given an admirable parallel be- 
 tween * anger ' and ' hatred ; ' in which he points out that ' anger ' 
 can only be directed against an individual or individuals, while 
 4 hatred ' may be felt towards a class or nation ; that ' anger ' only
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYxMS. 113 
 
 4 Detestation ' is somewhat like ' aversion,' but is oftener 
 applied to persons or personal qualities in the abstract. We 
 talk of ' detesting ' cruelty or lying — we should not speak 
 of having an ' aversion ' to them — because ' aversion ' is 
 scarcely ever applied to qualities in the abstract. 
 
 ' Abhorrence ' is as strong a term as ' aversion,' but *t is 
 differently applied. ' Aversion ' may be felt either towards 
 individual jiersons or things, but never towards actions. 
 ' Abhorrence ' is applied generally in reference to actions. 
 The proper object of abhorrence is guilt or crime ; we may 
 speak, indeed, of our ' abhorrence ' of such and such a 
 man ; but it is always applied to him as the author of some 
 criminal action, and, strictly speaking, it applies only to bad 
 conduct. 
 
 ENE5IY, ANTAGONIST, ADVERSARY, OPPONENT. 
 
 Of these four words, ' enemy ' is the only one which 
 implies general personal hostility. We may be adversaries, 
 antagonists, or opponents of those with whom we are in 
 general on friendly terms. The chief difference, indeed, 
 between an ' enemy ' and an ' adversary ' is, that the word 
 ' enemy ' is oftener applied to one who is personally hostile, 
 and ' adversary ' to one who happens for n time to be placed 
 in the position of an ' enemy,' as in war or in argument. 
 ' Antagonist ' and ' opponent ' are generally used in speak- 
 ing of a single combat, or a debate or dispute between two. 
 
 seeks retaliation, which shall be known and understood as such by ito 
 object, while 'hatred' desires destruction; and lastly, that 'anger 
 cannot subsist at the same moment with ' fear,' though ' hatred ' ai^d 
 ' fear ' are quite compatible. His example, however, has not been fol- 
 lowed in this work, in classing ' anger ' and ' hatred ' together, 
 because, though the two passions may often be confounded together, 
 and mistaken one fur the other, the two words are not liable to b« iais 
 taken ; and it is with words that we have now to do. 
 10*
 
 114 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 ' Antagonist ' (as its etymology implies) is applied to one 
 who is actively struggling with another, whether literally or 
 in argument. ' Opponent ' simply denotes one who differs. 
 <m- win) opposes & passive resistance. ' Antagonist' may be 
 used either for real fighting, or for verbal disputes ; ' oppo- 
 nent," almost exclusively for the last. 
 
 Of these four words, two, ' antagonist ' and ' adversary ' 
 are exclusively personal. The first, ' enemy,' may be used 
 for one who has a hatred and utter dislike for certain things ; 
 as, an ' enemy to luxury ' — 'an enemy to such and such a 
 course.' ' Opponent ' is sometimes also used in the same 
 way ; we may speak of ' an opponent of such and such 
 measures,' but always particularly and never generally, — 
 we could not speak for instance, of an opponent to luxury or 
 avarice. 
 
 REPROOF, REBUKE, REPRIMAND, CENSURE, REMON- 
 STRANCE, EXPOSTULATION, REPROACH. 
 
 A ' reproof ' is a simple admonition, expressive of our 
 disapprobation, generally addressed to some one beneath 
 us in age or station. ' Rebuke ' is now used nearly in 
 the same sense, but is a stronger term. It was formerly 
 applied rather as a ' remonstrance ' to an equal, or even to 
 a superior ; as in the Bible, ' Peter took him and began to 
 rebuke him.' * 
 
 ' A ' reprimand ' is always addressed to inferiors, and has 
 a stronger sense than either of the former words. It is 
 understood to imply something of an official reproof, and 
 from one having authority. 
 
 ' Censure ' has less of personality than any of these 
 words ; it is rather the expression of an unfavorable opinion 
 
 * The nouns and verbs are here used indifferently, as they precisely 
 correspond.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. llA 
 
 than a direct ' reproof.' The conduct of a public man is 
 1 censured ' in the papers ; an author is ' censured ' in a 
 review. It always applied to the opinion of equals, or to 
 those who judge as equals, even if they are not really so. 
 We never ' censure ' an inferior, and in ' censuring ' a supe- 
 rior, we place ourselves for the time on an equality with 
 him. 
 
 ' Remonstrance ' and ' expostulation ' are both more argu- 
 mentative, and have more of the character of advice than 
 any of the other words mentioned. They have also this 
 characteristic, that they always imply an attempt to dissuade 
 their object from some action or line of conduct which is 
 either taking place, or about to take place, — some step 
 which a person is about to take ; while ' censure ' applies to 
 what is past. We might say, ' His conduct deserves censure, 
 for he acted as he did in spite of the remonstrances (or 
 expostulations) of his friends.' 
 
 The chief difference between these two words is, that 
 a ' remonstrance ' may be used with a superior, while ' ex- 
 postulation ' is more generally applied to an equal or in- 
 ferior. 
 
 A ' reproach ' differs from all the other words mentioned 
 in three ways. First, it is more personal. A ' reproof ' is 
 always supposed to be given for the benefit of the person 
 reproved ; a ' reproach ' is often merely a vent to the feel- 
 ings of the person who gives it. Secondly, it is not limited 
 to any grade or relation, but may be given to equals, supe- 
 riors, or inferiors. A child may reproach a parent with his 
 neglected education ; a king may reproach his subjects for 
 their desertion — his allies for their faithlessness. Thirdly, 
 ' reproach ' differs in respect of its object. To reproach a 
 person, is to attribute a fault to him which he does not admit ;' 
 while to reprove him is to dwell on the wrong he has done 
 in committing it. Thus, we reprove the Romanists for their
 
 116 A COLLECTION Of 
 
 idolatry ; we reproach some professed members of our own 
 Church with being Romanists at heart. 
 
 ANSWER, REPLY, REJOINDER. 
 
 An ' answer ' and a ' reply ' may be synonymous, but are 
 not always so. In general we are said to ' answer ' a ques- 
 tion, and to ' reply ' to an attack. The first time a question 
 is responded to, it is always called an ' answer ; ' but if this, 
 again, is ' answered,' the ' answer ' to the ' answer ' is called 
 a ' reply.' A ' rejoinder ' is an ' answer ' given in support 
 of some former ' answer.' It is chiefly used as a law-term, 
 but in general it implies something said in a later stage of 
 the debate or discussion, rather than a ' reply.' But ' an- 
 swer ' (whether used as a noun or as a verb) is used in a 
 secondary sense, to imply something which serves the pur- 
 pose for which it was said — which satisfies the questioner, 
 confutes or silences the objector, defeats the opponent, &c. 
 
 A ' reply ' is merely something said in return, or by way 
 of an ' answer ' to some question, attack, &c. Hence we 
 say, ' This reply is no answer ; ' ' Many books have been 
 written in reply to this author, but he has never yet been 
 answered.' 
 
 A COMMAND, INJUNCTION, ORDER. 
 
 * Command ' is the most general term of the three. "We 
 speak of a ' divine command,' rather than ' injunction ' or 
 ' order.' ' Injunction ' relates more to general conduct ; 
 ' order ' to particular acts. A child receives ' orders ' to learn 
 his lesson, but ' injunctions ' to be diligent and attentive. 
 We should not speak of giving a servant ' orders,' but 
 ' injunctions ' to be tidy. A ' command,' though not more 
 absolute or despotic than an ' order ' or ' injunction,' gen- 
 erally indicate persons of a higher station : a king or gen- 
 eral issues ' commands ; ' an inferior officer gives ' orders.'
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. H* 
 
 4 Commandment,' the other noun derived from the verb 
 4 to command,' is now nearly obsolete, and used only for 
 the laws laid down in tbe Bible. The original meaning oi 
 our word ' command ' seems to have been ' power ' or au- 
 thority. (See Shakespeare, King Lear.) 
 
 DEFERENCE, RESPECT, VENERATION. 
 
 ' Deference ' may be felt for those whose general charac- 
 ter we neither ' respect ' nor ' venerate.' It i3 often enter- 
 tained unconsciously, and is nothing move than an habitual 
 presumption in favor of a person's opinions ; a feeling 
 rather than an opinion, that he is more likely to be right 
 than another. We may feel ' deference ' for a person on 
 particular points only ; for instance, we should defer to, or 
 feel deference for, a sailor in matters connected with the 
 sea, or a lawyer in questions of law. But ' respect ' and 
 ' veneration ' must be felt for the whole character of their 
 object. These two last words approach each other in their 
 meaning ; but ' veneration ' is a much stronger sentiment 
 than * respect.' We may both ' respect ' and ' venerate ' 
 those for whom we have no ' deference ; ' but this is a cir- 
 cumstance rarely if ever acknowledged, even to ourselves.* 
 
 Lastly, ' respect ' and ' veneration ' are felt exclusively for 
 moral qualities, to which * deference ' is not confined. We 
 should not think of respecting such a man for his mathe- 
 matical talents, or venerating another for his skill in some 
 work of art ; but in both these cases we might feel ' defer- 
 ence," 
 
 Conjugate words. — The conjugates ' respectable ' and 
 • venerable ' have considerably diverged from the meaning 
 of their roots. * Respectable ' is almost the lowest term of 
 approbation we can use ; and * venerable ' is always applied 
 
 *See Whately's Rhetoric, under the head ' Deference.'
 
 118 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 to something ancient; whereas, we may * venerate ' virtue, 
 whether in youth or age. ' Deferential ' is merely applied 
 to manners. The -verbs strictly correspond with the nouns. 
 
 ILLUSION, DELUSION. 
 
 • Illusion ' has most to do with visions of the imagination : 
 ' delusion ' with some decided mental deception. An ' illu- 
 sion ' Is an idea which is presented before our bodily or 
 mental vision, and which does not exist in reality. A ' de- 
 lusion ' is a false view entertained of something which 
 really exists, but which does not possess the quality or attri- 
 bute erroneously ascribed to it. 
 
 ' Delusions ' may likewise be applied to perverted opin- 
 ions. A fanatic sectarian is said to be possessed by ' delu- 
 sions.' ' Illusions,' on the other hand, are solely applied to 
 the visions of a distempered imagination, the chimerical 
 ideas of one blinded by hope, passion, or credulity — or, 
 lastly, to spectral and other ocular deceptions, to which 
 the word ' delusion ' is never applied. 
 
 FALSEHOOD, FALSITY. 
 
 ' Falsity ' is, properly speaking, the quality of a false 
 proposition ; ' falsehood,' the proposition itself. When we 
 have found out that a person has told a ' falsehood,' we are 
 convinced of the ' falsity ' of his assertion. The educated 
 classes are very apt to use the word ' falsehood ' for ' falsity ; ' 
 as ' I perceive the falsehood of your declaration.' The 
 vulgar fall into the reverse error, and sometimes speak of 
 ' telling a falsity.'' 
 
 DECEIT, DECEPTION, FRAUD. 
 
 ' Deception ' is used for individual instances, or acts, of 
 one who deceives ; ' deceit,' for the acts, and also from the 
 habit of mind, or for the act when continued and repeated.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. " i 9 
 
 We speak of ' a long course of deceit,'' but of ' an act of 
 deception.'' ' Deception ' is likewise used more in respect 
 of the effect produced on the person deceived ; ' deceit ' 
 with regard to the agent, or deceiver. ' Deception ' may 
 therefore be used in cases where no guilt is implied ; we 
 speak of a ' deception ' of the senses, an optical ' decep- 
 tion,' &c* 'Deceit' could not be used in these instances, 
 as it always has a reference to the intention of the agent. 
 The conjugate ' deceptive ' is generally applied to illusions 
 of the senses. 
 
 ' Fraud ' is always used for an individual act of deceit : 
 4 a system of fraud ' is a series of such individual acts. 
 
 ADMITTANCE, ADMISSION. 
 
 ' Admittance ' is almost invariably applied to a litsrai 
 permission to enter some place, and is never used figura- 
 tively. 'Admission' is more general in its signification, 
 and is used both in a literal and in a figurative sense ; as. 
 ' to make some admissions on a disputed subject.' Bin 
 even in the literal sense, in which either ' admittance ' cr 
 ' admission ' may be used, they somewhat diifer in their 
 shades of meaning. 
 
 ' Admittance ' is, in fact, a right to ' admission.' When 
 a ticket of ' admittance ' to some show or sight is given, it 
 implies merely a permission to enter : when we have entered, 
 we have obtained ' admission ; ' ' admittance ' was gained 
 as soon as the ticket was ours. 
 
 COMPULSION, COERCION, RESTRAINT, CONSTRAINT. 
 
 ' Compulsion ' and ' coercion ' are more active in theii 
 signification than the two other terms mentioned ; that is to 
 "ay, they 'Imply a positive as well as negative force. Wa 
 
 * See the article jn the adjectives, deceitful, &c.
 
 1^0 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 are * restrained ' from doing something we should wish to 
 do ; but we are ' coerced,' or ' compelled, ' to act in some 
 way against our will. A prisoner is compelled to work in a 
 house of correction ; he is restrained from escaping.* 
 
 Secondly, ' compulsion ' and ' coercion ' are never used 
 to express the force a person exercises on himself, hut only 
 in relation to others; 'restraint' and ' constraint ' may be 
 applied to ourselves. 
 
 There is a difference again, between ' compulsion ' and 
 • coercion.' ' Compulsion ' is actual force, used directly to 
 induce others to act as we would have them do : ' coercion ' 
 is a more remotely exercised force, being an appeal to the 
 passion of fear, &c. A government is said to use ' coercion ' 
 to make its subjects profess the established form of religion ; 
 a traveller in the hands of robbers gives up his purse, or signs 
 an order for a ransom, under ' compulsion.' It is true that, 
 in both cases, the object may be gained by awakening the 
 same kind of fcav : but the word ' coercion ' directs the 
 attention rather to the moral or mental, and ' compulsion ! 
 to the physical force employed. 
 
 ' Constraint ' differs from ' restraint,' chiefly in implying 
 a resistance of the will to the force used. ' Restraint,' 
 when applied to the power we exercise on ourselves, gener- 
 ally implies that force which is exerted by an inward princi- 
 ple of self-control ; while ' constraint,' though it may be 
 exercised on ourselves, proceeds from some external cause, 
 supplying the motive. A man of frail temper ' restrains ' 
 himself to a sense of duty ; but he is ' constrained' to con- 
 trol himself by the presence of those whom he fears, re- 
 spects, or regards with suspicion. We exercise ' constraint ' 
 on ourselves unwillingly : a ' constrained ' manner always 
 implies a manner acted upon by some influence from without, 
 
 * The verbs here correspond with the nouns.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 121 
 
 not by any inward motive — a curb put on tbe manner. 
 It is therefore generally applied to outward indications ; 
 whereas ' restraint ' may be exercised on the feelings or 
 passions. 
 
 ' Constraint ' is always personal ; ' restraint ' may be 
 applied to the emotions or feelings. A man is himself 
 * constrained ; ' we should not say that his feelings were 
 ' constrained ; ' his feelings, or emotions, are ' restrained.' 
 
 Again, ' constraint ' is positive, ' restraint ' negative ; hence 
 the passage in the Bible, ' The love of Christ consiraineth 
 us.' * We could not say, ' restraineth ' us, unless it were 
 from doing anything to which we were tempted. A person 
 is ' restrained ' from some action, and ' constrained to do it. 
 
 DETERMINATION, RESOLUTION, DECISION. 
 
 ' Decision ' differs from the other two words in implying 
 a choice between several courses of action, which the others 
 do not. 
 
 We ' decide ' f between opposite courses, we ' determine ' 
 what to do, and ' resolve ' to carry out our ' determination.' 
 ' Determination ' is a lower kind of ' decision.' ' Resolu- 
 tion ' has more of a moral character. A ' resolution ' taken 
 is a promise made to oneself. A stubborn man is ' deter- 
 mined.' A firm man is ' resolved.' A man who is quick 
 in forming a judgment, and firm in adhering to it, is ' decid- 
 ed.' A ' resolute ' or a * decided ' character both imply 
 something higher than a ' determined ' one. 
 
 These three substantives have in fact two meanings ; one 
 implying the act of ' resolving,' or ' deciding,' or ' determin- 
 
 * In eld English, the verb ' constrain ' was used in a wider sense 
 than it is now, being often used where we should now use the words 
   urge ' or e persuade.' 
 
 •fThe conjugate verbs and adjestives have corrcspon ling senses with 
 the substantives. 
 11
 
 122 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 ing,' the other, the habit. We have been considering the 
 latter, which would, however, be better expressed by ' reso- 
 luteness,' ' decisiveness,' &c. 
 
 NARRATION, NARRATIVE, RELATION, ACCOUNT, HISTORY, 
 
 TALE. 
 
 * Narrative ' and ' narration ' are nearly the same, and are 
 the widest in their meaning of all the group. ' Relation 
 is also nearly synonymous with them, but is less frequently 
 used, being more French than English. An ' account ' is 
 always a report of some individual event, and is only used 
 when its connection with the event alluded to is decidedly 
 expressed. We may speak generally of an interesting 
 ' narrative ' or ' narration,' but an account must always be 
 of some incident, its connection with which is never lost 
 sight of or left to be understood. 
 
 A ' record ' is a report of some event, or series of events, 
 made for the purpose of reference, — something of the 
 nature of a memorandum of a fuller kind. 
 
 A ' history ' must always be a connected account of a 
 series of events, generally one of some length. The inci- 
 dents recorded in it must be of some importance in them- 
 selves — we should not speak of the ' history ' of any trivial 
 occurrence, except ironically. The expression ' family his- 
 tory ' is no exception to this rule, for it has a relative impor- 
 tance, though only of a private character ; but ' history ' is 
 more usually and correctly appropriated to public events. 
 It is always used for a general outline, whereas ' account ' 
 must be particular. We should say, ' In the history of this 
 author we have an account of such and such a battle.' 
 
 The events related in history are always at least supposed 
 to be true ; whereas the word ' story ' is generally (though 
 not universally) applied to evident and apparent fiction, or to 
 something, at all events, of doubtful truth. For instance,
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 12^ 
 
 we say, ' I will tell you the history of my life ; ' but ' He 
 told me a long story of what had happened to him, which I 
 did not believe.' 
 
 The three words, ' history,' ' story,' and ' narrative,' are, 
 however, often used synonymously. 
 
 ' Tale ' is nearly the same as ' story,' but implies fictior. 
 still more decidedly and necessarily. We alwa} .>•• speak of 
 a ' fairy-tale,' ' a legendary tale,' — ' story ' in this oase 
 would not be used. The expression, ' He told me the whole 
 story,' would not necessarily imply fiction ; if the word ' tale' 
 were substituted, it certainly would. The only exception, 
 indeed, to this word's implying fiction, is the expression, 
 ' tale-bearing,' or ' tale-telling.' 
 
 DISPLAY, SHOW, PARADE, OSTENTATION. 
 
 ' Display ' is the only one of these four terms which d.es 
 not necessarily imply excess ; for though the expression 4 •> 
 love of display ' is sometimes used in that sense, yet we 
 frequently speak of ' a display' of talent or beauty, without 
 meaning to convey the idea of blame by the term. ' Dis- 
 play ' is not limited to any one class of subjects, but is equal- 
 ly used in material and in abstract cases. ' This man is 
 clever, but is too fond of the display of his talents ; ' ' The 
 song she sang was well fitted for the display of her powers 
 of voice : ' ' The peacock seems to delight in the display of 
 his fine plumage.' 
 
 ' Show,' when used by itself, is always applied to an 
 appearance of outward and material splendor — either 
 something that indicates wealth, or an imitation of it ; * 
 we say, for instance, ' V\ ealth is too often wasted in idle 
 show — a love of shew &nd brilliancy has ruined many.' 
 
 * The adjective • showy ' corresponds with this sense of the word 
 4 show.'
 
 12-1 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 4 Show,' however, when used in conjunction with another 
 substantive, is more like 4 display ' in meaning, but con- 
 veys also the idea of fiction. A 4 show ' of piety must be 
 feigned. One who really gives munificently may make a 
 4 display ' of his liberality ; but if he were said to ' make a 
 show of liberality,' it would imply that he only appeared to 
 give, while he really kept back his money. 
 
 4 Parade ' may be applied either to material objects or to 
 mental qualifications ; in both cases it indicates an excessive 
 and absurd display and boasting — which forces the things 
 ' displayed ' upon the public notice in an offensive manner. 
 A refined person may be fond of 4 show,' or inclined to 
 4 display : ' 4 parade ' is always vulgar. 4 Ostentation,' which 
 was the same in its original sense as 4 show,' now generally 
 indicates a parade of virtues or other qualities for which we 
 expect to be honored. The conjugate adjective, * ostenta- 
 iioue,' is more commonly applied to outward and material 
 splendor, and the substantive to a display of virtue ; but 
 either may be used for either. 
 
 IMAGINATION, CONCEPTION, FANCY. 
 
 * Imagination ' and 4 fancy ' are frequently confounded 
 together, but are, nevertheless, very distinct in their signi- 
 fication. In the first place, 4 imagination ' implies more of 
 a creative power than * fancy ; ' it requires a greater com- 
 bination of various powers, and is therefore a higher exer- 
 cise of genius. * Fancy,' on the other hand, is more an 
 employment of ingenuity and taste, though it also requires 
 inventive power. Secondly, 4 imagination ' implies a longer 
 flight ; • fancy,' rather a succession of short efforts : the 
 one is a steady blaze, the other sanies of sparkles. An 
 epic poem would require an exercise of the first ; a ballad, 
 or other lighter production, of the last. Hence we may see
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 125 
 
 that, as it has "been well remarked,* the difference between 
 the two is, in some measure, one of subject-matter ; for the 
 same power which we call ' fancy,' when employed in a 
 melody of Moore, would be called ' imagination ' in the 
 works of Dante or Milton. 
 
 In short, the efforts of ' fancy ' bear the same relation to 
 those of ' imagination ' that the carving and polishing of a 
 gem or seal does to sculpture. 
 
 In the third place, wit may come into works of ' fancy,' 
 and could not be admitted into the province of ' imagina- 
 tion.' The same with what are called conceits. 
 
 * Conception ' has something in common with imagination, 
 but it implies more decidedly a creative power, and is refer- 
 red to something tangible and real ; whereas, in efforts of 
 fancy and imagination, there is always a consciousness of 
 unreality. The province of ' conception ' is that which has 
 a real existence. Hence, the productions of painters, sculp- 
 tors, and musicians are called ' conceptions,' 
 
 ' Conception ' also denotes something framed and origi- 
 nated in our own mind ; whereas the imagination or fancy 
 may be acted on merely from without. The poet or writer 
 of fiction exercises his own conceptions, but awakens the 
 imagination of his readers. 
 
 CONVICTION, PERSUASION. 
 
 ' Conviction ' is the act of the understanding ; ' persua- 
 sion ' of the will. ' Conviction ' is effected by such a train 
 of argument as will bring the understanding to admit the 
 conclusion to which it leads ; ' persuasion ' is effected 1 y 
 exhortation, whose office it is to enlist the feelings and will 
 in the orator's service. The first is the province of logic, 
 
 * See an interesting article in the Edinburgh Review fcr A/prii, J842, 
 on Moore's Poems. 
 
 11*
 
 126 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 the second of rhetoric ; but it is o mistake to suppose, a« 
 manj do, that they can be exercised independently of each 
 othei, in reference to action. 
 
 Tc induce men to act as we would have them do, two 
 conditions arc requisite : first, they must be shown that cer- 
 tain means are essential, or at least the best possible, 
 towards a certain end ; and, secondly, that the end to be 
 attained is desirable.* It would be no use to prove to an 
 army that such and such means were likely to enable them 
 to conquer the enemy, unless they were inspired with the 
 desire of victory ; and, on the other hand, the most ani- 
 mating exhortations to bravery and daring would not induce 
 them to a certain mode of procedure, unless they thought it 
 conducive to that object. 
 
 But often one-half of the desired effect has been already 
 accomplished, and we have only the other half to perform : 
 the auditors are already convinced, and we have only to ex- 
 hort ; or, their feelings or desires sufficiently excited, and 
 we have only to convince them of the best means for ac- 
 complishing the end in view. 
 
 Hence, it is a mistake to say that the wisest of mankind 
 are governed by reason, and the majority by their feelings ; 
 for the wise could not act on their convictions, unless their 
 will were influenced ; and the multitude are convinced as 
 well as impelled by feeling, though they are often led by 
 their passions to accept bad and inconclusive reasoning as 
 convincing. 
 
 The real state of the case is, that the wisest and best of 
 mankind use their reason to bring their will and feelings 
 under control, while the unthinking crowd allow their feel- 
 ings to take captive their reason, and are first excited, and 
 then convinced on insufficient grounds. 
 
 ♦Sec Whately's Rhetoric, Part II., chap. i. § 1.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 127 
 
 ' Persuasion,' then, is the wider term of the two : it ii- 
 cludes both ' conviction,' and that excitement of feeling 
 which leads to action ; while ' conviction ' alone is inactive. 
 Formerly, ' persuasion ' was used much as ' conviction ' is 
 now, as we may see in some passages of our Bible transla- 
 tion. From the old use of the word probably arose the 
 expression, ' religious persuasion ; ' though it might almost 
 pas» for a satire on the proneness of mankind to follow their 
 fpeiings rather than their reason in matters of religious 
 belief. 
 
 GOODNESS, VIRTUE. 
 
 These words are used indiscriminately ; but when their 
 meaning is distinct, ' goodness ' is usually applied to that 
 which is natural and without effort, and ' virtue ' to the 
 merit which springs from self-discipline, and steady resist- 
 ance to temptations which are felt to be strong. * 
 
 One who had been brought up as a thief would be doing 
 a virtuous action in abstaining from depredation ; if, by long- 
 continued efforts, his character at last so improved that theft 
 was odious instead of tempting to him, he would perform 
 fewer virtuous acts, but his ' goodness ' would be greater. 
 ' Goodness of heart ' is, indeed, used to express a mere pas- 
 sive benevolence ; but ' goodness,' in the abstract, is used 
 to express a higher excellence than ' virtue.' We can ven- 
 ture to apply the term to the Supreme Being , whereas 
 ' virtue ' is purely a human quality. As long as we live on 
 
 * A very pleasing description of untutored natural goodness of dis- 
 position may be found in Wordsworth's Ode to Duty : 
 ' Glad hearts, without reproach or blot, 
 Who do thy will and know it not.' 
 The word 'virtue' could rot be applied to this instinctive kind ol 
 goodness : nor could it be applied to the highest kind ; : t seems to 
 indicate a middle state.
 
 128 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 this earth, the hest must spend their lives in resisting and 
 struggling against temptations, and controlling evil tenden- 
 cies ; hut in sinless perfection there can he no virtue. 
 
 HIvnilANCE, OBSTACLE, IMPEDIMENT. 
 
 A ' hindrance ' holds us hack when we are ahout to start 
 forward ; an ' obstacle ' is found in our path, and opposes us 
 when we have started ; an ' impediment ' makes our furthei 
 progress more difficult, and hampers us in what we wish t.. 
 do : whence the Romans called their baggage impedimenta. 
 A weight carried is an ' impediment ; ' a bar thrown across 
 the road is an ' obstacle ; ' an importunate visitor who pre- 
 vents our sitting out is a ' hindrance.' We might say, ' I 
 had so many hindrances before starting that I could not set 
 out as early as I wished ; I had many things to carry with 
 me, and this was an impediment to my speed ; the obstacles 
 I met with on the road tempted me to turn back.' 
 
 A ' hindrance ' or ' impediment ' may be merely of a ma- 
 terial kind ; an ' obstacle ' is something decidedly hostile, 
 and set in opposition to us. Even when the ' obstacle ' is 
 inanimate, we, as it were, personify it for the time, and 
 consider it in the light of something intentionally hostile. 
 Hence, the expressions we use in connection with these 
 words are different. We remove an ' impediment ' or ' hin- 
 drance ; ' we surmount an ' obstacle.' We proceed notwith- 
 standing an ' impediment ' or hindrance ; ' in spite of an 
 ' obstacle.' 
 
 ALLEGIANCE, LOYALTY. 
 
 'Allegiance' is a principle of action ; 'loyalty 'a senti- 
 ment. ' Loyalty ' is also more personal, and is more limited 
 to our relation to a hereditary monarch : ' allegiance ' would 
 apply equally to any form of government, merely implying 
 fidelity and obedience. In short, ' loyalty ' is a faithful ad<
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 129 
 
 herence to some individual monarch or ruler as such , 
 • allegiance,' fidelity to any government, old or new, monar- 
 chical or republican, to which we have sworn obedience. 
 The words are originally the same,* indicating obedience 
 to law, and thereby showing how little the light thrown by 
 derivations on the modern meaning of a word can be 
 trusted. 
 
 SECURITY, SAFETY, SURETY. 
 
 ' Security ' has preserved something of its etymological 
 meaning (securus, without care) ; it implies an absence of 
 all fear or anxiety, but not necessarily absence of danger ; 
 for there may be a false security. 
 
 By l safety ' we understand a well-grounded security ; an 
 absence of danger, not merely of the sense of danger. We 
 might say, ' They believed themselves in a place of safety, 
 but theirs was a false security.' 
 
 ' Security ' has, however, another sense, which is nearly 
 synonymous with ' surety ; ' both referring to precautions 
 taken to ensure safety. The adjective ' secure,' and the 
 verb ' to secure,' are not conjugate with the noun ' security,' 
 but rather with ' safety.' 
 
 The adjective ' sure ' is a contraction of ' secure,' and 
 when applied to things and places is synonymous with it ; 
 when to persons it implies a strong convi/.'.on, but not 
 certain knowledge. 
 
 REFORMATION, REFORM. 
 
 ' Reformation ' is generally applied to great occasions ; to 
 the amendment of principles, articles of belief; or points 
 affecting the highest and gravest interests of a nation or In- 
 
 * Some consider « allegiance ' to be derived from alligc to bind: thia 
 derivation, however, is by others considered doubtful.
 
 130 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 dividual. ' Reform ' is oftcner applied to practical details 
 We speak of a ' reformation ' in religion, but of a ' reform ' 
 in government ; of the ' reformation ' of a criminal, but of 
 a ' reform ' in the management of a bousebold, or adminis- 
 tration of business. A man wbose character has undergone 
 a complete ' reformation,' will general y effect a ' reform ' in 
 his habits and way of life. 
 
 It is a recent custom to speak of ' reforming ' abuses ; but 
 this is an impropriety of language ; abuses may be reme- 
 died, or extirpated, but they cannot be ' reformed.' In the 
 same way, we speak improperly of ' curing diseases ; ' it is, 
 correctly speaking, the patient who is cured. 
 
 FAITH, BELIEF, CERTAINTY. 
 
 'Belief is merely an assent of the understanding, in 
 which the will is not concerned : and this is the chief dis- 
 tinction between it and faith. 
 
 Faith may, however, be said to have, besides this, three 
 distinguished characteristics. 
 
 First, — It must be a belief founded on authority : this 
 does not imply a blind assent, in the absence of proof : for 
 we may have good and sufficient evidence for the trust- 
 worthiness of our authority. It is often supposed that faith, 
 to be perfect, requires that reason should be put aside or 
 kept in subjection : but this would be to make credulity a 
 necessary accompaniment of faith. It is too often found 
 so combined ; but the highest faith is not of this nature. 
 The true test of its merit and virtue is, not assenting to 
 anything against our reason, but against our prejudices or 
 interests. 
 
 Secondly, — Faith implies an assent to a system or series 
 of propositions, not to one insulated fact. Our trust in the 
 assertion of some one who was administering medicine to 
 us, that he had taken a certain bottle from a certain shelf,
 
 EK32JISE iYJONYMS. 131 
 
 would not be called faith ; though our reliance on his gen- 
 eral mode of practice would be so designated.* 
 
 Thirdly, — Faith is generally of a practical nature. We 
 do not speak of having ' faith ' in the Copernican system, 
 though we may believe it firmly on authority, because it 
 does not directly lead to any course of action : but one who 
 had been induced by the representations of its earliest 
 followers to attempt k \oyage round the world, would be 
 justly said to have ' faith' in what they told him, because he 
 not only held their opinions in theory, but followed theni up 
 in practice. 
 
 Hence a mere assent to the truths of Christianity, such as 
 we give to any mere historical fact, and which does not 
 affect the conduct, cannot be called ' faith.' 
 
 ' Certainty ' is generally applied to a firm conviction of 
 the truth of any proposition : but when opposed to ' belief ' 
 or ' faith,' it describes more correctly that conviction which 
 is only produced by demonstration, or the evidence of the 
 senses. 
 
 ' Certainty ' has come to be applied by a metonymy to the 
 thing, which is the object of a certain belief. 
 
 FORGIVENESS, PARDON". 
 
 As is usually the case where a Saxon and a Latin word 
 are used in nearly the same sense, the Saxon word gives 
 the more forcible, homely, and serious meaning ; the Latin, 
 on the other hand, the more polite and colloquial one. 
 
 Both ' forgiveness ' and ' pardon ' are alike used, it is true, 
 in a religious sense ; but in ordinary life ' pardon ' is applied 
 in more trifling matters than ' forgiveness.' We beg a per- 
 son's ' pardon ' for jostling him in a crowd : we ask his • for- 
 giveness ' for having seriously injured him. 
 
 • The primary notion of faith would seem to be, trust in a person.
 
 132 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 It is remarkable that the words in all European languages 
 which express • forgiveness ' or 'pardon,' all imply free gift. 
 
 FEELINOS, SENTIMENTS. 
 
 ' Sentiments ' are used in a wider sense than ' feelings,' 
 including not only what are strictly called ' matters of feel- 
 ing,' but also matters of opinion of one kind ; viz., those in 
 which feelings are concerned. Thus, we speak of out 
 sentiments on religious, political, or moral questions ; but 
 we should not speak of 'sentiments' on chemistry or mathe- 
 matics. ' Sentiments ' are never spoken of alone and in the 
 abstract except in reference to the natural moral faculties, 
 in a physiological sense. We speak of a person as having 
 ' strong ' or ' lively ' feelings, but never as having strong 
 ' sentiments.' 
 
 SPEECH, ORATION, HARANGUE, DISCOURSE. 
 
 A member of Parliament makes a ' speech ; ' a king is 
 received by a deputation, whose leader makes an ' oration ' 
 in his honor ; a popular leader makes an ' harangue ' to a 
 mob. A ' speech ' is the simplest mode of delivering one's 
 sentiments ; an ' oration ' is an elaborate and prepared 
 speech ; an ' harangue ' is a vehement appeal to the passions 
 of the persons addressed, or a speech which has something 
 disputatious and combative in it. 
 
 A ' discourse ' is a set speech on some subject which is 
 intended to convey instruction to the listeners. It differs 
 from the other three in being applied to what is written ; 
 the others are only spoken. 
 
 PITY, COMPASSION, SYMPATHY. 
 
 ' Pity ' and ' compassion ' resemble each other very nearly 
 in their signification ; but there is a shade of difference. 
 ' Pity ' often implies an approach to contempt ; ' compassion '
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 138 
 
 has more of tenderness in it. We may speak of pitying 
 the wicked, or the hopelessly foolish ; we only speak oi 
 compassionating those into whose feelings we can enter, 
 and whose actions we may conceive ourselves performing. 
 Again, ' compassion ' is sometimes felt for imaginary sor- 
 rows ; ' pity ' seldomer. 
 
 ' Sympathy ' implies more of fellow-feeling than either of 
 the other terms, and is not restricted to subjects of pain, but 
 may be equally felt for the pleasures of others. 
 
 A certain degree of equality in station, age, mind, or 
 qualities, is essential. We cannot feel sympathy with any 
 but one who is nearly an equal ; we may feel compassion 
 for a superior or inferior likewise ; we pity, generally, only 
 one whom we regard as in some way an inferior.* Great 
 admiration and pity cannot be felt at the same time for the 
 same person. No one could pity a martyr, or a hero nobly 
 dying for his country. The proper object of ' pity,' as has 
 been well observed by an eminent writer,! * s suffering not 
 wholly unmerited, but occasioned rather by weaknesses than 
 faults ; its most fitting subject is a character of mixed good 
 and evil, being neither of very high nor low order — like 
 Shakespeare's Lear, for example, or Scott's Amy Robsart. 
 
 MODESTY, DIFFIDENCE, HUMILITY. 
 
 ' Modesty ' and ' humility ' are virtues ; ' diffidence ' is 
 not itself a virtue ; and, in some cases, even amounts to 
 a defect. It implies a great, sometimes even an excessive, 
 
 * Hence, a high-spirited person feels it a degradation to be the 
 object of pity. Scott has alluded to this feeling in the Lady of the 
 Lake, — 
 
 • And last, and worst to spirit proud, 
 Had borne the pity of the crowd.' 
 
 tin one of the numbers of the Quarterly Review. The doctrine ie 
 Aristotle's, to whom the reviewer refers. 
 12
 
 134 A COLLECTION OP 
 
 distrust of our own powers. A diffident man will shrink 
 from doing that which he is perfectly equal to perform, from 
 an unreasonable dread of failure. ' Modesty ' does not 
 imply self-distrust, but simply an unwillingness to put our- 
 selves forward, and an absence of all over-confidence in 
 our own powers. A modest man may feel a proper confi- 
 dence in his own powers, but he will not be eager to display 
 them. He will rather shrink from notice than court it, and 
 when called to any post of distinction, he will ' bear his 
 honors meekly,' and make no attempt to claim even the 
 deference which might fairly be due to him. 
 
 And here it may be remarked, that the jealousy felt by 
 the generality of mankind towards superior talents is such, 
 that a man of eminent abilities is scarcely forgiven for rating 
 himself as he deserves ; though one of moderate intellect 
 is allowed to do so. 
 
 ' Humility ' somewhat resembles ' modesty,' but it implies 
 rather a readiness to yield our claims, than a reluctance to 
 court notice. ' Humility ' is often falsely defined to be a 
 disposition to underrate ourselves ; but this is a mistake. 
 There is no humility in a clever man's thinking himself a 
 fool ; in fact, such a mistaken estimate is more likely to 
 lead to a restless, irritable vanity. Real humility consists 
 in rating our own claims low; in being willing to waive our 
 rights, and descend to a lower place than might be our due ; 
 in being ready to admit our liability to error, and listening 
 patiently to objections, even when they thwart our views ; in 
 freely owning our faults when conscious of having been 
 wrong ; and, in short, in not being over-careful of our own 
 dignity. 
 
 Finally, we may consider that the opposite to ' diffidence ' 
 is confidence ; the opposite to ' modesty,' impudence oi 
 assurance \ the opposite to ' humility,' pride or conceit.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. ldZ 
 
 AUSTERITY, SEVERITY, RIGOR, STERNNESS, STRICTNESS. 
 
 ' Austerity ' and ' strictness ' are the only ones among 
 these terms which apply to the mode of life. ' Strictness ' 
 is ' rigor,' in the sense of a particular adherence to rules, 
 and steadiness in enforcing them. It also usually implies a 
 disposition to multiply rules and prohibitions, — to restrict 
 liberty. ' Austerity ' is chiefly used in reference to the 
 person characterized. ' Severity ' is almost exclusively ap- 
 plied to our judgments of, or conduct to, others. ' Rigor ' 
 may either mean an excess of severity, or great strictness in 
 adhering to rules. 
 
 A hermit leads a life of austerity ; a parent or teacher 
 may treat his children or pupils with severity ; the laws 
 under a despotic government are enforced with rigor. 
 ' Rigor ' does not necessarily imply severity, but only strict- 
 ness ; a government may enforce moderate rules with rigor. 
 
 The opposite to ' rigor ' is ' relaxation,' as ' lax ' is to 
 ' rigorous ; ' the opposite of ' severity ' is ' mildness ; ' that 
 of ' austerity ' — as relating to our conduct with others — is 
 ' indulgence ; ' but personal austerity has no opposite, except 
 that which points out a blameable excess on the one side, as 
 self-indulgence, or luxuriousness. The medium, in which, 
 as Aristotle says, virtue lies, is nameless.* 
 
 ' Sternness ' is more applicable to character and manners 
 than to judgment and actions. A man of stern disposition 
 shows it to all with whom he comes in contact, whether 
 offenders or not. 
 
 * It may perhaps, be suggested, that the word « temperance ' would 
 express this medium ; but the use of this word by itself is almost 
 entirely confined to moderation in eating and drinking; and it would 
 therefore, be more appropriately described as a medium between ' in- 
 temperance ' and ' abstemiousness,' than between ' austerity ' and 
 ' self-indulgence,' which apply to every part of a person's life, and 
 are not restricted to the gratification of the appetite.
 
 186 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 The two following groups of synonyms (with the excep- 
 tion of the paragraph on 'cleverness ') arc quoted from the 
 Diary of Sir James Mackintosh, whose definitions cannot 
 be improved upon : — 
 
 ' GENIUS, "WISDOM, ABILITIES, TALENTS, PARTS, INGE- 
 NUITY, CAPACITY,' CLEVERNESS. 
 
 ' Genius is the power of new combination, and may be 
 shown in a campaign, a plan of policy, a steam-engine, a 
 system of philosophy, or an epic poem. It seems to require 
 seriousness, and some dignity in the purpose ; on ludicrous 
 subjects it is called wit ; and in weaving together the parts 
 of an argument, or the incidents of a tale, it receives the 
 inferior name of ingenuity. 
 
 1 Wisdom is the habitual employment of a patient and 
 comprehensive understanding in combining various and 
 remote means to promote the happiness of mankind. It is 
 most properly applied to him who actually renders signal 
 services of the rooht difficult nature to society. It is well 
 used to denote the teachers of moral and political truth, 
 because the inculcation of such truth must in process of 
 lime produce its practical application. It is also applied to 
 those who improved the general modes of exerting intellect, 
 from a just, though not perhaps distinct, perception of the 
 ultimate tendency of intellectual cultivation to increase the 
 means of happiness, and to improve the moral nature of 
 man. But to mere speculation, or to those sciences of 
 which the professors have no immediate reference to human 
 improvement, this high and august term cannot be applied. 
 It is the loftiest and most venerable of all terms of com- 
 mendation, because it is the only word for intellectual supe- 
 riority, which necessarily includes a moral tendency, if not 
 a virtuous purpose. It is the highest exertion of reason for 
 the most pure end.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 157 
 
 'Abilities may be exerted in conduct, or in the arts and 
 sciences, but rather in the former ; and when the term is 
 applied to the latter, it is rather in the practical sense of at- 
 taining a particular object, than in that of general excellence. 
 
 4 Talents are the power of executing well a conception, 
 either original or adopted. They may be possessed in a 
 degree very disproportioned to general power, as habit may 
 strengthen a mind for one sort of exertion far above its 
 general vigor. 
 
 * Parts have lost a considerable portion of their dignity. 
 They were used in the last century perhaps almost in the 
 sense in which we now rather employ talents. They at 
 present, if at all used, might signify a specious sort of 
 smartness. 
 
 * Capacity is a power of acquiring. It is most remarkable 
 in the different degrees of facility with which different men 
 acquire a language. 
 
 4 Sir Isaac Newton and Milton are equally men of genius. 
 Bacon is the wisest of writers, not only because he is so 
 great a teacher of moral and civil wisdom, but because he 
 has contributed more than any other man to the general 
 improvement of the human understanding. Sir Isaac New- 
 ton had the highest philosophical genius, but the sciences on 
 which he employed it do not allow the praise of wisdom. 
 Sir Robert Walpole and Lord Godolphin were ministers of 
 great abilities, though they did not possess either the bril- 
 liant talents of Bolingbroke, or the commanding genius of 
 Chatham.' 
 
 ' Cleverness ' (derived evidently from the verb to cleave *) 
 
 * It is curious to observe, that several of the words which describe 
 the various mental powers are derived from words signifying to split, 
 cleave, or separate ; as science from scio, probably the same as scindo, 
 to cut: cleaver, from cleave : distinguish, discriminate, both signifying 
 a dividing or shifting process, &c. 
 12*
 
 138 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 is < orrectly applied to a certain quickness and readiness in 
 the operations of the mind, and especially in the act ff 
 acquiring knowledge. But the loose way in which ideas 
 are expressed in ordinary conversation has led to a consid- 
 erable abuse of this word, which is not seldom applied to 
 every kind of talent. 
 
 ' FORTITUDE, COURAGE, VALOK, BRAVERY, INTREPIDITY, 
 GALLANTRY, HEROISM. 
 
 ' Fortitude is the most comprehensive of these words. 
 It is always used morally, and is the name of a virtue which 
 consists in the habit of bearing pain and encountering dan- 
 ger. It is often confined to the endurance of pain, and is 
 used almost synonymously with patience, though it rather 
 indicates a spirit that resists pain, than one which submits to 
 it. Courage is active fortitude, and is shown against every 
 sort of danger. Bravery and valor are both courage, ex- 
 hibited against the danger of death from a living opponent ; 
 bravery, perhaps, extends to all living opponents ; valor is 
 certainly confined to human adversaries, and chiefly, if not 
 solely, in regular war. Firm courage is intrepidity ; ad- 
 venturous courage is gallantry. The contempt of danger, 
 not from ignorance or inconsiderate levity, but from just 
 confidence in the power of overcoming the peril, is heroism. 
 Fortitude is one of those moral qualities, which, on account 
 of their eminent importance, were called by the ancients 
 cardinal virtues. Regulus showed a determined fortitude 
 when he returned to death rather than violate his pledged 
 word. 
 
 ' Courage may be shown by a seaman who braves the 
 dangers of the sea, or by a horseman who mounts a horse 
 which no one else will approach. 
 
 4 Valor and bravery can only be displayed against present 
 danger from a living — if not a human — adversary. The
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. lt>9 
 
 tortures of Regulus were distant, though certain ; he would 
 rather be said to have encountered them with fortitude. 
 He might be praised for courage, but he would not be called 
 brave or valiant. He who climbs up a house almost de- 
 stroyed by fire to save a life may show the greatest courage, 
 but not bravery or valor. It is more natural to say that a 
 man encounters a tiger with courage, but perhaps there is 
 no impropriety in saying that he showed bravery. Bravery 
 may be proved in single combat ; valor is the courage of a 
 soldier in war — it cannot be applied to single combats. A 
 defence is intrepid, and seems scarcely to be gallant, 
 unless we consider the attacks by which the defence is car- 
 ried on ; it is in attack that gallantry is shown. 
 
 ' The consciousness of power which forms a hero usually 
 inspires sentiments so elevated, that the word denotes mag- 
 nanimity and generosity, however irregular, as well as cour- 
 age. We say, indeed, a barbarous hero, but it is a phrase 
 which is striking, from the perception of some degree of 
 repugnancy between the parts which compose it.' 
 
 LAW, STATUTE, ETJLE, EEGXJLATION. 
 
 A ' law ' is a ' rule ' formed by the goverment of a coun- 
 try. A nation is governed by laws ; a household by rules. 
 A ' statute ' is a ' law ' which is solemnly and formally 
 enacted, and distinctly set forth in words. The expression 
 ' statute-law ' is opposed to ' common-law,' or law established 
 by long custom. The by-laws of an university are also 
 called ' statutes.' 
 
 A ' regulation ' is nearly the same as a ' rule,' in its ordi- 
 nary sense. The enactments of a subordinate body are 
 called ' regulations,' or ' by-laws : ' those of a church, 
 ' ordinances.' 
 
 ' Rule ' and ' law ' have, however, other meanings besides 
 those we have mentioned, which are sometimes liable to be
 
 140 a collection of 
 
 confounded with them. ' Rule ' sometimes implies a gov- 
 erning force or power ; as, ' to live under a stern or a gentle 
 rule.' 4 Law ' is used for an invariable custom. It is in 
 this sense we speak of the laws of nature ; they are simply 
 certain events which happen invariably, and it is only by 
 observation we can discover them. If one of them was 
 broken through, it would cease to be a law of nature : but 
 a human law is no less a law, however ill it be obeyed.* 
 
 CONSOLATION, COMFOET, SOLACE. 
 
 * Consolation ' and • comfort ' are often synonymous ; 
 where they differ, the chief difference between them is, 
 1st, that 'consolation' has relation chiefly to real afflic- 
 tions, while ' comfort ' may also apply to what mitigates 
 lesser evils, besides including the material and substantial 
 conveniences of life. 
 
 2dly, * Consolation is used in a more active sense than 
 ♦comfort.' It implies, generally, the agency of another. 
 We administer * consolation ' to a friend in distress ; we 
 exhort him * to take comfort] not * to take consolation* 
 
 * Solace ' differs from both the other words, in being never 
 applied to human agents. We do not ' afford a solace ' to 
 sufferers, as we may afford consolation, or even comfort. 
 Habits or occupations are most frequently described as 
 affording * a solace ' in trouble ; as, for example, ' Books are 
 his chief solace in his present melancholy situation ; ' — ' The 
 companionship even of a mouse or spider has often been a 
 solace to a lonely prisoner.' 
 
 GIFT, PEESENT, DONATION. 
 
 Where no qualifying clause is inserted, * gift ' is generally 
 understood to imply something of considerable value, and 
 
 * See the article * Law,' in the Appendix to Elements of Logic.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 141 
 
 * present ' something comparatively trifling. A property ij 
 conferred by a deed of 'gift ; ' one friend makes a ' present' 
 to another of some small article of use or ornament. 
 
 2dly. A ' present ' must be intended as a mark of real or 
 supposed regard, or at least a kind of compliment : a ' gift' 
 may be made without any personal view to its object. An 
 author will sometimes make a ' gift ' of some of his works 
 to a library or to a bookseller, merely with a view to circu- 
 late them more widely ; in such a case the word ' present ' 
 would be inappropriate. Any benefit conferred as it were 
 accidentally, and not of compliment to its object, may be 
 called a ' gift ; ' hence we speak of ' the gifts of nature or 
 of fortune ' — not of their ' presents.' 
 
 In the common expression, ' A New-year's or Christmas- 
 gift,' ' gift ' is used synonymously with ' present.' 
 
 A ' donation ' is always a ' gift ' made to a public charity 
 or other institution. 
 
 REASON, CAUSE, SOURCE, ORIGIN. 
 
 ' Reason ' relates, originally, to logical sequence ; that 
 which takes place in an argument ; as, for instance, ' Be 
 always ready to give a reason of the hope that is in you.' — 
 (1 Pet. iii. 15.) Strictly speaking, a ' reason' is the cause, 
 not of so and so existing or occurring, but of our knowing 
 or believing it : as, the print of a man's footsteps is tbe 
 'cause' — not of his having passed that way, but of our 
 knowing it. But in conversation, and sometimes in books, 
 one may find this word employed in the sense of ' cause,' 
 properly so called, viz. : either the physical ' cause,' (that 
 which produces such and such an effect,) or what is called 
 the final ' cause,' * (or object aimed at in the production of 
 that effect.) Thus, we may hear people say, ' The reason 
 
 * See Whately's Logic under the head « Reason ' and ' Catse,' in 
 which this subject is fully discussed.
 
 142 A COLLECTION 01 
 
 why the days are longest in summer is so and so ; ' or ' The 
 reason why this house was built on high ground was to 
 escape the floods.' But in -such expressions, ' cause ' would 
 have been more proper. In the latter of these sentences, it 
 is, strictly speaking, the wish to avoid floods that caused the 
 choosing of that site for the house. 
 
 Though ' reason ' is often used for ' cause,' the converse 
 rarely takes place. We seldom find ' cause ' put for ' rea- 
 son.' 
 
 ' Source ' and * origin ' both have reference to physical, 
 not to logical sequence. They are sometimes used indiffer- 
 ently, but in general they preserve the character of their 
 respective etymological derivations. The Latin surgere, 
 the root or ' source,' often implies rising, as if from the 
 ground ; hence ' source ' was used to describe a fountain or 
 spring. And the idea conveyed by a spring, that of yielding 
 or producing as well as rising, has been preserved in the 
 more abstract meanings of the word. A ' source ' of informa- 
 tion is not only that from which our information proceeds, 
 Vut one to which we can recur, and from which we can 
 draw fresh stores. If we say, ' The source of his strength 
 and resolution is his ardent patriotism,' we imply that the 
 feeling described continually feeds the flame it has kindled ; 
 but if we said, ' The origin of my liking for such a person 
 was so and so,' it might imply that the circumstance from 
 which it had risen, had itself passed away. Hence we 
 speak of the ' origin,' not of the ' source,' of a family, a 
 dynasty, a discovery, or a language ; but of a ' source ' of 
 happiness, of information, of interest, or of gain. We might 
 say, ' This or that was the origin of the friendship which is 
 now such a source of happiness to me.' 
 
 Finally * origin ' is perhaps less remote than ' source ; ' 
 we call that a ' source ' to which something is ultimately 
 traced.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 14i 
 
 SELF-LOVE, SELFISHNESS. 
 
 * Self-love ' is not only a feeling, but a principle of action ; 
 ' selfishness ' is a habit. ' Self-love ' is a calm, deliberate 
 pursuit of that which is supposed to conduce to our welfare ; 
 ' selfishness ' is the almost instinctive desire of seeking our 
 own gratification at the moment, without regard to any other 
 consideration. Like all other instincts, it is not far-sighted ; 
 as the object of hunger is not happiness, but food, so the 
 object of ' selfishness ' is not happiness, but immediate grati- 
 fication. It will assume different forms, according to the 
 character of its possessor: as has been justly remarked, 
 ' every one has a self of his own.' One person will seek 
 glory ; another ease, another wealth : the disposition is the 
 same. 
 
 ' Self-love,' on the other hand, has happiness — as such — 
 for its object, and will sacrifice present pleasure to attain 
 that objeet ; hence, it is implied by a rational nature, and 
 cannot exist without it. 
 
 ' Selfishness,' however, is applied generally to a disregard 
 of the welfare of others, whether that disregard is shown in 
 grasping at momentary pleasures, or in deliberately follow- 
 ing the dictates of ' self-love,' and pursuing our own ad- 
 vantage at the expense of others. In either case, it must be 
 blameable ; whereas ' self-love,' if unaccompanied with 
 ' selfishness,' is not necessarily so. Indeed, as Bishop But- 
 ler has well remarked,* the world would be better than it is 
 if men had more ' self-love ; ' it is from the eager pursuit 
 of transient gratifications that most evil takes place, not from 
 the pursuit of happiness, as such. 
 
 ' Self-love ' is sometimes used in another sense, as some- 
 thing compounded of self-esteem and love of approbation — 
 
 * See Introduction to Butler's Sermons.
 
 141 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 self-respect, heightened by our sense of the estimation in 
 which others hold us. It is in this sense that we speak of 
 ' wounded self-love,' &c. 
 
 DISCIPLINE, TRIAL. 
 
 These two words have each senses quite remote and un- 
 mistakeable ; but they have also a sense in which they are 
 occasionally and justly applied to the same things; they 
 then differ in the view taken of the things they qualify. 
 
 'Discipline ' is given with a view to training; as its ety- 
 mology implies, it is a kind of teaching. A ' trial,' on the 
 other hand, is given to prove the strength or proficiency of 
 its object. A student receives instructions by way, of ' disci- 
 pline ; ' his examination is a ' trial.' A gun is subjected to 
 various processes to strengthen the metal, which answer to 
 ' discipline ; ' it is loaded to the muzzle, and fired by way of 
 4 trial,' or proof, as it is called. 
 
 But two circumstances cause these two words to be 
 confounded together. One is, that a trial well stood does 
 answer the purpose of discipline. A candidate who con- 
 tends for a prize, or is examined to test his proficiency, is 
 likely to be the better scholar after this trial of skill ; and 
 so in other cases. 
 
 Secondly, the circumstance of a trial being successfully 
 passed through, is often the cause of our knowing the quali- 
 fications of the person or thing tried ; and we are then apt to 
 think it has been the cause of these qualifications. For ex- 
 ample, men and animals in cold, mountainous, and barren 
 districts, are generally strong and hardy ; and many imagine 
 that the life of privation they lead actually gives them 
 strength ; the fact being, that such a life is not a ' discipline,' 
 but a ' trial.' It is a trial which kills all the weaker ones ; 
 none but the strong can stand it : but as their power of re- 
 sisting such a life enables us to see that they are strong, we 
 are prone to imagine that it gives them strength.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 145 
 
 The words ' discipline ' and ' trial,' are both frequently 
 applied in reference to the crosses and afflictions of life, 
 and not incorrectly, in different senses. Primarily, they 
 may be all said to come under the head of ' trials ; ' some 
 of them, however, are undoubtedly, in themselves, well 
 calculated for a ' discipline ' to the mind. But there are 
 others which have no tendency in themselves to make us 
 better, and are rather to be regarded as tests or trials of our 
 faith, patience, and Christian principles. Still, if these 
 i trials ' are well borne, they also form a most salutary ' dis- 
 cipline ' to us ; and we have then reason — from experience, 
 as well as from the teaching of Scripture — to believe that 
 they were intended as such by the wise and merciful Ruler 
 of the world. The word ' discipline ' is not, therefore, mis- 
 applied in speaking of them ; though it should be remem- 
 bered that they are ' trials ' in themselves, and ' discipline ' 
 only so far as we make them such. 
 
 ATTACHMENT, AFFECTION, TENDERNESS, FONDNESS, 
 LOVE, LIKING. 
 
 * Attachment ' is generally used to express a feeling which 
 has more of the character of fidelity than of sentiment : for 
 though often used in precisely the same sense as ' affection,' 
 it is also often used to denote merely a faithful adherence to 
 its object. A man may have a strong 'attachment ' to his 
 party, sect, or class : in this sense, the word ' affection ' 
 would never be used. A faithful subject would have an 
 ' attachment ' to his king — a Highland clansman, to his 
 chief ; in all these cases, the word implies devoted fidelity. 
 It is also used in relation to our feeling towards places, 
 which is seldom or never the case with ' affection.' And 
 yet strangely enough, the expression ' an attachment,' in the 
 abstract, is frequently used to denote an affaire de cceur — 
 13
 
 146 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 the very ' affection ' which is generally considered as em- 
 phatically more sentimental than constant. 
 
 ' Affection ' is ' attachment,' combined with more warmth 
 and feeling : it is also less restricted in its sense. ' Attach- 
 ment ' is not felt towards inferiors either in age or station : 
 ' affection ' may be felt to all. A mother is not said to feel 
 ' attachment,' but ' affection,' for her child. 
 
 ' Tenderness,' in reference to the words under considera- 
 tion,* may be considered as a sort of accompaniment to 
 ' affection,' refining that affection by a certain delicacy and 
 softness, and by a thoughtfulness and care, not only for the 
 welfare and real interest of its object, but even for his feel- 
 ings, his comforts, and smallest pleasures. It can only be 
 shown, in general, by the educated and civilized, because 
 they alone are considerate. A little child, or a barbarian, 
 may be full of ' affection,' but cannot show ' tenderness ; ' 
 and, in general, the softer and gentler natures possess it 
 most. 
 
 ' Fondness ' originally meant foolishness ; and is now 
 generally applied to that caressing kind of affection which 
 has more of demonstration than deep feeling. It is the only 
 one of the words before us, except ' love,' which is used 
 with reference to tastes and pursuits as well as persons ; 
 though the adjective ' fond ' is oftener used in this sense. 
 But we may have a ' fondness ' for gardening or mechanics 
 — for music or painting (though, by the way, this last 
 expression is seldom used by those who are really devoted 
 to the fine arts ) : but ' fondness ' is never used in reference 
 to higher pursuits, as science or philosophy. It is used in 
 reference chiefly to habits. 
 
 * It has two other meanings, one of them nearly conjugate to the 
 adjective * tender hearted,' which implies an extreme degree of com- 
 passion and passive benevolence ; the other, implying great carefulness 
 and attention in performing any office.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 147 
 
 ' Love ' is the most general of all the terms before us ; 
 and includes almost all their different meanings ; though, in 
 the abstract, usually employed to qualify one kind of affec- 
 tion, the being ' in love.' 
 
 ' Love,' is also used for a strong desire for the welfare of 
 its object, which may be felt quite apart from any prefer- 
 ence of his society or feeling of tenderness. It is in this 
 sense we speak of ' the love of mankind ; ' in this sense 
 that we are commanded to ' love our neighbor,' ' to love our 
 enemies,' &c. It does not imply any personal knowledge 
 of its object, or any consciousness on the part of that ob- 
 ject. 
 
 ' Liking,' on the other hand, implies a preference for the 
 society of its object quite independent of any wish for his 
 welfare, or any feeling of strong affection. Hence, people 
 are liked for very different qualities from those for which 
 they are loved. ' Liking ' is also extended not only to 
 pursuits and habits, but to inanimate objects, which is 
 not the case with any any of the other words under consid- 
 eration. 
 
 REASON, SENSE, UNDERSTANDING. 
 
 * Reason ' is the most comprehensive of these three words, 
 as it takes in the faculty of ' understanding ' in its widest 
 and most abstract signification. But it is used in three 
 senses, which are sometimes overlooked, from their close 
 connection. The first, as we have said, is that which denotes 
 all the intellectual powers collectively ; the second, those 
 particular powers which distinguish man from the brutes.* 
 The third, the arguments which are addressed to the reason- 
 ing faculty. This last is the sense in which persons are 
 
 * See Appendix to Whately's Logic, and Easy Lessons on Reason* 
 ing.
 
 148 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 exhorted to ' hear reason: ' Reason,' in short, in the second 
 sense, is the faculty which enahlcs us to understand a 
 ' reason ' in the third sense. 
 
 ' Sense ' and ' understanding ' arc used for a certain 
 amount of ' reason.' One who possesses a large share 01 
 « reason ' is said to have ' good sense,' 1 or a ' good under- 
 standing: These two expressions, however, are not synony- 
 mous. ' Sense ' is hoth active and passive in its signification; 
 ' understanding,' only passive. ' Understanding ' is used for 
 a clear perception of what is put before us ; * good ' sense ' 
 enables us to find out such things for ourselves. ' Sense ' 
 is accordingly used for judgment in the practical affairs of 
 life ; ' understanding ' is never so employed. The expres- 
 sion, ' want of reason,*' implies something different from 
 ' want of sense: One who shows want of ' sense ' must be 
 naturally stupid or silly ; one who shows want of ' reason ' 
 may be so blinded by passion or prejudice as not to make 
 use of the ' sense ' he possesses. 
 
 GAYETY, LIVELINESS, ANIMATION, VIVACITY. 
 
 ' Liveliness ' and « gayety ' are, perhaps, the nearest to each 
 other in meaning amongst this group ; but there is this great 
 difference between them, that ' gayety ' refers more to a tem- 
 porary state or mood of mind, « liveliness ' more to the 
 habitual disposition and character. ' Gayety ' is applied by 
 metonymy to those things which are supposed to excite it, 
 such as amusement, and dissipation ; while ' liveliness ' is 
 seldom applied to designate anything but character. 
 
 ' Animation ' appears at first sight to resemble ' liveliness,' 
 but it is, in fact, different. Both literally signify 'alive,' 
 but imply it in different senses. An animated person is 
 
 • See Proverbs and Precepts ; in which may be found a translation 
 of the lines of Hesiod on the subject.
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 149 
 
 eager, and easily excited; a lively person is light, gay- 
 spirited, cheerful. 
 
 • Vivacity is something between ' liveliness ' and ' anima- 
 tion ; ' it is less frequently used, being rather recently 
 adopted from the French. In French, it has come to mean 
 something more like ' hot-tempered.' 
 
 MISFORTUNE, CALAMITY, DISASTER. 
 
 « Misfortune ' is the most general of these words, and 
 applies to all kinds of untoward events. ' Calamity ' is 
 oftenest applied to some great public or family misfortune, 
 such as famine, pestilence, or the death or ruin of the 
 head of a household. ' Disaster ' is rather more correctly 
 applied to some unfortunate event, occurring as a hindrance 
 to some undertaking or work. A man who loses his proper- 
 ty encounters a misfortune ; ' if he meets with losses in 
 some speculation or other enterprise, they are ' disasters ; ' 
 a war is a great calamity to a nation, and entails misfortunes 
 on individuals ; the defeats and failures incidental to it are 
 4 disasters.' 
 
 It is the same with the conjugate words. ' Calamitous ' 
 draws the attention to the fact of the event itself being 
 unfortunate : ' disastrous ' to the evils accompanying it. A 
 war is 'calamitous' in itself: it is 'disastrous' if it turns 
 out ill. 
 
 ENVY, EMULATION, JEALOUSY. 
 
 All these words relate to sensations of uneasiness pro- 
 duced by the sight of another's advantages, not on his 
 aocount, but on our own. But their exact meaning it is 
 difficult to define, not only because their boundaries, as it 
 were, trench closely on each other, but because the names 
 are rendered uncertain by people's proneness to disguise the 
 thing. They are unwilling to admit, either to others, or 
 13*
 
 150 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 even to themselves, that they are guilty of faults which ara 
 so revolting to the ideas of all as ' envy ' and 'jealousy,' 
 especially the former.* 
 
 ' Envy ' is a dislike felt towards another, caused hy the 
 circumstance of his possessing some good, cither not pos- 
 sessed at all by ourselves, or possessed in an inferior decree, 
 or in which the superiority on our side is at least doubtful. 
 
 ' Emulation,' on the other hand, is a desire to attain, our- 
 selves, an equal share of some good which we see another 
 possess, without any dislike to him, or wish to deprive him 
 of it. The actions to which these two feelings give rise are 
 very different : ' emulation ' leading us to endeavor to attain a 
 share of the goodybr ourselves which we see another enjoy ; 
 ' envy,' to deprive him of it. The one has for its object, our 
 own gain; the other, our neighbor's loss. 'Emulation,' 
 accordingly, is not used in reference to every kind of good 
 which can be desired, but only to those things which we may 
 possibly attain by striving. Hence, it is almost limited to 
 honors, power, station, or excellence in any pursuit or moral 
 habit. We are not emulous of another's beauty, health or 
 natural talents, though we may be ' emulous ' of his attain- 
 ments or virtue. But ' envy ' may be felt equally for any 
 advantage, whether attainable by ourselves or not. 
 
 Many moralists are in the habit of speaking of ' emula- 
 tion ' as a feeling utterly bad in itself ; and in support of 
 this opinion the passage from the Epistle to the Galatians 
 is quoted, on ' emulations, wrath, strife,' &c. But the word 
 in the original, which is here translated ' emulation ' (zelos), 
 
 * This remark has been happily expressed by a German writer : « No 
 one is envious : envy is something so nasty that no one will touch it. 
 People hate their neighbors from jealousy — from a sense of honor — 
 from a consciousness of dependence — it all comes to the same as envy. 
 But envious! heaven forbid! no one is envious.' — From the Dramas of 
 Princess Amalie of Saxony.
 
 ENGLISH STNONTMS. 151 
 
 is in other parts of the New Testament rendered by 'jeal- 
 ousy,' ' rivalry,' or ' zeal ; ' and the word is almost as often 
 used in commendation as in blame. Hence, it seems clear 
 that, in the above-mentioned passage, it is used for an 
 unchristian and bitter spirit of rivalry and contention, and 
 not simply for the feeling we understand as ' emulation.' 
 This sentiment is, in moderation, a useful one ; it requires, 
 however, to be kept in check, as it is too liable, if indulged 
 to excess, to degenerate into 'envy.' 
 
 ' Jealousy ' is a somewhat ambiguous word, being capable 
 of three different senses, and used both to express a passion 
 and a habit. 
 
 First, it is used for a proneness to suspect a slight, or 
 faithlessness, or coldness, in the object of affection — this is 
 the habit. 
 
 Secondly, for a desire for the exclusive possession of 
 power, influence, approbation, or affection — this is the 
 passion. 
 
 And thirdly, it is used, though perhaps improperly, for a 
 modification of this passion, in the pain felt by those who 
 feel they have not their just due of affection or preference. 
 A child who sees his parents treat a brother or sister with 
 unjust preference may feel jealous in this sense, without 
 having a jealous temper. The other two kinds mentioned, 
 — the passion and the habit — are not necessarily com- 
 bined, though they are generally found together. 
 
 ' Jealousy ' differs from ' envy ' in being oftener (though 
 Dot always) appropriated to cases in which the affections are 
 concerned, and also, in relating more to ourselves and less 
 to others. A person is jealous on his own account, envious 
 on that of another. The person, too, over whom (to use an 
 old English expression, which avoids an ambiguity) he is 
 jealous, must always be some one beloved. 
 
 There are two or three other sentiments, to express which
 
 152 A. COLLECTION OF 
 
 we have no very exact words, and which are very apt to be 
 confounded with those we have mentioned, though in reality 
 different, because they all relate to pain felt at another's 
 good fortune. 
 
 The first we shall mention is the feeling called by Aris- 
 totle nemesis. It is an indignation at seeing another possess 
 a good of which he is undeserving, — or of which he makes 
 a bad use, — or which he is incapable of valuing. Those 
 who, like David, ' grieve to see the ungodly in such pros- 
 perity,' — or a poor student who sees an ignorant rich man 
 unable to appreciate his splendid library, — alike feel ne- 
 mesis. But, natural and justifiable as is this feeling, it 
 requires, even more than emulation, to be kept in check ; 
 for it is the disguise under which envy gains access to the 
 mind ; and many will secretly excuse their really envious 
 feelings on the ground that they are merely ' indignant ' at 
 the sight of ill-bestowed and ill-used advantages. But it is 
 a mistake, not of words, but of things, when this feeling, in 
 itself, is called by the name of ' envy.' 
 
 Another sentiment of a really blameable kind, which may 
 be considered as in some degree akin to ' envy,' is what 
 may be called ' grudging,' or, to use a polite term, ' exclu- 
 siveness,' — the dislike that any one besides ourselves should 
 possess some advantage we value. The lady who is men- 
 tioned as having boiled a valuable flower-root before sending 
 it to a friend, to prevent the possibility of her plant being 
 propagated, affords an instance of this disposition ; as, also, 
 those persons who suffer a valuable invention to die with 
 them rather than impart it : and the still more numerous 
 class who are in constant dread of any one obtaining posses- 
 sion of a song, a dress, a picture, or an ornament, which 
 they imagine to be their peculiar property. The Greeks 
 included this quality under the name phthonos, which also 
 comprised ' envy,' properly so called : zelos included ' emu
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 153 
 
 Jation,' and some kinds of 'jealousy.' The three passions, 
 phthonos, zclos, and nemesis, are discussed and compared 
 together in an admirable portion of Aristotle's Rhetoric. 
 
 PRIVACY, RETIREMENT, SOLITUDE, SECLUSION, 
 LONELINESS. 
 
 4 Privacy,' sometimes implies absence from the bustle 
 and state of public life ; at other times, it is nearly synony- 
 mous with ' retirement ; ' with this difference, that ' privacy ' 
 may be occasional and temporary, while 'retirement' al- 
 ways implies some continuance. If we withdraw to our 
 own rooms for an hour, we spend that hour in ' privacy ; ' 
 ' retirement ' refers to the habitual mode of life, and includes 
 not only absence from public life, but even from much 
 general society. One who leads a life of retirement has but 
 few associates, and mixes seldom in the gay world. 
 
 ' Solitude ' and ' seclusion ' imply more than this — an 
 enrire absence from all society ; but they imply this in 
 different senses. ' Seclusion ' must be, to a certain extent, 
 1 voluntary ; ' ' solitude ' may be used for a forced absence 
 from society. No one would say that a prisoner alone in 
 his cell, or a shipwrecked man on a desert island, were 
 living in ' seclusion,' but in ' solitude.' ' Seclusion ' seems 
 to imply shutting oneself up from the external world, as its 
 derivation indicates {claudc, to shut up or close) : hence, it is 
 more applicable to a monk, or nun in a convent, than to a 
 hermit in the wilderness. When we say tbat ' seclusion ' is 
 to a certain extent voluntary, we do not mean that it is 
 always in accordance with the wishes of those who practise 
 it. Many persons submit to a life of seclusion against their 
 inclinations : but still, in such cases no direct force is used ; 
 they are not compelled, in the sense that a prisoner is com- 
 pelled, to leave the world. 
 
 Correctly speaking, also, ' solitude ' is applied to one per-
 
 154 A COLLECTION' OF 
 
 6on alone : ' seclusion ' is more properly applied to a small 
 number of persons living together — as a family, or a com- 
 munity, or even the inhabitants of a retired village. 
 
 ' Loneliness ' implies rather the solitude of tbe heart. We 
 may be lonely in a crowd ; cr, indeed, lonely in a circle of 
 acquaintance — even of connections, if they are unsyra- 
 pathizing and uninterested in us. 
 
 1 Privacy ' is opposed to publicity. 
 
 • Retirement,' to gayety, or life in the world. 
 
 ' Solitude,' to the adjective social, or to society 
 
 ' Seclusion,' to society, in the widest sense. 
 
 ' Loneliness,' to sympathetic companionship. 
 
 The adjectives are, some of them, not strictly conjugate. 
 ' Lonely ' applies more to places tban persons, though some- 
 times to the latter. A ' lonely ' place is one where we should 
 feel lonely. ' Solitary ' and ' retired ' are also generally 
 applied to places ; ' retired ' always, except when a person \s 
 described as having withdrawn from some public situation - • 
 as, a ' retired ' officer, or statesman. * Secluded ' is always 
 (correctly speaking) confined to places. ' Private ' is now 
 more directly opposed to ' public ' than is its conjugate noun, 
 ' privacy.' A ' private ' interview, letter, or individual, is 
 exactly the opposite to a public one. 
 
 EARTH, WOULD, GLOBE. 
 
 In speaking of the ' earth,' we refer more to its external 
 and material part : in speaking of the ' world,' to the moral 
 and abstract view of the same thing. In considering the 
 4 earth,' we look at its construction, its natural productions, 
 its geological formation ; in comparing our own with other 
 planets or systems, we always speak of the ' earth ' — as, 
 ' The earth moves round the sun ; ' in this sense, * world ' 
 would be inadmissible. 
 
 The ' world ' is rather the ' earth ' viewed with reference
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 155 
 
 to its inhabitants. We speak of the providential care and 
 moral government of the ' world/ not of the ' earth : ' we 
 might say, ' The wonders and beauties with which the earth 
 abounds display the wisdom and goodness of the Creator, 
 but still more his government of the world.' And not only 
 is the expression, ' world,' used with reference to mankind 
 in preference to ' earth,' but with reference to man intellect- 
 ually, in contradistinction to physically. We speak of the 
 various races which inhabit the ' earth,' but of the civilized 
 ' world.' Hence, America was called ' The New World,' 
 being viewed with reference to a place that was to be in- 
 habited.* In speaking of men as forming a community, 
 ' world ' is always used instead of ' earth : ' as we speak of 
 ' the intellectual, political, theological, or gay world ' or 
 even of ' a poet's world ' — ' the world of fancy or of 
 dreams,' &c. Formerly ' earth ' was used as ' world ' is 
 now, as we may see in our translation of the Psalms, ' The 
 ends of the earth shall hear him,' &c. 
 
 ' Globe ' is generally used geologically, and occasionally 
 in poetry. 
 
 Lastly, ' earth ' is limited to our own planet ; but we 
 speak of other * worlds.' The planets are supposed to be 
 ' worlds ; ' the starry sky may be full of systems of worlds ; 
 the abode to which we look for a future life is continually 
 called ' a better world.' 
 
 This may partly arise from the different derivations of 
 these words. ' Earth ' is immediately traceable to the Ger- 
 man erde ; but it is probable that the original root of all was 
 
 * There are exceptions to this rule, the principal one being the 
 expression, ' sailing round the world,' which is always used instead of 
 * earth.' This, probably, arises from the fact, that ' earth ' is also gen- 
 erally used synonymously with   land,' in contradistinction to ' sea;' hence 
 the expression, ' sailing round the earth,' would be somewhat ano- 
 malous
 
 156 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 the Hebrew Ercts, supposed to be derived from a verb sig- 
 nifying to crumble or break in pieces. 
 
 ' World ' (whirled) was evidently expressive merely of 
 roundness : as the Latin mundus and Greek cosmos were of 
 ' order.' Cos?nos and mundus were both used to indicate 
 the universe. And it is curious that our derived word, cos- 
 mogony, always relates to the ' earth,' as distinguished from 
 4 world.' The ' world,' in our modern sense, was rendered 
 in Latin by seculum, and in Greek by aion. 
 
 PROFIT, GAIN, EMOLUMENT. 
 
 * Profit ' is distinguished from the other two words of this 
 group by being always applied to gain accruing from some- 
 thing that has been laid out first. We speak of ' profits ' 
 made by the sale of goods, but not of the ' profits ' of labor, 
 or winning ' profits ' in a lottery. * Gain ' includes every 
 advantage obtained which was not ours before. 
 
 ' Emolument ' is always the reward of labor, and that 
 reward obtained in a regular way, and not by chance. 
 
 The history of the derivation of this word is curious : its 
 root is the Latin mola, a mill ; it was first used to signify 
 anything which could be ground out of a mill ; then it 
 came to be figuratively employed, as if to convey the idea 
 of ' grist to the mill,' and so gradually assumed its present 
 sense. 
 
 IMPORT, MEANING, SENSE. 
 
 The ' import' of a speech or book is the idea which it most 
 readily conveys to others ; the ' meaning ' is the idea really 
 intended to be conveyed by the speaker or writer : the ' sense ' 
 is, either, 1st, The general substance of the whole; or, 
 2dly, The different ways in which it may be understood, 
 and the ideas it may be made to convey. 
 
 For instance, we might say, ' This writer declares his
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 157 
 
 meaning to be so and so ; it is true his words may be 
 brought to bear that sense, but such is not their obvious im- 
 port,' Or again, ' The Articles of our Church have been 
 received by certain writers in a non-natural sense ; but what- 
 ever may have been the meaning of their compilers, the 
 import is quite unlike what they are now made to say.' 
 
 AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, DIVERSION, RECREATION. 
 
 These four words are sometimes used differently, but 
 there are occasionallv variations in their meaning. 
 
 ' Diversion ' often preserves something of its etymological 
 sense, and conveys the idea of distracting the attention and 
 drawing the mind from subjects fatiguing or depressing : at 
 other times it is used to describe the lightest and gayest 
 kind of pleasures, and those which excite most laughter and 
 merriment. ' Recreation ' adheres even more strictly to its 
 etymology: it always iir.plies' refreshment after business or 
 serious employment.* An idle person may enjoy amuse 
 ment, entertainment, or diversion ; but never recreation. 
 
 'Amusement' and 'entertainment' are perhaps the most 
 alike in meaning ; but there is this great difference, that a 
 useful pursuit may be an amusement, if it pleases and recre- 
 ates the mind : but nothing can be looked on in the light of 
 ' entertainment ' which is not pursued for sake of that alone. 
 For instance, we should say, ' I find much amusement in 
 gardening,' but not ' much entertainment : ' or, ' I derive so 
 much amusement from the labors of my garden, that I do not 
 care for idle diversions.' Again, an ' entertainment ' always 
 conveys the idea of an elaborate show or spectacle, which 
 is not given by an ' amusement,' or a ' diversion.' f ' Rec- 
 
 * See some remarks on the subject in English Life, Social and 
 Domestic. 
 
 t The conjugate adjective 4 entertaining ' is nearly the same as 
 * amusing.' 
 
 14
 
 158 A COLLECTION OP 
 
 reation' differs from the other three in always implying that 
 an active part is taken in it. We speak of « the recreation 
 of dancing,' but not ' the recreation of witnessing a ballet ' : 
 where the pleasure is passive, ' amus3ment ' or • entertain- 
 ment ' is employed. We might express ourselves thus : 
 ' They enjoyed the recreation of a game of cricket : the 
 spectacle afforded much amusement (or entertainment) to 
 the spectators : and the ludicrous falls of some of the play- 
 ers supplied them with infinite diversion.'' 
 
 USAGE, CUSTOM. 
 
 Whenever ' usage ' is employed, ' custom ' might be sub- 
 stituted, though with less force : but a custom is not neces- 
 sarily a usage. A ' custom ' is merely that which is often 
 repeated ; a ' usage ' must be both often repeated and of 
 long standing. Hence we may speak of a new * custom,' 
 but not of a new ' usage.' 
 
 The history of the word ' custom ' is curious ; it proba- 
 bly had the same origin as * accost,' to come near ; and 
 thence ' to be habitual.' The root is the Latin costa, the 
 side or rib. 
 
 DEXTERITY, ADDRESS, SKILL. 
 
 ' Dexterity ' is most applicable to those actions in which 
 there is more call for quickness and readiness with the hands 
 than for deliberate contrivance and intelligence. ' Skill,' 
 on the other hand, implies more of head and less of hand- 
 work. A cricket or billiard player shows dexterity : an 
 artist or mechanician, skill. The same with the conjugate 
 adjectives: a dexterous workman is quick, neat, and handy; 
 a skilful workman understands the theory and practice of 
 his business thoroughly: it would not be enough for a 
 watchmaker to be dexterous, he must be also skilful. 
 
 ' Address ' is sometimes applied to feats of ' sleight of
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 159 
 
 hand,' but oftener to diplomatic readiness and acuteness in 
 accommodating ourselves to those we have to deal with. 
 
 The French use ' address,' generally, where we use the 
 word ' dexterity.' 
 
 HELP, AID, ASSISTANCE. 
 
 These words are nearly synonymous ; but as generally 
 happens when words of Saxon and Latin derivation are 
 compared together, the Saxon word is the stronger. ' Help ' 
 implies more done by the helper, and less by the person 
 helped, than ' aid ' or ' assistance : ' and it is the same with 
 the conjugate verbs : we may aid a person in carrying a 
 load, we help him out of a ditch into which he has fallen. 
 Hence, in a religious sense, it is usual to speak of ' seeking 
 help,' not ' aid,' from above, — unless we are understood to 
 speak of a power co-operating with man ; when the word 
 ' aid ' is admissible. In sudden distress the cry raised is 
 always ' Help ! ' not ' aid.' In the common expressions, ' I 
 cannot help this ' — ' you must help yourself,' the word * aid ' 
 could not be substituted. * 
 
 ' Assistance ' implies still more of co-operation, and less 
 of succor, than even ' aid.' Two persons are said ' to assist 
 each other,' not ' to aid each other.' It implies mutual aid. 
 We might say, ' Beaumont and Fletcher wrote plays, in 
 which each afforded assistance to the other : Beaumont 
 could not have succeeded without Fletcher's aid, and when 
 he was in a difficulty his friend's help extricated him.' 
 
 ACT, ACTION, DEED. 
 
 These first two words are often synonymous, but there 
 
 * There is a curious colloquial incorrectness in the common phrase, 
 ' Don't do so more than you can help : ' correctly speaking, it should 
 be ' more than you can't help; ' though this last would sound so strange 
 that it could hardly pass current.
 
 160 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 are essential differences between them. 1st. — ' Act' does 
 not necessarily imply an external result ; ' action ' always 
 does. We may speak of repentance, for example, as an 
 1 act : ' we could not call it an ' action.' The expression, 
 now nearly obsolete, but formerly common among Roman 
 Catholic writers, and our older divines, of ' an act of faith, 
 contrition, humility,' &c, — signifying merely a mental 
 determination, — shows how strong was the tendency 
 even then to extend the word ' act ' to operations of the 
 mind.* 
 
 2dly. — An act must be individual : we may speak of ' a 
 course of action.' ' Action,' without the article, may even 
 be spoken of in the abstract as opposed to a state of ' repose,' 
 ' indolence,' or ' contemplation : ' this could never be done 
 with the word ' act.' f 
 
 Lastly. — ' Act,' when qualified, is oftcner though not 
 universally, coupled with another substantive : * action ' 
 always by an adjective preceding it. We speak of ' a kind 
 action ' — but of ' an act of kindness.' ' A kind act ' might 
 be admissible, though not usual ; but ' an action of kindness ' 
 is an expression never used. ' Deed ' appears synonymous 
 with ' act.' 
 
 ANGEK, WRATH. 
 
 ' Anger ' is more correctly applied to the inward feeling : 
 ' wrath ' to the outward manifestation. Hence, in describing 
 external effects, which seem like those produced by anger, 
 the word ' wrath ' is always used. We should not speak of 
 
 * The French use the expression « actions de graces ' for thanksgiv- 
 ings; this is evidently derived from the Latin, ' agrere gratias.' 
 
 t The only way in which ' act ' could be used without the article, 
 would be in such an expression as * in act to strike '
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 161 
 
 the ' anger ' but of the ' wrath ' of the elements ' * We 
 therefore speak of ' the wrath of God,' more correctly than 
 of his anger. We cannot attribute to Him passions like 
 those of men : we can only describe the external effect? 
 which in men would be produced by those passions. 
 
 TYRANNY, DESPOTISM. 
 
 Both of these terms generally imply absolute power, 
 and power which is exercised for the pleasure of the gov- 
 ernor, not the benefit of the governed. But ' despotism ' is 
 applicable to a power which is regularly established by law, 
 however unjustly: while ' tyranny ' indicates the abuse of 
 extensive power, whether legal or otherwise. A nation may 
 be said either to suffer under ' despotism ' or ' tyranny ; ' but 
 the word ' despotism ' draws attention to the absolute power 
 of a government ; ' tyranny,' to the severe and harsh use 
 of that power. The word ' tyranny ' is likewise much less 
 limited to the description of the government of a country, 
 than « despotism.' We speak of the ' tyranny ' exercised by 
 a harsh parent or schoolmaster, or even by a stronger boy 
 over a weaker. Even in an abstract sense, we often speak 
 of the ' tyranny ' of fashion, habit or the passions ; in none 
 of these cases could we use the word ' despotism.' f 
 
 4 Tyranny ' and * despotism ' must both be unjust in all cases, 
 since they imply a preference of the interest of the governor 
 to that of the governed : but a « tyranny ' must also necessa- 
 rily be cruel : a ' despotism ' may be mild, and even in its 
 way beneficent. A slave-owner may be benevolent and 
 
 * See Scott's liokeby : 
 
 • Mine be the eve of tropic sun ! 
 No pale gradations mark his way, 
 No twilight dews his wrath allay.' 
 tThe conjugate adjective, 'despotic,' somewhat differs from the sub- 
 stantive in this respect. We do speak of ' a despotic parent,' &c.
 
 162 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 kind to his serfs, but his government of them must be a 
 ' despotism,' that being applied in the very meaning of the 
 word, which has deviated but little from its original etymo- 
 logical signification in Greek : — 'a master of slaves ' (Des- 
 
 potcs). 
 
 ' Tyranny,' on the contrary, originally implied merely an 
 absolute government. It is used in this sense by the early 
 Greek poets : though the oldest prose writers on record 
 apply the word exclusively to those who had usurped abso- 
 lute power in a free country. 
 
 It is a curious satire on human nature, that the word 
 which originally implied only unlimited power, should have 
 afterwards come to imply the abuse of that power, as if the 
 last was the necessary consequence of the first.* 
 
 LIBERTY, FREEDOM. 
 
 When applied to the condition either of a nation or indi- 
 vidual, these words are strictly synonymous, and conjugates 
 of the same adjective ' free ; ' but when used in ordinary 
 polite conversation, there is the same shade of difference 
 which is observable (as has been remarked before) in other 
 pairs of Saxon and Latin synonyms. ' May I take the 
 liberty ? ' is an expression in frequent use : ' May I take the 
 freedom ? ' would be considered as a piece of vulgarism. 
 
 VISTIGES, TRACES. 
 
 These words have a corresponding origin, and are often 
 synonymous ; when they differ, the word ' vestiges ' is al- 
 ways applied in its analogical sense, while ' traces ' may be 
 used either in this or in its primary sense. We follow the 
 
 *It has been suggested that the Greek Tyrannos may he nearly re- 
 lated to the Irish Tigernach (pronounced Tierna), a chief or lord, -which 
 is the word used as an equivalent to Kurios in the Greek Testa- 
 ment
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 163 
 
 traces of a. person or animal lost sight of : we discover the 
 vestiges of earlier formations in geology. In this last sense 
 the word ' traces ' might be equally well used : hut we never 
 6peak of ' the vestiges of foot-marks in a wood,' &c. 
 
 It may be observed that words of Latin origin are much 
 sooner corrupted from their original signification than Anglo- 
 Saxon ones : probably from the body of the language being 
 essentially Teutonic. 
 
 CHASTISEMENT, PUNISHMENT, PENALTY. 
 
 According to its primary sense, ' punishment ' meant 
 neither more nor less than vengeance or retribution. It 
 originally implied the giving satisfaction to individuals : 
 hence the Latin expression ' sumere poznas ' (to take or re- 
 ceive the punishment of an offender) ; and • Juere [or solvere] 
 poznas ' (to ' pay,' or discharge the penalty). In short, pun- 
 ishment was correlative to the sentiment of anger ; and 
 accordingly Bacon speaks of revenge as * a wild justice.' 
 But in its established modern sense, both * punishment ' and 
 ' chastisement ' may be defined as pain inflicted with a view 
 to prevent future wrongdoing. The chief difference be- 
 tween them is, that ' punishment ' is the term applied to 
 designate suffering inflicted with a view to deter either the 
 sufferer or others : while ' chastisement ' is confined to the 
 individual who is the object of it, and is supposed and in- 
 tended to have some reforming and corrective, as well as 
 deterring power. 
 
 Hence afflictions are called the ' chastisements ' (not the 
 punishments) sent by Providence : but the future retribution 
 of the wicked is spoken of as a ' punishment,' because it 
 cannot act as a corrective, but as a terror (in prospect) to 
 offenders. 
 
 The pains inflicted by the law of the land are, correctly 
 speaking, punishments, not chastisements ; for though some
 
 164 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 of them may happen to be of a reformatory character, theii 
 primary object is to deter, not to correct. 
 
 A 'penalty ' is a punishment considered in the light of a 
 debt incurred by certain offences, which must be paid off by 
 its object. The expression, when used in reference to the 
 law, is oftenest applied to fines ; and in a more general 
 application it is used to describe those sufferings which are 
 the natural consequences of a fault, and which may be con- 
 sidered as the debt which the offender incurs. We should 
 say, ' sickness, or poverty, is the penally which the in- 
 temperate, or the extravagant, must pay for their criminal 
 indulgences.' 
 
 PROJECT, DESIGN, SCHEME, PLAN. 
 
 All these words imply a certain end in view, and means 
 used to accomplish it : of the four, ' design ' looks most to 
 the end, and least to the means : ' scheme ' and ' plan ' 
 most to the means and least to the end: while 'project ' 
 seems to hold a middle place between the extremes. 
 
 * Scheme,' in accordance with its original root {schema, a 
 pattern), implies something fully formed and sketched out. 
 ' Plan ' conveys this idea even more fully, and betokens a 
 more advanced and matured state than ' scheme.' 
 
 For instance : ' They formed a project to revolutionize the 
 country : with this design they concocted a scheme ; they 
 then met together to mature their plan.' 
 
 PURPOSE, INTENT, INTENTION. 
 
 The word ' purpose ' always implies the use of some 
 means towards the end : with ' intention ' this is not the case. 
 For instance : ' He had long harbored the intention of taking 
 the life of his enemy, and for this purpose he provided him- 
 Belf with weapons.' 
 
 * Purpose ' has some resemblance to ' design,' (See the
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 165 
 
 head, design, pkoject, scheme.) It was originally a cor- 
 ruption of ' pro-pose,' and the conjugate of the verb • to 
 propose,' or ' to purpose,' as it was formerly called. 
 
 ' Intent ' and ' intention ' are much the same in significa- 
 tion. ' Intent ' was used in old English where ' intention ' 
 would now be employed ; (as may be seen from the tech- 
 nical expression, ' with intent to kill.') 'Intention ' was then 
 never used except — 
 
 First, in the logical sense of ' first or second intentions.' 
 
 Secondly, in a technical theological sense,* which it still 
 preserves: i. e. the Romish doctrine of intention, which 
 inculcates that if a priest administers any of the sacraments 
 without the inward will and determination to exercise his 
 priestly function, those sacraments are null and void. 
 
 [See the Archives of the Council of Trent, where an 
 anathema is pronounced upon those who doubt the truth of 
 this doctrine. See also some remarks on the subject in the 
 third number of the Cautions for the Times.'] 
 
 LIST, CATALOGUE. 
 
 A 'catalogue ' always implies some description of the arti- 
 cles named ; a ' list,' though it does not exclude a description, 
 only implies a simple enumeration. Hence, we never speak 
 of a * catalogue ' of subscribers, a visiting ' catalogue,' &c. 
 because then the names alone are enumerated ; but the con- 
 tents of a museum, library, or picture gallery, are said to 
 be set down in a ' catalogue,' because something answering 
 to a description is always appended, though it may only be 
 the title of a book, which is not a mere arbitrary sound like 
 the name of an individual, but conveys some sort of descrip- 
 tion of its contents. 
 
 * Many of the old technical terms in theology were scarcely altered 
 from the Latin.
 
 166 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 BREVITY, CONCISENESS. 
 
 « Brevity ' is often used indifFerently with ' conciseness ; ' 
 but when any difference is implied, then, properly speaking, 
 ' brevity ' refers to the matter, and ' conciseness ' to the 
 style. In fact, when brevity of style is spoken of, it may 
 be considered as synonymous with ' conciseness.' Strictly 
 speaking, however, ' brevity ' merely implies the use of few 
 words, while ' conciseness ' implies a great deal of matter 
 concentrated in a small space. 
 
 ' Brevity ' is sometimes attained by leaving much unsaid : 
 in such a case, what is said is not necessarily expressed 
 with ' conciseness ; ' * this last can only be attained by long 
 practice in the art of compressing. 
 
 A concise discourse is like a well-packed trunk, which 
 contains much more than it at first sight appears to do : a 
 brief discourse may be like a trunk half full ; short, because 
 it is scanty. 
 
 TOLERANCE, TOLERATION. 
 
 ' Tolerance ' is a habit of mind ; ' toleration ' applies to ac- 
 tion, not disposition. Principles of tolerance will lead to 
 the toleration of different opinions. 
 
 CONFIDENCE, TRUST, RELIANCE. 
 
 4 Confidence ' implies ' trust' ; but ' trust ' does not always 
 imply ' confidence.' Trust is rather particular than general : 
 we may feel trust in a man's honesty, but not in his good 
 judgment, &c. ; but 'confidence,' though sometimes used in 
 this partial sense, is also used in reference to the general 
 character. But we may repose trust in a person in whose 
 character, as a whole, we have no confidence. For instance, 
 
 ' See Midsummer .YijhVs Dream — ' A tedious brief play.'
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 167 
 
 we might say, ' I can trust * in such a person's acting in 
 this way because it is his interest, or, he is afraid of acting 
 otherwise ; ' these expressions themselves imply that the 
 person referred to is unworthy of confidence. ' Reliance ' 
 is only applied to qualities or actions : not in general to 
 persons ; if so used, it may usually be considered as trans- 
 ferred by metonymy from the action or quality to the person 
 qualified. 
 
 t 
 
 ERROR, MISTAKE, BLUNDER. 
 
 ' Error ' is always used to designate some action which 
 is blamed, whether morally or intellectually. It may pro- 
 ceed from nothing but a failure in judgment ; still the word 
 implies some degree of blame, though generally slight. 
 An ' error ' is always a ' mistake ' ; a ' mistake ' is not always 
 an ' error.' A mistake may attach no sort of blame to the 
 person who makes it ; it may even be ' a fortunate mistake.' 
 
 A ' blunder ' implies a mistake which is inconsistent with 
 the knowledge the agent possesses. If any one is said to 
 make a blunder in spelling or grammar, it implies that he is 
 acquainted with both. We talk, it is true, of ' blundering 
 on an object in the dark,' but this is rather for want of a 
 more correct expression. 
 
 A ' bull ' is in fact a blunder. 
 
 MALICE, SPITE. 
 
 These words are often used indifferently, and both imply 
 a desire of giving pain for its own sake ; but there are 
 important distinctions between them. 
 
 'Malice.' like its conjugate ' malicious,' is applied not only 
 to individual acts, but to the whole character and disposi- 
 tion ; ' spite ' and ' spiteful,' only to individual manifesta- 
 
 * The verbs an<l nouns correspond exactly.
 
 168 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 tions. For when a person is described as ' spiteful,' it is 
 always with reference to some particular speech or action. 
 4 Malice,' as its root (malum) would seem to imply, is often 
 used to describe an utterly unprovoked and spontaneous 
 desire of giving pain : in French, it is used to express a 
 mere love of teasing for fun's sake ; in English, it describes 
 that ill-will which often springs originally from that prin- 
 ciple when perverted and exaggerated. 
 
 ' Spite ' which immediately is derived from despite (depit), 
 seems traceable to the Latin root despuo, to spit out, as if 
 something loathsome and offensive. It has still preserved 
 so much of its etymology, as to imply ill-will resulting from 
 some feeling of pique, anger, or opposition ; and it general- 
 ly indicates a low and petty manifestation of the feeling. 
 A cruel boy will torment a younger child or an animal from 
 ' malice ; ' a successful candidate is slandered by his rivals 
 from ' spite.' 
 
 OCCUPATION, BUSINESS, AVOCATION. 
 
 The word ' occupation ' is applied to whatever employs 
 us either at the moment or habitually. ' Business ' must 
 always be a necessary, or, at least, an important and pressing 
 occupation — something connected with our profession or 
 other duties in life ; while ' occupation ' may describe a 
 merely amusing or ornamental pursuit. Painting affords an 
 agreeable occupation to an amateur ; to a professional artist 
 it is a business. 
 
 An ' avocation,' strictly speaking, is, as its root (a-voco) 
 indicates, that which calls us off, hinders us, from other 
 employments. It can, therefore, be only correctly used 
 relatively to other things. 
 
 NOVEL, ROMANCE. 
 
 Both these words have widely diverged from their etymol-
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 169 
 
 o&y. Originally a novel meant merely a new tale.* Now 
 (as the common term, ' a new novel,' may show) the idea of 
 newness is nowise connected with it. To define a ' novel ' is 
 no very easy task ; but it generally seeems to convey the idea 
 of something longer and more elaborate than a mere ' tale ; ' 
 and the complement of three volumes appears even more 
 closely connected with it than the magic ' five acts ' with a 
 tragedy. 
 
 A romance originally meant something written in the 
 Romance language, the old langue d'oc of the south of 
 France, which was the vehicle of the earliest poetry of the 
 middle ages. Hence it has now come to signify a tale of 
 a wild, high-flown, adventurous, and poetical cast — some- 
 thing very far removed from ordinary life. 
 
 The French have also preserved the word ' romance,' but 
 use it to describe a very different style of composition — 
 the lyrical ballad. ' Roman ' seems to apply equally to the 
 * novel ' and the ' romance.' 
 
 POVERTY, INDIGENCE, PAUPERISM. 
 
 ' Poverty ' simply implies a difficulty in supporting oneself 
 in one's own station ; it is therefore relative ; what is pov- 
 erty to a gentleman would be affluence to a laborer. 
 
 ' Indigence ' implies extreme distress, and almost destitu- 
 tion. 
 
 ' Pauperism ' signifies being maintained in idleness by pub- 
 lic charity ; it is therefore the most hopelessly degrading 
 state of all. A poor man, even an indigent man, may retain 
 his independence of character and self-respect : but a pauper 
 is degraded in his own eyes and those of all others. En- 
 
 * In old English, a * novelist ' signified a propounder of new opinions 
 in science or politics. 
 15
 
 170 A COLLECTION OF 
 
 couraged, nay urged on, to a life of indolent inaction 
 and owing his wretched subsistence to that forced charity 
 which, reversing the description of ' the quality of mercy,' 1 
 which ' is not strained ' — may be said truly, to be ' doutiy 
 cursed — cursing him that gives and him that takes ' — his 
 existence cannot but be miserable and degraded. 
 
 MATTER, SUBJECT. 
 
 The • matter ' of a discourse, book, &c, is from within ; the 
 ' subject ' from without. The ' matter ' comprises the argu- 
 ments used and the substance of what is said — all, in short, 
 except what concerns the style of writing or speaking. 
 
 The « subject,' on the other hand, is the theme of the dis- 
 course, that about which the arguments are brought forward. 
 
 Two persons taking different sides in a debate must treat 
 of the same subject : but the matter of their discourse must 
 be different. 
 
 We might say : ' The subject of discussion was very in- 
 teresting : in Mr. A.'s speech the matter was good, though 
 ill-expressed ; Mr. B.'s style was better, but his matter in- 
 ferior.' 
 
 LANGUAGE, WORDS, TEEMS, EXPRESSIONS. 
 
 In classing these substantives together, we do not, of 
 course, allude to their separate and independent meanings, 
 but merely to the sense in which they are used to describe 
 the matter and manner of a discourse. ' Words ' are used to 
 designate the simple meaning and sense of what is said, 
 without any allusion to its manner, style, or grammatical 
 accuracy. ' Language,' on the other hand, is generally used 
 to describe these latter characteristics. If we praise any one 
 for using ' good language,' we are understood to praise his 
 correctness of style and manner, not his matter ; but if we
 
 ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 171 
 
 say, ' These are good words,' this though not a usual ex- 
 pression, would be understood to refer to the meaning of 
 what was said. The phrase ' bitter words,' would be used 
 to describe the words whose meaning was bitter. 
 
 ' Terms ' are generally used to describe or define some- 
 thing else : and one term may be composed of several 
 words. 
 
 ' Expressions ' resemble ' language,' but apply more to 
 individual words or phrases, and less to the general tenor of 
 a discourse. 
 
 ' Words,' ' terms,' and 'language ' may sometimes be used 
 indifferently — as when we speak of ' delivering an opinion 
 in plain terms, words, or language ; ' in such a phrase as this, 
 ' expressions ' would be inadmissible. 
 
 SUGGESTION, HINT. 
 
 A ' suggestion ' is generally supposed to furnish us with 
 some practical assistance or directions ; a ' hint' implies 
 something slighter and more covert, and may be merely 
 negative in its tendency. 
 
 We may throw out a ' hint ' against some one's character 
 — we dissuade another from taking certain steps by a timely 
 ' hint : ' in neither of these cases could we be said to give a 
 ' suggestion.' 
 
 We might say — • He gave me a hint of the danger to 
 which I was exposed ; and afterwards supplied me with 
 suggestions as to the best means of avoiding it.' 
 
 MOMENT, INSTANT. 
 
 These words are most commonly synonymous ; where 
 they differ, ' instant ' seems to imply something even more 
 speedy than ' moment.' ' This instant,' conveys the idea of 
 
 plater rapidity than ' this moment.' Another difference
 
 172 A COLLECTION OF ENGLISH SYNONYMS. 
 
 may be mentioned ; the expression, ' a few moments ' — 
 ' two or three moments ' — is not uncommon : • a few in- 
 stants ' is never used. In this, our habit of speaking pre* 
 sents a striking contrast to the French, with whom ' quelques 
 instants ' is such a favorite expression.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Paob 
 
 
 Pjmm 
 
 Abandon ... 45 
 
 Avow . , 
 
 3^ 
 
 Abdicate 
 
 9 
 
 45 
 
 Amicable . 
 
 92 
 
 Abhorrence 
 
 
 
 112 
 
 Apt 
 
 • • \/0 
 
 Abjure 
 
 
 
 49 
 
 Amid 
 
 
 Abilities . 
 
 
 
 
 136 
 
 Amidst 
 
 > . 31 
 
 Absurd 
 
 
 
 
 64 
 
 Among 
 
 Accordingly 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
 Amongst 
 
 
 Account 
 
 
 
 
 122 
 
 Admire . 
 
 . 50 
 
 Acknowledge . 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
 Amaze 
 
 1 . 53 
 
 Admittance ) 
 Admission J 
 
 
 
 
 119 
 
 Astonish 
 
 
 
 
 Alone 
 
 . 33 
 
 Admirable 
 
 
 
 
 . 63 
 
 Absent 
 
 I . 91 
 
 Adversary . 
 
 
 
 
 113 
 
 Abstracted 
 
 Affection 
 
 
 
 
 145 
 
 Although 
 
 . 32 
 
 Affliction 
 
 
 
 
 100 
 
 Accurate 
 
 93 
 
 Agreeable 
 
 
 
 
 82 
 
 Address . 
 
 . 158 
 
 Alleviate 
 
 
 
 
 48 
 
 Amusement 
 
 157 
 
 Alarm 
 
 
 
 
 . 102 
 
 Aid 
 
 t . .159 
 
 Almost 
 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 Assistance 
 
 Also 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 Act j 
 
 ' . 159 
 
 Allow 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
 Action 
 
 Allegiance 
 
 
 
 
 128 
 
 Avocation 
 
 . 168 
 
 Announce . 
 
 
 
 
 48 
 
 Anger 
 
 . 97. 160 
 
 Animation 
 
 
 
 
 148 
 
 Avoid 
 
 52 
 
 Answer 
 
 
 
 
 116 
 
 
 
 Antagonist 
 
 
 
 
 113 
 
 Barbarous 
 
 80 
 
 Antipathy . 
 
 
 
 
 112 
 
 Bash fulness . 
 
 . 99 
 
 Approval > 
 Approbation j 
 
 
 
 
 99 
 
 Bear . 
 
 41 
 
 
 
 
 Because . 
 
 29 
 
 Apprehension 
 
 
 
 
 102 
 
 Beg j 
 
 1 . 40 
 
 Arrogance 
 
 
 
 
 108 
 
 Beseech < 
 
 As 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
 Besides . 
 
 . 26 
 
 Ask 
 
 
 
 
 . 40 
 
 Believe 
 
 43 
 
 Attract 
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 Belief . 
 
 . 130 
 
 Attachment 
 
 
 
 
 145 
 
 Beautiful 
 
 61 
 
 Austerity . 
 
 
 
 
 135 
 
 Bright 
 
   . .70 
 
 Authentic 
 
 
 
 
 75 
 
 Brilliant 
 
 Aversion 
 
 
 
 
 112 
 
 Bravery 
 
 138 
 
 [173]
 
 174 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 
 Page 
 
 
 But 
 
 25, 34 
 
 Consequently 
 
 By . 
 
 24 
 
 Conviction 
 
 Betwixt i 
 Between 1 
 
 . 31 
 
 Continual 
 
 Continuous 
 
 Be 
 
 1 . . 51 
 
 Contentment 
 
 Benevolent 
 
 
 Contemn 
 
 Beneficent 
 
 . 88 
 
 Confess . 
 
 Bountiful 
 
 I 
 
 Cost . 
 
 Benignant . 
 
 90 
 
 Courage 
 
 Blameless 
 
 . 86 
 
 Courteous . 
 
 Brotherly . 
 
 92 
 
 Cowardly 
 
 Brevity . 
 
 . 16G 
 
 Covert 
 
 Blunder 
 
 167 
 
 Cruel 
 
 Business 
 
 . 168 
 
 Curious 
 Comprehend 
 
 Calm . 
 
 82 
 
 Commend . 
 
 Calculated 
 
 . 93 
 
 Criminal 
 
 Captivate . 
 
 37 
 
 Charitable . 
 
 Capacity 
 
 . 136 
 
 Celebrated 
 
 Calamity 
 
 149 
 
 Cunning 
 
 Capricious 
 
 . 84 
 
 Crafty 
 
 Catalogue . 
 
 165 
 
 Custom 
 
 Cause 
 
 . 141 
 
 Chastisement 
 
 Candid 
 
 68 
 
 Cleverness 
 
 Charm • 
 
 . 37 
 
 Conciseness . 
 
 Changeable 
 
 84 
 
 Confidence 
 
 Certainty 
 
 . 130 
 
 
 Censure 
 
 114 
 
 Despise 
 
 Civil 
 
 . 58 
 
 Disdain 
 
 Comfort 
 
 117, 140 
 
 Direct . 
 
 Command 
 
 . 116 
 
 Delude 
 
 Compassion 
 
 132 
 
 Desert . 
 
 Completely 
 
 . 23 
 
 Distinguish 
 
 Compulsion 
 
 119 
 
 Discriminate 
 
 Coercion 
 
 Declare . 
 
 Constraint 
 
 
 Delighted . 
 
 Confiict 
 
 
 Dull 
 
 Combat 
 
 > . .111 
 
 Dastardly . 
 
 Contest 
 
 Dissimilar 
 
 Contention 
 
 
 D ifferent 
 
 Consolation 
 
 140 
 
 Distinct 
 
 Conception 
 
 . 124 
 
 Durable 
 
 Concealed . 
 
 75 
 
 Delightful 
 
 Conquer 
 
 . 39 
 
 Delicious 
 
 Conjecture . 
 
 43 
 
 Deep . 
 
 Consequences 
 
 . 110 
 
 Diligence
 
 INDEX. 
 
 175 
 
 Displeasure 
 
 Diffidence 
 
 D istress 
 
 Dread 
 
 Dislike 
 
 Detestation 
 
 Deference 
 
 Delusion 
 
 Deceit 
 
 Deception 
 
 Determination 
 
 Decision 
 
 Display . 
 
 Discourse . 
 
 Diffidence 
 
 Donation 
 
 Discipline 
 
 Disaster 
 
 Depraved 
 
 Deceitful 
 
 Diversion 
 
 Dexterity . 
 
 Deed 
 
 Despotism . 
 
 Design . 
 
 Enrapture 
 
 Enchant 
 
 Entirely 
 
 Entreat . 
 
 Endure 
 
 Embarrass 
 
 Educate 
 
 Expostulation 
 
 Elegcint 
 
 Everlasting 
 
 Eternal 
 
 Expense 
 
 Effects . 
 
 Enemy 
 
 Envy 
 
 Emulation 
 
 Earth 
 
 Excepting 
 
 Except 
 
 Page 
 
 97 
 
 99 
 
 100 
 
 102 
 
 112 
 
 117 
 
 118 
 
 118 
 
 121 
 
 123 
 132 
 133 
 140 
 144 
 149 
 86 
 94 
 157 
 158 
 159 
 161 
 164 
 
 37 
 
 23 
 40 
 41 
 41 
 46 
 114 
 59 
 
 76 
 
 106 
 110 
 113 
 
 149 
 
 154 
 
 34 
 
 Extol 
 
 Eulogize 
 
 Exist . 
 
 Endue 
 
 Endow 
 
 Expressions 
 
 Elude 
 
 Employ . 
 
 Exact . 
 
 Emolument 
 
 Entertainment 
 
 Error 
 
 Famous 
 
 Forward 
 
 Faultless 
 
 For . 
 
 Fascinate 
 
 Forbid 
 
 Forsake . 
 
 Fine . 
 
 Foolish . 
 
 Fruitless 
 
 Frank . 
 
 Fool-hardy 
 
 Fleeting . 
 
 Forcible 
 
 Fickle . 
 
 Fear 
 
 Fright 
 
 Fortitude 
 
 Falsehood 
 
 Falsity 
 
 Fraud 
 
 Fancy 
 
 Faith . 
 
 Forgiveness 
 
 Fortitude 
 
 Feelings . 
 
 Fondness 
 
 Fatherly 
 
 Fraternal 
 
 Friendly 
 
 Fit . 
 
 Freedom 
 
 Page 
 
 50 
 51 
 
 52 
 
 134, 170 
 52 
 54 
 93 
 156 
 157 
 167 
 
 94 
 51 
 
 86 
 29 
 37 
 42 
 45 
 61 
 64 
 67 
 68 
 69 
 69 
 77 
 84 
 
 102 
 
 105, 138 
 
 118 
 
 118 
 
 124 
 
 130 
 
 131 
 
 105 
 
 132 
 
 145 
 
 92 
 
 92 
 
 92 
 
 93 
 
 162
 
 176 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 
 Pace 
 
 
 Garrulous 
 
 . 77 
 
 Implore . 
 
 Gallantry . 
 
 138 
 
 Indolent 
 
 Gaiety . 
 
 . 148 
 
 Inform . 
 
 Gentle 
 
 71 
 
 Ingenuous . 
 
 Genuine 
 
 . 75 
 
 Inhuman 
 
 Genius 
 
 136 
 
 Injunction . 
 
 Gift 
 
 . 140 
 
 Ingenuity 
 
 Glad > 
 Gratified J 
 
 . 65 
 
 Intrepidity . 
 
 Instruct . 
 
 Globe 
 
 154 
 
 In spite of   
 
 Goodness 
 
 . 127 
 
 Illusion . 
 
 Grief . 
 
 100 
 
 Imagination 
 
 Grand 
 
 . 80 
 
 Impediment 
 
 Glistening > 
 Glittering J 
 
 . 70 
 
 Indeed 
 
 Innocent 
 
 Graceful 
 
 59 
 
 Illustrious . 
 
 Grateful 
 
 07 
 
 Import . 
 
 Guide 
 
 42 
 
 Intent 
 
 Gain . 
 
 150 
 
 Intention 
 
 Good-natured 
 
 . 00 
 
 Indigence 
 
 Guilty 
 
 86 
 
 Instant 
 
 Hardly 
 
 23 
 
 Jealousy 
 
 Haughtiness . 
 
 . 108 
 
 Just 
 
 Hatred 
 
 112 
 
 Joyful 
 
 Handsome 
 
 61 
 
 
 Harangue . 
 
 132 
 
 Kingly 
 
 Hence 
 
 . 28 
 
 Kind . 
 
 Heroism 
 
 138 
 
 
 Hidden . 
 
 . 75 
 
 Lazy 
 
 History 
 
 122 
 
 Lasting 
 
 Hinderance 
 
 . 128 
 
 Law 
 
 Honest . . 
 
 62 
 
 Likewise 
 
 However 
 
 . 25 
 
 Liking . 
 
 Humility 
 
 133 
 
 Loveliness . 
 
 Heavy 
 
 85 
 
 Loquacious 
 
 Hint . 
 
 171 
 
 Lovely 
 
 Help . 
 
 . 159 
 
 Love 
 
 Loyalty 
 
 Idle 
 
 . 66 
 
 Loneliness 
 
 Inasmuch as 
 
 29 
 
 Liberty 
 
 Indignation 
 
 . 97 
 
 Liberal . 
 
 Industry 
 
 96 
 
 List 
 
 Ineffectual 
 
 . 67 
 
 Language 
 
 Incongruous ) 
 
 79 
 
 
 Inconsistent ( 
 
 Magnificent 
 
 80
 
 INDEX. 
 
 177 
 
 Mild 
 
 Meek 
 
 Mislead . 
 
 Mitigate 
 
 Meed 
 
 Melancholy 
 
 Modesty 
 
 Misfortune 
 
 Merely . 
 
 Munificent 
 
 Motherly 
 
 Maternal 
 
 Meaning 
 
 Mistake . 
 
 Malice 
 
 Matter . 
 
 Moment 
 
 Notwithstanding 
 Nearly . 
 Nevertheless 
 Narrative, narration 
 
 Nay . 
 Neglectful 
 Negligent 
 Novel 
 
 Own . 
 
 Open 
 
 Obstinate 
 
 Ostentation 
 
 Order 
 
 Opponent 
 
 Obstacle 
 
 Oration . 
 
 Origin 
 
 Observe . 
 
 Only . 
 
 Occupation 
 
 Permit . 
 
 Puzzle 
 
 Perplex 
 
 Prohibit 
 
 Presume 
 
 Proclaim 
 
 I- 
 
 Page 
 
 71 
 
 43 
 
 48 
 
 98 
 
 100 
 
 133 
 
 149 
 
 33 
 
 88 
 
 92 
 
 156 
 167 
 167 
 170 
 171 
 
 22,25 
 
 23 
 
 25 
 
 122 
 
 32 
 
 90 
 
 168 
 
 35 
 
 68 
 
 84 
 
 123 
 
 116 
 
 113 
 
 128 
 
 132 
 
 141 
 
 52 
 
 33 
 
 168 
 
 35 
 
 41 
 
 42 
 45 
 48 
 
 Polite 
 
 Polished 
 
 Pretty 
 
 Pleased • 
 
 Permanent 
 
 Perpetual 
 
 Powerful 
 
 Potent 
 
 Pleasing 
 
 Pleasant 
 
 Placid 
 
 Profound 
 
 Patience 
 
 Philanthrop 
 
 Prudence 
 
 Pride 
 
 Parade 
 
 Persuasion 
 
 Pardon 
 
 Pity 
 
 Parts . 
 
 Present . 
 
 Privacy 
 
 Praise 
 
 Promote 
 
 Precise . 
 
 Profit . 
 
 Punishment 
 
 Penalty 
 
 Project 
 
 Plan 
 
 Paternal 
 
 Purpose 
 
 Poverty 
 
 Pauperism 
 
 Quiet 
 
 Hash 
 
 Resign 
 
 Relinquish 
 
 Relieve . 
 
 Renounce 
 
 Recant 
 
 Romantic 
 
 Resentment 
 
 10 
 
 Pag« 
 
 58 
 
 61 
 
 65 
 
 67 
 
 167 
 
 77 
 
 82 
 
 82 
 
 85 
 
 105 
 
 88 
 
 107 
 
 108 
 
 123 
 
 125 
 
 131 
 
 132 
 
 136 
 
 14C 
 
 153 
 
 50 
 
 51 
 
 93 
 
 156 
 
 163 
 
 164 
 
 92 
 164 
 
 169 
 
 82 
 
 69 
 45 
 48 
 49 
 
 74 
 
 97
 
 178 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Recompense 
 
 Reward 
 
 Regret 
 
 Resignation 
 
 Reformation 
 
 Reform 
 
 Rigor 
 
 Relation 
 
 Rule 
 
 Regulation 
 
 Reason 
 
 Restraint 
 
 Resolution . 
 
 Repugnance , 
 
 Rebuke 
 
 Reproof 
 
 Remonstrance 
 
 Reprimand 
 
 Reproach 
 
 Request . 
 
 Reply 
 
 Rejoinder 
 
 Respect 
 
 Results . 
 
 Retirement 
 
 Remark . 
 
 Regal 
 
 Rend 
 
 Righteous 
 
 Renowned 
 
 Reliance 
 
 Recreation 
 
 Romance 
 
 Self-conceit 
 Secret 
 Scarcely 
 Still . 
 So . 
 Since . 
 Suffer . 
 Scorn . 
 Subdue 
 Subjugate 
 Supplicate 
 Solicit 
 
 Page 
 
 . 98 
 
 100 
 . 105 
 
 129 
 
 . 135 
 122 
 
 . 139 
 
 141, 147 
 
 . 119 
 
 121 
 
 . 112 
 
 114 
 
 40 
 
 116 
 
 117 
 
 110 
 
 153 
 
 52 
 
 92 
 
 56 
 
 92 
 
 94 
 
 166 
 
 157 
 
 168 
 
 • 
 
 108 
 75 
 23 
 25 
 28 
 29 
 35,41 
 38 
 
 39 
 40 
 
 Suffer . 
 
 Sway 
 
 Surmise 
 
 Suppose 
 
 Sincere . 
 
 Strange 
 
 Surprising 
 
 Silly 
 
 Stupid 
 
 Simple 
 
 Slothful 
 
 Sparkling 
 
 Stiining 
 
 Soft . 
 
 Sentimental 
 
 Strong 
 
 Savage . 
 
 Sublime 
 
 Splendid 
 
 Superb 
 
 Stubborn 
 
 Satisfaction 
 
 Shyness 
 
 Sorrow 
 
 Sadness 
 
 Show . 
 
 Security 
 
 Safety 
 
 Surety 
 
 Sentiments 
 
 Speech . 
 
 Sympathy 
 
 Severity 
 
 Sternness 
 
 Strictness 
 
 Statute 
 
 Solace 
 
 Source 
 
 Self-love 
 
 Selfishness 
 
 Sense . 
 
 Solitude 
 
 Seclusion 
 
 Solely 
 
 Simply 
 
 Save . 
 
 Pagb 
 41 
 42 
 
 43 
 
 62 
 
 63 
 
 64 
 
 66 
 
 70 
 
 71 
 
 74 
 
 77 
 80 
 
 80 
 
 84 
 96 
 99 
 
 100 
 
 123 
 
 129 
 
 132 
 132 
 132 
 
 135 
 
 139 
 140 
 141 
 
 143 
 
 147, 156 
 
 153 
 
 33 
 34
 
 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 i7y 
 
 
 
 Page 
 
 
 Pagi 
 
 Shun 
 
 
 52 
 
 Tolerance ( 
 Toleration J 
 
 166 
 
 Shall . 
 
 
 54 
 
 Spotless 
 
 
 . 86 
 
 Terms 
 
 . 170 
 
 Sinful 
 
 
 86 
 
 
 
 Suitable 
 
 
 . 93 
 
 Upright 
 
 62 
 
 Sly . 
 
 
 94 
 
 Understand 
 
 50 
 
 Sense 
 
 
 . 156 
 
 Useless . , 
 
 67 
 
 Skill . 
 
 
 158 
 
 Unlike . 
 
 . 73 
 
 Scheme . 
 
 
 . 164 
 
 Utility > 
 Usefulness \ 
 
 106 
 
 Spite . 
 
 
 167 
 
 Subject . 
 
 
 . 170 
 
 Understanding 
 
 . 147 
 
 Suggestion . 
 
 
 171 
 
 Use (to make, of) 
 Usage 
 
 54 
 
 . 158 
 
 That 
 
 
 . 21 
 
 
 
 Though 
 
 
 . 23,32 
 
 Variable 
 
 84 
 
 Through 
 
 
 . 24 
 
 Vanity . 
 
 . 108 
 
 Therefore 
 
 ) 
 
 
 Vain . 
 
 67 
 
 Then 
 
 { 
 
 28 
 
 Vanquish 
 
 . 39 
 
 Thence 
 
 ) 
 
 
 Virtue 
 
 127 
 
 Tolerate 
 
 
 . 35 
 
 Voluntarily 
 
 . 27 
 
 Think 
 
 B 
 
 43 
 
 Vigorous 
 
 77 
 
 Teach . 
 
 
 . 46 
 
 Vestiges 
 
 . 162 
 
 Thankful 
 
 
 67 
 
 Veneration . 
 
 117 
 
 Transient 
 
 I- 
 
 . 69 
 
 Valor . 
 
 . 138 
 
 Transitory 
 
 Vivacity 
 
 148 
 
 Timid 
 Timorous 
 
 I 
 
 71 
 
 Which . 
 
 . 21 
 
 Timidity 
 
 
 . 99 
 
 While 
 
 23 
 
 Too . 
 
 
 26 
 
 With . 
 
 . 24 
 
 Talkative 
 
 
 . 77 
 
 Willingly • 
 
 27 
 
 Terror 
 
 
 102 
 
 Wherefore 
 
 . 28 
 
 Tale 
 
 
 . 122 
 
 Well-bred . 
 
 58 
 
 Talents 
 
 
 136 
 
 Weak . 
 
 . 64 
 
 Tranquil 
 
 
 . 82 
 
 Wisdom 
 
 107, 136 
 
 Trial . 
 
 
 144 
 
 World . 
 
 . 154 
 
 Tenderness 
 
 
 . 145 
 
 Will . 
 
 54 
 
 '1 hough 
 
 
 32 
 
 Wicked . 
 
 86 
 
 Tear 
 
 
 . 56 
 
 Words 
 
 170 
 
 Trifling 
 Trivial 
 
 T 
 
 91 
 
 Wonderful 
 
 Weighty 
 
 . 63 
 
 85 
 
 Tyranny 
 
 
 . 161 
 
 Wrath . 
 
 . 16G 
 
 Traces 
 
 
 162 
 
 
 
 Trust 
 
 
 . 166 
 
 Yet 
 
 . 25
 
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 on the Road from Long Ago to Now,' which you have just published, and can- 
 not forbear saying that in all ray acquaintance with juvenile literature I know of 
 uothiug in many respects equal to this remarkable book, which contains in its 
 small compass the concentrated knowledge of vast libraries. It is the admirably 
 told story of past centuries of the world's progress, and the amount of study and 
 labor required in its preparation seems almost appalling to contemplate. One is 
 struck with the peculiar excellence of its style, — clear, easy, graceful, and pic- 
 turesque, — which a child cannot fail to comprehend, and in which ' children of a 
 larger growth ' will find an irresistible charm. That it will prove a favorite with 
 old and young, I have no doubt. It seems to me that nothing could be more en- 
 joyable to the boy of our period than the story of how the boys of all ages lived 
 aud acted." 
 
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 WHO LIVE ON THE ROUND BALL THAT FLOATS IN THE AIR. 
 
 Library Edition, $1 .00. School Edition, SO cents, net. By mail, 65 cents. 
 The Seven Little Sisters are typical of seven races; and the author's 
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 Tie Seven Little Sisters Prove Tleir Sisterhood. 
 
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 This may be considered a sequel to The Seven Little Sisters, in 
 which the nationalities are again taken up, and the peculiarities of 
 each, in relation to its childhood, are naturally and pleasingly given. 
 
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 These plays have been prepared to enable the children to take a 
 
 comprehensive view of the geography of the different countries, 
 
 after having studied portions of it from day to day. 
 
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 Exercises for the Improvement of the Senses. For Young cini. 
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 department of the highest importance, but one very much neglected in the 
 seminaries, and even in the higher literary institutions of our country." — 
 Rev. John Wilson, A.M., President of Wesleyan Female College, Wil- 
 mington, Del. 
 
 "I am so well pleased with it, that I have just put it into the hands of a 
 class of thirty. I have examined with care every book of this class, and am 
 satisfied that Professor Underwood's surpasses all similar books in the 
 beauty, appositeness, and value of its selections." — Professor A. B. Stark, 
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 with an historical introduction, which is followed by an alphabetical list of 
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 selected extracts from over a hundred and fifty American authors, with 
 s"hort biographical and critical notices prefixed to most of them. 
 
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 The examination of its well-hlled pages will bring to many a new revelation 
 of the real richness and variety of our young and vigorous literature." — 
 Boston Journal. 
 
 " I consider ' Underwood's American Authors ' the best book of the kind. 
 . . . I use it constantly in my classes." — Austin George, Professor of 
 English, Literature, Kalamazoo College, Kalamazoo, Mich. 
 
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