IN MEMORIAM 
 S. L. MILLARD ROSENBERG 

 
 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 OLD AND NEW 
 
 WILLIAM KNIGHT 
 
 PROFESSOR OF MOK.M. PHILOSOPHY AMI I'OMTICAL KCONoMY 
 IN THE UNIVERSITY OK ST ANDREWS 
 
 BOSTON AND NK\V YORK 
 
 HOUGirrox, MIFFLIX AXD COMPAXV 
 
 (Cfje ItitocrstDc Press, ^Ta 
 1890
 
 Copyright, 1890, 
 BY HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY. 
 
 All rights reserved. 
 
 The Riverside Press, Cambridge, flfass., IT. .?. A . 
 Electrotypcd and Printed by 11. O. Houghton & Co.
 
 To MY FRIEND, 
 
 CO 
 
 JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, 
 
 DEDICATED. 
 
 CE: 
 uj 
 
 CO 
 
 CO 
 
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 oc 
 
 r-J'i^'S - '
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 SEVERAL of the essays in this volume 
 were published in London in the year 
 1879. A year or two afterwards, the en- 
 tire stock of the book of which they formed 
 part was destroyed by fire in the premises 
 of Messrs. Kegan Paul & Co. It has since 
 been out of print. The substance of the 
 first two essays on " Idealism and Ex- 
 perience, in Literature, Art, and Life," and 
 on "The Classification of the Sciences " 
 was embodied in a course of lectures de- 
 livered last summer to the Royal Institu- 
 tion of Great Britain. The essay on 
 " Immortality" was read to the Ethical So- 
 ciety at Toynbee Hall, East London, in 
 1888. The majority of the papers in the
 
 iv PREFACE. 
 
 former volume were addressed either to 
 Philosophical Societies, or to University 
 students. 
 
 A leading idea will be found running 
 through all these studies, "old and new." 
 The essay on " Eclecticicm " explains a 
 doctrine and a tendency which pervade the 
 volume, and color it throughout. Only 
 one or two of the perennial problems, how- 
 ever, those questions of the ages, which 
 reappear in all the literature of Philosophy, 
 are discussed ; and these are dealt with 
 less in relation to the tendencies of the 
 time than in their permanent aspects. 
 
 In the first essay an attempt is made 
 to test the merits of the rival philosophies 
 of Idealism and Experience by a study 
 of their results, or what they have given 
 rise to in the literary and artistic products 
 of the world, and in character both indi- 
 vidual and national. Both of these phi- 
 losophies are recognized as containing fun- 
 damental truths, and each as balancing 
 the other.
 
 PREFACE. V 
 
 In the essay on " The Classification of 
 the Sciences " I have tried to rearrange 
 the recognized groups of knowledge from 
 a fresh point of view. 
 
 The aim of the paper on " Metempsy- 
 chosis " is to prove that the preexistence 
 and the immortality of the soul are twin 
 ideas, in close speculative alliance, and to 
 show how the former casts light upon the 
 latter. 
 
 The third essay, originally an inaugural 
 address, delivered to the students of Moral 
 Philosophy in St. Andrews and part of 
 the fifth, discuss the theory of Evolution. 
 As this is the most definite philosophical 
 idea underlying the methods and processes 
 of Science, and as its advocates claim for 
 it the merit, not only of accounting for the 
 modifications of organic structure, but also 
 of explaining the origin of our intellectual 
 and moral nature, and as opposition to 
 its efficacy in the latter sphere is so much 
 misunderstood, one or two additional 
 paragraphs on the subject may be inserted 
 in this prefatory note.
 
 Vi PREFACE. 
 
 I do not deny the evolution of intellect- 
 ual and moral ideas. I only deny that 
 their evolution can explain their origin. 
 Every valid theory of derivation must start 
 with the assumption of a derivative Source, 
 or it performs the feat of educing some- 
 thing out of nothing, nay of developing 
 everything out of nonentity. It may surely 
 rank as an axiom that whatever is subse- 
 quently evolved must have been originally 
 involved. 
 
 Our intellectual and moral nature bears 
 the most evident traces of evolution. 
 Within the historic period, the progress of 
 humanity, both in knowledge and feeling, 
 has been more rapid and more apparent 
 than any advance made in the type of phys- 
 ical organization. If we compare the rec- 
 ords of civilization in ancient Egypt and 
 Assyria with that of England in the nine- 
 teenth century, the mind and character of 
 the race seem to have undergone a rela- 
 tively much greater development than its 
 physique. It is true that this may be only
 
 PR El-' AC K. VI 1 
 
 apparent. Possibly the alteration may have 
 been equally great in both directions. It 
 has certainly been equally real ; although 
 between the faces carved on the stones 
 and gems of the centuries B. c. and those 
 we see in the nineteenth century A. n. 
 there is less apparent difference than exists 
 between the science, the art, the religion, 
 and the morals of the respective periods. 
 
 Be this as it may, the history of human- 
 ity is the story of an ever-evolving, ever- 
 developing process. No one can ration- 
 ally deny, and scarcely any one ventures to 
 question this. No individual can escape 
 the modifying force of hereditary influ- 
 ences, and if these produce change in one 
 department of our nature, they necessarily 
 affect the whole of it. It is therefore cer- 
 tain that the present intellectual and moral 
 ideas of the race are the result of ages of 
 gradual growth, refinement, and self-recti- 
 fication. Nor can it be doubted, I think, 
 that the process has been a development 
 from within, while it has been modified by
 
 viii PREFACE. 
 
 influences from without ; that forces ab ex- 
 tra have cooperated with powers and ten- 
 dencies ab intra in producing the result. 
 
 It may be confidently affirmed that each 
 man is what he now is, not only in virtue 
 of what every other man has been before 
 him, in the direct line of ancestry, but also 
 in virtue of what everything else has been ; 
 while it may be as confidently affirmed that 
 he is what he is, in virtue of what he has 
 made himself, both as a rational being and 
 a moral agent. Such is the solidarity of 
 the race, and its organic unity, that the 
 present is the outcome as well as the se- 
 quel of the past, and that all the " charac- 
 teristics of the present age " are due to an 
 evolving agency, latent within the universe 
 ab initio. If this be so, the moral ideas 
 which now sway the race are a heritage 
 which have come down to it from the dawn 
 of history, nay, from the very beginnings 
 of existence. They reach it with the sanc- 
 tions of an immeasurable past, superadded 
 to the necessities of the present ; and the
 
 PREFACE. JX 
 
 binding force of ethical maxims is not 
 weakened, either by the fact that they are 
 slow interior growths, or because their 
 present form is due to the myriad modi- 
 fications of external circumstance. In 
 either case, and on both grounds, they 
 have the prestige of the remotest anti- 
 quity ; and even if their sole raison d'etre 
 were the authority of custom, that author- 
 ity would be real, because based upon the 
 everlasting order of the universe. So 
 much must be frankly admitted. The 
 whole pith of the controversy, however, lies 
 behind this admission. 
 
 I have pointed out in the third essay 
 that if the intellectual and moral nature of 
 man is entirely clue to the influence of ante- 
 cedents in other words, if the past alone 
 and by itself can explain the present, while 
 alteration is still going on, and change is 
 incessant no product is ever reached. 
 We have only an 
 
 eternal process moving on. 
 
 Iluvra pf.1, oi'Stv /xeVet. There is no standard
 
 X PREFACE. 
 
 of the true, or the beautiful, or the good ; 
 no principles of knowledge ; no canons of 
 taste ; no laws of morality. The principles 
 of knowledge are empirical judgments, and 
 nothing more ; the canons of taste are sub- 
 jective likings, and nothing more ; the laws 
 of morality are dictates of expediency, and 
 nothing more. As the fully developed 
 doctrine of evolution abolishes species al- 
 together, and reduces each to a passing 
 state of the organism, which is undergoing 
 a modification that never ceases; so the 
 notion of a standard of the true, or of the 
 right, vanishes, of necessity, in a process 
 of perpetual becoming. They are always 
 about to be ; they never really arc. The 
 species and the standard may still, for con- 
 venience' sake, receive a name, but it is 
 the name of a transient phase of being, of 
 a wave in the sea of appearance ; i'ox, ct 
 prctcrca nihil. The nominal alone sur- 
 vives ; the real and the ideal have together 
 vanished. 
 
 As the validity of this conclusion has
 
 PR El'' ACE. xi 
 
 
 
 been questioned, and as it seems to me of 
 far greater moment than is often allowed, 
 I may unfold it a little farther. 
 
 It is absolutely inevitable that all our 
 ethical rules must undergo modification 
 and change. That they must develop, 
 as they have developed, is not only cer- 
 tain, it is an omen of hope ; one of the 
 brightest prospects on the horizon of the 
 future. It is not difficult to discover much 
 in the present opinion and practice of the 
 world in which convention so often takes 
 the place of nature to make us thankful 
 that we have the prospect of change. Ev- 
 olution has assuredly much still to do, both 
 in eradicating the blots which now disfigure 
 the belief and the actions of mankind, and 
 in bringing out their undeveloped good. 
 Besides, if the moral law were to oper- 
 ate through all time with invariable fixity, 
 like the law of gravitation, it would be re- 
 duced to the inferior rank of mechanical 
 necessity, and the moral agent would sink 
 to the position of an automaton.
 
 xii PREFACE. 
 
 
 
 As to this, however, there is no con- 
 troversy. Past development and future 
 evolution are both alike admitted. The 
 question is not whether the adult moral 
 judgments and sentiments of the race have 
 been preceded by rudimentary ones, and 
 will yet ripen into maturer and mellower 
 ones as the bird has come out of the 
 egg, and the oak from the acorn. The 
 real question at issue which no amount 
 of brilliant discussion on side-issues should 
 for a moment obscure is as to the na- 
 ture of the Fountain-head, not as to the 
 character or the course of the stream. It 
 is as to the kind of Root, out of which the 
 tree of our knowledge has grown ; and as 
 to the substance of the Rock, out of which 
 our moral ideal has been hewn. Now, I 
 maintain that evolution, pure and simple, 
 is process pure and simple, with no pro- 
 duct ; with nothing definitely emerging, 
 and with nothing real or essential under- 
 neath. It is simply the Heraclitic flux 
 of thing's. But this takes for granted a
 
 PREFACE. Xlll 
 
 phenomenal theory of the universe. If 
 noumena exist, if there be a substantial 
 world within the ego, or within the cos- 
 mos beyond the ego, a doctrine of phe- 
 nomenal evolution is neither the first nor 
 the last word of Philosophy, but only a sec- 
 ondary and intermediate one. The whole 
 process of development is carried on in a 
 region entirely outside of the sphere of the 
 philosophical problem. This problem re- 
 emerges in full force, after every link of 
 the chain of evolution has been traced ; 
 and the completest enumeration of details, 
 as to the method of development, carries 
 us very little farther than the common- 
 place conclusion that we, and all things 
 else, have grown. 
 
 It will be found that, however far our 
 historical inquiry into the prior phases of 
 consciousness may be carried, it leads back 
 to the metaphysical problem of the rela- 
 tion of appearances to essence, or the phe- 
 nomenal to the substantial. It is only the 
 phenomenal that can be evolved ; noumena
 
 XIV PREFACE. 
 
 arc evolving powers or essences, them- 
 selves unevolved. If, therefore, our per- 
 sonality contains aught within it that is 
 noumenal, it contains something that has 
 not been evolved. If free will is not wholly 
 phenomenal, though it may have phe- 
 nomenal aspects, the will has not been 
 developed out of desire, as desire may 
 have been educed from sensation. 
 
 It is no solution of the difficulty, but a 
 mere cutting of the knot, to say that will 
 is a phase of desire, or the progeny of de- 
 sire. Of course, if there be no such thing 
 as free will, if necessitarianism be true, it 
 is the easiest thing in the world to explain 
 its evolution ; as easy as to explain how 
 the flower issues from the seed, i. e., it re- 
 quires no explanation at all. In other 
 words, if the rise of self-assertion be the 
 rise of will, if to find a centre in one's self 
 and to resist aggression or encroachment 
 on one's rights is to discover the root of 
 volition, the knot is cut ; but the problem 
 is not solved. The difficulty is explained
 
 PREFACE. XV 
 
 away ; but it reappears again, with uncli- 
 minished force, after the explanation is 
 given. 
 
 Everything, in this controversy, turns 
 on the determination of the nature of per- 
 sonality, and its root, free will ; and the 
 whole discussion converges to a narrow is- 
 sue. Unless an act be clue to the person- 
 ality of an agent, i. e., to his antecedents, 
 he is not only not responsible for it it 
 is not truly his ; similarly and simultane- 
 ously, unless it be due to his will, as a 
 productive cause, it is not his, it is tJic uni- 
 verse s ; it is the act of the antecedent gen- 
 erations, and not his own act. Unless it 
 be the outcome of his moral freedom, he is 
 an automaton, and the act is in no sense 
 his own. 
 
 Strong objection was taken by some 
 critics to the statement in my essay, as 
 originally published in The Nineteenth Cen- 
 tury, that if Evolution cannot account for 
 the origin of the moral faculty in the life- 
 time of the individual, the experience of
 
 Xvi PREFACE. 
 
 the race at large is incompetent to explain 
 it ; because the latter is merely an exten- 
 sion of the same principle and the same 
 process. It seems to me, however, to be 
 self-evident that if an explanation fails in 
 relevancy, within a limited area filled with 
 phenomena of a certain class, its applica- 
 tion to a larger area filled with the same 
 kind of phenomena will not redeem its 
 character, and give it success. If individ- 
 ual experience cannot explain the origin 
 of our moral ideas, collective experience 
 cannot come to the rescue ; and why ? Be- 
 cause by a mere enlargement of the space 
 which the principle traverses, you get no 
 fresh light as to its nature, or its relevancy. 
 It is said that the acts of all our ancestors 
 have transmitted a habit to posterity, and 
 that while the iron hand of the past is 
 holding us, we imagine by the trick 
 which custom plays unconsciously that 
 certain things are innate which have been 
 really acquired for us by the usage of our 
 ancestors. This is only possible, however,
 
 PREFACE. xvii 
 
 on the pre-supposition that the course of 
 development is at once rigidly necessita- 
 rian and purely phenomenal. 
 
 But if, in individual life and experience, 
 the rise of the higher elements out of the 
 lower cannot be explained by the mere pre- 
 existence of the lower, what possible right 
 can we have to affirm that an extension of 
 the process of evolution indefinitely far 
 back will bring us within sight of the solu- 
 tion ? We must have definite and verifia- 
 ble evidence of the power of evolution, to 
 explain the processes of change within the 
 sphere of subjective experience, before we 
 are entitled to extend it, as the sole princi- 
 ple explanatory of the changes that occur 
 beyond the range of experience. Unless 
 evolution can explain itself, we must get 
 behind the evolving chain to find the 
 source of its evolution. If change cannot 
 explain change, we must go beyond what 
 occurs to discover the cause of its occur- 
 rence ; and we cannot validly take a '' leap 
 in the dark," if we have no previous experi-
 
 Xviii PREFACE. 
 
 ence of walking in that particular way in 
 the light. 
 
 It will thus be seen that the problem of 
 evolution leads back, by no intricate path- 
 way, to the metaphysical problem of causa- 
 tion. If causation is simply occurrence, or 
 mere phenomenal sequence, as Hume 
 and the Comtists teach, then, evolution 
 is the process by which all things have 
 come to be what they are ; and the laws 
 of evolution are the laws of phenomenal 
 occurrence, which illustrate " the process 
 of becoming." If this, however, is an un- 
 satisfactory theory of causality, if causa- 
 tion is something more than sequence, 
 then evolution is not the sole or the chief 
 principle explanatory of existence, because 
 it leaves out of account the major truth 
 of causation itself. 
 
 The simple observation (for surely it is 
 no discovery) that a consequent follows in 
 the wake of an antecedent will not explain 
 how the sequence has been accomplished ; 
 and no extension of the time, or widening
 
 PREFACE xix 
 
 of the area, will help to explain it, because 
 such extension and widening are simply 
 the addition of a number of similar links 
 to those which already constitute the chain 
 of derivation. We get no principle explan- 
 atory of the whole, unless we find out how 
 the first link of the chain was forged, and 
 what it hangs on ; or, if there be no first 
 link, and therefore no connection with a 
 Source, unless we discover the inner tie 
 that unites the separate links, distinct from 
 their mere succession in time. 
 
 Further, even assuming the "correctness 
 of the theory of development, to make, 
 say, an opinion valid, or a custom expedi- 
 ent, the process of going back upon their 
 rudiments with those large drafts on 
 space and time which the derivative phi- 
 losophy indulges in is not requisite ; be- 
 cause an opinion might be true, and an act 
 might be useful, with no precedent to back 
 them up. They might be both true and 
 good just as they arose, and simply because 
 they arose. As everything is, on the same
 
 XX PREFACE 
 
 theory, in incessant change, and each 
 stage of the process is equally valuable, 
 venerable, and respectable, both opinion 
 and practice can dispense with the author- 
 ity of precedent. Precedent itself, in short, 
 breaks down on the theory of evolution. 
 What is the use of an appeal to an antece- 
 dent, in the case of a thing the existence of 
 which is necessitated, but which is itself 
 different from all its predecessors and from 
 all its successors ; a thing which, apart 
 from precedent and example, has as good 
 a right to ?xist as any of them ; and which 
 is itself not only necessitated, but also 
 ephemeral ? 
 
 I cannot, however, pursue this discussion 
 further without exceeding the limits of a 
 preface. 
 
 WILLIAM KXIGHT. 
 THE UNIVERSITY, ST. ANDREWS, N. 13. 
 August, 1890.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PACK 
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE, IN LITERATURE, 
 
 ART, AND LIEE 23 
 
 THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES . . 72 
 ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY AND EVOLUTION . .109 
 
 ECLECTICISM 173 
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE . . . .211 
 
 IMMORTALITY 283 
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS . . . 316
 
 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE, IN 
 LITERATURE, ART, AND LIFE. 
 
 Two great streams of tendency have 
 flowed side by side throughout the ages, in 
 almost equal strength and volume. These 
 streams have given rise to two rival phi- 
 losophies, that of Idealism, and that of 
 Experience. All the philosophies of the 
 world belong to one or other of these two 
 classes. They are either ideal or experi- 
 ential. They have been a thousand times 
 discussed, and their evidence weighed by 
 their advocates, on purely speculative 
 grounds. They may be appraised, how- 
 ever, and their merits and demerits dis- 
 cerned, quite as much by the results that 
 have flowed from them, as by their intrin- 
 sic evidence. A sure test of their philo- 
 sophic value is their outcome, or the influ- 
 ence they have exerted on the Literature,
 
 24 ESSAYS hV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the Art, and the Character of the periods 
 in which they have respectively flourished. 
 It is the aim of the following pages to 
 point out the influence of these two streams 
 of tendency, and to exhibit their relations. 
 A few preliminary sentences on the nature 
 of Philosophy and on its leading types will 
 enable us to estimate their nature and 
 their results. 
 
 All philosophy originates in human cu- 
 riosity, in the tendency to ask questions ; 
 but it is distinguished from a mere search 
 for information, or miscellaneous know- 
 ledge, by its being an attempt to discover 
 a principle which underlies, and which can 
 account for, individual experience and de- 
 tached occurrences, a principle within 
 which the latter may be embraced, and by 
 which it may be in part explained. Under 
 all the varied phases which philosophy has 
 assumed, it has been an attempt to get 
 beneath the surface show of things, and to 
 interpret, however inadequately, a part of 
 that mysterious text which the universe 
 presents to our faculties for interpretation. 
 And as such it has been a pursuit common 
 to all men, whether they have known it, or 
 known it not, and whether it has been
 
 IDEALISM AXD EXl'ERIENCE. 2$ 
 
 described by the old Greek term c/>iAorro<i//, 
 or not. It is a popular delusion that Philos- 
 ophy is a pursuit which 'may interest a few 
 recluse spirits, but is not a matter about 
 which men and women in general need 
 concern themselves, or with which they are 
 competent to deal. The truth is that when- 
 ever we ask the meaning of anything, or 
 the reason for anything, we at once begin 
 to philosophize ; and we are all uncon- 
 scious metaphysicians long before we read 
 a word of philosophical literature. We 
 cannot carry on the simplest conversation 
 on common things without using terms 
 which are the battlefields of metaphysical 
 discussion ; and if we are to use them ra- 
 tionally (even in our common conversation), 
 we must know something of their import, 
 and something of their history, as well as 
 of their latent significance ; that is to say, 
 we must philosophize. If we try to dis- 
 tinguish between appearance and reality, 
 between symbols and the things they sym- 
 bolize, between the accidental and the 
 essential, we are dealing with Philosophy. 
 Nay, if we pursue the simplest inquiry far 
 enough, we come to the question of its 
 ultimate evidence, and that is again to say
 
 26 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 we come to its philosophy ; so that our 
 only choice is, not whether we will deal 
 with philosophical problems or not, but 
 whether we will deal with them wisely or 
 foolishly, whether we will think with reason 
 or without it. 
 
 This being the aim and the end of Phi- 
 losophy, it is evident that its cultivation 
 must be a radical want of human nature, 
 and its pursuit a perennial tendency. At 
 particular periods it may be crushed under 
 the influence of other tendencies that pro- 
 nounce it to be illusory. But history 
 shows that Philosophy always revives in 
 undiminished strength and with increasing 
 lustre after every temporary repression. 
 Its best symbol is the phoenix, which was 
 fabled to spring immortal from the fire 
 that consumed it. 
 
 It is unnecessary, however, to vindicate 
 philosophy any further. I have rather to 
 illustrate the following thesis, viz., that the 
 particular type of speculation which we 
 either inherit or adopt has the closest bear- 
 ing upon all our other opinions and ten- 
 dencies, and to a large extent determines 
 these ; and, further, that the whole com- 
 plex outcome of a nation's life is colored
 
 IDEALISM A\D EXTERIENCE. 27 
 
 by its philosophy, up to at least one half 
 of what it becomes. No one can follow 
 the course of history without perceiving 
 that the labor of those who founded the 
 great systems of opinion has told, in in- 
 numerable ways, upon the world at every 
 point ; and that the various types of liter- 
 ary work, of artistic labor, of social senti- 
 ment, of political activity, and of religious 
 belief, have all been modified by the phi- 
 losophy which happened to be in the as- 
 cendant. The reason is very evident. It 
 is due to the unity and the solidarity of 
 the human race; in other words, to the fact 
 that no element in civilization is or can be 
 isolated from its allies. 
 
 But what are the two schools of philos- 
 ophy which have always existed side by 
 side, and are ineradicable features in the 
 speculative life of the world ? They are 
 respectively the philosophies of Idealism 
 and of Experience. They have succeeded 
 each other by action and reaction, some- 
 times slowly and sometimes swiftly. They 
 have assumed new phases at every stage 
 of their evolution ; but they have never 
 been absent, have never been extinguished 
 like the two great political parties, which
 
 28 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 have in every age (though under divers 
 names) contended for supremacy, but the 
 continued existence of both of which seems 
 essential to the stability of nations, and 
 the progress of the race. There is a 
 risk, however, that we become entangled 
 by our phraseology and deceived by the 
 very terms we employ. We must therefore 
 explain what is meant by the phrases we 
 have used. 
 
 Suppose, then, that after the most ex- 
 tended and exhaustive study of the uni- 
 verse that surrounds us, of all that ap- 
 peals to our senses, and of the forces work- 
 ing around us and within, the only thing 
 we can say, in explanation of the ever- 
 changing spectacle, is that certain of the 
 phenomena which resemble each other can 
 be arranged in classes, or departmental 
 groups, and that the whole of the phenom- 
 ena have been evolved out of antecedent 
 conditions ; but that we are quite unable 
 to rise above the stream of occurrences, 
 and apprehend a principle working within 
 it, or to get beyond the whole series, to 
 what is substantial, underworking, and 
 permanent, this is the philosophy of Ex- 
 perience or of Empiricism. It is so called
 
 IDEALISM AND EXTERIENCE. 2Q 
 
 because it limits us to the things which 
 come and go, which arise and fall, which 
 appear and disappear, which are born and 
 die, in endless sequence and by predeter- 
 mined necessity. It affirms that those 
 paths which scan to carry us beyond phe- 
 nomena are tracks which lead nowhere ; 
 and that any apparent light as to the realm 
 of substance is a will-o'-the-wisp, an ignis 
 faf uns. 
 
 Suppose, on the other hand, that we are 
 able to discern something more than mere 
 co-existence, succession, and evolution, 
 a stable element within the changing series, 
 a permanent causal Power working within 
 the mutable world of mere appearance ; 
 and if, in consequence of this, we may 
 validly interpret the things of sense as the 
 types, the shadows, and the symbols of 
 higher realities, viz., those archetypes which 
 are not visible, nor audible, nor tangible, 
 but which are disclosed to reason by the 
 aid of sense, and which illumine the realm 
 of sensation, this is the philosophy of 
 Idealism. 
 
 Each of these philosophies represents a 
 fundamental tendency of human nature. 
 Each has had a Ions: and a distinguished
 
 30 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 history. They began to develop them- 
 selves in the remote East, before the Hel- 
 lenic civilization crystallized and denned 
 them sharply ; and they have flowed on 
 ever since, in two great streams of ten- 
 dency, distinct from each other, yet show- 
 ing curious affinities, and even forming 
 temporary alliances. It is worthy of a 
 passing remark that, in almost every phi- 
 losophical controversy, we find the cen- 
 tral point of the opposite system somehow 
 recognized by the system that controverts 
 it ; only it is subordinated to another prin- 
 ciple which has the place of honor. Thus 
 the difference between opposite systems of 
 philosophy lies very often in the amount of 
 emphasis they throw on principles which 
 both recognize. 
 
 Amongst the great idealists of antiquity 
 there was an illustrious succession in 
 Greece before the time of Plato ; but in 
 him, and his intellectual work, Greek ideal- 
 ism culminated ; so much so that his name, 
 more than that of any other in the history 
 of the world, is associated with what is 
 called "the ideal theory" of knowledge, 
 and of existence. 
 
 It was out of an analysis of sense-per-
 
 IDEALISM AND KXTEKIENCK. 3 I 
 
 ception that this theory took its rise. Fol- 
 lowing the lesser light of the previous 
 idealism of Greece, and the greater light 
 of the ideal within his own mind, Plato 
 maintained that the senses those origi- 
 nal gateways of communication with the 
 outer world yield us by themselves only 
 a mass of separate impressions, which do 
 not constitute true knowledge, but are 
 merely its raw material ; and that, in order 
 to reduce these impressions to order, some- 
 thing more than sensation is required. lie 
 held that the mind brought forward from 
 within, and impressed upon the phenomena 
 of sense, certain ideal forms ; and that the 
 exercise of this interior power was neces- 
 sary to give permanence to the fleeting im- 
 pressions of sense, and to build them into 
 unity. It was the function of the reason 
 to apprehend a substantial and permanent 
 element underlying material forms, and 
 yet transcending them, an element which 
 existed apart both from the realm of mat- 
 ter and from the mind that realized it. 
 Plato always spoke, however, of ideas in 
 the plural. Tney were eternal and im- 
 mutable essences, superior to the visible 
 forms in which thev were mirrored to us,
 
 32 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and independent of the shadows which 
 they cast. They were the archetypes of 
 what appeared in the lower world of sense, 
 in which they were casually reflected to 
 us ; but they were not the creation of the 
 human faculties, "projections of the mind's 
 own throwing." They were independent, 
 eternal, archetypal essences, far more real 
 than the phenomena of sense ; and Plato 
 thought that, by means of these ideas, he 
 could explain the lower world of appearance. 
 There were many inconsistencies in 
 Plato's idealism. That, however, is a very 
 unimportant matter, because no philosophy 
 has ever escaped the charge of harboring 
 inconsistent elements within it, and it 
 would be a very dull and uninteresting phi- 
 losophy if it did ! The great merit of the 
 philosophy of Plato is the stress it threw 
 upon the universal element underived from 
 sense, which works through it and irradi- 
 ates it. It is quite true that he disparages 
 the sensible world unduly ; and hence a re- 
 action from his extreme idealism was inevi- 
 table. His great successor, Aristotle, broke 
 with his master mainly on this one point. 
 The theory that reduced our knowledge 
 of individual objects by themselves to a
 
 IDEALISM AND EXrERlENCE. 33 
 
 knowledge of shadows seemed to Aristotle 
 an undue disparagement of the things of 
 sense. lie believed that individual objects 
 were more real than anything they sym- 
 bolized, more real than the type or class to 
 which they belonged ; and this fundamental 
 difference between the two great philoso- 
 phies of antiquity ripened gradually into 
 the leading controversy of the Middle 
 Ages, a controversy which three centuries 
 of debate did not exhaust ; viz., whether 
 genera and species were real things, or 
 merely the names which we affix to a num- 
 ber of particular things. The philosophy 
 which Aristotle championed tended more 
 and more toward the side of experience, 
 even sensational experience ; although in 
 the high prerogative which he assigned to 
 Reason, both in his intellectual and in 
 his moral philosophy, he is not to be con- 
 founded with the leaders of the latter 
 schools, who have assigned to it the me- 
 nial office of being a sort of lion's provider 
 to the senses. 
 
 The reaction which took place in Greek 
 philosophy after Plato was a descent from 
 the ideal to the actual, a return to the con- 
 create world of experience, to finite realitv,
 
 34 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to the limited and the particular. As con- 
 trasted with this, the great and prevailing 
 merit of Plato's philosophy is not any par- 
 ticular doctrine which he taught, but that 
 spirit of idealism in which his whole phi- 
 losophy lived, and moved, and had its be- 
 ing. It was a philosophy of aspiration, of 
 intellectual flight and moral soaring above 
 realization toward the unattained and the 
 infinite. The philosophy of Aristotle 
 kept close to the finite, and distrusted all 
 that transcended it. It gave no scope for 
 aerial voyages, whether of the reason, or 
 of the imagination, or of the fancy. It 
 had, it is true, a sobering effect upon some 
 of the vague and mystic tendencies which 
 the opposite philosophy had shown, and 
 which it has often subsequently fostered. 
 It is also true that when we are in the 
 company of Aristotle and the Aristotelians 
 there is no fear of our mistaking a mirage 
 for the solid land. But, on the other hand, 
 since we are debarred from access to the 
 transcendental, the wings of aspiration are 
 bound, if they are not clipped ; and with 
 the repression of enthusiasm hope is di- 
 minished, and one great stimulus to prog- 
 ress removed.
 
 IDEALISM AND KXTERIEXCK. 35 
 
 So much for the main features of the 
 philosophies of Idealism and Experience. 
 
 It is the outcome of these rival systems 
 that we have now to investigate ; and their 
 real character may be ascertained quite 
 as much by the consequences to which 
 they have given rise, as by a study of their 
 intellectual structure and relations. 
 
 We have first to note the effect of the 
 prevalence of the spirit of Idealism on Lit- 
 erature, and the contrary effect of the prev- 
 alence of Experientialism or Empiricism. 
 Whenever the philosophy of idealism has 
 been in the ascendant we invariably find a 
 free and forward movement in imaginative 
 Literature. Originality abounds, and new 
 departures are made in many directions. 
 The reason is obvious. Dissatisfaction 
 with past attainment is inseparable from 
 idealism. It is one of the surest symptoms 
 of its presence that what has been already 
 realized or achieved ceases to interest, or 
 at least to attract, for the time ; and one 
 of its immediate results is fresh creative 
 effort, or new literary productiveness. It 
 is emphatically true of it, under all its as- 
 pects, that " forgetting what is behind, it 
 reaches out to what is before." All the
 
 36 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 higher literature, and especially all the lof- 
 tiest poetry of the world, is permeated 
 through and through by this spirit. From 
 its early springtime in the Vedic hymns, 
 its sublime flights in the Hebrew Psalter, 
 its marvelous diffusion in the Greek litera- 
 ture of the age of Pericles, its appearance 
 here and there in the Zendavesta, till it 
 burst upon the world with unparalleled in- 
 tensity at the commencement of the Chris- 
 tian era, we may trace its onward move- 
 ment, coloring all the nobler productions 
 of mediasvalism and of modern Europe. 
 The poetry of Dante, c. g., is idealistic to 
 the core. The spirit of chivalry is one of 
 its effects. It breathes through all the 
 hymns and litanies of Christendom, and is 
 impressed in indelible lines on its archi- 
 tecture, from the stateliest minster to the 
 humblest chapel ; and whenever there has 
 been what is called a ''renaissance," or 
 revival, in literature or in art, it has been 
 clue to the working, and at times to the 
 fermenting activity, of this principle. In 
 Chaucer we find it mingling in strange 
 ways, and giving an indefinable charm to 
 his simple naturalism. Then to what are 
 we to attribute the uniqueness of that cen-
 
 IDEALISM AND EXI'EKIENCK 37 
 
 tral product of our western civilization - 
 whose appearance marks the highest point 
 that has been reached in the literature of 
 the world, (our English Shakespeare,) - 
 but to the new spirit of idealism that 
 blended with his realism more naturally 
 and more completely than in any of his 
 predecessors ; the one tendency giving him 
 his breadth and range, the other his depth 
 and height ; and the two in unison giving 
 him unapproachable strength and unique- 
 ness in literature. The modern German 
 renaissance, under Goethe and Schiller as 
 leaders, but which shows a bright con- 
 stellation of lesser stars around these two, 
 was characterized by an equally pro- 
 found idealism. The literary work of these 
 men allied itself naturally to the philosophy 
 of Plato amongst the ancients, and to that 
 of Jacobi and Fichte amongst their con- 
 temporaries. When we recross the Chan- 
 nel, and examine the modern English po- 
 etry, at the commencement of this century, 
 we find that all the great writers, however 
 diverse the type of their genius, were ani- 
 mated by the same spirit, and developed 
 the same tendencies. We may take a 
 stanza from Shelley's poem To the Skylark
 
 38 ESSAYS 7.V PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 as the metaphorical embodiment of the 
 whole movement : 
 
 Higher still, and higher 
 
 From the earth thou springest, 
 Like a cloud of fire ; 
 
 The blue deep thou wingest. 
 And singing still dost soar, and soaring ever singest. 
 
 If now for the sake of contrast we go 
 back to the period of the Sophists in 
 Greece, those wonderfully clever talkers 
 who preceded Socrates, and taught rhetoric 
 to the people, we find that these men 
 were all experientialists. They worked with 
 a utilitarian aim. They succeeded in de- 
 veloping an admirable prose style ; but 
 there was no poetry amongst the Sophists, 
 and there could be none. Literary effort 
 turned toward the higher problems of hu- 
 man destiny would have been distasteful to 
 them ; that which showed an aspiration 
 after the unattained would have been un- 
 intelligible to them. But when the ideal- 
 istic reaction began, under Socrates and 
 Plato, we find a parallel development in lit- 
 erary art, preeminently in that of Sopho- 
 cles. Similarly in the long Middle Age, 
 when the philosophy of Aristotle was all 
 dominant in the universities and schools
 
 IDEALISM AA'D EX l'El.1 i-'.XCE. 39 
 
 of Europe, scarcely one poetic gleam ir- 
 radiated the intellectual firmament ; but 
 when the literary revival set in, it was the 
 star of Plato that first rose above the hori- 
 zon in the Florentine school, under the 
 rule of the Medici, and the rise of Italian 
 art and poetry was the return of idealism. 
 
 With the sixteenth century came many 
 new lights on old problems ; and the prose 
 literature of the Reformation is full of 
 ideal tendencies. The sixteenth is, how- 
 ever, a difficult century to deal with. 
 When we reach the eighteenth our footing 
 is surer, and the illustrations ready to 
 hand. The eighteenth was, in many re- 
 spects, a monumental century, and it is easy 
 to see how the dominant philosophy af- 
 fected its literature. In France the philos- 
 ophy of the Encyclopaedists was supreme. 
 In the last decade of the previous century, 
 Bayle's Dictionary had been published. 
 In the earlier part of the eighteenth came 
 Voltaire, Condillac, Helvetius ; in the lat- 
 ter half, Diderot, and D'Alembert. The 
 idealism of Descartes, of Malebranche, and 
 the Port Royalists had again given place 
 to a philosophy of experience. It was 
 Aristotle rcdi-civus, with the best part of
 
 4O ESS A YS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Aristotle left out. In England the philos- 
 ophy of Locke, which ushered in the cen- 
 tury, led on to that of Hume, Smith, and 
 Hartley. The prevailing spirit was that 
 of analysis, and logical test ; everything 
 hitherto received being dragged into the 
 light, subjected to cross-examination, and 
 compelled to exhibit its credentials. It 
 was the sophistic era of modern European 
 philosophy the reappearance of the old 
 doctrine of experience on a gigantic na- 
 tional scale. The result on the literature 
 and the art of the period is noteworthy. 
 Compare it with the state of matters in the 
 seventeenth century in France, when the 
 Cartesian idealism was still coloring the lit- 
 erature of that country, and producing such 
 results as Corneille in poetry and Claude 
 Lorraine in art. Of French poetry in the 
 eighteenth century there was none. There 
 was plenty of science, and a good deal of 
 excellent political economy ; but it was a 
 prosaic era, matter-of-fact to the very core, 
 unideal in its art, and as to all imaginative 
 work, poverty-stricken. Voltaire is the 
 typical child of the era and the movement. 
 In Britain David Hume is the central rep- 
 resentative ; and the prevailing strain of
 
 IDEALISM AND EXrKRIENCl.. 41 
 
 English poetry from Addison onwards - 
 through Pope, Young, Dyer, Akenside, 
 Collins, etc. is utterly unidcal. Of course 
 there were compensations. There was a 
 notable development of literary criticism, 
 many brilliant essays, histories, and nov- 
 els ; but just as the Greek Sophists, in a pe- 
 riod of disintegration and analysis, contrib- 
 uted nothing toward the re-statement or 
 re-interpretation of the perennial problems, 
 acquiescing in phenomena, bowing before 
 the omnipotence of events, with no gleam 
 of aspiration, no touch of enthusiasm 
 but most diligent collectors of facts, care- 
 ful students of the real, and attaining to 
 great perfection in the writing of clever 
 prose such were the eighteenth century 
 Encyclopaedists in France and in England. 
 This concentration upon facts limited the 
 significance and the value of the contribu- 
 tions which they made to literature. 
 
 The two tendencies the idealistic and 
 the realistic have a notable illustration 
 in the way in which the histories of na- 
 tions have been written. We have empir- 
 ical historians and ideal historians. We 
 have historians who are merely analysts or 
 recorders, the chroniclers of events ; and
 
 42 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 we have historians who are interpreters, 
 who tell us what events signify, who divine 
 their causes, and appraise their inner 
 meaning, as well as narrate their outcome 
 or their issues. It may be thought that 
 what we mainly need in a book of history 
 is an accurate chronicle, and that what 
 posterity will chiefly require is literal de- 
 tail, rigid matter-of-factness. In the first 
 place, however, the dry record of fact 
 never satisfies the student of history. Life- 
 less statistics are as dull reading as lists 
 of dates, or words in a dictionary. In the 
 second place, we do not escape inaccuracy, 
 or get any nearer to reality, by the help of 
 histories written after that fashion. The 
 historian has to deal not with automata, 
 but with the living characters of a bygone 
 age ; and, as he brings his pieces on the 
 chess-board of his chronicle, he must show 
 them to us living, moving, and struggling, 
 as they once did in the flesh, and not pre- 
 sent us with a mere lifeless epitome of 
 their deeds. The idealist is in a better 
 position for writing a faithful history than 
 the experientialist is, because he is more 
 likely to take account of the interior 
 springs of conduct, and the multitudinous
 
 IDEALISM AND EXTERIENCE. 43 
 
 hidden forces that sway human action. 
 Similarly, we have realist and idealist biog- 
 raphies ; the former giving only the dry 
 bones of fact, a skeleton of events, the 
 latter giving an interpretation of them. 
 
 Turning now to the outcome of the two 
 tendencies (the ideal and the real) in Art, 
 the illustrations are even more evident. 
 Art, in all its sections, deals with the beau- 
 tiful ; but, to the philosophy, or the doc- 
 trine for it cannot be called a philosophy 
 except by courtesy which traces every- 
 thing back to sensation, the beautiful is 
 simply that which pleases us. It has no 
 intrinsic place or significance in objects be- 
 yond us. According to this doctrine there 
 is nothing essentially beautiful, or inher- 
 ently admirable, in the universe. The dif- 
 ference which is an all important one 
 to the opposite philosophy between what 
 happens to be agreeable and what is in 
 itself beautiful is ignored. All standards 
 are relative or accidental. Empiricism in 
 Art virtually says they are all good enough 
 in their way, because they have happened 
 to emerge, but there is nothing inherent 
 in any one of them. Idealism in Art 
 affirms, on the contrary, that there is but
 
 44 SSAVS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 one absolute standard of the beautiful, 
 which all workers in Art endeavor to reach, 
 and realize in various ways, but to which 
 no one ever fully attains. 
 
 If we now examine the effect of the two 
 tendencies on the history of Art, and on 
 the course of its development, we find that 
 the effect of empiricism on the French art 
 of the eighteenth century was precisely 
 similar to its influence on literature. In 
 that dull century there was no art worthy 
 of the name. It was the era and the pe- 
 riod of the illumination, as it was pre- 
 sumptuously called, because there was 
 really no light on ultimate questions, 
 unless the term was adopted on the satiri- 
 cal principle of Incus a non Incendo. When 
 the Encyclopaedists were the dictators of 
 Europe in mental science and in literature, 
 all knowledge being traced back to sensa- 
 tion and represented as its outgrowth, Art 
 became of necessity mechanical and pro- 
 saic. It grew formal and technical, rigid 
 in its conformity to rule and precedent, 
 devoid of originality, deficient even in free- 
 dom. What a descent from the strong 
 men, who, breathing the air of the Carte- 
 sian idealism, had glorified the French art
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE. 45 
 
 of the seventeenth century. The eigh- 
 teenth is, of all modern eras, the one in 
 which empiricism in Art most distinctively 
 flourished. The period in which idealism 
 flourished most was from the fourteenth 
 to the sixteenth century, especially in the 
 great Tuscan school of Italy. Contempo- 
 raneously with its outburst in the poetry 
 of Dante was its early embodiment in 
 the art of Giotto, and Niccola Pisano, and 
 such of their successors as Donatello, Fra 
 Angelico, Lucca de la Robbia, Filippo 
 Lippi, Girlandaio, till we come down to 
 Bellini, in whom the two tendencies the 
 natural and the ideal were united. In 
 Giovanni Bellini we find the most consum- 
 mate perfection of execution combined 
 with rare ideal features ; but when we pass 
 Bellini and the almost equally noticeable 
 Botticelli and Carpaccio, and omitting 
 Raphael come clown to Titian and Tin- 
 toretto, we find that the mere power of 
 technical mastery in dealing with subjects 
 (/. c., the literal and the actual) interfered 
 with the ideal, and almost brushed it aside. 
 It pushed out the imaginative expression 
 of art ; and the result was that, with all 
 their perfection of form, and gorgeousness
 
 46 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of color, there was a certain coarseness in 
 these later Venetian masters. We miss 
 the nobler reserve and refinement of their 
 predecessors. 
 
 Mr. Ruskin has written much, and to 
 profit, on this subject throughout his 
 works ; but he has said nothing better, and 
 nothing so clear, as Browning has done in 
 several of his lyrics, most notably in the 
 poem called Old Pictures in Florence. The 
 theme of this poem is the contrast between 
 Greek art and the art of Christendom. 
 After a fine exordium, the comparison is 
 drawn. 
 
 May I take upon me to instruct you ? 
 When Greek Art ran and reached the goal, 
 
 Thus much had the world to boast in fructu 
 The Truth of Man, as by God first spoken, 
 
 Which the actual generations garble 
 Was re-uttered. 
 
 Then he gives the effect of this Greek art. 
 
 So, you saw yourself as you wished you were, 
 
 As you might have been, as you cannot be ; 
 Earth here, rebuked by Olympus there : 
 
 And grew content in your poor degree, 
 \Vith your little power, by those statues' godhead, 
 
 And your little scope, by their eyes' full sway. 
 And your little grace, by their grace embodied, 
 
 And your little date, by their forms that stay.
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE. 47 
 
 So, testing your weakness by their strength, 
 Your meagre charms by their rounded beauty, 
 
 Measured by Art in your breadth and length, 
 You learned to submit is a mortal's duty. 
 
 And now note, in contrast to this sub- 
 mission before the omnipotence of realized 
 fact, which was the outcome or final les- 
 son of Greek art, the counter truth and 
 the counter tendency. 
 
 (jrowth came when, looking your last on them all. 
 
 You turned your eyes inwardly one fine day, 
 And cried with a start What if we so small 
 
 He greater and grander the while than they ? 
 Are they perfect of lineament, perfect of stature ? 
 
 In both, of such lower types are we 
 Precisely because of our wider nature ; 
 
 For time, theirs ours, for eternity. 
 
 To-day's brief passion limits their range, 
 
 It seethes with the morrow for us and more. 
 They are perfect how else ? they shall never change : 
 
 \Ye are faulty why not ? we have time in store. 
 The Artificer's hand is not arrested 
 
 \Yith us; we are rough-hewn, no-wise polished : 
 They stand for our copy, and, once invested 
 
 \Vith all they can teach, we shall see them abolished. 
 
 It was under the inspiration of this idea 
 that, according to Browning, the early 
 Florentine painters worked ; feeling that 
 they themselves and their contemporaries, 
 with their present aims and coming des-
 
 48 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tiny, were more worthy of representation 
 by art than any of the old forms of the 
 Greek divinities, which expressed but the 
 fleeting fashion of their day ; and so 
 Browning continues : 
 
 On which I conclude, that the early painters, 
 
 To cries of " Greek Art and what more wish you ? " 
 Replied, "To become new self-acquainters. 
 
 And paint man, man, whatever the issue ! 
 Make new hopes shine through the flesh they fray, 
 
 New fears aggrandize the rags and tatters : 
 To bring the invisible full into play ! 
 
 Let the visible go to the dogs what matters ? " 
 
 Give these, I exhort you, their guerdon and glory 
 For daring so much, before they well did it. 
 
 The first of the new, in our race's story 
 
 Beats the last of the old ; 'tis no idle quiddit. 
 
 Perhaps in all literature there is no 
 better or juster explanation of the differ- 
 ence between Greek art and the art 
 of Christendom ; the preeminence of the 
 former consisting in its finished though 
 limited perfection its aim to find within 
 the finite the end or goal of endeavor ; 
 and the higher merit, the preeminence of 
 the latter, consisting in its dissatisfaction 
 with the most perfect expression of the 
 finite, and its effort to rise thence toward 
 the Infinite.
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE. 49 
 
 There is more, however, to be said on the 
 contrast between these two tendencies in 
 Art between Literality, with imitation 
 as its end and aim, and Ideality, with sug- 
 gestion as its end and aim. 
 
 Empiricism is, of course, always magni- 
 fying experience, at the expense of other 
 tendencies. Well ! let us go to experience, 
 that we may test empiricism in Art. In 
 entering any of the modern galleries, it 
 does not require one to have mastered 
 Plato's Philosophy of the Beautiful to be 
 able to tell at once what pictures are in- 
 spired by idealism, and what are not, 
 whether they be landscape or figure paint- 
 ings. In landscape, the most perfect pic- 
 ture is not one which is a mere imitation 
 of nature, a semi-photographic reproduc- 
 tion of it. It is rather one which gives us 
 a divination of its meaning, a disclosure 
 of its latent soul. Such pictures as those 
 of Turner by far the greatest landscape 
 artist that ever lived pictures in which 
 Nature is glorified by the "light that never 
 was on sea or land," these are the outcome 
 of idealism, or idealistic vision in Art. 
 Similarly in portraiture the most perfect 
 triumph is not an exact reproduction of
 
 5O ESS A YS 7/V PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the outward appearance of the human face 
 or figure. It is not even a transcript of 
 one particular mood, but it is the blending 
 of many different moods into a likeness, 
 in which expression is all dominant, and 
 which combines in a unity what the per- 
 son thus represented has formerly revealed 
 on many different occasions, and which is 
 therefore a truer interpretation of charac- 
 ter behind the mask of physiognomy than 
 the most perfect photograph could be. 
 
 Suppose that we had, in any art gallery, 
 such a transcript of reality that, as in the 
 Greek story, the very birds of the air were 
 deceived, and came to pick the fruit from 
 the canvas, or a painted curtain was mis- 
 taken for a real one, would it satisfy any 
 one as a high triumph of Art ? It might 
 satisfy a photographer, but it would not 
 even please a trained artistic eye. One 
 who has found out the secret of the beau- 
 tiful wishes no such deceptive mimicry. 
 If Art were the mere imitation of Nature, 
 many would discard it, and prefer the 
 thing it imitated, viz., Nature itself. The 
 truth is that the best art always leads 
 from Nature to a Reality beyond it, and 
 the ideal artist tries to embody on canvas
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE. 5 I 
 
 what has never been disclosed to the sense 
 of sight. 
 
 " Imitate Nature," say the Realists ; " re- 
 produce what is before your eyes, and you 
 can't go wrong." Now, even if this were 
 the true artistic rule, which it is not, 
 the question would remain, What is Na- 
 ture ? and that is a point by no means so 
 easily determined as may appear upon the 
 surface. There are as many different and 
 conflicting theories of Nature as there are 
 of Life. If Nature be not dead inanimate 
 substance, but a living force beneath ma- 
 terial forms, a creative source of energy 
 endlessly changing, and everlastingly re- 
 newing itself, the reproduction or repre- 
 sentation of this by Art will be something 
 very different from the photograph of a 
 single passing phase which it may have 
 chanced to assume. Here it is that we 
 discern the power and the perennial 
 charm of the landscape art of Turner. He 
 never reproduced a single passing phase 
 of Nature ; but, by that marvelous second- 
 sight of his, by the " power of a peculiar 
 eye," he blended into one many separate 
 and fugitive impressions, and brought them 
 to a luminous focus. He fused them to-
 
 52 ASSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 gather, not artificially but naturally, so 
 that the result was no fanciful invention, 
 which would have been a travesty of 
 Nature, but a divination of her inmost 
 spirit, disclosed to him through a multi- 
 tude of her forms. " Turner took liberties 
 with Nature," say some of his realistic 
 critics, who have no inward eye like his. 
 He did nothing of the kind. He only took 
 this liberty with each passing mood of Na- 
 ture, that he thrust it aside, if it interfered 
 with others which were quite as real and 
 worthy of representation ; and he combined 
 the many in the one, as no painter had 
 ever done before him, making the fugitive 
 permanent by the idealization of his art. 
 Every one knows that the face of Nature 
 is often commonplace. Dull skies, or 
 hard gray weather, a monotony of cloud, 
 or continual mist ; these things no artist 
 would select for reproduction on canvas. 
 But the idealist does not merely select the 
 more beautiful forms, and combine them 
 into a fresh product. He goes beneath 
 them all. While Nature is forever chang- 
 ing, is in incessant ebb and flow, he di- 
 vines its underlying essence ; and, knowing 
 by intuition how the spirit of the beauti-
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPEKIEXCE. 53 
 
 ful clothes itself in the vesture of form, 
 he does not care whether he has seen what 
 he actually portrays literally unfolded be- 
 fore the eye of sense. He has seen it 
 floating in more glorious vision before the 
 eye of the spirit, and he knows it to be 
 truer than any photograph or the instan- 
 taneous reproduction of a passing mood 
 of Nature could possibly be. 
 
 We must also remember that in physical 
 Nature imperfection mingles with every 
 fragment of the beautiful that exists. 
 Beauty is often hid behind the ugly, and 
 within the commonplace ; and Art pursues 
 the beauty, marred and mutilated as it 
 constantly is by deformity. As Tennyson 
 puts it, 
 
 That type of perfect in the mind 
 In Nature we can nowhere find. 
 
 But all Art is a sort of bridge flung across 
 the chasm which separates the actual from 
 the ideal, the real from the transcendent. 
 
 We have noted the relation in which the 
 art of Christendom stands to the prece- 
 dent art of Hellenism ; but it is to be ob- 
 served that the latter had its ideal as well 
 as the former, and drew all its inspiration 
 from it. Greece was emphatically the land
 
 54 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the ideal, and the Hellenic civilization 
 embodied it in a multitude of ways to the 
 ancient world. Take Greek sculpture, for 
 example. To what do we owe the majesty 
 and the radiance of the gods of Greece ? 
 In part, perhaps, to the free and joyous 
 energy of the Hellenic people ; but far 
 more to that conception of Nature which 
 was current in the noblest period of their 
 history ; and to the idea that the outward 
 form was, at its best, an embodiment of 
 something higher than itself. If we had 
 the finest sculptures of the age of Pericles 
 before us, we could not find their secret, 
 until we passed beyond the form to the 
 thought underlying it, to the soul within 
 the substance of the marble, the immate- 
 rial hinted at and expressed by the material. 
 The art of Phidias was an appeal from sense 
 to soul, from the outward to the inward. 
 
 The Greek artists were not copyists of 
 the actual. Their imagination was too in- 
 tense and varied in its energy, to permit 
 of their being satisfied with any single em- 
 bodiment of beauty, however perfect ; and 
 their art may be said to have been a histor- 
 ical protest against realism, and the mere 
 imitation either of Nature or of man. The
 
 IDEALISM AND EXri-.RIEXCE. 55 
 
 copyist sees only one of the fugitive phases 
 of the thing he copies. Both Nature and 
 man, however, assume new aspects every 
 instant. They do not tarry to be repro- 
 duced as they are, at any given moment 
 of time. Thus the evanescence of each 
 sample of the beautiful disclosed to the 
 senses and the fragmentariness of the 
 whole series sends us in quest of a beauty 
 that is one and not manifold, that is con- 
 stant and not changing. We pursue the 
 infinitely beautiful through all the illusions 
 of finite beauty, and our dissatisfaction 
 with each embodiment of it urges us on- 
 ward in pursuit of that ideal, of which 
 Plato in the Symposium sings the praise. 
 Those finite and detached specimens of 
 beauty which we find in Poetry, Paint- 
 ing, Music, and Architecture respectively, 
 are at times distracting, from their very 
 multiplicity, their immense variety, and 
 still more from their changefulness. \Ve 
 therefore go in search of some key which 
 will explain each, by unfolding its relation 
 to the rest, and to the unity which under- 
 lies them all. Without this key, the ex- 
 perience of fresh beauty might even induce 
 a sense of weariness ; but with it, each
 
 56 ESSAYS IN PHILOSO1HY. 
 
 successive instance which illustrates the 
 unity in the light of the variety has the 
 charm of novelty. The reason is obvious. 
 It is because the key, or the explanation 
 of the new experience, does not come out 
 of an old one, but from that which tran- 
 scends new and old alike ; while it is the 
 conviction that the highest beauty is un- 
 representable by Art, or inexpressible by 
 means of it, that gives its chief interest 
 to all the approximations which shadow it 
 forth. 
 
 In connection with this we may note 
 that Raphael who was not so idealistic 
 as his predecessors tells us that "as he 
 could not find perfect beauty in the actual, 
 he made use of an ideal which he formed 
 for himself;" although I would rather say 
 which he found within himself, and which 
 nothing appealing to the eye or to the ear 
 could possibly disclose to him. 
 
 The mention of the ear, as another chan- 
 nel through which the beautiful reveals 
 itself, leads to the consideration of Music 
 or Musical Art. 
 
 The distinction between the ideal and 
 the actual is quite as apparent in Music as 
 it is in anv of the sister arts ; and our
 
 IDEALISM AND EXI'EKIENCl:. 57 
 
 modern music has opened up a new chan- 
 nel of approach to the ideal which is pecu- 
 liarly and distinctively its own. Through 
 this medium we can, more easily than 
 through any other, escape from the thral- 
 dom of sense, and enter the wonderland of 
 ideality. Music requires no phenomenal 
 medium like canvas and oils, or marble, or 
 stone, or wood, by which to embody its 
 ideal ; and hence the great musicians are 
 less copyists of one another than other 
 artists are, and therefore perhaps they get 
 closer to reality. 
 
 If we compare the majestic creations of 
 John Sebastian Bach, the Shakespearean 
 wealth of inspiration to which Beethoven 
 attained, the height to which Handel and 
 Mozart carry us in their oratorios and 
 masses, the ethereal grace of Schumann, 
 the majesty of Wagner, and the depth of 
 Brahms, with the modern Italian opera, 
 the same distinction which we have traced 
 in pictorial art will be apparent. It is 
 worthy of note, in passing, that while it 
 is to Italy that we are mainly indebted for 
 idealism in painting, it is to Germany that 
 we owe idealism in music, as well as in 
 philosophy. It is true that in music we
 
 58 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 have not the same sharp lines of contrast 
 drawn between the two schools or tenden- 
 cies, such as we have in philosophy, po- 
 etry, and painting. It is also true that in 
 many a symphony, as in many an oratorio, 
 there is much of both tendencies. The 
 reason perhaps is that music, being an ex- 
 tremely delicate and subtle medium for 
 the expression of emotion, we have of ne- 
 cessity mixed effects in almost every great 
 creation. In a sonata, as in a lyric song, 
 we may in one part (as in one stanza) be 
 in the highest regions of ideality ; and, 
 in another, we may descend, if not to the 
 materialistic level, at least to the terres- 
 trial side of things. One has only to re- 
 call the effect produced by some oratorios 
 (or single choruses in an oratorio), by 
 many a mass, and many a sonata, the 
 sense not of freedom only, but of aspira- 
 tion and flight, of escape from the dull pro- 
 saic flats of existence to a more ethereal 
 region, and compare it with the effect 
 produced by common dance-music, or by 
 such a song as "Willie brewed a peck o' 
 maut " ! I say nothing against the dance- 
 music or the song. They have their place, 
 their function, and their charm. It is only 
 necessary to bring out the contrast.
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE. 59 
 
 The great composers have doubtless fol- 
 lowed the scientific laws of Art in writing 
 their most ideal pieces ; but, in proportion 
 to their originality, they have broken 
 through the trammels of precedent. They 
 have risen above bondage to the actual, 
 and breathed into the otherwise dry bones 
 of musical structure the breath of their 
 own life. There is a story told of Bee- 
 thoven that when some one said to him 
 that a particular passage in one of his com- 
 positions was incorrect, and could not be 
 allowed by the laws of musical composi- 
 tion, he replied, " Then / allow it ; let that 
 be its justification." Here we see the cre- 
 ative artist, the idealist, breaking away 
 from the slavery of use and wont, and tak- 
 ing a new departure by the originality of 
 his insight. 
 
 Speaking of his symphonies, Beethoven 
 said, " I feel that there is an eternal and 
 infinite to be attained. Music ushers man 
 into the portal of an intellectual world, 
 ready always to encompass him, but which 
 he may never encompass." In this sen- 
 tence we see Beethoven's recognition of 
 the vastness of the Ideal encircling, and 
 enveloping, and pressing upon him contin-
 
 60 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ually. It suggests the lines in the Ranolf 
 and AmoJiia of Alfred Domett, referring 
 to Browning's Sordello, - 
 
 The vast ideal's glare, 
 Blasting the real, to its own dumb despair. 
 
 No one who has any music in his own 
 soul can fail to be aware of the fact that 
 there are some composers who not only 
 open for us a door, as it were, into the 
 " house called beautiful," but who compel 
 us to go in with them ; and who, when we 
 have entered, discourse to us in such a 
 way that the sense both of discord and il- 
 lusion vanishes for the time, in the revela- 
 tion of a transcendent harmony ; who help 
 us to escape from the glamour of mere 
 appearance, the wearisome reiterations of 
 the actual, and who take us closer to exist- 
 ence, to the "last clear elements of things," 
 than when we are in familiar contact with 
 the phenomena of sense. Listen to the 
 Waldstein sonata, or to Beethoven's sym- 
 phony in C minor, or to the second of his 
 sonatas dedicated to Hadyn, and you feel 
 that a power is at work, carrying you out 
 of the realm of sensation into that of 
 thought, to a Rock that is higher than 
 you, and disclosing your relations to the
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE. 6 1 
 
 Infinite. You find your nature expanded, 
 and your consciousness, at one and the 
 same time, freed and deepened. Similarly, 
 there are other composers who keep us 
 enchained to the actual, and never allow 
 us to outsoar it, in any idealization of the 
 real. The former class are all inspired 
 whether they know it, or are ignorant of 
 it by the spirit of Plato; the latter are 
 consciously, or unconsciously the dis- 
 ciples of Aristotle. 
 
 There are nearly as many different 
 schools of music as there are of poetry ; 
 the two extremes being, on the one side, 
 the surface brilliancy which we have in the 
 larger part of the Italian opera, and on the 
 other the "great German ocean" (as it 
 has been aptly called) of the symphony 
 and the sonata, of the mass and the orato- 
 rio, in which we have height and depth 
 combined, strength, pathos, tenderness, 
 and endless suggestiveness. 
 
 We now come to the influence of the 
 two rival tendencies on individual and 
 national character. In this connection I 
 must note not only the bearing of the 
 opposite philosophies on the individual, 
 but also the conception of the individual
 
 62 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to which they respectively give rise. Ac- 
 cording to the one, every human being has 
 a separate value, an individual worth ; and 
 with each endless possibilities are upbound. 
 According to the other, each is like a wave 
 of the sea, which arises on the surface and 
 falls again ; that is tc say, he is an acci- 
 dental element in existence, fraught with 
 no special significance, and destined to 
 none. The social and political outcome 
 of this doctrine will be apparent. A utili- 
 tarian doctrine of morals is almost invari- 
 ably associated with, a sensational theory 
 of the origin of knowledge. If all our 
 knowledge comes from sense, and may on 
 the last analysis be traced back to it, then 
 all our actions must spring from motives 
 of self-interest and aggrandizement. On 
 this theory, the rules of action which hap- 
 pen to sway the individual have no sanc- 
 tion higher than experience, inherited 
 through ages and generations. Universal 
 custom, or the developed tendencies of the 
 race, constitute his rule of action. 
 
 The idealist does not underrate the force 
 or the significance of such a rule. It has a 
 most venerable ancestry, and indisputable 
 secular authority. As it brings with it the
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE. 63 
 
 prestige of all past experience, its claim 
 to be listened to is great. But then the 
 opposite philosophy of idealism leads the 
 individual to recognize a law of conduct, 
 at once "in him, yet not of him," to find 
 himself under no mere custom, which has 
 happened to emerge in the struggle for 
 existence, but an absolute rule of right, 
 which has been evolved within the race, 
 but is superior to it, and is therefore not 
 derived from it. 
 
 Here, as formerly, our concern is not 
 with the evidence on which these rival 
 philosophies of ethics repose, or by which 
 they have been respectively championed. 
 It is with the outcome or effect of each 
 respectively on character. The prevalence 
 of the one or the other of them at a partic- 
 ular time has been largely due to tempera- 
 mental causes, and there are many advan- 
 tages and many disadvantages associated 
 with each. These ought to be impartially 
 recognized. The effect of idealism is un- 
 questionably to elevate the character that 
 is pervaded by it. Sometimes, it is true, 
 its presence makes one visionary, or quix- 
 otic. It has been even known to make its 
 votary indifferent to that side of life which
 
 64 ESS A YS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 connects us with the world as it is. The 
 unsatisfactory side of every-day experience 
 pressing forcibly upon him, he takes ref- 
 uge in Utopias, in order that he may es- 
 cape from the illusions of the actual. Con- 
 sequently the idealist often misses much 
 of the satisfaction which he might derive 
 and which others derive from the 
 world as it is. 
 
 On the other hand, no dispassionate stu- 
 dent of history, and of historical biography, 
 can fail to see that whenever the empirical 
 philosophy has been in the ascendant, the 
 character of the nation, or of the period, 
 has become prosaic and commonplace. It 
 may have been extremely shrewd, in the 
 midst of its commonplace all the more 
 shrewd, vivacious, and sparkling, perhaps, 
 from the absence of ideality (as in the 
 period of the French enlightenment in the 
 eighteenth century) ; but as it gradually 
 sinks to the matter-of-fact level, it at the 
 same time degenerates to the common- 
 place. 
 
 The two tendencies may be compared 
 as follows. We have, on the one hand, 
 contentedncss with the actual, acquies- 
 cence in its limits, an abject deference to
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE. 6$ 
 
 facts, without any attempt to rise above 
 them. We have, on the other hand, a cer- 
 tain amount of restlessness, but with the 
 restlessness, aspiration ; an effort to sur- 
 mount hindrance, and to rise, on what have 
 well been named " the stepping-stones of 
 our dead selves," to higher things. The 
 effect of the pursuit of ideals on personal 
 character is unquestionably great. These 
 ideals are often cast down by experience, 
 but they are not therefore destroyed. Al- 
 though many of them can never be 
 wrought out or realized, and many of them 
 are destined to change, it does not fol- 
 low that any one of them has been useless. 
 The very destiny of each ideal that is cher- 
 ished is to give place to another, still loft- 
 ier ; and this is accomplished without jeal- 
 ousy, and without regret. A life contented 
 with this, which pursues the even tenor of 
 its way with no ideality or aspiration, is 
 apt to be at once jealous of rivals,. and sus- 
 picious of change. By the pursuit of his 
 ideals, however, and by exchanging one 
 for another successively, the idealist gets 
 nearer to reality than the experientialist 
 does, by keeping to the prosaic facts which 
 obtrude upon the senses. He has a wider
 
 66 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 range of vision, a more comprehensive 
 outlook ; and his very dissatisfaction with 
 the actual becomes to him the happiest 
 augury that he can outstep his past attain- 
 ments, and transcend his former experi- 
 ence. In comparing the characters of the 
 representative men who respectively illus- 
 trate these two streams of tendency, one 
 may see the self-complacency and satisfac- 
 tion of the experientialist, his contented- 
 ness with facts and laws. On the other 
 hand, the dissatisfaction of the idealist, his 
 sense of the poverty of experience, is ap- 
 parent ; but associated with this there is a 
 stimulus to fresh endeavor, which lifts him 
 out of the ruts of commonplace, and gives 
 him wing. 
 
 How the two tendencies operate respec- 
 tively on society at large is also instruc- 
 tive. When even the experience philoso- 
 phy is in the ascendant, the liberty of the 
 individual is more or less imperiled. One 
 of the corollaries of that philosophy being 
 that "might is right," the freedom of the 
 units in the body corporate is lessened, 
 when it gains the ascendancy. If individ- 
 uals and races are regarded merely as 
 waves that rise out of the sea of existence,
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE. 6/ 
 
 and fall back to it again, the natural con- 
 clusion will be that the units composing 
 the mass may be utilized for the common 
 weal. They may be regarded, for example, 
 as good fighting material, good for forming 
 battalions, and may be dealt with accord- 
 ingly in the rough, should any one arise 
 with force of character requisite to seize 
 and sway them for an ulterior end. In 
 fact, the Rob Roy rule of action, 
 
 That they should take who have the power 
 And they should keep who can, 
 
 is the direct outcome of the one doc- 
 trine ; while a regard for the rights of the 
 individual and especially of the weak 
 and the defenseless is upbound with 
 the other. Tyranny may not be always 
 practiced when the former philosophy is 
 dominant, but it is always possible. It 
 may be the despotism of one (as in an 
 oligarchy), or it may be the hydra-headed 
 despotism of the many (as in some re- 
 publics) ; but in either case, and in any 
 case, the natural outcome of the philoso- 
 phy, if it stands alone, is a style of action 
 that disposes of the individual too easily. 
 So much is this the case that any well-- 
 instructed person could infer, from the
 
 68 ESS4YS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 character of the prevailing philosophy, what 
 social and political results would probably 
 emerge in the nation or the period. 
 
 So much for the contrast of the two 
 tendencies, and their outcome in Litera- 
 ture, Art, and Life. It is to be noted, how- 
 ever, that as tendencies of human nature, 
 they are permanent and ineradicable. One 
 of the two may work itself out, in the 
 course of a generation, and then cease to 
 be as prominent or influential as it was ; 
 but it only retires to assume new features, 
 and to achieve new triumphs when it reap- 
 pears. The doctrine of the transmutation 
 of force, and the permanence of energy 
 may here be applied without any abate- 
 ment or scruple. 
 
 It is also to be observed that each of 
 the two tendencies is essential to the 
 other. Though often opposed, often in 
 violent hostility, they are inseparable, and 
 necessary each to each. It follows that 
 neither of them can ever be all dominant 
 in the world, so as to exclude or extin- 
 guish the other, as their partisans desire. 
 This is just as obvious as is the distinction 
 between them. The absolute supremacy 
 of either is a Utopian dream. Humanity
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPEDIENCE. 69 
 
 has never left itself, so to speak, without a 
 witness of the presence of both ; and al- 
 though the speech of one of them has been 
 sometimes like "a voice crying in the wil- 
 derness " of misunderstanding or reproach, 
 in the next generation it has received the 
 hosannas of the multitude. 
 
 A sensational theory of the origin of 
 knowledge, a utilitarian doctrine of morals, 
 a conventional standard of the beautiful, 
 a theory of society which disposes of the 
 individual as a mere unit in the mass, all 
 these have their use to the idealist in re- 
 minding him of his connection with mother 
 earth, in preventing him from becoming a 
 mere visionary, and pursuing quixotic en- 
 terprises and impracticable schemes. But, 
 on the other hand, to the disciple of expe- 
 rience, who is continually reminding him- 
 self and others of his relation to the things 
 of sense, the opposite philosophy is indis- 
 pensable ; that is to say, if he is to escape, 
 not only from the partisanship of a sect, 
 but from the thraldom of a theory. It 
 not only opens up to him novel points of 
 view, in endless series, and indefinite sug- 
 gestiveness ; but it supplies him with fresh 
 inspiration and stimulus, and with a moral
 
 70 ESSAYS J.V PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tonic of the greatest value. It counteracts 
 the tendency to succumb before the appar- 
 ent drift of circumstances, and to fall into 
 that nil admirari mood, which is so fatal 
 to character in an age of cynicism. 
 
 It is true that we are all born either 
 Platonists or Aristotelians, that is to say, 
 either idealists or empiricists ; and the 
 bias toward one or the other works on in 
 the blood of the race, and is ineradicable 
 by culture, or by any other influence. It 
 would be the reverse of an advantage if 
 the elimination of either were possible. If 
 it would be the dullest and most disagree- 
 able world to live in if we all agreed with 
 each other on every conceivable point, it 
 would be the most monotonous world im- 
 aginable if our sympathies ran always on 
 parallel lines, and the most unprogressive 
 world if our tendencies all met at a com- 
 mon focus. The great desideratum is the 
 frank admission by every one of the value 
 of other lines of thought and sympathy 
 and action, while he pursues his own ; the 
 recognition, not only of their importance 
 to those who follow them, but of their use 
 to the world at large ; so that whether 
 we were born Platonists or Aristotelians,
 
 IDEALISM AND EXPERIENCE. "J I 
 
 whether we are now idealists or experien- 
 tialists we may attain to the catholicity 
 and the tolerance that " shun the falsehood 
 of extremes."
 
 THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE 
 SCIENCES. 
 
 IT is more important to ascertain the 
 true Principles of Classification than ac- 
 tually to classify the Sciences, for two rea- 
 sons : first, because the schemes which 
 exist are so numerous, almost every phi- 
 losopher of note having tried to solve the 
 problem ; secondly, because each attempt, 
 being a product of the state of knowledge 
 existing at the time, must share in the 
 imperfection, as well as reflect the light of 
 the period. 
 
 It has been said that it is of slight con- 
 sequence how we arrange our knowledge, 
 provided we do actually know what we 
 think we know ; and further, that we 
 should rest contented with the isolated 
 fragments we can gather together, if we 
 are careful to sift and to verify them. It 
 is obvious, however, that we cannot know 
 any one thing accurately until we know it 
 in its relation to others ; and also unless
 
 CLASSIFICATION Ol- THE SCIENCES. 73 
 
 our knowledge converges to a focus, and 
 becomes symmetrical. The relations and 
 co-relations of the several sciences compel 
 us to bring them together, while we group 
 or arrange them in some sort of order ; 
 and there is no science which does not 
 either overlap, or intersect, or borrow from 
 another. Each has its frontier, or intel- 
 lectual margin, which is the property of 
 several ; and territorial disputes as to this 
 common ground are frequent. While the 
 provinces of many are not as yet accu- 
 rately defined, the circle of the whole is 
 continually widening. They have thus the 
 very subtlest inter-relations. 
 
 The problem before us is how to arrange 
 the sections of knowledge so that they fall 
 into departmental groups, each of which 
 is affiliated to its neighbor by a natural, 
 and not by an artificial tie in other 
 words, by some organic principle. In ad- 
 dition to this, the whole series should be 
 so arranged that if we were to start from 
 any one of its remotest subsections, we 
 should be able to work our way back with 
 ease from class to class, under the guid- 
 ance of a principle which at once com- 
 prehends the whole and unites the parts.
 
 74 ESSAYS /A r PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It might be thought that, in order to 
 succeed in this, one must be acquainted 
 with the details of all the sciences. This, 
 of course, is absolutely impossible ; but 
 the root principle of each science may be 
 understood by those who know very little 
 beyond it. The generic idea involved in 
 a particular body of knowledge may be 
 clearly grasped, while only a few of the 
 details which illustrate it are known ; and 
 it does not follow that a minute and care- 
 ful study of detail would make the funda- 
 mental notion of any science clearer to 
 the mind. In some respects the specialist 
 who has mastered a whole realm of know- 
 ledge perhaps created it is less fitted 
 than other men to determine its place in 
 the hierarchy of the sciences. In propor- 
 tion to the originality and value of his dis- 
 coveries is the likelihood that he will ex- 
 aggerate their importance. As a matter 
 of fact, it is not by our most distinguished 
 specialists that the best classifications of 
 knowledge have been made. Looking 
 upon their own province as paramount, 
 they have sometimes adopted an arbitrary 
 arrangement of the rest, as if they were 
 satellites revolving around a central sun.
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 75 
 
 It is rather by those who have the catho- 
 licity which even a slight acquaintance 
 with many sciences gives that the best 
 classifications have been made. 
 
 Moreover, not only is a specialist likely 
 to begin the work of classification with a 
 bias, but he cannot define his own province 
 until he transcends it. No science can be 
 allowed to settle its own boundaries, as no 
 nation could be safely trusted to determine 
 its own frontier. The provinces on the 
 map of human knowledge must be ar- 
 ranged by mutual adjustment and debate, 
 at times by conflict and the arbitrament of 
 war. The intellectual world, for example, 
 would not allow a logician to fix the prov- 
 ince of Logic, if he was no more than a 
 logician ; or a Biologist to say how much 
 his province should include, if he knew 
 nothing beyond it. 
 
 The sciences themselves are constantly 
 changing. Some are enlarging, others 
 contracting and disappearing. In their 
 mutual relations they are never stationary 
 for an instant of time, because every dis- 
 covery leads on to another, if it does not 
 involve it ; and, if the existing bodies of 
 knowledge are alwavs changing, a rear-
 
 76 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 rangement of the whole, sooner or later, 
 becomes inevitable. Some sciences, once 
 honored, are now like wrought-out mines 
 an exhausted intellectual field. A dis- 
 trict, supposed for centuries to be an inde- 
 pendent territory, is afterwards regarded 
 as a subordinate province belonging nat- 
 urally, and of right, to another science. 
 
 It is obvious that no classification can 
 be final, simply because we cannot antici- 
 pate the future ; but the greater provinces 
 on the map of knowledge have been little 
 altered since that map was first con- 
 structed by the genius of Aristotle. They 
 have been like the four great Continents, 
 which are marked off from one another by 
 characteristic physical features, and their 
 populations distinguished by broad racial 
 differences. These do not alter. The 
 smaller districts, on the other hand in 
 which the differences are merely local or 
 tribal are always changing. 
 
 There are, however, no provinces in 
 Nature which exactly correspond with the 
 diagrams we construct. These diagrams 
 are merely our reading of the text which 
 Nature presents to the human faculties 
 for interpretation, a subjective render-
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES, fj 
 
 ing of objective fact. Just as with our psy- 
 chological schemes, there are no divisions 
 in human nature itself. What we call 
 "perception," "memory," "imagination," 
 "reason," etc., are not compartments of 
 mind, but the varying activities of a single 
 principle, the unity of which is implied in 
 the very variety of its powers. Similarly, 
 our arrangements of the sciences are all 
 artificial, in the sense that they are the 
 interpretation we put upon that which 
 exists, either within us or beyond us. It 
 must further be remembered that, as every 
 object in Nature affords material for sev- 
 eral of the sciences, and can be dealt with 
 so as to yield the conclusions of several, 
 there must of necessity be not only an 
 overlapping of the provinces of knowledge, 
 but also a blending of its problems in ex- 
 perience. 
 
 That many artificial and arbitrary 
 schemes of classification have been offered 
 is not to be wondered at. A priori theo- 
 rists have tried to arrange a programme 
 of all possible knowledge drawing out a 
 chart which would remodel Nature. They 
 have presumed to tell us how the sciences 
 ought to develop themselves, or how they
 
 78 ESS A YS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 should have arisen historically. The sci- 
 ences have not arisen, however, in the or- 
 der of logical sequence, or of their theo- 
 retic distinction from one another. They 
 have sprung up in the most heterogeneous 
 manner, and have been developed in the 
 most casual fashion, as province after prov- 
 ince has been explored. A chart of the 
 sciences, constructed according to the 
 time of their historical appearance, would 
 be interesting and extremely useful ; more 
 especially if at the same time it traced out 
 the often complex causes that have given 
 rise to them. Were such a chart drawn 
 out, however, it would be found to be to- 
 tally unlike the philosophical classification 
 of which we are in search. The order of 
 time and the order of nature are very 
 different. 
 
 An opposite opinion was advanced by 
 Comte. He affirmed that the organic or 
 structural arrangement of knowledge fol- 
 lowed the line of its historical evolution. 
 If this were the case, our chief if not our 
 sole guide to the classification of the sci- 
 ences would be the history of the human 
 mind, and of its efforts to understand the 
 universe. The theory or Comte is untrue
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIILNCKS. 79 
 
 to fact. Looking to the history of the rise 
 of the sciences, we find that the move- 
 ments have not been always linear, so to 
 speak ; the most progressive ones have 
 been sometimes circular. Sciences last in 
 the order of nature have been first in the 
 order of time ; and, what is equally note- 
 worthy, many causes intellectual, social, 
 and political combined have determined 
 their origin. Some have sprung out of the 
 dark, as it were, into light, at particular 
 times, and in unexpected places. Contra- 
 riwise, when one would expect a discov- 
 ery to have been made, because it fol- 
 lowed logically from a truth already known, 
 it was not made. The door remained 
 shut in that direction, and a considerable 
 time elapsed before it was opened. 
 
 In the further discussion of this ques- 
 tion much will depend upon the definitions 
 with which we start ; and almost every- 
 thing turns on the meaning we attach to 
 Science itself. As the term is sometimes 
 used with the utmost vagueness, and the 
 result is mere confusion, we must distin- 
 guish Science, on the one hand, from the 
 inferior knowledge which it supersedes ; 
 and, on the other hand, from the higher
 
 8O ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 knowledge which transcends it. We must 
 separate the Sciences, both from miscel- 
 laneous information and from Philosophy, 
 as well as from Art. Some people talk of 
 the " philosophical sciences " a phrase 
 that is quite as misleading as its opposite, 
 the " scientific philosophies." Others speak 
 of the " practical sciences " a phrase 
 just as satisfactory as it would be to talk 
 of "scientific practice." It is true that 
 these phrases are not misleading if they 
 are taken figuratively, and if we keep in 
 mind that we are making use of symbols. 
 At the same time it is absolutely necessary 
 to remember that knowledge is wider than 
 science, and includes much more than sci- 
 ence within it. Scientific knowledge is 
 a knowledge of phenomena, or groups of 
 phenomena, belonging to provinces marked 
 off from one another by distinct intellec- 
 tual boundaries, and all reduced to law ; 
 and our knowledge becomes scientific as 
 soon as we find out the law of the occur- 
 rence of phenomena, so as to explain their 
 recurrence. 
 
 What follows from this is significant. 
 It is outside the province of science to in- 
 vestigate the nature of substance. That
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 8 I 
 
 is the province of Philosophy ; and when 
 we raise the question of the ultimate es- 
 sence of all things, it is a problem of phil- 
 osophical theology. Theology is not a 
 science. If theology were a science, God 
 would be a phenomenon. There is a sci- 
 ence of Religion, because the phenomena 
 of the human mind, in its effort to appre- 
 hend that which lies beyond Nature, can 
 be classified, and so far explained ; but 
 there can be no science of the Infinite. 
 It is true that we might scientifically ex- 
 plain the results of any manifestation of 
 the Infinite, in Nature or in History ; and 
 therefore, to that extent, we might have a 
 science of theology ; but we cannot place 
 it within the circle of those sciences which 
 have for their object-matter the phenomena 
 of the universe. 
 
 The distinction between Philosophy and 
 Science is ultimate and radical. The aim 
 of Science is the increase of knowledge, 
 by the discovery of laws, within v;hich all 
 phenomena may be embraced, and by 
 means of which they may be explained. 
 The aim of Philosophy, on the other hand, 
 is to c.vp/ain tJie sciences, by at once includ- 
 ing and transcending them. It does not,
 
 82 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 on the one hand, merely prepare the way 
 for science ; nor, on the other, is its func- 
 tion a simply administrative one ; viz., to 
 arrange the provinces of knowledge. Its 
 office is to take up ihe problem after it 
 has been laid down by science, and to 
 carry it further. Its sphere is that of Sub- 
 stance and Essence. It is a search for 
 the Ding-an-sich, the causa causans, within 
 the realm of the Infinite and the Absolute, 
 the discovery and interpretation of which 
 give it a title to rank if we may speak 
 in a figure as the scientia scientiamm. 
 In so far as any science deals with this 
 question of substance, it is occupying it- 
 self with the problem of philosophy under 
 an altered name. As compared with all 
 scientific questions, that problem varies 
 not. It has been the quest of the ages to 
 apprehend the Reality that underlies ap- 
 pearance, to unfold its characteristics, and 
 to explain its relation to the phenomenal 
 world, in which it is shadowed forth by 
 type and symbol. 
 
 While this remains, through all the 
 changes of the schools, the perennial ques- 
 tion of Philosophy, it is approached from 
 so many sides, and in such different ways,
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 83 
 
 that a variable clement is introduced along- 
 side of the permanent one. This may ex- 
 plain why no philosophical theory lasts, 
 why all are superannuated soon after they 
 take shape in propositions or formulas, 
 though each reappears again in slightly 
 altered form. 
 
 The attempts made to classify the sci- 
 ences may be counted, not by the score, 
 but by the hundred and the thousand. Al- 
 most every philosopher has tried to solve 
 the problem. 
 
 In ancient times the classifications of 
 Plato and of Aristotle were the most mem- 
 orable. Aristotle whose philosophy was 
 of the most encyclopaedic character sur- 
 veyed the entire domain of human know- 
 ledge, and himself created several sciences 
 by his extraordinary architectonic faculty. 
 He wrote or dictated books on Logic, 
 on Metaphysics, on Morals, on Politics, on 
 Rhetoric, on Natural History, on Zoology 
 and Comparative Anatomy, on Physics and 
 Astronomy, on the art of Poetry, and on 
 Psychology. All this was with him a clas- 
 sification of Philosophy rather than of Sci- 
 ence. He divided Philosophy into the 
 theoretical, the productive, and the prac-
 
 84 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tical domain : the theoretical embracing 
 physics, mathematics, and metaphysics ; 
 the productive including the various arts ; 
 while the practical included ethics and pol- 
 itics. Aristotle's classification, however, 
 has many defects. Logic, for example, is 
 outside of it although he was the first 
 to formulate the laws of deductive reason- 
 ing in a systematic manner ; and the dis- 
 tinction between productive and practical 
 science is a very misleading one. Why 
 should politics be regarded as a practical, 
 and not as a productive science ? If we 
 take into account the end it seeks to ac- 
 complish, it is more productive than the 
 sciences included by Aristotle under the 
 latter head. It is a mistake, however, to 
 classify knowledge with any reference to 
 its aims. Its inherent nature must be the 
 basis of any successful classification ; and 
 it must be confessed that, while Aristotle 
 arranges the sciences for us after a fashion, 
 and in a very remarkable way, he 
 neither shows us their evolution from a 
 central principle, nor builds them up into 
 an organic whole. With all his greatness, 
 he fails both as a scientific architect, and 
 as an interpreter of the order of nature.
 
 CLASSIFICATION Ol- Till-: SCIENCES. 85 
 
 The first really important classification 
 in modern times was that of Francis 
 Bacon ; and the most famous that have 
 followed are those of Hobbes, Comenius, 
 Locke, Leibnitz, Vico, Kant, Fichte, Schel- 
 ling, Hegel, Coleridge, Comte, Ampere, 
 Rosmini, Whewell, Hamilton, Herbert 
 Spencer, and Mr. Bain. Those of Bacon, 
 Hegel, Comte, and Spencer may be briefly 
 glanced at. 
 
 Bacon's intellect was, like Aristotle's, 
 encyclopaedic ; and he tried to map out the 
 sciences, after first laying down a new or- 
 ganon or method of inquiry. He divided 
 all knowledge into a knowledge either of 
 History, or Poetry, or Philosophy; corre- 
 sponding, he thought, to the faculties of 
 Memory, Imagination, and Reason. " The 
 sense," he said, "which is the door of the 
 intellect, is affected by individual objects 
 only. The images of these individuals 
 that is, the impressions received by the 
 sense are fixed in the memory ; and 
 pass into it, in the first instance, entire as 
 it were, just as they occur. These the 
 human mind proceeds to review, and rumi- 
 nate on ; and therefore, either simply re- 
 hearses them, or makes fanciful imitations
 
 86 ESSAYS IX PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of them, or analyzes and classifies them. 
 Therefore from these three fountains 
 memory, imagination, and reason flow 
 these three emanations, history, poesy, 
 and philosophy ; and there can be no 
 others." First, memory records and stores 
 up facts. This originates history ; and 
 history is either natural, or civil, each of 
 which has three subsections. Secondly, 
 imagination, working on the things of 
 sense, idealizes them, and originates poetry, 
 which according to Bacon is either 
 narrative, dramatic, or parabolical. Finally, 
 the reason working analytically originates 
 philosophy, "which has three objects, viz., 
 God, Nature, and Man." " Nature strikes 
 the human intellect with a direct ray, 
 God with a refracted ray, and Man with 
 a reflected ray ; " and so we have " the 
 doctrine of the Deity, the doctrine of Na- 
 ture, and the doctrine of Man." The 
 second and the third of these Bacon sub- 
 divided. His doctrine of nature (natural 
 philosophy) he arranged as speculative, 
 and as practical ; and the speculative he 
 subdivided into physics and metaphysics, to 
 which he added mathematics. The doc- 
 trine of man he subdivided into human
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 8/ 
 
 and civil philosophy ; and under both he 
 placed several minor sciences. 
 
 But the Baconian classification is full of 
 flaws. The faculties of memory, imagi- 
 nation, and reason do not stand apart 
 as Bacon fancied they do and, working 
 apart, give rise to the several sciences. 
 He held that history arose out of the 
 exercise of the faculty of memory by it- 
 self ; but surely the reason, and even the 
 imagination, are quite as much needed 
 as the memory is in the construction of 
 history ? Then even supposing that it 
 was correct to place philosophy amongst 
 the sciences (which it is not), if God, Na- 
 ture, and Man form a rigid tripartite divi- 
 sion, questions will be rediscussed in the 
 third section which really belong to the 
 second. Why should human physiology, 
 c. g. t be detached from the general science 
 of physiology ? and again, why should met- 
 aphysics be a subsection of the doctrine 
 of nature ? and mathematics be thrown 
 in as a sort of corollary to physics ? There 
 is much arbitrariness in Bacon's arrange- 
 ment of the provinces of knowledge. 
 
 Passing over many noteworthy schemes, 
 we reach that of Hegel. In his Encyclopce-
 
 88 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 dia of 'the Philosophical Sciences we have a 
 magnificent piece of intellectual work 
 solid constructive masonry. Hegel formed 
 a really grand conception of a universal sci- 
 ence, that should include within it the de- 
 tails of all the rest ; and he thought that, 
 in the experience of the individual and of 
 the race combined, we reach a knowledge 
 of the absolute essence both of nature and 
 of man. In. all nature he saw a mirror of 
 intelligence. Mind was objectified, or so- 
 lidified, in the external world : Reason had 
 become incarnate in matter. The root 
 of everything was the Idea itself ; but 
 thought had thrust itself forth, objectify- 
 ing itself in nature ; afterwards, it returned 
 back to itself, and reached a second 
 (higher) knowledge in self - consciousness. 
 The Hegelian division of knowledge thus 
 became tripartite ; the first section includ- 
 ing logic, the second the philosophy of na- 
 ture, and the third the philosophy of spirit. 
 Under the second head were included the 
 sciences of mathematics, physics, and or- 
 ganic life. The third was also subdivided 
 into three; the first (or the doctrine of 
 the subjective spirit) embracing anthropol- 
 ogy, phenomenology, and psychology ; the
 
 CLASSIFICATION OI< 1'HE SCIENCES. 89 
 
 second (or the doctrine of the objective 
 spirit) including legal right, individual mor- 
 ality, and state morality ; the third (or the 
 doctrine of the absolute spirit) dealing with 
 art, religion, and the absolute philosophy. 
 
 The merit of Hegel's classification is 
 that he strove to incorporate the scattered 
 sciences into an organic whole, and to in- 
 terpret them all, as parts of a universal 
 science to which each was contributory. 
 Its skill was conspicuous, and its sugges- 
 tiveness great ; but it erred ab iuitio, and 
 is as full of flaws as Bacon's classification 
 was. Hegel's radical blunder was this. 
 He started with an assumption of what the 
 sciences must be, and built them up out 
 of a priori notions detached from experi- 
 ence. This was as bad as any of the 
 assumptions of the mediaeval philosophy 
 which it discarded. From an a priori pos- 
 tulate he endeavored to construct a hie- 
 rarchy of the sciences one by one. He 
 evolved a solar system out of the abstract ; 
 and, in doing so, broke away from the facts 
 of science, established by Newton. The 
 planets he finds must be the most perfect 
 of celestial bodies ; and not being able to 
 account for the fixed stars, he sets them
 
 90 ESSAYS LV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 down as mere formal existences, and says 
 that the astral, as compared with the solar, 
 system is as little admirable as a disease 
 of the skin, or a swarm of flies ! 
 
 A very significant result of the Hegelian 
 system was that the subsequent natural 
 philosophy of Germany, imbibing its spirit, 
 entered for a time on a path of antagonism 
 to the science of the rest of Europe, and 
 intensified the schism between science and 
 philosophy for a generation. If we start 
 with the idea that the visible universe is 
 the outcome of an act of thought on the 
 part of the Infinite mirrored to us in the 
 realm of the finite, it seems natural to 
 conclude that the human mind may think 
 over again the thoughts of the divine, and 
 therefore that the true way to construct the 
 sciences is to evolve them altogether from 
 within. The whole course of history has 
 proved that by no royal road of demonstra- 
 tion can physical science be evolved from an 
 a priori postulate, that it is only by the slow 
 and patient induction of facts - - by hum- 
 ble experiment, and by tests a posteriori 
 that it can secure its triumphs. The con- 
 tempt of certain philosophers for the teach- 
 ings of experience, and their efforts to de-
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SC/<\'CS. 91 
 
 duce scientific truth from assumed data, 
 may account for the arrogance with which 
 some of the scientific guides of Europe 
 have decried philosophy ; e. g-., the bitter 
 way in which Hegel attacked Sir Isaac 
 Newton led to the obvious retort on the 
 part of scientific men that philosophers 
 lived in cloudland. 
 
 Leaving Hegel I come to Auguste 
 Comte, who perhaps did more for the posi- 
 tive sciences than any other writer of this 
 century. To Comte science was every- 
 thing. Philosophy was merely the co- 
 ordination of the results of the separate 
 sciences, or a systematization of the mis- 
 cellaneous mass of facts and laws which 
 science yields. Thus to him the supreme 
 problem of philosophy was the classifica- 
 tion of the sciences. He held that our 
 knowledge extends only to facts, and the 
 relations of facts. What underlies them, 
 what causes them, and what transcends 
 them, is hidden from our faculties. There- 
 fore, phenomena and the laws of phe- 
 nomena are the alpha and the omega of 
 knowledge. Another central doctrine in 
 his teaching was that the human mind 
 has progressed historically through three
 
 92 ESSAYS hV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 stages : the first, a theological or mytho- 
 logical stage, in which occult powers were 
 accepted as the causes of natural phenom- 
 ena ; the second, a metaphysical stage, in 
 which abstract essences or substances 
 were supposed to underly phenomena, and 
 to explain them ; the third, a scientific or 
 positive stage, in which only the phenom- 
 ena themselves and their laws have been 
 recognized as within the sphere of the 
 knowable. Comte held that this sequence 
 of stages is invariably seen in the develop- 
 ment of the human mind. As a reading of 
 history or a generalized law of progress, 
 however, it is as unverifiable as is Hegel's 
 a priori doctrine. 
 
 Comte proceeded to classify the sci- 
 ences, in the light of this law of Evolution ; 
 and at the outset, he laid down a distinc- 
 tion of great value, viz., the distinction be- 
 tween the abstract and the concrete. Ab- 
 stract science seeks the laws which govern, 
 and must govern, all phenomena, howsoever 
 they appear ; laws which are true of those 
 combinations of phenomena which actually 
 exist, but which would have been equally 
 true of any other combinations; e.g., Chem- 
 istry tells us of the laws to which all bodies
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 93 
 
 must conform, while Mineralogy unfolds 
 the conditions under which they actually do 
 appear. Therefore, the former is an ab- 
 stract, and the latter a concrete science. 
 Again, Biology tells us of the universal 
 laws of life, to which all living creatures 
 must conform ; Botany and Zoology un- 
 fold the particular conditions of life, to 
 which we find they do conform in the con- 
 crete world of experience. We have thus 
 a broad division of the sciences into two 
 main classes the abstract, which relate 
 to general or universal laws, arid the con- 
 crete, which deal with particular or special 
 things. It is to the former class that the 
 name Science properly belongs ; the con- 
 crete sciences are rather classifications of 
 existing phenomena. They spring up ear- 
 lier than the abstract sciences, but they 
 are much later in reaching their final 
 form ; because the laws on which they 
 depend, and to which the phenomena con- 
 form, are less easily discovered. 
 
 It is to the abstract sciences that Comte 
 almost exclusively confined himself. They 
 are the fundamental ones ; and he ar- 
 ranged them in an ascending scale, accord- 
 ing as they are respectively general or
 
 94 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 special, and according as they depend upon 
 each other. Each science depends on the 
 laws of the science which precedes it, to 
 which it adds new ones of its own. He 
 next finds that the phenomena which form 
 the basis of the sciences are divisible into 
 the organic and the inorganic. The organic 
 are more complex and less general than 
 the inorganic. The former are dependent 
 upon the latter, and include the latter within 
 them ; because it is inorganic material that 
 becomes organized, and the dependence of 
 the sciences on one another increases, as 
 the series advances. Inorganic phenomena 
 are divided into celestial and terrestrial 
 the former being more general and inde- 
 pendent than the latter. Thus the science 
 of astronomy comes first. Any and every 
 terrestrial phenomenon is to us more com- 
 plex than the most intricate of celestial phe- 
 nomena. The most complex astronomical 
 problem is really less intricate than the 
 simplest terrestrial one. Terrestrial phys- 
 ics fall into sections governed by the same 
 principle. Chemical phenomena are more 
 complex than mechanical or physical ones, 
 chemical action being modified by weight, 
 heat, electricity, etc. Therefore physics,
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 95 
 
 which follows astronomy, precedes chem- 
 istry, these three sciences covering the 
 whole realm of the inorganic. Turning 
 to organic phenomena, these present them- 
 selves either as relating to the individual, 
 or to the species ; yielding as result the 
 sciences of physiology or biology, and so- 
 ciology. Thus we have the five affiliated 
 sciences of astronomy, physics, chemistry, 
 biology, and sociology ; the whole series 
 being preceded by another, which is the 
 most radical, the most abstract, and inde- 
 pendent of them all, and therefore in a 
 sense preeminent, viz., mathematics. 
 
 It is when Comte passes on to consider 
 man, as the highest and the most charac- 
 teristic of living beings, that he fails, both 
 in his classification and in his results. 
 Man is a microcosm, and sums up in his 
 nature the characteristic features of all 
 creatures underneath him. He is the high- 
 est product of organization, or the organ- 
 ized life of the world ; but he is nothing 
 more. Comte does not admit that any- 
 thing in the cosmos is higher than an or- 
 ganized structure. Mind is merely a func- 
 tion of matter, and therefore the subjective 
 examination of consciousness is delusive.
 
 96 ESS A YS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It leads to nothing. As mind cannot be 
 studied apart from matter, there is no sci- 
 ence of psychology, as distinct from physi- 
 ology. Man is only a highly organized ani- 
 mal, and sociology or the study of man in 
 the aggregate is only an extended branch 
 of physiology. In short, the physical ab- 
 sorb the mental sciences within them. 
 
 Comte's classification has been sharply 
 criticised by an English disciple of the 
 same school of philosophy, Mr. Herbert 
 Spencer. Spencer's arrangement of the 
 sciences has acquired much celebrity, and 
 his influence over contemporary English 
 thought has been great. 
 
 Mr. Spencer's principle of classification 
 is that each class must include within it 
 "those objects which have more charac- 
 teristics in common with one another than 
 any of them have in common with any ob- 
 jects excluded from the class ; and that 
 those characteristics possessed in common 
 by these objects, and not possessed by 
 other objects, must be more radical than 
 any of the characteristics possessed by 
 them in common with other objects." The 
 broadest natural division among the sci- 
 ences, he thinks, is the division, first, into
 
 CLASSIFICATION Ol< THE SCIKXCI'.S. 97 
 
 those which deal with the abstract rela- 
 tions under which phenomena are pre- 
 sented to us, and, secondly, those which 
 deal with the phenomena themselves. 
 Thus the sciences which deal with Space 
 and Time are separated, by the profound- 
 est of all distinctions, from the sciences 
 which deal with what is disclosed to us in 
 space and time. They treat of the forms 
 in and under which phenomena are known 
 to us ; and the two sciences of logic and 
 mathematics belong to this category. Con- 
 trasted with these are the sciences which 
 treat of the phenomena themselves ; and 
 these fall into two categories, according as 
 we deal with them in their elements, or in 
 their totalities. The latter are the con- 
 crete sciences, and they include astronomy, 
 geology, biology, psychology, sociology ; 
 the former are abstract-concrete, and they 
 include mechanics, physics, chemistry. 
 
 In this there is a partial resemblance to 
 Comte's classification, but Mr. Spencer 
 uses the words abstract and concrete dif- 
 ferently from Comte. According to Comte, 
 each science has an abstract part, and a 
 concrete part. According to Mr. Spencer, 
 some sciences are wholly abstract, and
 
 98 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 others wholly concrete ; while others are 
 intermediate, or half of the one and half of 
 the other. To glance briefly at the three. 
 The sciences belonging to the first class 
 deal with relations, and not with realities ; 
 with the forms of things, and not with the 
 things themselves. The sciences of the 
 second class deal with realities, but not as 
 they are actually manifested to us, only as 
 these real things are by us artificially sepa- 
 rated from one another. The sciences of 
 the third class deal with realities as they 
 actually appear. To the first or abstract 
 class belong logic, which deals with quali- 
 ties ; and mathematics, which deals with 
 quantities. To the second, or abstract- 
 concrete class, belong : first, the sciences 
 which investigate the laws of force, as 
 manifested by matter in masses, such as 
 mechanics, statics, dynamics ; and, sec- 
 ondly, the sciences which investigate the 
 laws of force, as manifested by matter in 
 molecules, such as chemistry, the sciences 
 of heat, light, electricity, and magnetism. 
 In all these we carry on an analytical in- 
 vestigation of nature, by decomposing or 
 separating its phenomena. The third, or 
 concrete sciences, take cognizance of the
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 99 
 
 groups of actual phenomena, and aim not 
 at an analytical, but a synthetical treat- 
 ment of them. They include astronomy, 
 mineralogy, meteorology, geology, biology, 
 psychology, and sociology. These three 
 groups of sciences yield us respectively the 
 laws of the forms, the factors, and the 
 products of nature. 
 
 Here again, however, I think there are 
 some radical difficulties. Mr. Spencer's 
 primary distinction between objects and 
 relations on which his separation of the 
 two abstract sciences of logic and mathe- 
 matics from the concrete ones is founded 
 is far from satisfactory ; and, even if it 
 were a true distinction, I do not see that 
 any adequate classification of knowledge 
 could be based upon it, because there is 
 no science within the circle of knowledge 
 that does not deal both with objects and 
 relations. There can be no relations with- 
 out objects, and all objects have relations 
 each to each. This is but one of several 
 criticisms which might be passed on the 
 Spencerian catalogue, although it is, in 
 many respects, a distinct advance on all 
 previous arrangements of the sciences. 
 
 The following classification may perhaps
 
 IOO ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 avoid some of the defects in the schemes 
 criticised, without falling into others equally 
 great. I say perhaps advisedly, because 
 the problem is difficult, and the risk of 
 failure great. 
 
 Two things must at the outset be kept 
 in view. First, we must avoid the coinage 
 of new words, with the view of more accu- 
 rately denning our departments. To affix 
 an uncouth name to a newly discovered 
 section of knowledge is bad enough ; but 
 to recast the old terminology, by which 
 the sciences have been known time out of 
 mind, in favor of some new phrase, is 
 pedantic as well as arbitrary. Such re- 
 minting of terms can never yield the cur- 
 rent coin of the future. Second, the effort 
 to avoid cross-division may be carried so 
 far as to result in a one-sided classification. 
 A harmonious arrangement of the prov- 
 inces of knowledge is of course the end 
 we have in view ; at the same time it may 
 be better while the sciences are still 
 developing to leave a few unsymmet- 
 rical subsections in our scheme, than to 
 attain symmetry by the exclusion of a sin- 
 gle province, which cannot be easily fitted 
 into its place.
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. ioi 
 
 Two illustrations may now be given of 
 the way in which the sciences might be 
 grouped. Starting with the distinction 
 between Nature and Man, they might be 
 arranged, first, as object -sciences, and, 
 secondly, as subject -sciences ; in other 
 words, we might begin with those which 
 concern the outward universe surrounding 
 us, and then take up those which relate to 
 the inward nature of the knower. The 
 former, the object-sciences, might then be 
 subdivided into the organic and the inor- 
 ganic ; each of which would be susceptible 
 of numerous subdivisions. Again, the 
 whole group of the sciences might be ar- 
 ranged, first, as abstract and general, and 
 secondly, as concrete and special ; and 
 therefore, to a certain extent the former 
 class would be simple, and the latter com- 
 plex. In these two samples of classifica- 
 tion it will be observed that the former 
 arises out of a distinction between the 
 provinces of knowledge, while the latter is 
 based upon a difference in its character- 
 istics. 
 
 I prefer, however, to make the funda- 
 mental distinction between the sciences, 
 not that of the abstract and concrete, or
 
 102 ESSAYS. 7,V PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the general and special, nor even to distin- 
 guish them as the sciences of nature and 
 of man, but rather to divide them thus : 
 First, the sciences including and dealing 
 with the phenomena of mind ; and, sec- 
 ondly, the sciences including and dealing 
 with the phenomena of matter. This root 
 distinction, simple as it is, and possibly 
 just because it is so obvious, will be found 
 to yield a more symmetrical arrangement 
 of the groups than any other. 
 
 To begin with the sciences belonging 
 to the former class, there is, first, Logic, 
 the science of the phenomena and laws of 
 thought, of reasoning, inference, and evi- 
 dence. Second, Psychology, the science 
 of the phenomena of the human mind, of 
 the senses and the intellect of man. Third, 
 Ethics, the science of morality, dealing 
 with the phenomena of the emotions and 
 the will, with the springs of conduct and 
 their outcome. Fourth, Sociology, the sci- 
 ence which investigates the relation of 
 man to man in the body corporate, the 
 conditions and laws of human welfare, so 
 as to insure the stability of the social 
 organism. (Sociology, it will be seen, 
 touches on political economy, on ethics,
 
 CLASSIFICATION Oh' THE SCIENCES. 1 03 
 
 and on law.) Fifth, History, the science 
 which traces the phenomena and laws of 
 social evolution, illustrated on the field of 
 experience. Sixth, Jurisprudence, the sci- 
 ence which deals with the principles of 
 law and order, of social contract, and of 
 government ; in other words, the relation 
 in which the units stand to the whole in 
 each nation, and in which nation stands 
 to nation in the larger area of the world. 
 Seventh, Language, the science of the va- 
 rious forms of speech, and of their relation 
 one to another. (The sciences of Gram- 
 mar and of Comparative Philology might 
 perhaps be regarded as subsections of the 
 general science of Language ; the philo- 
 logical structure of any particular language 
 being a distinct province of inquiry from 
 that of comparative philology. Rhetoric 
 belongs to the arts, and has no place 
 amongst the sciences.) Eighth, sEstlictics, 
 the science which traverses the whole de- 
 partment of the beautiful, so far- as the 
 phenomena of beauty can be reduced to 
 law. Ninth, the science of Religion, deal- 
 ing with the phenomena of the human 
 mind in their relation to that which tran- 
 scends the finite, and the efforts made by
 
 IO4 ESS Ai'S IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 man to construct a theory of the ways in 
 which the Infinite manifests itself. All 
 these sciences are, less or more, sciences of 
 mind. They have for their subject-matter 
 the phenomena of mind, as distinct from 
 the phenomena of matter. 
 
 Turning now to the second class, which 
 includes the sciences dealing with the phe- 
 nomena of matter, I do not of course refer 
 to crass material substance, but to the 
 phases which the material world assumes, 
 the aspects under which it may be re- 
 garded, and the laws which can be deduced 
 from our observation of these. First, at 
 the base of the series, I place the science 
 which in a certain sense is a link of con- 
 nection between the two classes, as it 
 deals with the quantitative relations of 
 things, with number and space. It is the 
 science of Mathematics, with its numerous 
 subsections. Second, Experimental Phys- 
 ics, dealing with the laws of matter and 
 motion, in their complexity and variety ; 
 with its subsections, Statics, and Dynam- 
 ics, the laws of the phenomena of Light, of 
 Heat, of Electricity, and of Magnetism. 
 Third, CJicmistry, the science which inves- 
 tigates the ultimate constituents of bodies,
 
 CLASSIFICATION OI-' THE SCIENCES. 105 
 
 and by analysis resolves complex substances 
 into their elements. Fourth, Astronomy, the 
 science which deals with the constitution, 
 the laws, and the properties of celestial 
 bodies. Fifth, the science of Engineering. 
 Engineering is half a science and half an 
 art ; and, on the scientific side, it may be 
 brought under Statics and Dynamics ; but, 
 as it deals with the strength of materials, 
 and the laws of construction, it is perhaps 
 better to place it apart by itself. Sixth, 
 Biology, the science of the phenomena of 
 life and of living things ; which may be 
 subdivided, according as life is seen organ- 
 ized in the two kingdoms of nature, the 
 vegetable and the animal ; the result being 
 the two sciences of Botany and Zoology. 
 I need hardly point out that zoology has 
 numerous subsections, such as Ornithology, 
 Ichthyology, Entomology, etc. Seventh, 
 Geology, the science of the laws by which 
 the present surface of the earth has as- 
 sumed the form which it now presents. 
 Eighth, Mineralogy, the science which 
 deals with the substances that have been 
 shaped by the forces of which geology tells 
 us, the constituent elements of those rock- 
 substances which now diversify the earth.
 
 IO6 ESSAYS IX PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (It is proper to note that Mineralogy might 
 be considered as a department of chem- 
 istry.) Ninth, Meteorology, the science 
 which treats of the constitution of the 
 atmosphere and the laws regulative of 
 weather changes, etc. Tenth, the large 
 group of the Medical Sciences, which deal 
 with the human organism in health and in 
 disease, with the way of promoting the one 
 and preventing the other. Here, of course, 
 science and art must join hands ; we can- 
 not separate the healing art from the sci- 
 ence of medicine. In one of the subsec- 
 tions of the group (that, namely, of medical 
 jurisprudence) we also see how the medical 
 and the legal sciences touch each other. 
 The last science, eleventh, which I reserve 
 for this section, is that of Political Econ- 
 omy. It deals with the phenomena and 
 the laws of wealth. It traces the causes 
 of the wealth of nations, and investigates 
 the best way of distributing, as well as of 
 producing, wealth. From its close relation 
 to Sociology, however, this science might 
 almost lie between the two groups, as well 
 as be included in the latter of them. 
 
 I have not attempted to show how one 
 science gives rise to another, or depends
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 107 
 
 upon it ; nor how the sciences bear upon 
 the arts ; nor how the theoretical and 
 practical are intertwisted in experience. 
 These questions demand separate treat- 
 ment in detail. 
 
 Some of the advantages, however, to be 
 derived from the attempt to classify our 
 knowledge even if the effort is only 
 partially successful may be referred to 
 in conclusion, (i.) If our knowledge is 
 coordinated so that we see how the entire 
 structure is compacted by what each ele- 
 ment supplies, we will have a. much clearer 
 idea of the function of the separate sci- 
 ences, as well as of the scope of the whole. 
 (2.) Classification shows us the unity that 
 underlies the diversity of knowledge, the 
 distinctions of the separate sciences being 
 maintained, and yet transcended. The 
 recognition of the inner affinities of knowl- 
 edge, of its occult correspondences and 
 relations of the priority of one principle 
 and the subordination of another must 
 add to the importance of the humblest. 
 (3.) \Ye see how one science helps another, 
 and the extent of the debt they owe to each 
 other. The most important discoveries 
 ever made have been the result of coopera-
 
 108 XSSstyS AV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tion sometimes the unconscious coopera- 
 tion of workers in two or more sciences. 
 The debt that Geometry owes to Algebra, 
 that Optics owes to Chemistry (in the dis- 
 coveries of spectrum analysis, for example), 
 reacting again on Astronomy, and the way 
 in which Psychology has been aided by 
 Physiology, are illustrations of this. It is 
 also worthy of note that the specialist does 
 not necessarily advance his science best by 
 mere specialization. It is rather by bring- 
 ing one science to bear upon another that 
 the most notable results have been achieved 
 and the greatest discoveries made. (4.) An 
 appreciation of what has been clone by 
 others is one of the best results of a study 
 of the map of human knowledge. Natu- 
 rally, we overestimate our own department, 
 and possibly the best work ever done in 
 the world would not be done without such 
 exaggeration. It is well for us, however, to 
 have some knowledge of the achievements 
 of those with whose labor in detail we 
 can never become acquainted. The width 
 of mental vision, which such a survey gives, 
 should promote a sort of intellectual free- 
 masonry ; and that, in turn, should develop 
 the social friendliness, which lessens the 
 misunderstandings of life.
 
 ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY AND EV- 
 OLUTION. 
 
 DISCIPLINE in Philosophy is at once a 
 great inheritance of academic life, and a 
 permanent necessity of the human intel- 
 lect. We are to pursue research within a 
 province, which has drawn towards it 
 with a singular magnetic spell the 
 devotion of successive generations. To 
 solve the problems of Philosophy, or to 
 discover the limit of all possible solutions, 
 has been the ambition of every university 
 student from mediaeval times. It has been 
 said that in Scotland we all inherit the 
 speculative craving, and that metaphysics 
 are indigenous to our soil. This is but a 
 slight exaggeration of the fact that Philos- 
 ophy has for centuries formed the centre 
 of our academic discipline, and that we 
 have clothed the venerable word with a 
 meaning which gives it indisputable pre- 
 eminence in the curriculum of a liberal 
 education.
 
 IIO ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It is the fashion, however, to describe 
 the present age as predominantly scientific, 
 to affirm that the intellectual interest of 
 the hour has drifted away from specula- 
 tion, and that the surmises of Philosophy 
 have been abandoned for the more sober 
 teachings of experience. With this opin- 
 ion I am unable to concur. Were it cor- 
 rect, it should be described as a temporary 
 aberration of the human intellect, desert- 
 ing the " philosophia perennis " in behalf of 
 an empiricism, which in the sphere of 
 half-truths is as easily demonstrable, as 
 it is commonplace and crude. But such 
 an interpretation of the spirit of our age 
 is altogether superficial. Far and wide 
 throughout the republic of letters, in Brit- 
 ain, on the Continent, and in America, 
 there are authentic signs of a general re- 
 naissance of Philosophy. Within the last 
 quarter of a century those speculative 
 problems which are the theme of peren- 
 nial debate in the metaphysical schools 
 have awakened an interest, that is pro- 
 phetic of a new future for philosophy. 
 There has been a remarkable quickening 
 of the spirit of inquiry into all radical 
 questions, and a far clearer understanding
 
 ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. \ \ \ 
 
 of their issues ; while the general mind, 
 both in Europe and America, may be said 
 to be face to face with problems, which, 
 in the last generation, were confined to a 
 few scholars, or recluse speculative men. 
 
 It is unnecessary to trace the causes, 
 European or insular, which have} led to 
 this result ; it is enough to note it as 
 one of the characteristics of our age. In- 
 stead of Philosophy being superseded, or 
 submerged in Science, there are indica- 
 tions of a notable reaction in its favor, 
 and of its vigorous pursuit in unexpected 
 quarters. The splendor and rapid march 
 of the physical sciences, which threat- 
 ened for a time to eclipse if not to extin- 
 guish interest in the older problems which 
 lie behind them, has merely opened up 
 fresh pathways' converging, as before, on 
 Philosophy as the scientia scioitiarum ; 
 and in the chief tendencies at work at the 
 great educational centres, every one may 
 seethe reawakening of speculative thought. 
 The whole literary atmosphere is charged 
 with Philosophy. The leaders of physical 
 research are dealing with metaphysical 
 questions. The topics with which modern 
 science is most engrossed are speculative
 
 112 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ones. In the doctrines of evolution and 
 transformation of energy we not only find 
 the revival of old metaphysical theories 
 under a new scientific dress, but, apart 
 from philosophy, these questions are still, 
 as formerly, incapable of solution. The 
 recent literature of Philosophy is also rich 
 in treatises which are greatly in advance 
 of the contributions of the previous age. 
 Without naming any particular work or 
 writer, I may refer to such phenomena 
 as these : The encounters between the 
 most accomplished physicists and meta- 
 physicians on ground common to both 
 (the same problem being approached by 
 the one from beneath, and by the other 
 from above) ; the interest awakened in the 
 problems of sociology ; the light which 
 has been cast by philosophic criticism 
 on much that \vas deemed inexplicable 
 in the records of the past ; the remark- 
 able development of the historical and 
 comparative methods of research, as well 
 as of those purely critical and analytic ; 
 the attention given to the great masters 
 of ancient wisdom, especially to the lead- 
 ers of the Greek schools ; the opening up 
 of fresh sources of information as to In-
 
 h'.THICAL 1'IULOSOPHY. 113 
 
 dian and Oriental thought ; the establish- 
 ment of new journals and societies espe- 
 cially devoted to psychological, metaphys- 
 ical, and ethical study ; these are only a 
 few of the signs of the working of the phi- 
 losophic spirit, and the revival of specula- 
 tion in our time. I may add that all the 
 higher poetry and religious literature of 
 the world are saturated with Philosophy as 
 perhaps at no previous period in history. 
 Everywhere inquiry converges on first 
 principles. Even those who abjure meta- 
 physics unconsciously philosophize in their 
 rejection of it; while the subdivision of in- 
 tellectual labor due to the growing com- 
 plexity of culture, and the increasing num- 
 ber of those who devote their lives to 
 research has widened the area, as well 
 as deepened the lines of investigation. 
 
 One result of this diffusion of interest 
 in the questions of Philosophy, and the 
 popularization of its problems, is a better 
 understanding up to a certain point 
 of the great rival systems. There is more 
 eclecticism in the intellectual air. It is 
 beginning to be recognized that opinions, 
 which, when fully developed, come into 
 sharp collision with each other, may spring
 
 114 ASSAY'S IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 from a common root of truth ; and that, 
 in their origin, they may be only a way 
 of throwing emphasis on this or that side 
 of a fact that is equally admitted by the 
 advocates of opposing schools. It is being 
 seen that no system of Philosophy which 
 has lived, and won the assent of intellec- 
 tual men, is entirely false ; and that no one 
 which has passed away is absolutely true. 
 Every one now recognizes that the most 
 perfect system of belief is doomed to ex- 
 tinction, as certainly as the least perfect. 
 From none can error be eliminated ; and 
 the longevity of each is mainly due to the 
 pressure within it of elements that are pe- 
 rennial over those that are accidental and 
 casual. In the most erroneous, there is 
 some truth and excellence concealed ; 
 while, in the most true, error, partiality, 
 and bias invariably lie hid. In the recog- 
 nition of this fact is contained the prin- 
 ciple of catholicity in thought, and of tol- 
 eration in practice. The old maxim, that 
 "every error is a truth abused," remains 
 the basis of a wise and sober electicism. 
 
 It is also true that the causes which have 
 hitherto led to differences of philosophical 
 opinion are permanent ones, working in
 
 /; /'///( 'A L PHIL OSOril V 115 
 
 the blood and brain of the race ; and some 
 recent discussions in Philosophy have 
 shown the inveteracy with which the dis- 
 ciples of particular schools continue to in- 
 terpret facts in their own way, and the 
 strength of the constitutional bias which 
 incapacitates certain minds from seeing 
 both sides of a question. 
 
 The causes which differentiate the 
 schools of Philosophy arise at once from 
 the individuality of the system-builders, 
 and from the thousand influences by which 
 each is either consciously or unconsciously 
 affected. The former of these causes is 
 clue to remote ancestral tendencies, de- 
 scending in the line of hereditary succes- 
 sion, from no one knows how distant a 
 fountain-head, as well as to the creative 
 power of the system-builder working in 
 the present hour. The latter may be 
 traced in the education he has undergone, 
 and in the examples that have moulded 
 him from his infancy. Native idiosyn- 
 crasy, temperamental bias, and the force of 
 surroundings determine the character of 
 the opinions formed, and the type of the 
 system that results. 
 
 It follows that the rigorous logician, in
 
 Il6 ESSAYS 7A~ PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 his dislike of what is vague or paradoxical, 
 will of necessity be unjust to the mystic 
 intuitionalist ; while the latter may fail to 
 appreciate the prosaic love of fact, the de- 
 mand for verification, the desire that the in- 
 tellectual firmament should be clear of mist, 
 and that dislike of all nebulous and impal- 
 pable theories, which is invariably shown by 
 the disciples of experience. These things 
 must survive in the future, and determine 
 the alternate victory of opposing schools 
 of thought, in much the same way as they 
 influence the sphere of politics. It is as 
 irrational to believe that one particular 
 school (intuitional or experiential, a priori 
 or a posteriori} will dominate in the future, 
 as it is to suppose that the supremacy of a 
 Conservative Government will be perpet- 
 ual ; or that, if turned out of office, it will 
 not come back, in due time, with a major- 
 ity. No political party can remain perma- 
 nently in power. The same causes that 
 lead to its elevation, tend to its depression, 
 and to the future enthronement of its rival. 
 Similarly, the great pendulum of human 
 thought continues and must continue 
 to oscillate throughout the ages ; and the 
 historical succession of opposite schools is
 
 E Til 1C A L 1'IUL (A.V0/Y/ Y. I [ / 
 
 inevitable. If the dominant Philosophy 
 in England to-day is the experientialism 
 of Locke, it is certain to be succeeded by 
 a new school of a priori ontologists. For 
 as with empires and dynasties, so with 
 systems of opinion, the moment of the 
 greatest triumph is also the moment of 
 the first decline and fall. 1 It is probable, 
 however, that as our historical knowledge 
 becomes more thorough, and we are better 
 acquainted with the philosophies of the 
 past, especially with the causes that 
 have led to the rise of the great systems, 
 there will be a more general and ade- 
 quate appreciation of each ; and that a wise 
 and sober eclecticism, which shuns " the 
 falsehood of extremes," will result. The 
 next great school of British thought will 
 certainly be eclectic, in tone and character 
 if not in name. It may be more pro- 
 foundly eclectic in spirit, if it is not so in 
 the letter. 
 
 It is to be observed, however, that ec- 
 lectic schools are usually feeble in charac- 
 
 1 It is to be noted that the historical succession is 
 equally kept up by the rise of opposite or reactionary 
 theories, as it is by the development of existing opinion. 
 Intellectual progress is often due to antagonistic reac- 
 tion, and the reappearance of discarded theories.
 
 Il8 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ter, and barren in result, and that they 
 often collapse before the renewed vigor of 
 some sectarian movement. It cannot be 
 denied that there has been a want of inner 
 coherency in many of them ; and if they 
 are the offspring of compromise, or consist 
 in a mere miscellaneous piecing together 
 of the details of opposite systems, so 
 that the result is an artificial patchwork, 
 or at best an intellectual mosaic, no 
 other result than sterility is possible. 
 
 The nature of Philosophy, as distin- 
 guished from ordinary knowledge, will best 
 be understood through a series of con- 
 trasts, which lead up to the main char- 
 acteristic difference. The first distinction 
 is between a liberal and a professional ed- 
 ucation; the second, the distinction be- 
 tween the objective and the subjective in 
 knowledge ; the third, between the seeming 
 and the real ; the fourth, between science 
 and philosophy. 
 
 In the light of these distinctions, we 
 shall see that it is the aim of Philosophy 
 to escape from the illusions of inherited 
 or acquired belief, that it may reach the 
 ultimate ground of human knowledge ; and 
 this may be further described as either an
 
 E THICA L riUL OSOP11 Y. I 1 9 
 
 ascent above, or a descent beneath, our 
 secondary opinions to the region of first 
 principles. We shall see that its aim is 
 to reach the permanent and abiding, as 
 contrasted with the incessantly changing 
 aspects of phenomenal existence ; and that 
 its function is to get behind all the meta- 
 phoric modes of thought, or pictured repre- 
 sentations of reality, to the reality itself 
 which pictures and symbols represent. 
 The common consciousness of mankind is 
 in bondage to the concrete and the picto- 
 rial. It sees essence only in the light of 
 symbol, and confuses the two together. 
 Philosophy distinguishes them, and con- 
 ducts from the symbol to the thing sym- 
 bolized ; while it seeks the one ultimate 
 ground of all detached and fragmentary 
 knowledge. It is the quest for that su- 
 preme unity, in the vision of which the 
 separateness and detail of miscellaneous 
 knowledge is lost to view. Thus Philoso- 
 phy teaches that beyond the customary 
 and traditional, behind the pictorial and 
 concrete, within the changing, and beneath 
 the miscellaneous, lies the sphere of the 
 true, the real, the sempiternal, and the one. 
 Having: ascertained what it is we are to
 
 120 ASSAYS AV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 study, with its uses, and its place in the 
 curriculum of a liberal education, we 
 must next determine on the method to be 
 pursued in our inquiries. These questions, 
 however, are merely preliminary, leading 
 up to the specific problem of etJiics, It is 
 not Philosophy in general but Moral Phi- 
 losophy in particular thai is to be studied 
 by us ; and its sphere and province may 
 be defined in either of two ways. 
 
 In the first place, we may consider it in 
 its relation to, and in its distinction from, 
 the other branches which grow out of the 
 common root of human knowledge, such 
 as science, theology, politics, and aesthet- 
 ics. Its sphere and its boundaries cannot 
 be accurately known, till they are known 
 in the light of those relations, which con- 
 nect it inseparably with the provinces 
 which border it, on the right hand and on 
 the left. For example, it is organically 
 related to psychology. It is vitally con- 
 nected with theology. It is indissolubly al- 
 lied to sociology. It has a close relation to 
 physiology. And yet, on the other hand, 
 ethics has repeatedly suffered from undue 
 encroachment by each of these correlated 
 departments of knowledge. Now, it has
 
 E THICA I. PHIL OSOl'll Y 121 
 
 been regarded as an appendix or subsec- 
 tion of psychology ; again, it has been 
 sunk in metaphysic, the distinction be- 
 tween the psychology and the metaphysic 
 of ethics being ignored. It has been re- 
 garded as a simple corollary to our knowl- 
 edge of the phenomena of organization : 
 that is to say, it has been sunk in physiol- 
 ogy. It has also been described as a 
 province once independent, but now con- 
 quered and annexed by the Christian re- 
 ligion. These are illegitimate curtailments 
 or suppressions. And the penalty of tres- 
 pass, by any recognized body of knowledge 
 upon the domain of another, is always a 
 weakening of the enlarged province, which 
 is made too wide by its attempted annex- 
 ation of another. As, in the political his- 
 tory of a people, the conquest of alien 
 states and the annexation of distant terri- 
 tory are the invariable prelude to national 
 disaster as they lead to the breaking up 
 of the kingdom that has overgrown, or of 
 the commonwealth that has become too 
 vast so, in the realm of knowledge, a 
 "lengthening of cords" is not always ac- 
 companied by a corresponding "strength- 
 ening of stakes."
 
 122 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 At present the chief encroachment on 
 the sphere of Ethics comes from the side 
 of physical science, or physiology. In the 
 last generation it frequently came from the 
 side of religion : that is to say, many Eng- 
 lish writers supposed that the function of 
 what they called " natural ethics," as dis- 
 tinguished from "revealed morality," was 
 gone. To the question, whether the rules 
 of conduct, discoverable by reason and in- 
 tuition, or gathered by experience, were 
 valid guides to action, it was replied that 
 they were not ; because Christianity had 
 taken the place of natural morality, and 
 superseded it. This distinction, however, 
 is invalid. What is "natural" cannot be 
 superseded. It cannot even be placed in 
 a category opposite to what is "revealed." 
 The real distinction and contrast is be- 
 tween what is natural, and what is artifi- 
 cial. The fact that anything has been 
 " revealed " merely implies that it was pre- 
 viously unknown, or lay in shadow ; and 
 the disclosure of every truth, however it 
 may happen to have come to light, is, 
 strictly speaking, a revelation. Its simple 
 occurrence has all the force of a revelation, 
 whether it belongs to the sphere of morals
 
 ETHICAL PlULOSOl'HY. 12$ 
 
 or religion. We shall sec, as our course 
 proceeds, how the one province is indebted 
 to the other ; and how, by the spirituality 
 of its ideal, Christianity has given the hu- 
 man race a moral leverage in the pursuit 
 of virtue unknown to the ancient schools. 
 But it is equally necessary to vindicate the 
 integrity and independence of ethics, as it 
 is to point out how far, and in what direc- 
 tions, it is beholden to religion. 
 
 The second method, by which the sphere 
 of ethics may be defined, is by a condensed 
 summary of its chief problems, which may 
 be presented in the form of answers to the 
 following questions : (i.) What are the facts 
 of man's moral nature ? how are we con- 
 stituted, and endowed, as moral agents? 
 (2.) How has human nature come to be 
 what it is ? out of what prior conditions or 
 elements has it emerged ? In other words, 
 what are the causes or forces individual 
 and social, temperamental and racial 
 that have determined the moral devel- 
 opment of humanity, and working in uni- 
 son have fashioned the destiny of each 
 agent ? The " natural history " of morals 
 will be treated under this head, or the 
 growth of ethical ideas out of their rudi-
 
 124 ASSAYS IX PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mentary types ; and the curious phases 
 which the moral consciousness has under- 
 gone in the course of its evolution will be 
 discussed. (3.) What ought man morally to 
 be ? The contrast between the actual and 
 the ideal, between human aspiration and 
 attainment, with the authority of con- 
 science, and the nature of free will, fall to 
 be considered under this head. (4.) How 
 can human nature attain to its ideal, and 
 be brought into practical accordance with 
 law and order ? By what power or process 
 can moral harmony be reached, the discord 
 of the powers abolished, and the ethical 
 ideal be made real, in experience ? In 
 other words, how can man reach his des- 
 tiny ? Under this fourth head of inquiry 
 the relation between Ethics and Religion 
 comes again to be considered. 
 
 Having answered these four questions in 
 detail, the great systems of Moral Philos- 
 ophy, ancient and modern, must be histor- 
 ically and critically discussed. The stream 
 of ethical opinion must be followed from 
 the Greek schools onwards, with the view 
 more especially of exhibiting the genealogy 
 of doctrine, and the " increasing purpose" 
 of the various systems. At the close of
 
 J-.THICAL run.osoriiY. 125 
 
 tliis investigation we shall return to the 
 phenomena of the moral consciousness, 
 and ask, what are the inferences deducible 
 from it, or its implicates, as to the divine 
 nature, and the destiny of the human soul ? 
 Thus, our ethical inquiries will naturally 
 lead to theology and religion. 
 
 From this brief preliminary outline, it 
 will be seen that it is the phenomena of 
 human character which, in the first in- 
 stance, supply the ethical student with his 
 field of observation. The area of that 
 field is a wide one. It includes all our de- 
 sires and affections, the emotions and the 
 will, with the practical activities and devel- 
 oped habits which arc the outcome of char- 
 acter. It embraces all that exists, and is 
 evolved, within the plastic region of human 
 conduct, a region various and manifold, 
 at times heterogeneous and occult. We 
 begin with an investigation of the facts of 
 consciousness. We proceed thence to an 
 historical inquiry as to the process of de- 
 velopment by which these facts have come 
 to be what they now arc. This leads to 
 the further question of the meaning of 
 duty (a speculative problem), and to the 
 conduct of life (a practical discipline).
 
 126 ASSAYS SA r PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 In its most comprehensive aspect, then, 
 Moral Philosophy has two sides. From 
 its connection with human knowledge, and 
 from the necessity of our having an intel- 
 lectual root or ground of action, it is a 
 speculative study. From its connection 
 with conduct, and the necessity of our 
 realizing in life and action the princi- 
 ples of which it seeks the explanation, it 
 is a practical discipline. As a body of 
 knowledge it stretches between theory and 
 practice, and is the arch which spans the 
 chasm connecting speculation and action. 
 On one side, it is the theory of our prac- 
 tice ; on the other, it is the practice of the 
 theory we adopt. Speculatively consid- 
 ered, it is a systematized body of knowl- 
 edge dealing with human conduct. Its aim 
 is to explain the nature and to determine 
 the rationale of duty. It considers man, 
 however, not merely as a knower and con- 
 templator, but also as an actor ; as a prac- 
 tical being whose conduct is susceptible of 
 direct regulation and indirect control. As- 
 certaining the laws which govern charac- 
 ter, it essays an explanation of habit. En- 
 deavoring to unfold the relation between 
 conduct and welfare, it distinguishes while it
 
 ETHICAL PIIILOSOrilY. \ 27 
 
 connects duty and happiness. So far as it 
 confines itself within the region of facts, it 
 is simply a branch of psychology. It is 
 ethical psychology, or the psychology of 
 the moral, as distinguished from the in- 
 tellectual consciousness. When, however, 
 we ask the meaning of duty, or seek the 
 rationale of conduct, we transcend the phe- 
 nomenal sphere. Our inquiry becomes a 
 speculative one. Rising into the meta- 
 physic of ethics, it is ontological rather 
 than scientific. 
 
 To put it otherwise, we stand in certain 
 definite relations to our fellow-men, as 
 members of the same social organism, and 
 definite duties follow or flow from these 
 relations. So long as we investigate these, 
 dealing with them merely as facts, in order 
 that we may discover the laws which under- 
 lie the phenomena, facts of which the 
 phenomena are the expression, and the laws 
 the explanation, we are simply studying 
 what happens, and the manner of its hap- 
 pening. But the moment we raise the 
 further question of the meaning of duty, 
 and, perceiving that there is a frequent 
 contrariety between what we are and what 
 we ought to be, ask why we ought to be
 
 128 A.S'.SWKV 7.V PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 other than \ve are, or have been, then we 
 have left the region of moral psychology, 
 and entered that of the metaphysic of ethic. 
 We experience a strife between desire and 
 duty, between appetite and reason ; and, in 
 asking its explanation, the philosophy of 
 morals emerges. In our early years of ob- 
 jectivity and unreflectiveness no such in- 
 quiry is ever raised by us ; nor is it then 
 needed. What is, what happens the ac- 
 tual and the existing satisfies us ; or, if it 
 does not, we seek satisfaction simply by a 
 change in our circumstances and surround- 
 ings. Gradually, however, there comes 
 to all of us a sense of imperfection and in- 
 adequacy. We are haunted by a feeling of 
 the unattained, while we have occasional 
 glimpses of an ideal that is at once above 
 us, and within our reach. As soon as this 
 is perceived, it acts like a whetstone to our 
 inquiries into the meaning or rationale of 
 duty. The mere register of moral phe- 
 nomena no longer satisfies us. The rec- 
 ord of particular subjective states, simple 
 or complex, of desires as phenomenal 
 causes, or emotions as phenomenal effects, 
 cannot satisfy the speculative craving 
 that has been awakened. Detail of that
 
 ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. 129 
 
 kind is now regarded merely as a collec- 
 tion of preliminary data, which may serve 
 as the raw material for a philosophy of 
 morals. 
 
 I thus distinguish between ethical sci- 
 ence and ethical philosophy. Philosophy 
 is not a department of science, nor is 
 science a branch of philosophy. Their 
 provinces are distinct, though closely re- 
 lated at their frontier margins. Ethical 
 science deals with the phenomena of our 
 moral nature in all their length and 
 breadth ; ethical philosophy deals with the 
 inner essence of these facts, in its height 
 and in its depth, as well as with the link 
 which connects them indissolubly together. 
 Science treats of the coexistences and 
 succession of phenomena, and of the laws 
 which may be generalized from them. It 
 docs not attempt to reach the substrate 
 underlying the phenomena, or the nexus 
 by which they are united. Philosophy pur- 
 sues both the substrate and the nexus. In 
 so doing, it seeks the ultimate meaning 
 of the whole, as a unity ; and it will not 
 relinquish its search, though science may 
 affirm that its quest is as vain as the pur- 
 suit of the sanereal. Starting from the
 
 130 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 facts of experience, it seeks a theory of 
 these facts. It deduces inferences, which 
 the phenomena do not yield by way of gen- 
 eralization, but by way of necessary impli- 
 cation, or as causes requisite to account 
 for effects otherwise unexplainable. 
 
 Thus, to sum up, we may distinguish be- 
 tween the science of morals and the phi- 
 losophy of duty, as we distinguish the psy- 
 chology of cognition from the philosophy 
 of knowledge, or the science of taste from 
 the philosophy of the beautiful. In each 
 case, psychology precedes, and metaphysic 
 succeeds. 
 
 The usual distinction between meta- 
 physic and ethic is the source of an illusion. 
 If there is a "metaphysic of ethic," the two 
 spheres are not independent of each other, 
 but the one is the root of the other ; that 
 is to say, the metaphysical inquiry is an 
 inquiry into the root or ground of the 
 ethical phenomena ; just as, in another 
 province, the metaphysical inquiry con- 
 cerns the root of intellectual phenomena, 
 and as in a third region it deals with the 
 ground of all aesthetic phenomena. They 
 are related as the porch or vestibule is re- 
 lated to the shrine. I would thus classify,
 
 E THICA L PHIL OSOPII Y. 131 
 
 as three separate provinces, the Science of 
 knowledge, of duty, and of taste ; setting 
 over against these respectively the three 
 kindred, and co-related though indepen- 
 dent, departments of the Philosophy of 
 knowledge, of duty, and of taste. This is, 
 however, to anticipate what it will be the 
 aim of subsequent discussion to make ap- 
 parent. 
 
 It may be rash to express an opinion as 
 to the precise point which Ethical Philoso- 
 phy has reached in the ever-advancing 
 stream of speculation. This, with a state- 
 ment of desiderata, or problems that await 
 solution, may fittingly be postponed. It is 
 meanwhile more important to note the 
 bearing of the doctrine of Evolution on 
 the origin of the moral faculty ; a question 
 of frequent debate in the ethical schools, 
 one not unknown to antiquity, nor un- 
 successfully handled before the rise of 
 modern scientific method, but which has 
 come more prominently to the front in the 
 recent literature of philosophy. 
 
 Before, however, we can estimate the 
 bearing of the doctrine of Evolution on 
 ethics, \ve must have a precise idea of the 
 doctrine itself. It has been alleged that if
 
 132 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 the general principle of development be 
 established, its application to the sphere 
 of morality is only a matter of detail ; and 
 that the derivation of all the moral life and 
 consciousness of the race, out of elements 
 originally non-moral, is no longer an hypoth- 
 esis, but is a fact scientifically known. 
 In order to estimate the value of this as- 
 sertion, we must first see to what the doc- 
 trine amounts, and what is the evidence in 
 its favor. 
 
 Experience, individual and collective, 
 shows that every organism and every char- 
 acter alters by minute and imperceptible 
 changes, that each is incessantly varying, 
 that its very life is a series of changes. 
 Further, every living organism, as it gives 
 rise to others, transmits an altered struc- 
 ture, and originates a change of type. 
 So much is within the easily verifiable 
 range of experience, and even of com- 
 monplace observation. The theory of de- 
 velopment further suggests that we may 
 account for all the differences which now 
 exist in the scale of Nature, the immense 
 varieties of organic phenomena, by a slow 
 succession of similar changes, indefinitely 
 prolonged in ever-varying circumstances,
 
 ETHICAL PHILOSOrHY. 133 
 
 each one imperceptibly minute. Thus it 
 will be seen that the doctrine, fully carried 
 out, abolishes the distinction between gen- 
 era and species, as well as the difference 
 between species and individuals, all of 
 these being merely conventional distinc- 
 tions. They are the names which con- 
 veniently mark off organisms one from 
 another, when the process of evolution has 
 gone so far, and been in operation so long, 
 that its divergencies require to be signal- 
 ized in detail, and described at various 
 points. The whole series, having been 
 rigidly developed out of antecedent ele- 
 ments, and continuing still to develop, the 
 notion of independent types disappears. 
 All is process ; the products are simply 
 processes prolonged. What is reached at 
 any one stage, however, is necessarily evan- 
 escent. Nothing can exist for all time. 
 Each exists for its own time, and perishes, 
 only to make way for an equally perish- 
 able successor. 
 
 Now, if we cannot suppose that any 
 organisms spring up dc novo, without natu- 
 ral ancestry, and that any arrive on our 
 earth as foreigners from another planet, 
 whence can they severally spring ? If we
 
 134 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 exclude spontaneous generation and for- 
 eign arrival, we have but two possible theo- 
 ries. Either all have always existed in 
 some form or other and are only under- 
 going a series of transformations in time ; 
 or each has been developed out of a differ- 
 ent and lower stage, in the incessant com- 
 petition and struggle for existence. The 
 present indefinite complexity of organic 
 forms may be explained, either by the eter- 
 nal existence of an indefinite number of 
 fixed ideal types, which are revealing them- 
 selves in the varieties of concrete exist- 
 ence, or by the incessant evolution of one 
 protean principle, which in the transforma- 
 tion of life is assuming endlessly varied 
 phenomenal forms. 
 
 We may safely assume that the phys- 
 ical miracle of the creation of new types, 
 whether in the form of the spontaneous 
 generation of minute organisms, or the 
 sudden appearance of creatures more 
 highly organized, is not now taking place, 
 spasmodically. If we had reason to be- 
 lieve that it had ever happened, we 
 should have equal reason to conclude that 
 it was occurring perpetually, that the mir- 
 acle never ceased ; which would, in turn,
 
 E TII1CA L PHIL OSOf// Y. 135 
 
 abolish its miraculous or exceptional char- 
 acter. If, however, it is rash to affirm 
 that nothing can possibly originate, in 
 the form of organized material structure, 
 per salt nvi, it is not rash, but only the 
 dictate of a cautious philosophy, to affirm 
 that, since we have no experience of origi- 
 nation in this way, we are not at liberty to 
 assume that it has ever taken place. Un- 
 less we discover phenomena that can be 
 explained in no other way, phenomena 
 which remain irreducible and inexplicable 
 as the result of the slow modification of 
 ages, we have no scientific right, or philo- 
 sophical warrant, for assuming any break 
 in the process of orderly development by 
 law. So far, then, antecedent presumption, 
 grounded on experience, is in favor of evo- 
 lution. Evolution is the rule within human 
 experience. Origination per saltinn is not 
 even an exception to the rule. It is a hy- 
 pothesis called in to explain the absence of 
 connecting links between the species that 
 exist, the differentiation of organic types, 
 and the remoteness from one another of the 
 individuals which illustrate these types. 
 
 Our choice, therefore, does not lie be- 
 tween a doctrine of continuous evolution
 
 136 ESSAYS hV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 from a common fountain-head and a doc- 
 trine of successive originations at intervals 
 of creative activity, repeated throughout 
 the ages in linear series, the protoplas- 
 tic power starting into action after a long- 
 period of slumber, and again retiring to 
 rest. The latter notion must be laid aside, 
 as inconsistent with any elevated, not to 
 say reverential, idea of the creative Power 
 that works in nature. Our choice really 
 lies between a doctrine of continuous ac- 
 tivity and unceasing development (all things 
 emanating from a single Source, and being 
 the outcome of a solitary principle, end- 
 lessly manifesting itself in an indefinite 
 variety of forms) ; and a doctrine of fixed 
 types, or eternal essences, like the " arche- 
 typal ideas " of Plato, which have always 
 existed, and are indestructible types, which 
 emerge and reemerge are born, die, and 
 reappear in the incessant change and 
 palingenesia of the universe. 
 
 I do not think that the theory of evolu- 
 tion in organic nature has been proved ; 
 but it has been rendered the almost inevi- 
 table conclusion of the scientific intellect, 
 dealing inductively with the facts of biol- 
 ogy (especially of embryology) and palaeon-
 
 K rii ic AT. riin.osoriiv. 137 
 
 tology. I do not speak of any particular 
 theory of "natural selection " or "heredity," 
 but of the general doctrine of evolution as 
 opposed to cataclysmic bursts of energy. 
 The protoplasm of the nettle, of the mol- 
 lusk, of the lizard, and of man is chemically 
 the same. The rise in complexity of struc- 
 ture, from the lowest organism to man, 
 is not greater or more striking than the 
 series of changes through which each in- 
 dividual passes normally from the embry- 
 onic to the adult state. The intermediate 
 stages between the lowest form of vitality 
 and the highest are successively reached by 
 all the maturer organisms, so that we may 
 see the ascending scale of animated nature 
 mirrored and summarized in the evolution 
 of every embryo. Now, the marvel to hu- 
 man intelligence, in the development of a 
 feathered fowl out of the albumen of an 
 egg, is not intrinsically greater than the 
 evolution of all the flora and fauna of the 
 universe would be, supposing it to proceed 
 from a common protoplasmic germ. We 
 know that the one takes place incessantly. 
 Its mystery is forgotten, in its constancy 
 and commonness. The other is unknown 
 to experience ; but there is no obstacle to
 
 138 ASSAYS /.v PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it, in the nature of things. It contains 
 no greater mystery than the former, and 
 its future demonstration would not excite 
 surprise. Even within the range of experi- 
 ence, we can see development in progress. 
 Alike in the animal and vegetable king- 
 doms, amongst the foraminifera and the 
 diatoms, change and transformation, within 
 a limited field, may be observed; and the 
 development of higher organisms out of 
 lower ones is only an inductive inference, 
 drawn by analogy, from the phenomena 
 that fall under our observation, and can be 
 experimentally investigated. Even the line 
 between the animal and the vegetable can- 
 not now be drawn with the rigor by which 
 the naturalists of the last generation used 
 to separate the kingdoms of Nature ; while 
 modern biology will in all likelihood demon- 
 strate the actual emergence of fresh types 
 of organization out of rudimentary ones. 
 In this there will be no surprise to science. 
 It is to be noted, however, that the dis- 
 covery of a palaeontological form, intermedi- 
 ate between man and the ape, would not 
 prove that man was physically the descend- 
 ant of such an intermediate ; nor would 
 it greatly aid the controversy, except as
 
 ETHICAL r/IILOSOrHY. 139 
 
 affording a new link in the chain of or- 
 ganized existence. The theory of evolu- 
 tion will not be demonstrated even by a 
 discovery of all the missing links in the 
 chain of existence, but only by a scientific 
 use of the links which we possess, and by 
 warrantable inferences from them. 
 
 Does the vital, however, in any instance 
 proceed from the non-vital ? Is the bound- 
 ary between the animate and the inani- 
 mate as precarious as that which separates 
 the animal from the vegetable ? This ul- 
 terior question, which is one of the gravest 
 philosophical import, must arise, even 
 supposing that the derivation of all the 
 varieties of vital existence from one an- 
 other were a demonstrated conclusion of 
 science. The evolution of nature may be 
 a fact, a daily and hourly apocalypse ; 
 but certainly we have, as yet, no evi- 
 dence of the non-vital passing into the 
 vital. Spontaneous generation is an imag- 
 inative guess, unverified by scientific tests. 
 And matter is not itself alive. Vitality, 
 whether seen in a single cell of proto- 
 plasm, or in the human brain, is a thing sni 
 generis, distinct from matter, and incapa- 
 ble of being generated out of matter.
 
 140 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The theory, however, that all the higher 
 organized life of the universe has arisen 
 by evolution out of lower forms although 
 the material never gives rise to the men- 
 tal, or the non-vital to the vital seems 
 much more tenable than the counter-theory 
 to which I have referred, namely, that there 
 is within the universe a fixed but indefi- 
 nitely vast number of distinct types, corre- 
 sponding to the eternal ideas of Plato, each 
 of which is imprisoned within its own 
 domain, and is kept up by inheritance 
 and succession only within its limited 
 area. 
 
 It should be noted that those who ex- 
 plain the rise of every new organized pro- 
 duct by simple evolution demand for the 
 accomplishment of the process a length of 
 time that is almost inconceivably vast. It 
 is affirmed by their opponents that the 
 present universe carries within it the signs 
 of a comparatively recent origin, and that 
 it is traveling at no distant date (though 
 it may be measured by millions of years) 
 to extinction ; so that its beginning and 
 its ending are alike evidenced by, and in- 
 volved in, its present state. This affirma- 
 tion rests on evidence that is probably
 
 ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. 141 
 
 quite hidden to one who is not a specialist 
 in physical science. Certainly, if either 
 the unscientific or the speculative mind 
 is to receive it, it must be received on 
 trust. No evidence appreciable by the or- 
 dinary mind has been advanced to prove 
 such a limited duration to the existing 
 matter of the universe, or of the globe we 
 inhabit, as to render the evolution of all its 
 organized products impossible within the 
 period. 
 
 Let us suppose, however, the fact of evo- 
 lution to be proved, and every missing link 
 in the chain of derivation to be supplied, 
 the question would remain, From what is 
 tlie whole scries evolved? If the higher is 
 evolved from the lower, as a fowl is from 
 the egg, and the man from the child, from 
 what is the lower derived ? What started 
 the whole process of derivation ? If no 
 hiatus is permissible between any link in 
 the chain of organization, whence did the 
 first in the series proceed ? Suppose that, 
 in our regress towards the beginnings of 
 
 o o o 
 
 life, we have reached the lowermost step 
 of the descending scale, are we at liberty 
 to suppose a hiatus in the orderly develop- 
 ment, millions of ages ago, when the first
 
 142 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 germs of vitality started into being ? Did 
 the vital proceed by a still remoter devel- 
 opment from the non-vital ? or, was it 
 created by a fiat of volition ? or, has it al- 
 ivays existed in some form or other as an 
 eternal constituent of the universe ? I do 
 not see how we can escape from the last 
 alternative. The first is the evolution 
 theory in its completest form, which as- 
 signs a material origin to all spiritual phe- 
 nomena. The second is quite as arbitrary, 
 if it be thrust into the series of evolving 
 phenomena far back in the process, at 
 an imaginary creative epoch in the morn- 
 ing of time, as it is when capriciously 
 introduced between the links of the causal 
 nexus now. The supposition that it is 
 more likely to have taken place in a dis- 
 tant age than at present is like relegating 
 the age of miracle to an imaginary mythic 
 time, when earth was nearer heaven than 
 now, and so degrading the idea. \Ye are the 
 victims of metaphoric illusion in supposing 
 instantaneous creation to be one whit ea- 
 sier "in the beginning" than now. If time 
 has had no "morning" and will have no 
 "evening," creation is as real at the present 
 moment as it ever was. The notion that
 
 ETHICAL rirn.osoriiY. 143 
 
 theism is inconsistent with a belief in the 
 eternity of matter has proceeded from the 
 fear that, with matter eternally provided, 
 Deity would have less to do ; or that the 
 instantaneous summoning of the raw mate- 
 rial of the universe out of non-existence was 
 necessary to prove his omnipotence. But 
 with eternal matter and eternal life, the 
 superintendence of the universe, and the 
 building up of the organized forms which 
 have successively appeared, would require 
 the pervading presence of an Opifcx innndi, 
 no less than if the matter itself had been 
 created by him. If matter be not eternal, 
 its first emergence into being is a miracle, 
 beside which all others dwindle into abso- 
 lute insignificance. But, as has often been 
 pointed out, the very process is unthink- 
 able ; the sudden apocalypse of a material 
 world out of blank nonentity cannot be 
 imagined ; its emergence into order out of 
 chaos, when "without form, and void" of 
 life, is merely a poetic rendering of the 
 doctrine of its slow evolution. 
 
 Theism has nothing to fear, but much to 
 gain, from a scientific doctrine of evolu- 
 tion. Behind the proof of the gradual de- 
 velopment of life lies the question of its
 
 T44 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 origin and its Evolver ; and so long as 
 evolution cannot give a material answer to 
 the question, whence came t/ie force that 
 gave to matter its first impulse towards 
 the development of organic life, it is 
 powerless to suggest, far less to establish, 
 any atheistic doctrine. On the other hand, 
 the evolution of organic life is the grand- 
 est conceivable illustration of the working 
 of divine agency not detached from, but 
 inseparably upbound with, the life of the 
 universe. Those who explain the present 
 cosmical order, and all the varieties of ex- 
 isting organization by development, virtu- 
 ally see in it the disclosure or "revelation" 
 of several divine attributes, while they af- 
 firm that their 
 
 faith is large in time, 
 And that which shapes it to a perfect end. 
 
 Thus, the truth of the principle of evolu- 
 tion not as explanatory of the origin, 
 but of the procession and development of 
 material forms may be conceded, with- 
 out peril to any verifiable truth of theol- 
 ogy- 
 Is it equally relevant as an explanation 
 of the phenomena of character, and the 
 mysteries of our intellectual and moral
 
 ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. 145 
 
 being? Can we account for all the varie- 
 ties in the practice of the race, as the 
 progressive development of tendencies 
 originally very different, but which have 
 undergone modification and change during 
 thousands of generations, and in the course 
 of millions upon millions of experiments? 
 Or do we meet with phenomena within the 
 moral sphere, which are inexplicable by 
 such an extension of the theory of evolution, 
 -phenomena which are better explained 
 by another hypothesis, and which are ir- 
 reducible under the all-embracing unity of 
 the former ? This is our inquiry now. 
 
 In the first place, the fact that the intel- 
 lectual and moral consciousness of the race 
 has grown or been developed from lower 
 and even dissimilar states must be as 
 frankly conceded, as the rise and develop- 
 ment of material organization is conceded. 
 The facts which prove and illustrate this 
 process of growth form a most interesting 
 chapter in the history of human progress. 
 They are indeed a summary of civilization 
 itself. But our inquiry lies behind such an 
 induction of historical facts and instances, 
 however complete and satisfactory it might 
 be made.
 
 146 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 In the second place, we have to examine 
 the nature of the process of evolution more 
 carefully. Suppose that the present ver- 
 dicts of the moral consciousness have been 
 evolved out of lower ones, may not the 
 process be more accurately described as 
 one of emergence, than as one of creation 
 by development ? May not the " increas- 
 ing purpose " of human history be an in- 
 creasingly accurate interpretation or read- 
 ing of the reality of things ? In a process 
 of evolution all the stages are of equal 
 value and significance, The very terms 
 "high " and "low," "advanced" and "im- 
 mature," have no significance, except one 
 that is relative to the insight of the individ- 
 ual who uses them. A standard of intrinsic 
 worth there is none. Hence it is that an 
 experiential theory of the origin of know- 
 ledge and of morals fits into a doctrine of 
 
 o 
 
 evolution ; and conversely, the psycholog- 
 ical facts that suggest a non-experiential 
 theory of knowledge and of morals are 
 amongst the most formidable difficulties in 
 the way of the doctrine of evolution. It is 
 true that a perception of the a priori or 
 non-experiential character of knowledge, in 
 any of its forms, as it dawns gradually on
 
 ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. 147 
 
 the mind of the child, arises out of a lower 
 state of confused subjective groping. But 
 the lower state does not generate the higher. 
 With the unconscious awakening of intelli- 
 gence there is a more accurate apprehen- 
 sion of the facts of existence, and a pro- 
 gressive approach is made to a knowledge 
 of the essence and reality of things. It is 
 altogether unwarrantable, however, to af- 
 firm that, if we go back to the beginning of 
 things, we may assume that all that now is 
 human lay potentially, if not in embryo, 
 within the primitive ascidian ; that there 
 was a time when intelligence and morality 
 were not, and that these are " things of 
 yesterday " within the slow evolving uni- 
 verse. That the lower contained the higher 
 within it is a gratuitous assumption. It 
 would be more consistent to say that the 
 higher did not exist at all, until it came 
 upon the stage of being. This would in- 
 volve the assumption of a new creation - 
 the very assumption from which evolution 
 seeks to free us. It is surely more philo- 
 sophical, to suppose that when a new or- 
 ganism appears, its differentia is not due 
 to anything that was latent in its progen- 
 itor, but to a fresh development of the
 
 148 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 prolific life of the universe, issuing orderly 
 and incessantly from the fountain-head of 
 existence, and taking shape moment by 
 moment in new forms of organization. 
 
 There is a further obstacle in the way 
 of our admitting the unrestricted sway of 
 evolution within the sphere of intellectual 
 life and moral agency. If it is difficult to 
 see how the knowledge of a priori truths 
 can be derived from mere sensation, it is 
 still more difficult to see how moral free- 
 dom can he developed out of necessity. 
 
 I do not now enter on the great contro- 
 versy as to the nature of free-will. The 
 question of the ages is not to be discussed 
 in a paragraph. But this much may be 
 said : if we have evidence to warrant the 
 belief in moral autonomy, in such a free- 
 dom as constitutes the individual a morally 
 creative cause, while the causal nexus is 
 maintained in its integrity, it is clear 
 that this freedom cannot be itself " the 
 creature of circumstances." Evolution and 
 necessitarianism go hand in hand. They 
 are different ways of expressing the same 
 thing. If human nature is wholly evolved, 
 man is at best a cunningly devised machine, 
 an automaton. He is what he is, exclu-
 
 I-.TIUCAL I'fllLOSOl'HY. 149 
 
 sively because of what other things have 
 been, and because of what they have made 
 him. It is unnecessary to indicate the 
 nature of the evidence we have for a tran- 
 scendental freedom. But it is clear that 
 if evolution contains the whole truth on 
 this subject, if there is no complementary 
 or balancing truth on the other side, moral 
 freedom must be renounced. On the other 
 hand, if moral freedom be a fact, it is a 
 singularly stubborn one, which will neither 
 bend nor fit into a sectarian theory of evo- 
 lution. 
 
 If necessity and automatism be true, and 
 if the evolving stream of tendency be com- 
 petent of itself to perform the feat of edu- 
 cing all the moral life of the universe out 
 of elements that are originally non-moral, 
 the evidence should be accessible to the 
 unbiased student of the problem. Why 
 should we distrust our moral intuitions, 
 and accept the materialist solution of our 
 genealogy, unless the evidence be over- 
 whelmingly clear, and cogent ? It does 
 not appeal to us with any evidence dare ct 
 distinctc, as Descartes would have it. On 
 the contrary there is an a priori presump- 
 tion against it, in the explicit testimony of
 
 150 JESS AYS JN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 consciousness to the power of moral orig- 
 ination. Why am I to believe that a mate- 
 rial condition of the molecules of the brain 
 is the cause of a state of consciousness, and 
 not to believe that a state of consciousness 
 can ever be an originating cause of change 
 in the molecules of the brain ? There is 
 action and reaction between the material 
 and the mental. But it is not an equally 
 necessitated action and reaction. It is not 
 reciprocal, in the sense that both are solely 
 determined by their antecedents. The spe- 
 ciality of the action of the human will and 
 consciousness lies in their spontaneity and 
 freedom. 
 
 The growth of ethical sentiment and 
 dogma out of prehistoric elements, during 
 the innumerable eras of past existence, 
 must be admitted to be as certain as is the 
 progress of each individual from the blank 
 consciousness of childhood to the adult 
 state ; and the authority of the developed 
 product is not invalidated by its history 
 being traced, and the entire series of the 
 steps of its development disclosed. That 
 human character should grow, as well as 
 the physical organism to which it is re- 
 lated, is merely a corollary of its existence.
 
 ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. 151 
 
 That it should have come to be what it is 
 by a process of development is not only no 
 disparagement to it, but is absolutely es- 
 sential to its existence in any form what- 
 ever. Change anil development are twin 
 sisters. 
 
 For the same reason, it is self-evident 
 that what is now adult in the race, having 
 once been rudimentary, the language of its 
 maturity must be totally unlike the lispings 
 of its infancy. This fact, however, and 
 even the discovery of the precise law or 
 process of its development, does not fully 
 explain the progress, because it casts no 
 light on the nature of the Cause that has 
 determined the advance, or the propelling 
 force that has regulated the evolution. 
 After all our scientific and historical facts 
 are ascertained, the philosophical question 
 remains, Whence, or out of what prior 
 elements, have the moral faculty and the 
 moral feelings been developed ? Some of 
 those who find in evolution an adequate 
 explanation of all the problems of philoso- 
 phy seem to imagine that by simply affirm- 
 ing the groivtli of ethical sentiment and 
 idea, they have solved the puzzle of their 
 origin. Let the fact of development be
 
 152 ASSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 granted, not as an argumentative con- 
 cession, but as an elementary and almost 
 self-evident postulate, the question still 
 remains, Did the immature give rise to the 
 more mature, or merely go before it ? Did 
 the inferior originate the superior, or sim- 
 ply precede it in time ? 
 
 That the higher succeeded the lower is 
 evident ; but it does not follow that it 
 sprang out of it, in such a way that all the 
 actual and potential elements of its life may 
 be said to have been latent or contained 
 within the lower. The phenomena of sim- 
 ple succession do not explain a single oc- 
 currence ; and the fact that a progress is 
 seen from inferior forms to superior types 
 in Nature does not explain the cause of 
 the rise, or assign a reason for the advance. 
 That the cause is contained within the 
 phenomena themselves, and is not due to a 
 force, distinct from the phenomena though 
 inseparable from them, and pervading the 
 entire series is a dogmatic appendix, 
 which the experience-philosophy superadds 
 to the facts which it experientially investi- 
 gates. 
 
 Merely to affirm that the moral faculty 
 has grown unconsciously in the race, as it
 
 KTHICAl. 1'HILOSOPHY. 153 
 
 grows in the conscious life of each man, is 
 not to make a great discovery in morals, 
 but to state a commonplace which every 
 ethical school admits ; although the intui- 
 tional moralists may not have perceived its 
 extent so clearly, or admitted its signifi- 
 cance so fully, as their rivals have done. 
 To affirm that because it is developed it 
 is also derived from the elements that 
 foster its development is the illicit infer- 
 ence which the derivative moralists either 
 add to, or confound with, the admitted 
 fact. 
 
 Because the consciousness of the child 
 is a seeming blank, his mind to use the 
 old illustration like a sheet of white 
 paper on which impressions are gradually 
 imprinted from without, was the ground 
 on which the experiential philosophers of 
 the past denied that there were any latent 
 elements within it or behind, which expe- 
 rience did not create, but only evolved, or 
 brought to light. Within the present gen- 
 eration the controversy has merely widened 
 out, from the individual to the race. The 
 genesis of all the faculties is now sought 
 through a wider investigation of prehistoric 
 conditions, and the subsequent struggle for
 
 154 ESSAYS AV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 existence. But it is only the area whence 
 the inference is deduced that has been 
 changed. The process of deduction re- 
 mains the same. If there was anything to 
 warrant the old contention that what is de- 
 veloped in the individual is not the simple 
 product of experience, the mind of the 
 infant being more like a palimpsest than an 
 unwritten parchment, precisely the same 
 contention is valid now, in reference to the 
 larger and slower evolution of the histori- 
 cal consciousness of the race. The con- 
 troversy of to-day is really the old contro- 
 versy between Socrates and Protagoras, 
 between Plato and Aristotle, between Leib- 
 nitz and Locke, between Kant and Hume, 
 "writ larger,"- -through the amazing de- 
 velopment of physical science, biological 
 research, and the prehistoric archaeology 
 of our time. That the ingenious theories 
 of the teachers of evolution have filled 
 up for us the possible outlines of a most 
 interesting chapter in prehistoric archae- 
 ology is undoubted. The psychological 
 facts which Darwin has signalized are im- 
 portant factors in the ethical development 
 of the race ; but he has not solved the 
 ethical problem, and no amount of success-
 
 ETHICAL I'HILOSOrilY. 155 
 
 ful labor, along the lines in which he and 
 his successors have worked, will solve it. 
 
 I admit that, were it proved that the 
 moral faculty was derived as well as devel- 
 oped, its present decisions would not nec- 
 essarily be invalidated. The child of ex- 
 perience has a father whose teachings are 
 grave and peremptory. An earth-born 
 rule may be as stringent, though it is not 
 so august, as one derived from a celestial 
 source. It does not even follow that a be- 
 lief in the material origin of spiritual exist- 
 ence accomp'anied by a corresponding 
 decay of belief in immortality must nec- 
 essarily lead to a relaxation of the moral 
 fibre of the race. It is certain that it has 
 often done so ; but it is equally certain that 
 there have been individuals, and great his- 
 torical communities, in which the absence 
 of the latter belief has neither weakened 
 moral earnestness, nor prevented devo- 
 tional fervor. It is clear, therefore, that 
 we should no more discredit what has 
 come to be what it is by a process of de- 
 velopment than we should distrust the ver- 
 dicts of the moral faculty, because future 
 experience may on many points enlarge or 
 widen them. It may even be said that the
 
 156 ESSAYS IX PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 derivation of a faculty out of elements orig- 
 inally unlike itself, bringing with it the au- 
 thority of accumulated experience, indicates 
 the working of a great cosmic law which 
 gathers force from the width of the area it 
 sweeps, and the time it has taken to evolve 
 its products. It comes to us now with the 
 prestige of a remote antiquity, it can ap- 
 peal to the precedent of a million genera- 
 tions ; and, since it has alone survived in 
 the struggle for existence, it is fortified in 
 its appeal by the failure of every rival that 
 has for a time competed with it, but been 
 gradually thrust aside. 
 
 If this be conceded, we must note with 
 accuracy what it is we have reached and 
 found. We observe a continued advance in 
 the ethical conceptions of the race ; but we 
 discover no fixed standard of action, no 
 immutable canon, and hence no absolute 
 criterion of morality. Since the human race 
 is still changing and developing, fresh al- 
 terations will be produced, by the "increas- 
 ing purpose" of time, in the moral concep- 
 tions and feelings of the race, as certainly 
 and inevitably as changes on the earth's 
 surface will be produced by physical agents. 
 If we have no principle other than evolu-
 
 ETHICAL rirn.osortiY. 157 
 
 tion to guide us, nothing underneath the 
 linear series of changes which we call de- 
 velopment, which gives to these their char- 
 acter and explanation, we are able to call 
 one thing "good," and another "evil," only 
 because the forces that sway society have 
 happened to develop in one direction, and 
 not in another. I do not say that they 
 might have as easily tended in a direction 
 different from the one they have taken. 
 The fact that only one has been taken, 
 after the myriad struggles of the race, may 
 be held as proof that, to a human nature 
 such as ours, one only was possible. But, 
 on the theory of evolution, the goal is not 
 yet reached. There not only may but there 
 must be endless future development. \Ye 
 have not attained to anything higher than 
 a temporary and therefore a conventional 
 rule of expedient action. An absolute 
 standard is impossible. Since our human- 
 ity itself is in a perpetual process of "be- 
 coming," its rule of action always " about 
 to be," never absolutely "is." It is essen- 
 tially relative, necessarily contingent, inces- 
 santly changing. What is valid for the 
 human race to-day may cease to be valid 
 to-morrow, and must cease to be valid in the
 
 158 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 long run. It will become obsolete through 
 the slow procession of the ages, and the 
 stealthily superannuating hand of time. 
 Can a rule which thus disintegrates and 
 dies away command the reverential suffrage 
 of the race, even while it lasts ? Its per- 
 manence in any one form being momentary 
 its deepest characteristic being its in- 
 cessant change it may be questioned if 
 we can ever really know what we are asked 
 to reverence. 
 
 All "becoming" tends to "being" as its 
 end, or it is meaningless ; and we can only 
 explain "becoming" by presupposing "be- 
 ing." If, therefore, what \ve have to explain 
 is always about to be, but never actually 
 is, if it is all process and no product, or 
 if the product is simply process prolonged 
 forever, there is no intelligible meaning 
 in the process itself. Its very rationality 
 disappears. In other words, some know- 
 ledge of the end is necessary to give ration- 
 ality to the means. It is the goal that 
 makes the race intelligible, the port to 
 which the vessel is bound that explains 
 the voyage. In any case, we must have a 
 starting-point and an ending place ; two 
 termini, to mark out the course and differ-
 
 F.TIIfCAL rilfLOSOrilY. 159 
 
 entiate it, else the intermediate stages are 
 unintelligible. But, while we cannot get 
 within sight of these termini by the in- 
 ductions of experience, whether by an 
 imaginative regress to the fountain-head of 
 history, or by a surmise of its destination, 
 we find them disclosed and explained at 
 every stage of the intermediate journey, in 
 the consciousness of a law that is auto- 
 cratic, universal, and ideal. 
 
 Not that we can discern the beginnings 
 of morality, or anticipate the development 
 to which it may attain. Even were such 
 surmises or forecasts possible, they would 
 be of no use as data towards the solution 
 of the problem, inasmuch as they would be 
 either gathered historically from the field 
 of experience, or inductively inferred by 
 the aid of analogy. What we reach, how- 
 ever, transcends experience, without being 
 independent of it ; nay, by the very help 
 and teaching of experience, we outsoar it. 
 
 The chief point to be noted, in connec- 
 tion with a derivative theory of morals, is 
 the position in which it all leaves us in 
 the exercise of moral approbation and dis- 
 approbation. On the principle of evolu- 
 tion, all the phases through which ethical
 
 l6o ESSAYS /A 7 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 opinion and sentiment have passed were of 
 equal validity for the particular stage which 
 human nature had reached ; and, though 
 we may contrast, we may not judge these 
 phases by the standards or canons of to- 
 day. The fierce struggles of the early 
 stage, instead of being condemned, are to 
 be regarded as the necessary steps of an 
 " eternal process moving on " by which 
 adult opinion and sentiment have been 
 reached ; just as the unlimited strife 
 amongst the lower organisms in Nature 
 has resulted in an elevation of the type, 
 and in the survival of the fittest to live. 
 
 The advocates of empiricism and evolu- 
 tion, who have recently entered the lists 
 as champions of their own position against 
 the intuitional moralists, consistently af- 
 firm that there is no absolute standard 
 of right and wrong: that it is the verdict 
 of society based on the unconscious per- 
 ceptions of utility transmitted through a 
 thousand generations that makes a thing 
 either right or wrong. Things are not to 
 be done by us, because they are intrinsi- 
 cally right ; they are right, because we do 
 them ; that is to say, because the race, not 
 the individual (who may be capricious), has
 
 ETHICAL rHlLOSOl'HY. \f>\ 
 
 agreed, through the consenting experience 
 of centuries, to do them. Intuitional mor- 
 alists, on the contrary, maintain that certain 
 things are to be done, and others to be ab- 
 stained from, in virtue of an intrinsic right- 
 ness or \vrongness attaching to the acts 
 themselves ; and that the assent of the 
 race to a common rule (with manifold and 
 inevitable exceptions, which both prove and 
 illustrate it) is due, either to its progressive 
 discernment of that intrinsic Tightness, or 
 to the unconscious sway of a principle of 
 right reason which ' worketh out of view," 
 and which, though evolved by experience, is 
 not its child. 
 
 Intuitional moralists affirm that the 
 authority of the moral consciousness is 
 weakened and degraded on every theory of 
 evolution, ivJiicJi is also a theory of deri-ca- 
 tion. If the progressive experience of the 
 race, refined, disciplined, and consolidated 
 through many generations, has given rise 
 to the moral faculty, the authority of that 
 which has been thus derived is essentially 
 affected by the disclosure of its genealogy. 
 It is idle to allege that the discovery of its 
 origin in mere sensation is not (as has been 
 said) " to degrade the progeny, but to enno-
 
 1 62 ASSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ble the ancestry ; " for if the honor of hav- 
 ing produced a thing so totally unlike itself 
 is conceded to sensation, the belief in its 
 material origin may lessen the sanctity of 
 virtue, while it suggests its commonplace- 
 ness. It may also chill the ardor with 
 which virtue is pursued. 
 
 It is quite true that man may reverence 
 that which he supposes to have sprung 
 from the dust of the ground, as much as 
 that which he imagines to have descended 
 from the skies ; but, dispensing with both 
 these metaphoric modes of thought, we 
 cannot reverence anything so devoid of 
 character and coherence as a mere process 
 of becoming, or stream of tendency, an 
 endless genealogy without an original, a 
 series of phenomena of which the only cer- 
 tain thing is that A is the antecedent of B, 
 B of C, and so on ad infinitmn. Moreover, 
 in tracing the origin of the moral faculty 
 by the light of evolution alone we cannot 
 rest at mere sensation. \Ye must go much 
 farther back, and cannot pause consistently 
 anywhere ; just as, in our anticipations of 
 change in the future, we cannot rest at any 
 conceivable goal, but must believe that a 
 change in the moral consensus of the race
 
 ETHICAL I'lIII.OSOrilY. 163 
 
 will go on, till something totally unlike 
 the present is reached. Both in our re- 
 gress and in our progress, phenomena will 
 be found which bear no resemblance to the 
 present, but which nevertheless are, on the 
 one hand, the elements out of which it has 
 come, and on the other the product in 
 which it must disappear. In this analysis 
 of the moral sense we must go as far back 
 and as far forward as we can ; and when 
 the torch of history fails us, and the paler 
 light of archaeology fades in the dimness 
 of prehistoric surmise, the experience-phi- 
 losophy tells us to step backwards into the 
 darkness as trustfully as when we began 
 our explanation of the facts of conscious- 
 ness by its aid. \Ve are not to stop at 
 primitive man, or the primitive animal, 
 but go back to the primitive protoplasm. 
 The origin of the moral faculty must be 
 sought beyond the twilight of sensation, 
 in the blank midnight of the non-vital and 
 purely physical forces. Conversely, we 
 must suppose it not only possible but cer- 
 tain that in the millenniums of the future 
 a wholly different product will be evolved 
 out of the morals of our nineteenth cen- 
 tury. \Ye cannot diaw a line, and say,
 
 164 ASSAY'S 7.V PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 " Lo ! Jicre, across the line, the moral 
 faculty is formed, is mature ; whereas, 
 there, on the other side of it, it was un- 
 formed and immature." It is always 
 forming, maturing, changing ; and it must 
 undergo transformations into products as 
 unlike the present, as these are unlike the 
 contractile sensations of the ascidians in 
 primeval seas. All things, according to 
 the theory, are in perpetual motion ; and 
 the TroAe/Aos Trure/j Trui'Twr of Heraclitus is as 
 fully applicable to the paternity of the 
 moral faculty as it is to the origin of the 
 physical cosmos. In short, the universe 
 tells us of the "ebb and flow," but not of 
 the 
 
 Ever-during Power, 
 
 And central peace, subsisting at the heart 
 Of endless agitation. 
 
 In opposition to the derivative theory of 
 morals, the appeal of the intuitionalist is 
 still, as it used to be in olden controversy, 
 to the facts of consciousness ; and, in the 
 sphere of ethics, to the Absolute revealed 
 in and disclosed to consciousness. 
 
 Students of the same problem, however, 
 all appealing to consciousness, give us, as 
 the result of that appeal, a different and
 
 ETHICAL PHILOSOrJIY. 165 
 
 opposite verdict. Like the rival sects with 
 the same authoritative standard, the schools 
 of Philosophy all turn to consciousness for 
 their final testimony. And so, 
 
 This is the book where each his dogma seeks, 
 And this the book where each his dogma finds. 
 
 Nevertheless, we cannot dispense with the 
 appeal. Consciousness is, and always must 
 be, our final resort in every controversy. 
 As we have no infallible arbiter, and if 
 we had one, his decisions would require the 
 interpretation of consciousness, all de- 
 bate must end in, and all inquiry ultimately 
 repose upon, the testimony of a disciplined 
 reason, on enlightened consciousness. This 
 interior light, directing without dictating, 
 and not the inductions of sense-percep- 
 tion, derived from objective phenomena, 
 is our only valid guide, and our sole arbiter 
 in disputed problems. 
 
 We perceive 
 
 Within ourselves a measure and a rule, 
 Which to the sun of truth we can apply, 
 That shines for us, and shines for all mankind. 
 
 If we have evidence sufficient to warrant 
 the conclusion that the phenomena of the 
 moral consciousness are not explicable by 
 evolution in the lifetime of the individual,
 
 1 66 ASSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 our contention is, that evolution is incom- 
 petent to explain them, suppose you extend 
 it to a million generations. If we cannot 
 explain the origin of moral judgment by 
 the principle of association in any single 
 life, how should association be competent 
 to explain its genesis for the race at large ? 
 If duty does not arise out of utility by the 
 ascending steps of gradation in a single 
 lifetime, why should a mere lengthening of 
 the period enable it to do so ? In the very 
 limited field open to experimental research, 
 we have no instance of the one passing into 
 the other, or giving rise to it ; and we can- 
 not concede that mere length of time will 
 make amends for what the threescore years 
 and ten of individual life, and the few thou- 
 sand years of verifiable history, have failed 
 to start. 
 
 If, wnthin the range of human experience, 
 we saw the process beginning if we could 
 trace the rudimentary signs of such a pro- 
 cess at work, as the transformation of a 
 sensation into a moral perception, or a dis- 
 cernment of utility into a conviction of 
 duty, we might by analogy suppose the 
 process indefinitely extended, its area en- 
 larged, and its significance enhanced. But
 
 ETHICAL 
 
 the experimental fact, which should be the 
 basis of the argument, is wanting. It is 
 alleged that we have frequent instances of 
 the love and pursuit of virtue, as a means to 
 happiness, passing into a love and pursuit 
 of it as an end, and for its own sake. But 
 in none of the examples cited can we be 
 sure that the love and pursuit belonged to 
 these two separate categories in the re- 
 spective stages. \Ve do not know that 
 there was not a love and pursuit of it for its 
 own sake, though more dimly, at the first, 
 and more explicitly afterwards ; while con- 
 siderations of utility may have been con- 
 joined with this in both stages, at one time 
 prominently, and again more faintly. 
 
 Many efforts have been made to trace 
 the parentage of conscience to elements 
 unlike itself. Mr. Maudslcy tries to find 
 its root in the most animal of all our in- 
 stincts. More recently it has been said 
 that the conviction of an inherent right to 
 live is the germ out of which it has been 
 evolved ; a conviction which takes articu- 
 late shape in the proposition, " No one has 
 a right to kill me," but which existed, in a 
 rudimentary form, long before it expressed 
 itself thus definitely.
 
 1 68 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 If the conviction, " I have a right to live, 
 no one has a right to kill me," be the germ 
 out of which conscience has grown, we 
 have first to account for the rise of that 
 conviction itself, out of a state in which it 
 was the normal law of the universe for the 
 stronger to kill, and for the weaker to be 
 killed. The whole difficulty is slurred 
 over, if our explanation starts with a fully 
 formed sense of personality, and the devel- 
 oped feeling of an inherent right to live. 
 The problem to be solved is the reversal of 
 the primitive rule of universal war, and in- 
 discriminate struggle, when the only right 
 was that of the strongest, and when no in- 
 dividual could have any right to live, be- 
 cause his strength was simply relative to 
 the number and vigor of his competitors. 
 The state supposed to be evolved out of 
 this is a state in which, not only the 
 stronger members of the race, but even the 
 weakest individuals, come to feel that they 
 have an inherent riglit to live. I3ut can 
 evolution, which is a mere process of be- 
 coming, explain this? Is it that, when the 
 stronger have become proficient in the art 
 of pushing their weaker comrades aside 
 when they have vanquished opposition and
 
 KTUICM. PHILOSOPHY. 1^9 
 
 had a surfeit of slaughter their sense of 
 prowess gives rise to a new feeling that 
 they have done well ? Do they, in virtue 
 of their success in killing, win for them- 
 selves a right to survive ? Because of the 
 number of their victims, do they purchase 
 for themselves immunity from destruction ? 
 If so, and it is difficult to see how other- 
 wise it could be a case of evolution, pure 
 and simple, this is an instance of a prin- 
 ciple evolved out of its own opposite ! 
 The hiatus between the stage in which it 
 was natural that one animal should kill and 
 that others should be killed, and the stage 
 in which this became ////natural, and the 
 conviction sprang up that each had a right 
 to live and to continue in life, is one that 
 cannot be bridged over by any conceivable 
 process of evolution, unless it be evolution 
 by antagonism. The one was a state in 
 which our animal ancestors were wholly 
 destitute of a sense of right, and could 
 have no notion of a claim to live. 
 
 For why ? because the good old rule 
 Sufficed them the simple plan, 
 
 That they should take who have the power,* 
 And they should keep who can. 
 
 The other is a state, not different from
 
 IyO ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 this in degree, but diametrically opposite 
 to it in kind, a state in which each indi- 
 vidual discerns the worth of his own per- 
 sonality, and his inherent right to exist. 
 
 If the chasm between these two stages 
 is unbridged by evolution, does it fare 
 any better with the next step in the pro- 
 cess of development ? Suppose that the 
 persuasion, "I have a right to live," has 
 been gradually manufactured out of its 
 own opposite, how does the former give 
 rise to the conviction that another individ- 
 ual, like me, has an equal right to live, and 
 to live well ? The prolonged life of the one 
 was at first secured only by the constant 
 death of competitors, in the struggle for 
 existence. How did this give place to the 
 conviction that the others who might 
 very possibly wish to kill the successful 
 and surviving individual had an equal 
 right to live ? No theory of evolution can 
 answer this question, as no mere process of 
 development can solve the problem of the 
 genealogy of moral ideas. 
 
 Further, we have experimental proof, 
 within the limits of our conscious life, that 
 the Authority to which we bow is not de- 
 rived from anything lower than itself. It
 
 ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. I /I 
 
 carries the sign of its own absoluteness 
 and non-contingency in the autocratic man- 
 ner in which it announces itself. In the 
 phenomena of conscience, we find the traces 
 of a principle, 
 
 Deep seated in our mystic frame, 
 
 not evolved out of the lower elements of 
 appetency and desire, but controlling these, 
 as an alter ego, " in us, yet not of us." Ap- 
 pearing at first simply as one amongst the 
 other phenomena of consciousness, it mys- 
 teriously overshadows them ; and suggests, 
 in the occasional flashes of light sent 
 across the darker background of moral ex- 
 perience, the working of a personality be- 
 hind our own. As the seed quickens in 
 the furrow when the surrounding elements 
 cooperate to elicit its energy, so this latent 
 faculty, awakening from its slumber dur- 
 ing the process of moral education, is not 
 the simple product of that process. The 
 stimulus it receives merely liberates an 
 imprisoned power. Thus liberated, it dis- 
 cerns its own original, not by retrospec- 
 tive glances along the narrow lines of indi- 
 vidual or cosmological development ; but, 
 bv a direct intuition of the reason, it gains
 
 172 ESSAYS JN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Fresh power to commune with the invisible world, 
 And hear the mighty stream of tendency 
 Uttering, for elevation of our thought, 
 A clear sonorous voice, inaudible 
 To the vast multitude.
 
 ECLECTICISM. 
 
 I PROPOSE to discuss some of the fea- 
 tures of Eclecticism, a philosophy which has 
 received but scant justice from its critical 
 successors. 
 
 It is both a system, and a tendency ; a 
 formal philosophical doctrine, and a spirit 
 of philosophizing. At present it is not 
 necessary to consider it historically, either 
 in its strength or its weakness, as it ap- 
 peared in the third century at Alexandria 
 and Rome, at Athens in the fourth and 
 filth, or at Paris in the nineteenth ; nor to 
 deal with its secondary developments in 
 social organizations, artistic schools, or re- 
 ligious systems. It is more important to 
 ascertain its general speculative drift, its 
 leading features, and permanent tendency. 
 These may be seen, not only from the 
 phases which it has assumed when formed 
 into a coherent doctrine, but even more 
 characteristically from its unconscious pres- 
 ence within the lines and under the limits
 
 174 zssAys LV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the systems which have ignored it. 
 Wherever the effort to reconcile the claims 
 of rival doctrines has taken the place of a 
 one-sided advocacy of special views, the re- 
 sult, to the extent of the reconciliation, has 
 been eclectic. 
 
 The term, however, is unfortunately 
 misleading, as it seems to indicate the 
 really elementary process of gathering to- 
 gether bits of systems, and arranging 
 them in what must be at the best an arti- 
 ficial patchwork. No wonder that the re- 
 sult of a mere collection of memorabilia, 
 however carefully made, should be a pro- 
 duct without unity, coherence, or vitality. 
 A system that resolved itself into a " golden 
 treasury " of elegant extracts would deserve 
 the neglect of all competent logicians, and 
 of every serious thinker. 1 And this is the 
 ungenerous and inaccurate charge to which 
 Eclecticism the system suffering from 
 
 1 On the same day on which this lecture was de- 
 livered, Dr. Martineau, in a profound and noble utter- 
 ance from the Principal's Chair in Manchester New 
 College, spoke of ' an eclectic commonplace book of 
 favorite beliefs " as " the last resort of superannuated 
 philosophy.'' This remark will be appreciated perhaps 
 most of all by those who carefully distinguish between 
 " the commonplace book '' and the system and spirit of 
 Eclecticism.
 
 I-'.CLKCTICISM. 175 
 
 its defective title is sometimes exposed. 
 It is difficult, however, to find a better 
 word to describe it than this confessedly 
 inaccurate and misleading one. The name 
 of no system of philosophy is altogether 
 adequate. The words " Idealist " and " Real- 
 ist," "Ontologist" and "Experientialist," 
 although convenient as indicating certain 
 philosophical tendencies, are all inappropri- 
 ate in some of their applications, and cannot 
 be used with absolute rigor. The terms 
 " Intuitionalism " and " Utilitarianism " are 
 each misleading. The inadequacy of the 
 word used to describe it is thus a misfor- 
 tune which Eclecticism shares in common 
 with every other system of opinion. 
 
 Keeping in view, therefore, what has 
 already been said, viz., that its essential 
 features exist in many systems which dis- 
 own it, we shall find that the propositions 
 which lie at the basis of Eclecticism are 
 so self-evident, that in unfolding them we 
 may seem to be stating a series of truisms. 
 Out of their simplicity, however, profound- 
 ly important issues arise. 
 
 Eclecticism originates in the elementary 
 but constantly forgotten fact that there is 
 always truth on both sides of every great
 
 1/6 ASSAYS AY PHlLOSOl'HY. 
 
 controversy that has divided the thoughts 
 and feelings of mankind ; that error has 
 its origin usually, if not always in the 
 abuse "of truth, in the exaggeration or trav- 
 esty of fact ; that no intellectual doctrine 
 is absolutely and entirely false, or, root 
 and branch, a delusion ; that extravagance 
 in opinion usually proceeds from the ea- 
 gerness of devotees who carry true princi- 
 ples to false conclusions, and, in their 
 enthusiasm for a particular doctrine, for- 
 get its obverse. It is not that they are 
 wrong in the emphasis they throw on any 
 special truth, or group of truths. They 
 are only wrong in ignoring the fact that 
 each has a context dissimilar to itself, 
 though complementary and equally valid ; 
 and especially in forgetting that all major 
 truths are arranged in pairs, and may be 
 placed in the scales over against others of 
 equal weight and value ; so that, corre- 
 sponding to every important doctrine, there 
 is always one equally great which bal- 
 ances it on the opposite side. When it 
 is said of rival systems that they are each 
 "resistless in assault, but impotent in de- 
 fense," although I would prefer to say, 
 resistless in defense while impotent in as-
 
 E CL E C TIC ISM. I 7 7 
 
 sault, what is meant is, that there is a 
 citadel of strength (because a residuum of 
 truth) at the heart of the most erroneous 
 and extravagant, and that there is an ele- 
 ment of weakness (because a tendency to 
 bias or excess) associated with the truest 
 that a progressive civilization has evolved. 
 Thus the principle of Kclecticism contains 
 a very obvious theory of the nature of 
 truth and of error, and it offers an expla- 
 nation of their origin respectively. 
 
 Let us suppose two minds, of different 
 type or idiosyncracy, dealing with the same 
 problem, be it the origin of knowledge, or 
 the conditions of responsibility, a doctrine 
 of the beautiful, or a theory of conduct, 
 their hereditary intellectual tendencies 
 vary, their temperaments are not the 
 same, and their education has been differ- 
 ent. They therefore approach the prob- 
 lem from opposite sides. Necessarily, they 
 survey it in a different manner ; and their 
 interpretation, however accurate, must be 
 dissimilar. One will throw the stress on 
 the subjective side of human knowledge, 
 the other on the objective. The former, 
 starting from the Kgo, is idealistic 
 throughout ; the latter, beginning with
 
 178 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Nature, is materialistic to the close. The 
 one looks at man as a determined ele- 
 ment in the material cosmos, and his ethical 
 system is necessitarian ; the other regards 
 him as a free autonomous personality, and 
 his system is libertarian. These different 
 interpretations of the same problem, both 
 true at the root, generate controversy. 
 The differences increase ; and schools of 
 opinion arise, in which the opposite con- 
 clusions of the masters are intensified by 
 their less original pupils. The chasm be- 
 tween them gradually widens ; and, as the 
 conflict grows, the partisans of each sys- 
 tem retire to its strongholds, till the truth 
 which each most loudly asserts is denied 
 by its antagonist. The doctrines which 
 were at the first accepted on both sides 
 (on the one as major, and on the other as 
 minor) become party badges, and in the 
 end there is a fierce and sectarian denial 
 of the opposing system. In intellectual 
 and speculative theory, it is as in matters 
 personal, social, and national. A minute 
 divergence between two persons who are 
 perhaps both in the right widens into 
 a gigantic misunderstanding, or a slight 
 diplomatic difference ripens into an inter-
 
 ECLECTICISM 179 
 
 national quarrel. And if, in most national 
 quarrels, both nations are to blame, and 
 in the majority of political party-contests 
 neither side has a monopoly of justice, it is 
 precisely so in the strife of the philosophi- 
 cal sects, in the controversies between ar- 
 tistic schools, and the warfare of religious 
 parties. 
 
 Now suppose that the controversy be- 
 tween two philosophical sects has been 
 protracted and keen. As with every 
 other form of strife, the antagonism at 
 length dies away, and, in the calmer and 
 j uster mood which succeeds, a desire 
 springs up to reconcile, if possible, the 
 opposite claims. A retrospective study 
 of the controversy shows that the whole 
 truth lay with neither party, that each had 
 something real to defend, something worth 
 defending, and that the strife between 
 them was philosophically illegitimate ; al- 
 though, had there been no collision, the 
 characteristic merits of each would not 
 have been so prominently signalized. In 
 the case of diametrically opposite theories, 
 which negative each other, the excess of 
 both is neutralized ; and while each may 
 establish the truth of its own affirmation,
 
 ISO ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 its negative or aggressive tendency is held 
 in check by the mere presence of its oppo- 
 site. Thus the antagonism of the schools 
 preserves the philosophical world from the 
 intolerant usurpation of any one of them, 
 and brings out the special excellences of 
 each. 
 
 A state of perpetual controversy amongst 
 the sects, however, would do no particular 
 good, if it did not lead to a better appre- 
 ciation of their respective merits ; and we 
 find that an eclectic or reconciling move- 
 ment generally follows, and is produced 
 by, the controversies of the schools. It is 
 gradually seen that each, if "right in what 
 it affirmed," was " wrong in what it de- 
 nied ; " right in so far as it was positive, 
 and wrong only in its negation of the 
 locus standi or jus vivcndi of the systems 
 it sought to annihilate. 1 
 
 1 It is to Leibnitz that we owe the phrases I have 
 quoted in the text, and there is perhaps no name in the 
 roll of modern philosophy whose appreciation of the 
 spirit and aim of Eclecticism was more thorough than 
 his. " I have tried," he says, "to disinter, and to reunite 
 the truth, buried and dissipated under the opinions of 
 the sects of the philosophers." (Trots Icttres a M. AY- 
 mond dc Montmort, Opera, ed. Erclmann, p. 701.) "I 
 have found that most of the sects are right in a large 
 part of what they affirm, but not in what they deny.
 
 KCLECTICISM. l8l 
 
 The human mind cannot find repose 
 either in the onesideclness of a partisan 
 system, or in the absolute repression of 
 partisanship, and the substitution in its 
 plan of such eclecticism as shrinks from 
 the expression of difference. The eclecti- 
 cism I am expounding is assuredly not one 
 which would adjust differences, and end 
 controversy, by the adoption of mild and 
 
 ... I flatter myself that I have penetrated to the har- 
 mony of the several realms of philosophy " (he is speak- 
 ing of the materialists and the idealists), " and have seen 
 that both parties are in the right, if only they would not 
 exclude each other " (p. 702). Again (letter iii. p. 704), 
 " Truth is often wider spread than one thinks ; but it 
 is very often overlaid, and very often covered up ; and 
 weakened, mutilated, and corrupted by additions which 
 spoil it, or render it less useful. In getting hold of the 
 traces of Truth amongst the Ancients, or, to speak 
 more generally, our predecessors, one must draw gold 
 out of mud, the diamond from the mine, and light from 
 darkness. Thus would we reach the philosophia peren- 
 n is.*'' So too Cousin, " There is no absolutely false sys- 
 tem, but many incomplete ones, systems true in them- 
 selves, but erroneous in their pretense each to compre- 
 hend within itself that absolute truth which is only to 
 be found in them all. The incomplete, and therefore 
 the exclusive, that is the one radical vice of Philosophy, 
 or rather of the philosophers, because philosophy is in 
 all the systems. Each system is a reflection of reality, 
 but unfortunately it reflects it only under a single angle." 
 (Fragmens Philosophiqucs, i. p. 242, " Du Fait de Con- 
 science.")
 
 I 82 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 hazy commonplaces, which no sect or 
 school could possibly deny. It conserves 
 every intellectual difference that is the 
 outcome of distinctive thought, and of a 
 true interpretation of the universe ; only, 
 it makes room, alongside of each interpre- 
 tation, for others that have usually been 
 held to be inconsistent and incompatible 
 with it. 
 
 But, as it is in the union of one or two 
 historical facts, with sundry psychological 
 phenomena, that Eclecticism may be said 
 to find its stronghold, I pass to the con- 
 sideration of these. 
 
 In the first place, there is the histori- 
 cal fact of the incessant rise of new sys- 
 tems, their inevitable decay, and their per- 
 petual reappearance. Why do systems of 
 opinion pass away from the thought and 
 the allegiance of mankind, but from the 
 radical imperfection which necessarily char- 
 acterizes them ; from their adequacy for 
 a time, their inadequacy for all time ? 
 \Yhy do they reappear again, but from the 
 root of truth which they contain ? The 
 mere fact of the resurrection of old and 
 apparently exploded doctrines is a historic 
 proof of their superiority to the assault
 
 E CL EC TIC ISM. \ 8 3 
 
 that seemed to lay them low. It shows 
 that the conflict of opinion however in- 
 teresting as mental gladiatorship, and how- 
 ever valuable as a means of developing 
 knowledge, and sifting truth from error - 
 is a conflict which in the end leaves no one 
 absolute master of the field. If the con- 
 troversy is renewed, if the strife begins 
 again, it is because the forces on neither 
 side were silenced, and because each is 
 able to return to the combat with unex- 
 hausted courage and fresh resource. 
 
 The next fact is the impossibility (judg- 
 ing by analogy) of uniformity of belief, 
 and therefore of the cessation of contro- 
 versy ever occurring in the history of the 
 world, a consummation which is proba- 
 bly no more possible, and no more desira- 
 ble, than the cessation of physical storms, 
 and the substitution of perpetual calm and 
 sunshine. This, the necessity of fresh 
 controversy, though generally recognized 
 as a feature in the progress of civilization, 
 has perhaps never been adequately ap- 
 praised, and its corollaries have certainly 
 not been always seen. It involves the 
 certainty of the rise of new types of phil- 
 osophical thought and belief, while the
 
 1 84 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 human race continues to advance. With 
 every new cycle will come a new phase of 
 insight, and a new attitude of feeling to- 
 wards the universe. Does any one, except 
 the merest tyro in historical knowledge, 
 or the most youthful champion of debate, 
 expect the advent of a time when specula- 
 tive controversy will cease, and the oppo- 
 sition of the schools disappear ? Such a 
 result would imply either a radical altera- 
 tion in the structure of human nature, or 
 the extinction of belief in an ideal, and the 
 collapse of effort to reach it. It would be 
 the very dullest and dreariest world in 
 which every man agreed with every other 
 man upon every conceivable topic. It 
 would imply the decadence of the intellect, 
 the withering of the imagination, and the 
 stoppage of the pulse of the human heart. 
 It would amount, in short, to an arrest laid 
 on the mainsprings of civilization. And 
 where are we to draw the line between an 
 agreement on every possible problem, and 
 a general concurrence in the greater prob- 
 lems, as finally solved for the human race ? 
 Is not the distinction only one of degree ? 
 If absolute uniformity of opinion is impossi- 
 ble, is general concurrence less Utopian ?
 
 ECLECTICISM. \ 8 5 
 
 But why must systems of opinion run 
 through their cycles, and reappear ? Why 
 are the intellectual differences, which cul- 
 minate in opposing doctrines, destined to 
 remain as permanent and indelible ten- 
 dencies of human nature ? Are there any 
 psychological facts which explain how 
 they have hitherto existed, and justify the 
 inference that they will continue to charac- 
 terize the future evolution of humanity. 
 
 One explanation is, that every devel- 
 oped opinion, no matter how contorted and 
 extravagant it may be, has sprung from 
 some real root in the soil of human na- 
 ture. It has been evolved ; and if evolved, 
 its formative principle cannot have been 
 mere vagary, hap-hazard, or blind caprice. 
 Grant that it was often a crude guess, a 
 surmise, a thought casually thrown out 
 at an object, that gave rise to primitive 
 belief. These guesses were the offspring 
 of previous intelligence, and the precur- 
 sors of genuine knowledge. The surmises, 
 which grew out of vague unillumined grop- 
 ings, were disciplined by degrees into real 
 insight, definite and verifiable. But each 
 separate surmise, of necessity, directed to- 
 wards a particular aspect of Nature or of
 
 I 86 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Life, was different from the rest ; and the 
 result of the difference is seen in the vari- 
 ous "doctrines of knowledge" and "sys- 
 tems of the universe," or " theories of ex- 
 istence," which now divide or distract the 
 world. The source of the difference has 
 been chiefly within the individual theorist. 
 It has been due to temperament, and he- 
 reditary tendency, although also, in a minor 
 degree, to the education and surroundings 
 of the system builder. 
 
 Given a certain temperament, ancestry, 
 education, and influence, it is quite pos- 
 sible to predict the system that will nat- 
 urally emerge ; to say whether it will be 
 intuitional or experiential, idealist or real- 
 ist, a priori or a posteriori. Up to one half 
 of the result, it is altogether beyond the 
 individual's control, and is as rigidly de- 
 termined for him as is the color of his 
 hair, or the height of his stature, his na- 
 tionality, or his mode of speech. Diver- 
 sity will therefore necessarily characterize 
 all future systems of opinion and belief. 
 This diversity will be due to the immense 
 variety of the forces that sway human 
 nature, which is a fact of equal magni- 
 tude and significance with its underlying
 
 E CLECTIC1SM. I 8 J 
 
 unity, a variety which is not only con- 
 sistent with the unity, but which illus- 
 trates it, and goes on developing alongside 
 of it. It may thus be said that on the one 
 hand the unity of human nature, and on 
 the other its variety, constitute the root 
 and ground of eclecticism. If the race is 
 one in organic structure, in mental endow- 
 ment, in morp.l tendency, in imaginative ca- 
 pacity, and in spiritual possibility, despite 
 the thousand varieties which proclaim our 
 separateness and individuality, the out- 
 come of this unity, in the endless systems 
 we construct for the explanation of the 
 abiding mystery of the universe, must in 
 every instance possess a greater or less 
 degree of truth. On the other hand, the 
 variety which marks us off from one 
 another, the differences which separate us 
 despite our organic unity and the soli- 
 darity of the race must of necessity give 
 rise to fresh forms of dogma and belief. 
 Our speculative doctrines being sifted and 
 refined by controversy, our frames of theory 
 will correspond more and more adequately 
 to the truth of things, while they differ 
 from the older ones, which they supersede. 
 We may thus expect a simultaneous de-
 
 1 88 ESSAYS IX PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 velopment and deepening, both of the unity 
 and the variety of human nature, its diver- 
 sity in opinion, feeling, and practice, its 
 unity in aspiration and aim. 
 
 Here I may put a question, which, how- 
 ever simple, deserves consideration. What 
 is the meaning of the belief that two an- 
 tagonist systems can be reconciled, and of 
 the attempts made to effect the reconcil- 
 iation ? for example, that the philosophy 
 of experience can be reconciled with that 
 of intuition, or even that the claims of Re- 
 ligion and Science can be adjusted? that 
 there is no necessary collision in the nature 
 of things between the two, but only between 
 sundry mistaken versions or interpreta- 
 tions of each ? If the experiential and the 
 a priori systems of knowledge can be har- 
 monized, if the intuitional and the deriva- 
 tive theories of morals can be reconciled, 
 it is because every system of the universe 
 that has been evolved from the brain of 
 man must have arisen from some germ of 
 reality, and because its error has been 
 simply a distortion of the truth. 
 
 Add to this, that every published sys- 
 tem of opinion or that portion of it 
 which can be epitomized and exhibited in
 
 ECLECTICISM. \ 89 
 
 a reasoned treatise is only a small por- 
 tion of it. A large context is never ex- 
 hibited to view ; and just as a man may 
 be intellectually refuted without being 
 convinced, because what has been refuted 
 is only that portion of his opinions which 
 was revealed and expressed in words, the 
 context, lying within his mind undivulged, 
 being also untouched by argument, so 
 the vital part of every dogma may be a 
 subterranean clement, a root unconscious 
 to the individual, and never exposed to 
 view. If its upper growth is cut down, 
 like those perennial plants of which while 
 the stem decays the root survives, it will 
 send forth flowers next season freshly as 
 before. 
 
 We may thus see how action and reac- 
 tion is an inevitable and abiding feature in 
 human opinion and belief ; how the truth 
 and the error of "systems" is but a ques- 
 tion of degree ; how their vitality is due 
 to the truth they contain, and their lon- 
 gevity to the amount of that truth ; how 
 immortality, in the sense of abiding con- 
 tinuity, is the prerogative of none; while 
 resurrection and rehabilitation may be the 
 destiny of each. It is impossible for an
 
 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 individual, or a generation, to have an 
 equally clear grasp, and an equally firm 
 hold, of the opposite and balancing sides 
 of any truth ; and the prominence, which 
 the individual or the age may give to any 
 special view, always leads by reaction to a 
 corresponding predominance, in the next 
 age, of some other view. So soon as any 
 truth is generally recognized, and its nov- 
 elty has passed away, it falls by a natural 
 process into the background of the human 
 consciousness. Another truth, which could 
 not get full justice during the ascendency 
 of the former, is brought to light, is disin- 
 terred if not discovered ; and its advocacy 
 has the charm of novelty for a time, till it 
 too shares the fate of its predecessor, and 
 sinks into the shade, to make room for its 
 perishable successor. But this is not the 
 mere rise and fall of systems, and their 
 reappearance, precisely as they lived be- 
 fore. Nothing ever wholly dies ; but noth- 
 ing returns to visible life under the old 
 form. It is changed, both by its previous 
 existence in the field of human conscious- 
 ness, and by its temporary absence from 
 it, by its departure and its return. 
 
 Besides, as every dominant doctrine tends
 
 ECLECTICISM. IQI 
 
 at once and insensibly to become sectarian, 
 the best antidote to the evil of one-sideclness 
 is usually a counter movement towards the 
 other side, even although it be a move- 
 ment in excess across the dividing line. 
 Thus the error of idealism is met by mate- 
 rialistic reaction, and rice versa. The evils 
 of extreme necessitarianism are counter- 
 acted by an extreme doctrine of liberty. 
 The enthusiastic advocacy of a truth long 
 discsteemed is not only sure to provoke 
 hostility, but its excess is most easily 
 counterworked from a position on the 
 other side of the golden mean. Enthu- 
 siasm for a particular truth is always 
 beautiful, and often useful ; but, as its ad- 
 vocate may become its idolater, the bias 
 of his enthusiasm is best restrained by a 
 counter enthusiasm for some other truth. 
 The exaggeration is inevitable, and is ex- 
 cellent while it lasts. It becomes perni- 
 cious only if it lasts too long. 
 
 The student of the history of Philosophy 
 may at first be perplexed by the number 
 of opposing systems, and by the curious 
 hostilities of the system-builders. But so 
 soon as he turns from the field of history 
 to investigate the human consciousness,
 
 I Q2 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and discovers the number of conflicting 
 elements that are there, he ceases to won- 
 der at the diversities of the schools. The 
 latter are but a sign of the fertility, the 
 resource, and the wealth of human nature. 
 
 The disparagement of the labors of pre- 
 decessors, however, which is a failing of 
 so many philosophers may surprise and 
 disappoint the student of their works ; 
 more especially if he observes how much 
 they have been indebted to their predeces- 
 sors, if not for hints which they have ex- 
 panded, at least for the direction which 
 their labors have taken. 
 
 The explanation is easy. The ability to 
 do justice to past systems of opinion is a 
 rare intellectual quality, especially if it be 
 combined with original genius and actual 
 discovery. The ambition of founding or 
 completing a system disinclines the mind 
 to admit the humbling fact that very much 
 of what seems original has been already 
 said, in another form, and that there is ex- 
 ceedingly little that is new under the sun. 
 
 The illusion of originality, nevertheless, 
 has its uses. Most minds are urged to un- 
 dertake research by the prospect of original 
 discovery. Were the reappearance of an
 
 ECLECTICISM. 193 
 
 old system, in a new dress or dialect, to be 
 surmisod beforehand, one stimulus to con- 
 tinued speculative labor would be removed. 
 In other words, it is the illusion of original- 
 ity that is the chief spur to philosophical 
 activity. 
 
 '['he misrepresentation of former sys- 
 tems, to which I have alluded, itself ex- 
 plains the rise of new ones. Miscon- 
 ception of the nature or tendency of any 
 doctrine usually provokes a reaction in its 
 favor, and originates a desire to do it jus- 
 tice ; and so the old opinion returns in a 
 new form. It is true of systems as of 
 individuals : they must bj misconstrued, 
 before they develop their finest charac- 
 teristics. They take deeper root, in the 
 storm of adverse criticism. If all men 
 spoke well of a speculative doctrine, it 
 would be as injurious to its development, 
 as universal praise would be hurtful to the 
 character of its founder. 
 
 It is to be further noted that many 
 philosophical systems differ in appearance 
 more than in reality. Their antagonism 
 is on the surface ; deeper down they unite. 
 The difference may, as I have remarked, 
 be simply one of emphasis, at the particu-
 
 194 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lar point where the stress of the system is 
 laid. This fact is so important that it may 
 be restated thus. Two systems, let us say, 
 start from the same first principle. There 
 they are at one. But the agreement is hid- 
 den, is subterranean. They proceed to de- 
 velop what they hold in common. What 
 seems major to one is minor to another, and 
 vice versa. This sense of difference, inten- 
 sified by every fresh glance towards the 
 first principle, by slow degrees widens the 
 breach. The emphasis repeated like the 
 slow modifications of organic structure, of 
 which science has told us so much, and by 
 which it has explained so much results 
 in the formation of a new opinion. 
 
 If any one wishes to realize the latter 
 process, let him first study the law of 
 natural selection and the survival of the 
 fittest, in physical nature. Then if he 
 wants to find that law confirmed, let him 
 watch, by the light of history, the evo- 
 lution of human opinion. Only let the 
 stress continue to be laid on one side of 
 a truth, which has two sides, both equally 
 important ; what is thus emphasized will 
 beget a new type of opinion, which may 
 grow into a product so unlike that from
 
 ECLECTIClSKf. 195 
 
 which it sprung, that the parentage and 
 the derivation are scarcely recognizable. 
 But the result will have been wholly due 
 to an increase of emphasis, thrown entirely 
 on one side. 
 
 It follows from this that the most dis- 
 tinctive feature in each of the philosophi- 
 cal schools is admitted in some form or 
 other by all the rest ; only it is subordi- 
 nated to other features which have the 
 front place of honor. We may have to 
 search for it in what I may call the crypts, 
 or underground recesses of the system ; 
 but, if we do so, we will find it may be 
 concealed, or it may be almost obliterated 
 the very truth which forms the centre- 
 point of the rival philosophical school. For 
 example, Socrates and the Sophists held 
 much in common, and their original con- 
 flict was due to the importance which the 
 former attached to truths which the latter 
 only subordinated. The same is seen still 
 more significantly in the conflict between 
 the Stoics and the Epicureans, and preem- 
 inently in the great ethical controversy of 
 the ages as to Freedom and Necessity. 
 
 Thus when we criticise a particular sys- 
 tem, and say, " What So-and-so holds in
 
 1 96 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 A referring to one part of his doctrine 
 cannot be reconciled with what he holds 
 in B referring to another part of it, 
 his system is inconsistent," what does the 
 criticism mean but that he has taken more 
 facts into account than his system can 
 rationally explain, or than he can make 
 coherent ? In other words, it amounts to 
 this : that the man is larger than his sys- 
 tem, his humanity is wider than his inter- 
 pretation of human nature. 
 
 It has been said, however, that when- 
 ever Eclecticism ceases to be a mere spirit 
 of philosophizing, and becomes a system 
 of philosophy, it is false to its own first 
 principle. In the very act of laying the 
 foundations of a school, the eclectic, it is 
 said, becomes a sectarian, and commits an 
 act of intellectual suicide. It is therefore 
 affirmed that Eclecticism should be a reg- 
 ulative principle in all systems, and the 
 outcome of all, without being the distinc- 
 tive badge of any one ; that it should be a 
 tendency rather than a school, a way of 
 looking at systems of opinion, that is sym- 
 pathetic, fair-minded, and friendly, rather 
 than antagonistic and critical. We must 
 consider this objection.
 
 ECLECTICISM. 197 
 
 That it should be a prevailing spirit in 
 all philosophy, and that it cannot crystallize 
 into a dogma without belying its own prin- 
 ciples, is undoubted. Further, if it exists 
 as a tendency or attitude, although ignored 
 as a system, it is practically of the greatest 
 value. Hence its immense importance to 
 the student of history. It supplies him 
 with a double key, explanatory at once 
 of the philosophy of History, and the 
 history of Philosophy. But if, while the 
 spirit of eclecticism guides the construc- 
 tive labor of the system-builder, he still 
 keeps to the groove of his system, and 
 declines to assume the role of the eclec- 
 tic, he remains sectarian. Either one of 
 two things must result : he must keep to 
 his system as a distinctive party badge, 
 and disown what he will doubtless con- 
 sider the vague position of the eclectic ; or 
 his eclecticism must conquer his system. 
 
 The intellectual quality of fair-minded- 
 ness has a front place in the hierarchy 
 of the virtues ; but it may exist as a ten- 
 dency, without penetrating to the very core 
 of the constructive reason, and moulding 
 the system that results. The highest 
 merit of eclecticism is its doing full jus-
 
 198 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tice to the systems that partially under- 
 stand, yet formally repudiate it. As it is 
 the supreme triumph of charity to include 
 the uncharitable within the area it trav- 
 erses, to see something good even in the 
 intolerance that is persecuting, and that 
 would if possible extinguish what it can- 
 not comprehend, so, it is the crowning 
 excellence of the eclectic spirit that it 
 sees some latent good in the most outre 
 and distorted system that has ever disfig- 
 ured the annals of civilization. 
 
 But in its effort to do justice to every 
 other doctrine, it has not always been 
 just to itself. It has sometimes become 
 a martyr to its own generosity. Hence 
 it has been stigmatized as too mild and 
 diffusive, as the glorification of a weak 
 live-and-let-live system. Many of those 
 who esteem its tendency, despise it as a 
 formulated theory ; and while the specu- 
 lative world refuses permanently to adopt 
 any sectarian theory of knowledge or of 
 life, it has never cordially welcomed the 
 eclectics. It has shown a greater repug- 
 nance to acquiesce in this doctrine as the 
 last word of Philosophy, than to adopt 
 those sectarian extremes, which Eclect-
 
 ECLECTICISM. 199 
 
 icism tries to unite and reconcile. How 
 is this ? Can it be explained ? Yes ; the 
 eclectic can explain it. 
 
 There can be no doubt that, in propor- 
 tion to the width and elasticity of a sys- 
 tem, is its want of fitness as a working 
 theory of knowledge and life as a doc- 
 trine that can be applied to human affairs. 
 So true is the maxim of Goethe, " Thought 
 widens, but lames ; action narrows, but 
 animates." This is owing to the fact that 
 all activity is, and must be, carried on in 
 grooves. If we are to work in a world of 
 limitations, we must submit to our limits, 
 and not chafe under them. We may sit 
 apart, 
 
 Holding no form of creed, 
 But contemplating all ; 
 
 but when we do so, \ve retire from our 
 place and our duties, in a world of imper- 
 fect action, and of necessarily incomplete 
 fulfillment. 
 
 Constituted as we are, it is impossible 
 for our intellectual vision, however wide 
 the horizon it may sweep, to take in more 
 than a very few and limited group of 
 objects at any one time. What results 
 from this ? It is the temporary promi-
 
 200 SSSAl-'S IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nence of one truth or fact or law, or of 
 one group of truths, facts, and laws, which 
 strike the eye of the beholder, arrest his 
 attention, and rouse him to action. If 
 he saw the other and bordering truths 
 which balance the ones he sees, mitiga- 
 ting their force and regulating their sway, 
 
 truths which other eyes are seeing 
 while his do not, he could scarcely be 
 roused to the defense or the upholding of 
 the former ones. His enthusiasm would 
 certainly cool, and his energy might col- 
 lapse. Does any one imagine that if the 
 child had, in his childhood, a presage of 
 the wisdom of the man, he would show 
 any ardor in the pursuit of those " child- 
 ish things" which age sees to be illusory ? 
 If then the experientialist, the utilitarian, 
 the ontologist, the idealist, were more eclec- 
 tic than they usually are, if they saw the 
 full merit of the systems they oppose, 
 
 while their denunciations would be less 
 loud, and their antagonism less pronounced, 
 
 inaction, and perhaps indifference, 
 might take the place of energy. It is 
 not difficult to see why catholicity often 
 leads to inaction, why toleration and su- 
 pineness go hand in hand ; and why,
 
 ECLECTICISM. 2O I 
 
 with the narrower vision of the sectarian 
 thinker, is usually associated the propa- 
 gandist ardor of the partisan. 
 
 From this we may deduce a corollary. 
 In criticising extremes of opinion, which 
 in their ultra forms are to he condemned, 
 the main point is to recognize the mean, 
 and intellectually to return to it, for the 
 preservation of intellectual harmony ; but 
 to understand departure from it, not merely 
 for the sake of practical action, but for the 
 comprehension of the mean itself. Every 
 time we act, we depart from the mean, for 
 the mean state is one of torpor and repose. 
 Since, however, we must act, in one way or 
 another, we must also cross the medial line 
 between extremes, even while we do not 
 lose sight of it, or permit the intellectual 
 eye to be closed to it. If, as already re- 
 marked, monotony would characterize the 
 beliefs of mankind, were all the members of 
 the human race to see eye to eye, the drear- 
 iest results would follow if all men equally 
 shunned the "falsehood of extremes ;" be- 
 cause it is the extremes tJtat make the mean 
 intelligible. Thus, the seemingly illogical 
 position is reached : there is an advantage 
 to the human race in its partial glimpses
 
 202 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of truth, in its temporary, if it be no'; 
 a stationary, one-sidedness in thought and 
 action. 
 
 Here I must allude to a doctrine of Jouf- 
 froy, the distinguished successor of Cousin 
 in the French eclectic school. He says 
 that as truth and error are mixed in every 
 system, if truth be one and error various, 
 the variety of the systems is due to their 
 departures from truth ; and he even affirms 
 that the succession of the schools is owing 
 to the error they contain, each being a 
 fugitive mirror of an out-reaching reality. 
 I do not think that systems of opinion dif- 
 fer only in the erroneous elements they 
 include. I would rather say that the dis- 
 tinctive badge of each is the particular 
 truth which it is its merit to have signal- 
 ized, and made emphatic. The wise man 
 searching for truth finds its fragments 
 everywhere, its entire presence nowhere. 
 In every system he sees it partial, dismem- 
 bered, isolated ; hence he is both a believer 
 in evolution, and necessarily a student of 
 history. 
 
 Eclecticism and development go hand 
 in hand. No consistent evolutionist can 
 be other than eclectic. All systems hav-
 
 ECLECTICISM. 2OJ 
 
 ing, according to his theory, been evolved 
 out of antecedent ones, and it being his 
 function to trace the lineage and geneal- 
 ogy of each, all have an equal claim to 
 be regarded with honor. Nay more, every 
 link in the chain of derivation, being a 
 necessary sequence, is worthy of equal in- 
 tellectual respect, a respect quite incon- 
 sistent with the railing of some evolution- 
 ists against certain products that have been 
 evolved. According to their theory, as 
 the glacier shapes the valley and the sea 
 its beach, ancestral tendencies and uncon- 
 trollable contemporary forces shape the 
 beliefs of the untoward generation that re- 
 fuses to accept their doctrines. And why 
 should they be more irritated at the philos- 
 ophy or religion that surrounds them, than 
 at the denudation of the valley, or the 
 raising of the sea-beach ? 
 
 We are sometimes met, however, with 
 the charge that Eclecticism and Skepti- 
 cism go hand in hand. A consideration 
 of this will lead both to a final vindica- 
 tion of the claims of Philosophy, and to 
 a further explanation of the rise and fall 
 of " systems " of opinion. The two prop- 
 ositions, that no system is final, and that
 
 2O4 SSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 none is exhaustive, carry with them the 
 fundamental postulate of eclecticism ; but 
 this does not give to every system an equal 
 rank, or an equivalent value as a theo- 
 retical embodiment of the truth of things. 
 It is true that if I call no philosopher " mas- 
 ter," it is because all are masters within 
 their respective spheres, and because other 
 masters will yet arise to teach the gen- 
 erations of the future ; while the sphere 
 of truth itself outreaches every possible 
 chart which any of them may construct. 
 Any one system of the universe, how- 
 ever, is truer than another, not in pro- 
 portion to the number of the elements it 
 embraces, but in proportion to the accu- 
 racy with which it interprets the elements 
 with which it deals. 
 
 One advantage of a wise and sympa- 
 thetic study of the history of opinion is, 
 that it enables us to dispose satisfactorily 
 of a charge often ignorantly brought 
 against the claims of Philosophy. The 
 charge is that it is a barren study, yield- 
 ing no results which are demonstrably 
 certain, and can be taken for granted in 
 the investigations of the future. The 
 march of the physical sciences is pointed
 
 ECLECTICISM. 205 
 
 to as one of consecutive conquest and 
 progressive discovery, with no circular 
 movements, or serpentine windings, or 
 dubious return ings on former tracks. 
 Even brilliant "histories of philosophy" 
 have been written with the aim of prov- 
 ing that Philosophy is an illusion. Its 
 course is represented as a series of voy- 
 ages by bold adventurers on the illimita- 
 ble waters, without ever touching, or even 
 seeing, the "happy isles," and with many 
 experiences of shipwreck and disaster. 
 
 In support of this, we are pointed to 
 the rise and fall of systems ; and we are 
 asked either to select one out of the con- 
 flicting multitude, and prove it to be 
 orthodox, or to abandon the study of Phi- 
 losophy as resultless. 
 
 The only satisfactory way of dealing with 
 this objection is to get at the cause of the 
 rise and fall of all the systems that have 
 ever existed in the schools, or in the world 
 outside the schools. If we clearly appre- 
 hend, not only the reason why this or that 
 opinion has happened to prevail at a par- 
 ticular time, but the source or origin of all 
 .systems, actual or possible, the reasonable- 
 ness and the value of philosophical study
 
 2O6 ESSAYS L\ T PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 will be self-evident. It will be seen to be, 
 on the one hand, the study of the natural 
 history of the human mind ; and, on the 
 other, the study of the very problem with 
 which the human faculties have been in- 
 cessantly occupied. Every speculative sys- 
 tem is a memorial of the effort made by 
 man to interpret that mysterious Text 
 which the universe presents to his facul- 
 ties for interpretation. It is an attempt 
 to explain the ultimate meaning of the 
 things that environ us in the world with- 
 out, and occur in the world within. Every 
 system that has ever appeared is thus a 
 theory of the meaning of Existence ; and is 
 therefore a partial unfolding of the onward 
 thought of humanity, directed to this prob- 
 lem. We may safely hazard the assertion 
 that there must be some truth in all of 
 these systems, if there is truth in any one of 
 them. However defective it may be, each 
 is a landmark or index of progress. It has 
 not only contributed to the development of 
 the world's thought, it has been a neces- 
 sary part of it. 
 
 And, for the same reason, it becomes 
 superannuated and passes away. No sys- 
 tem can expand beyond a certain limit ;
 
 ECLECTICISM. 207 
 
 but, while it ceases to flourish ana seems 
 to pass away what really happens is this. 
 The development of human intellect and 
 insight, which has been going on for a 
 time in one direction, pauses in tJiat di- 
 rection, and begins to unfold itself along 
 another line. It progresses by alternate 
 ebb and flow, or by alternate beats of ac- 
 tion and reaction. No " system " philo- 
 sophical, religious, artistic, or social can, 
 in the nature of things, go on expanding 
 forever ; any more than a tree, or a flower, 
 can expand forever. But the human mind 
 continues to expand, the organic thought 
 of the world develops, the flowering of the 
 general consciousness goes on ; and all the 
 systems, which record and register these, 
 are merely historical memorials, by which 
 the rise of intellect and feeling, in certain 
 directions, and to a particular height, is 
 marked. Thus the hope of attaining a 
 finally perfect, or absolutely orthodox phi- 
 losophy a "system" that shall compose 
 the controversies of the ages, and end 
 the strife of rival schools is Utopian. It 
 is the fond illusion of speculative youth, 
 which passes away in the more sober judg- 
 ments of experience, especially if these
 
 2O8 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 judgments are formed under the light of 
 history. And it disappears, not because 
 truth is despaired of, or because so little of 
 it can be known, but because so much of 
 it is seen, and is seen scattered everywhere 
 in fragments. 
 
 If therefore the history of Philosophy 
 shows the incessant swing of the pendu- 
 lum of thought between opposite poles of 
 opinion, if destructive systems are followed 
 by constructive ones, if the skeptic suc- 
 ceeds the dogmatist, if an idealistic reac- 
 tion follows in the wake of every material- 
 istic movement, the explanation is easy. 
 It is not only that one extreme invariably 
 gives rise to its opposite, and that the two 
 act and react upon each other ; it is also 
 that both are always present, within hu- 
 manity itself. It is constantly forgotten 
 that our "systems of opinion " are only an 
 illustration of certain permanent tendencies 
 of human nature. They exhibit the upper 
 or surface sign of an underworking current, 
 which is ceaselessly moving on, often quite 
 unknown to the system-makers, -like those 
 vast tidal waves, of the rise and fall of which 
 the voyager on the Atlantic is wholly un- 
 conscious. The reason whv one and an-
 
 ECLECTICISM. 209 
 
 other "system" is dominant, and the reason 
 why they all reappear (after falling for a 
 time into the shade), is that they represent 
 ineradicable phases of thought, and are, 
 therefore uneliminable elements in human 
 civilization. It is thus that the doctrines 
 of the world's youth reappear in its age 
 that the systems of ancient India are seen 
 in modern Germany, and that the thought 
 of the old Greek sages has a resurrection 
 in Oxford and Berlin. If any symbol is 
 permissible in Philosophy it is that of the 
 phoenix. 
 
 Perhaps the most signal service which 
 eclecticism has rendered to the cause of hu- 
 man progress is the new way of looking at 
 History, and the historical schools, which 
 it has introduced. A wide knowledge of 
 the history of opinion has often given rise 
 to catholicity in philosophical theory ; and 
 although all historians have their bias, no 
 study is more helpful to width of view, or 
 is more emphatically the parent of fair- 
 mindedness. But the benefit is reciprocal. 
 If historical study promotes Eclecticism, 
 by showing that its basis is broadly laid in 
 the region of fact and event, the eclectic 
 spirit is one of the best safeguards to the
 
 2IO ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 historian. It preserves him from the taint 
 of partisanship. It animates the study of 
 the driest details with living interest, by 
 connecting them with their causes and 
 their issues. It has done immense service 
 to human progress by showing that the 
 true function of the historical critic is not 
 so much to expose illusions, as to ascertain 
 their origin ; to rise above, by getting be- 
 hind them ; and to discover the living root 
 whence error has sprung, and of which it 
 is the distortion. It is thus opposed to 
 every form of iconoclasm. In so far as 
 our liberal teachers and thinkers are icon- 
 oclasts, in so far as they are irreverent 
 towards the past or towards the present, 
 they are non-eclectic, sectarian, revolution- 
 ary ; and the practical merit of the system 
 I have been trying to expound a merit 
 probably greater than the most perfect the- 
 oretical consistency would be is its large 
 tolerance, its spirit of conciliation rather 
 than of compromise, and its detection of 
 truth underneath all the exaggeration, dis- 
 tortion, and caricature of the systems that 
 have from time to time emerged.
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFI- 
 NITE. 
 
 IT is one of the most noticeable facts in 
 the history of opinion that speculative doc- 
 trines, which become sharply antagonistic 
 when carried to their legitimate results, 
 are found to harmonize at the basis whence 
 they spring. There, they may even touch 
 each other, while their developed conclu- 
 sions may be as wide as the poles asunder. 
 It has been said that opposite errors have 
 usually a common irpwrov i^rSo?. It is per- 
 haps truer to affirm that all antagonistic 
 theories take their rise from an underlying 
 root of truth. The history of philosophy 
 shows how easily differences, which are 
 trivial at their first appearance, develop 
 into distinctive schools of opinion, and 
 how rapidly they are confirmed by the re- 
 action and antagonism of rival systems. 
 
 The question whether the supreme Be- 
 ing, or ultimate Existence within the uni- 
 verse, is in any sense personal, whether
 
 212 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it can be legitimately spoken of, and inter- 
 preted by us, in the terms in which we 
 speak of, and interpret our own personal- 
 ity, is as old as the discussions of the Elea- 
 tics in Greece ; and from Parmenides to 
 Hegel it has been solved in one way, while 
 from the Jewish monotheists, through the 
 entire course of Christian theology, it has 
 been answered in another. National tem- 
 perament and racial tendency have had 
 their influence in determining the charac- 
 ter of these answers ; and we may perhaps 
 affirm that the instinct of the Semitic races 
 has tended in one direction, while that of 
 the Aryan, or Indo-European, has tended 
 in another. If recent discussion of the 
 subject in contemporary literature contrib- 
 utes little to the solution of this contro- 
 versy of the ages, it has the merit of 
 presenting the perennial problem in a 
 singularly clear light ; and it proves how 
 the most abstruse questions of human 
 knowledge continue to fascinate the heart, 
 and to tax the intellect of man, while they 
 directly affect his practical life. 
 
 The late David Frederick Strauss, and 
 the brilliant literary critic Matthew Ar- 
 nold have each written stronglv against
 
 I'KKSONALITY AND THE I X FINITE. 213 
 
 the notion of personality in God ; the for- 
 mer, consistently developing the Hegelian 
 doctrine, which he has applied to the prob- 
 lems of religious history ; the latter, en- 
 deavoring to lay the basis of a new rever- 
 ence for the Bible, through a phenomenal 
 psychology and doctrine of ignorance, in 
 those delightful, though confessedly unsys- 
 tematic papers in the Contemporary Re- 
 view, 1 full of delicate and happy criticism, 
 though dashed too much with persiflage, 
 and scarcely grave enough when the radi- 
 cal importance of the question is consid- 
 ered, in connection with the literature of 
 solemn speculation on the subject. 
 
 Mr. Arnold has been telling us that we 
 must give up and renounce forever the de- 
 lusion that God is " a person who thinks 
 and loves." We are to recognize instead 
 "a stream of tendency, by which all things 
 fulfill the law of their being;" a "power 
 that lives and breathes and feels," but not 
 "a person who thinks and loves." We are 
 directed, as all the world knows, to " the 
 eternal not-ourselves that makes for right- 
 eousness." But does this curious entity, 
 this "eternal not-ourselves," present a more 
 
 1 Afterwards published in his book, God and the Bible.
 
 2 1 4 ESS A YS IN PHIL OSOPH Y. 
 
 adequate notion to the intellect than that 
 which it is meant to displace ? Is it less 
 ambiguous, or less hypothetical ? We are 
 asked to substitute, for the exploded notion 
 of a personal God, a negative entity of 
 which all that can with certainty be af- 
 firmed is that it is "not we ourselves," that 
 it is beyond us and eternal. All else is to 
 be set aside as personification and poetry, 
 or "extra-belief." But would not an "eter- 
 nal-in-ourselves " making for righteousness 
 be a more intelligible, an equally relevant, 
 and equally verifiable notion ? And how 
 do we know it to be " eternal," but by an 
 a priori process, which the new philosophy 
 would disown ? and is " a power that feels " 
 more intelligible, or verifiable, than " a 
 power that thinks ? " We are supposed to 
 be conducted, by the help of this definition, 
 out of the dim regions of theological haze, 
 to the terra finna of verifiable knowledge. 
 Is it then less intricate and confusing than 
 the old historic conception, which it is in- 
 tended to supplant ? Xo one, it is said, 
 " has discovered the nature of God to be 
 personal, or is entitled to assert that God 
 has conscious intelligence." But we arc- 
 told to look to "the constitution and his-
 
 PERSONALITY AND Till: IXI-IXITE. 215 
 
 tory of things," where we find an " eternal 
 tendency " at work " outside of us, prevail- 
 ing whether we will or no, whether we are 
 here or not;" and we shall find that this 
 eternal non-ego "makes for righteousness." 
 The special merit which the new defini- 
 tion claims for itself is that it is a lumi- 
 nous one, and that it is within the range 
 of experience, where it can be tested and 
 verified. Now, in this demand for verifi- 
 cation, Mr. Arnold either wishes our reli- 
 gious philosophy to be recast in terms of 
 the exact sciences, and nothing accepted in 
 the sphere of psychology and metaphysic 
 which cannot be reached as we reach con- 
 clusions in mathematics ; or he is stating a 
 philosophical commonplace, viz., that moral 
 truth is not susceptible of demonstrative 
 evidence. Are not the terms he makes 
 use of, however, both loose and deceptive ? 
 This ''making for righteousness" is meant 
 to describe the action of a vast impersonal 
 tendency, everywhere operative towards 
 that end. But surely all our experience of 
 "tendency" in the direction of righteous- 
 ness is personal. Observation of the re- 
 sults of human action, of the consequences 
 of wrong-doing and of righteous conduct
 
 2l6 SSAys //V PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 respectively, shows that certain causes, set 
 in motion by ourselves or by others, issue 
 in certain subjective effects. If we con- 
 fine ourselves to the sphere of experience, 
 we not only get no farther than the obser- 
 vation of phenomena, but all the succes- 
 sion we observe is personal, because it is 
 the field of human conduct alone that is 
 before us. In thus limiting ourselves, how- 
 ever, another fact arrests our notice. If 
 there be a stream of tendency, not our- 
 selves, that makes for righteousness, there 
 is also a stream of tendency, not ourselves, 
 that makes for wickedness. There are two 
 streams of tendency flowing through the 
 universe, into one or other of which all the 
 lesser rills of influence flow. \Ve can trace 
 their fluctuating course, from the early 
 centuries to the present time ; but what 
 the better are we of either, as a solution of 
 the ultimate problem of the universe ? If 
 we confine ourselves to the limited area 
 open to inductive inference, and the verifi- 
 cations of experience, we cannot reach the 
 conclusion that there is a single stream of 
 tendency, not ourselves and beneficent, 
 which makes for righteousness alone. If 
 certain phenomena seem to warrant this in-
 
 Y AMD THE INFINITE. 2 I/ 
 
 ferencc, counter-appearances suggest, with 
 equal force, the operation of a malignant 
 power, making persistently for evil ; and 
 with two antagonistic forces in perpetual 
 collision, the conditions of ditheism are 
 complete, and the Manichean doctrine is 
 reached. 
 
 Returning to the formula against which 
 Mr. Arnold has directed so many shafts of 
 criticism, viz., that God is "a person who 
 thinks and loves," I have no hesitation in 
 accepting it as a substantially accurate def- 
 inition of what is held by the majority of 
 theists ; although, perhaps few would state 
 it in these terms, and it is liable to mis- 
 conception, chiefly through the use of the 
 indefinite article. If Mr. Arnold were 
 merely cautioning us against identifying 
 our notion of what constitutes personality 
 in God, with our concept of personality in 
 man, if his teaching on this point were 
 but a warning against the popular ten- 
 dency to assume, either that human nature 
 was an adequate measure of the Divine, 
 or that it afforded our only light as to the 
 characteristics of the Divine, it would 
 be most salutary ; although it would be 
 merely a continuation of the familiar mes-
 
 2l8 SSAVS 7.V PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sage of the seers of Israel, a modern 
 echo of the prophetic voices of the He- 
 brew Church, when they affirmed that He 
 is " not altogether such an one as our- 
 selves." It amounts, however, to much 
 more than this. It is an echo of the 
 dogma which lies at the heart of every 
 monistic system of speculation ; viz., that 
 there is a radical inconsistency, or contra- 
 diction, between the notions of the Per- 
 sonal and the Infinite, so that we cannot 
 combine both in a concept which con- 
 serves the characteristics of each ; but 
 must, in logical consistency, surrender the 
 one, or the other ; that, in short, if God be 
 a person, He cannot be infinite ; and if in- 
 finite, He must be impersonal. Personal- 
 ity is regarded as, in all cases, essentially 
 limited, and necessarily bounded-. In the 
 human race, the personality of each man 
 is supposed to consist in his isolation from 
 his fellows ; and it is inferred that all per- 
 sonality consists in a gathering together of 
 self, at a centre or focus of individuality ; 
 that it is realizable and real, only in its 
 separation from, and exclusion of, other 
 things ; while it is affirmed that the Abso- 
 lute and Infinite are all-embracing 1 and all-
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE h\'f-L\ITE. 219 
 
 surrounding, excluding nothing, but enfold- 
 ing within themselves the totality of exist- 
 ence. Therefore, it is said, if there be an 
 infinite and absolute Being in the universe, 
 nothing else can exist besides. He will 
 take up and include within himself all ex- 
 istence whatsoever ; but, in so doing, he 
 cannot be personal ; for the personal is al- 
 ways the bounded, the fenced, the separate, 
 the inclosed. 
 
 To put the difficulty which the theistic 
 solution presents in its strongest light, I 
 restate the problem thus : Endeavoring 
 to realize the infinite, whether in space or 
 in time, we may begin by imagining cir- 
 cles beyond circles, or lines of continuous 
 succession unbroken by any point or in- 
 terval. We rise on the wings of imagi- 
 nation, and pursue the journey till thought 
 sinks paralyzed. But in so doing, we have 
 never really got one step beyond the finite. 
 By such imaginative flights along the lines 
 of sequence, or over areas of space, we 
 never approach one whit nearer to the 
 Infinite ; and why ? because the vastest 
 conceivable aggregate of finites is not 
 really liker it, than is the unit from which 
 we start, in the process of multiplication.
 
 22O ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The one is but the other "writ large." 
 Therefore, we may not only reach the no- 
 tion as well before the journey of finite 
 thought commences, but if we reach it at 
 all, it must be by a process wholly differ- 
 ent from an expansion of the finite, and by 
 the exercise of another faculty than that of 
 imagination. 
 
 We may reach it, however, in a mo- 
 ment, not by a multiplication of the finite, 
 but by its elimination ; not by enlarging 
 the notion, but by abolishing it. All con- 
 ceivable finites being before the mind, as 
 an indefinite quantity, we may say with 
 Herder, "These I remove, and thou the 
 Infinite liest all before me." Our 
 speculative thought of the Infinite is not 
 a pictorial or concrete realization of it as 
 a mental image, built up out of elements 
 furnished by sense-experience, or imagi- 
 natively bodied forth on the inner horizon 
 of the mind. We do not reach it by a 
 synthetic process, piecing together a mul- 
 titude of finite things, sweeping round 
 them, and imagining them in their totality. 
 But we at once and directly think away 
 all limitation, and abolish the finite, by 
 excluding individual determinate things,
 
 rEKSONALITY AND Till: JNI-1MTE. 221 
 
 from a field preoccupied by thought. Now, 
 with this idea of the Infinite as the ne- 
 gation of the finite is it possible to con- 
 join the notion of anything whatever that 
 is personal ? Personality manifests itself 
 to us familiarly, under the restrictions of 
 finite form. It is difficult to conjoin it 
 even with the notion of the indefinitely 
 vast. As you approach the latter, the for- 
 mer seems to recede. Is there an intel- 
 lectual stereoscope, through which the two 
 notions may be seen, blent in the unity 
 of a single conception ? The defined idea 
 of personality, and the shadowy notion of 
 the infinite, may be bracketed together 
 under a common term, which expresses 
 them both ; can they also be thought in 
 conjunction ? and have we any warrant for 
 the inference that they actually coalesce 
 in the supreme existence which we call 
 God ? This is the chief problem in the 
 philosophy of theism. 
 
 In dealing with it, all that we seem war- 
 ranted in affirming is, that personality is 
 one of the characteristics under which the 
 Supreme Being manifests himself ; not 
 that it is exhaustive of those phases of 
 manifestation that are either possible or
 
 222 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 actual. If we say that it is the highest 
 aspect known to us. we speak in a figure, 
 and proclaim the poverty of our insight. 
 For, to the Infinite, there is nothing either 
 high or low. These are ratios of com- 
 parison by which the finite calculates. 
 We give to the notion of personality an 
 eminence and value that are unique ; be- 
 cause, amongst the phenomena of the uni- 
 verse, it seems to us the noblest and the 
 most commanding. But it is not, of neces- 
 sity, the exclusive idea attachable to the 
 Divine Nature. That, within the fullness 
 of its infinitude, there should be aspects, 
 phases, features, characteristics, which are 
 totally unlike and utterly transcending the 
 personality of which we are conscious, is a 
 simple deduction from that infinitude. 
 
 With entire consistency, therefore, we 
 may affirm at once the personality and the 
 transcendency of God ; that is to say, we 
 may affirm that He is a person, as we 
 understand the term, and that He is more 
 than a person, as we understand it. We 
 cannot limit the aspects which his Being 
 may assume to the phases which our own 
 nature presents, any more than we may nar- 
 row the limits of his efficiency within the
 
 J'EKSOXALITY AND THE IXFLVITE. 22$ 
 
 boundaries of our own. If we believe that 
 everything distinctive of human person- 
 ality exists in God, in more exalted phases, 
 we must believe that infinitely more, at 
 the same time different from it, co-exists 
 within that nature. In other words, al- 
 though we recognize certain features in 
 the Divine infinitude, analogous to the per- 
 sonality of which we are conscious, it does 
 not follow that we may identify the two, 
 and take the human as a measure of the 
 Divine. It is true we may err by taking 
 a poor and circumscribed notion, gathered 
 from the workings of our own faculties, and 
 substituting it for the glory that is imper- 
 sonal, and the order that is eternal ; but that 
 clanger is not so great as is the counter- 
 risk of losing the personal altogether in the 
 nebulous haze of the infinite. The divine 
 Absoluteness is lost to view, if we think 
 merely of an infinite human being ; and 
 God is as truly discerned in the life, the 
 movements, and the glory of the universe, 
 which we cannot call human, in the ab- 
 solute Order, the eternal Beauty, the imper- 
 sonal Sublimity, and the indefinite Splen- 
 dor, which we can describe by no human 
 attribute or tendency, as He is revealed
 
 224 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in the wisdom, the tenderness, the grace, 
 and the affection that are properly our own. 
 
 Further, were we warranted in taking 
 our human nature as the sole clue to the 
 Divine, we might regard it also as its cri- 
 terion or test ; and, carrying up its mingled 
 moral phenomena, might find their arche- 
 types in celestial tendencies to evil as well 
 as to good. It is the notion that the 
 sphere of finite existence supplies us with 
 an area for inductive inference as to the 
 procedure of the Absolute, that has given 
 rise to so many of the distortions of popu- 
 lar theology. 
 
 What, then, is our warrant for assuming 
 an analogy which does not amount to an 
 identity, and in thus affirming the exist- 
 ence of a Personality at once real and 
 transcendent, or if we may venture on 
 the distinction human, yet not anthro- 
 pomorphic ? 
 
 The radical feature of personality, as 
 known to us whether apprehended by 
 self-consciousness or recognized in others 
 is the survival of a permanent self un- 
 der all the fleeting or deciduous phases of 
 experience ; in other words, the personal 
 identity that is involved in the assertion,
 
 ri-'.RSONALITY AND THE INFIA'ITK. 22$ 
 
 " I am." While my individual thoughts, 
 feelings, and acts pass away and perish, I 
 continue to exist, to live, and to grow in 
 the fullness of experience. Beneath the 
 shows of things, the everlasting flux and 
 reflux of phenomenal change, a substance 
 or interior essence survives. Is limitation 
 a necessary adjunct of that notion ? May 
 there not be an everlasting succession of 
 thoughts, emotions, and volitions, acts of 
 consciousness in perpetual series, while 
 the substantial and permanent self remains, 
 underneath the evanescent phenomena ? 
 and may not the thought, feeling, etc., 
 have an infinite range, and be all-pervasive 
 and interpenetrating at every spot within 
 the universe? Surely limitation does not 
 enter of necessity into the notion of per- 
 sonality. The action of a personal being 
 is limited by the material on which he 
 works, by his surroundings and circum- 
 stances ; and our personalities are limited 
 by other things, because they surround us; 
 but if we surrounded them, and pervaded 
 all finite things by omnipresent energy, 
 the limitation would be simply a mode of 
 action, and a condition of activity. It does 
 not therefore follow, from our experience
 
 226 ESS A YS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of limitation, that in being conscious, the 
 conscious subject must be invariably or 
 necessarily limited by the presence and 
 environment of others. May it not be 
 unlimited in act, unshackled by conditions, 
 spontaneous in all it does, although it acts 
 through the instrumentality and agency of 
 others ? 
 
 We may put the question in a fresh form 
 thus : Is separateness from other exist- 
 ences equivalent to finitucle ? Does the 
 one notion carry the other with it, or 
 within it ? All finite existences are sepa- 
 rate, one from another ; but does it follow 
 that all existence that is separate from 
 other forms or phases must be finite ? 
 The infinite existence, which we conceive 
 as the simple negation of the finite, may 
 surely pervade the latter without limita- 
 tion. The idea of a fence or boundary is 
 not involved in the notion of Personality 
 in the abstract, although it is involved in 
 the notion of finite personality. It does 
 not therefore follow that, if a being is per- 
 sonal, it must on that account be simply 
 one out of many, differentiated from 
 others, by reason of its personality. Its 
 personality need not be the cause of its
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 22? 
 
 separatencss and differentiation. Doubt- 
 less it cannot exist out of relation to other 
 beings ; sinee to fall back on the sugges- 
 tions of philology all r.ristence, or the 
 emergence of being in definite forms and 
 relations, implies separateness from others. 
 Although particular existence is what it is, 
 however, in virtue of other existences de- 
 termining and conditioning it, and we, in 
 our limitation, cannot be conscious of our 
 own personality, except under the condi- 
 tion of a non-ego beyond us, it is an ille- 
 gitimate inference from this to affirm that 
 personality cannot exist, or be consciously 
 realized, except under the condition of a 
 limiting non-ego. Is it not conceivable that 
 the sense of a limiting non-ego would van- 
 ish, in the case of a being that was tran- 
 scendent, and a life that was all-pervasive ? 
 That the dualism, involved in all finite 
 consciousness, should cease in the case of 
 the Infinite, may be difficult for us to real- 
 ize ; but to affirm that self-consciousness 
 of necessity implies a centre or focus, at 
 which the scattered rays of individuality 
 are gathered up, is assuredly to transgress 
 by the unwarranted use of a physical anal- 
 ogy.
 
 228 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 I may here quote from Strauss, who al- 
 ways states his case with force and clear- 
 ness : 
 
 The modern monotheistic conception of God 
 has two sides, that of the Absolute and that of 
 the Personal, which, although united in Him, 
 are so in the same manner as that in which 
 two qualities are sometimes found in one per- 
 son, one of which can be traced to the father's 
 side, the other to the mother's. The one ele- 
 ment is the Hebrew Christian, the other the 
 Grgeco-philosophical contribution to our con- 
 ception of God. We may say that we inherit 
 from the Old Testament the " Lord-God," from 
 the New the " God-Father," but from the Greek 
 philosophy the " Godhead/' or the "Absolute." l 
 
 So far well, and excellently put. But if it 
 be so, if these notions seemingly incom- 
 patible are united in our modern mono- 
 theism "in the same manner as two qual- 
 ities are sometimes found in one person," 
 does not that mitigate the difficulty of real- 
 izing both as combined in one transcend- 
 ent Personality ? As two rills of herecli- 
 
 J 
 
 tary influence unite to form a single stream 
 of personality in the individual, and as two 
 great conceptions of God have survived in 
 
 1 Old and X<~i' Faith, p. 121.
 
 rEKSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 22Q 
 
 the world, and alternately come to the front 
 in the mind of the race, - call them, for 
 distinction's sake, the Hebraic and the 
 Hellenic, cannot these he supposed to 
 unite in one vast stream of Transcendent 
 Being ? And are not these two concep- 
 tions merely different ways of interpreting 
 that supreme Existence, which both equally 
 recognize ? If we inherit these notions 
 from the sources which Strauss so happily 
 indicates, why should we proceed to dis- 
 own one half of the inheritance, casting out 
 the Jewish as airy and unverifiable, while 
 we retain the Greek as real and scien- 
 tific ? If we are indebted to both, why re- 
 fuse one half of the legacy ? or construe it 
 as the ghostly shadow ? while the other is 
 the enduring substance ? Was not the 
 monotheism of the Jew at least a histori- 
 cal discipline to the human consciousness, 
 in the interpretation of a real side of the 
 mystery, which in its fullness eluded him, 
 as much as it baffled the Greek ontolo- 
 gists ? Grant that the Jewish notion of 
 personality degenerated at times into an 
 anthropomorphism that was crude, and 
 scarely more elevated than the polytheism 
 it supplanted. The emphasis which it laid
 
 230 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 on the distinction and separateness of God 
 from the world was, nevertheless, part of 
 the historic education of the race; just as 
 the emphasis which the Greek mind laid 
 on the unity which underlies all separate- 
 ness was another part of that many-sided 
 education. 
 
 The idea that " personality implies a 
 limit " is largely due to the physical or 
 semi-physical notions that have gathered 
 round the notion of a throne on which a 
 monarch is seated. If we give up these 
 symbols of a "throne," a "court," and "a 
 retinue of angels," and even renounce that 
 of a local "heaven" as an "optical illu- 
 sion," we shall not thus "lose every attri- 
 bute of personal existence and action," as 
 Strauss tells us we must. Every rational 
 theist, nay every thoughtful man, under- 
 stands that these ideas are the mere sym- 
 bolical drapery, which has been wrapped 
 around the spiritual notion by the rea- 
 listic imagination of the Jews. 
 
 The whole of the sensuous imagery un- 
 der which the Divine Nature is portrayed, 
 as well as the material figures inlaid in 
 every sentence in which we speak of the 
 spiritual realm, are mere aids to the imagi-
 
 PERSONALITY A\D THE INF1MTE. 231 
 
 native faculty. They are the steps of a 
 ladder on which we rise, in order that we 
 may transcend the symbols, just as we 
 find that a realization of indefinite areas 
 of space, or intervals of time, helps us in 
 that transcendent act, by which we think 
 away the finite, and reach the infinite. 
 But that God is, to quote the ancient for- 
 mula, "all in the whole and all in every 
 part" (as the soul is in the body), not 
 localized at any centre, this is one of 
 the commonplaces of theology. The no- 
 tion of the oriental mind, which has col- 
 ored much of our western theology, that 
 such symbols as those associated with roy- 
 alty must be taken literally, and not as 
 "figures of the true," is expressly rejected 
 in some of the definitions of the Church 
 itself. And further, there is scarcely an 
 idea connected with the monotheism of 
 the Jews such as King, Judge, Law- 
 giver, Father in reference to which 
 there are not express statements, within 
 the Sacred Books of the nation, caution- 
 ing it against a literal application of 
 these terms to the Infinite. The prophets 
 saw their inadequacy, and felt their pov- 
 erty, while they used them. But they
 
 232 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 could not help using them. They could 
 not speak to the mass of the nation in 
 other than symbolic language, any more 
 than the leaders of the Greek schools 
 could have dispensed with an esoteric, and 
 made the crowds in the agora understand 
 speculation on Being in the abstract. If 
 we are to speak of God at all in human 
 words, we must employ the inadequate 
 medium of metaphoric speech ; and "jeal- 
 ousy to resist metaphor" does not, as 
 Francis Newman says, " testify to depth 
 of insight." l In their horror of anthropo- 
 morphism, ontologists have rarefied their 
 notion of the ultimate Principle of Exist- 
 ence into a mere abstraction, a blank 
 formless essence, a mere vacuum. But, in 
 making free use of anthropomorphic lan- 
 guage, we know that it is of necessity 
 partial, and at the last inadequate ; and we 
 exclude from our notion of personality 
 which it thus imperfectly describes 
 every anthropomorphic feature that savors 
 of limitation, while we retain the notion 
 
 1 " To refuse to speak of God as loving and planning, 
 as grieving and sympathizing, without the protest of a 
 quasi, will not tend," he adds, " to clearer intellectual 
 views (for what can be darker ?), but will muddy the 
 spring.-, of affection." Tht Soul, p. 29.
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE 7A7-A \V77-. . 233 
 
 of a Being who is personal and yet in- 
 finite. 
 
 That personality cannot coexist with 
 infinity is an assumption without specu- 
 lative warrant, or experiential proof. It 
 may be essential to personality that the 
 person " thinks and loves," as Mr. Arnold 
 puts it. But are thought and emotion 
 only susceptible of finite action, and ade- 
 quate to accomplish finite ends? And, if 
 the stream to which they give rise is lim- 
 ited, may not the Fountain whence they 
 flow be infinite ? Can we not realize the 
 existence of a Supreme Personality, within 
 which the whole Universe lives, moves, 
 and has its being and which has that uni- 
 verse as an area in which to manifest 
 its thought, feeling, and purpose ? May 
 not the intelligence, traces of which we 
 see everywhere in the physical order, 
 the purpose, in the manifestation of which 
 there is no gap or chasm anywhere, be 
 the varying index of an omnipresent Per- 
 sonality ? Into thought and emotion them- 
 selves the idea of restriction does not en- 
 ter ; although, whenever they appear in 
 special acts or concrete instances, they as- 
 sume a finite form. Thev are then lim-
 
 234 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ited by each other, and by their opposites, 
 as well as by every specific existence in 
 which they respectively appear. But to 
 themselves in the abstract the idea of 
 limitation no more appertains than it is 
 necessarily bound up with the notion of 
 power or energy. This, however, is to an- 
 ticipate. 
 
 We are deceived when we carry into 
 the realm of Nature and the Infinite the 
 analogy of a material centre and a physi- 
 cal circumference, by which our own per- 
 sonality is "cabined and confined." To 
 the Infinite, there can be neither centre 
 nor circumference ; or we may say that 
 the centre is everywhere, and the circum- 
 ference nowhere. But if the attributes of 
 mind or intelligence are revealed through- 
 out the whole extent of the universe open 
 to our inspection, is it impossible to con- 
 join with the notion of their infinite range 
 the idea of a Person, to whom they be- 
 long, in whom they inhere, and of whose 
 essence they are the many-sided manifes- 
 tation ? Is there any greater difficulty 
 in supposing their conjunction over the 
 whole universe than in realizing their 
 coincidence at any one spot within it ?
 
 1'ERSONALITY AND THE INI-LVITE. 235 
 
 It is assuredly not the mere extent of the 
 area that constitutes the difficulty of their 
 union. 
 
 We thus come back to what has, in 
 some form or another, lain at the root 
 of every theistic argument. Is the uni- 
 verse in any sense intelligible ? Can it 
 be read, understood, and interpreted by us 
 at all ? or does it present an " untranslata- 
 ble text," which we in vain attempt to de- 
 cipher ? When we say that phenomena 
 are organized, what do we mean by the 
 statement ? When we speak of them as 
 correlated, reciprocal, ordered, the parts of 
 a whole, what do we mean by these terms? 
 Are we projecting our own thoughts out- 
 wards, on the face of external nature ? or 
 are we engaged in deciphering an inscrip- 
 tion that is written there ? Surely, in the 
 earliest and simplest act of perception, 
 distinguishing one phenomenon from an- 
 other, we recognize the presence of mind 
 within the universe; and in our earliest 
 knowledge of an external world, we have 
 an experience suggesting the theistic infer- 
 ence. 
 
 One solution of the problem of theism 
 may thus be found in the answer we give
 
 236 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to the question, Are we warranted in in- 
 terpreting the universe in the light of our 
 own intelligence ? We are accustomed 
 to think, both popularly and scientifically, 
 that we know something of Nature ; and 
 we coordinate our knowledge in the sev- 
 eral sciences. But all the sciences take 
 for granted a general doctrine of the know- 
 able, and they all start from the presup- 
 position that in constructing them we do 
 not merely project our own thought into 
 Nature, but discover something regard- 
 ing natural phenomena themselves. We 
 speak as aimlessly in our most exact and 
 scientific language as if we talked at ran- 
 dom, if we do not find thought and rea- 
 son within all natural phenomena, as their 
 substrate, their essence, or their presup- 
 position. Even if we assume the role of 
 the agnostic, and take refuge in a con- 
 fession of ignorance, under the seeming 
 modesty which disclaims insight, a latent 
 doctrine of knowledge is nevertheless in- 
 volved. If we hold that all knowledge 
 reaches us through the senses, that we 
 can attain to nothing higher than " trans- 
 formed sensations," still behind this theory 
 of the origin of our ideas there lies an un-
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 237 
 
 eliminable element which transcends it, and 
 which is unconsciously taken for granted 
 in every theoretical explanation of things 
 as they are. If, therefore, mind be visible 
 in nature, and we cannot construe a sin- 
 gle phenomenon or group of phenomena 
 otherwise than in terms of intelligence, 
 our interpretation is not the result of un- 
 conscious idealization. It is the discern- 
 ment of objective reality, and is also the 
 recognition of mind, in the process of man- 
 ifestation. 
 
 Finding, therefore, the signs of mind 
 everywhere, in the correlations and succes- 
 sions of phenomena, may we not interpret 
 the whole series as the manifestation of a 
 personal entity underlying it ? Of a mind 
 that is impersonal we cannot form a no- 
 tion. Do not all the forms of finite being, 
 therefore, the specializations of existence 
 and the successions of phenomena lead 
 to the conclusion that there is a Supreme 
 Essence in which every specialization is 
 blent, a whole in which all succession is 
 merged ? Do not the successive parts lead 
 the mind to a " unity, where no division 
 is?" And if we thus interpret individual 
 and fragmentary things in terms of intel-
 
 238 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ligence, surely we cannot dispense with 
 Mind, when we rise to that supreme unity 
 in which variety ceases, and multiplicity is 
 lost to view. 
 
 It must be admitted that we do not know 
 what constitutes the inmost essence of per- 
 sonality, under all the shifting phases of ex- 
 perience ; and, on that account, there is an 
 element of vagueness attaching to the idea. 
 But we are aware that our own identity 
 or self-hood survives, while the successive 
 waves of experience rise and fall ; and, it is 
 surely quite conceivable that the eternal 
 Essence or everlasting Substance of the 
 Universe should be supremely conscious of 
 self, throughout all the change and turmoil 
 of existence. It may be that infinitude 
 alone supplies the condition for a perfect 
 consciousness of personality; and that our 
 finiteness, as Lotze thinks, is "not a pro- 
 ductive condition of personality, but rather 
 a hindering barrier to its perfect develop- 
 ment." J If there is a difficulty in thus 
 conceiving of a personality which can dis- 
 pense with a non-ego, as the condition of its 
 activity, which does not necessarily in- 
 volve the distinction between self and not- 
 1 Microcosmus, iii. p. 57 "-,.
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 239 
 
 self, and if, in consequence, we are un- 
 able to compress our belief in the Divine 
 Personality within the mould of a logical 
 formula, "let it" (as Mr. Greg says of the 
 belief in immortality), "let it rest in the 
 vague, if you would have it rest unshaken. 
 It is maintainable so long as it is suffered 
 to remain nebulous and unoutlined." The 
 very grandeur of the term "God" consists 
 in the fact that it includes not less, but so 
 much more, than any specific description 
 could embrace within it. The reality sur- 
 passes every definition of it ; and our vari- 
 ous theoretical explanations of the fact 
 which appeals to our consciousness in 
 forms so manifold are just so many ways 
 by which we successively register our own 
 imperfect and changeful insight. We put 
 into intelligible shape a conviction which, 
 the moment we define it, is felt to tran- 
 scend our definitions immeasurably. 
 
 But are our definitions ever correct ? In 
 answer to this we may affirm that they are 
 accurate so far as they go, while admittedly 
 incomplete. They need not lay claim to 
 be either final or exhaustive of that which 
 they endeavor to define. At the very best 
 they are the result of the efforts of the
 
 240 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 reason to formulate a conviction which has 
 several distinct roots, and assumes many 
 different phases, but which is not invari- 
 able, or steadily luminous, or always irre- 
 sistible. From the very nature of the case, 
 the Divine Personality must be suggested, 
 rather than evidenced with indubitable 
 force ; and if we can, by reason, scatter 
 the a priori difficulties which seem to 
 gather round the notion itself, it may be 
 left to the workings of intuition to reveal 
 the positive fact, a posteriori, in the flash 
 of occasional inspiration. If the Divine 
 Presence were obtruded upon the inward 
 eye, as material objects appeal to the sense 
 of sight, the faculties which recognize it 
 would be dazzled, and unable to note or 
 register anything besides. Our recogni- 
 tion of God must therefore be casual, fugi- 
 tive, occasional, to leave room for our know- 
 ledge of, and our relation to, other things. 
 Were it continuous and uniform, it would 
 sink to the level of our consciousness of 
 finite things and material existence. Per- 
 haps, in its very fugitiveness and transiency 
 there may be evidence of its divineness ; 
 and that there should be endless discussion, 
 and the perpetual shock of controversy in
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFIX IT/-:. 24! 
 
 regard to it, it is only to he expected. If 
 the aspects under which the Infinite is re- 
 vealed vary perpetually, if lie at once sur- 
 rounds and pervades us, yet withdraws from 
 our gaze, the everlasting controversy of the 
 ages, and the rise and fall of systems which 
 now assert and now dispense with his pres- 
 ence, are most easily explained. The per- 
 petual resuscitation of debate (after solu- 
 tions have been advanced by the score) is 
 proof of the working of an instinct which 
 rises higher than the proofs themselves. 
 They are, all of them, the ontological, 
 cosmological, ideological, and the rest, 
 merely historical memorials of the efforts 
 of the human mind to vindicate to itself iJic 
 existence of a reality of which it is conscious, 
 but ivliich it cannot perfectly define. In their 
 completest forms, they are the result of the 
 activity of the reason and the conscience 
 combined, to account for that reality, and 
 to define it to others. 
 
 That our consciousness of the Divine 
 Personality is often dormant says nothing 
 against its genuineness or trustworthiness, 
 when stirred to life. It rather tells the 
 other way. What is ceaselessly obtruded 
 on our notice is not more true, bv reason
 
 242 SSATS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of its obviousness, than what is flashed 
 upon us in moments of transient ecstasy or 
 insight. We are not always on the moun- 
 tain-tops ; nor can we breathe the ethereal 
 air forever, or live in the white light of a 
 never-ceasing apocalypse. But these are 
 surely the supreme moments of discern- 
 ment. Could any one rationally affirm 
 that the dull flats of mental life in which 
 our powers are arrested and distracted by 
 a multiplicity of objects surrounding them, 
 our thoughts embarrassed by contingency 
 and change are more significant of the 
 truth of things than those in which our 
 faculties are kindled into life by the sense 
 of a stupendous Presence appealing to them, 
 and yet. concealing itself from their scru- 
 tiny ? Nor will the general consciousness 
 of the race admit that the later are times 
 of mere idealistic trance and poetic illu- 
 sion. Rather are they times of inspiration, 
 in which we see beyond appearances, and 
 beneajth all semblance, into the inner life 
 of things. 
 
 The question has so many sides that, 
 at the risk of some repetition, it may be 
 restated thus : It is said that limitation is 
 involved in all activity, and that, if there
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 243 
 
 be an infinite Personality, it is doomed 
 to everlasting repose, without act or sign 
 of energy; for to act is to be limited by 
 the conditions of activity. Thus each spe- 
 cific mode of energy which takes shape 
 in a determinate form is, ipso facto, cur- 
 tailed. Power emerging from its latent 
 state, and showing if self on the theatre of 
 finite existence, limits itself, by its very 
 relation, to the things on which it oper- 
 ates. Therefore it is only the indetermi- 
 nate that can be unlimited and infinite. 
 This is the difficulty. 
 
 But, in the first place, is not power in its 
 latent state i.e., unmanifested, or spe- 
 cialized in a concrete form more limited 
 in its retirement, and hampered by its se- 
 clusion, than it would be in its energy and 
 activity ? Cliaractcr is not limited by the 
 special acts in which it is revealed. On 
 the contrary, the more varied its features, 
 the greater and fuller is the character. It 
 is not the absence of definite characteristics 
 that proves one human nature to be richer 
 than another, but their number, their inten- 
 sity, their manifoldness, and their range. 
 
 In the second place, a limit may be 
 self-imposed ; and if so, it is simply one
 
 244 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the conditions under which alone power 
 can manifest itself. Resistance reveals 
 power, by giving an opportunity for en- 
 ergy to overcome the barrier. Power un- 
 resisted is power unmanifested, and may 
 be conceived of as latent heat ; but it is 
 the presence of some obstacle to be over- 
 come which shows the power of that 
 which subdues it, in the very act of yield- 
 ing and being overthrown. It may be 
 conceded that whenever power is exer- 
 cised, and issues in a definite act, it is 
 limited by its relation to other acts. It 
 immediately becomes one of the million 
 links, in the chain of finite things. But 
 the fountain-head of energy, whence the 
 act has come forth to play its part in the 
 theatre of existence, is unaffected by that 
 limitation. In short, the act may be lim- 
 ited, while the Agent is not. 
 
 In the third place, the actual conditions 
 under which we live, and under which our 
 personality works, prove that the existence 
 of a barrier in some directions enlarges, 
 deepens, and widens our personality in 
 others (take, for example, the limitation 
 or restriction involved in all duty). And 
 this enlargement is not due merely to the
 
 ri'.RSONALITY ANJ) Till: /A7-7A7//-. 245 
 
 law of compensation, and to the fact that 
 what is lost on one side is gained on 
 another ; but it is because, without the 
 limit or the constraint, the highest form 
 of activity could not possibly exist. 
 
 Perhaps, however, the main speculative 
 difficulty is experienced, not when we 
 attempt to construe to our minds the ex- 
 istence of the Divine Personality alone, 
 but when we try to conceive it in its re- 
 lation to humanity ; when we endeavor, 
 in fact, to realize the coexistence of the 
 Infinite with the finite. So long as we 
 think only of the Infinite, there is no logi- 
 cal puzzle, and the intellectually consis- 
 tent scheme of pantheism emerges ; so 
 long, again, as we think only of the finite, 
 there is no dilemma, though we seem 
 locked in the embrace of an atheistic sys- 
 tem. But try to combine the infinite with 
 the finite the former being not the mere 
 expansion of the latter, but its direct ne- 
 gation and, in the dualism which their 
 union forces upon us, a grave difficulty 
 seems to lurk. What relation do the innu- 
 merable creatures that exist bear to the 
 all-surrounding and all-pervading Essence ? 
 It cannot be similar to that which the
 
 246 ESSAYS AV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 planets bear to the sun, round which they 
 revolve ; for the sun is only a vaster finite, 
 like its satellites : and God -f- the universe 
 is not a sum of being, equivalent to that 
 of the sun -f- the planetary bodies. How, 
 then, can there be two substances, a finite 
 and an infinite ? Does not the latter 
 necessarily quench the former by its very 
 presence ? As a child of four years once 
 put it to me, " If God is everywhere, how 
 is there any room for us ? " 
 
 We must admit that if God be "the 
 sum of all reality" (as the Eleatics, the 
 later Platonists, Erigena, Spinoza, and 
 Hegel have maintained), then, since we are 
 a part of that sum, we are necessarily in- 
 cluded within the Divine Essence. Fur- 
 ther, if there be but one substance in the 
 universe, and all the phenomena of the 
 human consciousness, together with those 
 of the external world, are but the varying 
 phases which that single reality assumes ; 
 then, it matters not what we call it, a 
 force, a cause, a person, a substance, a life, 
 God, all that is, is of it. This is the pan- 
 theistic solution of the problem, which has 
 fascinated so many of the subtlest minds. 
 It has, of course, been met by the doctrine
 
 AA'D THE INFINITE. 247 
 
 of creation in time, or the origination of 
 finite existence at a particular instant by 
 the fiat of a Creator. Many believe that 
 this doctrine is essential to theism, and 
 are afraid that if we allow a perpetual cos- 
 mos, we must dispense with an eternal 
 God, except as an opifex nniudi ; that if we 
 do not affirm the origin of the universe 
 ex niliilo, we are unable to maintain the 
 separateness of God from it, and his tran- 
 scendency. 
 
 I see no warrant for this. To affirm 
 that without an absolute start of existence 
 out of blank nonentity into manifested 
 being, we have no evidence of God at all, 
 or only the signs of an eternally hampered 
 Deity, a mere supplement to the sum of 
 existence, is altogether illegitimate. For 
 the evidence of Divine action would then 
 be dependent on the signs of past effort, or 
 the occurrence of some stupendous stroke, 
 crisis, or burst of energy. Why may not 
 the story of the universe be rather inter- 
 preted as the everlasting effect of an eternal 
 Cause ? Do we need an origin in time, if 
 we have a perpetual genesis, or a cease- 
 less becoming, coeval with the everlasting 
 cause ? Which is the grander, which the
 
 248 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 more realizable notion, to suppose Nature 
 at one moment non-existent, and the next 
 "flashed into material reality at the fiat of 
 Deity;" or to suppose it eternally plastic 
 under the power of an Artificer, who is 
 perpetually fashioning it, through all the 
 cycles of progressive change ? It is not 
 the actual entrance or the possible exit of 
 existence that we have to explain, but its 
 manipulations, the rise of organizations and 
 their decay, the evolution and succession 
 of varied types of life ; and it is precisely 
 these which attest the presence of an in- 
 dwelling and immediately acting God. 
 
 Dualism, therefore, finds its speculative 
 warrant, not in any assumed act of crea- 
 tion, but in the eternal necessities of the 
 case, in the double element involved in all 
 knowledge, and such experiential facts as 
 those of sense - perception and intuition 
 generally. 
 
 To get rid of the dualism of monothe- 
 istic theory, which seemed to him to limit 
 the Infinite, Spinoza adopted the old mo- 
 nistic position ; holding God and nature to 
 be but the eternal cause and the everlast- 
 ing effect, natura naturans and natura 
 natura t a. This theory, however, affords
 
 PERSONALITY Ai\D THE L\J-'IN 1 1 1:. 249 
 
 no explanation of how the mind of man 
 blossoms into a consciousness of the Infi- 
 nite, of how the finite knovver reaches his 
 conception of the Infinite ; because, ac- 
 cording to the theory, all that is reached 
 by the mind of the knower is itself a de- 
 velopment of the infinite. The psychologi- 
 cal act of recognition is itself only a wave 
 on the sea of existence. Dualism explains 
 the apprehension of the one by the other, 
 in its affirmation that all our knowledge 
 is obtained under the conditions of con- 
 trast and difference, and thus reaches us 
 in pairs of opposites. It does not affirm 
 that, in order to the consciousness of per- 
 sonality in the Infinite, there must of ne- 
 cessity be a recognition of self and not- 
 self, of self and the universe ; but it affirms 
 that to the finite knower it must be so ; 
 that to him subject implies object, and the 
 ego the non-ego ; that the two are given 
 together, and are realizable only in union. 
 On every monistic theory of the uni- 
 verse, however, the question, "Where is 
 God to be found ? " is meaningless. A 
 " search for God " is a contradiction in 
 terms ; because the seeker and the search, 
 the quest and the quczsitor and the qmcsi-
 
 250 SS.4FS IX PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tiim, are all manifestations of one and the 
 same substance. Dualism is involved in 
 the very notion of a search. 
 
 Further, to take for granted that the 
 Infinite is that which quenches the finite, 
 which abolishes and absorbs it, is to beg 
 the whole question in debate. This super- 
 session of the finite by the Infinite is 
 speculatively as illegitimate as is the 
 acosmism of Spinoza. It is true that we 
 reach the idea of the infinite by removing 
 the finite out of the way. But then the act 
 of exclusion or absorption, being an act 
 of thought, constitutes one term of a re- 
 lation. If we can think of the infinite 
 at all, we have a mental concept which 
 stands contrasted with that of the finite, 
 and thus again dualism emerges. Al- 
 though our conception of the infinite is 
 reached by the abolition of the finite, it 
 does not follow that if an Infinite Being 
 exists, the finite can coexist with it. For, 
 the latter is not only given as a prior fact 
 of consciousness, but, when we proceed 
 to eliminate it, the act of thinking it away, 
 being finite, supplies us with the unelim- 
 inable element of dualistic relation and 
 difference. Further, if it be true that to
 
 PERSONALITY AND HIE INFINITE. 2$ I 
 
 predicate anything whatever of the infi- 
 nite is to assign a limit to it, if the 
 maxim oninis determinatio est ncgatio be 
 sound, then the infinite has to the hu- 
 man mind no definite meaning whatso- 
 ever. It is not distinguishable from the 
 non-existent ; and the conclusion, " being 
 - nothing," is reached. Hegel himself 
 admits that "abstract supersensible es- 
 sence, void of all difference and all specific 
 character, is a mere capnt niortnum of the 
 abstract understanding." * But on what 
 principle are we debarred from claiming 
 for the Infinite Essence, simply because 
 of its infinity, all possible, all conceivable 
 predicates, and therefore the power of re- 
 vealing itself to the finite knower. To 
 affirm the opposite is not to limit us alone, 
 it is to limit the Infinite by denying its 
 power of self-manifestation. 
 
 In all thought and consciousness dualism 
 emerges because there is invariably a sub- 
 ject and an object, a knower and a thing 
 known. But do these limit each other? 
 How so ? \Ye know in part ; but the ob- 
 ject we discern may be recognized by us 
 as infinite, in the very act of knowing it in
 
 252 SSAVS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 part. We may be aware that what we ap- 
 prehend transcends, in its inmost nature, 
 our apprehension of it ; while the latter 
 fact does not abolish the former, or reduce 
 our supposed knowledge to ignorance. 
 While, therefore, all knowledge enters the 
 mind under dualistic conditions, this psy- 
 chological fact does not relegate the object 
 known by us to the category of the finite, 
 or prevent the direct knowledge of God in 
 his infinity and transcendency. Nor does 
 it follow that, with a double element in all 
 cognition, one of the two must be positive 
 and the other negative, as some of the ad- 
 vocates of nescience contend. They may 
 both be equally positive and negative, since 
 each is antithetic of the other, and is nev- 
 ertheless its supporting background in the 
 field of consciousness. One of the two 
 may be prominent at a particular moment, 
 but the other is invariably present behind 
 it, giving it form and character. In other 
 words, the relativity of human apprehen- 
 sion does not cut us off from a direct and 
 positive knowledge of the Infinite. As it 
 is admirably put by Dr. Martineau, "We ad- 
 mit the relative character of human thought
 
 1'ERSONALITY AND T/fE INFINITE. 253 
 
 as a psychological fact : we deny it as an 
 ontological disqualification." l 
 
 The most direct suggestions of per- 
 sonality in alliance with infinity reach us 
 through the channel of the moral faculty. 
 They are disclosed in the phenomena of 
 conscience, and also of affection. 
 
 Before indicating how these suggestions 
 arise, I return to the teaching of Mr. Ar- 
 nold on the subject. He has made us all 
 so much his debtors by the light he has 
 cast on sundry historical problems, and his 
 rare literary skill in handling these, that 
 any critic of his work, who differs from 
 him on so radical a point as the nature of 
 God, finds the task neither easy nor con- 
 genial. In addition to the obscurity which 
 the subject itself presents, there is a spe- 
 cial difficulty in adequately estimating a 
 writer, whose criticism is on most points 
 so true, so subtle, and profound. 
 
 Admiration, however, is one thing ; as- 
 sent is another. Mr. Arnold wishes us to 
 use the Bible fruitfully, and his contribu- 
 tions to its fruitful use have been neither 
 few nor slight. Nevertheless, in his attack 
 on what he terms the " God of metaphys- 
 1 Essays Philosophical and Thcoh\*idil, p. 2^,\.
 
 254 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ics," in his elaborate critical assault 
 lacking neither in "vigor nor in rigor" 
 on the notion of Personality in God, he re- 
 moves, as it seems to me, the very basis of 
 theology ; and the whole superstructure of 
 the science becomes fantastic and unreal. 
 He is sanguine of laying the basis of a 
 "religion more serious, potent, awe-inspir- 
 ing, and profound than any which the 
 world has yet seen " (p. 109), but he builds 
 it on the ruins of the theistic philosophy 
 of the past. The latter must in the first 
 instance be leveled with the ground, and 
 the debris removed. We are to find " the 
 elements of a religion new, indeed, but 
 in the highest degree hopeful, solemn, and 
 profound " (p. 109) only when we re- 
 nounce the delusion that " God is a per- 
 son who thinks and loves," regarding it as 
 a " fairy tale," as "figure and personifica- 
 tion," and of the same scientific value as 
 the personification of the sun or the wind. 
 Religion, however, being the expression 
 of dependence, involves and carries with 
 it the recognition of an Object on whom 
 the worshiper depends ; and, as he is per- 
 sonal, and his personality is most dis- 
 tinctly evinced in his religion, the Object
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 255 
 
 on whom he depends, and whom he rec- 
 ognizes, must be personal also. Without 
 personality or its archetype and ana- 
 logue in God, religion is reduced to a 
 poetic thrill or glow of emotion. If recog- 
 nition is absent from it, it is not only blind 
 and deaf and dumb, it is also inarticulate 
 and vague. But, as was happily said of 
 the system of Cointe, "the wine of the 
 real presence being poured out," we are 
 asked "to adore the empty cup." 
 
 The readers of Mr. Arnold do not need 
 to be told that Speculative Philosophy 
 in the grand historic use and wont of the 
 term is to him a barren region, void of 
 all human interest ; and that intellectual 
 travel over it is pronounced by him to be 
 resultless. His dismissal of the metaphys- 
 ical arguments for Divine Personality, 
 " with sheer satisfaction " " because they 
 have convinced no one, have given rest to 
 no one, have given joy to no one, nay, no 
 one has even really understood them " 
 (pp. 104, 105), is curious as coming from so 
 distinguished an advocate of rich and 
 many-sided culture. Curious, when one 
 remembers that from the schools of Spec- 
 ulative Philosophy all the great move-
 
 256 JESS AYS AV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ments of opinion in other departments 
 have originally sprung, and that every 
 question raised in these departments must 
 ultimately run up into the region of meta- 
 physic. On a first perusal of Mr. Arnold's 
 delightful papers, one feels that he is being 
 led, by the most charming of guides, into 
 the regions of light and of certitude. By 
 and by he finds that his guide is an army- 
 leader, who intends " boldly to carry the 
 war into the enemy's country, and see how 
 many strong fortresses of the metaphysi- 
 cians he can enter and rifle" (p. 96). He 
 becomes the general in a new crusade 
 against our English notions about God, 
 our crass metaphysics, and our unverifiable 
 theology, and would prepare the way for a 
 "religion more serious, potent, awe-inspir- 
 ing, and profound than any which the world 
 has yet seen " by first cleverly chaffing the 
 old philosophy out of the way. 
 
 But this disparagement of the whole re- 
 gion of metaphysic, because it deals with 
 the questions of "being" and "essence," 
 is not so surprising as is Mr. Arnold's at- 
 tempt to find, in the simple etymology of 
 words, a clue to the mysteries which baffle 
 the ontologist. In this investigation, in-
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 257 
 
 teresting as it is, he has started on a 
 journey which ends in a cul de sac. To 
 discover the origin of the terms Being, Es- 
 sence, Substance, by getting hold of the 
 primitive Aryan root whence the Greek, 
 Latin, French, or English words have been 
 derived, will not help us in the inquiry 
 which concerns the origin of the ideas ex- 
 pressed by these terms. Abstracta c.r con- 
 c ret is may be the law of linguistic deriva- 
 tion ; and, by etymological study, we may 
 learn how the human race has come to 
 make use of certain terms, and to attach 
 particular meanings to them. In following 
 the course of the ancient river of linguis- 
 tic affinity, we may trace the process by 
 which the notions of movement, growth, 
 and permanence have possibly grown out 
 of the "breathe," "grow," and "stand" of 
 the old Aryan root. But the most exact 
 knowledge of the subtlest windings of this 
 river will not solve, will not even give us 
 the materials for solving, the ulterior ques- 
 tion, whether the human mind has imagi- 
 natively transformed the concrete into the 
 abstract, or has been all the while inter- 
 preting to itself an objective reality. 
 
 "By a simple figure," says Mr. Arnold,
 
 258 ASSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 " these terms declare a perceived energy 
 and operation, nothing more. Of a sub- 
 ject, that performs this operation, they tell 
 us nothing" (p. 82). These " primitives " 
 have been "falsely supposed to bring us 
 news about the primal nature of things, to 
 declare a subject in which inhered the en- 
 ergy and operation we had noticed, to indi- 
 cate a fontal category, or supreme consti- 
 tutive condition, into which the nature of 
 all things whatsoever might be finally run 
 up" (p. 82). No one, so far as I am aware, 
 has maintained this, as Mr. Arnold puts it. 
 Let it be conceded that our abstract terms 
 arose out of concretes ; that, as acts of per- 
 ception must have preceded the processes 
 of generalization in the race (as they pre- 
 cede them in the experience of each indi- 
 vidual), the words employed to express 
 abstract ideas were first used to describe 
 individual or concrete things ; and that, 
 the etymological research, which unravels 
 for us the intricate processes of growth, 
 adaptation, and change, in the usns lo- 
 qncndi of terms, is one of the most fruitful 
 branches of inquiry. But, supposing the 
 entire course of linguistic development 
 traced for us by an unerring hand, and in
 
 \' A.\D ////. y.\AA\v //:. 259 
 
 precise scientific detail, the whole question 
 will rcemerge, and confront us as before, 
 What has the human mind really done, in 
 making use of these concrete terms to ex- 
 press its abstract notions ? To express 
 them at all, it must use some word ; and 
 that it selects one, which originally de- 
 scribed an individual or concrete thing, 
 tells nothing against the fact that it is now 
 able to abstract from these particulars, and 
 to describe, by means of the adopted term, 
 ideas which have not entered the mind by 
 the gateway of the senses. 
 
 Mr. Arnold speaks of the words "is" 
 and " be " as " mysterious petrifactions 
 which remain in language as if they were 
 autochthons there, as if no one could go 
 beyond them or behind them. Without 
 father, without mother, without descent, as 
 it seemed, they yet are omnipresent in our 
 speech, and indispensable" (p. 83) ; whereas 
 he has shown that the terms really arose 
 out of our sense-experience of concrete 
 things. Let us suppose that he is correct 
 in his account of the process by which the 
 product has been reached. He merely ex- 
 hibits to us a genealogical chart, or tree 
 of derivation. A out of B, B out of C, C
 
 26O ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 out of X. But the real question lies be- 
 hind the genealogy. We may imagine our 
 Aryan forefathers, in their infantile gaze 
 over the ever-changing world of phenom- 
 ena, describing what met the eye and ear 
 and senses generally, by certain words, 
 mostly imitative of the sounds of nature. 
 Then, as their intelligence grew with the 
 repetition of the old, and the occurrence 
 of new experience, if they wished to ex- 
 press the notion of a thing existing, they 
 made use of a term whicli they had previ- 
 ously used to describe its operation, viz., 
 "breathing." Were this statement of the 
 origin and prehistoric use of abstract terms 
 found to be correct, a point which must 
 be determined by specialists in the domain 
 of archaic etymology, the investigation 
 would not have guided us one step towards 
 the solution of the graver problem, as to 
 the origin of the ideas with which the terms 
 deal. We would have been merely moving 
 on the surface-plane of phenomenal succeV 
 sion, and the most accurate account of that 
 process would no more explain the source 
 of the ideas to which the mind has affixed 
 the old terms, than the discovery of all the 
 links of a chain would explain its origin 
 or method of construction.
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 261 
 
 Mr. Arnold would persuade us that, be- 
 cause the terms which now describe out- 
 abstract categories were originally used to 
 describe objects known by sense-percep- 
 tion, the ideas came in also by that outward 
 gateway. Is it not a better explanation < f 
 these "mysterious petrifactions," is and be, 
 that the notions which they represent, the 
 categories which they describe, are them- 
 selves autochthons in the human mind ; 
 and that they spring up out of the soil of 
 consciousness, whenever that soil is made 
 ready for their growth, by the scantiest in- 
 tellectual husbandry ? Indigenous to the 
 spirit of man, though latent in its inmost 
 substance till evolved by the struggle of 
 mind with its environment, it is not sur- 
 prising that in afterwards naming them, 
 the simple words, once used to describe 
 the operations of nature, or of man, should 
 be invested with new meanings ; or that in 
 the course of ages they should have broad- 
 ened out into general and abstract terms. 
 
 I5ut if neither the etymology of particu- 
 lar words, nor a study of the origin and 
 growth of language, affords us any help in 
 determining the origin of our ideas, it is 
 equally certain that no knowledge of "pre-
 
 262 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 historic man " can aid us in solving that 
 ulterior question. Suppose it proved that 
 man has arisen, in the long struggle for 
 existence, out of elements inferior to him- 
 self, and that his present beliefs have been 
 evolved out of lower phases of thought and 
 feeling, this proof will not determine it 
 will not even touch the problem of the 
 reality of that existence, to which the 
 present beliefs of the race bear witness. 
 The question of chief interest is not the 
 genealogical one, of how we have come to 
 be endowed with these beliefs, but the 
 metaphysical one, of their present validity 
 to the individual and to the species. Are 
 they, as they now exist, competent wit- 
 nesses to an outstanding fact and an abid- 
 ing reality ? It matters little how a be- 
 lief has been reached, if its final verdict be 
 true ; and the method of its development 
 casts no light on the intrinsic character, 
 or the trustworthiness of its attestations. 
 The evolution of organic existence out of 
 the inorganic, and of the rational out of the 
 organic supposing it scientifically dem- 
 onstrated, and every missing link in the 
 chain of derivation supplied would only 
 tell us of a law, or method, or process of
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 263 
 
 becoming. It would give us no informa- 
 tion as to the nature of the Fountain-head, 
 out of which the stream of development 
 has flowed, and is flowing now. What has 
 been evolved, in the slow uprise and growth 
 of innumerable ages, is the outcome of an 
 
 Kternal process moving on 
 
 in lines of continuous succession, an 
 ever-advancing stream of physical, intellec- 
 tual, and moral tendency. But the ques- 
 tion remains, Is this onward movement a 
 real advance ? Is it progressive, as well as 
 successive? Are the later conceptions of 
 the universe which have been developed 
 out of the guesses of primeval men really 
 "higher," because more accurate, interpre- 
 tations of the reality of things ? Or, is the 
 whole series of notions from first to last an 
 illusory process of idealization and person- 
 ification, and therefore mere conjecture 
 and guess-work ? Grant that theology has 
 grown out of nature-worship ; has the 
 growth been a progressive, and progres- 
 sively accurate, interpretation of what is ? 
 If the conception of a spiritual Presence 
 has emerged out of the animal sensations 
 of childhood, and the subtlest analyses of
 
 264 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 our Western theology have sprung out of 
 the fantastic notions of primitive religion, 
 the question of absorbing interest lies be- 
 hind this, and is altogether unaffected by 
 it. That question is, Are our present 
 adult notions like a mirage in the desert, 
 or like 
 
 The clouds that gather round the setting sun, 
 
 half the glory of which lies in the change- 
 fulness of their form and hue ? or has the 
 race had an intuition of reality varying 
 in accuracy, yet valid and authentic at 
 each stage of its progress ? If the latter 
 alternative be rejected, in what has the ad- 
 vance consisted ? Surely there has been 
 no intelligible advance at all ? and the 
 guesses of the child, at the foot of the 
 ladder of inquiry, have an equal scientific 
 value with the surmises of the most edu- 
 cated at the top ; that is to say, neither 
 have any scientific value at all. 
 
 If there be any meaning in a rudimen- 
 tary stage of human history, when the 
 notions formed of the universe were cha- 
 otic and distorted, and if this gave place 
 by gradual steps to a time when " the 
 ideas of conduct or moral order and right
 
 PERSONALITY AXD THE INFINITE. 265 
 
 had gathered strength enough to estab- 
 lish and declare themselves" (p. 135), what 
 meaning are \ve to attach to the progress, 
 unless in the latter period there was a more 
 accurate reading of the objective reality of 
 things / " The native, continuous, and in- 
 creasing pressure upon Israel's spirit of 
 the ideas of conduct, and its sanctions," 
 Mr. Arnold calls "his intuition of the eter- 
 nal that makes for righteousness." But 
 whence came this pressure, this appeal 
 from without, this solicitation and reve- 
 lation ? All that we are told is that " Is- 
 rael had an intuitive faculty, a natural 
 bent for these ideas" (p. 139). But the 
 scientific investigator of the laws of his- 
 toric continuity at once raises the farther 
 question of whence? and how? Whence 
 came they ? and how did they origin-ate ? 
 If these things pressed upon the national 
 mind of Israel, it must either have been 
 through tradition, the unconscious heri- 
 tage of past experience working in the 
 blood of the people, or through an eter- 
 nally present Power, disclosing itself to the 
 Hebraic race in a series of historic mani- 
 festations. But does an inferior state ever 
 create a superior one ? It necessarily pre-
 
 266 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cedes it in time. But is the lower ever 
 causal of the higher ? We are told that 
 the " usage of the minority gradually be- 
 came the usage of the majority" (p. 147). 
 So far, we are simply recording facts 
 which have occurred. We are dealing 
 with history, with the successions of phe- 
 nomena ; but we are explaining nothing. 
 
 Now, Philosophy essays an explanation 
 of History. It is not satisfied with statis- 
 tics. If we ask how the selfish and wholly 
 animal tendencies of primitive society 
 gradually gave place to others that were 
 generous or elevated, and if, in answer, 
 we are merely directed to habit, custom, or 
 usage, it is evident that our director is 
 simply veiling our ignorance from us, by 
 a repetition of the question proposed. It 
 is an explanation of the usage, not a re- 
 statement of it, that we desire. Habit 
 merely tells us that a thing done once was 
 repeated, and will be done again. What 
 we want to know is, how it came to be 
 repeated ? why it was done again ? why 
 it was done at all ? How the bent of the 
 race was determined this way rather than 
 that in favor of righteousness rather than 
 its opposite is therefore altogether un-
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE I. \7-7.VV TE. 267 
 
 explained by custom and association. It 
 is the custom, association, and usage, that 
 call for explanation. May not the existence 
 of an eternally righteous Source, or Centre 
 of the universe, explain it ? The spirit of 
 man can surely discern a supreme moral 
 principle, if he himself stands in a close 
 personal relation to it. And the rise from 
 rudimentary perceptions to a state which 
 we now agree to call the "moral order" 
 with the sanctions of society super- 
 added to the customs of our ancestors 
 is on any other theory unaccountable. 
 
 In other words, we cannot validly affirm 
 that the process of evolution has, after long 
 conflict, brought to the front principles of 
 conduct, which can be called the real ele- 
 ments of moral order, or of the constitution 
 of society, if these have not proceeded from, 
 and are the progressive manifestations of, 
 an eternal moral Nature. If they are the 
 product of a blind strife amongst rival ten- 
 dencies, at what point do they become a 
 rule for posterity ? At what stage of evolu- 
 tion are we warranted in saying that " the 
 perception, and the rule founded on it, 
 have become a conquest forever, placing 
 human nature on a higher stage ; so that,
 
 268 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 however much the perception and the rule 
 may have been dubious and unfounded 
 once, they must be taken to be certain and 
 formed now?" (p. 153). At no stage 
 could this be affirmed, because what has 
 been formed by strife must alter with the 
 continued action of the forces that have 
 made it what it is. The child of contin- 
 gency remains contingent, and may itself 
 become the parent of endless future change. 
 Unless, therefore, the law of evolution 
 ceases to operate, and the process of de- 
 velopment abruptly closes, the possible 
 alteration of the canons of morality, after 
 the conquest has been made, is not only as 
 conceivable as it was before the struggle 
 commenced, but it is as certain. Nay, the 
 disappearance of these canons before some 
 future rule of life is involved in their very 
 origin, if that origin be merely the " sur- 
 vival of the fittest " in the long struggle 
 for existence. 
 
 To put it otherwise. Let us suppose 
 that the family bond arose out of the self- 
 ish struggles of primitive man, that rev- 
 erence for parents and love for children 
 have been slowly evolved out of tendencies 
 that were originally self-regarding, why
 
 1'ERSONAUTY AND THE h\l-IXlTE. 269 
 
 should we call the later stage a more per- 
 fect one, for the race at large ? It may be 
 more perfect, for those who have attained 
 to it ; but it would have been out of place, 
 if earlier in the field. Is it not an essen- 
 tial part of the process of development 
 that every stage is as necessary and as per- 
 fect as all its antecedent and all its subse- 
 quent stages ? Unless a point is reached 
 when conduct becomes intrinsically excel- 
 lent, excellent in virtue of its conformity 
 to a rule which is not the product of evolu- 
 tion, a)id ichich cannot be superseded by any- 
 thing to be evolved millenniums hence, 
 how can we speak of monogamy and self- 
 restraint as "the true law of our being" 
 in contrast with the earlier promiscuous- 
 nwss which it succeeded ? Evolution, in 
 short, tells us nothing of a moral goal, be- 
 cause it gives us no information of a moral 
 Source. It supplies us with no standard, 
 because it points to no Centre ; and it 
 brings with it no ethical sanction higher 
 than custom, at any stage. // has come 
 about is all that it tells us of any phenom- 
 enon. 
 
 Now, not to speak of the fluctuating 
 moral verdicts of the world, and the obsti-
 
 2/0 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nate reversions from later to earlier stand- 
 ards, that which has stood at the front 
 and dominated for a while, falling again to 
 the rear and being disregarded, how can 
 we speak of one stage of human progress 
 as dim and rudimentary, and of another as 
 disciplined and mature, if there be no ab- 
 solute standard towards which the efforts 
 of the race are tending, and should tend ? 
 It is not merely that the ethical habit of 
 to-day may not be a "conquest forever," 
 but only a chance victory in the skirmish 
 of circumstance, which the next great con- 
 flict may reverse. It is much more than 
 this. If the later state be the creation of 
 the former, and evolved out of it, all the 
 stages being of equal value as cause and 
 consequence, the very notion of an ethi- 
 cal struggle disappears. The successive 
 moments of moral experience are reduced 
 to the mere category of states, prior and 
 posterior, in the stream of development ; 
 and conscious effort to reach a higher 
 standard, or to realize a nobler life, be- 
 comes unnatural discontent. It might 
 even be construed as rebellion against the 
 leadings of instinct ! and, if so, the actual 
 would legitimately crush out the ideal.
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE /A//A777-:. 2/1 
 
 Then, with the stimulus of aspiration gone, 
 and the sense of control removed, the drift 
 of the average man, and of the race, would 
 be towards the easiest pleasures, and the 
 satisfactions of the savage state. 
 
 The emergence of the conscience is one 
 thing, its creation is another. Its rise out 
 of lower elements, its consequent flexibil- 
 ity, and its possible transformation in the 
 course of ages into a much more delicate 
 instrument, sensitive to all passing lights 
 and shades and fine issues of conduct, is 
 perfectly consistent with its being a com- 
 petent witness to a Reality, which it has 
 gradually succeeded in apprehending, and 
 which it has not merely idealized out of its 
 own subjective processes. If the senti- 
 ment of duty arose out of an experience, 
 which was at first as entirely devoid of it 
 as that of the 
 
 Baby new to earth and sky, 
 
 who 
 
 Never thinks that this is I, 
 
 the obscure genesis of those convictions, 
 which finally assume shapes so transcend- 
 ent, could not invalidate or even affect 
 their trustworthiness. 
 
 The story of the race is but the story
 
 2/2 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the individual "writ large." When the 
 moral sense awakens in a child, under the 
 tutelage of its seniors, the influences to 
 which it is subjected do not create its con- 
 science. They merely evoke it. The child 
 opens its eyes, and sees ; although the pro- 
 cess of learning to see accurately may be a 
 much longer one in moral than in visual 
 perception. If it is so with the child, why 
 may it not be so similarly with the race ? 
 Why not necessarily ? Let the processes 
 of growth, therefore, be what they may, 
 the source of the moral faculty lies hid 
 beyond the lines of historical investiga- 
 tion, and the authority of the developed 
 product is not invalidated by the discovery 
 of its lineage. 
 
 It comes to this, that in the phenomena 
 of conscience we find the traces of a prin- 
 ciple 
 
 Deep-seated in our mystic frame, 
 
 which is not evolved out of the lower ele- 
 ments of appetency and desire. These 
 phenomena disclose results, which are best 
 explained by the presence of an alter ego, 
 "in us, yet not of us." We can trace it 
 working within, yet mysteriously overshad- 
 owing us, and suggesting in the occa-
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 2/3 
 
 sional flashes of light sent across the 
 darker background of experience the 
 action of another Personality, behind onr 
 oivn. 
 
 Our account of the phenomena of con- 
 science is not exhausted when we affirm 
 that certain moral causes, set in operation 
 by ourselves or others, issue in certain 
 subjective effects upon the character. To 
 Say that definite consequences result from 
 specific acts is only to state one half of the 
 case, and that the least important half. 
 How are our actions invested with the 
 character of blamevvorthiness, or the re- 
 verse? Moral worth and baseness are not 
 only two points or stages, in the upward 
 or downward stream of tendency. The 
 merit and the demerit are respectively due 
 to the character of the stream, as deter- 
 mined at the moment, by the act and 
 choice of the individual. 
 
 It is unnecessary at this point to raise 
 the large question of the freedom of the 
 will, its moral autonomy. It is enough to 
 affirm that the theoretical denial of free- 
 dom will always be met by a counter affir- 
 mation, springing from a region unaffected 
 by inductive evidence. It will also be met
 
 2/4 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 by the recoil of the feelings of mankind 
 from the doctrine of non-responsibility for 
 action, which is the logical outcome of that 
 denial. It may be safely affirmed that, 
 allowing for hereditary tendency, and the 
 influence of constraining circumstances, 
 the human race will continue to apportion 
 its praise and its blame to individuals, on 
 the ground that their action might take 
 shape in either of two contrary directions, 
 according to the choice and determination 
 of the will. No action ever arises abso- 
 lutely de novo, unaffected by antecedent 
 causes, both active and latent ; neither is 
 any action absolutely determined from 
 without, or from behind. In each act of 
 choice, the causal nexus remains unsev- 
 ercd ; while the act itself is ethically free, 
 and undetermined. In other words, af- 
 firming the moral autonomy of the will, 
 we deny the liberty of libertarian indiffer- 
 ence ; and affirming the integrity of the 
 causal nexus, we reject the despotism of 
 necessitarian fate : and we maintain that, 
 in so doing, we are not affirming and deny- 
 ing the same thing at the same time ; but 
 that we are true to the facts of conscious- 
 ness, and preserve a moral eclecticism,
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 2J$ 
 
 which shuns " the falsehood of extremes," 
 and has its evidence in the personality of 
 the agent. The two rival schemes of Lib- 
 erty and Necessity, both "resistless in as- 
 sault, but impotent in defense," are prac- 
 tically overthrown by the ease with which 
 each annihilates the other. To exhibit the 
 rationale of this would require a long chap- 
 ter. 
 
 Leaving it, therefore, and assuming 
 the freedom which we make no attempt 
 to demonstrate, the specialty of that 
 Power which presides over the region of 
 mixed motive and variable choice is at 
 once its absoluteness, and its independence 
 of the individual. It announces itself, in 
 Kantian phrase, as the " categorical im- 
 perative." It is not ours, as an emotion or 
 passion is ours. We speak in a figure of 
 the I'oicc of the conscience ; implying, in 
 our popular use of the term, its indepen- 
 dence of us. It is not our own voice ; or, 
 if the voice of the higher self, in con- 
 trast with the lower, which it controls, it 
 is an inspiration in us, the whispered sug- 
 gestion of a monitor "throned within our 
 other powers." If it were merely the re- 
 monstrance of one part of our nature
 
 2/6 SSA YS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 against the workings of another part, we 
 might question its right to do more than 
 claim to be an equal inmate of the house. 
 In any case disregard of it would amount 
 to nothing more serious than a loss of har- 
 mony, a false note marring the music of 
 human action, or a flaw in argument that 
 disarranged the sequences of thought. In 
 the moral imperative, however, which com- 
 mands us categorically, and acts without 
 our order, and cannot be silenced by us, 
 we find the hints of a Personality that is 
 girding and enfolding ours. As admirably 
 expressed by Francis Newman, 
 
 This energy of life within is ours, yet it is not we. 
 
 It is in us, it belongs to us, yet we cannot control it. 
 
 It acts without our bidding, and when we do not think 
 of it. 
 
 Nor will it cease its acting at our command, or other- 
 wise obey us. 
 
 But while it recalls from evil, and reproaches us for evil, 
 
 And is not silenced by our effort, surely it is not ive ; 
 
 Yet it pervades mankind, as one life pervades the trees. 1 
 
 It is not that in the restraints of law we 
 are conscious of a fence or boundary laid 
 down by statute. But, in the most deli- 
 
 1 Theism, p. 13. Cf. Fenelon, DC r Existence de Dieu, 
 Part I. c. i, 29. See also Cardinal Newman, Gram- 
 mar of Assent, Part I. c 5, I.
 
 PEKSOXALITY AND THE INFINITE. 277 
 
 cate suggestions and surmises of this moni- 
 tor, we are aware of a Presence "besetting 
 us" as the Hebrews put it "behind 
 and before," penetrating the soul, pressing 
 its appeals upon us, yet withdrawing itself 
 the moment it has uttered its voice, and 
 leaving us to the exercise of our own free- 
 dom. The most significant fact if not 
 the most noticeable in the relation of the 
 Conscience to the Will is its quick sugges- 
 tion of what ought to be done, and the en- 
 tire absence of subsequent compulsion in 
 the doing of it. When the force of the 
 moral imperative is felt most absolutely, 
 the hand of external necessity is with- 
 drawn, that we may act freely. Consciously 
 hemmed in and weighed down by physi- 
 cal forces within the sphere of Nature, 
 forces which we are powerless to resist, 
 the pressure is relaxed, within the moral 
 sphere ; and we are free to go to the right 
 hand or to the left, when duty appeals to 
 us on the one side, and desire on the other. 
 This has been so excellently put by Mr. 
 Richard Hutton, in his essay on "the 
 Atheistic Explanation of Religion," that I 
 may quote a sentence, which sums up the 
 ethical argument for the Divine Personal-
 
 278 ESSAYS IX PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ity, better than any other that T am aware 
 of: 
 
 Accustomed as man is to feel his personal feebleness, 
 his entire subordination to the physical forces of the 
 universe, ... in the case of moral duty he finds this 
 almost constant pressure remarkably withdrawn at the 
 very crisis in which the import of his actions is brought 
 home to him with the most vivid conviction. Of what 
 nature can a power be that moves us hither and thither 
 through the ordinary course of our lives, but withdraws 
 its hands at those critical points where we have the 
 clearest sense of authority, in order to let us act for our- 
 selves ? The absolute control that sways so much of 
 our life is waived just where we are impressed with the 
 most profound conviction that there is but one path in 
 which we can move with a free heart. If so, are we not 
 then surely ivatclu'J '' Is it not clear that the Power 
 which has therein ceased to more us has retired only to 
 obst'Wt' ? . . . The mind is pursued into its freest move- 
 ments by this belief that the Power within could only 
 voluntarily have receded from its task of moulding us, 
 in order to keep watch over us, as we mould ourselves. 1 
 
 It is thus that the dualism, involved in 
 all knowledge, comes out in sharpest promi- 
 nence in the moral sphere. There we rise 
 at once, above the uniformity of mere phe- 
 nomenalism, and out of the thralldom of 
 necessity, by recognizing the transcendent 
 element that is latent in the conscience. 
 \Ye escape from the circle of self alto- 
 gether, in the "otherness " of moral law. 
 
 1 Essays, Theological and Literary, vol. i. pp. 41, 42.
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 279 
 
 It is in the ethical field that we meet 
 with the most significant facts, which pre- 
 vent us from gliding, through a seductive 
 love of unity, into a pantheistic solution of 
 the problem of existence. The fascination 
 of the pursuit of unity, through all the di- 
 versities of finite existence, has given rise 
 to many philosophical systems, which have 
 twisted the facts of consciousness to one 
 side. But unity is by itself as unintelli- 
 gible, as diversity minus unitv is unthink- 
 able. If there were but one self-existing 
 Substance, of which all individual forms of 
 being were tributary streams, the relation 
 of any single rill to its source (and to the 
 whole) would be merely that of derivation. 
 Moral ties would be lost, in a union that 
 was purely physical. On this theory, the 
 universe would be one, only because there 
 was nothing in it to unite ; whereas all 
 moral unity implies diversity, and is based 
 upon it. There must be a difference in the 
 things which are connected by an under- 
 lying and under-working affinity. And we 
 find this difference most apparent in the 
 phenomena of the moral cosnciousncss. 
 While, therefore, the moral law legislates, 
 and desire opposes, in the struggle that
 
 2 SO SSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ensues between inclination and duty, we 
 trace the working of a principle, which has 
 not grown out of our desires and their 
 gratification. We discover that we are 
 not, like the links in the chain of physical 
 nature, passive instruments for the develop- 
 ment of the increasing purpose of things ; 
 but that we exist for the unfolding, disci- 
 plining, and completing of a life of self- 
 control, and the inward mastery of impulse, 
 through which, at the great crises of moral 
 decision, a new world of experience is en- 
 tered. 
 
 We cannot tell when this began. Its 
 origin is lost in the golden haze that is 
 wrapped around our infancy, when per- 
 sonal life is not consciously distinguishable 
 from automatic action. But as our facul- 
 ties enlarge, a point is reached when the 
 individual perceives the significance of 
 freedom, the meaning of the august rules 
 of righteousness, and the grave issues of 
 voluntary choice. It is then that con- 
 science 
 
 Gives out at times 
 
 A little flash, a mystic hint 
 
 of a Personality distinct from ours, yet 
 kindred to it, in the unity of which it lives,
 
 PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE. 28 I 
 
 and has its being. Whence come those 
 suggestions of the Infinite that flit 
 athwart the stage of consciousness, in 
 our struggle and aspiration after the ideal 
 if not from a Personal Source kindred 
 to themselves ? We do not create our 
 own longings in this direction. On the 
 contrary, as we advance from infancy to 
 maturity, we come, by slow progressive 
 steps, to the knowledge of a vast over- 
 shadowing Personality, unseen yet su- 
 pra-sensible, recognized at intervals then 
 lost to view, known and unknown, sur- 
 rounding, enfolding, inspiring, and appeal- 
 ing to us, in the suggestions of the moral 
 faculty ? In addition to this, our sense of 
 the boundlessness of duty brings with it a 
 suggestion of the infinity of its Source. 
 We know it to be beyond ourselves, and 
 higher than we, extra-human; even extra- 
 mundane ; while, on other grounds, we 
 know it to be also intra-human and intra- 
 mundane. \Ve find no difficulty in realiz- 
 ing that the Personality, revealed to us in 
 conscience, may have infinite relations and 
 affinities ; because, in no district of the 
 universe, can we conceive the verdict of 
 the moral law reversed. Nowhere would
 
 282 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it be right not "to do justly, and to love 
 mercy," although the practical rules and 
 minor canons of morality may, like cere- 
 monial codes, change with the place in 
 which they originate, and the circumstances 
 which gave rise to them. If, therefore, 
 the suffrage of the race has not created 
 this inward monitor, and if its sway is co- 
 extensive with the sphere of moral agency, 
 if its range is as vast as its authority is 
 absolute in these facts we have corrobo- 
 rative evidence of the union of the Per- 
 sonal with the Infinite.
 
 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 IN discussing this large subject, which 
 periodically comes to the front, and occu- 
 pies, if it does not agitate, every thought- 
 ful mind, the question, viz., of the sur- 
 vival of the individual when this life ends, 
 it is above all things necessary to keep 
 within the lines of verifiable evidence, in 
 order that we may lean on no broken, and, 
 if possible, on no breakable reed. It is 
 also necessary to distinguish between what 
 we actually know, and what we merely sur- 
 mise, or may legitimately hope for. If it 
 is not likely (as I do not think it is) that 
 many new proofs will be forthcoming, 
 proofs that will set the question finally at 
 rest, it is desirable that all the old ones 
 should be recast, from age to age. Still 
 more important is it that the great mass of 
 inconclusive argument, which so easily ac- 
 cumulates on a subject of such importance, 
 should be cleared away, in order that we 
 may see where the foundation stones are 
 lying.
 
 284 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Many persons seem to me to desiderate 
 far more, in the way of positive evidence 
 on this subject, than it is desirable a priori 
 to expect, or than the experience of the 
 past warrants us in hoping to obtain. One 
 distinguished writer has told us, sorrow- 
 fully, that he has found " no logical reasons 
 to compel conviction." But he forgets 
 that, if such existed, the controversy would 
 be closed. If there was no possibility of 
 questioning the doctrine, in its very obvi- 
 ousness it would be shorn of half its grand- 
 eur. It would sink to the level of a sec- 
 ondary truth, if not to the lower level of a 
 commonplace conviction. It is sometimes 
 forgotten that all perfectly luminous truths 
 are secondary ones. Truths that are pri- 
 mary, or ultimate, are of necessity dim ; 
 because, whenever we pass beyond phe- 
 nomena, the reality which we apprehend is 
 half concealed, as well as half revealed. 
 In our more impatient and shallow moods 
 w r e may wish it were otherwise ; but, in all 
 the profounder moments of experience, we 
 do not desire that these ultimate convic- 
 tions should be lowered to the level of the 
 perfectly obvious. It will be seen that sev- 
 eral important moral ends are served by
 
 IMMORTALITY. 285 
 
 the very obscurity of the problem with 
 which we are to deal. 
 
 It is expedient, first, of all to set aside 
 the irrelevant arguments that have been 
 advanced, both in favor of the doctrine 
 and against it ; always remembering that, 
 as every error is* a truth abused, many a 
 faulty argument may spring from a root 
 existing somewhere in human nature, or 
 beyond it ; and that, with all its irrelevancy 
 or inconclusiveness, it may be merely the 
 distortion of a truth, which only requires to 
 be reset, in order to afford valid corrobora- 
 tive testimony. 
 
 I put aside the instinctive desire or long- 
 ing for continued life, because we desire 
 and long for many things which we can- 
 not possibly get. We may note, however, 
 that it is not on the mere wish for immor- 
 tality that the argument is based, but 
 rather on this, that, since the stream of 
 instinctive tendency sets in that direction 
 so strongly, some real magnet, and no 
 mere illusion, must be drawing it forth. 
 Thus, the desire may be prophetic of its 
 own fulfillment. \Ve may take the state- 
 ment of Aquinas as an embodiment of this 
 argument, " Natural e dcsidcrium non potest
 
 286 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 esse inane ; " but the inference is invalid, 
 and must be set aside unhesitatingly. We 
 set aside also the proof drawn from the 
 consent of the ages. In reference to im- 
 mortality there is no consensus gentium. 
 It is not in the category of the "quod 
 semper, quod ubique, qu*od ab omnibus." 
 Then, there is the argument from analogy. 
 There is no analogy, however, between any 
 phenomenal change in the physical world 
 and that which supervenes when soul and 
 body separate. The doctrine of immortal- 
 ity is thus outwith or beyond experience. 
 It has been said that as the worm changes 
 into the chrysalis, and the chrysalis into 
 the fly, while both are in a rudimentary 
 manner within the worm from the first, 
 our act of dying may be merely " the shuf- 
 fling off" of "a mortal coil " which liber- 
 ates the spirit. But there is no analogy 
 between the two. The only valid parallel 
 would be the immediate appearance of an- 
 other body ; as, when a crustacean casts 
 its shell, the new one already exists within 
 that which is thrown aside. The butterfly 
 is materially within the caterpillar; and the 
 vital principle does not desert the worm 
 or the crustacean, and appear detached
 
 IMMORTALITY. 287 
 
 from its old envelope. It only slumbers 
 in the one, and reawakens in the other. 
 Thus no physical consideration is of any 
 value in favor of the survival of the human 
 soul. Grant that matter cannot by itself 
 fashion the material molecules into the 
 shapes which they assume, and that this is 
 due to an immaterial principle working in 
 and through it, it does not follow that the 
 vital force which accretes these molecules 
 and vitalizes them must continue to live, 
 independently of the work it does. 
 
 But now, with these arguments candidly 
 laid aside, there are others, constantly ad- 
 vanced against immortality, which must be 
 set aside as equally baseless. By far the 
 strongest of these is the present depen- 
 dence of the human soul upon the body ; 
 the correlation of the two being so close, 
 that the vigor of the one waxes and wanes 
 with the vigor of the other. So far as ex- 
 perience guides us, this dependence is con- 
 stant, though not absolute ; and it is in- 
 ferred that, being inseparable now, when 
 the one dies the other must perish with it. 
 This, however, is an illegitimate inference. 
 The present correlation of mind and mat- 
 ter, in the conscious life of soul and bodv,
 
 288 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 can prove nothing against the immortality 
 of the former ; and if, during the present 
 life, our vital phenomena are only the sen- 
 sible signs of a reality beyond themselves, 
 their cessation as phenomena is not neces- 
 sarily the cessation of life itself. We may 
 note further that, while analogy is incom- 
 petent to prove immortality, it is equally 
 incapable of disproving it, and that it can- 
 not, in the least degree, discredit it. It 
 does not follow that, because the elements 
 out of which the body is composed are 
 refunded to nature on the death of the 
 organism, the same must take place with 
 regard to the soul, unless we can prove, 
 on independent grounds, that mind is but 
 a function of body, when of course the 
 function would cease with the cessation 
 of its organ. 
 
 I have now to refer to certain argu- 
 ments, lying midway between those al- 
 ready mentioned, and the more valid ones 
 to which we afterwards proceed. These 
 intermediate proofs are founded on an al- 
 leged necessity for the completion or full 
 development of powers, for which the pres- 
 ent life gives no adequate scope. They 
 may be called psychological arguments, be-
 
 IMMOR TA L I TV. 289 
 
 cause they arise out of the contrast between 
 the results attained in this life and the 
 possibilities of attainment. In the case of 
 lower organisms, this docs not hold good. 
 They perish by the thousand, incomplete; 
 they are nipped in the bud by the million. 
 But the argument, or rather the sugges- 
 tion, or "intimation of immortality," in 
 the case of man, may be put thus. The 
 total absence of completion within terres- 
 trial limits, as compared with the approxi- 
 mate realization of it, in the case of the 
 lower creatures within these limits, sug- 
 gests for man a sphere and an arena in the 
 future in which completion will be possi- 
 ble. In the case of the flower, the insect, 
 and the tree, there is a fixed limit of devel- 
 opment. Further growth is impossible. 
 So with man's body ; beyond a definite 
 though variable limit it cannot possibly 
 continue to exist. Its functions wear out. 
 The human consciousness, on the other 
 hand, never blossoms into perfect for-m 
 within the limits of the "threescore years 
 and ten." Of course the physiologist will 
 tell us that the two must develop together, 
 and that the one cannot continue when 
 the other ends. The rejoinder, however,
 
 2QO ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is obvious : in autumn, the flower must 
 fade, because it has done its work. Not 
 only do external climatic conditions com- 
 pel decay, the internal state of the or- 
 ganism necessitates it. But this cannot 
 be affirmed with the same confidence, or 
 on the same grounds, of the human soul. 
 We have no evidence that, when the limits 
 of the bodily organism are reached, the 
 mental and moral faculties have attained 
 their goal. On the contrary, they often 
 seem to be just commencing tJicir develop- 
 ment. This is especially seen on the moral 
 side of experience, in reference to the ca- 
 pacities of human virtue and affection. 
 Their utterly inadequate development in 
 this life, as compared with their possibili- 
 ties of expansion, and still more their la- 
 tent conscious affinities, suggests a future 
 in which there will be room for enlarge- 
 ment. The mere existence of those moral 
 ideals which expand as we approach to- 
 wards them, and which recede perpetually 
 before the inward eye that contemplates 
 them suggests, not the fugitive chase of 
 a phantom, the pursuit of a will-o'-the-wisp, 
 but a future emancipation from fetters 
 which now arrest the development of en- 
 ergy.
 
 IMMORTALITY. 2QI 
 
 Before I state the grounds on which 
 in the absence of any evidence against im- 
 mortality our moral intuitions (and such 
 suggestions as those just referred to) may 
 be allowed to come in, and to weight the 
 scale of probability in its favor, a remark 
 may be made on the scorn with which the 
 latter kind of evidence is received in cer- 
 tain quarters. Perhaps it is not every mind 
 that can admit the force of the evidence of 
 intuition which is a sort of divination, or 
 purified second-sight, kindred to the poet's 
 vision of the universe ; but it is worthy of 
 note that, as it bears upon the future, this 
 intuition is invariably keenest in the best 
 of men. It is the noblest characters whose 
 attainments in virtue and goodness are 
 greatest, those who have done most for 
 their fellow-men, in whom this presage of 
 the future is most vivid ; and, further, it is 
 in their loftiest moments that the conjec- 
 ture is keenest. It is the surmise of the 
 highest element in human nature. 
 
 The wish that of the living whole, 
 No life should fail beyond the grave, 
 Derives it not from what we hold, 
 The likest Cod within the soul? 
 
 This surmise often intensifies, toward the
 
 ESSA YS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 close of life. Some of the best of men, 
 as they have approached the inevitable 
 barrier, have had the clearest sight of what 
 lies beyond it. And the poets as Ten- 
 nyson, in his "Crossing the Bar," and 
 Browning in his final "Reverie" have 
 spoken on the subject in their old age with 
 a clearer voice of prophecy. 
 
 But the answer which we give to the 
 problem of immortality must depend on 
 how we answer a prior question. That 
 prior question relates to the soul's nature 
 and inherent characteristics. If we have 
 good grounds for believing that we are 
 more than a succession of states of chang- 
 ing experience, if a thread of personality 
 and of inner continuity runs through all 
 that we are, so that we are not mere 
 functions of organization, we may have 
 good grounds for believing that the body 
 does not possess us, so to speak, but that we 
 possess it, and that we are therefore sepa- 
 rate and separable from it. Here we must 
 fall back on the testimony of conscious- 
 ness ; and while no one can do this vica- 
 riously, or by proxy for another, I think 
 that the following will be found to be a 
 fact which awaits discovery, and which has
 
 IMMORTALITY. 2Q3 
 
 only to be sought in order to be found, viz , 
 that while, during the present life, \ve are 
 gradually gathering together a mass of ex- 
 perience of all sorts, we are, or we may be, 
 conscious all the time of an underlying self 
 as a centre round which this experience 
 gathers. \Ve are continuously conscious 
 of the mind's dependence upon the body, 
 but it does not follow that this dependence 
 destroys its independence. We know that, 
 if the brain is injured, the manifestations 
 of thought are impaired, and that if the 
 brain is destroyed the manifestations of 
 thought cease ; but it does not follow that 
 thought itself ceases, or that the conscious 
 life of the mind comes to an end. 
 
 I admit that the array of statistics by 
 which the dependence of mind on brain is 
 established is the most formidable fact, or 
 series of facts, with which the spiritualist 
 has to deal in this inquiry. But surely it 
 is an equally arresting fact in our con- 
 scious experience that the mind's present 
 relation to the body is that of dependence 
 and independence combined. I deny that 
 it is wholly dependent, or that it is entirely 
 independent; I affirm it to be both the one 
 and the other. At certain times the cb-
 
 294 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pendence may be at a maximum, and the 
 independence at a minimum ; but at other 
 times it is precisely the reverse. In mo- 
 ments of heightened consciousness every 
 one knows how energy rises and asserts 
 itself, sometimes even chafing with the 
 trammels of the physical organism. We 
 cannot, of course, be conscious of the de- 
 tachment of the mind from the body ; but 
 we are habitually conscious of an inward 
 energy, which rises and falls within us, al- 
 ternately dominating over the organism 
 and succumbing to it, and which, there- 
 fore, may be finally separable from it. 
 Then is it not an undoubted fact that the 
 operations of mind are more perfect, the 
 freer they are from the restraints of the 
 body ? Up to a certain normal point the 
 body aids the mind ; beyond that point it 
 tyrannizes over it. Take this fact in con- 
 nection with the frequent consciousness of 
 powers possessed but unused, of powers 
 locked up, or held down by the fetters of 
 the flesh, latent energies, which are now 
 in us in a state similar to that in which 
 our senses were in the embryonic stage. 
 Does not this suggest the mind's indepen- 
 dence of its organism ? Grant that, with
 
 IMMORTALITY. 2Q5 
 
 all those heightenings and brightcnings of 
 consciousness, tliere is as the physiolo- 
 gists remind us a definite coordination 
 of molecular states, the former are at least 
 simultaneous suggestions of the inner free- 
 dom of the spirit. They surest that it 
 is not the slave of the body in which it 
 is lodged, but rather in the position of a 
 temporary tenant. If, then, our personal- 
 ity is not due to the body, may it not 
 survive when the body falls to pieces ? 
 Wherein lies the difficulty of supposing 
 that the individual carries within him the 
 seeds of immortality, \vhich cannot ripen 
 where they are at present, but which - 
 like the mummy wheat in Egyptian tombs 
 may supply the harvests of the future ? 
 
 The whole controversy hinges on the 
 question of the origin of mind, and whether 
 molecular motion can give rise to human 
 consciousness. That it can, is the mate- 
 rialistic thesis ; that it cannot, is the spir- 
 itualistic antithesis. The materialistic the- 
 sis is, I maintain, unverifiablc ; because 
 (i) no amount of research amongst exter- 
 nal phenomena can touch the question of 
 the source of those phenomena of which 
 we are conscious, or bring us within sight
 
 296 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of its solution ; and (2) if there be an in- 
 terior principle which binds together the 
 isolated threads of thought and feeling, we 
 have direct evidence that our personality 
 is not due to a mere passive evolution, but 
 that it is the product of an active power 
 working within phenomena, arranging and 
 coordinating them. If, therefore, we are 
 more than phenomena, we may at least 
 surmise that we do not perish and pass 
 away, as phenomena do. 
 
 There is no doubt that, so far as the 
 evidence of sense can guide us, death is 
 the end of the individual. Nothing can 
 follow but a rearrangement of the mole- 
 cules of matter, in some new individual 
 form, or in one without individuality. Xo 
 one doubts that the quantity of matter 
 within the universe neither increases nor 
 diminishes. It only changes. It appears 
 for a s time vitalized, but its vitality is only 
 for a time. The question is, What be- 
 comes of the vital principle, when it 
 ceases to animate a certain group of 
 atoms ? Does it simply fail back into the 
 great reservoir of cosmic force, out of which 
 it came, like a stream returning to the sea 
 in which it is lost; or does its individual-
 
 IMMORTALITY. 297 
 
 ity survive, detached from the old form 
 that now has perished, but still retaining 
 power to build up around it a fresh group 
 of atoms, a new phenomenal abode in a fu- 
 ture state of existence ? 
 
 When we strive to answer the question 
 just stated, there is one important fact 
 which may help our conjectures, viz., this: 
 that the vital force which at present con- 
 stitutes our personality, and builds it up, 
 is perpetually changing. Not for two mo- 
 ments of time is the arrangement of the 
 molecules of matter within any living or- 
 ganism the same ; nor is the coexistence 
 of thought and feeling stationary for a sin- 
 gle instant within the mind of any indi- 
 vidual. Our present life is a dynamical 
 process of incessant change, of progressive 
 evolution and development ; but through- 
 out this whole process, our individuality 
 survives. Individuality is not only con- 
 sistent with change, but change is abso- 
 lutely necessary to it. It is essential to 
 the very life of the individual. Why, then, 
 may not the individuality of the individual 
 continue after the larger and more thor- 
 oughgoing change of the molecules which 
 we call death ?
 
 298 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Add to this that we have no evidence 
 whatsoever that the mental phenomena of 
 the present life are the mere functions of 
 organization. We might quite as well, or 
 with equal justice, affirm that material 
 phenomena were mere phases of mind. 
 All that we discover in experience is that 
 thoughts and feelings are associated with 
 physical states, and vice versa. They are 
 corelated and coordinated, how we do not 
 know. Are we not at liberty to infer that, 
 if mental phenomena are not produced by 
 physical ones, they are not tied to them, 
 but are detachable from them ? It is true 
 that we find our mental states heightened 
 by their physical accessories, but our 
 physical states are as certainly influenced 
 by mental ones. Action and reaction be- 
 tween them is reciprocal and complemen- 
 tary. What is the inference from their 
 present conjunction ? Not that the one of 
 necessity ceases when the other does, but 
 that they are temporary allies, cooperating 
 now, but capable of new affinities, of fresh 
 groupings, and developments in another 
 sphere of existence. 
 
 1 shall now mention, without enlarging 
 on them, the more significant facts belong-
 
 ZMMOK TALJTY. 299 
 
 ing to our moral nature which suggest the 
 immortality of the individual. 
 
 There is, first, the intrinsic character of 
 moral life, as compared with mere physical 
 vitality. It is said that moral life carries 
 with it the evidence of indesiructibility, 
 because there is nothing in human love, 
 reverence, or devotion, that is naturally 
 perishable. There is nothing exclusively 
 terrestrial in friendship. It is outreaching 
 and transcendent, in its inner essence am- 
 aranthine ; but, if all is over, when to 
 human vision -life ends at death, the ques- 
 tion, "To what purpose is this waste?" 
 would be the most pertinent of inquiries. 
 This argument, or suggestion, becomes 
 stronger, if taken in connection with the 
 teleological explanation of the universe, as 
 a sphere in which purpose is visible, a sys- 
 tem of natural means working towards nat- 
 ural ends. Here is an apparatus within the 
 cosmic order, namely, our human life, 
 constructed with an outreaching or pro- 
 spective element in it. Is not this arrange- 
 ment, this structure, to be interpreted by 
 us as prophetic of the future ? 
 
 Secondly, a future is needed for the 
 completion of what is undeveloped here
 
 300 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and now, for the maturing of what at pres- 
 ent finds no scope for expansion, and no 
 arena in which to work. As one, to whom 
 the poetic "intimations of immortality" 
 were specially vivid, has elsewhere written, 
 
 Too, too contracted are these walls of flesh, 
 
 This vital warmth too cold, these visual orbs, 
 
 Though inconceivably endowed, too dim 
 
 For any passion of the soul that leads 
 
 To ecstasy, and all the crooked paths 
 
 Of time and change disdaining, takes its course 
 
 Along the line of limitless desires. 
 
 Thirdly, it is said that a future is needed 
 for the rectification of those moral anoma- 
 lies which are inexplicable without it, and 
 which at present seem rather to suggest a 
 dualistic than a monotheistic theory of the 
 universe. Reward and punishment are 
 not now measured out in proportion to 
 the desert of individuals ; therefore it is 
 inferred that the present life is but the 
 prelude to another, in which justice will be 
 done. This fact, which runs through all 
 history, and is the secret of all tragedy, 
 viz., that the innocent often suffer when 
 the guilty escape, suggests, in the words of 
 Jouffroy, that " human life is a drama, of 
 which the prologue and the catastrophe 
 are both wanting."
 
 IMMOR TALI TV. 30 1 
 
 The argument may be altered thus. It 
 is clear that in this life all men do not 
 reap as they sow. Some sow to the flesh, 
 ami have the best of it ; others sow to the 
 spirit, and have the worst of it so far as 
 the present life is concerned. If, therefore, 
 it is part of the general stream of tendency 
 that the outward and inward should ulti- 
 mately harmonize that virtue and hap- 
 piness should form a true moral equation 
 since they do not now run on parallel 
 lines, is not a future state necessary for 
 rectification ? If we live in a world over 
 which a great Moral Order dominates, 
 and in which the laws of conduct are su- 
 preme, we certainly also live in one in 
 which these laws are at present, in the 
 vast majority of instances, broken down 
 and overthrown. In other words, the ar- 
 rangements of the universe dc facto are 
 not what they ought to be de jure. This 
 therefore either suggests a future in which 
 
 oo 
 
 there will be a readjustment, or it suggests 
 the Zoroastrian doctrine of a conflict be- 
 tween the powers of light and darkness, 
 Ormuzd and Ahriman, good and evil, in 
 eternal strife. 
 
 These moral considerations are not ab-
 
 302 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 solute proofs, any more than the previous 
 ones. They are presumptions, which ripen 
 into likelihoods ; and they are certainly 
 sufficient to weight the scale on the side 
 of immortality, as against the opposite doc- 
 trine. 
 
 It is quite as important, however, to note 
 some of the effects of the presence and the 
 absence of a belief in immortality on hu- 
 man conduct, as it is to gather evidence 
 in its favor, because these effects may be 
 turned into evidence. Let it be granted 
 that on the theory that the existence 
 of the individual terminates at death, the 
 moral value of the present life is not de- 
 stroyed ; and, further, that the anticipation 
 of immortality does not usually become a 
 motive to well-doing, "in the case of those 
 who would not be virtuous without it." 
 Most pernicious teaching has sometimes 
 been put forth on this subject, by those 
 who have affirmed that all morality hinges 
 on a belief in immortality. This is simply 
 untrue to fact. Belief in a spiritual Order, 
 and in a moral Standard, has coexisted 
 (whether logically or not) with belief in 
 the annihilation of man ; but I agree with 
 a distinguished American writer on the
 
 IMMORTALITY. 303 
 
 subject, who says "that the effect of the 
 rejection of the belief is to give the great 
 motor nerve of our moral life a perceptible 
 stroke of palsy," and that the moral value 
 of the belief lies in these three things: 
 the light which it casts on the otherwise 
 bewildering mysteries of the present, the 
 motive it supplies for noble action, and the 
 solace which it yields under overwhelming 
 disaster. It is quite true that our duty 
 does not depend upon the length of our 
 days, but upon our existing relations ; but 
 if these relations are contracted within the 
 horizon of the present, an arrest is laid 
 upon some of our noblest aspirations ; and, 
 contrariwise, where the belief in immortal- 
 ity is present, and regulative, duty is seen 
 under a fresh light, its scope is widened, 
 its significance enlarged, and its pursuit 
 made easier. 
 
 It is one of the most curious things, how- 
 ever, in the history of opinion, that this 
 belief in immortality has been assailed as 
 hostile to morality, as egotistic and vain, 
 as a selfish idea which develops selfishness 
 in those who cherish it. It has been rep- 
 resented as the outcome of mere conceit 
 that any one should fancy himself an
 
 304 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 exception to the universal law that what- 
 soever appears in time must in time dis- 
 appear. It is further affirmed that human 
 virtue moves most securely within terres- 
 trial limits, and that the forecastings of the 
 future which this belief engenders break 
 in upon and mar 
 
 The sober majesties 
 Of settled sweet epicurean life. 
 
 The prospect of the future darkens our 
 present existence, it is said, by its shadow, 
 or its menace. 
 
 Now such a result is only possible where 
 the doctrine of immortality has been either 
 travestied or caricatured. It is the way in 
 which a belief is cherished that makes its 
 effect either selfish or the reverse, and 
 there have been both very humble and 
 very proud believers in immortality, just as 
 there have been both humble and proud 
 believers in annihilation. 
 
 As to the influence of the belief on con- 
 duct, the most important question is not, 
 does this or that individual hold the doc- 
 trine ? but does the doctrine hold them ? 
 i. e., does it dominate their thoughts, and 
 exert a controlling influence on conduct ? 
 
 Now the doctrine of annihilation, as
 
 IMMORTALITY. 305 
 
 taught in the materialistic and agnostic 
 schools, has undoubtedly given rise and 
 is much more likely than its opposite to 
 give rise to selfishness, and indifference 
 to other lives and interests. That a belief 
 in the existence of an infinite Moral Source 
 whence the laws of conduct emanate, and 
 in the continued existence of finite moral 
 natures by whom these laws are exempli- 
 fied, should lessen their authority tio:c, 
 may be set down with perfect charity as 
 a speculative paradox, a vagary, or an 
 intellectual whim. The contrary supposi- 
 tion that they are the mere outcome of 
 cosmic forces blind, relentless, and stern 
 which may go on developing and evolv- 
 ing others different from them, might pos- 
 sibly lower, and often has lowered, their 
 authority ; but the belief that they are 
 the finite reflection of an infinite Reality, 
 and that there is a supreme Consciousness 
 overshadowing us, and answering to our 
 limited apprehension of moral truth, has 
 always given force and point, as well as 
 elevation, to present duty. 
 
 The blank which is left in human life, if 
 this belief be removed from it, is further 
 seen, when we consider the substitutes
 
 306 ESSA YS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 proposed to be put in its place ; such, for 
 example, as the immortality of influence, 
 the indestructibility of our deeds, which 
 live on forever in their consequences, post 
 mortem corporis. Now, in the first place, 
 the offer of this as a substitute shows that 
 the human heart cannot surrender its be- 
 lief in immortality without some compen- 
 sation. But, in the second place, to accept 
 it as an equivalent is to accept a stone in- 
 stead of bread. It is no substitute at all, 
 because the immortality of influence is 
 common to all theories on the subject. It 
 is no compensation to one about to be de- 
 prived of a possession for the spoiler to 
 say, " Well ; you may keep the half of it," 
 though it may be a slight mitigation of the 
 loss. And, thirdly, the unsatisfactoriness 
 of what remains -this posthumous influ- 
 ence is apparent when one realizes the 
 mixed character of all that is transmitted 
 by us. It is unhappily true that " the evil 
 that men do lives after them, the good is 
 oft interred with their bones ; " and if the 
 thought of how our deeds will tell upon our 
 successors be the sole motive left to ani- 
 mate us to noble or disinterested action, I 
 fear it will become more and more atten-
 
 IMMORTALITY. 307 
 
 uatecl and vague. It is too shadowy and 
 remote to influence any hut a select few. 
 The masses of mankind, "the dim common 
 populations," cannot take it in. 
 
 Then there is the doctrine, which was 
 Spinoza's substitute for the immortality of 
 the individual, viz., that we have nothing to 
 do with duration in time, because in our 
 knowledge of the Infinite we transcend 
 time, and are now immortal, in the only 
 sense in which it is worth thinking of 
 immortality, immortal, that is to say, in 
 virtue of our escape from the world of illu- 
 sions, and our seeing all things sub specie 
 cetcrnitatis. Spinoza thought that to speak 
 of immortality as a thing of the future was 
 t) destroy its very nature, because if we 
 merely think of an extension of duration 
 we are still in thralldom to time, and are 
 not therefore really immortal ; and that we 
 attain to immortality, now and here, simply 
 by rising into the higher sphere of thought, 
 in which we contemplate the universe as 
 everlasting. But however true this may 
 be in one sense, in another it is altogether 
 misleading. It ignores our relation to the 
 phenomenal world, and if we discard the 
 notion of immortality in time, it will be
 
 308 ESSA YS fiV PIIILOSOTHY. 
 
 easy for the opponents of the doctrine to 
 claim us as on their side. It will be said, 
 What is the value of an immortality that 
 does not last ? Is it not a contradiction in 
 terms ? Spinoza's view of immortality is 
 not the continuous existence of mind after 
 the body dies, but merely the capacity in 
 the present life to rise above time, and see 
 all things under the form of eternity. He 
 thought that to look onward to our sur- 
 vival in time was to explain by means of 
 the temporal what in its essence tran- 
 scended time ; and so, the mere notion 
 of eternity into which the mind enters 
 when disillusioned by philosophy was 
 sufficient without any further idea of con- 
 tinuance or lastingness. But if this latter 
 element, which is all in all to the opposite 
 philosophy, be discarded, the present life 
 is not explained ; and if this intuition of 
 the Infinite, which may be reached by any 
 of us in time, passes away, if it vanishes 
 for us when we disappear from the earth, 
 what is its value? If it begins and ends 
 for us with our terrestrial lives, may it not 
 be surmised to have a material origin alto- 
 gether ? 
 
 On these substitutes for the survival of
 
 IMMORTALITY. 309 
 
 the individual I need not enlarge, but may 
 now point out some of the results which 
 follow from a rejection of the doctrine. 
 
 \Ye cannot prove a belief to be erroneous 
 by merely tracing out its consequences ; 
 but the discovery of startling practical re- 
 sults, issuing inevitably from the adoption 
 of a given theory, may suggest the likeli- 
 hood of a flaw somewhere about the root of 
 that theory. Taking, then, past experience 
 as our guide, we may affirm that, whenever 
 this belief has for a time disappeared, or 
 fallen away from the foreground of con- 
 sciousness, there has been a simultaneous 
 decline in the nobler elements of civiliza- 
 tion in Poetry, in Art, in Philosophy, and 
 even in Science. More particularly, the 
 affections of human nature have suffered ; 
 their tenderness and delicacy have b^en 
 blunted. If they are but mundane ties, 
 by which human beings are associated to- 
 gether for a time, but which are snapped 
 finally at death, even their temporal signifi- 
 cance is lessened. Duty becomes an alfair 
 of custom, of fashion, and of temperament. 
 Morality, as we have said, does not hinge 
 upon the belief in immortality ; but the 
 motives for self-control and self-discipline
 
 310 ESSAYS AV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 are changed, if we may legitimately sur- 
 mise that we have been evolved out of the 
 material universe, in the slow progression 
 of the ages, and that it is our destiny to 
 return to the abyss when this life ends. 
 It is easy to see how different is the effect 
 of a belief that, in the hints and sugges- 
 tions of the moral faculty, we are acted 
 upon by an infinite Intelligence and an in- 
 finite Personality, and that our relation to 
 that infinitely intelligent Personality is not 
 limited to the present life, but survives be- 
 yond it. The conviction that we not only 
 now live and move within the Infinite, and 
 yet are distinct from it, but that we shall 
 always do so, has a direct and immediate 
 influence, and an " uplifting influence," on 
 conduct. With this conviction removed, 
 human friendship degenerates to the level 
 of casual acquaintanceship, as with the 
 herds of " dumb driven cattle ; " and moral 
 life, with its sublime struggles towards 
 a distant goal, shrivels into commonplace, 
 while it contracts within the limits of the 
 secular. What is the consequence ? The 
 majority of men will say, cni bono? What 
 boots it, all this toil to reach a higher life, 
 if, at the end of it, we sink into the jaws of
 
 IMMOR TA LI TV. 311 
 
 darkness, and cease to be ? " Let us eat 
 
 and drink, for to-morrow we die." 
 
 Itefore indicating what seems to be the 
 wisest attitude of mind towards this prob- 
 lem, we may note some of the causes which 
 have led many of our contemporaries to 
 throw it into the background of convic- 
 tion, rather than bring it to the forefront. 
 There is, first, the speculative mystery 
 into which the belief runs up. There is, 
 next, the necessary absence of any experi- 
 mental evidence in regard to it. Again, 
 there is the difficulty of granting immor- 
 tality to man, and denying it to the higher 
 animals that resemble him in many ways ; 
 and the impossibility of granting the lat- 
 ter, and stopping short at any point in the 
 chain of organized life. Further, there is 
 the natural recoil which many feel from 
 the over- dogmatic confidence with which 
 the future has been spoken of, and the 
 gross material conceptions which have 
 been entertained of it ; and also an equally 
 natural recoil from the asceticism that 
 undervalues the present life, because of the 
 tremendousness of its sequel. These are 
 natural reactions. Then, there is the ab- 
 sorption of mind and of interest in things
 
 312 ESS4VS IN FHILOSOl'HY. 
 
 material, which is so marked a feature of 
 our age, the stream of tendency setting 
 strongly towards a physical explanation of 
 spiritual phenomena. Further, there is a 
 feeling of life-weariness, of the burden of 
 existence after a time, and with this the 
 inclination to lay it down, to escape from 
 the present turmoil by an absorption like 
 that of Nirvana, the feeling that, if 
 finally we sleep, \ve shall do well. The 
 loss of faith in the future which arises from 
 this feeling of life-weariness, accompanied 
 by a loss of interest in life itself, has some- 
 times spread through a whole community, 
 or historic period ; but it does not last. At 
 least it does not last with us in the West. 
 It is more an Eastern than a Western ten- 
 dency, due perhaps to mental, moral, and 
 physical causes combined. 
 
 Another phase of the difficulty at times 
 oppresses most men in the West, as well 
 as the Orientals ; and there are moods 
 of mind in which it appeals to all who 
 think deeply and reverently on the sub- 
 ject. Doubt as to immortality may be due 
 to humility. It may spring from a sense 
 of the poverty of our faculties, and the 
 tremendous enigma which the problem
 
 IMMORTALITY. 313 
 
 when all has been said about it pre- 
 sents to them. I have mentioned some 
 features of that enigna. Here is another 
 aspect of it. We can watch the beginnings 
 of life on this earth, we know how the gen- 
 erations succeed each other by a process 
 of development, in reference to which ex- 
 perience is our guide ; but we have no 
 similar evidence of the survival of any 
 single creature after its life on earth has 
 been cut short by death. 
 
 Perhaps the chief question is not whether 
 we are to survive ? but in what form is 
 the survival to be experienced ? What 
 kind of immortality is to be ours ? What 
 is it to be, and where is it to be? Will 
 \ve survive with our present identity, our 
 moral individuality, retained ? and will we, 
 in the next stage, be conscious of the re- 
 lations we have sustained to this life as it 
 now is ? On these points, we have very 
 little light. Doubtless, unless we retained 
 an individuality of some sort, it would not 
 be Tiv who survived. But, on the other 
 hand, is there not a very great deal about 
 this present life that is of necessity tran- 
 sient ? and are there not many things that 
 we fain would lose ? Very few desire to
 
 314 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 remain what they are, and as they are. 
 Perhaps the absolute loss of a large part of 
 present experience would be to the major- 
 ity of us a positive gain ; and yet, unless 
 we who have played our part on the stage 
 of this life continue, with rememberable 
 ties connecting us with it, and possessed 
 of affinities that remain unchanged though 
 enlarged, how can immortality in any sense 
 be ours ? 
 
 The whole problem is beset with diffi- 
 culties, both on the right hand and on the 
 left. Our truest and wisest attitude toward 
 it is one of tranquil hope and devout ex- 
 pectancy, tempered by cheerful acquies- 
 cence ; while we hail any further light that 
 may be vouchsafed to others, through the 
 happy auguries of a reverent outlook. This 
 mood of mind has been well expressed in 
 one of Wordsworth's sonnets, in which he 
 likens our present life to that of a bird 
 that has entered a lighted room from 
 the outside darkness and cold, that flutters 
 within it for a while, and then departs. 
 
 Man's life is like a Sparrow, mighty King ! 
 That while at banquet with your chiefs you sit 
 Housed near a blazing fire, is seen to flit 
 Safe from the wintry tempest. Fluttering,
 
 I.M.MOK TALITY. 3 I 5 
 
 Here did it enter; there, on hasty wing 
 
 Flies out, and passes on from cold to cold ; 
 
 l!ut whence it came we knosv not, nor behold 
 
 Whither it goes. Even such that transient Tiling, 
 
 The human Soul ; not utterly unknown 
 
 While in the Hody lodged, her warm abode ; 
 
 l?ut from what world She came, what woe or weal 
 
 On her departure waits, no tongue hath shown ; 
 
 This mystery if the Stranger can reveal, 
 
 His be a welcome cordially bestowed.
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF METEMPSY- 
 CHOSIS. 
 
 IT seems surprising that in the discus- 
 sions of contemporary philosophy on ihe 
 origin and destiny of the soul, there has 
 been no explicit revival of the doctrines of 
 Preexistence and Metempsychosis. What- 
 ever may be their intrinsic worth, or evi- 
 dential value, their title to rank on the roll 
 of philosophical hypotheses is undoubted. 
 They offer quite as remarkable a solution 
 of the mystery which all admit as the rival 
 theories of Creation, Traduction, and Ex- 
 tinction. 
 
 What I propose is not so much to defend 
 the doctrines, as to restate them ; to dis- 
 tinguish between their several forms ; to 
 indicate the speculative grounds on which 
 the most rational of them may be main- 
 tained ; to show how it fits as well into a 
 theistic as into a pantheistic theory of the 
 universe ; and to point out the difficulties 
 in the ethical problem which it lightens if 
 it does not remove.
 
 DOC TRINE OF ME TEMTS YCHOSIS. 3 r J 
 
 The question may be best approached 
 by a statement of the chief difficulty which 
 seems to block the way to a belief in Im- 
 mortality, arising out of the almost uni- 
 versal acceptance of the doctrine of Invo- 
 lution as explanatory of physical existence, 
 and one of the considerations by which 
 it has been met. This will lead, by natural 
 sequence, to the theories in question. 
 
 The difficulty is this. Admitting the de- 
 velopment of man out of prior conditions, 
 and retaining a belief in his immortality, a 
 point must have been reached when a mor- 
 tal predecessor gave rise to an immortal 
 successor. If all that now is has issued 
 inexorably out of what once was, and the 
 human race been gradually evolved out of 
 a prior type, we have but three alternatives 
 to choose from : either, first, the whole 
 series is mortal ; or, second, the whole is 
 immortal ; or, third, a long series of mortal 
 ancestors gave place, at a leap and a bound, 
 to an immortal descendant, the father of a 
 race of immortals. There is no other pos- 
 sible alternative, if we admit a process of 
 development. The first of the three may 
 be set aside meanwhile, since it is the doc- 
 trine of the natural mortality or extinction
 
 318 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the individual. The second presents the 
 insuperable difficulty of the continued ex- 
 istence in a separate form of all the living 
 creatures that have ever appeared on the 
 stage of being ; because it is impossible to 
 draw a line anywhere amongst them, and 
 say that the clog is immortal but the reptile 
 is not ; or that the reptile is, while the bee 
 and the ant are not ; or that they are, while 
 the myriad tribes of the protozoa are not. 
 We are, therefore, limited to the third hy- 
 pothesis, viz., that a point was reached 
 when immortality was evolved ; that is to 
 say, that the power of surviving the shock 
 of dissolution was non-existent for ages, but 
 that it became real in a moment of time, 
 when the mortal creature that preceded 
 man gave birth to one who was an " heir 
 of immortality." In stating the problem 
 thus, I merely indicate the logical result of 
 admitting the principle of Evolution as ex- 
 planatory of physical existence, and con- 
 joining with it the doctrine of Immortality. 
 The derivation of the human body from 
 a lower type is quite consistent with the 
 latter doctrine, because the body is not 
 immortal. It is, besides, a much worthier 
 notion, and more in keeping with analogy,
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 319 
 
 to suppose that the body was formed by 
 natural process out of a previous animal 
 organization, than to imagine it to have 
 been instantaneously created out of the rn- 
 organic dust of the world. IUit was the 
 human soul similarly evolved out of the 
 vital principal of the previous races? Was 
 the wr/ of the animal the parent of the t/a'\>/, 
 or Trrefyza, in man ? If we answer in the 
 affirmative we adopt the development the- 
 ory in its completes! form ; and it is certain 
 that man cannot be immortal. Mis race 
 may be permanent (although, by the hy- 
 pothesis, it is perpetually altering), but the 
 individuals composing it cannot live forever. 
 It is impossible, in short, that Immortality 
 can be a prerogative evolved out of mortal- 
 ity, because the one is separate:! from the 
 other, to use an expressive phrase of Nor- 
 ris's, " by the whole diameter of being." 
 This is the difficulty in question. 
 
 It has been met, or attempted to be met, 
 by the following consideration. It is al- 
 leged that the case was precisely the same 
 in reference to the first immortal evolved 
 out of a mortal ancestor, as it is in refer- 
 ence to any of his descendants ; because, 
 in both cases, the beginnings of life are
 
 32O ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 similar. These may be physiologically 
 traced ; and a point is always reached when 
 a possible mortality is averted. The "first 
 beginnings of individual life," says Mr. 
 Picton, "do not involve immortality: and 
 when such an incipient merely germinant 
 life deceases, it perishes utterly." There 
 must be a period reached, therefore, at 
 which immortality begins. " If an individ- 
 ual died one moment before a certain time 
 he would be annihilated : whereas, if he 
 survives a moment longer, he will live for- 
 ever." 1 And so it is thought that a time 
 comes when the personality of the indi- 
 vidual matures, when " his isolation grows 
 defined," and he is thenceforward able to 
 "survive the shock of death;" whereas, 
 had his bodily organization perished one 
 moment earlier, his destiny would have 
 been simply to remerge in the general 
 whole. Thus, the immaterial principle, 
 which in a thousand cases dies and passes 
 into some other form of immaterial energy, 
 survives in the case of others, and wins 
 permanence for itself by successfully re- 
 sisting the first perils of independent life. 
 Such is the rejoinder. 
 
 1 New Theories and the Old Faith, p. 199.
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 321 
 
 I cannot think this way of escaping the 
 difficulty a satisfactory one, unless the prin- 
 ciple which survives is believed to have ex- 
 isted previously in some other form. The 
 difference between immortality and mor- 
 tality is not one of degree. It is literally 
 infinite, and the one can never give rise to 
 the other. The immortal cannot, in the 
 nature of things, be developed out of the 
 mortal. A creature endowed with feeble 
 powers of life may originate another en- 
 dowed with stronger powers, which will 
 therefore live longer, and be able to sur- 
 vive the storms which have shipwrecked 
 its feebler ancestors ; but this is a totally 
 different thing from the evolution of an 
 immortal progeny out of a series of mortal 
 predecessors. Let us suppose, however, 
 that the immortal has descended, that it 
 has " lapsed from higher place," or that it 
 has ascended, risen from some lower sphere, 
 immortality may then belong to its very 
 essence. It may, in its inmost nature, be 
 incapable of death, its destiny being a 
 perpetual transmigration, or renewal of ex- 
 istence. The distinction between a theory 
 of evolution (which admits immortality) and 
 that of transmigration is immense. Ac-
 
 322 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cording to the former, man at a definite 
 moment of time emerged out of the -animal, 
 and the power of surviving the shock of 
 death was conferred upon him, or won by 
 him, in the struggle for existence. Accord- 
 ing to the latter, man was always immortal ; 
 before he entered the present life he ex- 
 isted in another state, and he will survive 
 the destruction of his present body simply 
 because his soul, which is intrinsically 
 deathless, passes into a new body, or re- 
 mains temporarily unembodied. The dif- 
 ference is immense. On the other hand, 
 the distinction between the theory of trans- 
 migration and that of absorption is equally 
 great. According to the one, the soul 
 retains its individuality and preserves its 
 identity through all the changes it under- 
 goes ; according to the other, its individu- 
 ality is lost, although its vital force 'sur- 
 vives as an ineradicable constituent of the 
 universe. 
 
 The doctrine of Metempsychosis is theo- 
 retically extremely simple. Its root is the 
 indestructibility of the vital principle. Let 
 a belief in preexistence be joined to that 
 of posthumous existence, and the dogma 
 is complete. It is thus at one and the
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 323 
 
 same time a theory of the soul's origin, and 
 of its destination ; and its unparalleled hold 
 upon the human race may be explained in 
 part by the fact of its combining both in a 
 single doctrine. It appears as one of the 
 very earliest beliefs of the human mind in 
 tribes not emerged from barbarism. It 
 remains the creed of millions at this day. 
 It is probably the most widely-spread and 
 permanently influential of all speculative 
 theories as to the origin and destiny of the 
 soul. 
 
 In a single paragraph its history may be 
 sketched, though in the most condensed and 
 cursory manner. It has lain at the heart 
 of all Indian speculation on the subject, 
 time out of mind. It is one of the cardinal 
 doctrines of the Vedas, and one of the roots 
 of Buddhist belief. The ancient Egyptians 
 held it. It is prominent in their great 
 classic, the " Book of the Dead." In Per- 
 sia, it colored the whole stream of Zoroas- 
 trian thought. The Magi taught it. The 
 Jews brought it with them from the cap- 
 tivity in Babylon. Many of the Essenes 
 and Pharisees held it. Though foreign to 
 the genius both of Judaism and Christian- 
 ity, it has had its advocates (as Delitzsch
 
 324 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 puts it) "as well in the synagogue as in 
 the church." The Cabbala teaches it em- 
 phatically. The Apocrypha sanctions it, 
 and it is to be found scattered throughout 
 the Talmud. In Greece, Pythagoras pro- 
 claimed it, receiving the hint probably both 
 from Egypt and the East ; Empedocles 
 taught it ; Plato worked it elaborately out, 
 not as a mythical doctrine embodying a 
 moral truth, but as a philosophical theory 
 or conviction. It passed over into the 
 Neo-Platonic School at Alexandria. Philo 
 held it. Plotinus and Porphyry in the third 
 century, Jamblicus in the fourth, Hierocles 
 and Proclus in the fifth, all advocated it in 
 various ways ; and an important modifica- 
 tion of the Platonic doctrine took place 
 amongst the Alexandrians, when Porphyry 
 limited the range of the metempsychosis, 
 denying that the souls of men ever passed 
 downwards to a lower than the human 
 state. Many of the fathers of the Chris- 
 tian Church espoused it ; notably Origen. 
 It was one of the Gnostic doctrines. The 
 Manichaeans received it, with much else, 
 from their Zoroastrian predecessors. It 
 was held by Nemesius, who emphatically 
 declares that all the Greeks who believed
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 335 
 
 in immortality believed also in metempsy- 
 chosis. There are hints of it in Boethius. 
 Though condemned, in its Origenistic 
 form, by the Council of Constantinople in 
 551, it passed along the stream of Chris- 
 tian theology, and reappeared amongst the 
 Scholastics in Erigena and Bonaventura. 
 It was defended with much learning and 
 acuteness by several of the Cambridge Pla- 
 tonists, especially by Henry More. Glan- 
 vill devotes a curious treatise to it, the 
 " Lux Orientalis." English clergy and Irish 
 bishops were found ready to espouse it. 
 Many English poets, from Henry Vaughan 
 to Wordsworth, praise it. It appealed l.o 
 Hume, as more rational than the rival the- 
 ories of Creation and Traduction. It has 
 points of contact with the anthropology of 
 Kant and Schelling. It found an earnest 
 advocate in Lessing. Herder also main- 
 tained it, while it fascinated the minds of 
 Fourier and Lerroux. Soame Jenyns, the 
 Chevalier Ramsay, and many others have 
 written in its defense. If we may broadly 
 classify philosophical systems as a priori 
 or a posteriori, intuitional or experiential, 
 Platonist or Aristotelian, this doctrine will 
 be found to ally itself, both speculatively
 
 326 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and historically, with the former school of 
 thought. 
 
 Passing from the schools to the instinc- 
 tive ideas of primitive men, or the concep- 
 tions now entertained by races half-civ- 
 ilized or wholly barbarous, a belief in 
 transmigration will be found to be almost 
 universal. It is inwoven with nearly all 
 the mythology of the world. It appears in 
 Mexico and in Tibet, amongst the negroes 
 and the Hawaiian Islanders. It comes 
 down from the Druids of ancient Gaul to 
 the Tasmanians of to-day. The stream 
 of opinion, whether instinctive, mystic, or 
 rational, is continuous and broad ; and if 
 we could legitimately determine any ques- 
 tion of belief by the number of its adher- 
 ents, the quod semper, quod nbiquc, quod ab 
 omnibus, would apply to this more fitly 
 than to any other. Mr. Tylor speaks of it 
 (" Primitive Culture," ch. xii.) as now " ar- 
 rested and unprogressive," or lingering 
 only as "an intellectual crotchet." It may 
 be so ; but I think it quite as likely to be 
 revived, and to come to the front again, as 
 any rival theory on the subject, when the 
 decay that is the fate of every system of 
 opinion overtakes those that are in the
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 327 
 
 place of honor and recognition now. Kaeh 
 philosophical doctrine being, in the n:iture 
 of things, only a partial interpretation of 
 the universe, or an approximate solution of 
 the mystery of existence, is in its turn set 
 aside as inadequate; while all the greater 
 ones invariably reappear under altered 
 forms. The resuscitation of discarded 
 theories is as inevitable as the modifica- 
 tions which they undergo in the process of 
 revival. Metempsychosis is true of all 
 theories^ whether it applies to souls or not. 
 There are three possible forms of the 
 doctrine. Logically four may be held, but 
 only three are philosophically tenable. 
 Either, first, it may be maintained that the 
 metempsychosis is universal, extending to 
 all finite forms of life, so that the highest 
 may change place with the lowest, and 
 vice versa. The life that was in man may 
 degenerate, or pass downwards into the 
 animal ; or the life that was in the animal 
 may rise, and pass upwards into man ; the 
 winding stream of development flowing 
 either way, and the particular direction 
 which the current takes being determined 
 by the internal state of the individual. 
 There mav be thus, on the one hand, deg-
 
 328 ESSATS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 radation and descent ; on the other, eleva- 
 tion and ascent, through a perpetual cycle 
 of successive births and deaths. Or, sec- 
 ond, the transmigration may be limited to 
 the animal world, and denied to the human. 
 It is a conceivable and may seem a plausi- 
 ble hypothesis, to those \vho shrink from 
 extending the transmigration to man, that 
 it applies solely to the lower orders of ex- 
 istence, that the life of an animal is lost 
 or " blown out," but that on the destruc- 
 tion of its organization, the vital force re- 
 merges, and is continued in some other 
 form. (The supposition which is logically 
 distinct from this, but which is not phil- 
 osophically tenable, is the contrary one, 
 that the transmigration holds good of man 
 only, and docs not extend to the animal 
 world.) The third form of the theory is 
 that the transmigration may apply both to 
 the human and to the animal world ; but 
 that in each case it is strictly limited to 
 one sphere, that is to say, that the souls of 
 men animate successive bodies, but that 
 they never descend to a lower level, while 
 the vital spirit of the animal never ascends 
 into the human form. This was practi- 
 cally the development which the Pythago-
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMrSYCHOSIS. 329 
 
 rean and Platonic doctrine took, under 
 Porphyry and others, in the Alexandrian 
 school. Thus, metempsychosis may be 
 either, first, a law or process regulating 
 the universal development of life on our 
 planet, or, second, a cyclical movement 
 along one line, and confined to one group 
 of existences ; or, third, it may be a move- 
 ment along two definite lines, but strictly 
 limited to these lines. 
 
 There were certain very obvious facts, 
 which gave rise to the belief among prim- 
 itive races, and others less prominent, 
 though of a higher order, which suggested 
 it to the more meditative spirits of anti- 
 quity. The inferences may have been illog- 
 ically drawn but the natural history of a 
 doctrine is one thing, its philosophical valid- 
 ity is another ; and the historical develop- 
 ment of a belief does not always or usually 
 follow the lines of scientific evidence. The 
 student of the history of civilization is fa- 
 miliar with this fact, that reasonings which 
 are philosophically worthless have fre- 
 quently led to conclusions which are at 
 least highly probable ; just as beliefs which 
 are demonstratively true have often been 
 sustained by arguments radically unsound.
 
 33O ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The superficial resemblances between 
 the lower animals and men, in feature, dis- 
 position, and character, in voice and mien, 
 suggested to the primitive races the prob- 
 ability that the bodies of animals were 
 inhabited by human souls, and these of 
 men by animal natures. The intelligence 
 and feeling of the brutes, their half-human 
 character, as well as the brutality of some 
 men, seemed an evidence that their respec- 
 tive souls or vital principles had exchanged 
 places. They saw the cunning of the fox, 
 and the fierceness of the tiger, in their 
 comrades. They also learned the fidelity 
 of a friend from the rare attachment and 
 devotion of their dogs. As they were in 
 the habit of describing the qualities of men 
 by these surface resemblances, as leonine, 
 currish, vulpine, etc., and, i'ice versa, of 
 describing the characteristics of animals 
 by terms originally applied to their own 
 race, it was a natural, though not a logi- 
 cal, inference that their respective vital 
 principles were interchangeable. In short, 
 the rare humanity of some animals, and 
 the notorious animality of some men, sug- 
 gested to the primitive races, not the com- 
 mon origin of both, but the arbitrary pas- 
 sage of one into the other.
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 331 
 
 In addition, family likenesses being 
 transmitted, and reappearing after an in- 
 terval of generations, suggested the return 
 of the spirits of the dead within a new 
 physical organization. Mere facial resem- 
 blances led the common mind to believe 
 in the reembodiment of souls. Still more 
 significantly, the appearance of mental fea- 
 tures resembling those of any noted person 
 in the past, suggested the actual return of 
 the departed. If one resembled his ances- 
 tors somewhat closely in intellect or valor, 
 in temperament or style of action, it was 
 supposed that the ancestor had again put 
 on the vesture of the flesh, and " revisited 
 the glimpses of the moon." The spirit of 
 the master being seen in the pupil seemed 
 a hint of the same thing ; and the notion 
 that one of the dead had returned to reani- 
 mate another body very naturally grew out 
 of these obvious concrete facts. It need 
 scarcely be said that the deduction is 
 wholly unwarrantable, and the argument 
 illusory. An illogical inference, founded 
 on some surface analogy, has frequently 
 given rise to a belief, which has grown 
 strong in the total absence of valid evidence 
 in its favor. For example, the spirit of a
 
 332 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 master usually appears in his pupil most 
 conspicuously when both are living, or 
 shortly after the death of the master, and 
 when his soul cannot have entered his 
 pupil, unless he became the recipient of 
 two souls. Further, there is no reason to 
 believe that if metempsychosis took place, 
 the new manifestations of mind and char- 
 acter would be similar to the old ones. 
 They would much more likely be widely 
 different. It would give us a poor notion 
 of any spirit that reappeared within the old 
 limits, if it merely reproduced its past ac- 
 tions. Such a procedure would be as dis 
 appointing as those inane utterances of the 
 dead with which modern Spiritualism pre- 
 tends to be familiar. If the spirits of the 
 departed make any progress in knowledge 
 and experience, we would expect to find 
 something very different from a repetition 
 of their former mode of activity. The argu- 
 ment is quite illusory. 
 
 A third one is much more worthy of con 
 sideration. It arises out of certain psycho- 
 logical facts, which have seemed to warrant 
 the inference of the soul's preexistence. 
 Quite suddenly a thought is darted into 
 the mind, which cannot be traced back to
 
 DOCTRINE OF METK.MrSYCHOSIS. 333 
 
 any source in past experience ; or we hear 
 a sound, see an object, experience sensa- 
 tions, which seem to take us wholly out of 
 the circle of sense-perception that has 
 been possible to us in the present life. 
 This is one of the arguments of the 
 Phaedo ; and it is the central thought of 
 Wordsworth's magnificent "Ode on the 
 Intimations of Immortality from Recollec- 
 tions of Childhood." The " splendor in the 
 grass," and " glory in the flower," which 
 Wordsworth saw and felt in childhood, he 
 explains by their being the dim memory 
 of a brighter experience that was passed ; 
 a recovered fragment of ante-natal life 
 
 Not in entire forgetfulness, 
 
 And not in utter nakedness, 
 
 I5ut trailing clouds of glory do we come, etc. 
 
 On the one hand, the halo with which 
 memory surrounds our childhood, and, on 
 the other, the melancholy awakened by a 
 sense of its being irrecoverably gone, have 
 suggested the idea that we look back, as 
 through a golden gateway, to the glory of 
 a dawn preceding it. 
 
 The soul that rises with us, our life's star 
 I lath had elsewhere its setting, 
 And cometh from afar.
 
 334 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 This is also one of the arguments adduced 
 by Gautama, the reputed founder of the 
 Nyaya system of Indian Philosophy. I 
 quote from the aphorisms of the Nyaya, 
 published for the Benares College, at Alla- 
 habad. "Joy, fear, and grief," he says, 
 " arise to him that is born, through relation 
 to his memory of things previously expe- 
 rienced." And this aphorism is thus com- 
 mented upon by one of Gautama's pupils, 
 Viswanatha : "If joy arises before the 
 causes of joy are experienced, the child 
 must have existed in a previous life." And 
 so the subtile Indian metaphysic said, " If 
 in one life, then in a series, and an illimita- 
 ble series ; and there being no beginning, 
 it is indestructible, and can have no end. 
 Gautama endeavored to prove the same 
 thing from the psychological phenomena 
 of desire. " We see nothing born void of 
 desire." Since every creature experiences 
 desires which seek satisfaction before there 
 is any experience of what can satisfy them, 
 Gautama and his commentator trace this 
 back to knowledge acquired in a previous 
 life. 
 
 Both arguments are inconclusive. The 
 first set of phenomena referred to by Plato,
 
 DOCTKIXK OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 335 
 
 and by the Platonic poets so often, can be 
 explained otherwise than by the hypoth- 
 esis of preexistence. In dreams, notions 
 seemingly the most discordant unite, and 
 our whole consciousness sometimes passes 
 into a chaotic or amorphous state. As to 
 the second set of phenomena appealed to 
 by Gautama, if instinctive desire demands 
 a previous life to explain it, the same in- 
 stinct in that life requires one still prior, 
 and so on ad injinitmn. And the action 
 of instinctive desire can be easily explained 
 as the growth of experience, or the result 
 of a series of tentative efforts which seek, 
 and continue to seek, satisfaction, till they 
 find it. 
 
 On the other hand, while these sugges- 
 tions of instinct and of reminiscence seem 
 invalid, the absence of any memory of ac- 
 tions done in a previous state cannot be 
 a conclusive argument against our having 
 lived through it. Forgetfulness of the 
 past may be one of the conditions of en- 
 trance upon a new stage of existence. 
 The body, which is the organ of sense-per- 
 ception, may be quite as much a hindrance 
 as a help to reminiscence. As Plotinus 
 said, "matter is the true river of Lethe:
 
 336 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 immersed in it, the soul forgets every- 
 thing." In that case casual gleams of 
 memory, giving us sudden, abrupt, and mo- 
 mentary revelations of the past, are pre- 
 cisely the phenomena \ve would expect to 
 meet with. If the soul has preexisted, 
 what we would a priori anticipate are only 
 some faint traces of recollection, surviving 
 in the crypts of memory. 
 
 One of the main objections brought 
 against the doctrine of preexistence an 
 objection which seems insuperable to the 
 popular mind is the total absence of any 
 authentic or verifiable memory of the past. 
 It is supposed that if we cannot remember 
 a former life, it is all the same as if it never 
 was ours ; for the thread of identity must 
 be a conscious one. This, however, is just 
 what its advocates deny. They appeal to 
 the latent elements which underlie our 
 present consciousness, out of which the 
 clearest knowledge arises ; and they main- 
 tain that there is a hidden world of the un- 
 conscious in which the subterranean river 
 of personality flows. 
 
 But the deeper and more philosophical 
 grounds on which the doctrine of the pre- 
 existence of the soul has been and may be
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 337 
 
 maintained arc threefold. They may be 
 characterized respectively as the specula- 
 tive, the ethical, and the physical justifica- 
 tions of the dogma. If they explain its 
 prevalence, and account for its vitality, 
 they do so by giving a show of reason for 
 the theory, its intellectual raison d'etre. 
 
 The first is a purely ontological considera- 
 tion, the relevancy of which will be denied 
 by the disciples of experience, but which 
 seems, to say the least, to be more valid 
 than their denial. No one has stated it with 
 more force or persuasiveness than Plato. 
 The great idealist of antiquity found an evi- 
 dence of preexistence in our present know- 
 ledge of a priori notions, or ideas which 
 are not the product of experience, such as 
 mathematical axioms, and all metaphysical 
 first principles. If they are latent in the 
 soul at birth, their origin must be sought 
 in a previous state of existence. \Ve could 
 not now transcend sense, and reach gen- 
 eral notions of any kind, unless these no- 
 tions had belonged to us in a previous 
 state. But it is evident that if their origin 
 in this life demands for its explanation the 
 presupposition of a prior life, their exist- 
 ence in that state would involve the pos-
 
 338 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tulate of one still previous, and so on ad 
 infinitum ; that is to say, it would demand 
 the eternal existence of the soul itself. 
 And it is thus that we reach the fully 
 developed form of this ontological argu- 
 ment. If life or existence belongs to the 
 soul intrinsically, it must have always ex- 
 isted. As in the Nyaya system, the soul 
 is held to be eternal, because, if not eternal, 
 it would be mortal. " Whatever has had a 
 beginning will have an end," was the fun- 
 damental position of Gautama and his 
 school ; and this notion is so fixed in the 
 Brahminical mind, that every religion which 
 denies it, or fails to recognize it, is looked 
 upon as ipso facto a false religion. The 
 Brahminical mind is opposed to Christian- 
 ity, because it conceives that Christianity 
 is opposed to preexistence. So in the 
 Bhagavad Gita it is said of the soul, " You 
 cannot say it hath been, or is about to be, 
 or is to be hereafter. It is a thing with- 
 out birth." 
 
 The whole argument of the Phasdo re- 
 volves around the same centre, that the 
 soul is naturally and intrinsically death- 
 less, that it has in it a principle of life 
 with which you cannot associate mortal-
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 339 
 
 ity, and of which you cannot predicate it. 
 If so, its preexistence is as certain as its 
 posthumous existence. This is the domi- 
 nant thought of all that Plato teaches on 
 the subject of immortality, alike in the 
 Phrcdo, the Phaedrus, and the Republic. It 
 is a purely ontological consideration. All 
 the detailed argumentation in the Phxdo, 
 for example, whether it involves ethical or 
 dialectical elements, the proof from the 
 everlasting cycle of existence and origina- 
 tion out of opposites, the argument from 
 reminiscence, the proof from the simplicity 
 and consequent indissolubility of the soul, 
 the refutation of the objections of Simmias 
 and Cebes, the psychological plea founded 
 on the native prerogatives and capacities 
 of the soul, all either presuppose, or are 
 merely different ways of stating and illus- 
 trating the cardinal position, that indestruc- 
 tible life belongs to the soul's essence. To 
 Plato, the ideal theory is primary, the im- 
 mortality of the soul secondary ; but the 
 one involves the other. If the mind of 
 man is competent to grasp eternal ideas, it 
 must be itself eternal. If the ideas which 
 it apprehends are eternal, it must partici- 
 pate in their eternity ; and this im perish-
 
 340 ESS A YS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ableness is of its very essence. In the 
 Phaeclrus the argument is advanced that 
 the soul is apx^j KU^O-CCUS. It is the source of 
 motion ; but having the cause of motion 
 within itself, out of this awoKtV^cris comes its 
 immortality. In the tenth book of the 
 Republic the question is raised, what can 
 possibly destroy the soul ? Evil attacks 
 and corrupts it. It injures its character 
 without wasting its substance : and if this, 
 which most of all might be supposed capa- 
 ble of destroying it, cannot, then nothing 
 else can assail it. What is composite may 
 be decomposed ; but the soul, though it 
 has many faculties, is not composite. It is 
 one, and cannot be decomposed, and must 
 therefore live forever. But, if so, it has 
 lived always. It is without beginning 
 ael bv (Rep. X. 609-611) ; as in the 
 Phoedo it is described as di&ov or (106 D.). 
 The number of souls in the universe does 
 not increase. An addition to the number 
 of immortals would be a contradiction in 
 terms, inasmuch as what begins to be must 
 die, and what does not die in time was 
 never born in time. If, therefore, we can- 
 not attach the idea of dissolution or non- 
 existence to the soul, it must have had an
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 341 
 
 eternal past ; no temporal origin can be 
 assigned to it. Its preexistence and its 
 posthumous existence are correlative ideas 
 in Platonic thought. If it has had an 
 historical origin in time (which it has), it 
 will have it over and over again ; experi- 
 encing many births and many deaths. It 
 is born when it dies, and it dies when it 
 is born. In short, the terms " birth " and 
 "death" denote merely relative concep- 
 tions ; and there disguise our ignorance, as 
 much as they disclose our knowledge. \Ye 
 see the phenomenal appearances of birth 
 and death, of origination and decease ; but 
 the amount of vital force, or of spiritual 
 existence, is a fixed and constant quantity. 
 The second ground on which the theory of 
 preexistence finds a philosophical justifica- 
 tion is an ethical one. It offers an explana- 
 tion of the moral anomalies of the world, the 
 unequal adjustments of character to situa- 
 tion, with the heterogeneousness and ap- 
 parent favoritism of Providence. To many 
 minds this has seemed the most plausible 
 aspect under which metempsychosis may 
 be regarded ; and if it unravels the ethical 
 puzzle of suffering associated with virtue, 
 and happiness allied with evil, it may have
 
 342 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 great moral value, even while its scientific 
 basis remains unproved. Hierocles said, 
 " Without the doctrine of metempsychosis, 
 it 'is not possible to justify the ways of 
 Providence." Let us see. It is offered to 
 us not as an explanation of the origin of 
 evil in the abstract, but as a key to the un- 
 equal adjustment of happiness and misery 
 in the present life, or the way in which 
 they are respectively distributed. It is 
 an oft-told tale in the literature of the 
 world, and a perplexing fact in every life, 
 this union of virtue with sorrow or even 
 with misery (which is the secret of all 
 tragedy), and the opposite and equally in- 
 congruous union of happiness and vice. If 
 the phenomena of the moral world, taken 
 by themselves, are to yield us a theory of 
 the universe, it can scarcely be a mono- 
 theistic one. It must be clualistic or Man- 
 ichean. They seem to indicate either the 
 conspicuous partiality and favoritism of 
 Heaven, or a successful assault on the 
 government of a righteous Being, by a 
 formidable rival power, if not an equal 
 potentate. At this point, the theories of 
 preexistence and metempsychosis offer to 
 lighten the burden of the difficulty. They
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 343 
 
 affirm, to quote the words of Jouffroy, 
 used by him in another connection, 
 that human life is "a drama, whose pro- 
 logue and catastrophe are both alike want- 
 ing." In a previous state, the s:tme laws 
 existed which govern our present life ; and 
 as the two states are connected by moral 
 ties, we now gather the fruit of what we 
 formerly sowed. It is not more true that 
 in age we reap the fruit of the seed we 
 sow in youth, than that we gather in this 
 life the harvest of an innumerable scries of 
 past lives. The disasters which overtake 
 the good are not the penalty for present 
 action ; they are punishment for the errors 
 and faults of a bygone life. The sufferers 
 are not expiating their forefathers' crimes, 
 but their own formerly committed. Feli- 
 city associated with moral degradation has 
 the same relation to a past state of exist- 
 ence. The reward is given for former 
 actions that were worthy of recompense; 
 the external circumstances of each lile 
 having a moral relation to the internal 
 state of the soul in its previous existence. 
 
 The theory arises out of a demand for 
 equity in the adjustment of the external 
 and the internal conditions of existence.
 
 344 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 On no moral theory can the present un- 
 equal adjustment be considered both equi- 
 table and final. If it is final i. <?., if there 
 is no future rectification it is not equi- 
 table. If it is not final, but only a tem- 
 porary arrangement for the purposes of 
 moral discipline and education, it may be 
 the most equitable of all possible arrange- 
 ments. The moral root of the theory is 
 thus the sense of justice, and the convic- 
 tion not only that justice will be done, but 
 that it is noiu being- done. On the theory 
 of a coming rectification, which connects 
 the present with the future, and not with 
 a past life, the idea is that justice is not 
 now done ; but that the assize and the sen- 
 tence will put all to rights. The theory of 
 metempsychosis, connecting the present 
 with the past as well as with the future, 
 affirms that there is no region of space, or 
 moment of time, in which it is not done. 
 It is scarcely to be wondered at that 
 Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, 
 calls this doctrine " the golden key " to 
 Providence ; or that he enlarges in its 
 praise, in that remarkable dream in his 
 "Divine Dialogues," in which he describes 
 his vision of the key. " Let us but as-
 
 DOCTRINE Or METEMPSYCHOSIS. 345 
 
 sutnc," he says, " the prcexistcnce of 
 souls, and all those difficulties which over- 
 cloud the understanding will vanish." Ik- 
 supposes that human souls were created 
 "in infinite myriads," "in the morning of 
 the world." "All intellectual spirits that 
 ever were, are, or shall be, sprang up with 
 the light, and rejoiced together before God, 
 in the morning of the creation." I make 
 this quotation from More whose Dia- 
 logues on the subject are much more in- 
 teresting than his labored treatise on " The 
 Immortality of the Soul," because, as he 
 combined the doctrine of the creation of 
 souls with their preexistence, he repre- 
 sents one branch of the theory ; the other 
 branch being that represented by Gautama, 
 Plato, and the neo-Platonists, who maintain 
 the soul's eternity'. Metempsychosis fits 
 equally well into both theories. As a spec- 
 ulative doctrine, it is equally consistent 
 with a belief in instantaneous creation, and 
 with a theory of emanation. 
 
 The ethical leverage of the doctrine is 
 immense. Its motive power, as compared 
 with the notion of posthumous influence 
 after the individual has perished, the 
 substitute for immortality offered by La
 
 346 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Mettrie and his colleagues, and by all the 
 positivists, is great. It reveals as mag- 
 nificent a background to the present life, 
 with its contradictions and disasters, as 
 the prospect of immortality opens up an 
 illimitable foreground, lengthening out on 
 the horizon of hope. It binds together the 
 past, the present, and the future in one 
 ethical series of causes and effects, the 
 inner thread of which is both personal to 
 the individual and impersonal, connecting 
 him with two eternities, the one behind 
 and the other before. With peculiar em- 
 phasis it proclaims the survival of moral 
 individuality and personal identity, along 
 with the final adjustment of external con- 
 ditions to the internal state of the agent. 
 
 So far the evidence is in favor of the 
 doctrine. Several objections to it from an 
 ethical point of view must now be candidly 
 weighed. To believe in a past state of ex- 
 istence, of which we have no present re- 
 membrance, may appear to some minds to 
 weaken the sense of responsibility. It may 
 be doubted whether we can sustain a moral 
 relation to a life of which we remember 
 nothing, or to a future in which the mem- 
 ory of the present will similarly vanish.
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 347 
 
 To this objection it might justly he re- 
 plied that the moral links which connect 
 the successive moments of our present ex- 
 perience are often unconscious ones, and 
 their validity as links docs not depend on 
 their being luminous ever afterwards. The 
 supposed recency of our origin is not the 
 ground of our responsibility, and we arc 
 accountable for a thousand things we have 
 forgotten. 
 
 For is not our first year forgot ? 
 The haunts of memory echo not, 
 
 even as to terrestrial life. To other 
 minds and temperaments, the notion of a 
 vast ancestry, of an illimitable genealogy, 
 will rather deepen the sense of responsibil- 
 ity than weaken it. As the inheritance of 
 an illustrious name and pedigree quickens 
 the sense of duty in every noble nature, a 
 belief in preexistence may enhance the 
 glory of the present life and intensify the 
 reverence with which the deathless princi- 
 ple is regarded. The want of any definite 
 remembrance of past states of conscious- 
 ness can be no barrier to a belief in our 
 having experienced them ; and a very 
 slight reflection will show that if we have 
 preexisted this life, memory of the details
 
 348 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the past is absolutely impossible. The 
 power of the conservative faculty, though 
 relatively great, is extremely limited. We 
 forget the larger portion of experience 
 soon after we have passed through it ; and 
 we should be able to recall the particulars 
 of our past years in the present life, fill- 
 ing up the missing links of consciousness 
 since we entered on it, before we were in 
 a position to remember our ante-natal ex- 
 perience. Birth into this world may be 
 necessarily preceded by crossing the river 
 of Lethe, the result being the obliteration 
 of knowledge acquired during a previous 
 state. While the capacity for fresh ac- 
 quisition survived, the garnered wealth of 
 old experience would determine the amount 
 and the character of the new. So long, 
 therefore, as it is impossible to retain the 
 memory of all past experience in the pres- 
 ent life, so long as fragments survive which 
 suggest pree'xistence, so long as the river 
 of our consciousness flows in many subter- 
 ranean ways, so long as the connection of 
 soul and body induces forgetfulness as 
 much as it quickens remembrance, there 
 may be no insuperable barrier in the way 
 of the theory of metempsychosis.
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 
 
 Another difficulty must be considered. 
 It may be said that precxistence fails to 
 explain the moral inequality which now 
 exists, because if we assume a previous 
 life to account for the maladjustment of 
 this, a prior preexistcnce must explain the 
 anomalies of that, and so on ad injlnitnin. 
 1C veil if the moral disorder is temporary, 
 its future elimination will not explain why 
 it once existed under a perfect system of 
 moral government. The theory of its pre- 
 vious existence only carries the difficulty 
 one stage nearer to its source, but it does 
 not remove it, or lighten its pressure in 
 the region to which it is driven back. Be- 
 sides, if the ultimate prospect is such a re- 
 arrangement of destiny, by an adjustment 
 of the external state to the internal con- 
 dition, that no inequality remains, why is 
 this not effected noiv''? Why is the mar- 
 riage of virtue and felicity (the internal 
 and the external) so long postponed ? 
 
 To this it may be replied that it is no 
 part of the theory of metempsychosis to 
 explain the origin of evil. It is only the 
 inequality arising from the way in which 
 happiness and misery are distributed in 
 this life often in inverse ratio to virtue
 
 350 ESSAYS JW PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and vice that it seeks to explain. To 
 throw any speculative or moral difficulty 
 into the background, and prevent its for- 
 ward pressure, is to accomplish something, 
 although the puzzle still remains ; and to 
 throw it back a little way is perhaps all 
 that we can do, unless we can eliminate it, 
 which assuredly we cannot do. The de- 
 mand to carry it still farther back, so as to 
 explain the previous inequality, is really to 
 raise the question why it is there at all. 
 And to this there is probably no answer, 
 except that which the existence of free 
 will supplies. With free will permanently 
 existing, there is a permanent possibility 
 of departure from the moral centre, and 
 of swerving towards the circumference. 
 Hence the necessity for a readjustment of 
 internal with external conditions will al- 
 ways exist. 
 
 Others may still further object that their 
 sense of justice is not satisfied by our suf- 
 fering in the present life for the errors of 
 one that is past. But is there justice in 
 our suffering in manhood for the faults of 
 our youth ? in our receiving anything to- 
 day for the acts of yesterday ? or in chil- 
 dren sufferine: at all for the deeds of their
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 351 
 
 parents? In the two former cases, it is 
 merely a question of a certain time elaps- 
 ing between the act and its consequences. 
 The third is the case of one individual suf- 
 fering for the errors of another, to whom he 
 stands organically and otherwise related. 
 But if each of us may suffer for his own 
 past actions, and one may suffer through 
 another's deeds, the law will continue to 
 operate, although the deed may belong to 
 one stage of being and the penalty to an- 
 other, although the cause and its conse- 
 quence be separated by the widest possi- 
 ble interval. 
 
 There is a third objection which must 
 not be overlooked. An everlasting cycle 
 of lives might become wearisome, and in- 
 duce a longing for repose, unbroken by 
 any^new birth in time. The perpetual de- 
 scent and ascent, with repetitions of expe- 
 rience only slightly varied, might lead to 
 the wish of the lotus-eaters 
 
 While all things else have rest from weariness, 
 Ail things have rest, why should we toil alone ? 
 
 Xor ever fold our wings, 
 
 And cease our wanderings ; 
 
 Why should we only toil, the roof and crown of things ? 
 
 This is virtually the longing for nin-ana.
 
 352 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 And the relation of the doctrine of me- 
 tempsychosis to that of nirvana is curious 
 and interesting. Metempsychosis is part 
 of the Buddhist belief, and yet nirvana, 
 the goal of Buddhist longing, is the cessa- 
 tion of metempsychosis ; the soul attain- 
 ing rest by ceasing to exist, or being 
 "blown out." Into all the forms of Bud- 
 dhist opinion transmigration enters ; but 
 " soul wandering " is a calamity, an evil 
 inseparable from existence. Nirvana is a 
 deliverance from metempsychosis. After 
 undergoing the needful purification of 
 many births and deaths, the soul attains 
 the condition requisite for the perfect feli- 
 city of annihilation. In other words, it is 
 the discipline of metempsychosis that 
 gradually induces a feeling of detachment 
 from sensible things. A repetition of ex- 
 perience is no longer necessary, and the 
 soul is at length fitted and entitled to es- 
 cape from the turmoil of existence, with its 
 endless "vanity and vexation of spirit," 
 into the perfect rest of non-existence. 
 Such is nirvana. It is worthy of note, 
 however, that amongst the Cingalese 
 Buddhists, the transmigration ending in 
 nirvana or the peace of nonentity
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 353 
 
 passed into a doctrine of extinction plus 
 transmission. The departing soul, ready 
 to be "blown out," lit the lamp of exist- 
 ence in another spirit before its own anni- 
 hilation was consummated. Its last point 
 of contact with existence, its expiring ef- 
 fort, was a creative one. It kept up the 
 succession of creatures destined to un- 
 dergo the same process of metempsycho- 
 sis, by a final act of npddana, or attachment 
 to existence ; after which, it entered itself 
 into the supreme bliss of nirvana. 
 
 This desire for rest in the extinction of 
 all desire, so congenial to the Oriental 
 mind, presents no attraction to the hardier 
 races of the West and North. It may be, 
 in fact, a temperamental feature, deter- 
 mined by subtle climatic conditions and 
 racial peculiarities. Certainly it offers no 
 allurement to natures that have learned to 
 measure the charm of existence by the 
 amount of energy evoked and sustained ; 
 and who have seen that " pleasure is but 
 the reflex of unimpeded energy." Rest is 
 only valued by us as the condition of a iresh 
 departure, and of renewed activity. Tar- 
 rying for a time in any harbor of existence, 
 the inevitable longing arises for another
 
 354 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sight of the great ocean, and a new voy- 
 age. 
 
 The last ground on which metempsycho- 
 sis may be advocated belongs to the meta- 
 physic of physics. As an argument it has 
 often been implied, when it has not been 
 expressly affirmed ; just as the imaginative 
 guesses and surmisings of the primitive 
 tribes may have grown unconsciously out 
 of a speculative root, which their authors 
 were incompetent to grasp. That philo- 
 sophical root is the uniformity in the 
 amount of spiritual existence ; the convic- 
 tion that, since the quantity of matter is 
 neither increased nor diminished, it is the 
 same with the quantity of spirit ; that it is 
 neither added to, nor taken from, at any 
 moment of time. It is a doctrine of modern 
 science that there is a uniform stock of 
 energy within the universe, which neither 
 increases nor decreases, but which inces- 
 santly changes its form and manifesta- 
 tions, dissolving retiring reemerging, ap- 
 pearing disappearing and returning, the 
 proteus of the physical world. Is there a 
 phoenix in the spiritual realm, correspond- 
 ing to this proteus in the material sphere ? 
 In other words, while the amount of ma-
 
 DOCTRINE OF METEMrSYClIOSIS. 355 
 
 terial substance remains stationary, if the 
 quantity of spiritual existence were swiftly 
 to increase at one end, with no correspond- 
 ing diminution at the other, /. c. t if the 
 birth of the spirits of the human race was 
 a new creation, multitudes every instant 
 of time darting out of nonentity into mani- 
 fested being, and if their death was a 
 simple transference to some new abode, 
 would not this incessant and rapid increase 
 overstock the universe ? 
 
 Now, since no physical power is ever 
 lost, all force being simply transformed, if 
 the doctrine of the conservation of energy 
 be applied to the sphere of moral and spir- 
 itual life, two alternative theories alone are 
 possible : either preexistence and immor- 
 tality combined, or emanation and absorp- 
 tion. Whether the latter is materialistic 
 or pantheistic matters not, except for the 
 name we choose to adopt ; the essence of 
 the doctrine is the same. It is self-evident 
 that if the amount of spiritual existence is 
 not increased every moment, the preexist- 
 ence of all souls that are born, before their 
 incarnation in the flesh, is as certain as 
 their immortality. The one carries the other 
 with it, or is carried by it. They are, in-
 
 356 ASSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 deed, not two doctrines, but two sides of 
 the same doctrine. Thus the number of 
 souls in the universe will be a fixed and 
 constant quantity. If the conservation of 
 energy be true of spiritual existence, and 
 the soul is to survive the death of the body, 
 then it lived before the body was vitalized. 
 If it is never to be extinguished, it never 
 was produced. It was probably the force 
 of this consideration that led the acute 
 mind of David Hume to affirm that " me- 
 tempsychosis is the only system of this 
 kind (i. c., of immortality) that Philosophy 
 can hearken to." 1 He "says what is in- 
 corruptible must also be ingenerable." 
 " The soul, if immortal, existed before 
 our birth " (p. 400). In the same con- 
 nection he acutely suggests " how to dis- 
 pose of the infinite number of posthu- 
 mous existences ought to embarrass the 
 religious theory " (p. 404). With this we 
 may associate a remark of Shelley : " If 
 there are no reasons to suppose that we 
 have existed before that period at which 
 our existence apparently commences, then 
 there are no grounds for supposing that 
 we shall continue to exist after our exist- 
 1 Philosophical Works, iv. p. 404.
 
 DOCTKINK OF METEMPSYCHOSIS. 357 
 
 cnce has apparently ceased." (Kssays, p. 
 58). The "continual influx of beings," 
 without a corresponding egress, is a diffi- 
 culty which will seem insuperable to many 
 minds. There is a growing consensus of 
 opinion amongst spiritualists and material- 
 ists alike, that the quantity both of matter 
 and of force within the universe suffers no 
 diminution, and no enlargement ; loss in 
 one direction being invariably and neces- 
 sarily balanced by gain in another, and all 
 the phenomenal changes in Nature being 
 simply a matter of exchange a transpo- 
 sition of elements, the sum of which is 
 constant. If this be so, it has an impor- 
 tant bearing both on the survival of the 
 soul after death, and on its precxistence ; 
 the two doctrines standing and falling to- 
 gether. 
 
 As to the permanence of the materials 
 which compose the body, when the organi- 
 zation is broken up and disintegrated, there 
 is no debate. The survival, in some form 
 or other, of what we call the mind, soul, 
 or conscious ego, and what a materialist 
 psychology terms vital force, is also con- 
 ceded. Neither is annihilated ; they are 
 only transmuted or transformed. But tiie
 
 358 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOrilY. 
 
 controversy remains after this concession, 
 and underlies it. The alterations which 
 the body undergoes can be traced, because 
 it continues visible after death. Its changes 
 can be experimentally investigated, because 
 the transformations are slowly effected. 
 But the transformations and changes of the 
 soul, or vital principle, cannot be traced. 
 
 The question which now remains to be 
 disposed of, on grounds of probability, is 
 not whether the soul does or does not sur- 
 vive. Its survival is conceded, and main- 
 tained as axiomatic. The only controversy 
 is, in u'liat form docs it survive ? Is it 
 refunded to the universe, as material sub- 
 stance is restored, to be worked up into 
 new forms, by the protoplastic force that 
 originally made it what it was? or does it 
 survive, with its individuality and identity 
 unbroken ? That is the controversy be- 
 tween the materialist and the spiritualist. 
 
 May not the latter be abandoning one 
 half of his territory, or at least surrender- 
 ing one of his positions and weakening 
 his ultimate defense, if he throws away the 
 doctrine of preexistence ? It seems diffi- 
 cult to maintain, on rational grounds, that 
 the sum of finite existence is being perpet-
 
 DOCTRIXE OF METEMrSYClfOSlS. 359 
 
 ually filled up before, with no correspond- 
 ing diminution behind ; a distinctly quan- 
 titative increase in front, with no decrease 
 to balance it in the rear. Over-population 
 in the mother country has necessitated 
 emigration to the colonies. Hut, on the 
 theory of incessant miraculous increase, 
 there is no conceivable colony in the uni- 
 verse that would not be already over- 
 stocked, and where the arrival of any emi- 
 grants from the parent country would not 
 be unwelcome. 
 
 In this connection, it is worthy of note 
 with what caprice the immortality of the 
 brute creation is sometimes spoken of, in 
 comparison with the immortality of man. 
 By many, who are confident of their own 
 survival, the immortality of animals is con- 
 sidered a curious and interesting question, 
 but one that is speculatively unimportant, 
 and theoretically indeterminable. How 
 much depends on the solution of the prob- 
 lem of the destination of life is not per- 
 ceived. For example, we hear it olten 
 said, there can be no objection to the im- 
 mortality of the ///>//<;- animals. But 
 scientific rigor will not permit a line of 
 demarkation to be drawn between the ani-
 
 360 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mal races. They all shade into one an- 
 other. Are we then prepared to admit 
 the immortality of every creature in which 
 there is the faintest adumbration of intelli- 
 gence ? and if so, of every one in which is 
 "the breath of life." If we do not admit 
 this, then the intelligence which we find in 
 the dog, the beaver, the bee, and the ant, 
 which does not "perish everlastingly," is 
 conserved somewhere, after the dissolution 
 of the bodies of these animals. But how 
 vast the Hades, stocked with the spiritual 
 part of every creature that has ever lived and 
 died upon our planet from primeval time ! 
 When the prolific increase of the tribes of 
 animated nature is realized, and the enor- 
 mous cycles of time during which the suc- 
 cession has been kept up, imagination sinks 
 paralyzed before the conception of any 
 shadowy storehouse, in which these crea- 
 tures continue to live, far less to flourish. 
 The supposition is felo-de-se. 
 
 But, it may be pertinently asked, if we 
 abandon the immortality of all, can we re- 
 tain the immortality of any ? Is not trans- 
 migration, in this case, the most probable 
 hypothesis ? Is not the notion of a uni- 
 form stock of vital energy, which passes
 
 DOCTRINE Ol< ME'1'E.Ml'SYCllOSIS. 361 
 
 and repasscs endlessly throughout the or- 
 ganized tribes of nature, the most consist- 
 ent theory we can frame ? No one need 
 hesitate to apply the doctrine f metem- 
 psychosis to the animal world, although he 
 may doubt its applicability to the human 
 race ; while, if we reject it in the lower 
 sphere, and, in consequence, hold that the 
 intelligence and devotion of the dog perish, 
 it may be hard to maintain that the reason 
 and affection of man survive. 
 
 Another special difficulty arises at this 
 point, and it is, perhaps, the chief objec- 
 tion to the doctrine of metempyschosis. 
 How docs " the life " that survives unex- 
 tinguished pass from one organized form 
 to another ? We can trace its signs or 
 manifestations till they cease at death. So 
 far all is clear. But what becomes of it on 
 the dissolution of the body ? 
 
 Animula, vagula, blandula, 
 IIospcs comesque corporis, 
 Qua: nunc abibis in loca ? 
 
 If not extinguished, it merely retreats and 
 reappears. But how does it connect itself 
 with the new organization, into which it 
 subsequently enters as an animating and 
 vitalizing principle? This is a difficulty
 
 362 SSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 not only in the way of transmigration, but 
 of survival in any form. The present con- 
 nection between soul and body is known 
 so far ; and, in the absence of experience 
 of separation, we have some psychological 
 facts which suggest that the union is not 
 inseparable, that the soul is not a function 
 of the body, but that in each individual 
 we have two principles, if not two sub- 
 stances, temporarily united. When they 
 are separated, however, as they are at 
 death, how does the spiritual part con- 
 tinue to live disembodied ? and how does 
 it unite itself, or how is it united, with a 
 new corporeal form ? Does it ally itself 
 with its new organization, in some cases, 
 by a voluntary act ? in others, by a passive 
 and involuntary process ? If the latter, 
 there must be some law by which the 
 change is effected, some method of devel- 
 opment determining the movement in a 
 cycle. If the act is voluntary, we have a 
 fresh difficulty to face, viz., that the spir- 
 itual must be able to select its new abode. 
 It must, therefore, either choose one out 
 of many, or it must enter into the only 
 one that is fitted for its reception. It 
 must be either wholly active or wholly pas- 
 sive, or partly active and partly passive.
 
 DOCTRINE OF .METEMPSYCHOSIS. 363 
 
 Wo can state the alternatives, but how 
 to choose amongst them, how to select 
 one of them, is a difficulty that remains. 
 The spirit shrinks from a ghostly or dis- 
 embodied state as its perpetual destiny, 
 nearly as much as it recoils from the sleep 
 of nirvana; but how to find a bod}-, how 
 to incarnate itself, or even to conceive the 
 process by which it could by any foreign 
 agency be robed anew, remains a pu/./.le ; 
 even while, as Henry Vaughan expresses 
 it,- 
 
 It feels through all this fleshly clresse 
 15i ight shootes of cvcrlastingncssc. 
 
 These are difficulties which attend every 
 attempt to form definite conceptions as to 
 the details of this question. Mr. Greg is 
 wise when he says, of the belief in immor- 
 tality, " Let it rest in the vague, if you 
 would have it rest unshaken," 
 
 An additional point must be noted. Al- 
 though we may validly object to have our 
 convictions exhibited to view, as we de- 
 cline to expose the rootlets of a plant to 
 " the nipping and the eager air " of winter, 
 it is a signal gain to integrity of belief 
 that the scientific spirit of our age de- 
 mands the removal of all presuppositions
 
 364 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 which cannot be verified, and insists that 
 those which remain shall be luminous 
 from root to branch. It does this with 
 even more force and rigor than Descartes 
 employed, in his new method of research. 
 So much intellectual mist has been al- 
 lowed to gather and settle over this ques- 
 tion of the soul's destiny, that when a 
 breath of the east wind raises it, and shows 
 how little is known or can be intelligently 
 surmised, many desire that the obscuring 
 curtain should speedily fall again. But in 
 discussing the question of immortality it is 
 above all things necessary that we mark 
 the alternatives of the controversy, and 
 the consequences which follow from our 
 premises, alike of affirmation and denial. 
 If we reject the doctrine of preexistence 
 we must either believe in non-existence, 
 or fall back on one or other of the two 
 opposing theories of creation and traduc- 
 tion : and, as we reject extinction, we 
 may find that preexistence has fewer dif- 
 culties to face than the rival hypotheses. 
 Creation or creationism, as it has some- 
 times been named is the theory that every 
 moment of time multitudes of new souls 
 are simultaneously born, not sent down
 
 DOCTRIXE OF MKTEU PSYCHOSIS. 365 
 
 from a celestial source, but freshly made 
 out of nothing, and placed in bodies pre- 
 pared for them by a process of natural gen- 
 eration. It is curious to observe how ve- 
 hemently the Cambridge 1'latonists recoiled 
 from the notion of a pure spirit, fresh from 
 the hand of Deity, being placed by him " in 
 such a body as would presently defile his 
 image." The idea of the Creator being 
 compelled to add a spirit to the body, how- 
 ever and whensoever a body might arise, ac- 
 cording to natural law and process, seemed 
 to them a monstrous infraction of divine 
 liberty. The theory of traduction seemed 
 to them even worse, as it implied the der- 
 ivation of the soul from at least two 
 sources from both parents; and a sub- 
 stance thus derived was apparently com- 
 posite and quasi-material. 
 
 It is easy to criticise the doctrine of 
 preexistence, as held in the Pythagorean 
 brotherhood, and taught by the mystic 
 sage of Agrigcntum, or even by 1'lato. 
 The fantastic folly of the Urahminical 
 teaching (as in the twelfth book of the 
 laws of Manu) and the absurdity of Bud- 
 dha's transmigrations are apparent. Hut 
 it is easier to follow Lucretius in his satire
 
 366 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of it, than to appreciate the difficulty which 
 gave it birth. As reproduced by Virgil 
 and by Cicero, the genius of the Greek 
 poets and philosophers lost the charm of 
 its original setting ; and I question if the 
 surmises of Plato were fully appraised, till 
 the Phnsdo itself experienced metempsy- 
 chosis in Wordsworth's " Ode." But 
 stripped of all extravagance, and expressed 
 in the modest terms of probability, the 
 theory has immense speculative interest, 
 and great ethical value. It is much to 
 have the puzzle of the origin of evil 
 thrown back for an indefinite number of 
 cycles of lives, to have a workable explana- 
 tion of nemesis, and of what we are accus- 
 tomed to call the moral tragedies, and the 
 untoward birth of a multitude of men and 
 women. It is much, also, to have the doc- 
 trine of immortality lightened of its diffi- 
 culties ; to have our immediate outlook 
 relieved by tb.3 doctrine that, in the soul's 
 eternity, its preexistence and its future 
 existence are one. The retrospect may 
 assuredly help the prospect. And if "this 
 gray dogma, fairly clear of doubt," as Glan- 
 vill describes it, seems strange in the ab- 
 sence of all remembered traces of past
 
 DOCTRINE OF MKTKMrSYCJ/OS/S. 3^.7 
 
 existence, it is worth considering that in a 
 future state a point will he reached when 
 preexistence will ho true. If \ve are to he 
 immortal, immediately after death inetrm- 
 psychosis will have heeoine a reali/.ed ex- 
 perience ; and our present lives will stand 
 in the same relation to the future, on 
 which we shall then have entered, as that 
 in which the past now stands to our pres- 
 ent life. 
 
 Henry More said that he produced his 
 golden key of preexistcnce " only at a 
 dead lift, when no other method would 
 satisfy him, touching the ways of (jod, 
 that by this hypothesis he might keep his 
 heart from sinking." Whether TIV make- 
 use of it or not, we ought to realize its 
 alternatives. They are these. Either all 
 life is extinguished and resolved, through 
 an absorption and rcassimilation of the 
 vital principle everywhere ; or a perpetual 
 miracle goes on, in the incessant and rapid 
 increase in the amount of spiritual exig- 
 ence within the universe; and while hu- 
 man life survives, the intelligence and the 
 affection of the lower animals perish ever- 
 lastingly.
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 
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 tfAP 1 3 1952 
 
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