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 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
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 BIOLOGY, 
 
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, BASED ON 
 
 THE SIMPLE REACTION 
 
 THESIS PRESENTED TO THE 
 
 FACULTY OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY FOR THE DEGREE 
 OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 JOSEPH HERSCHEL COFFIN 
 
 1907 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, BASED ON 
 
 THE SIMPLE REACTION 
 
 THESIS PRESENTED TO THE 
 
 FACULTY OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY FOR THE DEGREE 
 OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 JOSEPH HERSCHEL COFFIN 
 
 1907 
 
BIOLOGY^ 
 LlBRARf 
 
 THE COMMONWEALTH PRESS, 
 
 O. B. WOOD, 
 WORCESTER, MASS. 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 
 BASED ON THE SIMPLE REACTION 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 1 
 
 The author began the experiments upon which this paper 
 is based, in the fall of 1904, with the view of ultimately for- 
 mulating some sort of definition of voluntary action, and of 
 outlining, as accurately as might be, the psychology of it. 
 The impulse which prompted this bit of research seems to 
 have been one in common with a general impulse toward a 
 more complete and satisfactory explanation of the problem 
 which action sets to psychology. For, within the last year 
 (1906), a number of articles and books have appeared, 
 notably Ach's Willensthatigkeit und das Denken, and the 
 Garmann Festschrift, all of which attack the problem of 
 will, and of voluntary action. 
 
 Generally speaking, it is safe to say that the phenomena 
 of voluntary action have been, and are, the least understood 
 of any group of psychical phenomena. In the course of the 
 development of psychology, the chapter on ' will ' has inva- 
 riably presented great difficulty to the various psychologists, 
 no matter to what school they may have belonged. It has 
 probably provoked more sheer speculation than any other set 
 of mental phenomena, and also lies at the bottom of a greater 
 number of errors and misconceptions than anything else. 
 Moreover, a great amount of the confusion which has arisen 
 within the science of psychology itself, both with regard to 
 its relation to the other sciences and to philosophy, can 
 doubtless be traced to the different interpretations which 
 have been given to attention, will and voluntary action. His- 
 torically, at least, the so-called psychological discussions of 
 will have, in many instances, been purely metaphysical; and 
 where not so, the explanations have led to many and various 
 logical difficulties. 
 
 So it is not surprising that Experimental Psychology, with 
 its more advanced methods, and keener insight, should ap- 
 proach the problem of voluntary action, together with other 
 higher, more intimate and more purely psychical processes, 
 with hope and some degree of confidence; and neither is it 
 
 1 See Appendix F. 
 
 175124 
 
4 COFFIN 
 
 surprising that the movement should be a general one. The 
 history of science reveals the fact that advancement has 
 usually been effected by independent, but simultaneous dis- 
 coveries by different individuals. Hence, in relation to the 
 above-mentioned books and articles, this article may appear 
 to be a timely one. 
 
 The Reaction Experiment has had a long and varied life, 
 and has been put to many uses. As a psychological experi- 
 ment, it was in its infancy from 1820, when Bessel began to 
 investigate the difference in observation times in astronomy, 
 and discovered what he called the 'personal equation,' to 
 1850, when the need was felt for a more accurate method of 
 observation, and the Registration Method (chronoscope) 
 was introduced. During this period it meant little more 
 than a possible means of standardizing individual differences, 
 in the matter of correct transit observations. In 1856, 
 Mitchell undertook to get the absolute 'personal equation,' 
 by the introduction of the Reaction Experiment proper. He 
 called it the 'personality of the eye,' however, thinking it a 
 defect of that organ. And in this connection, Hartmann 
 discovered in 1858 that expectation and surprise greatly 
 affect the personal equation : in all of which we have the 
 glimmering of its psychological importance. 
 
 Thus the Reaction Experiment was rinding its way into 
 psychology from astronomy. But 30 years after the per- 
 sonal equation had been discovered Helmholtz (1850) con- 
 ceived the idea of using the Reaction Experiment to meas- 
 ure the rapidity of neural excitation and transmission; so 
 physiology became interested in it also, at a very early date. 
 It was about this time that Donders worked out his set of 
 experiments on the rapidity of thought, which he believed 
 would be represented by the difference between the reaction 
 time and the physiological time, which he thought he already 
 knew. He therefore combined the physiological and psy- 
 chological aspects of the experiment and made explicit its 
 psychological value. His classic A, B, and C methods are 
 familiar to every one who is familiar with the Reaction Ex- 
 periment. And it was upon this as a basis that Wundt be- 
 gan experimenting on the Reaction in 1861. 1 
 
 l For a History of the Reaction, see Sanford, A. J., 2, pp. 
 1-38. 
 
 Cf. Titchener, "The Leipsig School," Mind, 1892, pp. 206- 
 534; and Manual of Psychology, Vol. 2, Pt. II, p. 356 f. 
 
 Also note that Titchener paralleled his exposition of action 
 with the Reaction Experiment in his Primer of Psychology 
 (1898), and in his Outlines of Psychology (1895). 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 5 
 
 During: the 70's there were many reaction experiments 
 performed. Exner (Hermann's Handbuch, Vol. II, Pt. I, 
 pp. 262 ff.) found ten different researches, one of the impor- 
 tant ones of which was that carried on in Helmholtz's labo- 
 ratory by von Kries and Aurbach (Arch. f. Anatomy u., 
 Physiologic, 1877, 297 ff.), the object of which was to find 
 out how sensations are worked up into ideas. 
 
 Thus far, then, we have noted four uses to which the Re- 
 action Experiment has been put; (1) in astronomy, the 
 personal equation; (2) in physiology, measurement of the 
 rapidity of nerve currents; (3) method of finding rapidity of 
 thought; and (4) a way of studying consciousness. The last 
 two have significance for psychology, and it is plain that 
 Astronomy and Physiology have offered Psychology a most 
 fruitful method for the study of mental processes. 
 
 But throughout the history of the Reaction Experiment, 
 as used by psychologists, until comparatively recently, the 
 main interest has always been the temporal measurement of 
 conscious processes. Great tables of reaction times have 
 been made; the effects of practice, fatigue, warning signals, 
 strength of stimulus, etc., were worked out at great length, 
 and their effects on the reaction times noted. Great elabora- 
 tion in technique was made, but small advance in introspective 
 data, as to the constituents of the action consciousness itself. 
 Introspection was used mainly as a check upon the experi- 
 ment, telling the direction and degree of attention, etc. 
 
 Without doubt, the most consistent and systematic account 
 of the Reaction Experiment for psychology, historically con- 
 sidered, has been Wundt's treatment of it in the various 
 editions of his Grundziige. Here, as elsewhere, in the early 
 treatment of the experiment, the emphasis is placed on the 
 temporal relation of the ideas, as they run their course ; and 
 it is the chronoscopic results as to the actual time duration 
 of the various processes that are of interest to him. A state- 
 ment of Wundt's position with regard to the Reaction will 
 probably best illustrate the general attitude toward the ex- 
 periment, as represented in the literature of the 70's and 
 80's. This attitude would best be gleaned, however, from 
 the first four editions of the Grundziige, for in the fifth edi- 
 tion, his own position is slightly shifted with regard to the 
 matter. 
 
 The fourth division of the first edition of the Grundziige 
 (1874), Wundt devotes to a consideration of "Consciousness 
 and the Course of Ideas." The first chapter of this division 
 takes up consciousness and attention. Omitting, for the 
 present discussion, his analysis and characterization of at- 
 tention as such, and his exposition of perception and apper- 
 
6 COFFIN 
 
 ception, the important point in connection with what is to 
 follow, is, that attention is regarded as the first condition of 
 all clear ideation. The second chapter of this division is 
 entitled, "The Course and Association of Ideas." And here 
 it is that the discussion of the Reaction Experiment occurs. 
 According to this account, then, there are two ways open to 
 the psychologist by which the course of ideas may be studied. 
 One may either seize upon and analyze the course of memory 
 images which constitutes so large a part of our mental life, 
 or one may investigate the changes of ideas dependent upon 
 sensation, i. <?., those that are originated from without. 
 The former of these is the method which has been em- 
 ployed heretofore. But at the basis of this method there 
 lies a fundamental fallacy: viz., it has been supposed that the 
 course of the ideas repeats, without essential change, the 
 temporal course of the original sensations ; which supposition 
 need not be true. The second method, then, is the one which 
 must be adopted. And the first task, accordingly, is to in- 
 vestigate the general laws governing the temporal course of 
 ideas as based upon experimental investigation of the rela- 
 tion of their formation and succession, to the original outer 
 stimulus. Now the simplest case of this kind is given when 
 a simple sensation is perceived as a stimulus, in response to 
 which a simple movement is to be made, when the impres- 
 sion has been apperceived: i. e., attended to. To supplement 
 this, it is necessary to have some sort of time measuring 
 apparatus, some way of determining the time elapsing be- 
 tween the giving of the stimulus and the muscular response 
 which follows. The whole situation is a succession of very 
 simple mental processes, given under uniform conditions, 
 and capable of being investigated. It is a device for the 
 study of the course of ideas ; for it is necessary that an idea 
 of the impression shall be formed, that the movement shall 
 be determined upon, and that it be executed. The procedure 
 may, therefore, be factored into the five following steps : 
 (1) The transmission of the nervous impulse toward the 
 centre, (2) the perception of the stimulus, z. ., the entrance 
 of the sensation into the field of consciousness, (3) apper- 
 ception, or the entrance of the sensation into the focus of 
 attention, (4) the will-impulse, the willing of the action, and 
 (5) the transmission of the nervous excitation toward the 
 periphery. Of these, the first and last are purely physio- 
 logical, while the second, third and fourth are psychological 
 processes. And of the psychological group, the middle one, 
 apperception, is most important. As a matter of fact, how- 
 ever, the three stand in very close relation, for in the first 
 place, perception may be said to be little more than a pre- 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 7 
 
 liminary; it is the beginning of what, in its completion is the 
 clear, distinct apperception. This process is not only the 
 most important intrinsically, but also probably consumes 
 more time than the others. In the second place, the will- 
 impulse is more or less automatic in its action, the move- 
 ment having already been determined upon. In many cases, 
 to be sure, the will-impulse seems to be a separate act, and 
 to be so recognized in introspection, but in general one has 
 no knowledge of this separateness, but rather feels the two 
 things joined; and the will-impulse seems to be merely a 
 fruition of the potential nature of the apperception. And, in 
 short, we can do no better than to group all five processes 
 together and call the resultant complex, the 'reaction time.' 
 Of Jhis^we have every reason to believe that the greater 
 part "is^onsumed by the psychical, not the physiological part 
 ofTKe process. 
 
 Next in the exposition, Wundt gives the norms for the 
 various sense departments, under conditions of constant 
 quality and intensity of stimulus ; l nothing, however, being 
 said of the various types of reaction, depending upon the 
 direction of attention. Moreover, by making the various 
 stimuli liminal, he finds that the reaction times very 
 markedly approach each other, as to length. He therefore 
 concludes that the apperception time in all cases is the same ; 
 and that, where variations occur, they are due to differences 
 in the sense departments that mediate the stimulus. After 
 this, he inquires into the effect of intensity upon the reaction 
 time. Here, he finds that in general, increased intensity 
 shortens the time, in cases where attention has been con- 
 stant.' 2 He also worked with known and unknown stimuli, 8 
 in which experiments he found that reaction to a known 
 stimulus is of shorter duration than that to an unknown one. 
 Further, he gives results concerning expectation and dis- 
 tracting influences. 4 Entirely unexpected stimuli greatly 
 increase the time, and the presence of disturbing noises 
 likewise lengthens reaction times. In these and other com- 
 plications mentioned, the thing to be noted is, that the new 
 or changed element has its effect upon the apperception part 
 of the psychical process. Therefore, the thing to be empha- 
 sized is, that the nature, and temporal course, of the ideas in 
 that given moment of time are altered. Their kind, number 
 and duration, and their relation to each other in the complex 
 
 "Grundziige (1874), p. 730 ff. 
 2 Grundzuge (1874), pp. 733 ff. 
 8 Grundziige (1874), pp. 741 ff. 
 4 Grundzuge (1874), pp. 743 ff. 
 
8 COFFIN 
 
 changes with the variations of the conditions. This can be 
 measured in part, at least, by the chronoscope. No other 
 significance seems, then, to be here attached to the Reaction 
 Experiment, than that it is a means of exercising some ob- 
 jective control over the mental processes concerned in a 
 simple flow of ideas, during attention, aroused by a simple 
 external situation. No inkling is here given that the Reac- 
 tion Experiment furnishes a possible means of studying a 
 cross-section of a simple action, a use to which it has later 
 been put. 
 
 In the second edition (1880) Wundt first uses the term 
 'simple reaction.' And, following the first edition, the ex- 
 position of it is found in the chapter entitled "Apperception 
 and the Course of Ideas," the heading of the first paragraph 
 of which is, " Simple Reaction to Sense Impression." The 
 problem is stated here in almost the same words as used in 
 the previous edition ; the gist of which is, that it is our task 
 to investigate the course of ideas in a simple case in which 
 a simple train of ideas is aroused by an external impression. 
 And as a method, the simple reaction will serve better than 
 anything else. Here, the reaction is factored as in the pre- 
 vious treatment, and the figures used in regard to the norms 
 of various sense departments are here repeated, no mention 
 being made as yet of the types of reaction. 1 In short, the 
 problems taken up in the two editions are the same, with this 
 exception : in the second edition, he has discovered a further 
 means of studying apperception. It consists in the compli- 
 cation reaction. * Here, he introduces the discrimination and 
 choice reaction, and by manipulating the results, is able to 
 obtain temporal values for the interpolated processes. The 
 impression gained from a comparison of the two editions is 
 that, if any difference, Wundt uses the Reaction Experiment 
 more consciously and more systematically to illuminate the 
 course of ideas in the second than in the first edition. On 
 the other hand, he has a deeper interest in the Reaction Ex- 
 periment for its own sake ; he is inclined to develop all its 
 possibilities, as far as he sees them, and to make the system- 
 atic application later. But here, as before, the emphasis is 
 entirely upon the course of the ideas during the reaction 
 time. 
 
 Again, in the third edition (1887) the discussion of the 
 Simple Reaction occurs in the chapter entitled "Apperception 
 and the Course of Ideas." The problem here, as formerly, 
 is "the investigation of the general ilaws of the course of 
 
 'Grundziige (1880), pp. 219 ff. 
 2 Grundziige (1880), pp. 247 ff. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 9 
 
 ideas, based upon the experimental investigation of the re- 
 lation of their temporal formation and succession ; to which, 
 is added, in the next chapter, a second task : the investiga- 
 tion of the laws of the association of ideas, relying upon 
 introspection of their course freed from outer influences as 
 much as possible." And here again, the simplest case is 
 found in the simple reaction. Then follows the factoring of 
 the reaction just as it was made in the preceding edition. 
 
 The main advance which the third edition makes over the 
 first and second, in the matter of the analysis of the simple 
 reaction, lies in the fact that Wundt here accepts and incor- 
 porates the results of Lange who had been at work on the 
 factors of expectation and preparation. Lange said that the 
 differences in the reaction times were not to be referred en- 
 tirely to differences of practice, as had before been assumed, 
 but that there is a qualitative difference in the reaction, yield- 
 ing two types, depending for their quality upon the direction 
 of attention before and during the reaction. These, he 
 names the 'extreme muscular' and the 'extreme sensorial.' 
 In the first instance, the observer anticipates the motor in- 
 nervation and attends to the movement he is about to per- 
 form; in the second case, the whole strain of attention is 
 thrown toward the expected stimulus. This distinction, 
 Wundt accepts and designates the types the ' muscular ' and 
 the ' sensorial.' They are still described, however, with re- 
 gard to the content of the action consciousness. The one 
 type is explained by assuming that the act of apperception 
 is entirely eliminated, and that perception and will-impulse 
 probably coincide in point of time. The sensorial or com- 
 plete reaction is one in which all five factors are found, as 
 outlined above (p. 7). In this edition, the reaction is of 
 more intrinsic interest than heretofore; and various compli- 
 cating factors, such as unexpected stimulus, preparatory sig- 
 nal, distracted attention, the effects of drugs on the observer, 
 etc., find place in the analysis; and false reactions and pre- 
 mature reactions are analyzed. Besides these, the com- 
 pound reaction is further developed. Choice reactions, 
 choice between movement and rest, between two or more 
 movements, discrimination reactions and association reac- 
 tions are all developed and analyzed. While the systematic 
 place of all these things is to be found in relation to the 
 course of ideas during the period of reaction. They are all 
 made to illuminate the phenomena of conscious processes 
 which have their existence during the moment of time under 
 consideration. 
 
 In the fourth edition (1893) the treatment of the simple 
 reaction is the same as in the third, whereas the compound 
 
10 COFFIN 
 
 reaction receives more attention. The association reaction 
 is further developed, likewise the discrimination; while at 
 the close a few paragraphs are devoted to the subjects of 
 the tendency toward automatic co-ordination, and reflex 
 movement in the reaction, and their effects upon it. But as 
 regards the attitude toward the reaction, there is no change. 
 The value of the experiment lies in the fact that it furnishes 
 a means of studying the ideational content of mind during a 
 given measured period of time. 
 
 Before considering the exposition of the Reaction Experi- 
 ment as set forth in the fifth edition of the Grundziige, it is 
 necessary to notice a new tendency in the way of considering 
 the reaction. From what has preceded, it is plain that the 
 Reaction Experiment was made use of, up to this time, for 
 any one of four things : (1) to obtain reaction norms for 
 their own sake, (2) as an experimental control for determin- 
 ing the temporal course of ideas. It was assumed that, 
 since it takes time to make a reaction, there must be some 
 conscious content during that time, which conscious content 
 could be described as ideas. The reaction then, furnished 
 a means for factoring, and measuring the factors, the con- 
 scious processes contained within the limits of the reaction. 
 The assumption upon which this use of the Reaction Experi- 
 ment was based seems to be logical, to about the same de- 
 gree that it is psychological. (3) A large list of experiments 
 upon the determination of practice, fatigue, and various con- 
 ditioning factors of the reaction, following naturally from 
 (2). (4) A large number of experiments with the view of 
 determining the various types of reaction. 
 
 In addition to this, the experiment was made use of quite 
 extensively during the 90' s with the view of determining by 
 its aid, mental types; and also as a differential test in abnor- 
 mal psychology and artificial derangements. But little use 
 seems to have been made of Kiilpe's suggestion that the 
 reaction is a simple voluntary action, and that the latter is, 
 therefore, accessible to scientific investigation. Indeed, the 
 invest'igation seems to have received such impetus in the 
 direction already remarked, that it is only within the very 
 immediate past that the action consciousness has thus been 
 attacked by means of the reaction. 
 
 In 1893, the same year of the fourth edition, Kiilpe made 
 the following statement: "the reaction is an action in re- 
 sponse to a peripheral stimulus; and thus, action is accessi- 
 ble to scientific investigation." Looking at it from our 
 present vantage point, it seems strange that it had not been 
 considered in this light before. But the reason is doubtless 
 to be found in the fact that the interest which the reaction 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS II 
 
 brought with it from astronomy, and, later, from physiology, 
 were entirely foreign to the present psychological interest. 
 The original impetus was in the direction of the temporal 
 measurement of mental and physiological processes, and, 
 naturally, the investigation followed the direction already 
 marked out. It is difficult to evaluate the net result of the 
 great amount of experimentation which was carried on along 
 this line : certainly it was great. But the fact remains 
 that it was as the extreme swing of the pendulum; the reac- 
 tion experiment was carried past the point where it could do 
 the most good for psychology. Stress was laid upon what 
 now seems to us to be secondary considerations. But the 
 reaction experiment was eventually to find its rightful place; 
 and it was doubtless Kiilpe's statement that formed the turn- 
 ing point at which the new beginning should be made. The 
 new attitude is also reflected in Wundt, for, as was intimated 
 above (p. 5), he shifted his position in a measure to con- 
 form to it. 
 
 Accordingly, in the fifth edition (1903) of his Grundziige, 
 Wundt brings the chapter containing the exposition of the 
 reaction, in after the chapter on Will, and makes many ref- 
 erences back and forth. The chapter containing the discus- 
 sion of the reaction, is entitled "Consciousness and the 
 Course of Ideas," and is treated in the same connection as 
 in the earlier editions. There is, however, this very note- 
 worthy change of attitude; the reaction, which has hereto- 
 fore been used to determine the temporal course of ideas, 
 really involves an act of will; "the reaction process is a will 
 process, which is set up by an outer stimulus, in order to 
 terminate in a movement spontaneously following the ap- 
 perception of the stimulus, which movement is the reaction 
 movement." "The reaction experiment permits the analysis 
 of the conscious processes during action, at the same time 
 recording the objective time between the stimulus and the 
 movement." And again, " the reaction is the typical form 
 of the will process : here we can analyze will and its vari- 
 ous processes." These statements and others point conclu- 
 sively to the new attitude : that the reaction has come to 
 mean more than the temporal measurement of a set of men- 
 tal processes which follow each other in point of time. It 
 has come to be a matter of studying a simple voluntary 
 action. 
 
 In regard to the analysis of the simple reaction, the follow- 
 ing may be noted : It is here factored as in the preceding 
 editions, with the exception that the first and fifth events 
 physiological are divided yet further. The first may be 
 supposed to consist of (i) the stirring up of the sense organ, 
 
12 COFFIN 
 
 and (ii) the conduction of the nerve current to the appropri- 
 ate nerve centre. The fifth consists of (i) the conduction of 
 the peripheral excitation from the appropriate centre, and 
 (ii) the excitation of the muscle. The processes (2), per- 
 ception, and (3) apperception, and (4) will impulse, may 
 overlap each other, or some of them may coincide, or be 
 lacking (cf. above). The simple reaction, as an action, 
 may thus be further analyzed. The simplest case of re- 
 sponding to an outer stimulus is to be found when we await 
 a given sensation which is to be raised to an idea, and with- 
 out the interpolation of other processes, to make a simple 
 pre-determined movement upon its apprehension. It con- 
 tains, as psychical processes, the following things : the per- 
 ception of the stimulus, entrance into consciousness, the ap- 
 perception, or entering into the focus of attention, and the 
 formation of the will-impulse. A sensation, by virtue of 
 being a sensation, lies in the field of consciousness and ac- 
 companies the stirring up of the central mental tract, and is, 
 therefore, a psychophysical event. An especial activity, 
 which we perceive subjectively, is necessary in order to 
 direct the attention to such a sensation. But this may also 
 be a psychophysical event, for there is probably a nervous 
 change corresponding to it. Finally, the will impulse, which 
 closely follows apperception, is in the apperception of the 
 out-going movement. In the simple reaction, this consists 
 of the impulsive apprehension immediately following the 
 apprehension of the stimulus which takes place at the same 
 time that the excitation of the central motor tract is supposed 
 to occur. Therefore, the will impulse may also be consid- 
 ered to be psychophysical. 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that Wundt, in his last edition, 
 feels the force of the argument in favor of regarding the 
 reaction as the type of all voluntary action in general, it is 
 noteworthy that he still treats it as a way of studying the 
 course of ideas, the course of ideas during action. But he 
 gives us nothing particularly new with regard to the psycho- 
 logical facts; merely a new attitude toward the facts. On 
 the other hand, Kiilpe, at the time that he made the state- 
 ment that the reaction is a simple voluntary action in 
 response to a stimulus, says, "the duration of the reaction is 
 dependent upon external and internal conditions. . . . 
 The changes which are due to the internal conditions are of 
 greater psychological importance (than the external). Be- 
 sides altering the duration of the whole act, they usually 
 imply a qualitative modification of its contents. Especially 
 important in this connection, is the preparation of the subject 
 for the reaction." (Outlines, p. 407.) And again: "The 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 1$ 
 
 essential dependence of the whole process upon the intensity 
 of the preparation, is shown by the marked influence of the 
 time allowed for the concentration of the attention upon the 
 rapidity of the reaction." Now this preparation lies in 
 the conscious state of expectation. There is an apperceived 
 idea either of the impression, in which case we have the 
 sensorial reaction, or of the movement to be made, in which 
 case we have the muscular type. This apperceived idea, 
 using Wundt's terminology, is accompanied by, and is fused 
 with, the muscular adjustments that are characteristic of the 
 corresponding type. Hence, when the impression comes, 
 the movement goes off. In the ordinary way of conducting 
 the reaction experiment, then, the period between the signal 
 and the stimulus, the time of preparation, is, for Kiilpe, 
 the most important one. For the nature of the preparation 
 determines the quality and nature of the reaction. Here, 
 then, is something entirely new; while holding that the reac- 
 tion is a type of voluntary action in general, Kiilpe goes a 
 step further and says that the mental antecedents of the 
 reaction the preparation are the most important thing. 
 While in sharp contrast to this attitude, and in correspond- 
 ence to his previous conception of it, is Wundt's way of 
 regarding the reaction. While recognizing that the direction 
 which attention takes is largely responsible for the nature of 
 the reaction, it is the actual content of consciousness at the 
 time of the reaction itself to which he attaches importance. 
 This content is the so-called perception, apperception, and 
 will impulse ; and it is this in which he is interested. To 
 make the contrast more explicit, Kiilpe regards the time of 
 preparation for the action, from the 'now' to the stimulus, 
 as the most important, while Wundt still clings to the notion 
 that the conscious content from the stimulus to the move- 
 ment is the important part. This, then, shall be one part of 
 the problem set before us in this paper, which we shall en- 
 deavor to answer. We shall try to determine from a great 
 mass of introspective data obtained from the simple reaction, 
 which of these two periods in the process of action is of 
 greatest psychological importance. 
 
 In approaching the action consciousness by way of the 
 simple reaction, it may be well to get clearly in mind the 
 reasons why the reaction may be used in this way. Kiilpe 
 says (Outlines, p. 407), "the reaction is simply the exact 
 type of all actions, as they are termed in the psychology of 
 everyday life, which are initiated by an external stimulus. 
 . . . It is not difficult (p. 409) to discover analogies be- 
 tween the forms of the simple reaction and certain activities 
 or actions in everyday life. Every one must have had ex- 
 
14 COFFIN 
 
 periences which recall the premature or erroneous reaction ; 
 and every one knows the difference between two actions, one 
 of which is continuously directed by the idea of end, while 
 the other is accomplished step by step, as it were, each stage 
 in its execution requiring special preparation. When the 
 series of factors involved in an action has become familiar 
 by long practice, there can be no doubt of the advantage of 
 a constant idea of its ultimate end." Now why can we say 
 that * 'the reaction is the exact type of all action?" If we 
 may define action provisionally and in general terms, as con- 
 consciously conditioned movement, i. e., movement which 
 has motive, conscious antecedents and concomitant kinaes- 
 thetic sensations movement with a psychophysical set, it is 
 plain that the simple reaction may justly be termed an ac- 
 tion, because it fulfills the conditions : provided the reaction 
 is taken before it has had time to become automatized, or in 
 Wundt's terms, a cerebral reflex. The simple reaction un- 
 doubtedly has conscious antecedents of the most definite 
 kind. If there are to be conscious antecedents, the mind 
 must be in a state of attention, and this we have to a very 
 g'reat degree in the case of preparation. The attentive state 
 and all it signifies is the conscious antecedent of the reac- 
 tion, and this conscious preparation is certainly as distinctly 
 present in the reaction as it is in ordinary life. Following 
 Wundt, nothing could be more conscious than the perception, 
 apperception and will impulse found in the action. If there 
 is any difference in the conscious conditions of the reaction 
 and ordinary action, the former is more distinctly conscious 
 than the latter. In regard to the consequences in the two 
 cases, the affective tone, which constitutes the bulk of the 
 after effects, may be, and probably is, in the reaction more 
 indifferent than in most ordinary actions. But this is due 
 rather to the simplicity of the reaction, than to any quali- 
 tative difference as to the nature of the two things. Again, 
 since the reaction is a movement in response to a stimulus, 
 which definition implies consciousness as a condition, it be- 
 comes evident that it is at least a case of action whether it is 
 the type of action or not, from the very definition. But, so 
 far from being merely a case of action, it seems that the 
 reaction is also the type of action, for several reasons. 
 First, it is undeniable that all action, properly speaking, 
 implies bodily movement of some sort, and that the move- 
 ment follows upon stimulation of some sort, using 'stimu- 
 lation' in its broadest sense to mean both inducement and 
 incentive, implying both external and internal excitation. 
 Now the reaction seems to be the simplest case in which 
 these various factors are found, nevertheless, it seems to 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 15 
 
 contain all the essentials of voluntary action. To be sure, 
 the movement in voluntary action may be ever so complex, 
 e. g., the movements involved in writing, but it is still move- 
 ment in response to some stimulus. Likewise, the stimulus, 
 so far from being merely one simple expected sensation, 
 may come from any part of our varied conscious experience, 
 a sensation or sensation complex or a benevolent impulse, 
 but it is still a stimulus. In other words, the reaction is 
 voluntary action reduced to its lowest terms. It is volun- 
 tary action with as many of the complicating factors ruled 
 out, as it is possible to obtain it. Attention is narrowed 
 down, and directed to some one expected impression, or 
 some movement pertinent to the reaction experiment, in- 
 stead of being busied with the larger affairs of professional 
 life, in which case, every particular stimulus has to be 
 attended to after it comes, and the appropriate movement 
 both selected and executed afterward. Moreover, in most 
 ordinary action, there is nothing that corresponds to the 
 'ready' signal of the reaction. The stimulus simple breaks 
 in upon consciousness unheralded, and attention has after- 
 ward to be adjusted, or preparation for the movement has to 
 be effected after the stimulus has been received, instead of 
 before. And more than that, instead of there being one 
 particular movement or set of movements, ready prepared 
 for, so that they go off as soon as the stimulus has been 
 apperceived, the right movement must be executed. But 
 everywhere and always, action is consciously conditioned 
 movement in response to some stimulus ; hence, in all fair- 
 ness it may be said that the reaction represents voluntary 
 action in its simplest terms. With regard to that which we 
 ordinarily term volitional action, which term indicates the 
 more subjective nature of the stimulus, we have merely to 
 widen the meaning of the term 'stimulus' in order to make 
 it include those more subjective promptings which charac- 
 terize those acts. Thus defined, action is still consciously 
 conditioned ; the stimulus is still a conscious affair, indeed 
 more intimately conscious, if any difference, than the more 
 objective stimulus, the sensation, and movement results as 
 a consequence. 
 
 If, then, the action consciousness may thus be considered 
 as a type of voluntary action, it follows that a thorough 
 analysis of the reaction will of necessity throw some light 
 upon voluntary action in general. If by an introspective 
 analysis of the simple reaction, we are able to determine 
 what the actual constituent processes are, and which of them 
 is of most importance we shall have added something to the 
 sum-total of the psychological knowledge concerning volun- 
 tary action. 
 
1 6 COFFIN 
 
 And it is with this that Part I has to deal. 
 
 PART I 
 THE ANALYSIS OF THE SIMPLE REACTION 
 
 The following analysis is based upon the introspective re- 
 sults from a set of reactions of the auditory type. It would 
 have been interesting as well as valuable to have had an 
 equal amount of introspective data from experiments from 
 other sense departments. But such would have required 
 more time than was at the disposal of the author; and, be- 
 sides, it may be assumed that what is essential of action in 
 response to an auditory stimulus, would likewise be essential 
 to a simple reaction to a stimulus from any other sense organ. 
 
 Five observers were used. Miss Murray (M) was Scholar 
 in the Department of Psychology, and had had three years 
 of psychological work. She had done the reaction experi- 
 ment as outlined in Titchener's Manual of Psychology, three 
 years before, so had had some practice in introspective work 
 of this kind. Miss Peirson (P) was a junior in Cornell and 
 was in her second year of psychological work. Mrs. Patti- 
 son (Pn) had had about the same amount of psychological 
 training as Miss Pierson. Both ladies had done the reaction 
 experiment before, in the drill course in Cornell. Mr. Fos- 
 ter (F) was doing his second year of graduate work. He 
 was a thoroughly conscientious student with some psycho- 
 logical training, but had never done the reaction experiment. 
 To Mrs. Coffin (C), the reaction was entirely new, as she 
 had had no introspective training. 
 
 As the recording instrument, the vernier chronoscope was 
 used. This instrument was chosen for three reasons, in pref- 
 erence to the Hipp chronoscope, which was at hand, and 
 might have been used. First, great accuracy was not de- 
 manded. The times were used merely as a check upon the 
 introspections, the great weight being thrown upon the latter; 
 second, the experimenter wished to be near the observer, 
 that he might observe him; and third, the experimenter 
 wished to be able to question the observer as occasion arose. 1 
 
 The order of the experiment was as follows : A * ready' 
 was given, at which the observer closed his eyes and laid the 
 index finger of the right hand on the key of the short pendu- 
 lum. After two seconds, the experimenter said "now," and 
 in two more seconds tapped the key of the long pendulum, 
 which was the signal for reacting. Fifty 'Natural' reactions 
 were taken from each observer, and approximately 200 
 'Muscular' and 'Sensorial' reactions respectively. 
 
 1 See Appendix A. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 17 
 
 The instructions for the Natural Reaction were as follows: 
 "At the 'ready' you are to place the finger upon the key, 
 close your eyes, and assume a comfortable bodily position. 
 At the 'now,' prepare for reacting by concentrating your at- 
 tention; and upon hearing the stimulus, push the finger 
 down. Then, with eyes still closed, and bodily position un- 
 changed, you are to recall the experiment as vividly as possi- 
 ble and immediately afterward, write out a full occount of 
 it." Since time was taken for the observer to write out his 
 introspections, ten reactions per day were as many as could 
 profitably be taken, as more would have been fatiguing. 
 
 The Natural Reaction which was taken up first, served 
 mainly as a preliminary to those which followed. Not a 
 great deal of value, introspectively, was obtained from them. 
 To some of the observers, the reaction was entirely new, 
 while the others were more or less rusty in that sort of in- 
 trospection, hence the main value of it was to accustom the 
 observers to the method, and to teach them the kind of ob- 
 servation that was required. In addition, the novelty of the 
 experiment was allowed to wear away, and the main features 
 were allowed to become evident. 
 
 It might seem that the very fact of practice would alter 
 the conditions and thereby change the content of conscious- 
 ness; that introspection would accordingly be changed, and 
 steps fundamentally important to the natural reaction be 
 dropped out. This may be true, and probably is to some 
 extent, but the loss is partially recompensed by the added 
 facility in introspection, and the standardizing of the condi- 
 tions which gives opportunity for more than a single view of 
 the reaction. 
 
 The photograph of the action consciousness is best taken 
 just after the experiment. One can then put oneself through 
 it again just as it was experienced. The various elements 
 and processes can be enumerated, dwelt upon, compared and 
 fixed in memory till they can be written down. The stability 
 of introspection depends upon practice sufficient to rid one 
 of the feeling of novelty, to make one at home with the ex- 
 periment, and to enable the important and elemental proc- 
 esses to sift themselves out and assume bold relief in the 
 whole picture. But it is also true that habits in the way of 
 reaction very soon form; and introspection cannot be of 
 much value after the experiment [has become stereotyped. 
 And sooner or later, in spite of the experimenter's instruc- 
 tions, and the good intentions on the part of the observer, 
 the experiment is bound to traverse the same paths after a 
 certain number of repetitions. 
 
 2 
 
I 8 COFFIN 
 
 A. THE NATURAL REACTION. 1 
 
 In the natural reaction, the attention upon which the whole 
 nature of the reaction depends, is at first distributed over the 
 whole experiment in a confused sort of way. No determined 
 mode of procedure or system has yet been established. Now 
 one thing, now another claims the attention ; the stimulus, 
 the movement to be made, an anxiety to perform the experi- 
 ment satisfactorily, strain sensations, images, feelings of 
 unreadiness, and many other things get their share. In a 
 word, complex feelings, and higher mental processes mingle 
 with simpler and more elemental ones to form a general 
 chaotic state. The events from the ' now ' to the reception 
 of the stimulus constitute a new experience, and there is no 
 predetermined way of getting ready for, or receiving the 
 stimulus as is the case after practice. Each experiment 
 stands apart from all others and is of its own peculiar kind, 
 having its own peculiar contents and conditions. There can 
 be nothing particularly predicted of them as a class, except 
 that their nature depends upon the mood of the observer as 
 he goes into the experiment. If he has a feeling that the 
 preceding experiment was not carried out to the satisfaction 
 of the experimenter, as to introspective results, reaction 
 times, etc.; if he has not gained the upper hand of the experi- 
 ment, and other similar misgivings, the contents and condi- 
 tions of consciousness during reaction are very different 
 from what they are when the opposite mood prevails. It is 
 also obvious that reaction times under such varying condi- 
 tions vary greatly in length; as a matter of fact, from about 
 14 to 40 sigma. 
 
 Each of the conditions mentioned under this heading will 
 come out in more detail in the description of the muscular 
 and sensorial reactions. The reception of the stimulus, the 
 action and the after-effects can also be better treated in the 
 light of clearer introspection and more constant conditions 
 which necessarily follow practice. 
 
 B. THE MUSCULAR REACTION. 2 
 
 In all but one of the observers (P), the natural reaction 
 passed over into the muscular type after about 40 trials, 
 and it became habitual, of course, to attend to the move- 
 ment to be made. In this, the conditions are more easily 
 described, but the contents of consciousness are more diffi- 
 cult to determine, because the reaction time is much shorter 
 
 1 See Appendix B. 
 
 2 See Appendix C. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 1 9 
 
 than in the sensorial. In the case where the observer was 
 of the sensorial type, the same number of experiments were 
 sufficient to establish that mode of reaction ; and the times, 
 though longer than the muscular, became much more regu- 
 lar than they were at first. 
 
 The instructions for the muscular reaction were as fol- 
 lows: "Attend to the movement you are going to make. 
 Prepare yourself for the movement, so you may be on the 
 alert to move upon hearing the sound of the stimulus. The 
 sense impression will give you the opportunity to make the 
 movement you have been waiting for since the 'now'." It 
 is interesting to notice in this connection that the very 
 nature of the reaction experiment seems to suggest to the 
 observer that the important thing is the reaction time. Even 
 when the precaution has been given to disregard the time 
 element, and simply to ' react upon hearing the stimulus,' 
 there is still the desire to do it quickly. And when the ob- 
 server has been plainly told that the important part is a care- 
 ful introspection the same desire still persists. The ten- 
 dency is especially noticeable in observers whose natural 
 way of reacting is muscular when they are required to per- 
 form the sensorial reaction. They feel that attending to the 
 stimulus is incompatible with a * good reaction.' For with 
 these the ' good reaction ' comes to mean a short reaction 
 time. 
 
 In order to get a complete photograph of the reaction, 
 the muscular and sensorial reactions were divided into four 
 parts : (1) from the 'now' to the stimulus, (2) the reception 
 of the stimulus, (3) the movement, and (4) the after-effects. 1 
 The whole series of muscular and sensorial reactions, ac- 
 cordingly, were divided into four sets of fifty experiments 
 each, respectively. The observer was asked to throw the 
 introspective attention in turn upon the four periods men- 
 tioned. First, he was told to react muscularly, in conformity 
 to the instructions given above, and during the first fifty ex- 
 periments, to analyze the period of preparation, i. e., from 
 the ' now ' to the stimulus ; during the next fifty experiments, 
 the introspective attention was directed to (2) the reception 
 of the stimulus ; and so on throughout the four periods. In 
 this way, it was thought, a more minute, intensive analysis 
 
 1 Ach, in the book already referred to, factored the reac- 
 tion much after this manner. He used three periods, how- 
 ever, instead of four: period of (1) preparation, (2) move- 
 ment, (3) after effects. 
 
 Titchener also suggested this method. Cf. Manual, Vol. 
 II, Pt. II. 
 
2O COFFIN 
 
 could be effected than would be obtained by an equal num- 
 ber of general muscular reactions. This same intensive 
 method of introspection was employed with the sensorial 
 reaction, the difference being one of instruction rather than 
 introspective method. 
 
 I. PREPARATION: 'Now' TO THE STIMULUS 
 
 The time from the 'now' to the stimulus, or the time of 
 preparation, seems to be of most importance and yields the 
 greatest amount of introspective data. The processes then 
 at work give it its mark of distinction, and its peculiarity. 
 Beginning with the 'ready,' there is a pulling together of 
 oneself and a narrowing of attention to the business in hand : 
 a voluntary shutting out of distracting noises and thoughts. 
 With the 'now,' preparation proper begins. There is a 
 tensing of the muscles of arm, shoulder and hand. The 
 observer leans forward, inclines the head, and makes the 
 finger the focal point of attention. Analysis shows that all 
 this is constituted of a countless number of strains in all 
 parts of the body, especially about the arm, finger and eyes. 
 Images also play back and forth during the interval ; images 
 of apparatus, the observer's own person, kinaesthetic images 
 in the finger, of the movement to be made. 1 And these 
 strains, images, etc., vary with the degree of attention. In 
 short, the observer puts himself in a special psychophysical 
 attitude. It consists of a predisposition to make a certain 
 movement, a summation of energy, and a cessation of every- 
 thing else in order to be ready for the cue to let go. One 
 observer describes the kinsesthetic sensations arising from it 
 as a strange tingling in the ringer. So perfect does this 
 attitude become that the attention during the first part of the 
 interval may be conceived in popular terms, as organizing 
 the reflex, then leaving it and engaging itself with the com- 
 ing stimulus. This waiting for the stimulus is often felt as 
 a bare passage of time, the content of which is doubtless to 
 be explained in terms of organic sensations, compressed 
 feeling about the heart and lungs if the breathing is in any 
 way interfered with, together with other sensations. 2 An 
 
 1 The point with regard to the kinsesthetic images is a dis- 
 puted one, many claiming that the so-called images are in 
 reality weak sensations. But as far as my data bear upon 
 it, the evidence is in favor of such images. Cf. Kiilpe, Out- 
 lines, and James Psych. 
 
 2 Cf. article in Meumann's Archive on Descriptive Psy- 
 chology, in which the author says the feeling of the passage 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 21 
 
 interesting side light upon this attitude is the fact that the 
 effort is felt as being negative, instead of positive, during 
 the last part of the interval. That is, the observer feels 
 that he must hold back, or inhibit the tendency to react, until 
 the signal comes. To forget this is to react too soon. 
 
 II. THE RECEPTION OF THE STIMULUS 
 
 The stimulus comes as a signal to let go, as a cue for the 
 releasing of the movement. There is no feeling of surprise 
 or strangeness, as may be the case in the first few series of 
 the natural reaction. It is simply expected as a part of the 
 natural order of events. Moreover, any noise which occurs 
 at the time of the expected stimulus is accepted as the proper 
 signal. Sometimes the observer is not conscious of having 
 reacted to the wrong stimulus, and when he does become 
 aware of it, it is usually because of the sight of the single 
 swinging pendulum, or the different tactual feeling of the 
 false stimulus. The ordinary stimulus carries with it a cer- 
 tain jar and vibration which is lacking in others, and the 
 lack of this makes the stimulus feel different, and so forces 
 itself into consciousness. But when the experimenter takes 
 the precaution, silently to set his pendulum swinging, simul- 
 taneously with the false stimulus, the observer does not 
 realize his error nearly so easily. This holds true when the 
 false stimulus is somewhat similar to the real one, as the 
 sound made by tapping the table instead of the reaction key. 
 Perfectly absurd noises, however, such as the snapping of 
 the finger, are often sufficient to set the movement off, but 
 are recognized afterwards as being false. Sometimes the 
 sound of the stimulus hardly enters consciousness at all. In 
 such cases, that which does seem to be the conscious factor 
 is the jar, cutaneous sensations set up by the mechanical 
 vibrations occasioned by the striking. 
 
 It is interesting in this connection to note the effect of the 
 content feeling of the interval, mentioned above. If a false 
 stimulus is given before the two-second interval is over, 
 there is little tendency to react to it, showing that the ob- 
 server has to have the 'ready' feeling before he can give 
 himself up to the reaction; also that he has learned from 
 
 of time is the activity of a pure thought element, because 
 there is nothing else there. 
 
 But so far as the evidence gathered in these reactions 
 goes, the passage of time seems to be a perception of a suc- 
 cession of organic sensations. 
 
 Cf. also, Titchener, Manual, Vol. II, Pt. II, pp. 395 ff. 
 
22 COFFIN 
 
 experience to be ready at the end of the two-second interval, 
 so that if the stimulus comes too soon, his attention is called 
 to it, he recognizes it as false, and hence does not react. 
 Moreover, if the interval be shortened and the right stimulus 
 is given, the reaction time is lengthened and the experiment 
 seems less satisfactory to the observer than when carried 
 out in the regular time relations. In other words, instead 
 of the mere sound of the hammer on the key, the real stimu- 
 lus comes to be sound-of-hammer-plus-content-of-conscious- 
 ness-after-'now.' When the interval is kept constant 
 (objectively) the reaction times will be most regular, and 
 the observer feels the experiment to be most satisfactory. 
 If the intervals are shortened or lengthened, the reaction 
 ceases to be purely motor, and attention is directed more or 
 less to the stimulus. 
 
 III. THE MOVEMENT 
 
 The reception of the stimulus, i. e., the cue for the release 
 of the movement and the release itself, or the movement, are 
 very closely connected both in consciousness and in time. 
 It is therefore difficult to discuss them separately. The 
 movement, in the purely muscular type, goes off with a jerk 
 when the stimulus is heard. The predisposition has already 
 been prepared, and as soon as the signal comes, the release 
 is made, the restraint is taken away, and the movement has 
 been brought about. As for there being conscious concomi- 
 tants of the movement, introspection does not reveal any. 
 The nearest it approaches it, is in the recording of the kinses- 
 thetic sensations set up by the movement itself. In cases 
 where the observer pushes the key before the stimulus has 
 been given, there may be either one of two causes assigned: 
 either the tension in the ringer is so great that the finger has 
 simply and accidentally borne too heavily upon the key, thus 
 letting the pendulum swing unknown to the observer, which 
 of course, is not a true reaction; or the interval measured by 
 the content of consciousness has been longer than usual 
 (subjectively) and the reaction takes place in response to 
 this as a stimulus. And in so far as the content forms a part 
 of the stimulus, the reaction was a proper one, only prema- 
 ture. If the objective stimulus coincides nearly enough with 
 the subjective part, the reaction times are short, as counted 
 by the pendulum swings (.04, .06, .08, etc.). In which cases, 
 it merely accidentally assumes the appearance of the normal 
 reaction. But in reality should not be so counted. Where 
 the real interval seems subjectively to have been shortened, 
 the reaction time is lengthened. 
 
 In some cases, the reception of the stimulus and the reac- 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 23 
 
 tion seem to the observer to be simultaneous. He feels no 
 sequence in them. But when he does recognize the stimulus 
 to be followed by the action, one would expect the longer 
 times to yield a greater amount of introspective material. 
 But this is not the case. Where there is a difference of as 
 much as .08 or .10 of a second there is no appreciable differ- 
 ence in introspection. Consciousness seems to be suspended 
 while the neuro-muscular apparatus gets into action. 
 
 While there seems to be no simple process which can be 
 named and described during this time, there is often, ^ in the 
 longer reactions a complex hesitancy; a feeling that " I am 
 not reacting as promptly as I could." What this feeling is, 
 or why they experience it, the observers cannot tell. One is 
 inclined to think in this case that attention has become a sort 
 of ideal spectator which stands off and looks on at the pre- 
 disposition, the movement, and the stimulus. And in thus 
 doing, disables it to a slight extent. 
 
 IV. THE AFTER EFFECTS 
 
 The after effects of the reaction are complex. In the first 
 place, it is a letting go, and easing down of attention, con- 
 sciousness again widens out, and new trains of thought are 
 started. In most of its aspects, it seems to be the reverse 
 of the preparation period. Where there, the observer 
 assumed a certain bodily attitude, closed his eyes, and nar- 
 rowed down his attention, in short assumed a certain psy- 
 chophysical predisposition, we here find him relaxing the 
 body, opening eyes, and completely getting out of the reac- 
 tion attitude. In the second place, and more important, 
 the affective tone of the experiment is made manifest here. 
 As a general rule, there is not very much affective tone at- 
 taching to the reaction experiment; and especially is this the 
 case after much repetition. But where there is, it is shown 
 in pleasantness caused by a consciousness of having per- 
 formed the experiment satisfactorily or some such general 
 feeling. The pleasantness is occasioned by the whole of the 
 complex situation rather than by any one definite sense im- 
 pression or idea, and is in consequence, correspondingly 
 vague and of little intensity. On the other hand, unpleasant- 
 ness is usually occasioned by some definite strain sensation, 
 or idea. It is after the experiment is over that one realizes 
 that there has been discomfort, or uneasiness, or unpleasant 
 strain. Under normal conditions, the experiment is more 
 often of a general satisfied feeling (pleasant) than with un- 
 pleasantness. 
 
24 COFFIN 
 
 C. THE SENSORIAL REACTION 1 
 
 The chief difference to be found between this sort of reac- 
 tion and the muscular is mainly in the first stage, viz., the 
 preparation. The instructions given to the observer are: 
 " You are to pay attention to, and watch for the stimulus. 
 Do not bother with the movement, for it will execute itself 
 when the time comes. You must find some way of recogniz- 
 ing the stimulus as the right one immediately, e. g., have an 
 auditory, visual or motor image by which to recognize it. 
 You must be sure to have clearly recognized it, so that you 
 will not react to a wrong stimulus. And this must be done 
 directly, so that you shall not make a discrimination reaction 
 of it, by stopping to decide whether it is the right sound or 
 not. Simply be able to know it, and to know it immediately." 3 
 
 The great difficulty in this set of experiments was, that 
 these observers, with one exception, found it very difficult 
 to follow the instructions. It required considerable practice 
 for them to be able to put themselves into the right attitude. 
 An attitude too aggressive and too active is as fatal to the 
 experiment as the other extreme would be. 
 
 In addition to the above, it should also be noted that the 
 observers had been made acquainted with the nature of 
 the discrimination reaction. It was deemed necessary that 
 they should know, in order to forestall any tendency toward 
 the discrimination reaction. 
 
 I. PREPARATION 
 
 In this, as in the muscular reaction, the important period, 
 and the one yielding the greatest amount of introspective 
 material, is the period of preparation. And this is a fact of 
 great significance. Despite the fact that the second period 
 (from the stimulus to the movement) is much longer in this 
 than in the muscular reaction, and, therefore, would seem on 
 the face of it to contain more, and to be of more importance 
 in the simple sensorial reaction, nevertheless, here, as be- 
 fore, the time of preparation is of most importance. It is 
 very possible, and indeed probable, that in the choice or 
 discrimination reaction, and those of like nature, the second 
 period would be of the most importance, for in them the 
 essential and characteristic processes do take place in this 
 period. 
 
 But here, as in the muscular reaction, beginning with the 
 'now/ there are the numerous strain sensations and tensing 
 
 1 See Appendix D. 
 
 2 Titchener: Manual of Psychology, Vol. I, Pt. II. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 25 
 
 of muscles which go with active attention. They are largely 
 transferred, however, from the finger and hand to the eye 
 and ear, head and neck, indicating a different direction of 
 attention. In short, the attitude is one of listening ; the 
 hand drops out of consciousness and attention turns to the 
 expected stimulus, instead of making the finger the focal 
 point. This is done differently by different observers, de- 
 pending upon their type. A visually minded person gets a 
 visual image of the hammer descending upon the key, others 
 have auditory images, and others tactual 1 and muscular. As 
 a matter of fact, however, it is usually a mixture or combi- 
 nation of these types. In the sensorial as in the muscular, 
 the observer develops sort of a predetermination toward the 
 end in view, as the preparation progresses. It is not so 
 nearly altogether a muscular affair this time, however, for 
 he holds before himself a mental pattern or image, by which 
 to identify the stimulus when it comes. The muscular pre- 
 disposition and the mental image play into each other's 
 hands in the process of the experiment. The business of 
 attention is to create and hold this image in a way most 
 easily to identify the stimulus, if it be a correct one, or to 
 reject it if it be false. If the incoming stimulus fits the pat- 
 tern the movement goes off ; if not, there is no tendency to 
 move, and the pressure is let down. In the muscular type, we 
 said, " the stimulus is the cue which is the signal to let go." 
 In this type, the signal is not merely the stimulus but a 
 stimulus-of-the-right-pattern. Anything else is not a stimu- 
 lus. Hence, in order to be a stimulus, the sound must fit 
 the pattern held in attention. 
 
 It need hardly be said in this connection that this kind of 
 reaction is difficult for muscularly minded people to make in 
 its pure form. The difficulty is, either to keep control of 
 the muscular predisposition so as not to make a muscular 
 reaction or to avoid the other extreme of waiting to think 
 about and judge as to the stimulus, either of which cases 
 throws the experiment out. It is interesting to note that 
 when a false stimulus has been given, and the observer has 
 kept his attention maximal, there is a summation of energy 
 which needs letting down ; and this is accomplished by some 
 characteristic movement, as by the jerk of the head or the 
 shrug of the shoulders. 
 
 II. RECEPTION 
 
 It has already been said that in order for a sound to be a 
 stimulus it must fit the pattern which the attention actively 
 
 1 Cf. note on page 34. 
 
26 COFFIN 
 
 holds. When the attention is maximal, z. <?., when the pat- 
 tern is clear and distinct, the stimulus is apprehended as 
 right or wrong ; it either fits, or it doesn't fit, and this imme- 
 diately. If it does fit, it is accepted as the cue for the re- 
 lease of the movement. The interval between the stimulus 
 and the movement is much longer in the sensorial reaction 
 than in the muscular, and varies more. The time is occu- 
 pied with the apprehension of the stimulus, i. e., the stimu- 
 lus is applied to the pattern as it were, and the identification 
 made. When the attention is partially distracted, the pat- 
 tern loses its distinctness, and becomes hazy, and if the 
 stimulus comes at this time it cannot be recognized as easily 
 and directly. In other words, the image has again to be 
 called up and a judgment made. When the attention is con- 
 stant throughout a series, the reaction times vary but 
 slightly. There seem to be all grades between pure senso- 
 rial and choice reactions, but all depends upon the attention 
 and vary with it. Hence, after the observer has learned to 
 apprehend the stimulus immediately, and when in condition 
 to keep the attention constant, the experiments become very 
 much alike and reaction times are constant. 
 
 When the instructions have been for the sensorial reaction 
 but the observer reacts to a wrong stimulus, either one of 
 two things happens. Either the attention has wandered, and 
 the reaction has been a purely muscular one, or the muscu- 
 lar predisposition has been so strongly organized that the 
 subject may release the pendulum when the attention is 
 maximal, even while perceiving the stimulus to be false, and 
 having no inclination to press the key. In this case, the 
 movement has been unconscious to the observer, and is not 
 a reaction in the true sense. 
 
 When the objective time interval between the ' now 'and 
 the stimulus is lengthened or shortened, the result is the dis- 
 traction of attention, and in either case, the lengthening of 
 the reaction time. There is not such a content feeling in 
 this as in the muscular reaction, but there is a gradual 
 heightening of the attention wave, during the preparation 
 stage, and if the stimulus coincides with the crest of this 
 wave, in point of time, the recognition is more easily made, 
 and the reaction time shortened. 
 
 III. THE ACTION 
 
 Once the stimulus has been recognized, the movement is 
 released, or better, goes off. The muscles have already 
 been prepared for the movement, the muscular predisposition 
 already effected, as in the muscular type of reaction, except 
 that the tension in this is not so great. The organization 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 27 
 
 has been mainly unconscious, however. Hence, as soon as 
 the signal is recognized, the movement takes place. Intro- 
 spection does not tell us what the step or process between 
 the recognition of the stimulus and the movement in the sen- 
 sorial reaction, any more than it did in the muscular. Intro- 
 spection reveals nothing aside from certain kinaesthetic 
 sensations which are set up by the movement itself, as in the 
 former case. The movement is more deliberate in this case 
 than in the case of the muscular reaction, however. In the 
 latter, the movement went off with a sort of jerk involving 
 the whole arm, while in the former, it is an orderly, fully 
 controlled and deliberate movement. The reason for this is 
 doubtless to be found in the character of the muscular set in 
 each case. In the muscular reaction, the tension is high and 
 the strain great, hence the movement, when released, goes 
 off with a jerk; while in the sensorial, the set is not so tense 
 nor the strain so great, hence the movement is made less 
 rapidly. 
 
 The observer almost always has a feeling as to the quick- 
 ness of the reaction. 1 But he is not able to judge with any 
 accuracy as to the length of the reaction time. In excep- 
 tionally long reactions he may report the time shorter than 
 in others, which in reality were shorter. This again can be 
 referred to the state of the attention, at least for a partial ex- 
 planation. When the degree of attention is maximal, the 
 reactions are objectively shortest, but they may feel longer 
 to the observer than others where attention has evidently 
 waned, probably for the same reason that a given length of 
 time seems longer or shorter under differing conditions, e. g. y 
 suspense or composure. 
 
 IV. THE AFTER EFFECTS 
 
 The after effects are much the same in this as in the mus- 
 cular reaction, with this difference. There is not felt to be 
 so great a letting down of muscular tension, for the reason 
 that there is not so much muscular strain to begin with. 
 Moreover, this sort of reaction is a greater tax on the atten- 
 tion, and there is, consequently, a greater widening out of 
 this, at the end, than is the case in the muscular. In like 
 manner, whatever affective tone attaches to the experiment 
 makes itself felt in this stage. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ANALYSIS 
 With regard to these results, it may be noted first, that of 
 
 1 See Watanby, A. J., VI, pp. 408 ff. 
 
28 COFFIN 
 
 the four parts into which the muscular and sensorial reactions 
 were divided, the first seems to afford the best opportunity 
 for analysis. It is easier for the observer to introspect this 
 period than the others; and as a consequence, the greatest 
 amount of introspective data comes from it. In other words, 
 there are more events that may be singled out, remembered 
 and recorded here, than at any other time during the reac- 
 tion. The fact that there is a greater number of events in 
 this period does not necessarily mean that for that reason, 
 the period is of the most importance, of course. It does not 
 mean that it is any more essential for that reason alone. But 
 on the other hand, the essential processes then at work, are 
 of very great intrinsic value. Indeed they are essential fac- 
 tors of the reaction. If it were possible to have an action 
 without conscious antecedents, i. <?., without some degree of 
 attention, then there would be no ground for claiming that 
 the processes of the preparatory stage are essential. But 
 since the very concept 'action' implies a certain degree of 
 consciousness and therefore, of attention, it is inconceivable 
 that the action should take place without the initial process 
 of directing the attention to the business in hand. We saw 
 by the analysis that everything belonging to the first period 
 was subservient to the one process of appropriately directing 
 the attention. All recorded bodily strains were merely so 
 many concomitants of the directing of attention, and the 
 place at which they were localized only branded the attention 
 as being one type or another. So that if there is any truth 
 in our conception of action, as implying at least some degree 
 of attention, it seems that Kulpe was right in insisting upon 
 the importance of the preparatory stage in the reaction. Not 
 only so, but the further fact that the degree, and direction of 
 attention in this stage determines the nature and rapidity of 
 the reaction, also adds weight to the assumption. 
 
 With regard to Wundt's content theory. Our analysis fails 
 to evince anything like so complex a process in conscious- 
 ness, as would be implied by his perception-apperception- 
 will analysis. In the muscular type, no conscious processes 
 corresponding to each of these three things were recorded. 
 What is actually there, what observers are able to remem- 
 ber and write down, is nothing than the simple perception of 
 the stimulus, after which nothing more is known about the 
 reaction process, until kinaesthetic sensations come in telling 
 of the actual movement that is taking, and has taken place. 
 Wundt's theory seems to rest upon the assumption that no 
 idea can be acted upon until it has come to the focus of at- 
 tention, and that it cannot arrive at the focus of attention 
 except it come in through the 'margin' or 'fringe,' to use 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 29 
 
 James's expression; and more than this, that the apperceived 
 idea cannot be acted upon until it is somehow worked over 
 into a will-impulse. But we have found no introspective 
 evidence that would support this. In the first place, action 
 may take place, in which attention is not maximal, i. e., in 
 which the idea is not clearly apperceived ; and in the second 
 place, very many actions are performed without a conscious 
 will-impulse after the apperception and before the movement. 
 In short, one would believe Wundt's scheme to be logical 
 rather than purely psychological. And of this, he seems to 
 become partially aware in the Third Edition; and in order 
 to make the theory conform more nearly to the new facts 
 brought to light, he shrinks one, two, or all the processes 
 up and crowds two or all of them together, and explains that 
 there are cases of simple reaction (muscular, cerebral-reflex) 
 in which we do not have the three steps clearly in conscious- 
 ness. But it is difficult to see why he continues to cling to 
 the formal analysis, and to talk in terms of perception, ap- 
 perception and will-impulse, when one or more of them are 
 not found at all. 
 
 In the sensorial reaction, the chance for the application of 
 his scheme is much better. But, as was seen in the analy- 
 sis, there is nothing to suggest this tri-parti division. What 
 was actually experienced, was the direct recognition of the 
 stimulus, by any one of three or four ways, after which the 
 movement took place immediately. To be sure, the stimu- 
 lus in this case must be attended to, and the greater the de- 
 gree of attention it receives the more satisfactory the 
 reaction. But the stimulus is not consciously worked up 
 from the perceptive level to the apperceptive level. Atten- 
 tion is already present to a marked degree in preparation in 
 the shape of expectation, and the stimulus is apperceived. 
 Following at once upon this is the movement. It. takes place 
 immediately, without any conscious step corresponding to 
 the will-impulse, for the muscular predisposition was already 
 prepared in the beginning. So that in the muscular we have, 
 first, a high degree of attention upon the movement to be 
 made, perception of the stimulus, then movement. In the 
 sensorial, we have high degree of attention upon the im- 
 pression, apperception, then movement. In each case, the 
 preparatory attentive state seems to be the essential thing 
 upon which the other steps follow with pre-arranged cer- 
 tainty. Hence, the more closely we look into the reaction 
 consciousness, the more strongly are we convinced of the 
 truth of Kulpe's contention that the preparatory stage is the 
 most important one, and that Wundt's content theory is 
 rather a logical one than strictly a psychological analysis. 
 
30 COFFIN 
 
 In taking the simple reaction as the type of all voluntary 
 action, we are keenly conscious that we are making an ab- 
 straction, and that in so far as it is abstract, it is so far from 
 the reality of the ordinary voluntary action. And more than 
 this, we are aware that the subdivision of the reaction into 
 the four periods, is a further abstraction, and, hence, that 
 we have prescribed conditions which probably never occur 
 in ordinary action. But science has always to make abstrac- 
 tions, otherwise advancement is impossible : and it is only 
 by such abstract and methodical means that we are able to 
 ascertain the constituent mental processes in a given bit of 
 experience, under given conditions. So the facts here given 
 regarding consciousness under the given conditions, must 
 surely be of significance for any theory of voluntary action 
 that may be advanced ; and, on the other hand, the theory 
 must take account of the facts as here given. 
 
 PART II 
 
 Every science has its own terminology, and the terms, 
 though very often drawn from the general storehouse of 
 words in ordinary usage, soon take on special meanings per- 
 taining to the particular science. In other words, each 
 science, in order to be exact, 'must employ terms that have 
 a very limited, technical and definite meaning, that have in 
 their own particular context a specific significance, quite 
 different from the general loose meaning of everyday life. 
 Psychology is no exception to this general rule. It uses a 
 terminology quite its own, and the better the psychology, 
 the more specific and technical are the terms it employs. 
 This fact must be borne in mind in approaching the subject 
 here under discussion. Unfortunately, many psychological 
 terms have found their way into the science from philosophy, 
 and the danger of confusion is doubly great in these instances. 
 'Voluntary action' is one of these terms which has come to 
 psychology from philosophy, and is yet in common use in 
 both. It also receives much discussion in ethics books, and 
 because it includes movement, it also enters into biological 
 and physiological discussions. Naturally, then, we may 
 expect the term to be used loosely in psychology; and we 
 may also expect a certain amount of philosophical confusion 
 as to its meaning. 
 
 The concept Voluntary action' in the technical sense, has 
 found its place in all systems of psychology, and it will be 
 worth our while to pass in review the criteria pertaining to 
 the subject, as given by a few of the contemporary writers 
 on psychology, and criticise the deliverances of one or two 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 31 
 
 of the latest. Titchener says, 1 "The word 'action' denotes 
 both the mental condition and the mental concomitants of 
 movement. Movement is, therefore, a more general term 
 than action. All actions are, in part, movements, but only 
 those movements which have conscious processes as their 
 condition and other conscious processes as their concom- 
 itants can form part of action." 
 
 James maintains that in order to voluntary action, the 
 mind must be supplied with images by which to guide the 
 action, at the time it is executed. 2 ''Whether or no there be 
 anything else in the mind at the moment when we consciously 
 will a certain act, a mental conception made up of memory 
 images of these sensations defining which special act it is, 
 must be there. . . . My first thesis, accordingly, is that 
 there need be nothing else. And that in perfectly simple 
 voluntary action there is nothing else in the mind but the 
 kinaesthetic idea thus defined, of what the act is to be. 
 
 Hoffding says, 8 "Voluntary action proper is characterized, 
 psychologically, by the idea of the end of action, and the 
 means to its realization, and by a vivid feeling of the worth 
 of that end. ... A motor impulse presupposes the 
 memory of executed movements ; this may be either the 
 memory of the appearance of the movement, or a motor idea 
 proper. . . . This predisposition or internal preparation 
 by means of which a movement is, as it were, adopted or 
 fixed in consciousness, does not admit of more minute de- 
 scription. It is the fundamental element in the consciousness 
 of an intended movement, and can be known only by direct 
 introspection." 
 
 Sully's definition : 4 "A voluntary action is an action con- 
 sciously directed to some end." "The fundamental element 
 of will is desire." His analysis of a simple case of volun- 
 tary action follows. "The process involved in the simplest 
 type of voluntary action may be described as follows. The 
 initial stage is the rise of some desire in the mind. This 
 desire is accompanied by the representation of some move- 
 ment (motor representation) which is recognized as sub- 
 serving the realization of the object. The recognition of the 
 causal relation of the action to the result involves a germ of 
 belief in the attainability of the object of desire, or in the 
 efficiency of the action. Finally, we have a carrying out of 
 
 kitchener: Outlines of Psychology, 1899, p. 248. 
 3 James: Psychology, II, p. 492. 
 8 Hoffding: Outlines of Psychology, 1891, p. 318. 
 4 Sully: Outlines of Psychology, 1885, p. 574. 
 * Ibid., 575. 
 
32 COFFIN 
 
 the action thus represented. This may be described as the 
 direction of the active impulse involved in the state of desire 
 into the definite channel of the action suggested. This last 
 stage of the process of volition is known as the act. The 
 desire which precedes and determines this is called its 
 moving force, stimulus or motive. Since this motive in- 
 volves the anticipation of the final realization, this consum- 
 mation is spoken of as the object, purpose or end of the 
 action, and correlatively, the action as the means of gaining or 
 realizing the object of desire." 
 
 Stout : 2 "Thus we may define a volition as a desire quali- 
 fied and defined by the judgment that so far as in us lies, we 
 shall bring about the attainment of the desired end because 
 we desire it." "A voluntary decision is normally followed 
 by action which carries or tends to carry it into effect." 1 
 
 Ladd : 4 "By a volition we understand then, a definite con- 
 ative activity consciously directed toward the realization of 
 some mentally represented end, preceded or accompanied by 
 the condition of desire, and usually accompanied or followed 
 by a feeling of effort." 
 
 Lotze : 5 "An act is voluntary if the internal initiatory 
 conditions from which an act springs are approved, adopted 
 or controlled by the will, when they have taken place." 
 "We can only speak correctly of will when the motives of 
 various actions and their values are compared in full con- 
 sciousness and the choice is made between them. It is quite 
 unreasonable to assume that we express by the words 'I 
 will' no more than is involved in the future tense 'I shall.' ' 
 
 Jodl : "The end-conscious act may be differentiated from 
 the involuntary or blind action by being an act of will. Will 
 is a narrow effort, a wider term ; there is no will which is 
 not effort, but not all effort deserves the name ' will,' be- 
 cause not all effort carries with it consciousness of what it is 
 striving for." Every voluntary movement is characterized 
 by the fact that it is accompanied by an image of the move- 
 ment to be executed ; but the will itself cannot be left out of 
 account." 
 
 *Ibid., 588. 
 
 2 Manual of Psychology, 1899, p. 589. 
 
 8 Ibid., p. 599. 
 
 4 Outlines of Descriptive Psychology, 1898, p. 356. 
 
 5 Outlines of Psychology, Tr. by C. L. Herrick, p. 66. 
 * Ibid., 139. 
 
 7 Lehrbuch: d. Psychologic, II, p. 52. 
 9 Ibid. t p. 61. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 33 
 
 Ward : 1 "In ordinary voluntary movement, we have first 
 of all an idea or representation of the movement, and, last 
 of all, the movement itself." "Attention is the condition of 
 action." 
 
 Many other psychologists define voluntary action in much 
 the same way, for example : Dewey (Psychology, 1887, p. 
 359) defines it as, "Impulse consciously directed toward the 
 attainment of a recognized end which is felt as desirable. It 
 involves knowledge of the end, knowledge of the means to 
 the accomplishment of the end. . . An impulse must furnish 
 the force ; a desire, when chosen, becomes the motive." 
 
 Angell (Psychology, 1904, p. 341) : "Such acts (volun- 
 tary) always involve foresight of some end. This end is de- 
 sired or at least consented to, and certain muscular move- 
 ments then occur, which are meant to attain the end." 
 
 Murray, in his Hand Book of Psychology (1887, p. 393), 
 says: "Volitions are actions consciously directed to an 
 end ; and the problem of psychology is to explain the process 
 by which we acquire control over our actions so as to make 
 them subserve the end we have in view instead of being 
 aimless." 
 
 So far, then, there seems to be pretty general agreement 
 among psychologists, as to three essentials of action. (1) 
 Action is movement consciously directed toward a desired 
 end. The act itself is the means to the attainment of the 
 desired end. (2) Some sort of imagery is the necessary condi- 
 tion or antecedent of the action : there must be memory images 
 (visual or kinaesthetic) of a previous movement which ac- 
 complished the same end. (3) The ' impulse ' furnishes the 
 ' force ' by which the movement is accomplished. 
 
 But in contrast to these utterances which are in general 
 agreement, there are two or three recent writers who par- 
 tially repudiate the commonly accepted doctrine. Thorndike, 
 in the preface of his Elements of Psychology says, "In one 
 particular the author abandons the accepted doctrine of the 
 psychology books. That images of the resident and remote 
 sensations produced by movement should be the usual exci- 
 tant to the movement he cannot believe, and has never 
 taught." 2 And in the text, his argument is as follows : first, 
 with regard to the problem. "Psychologists have argued 
 much about what kinds of mental states are the antecedents 
 of movements in purposive action. The arguments concern 
 chiefly (1) the so-called feelings of innervation, (2) the feel- 
 ing of decision, of consent, of ' let this act be,' the fiat, and 
 
 Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed. XX, p. 42. 
 * Elements of Psychology, 1905, p. 12. 
 3 
 
34 COFFIN 
 
 (3) the memory images of the feelings produced by the 
 movement." l The author follows James in making these 
 images of two kinds, images of ' resident ' and ' remote ' 
 sensations. ' Resident ' sensations are kinsesthetic sensations 
 due to the movement ; the ' remote ' sensations are secon- 
 dary sensations, sound, sight, pressure, etc., which accom- 
 pany movement. He continues, 2 " Only recently has it been 
 argued that, after all, there is no justification for the assump- 
 tion that any peculiar sort of feeling is a necessary element 
 of purposive action ; that really any mental state whatever 
 may be the antecedent of an intentional act. Yet this seems 
 easily demonstrable. For instance, I just now completed 
 the purposive action of writing, ' Yet this seems easily de- 
 monstrable/ The act was certain finger movements and 
 certain eye movements involved in guiding them. But my an- 
 tecedent state of mind contained no images whatever of feel- 
 ings in my fingers, arms, or eyes, nor even sight of the 
 words. It was simply the judgment, * Yet this seems easily 
 demonstrable,' felt with the auditory image of the words. A 
 few hours ago I signed a lease and I can confidently affirm 
 that the thought antecedent to the act contained no images 
 of any sensations in any way connected with the act of writ- 
 ing my name, but only the auditory images, ' He came to 
 my terms after all.' Professor James, who maintains that 
 4 'whether or no there be anything else in the mind at the 
 moment when we consciously will a certain act, a mental 
 conception made up of these sensations (of the movement's 
 results). . . must be there." (Principles, II, 402), gives illus- 
 trations which prove precisely that the antecedents to a move- 
 ment need never have been its results. "We say, 'I must 
 go down stairs,' and ere we know it we have risen, walked, 
 and turned the handle of a door." (Idem, p. 579.) "Hallo ! 
 I must lie here no longer," is the antecedent to getting out 
 of bed. In fact, the doctrine that the image of some one of 
 the previous results or effects of the movement is its neces- 
 sary antecedent in purposive action makes the perversest of 
 mistakes. The antecedent is some one of its previous pre- 
 liminaries or causes. Occasionally, what was first a result 
 or effect of a movement may later be thought of as a prelimi- 
 nary, and so become its antecedent in still later connections. 
 But in general what has led to a movement, not what comes 
 after it, will lead to it on future occasions. . . So, also, there 
 is no need of restricting the word motive to any particular 
 class of feelings. Any mental state may serve as a motive. 
 
 p. 281. 
 *Ibid., p. 282. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 35 
 
 For a motive to an act is simply any fact which assists to be 
 present and to be approved a mental state which will have 
 the act as its sequent." 
 
 The author does not pass criticism upon the first two of 
 the problems which psychologists have argued about as he 
 outlines them. He may, or may not accept the doctrine of 
 the 'feeling of innervation' and the 'fiat.' The opinion of the 
 present writer, however, is, that a consensus of opinion of 
 the present day psychologists would show the innervation 
 theory to be practically a dead issue. While the fiat concept 
 would be more or less generally accepted, in the form of 
 some doctrine of desire. The point of interest, as well as 
 the point at issue in the present treatise, however, is with 
 regard to the statment that " any mental state whatever may 
 be the antecedent of an intentional action," and with the fur- 
 ther statement that "controlled, purposive or voluntary action 
 means, . . behavior in which a purpose is felt, in what we 
 think we are about, and act with foresight." 
 
 To begin with, the author confuses the problem by assum- 
 ing that 'purposive' and 'intended' acts are the same as Vol- 
 untary' acts. As was pointed out at the beginning of this 
 section, 'voluntary action' is one of the many technical terms 
 of psychology, and as such, has a perfectly definite and re- 
 stricted meaning, of which most psychologists are aware, as 
 indicated by the list of definitions cited. But witness the 
 last quotation Thorndike makes the terms 'purposive* and 
 'voluntary' synonymous. As a matter of fact, however 'pur- 
 posive' is a very much wider and more general term than 
 'voluntary.' Assuredly, some purposive acts are voluntary, 
 and most voluntary acts are purposive, but the terms are by 
 no means synonymous. One might as well speak of any 
 movement performed by the voluntary muscles, as psycho- 
 logically voluntary; thus confusing biological purposiveness 
 with psychological volition. A reflex is purposive, and so 
 are many automatic actions, but no one claims that they are 
 voluntary on this account. In like manner, the word 'in- 
 tended' is not clear. It implies a higher degree of mentality 
 than purposiveness, but here also, an act may perfectly well 
 be intended and vet not be voluntary, as the term has been 
 defined above. Intended' and 'voluntary' are certainly over- 
 lapping terms, as are 'purposive' and Voluntary,' but they 
 are by no means synonymous. So the author has been led 
 astray in his treatment of action, by not having the problem 
 definitely in mind. This is shown very clearly, by the class 
 
 I 0p. cit., p. 277. 
 
36 COFFIN 
 
 of illustrations he adduces to support his argument. To 
 these illustrations, we will return presently. 
 
 But before taking up this point of special interest, let us 
 briefly consider the paragraph headed, "The feelings produced 
 by a movement rarely cause it." If we understand the au- 
 thor correctly, his argument in this section depends upon the 
 assumption that most psychologists hold the 'resident' or 
 'remote' images to be essential to all action, which he himself 
 calls 'purposive' 'intentional' or 'voluntary'; that the essence 
 of the motive is these images. But the assumption is ground- 
 less. What they do hold, according to definition, and as in- 
 stanced by illustration, is that these images when present, 
 usually accompany or precede movements, as guides to them. 
 In other words, in cases where the movements are not habit- 
 ual, images teU'which of an indefinite number of movements, 
 is the appropriate one, which will most directly bring about 
 the desired end. The individual has learned by past experi- 
 ence, that certain movements accomplish certain things, 
 hence, when the idea of something to be accomplished comes 
 to the mind, the idea of the appropriate movement as a means 
 comes up with it as an antecedent to the movement, usually 
 in the form of some sort of an image. Where this is not the 
 case, where ideas of movement seem distinctly not to be 
 present, the action can hardly be termed voluntary, in the 
 sense of the definitions, but rather a sensory or ideo-motor, 
 or even an automatic action, in which the details of execution 
 are handed over to the nervous system, where movement 
 follows directly, upon representation. As a matter of fact, 
 the vast majority of our so-called acts in the course of the 
 day, are of this class, movements which just go off of them- 
 selves when the proper cue is received, whatever the cue 
 may be. But the point which seems to have been left out of 
 account by the author, when he says that "any mental state 
 whatever may be the antecedent of an intentional act " is the 
 fact that in most voluntary acts of the ordinary sort, the or- 
 ganism is predisposed toward a certain set of movements by 
 way of habit. 
 
 A criticism of the illustrations, above mentioned, will help 
 to make this clear. For example, he assumes that he has 
 performed a voluntary act in the following: " I just now com- 
 pleted the purposive action of writing," "Yet this seems 
 easily demonstrable." " The act was certain finger and arm 
 movements,'" etc. No one will deny that this was a pur- 
 posive act, but it was by no means voluntary, as the latter is 
 commonly and technically understood; because the act was 
 more than "certain finger and arm movements." It com- 
 prised the mental processes antecedent to and concomitant 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 37 
 
 with the movements involved in driving the pen. It involved 
 the predisposition toward that kind of movement as well as 
 the movements themselves; otherwise, the words might have 
 been spoken, or any other inadequate action made. And 
 this predisposition towards writing the words was a function 
 of attention and was accomplished in the general preparation 
 for the day's work. For the ordinary individual, it must also 
 have involved various images, resident and remote, at the 
 time of the preparation when he sat down at his desk. But 
 whether they were present or not just before the writing of 
 that particular sentence, or in the general preparation for the 
 day's work, is immaterial. What is important, is the fact 
 that most psychologists hold that memory images, resident 
 and remote, were highly essential when the act of writing 
 was being learned; i. e. y that in the genesis of the act, images 
 were necessary as a guide to the act. The sort of act de- 
 scribed in the illustration is very complex. It is one part of 
 a system of related acts and cannot be isolated out of its sur- 
 roundings and still retain its true relations; i.e., it cannot be 
 fully explained without recourse to its genesis. The same 
 argument applies to the other illustration given, viz., "A 
 few hours ago, I signed a lease, and I can confidently affirm 
 that the thought antecedent to the act contained no images 
 of any sensation in any way connected with the writing of 
 my name." But here again, the act is more than the writing 
 of one's name. The desired end was a lease-signed-at-my- 
 own-terms. The agent's coming to terms is the cue for cer- 
 tain predetermined hand movements, and the real act was 
 the decision that the end should be chosen. The movements 
 were predetermined in the general attentive state preparatory 
 to the action. So by definition, only those purposive or in- 
 tended acts which are voluntary, are held to have as an essen- 
 tial part of their motives, resident and remote images of 
 previous movements. The writer of the illustration has 
 made reactions similar to those instanced so many times that 
 they are no longer purely voluntary acts, according to the 
 general criteria of definitions given above, which, as we 
 understand them, imply attention, not only to the end desired 
 but also to the means of attainment. The acts instanced, 
 like a host of ordinarily so-called voluntary acts approach 
 the psycho-motor act in character. Titchener says (Primer 
 of Psychology, 1905, p. 170), " So the impulse degenarates. 
 In the first place, the idea of our own movement drops out 
 of the motive. . . The copy, the movement idea then dis- 
 appears; it no longer means anything to the organism, and an 
 idea owes its life to meaning something. Secondly, the idea 
 of the result becomes absorbed, so to speak, in the precep- 
 
38 COFFIN 
 
 tion of the object. . . The idea of result comes to be merely 
 a sort of tag stuck on the perception." And it is to a class 
 very like this psycho-motor action that the instances above 
 quoted belong. For psycho-motor action and the (what may 
 be termed) predetermined action, very nearly like it in char- 
 acter, are not voluntary action in the sense of the definitions. 
 Neither the author's own illustrations, nor those quoted from 
 James then, belong to that class of actions technically termed 
 voluntary. They are purposive to a high degree, and are 
 certainly intended, but they are not therefore voluntary. 
 
 So in the first place, the break which the author thinks he 
 is making with the psychology books, in regard to the mem- 
 ory images, as constituents of motives to action, is neither 
 consistent nor complete. It is inconsistent because the 
 statement in the preface would indicate that he meant to predi- 
 cate of all kinds of action the non-essentialness of memory 
 images, while in the text, he leaves out of account altogether 
 that which is technically termed ' voluntary ' in the various 
 systems of psychology. And his break is incomplete for the 
 reason just mentioned; that his criticism does not take into 
 account what is technically known as voluntary action. 
 
 There seems to be no reason why Thorndike should not 
 subscribe to the general definition of action as consciously 
 conditioned movement. But consciousness implies some de- 
 gree of attention, and where there is attention, there must be 
 something attended to. Hence, in all cases of action, some- 
 thing is being attended to, which is pertinent to the action; 
 and it is difficult to conceive that this something-attended-to 
 should be anything other than some sort of an idea of object 
 to be acted on or idea of end, or result to be attained. 
 
 The present writer's own introspective analyses of simple 
 voluntary acts point very decidedly to the necessary exist- 
 ence of quite definite ideas of end or result. For example, 
 in the act of rising to open the door in response to a knock, 
 the experience is as follows: At the sound of the knock, a 
 startled feeling, the components of which seem to be upon 
 analysis, a throb in the head, a pulsing flush over neck and 
 face, one slower and stronger heart beat, followed by an in- 
 creased rate, a catch of breath, and a slight depressing sen- 
 sation about lungs. Almost simultaneously with the knock, 
 visual images of the door, of the possible cause of the knock, 
 i. <?., image of the hand and arm on the outside, with a more 
 or less vague image of an individual come to consciousness. 
 These images come simultaneously with the sensations just 
 noted. After the knock has ceased, very frequently auditory 
 images of it recur, as if it were continuing ; visual images 
 of a moving hand tapping the door usually accompany the 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 39 
 
 auditory. Simultaneously with these, or rather in rapid alter- 
 nation with them, the idea, 'I must open the door and see 
 who's there' arises. This comes as auditory word images 
 accompanied actual movements of the larynx and back of 
 tongue; and at the same time, relief from the depressing 
 respiratory sensations. With the idea of opening the door, 
 the movement toward it actually begins, and vague images 
 of hand and arm at the handle arise. Meanwhile the atten- 
 tion is strongly expectant. Word images of * who can it be,' 
 ' have I expected any one ' run through mind, and with them 
 visual images of different individuals come and go ; and this 
 sort of interplay continues until the actual opening of the 
 door puts a stop to it. 
 
 These introspective data would naturally be interpreted 
 thus : The organic sensations indicate the feeling tone. The 
 idea of opening the door to see who is there is most assur- 
 edly an idea of end or result. The visual and auditory im- 
 ages and the kinaesthetic sensations from throat are the con- 
 stituents of expectant attention. The action is a reaction to 
 an unexpected stimulus. Very few if any memory images 
 of past movements are present because the means of accom- 
 plishing the desired end has no longer to be attended to. 
 The reactor has previously been placed in similar positions 
 an indefinite number of times, and his nervous system has 
 learned by practice what the appropriate movements for this 
 kind of situation are. In other words, it is what may be 
 termed a predetermined voluntary action the condition of 
 which is an antecedent idea of end, which idea of end neces- 
 sarily involves attention. 
 
 Hence, we maintain, that if Thorndike means to include 
 voluntary in its technical sense within ' intended ' action, 
 "any mental state whatever may" not "be the antecedent 
 of" all "intended acts." 
 
 APPENDIX A 
 
 The method of questioning the observer in experimental 
 tion of this sort, where introspection is difficult, is a valuable 
 aid, and was made use of to advantage in this series of ex- 
 periments. In the first place, it is valuable to the experi- 
 menter, because he may induce the observer to make his 
 introspective records fuller and more complete. The experi- 
 menter, having read over the previous day's record, is aware 
 of the deficiencies and gaps in the records, and can judge as 
 to the thoroughness of the introspective picture. And by 
 judicious questioning, he is able to bring out points of im- 
 portance, that would, perhaps, not have been brought out 
 
40 COFFIN 
 
 entirely spontaneously; and all without danger of sugges- 
 tion provided the questions are properly framed. The ques- 
 tion should be so worded that it merely makes the observer 
 aware that his introspection has not been as complete as de- 
 sirable in regard to the point in question. In the second 
 place, the method is valuable to the observer. A few wisely 
 directed questions do much to add zest and interest, and 
 may each be made to appear as a separate sub-problem to 
 be solved. Which problems serve as something concrete 
 upon which to work. 
 
 On the other hand, valuable as the method is, it is one 
 which must be used with care, and one that cannot, with 
 safety, be carried too far, at the risk of invalidating the 
 results. 
 
 Cf. Whipple, A. J. XII, 424. 
 
 F. Angell: Meumann's Arch. 
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
 Following is a classified list of introspections selected from 
 the daily records. They are characteristic of the whole of 
 the group, of which there is not space to include more. In 
 each case the capital indicates the observer, the roman nume- 
 ral the series; and the figure the reaction time. 
 
 Illustrations of the natural reaction are taken more freely 
 from F and C than the others because neither of them had 
 ever had any work in the reaction. 
 
 Similar lists of reaction introspections have been made by 
 others. Cf. Titchener, Manual, Vol. I, Pt. II, pp. 220 ff. Ach, 
 Willensthatigkeit; and Benet. 
 
 C. I. 40. "Attention divided between idea of stimulus 
 and movement to be made. Feeling of unreadiness, un- 
 pleasant. Strain sensations in neck, slightly in finger also. 
 Hazy images." 
 
 F. I. .34. "Attention on sound of 'now,' then visualiza- 
 tion of key; next to the coming stimulus, then back to my 
 own person and key. Slight bodily strain, startled feeling 
 at stimulus, followed by visual idea of key and of E. Con- 
 fused." 
 
 F. I. .34. " Slight confusion, then expectant attention on 
 E's key; Reaction followed stimulus without voluntary effort. 
 Time short, slight relief." 
 
 C. I. .16. "Attention on reaction more fixed because of 
 past failure. Muscular strain especially in muscle used to 
 flex finger; singled it out after * ready.' Strain in eyes and 
 forehead." 
 
 C. II. .38. " General mood of 'must-try-harder.' Feeling 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 41 
 
 of insecurity as to results. Attention divided between stimu- 
 lus and reaction. Clear images of bodily position and instru- 
 ment." 
 
 F. II. .22. " Attention on 'now, 'largely passive. No con- 
 fusion. Stimulus was visualized. Conscious of downward 
 movement of finger. Relief from strain." 
 
 Pn. II. .34. " Deliberate. Sound followed by visual im- 
 age of its cause. Then remembered movement and pushed 
 key." 
 
 C. II. .10. ''Attention good, almost entirely on reaction. 
 Clear image of self. Strain in forehead and finger; held 
 breath from * now ' to movement. Reaction came with a 
 jerk, giving relief. Reaction made before any image came." 
 
 APPENDIX C 
 Preparation 
 
 Wrong stimuli were sometimes used, mainly in order to 
 bring out the nature of the reception of the stimulus. 
 
 The quotations here given are only typical of a great num- 
 ber of similar ones and are taken almost at random from the 
 introspections collected. 
 
 Pn. I. .16. "At 'ready,' pulled myself together, bracing 
 muscles, and held breath." 
 
 P. V. .14. "Visualization of surroundings; strained feel- 
 ing in head and arm. Not only heard stimulus, but visualized 
 its cause." 
 
 P. V. .18. "Visual image of movement before it was 
 made." 
 
 M. V. .18. " Muscular tension all over; innervation of 
 finger; auditory and visual images of stimulus ; also kinaes- 
 thetic images in finger." She also remarks that " closing 
 the eyes seems to shut out of consciousness many objects 
 and associations, and makes it easier to narrow the attention 
 to the experiment. The ear also ceases to hear disturbing 
 noises and is intent on the coming stimulus, often imaging 
 it. The finger is also keenly sensitive to its position and 
 function." 
 
 Pn. IV. .12. "Visual image of swinging pendulum at 
 coming of stimuli." 
 
 M. IV. .16. "Strain sensations in trunk; visual images 
 of apparatus and table ; auditory image of stimulus repeated 
 three or four times." 
 
 M. II .16. "Went through experiment mentally, in its 
 steps, accompanied by visual, auditory, and kinaesthetic 
 images. Saw table, experimenter, and apparatus ; heard 
 stimulus, and felt image of my movement." 
 
42 COFFIN 
 
 C. I. .12. " Strain in head and finger ; imaged instru- 
 ment, also position of myself and experimenter." 
 
 C. III. .14. "Attention on finger, strain in finger, arm 
 and head, visual images. Stimulus came as surprise, and 
 finger went off of itself, yet was conscious of its movement." 
 
 C. IV. .06. " Visual images of my movement, experimen- 
 ter, and apparatus. Strain in forehead and finger with a 
 tingling in the latter." 
 
 C. IV. .06. "Strain and tingling as before." 
 
 F. III. .12. " Strain with set or rigidity of muscles of 
 shoulder and arm." 
 
 F. III. .10. u Visual image of experimenter's hand and 
 stick, with tingling of arm muscles ready to act." 
 
 F. III. .12. "Strain in head with forward tendency of 
 body. Visualization of instrument ; a general explosive re- 
 action which seemed to take place in shoulder and arm, and 
 seemed of itself to move the key." 
 
 Pn. V. .10. " Muscular set, then attention to the coming 
 stimulus." 
 
 Pn. IV. .12. " A holding back tendency to avoid previous 
 error." (Reacting too soon.) 
 
 F. II. .14. "Strong inhibition to prevent release of key 
 at 'now." 
 
 C. III. .14. "After 'now,' a tendency to react, but con- 
 sciously inhibited." 
 
 Reception 
 
 Pn. IV. .14. "Don't remember stimulus attention on 
 movement." 
 
 M. V. .14. "Barely perceived stimulus as sound, just 
 sufficient to set off movement." 
 
 F. II. .10. "Stimulus the cause for release, the reaction 
 was the release. 
 
 Pn. III. W. S. " Reaction by kinaesthetic sensation. Re- 
 alized afterwards that it was false stimulus by lack of jar." 
 
 Pn. V. .08. " Did not hear stimulus, but reacted to in- 
 clination to react to slightest provocation, and felt jar of 
 stimulus." 
 
 Pn. V. W. S. " Knew that I reacted to W. S. by lack of 
 jar and after- vibrations of stimulus." 
 
 Pn. V. (E snapped finger.-and released key.) "After reac- 
 tion, a sense of unsatisfactoriness at stimulus, but why, I do 
 not know. It seemed just like an echo." 
 
 Pn. V. .16. "Stimulus indistinctly remembered; came 
 as natural course of events." 
 
 M. V. .12. "Stimulus not heard or attended to, seemed 
 merely part of memory image." 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 43 
 
 Pn. V. (No stimulus given B.) "Reacted when tension 
 reached climax and missed stimulus only after reaction was 
 over." 
 
 The Movement 
 
 F. II. .12. "The restraint caused by the preparation au- 
 tomatically removed; followed by relief." 
 
 F. II. .10. "At stimulus, a feeling of release; reaction 
 constituted the release." 
 
 F. II. .12. "General explosive reaction; finger seemed of 
 itself to move the key." 
 
 C. III. .14. "Great muscular relief came with stimulus." 
 
 C. IV. .15. "Finger seemed to release itself." 
 
 Pn. III. .12. "Auditory sensation and the feeling that I 
 am releasing now while the sound of the stroke still vibrates." 
 
 Pn. III. Too Soon. " Muscular sensations at reaction, 
 and pleasantness at belief of accomplishment of purpose." 
 
 Pn. IV. Too soon. "After 'now' an unpleasant muscular 
 strain and suspense. With stimulus, a decided muscular re- 
 lief which was pleasant." The relief, of course, is the result 
 of the movement, but the observer evidently thought the 
 action was a response to a stimulus, which was not the case, 
 for the stimulus and movement were simultaneous. 
 
 Pn. V. Too soon. "Already at 'now' to react. Believe 
 I should have done so whether the stimulus had come or not. 
 Stimulus seemed long in coming, but it caused reaction 
 almost before it came to consciousness." In this reaction 
 the time relations are incorrect. The observer thought she 
 reacted to the stimulus when in reality she reacted too soon. 
 The most reasonable explanation, it seems to the author, is 
 that the reaction was really made to the content part of the 
 stimulus, i.e., when the interval from the 'now' to the 
 stimulus gets about so full (kinaesthetic sensations, breath- 
 ing, etc.) the action goes off quite automatically as where it 
 is in direct response to the auditory stimulus. 
 
 Pn. III. .10. " Stimulus and reaction seemed to coincide. 
 Muscular sensations of reacting ; felt key coming up." 
 
 C. IV. .12. "Response seemed identical with stimulus." 
 
 After-effects 
 
 Pn. II. .08. "When stimulus came, a pleasant feeling of 
 relief." 
 
 F. II. .12. "Instant relaxation of arm and shoulder. 
 Pleasant." 
 
 C. III. .18. " Relaxation more pleasant because certain 
 of having made better reaction." 
 
 C. V. .10. " Strong relief with reaction. Pleasant." 
 
44 COFFIN 
 
 APPENDIX D 
 Preparation 
 
 C. I. .28. "Attention went to a hasty reconstruction of 
 the impression caused by previous stimuli as a pattern. 
 When the stimulus came, there was an immediate compari- 
 son of the two, and after recognition, the movement came as 
 a natural result of the preparation." 
 
 C. I. .28. "Waited a little after stimulus came to be sure 
 it was right." 
 
 C. I. .28. " Strong tension about head in listening" 
 
 P. I. .28. "Was braced nervously and muscularly, to re- 
 act to right stimulus." 
 
 P. I. .22. "Intent on having correct stimulus, and reac- 
 tion seemed to be set off by it, as opposed to any other." 
 
 P. II. .28. ''Tried to recall sound of previous stimulus." 
 
 P. II. 28. "An auditory image of stimulus, and at coming 
 of stimulus a pleasant recognition of it as identical with 
 image." 
 
 M. II. .24. " Imaged stimulus kinaesthetically, visually 
 and slightly in throat." 
 
 M. III. .26. ' Trying to ideate the sound exactly." 
 
 P. IV. .22. "Attention went to a hasty reconstruction of 
 the stimulus, to be used as a pattern." 
 
 Reception 
 
 C. I. .28. || Stimulus identified easily." 
 
 C. I. .20. " Stimulus seemed to carry its own conviction 
 to consciousness, where something seemed to hitch onto it, 
 assuring its correctness." 
 
 P. V. .28. "Auditory memory of sound, and recognized 
 stimulus as similar to it." 
 
 P. V. .28. "Recognized: in the sense that the auditory 
 qualities of the sound fitted into the place they previously 
 had, and still occupied in consciousness." 
 
 F. I. .26. "Tried to recall sound of stimulus. Did so 
 partially by framing vocal reproduction on it. At stimulus, 
 was conscious that sound was that for which I had framed 
 vocal organs." 
 
 F. II. .22. " Failed to get any kind of picture of stimulus, 
 grew confused and reacted unconsciously." 
 
 F. II. .24. " Recalled idea * sharp ' and ' chug/ and con- 
 structed and auditory pattern of it." 
 
 M. IV. .24. "Sound corresponded exactly to that ideated." 
 
 C. I. W. S. " Reaction not really caused by stimulus, but 
 largely because everything was ready." 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION CONSCIOUSNESS 45 
 
 C. I. W. S. " Stimulus recognized as wrong, but finger 
 pressed key without conscious volition, due to tension in that 
 member." 
 
 M. III. .30. " Stimulus came in middle of two or three 
 rehearsals of sound image, in wrong position in series, and 
 made a hitch in experiment." 
 
 The Action 
 
 F. " Usually, the recognition of the stimulus as the right 
 one is followed by the consciousness that the arm is in 
 motion." 
 
 M. II. .28. " Stimulus recognized as right, then felt my 
 finger pressing key down." 
 
 The After-effects 
 
 C. I. 28. " Strong relief about head, especially." 
 M. IV. .22. " Movement gave pleasant relief." 
 
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