-if i 52 ; c • - - AND - 202 MAIN ST. VOTE FOR *^ CLINTON T. HORTON Republican Candidate for MEMBER OF ASSEMBLY 2nd DISTRICT Whose Progressive Record at Albany Last Year ENTITLES HIM TO RE-ELECTION No. 13 Under the Eagle fi. 1 7 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW LIBRARY /I J ^ '/ ujL,^:^^/ ^ 1 /- /f / ■' ^' • .. .{ . OiA^^L €^'> yO* ' ^ ^^ 7. /- THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW From the Draft prepared for the Commissioners on Uniformity OF Laws, and Enacted in Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Con- necticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee. Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. THE FULL TEXT OF THE LAW AS ENACTED, WITH COPIOUS ANNOTATIONS. BY JOHN J. CRAWFORD, Of the New York Bar, BY WHOM THE STATUTE WAS DRAWN. THIRD EDITION. NEW YORK: BAKBR, VOOKHIS AND COMPANY. 1908. Copyright, 1897, Bv John J. Crawford. Copyright, 1902, By John J. Crawford. Copyright, 1908, By John J. Crawford. J. B. LVON COMPANY PRtNTRKS AND BINDEUSr ALBANV. N. Y C^ f PllEFACE TO THIRD EDITION. Since the second edition of this book was pubhshed in 1902, the Negotiable Instruments Law has been enacted in the following States, viz. : Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, West Virginia and Wyoming. In all but _ one of these, the language of the Act is the same as that i~ in the New York statute, except in a few minor and unim- portant particulars. The Illinois statute, however, contains i some provisions materially different. These consist mainly ;:of proposed amendments submitted to the Commissioners 'rron Uniformity of Laws at their annual meeting in 1900, but which the Commissioners, by a unanimous vote, after a full report from a committee appointed to consider the subject, rejected as undesirable. In the six years that have elapsed since the publication of the second edition, the statute has been applied or construed in more than two hundred cases. All of these are cited in the present edi- tion. The numbers of the sections vary in the different States, and for convenience of reference a table of corrc- sp(jnding sections has been added. John J. Crawford. 30 Broad Street, New York, June 10, 1908. [iii] PREFACE TO SECOTO EDITION. When the first edition of this book was pubhshed, the Neg-otiable Instruments Law had been passed in four States, viz. : New York, Connecticut, Florida and Colorado. In the four years which have elapsed since then it has been enacted in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin, North Dakota, Utah, Oregon and Washington, and has also been adopted by Congress as the law of the District of Columbia. In most instances the law has been passed in the form pro- posed by the Commissioners on Uniformity of Laws ; but in several States a few minor changes have been made. These are indicated in the notes to this edition. I have also en- deavored to point out the changes made by the law in the different States, and have added to the notes citations to the decisions in all the States where the statute is now in force. It is somewhat notable that so few cases have arisen under the Act. The reported cases number only about a half dozen in all ; and in most of these the court was required only to apply the act, and not to construe it. Perhaps nothing could better demonstrate that the practical working of the law has been satisfactory. As in the previous edition, the text is that of the New York Act. For the information of the pro- fession outside of New York it may be stated that the hiatus in the section numbers does not indicate the omission of any sections, but is in accordance with the plan adopted in all the " General Laws " of this State. John J. Crawford. 30 Broad Street, New York, February i, 1902. [v] PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. In 1895 the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Laws, which met that year in Detroit, instructed the Committee on Commercial Law to have prepared a codifi- cation of the law relating to bills and notes. The matter was referred to a sub-committee consisting of Lyman D. Brewster of Connecticut, Henry C. \\'ilcox of New York and Frank Bergen of New Jersey; and I was employed by the sub-committee to draw the proposed law. When com- pleted, the draft, with my notes, was submitted to the sub- committee, who printed it and sent copies to each member of the conference, and also to many prominent lawyers and law professors, and to several English judges and lawyers, with an invitation for suggestions and criticisms. The draft was submitted to the conference which met at Sara- toga in August, 1896; and the Commissioners who were in attendance, being twenty-seven in all. and representing fourteen different States, went over it section by section, and made some amendments therein, most of which were such changes in the existing law as I had not felt at liberty to incorporate into the original draft. The draft as thus amended was adopted by the conference; and in such form it has been submitted to the legislatures of many of the States. It has been passed and has become a law in New York, Connecticut. Colorado and Florida. T am informed that the Commissioners on I'niformity of Laws will make special effort to hrivc it adopted in many other States at the next session of their legislatures. The text of the law as printed in this edition is that of the New York statute. This is precisely the same as that of [vii] VUI rUKFALl-: TO riRST liDlTlON. the draft published by the Coniniissioners on Uniformity of Laws, and the statute as passed in Connecticut, Colorado and Florida, except that the section numbers have been changed, and section headings introduced, to conform the statute to the plan adopted by the Commissioners of Statu- tory Revision in their revision of the General Laws, and three sections, viz., 330, 331 and 332, relating to special matters heretofore embodied in other New York statutes, have been added. In the course of the passage of the bill through the New York Legislature a number of errors were made in the en- grossing and were not detected until too late to be corrected. I have indicated these by asterisks and foot-notes. Probably none of them are of such a character as to efTect the mean- ing, since they are so obviously mistakes. In submitting, this edition of the statute to the public, I embrace this my first opportunity to publicly express my ap- preciation of the unvarying courtesy and consideration shown me by the Commissioners on Uniformity of Laws, and especially by those composing the sub-committee having the preparation of the bill in charge. John J. Crawford. 30 Broad Street, New York, July 8, 1897. TABLE OF CORRESPONDING SECTIONS. IX TABLE OF CORRESPOXDIXG SECTIONS OF THE STATUTES. Commis- N. Y. sioner's draft.* Ariz. 111. Kans. Md. Mich. Nebr. Ohio. R.I. Wis. 1 2 190 191 189 190 1 13 1 1 1675 '3487' 2 14 2 'isg' "siis" 2 1675 3 192 3488 191 3 15 2 190 3178a 3 1675 4 193 3489 192 4 16 2 191 3178b 4 1675 5 194 3490 193 5 17 2 192 317SC 5 1675 6 195 194 6 18 2 193 3178d 6 1675 7 196 3491 195 7 19 2 194 3178e 7 1675 20 1 3304 1 8 20 3 1 3171 9 1675-1 21 2 3305 2 9 21 4 2 3171a 10 1675-2 22 3 3306 3 10 22 o 3 3171b 11 1675-3 23 4 3307 4 11 23 6 4 3171c 12 1675-4 24 5 3308 5 12 24 7 5 3171d 13 1675—5 25 6 3309 6 13 25 8 6 3171e 14 1675-6 26 7 3310 7 14 26 9 7 3171f 15 1675—7 27 8 3311 8 15 27 10 8 3171g 16 1675-8 28 9 3312 9 16 28 11 9 317 Ih 17 1675-y 29 10 3313 10 17 29 12 10 3171i 18 1675-10 30 11 3314 11 18 30 13 11 3171J 19 1675-11 31 12 3315 12 19 31 14 12 3171k 20 1675-12 32 13 3316 13 20 32 15 13 31711 21 1675-13 33 14 3317 14 21 33 16 14 3171m 22 1675-14 34 15 3318 15 22 34 17 15 317111 23 1675-15 35 16 3319 16 23 35 18 16 31710 24 1675-16 36 17 3320 17 24 36 19 17 3171p 25 1675-17 37 18 3321 18 25 37 20 18 3171q 26 1675-18 38 19 3322 19 26 38 21 19 3171r 27 1675-19 39 20 3323 20 27 39 22 20 3171s '28 1675-20 40 21 3324 21 28 40 23 21 31711 29 1675-21 41 22 3325 22 29 41 24 22 3171U 30 1675-22 42 23 3326 23 30 42 25 23 3171V 31 1675-23 50 24 3327 24 31 43 26 24 3171W 32 1675-50 51 25 3328 25 32 44 27 25 3171X 33 1675-51 52 26 3329 26 33 45 28 26 3l7ly 34 1675-52 53 27 3330 27 34 46 29 27 3171Z 35 1675-53 54 28 3331 28 35 47 30 28 3172 36 1675-54 55 29 3332 29 36 48 31 29 3172a 37 1675-55 60 30 3333 30 37 49 32 30 3172b 38 1676 61 31 3334 31 38 50 33 31 3172c 39 1676-1 62 32 3335 32 39 51 34 32 3172il 40 1675-2 63 33 3336 33 40 52 35 33 3172e 41 1676-3 64 34 3337 34 41 53 36 34 31721 42 1676-4 65 35 3338 35 42 54 37 35 3172k 43 1676-5 66 36 3339 36 43 55 38 36 3172U 44 1676-6 67 37 3340 37 44 56 39 37 3172i 45 1676-7 6K 38 3341 38 45 57 40 38 3172i 3172U 46 1676-8 60 39 3342 39 46 58 41 39 47 1676-9 70 40 3343 40 47 59 42 40 31721 48 1676-10 71 41 3344 41 48 60 43 41 3172m 49 1676-11 72 42 334. -| 42 49 61 44 42 317211 50 1676-12 73 43 3346 43 50 62 45 43 31720 51 1676-13 74 44 3347 44 51 63 46 44 31721) 52 1676-14 75 45 3348 45 52 64 47 45 3172(1 53 1676-15 X TABLE OF CORRESPONDING SECTIONS. Table of Corresponding Sections of the Statutes (Continued). N. Y. Commis- si oner's draft.* Ariz. 111. Kans. M(l. Mich. Ncbr. Ohio. K. I. Wis. 76 46 3349 46 53 65 48 46 3172r 54 1676-16 T7 47 3350 47 54 66 49 47 3172s 55 1676-17 78 48 3351 48 55 67 50 48 31721 56 1076-18 79 40 3352 49 56 OS 51 49 3172V1 57 1670-19 80 50 3353 50 57 69 52 50 3172V 58 1676-20 90 51 3354 51 58 70 53 51 3172W .59 1676-21 91 52 3355 52 59 71 54 52 3172X 60 1676-22 92 53 3356 53 60 72 55 53 3172.V 61 1670-23 93 54 3357 54 61 73 56 54 3172Z 62 1070-24 94 55 3358 55 62 74 57 55 3173 63 1670-25 95 56 3359 56 63 75 58 56 3173a 64 1676-26 96 57 3360 57 64 76 59 57 3172b G5 1676-27 97 58 3361 58 65 77 60 58 3173c 66 1676-28 98 59 3362 59 66 78 61 59 3173il 67 1676-29 110 60 3363 60 67 79 62 60 3173e 6S 1677 111 61 3364 61 68 80 63 61 3173f ^■{ 1677-1 112 62 33C5 62 69 81 64 62 3173K 70 1677-2 113 63 3366 63 70 82 65 63 3173h 71 1677-3 114 64 3367 64 71 S3 66 64 31731 72 1677-4 115 65 3368 65 72 84 67 65 3173J 73 1677-5 116 66 3369 66 73 85 68 66 3173k 74 1677-6 117 67 3370 67 74 S6 69 67 31731 75 1677-7 118 68 3371 68 75 S7 70 68 3173m 76 1677-8 119 69 3372 69 76 88 71 69 3173n i t 1677-9 130 70 3373 70 77 89 72 70 31730 78 1678 131 71 3374 71 78 90 73 71 3173p 79 1678-1 132 72 3375 72 79 91 74 72 3173C1 80 1678-2 133 73 3376 73 80 92 75 73 3173r 81 1678-3 134 74 3377 74 81 93 76 74 3173s 82 1678-4 135 75 3378 75 82 94 77 75 7173t 83 1678-5 136 76 3379 76 83 95 78 76 3173U 84 1678-6 137 77 3380 77 84 96 79 77 3173V 85 1678-7 138 78 3381 78 85 97 80 78 3173\v S6 1678-8 139 79 3382 79 86 98 81 79 3173X S7 1678-9 140 80 3383 80 87 99 82 80 3173y ss 1678-10 141 81 3384 81 88 100 83 81 3173Z S9 1678-11 142 82 3385 82 89 101 84 82 3174 90 1678-12 143 83 3386 83 90 102 85 83 3174a 91 1678-13 144 84 3387 84 91 103 86 84 3174b 92 1678-14 145 85 3388 85 92 104 87 85 3174c 93 1678-15 146 86 3389 86 93 105 88 86 3174(1 94 167S-16 147 87 3390 94 106 89 3174f 95 167S-17 148 88 3391 87 95 107 90 87 3174f 96 1678-18 160 89 3392 88 96 108 91 88 3174e 97 1678-19 161 90 3393 89 97 109 92 89 3174h 98 1678-20 162 91 3394 90 98 110 93 90 3174i 99 1678-21 163 92 3395 91 99 HI 94 91 3174J 100 1678-22 164 93 3396 92 100 112 95 92 3174k 101 1678-23 165 94 3397 93 101 113 96 93 31741 102 1678-24 166 95 3398 94 102 114 97 94 3174m 103 1678-25 167 96 3399 95 103 115 98 95 317411 104 1678-26 168 97 3400 96 104 116 99 96 31740 105 1678-27 169 98 3401 97 105 117 100 97 31741) 106 1678-28 170 99 3402 98 106 118 101 98 3174q 107 1678-29 * These are the numbers of the sections as enacted in the fallowing states: Ala- bama Colorado, Connecticut. District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana. Nevada, New Jer.sey, New Mexico, North Carohna, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming. In some instances these numbers have been changed by incorporating "the act in a code. TABLE OF CORRESPONDING SECTIONS. XI Table of Coreespondlxg Sections of the Statutes (Continued). N. Y. 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 210 211 212 213 214 215 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 Commis- sioner's draft.* 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 Ariz. m. Kans. Md. Mich. Nebr. 3403 99 107 119 102 99 3404 100 108 120 103 100 3405 101 109 121 104 101 3406 102 110 122 105 102 3407 103 111 123 106 103 3408 104 112 124 107 104 3409 105 113 125 108 105 3410 106 114 126 109 106 3411 107 115 127 110 107 3412 108 116 128 111 108 3413 109 117 129 112 109 3414 110 118 130 113 110 3415 111 119 131 114 111 3416 112 120 132 115 112 3417 113 121 133 116 113 3418 114 122 134 117 114 3419 115 123 135 118 115 3420 116 124 136 119 116 3421 117 125 137 120 117 3422 118 126 138 121 118 3423 119 127 139 122 119 3424 120 128 140 123 120 3425 121 129 141 124 121 3426 122 130 142 125 122 3427 123 131 143 126 123 3428 124 132 144 127 124 3429 125 133 145 128 125 3430 126 134 146 129 126 3431 127 135 147 130 127 3432 128 136 148 131 128 3433 129 137 149 132 129 3434 130 138 150 133 130 3435 131 139 151 134 131 3436 132 140 152 135 132 3437 133 141 153 136 133 3438 134 142 154 137 134 3439 135 143 155 138 135 3440 144 156 139 136 3441 i36 137 145 157 140 137 3442 138 146 158 141 138 3443 139 147 159 142 139 3444 140 148 160 143 140 3445 141 149 161 144 141 3446 142 150 162 145 142 3447 143 151 163 146 143 344S 144 152 164 147 144 3449 145 153 165 148 145 3450 146 154 166 149 146 3451 147 155 167 150 147 3452 148 156 168 151 148 3453 149 157 169 152 149 3454 150 158 170 153 150 Ohio. 3174r 3174s 31741 3174U 3174V 3174W 3174X 3174y 3174Z 3175 3175a 3175b 3175c 3175d 3175e 3175f 3175g 3175h 3175i 3175J 3175k 31751 3175m 3175n 31750 3175p 3175q 3175r 3175s 31751 3175U 3175V 3175W 3175X 3175y 3175Z 3176 3170a 3170b 3176c 3176d 3176e 31761 3176g 3176h 3176i 3176J 3176k 31761 3170m 317011 31760 R.I. OS 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 40 47 48 49 50 • Thoso arp the nnmbfrs of thf soclions as fnartod in the follow! baiiiii. Colora'lo, (V)iiiif(liank v. Jones, 6 Mass. 524 108 Berry v. Robinson. 9 Johns. r2i 19, 59 Bicgler v. Merchants' Loan aii xwi TABLE OF CASES. PACE. Gray's Adnir. :•. Bank of Kentucky, 29 Pa. St. 365 68, ^-j Greenwich Bank v. De Groot, 7 Hun, 210 13 Gregg V. Bean. 69 Vt. 22 1/8 Griffin v. Erskine, 131 Iowa, 444 57 Griffiths v. Kellogg, 39 Wis. 290 28 V. Shipley, 74 Md. 591 78 Grissom v. Commercial Bank, 87 Tenn. 350 in Guano Company v. Marks, 135 N. C. 59 ^il Guarantee Co. v. Craig, 155 Pa. St. 343 i39 Guerrant v. Guerrant, 7 Va. Law Reg. 637 25 Guild V. Goldsmith, 9 Fla. 212 ' 97, 98 Gunston v. Heat and Power Co., 181 Pa. St. 327 82 Haddock, Blanchard & Co., Inc. v. Haddock, 118 App. Div. 412.85, 87 Hagerty v. Phillips, 83 Me. 336 93 Hagey v. Hill, 75 Pa. St. 108 140 Hague V. Davis, 8 Gratt. 4 92 Haines v. Dubois, 29 N. J. Law, 259 47 V. Merrill, 56 N. J. Law, 312 78 Hale V. Danforth, 46 Wis. 554 92, 108 Halifax v. Lyle, 3 Welsby, H. & G. 446 82 Hall V. Auburn Turnpike Co., 27 Cal. 256 46 V. Cordell, 142 U. S. 116 i53 V. Toby, no Pa. St. 318 18, 50 Hallen v. Davis, 59 Iowa, 444 24 Halliday v. Hart, 30 N. Y. 474 140 V. McDougall, 20 Wend. 81 163, 165 Hallowell v. Curry, 41 Pa. St. 322 104 Haly V. Brown, 5 Pa. St. 178 126, 128, 132, 133 Hampton v. Miller, 78 Conn. 267 97 Hanover National Bank v. American Dock & Trust Co., 148 N. Y. 612 8 Hansborough v. Gray, 3 Gratt. 340 95 Harger v. Wilson, 63 Barb. 237 75 Harker v. Anderson, 21 Wend. 2)1Z ^7^ Harmon v. Haggerty, 88 Tenn. 705 183 Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93 I49, 176 V. The Bank of Jacksonville, 20 Fla. 501 146 Harrison v. Ruscoe, 15 L. H. Exch. no; 15 M. & W. 231 116 V. Nicollet National Bank, 41 Minn. 488 176, i77 Harrold v. Kays, 64 Mich. 439 40 Hart V. Stickney, 41 Wis. 630 64 Hartford Bank v. Stcdman, 3 Conn. 494 132 Hartley v. Carboy, 150 Pa. St. 23 146 TABLE OF CASES. XXVll PAGE. Haskell v. Boardman, 8 Allen, 38 I30 V. Brown, 65 111. 29 50 V. Jones, 86 Pa. St. 173 ^^^ Hastings v. Thompson, 54 Minn. 184 9 Hawkins v. Young, (Iowa) 1 14 N. W. Rep. 1041 79 Hawley v. Jette, 10 Oregon, 31 108 Hayes v. Werner, 45 Conn. 252 97 Haynes v. Birks, 3 Bor. & Pul. 599 ^^7 Heard v. Dubuque Bank, 8 Neb. 10 10 Hegeman v. Moon, 131 N. Y. 462 I4 Heise v. Bumpass, 40 Ark. 547 3° Heist V. Hart, 7i Pa. St. 286 49 Henderson v. Thornton, zi ^liss. 448 83 Henry Christian Building and Loan Association v. Walton, 187 Pa. St. 201 i'J Herdic v. Roessler, 109 N. Y. 127 43. 182 Herdman v. Wheeler, i K. B. ( 1902) 361 25 Hereth v. Meyer, Z2> Ind. 511 12 Herker v. Anderson, 21 Wend. 372 I77 Herrick v. Whitney, 15 Johns. 240 88 V. Wolverton, 41 N. Y. 581 97 Heuertematte v. Morris, loi N. Y. 63 41. 83 Hewins v. Cargill, 67 Me. 554 ^-^8 Hibbs V. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167 13 Hibcrnia Bank v. Lacomb, 84 N. Y. 367 96 Hickok V. Bunting, 92 App. Div. 167 39 Higgins V. Ridgway, 153 N. Y. 130 49 Hill T'. Buchanan, 71 N. J. Law, 301 I43 z'. Farrell, 3 Grccnleaf, 233 132 V. Hall, 191 Mass. 253 28 Hills V. Place, 48 N. Y. 520 95, 96 Hinckley r. Merchants' National Bank, 131 Mass. 147 78 Hinsdale v. Miles, 5 Conn. Z2>^ 167 Hobbs V. Straine, 149 Mass. 212 132 Hodge V. Wallace, 129 Wis. 84 9 V. Smith, 130 Wis. 326 6, 26, 49, 68, ^^ Hodges V. Shulcr, 22 N. Y. 114 16, 119 Hoffman v. Planters' National Bank (Va.), 39 S. E. Rep. 134 148 Holbrook v. Burt, 22 Pick. 555 5 Holcomb V. Wyckoff, 35 N. J. Law, 38 75 HoMsworth v. Hunter. 10 C. & B. 449 17-4 Holmes v. Roe, 62 Mich. 199 178 V. West, 17 Cal. 623 18 XXviii TABLE OF CASES. PAGE. Holtz V. Boppe, 37 N. Y. 634 loi Home Insurance Company v. Green, 19 N. Y. 518 119 National Hank v. Newton, 8 Bradwell, 563 Ill Savings Bank v. Stewart (Neb.), no N. W. Rep. 947 113 Homer v. Wallis, 1 1 Mass. 310 148 Kook V. Pratt, 78 N. Y. 371 52 Hopkinson v. Foster, L. R. 18 Eq. 74 ^7^^ i^o Hotchkiss V. First National Bank, 21 Wall. 354 78 V. Fitzgerald Patent Etc. Co., 41 W. Va. 357 4° House V. Vinton Bank, 43 Ohio St. 346 123 Howard v. Boorman, 17 Wis. 459 46, 95 V. Ives, I Hill, 263 126, 127 Howe V. Merrill, 15 Cush. 88 92 Howland v. Adrian, 29 N. J. Law, 41 119. 126, 132 V. Carson, 15 Pa. St. 453 ^55 Hubbard v. Gurney, 64 N. Y. 450 I39 V. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 43 122 HufT T'. Wagner, 63 Barb. 230 75 Huffuker v. National Bank, 12 Bush. 293 164 Hughes V. Large, 2 Pa. St. 103 76 Humphreys v. Sutcliffe, 192 Pa. St. 336 104 Hungerford v. O'Brien, 37 Minn. 306 II5 Hunter v. Hook, 64 Barb. 469 130 V. Van Bomhurst, i Md. 504 1 19 Hutchinson v. Boggs & Kirk, 28 Pa. St. 294 78 Hutchison v. Crutcher, 98 Tenn. 421 104 Industrial Bank of Chicago v. Bower, 165 Til. 70 178 Trust Title and Savings Co. v. Weakley, 103 Ala. 458. . 178 Ingalls V. Lee, 9 Barb. 647 58 Ingersoll v. Martin, 58 Md. 67 43 In re Bishops' Estate, 195 Pa- St. 85 I39 Brown, 2 Story, 502 176 Swift, 106 Fed. Rep. 65 134 Insurance Company v. Wilson, 29 W. Va. 543 9^ Iron City National Bank v. Fort Pitt National Bank, 159 Pa. St. 46 82 Iron City National Bank v. Rafferty, 207 Pa. St. 238 31 Irving National Bank v. Alley, 79 N. Y. 536 176 Ivory V. Bank of the State, 36 Mo. 475 '^77 Jackson v. Myers, 43 Md. 452 i7 V. Richards, 2 Caines, 343 108 James v. Brown, 1 1 Ohio, 601 18 Jameson v. Swinton, 2 Taunt. 224 126 Jamieson v. McFarland, 43 Wash. 153 36 TABLE OF CASES. XXIX PAGE. Jarnigan v. Stratton, 95 Tenn. 619 123 Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N. Y. 652 69 V. St. Croix Manufacturing Co., 23 Me. 287 125 V. Wilson, 46 Conn. 91 I49. I54 Jeffrey v. Rosenfeld. 179 Mass. 506 I45 Jenkins v. Schnaub, 14 Wis. i 4° V. White, 147 Pa. St. 303 130 Jenkinson v. Wilkinson, no N. C. 532 60 Jennison v. Stafford, i Cush. 168 43 Jerman v. Edwards, 29 App. Cases, D. C. 535 59, 60 Johnson v. Brown, 154 Alass. 105 126, 165 V. Buffalo Center State Bank (Iowa), 112 N. W. Rep. 165 57 V. Clark, 39 N. Y. 216 i54 V. Mitchell, 50 Tex. 212 55 V. Ramsay, 43 N. J. Law, 279 93 Jones V. Council Bluffs Branch, etc., 34 111. 3U ^53 V. Darch, 4 Price, 300 82 V. Home Furnishing Co., 9 App. Div. 103 81 V. Roberts, 191 Pa. St. 152 130 V. Rodetz, 27 Minn. 240 10 Jordan t'. Grover, 99 Cal. 194 78 V. Tate, 19 Ohio St. 586 I4 Joseph V. Solomon, 19 Fla. 623 163 Joy V. Diefendorf, 130 N. Y. 6 78 Joyce V. Realm Insurance Company, L. R. 7 Q. B. 580 30 Judah V. Harris, 19 Johns. 144 18 Jurgens v. Wichmann, 108 N. Y. Supp. 881 127 Kaschncr v. Conklin, 40 Conn. 81 ^44 Kcene v. Behan, 40 W^lsh. 505 68, 77. 78 Keith V. Jones, 9 Johns. 120 I7 Kelley v. Brown, 5 Gray, 108 130 V. Whitney. 45 Wis. no 64 Kelly V. Burroughs, 102 N. Y. 93 92, I44 Kenworthy v. Sawyer, 125 Mass. 28 140 Kerby v. Rucgamcr, T07 .'Kpp. Div. 491 34 Kerr v. Anderson (N. D.), ni N. W. Rep. 614 77 Keyes v. Feustomachcr, 24 Cal. 329 18 Kilcresse v. White, 6 Fla. 45 7^ Kilgore v. Bulklcy. 14 Conn. 362 n8 Kimball v. Bryan, 56 Iowa, 632 106 King V. Doane, 139 U. S. 166 78 7'. Holmes, 11 Pa. St. 4.56 102 Kingslcy v. Sampson, 100 III. 54 3° XXX TABLE OF CASES. PAGE. Kinney v. Kruse, 28 Wis. 183 68, 77, 79 Kinsley v. Robinson, 21 Pick, i2^ 106 Kirschncr v. Conklin. 40 Conn. •]^ 92 Kiskadden r. Allen, 7 Colo. 206 14 Kniss V. Holbrook, 16 Ind. App. 229 183 Knox V. Eden Musec American Co., 148 N. Y. 454 69 Koehning v. Muemminghoff, 61 Mo. 403 19 Kohn V. Consolidated Butter and Egg Co., 30 Misc. (N. Y.) 725. . 85 Konig V. Bayard, i Pet. 250 171 Kunkel v. Spooner, 9 Md. 462 62 Ladd V. Franklin, 37 Conn. 64 69 Lake Shore National Bank v. Butler Colliery Co., 51 Hun, 63 121 Lambert v. Pack, i Salk. 127 91 Land, etc., Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Br.nk, 196 Pa. St. 230 37 Lane v. Stacy, 8 Allen, 41 93 Lassas v. McCarty, 47 Ore. 474 38, 75 Laubach v. Pursell, 35 N. J. Law, 434 I43 Lawrence '■. Miller, 16 N. Y. 235 116, 117 Lawson v. First National Bank, 102 S. W. Rep. 324 "71 Lazier v. Horan, 55 Iowa, 'j'j 96 Leask v. Dew, 102 App. Div. 529 I44. ^45 Leather Manufacturers' National Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96.. ■ 2,7 Leavitt v. Putnam, i Sandf. 190 19 3 N. Y. 494 5 Legg V. Vinal, 165 Mass. 555 103, 135. 165 Lehigh Valley Coal v. West Depere Agr. Works, 63 Wis. 45.. 46 Leidy v. Tammany, 9 Watts, 353 98 Lenheim v. Wilmarding, 55 Pa. St. 73 44 Lenox v. Roberts, 2 Wheat, 2ns 123 Leonard v. Draper, 187 Mass. 536 87, 90 Levins v. Briggs, 21 Oregon, 2>'hi ^o Levy V. Ford, 41 La. Ann. 873 40 Lewis V. Brehme, ZT, Md. 412 129 Lewisohn v. The Kent and Stanley Co., 87 Hun, 257 21 Libby v. Mekelborg, 28 Minn. 38 18 Life Insurance Company v. Pendleton, 112 U. S. 696 106, 134, 150 Light V. Kingsbury, 50 Mo. 331 19 Lindeman's Exr. v. Guildin, 34 Pa. St. 54 122 Lindsay v. Price, Z2> Tex. 280 50 Lindsey v. McClelland, 18 Wis. 481 18, 98 Lines v. Smith, 4 Fla. 47 38 Linn v. Horton, 17 Wis. 150 1 17, 126 Littauer v. Goldman, 72 N. Y. 506 88, 89 -> TABLE OF CASES. XXXI PAGE. Lloyd V. Oliver, 18 Q. B. 471 30 V. Osborne, 65 N. W. Rep. 859 178 z: Sigourncy, 5 Bing. 252 ; 3 M. P. 229 52 Lockwooa z: Crawford, 18 Conn. 361 96, 103, 130, UO Logan f. Ogden, loi Tenn. 392 84 Loizeaux v Fremder, 123 Wis. 193 112, 113 Lomax z: Picot, 2 Rand. 260 54 Lombard v. Byrne, 194 Mass. 236 39 Long V. Rhawn, 75 Pa. St. 128 "6 Lookout Bank v. Aull, 93 Tcnn. 645 56 Lord V. Ocean Bank, 20 Pa. St. 384 45> 80 Losee z: Bissell, 76 Pa. St. 459, 462 63 V. Durkin, 7 J. R. 70 67 Louisville R. R. Co. z'. Caldwell. 98 Ind. 251 38 Loux V. Fox, 171 Pa. St. 68 178 Low v. Howard, 10 Cush. 159 109, 129, 130 II Cush. 268 130 Lowell Trust Co. z'. Pratt, 183 Mass. 379 128 Lowery v. Steele, 27 Ind. 168 i v. Steward, 25 N. Y. 239 ^- Lyon z'. Ewings, 17 Wis. 61 54 v. Phillips, ic6 Pa. St. 57 ^7 MacDonald v. Whitfield, L. R. 8 .\pp. Cas. 733 93 Mackay z: St. Mary's Church, 15 R. L 121 I7 MacLeod v. Luce, 2 Stra. 762 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 1481 11 Madison Square Bank v. Pierce, 137 N. Y. 444 55, U7 Magee v. Lovcll, L. R. 9 C P. 107 30 Maginn v. Dollar Savings Bank, 131 Pa. St. 362 180 Magoon v. Rebcr, 76 Wis. 392 68 Maitland v. Citizens' National Bank, 40 Md. 540 40 Mar.deville v. Welsh, 5 Wheat. 286 I49 Manufacturers', etc.. Bank v. Love, 13 App. Div. 561 32 Marine National Bank v. National City Bank, 59 N. Y. 67 81 Market and Fulton National Bank v. Sargent, 85 Me. 349 78 Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich. 184 9, 54 Marks v. Boone, 24 Fla. I77 "5, 124 Marling v. Nommcnsen, 127 Wis. 363 63, 113 Marsh z: Marshall, 53 Pa. St. 396 64 Marshall z: Burnby, 25 Fla. 619 '57 V. Sonneman, 216 Pa. St. 65 118 Martin 7'. Bank, 94 Tcnn. 176 40 V. Tngcrsoll, 8 Pick, i '33 7: Stone. 67 N. H. 3f^7 '4 Maryland Fertilizing Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 584 10 XXxii TABL1-: OF CASES. PAGE. Mason f. Frick, 105 Pa. St. 162 17 I'. Kilcourse, 71 N. J. Law, 472 165 V. Noonan, 7 Wis. 609 S8 Maspcro r. Pcclesclaux. 22 La. Ann. 227 122 Massachusetts Bank v. Oliver, 10 Cush. 557 122 National Bank v. Snow, 187 Mass. T59-22, 28, 71, I47 Matlock V. Schcucrman (Ore.) 93 Pac. Rep. 825 66, 70, 78 Matteson v. Moulton, 79 N. Y. 627 I5S Mattison v. Marks. 31 Mich, 421 14 Maule V. Crawford, 14 Hun, 193 20 Maxwell v. Agnew, 21 Fla. 154 176 Mayer v. Jadis, i IVI. & Rob. 247 60 Mayers v. McRimmon, 140 N. C. 640 5°, 60 J^IcBride v. Farmers' Bank, 26 N. Y. 450 40 ]\IcCarty v. Roots, 21 How. (U. S.) 432 92 McCaughcy v. Smith. 27 N. Y. 39 148 McConcghy v. Kirk, 68 Pa. St. 200 91 McCormick v. Shea, 50 Misc. 592 I45. 146 McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. 636 53 McDonald v. Magruder, 3 Peters, 470 92 McFarland v. Sikes, 54 Conn. 250 49 McKim V. King, 58 Md. 502 64, 67 :\IcKnight v. Parsons (Iowa), 113 N. W. Rep. 858 65, 77, 78 McLeod V. Hunter, 29 Misc. 558 19 McSherry v. Brooks, 46 Md. 103 59 McWherter v. Jackson, 10 Humph. 208 33 Mead v. Engs, 5 Cow. 303 127 Mechanics' Bank v. Griswold, 7 Wend. 165 109, 130 v. Merchants' Bank, 6 Mete. 13 104 V. Stratton, 2 Keyes, 365 22 and Traders' Bank v. Seitz, 150 Pa. St. 632 112 Megowan v. Peterson, 173 N. Y. i 34 Mehlenger v. Harriman, 185 Mass. 245 66 Melton V. Brown, 25 Fla. 461 84 Mercer County v. Hackett, i Wall. 83 17 V. Lancaster, 5 Pa. St. 160 127 Merchants' Bank v. Birch, 17 Johns. 24 122 V. Griswold, 72 N. Y. 472 154 V. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604 176, i79 of Canada v. Brown, 86 App. Div. 599 122 Nat. Bank v. Haverhill Iron Works, 159 Mass. 158 78 Meriden National Bank v. First National Bank, 7 Ind. App. 322.. I79 V. Gallaudet, 120 N. Y. 298 88, 93 Merritt v. Todd, 23 N. Y. 28 97 TABLE OF CASES. XXXlll PAGE. Mersick v. Alderman, yj Conn. 634 43 Merz V. Kaiser, 20 La. Ann. 379 60 Messmore v. Morrison, 172 Pa. St. 300 18 Aletropolitan Bank v. Jones, 137 111. 634 179 Meuer v. Phenix National Bank, 42 Misc. 341 60, 61 94 App. Div. 331 179 Meyer v. Beardslej-, 29 N. J. Law, 236 152 V. Richards, 163 U. S. 385 88, 89 Meyers v. Standart, 1 1 Ohio St. 29 156 M. Groh's Sons Co. v. Schneider, 34 Misc. (N. Y.) 195 78 Middleborough National Bank v. Cole, 191 Mass. 168 45 Middleton v. Griffith, 57 N. J. Law, 442 49 Milius V. Kauffman, 104 App. Div. 442 39 Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Pa. St. 1 19 148 V. Hannibal & St. Jo. R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 430 30 V. Kreiter, 76 Pa. St. 78 136 V. Reynolds, 92 Hun, 400 2Z Mills V. Bank of U. S. 1 1 Wheat. 431 1 19, 120 Mingus V. Condit, 23 N. J. Eq. 313 39 Minir v. Crawford, L. R. 2 Scotch Appeals, 456 140 Minot V. Russ, 156 Mass. 458 I79 Minturn v. Fisher, 4 Cal. 36 I77 Mitchell V. Baldwin, 88 App. Div. 265 77 V. Culver, 7 Cow. 336 23 V. Fuller, 15 Pa. St. 268 55 Moggridge v. Jones, 14 East. 485 44 Mohlman Co. v. McKanc, 60 App. Div. 546 133 Monson v. Drakely, 40 Conn. 559 31 Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553 9 County Bank v. Marsh, 7 N. Y. 481 128 Montrose Savings Bank v. Claussen (Iowa), 114 N. W. Rep. 547- • 65 Monument Nat. Bank v. Globe Works, loi Mass. 57 46 Moore v. Alexander, 63 App. Div. 100 109, 130 V. Baird, 30 Pa. 136 75 V. Hardcastlc, 1 1 Md. 486 128 Moorhcad v. Gilmore, 77 Pa. St. 1 18 69 Moreland's Assignee v. Citizens' Savings Bank, 97 Ky. 211 166 Morford v. The Farmers' Bank of Saratoga County, 26 Barb. 568. 46 Morgan v. Edwards, 53 Wis. 599 10 V. Thompson. 72 N. J. Law, 244 9.3 Morganton v. Hay, 143 N. C 326 154 Morris v. Cudc, 57 Tex. 337 60 Canal, etc., Co. v. Fisher, 9 N. J. Eq. 699 17 2 XXXIV TABLE OF CASES. X>ACE. Morrison v. Bailey. 5 Ohio St. 13 I77 Lumber Co. v. Lookout Mt. Hotel Co., 92 Tcnn. 6 92 Morse v. Huntington, 40 Vt. 488 140 Morton v. Naylor, i Hill 583 12 V. N. A. & Selma Ry. Co., 79 Ala. 590 69 Moskowitz r. Dcutsch, 46 Misc. 603 146, 147, 177 Mott v. Havana National Bank, 22 Hun, 354 12 Moyer & Brother's Appeal. 87 Pa. 129 108 Mudd V. Harper, I Md. no 19, 96 Munger v. Shannon. 61 N. Y. 25 1 11, 12, 149 Munn t'. Burch, 25 111. 35 180 Murray v. Judah. 6 Cow. 484 176 V. Lardner, 2 Wall, no 69, 78 Musson v. Lake, 4 How. 262 103 Mutli 7'. Dolfield, 43 Md. 466 117 Myrick v. Merritt, 22 Fla. 335 i57 Nailor v. Bowie. 3 Md. 251 102 Nash V. De Freville (1900), 2 Q. B. 72 138 National Bank v. Cade, 73 Mich. 449 127 V. Cole, 191 Mass. 168 45 V. Shaw, 79 Me. 376 126 V. Sutton Manufacturing Co., 6 U. S. App. 312 9 of America v. National Bank of Illinois, 164 111. 503. 180 of Commerce v. Atkinson, 55 Fed. Rep. 465, 2y U. S. App. 88 46 of Commerce v. Pick, 13 N. D. 74 74 of Newport v. Snyder Manufacturing Co., 117 App. Div. 370 46, 47 of North America v. Bangs, 106 Mass. 441 82 of Phoenixville v. Buckwalter, 214 Pa. St. 289 80 of Republic v. Young, 41 N. J. Eq. 531 69 of Washington v. Texas, 20 Wall. 72 59 Butchers' and Drovers' Bank 7/. Hubbcll, 117 N. Y. 384.. 52 Citizens' Bank v. Toplitz, 81 App. Div. 593, 178 N. Y. .466 142 Exchange Bank v. Cumberland Lumber Co., 100 Tenn. 479 84 Exchange Bank v. Hartford P. & E. R. Co., 8 R. L 375 8, 17 Exchange Bank v. Lubrano, 68 Atl. Rep. 944 83, 176 National Park Bank v. German-American M. W. & S. Co., 116 N. Y. 281 46, 71 V. Ninth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 77 81 V. Seaboard National Bank, 114 N. Y. 28 90 TABLE OF CASES. XXXV PAGE. National Revere Bank v. Morse, 163 Mass. 381 40, 68, 78 Savings Bank v. Cable, 72> Conn. 568 12 Ulster County Bank v. Madden. 114 N. Y. 280 147 Union Bank v. Todd, 132 Pa. St. 312 40 Nelson v. Cowing, 6 Hill, 2,33 64 V. First National Bank, 69 Fed. Rep. 798 166 29 U. S. App. 554 120 New V. Walker, 108 Ind. 365 183 Ncwcombe v. Fox, i App. Div. 389 28, 62 New Haven Mfg. Co. v. New Haven Pulp and Board Co., 76 Conn. 126 59 Newell V. Gregg, 51 Barb. 253 64 Newhall v. Clark, 3 Cush. 376 157 Newman v. King, 54 Ohio St. 272, 148 New York & N. H. R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30 154 Nevins v. Townsend, 6 Conn. 7 66 Niagara Bank v. Fairman Co., 31 Barb. 403 156 Nichols V. Ruggles, 76 Me. 27 11 Nightingale v. Meginnis. 34 N. J. Law, 461 139 Northampton National Bank v. Kidder, 106 N. Y. 221 78 North Atchinson Bank v. Garretson, 51 Fed. Rep. 167 153, 154 Northfield National Bank v. Arndt (Wis.), 112 N. W. Rep. 451 65 Northwestern Coal Co. v. Bowman, 69 Iowa, 150 5, 127, 176 National Bank v. Bank of Commerce, 107 Mo. 402. . 52 Norton v. Ellam, 2 M. & W. 461 95 Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 281 24, 26, 29 Ocean National Bank r. Fant. 50 N. Y. 474, 476 103 V. Williams, 102 Mass. 141 166 O'Connor v. Mechanics' Bank, 124 N. Y. 324 180 Ofenstcin v. Bryan, 20 App. Cases D. C i 146 Olry V. Miller, 74 Conn. 304 98 Oppenhcimer v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 97 Tenn. 19. . . .9, 75 Oriental Bank v. Gallo, 1 12 App. Div, 360 90 Orr V. South Amboy Terra Cotta Co., 1 13 App. Div. 103 71 Osborne v. Hubbard, 20 Oregon, 318 17 Otis V. Cullum, 92 U. S. 448 89 Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. St. 346 16 Ovrick V. Colston, 7 Gratt. 189 24 Oxford Bank v. Davis. 4 Cush. 188 160 Oxnard v. Varnum. 1 1 r Pa. St. 193 102 Pacific Bank v. Mitchell, 9 Met. 297 i37 Packard v. Dimfce, i rg App. Div. (N. Y.) 599 9' V. Wrndholz, 88 App. Div. 365; 180 N. Y. 549 45. 90 Page V. Moncll, 3 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 433 23 XXXVl TABLE OF CASES. PAGE. Paine r. Central Vermont R. R. Co., ii8 U. S. 152 97 V. Edscll, 19 Pa. St. 178 121, 146 Pardee v. Fish, 60 N. Y. 265 97 Parker -•. City of Syracuse, 31 N. Y. 376 12 Parker z\ Gordon, 7 East. 387 103 V. Kellogg, 158 Mass. 90 102 V. Stroud, 98 N. Y. 379 96, 97 Parks V. Smith, 155 Mass. 26, 33 130 Parr z'. City Trust Co., 95 Md. 291 109 Passmore v. North, 13 East. 517 22 Patch V. Washburn, 82 Mass. 82 92 Patterson i-. Todd, 18 Pa. St. 420 19, 59 Payson z'. Whitcomb, 15 Pick. 212 95 Peach z'. Bligh, 37 111. 317 50 Pearce v. Langfit, loi Pa. St. 507 126 Peason 7>. Garrett, 4 Mod. 242 14 People's Bank v. Brooke, 31 Md. 7 165 V. Franklin Bank, 88 Tenn. 299 82 z'. Kcech, 26 Md. 521 104 National Bank z'. Schepflin, y^ N. J. Law. 29 45 Savings Bank v. Bates, 120 U. S. 556 39 Perez v. Bank of Key West, 36 Fla. 467 136 Perry v. Bigclow, 128 Mass. 129 15 Persons z>. Hawkins, 41 App. Div. 171 49 V. Kruger, 45 App. Div. 187 121 Phelan v. Moss, 67 Pa. St. 59 69 Phelps V. Stocking, 21 Neb. 444 124 V. Vischer, 50 N. Y. 69 84 Phillips V. Astberg, 2 Taunt. 206 loi V. Dippo, 93 Iowa, 35 131 V. Preston, 5 How. (U. S.) 278 92 Phoenix Bank v. Hussey, 12 Pick. 483 150, 163 Insurance Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 30 160 Pickle v. People's National Bank, 88 Tenn. 380 180 Pier V. Heinrichsoffcn, 67 Mo. 163 106, 125 Pierce z'. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546 165 V. Struthers, 27 Pa. St. 249 102 Pine V. Smith, 11 Gray, 38 64 Pitts z: Jones, 9 Fla. 519 134 Place v. Mcllvain, 38 N. Y. 96 139 Planters' Bank v. Evans, 36 Tex. 592 133 z'. Keese, 7 Heish, 200 176 Piatt c'. The Sauk County Bank, 17 Wis. 222 18 Plover Savings Bank v. Moodie, (Iowa) no N. W. Rep. 29 99 TABLE OF CASES. XXXVll PAGE. Poole V. Tolleson, i McCord, 200. 19, 59 Porter v. Judson, i Gray, 175 165 V. Porter, 51 Me. 376 18 Power V. Mitchell, 7 Wis. 159 108, 109 Prescott Bank v. Coverly, 7 Gray, 216 5, 91, 160 National Bank v. Butler, 157 Mass. 548 91 Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn. 127 59 Price V. Jones, 105 Ind. 544 144 Pulsifer v. Hotchkiss, 12 Conn. 234 44 Purcell V. Allemong, 22 Gratt. 739 178 Quiggle z: Herman, 131 Wis. 379 74, 184 Quimby v. Varnum, 190 Mass. 211 142 Quinn v. Hoord, 43 Vt. 375 40 Railroad Company v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14 40 Rand v. Dovey, 83 Pa. St. 281 60 V. Reynolds, 2 Gratt. 171 128 Ranger v. Cory, i Mete. 369 66 Raymond v. Sellick, 10 Conn. 485 19, 39 Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 238 2^, 25 Redman v. Adams, 51 Me. 433 11 Reed v. Spear, 107 App. Div. 144 105, 132 V. Wilson, 41 N. J. Law, 29 103 Regester's Sons Co. v. Reed, 185 Mass. 226 77 Regina Flour Mill Co. v. Holmes, 156 Mass. i r 53 Rcier z: Straus, 54 Md. 278 165 Reilly v. Daly, 159 Pa. St. 605 149 Reincke v. Wright, 93 Wis. 368 108 Reinhart z: Schall, 69 Md. 352 92, 93, 143 Reynolds v. Appleman, 41 Md. 615 164 Rice V. Grange, 131 N. Y. 149 44, 45 V. Rice, 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 458 14 Rickets v. Pendleton, 14 Md. 320 49, 102, 135, 165 Kidgcley Bank r. Palton, 109 111. 484 176 Rikcr V. Sprague Manufacturing Co., 14 R. I. 402 14 Riverside Bank z'. Woodhaven June. L. Co.. 34 App. Div. (X. Y.) 362 38 Roach t'. Osfkr, i Man. & Ry. 120 133 7'. Wondali, 91 Tcnn. 206, Wisconsin ^o, 42 Roberts v. I lall, ,-^7 Conn. 205 40 V. Hawkins. 70 Mich. 566 115 V. McGrath. 38 Wis. 52 28 V. Parish. 17 Oregon. 583 53 V. Snow, 28 Neb. 425 19 XXXVIII TABLE OK CASES. PAGE. Robertson t-. Brcodlonc, 7 Porter, 541 76 z: Kensington, 4 Taunt. 30 55 Robins z>. Lair, 31 Iowa, 9 40 Robinson z'. Ames, 20 Johns. 146 160 V. Barnett, 19 Fla. 670 129 V. Lymon, 10 Conn. 31 76 Robson V. Bennett. 2 Taunt. 388 117 Rock County National Bank v. Hollister, 21 Minn. 385 53 Rockfieki z: First National Bank of Springfield, (Ohio) 83 N. E. Rep. 39^ 3. 85 Rockville National Bank z'. Citizen's Gas Light Co., 72 Conn. 576. 40 V. Holt, 58 Conn. 526 140 Rogers z'. Durrant, 140 U. S. 298 176 V. Siplcy, 35 N. J. Law, 86 47 V. Squires, 98 N. Y. 49 42 V. Vosburgh, 87 N. Y. 208 148 Rome z'. Young, 2 Brod. & Bing. 165 ; 2 Bligh. 391 157 Rosemon v. IMahoncy, 86 App. Div. 377 42 Ross V. Bedell, 5 Duer, 462 134 V. Hurd, 71 N. Y. 14 108, 129 Rosson V. Carroll, 90 Tenn. 90 19, 59, 118, 124, 165 Rouse V. Wooten, 140 N. C. 557 4 Rouvant z'. San Antonio National Bank, 63 Tex. 610 82 Rovicz V. Nickells, 9 N. D. 536 77 Rowland z'. Fowler, 47 Conn. 349 75 Ruiz V. Renauld, 100 N. Y. 256 154 Rumball r. Ball. 10 Md. 38 95 Russ V. Sadler, 197 Pa. St. 51 92 Russell V. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514 24 Salen v. Bank of the State of New York, no App. Div. 636 36 Salmon z'. Hopkins, 61 Conn. 47 57 Salt Springs National Bank z: Burton, 58 N. Y. 430 loi, 103 Sanderson v. Sanderson, 20 Fla. 292 124 Sargent v. Southgate, 5 Pick. 312 64 Sasscer v. Farmers' Bank, 4 Md. 409 118, 125 V. Stone, ID Md. 98 102 Saunderson v. Piper, 5 Bing. N. C. 425 29 Savior V. Bushong, 100 Pa. St. 27 180 Schaeffer v. Fowler, 1 1 1 Pa. St. 45 1 40 Schierl 7'. Vaumcl, 75 Wis. 75 130 Schlesinger v. Gilhooly, 189 N. Y. i 73 V. Kelly, 1 14 App. Div. 546 73 V. Lehmaicr, 191 N. Y. 69 72 V. Schultz, 1 10 .App. Div. 356 98, 104 TABLE OF CASES. XXXIX PAGE. Schmittlcr v. Simon, loi N. Y. 554 n. 57 Schreyer v. Hawkes, 22 Ohio St. 308 ' 24, 29 Schroeder v. Turner, 68 Md. 506 84 Schwartzman v. Post, 94 App. Div. 474 ^37 Scott V. Pilkington, 15 Abb. Pr. 280 154 Scudder t: Union National Bank, 91 U. S. 406 I53, i54 Seaton v. Scoville, 18 Kans. 433 9. 1-26 Seattle Shoe Co. v. Packard, 43 Wash. 527 32 Seaver v. Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267 97 Second National Bank of Aurora v. Basuier, 65 Fed. Rep. 58 9 V. Anglin, 6 Wash. 403 10 V. Morgan, 165 Pa. St. 199 69 z'. Smith, 118 Wis. 18 118 Sedgwick v. AIcKim, 53 N. Y. 307 26 Seldner v. Mount Jackson National Bank, 66 Md. 488 108, 122 Self V. King, 28 Tex. 552 i9 Seltzer v. Deal, 135 N. C. 428 69 Serle v. Norton, 9 M. & W. 309 23 Shaw V. Camp, 160 111. 425 14 V. Knox, 98 Mass. 214 92 V. Pratt, 22 Pick. 305 ^37 Shawmut National Bank v. Manson, 168 Mass. 425 39, 65 Shedd V. Brett, i Pick. 401 100, 119, 126 Shelburne Falls National Bank v. Townsley, 102 Mass. 177 126 107 Mass. 444 128 Sheldon v. Bcnhani, 4 Hill, 129 120 V. Heaton, 88 Hun, 535 ^9 Shenandoah National Bank v. Marsh, 89 Iowa, 273 9 Shepard v. Chamberlain, 8 Bray, 225 103 Shcpard v. Hauson, 9 N. D. 249 63 V. Hawlcy, i Conn. 367 122 Sherer v. Easton Bank, 33 Pa. St. 134 123, 165 Sherman v. Goodwin, ( Ariz.) 89 Pac. Rep. 517 176 Shipman v. Bank of the Slate of New York, 126 N. Y. 318 20 Shires v. Commonwealth, 120 Pa. St. 368 182 Shoemaker v. Mechanics' Bank, 59 Pa. St. 79 '26 Shocnbergcr's Executor v. Lancaster Savings Institution, 28 I'a. St. 459 '-'2 Shover v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 57 N. Y. 459 134 Shutts V. Fingar, 100 N. Y. 5.W 97, 138, 1 39 Sice V. Cunningham, i Cowen, 397 67 Siebcneck 7'. Anchor Savings Rank, 11 1 Pn. St. 187 '30, 140 Siegel V. Dubinsky, 50 Misc. 681 i:i2 xl TABLE OF CASES. PAGE. Siogcr r. Second National Bank. 132 Pa. St. 307 135 Simmons 7'. Thompson, 29 App. Div. (N. Y.) 559 49 Simpson f. Davis, i ig Mass. 269 146 7'. Hall, 47 Conn. 417 60 Simus T'. Larkin, 19 Wis. 390 128 Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Summers, 143 N. C. 102 39, 66, 77 99, 176, 177 Skilbeck v. Garbett, 7 Q. R. 846 126 Slack 7'. Kirk. 67 Pa. St. 380 93 Slagel V. Rusts' Admr.. 4 Graft. 274 93 Sloan f. The Union Banking Co., 67 Pa. St. 470 70 Slocomb 7'. Lizzardi, 21 La. Ann. 355 122 Smalley 7'. Wright, 40 N. J. Law, 471 122 Smith 7'. Bayer. 46 Ore. 143 53, 63 7'. Caro, 9 Oregon, 278 19, 58, 91 v. Clarke, Peake, 225 55 V. Dunham, 8 Pick. 246 148 V. Ellis, 29 Me. 422 14 V. Erwin, 77 N. Y. 466 140 V. Fisher, 24 Pa. St. 222 107 V. Hill, 6 Wis. 154 121 v. Kendall, 6 T. R. 123 ■. 20 V. Lounsdale, 6 Oregon, 78 108, 120, 130 V. Marsack, 6 C. B. 4S6 83 V. Melton, 133 Mass. 369 t6i V. Pickham, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 326 131 V. Poillon, 87 N. Y. 590 125 V. Rockwell, 2 Hill, 482 103 V. Shippcy, 182 Pa. St. 24 50 V. Smith, I R. L 388 28 V. State Bank, 104 N. Y. Supp. 750 45, 146 Sneel v. Prescott, i Atk. 245 52 Solomon 7'. Hopkins, 61 Conn. 47 31 Southern Loan Co. v. Morris, 2 Pa. St. 175 91 Spann v. Baltzell, i Fla. 301 118, 165 Spear v. Pratt, 2 Hill, 582 152 Spencer v. Carstarphen, 15 Colo. 445 49 V. Drake, 84 App. Div. 272 98 V. Sloan, 108 Ind. 183 40 Spies V. National City Bank, 174 N. Y. 222 138 Spoffard v. Norton, 126 Mass. 333 53 Sprague v. Fletcher, 8 Oregon, 367 131 Spurgeon v. Smiths, 1 14 Ind. 453 I39 Stanton v. Blossom, 14 Mass. 116 116 TABLE OF CASES. xH PAGE. Stapleton v. Louisville Banking Co., 95 Ga. 802 9 Stark V. Olsen, 44 Xeb. 646 10 Staylor z: Ball, 24 Md. 183 132 Steadman v. Jilman, 10 Conn. 56 76 Steckel z: Steckel, 28 Pa. St. 233 66 Stein z'. Yglcsias, i Crom. Mees. & Ros. 565 76 Stephens v. ]Monongahela National Bank, 88 Pa. St. 157 40, 45 Stephenson v. Dickson, 24 Pa. St. 148 124, 135 Sterry v. Robinson, i Day, 11 (Conn.) 162 Stevens v. Brice, 21 Pick. 193 66 Stewart v. Eden, 2 Cai. 121 139 V. Kennett, 2 Camp. 177 116 z'. Preston, i Fla. 10 54 St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 566 180 Stoddard v. Kimball, 6 Cushing, 469 43 Stoneman v. Pyle, 35 Ind. 103 9 Struthers z'. Blake. 30 Pa. St. 139 102, 126 Stuber v. Schack, 83 111. 192 140 Sturges V. Chicago Fourth National Bank, 75 111. 595 153 Si'-llivan v. German National Bank, 18 Colo. App. 99 74 V. Langley, 120 Mass. 437 78 Sulsbacker v. Bank of Charlestown, 86 Tenn. 201 102, 162 Summers v. Barrett, 65 Iowa, 292 no Sumner z'. Bowen, 2 Wis. 524 165 z'. Kimball, 2 Wis. 524 135 Sumwalt z'. Rigeley. 20 Md. 107 33 Superior City v. Ripley, 138 U. S. 93 152 Sussex Bank t-. Baldwin. 2 Harr. . 487 (N. J.) 100, 119 Suydam z'. Combs, 3 Green (N. J.) 133 83 Sutherland v. Mead, 80 App. Div. 103 42 Sweeney v. Thickstum, 77 Pa. St. 131 16 Sweeny v. Easter, i Wall. 173 52 Swengle v. Wells, 7 Ore. 222 113 Swift V. Smith, 102 U. S. 442 69 v. Tyson, 16 Pet. i 40 Swopc v. Ross. 40 Pa. St. 1S6 81 Sylvester v. Crohan. 138 N. Y. 494 96 Bleckley Co. v. Alewinc, 48 S. C. 308 10 Tnlcott v. Cogswell. 3 Day. 512 92 Tanner f. Hall, i Pa. St. 417 46 Tate V. Sullivart .30 Md. 464 13J, 135 Taunton Bank 7'. Richardson. 5 Pick. 436 log Taylor 7'. Croker, 4 Rsp. 187 82 Terbell v. Jones, 15 Wis. 253 129, 165 xlii TABLE OF CASES. PACE. Terry r. Bisscll. 26 Conn. 41 37 riiird National Bank r. Bowman, 50 App. Div. 66 12 Tlionipson v. Commercial Bank, 3 Caldio, 49 150 V. Ketcham, 8 Johns. 146 '9 Thornton v. Applcton. 29 Mo. 298 M^ V. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183 i30 Thorp 7: Mindeman, 123 Wis. 149 I4> 5°, 54 Thorpe z: White, 188 Mass. 333 3, 146 Throop Grain Cleaner Co. v. Smith, no N. Y. 83 150, 180 Thurston v. McKenn, 6 Mass. 4^^ 66 Tibby Bros. Glass Co. v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, (Pa.) 69 Atl. Rep. 280 J8o Tidmarsh v. Grover, i Maulc & S. 735 m8 Tindal r. Brown, i Term Rep. 167 n6 Tischlo V. Shurman, 49 Misc. 257 ^9 Tobcy V. Lenning. 14 Pa. St. 483 t 18 Tod V. Wick, 36 Ohio St. 370 ^^- Todd V. Ncal's Administrator, 49 Ala. 273 166 V. Shelburne, 8 Hun, 512 75 Tolman v. American National Bank, 22 R. I. 462 36 Tombeckbe Bank v. Stratton, 7 Wend. 429 ^39 Tomlinson Carriage Co. r. Kinsella, 31 Conn. 273 5 Toole V. Craft, 193 Mass. no 3, 109, 130 Torbet v. Montague, 38 Colo. 325 5i. 9i. 108 Torpey v. Tebo, 184 Mass. 307 8, 13, 176 Torrey v. Frost, 40 Me. 74 '34 Town v. Rice, 122 Mass. 67 I5 of Solon z: Williamsburgh Savings Bank, n4 N. Y. 122.146, 147 Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 170 165 Trader v. Chicester, 41 Ark. 242 9 Traders' National Bank v. Jones, 104 App. Div. 433 "^^ V. Rogers, 167 Mass. 315 ^7 Trickey v. Larne, 6 M. & W. 278 44 Troy City Bank v. Lanman, 19 N. Y. 477 '56 Trustees of the I. I. Fund v. Lewis, 34 Fla- 4^4 i'2, 176 Tullis 7'. McClary, 128 Towa, 493 62 Turnbull v. Maddux. 68 Md. 579 '29 Turner v. Iron Chief Mining Co., 74 Wis. 355 96 Tuscumbia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rhodes, 8 Ala. 206 76 Twelfth Ward Bank v. Brooks, 63 App. Div. 220 I43 Tyler v. Young, 30 Pa. St. 143 98 Tyson v. Joyner, 139 N. C. 69 62 Ulster County Bank v. McFarlan, 5 Tlill, 432 I54 Union Bank v. Fowlkes, 2 Sneed, 556 150 V. Willis, 8 Mete. 504 105 TABLE OF CASES. xliii PAGE. Union Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Bolan, (Idaho) 93 Pac. Rep. 509- I5 United States z: American Exchange National Bank, 70 Fed. Rep. 232 90 V. Hodge, 6 How. 279 (U. S.) 140 V. White, 2 Hill, 59 20 National Bank v. Ewing, 131 N. Y. 506 47 University Press v. Williams, 48 App. Div. (N. Y.) 190 132 Valley National Bank v. Uhlcr. 191 Pa. St. 356 130 Savings Bank v. Mercer, 97 Md. 458 69 Vanarsdale v. Hax, 107 Fed. Rep. 878 60 Van Buskirk z: State Bank of Rocky Ford, 35 Colo. 142. . .153. I79, 180 Vanderford z'. Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank, 66 Atl. Rep. 47 ^^^ Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, (Iowa) 112 N. W. Rep. 807 3, 24, 64 Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531 ^^ Van Hoosen v. Van Alstyne, 9 Wend. 75 ^9. 59 Vathir v. Zane, 6 Gratt. 246 78 Vinton v. King, 4 Allen, 562 64 Vosburgh v. Diefendorf, 119 N. Y. 357 ^ Wadhams z: Portland, etc., Ry. Co., 37 Wash. 86 i53 Wagman v. Hoag, 14 Barb. 233 140 Wagner v. Kenner, 2 Rob. 120 22 Wahlig V. The Standard Pump Manufacturing Co., 25 N. Y. St. Rep. 864 -^6 Walker v. Bank of State of New York, 13 Barb. 636 156 V. N. Y. State Bank, 9 N. Y. 582 158 Wall v. Hallenbcck. 19 Neb. 639 50 Wallabout Bank v. Peyton, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 727 66 Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason, 333 ^^o V. Crilly, 46 Wis. 577 ^°' v. McConncll, 13 Peters, 136 96, 156 Walsh V. Blatchley, 6 Wis. 422 160, 173. i74 V. Dart, 12 Wis. 635 18 V. Dort, 23 Wis. 334 '6o Ward V. Allen, 2 Mete. 53 ^53 V. Tyler, 52 Pa. St. 393 ^-"^ Waring v. Bctts, 90 Va. 46 101. 103 Watervlict Rank z: White, i Dcnio, 608 .56 Watson V. Russell. 3 R. & S. .^4 : 5 B. & S. 968 64 z: Wyman. 161 Mass. 96, 99 "2 Way V. Butterworth. 108 Mass. 509 '"4 Weaver v. Bardcn. 49 N. Y. 286 .19 Weber v. Orton, 91 Mo. 680 62. 100 Wedge Mines Co. v. Denver National Bank, 19 Colo. App. 182 176 xliv TABLE OF CASES. PAGE. Weeks f. Esler. 143 N. Y. 374 I7 Weenis v. Fanners' Bank, 13 Md. 231 105, 13S. 165 Welsh f. B. C. Taylor .Manufacturing Co., 82 111. 581 106 r. Sage, 47 N. Y. 143 69 West Branch Bank :•. Inilner, 3 Pa. St. 399 134 Wcstberg v. Chicago L. & C. Co., 117 Wis. 589 9. 155 Western Wheeled Scraper Co. v. Sadilek, 50 Neb. 105 178 Westfall r. Farwell, 13 Wis. 504. 509 120, 121 Westminster Bank v. Whcaton, 4 R. I. 30 I77 West River Bank v. Taylor, 34 N. Y. 128 1 17, I39 Weyerhauser v. Dunn, 100 N. Y. 150 24, 148 Weyman v. Yeomans, 84 111. 403 148 Wheeler ?'. Field, 6 Mctc. 290 107 V. Guild, 20 Pick. 545, 553 112 V. Warner, 47 N. Y. 519 97 V. Webster, i E. D. Smith, i 152 White V. Camp, i Fla. 94 58 v. Savage, 48 Oregon, 604 45 Whitcford v. Burckmeyer, i Gill, 127 129 V. Munroe, 17 Md. 135 35 Whitehead v. Walker, 10 Mees. & Welsh. 696 76 \\"hiten v. Hayden, 9 Allen, 408 53 Whitesides v. Northern Bank, 10 Bush. 501 148 Whitney v. Clary, 145 Mass. 156 39 V. Collins, 15 R. I. 44 96 V. Elliot Nat. Bank, 137 Mass. 351 11 V. National Bank of Potsdam, 45 N. Y. 303 88 Whittaker v. Morrison, r Fla. 25 120, 130 Whittle V. Fond du Lac National Bank, 26 S. W. Rep. 1106 9 Whitwell V. Brigham, 19 Pick. 117 83, 123 V. Johnston, 17 Mass. 499 124 Wilkie V. Chandon, i Wash. 355 131 Wilkins z: Jadis, 2 B. & Ad. 188 loi Willett V. Phcenix Bank, 2 Duer. 121 22 Williams v. Bank of United States, 2 Peters, 96 128 V. Banks, ir Md. 198 45 V. Drexel, 14 Md. 566 82 V. Holt, 170 Mass. 351 62 V. Huntington, 68 Md. 590 69, 75, 78 V. Moseley, 2 Fla. 304 18 7>. Winans, 2 Gr. 239 (N. J.) I54 Williamsport Gas Co. v. Pinkerton, 95 Pa. St. 62 98 Willis V. Finley, 173 Pa. St. 28 178 V. Green, 5 Hill, 232 105, 123 TABLE OF CASES. xlv PAGE. Wills V. Wilson, 3 Oregon, 308 146, 148 Wilson V. Hcndee, (X. J.) 66 Atl. Rep. 413 S5, 86 V. Lazier, 11 Gratt. 477 43, 77, 7<- V. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co., 120 N. Y. 145 /i V. Powers, 130 Mass. 127 ^40 V. Senier, 14 Wis. 380 I07 V. Tolson, 79 Ga. 137 53 V. Wilson, 26 Oregon, 315 38 Winans v. Davis, 3 Harr, 276 (N. J.) 125 Windham Bank v. Norton, 22 Conn. 213 106, 125 Wintermute v. Torrent, 83 Mich. 555 53 Wirt V. Stubbleheld, 7 App. Cas. D. C 283 72 Wisconsin Yearly Meeting of Freewill Baptists v. Barber, 115 Wis. 289 ^^ Wise V. Charlton, 4 A. & E. 486 i5 Wisner v. First National Bank, (Pa.) 68 Atl. Rep. 955 ^55 Witherow v. Slaybach, 158 N. Y. 649 92 Wittich V. First Nat. Bank of Pensacola, 20 Fla. 843 i77 Wolf V. Hostetter, 182 Pa. St. 292 92 Woman v. Frost, 52 N. Y. 422 44, 45 Wood V. Repold, 3 Harris & J. 125 92 V. Robinson, 22 N. Y. 567 39 V. Sheldon, 42 N. J. Law, 425 89 V. Steele, 6 Wall. 80 146, 148 Woodman v. Thurston, 8 Cush. 157 131 Woods V. Neeld, 44 Pa. St. 86 27 V. North, 84 Pa. St. 407. • ^^ Son Co. V. Schaefer, 173 Mass. 443 49 Woolenwebcr v. Kcttcrlin, 17 Pa. St. 389 I34 Wooley V. Cobb, 165 Mass. 503 49 Worthington v. Cowles, 12 Mass. 30 93 Wright V. Hart's Admr., 44 Pa. St. 454 '^ V. Irwin, 2:^ Mich. 32 9 V. Vermont Ins. Co., 164 Mass. 302 95 WyckofF V. Rnnyon, 33 N. J. Law, 107 44 Ycnncy v. Central City Bank, 44 Neb. 402 63 ^'ing]ing v. Kohlhass, 18 Md. 148 8 Yoving V. Durgin, 15 Gray, 264 128 V. Shriner, 80 Pa. St. 463 76 Youngs V. Lee, 12 N. Y. 551 "9 Zimmerman v. Anderson, 67 Pa. St. 421 16 V. Rote, 75 Pa. St. 188 16 The Negotiable Instruments Law. The Law Has Been Enacted in the Following States and Territories : Alabama.— Laws 1907, Chap. 722; Code 1907, Chap. 115, Sees. 4958- 5149- Arizona.— Rev. Stat. 1901, p. 852, title 49 of Civil Code, Sees. 3304- 3491 ; Laws 1905, Chap. 23. Colorado. — Laws 1897, Chap. 64. Connecticut.— Laws 1897, Chap. 74; Genl. Slat. Rev. 1902, p. 1028. District of Columbia.— Laws U. S. 1899; Laws U. S. 1901 ; Laws U. S. 1902, Sees. 1304-1493. Florida.— Laws 1897, Chap. 4524; Genl. Stat. 1906, p. 1147 ; Sees. 2394-3099- Idaho. — Laws 1903, p. 380. Illinois. — Laws 1907, p. 403- Iowa.— Laws 1902, Chap. 130; Laws 1906, Chap. I49; Code Supp. 1902, p. 352, Chap. 3-A, Sees. 3o6o-ai-3o6o-ai98. Kansas.— Laws 1905, Chap. 310; Genl. Stat. 1905, P- 967, Chap. 70, Sees. 4533-4732. Kentucky. — Laws 1904, Chap. 102. Louisiana. — Laws 1904, Chap. 64. Maryland. — Laws 1898, Chap. 119. Massachusetts.— Laws 1898, Chap. 533; Laws 1899. Chap. 130; Rev. Laws 1902, p. 628, Chap. 7Z, Sees. 18-212. Michigan.— Laws 1905. Chap. 265. Missouri.— Laws 1905, p. 243; Laws 1907, p. 366. Montana. — Laws 1903, Chap. 121. Nebraska.— Laws 1905, Chap. 83; Comp. Stat. 1907, Chap. 41, Sees. 3558-ai-3558-ai98. Nevada. — Laws 1907, Chap. 62. New Jersey. — Laws 1902, Chap. 184. New Mexico. — Laws 1907, Chap. 83. New York.— Laws 1897, Chap. 612; Laws 1898, Chap. 336; Laws 1904. Chap. 287. North Carolina.— Laws 1899, Chap. 7ii\ Laws 1905, Chap. 327; Laws 1907. Chap. 807; Revisal, 1905. P- 655. Chap. 54, Sees. 2151-2346. North Dakota — Laws 1899, Chap. 113; Civil Code, 1905. P- 1002, Chap. 90, Sees. 6303-6498. Ohio.— Laws 1902, p. 162; Bates' Annot. Stat. (5th cd.) pp. 1800a- 1807. Sees. 3171-3178C. Oregon.— Laws 1899. p. 18; Bellinger & Cotton's Annot. Codes & Stat., p. 1440, Sees. 4403-4594- Pennsylvania. — Laws 1901, No. 162. rxhiil xlviii i:nactments in states and teuuitories. Rhode Island.— Laws 1899, Chap. 674. Ten NF.ssKE.— Laws 1S99, Cliap. 94- Utah.— Laws 1S99, Chap. 83. ViRGiNi.\.— Laws 1898, Chap. 866; Laws 1906, Chap. 219; Code, 1904, Chap. 133a. Sec. 2841a. \V.\SHiNGTON.— Laws 1899, Chap. 149. West Virgini.x.— Laws 1907, Chap. 81. Wisconsin.— Laws 1899, Chap. 356; Laws 1901, Chap. 41; Laws 1905, Chap. 262 ; Laws 1907. Chap. 361. Wyoming.— Laws 1905, Chap. 43. THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, Tim NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. A general act relating to Negotiable Instruments (being an act to establish a law uniform with the laws of other States on that sub- ject).* Article I. General provisions. (§§ 1-7.) 11. Form and interpretation of negotiable instru- ments. (§§ 20-42.) III. Consideration. (§§ 50-55-) IV. Negotiation. (§§ 60-80.) V. Rights of holder. (§§ 90-98.) VI. Liabilities of parties. (§§ 110-119.) VII. Presentment for payment. (§§ 130-148.) VIII. Notice of dishonor. (§§ 160-189.) IX. Discharge of negotiable instruments. (§§ 200-206.) X. Bills of exchange; form and interpretation. (§§ 210-215.) XI. Acceptance. (§§ 220-230.) XII. Presentment for acceptance. (§§ 240-248.) XIII. Protest. (§§ 260-268.) XIV. Acceptance for honor. (§§ 280-290.) XV. Payment for honor. (§§ 300-306.) XVI. Bills in a set. (§§ 310-315.) XVII. Promissory notes and checks. (§§ 320-325.) XVIII. Notes given for a patent rights and for a speculative consideration. (§§ 330-332-) XIX. Laws repealed, when to take effect. (§§ 340, 34I-) * This is the General Title proposed by the Commissioners on Uni- formity of Laws, and used in many of the States. It has been held sufficiently comprehensive under a constitutional provision providing that no law shall embrace more than one subject to be expressed in the till.-. CiUey v. Harrcll (Tcnn). lor S. W, Rep. 424- 2 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. ARTICLE I. General Provisions. Section i. Short title. 2. Definitions and meaning of terms. 3. Person primarily liable on instrument. 4. Reasonable time, what constitutes. 5. Time, how computed; when last day falls on holiday. 6. Application of chapter. 7. Rule of law merchant; when governs. Section i. Short title. — This act shall be known as the negotiable instruments law (a). (a) The law is confined to negotiable instruments. No attempt is made to deal with instruments which are non-ne^otiablo; and they are not governed by the statute. In determining whether the rules of the statute will apply to any particular instrument, it is first necessary to ascertain whether such instrument is negotiable, according to the terms of the statute. In many instances the rules will be the same for instruments of either kind; but that is not because instruments which are non-negotiable are governed by the statute, but because the statute is a codification of common law rules which before its adoption applied equally to both classes of instruments. In other words, a negotiable instrument is gov- erned by the statute and a non-negotiable instrument by the rules of the common law, though frequently these rules will be the same. For example, if a note drawn payable at a bank con- tains terms which render it non-negotiable, the provision of sec- tion 87, that "where the instrument is made payable at a bank it is equivalent to an order to the bank to pay the same for the account of the principal debtor thereon," would not apply; but the case would be governed by the rule of the common law, which is the same as the statutory rule in some of the States, but dif- GENERAL PROVISIONS. 3 ferent in others. This distinction must be carefully borne in mind, or much confusion will result. In a case arising under the laws of another State the court will not take judicial notice that the Negotiable Instruments Law has been enacted in that State; but, in the absence of evidence on the subject, will presume that the law of such State is the same as the common law before the enactment. Demelman v. Brazier, 193 Mass. 589. In construing the Act. however, the courts will notice the fact that its adoption was the result of an effort to bring about a uniform system of law respecting negotiable instruments. Eockfield v. First Nat. Bank of Springfield (Ohio) 83 N. E. Rep. 392; Downey v. O'Keefe, 26 R. I. 571 ; Thorpe v. White, 188 Mass. 333 ; Toole v. Crafts, 193 Mass. 110; Gibbs v. Guaraglia (N. J.) 67 Atl. Rep. 81; Baumeister v. Kuntz (Fla.) 42 South. Rep. 886; Farquahar Co. V. Higham (N. D.) 112 N. W. Rep. 557; Vander Ploeg v.- Van Zuuk (Iowa) 112 N. W. Rep. 807. In Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. V. First National Bank of Alexandria (102 Va. 757, 758), it was said : " This opinion might be greatly prolonged by the citation of conflicting cases, and a discussion of the discordant views entertained by courts and text-writers of the greatest ability upon these questions; but the object, as we understand it, of the codification of the law with respect to negotiable instru- ments was to relieve the courts of this duty, and to render certain and unambiguous that which had theretofore been doubtful and obscure, so that the business of the commercial world, largely transacted through the agency of negotiable paper, might be con- ducted in obedience to a written law emanating from a source whose authority admits of no question." §2. Definitions and meaning of terms.— In this act, unless the context otherwise requires : ^ "Acceptance " means an acceptance completed by delivery or notification. "Action " includes counter-claim and set-off. " Rank " inchides any person or association of persons carrying on the business of banking, whether incorporated or not. 4 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. *' Bearer " means the person in possession of a bill or note Avliich is payable to bearer. '' Bill " means bill of exchange, and " note " means ne- gotiable promissory note. " Delivery " means transfer of possession, actual or con- structive, from one person to another. " Holder " means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof. " Indorsement " means an indorsement completed by delivery. " Instrument " means negotiable instrument. " Issue " means the first delivery of the instrument, com- plete in form, to a person who takes it as a holder. " Person " includes a body of persons, whether incorpo- rated or not. " Value " means valuable consideration. " Written " includes printed, and " writing " includes print. § 3. Person primarily liable on instrument. — The per- son " primarily " liable on an instrument is the person who by the terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the same. All other parties are " secondarily " liable (a). (a) This section is to be construed in connection with section 37, which provides that " no person is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon ; " and also with section 211, which provides that " the drawee is not liable on the bill unless and until he accepts the same ; " and with section 325, which provides that "the bank is not liable to the holder unless and until it accepts or certifies the check." These are not, by the terms of the instrument, absolutely required to pay the same until such acceptance or certification. In Rouse v. Wooten (140 N. C. 557, 558) it was said : "A surety comes squarely within the definition of a person whose liability is primary, for he is by the terms of the instrument absolutely required to pay the same." But obviously this would not be so in the case of one signing as GENERAL PROVISIONS. 5 " guarantor," since he is liable only where there is default by the party whose obligation he has guaranteed. § 4. Reasonable time, what constitutes. — In determin- ing what is a " reasonable time " or an " unreasonable time," reo-ard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business (if any) with respect to such instruments, and the facts of the particular case (a). (a) Where the facts are doubtful or disputed, the question of reasonable time is a mixed question of law and fact. But when the facts are clear and undisputed, the question is one of law for the court. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Zimmerman, 185 N. Y. 310; German Am. Bank v. Mills, 99 App. Div. (N. Y.) 312; Pres- cott Bank v. Coverly, 7 Gray, 217; Gilmore v. Wilbur, 12 Pick. 124; Holbrook r. Burt, 22 Pick. 555; Northwestern Coal Co. v. Bowman, 69 Iowa, 153; Aymar v. Beers, 7 Cow. 705; Tomlinson Carriage Co. v. Kinsella, 31 Conn. 273. See note to section 131. § 5. Time, how computed ; when last day falls on holiday. — Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act herein required or permitted to be done falls on Sunday or on a hoHday, the act may be done on the next succeeding secular or business day (a). (a) As to the mode of computing time, see the New York Stat- utory Construction Law (§§ 26, 27). § 6. Application of chapter. — The provisions of this act do not apply to negotiable instruments made and de- livered prior to the passage hereof (a). (a) The time when the statute was to take effect is provided for by section 341. In New York this was October 1st, 1897. But while the law did not go into effect until then, its application is not limited to instruments made after tlial date. An instrument made and delivered after the passage of the act was equally within its operation after October 1st. For example, if a note payable four months after date was dated and delivered on July 15th, 1897, it must, at maturity, Iiave been presented for payment in the manner prescribed by the statute; and if dishonored, the 6 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. statutory rules as to giviut-- notice oL' dishonor must have been complied with. But iu tho case of a note dated and delivered April 15th, 1897, and payable six months after date, none of the provisions of the statute apply. §7. Law merchant; when governs. — In any case not provided fur in this act the rules of the law merchant shall govern (a). (a) It is to be observed that the rules governing in such cases are not those which existed by virtue of a statute. All prior stat- utes upon the subject of bills and notes are repealed; and where a ease arises which is not provided for in the Negotiable Instru- ments Law, it is not to be determined by resort to any of the former statutes, but by reference to the rules of the law mer- chant. As to the presumption concerning the law of another State, see Demelman v. Brazier, 193 Mass. 588. In the late case of Columbian Banking Co. v. Bowen (114 N. W. Ivep. 451) it was said by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin : " Counsel for appellant have presented quite an extended argument, referring to many authorities, as to the law antedating and independently of the negotiable instrument statute (chapter 356, p. 681, Laws 1899) to support the proposition, that appellant was released from lia- bility on the instrument in question, because of the period inter- vening between his parting therewith and the presentation thereof to the drawee for payment. Such statute was enacted for the purpose of furnishing, in itself, a certain guide for the deter- mination of all questions covered thereby relating to commercial paper, and, therefore, so far as it speaks without ambiguity as to any such question, reference to case law as it existed prior to the enactment is unnecessary and is liable to be misleading. The negotiable instrument law is not merely a legislative codification of judicial rules previously existing in this state making that written law, which was before unwritten. It is, so far as it goes, an incorporation into written law of the common-law of the state, so to speak, the law-merchant generally as recognized here, with such changes or modifications and additions as to make a system harmonizing, so far as practicable, with that prevailing in other states. That it contains some quite material changes in previous rules governing commercial paper we have had occasion hereto- fore to point out. Hodge v. Smith, 130 Wis. 326; Aukland v. Arnold (Wis.) Ill N. W. Rep. 212." FORM AND INTERPRETATION. ARTICLE II. Form and Interpretation. Section 20. Form of negotiable instrument. 21. Certainty as to sum; what constitutes. 22. Wlien promise is unconditional. 23. Determinable future time ; what constitutes. 24. Additional provisions not affecting negotia- bility. 25. Omissions; seal; particular money. 26. When payable on demand. T.y. When payable to order. 28. When payable to bearer. 29. Terms when sufficient. 30. Date, presumption as to. 31. Ante-dated and post-dated. 32. When date may be inserted. 33. Blanks, when may be filled. 34. Incomplete instrument not delivered, 35. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. 36. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. 37. Liability of person signing in trade or assumed name. 38. Signature by agent; authority; how shown. 39. Liability of person signing as agent, et cetera. 40. Signature by procuration ; effect of. 41. Effect of indorsement by infant or corporation. 42. Forged signature ; effect of. § 20. Form of negotiable instrument. — An instrument to be negotiable must confonn to the following requirements: T. It must be in writing (a) and signed by the maker or drawer. 8 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. 2. Must contain an unconditional promise (6) or order to pay a sum certain in money (c) ; 3. Must be payable on demand {d), or at a fixed or determinable future time (e) ; 4. Must be payable to order (/) or to bearer (g) ; and 5. Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reason- able certainty (/i). (a) The writing may be in pencil. Brown v. Butchers' Bank, 6 Hill, 443. (fc) See section 22. (c) This is the nile of the law merchant, and the rule which prevails in most of the States. In some States — as, for example, in Georgia — certain instruments are declared by statute to be negotiable, though they provide that payment is to be made in goods or merchandise. See also section 25, subdivision 5. In New York warehoiise receipts issued by certain corporations are declared to be negotiable. See Hanover Nat. Bank v. Ameri- can Dock and Trust Co., 148 N. Y. 612; Corn Exchange Bank v. Same, 149 N. Y. 174. The act does not repeal these statutes. An insrtrument which, by its true construction, is an unconditional order to pay a certain sum of money at a fixed future time, to the payee or order, is a bill of exchange under the terms of the statute. Torpey v. Tebo, 184 Mass. 307. (d) See section 26. (e) See section 23. (f) See section 27. The North Carolina Act reads: "Must be payable to the order of a specified person or bearer." The words " specified person " are surplusage, since by section 27 this is de- clared to be the effect of the term " order." (g) Yingling r. Kohlhass, 18 Md. 148; Curtis v. Hazen, 56 Conn. 146. If the instrument is payable to a particular person, and not to his order or to bearer, it is not negotiable. Backus v. Danf orth, 10 Conn. 297. As to bonds payable to bearer and coupons, see Carr. v. Leferre, 27 Pa. St. 413; County of Beaver v. Armstrong, 44 Pa. St. 63; National Exchange Bank v. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 8 R. I. 375. As to Treasury notes, see Frazer v. D'Quilliers, 2 Pa. St. 200. See section 28. An instrument which is not pay- able to order or bearer is not within the terms of the statute. FORM AND INTERPRETATION. 9 Westberg r. Chicago L. & C. Co., 117 Wis. 589. In Tennessee the Act has repealed Shannon's Code, § 3506, providing that every not-e, whether payable to order or not, should be negotiable in the same manner as promissory- notes. Gilley v. Harrell (Tenn.), 101 S. W. K«p. 424. (h) See section 215. §21. Certainty as to sum; what constitutes. — The sum payable is a sum certain within the meaning of this act, although it is to be paid : 1. With interest; or 2. By stated instalments (a) ; or 3. By stated instalments, with a provision that upon de- fault in payment of any instalment or of interest (b), the whole shall become due ; or 4. With exchange, whether at a fixed rate or at the current rate (c) ; or 5. With costs of collection or an attorney's fee, in case payment shall not be made at maturity (d). (o) Markey t'. Corey, 108 Mich. 184 ; Wright v. Irwin, 33 Mich. 32. In this case the note was for $1500, to be paid twenty per cent, a month from the 1st of July, 1871. (6) For a case arising under the provisions of the Wisconsin Act, see Hodge v. Wallace, 129 Wis. 84. (c) Second National Bank of Aurora v. Basuier, 65 Fed. Hop. 58; Hastings v. Thompson, 54 Minn. 184; Flagg.r. School Dis- trict, 4 N. D. 30; Whittle v. Fond du Lac National Bank (Tex.) 26 S. W. Rep. 1106. Contra, Culbertson v. Nelson, 93 Iowa 187. (d) As to this point there has been much conflict in tlie dec sions. The rule adopted in the Act is the one sustained by the weight of authority. It is sui)ported by National Bank v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 6 U. S. App. 312, 331; Oppenhoiin(>r v. Fanners n-,>d Merchants' Bank, 07 Tenn. 19; Montgomery r. Crossthwait. 90 Ala. 553; Trader v. ('lii.li. st^^W*' --*^ - "^ '"■ (a) The mere mention of a fund in a draft does not necessarily f^^i^^. ._ deprive it of the character of commercial paper, but it must 3 3^ further appear, in order to have such effect, that it contains either an express or implied direction to pay it therefrom, and not other- wise, ^chmittler v. Simon, 101 N. Y, 554, 560. In the case cited, a draft drawn upon an executor contained the words, " and charge the amount against me and of my mother's estate." It was held that the reference to the estate was not a direction to pay out of it, but that the estate was referred to simply as a means of reimbursement. So, in Macleod v. Luce, 2 Stra. 762 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 1481, where the instrument contained the words, " as my quarterly half-pay, to be due from 24th of June to 2Tth of September next, by advance," the court said, " The mention of the half -pay is only by way of direction how he shall reimburse himself, but the money is still to be advanced on the credit of the person;" and the court accordingly held the instrument to be -a bill of exchange. Like- wise, in Kedman v. Adams, 51 Me. 433, where the drawer added, " and charge the same against whatever amount may be due me for my share of fish," it was held that these words were a mere indica- tion of the means of reimbursement, and did not destroy the nego- tiable character of the draft. And a similar ruling was made in Whitney v. Eliot National Bank, 137 Mass. 351, where the direc- tions were, " charge the same to account of 250 bbls. meal ex- schooner "Aurora Borealis." See also Nichols v. Euggles, 76 Me. 27. The test is whether the drawee is confined to the particulai fund, or whether, though a specified fund is mentioned, he could have the power to charge the bill up to the general account of the drawer, if the designated fund should turn out to be insufficient. Plunger v. Shannon, 61 N. Y. 251, 255. A draft in the following form : " Pay to the order of the First National Bank of Hutchin- son, Kansas, $1,500 on account of contract between you and the Snyder Plaining Mill Company" was held negotiable, the words "on account of," etc., being dcomod an indication of the fund to which the drawee was tf) look for reimbursement, and not a direc- tion to charge a particular fund. First Nat. Bank of Hutchinson V. Lightner, 74 Kans. 736. (h) For example, a note expressed to be in payment of certain * Error in engrossing. 12 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. tracts of land is ncgotiublc. Firat Mat. Bank v. Michatl, 'JG N. C. 53. The most frequent instances of tliis sort are notes given in payment of the purchase price of goods and chattels. Thus, in Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, l;56 U. S. 208, it was helil that the negotiable character of a promis- sory note was not atfected by a provision that it was given with others in payment for certain cars, the title to which should re- main in the payee until all the notes of the series should be paid. The court said : " The transaction is, in legal effect, what it would have been if the maker, who purchased the cars, had given a mortgage back to the payee, securing the notes on the property until they were all fully paid. The agreement, by which the vendor retains the title and by which the notes are secured on the cars, is collateral to the notes, and does not affect their negotiability. It does not (lualify the promise to pay at the time fixed, any more than would be done by an agreement of the same kind, embodied in a separate instrument, in the form of a mort- gage." So, in Mott V. Havana Nat. Bank, 22 Hun, 354, a like ruling was made with respect to a provision in a note that it was to be " in part payment for a portable engine, which engine shall be and remain the property of the owner of this note until the amount hereby secured is paid." So, where there was a simi- lar recital as to the title of a piano, for the price of which the note was given. Third Nat. Bank v. Bowman, 50 App. Div. (N. Y.) 66. And so, where there was a recital in the note that it was " given in consideration of a certain patent right." Hereth V. Meyer, 33 Ind. 511. But see section 330. (c) An order on a savings bank, " Pay C, or order, three hun- dred dollars, or what may be due on my deposit book No. E, page 632," is payable out of a particular fund, and therefore not negoti- able under the statute. National Savings Bank v. Cable, 73 Conn. 568. See also, Lowery v. Steward, 25 N. Y. 239 ; Munger v. Shan- non, 61 N. Y. 251; Parker v. City of Syracuse, 31 N. Y. 376; Morton V. Naylor, 1 Hill, 583 ; Gawken v. De Loraine, 3 Wils. 207. In the case first cited the order was : " Please pay to the order of Archibald H. Lowery the sum of $500 on account of twenty-four bales of cotton shipped to you as per bill of lading, hy steamer Colorado, inclosed to you in letter." It was held that this was not a bill of exchange, requiring acceptance to bind the drawers, but a specific draft or order upon a particular fund. The language of the statute payable " out of a particular fund " is the equiva- FORM AND INTERPRETATION. I3 lent of the expression found in many of the cases " drawn on the general credit of the drawer." Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 175. A clause in the trust deed securing payment of an issue of bonds provided that, " No present or future shareholder, officer, manager or trustee of the Express Company shall be personally liable as partner or otherwise in respect of this bond or the cou- pons appertaining thereto, but the same shall be payable solely out of the assets assigned and transferred to the said Trust Com- pany or out of other assets of the Express Company :"—iIe?(f, that while a joint stock association differs from a corporation and is like a partnership in respect to the individual liability of its members, the association issuing the bonds must be re- garded as a joint, quasi corporate entity; that the bonds having been issued in its name, upon its general credit and binding all its assets, complied with the requirements for a negotiable instru- ment, even though the practically unimportant individual liability of members was excluded; that such exclusion did not constitute the general assets, out of which the bonds were payable, a par- ticular fund within the meaning of this section. (Id.) § 23. Determinable future time ; what constitutes. — An instrument is payable at a determinable future time, within the meaning of this act, which is expressed to be payable: 1. At a fixed period after date or sight; (a) or 2. On or before a fixed or determinable future time speci- fied therein ; (b) or 3. On or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event, which is certain to happen, though the time of happening be uncertain (c). An instrument payable upon a contingency is not ne- gotiable, and the happening of the event does not cure the defect (d). (a) A draft was drawn as follows: "Mr. Wm. Tobo. Will please pay to K. J. Tonx^.v or order two hundred and fifty dollars and charge to my account. Due Oct. 1. John Ryan:" — Held, that the words "due Oct. 1," were to bo construed ns payable October 1st. and hence that the instrument was negotiable. Tor- pey V. Tebo, 184 Mass. 307. 14 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. {b) In such a case the legal rights of a holder are clear and cert^iin ; the note is due at a time iixcd, and it is not due before. The option of tiio maker, if exercised, would be a payment in advance of the legal liability to pay, and nothing more. See Mat- tison V. Marks, 31 Mich. 421; Smith v. Ellis, 29 Me. 422; Bu- chanan V. Wren (Tex.) 30 S. W. Kep. 1077; Riker v. Sprague Mfg. Co., 14 R. I. 402; Kiskadden v. Allen, 7 Colorado 20G; Jordan v. Tate, 19 Ohio St. 58G; Albertson v. Laughlin, 173 Pa. St. 525. Thus, where the note was made payable twelve months after date, or before, if the money was made out of the sale of a machine, it was held to be negotiable. Ernsrt v. Steckman, 74 Pa. St. 13. So, in Ackley School District v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135, 140, it was held that municipal bonds, issued under a statute providing that they should be payable at the pleasure of the dis- trict at any time before due, were negotiable. The court said : " By their terms, they were payable at a time which must certainly arrive; the holder could not exact payment before the day fixed in the bonds; the debtor incurred no legal liability for nonpay- ment until that day passed." In the Wisconsin act, the words " though payable before then on a contingency " are added. For a case applying the Wisconsin statute, see Thorp v. Mindeman, 123 Wis. 149. (c) Thus, a note payable a certain number of days after the death of the maker, or upon demand after the death of the maker, is a good promissory note, because the event is sure to happen. Carnwright v. Gray, 127 N. Y. 92 ; Hegeman v. Moon, 131 N. Y. 462. See also Shaw v. Camp, 160 111. 425; Martin v. Stone, 67 N. H. 367; Price v. Jones, 105 Ind. 544; Bristol v. Warner, 19 Conn. 74. But an instrument payable when, or in so many days after, "A shall become of age," would not be negotiable, because it is un- certain whether A will live so long. Goss v. Nelson, 1 Burr, 226; Rice V. Rice, 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 458. So, a note payable "when A shall marry," Reason v. Garrett, 4 Mod. 242; or when a certain ship shall arrive. Coolidge v. Ruggles, 15 Mass. 387; Grant v. Wood, 12 Gray, 220. (d) Duffield V. Johnston, 95 N. Y. 369; First National Bank v. Alton, 60 Conn. 402. Thus, where an instrument is made payable when a certain person shall become of age, the fact that he actually attains his majority does not fnake the instrument negotiable. Gogs V. Nelson, 1 Burr, 226. But a stipulation on the face of the paper that the sureties consent to an extension of time for pay- FORM AND INTERPRETATION. 1$ ment without notice does not destroy the negotiable quality of the instrument. Farmer v. Bank of Graettinger, 130 Iowa 469. Contra, Union Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Bolan (Idaho) 93 Pac. Rep. 509. § 24. Additional provisions not affecting negotiability. — An instrument which contains an order or promise to do any act in addition to the payment of money is not ne- gotiable. But the negotiable character of an instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected by a provision which: 1. Authorizes the sale of collateral securities in case the instrument be not paid at maturity (a) ; or 2. Authorizes a confession of judgment if the instrument be not paid at maturity (b) ; or 3. Waives the benefit of any law intended for the advan- tage or protection of the obligor (c) ; or 4. Gives the holder an election to require something to be done in lieu of payment of money (d). But nothing in this section shall validate any provision or stipulation otherwise illegal (e). (a) Collateral notes are often non-negotiable because of some provision therein in regard to the time of payment, or because of provisions requiring something to be done in addition to the pay- ment of money. But a statement that collateral security has been deposited for the performance of the promise contained in the note is a recital only which does not affect its negotiability. Wise V. Charlton, 4 A. & E. 486; Fancourt v. Thorne, 9 Q. B. 312. And a provision merely authorizing the sale of the collateral, if the note be dishonored, does not have this effect. >^erry v. Bigelow, 128 .\ra9^. 129; Towiie v. Rice, 122 Mass. 67; Biegler v. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co.. 62 111. App. 560; Arnold v. Rock River Valley Union R. R. Co., 5 Duer, 207. A statement, however, that the note is "given as collateral security with agreement" destroys its negotiablf character. /X^ostello v. Crowell, 127 Mass. 293. (h) This provision was inserted in the act to meet the require- ments in some of the States where judgment notes are in use. Such notes nre not known in New York. In Pennsylvania it was held that the warrant of attorney rendered the note non-negotiable. ; l6 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. St. 34(5; Sweenoj' v. Thickstuin, 77 Ta. St. 13L A note which authorizes a confession of judgment ut any time after its date, whether duo or not. is not negotiahle under the statute; for as the time of payment will thus depend upon the whim or caprice of the holder, it is absolutely uncertain. Wisconsin Yearly Meeting of Freewill Baptists v. Barber, 115 Wis. 289. (c) In some of the States it is a common practice to insert in promissory notes a waiver of the benefits of homestead and exemp- tion laws, and this provision of the act is designed to meet such cases. See Zimmerman v. Anderson,*^7 Pa. St. 421; Zimmerman V. Rote, 75 Pa. St. 188. (d) An illustration of this case is the right of the holder to elect to take stock of a corporation in lieu of payment in money. Hodges V. Shuler, 22 N. Y. 114. As the obligation of the maker is to pay in money, and as the payment in stock is not optional with him, the note is not within the rule that a negotiable instrument must not be payable in the alternative. — Id. (e) The object of this provision is to prevent any inference of / an intent to validate any agreement or stipulation mentioned in / the section, where, by any statute or settled policy of the State, the same would be illegal. In the Wisconsin Act the following words are added : " or authorize the waiver of exemptions from execu- tion." §25. Omissions; seal; particular money. — The validity and negotiable character of an instrument are not affected by the fact that: 1. It is not dated (a) ; or 2. Does not specify the value given, or that any value has been given therefor (&) ; or 3. Does not specify the place where it is drawn or the place where it is payable (c) ; or 4. Bears a seal (d) ; or 5. Designates a particular kind of current money in which payment is to be made (c). But nothing in this section shall alter or repeal any statute requiring in certain cases the nature of the consideration to be stated in the instrument (/). FORM AND INTERPRETATION^. I7 '/{a) Church v. Stevens, 107 N. Y. Supp. 310. See section 36, which provides that " where the instruineut is not dated, it will be considered to be dated as of the time it wag issued." As between the immediate parties parol evidence is admissible to show the true date of a misdated note. Bigge v. Piper, 86 Tenn. 589. (h) This was the general rule at common law. Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 108. But formerly in Connecticut a promissorj^ note, not purporting on its face to be for value re- ceived did not import a consideration. »^dgerton v. Edgerton, 8 Conn. 6; Bristol v. Warner, 19 Conn. 7. (c) See sections 22, 54, 137. (d) Prior to the statute the Court of Appeals of New York held that the commercial paper of a corporation did not lose the quality of negotiability by having attached thereto the cor- porate seal. Chase Xat. Bank v. Faurot, 149 N. Y. 532 ; Weeks v. Esler, 143 N. Y. 374. See also Mackay v. St. Mary's Church, 15 K. I. 121. The same rule had been applied to municipal bonds under seal. Bank of Eome v. Village of Eome, 19 N. Y. 20; Mercer County v. Racket, 1 Wall. 83. And to the bonds of private corporations. Brainard v. N. Y. & II. K. E. Co., 25 N. Y. 496. So it was held that the negotiability of a United States treasury note was not restrained or affected by the fact that it was under the treasury seal. Dinsmore v. Duncan, 57 N. Y. 573. In Mercer County V. ITacket, supra, it was said by Justice Geier, speaking of bonds issued under seal : " But there is nothing immoral or con- trary to good policy in making them negotiable if the necessities of commerce require that they should be so. A mere technical dogma of the courts or the common law cannot prohibit the com- mercial world from inventing or is.m, 535 ; Gaylord v. Van Loan, 15 Wend. 308 ; McLeod v. Hun- ter/29 Misc. N. Y. 558 (a case arising under the statute) ; Koehn- ing V. Muenuniughoff, 61 Mo. 403 ; Self v. King, 28 Tex. 552. The words " on demand " may be added without avoiding the instru- ment. Byles on Bills, 210. (c) Berrj' v. Robinson, 9 Johns. 12J; Leavitt v. Putnam, 1 Sandf. 199; Bassonhoi-st v. Wilby, 45 Ohio St. 336; Light v. Kingsbury, 50 Mo. 331; Smith v. Oaro, 9 Oregon 280; Bemis v. McKenzie, 13 Fla. 553. It is commonly said that the indorsement of a bill or note which is overdue is equivalent to drawing a new instrument payable at sight. Bishop v. Dexter, 2 Conn. 419; Mudd V. Harper, 1 Md. 110. In such cases presentment for pay- ment must be made and notice of dishonor given, as in other instances of instruments payable on demand. Berry v. Robinson, 9 Johns. 121; Van Iloosen v. Van Alstyne, 9 Wend. 79; Poole v. Tolleson, 1 McCord, 200; Patterson v. Todd, 18 Pa. St. 420; Rosson V. Carroll, 90 Tenn. 90; Brown v. Hull, 33 Gratt. 23. Where a note, negotiated before due, is further negotiated after it has been dishonored, the holder takes the legal title, and can maintain a suit upon it in his own name, in the same manner as if he had received it before it was due. French v. Jarvis, 29 Conn. 353. § 27. When payable to order. — The instrument is pay- able to order wiiere it is drawn payable to the order of a specified person or to him or his order (a). It may be drawn payable to the order of : I, A i)ayee who is not maker, drawer or drawee; or ■^-2., The drawer or maker (b) ; or 3. 'II le drawee; or 4. 'Iwo or more payees jointly ; or 5. One or some of several payees (c) ; or 6. The hoMcr of an office for the time bcini^ (d). OU ^ M'-j vx JO TiiK m:c;otiai{le instruments law. Where the instrument is payable to order the payee must be nametl or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty (e). (a) By the rules of the law merchant an instrument payable to a specified person without the addition of the word " order," or other word of similar import, was not negotiable. Byles on Bills, p. S3; Smith v. Kendall, T. R. 12o ; Maule v. Crawford, 14 Ilun, 1U3; Carnwright v. Gray, 127 N. Y. 92. The English Bills of Ex- change Act provides that " a bill is payable to order which is expressed to be so payable, or which is expressed to be payable to a particular pei'son, and does not contain words prohibiting trans- fer or indicating an intention that it should not be transferable." But this change in the law was not deemed advantageous, and was not adopted. (h) A note payable to the order of the maker is not complete iiutil indorsed by him. Section 320. (c) Illustration: A draft payable to A, B, and C, or either of them, or any two of them. (d) For example, a note payable to three persons as tinistees of an incorporated association, or iheir successors in office, is nego- tiable. Davis V. Gore, 6 N. Y. 124. (e) The payee need not be designated by name. If his identity can be ascertained with certainty, it is sufficient. *^nited States v. White, 2 Hill, 59; Blackman v. Lehman, 63 Ala. 547. § 28. When payable to bearer. — The instrument is pay- able to bearer: 1. When it is expressed to be so payable; or 2. W'hen it is payable to a person named therein or bearer (a) ; or 3. When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non- existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable (b) ; or 4. Wlien the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any person (c) ; or FORM AND INTERPRETATION. 21 5. When the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank (d). (a) Illustration: Instrument payable to "A. B., or bearer." In such case it is negotiable by deliverj% and the indorsement of A. B. is not necessary to pass the title therein. See section GO. (fe) It is essential that the fictitious character of the payee should be known to the person making the instrument so payable. As said by the Court of Appeals of New York, in Shipman v. Bank of the State of New York, 126 N. Y. 318, " The maker's intention is the controlling consideration which determines the character of such paper. It cannot be treated as payable to bearer unless the maker knows the payee to be fictitious, and actually intends to make the paper payable to a fictitious i)erson." Hence, if the maker or drawer supposes the payee to be an actu- ally existing person (as, for instance, where he is induced by fraud to draw the instrument to the order of a fictitious person whom he supposes to exist), the instrument will not be payable to bearer, and no person can acquire the title thereto by delivery. And where the instrument is drawn, payable at a bank, the bank cannot charge the same to the account of its customer, since the instrument is not in such case payable to bearer, and the indorsement is a forgery.y/Shipman v. Bank of the State of New York, supra; Armstrong v. Bank, 46 Ohio St. 412; Bank of England v. Vagliano [1891], App. Cas. 107. But see Clutton v. Attenborough [1895], 2 Q. B. 707. It has been held that a note made payable to the order of the estate of a deceased person is a promissory note with a fictitious payee, and that where it has been Tiegotiated by the maker it is deemed as against him to be a note payable to bearer. Lewisohn v. The Kent & Stanley Co., 87 TTun, 2r)7. But the correctness of this view seems very ques- tionable. The ground of the rule is that, as the fictitious payee raniK)t indorse the instrument, the drawer or maker musft have inteniiy- able to thf order of an estate; for llie obvious inteiifinix Jiauk, 2 Duer, liil; Mechanics' Bank v. Strattun, 2 Koyes, 365. {d) If the maker of a promissoiy note wrongfully obtains pos- session of it after it has been indorsed in blank by tlie payee, he is the bearer within the meaning of the statute. Massachusetts National Bank v. Snow, 187 Mass. 159. § 29. Terms when sufficient, — The instrument need not follow the language of this act, but any terms are sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform to the re- quirements hereof (a). (a) It may be written in a foreign language as well as in Eng- lish. Debebian v. Gala, 64 Md. 2G2, 265. The writing may be in pencil as well as in ink. Brown v. Butchers' Bank, 6 Hill, 443. As to the construction of ambiguous instruments, see section 36. § 30. Date, presumption as to. — Where the instrument or an acceptance or any indorsement thereon is dated, such date is deemed prima facie to be the true date of the making, drawing, acceptance or indorsement, as the case may be (a). (a) But evidence is admissible, as between the immediate parties, to show a mistake in the date. Cowing v. Altman, 71 N. Y. 441. If the date is an impossible one, the law will adopt the nearest day. Thus, if the date is written September 31st, the true date will l)e deemed to be September 30th. Wagner v. Ken- ner, 2 Bob. (La.) 120. § 31. Ante-dated and post-dated. — The instrument is not invalid for the reason only that it is ante-dated or post- dated, provided this is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered acquires the title thereto as of the date of deliv- ery (a)^ ^ (a) A post-dated bill or check may be negotiated before the day of its date, v13rewster v. McCardle, 8 Wend. 478; Pasmore v. FORM AND INTERPRETATION. 23 North, 13 East, 517. In the case last cited the payee -who had negotiated a post-dated bill died the day before the day of date; but it was held that the indorsee had derived title through such payee, and could recover of the drawer. If for the purpose of evading the law, a false date is inserted in the instrument, it will be void as to all persons having notice. Serle v. Norton, 9 M. & W. 309. § 32. When date may be inserted. — \\here an instru- ment expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date is issued undated, or where the acceptance of an instrument payable at a fixed period after sight is undated, any holder may insert therein the true date of issue or acceptance, and the instnmient shall be payable accordingly (a). The inser- tion of a wrong date does not avoid the instrument in the hands of a subsequent holder in due course ; but as to him, the date so inserted is to be regarded as the true date (&). (a) See next section. >/^ (b) Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 238; Page v. Monell, 3 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 433; Mitchell v. Culver, 7 Cow. 336. §33. Blanks; when may be filled. — Where the instru- ment is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by fining up the blanks therein/(a). And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signa- ture in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount (b). In order, however, that any such instrument, when completed, may be enforced against any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time. But if any such instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder in due course (c), it is valid and effectual for all purposes 24 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time ((/). (a) The leading authority upon this point is Kussell v. Lang- staffe, 2 Doug. 514. In that case a person had indorsed his name on five copperplate checks, blank as to amounts, dates and times of payment, and the holder, Galley, tflled them up as his own notes with different dates, aniuunts and times of payment. The indorser was held liable to the plaintiff, who had discounted them. Lord Mansfield said : " The indorsement on a blank note is a letter of credit for an indefinite sum. The defendant said : * Trust Galley for any amount, and I will be his security.' It does not lie in his mouth to say the indorsement was not regular." See also Ovrick I'. Colston, 7 Gratt. 189; Frank v. Lilienfeld, 33 Gratt. 377; Boyd V. McCann, 10 Md. 118; Elliot v. Chestnut, 30 Md. 562; Andros- coggin Bank V. Kimball, tf6 Cush. 373. If the place for the name of the payee is left blank the holder may fill it up with his own name as payee, i^oyd v. McCann, 10 Md. 118. But it will be noticed that the authority is only to complete the instrument, for while there is an authority to fill up blanks in order to make the instrument complete as such, there is no authority to insert a special agreement not essential to the completeness of the instru- ment. >A\"eyerhauser v. Dunn, 100 N. Y. 150. It will also be noticed that, except where the paper has been negotiated to a holder in due course, the presumption of authority is not abso- lute, but only prima facie. Where the amount is stated in fig-urcs in the margin, and a blank space is left for the amount in the body, of the instrument, it is not complete until the blank is filled up. Chestnut v. Chestnut, 104 Va. 539; Hallen v. Davis, 59 Iowa, 444; Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 281; Schreyer v. Hawkes, 22 Ohio St., 308, 315; Garrard v. Lewis, L. R. 10 Q. B. Div. 30. (h) It is to be observed that this rule applies only where the incomplete instrument has been delivered. See next section. (c) As the statute applies only to a person to whom the instru- ment has been negotiated, a payee, to whom paper is delivered after it has been filled up without authority, is not within the protection of this clause. Vander Ploeg v. Van Zunk (Iowa) 112 r N. W. Rep. 807. In the case cited the defendants placed their FORM AND INTERPRETATION. 25 signatures on a blank printed form at the request of P, who was a partner of one of them in a mercantile business, on the repre- sentation that he might find it necessary to raise $150 or $200 for temporary use in the business. Afterwards P, being indebted on his individual account to the plaintiff, filled out the form for $2,000 payable to the order of the plaintiff, and delivered the same to the plaintiff without authority from the defendants : — Held, that the plaintiff could not be deemed a holder in due course, since he was a party to the original contract, and not a person to whom the paper had been negotiated. The court said: " It seems to us under these definitions and the application thereof the plaintiff was a holder of the note, but not a holder in due course. The latter term seems unquestionably to be used to indi- cate a person to whom after completion and delivers- the instru- ment has been negotiated. In an ordinary case [the payee] is the person with whom the contract is made, and his rights are not in general dependent on any peculiarities in the law of negotiable instruments. The peculiarities of that law distinguish- ing negotiable instruments from other contracts relate to a holder who has taken by negotiation, and not ag an original party." See also Guerrant v. Guerrant, 7 Va. Law Reg. 637; Herdman v. Wheeler, 1 K. B. (1902) 361. ((/) If the instrument be used, or the blanks filled up contrary to the agreement or intention of the original parties, the maker is held to any bona fide holder for value, upon the principle that where one or two innocent parties must suffer by the fraud or wrong of a third person the one who put it in the power of such third person to commit the fraud or wrong must bear the loss. Tlie liability of the maker in such case has also, sometimes, been placed upon the principle of estoppel; he, having put his paper in circulation, and thus invitetl the public to receive it of any one having apparent title, is ei?topped to urge the actual defect of title against a bona fide holder. Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 234, 238. WTiere one makes and delivers a promissory note, perfect in form, except that a blank is left after the word " at " for the place of payment, there is an implied authority for any bona fide holder to fill the blank, and the insertion of a place of payment, >and negotiation of the note, contrary to the agreement of the original parties, does not avoid it in tlie hands of a bona fidr holder of value. (Id.) So, one who intrusts another with his blank accept- ance is lialilf to a bolder for value, though filled up for a sum 26 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. exceeding that limited by the acceptor. Viin Duzer r. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531. But where the amount is left blank in the body of the note, and a sum is indicated in fii^ures in the margin, the amount cannot be filled in for a larger sum than that so indi- cated. Norwich Bank v. Ilydo, 13 Conn. 284. §34. Incomplete instrument not delivered. — Where ^an incomplete instrument has not been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated, without authority, be a valid con- tract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery (a), (a) A negotiable instrument must be complete and perfect when it is issued, or there must be authority reposed in some one after- ward to supply any thing needed to make it perfect. Sedgwick v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307. 313; Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Best, 105 N. Y. 59, 67. And mere negligence on the part of the person sought to be held liable will not be sufficient to entitle the holder to recover of him on the instrument. Baxendale v. Bennett, L. K. 3 Q. B. Div. 525. Thus, in the case cited, where a blank ac- ceptance which had been given to one person and returned by him was afterward stolen from the acceptor and another person filled in his own name and negotiated the bill, it was held that there could be no recovery on such acceptance even by a bona fide holder for value. Barnwell, L. J., said : " The defendant here has not voluntarily put into any one's hands the means, or part of the means, for committing a crime. But it is said that he had done so through negligence. I confess I think he has been negli- gent — that is to say, I think if he had had this paper from a third person as a bailee bound to keep it with ordinary care, he woidd not have done so. But then this negligence is not the proximate or effective cause of the fraud. A crime was necessary for its completion." Where a promissory note is delivered by the maker to the payee, upon a verbal agreement that the instrument shall not take effect until other persons shall have signed, the paper will have no validity as between the original parties, unless so completed. Hodge V. Smith, 130 Wis. 326. If only part of such other signa- tures be obtained, the party first signing may defend on the ground that the instrument was never either completed or delivered, while the other parties may defend on the ground of fraud, even though FORM AND INTERPRETATION. 2/ they themselves signed unconditionally, for the reason that the paper never took effect as to the conditional maker. (Id.) A woman delivered to her husband a check signed by her and made payable to a certain creditor, but with the amount left blank, instructing her husband to apply it in payment of her debt, and the husband delivered it to the creditor with the blank unfilled, to be used as a pajnuent upon a debt of his own to the same creditor, and allowed the creditor with his consent to fill in the blank with a certain amount as such payment: — Held, that the check was an incomplete instiniment under this section, and that in an action brought by the creditor against the woman for her indebtedness to him, alleged to be unpaid, she could produce evi- dence to show that, by the authority actually given him, her hus- band had no right to treat the check as he did or to apply it otherwise than in payment of her debt. Boston Steel & Iron Co. V. Steuer, 183 Mass. 140. §35. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. — Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and re- vocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto (a). As between immediate parties,! and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be effectual,. must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, draw^ ing, accepting or indorsing, as the case may be« and in such case the delivery may be shown to have been con- ditional (b), or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumecl^ (c). And where the instniniciit is no longer in the posses- sion of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved (d). (a) Like other writt^-n f'ontraftfl, a lull of exchango or prom- isaorj' note has no legal inception or valid existence as such until } 28 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. it has been clelivereil in accordance with tlie purpose and intent of the parties. Burson v. Huntington, 21 Alich. 410. This pro- vision of the statute does not render incomplete a promissory note indorsed in bhmk by the payee and afterwards stolen from him by the maker and presented by the thief to a bank which discounts it in good faith, because such a note takes eifect when delivered by the maker to the payee, and is made payable to bearer by the payee's indorsement in blank before the theft. Massachu- setts National Bank v. Snow, 187 Mass. 100. (h) Thus, as between the original parties, it can be shown by parol evidence that the note although delivered was only to become binding in case the maker sold certain bonds placed in his hands as agent for sale. Hill v. Hall, 191 Mass. 253. (c) This provision changes the law in some of the States. In some cases it has been held that an instrument in the form of a regotiable promissory note, which has never been delivered by the alleged maker, has no legal existence as such note, and the party sought to be charged upon it may always, unless estopped by his own negligence, defend successfully against it, without regard to the time when or the circumstances under which it was acquired by the holder. Roberts v. McGrath, 38 Wis. 52; Chipman v. Tucker, 38 Wis. 43; Griffiths i'. Kellogg, 39 Wis. 290; Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 410. This change, like some others made by the act, is in the direction of facilitating the circulation of com- mercial paper. The provision does not apply, however, in the case of an incomplete instrument completed and negotiated without authority. See section 34. (d) Possession of the instrument is prima facie evidence of title. Newcombe v. Fox, 1 App. Div. 389. § 36. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. — Where the lan.q-uage of the instruiTient is ambiguous, or there are omissions therein, the following rules of construc- tion apply: I. Where the sum payable is expressed in words and also in figures and there is a discrepancy between the two, the sum denoted by the words is the sum payable; but if the words are ambiguous or uncertain, references may be had to the figures to fix the amount (a) ; FORM AND INTERPRETATION. 29 2. Where the instrument provides for the payment of interest, without specifying the date from which interest is to run, the interest runs from the date of the instrument, and if the instrument is undated, from the issue thereof ; 3. Where the instrument is not dated, it will be considered to be dated as of the time it w^as issued (t*) ; 4. Where there is a conflict between the written and printed provisions of the instrument, the written provisions prevail (c) ; 5. Where the instrument is so ambiguous that there is doubt whether it is a bill or note, the holder may treat it as either at his election (d) ; 6. Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is to be deemed an indorser (e) ; 7. Wliere an instrument containing the words " I promise to pay " is sigiied by two or more persons, they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon (/). (a) The figures in the margin of a bill or note are regarded as simply a memorandum or abridgement for convenience or refer- ence, and form no part of the instrument. Smith v. Smith, 1 R. I. 388; Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 281; Schreyer v. Hawkes, 22 Ohio St. 308. Where the marginal figures of a bill were 245 1., but the words " two hundred pounds " were written in the body of the instrument, it was held to be for the latter sum. Saunderson v. Piper, 5 Bing. N. C. 425. In Garrard v. Lewis (L. R. 10 Q. B. Div. 30, 32) koifl Justice Bowen, speaking of the import and eflFect of marginal figures at the head of a bill of exchange, said: "They do not seem in general to have been considered among merchants as of the same effect and value as the mention of the sum contained In the body of the bill. Tlie history of these marginal figures iiiny perhaps be shmtly sum- marized as follows: — The first model of a bill of exchange pre- served to us. and whir-h dates from 1381. does not, T believe, possfss them, though it dm's possess the nature or vocation with which merchants' bills U9cd generally to commence, and which 30 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. usually preceded the figures. The marginal figure at the head of a bill was probably added at a very early dale, in order that the amount of the bill might strike the eye immediately, and was in fact a note, index or summary of the contents of the bill which followed." {h) Kingsley v. Sampson, 100 111. 54. (r) But this rule does not ponnit of the rejection of any of the printed matter which by any reasonable construction may be reconciled with the written part. Miller v. Hannibal & St. .To. R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 430; Magee v. Lovell, L. R. 9 C. P. 107; Joyce v. Realm Ins. Co. L. R., 7 Q. B. 580. (d) Heise v. Bumpass, 40 Ark. 547. Where the instrument ran " On demand, I prt)mise to pay A. B., or bearer, the sum of fifteen pounds, value received," and was addressed in tlie margin to one J. Bell, who wrote upon it, "Accepted, J. Bell," it was considered to be in effect the note of J. Bell, as it contained a promise to pay, although, in terms, it was an acceptance. Block v. Bell, 1 M. & R. 149. Where the instrument was in the following form : " Lon- don, August 5, 1833. Three months after date I promise to pay Mr. John Bury or order forty-four pounds, eleven shillings, and five pence, value received, John Bury," and was addressed in the lower left-hand corner " J. B. Grutherot, 35 Montague Place, Bed- ford Place," and Grutherot's name was written across the face as an acceptance, and Bury's name across the back as an indorse- ment, it was held that Buiy might be held either as the drawer of the bill against Grutherot, or as the maker of the note, and therefore was bound without notice of dishonor. Edis v. Bury, 6 Barn. & Ores. 433. In another case the instrument ran : " Two months after date I promise to pay A. B. or order ninety-nine pounds, II. Oliver," and was addressed to J. E. Oliver and ac- cepted by him. The court said : " It is not unjust to presume that it was drawn in this form for the purpose of suing upon it either as a promissory note or as a bill of exchange." Lloyd v. Oliver, 18 Q. B. 471. (e) For example, if a person should write his name across the face of a note, he would, under this provision, be deemed an in- dorser. There are some decisions which hold that in such case he would be deemed a joint maker. It is, perhaps, not very impor- tant which view is adopted, so that the rule upon the subject is fixed and certain. Throughout the act it has been the policy to make all irregular parties indorsers. See section 114. In Ger- FORM AND INTERPRETATION. 3 1 mania Xat. Bank v. Mariner, 129 Wis. 544, "A note read : " Four mouths after date the Northwestern Straw Works promise to pay,' etc., and was signed ' The Northwestern Straw Works, E. R. Stillman, Treas. ; John W. Mariner.' " Mariner was the secretary of the corporation, duly authorized to sign the note on its behalf: — Held, that the signature of Mariner was not so placed on the in- strument ag to make it doubtful in what capacity he intended to sign, within the meaning of this section. The Court said : " This provision, by its very terms, applies only to a case of doubt aris- ing out of the location of the signature upon the instrument. Names are sometimes placed at the side, on the end, or across the face of the instrument, and thus a doubt arises as to whether the signer intended to be bound as a maker or indorser, or perhaps as a guarantor, and to solve these doubts the section in question, was evidently framed. It was to settle a doubt fairly arising from the ambiguous location of the name, and applies to no other. In the present case there is no doubt of this nature. The signature of Mr. Mariner is placed in the usual and proper, in fact the only proper, place for a maker. The doubt arising is not a doubt whether he intended to sign as maker, in- dorser, or guarantor, for it is clear from the location of the name that he did not intend to sign as indorser or guarantor, but simply a doubt whether he intended to sign in an individual or in a representative capacity as maker. To say that, where it conclusively appears from the instrument that the signer intended to sign as a maker, the statute is intended to make him an in- dorser, would be little short of ridiculous. The statute was passed to meet a case where it is doubtful from the instrument whether a man intended to become an indorser, not to make an indorser out of a person who, without doubt, intended to sign as a maker, either individually or as representative of another. We have no doubt, therefore, that this section has no application to the present case." Where two officers of a corporati(»n indorsed on the com- pany's demand note the following words: "For value received, we hereby guarantee the proini)t payment of this note," and fol- lowed the words with their signatures, they were held liable as sureties, itmi not, as guarantors of the instrument. Iron City National I'.ank v. Rafferty, 207 Pa. St. 2:58. (f) Monson V. Drakclcy, 40 Conn. H.'iO; Solomon v. Hopkins, 61 Conn. 47; Dart v. Sherwood, 7 Wis. 523. 3J lllH NKGOIIABLE INSTKU iMENTS LAW. § 37. Liability of person signing in trade or assumed name, — Ao person is liable on the instrument whose signa- ture does not appear thereon ((/), except as lierein other- wise expressly pro\icled. lUit one who signs in a trade or assumed name will be liable to the same extent as if he had signed in his own name {b). (a) Persons dealing with negotiable instruments are presumed to take them on the credit of the parties whose names appear upon them, and a person not a party cannot be charged upon proof that the ostensible party signed or indorsed as his agent. Manufac- turers', Etc., Bank v. Love, 13 App. Div. (N. Y.) 5G1; Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 363. Under this section, a firm upon whom a draft is drawn by its commercial traveller is not liable thereon before acceptance by reason of any custom in previous years to honor such drafts. Seattle Shoe Co. v. Packard, 43 Wash. 527. (b) A person may become a party to a bill or note by any mark or designation he chooses to adopt, provided it be used as a sub- stitute for his name and he intends to be bound by it. De Witt v. Walton, 9 N. Y. 574: Brown v, Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 6 Hill, 443. § 38. Signature by agent ; authority ; how shown. — The signature of any party may be made by a duly authorized agent. No particular form of appointment is necessary for this purpose: and the authority of the agent may be estab- lished as in other cases of agency. § 39, Liability of person signing as agent, etc. — Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a prin- cipal, or in a represenative capacity, he is not liable on the mstrument if he was duly authorized (a) ; but the mere addition of words describing him as an agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing his principal, does not exempt him from personal liability (b). (a) In the original draft submitted to the Conference of Com- missioners on Uniformity of Laws this section read as follows: FORM AXD INTERPRETATION. 33 " Where a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a representative ca- pacity, he is not liable on the instrument; but the mere addition of words describing him as an agent, or as filling a representative character, does not exempt him from personal liability. In de- termining whether a signature is that of the principal or of the agent by whose hand it is written, that construction is to be adopted which is most favorable to the validity of the instrument." This is the English rule, and was the rule in New York prior to the statute. Under that rule a person signing for or on behalf of a principal was not liable on the instrument, notwithstanding he had no authority to bind his principal. There was an implied warranty on his part that he possessed such authority, and if he did not, he became liable upon such warranty for the damages re- sulting from the breach. Miller v. Reynolds, 92 Hun, 400. But no action could be maintained against him on the instrtunent, when by its terms it did not purport to bind him. And his lia- bility upon the implied warranty did not accompany the transfer of the instrument, unless the claim founded upon the warranty was also assigned to the person to whom the instrument was transferred. (./<:/.) The effect of the section, as it now stands, is, probably, to permit the holder to sae the agent on the instru- ment, if he was not duly authorized to sign the same on behalf of the principal. {h) Thus, he is not relieved from liability by adding the de- scriptive term " trustee," Bank v. Looney, 99 Tenu. 278, or "administrator," or "guardian," Emm v. Carroll, 1 Yerger, 144; ^fcWherter v. Jackson, 10 Humphrey, 208; Carter v. Wolf, 1 Heisk, 674, or "agent," Sumwalt v. Rigeley, 20 Md. 107, or "secretary," Daniel v. Glidden, 38 Wash. 556. Where a nego- tiable promissory note has been given for the payment of a debt contracted by a corporation, and the language of the promise does not disclose the corporate obligation, and the signatures to the paper are in the names of individuals, a holder, taking hona fide and without notice of the circumstances of its making, is entitled to hold the note as the personal undertaking of its signers, notwithstanding they affix to their names the title of an office. Such an affix will V)e regarded as descriptive of the per- sons, and not of the character of the liability. Unless llic promise 7)urports to be by the corporation, it is that of the persons who subscribe to it; and the fact of adding to their names an abbre- 3 ;vf "• • 34 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. ff viatiou of some official title has no legal sijiiiification as quali- fying their obligation, and imposes no obligalion upon the corpo- ration whose officers they may be. This rule is founded t)n the general principle that in a contract every material thing must be detinitely expressed and not left to conjecture. Unless the lan- guage creates, or fairly implies, the undertaking of the corpora- tion, or if the purpose is ecjuivocal, the obligation i:^ that of its apparent makers. Casco National Bank v. Clark, 13'J N. Y. 307, 310; First Nat. Bank v. Wallis, 150 N. Y. 455. In Megowan v. Peterson, 173 N. Y. 1, it was held that a trustee of an insolvent firm, for the benefit of creditors thereof, appointed by such firm and its creditors, is not personally liable under this section, upon a note signed by him as "trustee," but without disclosing his rep- resentative capacity upon the face of the note, where the payee is one of such creditors and the consideration for which the note Avas given was property purchased from the payee for the benefit of the trust estate. The Court, speaking of this provision of the statute, said : " We do not understand that the statute to which we have alluded was designed to change the common-law rule in this regard, which is to the effect that, as between the original parties and those having notice of the facts relied upon as con- stituting a defense, the consideration and the conditions under which the note was delivered may be shown." See also Kerby v. Ruegamer, 107 App. Div. (N. Y.) 491; Crandall v. Kollins, 83 Id. 618. § 40. Signature by procuration ; effect of. — A signature by " procuration " operates as notice that the agent has but a limited authority to sign, and the principal is bound only in case the agent in so signing acted within the actual limits of his authority (a). ia) The words "per procuration" have a special technical sig- nificance. They are an express intimation of a special and limited authority; and a person taking a bill so drawn, accepted, or indorsed, is bound to inquire into the extent of the authority. Byles on Bills, 33. But an indorsement by an agent " per pro " which is within the powers conferred upon him is binding \ipon his principal aa against hona fide holders for value, though the agent abused his authority. Bryant v. La Banque du Peuple j^V^'^C " V /•> .'/I FORM AND INTERPRETATION. 35 [1893], App. Cases, 170. The term is seldom, if ever, used in this countrj'. § 41. Effect of indorsement by infant or corporation. — The indorsement or assignment of the instrument by a cor- poration or by an infant passes the property therein, not- withstanding that from want of capacity the corporation (a) or infant {b) may incur no habihty thereon,^ (a) Thus, if a note should be drawn payable to the order of a corporation, and the corporation should indorse the same without consideration, such indorsement would pass the title to a subse- quent holder with notice of the facts, though the corporation would not be liable to him as an indorser. See note to section 55. (fe) The statute changes the law. See Roach v. Woodhall, 91 Tenn. 206. The change, like others, was made to facilitate the ready and safe transfer of commercial i)aper. § 42. Forged signature ; effect of. — Where a signature is forged or made without authority of the person whose signattire it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge there- for, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature (a), unless the party, against whom it is sought to enforce such right, is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of au- thority (b). (a) Buckley v. Second Nat. Bank of Jersey City, 35 N. J. Law, 400; Whiteford v. Munroe, 17 Md. 135. But it does not follow from this provision that proof of one forged signature on a note must of nf'cessity, and in all cases, bo given eflFect to avoid the note in favor of those whose signatures thereto are found to be genuine. It is the forged or niumtlinrized signntnrc tlint is declared to be ino])erative; ami the inliibitory eliiuse forbids re- covery on the instrument as against any party where the right of reeovery is predicated on sueli ino])erative sigjinture. Beem i», Farrell (Iowa). 11.". N. W. Rep. 509. The agent of the plaintiff n 30 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. who had power of attorney to receive and indorse checks far the plaintitf and to deposit them in certain banivs, indorsed them witli tliu name of tlie phiintitf, to whom they were payable, addiuj;- his own indorsement, anil transferred them to certain stock- brokers with whom he was speculating, as margins on his per- sonal transactions, the brokers having knowledge of the agency: — Held, that the unauthorized diversion of the checks by the agent, after indorsement, did not make the original indorsement of the plaintitf's name a forgery under this section. Salen v. Bank of State of New York, 110 App. Div. (N. Y.) 636. P, by fraud- ulently representing himgelf to be H, obtained a check from T, payable to the order of II. At the time, T knew of the existence of IL and delivered the check to P supposing that he was H. P indorsed H's name on the check, and gave it to D, who collected the money thereon from the bank, which charged the same against the account of T : — Held, that under this section the signature made by P transferred no interest, and that T could recover the amount from the bank. Tolman v. American National Bank, 22 R. I. 462. Stiness, C. J. said : " We have referred to authorities because the defendant's counsel so earnestly and ably argued that the act did not alter the law-merchant that it seemed proper to show that the law in this respect, outside of the act, is in a very unsatisfactory state and that the act ig right. We do not think that the act does alter the law as it was when, a few years ago, it seems to have been switched off on a fallacy in some places. One of the advantages of the act is in settling the question. Waiving the question of forgery, about which the cases we have cited differ, the signature in this case is clearly one 'made with- out the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be,' and, therefore, it is 'wholly inoperative.' This being so, the defendant cannot justify its action under it, there being no evidence of any conduct by the plaintiff to mislead the defendant and so to estop bin jircsent claim. As the case stood, the plaintiff had ordered money paid to Haskell. The bank had not so paid it. The fact that the plaintiff had leen imposed upon did not relieve the bank from its duty to see that the money was paid according to order." But where the instrument is intended for the person to whom it is delivered, his indorsement will pass a good title to a holder in due course, though he procured the same Vjy falsely representing himself to be another person of the same name. Jamieson v. McFarland, 43 Wash. 153. The difference FORM AND INTERPRETATION. 37 between the two cases is, that iu the former, the drawer of the check or draft intends it for a particular person other than the one to whom he delivers it; in the latter case, the person to whom he delivers it is, in fact, the one for whom he intended it. Compare Land, etc. Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 196 Pa. St. 230. (&) Where the transaction is contrary to good faith and the fraud aflfects individual interests only, ratification is allowed; but where the fraud is of such a character as to involve a crime the adjustment of which is forbidden by public policy, the ratifica- tion of the act from which it springs is not permitted. Forgery does not admit of ratification. A forger does not act on behalf of, nor profess to represent, the person whose handwriting he counter- feits; and the subsequent adoption of the instrument cannot supply the authority which the forger did not profess to have. Henrj' Christian Building and Loan Association v. Walton, 181 Pa. St. 201; Lyon v. Phillips, 106 Pa. St. 57. But cases some- times arise where parties are estopped to dispute the genuineness of their signatures. Crout v. DeWolf, 1 R. I. 393. Thus, where a customer has been guilty of negligence in examining the ac- count and vouchers returned to him by his bank, he will not be permitted to dispute the account because some of the checks are forgeries. Leather Manufacturers' Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96. Where one whose name has been forged to a note has received no benefit from the forgery, and the forger was not his agent for any purpose, he is not bound, as a matter of legal duty, when the note is first shown to him, to repudiate or disclaim at once the genuineness of the signature. Ilis failure to do so is evidence, in the nature of an admission, which may be considered as bearing upon the question whether he assumed the signature as his own, but it is not conclusive. Traders' National Bank v. Rogers, 167 Mass. 315. As to what conduct will amount to an estoppel, see Terrs- r. Bisscl, 26 Conn. 41. A married woman, to shield her husband, ratified a signature on a promissory note to a bank, purporting to be hers but forger! by bor husband. At maturity the note- was surreiulcnd l.. the Inisbaml on his giving in renewal a note similarly forged which was accepted in good faith by the bank. In an action by the bank on the first note, it was hclfl, that the substitution and acceptance of the second forged note did not constitute a payment, so as to bar an action on the note ratified by the defendant. Central National Bank v. Copp, 184 l^fass. 328. 38 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. ARTICLE III. Consideration of Negotiable Instruments. Section 50. Presumption of consideration. 51. What constitutes consideration. 52. What constitutes holder for value. 53. When lien on instrument constitutes holder for value. 54. Effect of want of consideration. 55. Liability of accommodation party. § 50. Presumption of consideration. — Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration ; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value (a). (a) Riverside Bank v. Woofniaven June. L. Co., 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 362; Delano v. Bartlott, 6 Gushing, 364; Lines v. Smith, 4 Fla. 47 ; Flint v. Phipps, 16 Oregon 437. This is the rule, though no consrideration be expressed. Wilson v. Wilson, 26 Oregon 315. See section 25. The statute makes this rule applicable only to in- struments which are negotiable. But by the law merchant a bill of exchange, though it lacks the words payable " to order," or to " bearer," which are essential to negotiability (see sections 20, 210), imports a consideration. Louisville R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 9b Ind. 251 ; Cowan v. Hallock, 9 Colo. 576. The statute has not altered this rule. See section 7. But as regards the presumption of consideration in the case of non-negotiable notes, the law of ^NTew York and of some of the other States has been changed. See note to section 320. As to the burden of proof, see Delano v. Bartlett, 6 Cushing, 364. In Lassas v. McCarty, 47 Oregon 474, it was said that the presumption of the statute that a promissory note was given for a suflBcient consideration is of much impor- tance in business transactions, and should not be lightly disre- CONSIDERATION OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 39 garded, in favor of those who have carelessly, or by being unduly confiding, set afloat commercial paper. The production of the paper establishes prima facie that there was a consideration. Dawson v. Wombles, 123 Mo. App. 340; Bank of Monticello v. Dooly, 113 Wis. 590, 593; Hickok v. Bunting, 92 App. Div. (N. Y.) 167. But when this presumption is met by proof tend- ing to rebut it, then, on the question whether there was a consid- eration, the burden of proof is on the holder throughout the trial. Lombard v. Byrne, 194 Mass. 236, 238. As to the effect of a failure to deny that the paper was given for value see Benedict v. Kress, 97 App. Div. (N. Y.) 65. § 51. Consideration, what constitutes. — Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract (a). An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value ; and is , deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time (&). (a) See Conover v. Stillwell, 34 N. J. Law, 54 ; Eaton v. Libbey, 165 Mass. 218; Whitney v. Claiy, 145 Mass. 156; Shawmut Nat. Bank v. Manson, 168 Mass. 425 ; Kaymond v. Sellick, 10 Conn. 480. Lender this provision, a bank discounting a note and obtaining credit in favor of the indorser in a solvent bank for the amount (pf tlie di.scountod paper is a holder for value. Elgin City Banking Co. v. Hall (Tenn.), 108 S. W. Rep. 1068. (h) For cases applying the statut^gee Singer Manufacturing Co. V. Summers, 143 N. C. 102;^lius v. Kauflfman, 104 App. Div. (N. Y.) 442; Commercial Nat. Bank v. Citizens' State Bank, 132 Iowa, '706. The general rule is that whore a conveyance is made or security taken, the consideration of which is an ante- cedent debt, the grantee or the person taking the security is not regarded as a purchaser for a valuable consrideration. People's Savings Bank r. Bates. 120 TJ. S. 556, 565; Weaver v. Bordon, 49 N. Y. 28(1; Cary r. White. 52 N. Y. 138; Wood v. Bobinson, 22 N. Y. 567; Mingus v. Condit, 23 N. J. E