LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE rovinces to the states, as theirs by right and inheritance, because the Spanish did not think that they could defend them against Louis XIV. But William III., then Stadtholder, declined the possession of these countries, chiefly because he fore- saw in the religious differences an unconquerable hindrance to assimilation. So the Netherland provinces passed from the Spanish government into that of Austria, without having even bettered their destiny by that move. And thus we behold Belgium in its depths of impotency, while we shall see Holland mount the very summit of its power. The influence exerted by the united Netherlands upon the affairs of Europe since the twelve years' truce is very pronounced. After the expiration of this armistice during which, however, the Avar in India was waging, war was again kindled between Spain and the states. But at that time the weakness of Spain was such that even a Spinola was no longer able to arouse energy in the course of proceedings against the revolted countries. 28 Holland and Belgium. The military equipments of the states were also very slight, and in the year 1628 moreover the Prince of Orange did not once enter the field. However, it was in the year 1648 that Spain hrst consented to acknowledge the states as sovereign countries, in the peace of Minister (Westphalia) which was a document written on mere paper, despite the value which the states placed upon the event, not on pergament, and only signed with Yo el rey (I the king). This struggle had lasted altogether now eighty years. Whole generations had been born and had died without having any knowledge of peace (in their own country at least), except by hearsay. And yet the desire for this peace was so feeble, that the conclusion of the same on Holland's part met with great opposition. We have shown how during the war trade and industry had been elevated to the highest pinnacle. Moreover art and science also were flourishing. The universities of Leyden, Franeker, Utrecht and Harder- wyck were founded, and the masterpieces of the Netherland School, Avhich still form so essential a part of the wealth of the picture galleries of Europe, are off- springs of that stormy period and the one succeeding. To be sure, the state was in debt, but individuals enjoyed immeasurable prosperity and luxury. For example, in the case of the flower trade, a most decided contrast to the mercantile solidity of the Hollanders, they sold and bought such perishable wares as the bulbs of tulips and hyacinths at five and six thousand florins a pound. If war had not become a necessity to the Hollanders, it was however a custom ; they waged it, of course, Avith their own money, but with foreign blood, on foreign seas and in foreign lands. But peace lasted only four years, when the Nether- land navy set sail against England, Portugal and Sweden. England, at that very moment preparing itself for Holland and Belgium. 29 the part which it intended to play in the monarchy of the seas, did not mistake the dangerous rival which it had in the young state across the channel. England was already a formidable maritime power, the united provinces would become such in the contest which was destined to preclude them from it. But in spite of the superiority which the number and greater size of their ships secured to the English, they were unable by two military invasions to vanquish the power of the provinces on the sea. Under com- manders like Wassenaer, Ruyter and Tromp, this power kept its place everywhere, Avas just as oft con- queror as conquered, and it even dared at the close of this war to pass up the Thames as far as Chatham, where it partly captured and partly burned the royal ships lying there. At this crisis in London they did not know how to protect themselves from the visit of the Netherlander unless by sinking their ships in the Thames. But while the navy of the states was playing such a glorious part, their land force had fallen into such a decline that the Bishop of Munster was emboldened to invade them with an army, and while they were threaten- ing the queen of the sea in her capital, they were forced to call upon France for aid against the ecclesiastical lord. This total ruin of the land force was partly wrought on purpose, and the reason for it is to be found in the jealousy which the magistrates had of the Prince of Orange. That is to say, this family had scarcely won for the country its independence, before the country began to fear lest it should lose this through the family. With a kind of distrust which evinced little of the gratitude owed by the states to William the Silent and his family, the most of its members having sacrificed their own lives in battle for the sake of these very states, they carefully excluded the descendants of the family from all posts and influence. 30 Holland and Belgium. The opposition to the house of Orange was repre- sented by two distinguished men, namely, Oldenbarne- veldt, the pensioner of the Council of Holland, and his successor, de Witt. Both regarded it as very hazardous to give the warlike descendant of William I. any power in governmental affairs ; they found it advisable to keep the supreme power in various degrees of modification for the states-general (that is, the deputies) of the pro- vinces, but chiefly for themselves as representatives of the province which was by far the most powerful. The influential body of merchants especially agreed with them as regards this, for they, mindful of instances like those of all the reigns from the time of Charles of Burgundy to that of Anjou and Leicester, certainly had no cause to wish again for the government of a single man. A few violent measures of Prince Morice and William II. had still further injured the cause, a pro- ject of the latter respecting Amsterdam had miscarried, and William III. during his minority lost all that dis- tinguished him from a private citizen. The attitude of opposition of the Orange house to the people of the Netherlands was an extraordinary one, and in order not to spoil everything there was need of great moderation and circumspection, which signally distinguished the acts of the princes of this house. Their claims for a higher position were never established by a convention or a resolution. They rested merely on the great services rendered the state, and were therefore only the more honoured. Since the Union of Utrecht each of the united provinces formed a perfectly independent sovereign state in itself, whose regents were the deputies chosen from the whole body of the nobility and the cities and appointed states-general. For general affairs of all the provinces, such as war and peace, taxation, treaties, etc., there was a committee of the states, the members of which were called the states-general, and these were very much inclined, although unjustly, to regard them- Holland and Belgium. 31 selves as the supreme power. Besides this actually highest power, there was wont to be moreover a seem- ing one, that is, the office of the stadtholder although there was no longer a foreign regent that he had to represent. But the stadtholder outwardly represented the state, and through the lustre of his ancestry and his own person it was intended that he should inspire esteem in foreign powers. Generally, beside the regency over several provinces he united also in time of war the offices of general and admiral, because it was found that by the centralization of the powers it was possible to act with more strength, and at that time his influence indeed was very considerable. Now, at the verv moment the high magistrates excluded the Orange family from these offices and to a certain extent had even abolished these offices, there existed a strong and wide-spread feeling in their favour. For them were the remembrance of distinguished services and a vast following among the people. Certainly, a prince fond of war must have been more congenial to the nobility, although they felt that they were very much in the background, than the corps of high-mightinesses, and furthermore the common man, accustomed to his earls and custodians from by-gone and happier days, loved the brilliancy and pomp of a liberal, princely lord, who distributed honours and favours, while the states issued the writs only for taxes and duties. The Orange party, for reasons conceivable, had a following also in the army, so far as there was such a thing. Since ties of relationship bound the interests of the house of Orange to the royal family of England, de Witt threw his whole influence upon the interests ol* France. For this reason the naval force had to be elevated to an imposing position, but the land force to be diminished as much as possible. In this policy the mercantile frugality of the states seconded him. The appointments of officers in the troops still remain- 32 Holland and Belgium. ing after a series of reductions, were possessed by the cousins of the burgomaster, and their whole duty was to spend their incomes and be anti-Orange. But the allied states were of themselves about to undergo an experience, with less pain to themselves, which they could have acquired from the example of others in history, namely, how dangerous is a division of the controlling power in the state, especially at a time when powerful neighbours are ready to enrich themselves through the weakness of others. Such a restless neighbour had the states par excellence in Louis XIV. This monarch believed that he had certain claims on the Spanish Netherlands. To ease his conscience he ordered his council and some of the clergy to investi- gate these claims, and both found that they were well established. Moreover Europe's criticism respecting these was, that they could be better confirmed by cannon than on legal grounds, and the king also deter- mined to lend them the necessary strength by the help of a considerable army. De Witt purposely shut his eyes to that which cer- tainly was easy to see, but which was destined to carry with it the overthroAv of himself and his regime. He stoutly opposed every advancement of the Prince of Orange, he reduced the army still further, and he regarded himself and the state, moreover, fully assured of the friendship of France, when the storm did burst forth which all men, conjectured must end the exist- ence of the united Netherlands. France and England, then the two greatest powers in Europe, declared war with the states ; Sweden and the Bishop of Munster, and the Crown Prince of Cologne joined in this with a great force, and the Netherlands, hard pressed, abandoned by their allies, and overwhelmed with warfare, had no other hopes than in their own strength, and in the possible aid of remote Spain and Brandenburgh. Holland and Belgium. t>3 The states made the most humble remonstrances, but in vain. Their humility was so great that England was almost constrained to find an excuse for with- drawal. The future conquests were meanwhile dis- tributed beforehand. An army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, and at that time men were not accustomed to such armies, under generals like Turenne and Conde, with the King of France at its head, advanced along the sea (1672). Gelderland, Utrecht and Overyssel were immediately lost, Fries- land and Groningen were in the possession of the enemy, and the floods alone hindered the French from advancing into Holland. The fortresses fell one after another, even the strongest, almost without resistance. Ostend, for example, was surrendered to the king in just as many days as it had years withstood Spinola. Louis XIV. saw himself in the brilliant light of a great conqueror, and selected the right moment to return to Madame de Montespan. During the time of this unparalleled success a formid- able English fleet sailed up on the opposite side intend- ing to land and conquer the last spot in Holland where the independence of the states had fled for refuge. And the states had nothing to oppose to all these threaten- ing storms but twenty thousand bad, undisciplined men, under commanders who had neither courage nor knowledge of war. And besides there were quarrels, as usual, in the interior, and divided opinions with regard to the measures to be adopted. It actually required all the power of Louis XIV. and a miracle to prevent the annihilation of the state. A double ebb, which lasted twelve hours, and a hurricane immedi- ately following it, prevented the landing. This incident was very rare in spring and autumn, but had never happened, as on this occasion, in summer. Finally those on land had to thank the presumption of Louis XIV. for what otherwise they had expected to thank his generosity. The excess of his demands VOL. I. D 34 Holland and Belgium. drove the despairing people back to their own strength, and from this they Avere obliged now to expect their own rescue. De Witt and his party perished in the press of these circumstances. This distinguished man, who, in addition to a decided passion for power, possessed all the qualities of a great statesman, together with his brother, the meritorious Admiral de Witt, was murdered by the mob in a shocking manner. Previous to this the Prince of Orange had been appointed by general acclamation as Stadtholder and Captain-General, and these offices were to be hence- forth hereditary. Although many conditions had been stipulated on the part of France favourable to the Prince in the proposals for peace, yet he declared, when interrogated, that the proposals were in every respect unacceptable, and that one would rather perish than agree to them. The army was made up anew, and organized, and if William III. was not successful in his undertakings with this new army, great honour is due to him for having warded off a disgraceful peace by his firmness, just as he it was also who later, as King of England, again destroyed, at least partially, the threatening increase of France's supremacy. The relations continued to shape themselves, without much action on the part of the states, more and more favourably, especially because of the presence of the imperial troops ; and thus the Netherlands emerged from a conflict in which the greatest victory was the preservation of their existence. The Peace of Nimeguen (1679) restored the state of the United Netherlands. From this time on this state waged no more wars with England. Both countries naturally united against the threatening supremacy of France, and just as William III.'s ancestor a hundred years before had broken the ascendancy of Spain, so William III. of Holland and Belgium. 35 Orange seemed now destined to check the devastating torrent of French tyranny. Therefore the Netherlands soon saw themselves involved in new Avars. The first lasted seven years, and, according to the Peace of Ryswick, the states con- tinued in possession of all that they had before. But the war cost them six hundred million florins. The second lasted eleven years. It was the cele- brated AVar of the Spanish Succession. William III. died without seeing the favourable issue which the united armies of Marlborough and Eugene Avon by fighting. This Avar achieved its purpose on the Avhole, so far as the humiliation of Louis XIV. Avas con- cerned, and it Avould have achieved much more had not a quarrel over a Avoman at the English Court overthroAvn Marlborough in spite of his battles, and had they been as skilful in concluding peace as in carrying on Avar. According to the Peace of Utrecht, the Spanish Netherlands (1715) passed into the possession of Austria, and the United Provinces received, by the so-called " Barrier Treaty," the right to garrison several for- tresses in the noAv Austrian Netherlands. But this was all that they gained from their almost excessive struggles for the common cause. Since the time of the origin of the state of the United Netherlands by the Union of Utrecht until the Peace of Utrecht one hundred and thirty-four years had expired, and of these thirty were years of peace, but one hundred and four years of Avar. These years were, moreover, perturbed by continuous internal quarrels, by Avars in East India, and by the services given to other states. These had required an outlay of forces which seemed to be Avholly out of proportion to the size of the state. In the year 1672 the united Anglo-French navy Avhich set out against the states consisted of one hundred and one large warships ; these were armed d 2 36 Holland and Belgium. with more than six thousand guns, and manned by thirty-five thousand men. The States opposed them with ninety-one warships, together with sixty-five fire- ships and pinnaces, and they won the battle. These were the greatest navies which ever before or since have been seen on the sea. Each of them sur- passed in size the celebrated Armada of Philip II. In the year 1673 the Netherlands equipped seventy- five warships, forty-three smaller ships with forty-three hundred cannon, and twenty thousand men ; and when William III. reorganized the army, they put sixty-six thousand men in the field. This turbulent and active period in the history of the Netherlands is at once that of their greatest splendour and their florescence. The very debts of the govern- ment, and these were the only vestiges traceable in the country, of so many wars were profitable for individuals. The abundance of currency was so great and the credit of the government so little impaired that it could , obtain at any moment in the country vast sums at a small interest. Gold was so abundant that they did not desire to pay up the state debts. Such wealth and the gigantic achievements and vigorous efforts of the states had procured for them a position and an influence in the political world which little accorded with the marked disregard with which other powers, and especially France, took care to treat the " Merchant State." And if they charged it to the states as an insult that the latter claimed on one of their medals " to have aided kings, protected and reconciled them, to have maintained the freedom of the seas, and to have restored the peace of Europe," then the only occasion for it was, very truly, that so small a power had dared to tell the truth. But the political greatness of Holland was an exalted position, one which could not last. The peace which elevated the other states produced the overthrow of this one. Holland and Belgium. 37 William III., who reigned in England under many limitations, enjoyed in the Netherlands the most marked respect, so that the French did not without reason call him the King of the Netherlands and the Stadtholder of England ; but with him ceased the male issue of the Nassau-Orange house, and the parties used this circum- stance to remove the rest of the members of the Orange house from high positions and to re-establish a govern- ment without a Stadtholder. The result of this was the total ruin of the army. It is true that the War of the Spanish Succession, that most successful of all Nether- land campaigns, happened after the death of the Stadt- holder, but it was conducted with the army and all the arrangements which he had called into being. How bad the condition of the military of the Netherlands became is demonstrated by the ease with which the French in the new war of the year 1747 took possession of their barrier towns. In this year thirty-live thousand men belonging to the troops of the state were French prisoners, that is, nearly their whole army. Business also declined, and the principal reason for this was that other nations were now carrying on a commerce with the East Indies, their shops and manu- factories stopped, and the Hollanders thus had to withstand enormous competition. It further happened that while the states, in order to render France's dangerous proximity less menacing, had bound them- selves closely to England, England itself, a no less dangerous nation on the sea, had increased its own maritime power by the ruin of that of France to such an extent that soon the navy of the Netherlands was no longer a match for it. Thus after a long period of peace the United Pro- vinces had considerably fallen from their ascendency, and they offer little that interests our observation, excepting the internal conflict between the Orange and anti-Orange parties. The origin of this opposition coincides with that of the State, and its continuance 38 Holland and Belgium. during the whole duration of the same manifests itself at times in open combat, at times in secret intrigue. At the death of William III., who died without issue, all influence of the house of Orange was again lost, but the French invasion about the middle of the eighteenth century brought William IV. again to the helm of state by the vote of the people. The great likeness of the destiny of this Stadtholder with that of his royal predecessor, William III., has been generally noted. The one, like the other, was born after the death of his father, and with an unusually tender and weakly constitution. During their minority they lost all rights which their forefathers had possessed. Both married daughters of English kings, and in consequence of unsuccessful wars threatening the state with destruction, as well as of popular uprisings which broke out both times in V eere, both were elevated to the same dignity in the United States, which position was henceforth declared to be hereditary in the male and female line. Still the opposition party was not destroyed. Under William V. it lifted its head with new power, especially in the last quarter of the last century, and it really continued to be in possession of the greatest part of the actual power in the state. Holland and its powerful, wealthy, and arrogant Amsterdam were the chief supports of this faction, which applied to itself the name of the Patriots, so as to show by this that their opponents, the Orange party, are not Patriots, but the opposite. The most open acts of injustice and persecution were permitted against this party ; the hereditary Stadtholder was attacked in the most dis- honourable manner, insulted, and overwhelmed with calumnious writings. Indeed, it went so far as to take from him the command over the troops in the Hague, and this Prince could not defend himself from such unlawful attacks and insults without arousing a civil war. Incited by the aid of foreign powers, and fearful lest the party favouring the Prince in the states Holland and Belgium. 39 assembly could yet win the upper hand, the Patriots of Amsterdam in April of 1787 determined upon measures of violence, they changed the council in the said city, in Rotterdam and Utrecht, and ordered their troops to march to the aid of their supporters in those cities. At this moment the Prince of Orange came out with a final declaration, which encouraged his supporters to appear publicly, and then it became very manifest that the greater part of the nation was for the Stadt- holder. The Patriots, although whole battalions of them went over, put their trust meanwhile in their armed civil corps, and in the protection of France, since they supposed that France would not have expended sixty million pounds in vain, which, according to the calcula- tion of Calonne, was the cost of the Netherland matter. But a speedy end was brought to these intrigues by the invasion of twenty-four thousand Prussians. The Patriots had stopped the Consort of the Stadtholder, the Princess Willielmina of Prussia, sister of Frederick William II., on her journey to the Hague near Schoon- hofen, and after delaying her thirty-six hours had sent her back without many ceremonies. The king, her brother, who had previouly abstained from all inter- ference, demanded satisfaction for this conduct, and when it did not follow after repeated summons, he granted its originators a limit of four days in which to explain themselves. When this set time had elapsed without conclusive answer, the Duke of Brunswick, September, 1787, advanced with three columns to Nymegen, Amersfort, and Zutphen. Not turning aside to visit a French camp of forty thousand men, which was said to have been located near Givet, the army was before the walls of Amsterdam in a few days, which for three centuries past had not seen an enemy. The opposition of the Patriots was just as feeble as their arrogance had previously been great. 4