AWUNIVERS/A , .v 11 - ! -"v//_ AVluj'ANljLLcir/ c5&n ^1 -!^- _^ ^- s -2,>^x v^ %)jnv3jo^ ^-OF-CALIFO^ < s SIT! , M It ^UIBRARY/9/- V V\E UNIVER5 1 //, rjr ^AOS-ANGElfj o THE PHILOSOPHY OF NECESSITY; OB, NATURAL LAW AS APPLICABLE TO MOEAL, MENTAL, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE. BY CHARLES BRAY. SECOND EDITION, REVISED. " Let the Dead Past, bury its Dead." LONGMHOW. ' That no idea or feeling arises, save as a result of some physical force expended in pro- ducing it, is fast becoming a common-place of science." HEBBEBT SPKNCEK. 1 Everything that exists depends upon the past, prepares the future, and is related to the whole." OBKSTBD. 1 The ordinary events of History instead of being causes are merely the occasions on which the real causes act." H. T. BCCKLB. ' Society prepares crime, and the guilty are only the instruments by which it is executed." QCETBLET. ' The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of folly, is to fill the world with fools." ' When men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as authentic records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men than to write legibly on paper already scribbled over." HOUSES. LONDON : PRINTED AT THE HERALD OFFICE, COVENTRY. Stack Annex 5" PREFACE. THE establishment of the British Association for the Advancement of Social Science in October, 1857, was the practical recognition of the Principle that Mind is equally the subject of fixed law with Matter. The disputes touching Free Will and Necessity have hitherto been regarded as idle metaphysical controversy, having no practical result ; but Free Will implies contingency or chance, and contingency is fatal to Law, and without Law there can be no Science ; for Science is the power to predict the future from the past, by the aid of known, fixed, aud determinate law, excluding all contingency. Philosophical Neces- sity, then, and Law are the same thing ; and instead of the efforts to establish its truth being idle and worthless, its recognition must be the base of all progress, and can alone enable Social Science to take its place by the side of Physical, or indeed to deserve the name of Science at all. The object of this work is to inquire how far our present knowledge will enable us to apply this principle to mind and morals as it has hitherto been applied to Physics, and to determine thereby the important ques- tions of, What is man ? What are his obligations ? and How may they best be performed ? The writer is aware how imperfect a work must be where so wide a range of subject is compressed into so small a compass, and how un- attractive a dry detail of principles, without ornament and without illustration, is likely to be with respect to topics which, from their abstruseness, are ordinarily distasteful, even when touched by a master hand aud relieved by all the graces of style. Ambitious as the task would seem, and wide as is the space to be travelled over, it is not so great as it appears if we leave out all the mere assumption and speculation which time has hallowed and prejudice sanctified, and are guided only by the light of present discovery, aud proved and positive 1C IV PREFACE. science ; and he trusts therefore that the searcher after truth, who, like himself, has felt the want of fixed principles in Ethical Philosophy, will forgive the imperfections of the manner, and find something to interest him in the matter of the following pages. Physical science has made rapid strides, and knowledge has secured for us, to a vast extent, a dominion over earth, sea, and air. But the science of man, which alone can make this power available to the increase of happiness, has been in a corresponding degree neglected, and held to be of less importance than that knowledge which tends only to the increase of wealth. The knowledge that men have of their own minds, is ordinarily considered to furnish sufficient insight into human nature, without the aid of mental philosophy ; and in Moral and Social Science, the opinions to which they are born, based on the theology of their country, constitute to most individuals a standard of truth. Hence there is no subject on which such various and con- flicting opinions exist as upon that of the present inquiry ; people feel rather than reason, and these great questions are considered so purely controversial, as to be hitherto inadmissible into British Associations, Mechanics' and Philosophical Institutions, and all other Societies devoted to the moral and intellectual culture of the people. Men brought up in the same University, reading the same books, trained by the same studies, come to conclusions on these questions diametrically opposite. As an illustration of this diversity of opinion, Mr. G. W. Hastings, Hon. Secretary to the Social Science Association, is reported to have said at Glasgow, on the 20th of March, 1860 : " In regard to this Association, as it was called, for the Promotion of Social Science, he had heard several objections made to it. He had heard it said that there was no such thing as Social Science that the whole thing was a delusion that the term science was not applicable to the pursuits of the Association. He, however, must differ very strongly from such opinions. They might not be able to put their propositions in the same exact forms as the followers of the physical sciences had been able to do. But it was not very many years since some of the exact sciences themselves were in the very position in which Social Science was now ; and he thought the philosopher who had written so much upon the subject of Social Science had said truly that it was the PREFACE. V greatest of all sciences, for it embraced all problems connected with mankind, morally, intellectually, physically, and existed to solve that great question How could men live in a community to the greatest advantage of each other 1" On the other hand, at the meeting in Lon- don, last year, (1862,) we find the President of the Section on Social Economy, Richard Monckton Milnes, Esq., in his address, repeating the very objection against which the Secretary protests. He says, " I own I almost prefer the name of ' Social Economy' to that of ' Social Science,' because I have always felt that in treating upon social ques- tions it is hardly possible to do so in a really scientific manner." * * "If all mankind resembled one another; if you could predicate dis- tinctly either of a nation or an individual what the mind were to be ; if you could distinctly say that such and such a thing, such and such a series of actions, would produce such and such a series of results then, I think, it would be quite right that we should talk of Social Science. But when we see that, as in the work of education, you may apply the same educational processes to a considerable number of individuals, and yet produce totally different results ; when we see the same elements of civilization given to different nations, and yet those nations pro- ducing totally different results, both in their individual character and the place they occupy in the history of the world, I think we shall see that there enters into this question an element which is almost contra- dictory of strict scientific principle. That element is human liberty, the free-will of mankind. Without that free-will no man can have individual power of action, no man can call himself a man ; and this free-will, when applied to the community of nations, assuming all the forms of public opinion and public estimates of great questions, this itself so modifies the questions of Social Economy that I think you will see what I mean when I say I much prefer that definition to the stricter one of ' Social Science.'" Again, in opposition to this, we find the most advanced school of thinkers represented by Mr. H. T. Buckle, who says, " The actions of men being guided by their antecedents, are in reality never inconsistent, but, however capricious they may appear, only form one vast scheme of universal order, of which we in the present state of knowledge can . barely see the outline." He also says, "It will be as rare to find an VI PREFACE. historian who denies the undeviating regularity of the moral world, as it now is to find a philosopher who denies the regularity of the material world." A writer in the "Westminster Review," (Oct., 1861,) in an article on Professor Goldwin Smith, on the Study of History, says, "He (Mr. Smith) may think that the scientific view of history accepts the other horn of the dilemma the doctrine of Necessity. It does nothing of the sort. It stands upon its own proof. It leaves the antagonistic dogmas of metaphysics in their internecine struggles. It accepts and adopts the practical conclusions of both parties. * * How these two are reconciled, may still remain an insoluble problem in the eyes of meta- physicians, but it has now ceased to possess any interest or use. The practical issue is, that none believe the will to be the victim of circum- stance, and none believe it to transcend the sphere of knowledge. In the system of a great metaphysician Free- Will and Necessity are two contradictories, either of which is inconceivable. With our faculties, he says, it is equally impossible to conceive choice combined with certainty, as it is to conceive volition without a cause." (p. 307-8.) It has been this unwise and unworthy spirit of compromise, this attempt to hold both doctrines of Free-Will and Necessity, of not clearly seeing that if one is true the other must be false, that has led to all the inconsistencies on this subject, and obscured the knowledge, and pre- vented the advance of a true philosophy of morals. A man is said to be "free" so long as there is no "compulsion from without over- coming resistance from within," so long as there is no physical obstruction or mental derangement interfering with the exercise of his natural powers ; but it is evident that the will is the " victim of cir- cumstance," so far as it is entirely dependent upon these natural powers ; that a man did not endow himself with these powers, and although it is true he can do as he pleases, he can only please to act or will as they direct. It is of no use, therefore, trying any longer to temporise with this fact, but our ethical code and our ideas of moral responsibility must be brought into accord with it. There would be little use in Law and Order in Physics, if one-half of nature, and that the most important mind, were still left to chance or free-will, or rather "if choice were PREFACE. vii not combined with certaiuty." What is called knowledge of humau nature, and the skill, sagacity, or wisdooi that manages and commands mankind, is nothing more than a better acquaintance than ordinary of the laws of niind ; and our calculations of futurity thus formed, are made with almost absolute assurance of success. The recognition of Philosophical Necessity, or that Mind is equally the subject of law with Matter, involves the reconstruction of our whole ethical code, which must be rebuilt upon the principle that nothing is to be left to accident in the moral world, any more than in the physical. This element of chance must be excluded, for it has been truly observed that "five hun- dred people may be found to lead a forlorn hope, for five that would consent to take a red-hot poker in their bare hands." The present sys- tem, based upon a fiction, must be replaced by an exposition of natural law, and a clear elucidation of the natural and inevitable consequences of our actions. Instead of the recognition of Necessity " ceasing to possess any interest or use," as observed by the writer in the Westminster, we may mention as illustrative of the contrary, that if the doctrine be accepted and logically used, we get rid at once of Revenge, Remorse, and Punish- ment, except such as is for the good of the individual offending : for the first would be absurd, the second useless, as the recognized and experienced consequences of our actions are sufficient for our future guidance, and "forgiveness," or remission of punishment that was for our good would be simply an injury. Revenge, remorse, and retri- butive punishment are the sources of half the crime and misery in the world. The problem of man's nature, of the why and the wherefore ; of his relation to this world, and to the past, present, and future of his existence ; of the origin and object of evil, must always have an increasing and absorbing interest, and every one has his own solution of such problems, founded ordinarily upon tradition and feeling, and not at all upon science, or upon what we really can know ; and each trembles with alarm at every assault upon his time-honoured system, fearing that if his venerable solution must be laid aside, the bulwarks of virtue must go with it ; but such persons may share the consolation and satis- faction which it has given the present writer to find that morality and Vlll PEEFACE. virtue are based upon laws as fixed and determinate as the law of gravi- tation which upholds the universe itself, aud that the Universal Father thus reveals Himself, iu a language that cannot be misunderstood or misinterpreted, to every sect and every clime. Much in this Edition has been re-written, and much has been added ; and although time has only strengthened the conviction which the writer entertained of the truth of the Ethical principles of the work ; in its Political Economy it is believed that there is nothing now at variance with the doctrines so admirably laid down by J. S. Mill. The aspirations of the Socialists after community of interest and pro- perty are consigned, at least for many generations, to Utopia, although the economic principle in the form of Co-operative Societies, is shown to be making rapid progress. It must be added that this work makes no pretensions to literary merit. The writer has been too much in earnest to find out the truth, even to think of the graces of style ; he fears even that in some cases he has not been sufficiently full and explicit to make himself understood. This is a great fault, but he trusts that the seed thus sown will not in consequence be altogether fruitless, and that at no distant day, some mind more competent than his own to do justice to the all-important principles laid down, may be induced to do so by the imperfect effort now made. ERRATA. For " unusual" p. 208, line 24, read " universal." For "intentions" same page, line 31, read "intuitions."