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CHINA, CAPTIVE OE FEEE 
 
CHINA, 
 
 CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 A Study of 
 Chinas Entanglements 
 
 BY 
 
 Rev. gilbert REID, A.M., D.D. 
 
 DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHINA 
 
 Author of "Glances at China," " Anti-foreign DisturbanceB 
 
 in China," "Revolution and Religion," and "A 
 
 Christian's Appreciation of Other Faiths," 
 
 and many books in Chinese 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY 
 
 1921 
 
 u/ t) i£j ,ij 
 
CorrRioHT, 1921 
 Bv DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY, IHO. 
 
 PRINTED IN U. S. A. 
 
 eOOK MANUFACTURERS 
 R A H W A V N E.W JERSEY 
 
i 
 
 w 
 
 ZD5 
 
 PEEFACE 
 
 "Now it can be told" — ^not because the facts have not 
 
 fy been known or because any censor has forbidden their 
 
 fj publication, but because the temper of the reading public 
 
 t^ has not yet escaped the bias of war and resumed the calm- 
 
 i\^ ness, poise, fairness and broad-mindedness of days before 
 
 the war. America by entering the war and through glory 
 
 of achievement has not suffered militarily, but morally. 
 
 Not until one reaches the lofty idealism of ** being just 
 
 . to those to whom we wish to be just, and just to those to 
 
 ^ I whom we do not wish to be just," will he read with patience 
 
 ' such a book as this. 
 
 ^ The author primarily is an advocate of justice the world 
 
 over, but, to be intelligently just, there comes the task of 
 
 accommodating thinking to the process of discrimination. 
 
 In times of war, and under the behests of war, conscience 
 
 ; must be set to sleep, and loyalty must shape itself by cur- 
 
 .^ rent opinion, loftily proclaimed, that one's own nation and 
 
 ^ all her associates are of necessity immaculate, and the op- 
 
 v^ posing group without any virtue which Heaven or man 
 
 may recognize. When peace dawns, and reconstruction is 
 
 undertaken — undertaken on the basis of real re-conciliation 
 
 — then policies and systems, customs and governments must 
 
 be discriminated from peoples and the individual, and even 
 
 in the individual one must learn to see both good and evil. 
 
 So far as peoples are concerned, and not the character 
 
 of their dominating, governmental policies, the author 
 
 acknowledges that as a resident in China of nearly four 
 
 decades, he is pro-Chinese, rather than pro-Japanese or 
 
 even pro- American, but, even so, the views presented are 
 
 Y 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 not altogether the Chinese view; they are his own views. 
 His views are based on a knowledge of existing facts, such 
 as the average person does not generally see, and the ex- 
 pression of these views is made with the intent of being 
 fair, undetermined by prejudice for or against any par- 
 ticular people. In being loyal to the truth and true to 
 the facts, the author does not gainsay that other fact, that 
 lie is, and has been, and will continue to be, supremely 
 interested in the welfare of the Chinese people and of 
 China as a nation. 
 
 As to the treatment meted out to China by other nations, 
 or, more specifically, other governments, the reader will 
 observe that Japan at certain stages vis-a-vis China is 
 severely criticized, but after all no worse than the criticism 
 of Great Britain and no worse as to Great Britain than the 
 criticism of the author's own government, or the policy 
 pursued towards China by the Wilson Administration dur- 
 ing the delirium of war. Other readers who read here and 
 there a line will refuse to face the facts as they reveal 
 favourably the German temper of mind on the eastern out- 
 skirts of Asia, far removed from the real seat of the awful 
 conflict in arms. All that the author asks for in the way 
 of indulgence is a patient study of the facts. He acknowl- 
 edges that as to the comparative relationship of Allies and 
 Central Powers to China during the last few years, and 
 as to the policy pursued and their general demeanour, he 
 may be classed more as pro-German than pro-Ally, but here 
 again the reader is asked to study the facts. At bottom, 
 the worst that can be said is that by the behests of Pres- 
 ident Wilson he has had, and still has, "friendship and 
 sympathy for the German people," and has refused to 
 discard his friendship because certain governments were 
 determined on war. 
 
 A certain amount of respect may be accorded the author, 
 if it be known that for adhering to his convictions and out 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 of love for China he was made to suffer not only for China, 
 but with China, and underwent some tragic, amusing and 
 puerile persecution from the great diplomats of four Le- 
 gations, British, French, Japanese and even American. The 
 U. S. Constitution, like the Sermon on the Mount, both 
 "slumbered and slept." 
 
 Out of supreme interest in the permanency and well- 
 being of China, he foregoes the personal factor, and callj 
 on all peoples to give China a chance and to help her 
 defend her rights. 
 
 Let the reader — and may there be many in many lands — 
 "read, learn, and inwardly digest" the facts as here told 
 and the truth at which the author has aimed. 
 
 Gilbert Beid. 
 February, 1921. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 I A Background of Foreign Encroachments 1 
 II Germany's Menace to China and Ger- 
 many's Rights 16 
 
 III Intrusion op the War into China : Britain 
 
 AND Japan in the Lead .... 36 
 
 IV Japan's Inroads in China .... 63 
 
 V The Injury to China through American 
 
 AND Allied Intrigue 84 
 
 VI A Series of Aggravations and Perils to 
 
 China 121 
 
 VII Commercial Eivalries as Affecting China 147 
 VIII The Blow Struck at China at the Peace 
 
 Table 168 
 
 IX The Future Prospects of China . . . 206 
 X Japan's Future Influence in China . . 223 
 XI The Future Influence of "Western Na- 
 tions in China 243 
 
 XII Vital Principles versus Spoliation . . 261 
 
 ' APPENDIX 
 
 I The Neutrality of China .... 281 
 II A Chinese President's Proclamation on 
 
 the War, and Editorial Comments . . 290 
 
 III The Versailles Treaty Concerning the 
 
 Christian Missions of Germany . . 295 
 
 IV The Problem of German Missions . . 297 
 
 V Conversation of President Wilson and 
 
 U. S. Senators . . . . . .302 
 
 VI China's Attitude to the Anglo- Japanese 
 
 Alliance 309 
 
 Index 313 
 
CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE 
 
CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 A BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 
 
 The contact of European civilization with the peoples 
 of Asia and Africa, and the American continents, makes 
 sad reading for the man of justice. As to the one country 
 of China, with a long record of civilization, statecraft, 
 philosophy, art and religion, the question arises, "Has 
 China been blessed or cursed by Western civilization?" 
 
 The seriousness of China's international relations began 
 in the early eighties in the growing rivalry and conflict 
 between China and Japan, with Korea as a centre. Before 
 that time. Great Britain, France and Russia were the chief 
 countries in the forceful opening of China to the trade, 
 missions and diplomacy of the rest of the world, accompa-^ 
 nied by minor acts of encroachment, interference and 
 seizure of territory under the legal guise of treaties. Look- 
 ing at the sad havoc of the years, Japan may well claim that 
 she is no worse than European nations in their treatment of 
 China. From China's standpoint all outsiders are bad, with 
 no sign of repentance. I mention a few outstanding facts. 
 
 Great Britain began her aggressive policy with the 
 "Opium War," ending in the treaty of 1842, whereby the 
 island of Hongkong became an English crown colony. 
 
 Justin McCarthy, speaking of ways to justify British 
 action, says: 
 
 But no considerations of this kind can now hide from our eyes 
 the fact that in the beginning and the very origin of the quarrel 
 
 1 
 
2 CHINA, CAPTIVE OE FREE! 
 
 we were distinctly in the wrong. We asserted, or at least acted 
 on the assertion of, a claim so unreasonable and even monstrous 
 that it never could have been made upon any action strong enough 
 to render its assertion a matter of serious responsibility.^ 
 
 France seconded the war operations of the British and 
 directed her efforts henceforth to the religious task of being 
 Protector of Catholic Missions, and indirectly of Chinese 
 converts. It is hence easy to understand the desire once 
 expressed by Prince Kung that China might be free of 
 * ' opium and missionaries. ' ' Opium from 1842 spread more 
 and more throughout China, while missionaries, both Cath- 
 olic and Protestant, harassed the Chinese Government by 
 so-called "difficulties," dependent for settlement on the 
 frequent application of the "gun-boat policy." 
 
 Concerning the view that China presented "a vast field 
 of lucrative opportunities for British merchants," J. 0. P. 
 Bland writes : * 
 
 The wars of 1842 and 1858 were deliberately undertaken for the 
 development and protection of that field, at a time when Eng- 
 lishmen had no reason to anticipate serious rivalry in the reaping 
 of its harvests. 
 
 Russia during these years had encroached from the north 
 on the Amur region of Manchuria, and from the northwest 
 on Chinese Turkestan. China more and more realized that 
 Russia was the "Big Bear." 
 
 The general policy of the United States to China as to 
 Japan was that of generosity, made conspicuous by Caleb 
 Cushing and Anson Burlingame. 
 
 In 1883 and 1884 hostilities arose between China and 
 France, resulting in China's losing the suzerainty of 
 Annam and Tongking, which passed to the control of 
 
 * "A History of Our Own Times," p. 166. 
 
 * " Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 256. 
 
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 3 
 
 France as part of her colonial empire. France became the 
 menacing factor on China's southern frontier, as Russia 
 was on the north. 
 
 About the same time — actually in 1882 — after Great 
 Britain and the United States had induced Korea to make 
 with them commercial treaties, thus impairing China's 
 suzerainty of Korea, the Chinese Government dispatched 
 to Korea a young officer, Yuan Shih-kai, with a small force 
 of 3,000 men, to maintain China's rights and prestige. 
 Friction between Chinese and Japanese ambitions grew 
 more intense. This young Chinese was viewed by Japan as 
 an antagonist and became still more so, some twenty years 
 later, when as President he was the "strong man" of China. 
 Russia, too, in the early eighties, entered upon the scene, 
 and was looked at askance by Japan even more than by 
 China. Korea was already the centre of international 
 intrigue. 
 
 The question of Korea, whether or not to be attached to 
 China as to a suzerain Power, was an object of interest to 
 Japan. Out of this question has sprung Japan's ever- 
 expanding ambition — or, in another phraseology, has be- 
 come a progressive nation like those of the West. Japan's 
 "peaceful expansion" on the Asiatic continent goes by the 
 decade and in terms of war : first, 1894, in war with China ; 
 second, 1904, in war with Russia; and third, 1914, in war 
 with Germany. By 1924 will it be war with Britain, or the 
 United States, or a decadent white race? 
 
 It was 1894 when Japan found a sufficiently plausible 
 reason for announcing a casus belli against China. In the 
 conflict the Chinese navy, trained by British officers, fell 
 into the hands of Japan. The Chinese army, mostly of 
 the old style, was defeated, retreating from Korea and 
 Manchuria. Peking, the national capital, was threatened. 
 The Chinese Government sued for peace. China was humil- 
 iated in the eyes of the world. Japan of a sudden rose to a 
 
4 CHINA, CAPTIVE OB FREE? 
 
 commanding position among the Great Western Powers — 
 the only strong Eastern Power in all Asia. 
 
 The man to make peace on the Chinese side was the great 
 Oriental diplomat, Li Hung-chang, aided by an American, 
 John W. Foster. The Japanese diplomat was Count Ito, 
 already known to Li Hung-chang, and more sure of success 
 because his diplomacy was backed by military conquest. 
 All that China had to do was to submit. 
 
 In the first article of the treaty the responsibility was 
 laid on China to "recognize definitely the full and com- 
 plete independence and autonomy of Korea, ' ' a captivating 
 phrase. As for Japan, she made no declaration to this 
 effe^. 
 
 "Besides an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels (about 40,000,- 
 000 pounds sterling) which Japan demanded of China, 
 there was also the cession of the island of Formosa, of the 
 Pescadores group, and of the peninsula of Liaotung at the 
 southern end of Manchuria. This latter comprised Port 
 Arthur, China's strongest fortification. It was in reference 
 to the latter cession that Li Hung-chang displayed his 
 skill as an Oriental diplomat. Before leaving Peking for 
 peace negotiations at Shimonoseki, he came to an under- 
 standing with the Russian Minister to intervene on China's 
 behalf. Thus, no sooner was the treaty signed, than the 
 Russian Government, backed by France and Germany, 
 ** recommended" to Japan the retrocession of Liaotung, in 
 lieu of a further indemnity of 7,500,000 pounds sterling. 
 The joint advice was in these words : 
 
 Such territorial acquisition constitutes a menace against the 
 capital of China, renders Korea's independence merely nominal, 
 and jeopardizes the perpetual peace in the Far East. 
 
 Concerning this act of finesse, H. B. Morse writes : 
 
 Mr. Foster declares that he first heard of the demand during his 
 stay in Peking, April 24th to May 2nd, and that "Li Hung- 
 
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 5 
 
 Chang waited anxiously for some indication from Russia, but 
 none was received by him till we reached Tientsin on our return." 
 This disposes of the possibility of any direct assurance having 
 been given; but none the less, the viceroy must have had a rear 
 sonable expectation that the action would be taken.^ 
 
 In this connection, as bearing on Japan's future policy 
 of expansion, John W. Foster writes : 
 
 I have reason to believe that the demand for territory on the 
 mainland of China was contrary to the better judgment of 
 Marquis Ito. ... In my conversations with Count Mutsu, I 
 told him I was satisfied Russia would not pei-mit Japan to occupy 
 the mainland so threateningly near to Peking, and that it was not 
 good policy to insist upon it.^ 
 
 The war, and then the peace settlement, of China and 
 Japan in 1894 and 1895, have had serious, unexpected, 
 and far-reaching bearings, all linked up in one way or 
 another with the political manoeuvers of the present war. 
 
 (1) First of all, the way was open for Russia to push 
 her interests in Manchuria as China's "true friend," and 
 to find at last an outlet to the sea. 
 
 (2) The policy of China's dependence on loans from 
 European Powers was initiated for meeting at once the 
 indebtedness to Japan. France and Russia made a joint 
 loan of 400,000,000 francs, and British and German bankers 
 advanced jointly two loans of 16,000,000 pounds sterling 
 each. The British required of the Chinese that as the 
 maritime customs was to be the security, the Inspector 
 General of the customs should be a Britisher so long as 
 Britain held the preponderance of foreign trade. This 
 arrangement now spurs on the Japanese to be preponderant 
 
 ' " The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. HI, 
 p. 47. 
 • " Diplomatic Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 163. 
 
6 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 in China, both politically and commercially, in place of 
 Britain. 
 
 (3) More serious for the political integrity of China was 
 the policy adopted in 1898 of acquiring in the name of lease 
 small sections of Chinese territory and some of China's 
 most important harbours, capable of fortification. The 
 country responsible for the first move was Germany, a new 
 factor in China's international relations. Germany's am- 
 bitions to have a place in the sun, as it shines in old Cathay, 
 succeeded those of Great Britain, France,* Russia, the 
 United States, and Japan. The impelling cause of Ger- 
 many's action, so calamitous to China, was these two fol- 
 lowing facts: — (a) Two Catholic missionaries of German 
 nationality, and connected with a new diocese in western 
 Shantung under a German bishop, were killed by a Chinese 
 mob near the close of 1897. A fitting penalty, in line with 
 the long-established policy of Force, was demanded. Rep- 
 aration had in fact been made prior to the ingenious pro- 
 posal — no part of the reparation — that Germany have a 
 port of her own. This policy, along with the circumstances 
 that gave rise to it, I criticized then, and criticize still more 
 strongly today, (b) Still more important was the fact that 
 Russia had already begun the Chinese Eastern Railway in 
 Manchuria, and was advancing to a position of dominating 
 influence, if not territorial acquisition, at Port Arthur, at 
 the harbour of Dalny, and in Liaotung, which only two 
 years before had been retroceded by Japan to China. Russia 
 was also reported as having been assured by China of a 
 concession in Shantung of Kiaochow Bay and harbour. 
 Moreover, a memorial had been presented to Lord Salisbury 
 in 1896, by one who had investigated the region, that the 
 British Government take steps to get co^trol of this un- 
 developed port.^ 
 Amid such a clash of powerful rivals, China preferred 
 * I Baw the memorial while living in Peking at the time. 
 
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 7 
 
 Germany to both Russia and Great Britain, who already 
 had won a dominating influence. By admitting Germany, 
 a check could be placed on Russia and Britain, just as 
 Russia, France and Germany had been a check to Japan. 
 It had always been the diplomacy of Li Hung-chang (and 
 successful it had proved to be) to play one nation against 
 another. This meant equilibrium for China, and national 
 security. 
 
 The German Government, conscious that German inter- 
 ests were deprived of the special advantages which Britain, 
 France, Russia and even Japan had acquired, negotiated 
 with the Chinese Government for the leasehold of Kiao- 
 chow. This included the harbour and hamlet of Tsingtao, 
 as yet undeveloped. The treaty was signed March 6, 1898. 
 The lease was made out for ninety-nine years. 
 
 March 27, following the example of Germany, a Conven- 
 tion was signed by China and Russia, leasing Port Arthur 
 and Talien-wan (Dairen) to Russia for a term of twenty- 
 five years. Russia thus secured the strongest fortification on 
 the China coast. She acquired that which was objected to 
 in the case of Japan three years before, but it is well to 
 remember that Japan's stipulation was for permanent ces- 
 sion, while that of Russia was for a lease during a short 
 period of years. 
 
 April 3, Great Britain insisted on a Convention with 
 China, and, July 1, signed the Convention, leasing Wei- 
 haiwei in the province of Shantung to Great Britain "for 
 so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occu- 
 pation of Russia.'* This port, together with the island of 
 Liukungtao, was opposite to Port Arthur, on the other side 
 of the Gulf of Pehchihli, and opposite to Tsingtao, on the 
 other side of the Shantung peninsula. Next to Port Arthur 
 it was China's most important naval base and land fortress. 
 
 France, too, had her demands. May 27, France and 
 China signed a Convention leasing to France a harbour on 
 
8 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 the sonthem coast of Canton province (Kuang-tung), 
 known as Kuang-chow-wan, for a period of ninety-nine 
 years. 
 
 — It IS interesting here to note that in this same year, 1898, 
 though after the forced lease of territory to the four Euro- 
 pean Powers, there came, under the leadership of Emperor 
 Kuang-hsii, the hundred days of reform, succeeded by the 
 coup d'etat of the Empress Dowager and her reactionary 
 measures. Yuan Shih-kai, back from Korea, was conspic- 
 uous in bringing on the coup. This was an internal blow 
 at China's well-being. 
 
 (4) Another intrusion on China's sovereign position was 
 the adoption of the policy of spheres of interest, sometimes 
 called spheres of influence. The latter is more a political 
 term, leading gradually to China's dismemberment. Con- 
 cerning a sphere of interest, T. W. Overlach says: 
 
 Its essential element is a negative one: namely, the term ex- 
 presses the principle that no other power except the one in 
 whose favour the "sphere of interest" exists shall be permitted 
 to acquire concessions or to exert any control or influence whatso- 
 ever — not to speak about military occupation — at the same time 
 giving the privileged power a monopoly of the right to seek 
 concessions.^ . 
 
 The root of this dubious policy was in the special demands 
 made by France, after the hostilities of 1883 and 1884, with 
 reference to Chinese provinces bordering on Annam. The 
 southwestern province of Yunnan was especially affected. 
 After the China-Japan war, the French extended their 
 sphere to the provinces of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, 
 where was located the leased territory of Kwang-Chou-wan. 
 Great Britain, however, managed to secure counter conces- 
 sions both in Kuang-tung and Yunnan, as a check on 
 
 * " Foreign Financial Control in China," p. v. 
 
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 9 
 
 France. Most important of all, as a counterbalance to 
 the French Indo-China empire, Great Britain, July 24, 
 1886, arranged with China that Burma should pass from 
 the suzerainty of China to the complete control of Great 
 Britain. 
 
 ^ Recognition of the Russian sphere of interest in the three 
 provinces of Manchuria, leading up to the acquired lease 
 of the Liaotung peninsula in 1898, succeeded that of France 
 in the southern provinces, and was also contrary to the 
 original desires of the British Government as represented 
 by Lord Salisbury. Russia's insistence on her right to 
 make her own arrangement with the Chinese Government 
 led finally to Britain's acquiescence. 
 
 Germany's sphere of interest was a part of the momen- 
 tous transactions pertaining to Kiaochow in 1898. Lord 
 Salisbury did not like the trend of events, but in true diplo- 
 matic style yielded to Germany 's wishes to avoid all danger 
 of a clash. H. B. Morse says : 
 
 England had no desire to see the " break-up " of China, of 
 which these successive cessions (of 1898) seemed to be the be^- 
 ning; and, acting on her unvaiying policy in China, her one wish 
 was to maintain the equality of opportunity which had existed up 
 to that time.^ 
 
 Japan also had her sphere of interest in Fukien province, 
 as a natural corollary of the cession in 1895 of the island of 
 Formosa. 
 
 Great Britain, in this nice political game of tit for tat, 
 brought forward the claim, to which she has held to the 
 present time, that the whole Yang-tsze valley, even includ- 
 ing the western province of Szechuan, must be the British 
 sphere of interest. The British Government, however, has 
 
 ^ " The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. Ill, 
 p. 113. 
 
10 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 found it no easy task to exclude other nationals from acts 
 of exploitation in the Yang-tsze basin. 
 
 As between Britain and Russia, an arrangement was 
 reached in April, 1899, that Britishers were not to seek 
 railway or mining concessions north of the Great Wall, and 
 Russians were not to seek similar concessions in the 
 Yang-tsze valley. 
 
 As between Britain and France, each has had the habit 
 of intruding on the "preserve" of the other, France gen- 
 erally making use of Belgium to soothe British suscepti- 
 bilities. 
 
 As between Britain and Japan, the former has never 
 wounded the Japanese sense of honour as related to prior 
 position in Fukien, though reciprocity has been made im- 
 possible through Japanese ambitions along the Yang-tsze 
 river. 
 
 As between Britain and Germany, the lease of Weihaiwei 
 to Britain was viewed by Germany as an infringement of 
 the German "preserve." Friction, however, was avoided 
 by Britain disclaiming any desire to obstruct. Notice the 
 official statement: 
 
 The British Government, in view of the approaching occupa- 
 tion of Weihaiwei, has spontaneously intimated to the German 
 Government that it has not the intention of injuring or calling 
 into question German rights or interests in the province of Shan- 
 tung, or of creating any difiBeulties for the German Government 
 in that province.^ 
 
 (5) A final circumstance in the international relation- 
 ship of China was the battle for commercial concessions. 
 All nations took part in the scramble. Americans, disap- 
 proving of the other forms of encroachment, appeared as 
 active concessionaires, acquiring the concession for railway 
 
 * Rockhill, " Treaties with China," p. 180. 
 
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 11' 
 
 between Hankow and Canton. The Russians were push- 
 ing the great Chinese Eastern Railway system, crossing 
 Manchuria from the Amur to Port Arthur. The French 
 began to build a line through Tongking into Yunnan. The 
 Germans were building the first line in the sacred province 
 of the Sages, across Shantung from Tsingtao to Tsinan-fu, 
 the provincial capital. 
 
 The British had rather the preponderance of first claim 
 in mines and railways. The Peking Syndicate acquired 
 control of the vast coal area in the northern provinces of 
 Shanse and Honan, and as to railways J. 0. P. Bland 
 writes : 
 
 In 1898, with the acute development of the " spheres of influ- 
 ence " regime and the assertion by Great Britain of special rights 
 in the Yangtsze Valley, five exclusively British railway concessions 
 in that region were extracted from China under severe diplomatic 
 pressure by the British Minister.* 
 
 These five phases of outside intrusion into Chinese life, 
 and often of unjust encroachment and inconsiderate inter- 
 ference, helped to bring on the Boxer uprising of 1899 
 and 1900. 
 
 This uprising, resulting in the siege of the Legations, 
 was disastrous to China. The Protocol, signed by all, and 
 forced on the Chinese, was from first to last punitive. In the 
 midst of much that was harsh, inconsiderate, and, as seen 
 today, unfair, there were two favourable circumstances, 
 one the preservation of Chinese autonomy through adher- 
 ence to the equitable policy of spheres of interest, linked 
 with the Hay policy of the open door in matters of ordinary 
 trade, missions and residence, and the other the preserva- 
 tion of the Manchu monarchy with protection accorded to 
 the old Empress Dowager, who was in many respects the 
 most guilty person in the whole anti-foreign uprising. 
 
 * " Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 270. 
 
12 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 When, ten years after the China-Japan war, the war 
 arose in 1904 between Japan and Russia, Japan had her 
 second great opportunity to establish herself in China, not 
 so much on an equality with Western nations as in a po- 
 sition ahead of them. 
 
 This war had also certain effects on Chinese political 
 life: — (1) In waging the war the Chinese Government was 
 induced to give up its neutrality by granting a war zone 
 in Manchuria for both belligerents. As for Russia and 
 Japan, they both infringed on China's neutral territory. 
 
 (2) Russian rights and privileges in southern Manchu- 
 ria, including the retroceded Liaotung peninsula, were 
 ceded by the Portsmouth treaty to Japan. This established 
 Japanese influence not only in the south, in Fukien, but in 
 the north, in Manchuria. 
 
 (3) The arrangements made were first between Russia 
 and Japan and then between them and China. A clause 
 was introduced into the Sino-Japanese Convention, giving 
 Japan an exclusive position in southern Manchuria. 
 
 (4) Japan more than ever acquired a position in Korea 
 to the exclusion of both China and Russia. 
 
 (5) Japan, by her military operations, greatly enhanced 
 her prestige among the nations of the world. 
 
 Following close upon Japan's gain, if not complete vic- 
 tory, in the war with Russia, came the gradual absorption 
 of Korea. In the Portsmouth treaty of 1905 the indepen- 
 dence of Korea is not mentioned, but it states that Japan 
 "possesses in Korea paramount political, military and eco- 
 nomical interests. ' ' By 1906 Japan had a Resident-General 
 in Seoul, in the person of Count Ito. Then followed com- 
 plete control of Korea's affairs, in the name of a protec- 
 torate, and finally, in a very diplomatic way, the absorption 
 of Korea into Japan's national life in 1910. This, along 
 with the rights acquired from Russia in Manchuria, gave 
 a preponderance to Japan in affairs of the Far East. It 
 
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 13 
 
 remained for Japan to make her power a menace or a help 
 to China. 
 
 A further move on the part of Japan for establishing 
 her leadership, and for having it recognized, was to make 
 Conventions concerning China with Great Britain, first in 
 1902, then in 1905, and then in 1911 ; with Russia in 1907 ; 
 with France in the same year ; and with the United States 
 in 1908. These conventions recognized, if they did not 
 guarantee, "the independence and territorial integrity of 
 China. ' ' This was much like the policy in Europe of strong 
 Powers neutralizing smaller States. The insult to China 
 was in the fact that outside nations proceeded, under Ja- 
 pan 's initiative, to negotiate about China, without negotiat- 
 ing with China, or doing it at China's request. China was 
 ignored in her own affairs. 
 
 These conventions also stipulated "equal opportunities 
 for the trade and industries of all nations," a splendid 
 theory if meant to be carried out, whether in peace or in 
 war. 
 
 There has never been anything sentimental in the foreign 
 policy of Japan, and her statesmen have from the first displayed 
 a thorough appreciation of the fact that Treaties and Conven- 
 tions between the great Powers may serve to conceal, but not to 
 hinder, the processes of geographical gravitation and the ulterior 
 purposes of statesmen.^ 
 
 In a general way, there were two groups of concession- 
 hunters and financial exploiters. The one group was 
 French and Russian, with whom Belgium generally asso- 
 ciated. The other group was British and German, with 
 whom Americans and Japanese were more apt to join, as 
 the stronger combination. As early as 1895 the Hongkong 
 and Shanghai Banking Corporation made an agreement 
 
 ^ J. 0. P. Bland, " Recent Events and Present Policies in China," 
 p. 293. 
 
14 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 with the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank to share all business 
 acquired from the Chinese Government. This co-operation 
 extended with only a slight break down to the Great War. 
 There were exceptional acts in this general grouping, as 
 when Belgians joined with British and Americans in con- 
 cessionary schemes, or British and French formed a Com- 
 pany for joint exploitation. 
 
 It should not be overlooked that after the Boxer up- 
 rising, the Germans, acting on business principles, rather 
 than under orders from German officialdom, adopted an 
 attitude to the Chinese that was conciliatory, friendly, 
 adaptable and co-operative. By this change Germans won 
 great success in matters of trade in China. The terms of 
 the agreement made with the Germans for building the 
 railway between Tientsin and Nanking (Pukou) were more 
 generous to the Chinese than in all previous concessions, 
 and when the British were admitted to the arrangement for 
 building the southern half, they had to agree to the same 
 liberal terms. In proportion as Germans succeeded, others 
 became jealous and plotted ruin. 
 
 The last great event prior to the World War was the 
 first revolution which took place in 1911, bringing about 
 the abdication of the Manchu House in 1912. In this revo- 
 lution as also in the second revolution of 1913, Japan had 
 the peculiar opportunity, if she cared to utilize it, of help- 
 ing to keep China weak by keeping her in turmoil. The 
 Japanese Government, as was natural, was more in sym- 
 pathy with the Manchu monarchy, while radical Japanese 
 were ready to give aid to the revolutionary party under 
 Dr. Sun Yat-sen. On the other hand, when Yuan Shih-kai 
 became President, he had but little support from any fac- 
 tion in Japan, owing to the old disagreements when he was 
 Chinese-Resident in Korea, prior to the China-Japan 
 Var. 
 _In the main, then, through the last two decades. Great 
 
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 15 
 
 Britain's preponderating influence was passing to Japan. 
 To both, Germany was the great competitor, and next came 
 the United States, with Russia and France receding in 
 matters of trade, but still busy in matters political. These 
 rivalries with threatening collisions encircled China. J. 0. 
 P. Bland says of Japan's steady advance: 
 
 By virtue of her geographical situation and her new military 
 prestige, Japan could not only assert preponderant political 
 claims at Peking, but she could hope to push her trade and 
 industries throughout China in successful competitioii with the 
 European Powers, her ally included.^ 
 
 China's unfortunate position today, and the new crisis 
 in her political existence, are involved in the events of 
 previous years, wherein China was made to bend to the 
 will of stronger Powers. China may give thanks to High 
 Heaven, but to no one else. If she survives, it will be by 
 a Providential interposition, and not by the favour of men. 
 
 * " Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 294. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 Germany's menace to china and Germany's rights 
 
 In nothing is it more difficult to exercise discrimination 
 of judgment, which is essential to being just, than con- 
 cerning Germany's position in China. The first disclosure 
 of German designs as a political factor, though coming after 
 the movements of Britain, France and Russia, and even of 
 Japan, did not increase the reputation of Germany. Other 
 countries made inroads after waging a war; Germany 
 threatened a war and then marched forward. The Chinese, 
 like the rest of civilized peoples, can never forget the threat 
 of the "mailed fist." It was a bad way to seek ac- 
 quaintance. 
 
 But, to be fair, Germany's strong action in 1897 and 
 1898 was no worse than the encroaching policy of other 
 Powers. The only great Power that was free from high- 
 handedness and territorial aggrandizement was, up to that 
 time, the United States. 
 
 Moreover, the forced lease of Chinese ports for exclusive 
 foreign control, and the insistent demand for concessionary 
 Tights, as pursued in 1898 by Germany, Russia, Great 
 Britain and France, were all on a par. 
 
 The one to complain or to censure was China alone, and 
 the four great military Powers of Europe were equally at 
 fault, if fault there was. 
 
 It is well to remember that Germany's menace to China 
 was not during the period of a World War or since,, but 
 sixteen years before. If menace there has been in these 
 latter years it has not been to China, but rather to the 
 commercial ambitions of rival nations. 
 
 16 
 
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 17 
 
 Even in the year 1898, when the action of Germany for 
 gaining a foothold in China is open to condemnation, a 
 clear-cut, discriminatory analysis is incumbent, in the in- 
 terests of the law of righteousness. The treaty as to Kiao- 
 chow made between the two governments of Germany and 
 China was not the reprehensible part of their inter-rela- 
 tions, was in no wise an act of duress, but where the Ger- 
 mans are open to censure was in the settlement previously 
 reached for the massacre of two German missionaries. The 
 treaty, as a matter of fact, was subsequent to the use of ^ 
 force and to what, after the event, may be called a harsh 
 settlement. At that time the general feeling among for- 
 eigners in China was that Germany aided all jother govern- 
 ments in insisting that Chinese officials give proper pro- 
 tection to missionaries. Riots had arisen in different parts 
 of China, and the British, French and American Legations 
 were wont to use pretty strong language to bring the 
 Chinese Foreign Office to terms. Let me quote from a 
 dispatch of Sir Claude McDonald, the British Minister, to 
 Lord Salisbury under date of December 1, 1897, as it ap- 
 pears in the Parliamentary Papers : ^ 
 
 During the summer there were prevalent in this province 
 rumours of the kidnapping of children of foreigners, which pro- 
 duced much excitement, and placed the mission<aries in the in- 
 terior in great danger. The Governor, in spite of much pressure, 
 did nothing to suppress these rumours, and even by his attitude 
 gave them tacit encouragement. After repeatedly calling the 
 Yamen's attention to his conduct, I was at last obliged to desire 
 them to warn him that if any serious incident occurred as a result 
 of his anti-foreign spirit, he would find himself in jeopardy. This 
 I did in a note so long ago as the 27th of July and the result 
 was, according to a report from His Majesty's consul at Chefoo, 
 that active measures were at length taken to check the rumours 
 and the ferment thereupon subsided. 
 
 * See A. H. Snow's article in the Nation, September 20, 1919. 
 
18 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 It is not possible at present to ascertain whether this agitation 
 has indirectly led to the present outrage, but the Governor's atti- 
 tude has been such as to induce full approval of the Qerman 
 demand for his dismissal. 
 
 Sir Claude writes thus of the dispatch of three small 
 German cruisers to Kiaochow Bay, on the massacre of two 
 German Catholic missionaries: 
 
 If the German occupation of Kiaochow is only used as a 
 leverage for obtaining satisfactory reparation . . . for the mur- 
 der of German missionaries, the effect on the security of our own 
 people will be of the best. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the German object is to secure Kiaochow 
 as a naval station under cover of their demands for reparation, it 
 is by no means clear that their acquisition of it will prejudice our 
 interests. 
 
 Mr. Snow, from whom I derive these valuable citations, 
 sums up in this admirable fashion : 
 
 The terms of the reparation settlement were agreed upon about 
 two months before the treaty was signed. The Governor was 
 degraded. The money reparation included compensation to the 
 relatives of the murdered priests, damages for injury to the 
 mission buildings, and a contribution to the building of mission 
 chapels near the scene of the murder. The reparation-money was 
 paid to the Roman Catholic authorities. Germany obtained for 
 itself and all foreign states an Imperial tablet condemnatory of 
 the anti-Christian and anti-foreign proceedings. The next year 
 the Vatican granted to Germany the ecclesiastical protectorate 
 over Roman Catholics in Shantung; this religious sphere of influ- 
 ence being subtracted from that of France, which had theretofore 
 extended over all China. 
 
 The treaty stated that the Chinese Government regarded the 
 occasion of the amicable closing of the reparation settlement as 
 an appropriate one for giving a concrete evidence of its grateful 
 recognition of friendship shown to it by Germany. 
 
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 19 
 
 As to the compacts themselves, which were diplomatically 
 negotiated between the Chinese and German governments, 
 they deserve careful analysis, if only that we may judge 
 with a righteous judgment concerning the bewildering 
 action taken at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 
 
 According to past usage, and even in the identical lan- 
 guage of the Versailles treaty, what Germany had in Shan- 
 tung was certain "rights." If she had any rights, they 
 were granted her by China and by China alone. These 
 rights, moreover, were determined by treaty of the two 
 governments of China and Germany, and by the action of 
 no other government. For others to strike a blow at this 
 contract is an offence to China as much as to Germany. 
 China has been wronged amid the upheaval of war just 
 because Germany has been wronged. Righteousness has 
 suffered even more. A contract has been ignored, a treaty 
 has been cast aside, and that by outsiders. Rights, both 
 of Chinese and Germans, have been trampled in the dust. 
 
 What, then, were German rights in China, particularly 
 in Shantung? What was the compact, solemnly sealed and 
 signed by the two governments, in March, 1898? 
 
 The contract is in two parts, the one a treaty respecting 
 the lease of Kiaochow to Germany by the Chinese Govern- 
 ment, and the other a treaty respecting railway and mining 
 concessionary rights in the province of Shantung. Note 
 the chief features. 
 
 I. The Territorial Lease 
 
 There are several features in this lease arrangement 
 which deserve special attention. 
 
 (1) Friendly relations between China and Germany 
 were asserted. In the preamble it is stated: 
 
 The Imperial Chinese Government considers it advisable to give 
 a special proof of their grateful appreciation of the friendship 
 shown to them by Germany. 
 
20 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 And again: 
 
 The Imperial German and the Imperial Chinese Governments, 
 inspired by the equal and mutual wish to strengthen the bonds of 
 friendship which unite the two countries, etc., etc. 
 
 Article I also says: 
 
 His Majesty the Emperor of China, guided by the intention to 
 strengthen the friendly relations between China and Germany, 
 etc., etc. 
 
 » 
 
 All the treaties made by foreign nations with China, with 
 the notable exception of the punitive Protocol of 1901, suc- 
 ceeding the Boxer uprising, have given profuse expressions 
 of everlasting peace, amity and friendship. Fine phrase- 
 ology and professions of kindly sentiments characterize 
 both Occidental and Oriental diplomacy. They are gen- 
 erally tucked away in some preamble, which too often is 
 sugar coating to a bitter pill. Germany, therefore, was 
 conforming to good usage in proceeding to negotiate ter- 
 ritorial acquisition in China. 
 
 (2) The German acquisition of Kiaochow territory of 
 the Bay and the islands in the Bay was in the form of a 
 lease. Article II says : 
 
 His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Germany in 
 lease, provisionally for ninety-nine years, both sides of entrance 
 to the Bay of Kiaochow. 
 
 The leased zone was "a zone of 50 kilometres (100 
 Chinese U) surrounding the Bay of Kiaochow at high 
 water." Also "the whole water area of the Bay up to the 
 highest watermark at present known," and "all islands 
 lying seaward from Kiaochow Bay, which may be of im- 
 portance for its defence." 
 
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 21' 
 
 The land zone, which was less than the zone of the Bay, 
 was about 117 square miles, smaller than that allotted to 
 either Russia, Great Britain, France or Japan. In the 
 hinterland, there was a neutral zone of some 2,500 square 
 miles. In the more limited area of the peninsula between 
 the east shore of the Bay and the sea lay Tsingtao and the 
 German Concession proper. 
 
 This was a new mode of getting control of another 
 country's land and harbour. Heretofore, the aim had been 
 to possess land and sea in perpetuity. The new aim was 
 better, but still bad. The nearest example was the leasing 
 of certain ports as treaty ports for the trade of all nations 
 and placed for the most part under foreign administration. 
 
 At treaty ports, the British had what is called a Settle- 
 ment of their own at Canton, Shanghai, Tientsin, and a few 
 other places ; and the French had what they called a Con- 
 cession in Shanghai, Tientsin and Hankow. In all these 
 cases the land was leased by the Chinese Government. Ac- 
 cording to the new arrangement Germany was to have 
 exclusive control of a port or leased territory. As to China, 
 the original owner and the other contracting party, it is 
 to be assumed that she was ready to make out the lease to 
 Germany and to no one else. 
 
 The treaty made special reference to the reasonable desire 
 of Germany to be treated in the same way as other nations. 
 Thus Article II : 
 
 With the intention of meeting the legitimate desire of his 
 Majesty the German Emperor that Germany, like other Powers, 
 should hold a place on the Chinese coast for the repair and equip- 
 ment of her ships, for the storage of materials and provisions 
 for the same, and for other arrangements connected therewith, 
 etc., etc. 
 
 Seeing that France had a great colonial empire on the 
 Pacific coast, and Great Britain had possessions all the waj^ 
 
22 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 from the Atlantic through the Mediterranean Sea and In- 
 dian Ocean to Hongkong in the Pacific, with an ever- 
 expanding grasp of power, it does not seem so reprehensible 
 for Germany to possess in a modified sense one open port, 
 that of Tsingtao in Shantung. 
 
 (3) The evident intention of both parties to the contract 
 was clearly that the arrangement made was between Ger- 
 many and China alone. For the territory to pass to Japan 
 or to any other country was not to be thought of. Article 
 V says: 
 
 Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return 
 Kiaoehow to China before the expiration of the lease, China 
 engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred 
 at Kiaoehow and to cede to Germany a more suitable place. 
 Germany engages at no time to sublet the territory leased from 
 China to another Power. 
 
 It is to be supposed that if any country was to secure all 
 the improvements gratis, that country was to be China, not 
 Japan, or any group of allied nations, representing them- 
 selves to the world as international. 
 
 While the phrasing used implies that Germany would 
 always want some place for her own special administra- 
 tion, it may be taken for granted that if other countries 
 should at any time withdraw from their leased territory 
 and give up extra-territorial jurisdiction, Germany would 
 consent to do the same. 
 
 The use, however, of the word "provisionally" in describ- 
 ing the limit of the lease to ninety-nine years gives the 
 natural implication that the occupation was thought of as 
 permanent. It is here that Germany did a great wrong 
 to China, but Great Britain, Russia, France and after- 
 wards Japan have been unable to pose as innocent, while 
 denouncing German culpability. 
 
 An English authority, writing of this form of lease, says ; 
 
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 23 
 
 We must agree with Despagnet, who, after remarking that the 
 restoration of the temtory at the specified time is very unlikely, 
 says that these pretended leases are alienation disguised in order 
 to spare the susceptibility of the state at whose cost they are 
 made.* 
 
 Still, this possible alienation should not be stretched so 
 far as to allow at any time transfer to a third party in vio- 
 lation of other stipulations to the contrary. According to 
 the terms of the grant, the rights acquired by Germany 
 were unassignable and non-transferable. 
 
 (4) Chinese sovereignty was to be retained in the leased 
 territory, though administration was to pass to the Ger- 
 mans. Article III begins thus : 
 
 In order to avoid the possibility of conflicts, the Imperial 
 Chinese Government will abstain from exercising rights of sov- 
 ereignty in the ceded territory during the term of the lease, and 
 leaves the exercise of the same to Germany. 
 
 Article I defines the leased zone as granted by the 
 Chinese Emperor, and adds the clause, "while reserving to 
 himself all rights to sovereignty." 
 
 Article III also contains a clause that is slightly equivo- 
 cal. It reads : 
 
 In virtue of the rights of sovereignty over the whole of the 
 water area of the Bay transferred to Germany. 
 
 In this phraseology it is the water area of the Bay, not 
 the land zone, which admits of transfer of sovereignty. 
 Even so, it is the exercise of sovereignty that must be meant. 
 This was particularly necessary in regard to harbour regu- 
 lations in the Bay of Kiaochow. 
 
 Of Chinese residing in the leased area Article V says : 
 
 * J. Westlake, " International Law," p. 136. 
 
24 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 The Chinese population dwelling in the ceded territory shall at 
 all time enjoy the protection of the German Government, pro- 
 vided that they behave in conformity with law and order. 
 
 H. B. Morse adds an important footnote: 
 
 The Chinese city of Kiaochow, situated inland from the head 
 of the bay, within the fifty-kilometre neutral zone, remained under 
 Chinese jurisdiction; the German port and administration centre 
 were at Tsingtao at the mouth of the bay.^ 
 
 T. J. Lawrence disapproves of this division of sovereign 
 powers. He says: 
 
 In private law both lease and usufruct imply that the property 
 continues to belong to the grantor, while the grantee has the use 
 and beneficial enjoyment of it for the time and under the con- 
 ditions fixed in the grant.^ 
 
 Then after referring to these leased territories in China, 
 he sums np thus: 
 
 In fact, the attempt to separate property or sovereignty on the 
 one hand from possession on the other, by the use of phrases 
 taken from the law of lease or usufruct, is in its very nature 
 deceptive ! ^ 
 
 To show how far the Grermans, in acquiring this leased 
 area, were willing to co-operate with the Chinese, it was 
 agreed that Tsingtao should become a free port of trade, 
 and by subsequent agreements with Sir Robert Hart, In- 
 spector-General of Customs, it was arranged that the 
 Chinese customs administration should be established at 
 
 * " The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. Ill, 
 p. 109. 
 
 ' " Principles of International Law," pp. 176, 177. 
 
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 25 
 
 Tsingtao itself, and not on the boundary of the Chinese- 
 administered territory. "The free depot," says Mr. Morse, 
 "aided by the railway, prospered, but it was prosperity 
 based on an English free-trade policy, and not on the policy 
 adopted elsewhere in German territory. ' ' ^ This fact ought 
 to be kept in mind, when one feels called upon to exclude 
 Germany from all rights in Kiaochow territory as from 
 all her colonial possessions. 
 
 (5) There was also a military character to the purposes 
 and plans of the German leased territory. The preamble 
 states that the chief purpose or wish of both countries was 
 "to strengthen the bonds of friendship, which united the 
 two countries, and to develop the economic and commercial 
 relations between the subjects of the two States," while 
 Article I outlines two intentions in the mind of the Chinese 
 Emperor, the one "to strengthen the friendly relations 
 between China and Germany," and the other "to increase 
 the military readiness of the Chinese Empire." This par- 
 ticular feature of the contract has been overlooked by most 
 war-critics. Tsingtao was never meant by either party as 
 a menace to China (though possibly it might be construed 
 as a menace to Japan), but as an auxiliary agency in 
 Chinese plans for national self-defence. Hence not only 
 German troops were to be allowed "free passage" in the 
 leased zone, but Chinese troops were to be allowed to be 
 stationed within that zone. 
 
 Article II refers to the new fortifications thus : 
 
 Germany engages to construct, at a suitable moment, on the 
 territory thus ceded, fortifications for the protection of the build- 
 ings to be constructed there and of the entrance to the harbour. 
 
 Here, very clearly, the newly-built German fortifications 
 were for defensive purposes alone, not for offensive war- 
 fare, or as a naval base for attacking an enemy. 
 
 * " The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. IIL 
 p. 110. 
 
26 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Chinese ships of war were also to be free from all re- 
 strictions, and from all dues, except those necessary in 
 harbour arrangements. 
 
 In a word, the new port became under German direction 
 more of a commercial town and a summer resort than a 
 military fortification. By the expenditure of vast sums of 
 money, provided annually by the German Imperial Gov- 
 ernment, Tsingtao became the model city of the Far East, 
 administered largely on the single-tax theory. By the in- 
 crease of trade, by the establishment of a high-grade gov- 
 ernment hospital and of technical schools under joint Ger- 
 man and Chinese control, and by the inauguration of Ger- 
 man missionary operations, carried on, side by side, with 
 those of American Societies, the Chinese had reason to 
 express a sincere admiration for the service being thus ren- 
 dered by an alien government to their own country. 
 
 Let us take the opinion of S. K. Hornbeck, once a teacher 
 in a Chinese Government College, and now professor in 
 the University of "Wisconsin. He says : 
 
 Before long a substantial breakwater, granite docks with com- 
 plete equipment and a floating dock capable of handling vessels 
 of 16,000 tons displacement had been installed. At Tsingtao there 
 soon appeared a modem German city, carefully planned, artisti- 
 cally and substantially built. Forts, shops, military departments 
 and well-equipped barracks gave the character of a fortified base ; 
 but Kiaochow was never given the military equipment or aspects 
 of a Port Arthur or a Vladivostok — as the comparative ease with 
 which it was recently taken (in 1914) shows.* 
 
 And again: 
 
 At Tsingtao and its environs more than 60,000 metres of ex- 
 cellent roads were built. Systematic afforestation was undertaken 
 both there and in the hinterland. Schools of all sorts were estab- 
 
 * " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 296. 
 
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 27 
 
 lished, including a German High School with well-equipped 
 laboratories and library, and several faculties.^ 
 
 Putnam Weale, writing ten years before the Great War, 
 says: 
 
 As has already been stated, this town of Tsingtao, on which 
 part of the Berlin millions have been spent, is excellently well 
 laid out. The streets are broad and admirable, and provided 
 with sidewalks of noble dimensions. Electricity lights all the 
 town, and a complete water-supply system has been installed. 
 There are good hotels and passable shops, a splendid parade 
 ground and fine military roads darting everywhere into the 
 country. Tsingtao is an unique creation in the Far East.^ 
 
 //. The Concessionary Bights in Shantung 
 
 Perhaps the more important of the arrangements made 
 between China and Germany in 1898 had to do with railway 
 and mining concessions in Shantung province. They were 
 a part of Germany's subsequent demand for a sphere of 
 interest, to match the spheres of other countries, Great 
 Britain, Russia, France and Japan. 
 
 (1) Germans, in this new arrangement, received sanc- 
 tion to build a railway from Kiaochow (or Tsingtao) to 
 Tsinan-fu, the provincial capital, and from each of these 
 places to the Shantung boundary. 
 
 (2) To carry on this railway construction, **a Chino- 
 German Company shall be formed, " " and in this Company 
 both German and Chinese subjects shall be at liberty to 
 invest money if they so choose, and appoint directors for 
 the management of the undertaking. ' ' 
 
 Here was a project for joint co-operation and manage- 
 ment, most commendable at that time, and capable of ulti- 
 mate good to the Chinese. 
 
 * " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 297. 
 » "The Re-Shaping of the Far East," p. 348. 
 
28 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Another Article, No. Ill, adds: "All arrangements in 
 connection with the works specified shall be determined by 
 a future conference of German and Chinese representa- 
 tives." The arrangement of 1898 was merely an initial 
 move. But the general principle was a good one, that 
 nothing should be determined except by conference with 
 the Chinese authorities. 
 
 The same Article adds: "Profits derived from the work- 
 ing of these railways shall be justly divided pro rata be- 
 tween the shareholders, without regard to nationality." 
 
 (3) This railway enterprise, thus inaugurated by the 
 Germans, was to be separate from all political designs. 
 There might result a sphere of interest, commercial in 
 character, but not a sphere of influence, political in char- 
 acter. So Article III closed with these words : 
 
 The object of constructing these lines is solely the development 
 of commerce. In inaugurating a railway system in Shantung 
 Germany entertains no treacherous intention towards China, and 
 undertakes not to unlawfully seize any land in the province. 
 
 (4) Beside the project of railway building there was 
 another for opening mines. Article IV reads thus: 
 
 The Chinese Government will allow German subjects to hold 
 and develop mining property for a distance of 30 li (some 10 
 miles) from each side of these railways and along the whole 
 extent of the lines. 
 
 (5) Co-operation was also to be encouraged in these 
 mining operations, thus : * ' Chinese capital may be invested 
 in these operations." And again: "All profits derived 
 shall be fairly divided between Chinese and German share- 
 holders. ' ' 
 
 (6) The improvement of commerce and of friendly re- 
 
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 29 
 
 lations between the two countries is stated as the sole object 
 in mind. 
 
 (7) Then comes in a far-reaching stipulation, establish- 
 ing once for all a German sphere of interest, such as other 
 countries were allowed to have, thus: 
 
 The Chinese Government binds itself in aU cases where foreign 
 assistance, in persons, capital or material, may be needed for 
 any purpose whatever within the province of Shantung, to offer 
 the said work or supplying of materials, in the first instance, to 
 German manufacturers and merchants engaged in undertakings 
 of the kind in question. In case German manufacturers and 
 merchants are not inclined to undertake the performance of such 
 works or the furnishing of materials, China shall be at liberty 
 to act as she pleases. 
 
 (8) The concession for the railway was actually made out 
 in June, 1899, and granted to a syndicate, to be called 
 Shantung Railway Company (Sehantung-Eisenbahn-Ge- 
 sellschaft), with a capital of 54,000,000 marks, by the 
 German Imperial Government, which in turn had secured 
 the concessionary rights the previous year through treaty 
 from the Chinese Imperial Government. 
 
 This participation in railway schemes in China by the 
 German Government is similar to the way any American 
 syndicate, seeking for exploitation in China, must receive 
 a charter from some State Legislature. 
 
 (9) According to this new arrangement between the 
 German Government and the newly-formed syndicate, it is 
 specially stipulated that "German material shall be used, 
 as far as possible, in the construction of the railways." 
 
 In 1900, the noted Boxer year, while Yuan Shih-kai was 
 Governor of the province of Shantung, a new agreement 
 was made between him, as representing the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment, and the German Company. The authority for 
 policing and protecting was taken out of the hands of the 
 
30 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Germans and placed exclusively in the hands of the Chinese 
 provincial authorities. China bound the Germans not to 
 utilize their railway rights in Shantung as Russians were 
 using theirs in Manchuria, and as Japan afterwards used 
 hers in the same region. Article 16 reads thus : 
 
 Should it ever happen that it becomes necessary for soldiers 
 to protect the railway outside of the 100-li zone, the Governor 
 of Shantung shall detail such soldiers, and foreign soldiers cannot 
 be used. The Governor of Shantung having consented to use his 
 utmost endeavours to protect the railway both in time of construc- 
 tion and operation, he must see to it that the railway receives no 
 injury from bandits. 
 
 If in any way it had seemed that China 's sovereignty had 
 been infringed upon by the original concessionary rights 
 granted to Germans, it was made clear in the new agree- 
 ment that China had complete sovereignty and political 
 control along the line of the railway, which were not 
 claimed by Germany. 
 
 Article 17 is equally specific: 
 
 The object of constructing this line is solely the development of 
 commerce, and it will not be permissible to transport foreign 
 soldiers or munitions used by foreign soldiers to any place outside 
 of the 100-li zone. If by any chance the peaceful relations 
 existing between China and any foreign Power become broken, 
 the railway will still remain under the management of the Com- 
 pany, but the Company must still observe the above rule. But 
 if the oflBces are seized by an enemy, and the Company loses its 
 control, then this province will no longer assume the responsibility 
 of protecting the Une. 
 
 The anomalous feature of the Great War was that Japan, 
 a friend, not an enemy of China, proceeded to seize the of- 
 fices of the Company and to exclude all Chinese provincial 
 protection. 
 
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 31 
 
 Thfs railway from Tsingtao to Tsinan-fu, of about 250 
 miles in length, was completed in 1904 at a cost of 52,900,- 
 000 marks. The railway proved a paying investment, but 
 the mines were operated at a loss to the German Company. 
 Whatever the reason, by 1911, the Mining Area Delimita- 
 tion Agreement renounced most of the mining rights 
 granted in the Convention of 1898. In fact the German 
 Company retained for itself only two collieries and one 
 mine. The Japanese, however, in occupying Shantung, 
 made no distinction between mines worked by Germans and 
 those worked by Chinese. 
 
 After the completion of the Shantung railway there came 
 the building, as a Chinese Government enterprise, of the 
 grand-trunk line from Tientsin south to Pukou, opposite to 
 Nanking, wherein the northern section to the southern 
 border of Shantung was to be built and financed by a Ger- 
 man Company and the southern section by a British. 
 
 Towards the end of 1913, the Chinese Government 
 granted to Germans the further right to build two other 
 railway lines running west and southwest to connect with 
 railway systems already built, but on terms more favourable 
 to the Chinese than in the original agreements of 1898-9, 
 and like the terms governing the Tsin-Pu line. 
 
 Concerning the character of German commercial enter- 
 prise, let us quote from S. K. Hornbeek : 
 
 At first the Germans appeared bent upon asserting themselves 
 politically in Shantung. Practically everything in connection 
 with the railway was kept in German hands. German guards 
 were installed for the " protection " of the railway. A German 
 post-office was established. Germany seemed to be following a 
 policy similar to that which Russia had pursued in Manchuria. 
 But at the end of 1905 they began to withdraw their troops; they 
 handed over their post-offices to the Chinese; they made an agree- 
 ment whereby the Chinese Customs administration was to func- 
 tion at Tsingtao much as elsewhere in China — with the special 
 
32 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 provision that twenty per cent, of the duties collected be con- 
 tributed toward the expenses of the local Tsingtao administration ; 
 and they began to employ Chinese in various capacities.^ 
 
 In referring to the latest German concession of 1913, this 
 writer adds: 
 
 The Germans gave evidence of having relinquished the last 
 vestiges of an actively aggressive political policy, in favour of 
 commercial co-operation.^ 
 
 He sums up the situation in the following language : 
 
 Since the original seizure of Kiaochow the Germans had made 
 no additional attempt to extend their territorial holdings or 
 special privileges in China. They had not undertaken to extend 
 their administration over Shantung — or even over the Railway 
 Zone. The Shantung Railway Company had never attempted to 
 assume a political status and perform political functions. The 
 German Government had not sought to stretch the terms of the 
 Convention of 1898. There had been no creating of issues and 
 demanding of immediate settlement such as had characterized the 
 progress of the Japanese in Manchuria. German subjects had not 
 exceeded their plainly stipulated rights; they had not invaded 
 the interior; they had not become engaged in personal and police 
 conflicts with the Chinese. There was in the later years of 
 German presence in Shantung little of which from the point of 
 view of the open-door policy, complaint could be made. For ten 
 years past the Germans had done practically nothing calculated to 
 complicate the politics of the Far East, and, except commercially, 
 they disturbed no peace in the Far East but the peace of mind 
 of Japanese expansionists. Judged upon the basis of substantial 
 accomplishment, successful and just administration and real con- 
 tribution to the economic and social welfare of the people who fell 
 within the range of their influence, none of the Powers holding 
 
 * " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 296. 
 
 • Jbid., p. 298. 
 
 / 
 
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 33 
 
 fjases on the China coast can offer better justification for its pres- 
 ence than could the Germans.^ 
 
 This was written in 1916, before the United States Gov- 
 ernment entered on war and began to put restraint on the 
 free, full and fair expression of opinions or the statement 
 of facts. My own observation leads me to corroborate what 
 is here said by Professor Hornbeck. "With a clearer knowl- 
 edge of German use of concessionary rights acquired from 
 China, one may the better judge of both the military and 
 commercial ambition of rival nations to uproot German 
 influence in China. He will be the just man who takes 
 the facts as they are in China, however favourable to the 
 Germans, and bases the attempt at righteous judgment on 
 real truth, untainted by the passions of war and bloodshed. 
 
 One of the latest books on the Far East, "The New Map 
 of Asia" by Herbert Adams Gibbons, makes this reference 
 to Germany's inroad into China in 1898.^ 
 
 To assert that the Germans were alone to blame or even the 
 first to blame, as has been so frequently done during the recent 
 war, is to deny the facts. 
 
 And again: 
 
 The Japanese have no more contempt and the Chinese no more 
 dislike for Germans than for other Europeans. All are tarred 
 with the same brush. All have set the same example to Japan. 
 All have acted in the same way toward China. 
 
 In concluding this analysis it may be well to note two 
 exaggerations — slight deviations from truth — perpetrated 
 both on Germans and Japanese in their relation with the 
 Chinese. The one is spoken of as " the rape of Shantung, ' ' 
 or the robber's seizure. Today Japan is thus condemned; 
 
 • " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," pp. 298, 299. 
 » " The New Map of Asia," p. 390. 
 
34 CHINA, CAPTIVE OE FREE? 
 
 yesterday it was Germany. Of the two Germany is looked 
 upon as the greater criminal. *' Japan," it is said, "only 
 took stolen goods from the robber." If German rights and 
 the leased territory were stolen goods, then Japan should 
 hand them back to the rightful owner. If not stolen from 
 China in the first place, Japan had no legal right thereto, 
 for the contract was a personal one, between China and 
 Germany alone. In strict justice there was no robbery, or 
 plunder, or rape, on Germany's part, but a legal transac- 
 tion, a treaty agreement. Whatever measure of wrong may 
 be detected, the same measure must be meted out to Great 
 Britain, France and Russia, and, later on, to Japan, who 
 acquired similar leases of harbours and territory. Moreover, 
 if a forced lease is a theft, how much more a permanent 
 possession, as Great Britain in Hongkong, France in Tong- 
 king, and Japan in Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores. 
 
 The second exaggeration is that the transaction of Ger- 
 many leasing a Chinese port was illegal, because the treaty 
 was made under duress. The same charge has been since 
 made of the Sino-Japanese Conventions of 1915, one of 
 which bears on Shantung. If all treaties are to be abro- 
 gated because of the charge of force majeure, where are we 
 to stop? What treaties made with China would be left? 
 As a matter of fact, in most eases, the duress did not come 
 when a treaty was made, but before. Thus France secured 
 an indemnity in 1856, after some French missionaries had 
 been killed, and Great Britain acquired Hongkong by 
 treaty, after the Opium War. So the German Government 
 forced things when in 1897 two German missionaries were 
 killed, but the treaty of 1898 was of the same character as 
 all others made with China, or, if you please, forced on 
 China. The treaty part of Germany's action was similar 
 to the treaties made the same year by Great Britain, Russia 
 and France, and was subsequent to the reparation act al- 
 ready completed. 
 
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 35 
 
 From a moral point of view the violence done to China 
 again and again by foreign Powers is to be reprobated, the 
 guilt or innocence of each is to be determined relatively, and 
 the righteous or commendable thing for all to do is for all 
 to hand back to China all that they have taken from her, 
 however acquired. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 mTRDSION INTO CHINA OP THE EUROPEAN WAB: BRITAIN AND 
 JAPAN IN THE LEAD 
 
 The war that was raging in 1914 was not yet a World 
 War, it was only a European war. In it, Germany and 
 Austria-Hungary were arrayed on the one side, and Serbia, 
 Russia, Prance, Great Britain and Belgium were on the 
 other side. Hence this war had no business in Asia. What- 
 ever the diplomacy which carried the lighted torch from 
 the conflagration of western Europe far away into eastern 
 Asia, it was a diplomacy deserving our severest con- 
 demnation. Who, then, was the guilty party? Shall 
 China, in lamenting her present unfortunate situation, for- 
 get the primal source of all these woes in the political 
 manceuverings of the year 1914, August to December, and 
 the daring, drastic, unfeeling intrusion on China's political 
 integrity by the two island empires, Britain and Japan ? 
 
 If it is hard for an American of English and Scotch stock 
 to speak favourably of German conduct, even as seen in dis- 
 tant China, it is just as hard, yea, uncongenial and almost 
 irreverent, to acknowledge any wrong, or error of judg- 
 ment, or diplomatic waywardness, in those of one's own 
 kith or kin, our cousins across the sea, in their dealings, 
 past or present, with the yellow and brown races of the 
 Asiatic continent. But facts should overrule personal pro- 
 clivities in matters so serious as the destiny of an ancient 
 people. Personally I still hold in highest esteem the re- 
 ligious qualities, the mental alertness, the sense of fair-play 
 and the courageous resolve to defend among men civil and 
 religious liberty, which characterize the Anglo-Saxon race, 
 
 3e 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 37 
 
 but I cannot close my eyes to the diplomatic blunder and 
 illegal transaction concerning the neutral rights of China, 
 in the closing months of 1914, which characterized the pol- 
 icy of the British Imperial Government and then the joint 
 action of the Japanese Government. It was so-called "mil- 
 itary necessity" and arbitrary behaviour, with no concern 
 for China's rights, that went marching on through the 
 Shantung peninsula, under the two flags of Japan and 
 England, the mightiest of the East and the West. 
 
 What I here relate as to the actual facts that bear so 
 heavily on China's destiny comes from intimate knowledge 
 and close observation of the varied factors. To criticize 
 Japan is expedient and sane; to say aught of England is 
 both perilous and imprudent. What, however, are the 
 facts? 
 
 Two questions must be answered : first, Should the Euro- 
 pean War have been brought into China at all? and, sec- 
 ond. Who was responsible for bringing the war into China, 
 Japan alone, or Japan and Great Britain together? Fol- 
 lowing this, a little study will be worth while as to how 
 Japan waged the war in violation of international law, and 
 how afterwards she seized all German concessionary rights 
 in Shantung, in further violation of international law. 
 
 I. WJiy bring tJie war into Eastern Asia and on to 
 Chinese soil? If the war had been limited at the outset to 
 the four great belligerents of continental Europe, Austria- 
 Hungary, Germany, Russia and France, not only would 
 there have been a straight, fair fight, but also no occasion 
 for projecting war into the continents of the Americas, of 
 Africa and of Asia. But when England took part on the 
 one side, the whole British Empire was involved, and that 
 meant commotion in all the continents and on all the seas. 
 
 Before the first declaration of war, Sir Edward Grey had 
 exerted himself, not only to avoid war, but to keep it cir- 
 cumscribed to the narrowest limits, if war should actually 
 
 95032 
 
38 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEt 
 
 arise. He wrote of "the gravity of the situation if the war 
 could not be localized"; he dreaded "the possibility of a 
 European conflagration. ' ' How much more a conflagration 
 spreading, as on the wings of the wind, to the populous 
 regions of eastern Asia. Surely the act of wisdom was to 
 put forth effort to keep Asia quiet, not to stir up turmoil. 
 
 As to whether China should be embroiled, she was the 
 nation most concerned, and her wishes should have been 
 first considered. In accordance with usage, the Chinese 
 Government promptly issued a proclamation of neutrality. 
 Efforts were also made to secure the co-operation of all 
 foreign residents in China for making easy the Chinese task 
 of preserving neutrality. I did my part at the request of 
 President Yuan Shih-kai. China also sought the govern- 
 mental action of Japan and of the United States, two neu- 
 tral nations to be deeply affected. Formal request was 
 made of Japan to join in measures for defending the neu- 
 trality of the Far East and for mutual well-being along 
 lines of peace. Japan was a neighbour, and might have 
 given China 's request a first place in her diplomatic action. 
 Japan as showing her trend abstained from declaring 
 neutrality, as China had done. Moreover, she had begun 
 to mobilize her forces. Japanese papers stated it thus: 
 **The war in Europe gives wings to the Tiger" (Japan). 
 
 The Chinese Government, realizing possible danger of 
 conflict on the territories leased to Great Britain, France 
 and Germany, as also to Japan, proposed a plan for neutral- 
 ization, thus making these territories as neutral as all ter- 
 ritory under Chinese control, or as the larger treaty-ports 
 under foreign control. 
 
 No obstruction came to the proposition from Germany. 
 She was as anxious to keep the war away from Tsingtao 
 as China was to keep it away from the whole of the China 
 coast. The German Minister, finding that Japan was de- 
 laying to give consent to the plan of neutralization, went 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 39 
 
 so far as to negotiate with the Chinese Government for 
 transfer to China of complete authority over the German- 
 leased area of Kiaochow. This re-cession to China was even 
 brought to the attention of the American Government by 
 the Chinese Government. Events were sweeping on with 
 electric speed, and this plan, like the other, failed of con- 
 summation. Japan's speed was too great for the rest of 
 the world. 
 
 Should these negotiations come to naught, it was the 
 wish of China, that if war by any means should approach 
 the China coast, it should continue to avoid the treaty-ports, 
 such as Shanghai, Tientsin, or Canton, and also Chinese- 
 administered territory; it must rigidly be restricted to the 
 limited areas held under lease by the nations at war. Even 
 this yielding on China's part ought never to have been 
 necessary. Certainly no more was to be expected. 
 
 The places likely to be affected under these contingencies 
 were the British leasehold of Kowloon (opposite to Hong- 
 kong), her leasehold of Weihaiwei on the north coast of 
 the Shantung peninsula, and the German leasehold of Kiao- 
 chow, with fortifications at Tsingtao, on the south coast of 
 the Shantung peninsula. 
 
 Much, therefore, depended on the respective purposes 
 of mind of the two antagonists, England and Germany, or, 
 more properly, of the British and German governments. 
 Much also depended on the tendency of the Japanese Gov- 
 ernment towards war or towards peace, towards helping 
 China and Yuan Shih-kai to remain neutral, or towards 
 embroiling China in the many complications incident to war 
 at one's own door. As for Japan, jealous of Yuan Shih-kai 
 since the early antagonisms over Korean affairs, and averse 
 to China's experiment in a democratic government, she was 
 more likely to make it hard for China than easy. When 
 China formally requested that Japan use her influence to 
 render China immune from warlike activities, the reply 
 
40 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 was that the time was not ripe to consider the proposal and 
 that Japanese action awaited the war measures of Great 
 Britain. 
 
 As for Great Britain and Germany, everything depended 
 on the war schemes of the home governments and on the 
 larger issues of military strategy. In a word, China 's fate 
 rested not with the thoughts of peoples but with imperial- 
 istic governments, engaged in the great but perilous game 
 of war. The entrance of Japan into the war was not pop- 
 ular with the Japanese people ; and as for the majority of 
 British residents in China, there was sympathy felt for 
 China and dread of coming trouble, if Japan should enter 
 the fray. It was not until the British Government took 
 action, that the British resident in the Far East began to 
 discipline himself into enjoying the prospect of Japan as 
 an Ally waging war on Chinese soil. 
 
 As for the German Government, it sent on August 12 
 (1914) the following telegram to its ambassador in Tokio: 
 
 East Asiatic squadron instructed to avoid hostile acts against 
 England in case Japan remains neutral. Please inform Japanese 
 Government.^ 
 
 The Japanese Government gave no reply, as it had given 
 no favourable response to the proposals of China. 
 
 The German Government, while anxious that Tsingtao 
 should not be attacked, did the fair thing by making no 
 attack or threat of attack, on either British or French 
 leased territories or on their colonial possessions. Russian 
 Vladivostok also remained immune. 
 
 But what was the cry from Japan and accepted as truth 
 the world round? Namely this: "Tsingtao is a naval 
 base." But what were the facts? This: the German Pa- 
 cific squadron, having left the China and Japan seas in 
 
 * German White Book, Appendix 40. 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 41 
 
 the summer months, sailed towards the southern Pacific 
 waters, not back to the China coast; all that remained be- 
 hind in Tsingtao was what an Englishman has described 
 as * ' only obsolete craft. ' ' Only one ship, the Embden, came 
 into Tsingtao harbour with dispatches from Admiral von 
 Spee, of the German Pacific Squadron, but by August 4, 
 along with four colliers, "apparently proceeded to cruise 
 in the neighbourhood of Vladivostok, where she captured a 
 Russian auxiliary cruiser and one or two merchant ships, 
 before going south to make history in the Bay of Bengal. ' ' ^ 
 This author outlines five possible objects which the German 
 Admiral may have had in mind in this peculiar naval 
 strategy. Among these there is no mention of any purpose 
 to wage war in either the China or Japan Sea. He con- 
 cludes that the object "likely to yield a richer harvest" 
 than any other scheme was ' ' to harass our trade with South 
 America." For Britain or even Japan to make the attack 
 in that part of the broad Pacific was legitimate. In equal 
 proportion it was both wrong and needless to make attack 
 on the China coast. 
 
 Another Englishman, W. L. Wyllie, writes : ^ " The Ger- 
 man squadron was in the Carolines at the opening of war," 
 and ' * curiously enough, made no attempt to return to their 
 base at Tsingtao." "During August and the first half of 
 September, Count Von Spee's ships steamed about in the 
 South Pacific." October 30, the squadron was about fifty 
 miles west of Valparaiso. November 1st there came the 
 battle with Admiral Craddock's ships, the Good Hope and 
 the Monmouth, in which the latter were sunk, the British 
 defenders dying an heroic death. December 8th, there oc- 
 curred the second naval battle, off the Falkland Islands, 
 in which Admiral Sturdee's squadron was victorious, and 
 
 * Commander Spencer-Cooper, " Battle of the Falkland Islands," 
 p. 11. 
 
 » " Sea Fights of the Great War," pp. 83, 84. 
 
42 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 the German ships were sunk, the German defenders dying 
 an heroic death. Thus before 1914 had come to an end, the 
 assumed threat of Tsingtao as a naval base had vanished. 
 
 The German purpose, different from the English, was to 
 restrict the war to Europe. If any fighting should take 
 place, far away from the centre of military action, let it be 
 on the high seas and not in a neutral country like China. 
 A battle between British and German fleets on any ocean 
 would have been legitimate, bringing no harm to others. 
 For either fleet to take possession of the island colonies of 
 the other country was also a fair game in war. But there 
 was dynamite in the proposal that an attack be made on 
 Tsingtao, still remaining under Chinese sovereignty, and 
 situated on the China coast. 
 
 To infringe on the neutral rights of Belgium may have 
 been construed by the German Staff as a "military ne- 
 cessity, ' ' but for Germany or Great Britain or any one else 
 there was no "military necessity" to thrust the European 
 War into the Far East, on to Chinese soil, for attack on 
 either British Weihaiwei or German Tsingtao. For a few 
 thousand isolated Germans, 4,500 in all, to be subjugated 
 by any kind of enemy force, whatever the flag, could have 
 no bearing on the ultimate issue of the war, either for or 
 against Germany. "Foreign leased territories in China," 
 says Thomas F. Millard, * ' were only pawns in the war, and 
 could have been eliminated without affecting in the slight- 
 est degree the essential strategical zones of operations. ' ' ^ 
 
 If the combined naval forces of Russia, France and Great 
 Britain, Germany's immediate antagonists, were insuffi- 
 cient to vanquish Tsingtao, it would have been better if 
 they had preserved the peace of the Far East by keeping 
 war nearer home and by using peaceful means in relation 
 to the Far East. Being unnecessary, uncalled-for, a mere 
 incident in a mighty struggle, such belligerent activities 
 
 ' " Oux Eastern Question," p. 89. 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 4? 
 
 should have been discountenanced, all the more that 
 China's national entity and well-being might be impaired 
 or imperilled. This was the view I took at the time, think- 
 ing of China 's interests. What has happened since has con- 
 firmed me in this view. To bring the war from Europe to 
 Asia has been a calamity to China, though so worked as to 
 be a gain to Japan. Marquis Okuma was no doubt right 
 in thinking that the new circumstances afforded Japan "the 
 one opportunity of 10,000 years." As for China, they 
 brought the one catastrophe of 10,000 years. As between 
 Great Britain and Germany, the blow which Germany re- 
 ceived in the loss of Tsingtao and the glory which Great 
 Britain received have been too insignificant to deserve a 
 passing thought. Britons there are who now see that the 
 elimination of Germany and the expansion of Japan is no 
 more good to them than to China. 
 
 II. We now come to another question, one more of fact 
 than of opinion: Which country brought the war into 
 China, Japan alone or Japan in conjunction with Great 
 Britain? 
 
 Most writers and speakers have been accustomed to refer 
 to Japan as the guilty interloper. Few Americans or Brit- 
 ishers, especially those living in the Far East, have so much 
 regard and admiration for Japan as to exonerate her 
 through a division of culpability. An easier way of ren- 
 dering judgment is to assume one's own innocence and 
 cast all blame on one individual or on one nation. So far 
 as this is done, Japan is unfairly treated, and the cause of 
 justice dishonored. 
 
 Putnam Weale^ states the matter thus, in one of his 
 books : 
 
 Japan, after some rapid negotiations with her British Ally, 
 had filed an ultimatum on Germany. 
 
 * " Fight for the Republic of China," pp. 71, 84. 
 
44 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Again, more explicitly: 
 
 There was also the feeling abroad [in Japan] that England 
 by calling upon her Ally to carry out the essential provisions of 
 her Alliance had shown that she had the better part of a bar- 
 gain, and that she was exploiting an old advantage in a way 
 which could not fail to react adversely on Japan's future world's 
 relationships. 
 
 Dr. Arthur J. Brown,^ relying for information on many 
 sources, sums up thus: 
 
 Great Britain early gave Japan a fine opportunity in connec- 
 tion with the German fortified post at Tsingtao in the province of 
 Shantung, China, which had been made one of the most formidable 
 fortifications in the world. Of course the British could not afford 
 to leave the Germans in possession of a naval base from which 
 the immense commerce of the Allies in the Far East could be 
 successfully raided and, as the British had their hands full in 
 Europe, it was natural that they should expect their more con- 
 veniently situated ally, Japan, to attend to this matter for them. 
 
 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, one of many unholy al- 
 liances, was at the bottom of the unfriendly intrusion. 
 But in Dr. Brown's statement two slight errors are found. 
 One, the formidability of the fortification is stated with 
 exaggeration ; and the other, Tsingtao was not used as naval 
 base for raiding purposes, as is made clear above. The 
 main idea that Britain was the agent to present Japan with 
 a new opportunity of achievement is correct. How great 
 was the opportunity was probably not realized by the over- 
 burdened British Government. Britons might have hesi- 
 tated to call in such an ally, had they known where such 
 opportunity might lead. 
 
 Thomas F. Millard, who is known to be anti-Japan more 
 than anti-England, in two books, **Our Eastern Question," 
 
 » " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 416. 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 45 
 
 published in 1916, and * ' Democracy and the Eastern Ques- 
 tion," published in 1919, holds to the view that "Japan 
 herself took the initiative contrary to the real desire of her 
 ally, and by force of circumstances compelled Great Britain 
 to acquiesce with, and officially to sanction, this diplomatic 
 fiction." He also says the belief held in America, that 
 "Japan entered the war because she was required to do so 
 by the Anglo- Japanese Alliance," is not a "correct" one. 
 There seems to be circumstantial evidence to uphold this 
 view. But official utterances speak otherwise. Too much 
 sympathy for Germany existed among educated men in 
 Japan, and particularly in the Army, to lead the Japanese 
 Government to make the first move towards expanding the 
 area of war or towards antagonizing Germany. 
 
 Major T. E. Compton, an English officer, writing in 
 November, 1918, says: 
 
 Whatever preoccupations the appearance of the Teuton in 
 China may have caused her, Japan, after her recovery of Port 
 Arthur in 1905, had no quarrel with Germany, from which 
 country her schools of medicine and science and, above all, her 
 army had obtained great benefits. 
 
 The fact which induced Japan to enter the war was the 
 opportunity for territorial expansion. 
 
 On the other hand, when Great Britain once entered the 
 war, it became her policy to call in the resources of all her 
 possessions for both offensive and defensive war. As Great 
 Britain was in the Far East, war, ipso facto, came there 
 also. She seemed ready to go to the ends of the earth and 
 there capture German possessions, both great and small. 
 From London the lines went out to all the world. 
 
 At the very time Japan entered the war, a correspondent 
 in the London Times (Aug. 24) urged British merchants 
 "to take advantage of every opportunity which may pre- 
 sent itself for diverting German commerce to our advan- 
 
'46 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 tage. ' ' If Japan had an ulterior end in projecting the war 
 into China, the British had the same, except that perhaps 
 the Japanese end was political and tTie British commercial. 
 Subsequent events make clear the motive of both. 
 
 Now as to the origin of the war in the Far East, Baron 
 Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time in Marquis 
 Okuma's cabinet, said, in a speech in the Diet on Septem- 
 ber 4: 
 
 Early in August the British Government asked the Imperial 
 Government for assistance under the terms of the Anglo- 
 Japanese Alliance. 
 
 Then, after recounting the terms of this Alliance, he 
 continued : 
 
 Therefore, inasmuch as we were asked by our Ally for assist- 
 ance ... we could not but comply to the request to do our part. 
 
 And again : 
 
 The Japanese Government therefore resolved to comply with 
 the British request, and if necessary to open hostilities against 
 Germany. 
 
 A statement previously issued by the Japanese author- 
 ities for publication in the press used these words: "The 
 Governments of Great Britain and Japan, having been in 
 communication with each other, etc., etc." 
 
 The British Government has never denied the statement 
 of fact, or charge, if you so desire to call it, that the British 
 Government asked for the assistance of Japan. The actual 
 documents of the negotiations have not been made public, 
 but the results are so obvious that they reveal the "inner 
 consciousness" of the two governments. In a true technical 
 sense, Japan was the only Ally which Great Britain had. 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 47 
 
 The relations of Great Britain to France and Russia were 
 only of an entente cordials. 
 
 The London Times on August 18, some two weeks be- 
 fore Baron Kato made his speech in Tokio, used these 
 words : 
 
 It should be said at once that the Japanese intervention has 
 not taken place without full consultation with Great Britain. 
 
 Later on, under date of September 25th, the London 
 Times used stronger language : 
 
 We appealed to our Ally in the terms of the Treaty, and she 
 has answered that appeal with the loyalty we have learned to 
 expect of her. . . . Japan had no desire to intervene in the 
 war. She has done so, the Emperor and his Ministers tell us, 
 because she could not break her promises. 
 
 According to Jefferson Jones ^ (a nom de plume), who 
 was familiar with the facts as they took place in Tokio, the 
 Japanese Government on August 2d expressed to the Brit- 
 ish a willingness to put in force the Anglo-Japanese Al- 
 liance, and by August 7 the British Ambassador in Tokio 
 "handed to the Foreign Office at Tokio a request that Japan 
 join in the European war." 
 
 The American diplomat, W. W. Rockhill, in an address 
 which he delivered in New York, November 12, the last 
 speech before his death, gave utterance to this careful 
 statement : 
 
 The action of Japan was taken after consultation with the 
 ally, Great Britain, and, inferentially, with the approval of 
 France and Russia. 
 
 Mr. K. K. Kawakami,^ who is in a position to know, de- 
 scribes how the war plan of Japan was set in motion by the 
 
 » "The Fall of Tsingtau," pp. 18, 20. 
 
 ' " Japan and the European War," in Atlantic Monthly, November, 
 1914. 
 
48 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 British Government, even prior to Britain's declaration of 
 war against Germany. These are his words : 
 
 The assertion that Japan thrust herself upon the war ■without 
 England's invitation is as sinister as it is unwarranted. Japan 
 did not join hands with England without England's request. 
 When it became evident that England must come to the rescue 
 of France and Belgium, the press of Japan, without exception, 
 hoped that Japan would not be called upon to aid her western 
 ally. But the western ally did call upon Japan. 
 
 On August 3, that is, the day before England declared war on 
 Germany, the British Ambassador to Japan hurried back to Tokio 
 from his summer villa and immediately requested an interview 
 with Baron Kato, Foreign Minister. At this conference the 
 British Ambassador informed Baron Kato that his government 
 was compelled to open hostilities against Germany and that it 
 desired to ascertain whether Japan would aid England in the 
 event of British interests in the Far East being jeopardized by 
 German activities. 
 
 Baron Kato answered that the question put to him was such a 
 serious one that he could not answer it on his own account. 
 
 On the evening of the same day Count Okuma convened a 
 meeting of all the Cabinet members. Bearing the resolution of 
 this meeting. Baron Kato, on August 4, called upon the British 
 Ambassador and told the latter that Japan would not shirk the 
 responsibilities which the alliance with England put upon her 
 shoulders. 
 
 At this time Japan did not expect to be called upon to aid 
 England for at least a few months. But on August 7 the British 
 Ambassador suddenly asked for an interview with Baron Kato 
 and told the Foreign Minister that the situation had developed 
 in such a manner as to oblige England to ask for Japan's assist- 
 ance without delay. On the evening of that day Premier Okuma 
 requested the " Elder Statesmen " and his colleagues to assemble 
 at his mansion. The conference lasted until two o'clock the next 
 morning. Before it adjourned the policy of Japan was definitely 
 formulated. 
 
 What caused Downing Street to invite Japan's co-operation so 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OP EUROPEAN WAR 49 
 
 soon is not clearly known to the outside world. But the Japanese 
 press is in all probability right when it says that Japan and 
 England were obliged to act promptly in order to frustrate the 
 German scheme to transfer Kiaochow to the Chinese Govern- 
 ment before Germany was compelled to surrender it at the point 
 of the sword. Had Germany succeeded in carrying out this scheme 
 she would still have enjoyed, in virtue of Article Five of the 
 Kiaochow Convention of 1898, the privilege of securing in some 
 future time " a more suitable territory " in China. This was 
 exactly the condition which the Allies did not want to see estab- 
 lished in China. If, on the other hand, Germany were forced to 
 abandon Kiaochow by the arbitrament of the sword, China would 
 no longer be under obligation to "cede to Germany a more 
 suitable place." 
 
 These words show plainly that the war measures to be 
 carried out in China originated with the British Govern- 
 ment. It is also disclosed that Japan and the European 
 Allies at the early days of the war had formed the great 
 plan to forestall Germany in her desire to ever have in 
 China a port of her own, as others had. Already the great 
 purpose was made clear that Germany must not only be 
 destroyed militarily, but eliminated, even from China. 
 
 It may be taken for granted that the British Government 
 — not the British people, or the British resident in China — 
 while approving and even desiring the military assistance 
 of Japan in the initial stages, was not bound to approve of 
 all that Japan did, to the very end of the war. But an 
 alliance is oftentimes a burden to either ally as well as a 
 prolific source of evil to others. Hence, if we desire to 
 overlook the personal factor, we may lay the blame for these 
 unfortunate transactions in China to so impersonal a factor 
 as the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, just as we may blame the 
 horrors and evils of the whole war, not on Germany or 
 Russia or Britain, but on war or ''special alliances." 
 
 The ultimatum which was sent to the German Imperial 
 
50 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Government August 15 was not sent by Great Britain, a 
 belligerent, but by Japan, officially still a neutral, but of 
 course an ally of a belligerent. The document was diplo- 
 matically perfect. Japan bound herself by no unnecessary 
 limitations and proclaimed the most laudable of motives. 
 Notice the phraseology : 
 
 1. **To take measures to remove the causes of all dis- 
 turbances of the peace of the Far East." 
 
 2. "To secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern 
 Asia." 
 
 3. "To safeguard the general interests as contemplated 
 by the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great 
 Britain." 
 
 One not trained in the school of militarism or even in the 
 school of diplomacy might suppose that the best measure 
 for effecting peace would be a peaceful, rather than a war- 
 like measure, and for removing any cause of disturbance all 
 that might be needed would be to avoid creating a disturb- 
 ance through one 's own actions. For such peaceful designs, 
 Japan could have solicited the aid of so great a neutral as 
 the United States, and especially of China, the country most 
 affected. By mentioning "the Far East," and "Eastern 
 Asia" Japan was given a wide sweep of activity, but the 
 main concern was the little spot on the Shantung peninsula 
 known as Tsingtao. As stated above, this spot could have 
 been neutralized or re-ceded to China. As it was, there was 
 no disturbing element, for the German squadron had left 
 not only Tsingtao but "Eastern Asia," and the military 
 operations of the Germans were for defensive purposes 
 alone in the eventuality of attack by some outside enemy. 
 It was the entrance of Japan into war, on Chinese soil and 
 in Chinese waters, not the presence of a few Germans in 
 Tsingtao, that brought about * * disturbances of the peace of 
 the Far East," which have not yet ended with the signing 
 of the Versailles treaty of peace. Peace in all China was 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 51 
 
 upset by Japan's "measures" of war. The only "general 
 interests" safeguarded were those of Japan. Not only did 
 Germany lose the "equal opportunities of all," but Great 
 Britain, viewed relatively, lost much at the hands of this 
 her Ally. As for the "interests" of China they have been 
 totally neglected. 
 The ultimatum made to Germany had two demands : 
 
 First — To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese 
 waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and 
 to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn. 
 
 Second — To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to 
 the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensa- 
 tion, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to the 
 eventual restoration of the same to China. 
 
 The Japanese, surely, are humourists, without the appear- 
 ance of humour. This might be called comedy, were it not 
 for the tragic events which followed. 
 
 An ultimatum, presented at so early a date to a Teuton, 
 was the surest way to bring about armed resistance. If the 
 real desire of the Japanese, and with them of the British, 
 was preservation of peace, they could have tried negotia- 
 tion, not an ultimatum ; and negotiation would have fared 
 better if left in Chinese hands, with Japanese rendering 
 hearty approbation. If the object was to bring about hos- 
 tilities, rather than to "remove the causes of all disturb- 
 ances," Japan, seconded by Great Britain, adopted the 
 wisest course. 
 
 Left in Chinese hands, the first element presented in the 
 ultimatum could have been quickly satisfied. The German 
 men-of-war had already left the confines of "Chinese and 
 Japanese waters," and the only way for Japanese men-of- 
 war to find them was to hurry after them in mid-Pacific 
 and take up a few German islands on the way. The other 
 
52 CHINA, CAPTIVE OE FREE? 
 
 "armed vessels" left at Tsingtao might have been interned 
 at the request of China to Germany. 
 
 Left also in Chinese hands, the second element of the 
 ultimatum could easily have been complied with, except 
 that the restoration of Kiaochow to China would have been 
 immediate and not ** eventual." 
 
 Again we say, how much better it would have been for 
 China, for the peace of Eastern Asia, for the prevalence of 
 right, free from all sorts of complications and hindrances, 
 if Great Britain and Japan had jointly planned to put out, 
 rather than to kindle, the fires of both war and revolution. 
 
 It may be here noted that the promise of "eventual res- 
 toration" of Kiaochow to China was made to Germany 
 alone, and also on condition of immediate surrender of the 
 same to Japan. The words used freed Japan from obligation 
 to make transfer to China, if the territory should be ac- 
 quired in some other way than by compliance with an 
 ultimatum. 
 
 It has been reported that prior to the ultimatum, in con- 
 sultation with the Foreign Office in London, consent was 
 given to this proposal of Japan, if she "confine her war 
 operations to the China Sea," and "eventually turn over 
 Kiaochow to China. " ^ It is also stated that the day before 
 the ultimatum expired, the Japanese Minister in Peking 
 "tried to reassure China by stating verbally" that if 
 "Japan was compelled to occupy Kiaochow, that territory 
 would be returned to China after the war. ' ' ^ 
 
 This matter of "eventual restoration" to China has con- 
 flicting interpretation from Japanese statesmen. "While 
 Premier Okuma, August 20, declared that Japan "harbours 
 no design for territorial aggrandizement and entertains 
 no desire to promote any other selfish end, ' ' and, August 24, 
 telegraphed the New York Independent that Japan had "no 
 
 * Jefferson Jones, " The Fate of Tsingtau," pp. 23, 24. 
 
 * Thomas F. Millard, " Our Eastern Question," p. 90. 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 53* 
 
 desire to secure more territory" (making no mention of 
 Tsingtao), Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said 
 in the Diet, early in December, that ** Japan had never com- 
 mitted herself to any foreign Power" "in the matter of 
 final disposition of Kiaoehow. " ^ It is clear now, that it 
 would have been easier for China to get back Kiaoehow 
 with no conditions fixed thereto, if this roundabout and 
 warlike method of Japan had been discarded. Intervention 
 has seldom proved a blessing to China, in her long ex- 
 periences with outside nations. 
 
 About the time the ultimatum was made known, the 
 Press Bureau in England gave out this announcement: 
 
 It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to 
 the Pacific Ocean, beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it 
 may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the 
 Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, 
 nor to any foreig:n territory, except territory in German occupa- 
 tion on the continent of Eastern Asia.^ 
 
 How far the Japanese conformed to this understanding 
 as to operations on the high seas, need not here be consid- 
 ered. There was really more reason for the two Allies to 
 unite in capturing enemy-ships or enemy-colonies, than for 
 them to attack the territory of China temporarily leased to 
 Germany. The latter operations brought more harm to 
 neutral rights and to the law of nations than the former 
 could possibly have done. 
 
 The fall of Tsingtao, as compared with battles in other 
 areas of the war, needs only brief notice. What happened 
 by way of supplement — the victory of Japanese diplomatic 
 finesse — will require years of investigation by students of 
 history, political science, and ethics, the world over. 
 
 When the time-limit of Japan's ultimatum to Germany 
 
 * Thomas F. Millard, " Democracy and the Eastern Question," p. 82. 
 
 * London Times, August 18, 1914. 
 
54 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEf 
 
 expired, August 23, the Japanese were fully prepared to 
 win a victory, even if the 4,500 Germans should be exter- 
 minated in an awful holocaust, as seemed likely under re- 
 ported orders from the German Kaiser ' ' to defend the place 
 to the last man." 
 
 The great Japanese navy had its ships, both large and 
 small, arranged in a semi-circle outside the Bay of Kiao- 
 chow. The Japanese army, under command of Lieut.-Gen- 
 eral Kamio, had three divisions aboard transports, ready to 
 land with great guns, smaller arms, and ammunition, with 
 a fully equipped commissariat and hospital service. Later 
 on the Japanese were aided by some 1,200 men under com- 
 mand of Major-General Barnardiston, who came from the 
 British garrison at Tientsin. The fortifications on the hills, 
 litis, Bismarck, and Moltke, to the rear of Tsingtao city, 
 were got ready for the siege. The supply of guns and am- 
 munition was only enough for a short siege. The main 
 thing the Germans had to rely upon was their courage. 
 They were practically isolated from the leaders of the 
 campaign in Europe. Tsingtao might have held out against 
 an Anglo-Franco-Russo combination, but not against the 
 army and navy of Japan, conducting the assault as they 
 did. 
 
 III. We here approach the third question of our present 
 discussion, as to how Japan, with at least no objection by 
 the British, violated the neutral rights of China, as 
 guaranteed by the law of nations, in making attack on 
 Tsingtao. 
 
 Japanese transports by September 2 entered the port 
 of Lungkow, on the northern coast of the peninsula, west 
 of the treaty-port of Chefoo and the British-leased territory 
 of Weihaiwei. Lungkow was not a treaty-port, open to 
 trade, neither was it leased to any foreign government. It 
 was purely a "native" port, for the exclusive use of the 
 Chinese. It was a thoroughly neutral port, into which 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 55 
 
 belligerents had less right of entrance than even into the 
 treaty-ports. 
 
 The Japanese transports proceeded to land their soldiers, 
 guns and military outfit for transport across the neutral 
 Shantung peninsula, 150 miles, to attack Tsingtao from the 
 land side — and to do other things which they could do only 
 as contrary to the law of nations. 
 
 Bodies of Japanese troops, says Thomas F. Millard,^ made 
 detours, occupying important cities and towns in the province 
 wide of a direct line of march. Wherever they went, the Japanese 
 assumed control of the country, means of communication, posts 
 and telegraphs; and subjected the Chinese population to many 
 hardships, deprivations and indignities, which were obserx'ed and 
 reported by American and British missionaries in that region. 
 
 Supposing that the Japanese navy, attacking from the 
 sea, was unable to overthrow a small body of Germans, the 
 Japanese army, helped by the navy, ought to have been 
 able to accomplish it, making the attack within the area 
 leased to Germany, or within the much larger "neutral 
 zone," so-called, stretching 37 miles from the shores of the 
 wide Bay of Kiaochow. There was no necessity to wage 
 war outside these limits, on the neutral soil of China. 
 
 The British overlooked Japanese wrongdoing in that no 
 protest was made, suitable to an old Ally, but at the same 
 time they appeared well to the world and magnified their 
 friendship for China, by landing their own little military 
 force within the narrow limits of the German protectorate. 
 They came in late, towards the end of September, but, as 
 the London Times said, ''the distance which separated 
 Laoshan Bay from Tsingtao was so much shorter, and pre- 
 sented so much less of difficulty than the Japanese had to 
 encounter in their preliminary advances, that the British 
 
 * " Our Eastern Question," p. 107. 
 
56 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 really arrived on the scene just as the Japanese were fin- 
 ishing their first engagement in force, ' ' 
 
 The London Times, while exalting the sagacity of Great 
 Britain in landing her force inside the German-leased ter- 
 ritory, comments : ' ' thus avoiding the breach of neutrality 
 alleged by the Chinese against the Japanese." This word, 
 "alleged," is more a slap at Chinese stupidity than a re- 
 buke to Japanese illegality. But we must remember that 
 Eastern Asia is not Central 'Europe. Good and evil, for 
 four years and more, have been divided according to lines 
 of longitude and latitude. 
 
 The Chinese Government, being unable to resist the en- 
 croachments of Japan, took a different position to that of 
 Belgium when she refused to allow German troops to be 
 transported across Belgian territory. China accepted the 
 advice of Dr. Ariga, Japanese advisor to President Yuan 
 Shih-kai, and proposed a war zone, favourable to Japan's 
 plans, but unfavourable to the German defence of Tsingtao. 
 Japan evaded and then rejected the proposal. The fol- 
 lowing, however, is the Note presented by the Chinese For- 
 eign OfBce to the Foreign Legations on September 4 : 
 
 The Government of China declared its neutrality toward the 
 present European war and is faithfully maintaining it. Accord- 
 ing to reports from the Chinese local authorities in the province 
 of Shantung, the Germans have commenced war operations at 
 Kiaochow Bay and their sphere of influence there, and the allied 
 forces of Japan and Britain have also started war operations 
 at Lungkow, Kiaochow, Laichow, and in their neighbouring dis- 
 tricts. Germany, Japan and England are all in friendly relations 
 with China, and it is to be regretted that unfortunately these 
 Powers have taken such unexpected courses in China's territory; 
 therefore the Chinese Government has decided to propose special 
 limitations as regards the extent of the present war operations 
 as China limited the scope of war operations at Liaotung penin- 
 sula at the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Chinese 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 57 
 
 Government will not accept responsibility for the passing of 
 troops or any war operations at Lungkow, Laichow, Kiaochow, 
 and their adjacent districts, but in the other districts in China the 
 Government will strictly enforce neutrality as declared.^ 
 
 After many obstructions from the "elements," but not 
 from the Chinese or Germans, the Japanese at last, on Sep- 
 tember 11th, came in contact with a German detachment — 
 of 10 men. From that time on, to the end of October, there 
 were many skirmishes, forcing back the German defenders 
 to the limits of their forts. From the middle of September, 
 Tsingtao was in a state of siege, the only communication 
 with the outside world being by wireless. The white peo- 
 ples of the United Kingdom, of the French Republic, and 
 of the Holy Russian Empire, mostly Christians, were be- 
 ginning to exult that at last their brothers of the same race 
 and religion, friends in the social and business life of the 
 Far East, were to be caught like "rats in a trap." The 
 Japanese maintained self-restraint. They were embarked 
 on a bigger expedition than the pigmy game of personal 
 hate. The whole spectacle left a peculiar impress on the 
 Chinese mind. Here for the first time white men fought 
 white men, and called for the help of their little yellow 
 brothers, on the soil of China's millions. 
 
 Real fighting began October 31, anniversary of the 
 accession to the throne of the Mikado. Guns of all sizes, 
 from the Japanese and British land forces, and from their 
 cruisers outside the harbour, as well as from the German 
 forts, began to fire back and forth, making the sound as it 
 echoed and re-echoed among the Shantung hills fiercer and 
 more overwhelming to the imagination than was the deadly 
 reality. The Japanese had maps of the whole country, 
 around and inside the besieged town. By use of telephone 
 from land to sea, the gunners learned the exact spot where 
 
 * Jefferson Jones, " The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 46. 
 
5g CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 the shells fell. By day or by night the investing forces 
 closed in upon the Germans. One redoubt after another 
 was taken. One battery after another was silenced. By 
 November 6, "twenty-five yards from the front wall that 
 skirted the Tsingtau fortresses for three miles from the Bay 
 of Kiaochow on the right, to the Yellow Sea on the left, was 
 entrenched the front line of the Japanese and British ex- 
 peditionary forces. Behind this line of underground 
 fighters was another line, a third, and then the large, mas- 
 sive twenty-eight-centimetre siege guns of the Japanese."^ 
 They had 142 guns on the firing line. 
 
 In the final rush up the sides of litis Fort there were 
 "17,000 men against 3,800." The Germans, who had held 
 on bravely and untiringly, had fired their last shells ; their 
 ammunition was exhausted. The Kaiser had sent word that 
 they might surrender, and so at 7.05 on the morning of 
 November 7, the white flag was hoisted at the residence 
 of Governor-General Meyer- Waldeck, and 3,800 Germans 
 became prisoners of war in Japan. The bushido spirit had 
 won; Great Britain stood by and watched the growing 
 power of Japan. 
 
 Of the siege, Mr. Jefferson Jones writes: 
 
 From an Oriental standpoint the siege of Tsingtau will always 
 stand out as remarkably free from hatred. During the opera- 
 tions, Japanese oflBcers sent many messages into the Tsingtau 
 garrison, wishing their German friends and former tutors luck 
 and safety during the siege. The Japanese officers seemed always 
 courteous. They placed courtesy foremost, instead of indulging 
 in recrimination such as usually goes on between the German and 
 British officers and troops. General Kamio and his officers did 
 not desire to humiliate the defeated German officers. The mes- 
 sages that were interchanged during the siege and afterwards 
 were couched in the most courteous language, nor did Govemor- 
 
 ' Jefferson Jones, " The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 87. 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 59 
 
 General Waldeek and his staff officers lose their swords after the 
 final surrender.^ 
 
 What concerns the moralist is the astounding fact that 
 in attacking German Tsingtao, the British condoned the 
 Japanese infringement of the Hague Convention in insist- 
 ing on transport of troops and arms across the neutral soil 
 of the Shantung peninsula. 
 
 Though the Chinese had been advised by the Japanese 
 advisor to give a form of legality to Japan's war operations 
 by establishing a war zone, it was only a matter of a few 
 days when Japanese soldiers were marched outside the pre- 
 scribed area, and infringed again on the Hague Convention 
 by marching 250 miles along the Shantung Railway to 
 Tsinan-fu, the provincial capital. Japan not once but twice 
 reduced the Hague Convention to a "scrap of paper," and 
 Britain, though an Ally, entered no protest and passed no 
 criticism.^ 
 
 No sooner had the Japanese force succeeded in marching 
 through quagmires from Lungkow to the rear of the Ger- 
 man defences, near the middle of September, than a detach- 
 ment was sent westward to Weihsien, an important centre 
 on the Shantung Railway. **A11 of northern China rose in 
 revolt against the Japanese action. The Japanese troops 
 took command of the Shantung Railroad, shooting down 
 native employees who seemingly rebelled at the invasion. 
 The troops pushed on to Tsinan-fu, leaving small garrisons 
 in every Chinese town to keep 'Japan's peace,' and in a 
 few days western Shantung was practically in the control 
 of Japan." ^ 
 
 The Japanese did it all in quick time, the only ones to 
 obstruct their march being Chinese. And one might ask the 
 
 » "The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 118. 
 
 * See Appendix I. 
 
 • Jefferson Jones, " The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 48. 
 
60 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 question: Ought the Chinese to be treated as an 'enemy,' 
 while trying to remain neutral? From the standpoint of 
 law and equity, which nation in the Far East went more 
 astray, Germany or Britain and Japan? And did China 
 suffer, and continue to suffer, for her own misdeeds, or for 
 the misdeeds of outsiders ? 
 
 By October 3, and before the forts of Tsingtao were 
 silenced, a Japanese military force took over the whole of 
 the Shantung Railway, outside of German-leased territory, 
 or the war zone granted by China. Besides planning the 
 conquest of the German-leased territory of Kiaochow, Ja- 
 pan had a deep-laid plan, to make conquest of all German 
 rights in Shantung, in the form of railway and mining 
 concessions granted in treaty by the Chinese Government. 
 All this was within the bounds of China, The Japanese 
 seemingly did not surmise that it would ever occur to diplo- 
 matic minds to discountenance and repudiate the right of 
 conquest ; so they went boldly forward, fully confident that 
 Might in the end would win the day. 
 
 When the Japanese entered Tsinan-fu, capital of Shan- 
 tung province, they proceeded to occupy it with a military 
 guard. They also planned the bigger scheme to occupy the 
 German-built railway from Tsinan-fu to Tientsin, but now 
 the British, having schemes of their own, strongly objected. 
 Japan was thus left to Shantung as a sphere of conquest, 
 illegal but none the less actual, and afterwards to be con- 
 doned by statesmen believing in self-determination.^ 
 
 Where before, in the laws governing the waging of war, 
 as to the obligations of belligerents and the rights of neu- 
 trals, has it been taught that one nation in war with another 
 nation can go into a third and neutral nation and forcibly 
 
 ^ Prof. John Dewey in "The New Republic," March 3, 1920, writes: 
 " Japanese troops overran the province before they made any serious 
 attempt to capture Tsingtao. It is only a slight exaggeration to say 
 that they took the 'Chinese' Tsinan before they took the German 
 Tsingtao." 
 
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OP EUROPEAN WAR 61 
 
 take possession of all enemy property? If this be new in- 
 ternational law, suggested by Japan and adopted by Europe 
 and America, then investments in a foreign land become a 
 risky venture. Should Japan some time be at war with the 
 United States, then Japanese soldiers may seize in China 
 some Standard Oil concession or some of the railway con- 
 cessions granted to American bankers. With equal right in 
 the late war, British marines might have landed in New 
 York, when America was neutral, and have taken over all 
 German Companies from New York to Philadelphia. 
 Thomas F. Millard touches on the same proposition : 
 
 Japan's seizure of the entire Tsinan-Tsingtau Railway was not 
 a necessary military measure, as was pretended, but was a po- 
 litical move. The seeming acquiescence of Great Britain with 
 that move gives it additional importance. Does Great Britain 
 regard the Canton-Kowloon Railway (extending from British- 
 leased territory opposite Hongkong) as also constituting, in 
 Japan's phraseology, " an indivisible part " of Great Britain's 
 Kowloon leasehold ? These considerations make this question very 
 significant to China ; and also significant to all foreign investments 
 existing in China now, and those which may hope to get a legiti- 
 mate foothold in China hereafter.^ 
 
 What concerned China was her responsibility in permit- 
 ting or in forbidding any attempt of a belligerent to in- 
 fringe on her sovereignty or neutrality. Strong states not 
 only forbid, but actually take steps to resist, all violation 
 of their rights. "If a state has neutrality laws, it is under 
 obligation to enforce these laws. ' ' So, on the other hand, if a 
 neutral not only permits, but condones any violation of her 
 neutrality, she ceases to be neutral, and becomes a belliger- 
 ent. "A neutral state," says Hall in his "International 
 Law," "which overlooks such violations of its neutrality as 
 it can rightly be expected to prevent, or which neglects to 
 
 * " Our Eastern Question," p. 113. 
 
62 CHINA. CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 demand reparation in the appropriate cases, becomes itself 
 an active offender." Considering all the circumstances, 
 however, China's failure to resist must be judged with a 
 degree of palliation and not with condemnation. If any 
 nation might have complained of China's remissness, it was 
 Germany, and not Great Britain or Japan. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 japan's inroads in CfflNA 
 
 The starting-point in the weakening of China by outside 
 attack was in 1914, when Britain and Japan spurned the 
 wishes of China and brought the firebrand of war all the 
 way from Europe to the shores of Shantung, where Con- 
 fucius and Mencius had instilled wise teachings as to 
 human relationship. In fact, the diplomatic move and the 
 military hard-heartedness was contrary both to Confucian- 
 ism and to Christianity. The year 1914 was thus a bad year 
 for China, as for European civilization. 
 
 But the year 1915 was even worse for China. This was 
 the year when Japan made gigantic strides in the military 
 domination of her nearest neighbour, and threatened as 
 never before attempted by any Power, East or West, the 
 very existence of the Chinese state. This was the period of 
 the "Twenty-one Demands." The manoeuverings thereon 
 were so intricate, that without a special effort an unjust 
 judgment will be rendered and misrepresentation will gain 
 currency. Out of a natural indignation at Japan's high- 
 handedness there is danger of going too far in condemning 
 Japan. At least it is incumbent, as in other judgments, to 
 distinguish the policy of the Japanese Government and that 
 of the mass of the Japanese people. 
 
 We must tread warily, if we are to avoid a stumble, either 
 in holding to principles or in passing judgment on both 
 Chinese and Japanese. 
 
 In 1914 a little band of Germans had been overpowered 
 by the Japanese army and navy, aided by a small British 
 force. It remained for Japan alone in 1915 to overpower 
 
 !63 
 
64 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 China by skill of diplomacy, by force of arms, or by a threat 
 and an ultimatum. China, being weak militarily as com- 
 pared with Japan, had been forced to yield, as had the few 
 Germans stranded on the shores of Shantung. The Ger- 
 man surrender was no disgrace. The Chinese surrender 
 was humiliating. Japan won by Might, not by Right. She 
 did as all belligerents were doing — sought victory, and then 
 the spoils of war, by superior military strength. The only 
 difference was that Japan's chance came early. The 
 chances for her Allies came late, after over four years of 
 slaughter, anguish and struggle. Japan, arriving early on 
 the field of glory, had no need to wait for a Peace Con- 
 ference ; she pre-empted the ground, forestalled events, out- 
 ran all runners, by reaching a settlement with China — a 
 victorious belligerent dictating to a neutral about a van- 
 quished belligerent. Japan trusted to fait accompli. * ' Pos- 
 session is nine-tenths of the law." Militarism was plainly 
 in evidence on the hills around Tsingtao. It was not in 
 evidence in negotiations of the Japanese and Chinese Gov- 
 ernments, but, none the less, it backed up the negotiations, 
 it commandeered success, it was the power behind the 
 throne. 
 
 The face of a Japanese diplomat is impassive, but his 
 diplomacy is very active. As was once said of the Russians, 
 so it may be said of the Japanese: "They can wait a 
 hundred years." At the end of 1914, the Japanese saw no 
 need to wait longer; their day had come; they had the 
 chance to carry out great plans, far-reaching plans, not 
 merely to take the place of Germans in a part of China, but 
 to become the great predominating power in all China. 
 Japan's ambition was the hegemony of the Far East, and 
 then in due time to have it recognized — signed and sealed — 
 by all the great Powers. 
 
 November 16, 1914, 3,800 Germans surrendered to 
 Japan. January 18, 1915, only two months later, the 
 
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 65 
 
 Japanese Minister in Peking, Mr, Hioki, made a presenta- 
 tion to President Yuan Shih-kai of an official document 
 commonly spoken of as the Twenty-one Demands. The char- 
 acter of each point in the document and the way it was 
 presented seemed almost a duplicate of demands once made 
 on the Emperor of Korea prior to the absorption of that 
 country by Japan. It was a startling venture in the realm 
 of territorial expansion. As Putnam Weale says, it was 
 "a list designed to satisfy every present and future need 
 of Japanese policy and to reduce China to a state of 
 vassalage."^ 
 
 Properly any such official document should have been 
 presented, if presented at all, to the diplomatic department 
 of the Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was 
 an impropriety, and almost an insult, for the Japanese 
 Minister to ask for an audience with the President of the 
 Chinese Republic, and then to go beyond ceremonial usages 
 and hand to him such a menacing and dictatorial document. 
 
 The Japanese, never having any great liking for Yuan 
 Shih-kai, were no doubt delighted to have the chance to 
 present him as President — "the strong man of China" — 
 an offensive document whose demands he was powerless 
 to resist. 
 
 Moreover, the Japanese Minister insisted on complete 
 secrecy. Any disclosure would prove disastrous to China 
 as a nation and to Yuan Shih-kai personally. 
 
 From the beginning of the war to the present nothing 
 stands out in Japanese politics more deserving of severest 
 condemnation than the presentation and attempt at exe- 
 cution of these Twenty-one Demands. As they gradually 
 became known, the British and French, as well as Amer- 
 icans and Chinese, joined in one great uproar of denun- 
 ciation. The British were beginning to doubt their wisdom 
 in inviting Japan to eliminate "the German menace"; 
 
 » " Fight for the Republic in China," p. 87. 
 
66 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 they already saw a Japanese menace, and did not hesitate 
 to warn against it. 
 
 The Twenty-one Demands as actually made known to 
 the President of China were in five groups. The first, quite 
 logically, bore on the confirmation of Japan's possession 
 of German rights in Shantung. The second enlarged and 
 prolonged the Japanese hold on rights acquired in Southern 
 Manchuria in the war with Russia ten years before, and 
 linked on with this certain demands concerning Inner 
 Eastern Mongolia. The third related to increased control 
 in the Hanyehping Company, China's greatest industrial 
 enterprise, and in the development of mines, in the geo- 
 graphical centre of China Proper, thus projecting into 
 the British sphere of interest. The fourth, a very brief 
 one, but apparently magnanimous on Japan's part, was 
 the obligation resting on China to lease no more harbours or 
 islands on the China coast to a third Power. The fifth 
 group, most vital of all, related to railway concessions in 
 the Yangtsze Valley, to Japan's priority in Fukien prov- 
 ince, recognized for some time as Japanese sphere of in- 
 terest, and, more than all, to an astounding influence and 
 authority on the part of Japan in the internal and political 
 affairs of all China, deeply affecting China's sovereignty 
 for all future time. 
 
 Looking backward, it is clear that Group I, which bore 
 Upon cession to Japan of all German rights in Shantung, 
 to be agreed to by China, automatically arose from Japan's 
 method of attacking Tsingtao, and this in turn arose from 
 the appeal to Japan by the British Government to enter 
 the war against Germany in the Far East. Nothing more 
 needed negotiation. 
 
 Looking forward, the Demands made as to the province of 
 Shantung afforded Japan the rare opportunity, not to be 
 neglected, of fixing once for all Japan's predominance not 
 only in Shantung, but in Southern Manchuria, in Inner 
 
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 67 
 
 Mongolia, in the province of Fukien, in the British sphere 
 of interest, and, in a political way, in the whole of China. 
 
 The Japanese Government, trusting that secrecy could be 
 kept — "clothed in impenetrable mystery," as Putnam 
 Weale writes — assured foreign governments, who pressed 
 for information, that there "had never been twenty-one 
 demands, as the Chinese alleged, but only fourteen, the 
 seven items of Group V being desiderata which it was in 
 the interests of China to endorse but which Japan had no 
 intention of forcing upon her. ' ' ^ 
 
 Dr. Sidney L. Gulick says: "I have it on pretty high 
 authority that Group V was put up for purposes of trad- 
 ing. Japan arranged that Yuan Shih-kai could say to 
 China that he had forced Japan to back down on the most 
 important demands and thus 'save his face' for having 
 yielded the rest. ' ' ^ 
 
 This mode of reasoning rests on a foundation of moving 
 sand. If the mention of Group V was a bargaining pro- 
 cess, why insist at the end that the points were to be 
 deferred for future consultation? And why in 1918 was 
 the attempt again made to carry them out through a number 
 of secret agreements with the militaristic faction con- 
 trolling the Peking Government? 
 
 The full text of the Demands was not revealed by Japan 
 to the Governments of Japan's Allies or the United States 
 till rumours had become so loud, as well as manifold, 
 that all denial was threatening to the moral standing of 
 Japan. It was a month before even the limited, and less 
 objectionable, list was made known officially, while the 
 complete list was delayed still longer, until in fact the 
 Twenty-one Demands were modified in a revised list, pre- 
 sented to China, April 26 (1915). In all probability the 
 revision of the original list was due as much to foreign 
 
 * Putnam Weale, " The Fight for the Republic in China," p. 100. 
 » Arthur J. Brown, " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 425. 
 
68 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 criticism and world-wide outcry as to the argumentative 
 powers of the Chinese Foreign Office and President Yuan 
 Shih-kai. 
 
 The reader should bear in mind that after many con- 
 ferences concerning the original Twenty-one Demands 
 Japan presented, April 26, a revised list, less drastic than 
 the previous one, of twenty-four Articles, but arranged in 
 three Groups instead of five; that, on May 1, the Chinese 
 Foreign Office presented to the Japanese Minister a memo- 
 randum discussing the general matters at issue, and en- 
 closing China's proposed list of thirteen Articles in three 
 Groups; that, on May 7, Japan presented an ultimatum, 
 demanding acceptance of Japan's revised list and calling 
 for a favourable reply within 48 hours, or ''the Imperial 
 Government will take steps they may deem necessary"; 
 that, on May 9, China complied, presenting, however, an 
 able "Official Statement" in defence of China's position, 
 and that, on May 25, treaties were made, or exchange of 
 notes passed, between Mr. Hioki, the Japanese representa- 
 tive, and Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, the Chinese representative, 
 settling once for all, as it was supposed, the right of Japan 
 to dictate in Chinese affairs, and the duty of China to 
 comply on pain of war and complete subjugation. 
 
 Thus Japan handed out an ultimatum first to Germany, 
 a belligerent, and then to China, a neutral and neighbour. 
 All along China has been treated less as a neutral or even as 
 an ally or associate than as an enemy. "Japan," says 
 Thomas F. Millard, "employed bludgeoning tactics all 
 through the negotiations. She reinforced her military 
 forces in Shantung and Manchuria and made strategical 
 dispositions unmistakably directed against China, ' ' All this 
 gave force and significance to the ultimatum. Had it not 
 been that the "strong man," Yuan Shih-kai, was President, 
 the forces of internal revolt or the forces of external war 
 could never have been held in cheek. There was force 
 
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 69 
 
 majeure, plenty of it, in negotiation and in the settlement, 
 as in many a treaty before, but through kind words from 
 Britons and Americans the hope sprang in the Chinese 
 breast that in some way and at some time High Heaven 
 would rescue China from the grip of an outside nation, 
 "Yuan chose the wiser cause," says Mr. Millard, with 
 whom all familiar with the circumstances must agree. ' ' He 
 conceded what he must, and saved such exceptions as he 
 could, hoping that China's case would get a hearing before 
 civilization later. ' ' ^ 
 
 Thus in 1915 Japan acquired certain rights in China by 
 means of a treaty with China; legality enshrouded mili- 
 tarism; China had consented. To understand just how 
 much Japan gained, and how much China was forced to 
 lose, these investigations may be made along two lines, one 
 the direct result of the war as seen in acquisition of previous 
 German rights in Shantung, and the other the indirect 
 result as seen in acquisition of rights in other sections of 
 China, along with the promise of more blessings still in 
 store. 
 
 I. Japan's direct gain through rights in Shantung. 
 
 (1) The new Chino- Japanese Treaty, Article 1, reads: 
 
 The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all mat- 
 ters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree 
 with the German Government relating to the disposition of all 
 rights, interests and concessions which Germany by virtue of 
 treaties or otherwise possesses in relation to the province of 
 Shantung. 
 
 The significance of this agreement as bearing on the 
 wisdom of China's own entrance into the war has been 
 generally overlooked. All the rights which China originally 
 ceded by treaty to Germany in 1898 are to be disposed of 
 by mutual consultation of Germany and Japan. And 
 
 * " Our Eastern Question," p. 154. 
 
J 
 
 70 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 China is to agree to it. Was it wise for China later on to 
 antagonize either Germany or Japan by going to war with 
 the one and by conflicting with the other at the Peace Con- 
 ference in Paris? Would it not have been wiser to keep 
 on friendly terms with both than to rely on the assuring 
 phraseology of America, Britain and France, that China 
 would be befriended, if she entered the war, and would be 
 allowed a seat, however lowly, at the Peace Table? 
 
 In conversations which I personally had with the German 
 Minister, Admiral von Hintze, before either China or the 
 United States declared war, I know that Germany was 
 ready to urge on Japan the presence of a Chinese repre- 
 sentative at the proposed conference of Germany and 
 Japan. In the Official Statement presented by China, May 
 7, 1915, it is said : 
 
 The suggestion relating to participation in conference between 
 Japan and Germany was made in view of the fact that Shantung, 
 the object of future negotiations between Japan and Germany, is 
 a Chinese province, and therefore China is the Power most con- 
 cerned in the future of that territory. 
 
 It certainly seemed very probable that more advantage 
 would have accrued to China by following such a line of 
 action than by the policy she was led to pursue from 1917 
 until the signing of the Versailles Treaty, June 28, 1919 — 
 an occasion on which China, alas, was forbidden even to 
 *'sign with reservations." 
 
 (2) The disposition of the German-leased territory of 
 Kiaochow was settled by exchange of notes. This terri- 
 tory is to be "left to the free disposal of Japan," thus 
 recognizing, as the Versailles Treaty has also recognized, 
 Japan's supremacy over both Germany and China in ref- 
 erence to this territory. However, Japan by her sovereign 
 grace "will restore the said leased territory to China." 
 
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 71 
 
 Free salvation again, but — but — ' * under the following con- 
 ditions." And what are they? Four in all, but two are 
 noteworthy : 
 
 *'A Concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan 
 to be established at a place designated by the Japanese 
 Government"; 
 
 "If the Foreign Powers desire it, an International Con- 
 cession may be established." 
 
 What is left as a residuum is to go to China, but under 
 the stipulation that Tsingtao "be opened as a Commercial 
 Port," as it had been in fact by agreement with Ger- 
 many. 
 
 This arrangement would make the once free-port of 
 Tsingtao under German jurisdiction a second Shanghai, in 
 which there exists a French Concession, an International 
 Settlement, and the Chinese native city and suburbs. 
 
 Showing the pressure that Japan constantly brought on 
 China by dangling the promise of the restoration of Kiao- 
 chow, it is stated that when Japan presented the revised 
 Demands, April 26, "the Japanese Minister stated that the 
 Japanese Government would restore the leased territory of 
 Kiaochow to China at an opportune time in the future and 
 under proper conditions"; and then it is added — "if the 
 Chinese Government would agree to the new list of Twenty- 
 four Demands without modification." A pretty big if, a 
 preliminary ultimatum. 
 
 Was it at all likely that China by being embroiled in the 
 war would be able to alter the Chino-Japanese agreement 
 of 1915? The restoration of Kiaochow, if it ever takes 
 place, is to be on the conditions defined in 1915 and by 
 Japan's "free disposal." Japan, to strengthen her posi- 
 tion from 1915 to 1919, purchased much land in the de- 
 sirable portion of Tsingtao and around, to be set apart as 
 a Japanese Concession. Whether an International Settle- 
 ment is formed or not, Japan has acquired through a grow- 
 
 J 
 
72 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 ing population at Tsingtao and through delay a predom- 
 inant influence in all administration. 
 
 (3) Another Article reads: 
 
 The Chinese Government agrees that as regards the railway to 
 he huilt by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect 
 with the Kiaochow-Tsinan-fu Railway, if Germany abandons the 
 privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will ap- 
 proach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan. 
 
 The Versailles Treaty of Peace has not improved on this 
 arrangement. "China herself" is to build the railway, 
 according to the terms agreed upon by China and Japan. 
 If she has money of her own, as she ought to have under 
 proper management, there will be no necessity for Jap- 
 anese or German financing. What others object to is that 
 they do not have an equal chance. 
 
 (4) One more stipulation is the following: 
 
 Within the province of Shantung or along its coast no territory 
 or island will be leased or ceded to any foreign Power under any 
 pretext. 
 
 It is generally supposed that this stipulation was meant 
 to check the designs of Germany, to whom according to the 
 Treaty of 1898 was to be given by China "a more suitable 
 place," "should Germany at some future time express the 
 wish to return Kiaochow Bay to China." 
 
 It is to be acknowledged that the principle here laid down 
 is a good one, and that Japan deserves credit for bringing 
 it forward — ^namely, that the habit of seizing Chinese ports 
 and territory comes to an end. May, 1915. Japan, too, 
 according to this, is never to occupy territory, at least in 
 the province of Shantung. 
 
 r" Thus, in the above four stipulations, what Japan had 
 gained by right of conquest in 1914, in Shantung, she has 
 
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 73 
 
 confirmed by treaty in 1915, except that a few points were 
 to be amicably settled through negotiation after the ter- 
 mination of war. The Treaty of Versailles was no better, 
 for it, too, gave its sanction to the principle of conquest, i 
 without the definite agreement of future negotiation. 
 
 The Chinese in the negotiations preceding the ultimatum 
 of May 7 did not specially complain of what Japan insisted 
 on concerning Shantung. In fact in China's Memorandum 
 of May 1st, it is stated : 
 
 As regards matters relating to Shantung, the Chinese Govern- 
 taent has agreed to a majority of the demands. 
 
 Thus so far as Shantung is concerned, it is hard to under- 
 stand why more stress was laid at the Peace Conference on 
 Shantung affairs than on other matters to which China 
 strongly objected in the 1915 negotiations. If China ex- 
 pected to have altered or abrogated the agreements of 1915, 
 she should have placed on record her protest and not de- 
 clared that she ' ' agreed. ' ' Still less could China complain 
 at the Paris Peace Conference that the Treaty of 1915, so 
 far as Shantung was concerned, was made under duress. 
 Duress was applied to other matters. 
 
 There were, however, two particulars in the Shantung 
 settlement of 1915 which China brought forward and 
 which Japan as a good neighbour might have agreed to. 
 One, as given out in China's "Official Statement," reads: 
 
 Another supplementary proposal suggesting the assumption by 
 Japan of responsibility for indemnification of the losses arising 
 out of the military operations by Japan in and about the leased 
 territory of Kiaochow was necessitated by the fact that China was 
 neutral vis-d-vis the war between Japan and Germany. 
 
 This was simple justice. As Germany is called on to 
 indemnify the losses in Belgium, much more should Japan 
 
74 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 indemnify the losses of China. Why so clear a duty slipped 
 from notice at the Peace Conference at Paris can only be 
 explained by the skilful manceuvering of the Japanese 
 delegates. 
 Another reasonable request reads: 
 
 That the military railway, the telegraph lines, etc., which were 
 installed by Japan to facilitate her military operations should be 
 removed forthwith; that the Japanese troops now stationed out- 
 side of the leased territory should be first withdrawn, and those 
 within the territory should be recalled at the time when Kiaochow 
 is returned to China. 
 
 Knowing of the inroads made by Japan in Manchuria 
 after the war with Russia through a military railway and 
 refusal to withdraw troops and police, it was China's duty 
 to avert such evils in Shantung. Japan 's persistent refusal 
 to comply with such a reasonable request can only increase 
 Chinese suspicion of Japanese designs. 
 
 The Agreements of 1915 were thus bad, not so much in 
 what they affirmed as in what they omitted to affirm. 
 p' The peril to China was also not so much in the actual 
 ' specifications of the Treaty bearing on Shantung as in the 
 j substitution of Japan for Germany, thus excluding a strong 
 balancing power and transferring it all to the increased 
 (predominance of Japan. S. K. Hornbeek has written : 
 
 With the Manchurian railways penetrating the heart of Man- 
 churia and the Shantung Railway extending to the heart of 
 Shantung — and with the right to extend the latter line to join the 
 Peking- Hankow line — Japan is in a position, should she so 
 choose, at any moment to grind Peking between the millstones of 
 her military machine. So far as strategy is concerned, Japan has 
 North China commercially, militarily and politically at her 
 mercy. ^ 
 
 * " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 346. 
 
 b 
 
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 75 
 
 II, Japan's indirect gains in other parts of China. 
 
 (1) Japan's demands in Manchuria are agreed to in the 
 following particulars : 
 
 (a) The lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (or Dairen) is 
 extended to 99 years. 
 
 (6) "The terms of the South Manchuria Railway and 
 the Antung-Mukden Railway" also extend to 99 years. 
 The Chinese Memorandum acknowledges that it must 
 * * abandon its own cherished hopes to regain control of these 
 places and properties at the expiration of their respective 
 original terms of lease." 
 
 (c) "Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by 
 negotiation, lease land necessary for erecting suitable build- 
 ings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricul- 
 tural enterprises." They also "shall be free to reside and 
 travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and 
 manufacture of any kind whatsoever." Thus, merchants, 
 manufacturers and farmers, if they are Japanese, may live 
 anywhere in South Manchuria, as in China's treaty- 
 ports. 
 
 (d) "In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring 
 jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries 
 incidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its 
 permission." Such co-operation is unobjectionable. 
 
 (e) Japanese subjects "shall also submit to the police 
 laws and ordinances and taxation of China." The treaty 
 on this point is a slight improvement on the revised list of 
 the Japanese, in that the latter stipulated that the laws and 
 ordinances must be "approved by the Japanese Consul," 
 while the former adds merely that ' ' the Chinese authorities 
 will notify the Japanese Consul." 
 
 (/) A rule is laid down, to which no exception can be 
 made, as to Mixed Court procedure in litigation between 
 Chinese and Japanese, similar to that at treaty-ports. Then 
 the clause is added ; 
 
76 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 When, in future, the judicial system in the said region is com- 
 pletely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese 
 subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese law 
 courts. 
 
 This feature while not appearing in the original copy of 
 the Demands, appears both in the revised list and in the 
 final agreement. 
 
 (g) A revision is made in the terms of the Kirin-Chang- 
 chun Railway Loan Agreement, giving Japan the conces- 
 sion, and to this China had already assented. 
 
 (h) It is agreed that in building railways "if foreign 
 capital is required, China may negotiate for a loan with 
 Japanese capitalists first." This merely establishes South 
 Manchuria as a Japanese sphere of interest, just as British, 
 French and Germans had secured in other parts of China. 
 
 (i) New commercial ports are opened in Manchuria, 
 wherein all foreigners may carry on trade. 
 
 (j) Japan is allowed certain mining areas, heretofore 
 not worked. In this way South Manchuria more than ever 
 becomes Japan's special and exclusive sphere of interest, 
 similar to the position of other countries in other parts of 
 China. 
 
 (k) "Hereafter, if foreign advisors or instructors on 
 political, financial, military or police matters are to be em- 
 ployed in South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed 
 first." This is like the original form of the Demands, ex- 
 cept that "may be employed" is the improved form of the 
 phrase, "the Japanese Government shall be consulted." 
 To this the Chinese commissioner presented no objection. 
 
 (2) Japan's demands in Inner Eastern Mongolia are 
 agreed to in only a few particulars, namely, (a) opening 
 of commercial ports, (b) applying for loans to Japanese 
 capitalists first, and (c) employing Japanese advisors and 
 instructors first. These are similar to the revised list, 
 
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 77 
 
 while the original list aimed at much more, giving to the 
 Japanese nearly the same position in Mongolia as in 
 Manchuria. 
 
 In reference to Japan's position in South Manchuria and 
 Eastern Mongolia, the Treaty says that it is concluded 
 "with a view to developing their economic relations," while 
 the original Demands state that ''the Chinese Government 
 has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Ja- 
 pan." In either ease China was set to lose in her sovereign 
 position in Manchuria and Mongolia far more than in_ 
 Shantung. 
 
 ^(3) Japan secures greater control of the Hanyehping 
 Company, consisting of iron and coal mines and a great 
 steel foundry. Greater co-operation of capitalists from 
 both countries is to be allowed. ' * The Chinese Government 
 further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, 
 without the consent of the Japanese capitalists, to convert 
 it into a State enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use 
 foreign capital other than Japanese." 
 
 The mines and works of this great industrial Company 
 are in the very centre of China, within the British sphere 
 of interest. 
 
 The original Demands extended Japan's influence in the 
 Yangtsze Valley by insisting that * ' all mines in the neigh- 
 bourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall ^ 
 not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, 
 to be worked by other persons outside of the said 
 Company." 
 
 Naturally the opposition by Britons to the Twenty-one 
 Demands was directed more to Group III, which related to 
 this Company, than to the settlement of either the Shan- 
 tung or the Manchurian and Mongolian questions. The 
 Chinese Minister also could not agree to the insertion of the 
 original form, as it ''seriously affected the principle of 
 equal commercial opportunity. ' ' Few foreigners or Chinese 
 
78 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 I at that time of discussion had much to say about the Jap- 
 \ anese acquisition of German rights and concessions in Shan- 
 ^ \ tung, which, therefore, was not particularly a work of force 
 \ majeure. 
 
 As Great Britain was and is a formal Ally of Japan, 
 Japan yielded to British criticism about the Hanyehping 
 Company, and simply omitted, but did not abandon, the 
 objectionable part of the original Demands. 
 
 (4) Japan secures an agreement from China through 
 exchange of notes to the effect "that the Chinese Govern- 
 ment hereby declares that it has given no permission to 
 foreign nations to construct, on the coast of Fukien prov- 
 ince, dockyards, coaling stations for military use, naval 
 bases, or to set up other military establishments, nor does it 
 entertain an intention of borrowing foreign capital for the 
 purpose of setting up the above-mentioned establish- 
 ments. ' ' 
 
 This recognized Japanese priority in Fukien province, 
 where for many years Japan had claimed a sphere of in- 
 terest. The new wording gave recognition to Japan's po- 
 litical influence, by warning off all other foreigners. 
 
 In the original form of the Twenty-one Demands, the ref- 
 erence to Fukien is contained in the objectionable Group V 
 as Article 6. 
 
 It was understood at the time that Japan desired such 
 an agreement, out of fear that the United States was 
 designing some scheme of intrusion into the Fukien 
 province. 
 
 Thus Japan, in as early an hour as possible, by means of 
 the Treaties of 1915, protected and expanded her interests 
 not only against Germany but against Great Britain and 
 the United States and even against China herself. 
 ^ (5) China also agrees in the final arrangement to the 
 modified form of Group IV, that she will "give a pro- 
 nouncement by herself in accordance with the following 
 
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 79 
 
 principle: *No bay, harbour or island along the coast of 
 China may be ceded or leased to any Power.' " 
 
 This is an expansion of a very desirable article in the 
 Shantung arrangement. If all the countries, Japan in- 
 cluded, would now agree to give up all harbours or territory 
 already held on lease, China's national integrity and the 
 peace of the Far East would be greatly solidified. 
 
 (6) In the reply of the Chinese Government, May 8, 
 to the ultimatum of Japan, it is agreed that "five articles 
 of Group V" are "postponed for later negotiation." 
 These five "refer to (a) the employment of advisors, 
 (b) the establishment of schools and hospitals, (c) the 
 railway concessions in South China, (d) the supply of arms 
 and ammunition and the establishment of arsenals, and 
 (e) right of missionary propaganda." "It is this fact [of 
 postponement] which remains the sword of Damocles hang- 
 ing over China's head, and until this sword has been flung 
 back into the waters of the Yellow Sea the Far Eastern 
 situation will remain perilous" (Putnam Weale). 
 
 Several of the items to be postponed came up for "nego- 
 tiation" and also for settlement in 1918 before the an- 
 nouncement of armistice. What Japan thus acquired, in 
 Shantung, in Manchuria, in Mongolia, in the Yangtsze Val- 
 ley, in Fukien, in all China (potentially), was startling. 
 
 This much can be said, however, of Japanese attitude to "" 
 China that there was more readiness to negotiate than in 
 most treaties concluded under coercion. -4 
 
 Moreover, while the original form of the Twenty-one 
 Demands deserves the severest censure, the ultimate agree- 
 ment is less objectionable. What China agrees to after 
 receipt of the ultimatum is in the main what she had agreed 
 to in conference prior to the ultimatum. The subsequent 
 complaint, made known at the Peace Conference in Paris, 
 that the Agreements of 1915 should be abrogated by the 
 League of Nations because they were signed under duress, 
 
80 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 is worthy of no consideration, in face of the far greater act 
 of duress, with exclusion of all negotiation, as revealed in 
 the Versailles Treaty with Germany as well as in most 
 treaties with China. In the " Official Statement" which 
 China made May 8, it may be seen that according to 
 China's own acknowledgment she had consented to prac- 
 tically all that the ultimatum required, and that therefore 
 coercion, if it existed at all, was insignificant : 
 
 Of the twenty-one original demands there were six, as previ- 
 ously mentioned, to which China could not agree. 
 
 And these six were not included in the "Revised List," 
 concerning which — and not the ** Twenty-one Demands" — 
 Japan had issued her ultimatum. 
 
 Still less could the Shantung settlement be made a matter 
 of objections, except so far as it omitted certain points which 
 China desired to have inserted. 
 
 The restoration of Kiaochow to China seems to have been 
 the chief factor in the Chinese claim as made to the Su- 
 preme Council in Paris, but, May 7, 1915, the Japanese 
 Government declared: "If the Chinese Government accept 
 all the articles as demanded in the ultimatum the offer 
 of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow to China, 
 made on the 26th of April, will still hold good." In fact, 
 the Versailles Treaty accorded more to Japan, and took 
 more away from China, than the settlement of 1915 as made 
 between China and Japan direct. 
 
 '^ If China has complaint to make, it should be against the 
 entrance of war into China in 1914, from which has issued 
 ] a variety of evils, annoyances and misfortunes. 
 
 A minor complaint might be this: why did not Japan 
 content herself with reaching a settlement on the one ques- 
 tion of disposal of former German rights in Shantung? 
 Why did she compel China to drag in other matters, con- 
 
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 81 
 
 nected perhaps with the former war with Russia, but not 
 with the war with Germany? And why, too, did the 
 Chinese delegates at Paris lay stress on only the matters 
 relating to Shantung, and not to the major part of the 
 1915 Agreement? 
 
 S. K. Hornbeek ^ presents the reader with a philosophical 
 conundrum : 
 
 The ultimatum demanded little of importance to which China 
 had not already agreed. Was it then really nothing but a stuffed 
 club, a mere bluff, its presentation a " grand-stand play " ? Was 
 the threat of war made simply to save the face of the Chinese 
 Government before the Chinese people, to enhance the prestige 
 of the Japanese Government with the Japanese people, to place 
 before the world a picture of Japan provoked by Chinese ob- 
 structionist tactics to the point of raising the sword and then, 
 rather than break the peace, magnanimously foregoing the easy 
 glory of an easier conquest and the full fruits of an assured and 
 early military success? Or was Japan really asking for a little 
 more in addition to the very much which China had already con- 
 ceded, actually ready to go to war rather than be denied? 
 
 My own opinion is that Japan presented the original ; 
 Twenty-one Demands with the probability of having them , 
 accepted, but when by official conference and public agi- 
 tation complete acceptance seemed improbable, Japan 
 issued an ultimatum as to what China had already agreed, %/:.■ 
 knowing that refusal on China's part was unlikely, and 
 that compliance under circumstances of an ultimatum 
 would imply a yielding to Japan's superior Might, with a 
 world-wide recognition of Japan's predominance. 
 
 Still, Japan has suffered through the prevalent miscon- 
 ception that Japan forced on China the Twenty-one 
 Demands. 
 
 Looking at the whole transaction, illustrative of Force 
 
 * " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 327. 
 
82 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 and characteristic of War, the Chinese, and the whole 
 world, may well complain that as a result of excluding 
 Germany from China and substituting Japan, a way is 
 found in the garb of legality, and by the sacredness of trea- 
 ties, to establish irrevocably the supremacy of Japan in all 
 Eastern Asia. 
 
 No sooner had China and Japan come to an agreement, 
 which was all to Japan's gain and China's loss, than the 
 United States Government, through the Secretary of State, 
 William Jennings Bryan, sent an identic note to Japan 
 and China as follows : 
 
 In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have 
 taken place and which are now pending between the Government 
 of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements 
 which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of 
 the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the 
 Chinese Republic [of Imperial Japan] that it cannot recognize 
 any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or 
 which may be entered into between the Governments of China 
 and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and 
 its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the 
 Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China 
 commonly known as the Open Door policy. 
 
 It is evident that an official utterance of this kind would 
 inspire in the Chinese confidence of American help, and 
 in the Japanese resentment at American intrusion. On 
 the one hand, the confidence of the Chinese was futile, for 
 if the American Government, in the face of past treaties, 
 did nothing to prevent the Japanese annexation of Korea, 
 how could she be expected to help China in a matter so 
 indefinite as these agreements of Japan and China, during 
 the administration of that strong man, President Yuar 
 Shih-kai? On the other hand, the resentment of the Jap- 
 anese foreboded no good ; to stir it up was an act of folly. 
 
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 83 
 
 Unless America had something definite to complain about, 
 rather than utter general insinuations, it would have been 
 better to remain silent and observe the customary proprie- 
 ties. Reading the words of the Note one might suppose 
 something substantial was about to take place, when in 
 reality there was a combination of illusion and offensive- 
 ness. The Chinese, or even the "Open Door," received 
 no help, while the Japanese were offended. Unless the 
 United States Government intended to rescue China from 
 a harmful situation there was no reason for such a formal 
 utterance. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE INJURY TO CfflNA THROUGH AMERICAN AND ALLIED 
 INTRIGUE 
 
 Viewing events in China in historical order, we now come 
 to the next scene in the great drama, to the events oi 1917. 
 The narration, for an American, is most humiliating. For 
 the first time in history, the American Government tied 
 itself up with intrigue, chicanery, secret diplomacy and 
 selfish agreements. Eather, it was that part of the Amer- 
 ican Government called the Executive branch, that is, the 
 "Wilson Administration. The intricacies of intrigue make it 
 hard to separate the responsibility of one government from 
 that of others. In bringing China into the meshes, perils 
 and enthrallment of the World War, how far was the 
 United States accountable, how far the Entente Allies, and 
 how far Japan ? And as to the United States, how far was 
 President Wilson the accountable party, how far Secretary 
 of State Lansing, and how far the American Minister at 
 Peking, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch ? 
 
 In any case, it was most disastrous to China that outside 
 advice, appeal, threat, pressure, by means of diplomatic 
 intrigue under the semblance of friendly solicitude, induced 
 China to forsake the safe path of peace and neutrality and 
 enter the whirlpool of a World War and of world chaos. 
 
 It was unfortunate for America's fair name that her 
 agents should counsel China to forsake peace for war, 
 democracy for autocracy, liberty for enslavement and quiet- 
 ness for confusion, discord and upheaval. 
 
 There were two centres of intrigue, the one in Peking 
 tinder American instigation, and more and more eneour- 
 
 84 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 85 
 
 aged by the European Allies and by Japan; the other in 
 Tokio, where the European Allies connived with Japan in 
 secret compact not only against Germany, but against 
 China and the United States. 
 
 I. First, then, the intrigue in Peking to embroil China 
 in the Great War. 
 
 There were three steps for China in diplomatic procedure : 
 first, to send Germany a letter of reproof and of threat, 
 February 9, 1917 ; second, to sever diplomatic relations with 
 Germany, March 14; and, third, to declare war against 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary (without Parliamentary 
 action), August 14. 
 
 The war issue did not specially engross the attention of 
 China until February 4 (1917), and then through action 
 of the American Government and by definite request of 
 President Wilson. 
 
 Heretofore advocates of war and of peace, except out- 
 and-out pacifists, have generally theorized thus: Never 
 go to war except as a last alternative. But President, 
 Wilson announced a new dictum to all neutral nations for 
 assuring a real world war: Whether with or without just 
 cause, every neutral nation is advised to do what the United 
 States does — first, be neutral ; second, break off diplomatic 
 relations with Germany; and, third, declare war on Ger- 
 many. On this new theory, there will be no neutral nations, 
 no neutral rights, and no laws on neutrality or freedom of 
 the seas. This new doctrine, more chaotic than idealistic, 
 was subsequently introduced into the Covenant of the 
 League of Nations, as invented at Paris for maintaining 
 peace and also for assuring a world war, if war is ever to 
 come again. So far, then, President Wilson was solely re- 
 sponsible for getting China on the war-path. 
 
 Prior to President Wilson's innocent suggestion of Feb- 
 ruary, 1917, China had managed to remain at peace, on 
 
86 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 equally friendly terms with all nations. During the in- 
 cumbency of President Yuan Shih-kai, there had been two 
 or three slight, tentative overtures — properly mere queries 
 — on the part of President Yuan to his old friend, Sir John 
 Jordan, the British Minister, as to the advisability of the 
 Chinese entering the war. There is no question as to the 
 friendship of this Britisher for the Chinese President, or 
 as to his sincere concern for China's development and 
 progress. Thomas F. Millard,^ from his varied sources of 
 information, states that the British Minister did not look 
 upon these suggestions with favour, probably on account of 
 Japan's opposition, but that the French and Russian Le- 
 gations gave some encouragement. However, there was no 
 unity of purpose in Peking and Tokio among these diplo- 
 matic representatives. As to the American Minister, rep- 
 resenting a neutral country, Mr. Millard asserts: "I am 
 informed that the American Minister expressed his private 
 opinion to Yuan Shih-kai that such a move probably would 
 save China." This was some time towards the end of 1915, 
 ■when the United States was not yet a belligerent. It was 
 strange advice to come from a neutral and an advocate of 
 universal peace. 
 
 A somewhat different account of President Yuan's atti- 
 tude to the war is given by Mr. Kawakami. I quote his 
 words : 2 
 
 What Yuan really had in mind in declaring himself in favour 
 of the Entente Powers was the attainment of his ambition to 
 become an emperor. . . . The resourceful Yuan, unwilling to 
 give up his imperial designs, secretly conferred with England 
 proposing that he would declare war upon Germany and drive 
 German interests from China, if the Entente Powers would, in 
 return, support his scheme to enthrone himself. England, eager 
 
 * " Democracy and the Eastern Question," pp. 95-100. 
 » " Japan and World Peace," p. 129. 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 87 
 
 to exterminate German influence in China, was favourably dis- 
 posed towards this proposal. 
 
 This was the impression which I also received as to polit- 
 ical manoeuvres going on in Peking. I was told that when 
 President Yuan actually launched his imperial scheme 
 towards the end of 1915, he had a secret understanding 
 with the British Minister that British recognition would be 
 accorded, if the scheme was successful, and if the new Im- 
 perial Government declared war on Germany. When the 
 scheme failed. President Yuan, as I was informed, asked 
 Sir John Jordan to come and consult with him, but the 
 request was not granted, and President Yuan, mortified 
 over his failure, was taken ill and died. Needless to say, 
 this nice little intrigue for bringing China into the war 
 also came to naught. 
 
 Mr. Kawakami is probably correct in saying that Japan 
 did not join England in perfecting this scheme ; but I re- 
 gard it that the opposition was not so much due to 
 Japan's being "unalterably opposed to the crowning of 
 Yuan Shih-kai," as being opposed to the man, and also 
 to China's war purposes, unless Japan's ambitions were 
 satisfied. 
 
 In a general way, if China's entry into the war should 
 have effect on the spread of righteousness, truth, love and 
 liberty throughout the world, or even on the military opera- 
 tions of the war in Europe as distinct from commercial 
 rivalries and jealousies, then it was a duty of the United 
 States to put forth every effort to persuade China to be- 
 come one of the belligerents on the side of the majority, 
 and probably also on the side of the victors. Moreover, if 
 China could only get her wrongs righted, that is, wrongs 
 done by Japan, through being present at the future Peace 
 Table, and if she could be present there only by going to 
 war with Germany, then it was wise, though not imper^- 
 
88 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 tive, to yield to outside persuasion under the leadership of 
 the United States. Should the presence of Chinese dele- 
 gates at the Peace Conference be without effect, then 
 it would have been better for her to have remained 
 neutral, at peace within her own borders and with all 
 peoples. 
 
 Furthermore, if China wanted a casus belli, she had a 
 better one against Japan than against Germany. The 
 China Sea and the Japan Sea were more vital to China 
 than the North Sea or the English Channel. To get ahead 
 of Japan by warring on Germany: to force compensation 
 from Japan by joining the Allies, of whom Japan was one, 
 partook too much of the old diplomacy of intrigue and 
 chicanery rather than the new diplomacy, widely pro- 
 claimed, of "open covenants" and straightforward 
 dealing. 
 
 At that particular time, also, China had greater grievance 
 against France than against Germany, owing to French 
 high-handed occupation of Lao-shi-kai, adjoining the 
 French Concession in Tientsin. 
 
 The President of China, successor to Yuan Shih-kai, was 
 Li Yuan-hung. He assumed office June 6, 1916. He had 
 been military leader of the first revolution which overthrew 
 the Manchu Monarchy, of which Yuan Shih-kai had been 
 the last Premier. Yuan was monarchical in his sympa- 
 thies; Li was devoted to the democratic idea. Yuan left 
 the country broken by discord and strife; Li set out to 
 unite the country, to stop fighting and to establish a bona 
 fide Republic. All factions, all sections of the country, 
 were brought together under the centralizing, or rather 
 harmonizing influence of President Li. Every one trusted 
 him. He only needed a fair chance and sufficient time to 
 show to the world that Democracy was suited to the 
 Chinese. If the country could be kept at peace, if war 
 could be put at arm's length, he was sure of success. His 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 89 
 
 Premier was General Tuan Chi-jui, last Secretary of State 
 under Emperor-President Yuan, who, like President Li, was 
 opposed to all monarchical schemes. 
 
 The Parliament, which had been dissolved by President 
 Yuan, was re-called by the new President. This Parliament 
 early began the discussion of a permanent Constitution, and 
 by the spring of 1917 had almost completed its task. 
 Clashes had arisen between the different branches of au- 
 thority, but none so serious as to forebode defeat to liberal 
 institutions or renewed strife in the land. The outlook for 
 democracy, peace and national prosperity was bright. 
 
 Thus it was until February 4, 1917, when the American 
 Minister in Peking, Paul S. Reinsch, made known to Pres- 
 ident Li the request of President Wilson, that China, as 
 well as all other neutral nations, should imitate the example 
 of the United States by severing diplomatic relations with 
 Germany. Thus it was that the leader of neutral nations 
 became a leader in belligerency. I had previously conveyed 
 to President Wilson the desire of President Li to follow 
 the lead of the United States in bringing together all neu- 
 tral nations in a common effort to effect peace. Now the 
 Chinese President was forced by another and diametrically 
 opposite proposition, looking to active participation in 
 war. 
 
 If this proposal or request had been communicated to 
 China merely in the usual official way without pressure, no 
 harm would have been done to China and no confusion 
 would have arisen. China, in all probability, would have 
 remained neutral and at peace. Moreover, no further ad- 
 vantage would have accrued to Japan at China's expense. 
 Samuel G. Blythe, who was in Peking those critical days, 
 has described the character of the campaign and propa- 
 ganda, which was carried on with prudent secretiveness, to 
 embroil China in war against Germany in the probable 
 ^eventuality that war would arise between Germany and 
 
90 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 the United States. He speaks of this political crusade as 
 a "Flying Wedge." ^ 
 
 (1) First, then, the initial step of sending a threatening 
 letter — a kind of ultimatum — to Germany. The great mass 
 of Chinese officials, merchants, students, farmers, labourers, 
 had no desire to take sides in the calamitous struggle going 
 on in Europe. They resented what Japan and Great Britain 
 had already done on Chinese soil in the years 1914 and 
 1915 ; they knew no reason why they should join such com- 
 pany as against Germans and Austrians. They did not wish 
 to become entangled in affairs in Europe, 
 
 "When a really friendly nation like the United States, 
 one that had professed to follow the same path of neutrality 
 and impartiality, came forward to counsel association in the 
 task of upholding law and righteousness, Chinese officials 
 who were thus approached felt bound to consider the new 
 suggestion from a sister Republic. America had not yet 
 declared war or joined the Allies. But never mind ; diplo- 
 macy is far-reaching. 
 
 As already stated, President Wilson was solely respon- 
 sible for instructing on February 4, 1917, all his agents in 
 neutral countries to advise them to sever relations with 
 Germany. How it was carried out in Peking was left to 
 the responsibility of the American Minister, Dr. Paul S. 
 Reinsch, sometimes acting with, and sometimes without, the 
 instructions of Secretary of State Lansing. To show 
 America's abundant power and to hasten compliance on 
 China's part, Dr. Reinsch secured an entourage of capable 
 experts, skilled in manipulating Chinese political thought. 
 He himself was **at the apex of the wedge," to use Mr. 
 Blythe's phrase. Next in point of capacity was Dr. John 
 C. Ferguson, counsellor of the Chinese Red Cross Society, 
 and so in semi-official relations with the Chinese Govern- 
 
 » Saturday Evening Post, April 28, 1917, " The First Time in Five 
 thousand Years." 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 91 
 
 ment. Next came Roy S. Anderson, son of a Methodist 
 missionary and familiar with the intricacies of Chinese 
 officialdom. Along with these two Americans there were 
 brought into the secret two Australians. One was Dr. 
 George E. Morrison, a paid political advisor of President 
 Li Yuan-hung to look after the special interests of China. 
 The other was W. H. Donald, editor of the American mag- 
 azine, the Far Eastern Review, and for some time Peking 
 correspondent of the New York Herald. Then came an- 
 other duet, "writing men," Charles Stevenson Smith, rep- 
 resenting the Associated Press, and Samuel G. Blythe, rep- 
 resenting the Saturday Evening Post. With all these were 
 associated four young Chinese, Dr. Chen Chin-tao, a Yale 
 graduate and then Minister of Finance ; Admiral Tsai Ting- 
 kan, also educated in America, and naval A. D. C. to the 
 President; C. C. Wu, son of Dr. Wu Ting-fang, educated 
 both in America and in England, and associated with his 
 father in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Eugene 
 Chen, an English University man, a master of style, and 
 at the time editor of the Peking Gazette. 
 
 The President was first approached by Admiral Tsai 
 and Dr. Morrison, both drawing salaries from Chinese rev- 
 enues. "That genial dignitary told them he was opposed 
 to the matter in its entirety and in all its parts." (I quote 
 from Mr. Blythe 's disclosure.) 
 
 Who next? Naturally the Premier, General Tuan Chi- 
 jui, but he "was opposed." "Most of the older generals" 
 were also opposed. "The Young China party must be 
 appealed to." Arguments were ready to hand, forceful 
 arguments, when only one side is heard. Here they are : 
 
 (1) "China will secure in her own right a place in 
 the Peace Conference." This was probably the great out- 
 standing reason for China's acceptance of the American 
 proposal. The Chinese looked upon the coming Peace Con- 
 ference as the open sesame. 
 
92 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 (2) "It is the one great chance for Young China to 
 sweep away this archaic, inefficient governing class and 
 come into Young China 's own. ' ' This thought, full of sug- 
 gestion, captivated Young China — more than it did the old 
 mandarins. 
 
 (3) China would be "in a position to repudiate the 
 German and Austrian share of the Boxer indemnity. ' ' This 
 was just what the Chinese liked: getting rid of a debt 
 through legal processes. Of course, the possibility implied 
 that China must declare war; nothing less could win the 
 stakes. The mere thought of shuffling off a treaty obligation 
 and financial indebtedness was most alluring. 
 
 These were reasons for breaking off relations or even for 
 going to war, but at the time, considering all the complex 
 factors, the play was to persuade China to do something 
 less, that is, to threaten Germany. If possible, China was 
 to be blindfolded, so that the future might be involved un- 
 escapably in the present. 
 
 Let me again quote from Mr. Blythe, who wa.s on the 
 inside of this renowned American exploit and this unfortu- 
 nate Chinese venture: 
 
 For hours and hours, day and night, Peking resounded with 
 speeches to timid Chinese made by these urgent Americans and the 
 two invaluable Australians, urging, forcing, begging, cajoling 
 and showing the Chinese who were needful to toe the mark. There 
 was no rest. There was no soft-pedal business. It was a big, 
 hard, two-fisted campaign, and he who dallied was a dastard; 
 and he who doubted was roundly damned ! 
 
 Two other arguments began to be used: (1) that China 
 associate herself with the United States — an informal alli- 
 ance of two Republics, and (2) that China with the help 
 of her sister Republic would then be able to checkmate the 
 ambitious designs of Japan. 
 
 As to the former point, "a long course of argument wasj 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 93 
 
 necessary to make it plain that the Americans were not 
 asking China to join the Allies, but were asking China to 
 join America and the other neutrals, which was an entirely 
 different matter." Mr. Millard says that ** among for- 
 eigners in China, except Japanese, there was almost una- 
 nimity of opinion that China's opportunity to escape for- 
 eign domination and a further restriction of her autonomy 
 and territory lay in getting under the wing of America." 
 So far as the Chinese listened to any words of mi*ne, I 
 warned them that all this fine talk was illusive and that 
 once started on the slippery down-hill path, it would not 
 be long before China would, willy nilly, take orders from 
 all the Allies, and that Japan would not be found in that 
 dread day the smallest and most gentle. 
 
 As to the second point, the Chinese were ready enough 
 to put a check on Japan, but they were apprehensive. And 
 there "was more than apprehension." There was "actual 
 fear" — "fear of what the Japanese might do." From my 
 side (and I edited the only paper in English which sup- 
 ported the Chinese President in his policy of neutrality), 
 I warned the Chinese against anything like sharp practice 
 in resisting the Japanese. "What you do," I said again 
 and again, "let it be done aboveboard. Don't aspire to be 
 tricky." 
 
 Mr. Blythe again: 
 
 There was no let-up to the campaign. Dr. Eeinsch was inde- 
 fatigible. He had repeated audiences with the President and with 
 the Premier. He worked night and day, and he captained the 
 squad that was working with him. . . . 
 
 At this juncture Dr. Reinsch rose and declared himself in a 
 vigorous and American manner. He told the Chinese exactly 
 what was proposed to them; what the benefits to China would be. 
 And he also told them that their attempt at a compromise would 
 not suffice. They must go the distance or not start. Also, the 
 Flying Wedge enunciated the same sentiments — not in the diplo- 
 
94 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 hiatie language employed by Dr. Reinsch, mayhap, but in words 
 that were to the point. No compromise! That was the watch- 
 word. All or nothing! To be sure, we didn't expect a definite 
 break in diplomatic relations; but we demanded just that, none 
 the less. What we wanted was an adequate declaration that would 
 align China with the United States, and were content to leave the 
 question of breaking off diplomatic relations to a later date. 
 The Chinese did not know this, and they were much perturbed 
 Chinese. They argued shrewdly that they had no grievance with 
 Germany; that there had been no situation anterior; and that to 
 do this thing would be like walking up and assaulting an old and 
 unoffending friend. 
 
 Thus the American Minister in Peking and his coterie 
 of friends were aspiring to high diplomacy of a typical 
 kind, so familiar in past ages; they were playing politics, 
 and the Chinese were the tools. There can be no doubt of 
 Dr. Reinsch 's friendly intentions in China's interests, but 
 one may well doubt the wisdom or utility of his diplomatic 
 venture. 
 
 The result was the first step, namely, a mere formal 
 dispatch from the Chinese Foreign Office to the German 
 Minister, protesting against Germany's method of waging 
 war and advising in solemn terms a speedy reversal of 
 policy. In phraseology and moral ideas China was, indeed, 
 aligned with the United States. As to the authorship of 
 the document, supposedly prepared by Mr. C. C. Wu, act- 
 ing for his father who was laid aside by illness and was 
 being medically treated by a German physician, Samuel 
 G. Blythe says : 
 
 The form of the Notes was to be decided. It is not necessary 
 to say when or where or by whom the Note to Germany and the 
 Note to the United States, presented by China, were written. 
 All that is necessary is to say that before these Notes were agreed 
 upon by the Cabinet and given to the German Minister and to 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 95 
 
 the American Minister, they were entirely satisfactory both in 
 manner and in matter to all intimately concerned. 
 
 The dispatch to the German Minister, dated February 9, 
 five days after the receipt by the Chinese Government of 
 the American Minister's dispatch, contains this magnifi- 
 cently conceived sentence: 
 
 The new measures of submarine warfare inau^rated by Ger- 
 many, imperilling the lives and property of Chinese citizens to 
 even a gi-eater extent than the measures previously taken which 
 have already cost China so many lives, constitute a violation of the 
 principles of international law at present in force, and an inter- 
 ference with legitimate commercial intercourse between neutral 
 states and between neutral states and belligerent powers; if we 
 submit to this method of warfare it will be equivalent to an 
 admission on our part that this arbitraiy and unjustifiable course 
 of action is in accordance with international law. 
 
 Beside the rebuke and protest, the Note contained this 
 warning — it might almost be called an ultimatum — con- 
 ceived by a brilliant brain: 
 
 In case, contrary to its expectations, its protest be ineffectual, 
 the Government of the Chinese Republic will be constrained, to its 
 profound regret, to sever diplomatic relations at present existing 
 between the two countries. It is necessary to add that the atti- 
 tude of the Chinese Government has been dictated purely by the 
 desire to further the cause of the world's peace and the mainte- 
 nance of the sanctity of international law. 
 
 The Chinese were delighted with their literary effort and 
 diplomatic ingenuity. In fact the version in English far 
 surpassed the version in Chinese. Eugene Chen, editor of 
 the Peking Gazette, exulted that the two Republics were 
 taking together such a lofty moral position. He wrote; 
 
96 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 The decision arrived at is in every sense a victory of the 
 younger intellectual forces over the older mandarinate, whose 
 traditions of laissez faire and spineless diplomacy have hitherto 
 cost China so much. 
 
 Miss La Motte * gives expression to a somewhat prevalent 
 view: 
 
 Again I marvelled at the lofty tone of this note, and wondered 
 how this moral strength had been so suddenly acquired. Thought 
 I to myself, can this be poor old browbeaten China — humbled 
 and prostrate before the Powers of Europe, unable to protest 
 when her territory is snatched away from her, — now suddenly 
 giving voice to these exalted ideas'? Does it not seem rather 
 ludicrous that she should suddenly proclaim herself the upholder 
 of international law? Like Moses of old, she is now stretching 
 forth her arms; but who are they who uphold those arms? These 
 solemn notes are given forth to the world, and the world is asked 
 to believe sincerely, as China herself states, that they were " dic- 
 tated purely by the desire to further the cause of the world's 
 peace and by the maintenance of the sanctity of international 
 law." Let us believe it, if we can. 
 
 For the moment the Chinese were captivated by an hal- 
 lucination. 
 
 There are those who now blame the American Minister 
 for giving assurance of help to the Chinese Government 
 and which the President failed at the Peace Conference to 
 have realized. He would, indeed, be to blame, if he was not 
 authorized by the President. Others blamed the President 
 for not guaranteeing to China all that she had been led to 
 believe was to be hers. But here it is to be supposed that he 
 authorized assurances to China. Discrimination here is 
 most important. To be sure, the President was the one re- 
 sponsible for requesting China along with other neutral 
 nations to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, as an- 
 
 » " Peking Dust," p. 142. 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 97 
 
 PoajQced in his Message to Congress, but he was not to blame 
 jfor all of China's subsequent entanglements for the very 
 reason that what he definitely authorized was the official 
 presentation of his personal request. What occurred in 
 Peking in the way of assurance* of American help must be 
 traced to the difficulties of executing the President's re- 
 quest and to the policy pursued in reference to what is 
 called both the first and second steps of the Peking Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 What the President has understood as to his own inten- 
 tions in early 1917 has been made clear in the conversation, 
 August 19, 1919, between the President and the Senatorial 
 Committee of Foreign Affairs. I quote: 
 
 Senator Johnson — Did China enter the war upon our advice, 
 the advice of the United States? 
 
 The President — I cannot tell, sir. We advised her to enter and 
 she soon after did. Whether she had sought our advice, and 
 whether that was the persuasive advice or not, I do not know. 
 
 As will be seen in the subsequent discussion of China's 
 taking the third step, that of declaring war, the chief factor 
 or ''persuasive voice" was Japan, while Great Britain and 
 France came next in point of persuasiveness, and the 
 United States was a passive third. It was in the initial 
 stages of persuading China to threaten and warn Germany 
 and then to sever diplomatic relations that the American 
 Government was the active factor and "persuasive voice." 
 What the President recognizes to be his responsibility in 
 those initial stages is further disclosed in this peculiar 
 "official inquiry": 
 
 Senator Johnson — Do you recall, Mr. President, that preceding 
 that advice we had asked China, as one of the neutral nations, to 
 sever diplomatic relations with Germany? 
 
 Mr. President — I do not recall, Senator. I am sure Mr. 
 ^Lansing can tell, though, from the records of the department. 
 
98 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Senator Johnson — Do you know, Mr. President, whether or not 
 our Government stated to China that if China would enter the 
 war we would protect her interests at the Peace Conference t 
 
 The President — ^We made no promises. 
 
 It is quite likely that no promise in this identical form 
 was given. It is equally probable that the President him- 
 self was not kept posted as to the real form of assurances 
 which lured the Chinese Government on to coming danger. 
 
 As to the arguments advanced by Americans in Peking 
 for embroiling China in the war the Allied Ministers in 
 Peking passed no criticism so long as the end was attained. 
 They were conscious that the best way to get China started 
 on the war-path was to leave the counselling to America 
 alone, and that the two arguments of aligning China with 
 the sister republic and of putting a check to Japan's de- 
 signs were more impelling than any argument of their 
 own. 
 
 Japan, on the other hand, was both jealous and indignant 
 at American intrusion and at the kind of argument used. 
 Her ingenuity was equal to the occasion. Hitherto she had 
 opposed all plans for bringing China into the war, now she 
 suddenly wheeled around, rushed in ahead of the American 
 propagandists, and ever since has held the position of pre- 
 dominance, superior not only to American influence in 
 China, but to that of the British and French. She was 
 more insistent than any American or European that China 
 must delay no longer to sever relations with Germany, not 
 because she hated Germany, but because she could give good 
 proof that what Americans and Europeans could not do, 
 she was able to do. 
 
 (2) We thus come to the second step, that of severing 
 diplomatic relations with Germany. The campaign against 
 China for effecting this object was triangular. The Chinese 
 who argued for action grew in numbers and were of three 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 99 
 
 groups according to the leadership to which they attached 
 themselves. One group advanced the argument that China 
 should align herself with the United States ; this was mostly 
 the Young China party. The second group argued that 
 China should align herself with the Allies, meaning Euro- 
 pean Allies, as against the Central Powers and Turkey; 
 this was under the leadership of returned students from 
 those countries and of those who had held offices at the 
 European capitals. The third group did not so much 
 argue, as they secretly plotted, to bring China and Japan 
 into closer relations under Japan's military direction; this 
 was composed of the pro-Japan party, which grew stronger 
 as the war continued and as China's entanglements in- 
 creased. 
 
 The Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, fell under the in- 
 fluence of the third group and of Japan. In a conversation 
 which I had with him at the time, he said, "We are bound 
 to take the second step. We are helpless. We are pressed 
 to act, ' ' meaning the pressure of Japan, which worked with 
 no ostentation or open propaganda. 
 
 Dr. Wu Ting-fang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his 
 young son, C. C. Wu, joined the American group; they, 
 very reasonably, thought it best that China should have a 
 place at the Peace Table. 
 
 Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs when 
 Japan presented the Twenty-one Demands, and once Min- 
 ister to France, Mr, Liang Chi-chiao, the noted reformer 
 and active participant in the revolution against Yuan Shih- 
 kai's monarchical movement, and Mr. Tsai Yun-pei, noted 
 educationist, who had just returned from a visit to Europe, 
 were three of the strongest agents of the pro-Ally party. 
 Really it was a pro-French party. 
 
 Tsao Yu-lin, who had been educated in Japan, and was 
 Minister in the Chinese Government, Lu Tsung-yu, for- 
 merly Minister to Japan, and Chang Tsung-hsiang, Min- 
 
100 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 ister to Japan during these critical times, were of the pro- 
 Japan party. 
 
 Agitation flourished as never before. Money in abun- 
 dance was forthcoming to make sure all doubtful ones. The 
 Allied Legations of Europe, Japan and the United States, 
 all from different angles, pressed the Chinese to make what 
 was called a "masculine decision." President Li Yuan- 
 hung was chief of the party of strict neutrality. He wished 
 to see China on friendly terms with all nations. More than 
 all, he abhorred intrigues, secrecy, trickery and bribery. 
 His one desire was to see China a real Republic, and that 
 he and all officials abide by the law and Constitution. At 
 the same time he refused to force his own will on the Gov- 
 ernment. As the situation became more intense, and his 
 own views clashed with those of the Premier and the Cab- 
 inet and the whole group of agitators, he consented to refer 
 the matter of severance of relations with Germany to the 
 two Houses of Parliament, and to submit his own judg- 
 ment to the decision of the people's representatives. 
 
 The Lower House, March 10, voted 330 to 87 in favour 
 of the Cabinet 's recommendation. The Upper House voted 
 the next day, 158 to 37. 
 
 By a strange coincidence the reply of the German Gov- 
 ernment to the Chinese dispatch of February 9 was made 
 on the same day. It had no effect in altering the general 
 result of the campaign of enlightenment. The German Min- 
 ister and his staff received their passports, March 14. Many 
 Chinese officials really regretted the departure of Admiral 
 von Hintze, who had commended himself and his govern- 
 ment by his geniality as well as by his thoughtfulness for 
 China's best interests. It was not till March 25 that he and 
 his suite left Peking, some of the Chinese having taken the 
 unusual position that he might live on quietly at some sea- 
 side resort till the war came to an end ; this, they thought, 
 would not be far away. 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE ' 101 
 
 (3) The third step, most serious of all, but one in which 
 the United States was less implicated, was to get China to 
 declare war. Here confusion, already great, became worse 
 confounded. For five months China's turmoil increased 
 from day to day and from one plot into another. China 
 became a land of upheaval and strife, of the passions of 
 war and of autocratic domination. 
 
 The Premier and his coterie argued that the third step 
 was logical and even necessary. The President favoured a 
 declaration of war even less than he had favoured the break 
 in diplomatic relations. Members of Parliament, who saw 
 that all the nice things which the Allies had suggested as 
 quite possible, and which the Premier had represented as 
 ** assurances," were mere fancies of an excited brain, be- 
 came antagonistic to the Premier and his proposals of war. 
 The Young China party, while ready for war, all the more 
 that the United States had declared war in April, was not so 
 ready to allow leadership and added power to the Premier 
 and his military associates. The war issue had brought 
 schism between the President and the Premier, and now 
 was bringing schism between Parliament and the Premier, 
 between democracy and militarism. There was a growing 
 feeling that China had done enough in connection with 
 the European War, and that more should not be expected 
 unless some decided advantages were to appear. 
 
 As to the change going on in the arguments used, I quote 
 from the Washington correspondent of the New York 
 Tribune for April 12, 1917 : 
 
 It is understood that the principal question confronting the 
 Peking Government at this moment is not whether China should 
 enter the war, as this virtually has been decided, but whether 
 China should continue to align herself with the United States and 
 follow this country's lead, or should join the Entente Alliance 
 under the leadership and direction of Japan, If a decision fol- 
 lowing the latter course is made it is believed here that Japan 
 
102 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 •will obtain control of China's army and military resources, and 
 establish a semi-protectorate over China that would make it dif- 
 ficult for either China or the other Powers to induce Japan to sur- 
 render after the war. 
 
 The Premier towards the end of April called a confer- 
 ence of all the Military Governors, who decided to follow 
 the lead of their military chief. The military element was 
 now in the saddle. On May 1, the Cabinet unanimously 
 decided in favour of a declaration of war. The President, 
 still opposed to these war schemes, consented in the con- 
 stitutional way to refer the matter to Parliament. A dis- 
 patch was sent to Parliament by the President, on May 7. 
 By May 10, Parliament met to discuss and decide. A howl- 
 ing mob, hired by the militarists, gathered outside Parlia- 
 ment building, to force compliance to the patriotic demand 
 for war. Naturally Parliament refused to act under such 
 methods of coercion. Moreover, all of the Cabinet Min- 
 isters except one resigned. The Military Governors sup- 
 porting the Premier memorialized the President to dissolve 
 Parliament. Being rebuffed, they retired to Tientsin. The 
 Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, was dismissed from ofSce 
 by mandate of the President, and Dr. Wu Ting-fang be- 
 came acting Premier. The militarists formed a "Provi- 
 sional Government" of their own in Tientsin. Different 
 provinces or their Military Governors declared independ- 
 ence. The cry was, "On to Peking!" The President 
 was firm, and issued a proclamation to warn these of- 
 ficers of the government who were plotting revolt. General 
 Chang Hsun, the most reactionary of all, but holding ideas 
 of his own, was invited to mediate. He arrived in Tientsin 
 June 7. An ultimatum from the mediator came to the 
 President to dissolve Parliament. The mediator, moreover, 
 had troops, as had the Premier and Military Governors. 
 The President yielded and prepared a mandate for Dr. Wu 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 103 
 
 Ting-fang to countersign. This veteran statesman showed 
 a lofty courage: "You may take off my head, but I will 
 sign no such mandate." He was allowed to retire. An- 
 other man was chosen, who signed, and the mandate went 
 forth. Parliament disappeared, and the militarists were 
 in the saddle. In fact, the Republic was no more; this was 
 the result of a crusade for war. Men who wanted war with 
 Germany were having war with themselves. Civil strife 
 had begun. Meanwhile, in all this confusion and lawless- 
 ness, General Chang Hsun came with his soldiers to Pe- 
 king, compelled more mandates to be issued, declared the 
 restoration of the Monarchy, and then by a quick reversal 
 was in a few days defeated by the troops of the ex-premier, 
 General Tuan Chi-jui. 
 
 Most of the Parliamentarians retired to Shanghai and 
 then to Canton, where they established a "Constitutional 
 Government." President Li Yuan-hung, chagrined at his 
 failure, resigned, and the Vice-President, General Feng 
 Kuo-chang, came to Peking as acting President. General 
 Tuan Chi-jui, who had once more shown his loyalty to the 
 Republic, again became Premier, but without sanction of 
 a Parliament. The militarists were in complete possession. 
 The war issue could again come to the front with chance of 
 favourable consideration. 
 
 So long as the act of inducing China to enter the war 
 was looked upon as a great achievement for a worthy cause, 
 credit was given to Dr. Reinsch ; but no sooner did the act 
 begin to appear unwise than America's responsibility began 
 to be denied. Thus W. Reginald Wheeler^ writes, in a 
 foot-note however: 
 
 The personal influence of the American Minister and his asso- 
 ciates at Peking, throughout all the negotiations leading up finally 
 to a declaration of war, was one of the strongest factors in induc- 
 ing China to join the Allies. 
 
 * " China and the World War," p. 79. 
 
104 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Whatever the purpose of the American Minister, the 
 policy of the American Government, and of Americans 
 familiar with Chinese conditions, was, if not hostile to the 
 inoculation of China with the war-fever, at least of a neg- 
 ative and somewhat inoperative character. It is not quite 
 the truth to say that China entered the war at America's 
 invitation. 
 
 During the months of turmoil and civil strife, the Amer- 
 ican Minister, as if to make amends for past zeal, was in- 
 structed to send, on June 5, the following dispatch to the 
 Chinese Government : 
 
 The Government of the United States learns with the most pro- 
 found regret of the dissension in China and desires to express the 
 most sincere desire that tranquillity and political co-ordination 
 may be forthwith re-established. 
 
 The entry of China into war with Germany — or the continuance 
 of the status quo of her relations with that Government — are mat- 
 ters of secondary consideration. 
 
 The principal necessity for China is to resume and continue her 
 political entity, to proceed along the road of national development 
 on which she has made such marked progress. 
 
 With the form of Government in China or the personnel which 
 administers the Government, the United States has an interest 
 only in so far as its friendship impels it to be of service to China. 
 But in the maintenance by China of one central, united and alone 
 responsible Government, the United States is deeply interested and 
 now expresses the very sincere hope that China, in her own inter- 
 est, and in that of the world, will immediately set aside her 
 factional political disputes, and that all parties and persons will 
 work for the re-establishment of a co-ordinate Government and 
 the assumption of that place among the Powers of the world to 
 which China is so justly entitled, but the full attainment of which 
 is impossible in the midst of internal discord. 
 
 This was another of America's admirably phrased mes- 
 sages to China. To one not trained in the manoeuvrings 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 105 
 
 of diplomacy it would seem that real interest in China 
 might have been better effected by keeping the war issue 
 entirely away from China's political life. If it had never 
 been broached by the American Government or pushed by 
 the persuasive reasonings of Americans the European 
 Allies would have had no lever to move China to enter 
 the war and no raison d'etre to intrigue with Japan to 
 consent to the general scheme. Without the war issue, Par- 
 liament would hardly have been dissolved, and civil strife 
 have had no chance to begin. 
 
 Shortly before the United States sent this Note, an Eng- 
 lish correspondent of the North China Herald, David 
 Fraser, on May 17, expressed his doubts as to the wisdom 
 of seeking Japan's co-operation. He wrote thus: 
 
 It was one thing to admit Germany to a special position in 
 Shantung because her military power could never have been ex- 
 erted in the Far East. It is quite another thing to see Japan 
 become so privileged, ambitious as she is of predominance in 
 China. 
 
 The action of the United States Government in issuing 
 a warning to China probably resulted in more harm than 
 good. (1) The Note was futile in restoring peace to China. 
 (2) The action of the American Government soon changed 
 to its original form, of advising China to follow the United 
 States and enter the war, thereby nullifying the force of 
 the warning. (3) Japan was offended at American in- 
 trusion into Chinese affairs, without consulting the Powers 
 most concerned. Thus, then, as all through the subsequent 
 events of war and peace, China, the United States, the 
 Entente Allies and Japan, all of whom were associated in 
 the overthrow of Germany, were jealous and suspicious of 
 each other, now giving more power to Japan and then 
 trying to withdraw it. 
 
106 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 When General Tuan Chi-jui again became Premiei', JvAyf 
 15, and General Feng Kuo-ehang formally became Pres- 
 ident, August 1, little argument was needed to bring to a 
 successful end the long campaign of inducing China to 
 take part in the Great War. The Cabinet and the Pres- 
 ident declared war against both Germany and Austria- 
 Hungary, August 14. No parliamentary sanction was pos- 
 sible. China's entrance into the war was an autocratic 
 move, not a democratic one, and yet China, too, professed 
 to believe that she was fighting to make the world * ' safe for 
 democracy. ' ' 
 
 China declared war more at the behest of Japan than 
 from the irresistible pressure of public sentiment. There 
 were stronger reasons against the fatal action than for it. 
 Arguments on both sides turned Peking into a Debating 
 Society, but they were never the propelling force. Japan 
 held the reins. 
 
 Some of China's leaders who were opposed to a declara- 
 tion of war were ex-President Li Yuan-hung, military 
 leader of the first revolution ; Dr. Sun Yat-sen, great revo- 
 lutionist and first Provisional President ; Tang Shao-yi, first 
 Premier; and Kang Yiu-wei, the noted reformer of 1898, 
 and one who still held fast his original views for twenty 
 years. Most of the Chambers of Commerce, fearful of the 
 growing power of the military autocrats, and of the spread 
 of internal strife, counselled neutrality so far as was then 
 possible. 
 
 The chief argument in support of a declaration of war 
 was the financial one. On the one hand China would be 
 free from paying the enemy countries monies due them, 
 altogether amounting to $170,000,000, and on the other 
 could receive from abroad a big loan, estimated at $200,- 
 000,000 to be floated if not in London, Paris or New York, 
 at least in Japan. Japan's proffered aid in reality was 
 already assured. 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 107 
 
 Another reason was that having put their hand to the 
 plough, the Chinese should not look back. There could be no 
 assurance of having Allied promises fulfilled, if China 
 stopped halfway. With an actual declaration of war, one 
 blessing after another would follow. 
 
 Dr. George E. Morrison, the President's diplomatic ad- 
 visor, thought out two other reasons, which carried weight 
 with the intellectuals, though not with the mass of the 
 people. They were : 
 
 By terminating her treaties with Germany China would be able 
 to make new and more advantageous treaties after the war, and 
 possibly have a general revision of treaties. 
 
 In the Customs there are 118 Germans employed, 41 in the 
 indoor and 77 in the outdoor. By their removal vacancies would 
 be made which could be filled by Chinese students, of whom 24 
 per year are turned out by the Customs College and are waiting 
 employment. 
 
 Another reason, which had had more weight at the open- 
 ing of the crusade by the American Minister than after 
 the political upheaval, was that through representation at 
 the coming Peace Conference all China's international 
 problems could be solved and past wrongs could be righted. 
 This was the dream-land in which not a few continued to 
 live until the day the Versailles Treaty was signed. 
 
 The arguments opposed to the declaration of war may 
 be summarized as follows: 
 
 1. As the war issue had led China into confusion, it was 
 wiser to put it to one side. 
 
 2. China's internal difficulties were too many and too 
 serious to allow scope for action on outside and far distant 
 questions. Better for China to reorganize than to enter 
 the European War. 
 
 3. As complications had already arisen, more must be 
 expected, if China joined one side or the other. 
 
108 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 4. So long as the people saw no reason for the war, and 
 there was no Parliament to sanction, the declaration of war 
 had better be postponed. 
 
 5. Promises of outside help must be taken as illusory. 
 China had better start out to help herself. 
 
 6. If China declared war, she would be compelled to take 
 orders from others, and to that degree lose her power of 
 independent action. A strong nation like the United States 
 might avoid subjection to the will of others, but not a weak 
 nation like China. 
 
 7. Many who had favoured war as an abstract proposi- 
 tion, were opposed to the way the war was declared and to 
 the type of government consummating the act. In a word, 
 it was not the Chinese nation, but the Peking Government 
 that was to make the decision. 
 
 8. To use a figure of speech, China was asked to spring 
 into the fire with no weapons to put the fire out. Or to use 
 another figure, China was asked to float out to the whirl- 
 pool, from which she would then be admonished to escape 
 and come to the shore. 
 
 The views of Dr. Sun Yat-sen were made known in an 
 open letter to Premier Lloyd George as early as March 7. 
 They were ridiculed by the Allied press (not by the Jap- 
 anese) , but at this later date may be regarded as good fore- 
 sight. I quote in part: 
 
 ... I have been approached by prominent English to con- 
 sider the question of China joining the Allies, After careful 
 study I come to the conclusion that it would be disastrous to both 
 countries should China break her neutrality. For China is yet an 
 infant Republic and as a nation she may be likened to a sick man 
 just entering the hospital of constitutionalism. Unable to look 
 after herself at this stage, she needs careful nursing and support. 
 Therefore China cannot be regarded as an organized country. She 
 is held intact only by custom and sentiment of a peace-loving 
 
AMEEICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 109 
 
 people. But at once, should there arise discord, general anarchy 
 would result. . . . 
 
 . . . Should China enter the war, it would prove dangerous 
 to her national life and injurious to the prestige of England in 
 the Far East. The mere desire to get China to join the Allies is 
 to Chinese minds a confession of the Allies' inability to cope 
 with Germany. Just now comes Premier Tuan's report to the 
 President that the Entente Powers are coercing China to join the 
 Allies. Already the question has raised bitter dissensions among 
 our statesmen. Discord now may evoke anarchism which will 
 arouse the two strong but perilous elements in China, anti-foreign 
 fanatics and Mohammedans. 
 
 The dissensions which arose after Dr. Sun penned these 
 words, and which have continued to the present, show the 
 foreign thinker and schemer that it may be prudent as to 
 things Chinese to give heed to the warnings of the Chinese, 
 who place first the interests of their own country. 
 
 I may here recount part of a conversation with President 
 Feng Kuo-chang, August 13, the day before he issued the 
 declaration of war. 
 
 I said to him: "There is no objection to China's declar- 
 ing war on Germany, if that is all. It will be a declaration, 
 but nothing will be done. Germany has no troops or ships 
 to send here, and you are not likely to send any to fight 
 Germany. What I fear is that you will have to join the 
 Allies, of whom Japan is chief, and henceforth you will 
 have to obey them. This wiU be your disaster." 
 
 "I am opposed to joining either side," the President 
 said, and then added: "China will fight Germany inde- 
 pendently. China is opposed to violations of international 
 law, and therefore joins with the United States in opposing 
 such violations. We will take orders from no one." 
 
 "Very good," I replied, "I hope so. Wait and see." 
 
 This idea of making war without joining the Allied na- 
 tions, including Japan, was where President Feng differed 
 
110 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 from the more zealous agitators. Possibly he had derived 
 the idea from President Wilson. Before leaving Nanking 
 for Peking, late in July, to enter the Presidential Palace, 
 he made a speech containing these words : 
 
 Originally I was absolutely opposed to the declaration of war. 
 But after my attempts to oppose it proved futile, I have had to 
 follow the general trend of public opinion. Although I now have 
 no objection to the declaration of war upon Germany, yet I am 
 still opposed to the idea of my country entering into alliance 
 with the Entente Powers. If our entry into the war on the side 
 of the Entente Powers becomes a matter of imperative necessity, 
 we may do so on certain conditions, without which I deem it were 
 better for us to keep out of it. For it must be understood that in 
 the case of declaring war upon Germany independently, we can do 
 so at our own perfect will, but if we go to war on the side of 
 the Entente, we should not be as free as we should like to be. 
 
 Here, then, we are able first to detect the varying course 
 Chinese thought had taken from those early days in Feb- 
 ruary. The scheme of China aligning herself with the 
 United States had vanished, the subsequent scheme of join- 
 ing the Entente Allies was not accepted by all the Chinese, 
 and was advocated by Japan only on the understanding 
 that she was to act for the Entente in Far Eastern affairs, 
 and might ultimately become the sole Ally of China. 
 
 As illustrating the attempt to get China to do what the 
 new President was anxious not to do, I cite an instance on 
 August 6, when the seven Ministers for France, Portugal, 
 Russia, Japan, Belgium, Great Britain, and the United 
 States had audience with the new President. The capable 
 French Minister, M. Conty, was spokesman for the group. 
 He not only extended congratulations as befitted a cere- 
 monial call, but seized the opportunity to express apprecia- 
 tion that China was going to declare war on Germany. He 
 added the hope that the bonds between China and these 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 111 
 
 Allied nations would be cemented by a closer association in 
 the great struggle. These words did not harmonize with 
 the American Note of warning, issued shortly before. 
 Neither did they harmonize with President Feng's explicit 
 desire that China go to war in an independent capacity.^ 
 Thomas F. Millard ^ writes thus of the purposes of Japan : 
 
 When it was evident that the united urging of the American, 
 British and French Grovernments, and the influence of individual 
 foreigners, would bring China into the war, Japanese diplomacy 
 made a characteristic manoeuvre. The Chinese Government was 
 advised by Japan to declare war as one of the Allies, and not as 
 a separate nation. This was a scheme to detach China from the 
 United States, which power never had formally joined the Allies, 
 and attach her to the Allies, thereby making her a part of and 
 subject to the private agreements made among the nations com- 
 posing the original alliance. 
 
 The climax of the tragic and momentous moulding of 
 China's destiny received a touch of pleasant humour from 
 the hand of the Minister for Austria-Hungary, Baron von 
 Rosthorn, who had remained in Peking till the middle of 
 August, 1917. This diplomat had originally been in the 
 Chinese Customs Service, was a Chinese sinologue, and was 
 a protagonist of Chinese rights. His term of service in 
 the Legation was longer than that of all the seven Ministers 
 combined who formed the opposing group. 
 
 On the day war was declared by the Peking Government, 
 he sent to the Chinese Minister this most unusual Note : 
 
 Peking, August 14, 1917. 
 YouB Excellency, 
 
 I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of 
 today of the following tenour: 
 
 (Text of Chinese Note) 
 
 * See Appendix II. 
 
 * " Democracy and the Eastern Question," p. 131. 
 
112 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 In reply I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I 
 have taken cognizance of your note and am awaiting instructions 
 from my Government. 
 
 I cannot here enter into the arguments contained in the declara- 
 tion of war, but feel bound to state that I must consider this 
 declaration as unconstitutional and illegal, seeing that according 
 to so high an authority as the former President Li Yuan-Hung 
 Such a declaration requires the approbation of both houses of 
 Parliament. 
 
 Etc., etc. 
 
 II. The Intrigue going on in ToMo to embroil China in 
 the war. 
 
 To make clear the peculiar windings of diplomacy in 
 inducing China to take the three steps that bound China to 
 one group of warring nations, a study must be made of 
 the greater and wider intrigue going on in Tokio, in which 
 the Governments of Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, 
 and at first Russia, all had a part. 
 
 As soon as the Entente Allies detected that the United 
 States was seeking in early February to take the lead in 
 Oriental polities by inducing China to align herself with 
 the sister Republic in all war measures, the Ambassadors in 
 Tokio for Russia, Great Britain, France and Italy secretly 
 negotiated with Japan as to Japan's connections with 
 China's war measures. The one intrigue conflicted with 
 the other. The American Legation in Peking was pointing 
 out how China could get ahead of Japan in reference to 
 German and other rights which Japan had planned to ap- 
 propriate. At the same time the four European Embassies 
 were pointing out to Japan how she could appropriate all 
 German rights not only in Shantung but in the German 
 colonies north of the equator. Europe agreed with the 
 United States, a future associate in the war, in the one 
 matter of arraying China against Germany. But Japan 
 had previously resisted the European advice that China 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 113 
 
 should enter the war. To resist American advice in the 
 same direction was less feasible, for China would probably 
 accept the advice. Japan, therefore, would do well to ac- 
 cede to the combined advice of Europe and America, if so 
 be that her gains would be greater. To induce Japan to 
 allow China, first to break with Germany and then to de- 
 clare war, all that was necessary was to give Japan a 
 reasonable quid pro quo. This was to guarantee to Japan, 
 whatever China or the United States might wish, all the 
 German rights in Shantung and the South Seas north of 
 the equator. In making this guarantee, which proved of 
 highest value at the Paris Peace Conference, Japan, too, 
 was requested to give a quid pro quo, namely, to assist in 
 bringing about the repatriation of all Germans, and the 
 requisition of German commercial houses in China. In fact 
 it seems clear that the British and French were more anx- 
 ious to consummate these last designs than to lead China 
 into the war. China 's entrance into war was the means for 
 facilitating and legalizing the total elimination of Germans 
 from China and the destruction of German trade. 
 
 Thus while China supposed, at American suggestion, that 
 her entrance into war would afford her the chance of ter- 
 minating treaties with Germany and possibly of nullifying 
 the agreements with Japan of 1915, and so of restoring all 
 German rights to China, the European Allies were conniv- 
 ing with Japan, unknown to China or to the United States, 
 that what China hoped to get would all pass to Japan. If 
 these facts had been known to the Peking Government, the 
 arguments of all groups of outside agitators would have 
 lost most of their persuasiveness. As to the United States, 
 even as late as August 11 and 19, 1919, both President 
 Wilson and the Secretary of State asserted that they had 
 been kept in ignorance of these wonderful compacts of our 
 associates in war. 
 
 One informing document is a dispatch of Viseoimt 
 
114 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Motono, February 19 (1917), to the French and Russian 
 Ambassadors. It is as follows: 
 
 ... In view of recent developments in the general situation 
 and in view of the particular arrangements concerning peace 
 conditions such as arrangements relative to the disposition of the 
 Bosporus, Constantinople and the Dardanelles, being already 
 under discussion by the Powers interested, the Imperial Japanese 
 Government believes that the moment has come for It also to 
 express Its desire relative to certain conditions of peace essential 
 to Japan and to submit them for the consideration of the Gov- 
 ernment of the French Republic. 
 
 The French Government is thoroughly informed of all the ef- 
 forts the Japanese Government has made in a general manner to 
 accomplish its task with the present war, and particularly to 
 guarantee for the future the peace of Oriental Asia and the 
 security of the Japanese Empire, for which it is absolutely neces- 
 sary to take from Germany its bases of political, military and 
 economic activity in the Far East. 
 
 Under these conditions the Imperial Japanese Government pro- 
 poses to demand from Germany at the time of the peace negotia- 
 tions the surrender of the territorial rights and special interests 
 Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands 
 situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean. 
 
 The Imperial Japanese Government confidently hopes the Gov- 
 ernment of the French Republic, realizing the legitimacy of these 
 demands, wUl give assurance that, her case being proved, Japan 
 may count upon their full support on this question. . . .^ 
 
 The reply of the French Ambassador at Tokio, under 
 date of March 2, 1917, reads thus : 
 
 The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give 
 the Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of 
 the Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shan- 
 tung and the German Islands on the Pacific north of the equator. 
 
 * Charles A. Selden, New York Times, April 12, 1919. 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE ll5 
 
 It also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese 
 Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed 
 before the war in this Chinese province and these islands. 
 
 M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its sup- 
 port to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations 
 with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. 
 The consequences in China should be the following: 
 
 First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and 
 consuls ; 
 
 Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to 
 leave Chinese territory; 
 
 Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and 
 the ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at 
 the disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and 
 Portugal ; 
 
 Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established 
 in China; forfeiting the rights of the Germans in the Concessions 
 she possesses in certain parts of China.^ 
 
 The fact that these secret Agreements were not disclosed 
 to the Peking Government bespeaks no real friendliness to 
 China. The fact that they were not disclosed to the Wash- 
 ington Government, at the very time America's help was 
 being sought by the Entente Allies, and at the time Amer- 
 ican arguments were deluding the Chinese, bespeaks no 
 real friendliness to the United States. This was hardly 
 playing the game. According to the statement of Secre- 
 tary Lansing, August 11, 1919, before the Senate Com- 
 mittee of Foreign Relations,^ neither Mr, Arthur Balfour, 
 nor M. Viviani, nor Viscount Ishii, on coming to the United 
 States in 1917 on special missions, confidential and far- 
 reaching, disclosed to any one in the American Government 
 the arrangements arrived at in Tokio the early part of the 
 same year. Senator Borah, at the same Committee meeting, 
 
 ^ Charles A. Selden, New York Times Paris correspondent, April 21, 
 1919. 
 
 ' New York Sim, August 12, 1919. 
 
116 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 read the following from the records of the House of Com- 
 mons March 4, 1918 : 
 
 Mr. King asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether 
 there have been communicated to President Wilson copies of all 
 treaties, whether secret or public, and memoranda of all other 
 agreements or undertakings to which this country has become a 
 party since August 4, 1914; and if not, whether copies of all 
 such documents will be handed to the American Ambassador in 
 London ? 
 
 Balfour — The honourable Member may rest assured that Presi- 
 dent Wilson is kept fully informed by the Allies. 
 
 At least the Secretary of State was kept ignorant of these 
 arrangements made by the Allies in Tokio, for when Sen- 
 ator Borah asked Mr. Lansing, "Notwithstanding the state- 
 ment of Ishii and the statement of Balfour, it is a matter of 
 fact that the Secretary of State of the United States had 
 no knowledge of these treaties until after the signing of 
 the armistice, is it not?" Mr. Lansing replied: ''That is 
 true." It is even more likely that President Wilson was 
 left in ignorance. 
 
 More serious was the omission of informing China. She 
 was the one country vitally affected. Germany had no 
 rights in Shantung except as granted by China, the sover- 
 eign State. For American agents to urge on China the 
 severance of relations with Germany in order that China 
 might strengthen her position in Shantung as against both 
 Germany and Japan, at the very time that the Allies were 
 trying to eliminate China from having possession of Ger- 
 man rights that Japan might be the gainer, was hardly 
 playing fair with China, a past friend and a potential ally. 
 The rights which Germany had had in Shantung prior to 
 the war were all embraced within the bounds of China, not 
 of Japan. China, not Japan, had sole responsibility for the 
 disposal of German rights, German property, German title- 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 117 
 
 deeds and German investments within the confines of 
 China. Japan had the same responsibility within her own 
 confines. 
 
 It was a sorry spectacle this trickery and chicanery being 
 perpetrated on China. And, how blind was American 
 statecraft and how inconsistent American idealism to pro- 
 claim on one side of the globe righteousness, democracy, 
 open covenants and the emancipation of the oppressed, and 
 to share in intrigue, secrecy, selfishness and deception on 
 the other side of the globe. 
 
 In a general way, the United States was trying to help 
 China as against Japan, while Great Britain, France and 
 Italy were seemingly helping Japan as against China. The 
 American attitude to Japan, as represented by the doings of 
 the American Legation in Peking, was not hid from the 
 statesmen of Japan : but the attitude of the three European 
 Allies towards China, as revealed by their scheming in 
 Tokio, was the very opposite of what the Ministers in Pe- 
 king for Britain, France and Italy loudly proclaimed to 
 the Chinese. As we now read the facts, these six countries 
 not only were forming plots to overwhelm Germany, but 
 were at loggerheads with each other on the very eve of 
 combining against Germany. Above all, this medley of 
 war scheming was taking place during the months of Feb- 
 ruary and March before either the United States Congress 
 or the Chinese Parliament was asked to declare a state of 
 war with Germany. The intrigue was a motley mixture of 
 semi-neutrality and defiant belligerency. Secrecy envel- 
 oped all. Strange associations for President Wilson and 
 the American people, who from the founders' day have 
 stood for straightforward dealing with all peoples of men, 
 Oriental as well as Occidental. 
 
 Dr. Arthur J. Brown,^ referring to Japan's change of 
 mind in reference to China under influences so adroit and 
 
 * " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 436. 
 
118 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 unholy, comments thus: "Verily, dubious are the ways of 
 secret diplomacy." And he quotes from Dr. Frank J. 
 Goodnow of March 14, 1917 : 
 
 China would never have broken off relations but for urgings of 
 Japan, which has sinister designs against the integrity of China. 
 And unfortunately she will be able to carry out her scheme. One 
 obvious motive is the opportunity it wUl afford Japan to gain 
 control of China's army and navy, a step that will put her abso- 
 lutely at the Mikado's mercy. 
 
 The Englishman of the Far East has as a rule a high 
 sense of honour, a reputation for probity, straightforward 
 dealing and playing fair, but the diplomatic tactics pur- 
 sued in Tokio by the four European Allies were of the 
 Old World type, made feverish by contact with a sly kind 
 of Oriental diplomacy. There was in those days, on en- 
 trance into war of both the United States and China, a lot 
 of humbug, and some buncombe, a fair amount of self- 
 complacency and an immense amount of secrecy, inconsist- 
 encies galore, and selfish national ambition beyond measure. 
 
 A few days after the Chinese President issued the decla- 
 ration of war, all the eight Ministers of the new group 
 (arrayed against Grermany) sent to the Foreign Office in 
 Peking, in almost similar phraseology, notes of congratula- 
 tion and profound assurances of renewed friendship. I 
 append the one from the United States as being the one 
 nation whose word was more likely to be fulfilled. 
 
 . . . My Government is happily desirous of taking this op- 
 portunity to make it definitely known that in friendship, co- 
 operation and support my Government will do what it can to 
 enable China to enjoy the position and special regard that are 
 due to a great country. 
 
 The reception of such Notes had only one effect, to in- 
 spire in the Chinese breast hope and joy and to remove all 
 fears of future trouble. 
 
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 119 
 
 My views on the situation have been clarified by sub- 
 sequent events, but what I thought at the time is shown 
 in an editorial which I wrote, somewhat sceptically, I con- 
 fess, August 21 : 
 
 It is a pity that the Chinese Government and the various Allied 
 Legations have not given more publicity to the replies sent to the 
 Chinese Government by the Allied Ministers (including the 
 American) in congratulation of having another ally against 
 Germany. 
 
 China in entering the war at the behests of friendly advisors 
 from near and far was just a little tremulous as she neared the 
 fateful hour, but now she is assured, yea, seven times reassured, 
 that she will now have more gains than her fondest fancies had 
 painted for her. 
 
 We have had the impression, and we told President Feng 
 so, that the outlook for China had never been so hopeless. We 
 must reverse this extravagant statement, until facts prove that 
 our revised view is wrong. 
 
 Ministers Plenipotentiary of eight countries assure China 
 (yes, assure her) that she is now to receive their united " friend- 
 ship, solidarity and assistance." Japan goes still further. She 
 says, " That at this moment the friendship of these two countries 
 has been much enhanced and their relations have grown still 
 closer." This is comforting. Moreover, all the eight Ministers 
 point China forward and upward, for she is now to enjoy the 
 position " due to a great Power." 
 
 At one bound, by a simple Declaration of War, China attains 
 to all this glory, distinction and assured friendship of other 
 Powers. She has become with less trouble than Japan one of the 
 family of nations. 
 
 On our part we have no doubt but that the ex-Ministers for 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary would be pleased to write the 
 same Notes with the same assurances, if so be the Notes were not 
 returned. 
 
 Several years ago Japan took the lead in making an arrange- 
 ment with Great Britain, France and Russia, for guaranteeing 
 
120 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 equal opportunity in China to all nations, and the sovereign 
 independence of China. 
 
 Today she takes the lead — for leader she is — in bringing not 
 only Great Britain, France and Russia, but the United States, 
 Belgium, Italy and Portugal, to the policy of solidarity and 
 assistance. 
 
 Premier Tuan Chi-jui deserves all the honour he can get for 
 effecting this tangible result. 
 
 For half a year we have written upwards of 120 squibs against 
 the abandonment of neutrality and peace. We now see how 
 foolish we have been; China gets into no trouble at all, but has 
 abundant assurances of blessing that are never to end. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 A SERIES OP AGGRAVATIONS AND PERILS TO CHINA' 
 
 When the Peking Government, with no sanction of Parlia- 
 ment, declared war on the two Central Powers, August 14, 
 
 1917, the mass of the Chinese took the result with their 
 customary spirit of fatalism. What matter if the outcome 
 be good or bad ? What would happen was inevitable ; why 
 complain? Already China had been carried along for six 
 months by complex and hidden forces, as in a current, and 
 the future no man could see. That complications, en- 
 tanglements, annoyances, and all sorts of troubles, with 
 possible catastrophes, would arise, seemed to be a certainty. 
 War seldom brings blessing to the weak ; and China surely 
 was weak. Dr. Arthur J. Brown, writing at the close of 
 
 1918, says: ^ 
 
 Time alone will show whether China embroiled herself in the 
 world war to her benefit or to her hurt. We suspect that, in spite 
 of the virtuous and well-meant declarations of the various Powers 
 regarding " the rights of weaker nations," poor, helpless China 
 will get only what the representatives of stronger governments 
 deem expedient and that Japan will have a good deal to say as 
 to what that shall be. 
 
 Coincidentally the United States and China should fare 
 well, for the former declared war on Good Friday and the 
 latter on the day the Holy Pontiff made his appeal for 
 peace. 
 
 Most of the Japanese papers, more familiar than others 
 
 * " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 436. 
 
 121 
 
1^2 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 with the part played by the Japanese Government, wrote in 
 commendatory language of China's decision. One paper, 
 however, the Osaki Asahi, wrote in a different strain, a few 
 days prior to the decision, thus : 
 
 China's participation in the war has now become a matter of 
 time. No one has doubted that it will come. Now after Vice- 
 President Feng Kuo-ehang's arrival in Peking, the decision has 
 been arrived at. Whether it is necessary for her to take that 
 step or not is not the question now. An independent nation to 
 be forced by others to do anything, to talk about humanity which 
 is not in her mind and to declare war which is not necessary, is 
 indeed a regrettable thing from the point of view of national 
 existence of that nation. To be sure, even Japan is not free 
 from doing things which are not altogether necessary but because 
 forced by others. Some persons are inclined to regard Japan's 
 declaration of war against Germany merely from the point of 
 view of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. We supported the war 
 from the point of view of the Oriental problem, independently 
 of all else. As for the question of China's participation in the 
 war, judged from the history and effect of it, it is doubtful 
 whether it is advantageous to China or not. 
 
 As I viewed the probabilities at the time, I was more than 
 doubtful, I was pessimistic as to the outcome for China. In 
 a conversation with President Feng on the eve of declaring 
 war, I said : 
 
 ' ' I have seen China in many difficulties ; I passed through 
 the Boxer uprising; but I have never been so hopeless as 
 to China's future as I am now." 
 
 "And I, too," he replied, "have no hope." 
 
 China, even more than vigorous and prosperous America, 
 would have done well to heed these words of Washington's 
 Farewell Address : ' ' Harmony and liberal intercourse with 
 all nations are recommended by policy, humanity and in- 
 terest. But even our commercial policy should hold an 
 
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 123 
 
 equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting ex- 
 elusive favours or preferences." 
 
 The question was never presented to China to enter the 
 war on the side of the Central Powers; therein these two 
 (Powers showed themselves true friends of China. The 
 question urged on China by eight Legations — I will not say 
 Governments — was to join the United States, or the Entente 
 Allies, or Japan, or all of them, against the Central Powers, 
 until the latter should be vanquished not only on the field 
 of battle, but in the marts of trade and even within the 
 sacred domain of missions, science and education. For one 
 to argue otherwise was to lay himself open to being called 
 pro-German, and few cared to take the risk. I was among 
 the number to follow my own conscience, and I had the joy 
 of suffering for it. If China had persisted in remaining 
 neutral, she would have had good company, Spain, Hol- 
 land, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, and two 
 of the A. B. C. Republics of South America — Argentine and 
 Chile. If China had merely severed diplomatic relations 
 with Germany^ as President Wilson requested, China's sole 
 associates of any importance would have been Peru and 
 Ecuador. To go further, and declare war, China was in 
 the company of Brazil, Guatemala, Siam and Greece, and 
 still more of the United States, Great Britain, France, 
 Italy, Belgium, Portugal, the Czarist Russia (still retaining 
 a Minister in Peking) and Japan. It certainly seemed as 
 if China in going with the crowd was on the winning side, 
 both by superiority of military power, by combination of 
 financial resources, and by a widespread profession of lofty 
 aims, righteous ideals and untarnished justice. When all 
 these eight foreign Ministers solemnly assured China that 
 she could rely on their help and solidarity for placing her 
 high among the great nations of the world, it was simple 
 folly for a private individual like myself to sing in a 
 minor key. 
 
124 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FEEE? ' 
 
 Hardly, however, had China made her choice as to the 
 side of righteousness and the policy of prudence and secur- 
 ity than one by one a series of complications, annoyances 
 or troubles befell her, held sway through the Paris Peace 
 Conference, and has not yet come to an end. These troubles 
 which have come to China have come from China's associ- 
 ates in war, not from enemies in war. Some of the more 
 glaring misfortunes and annoyances I will now briefly 
 mention. 
 
 I. British demands as to Tibet. 
 
 While China was all stirred by the hot discussion on the 
 war question, the British Government, having kept silent 
 for several years, with no fixed agreement in her possession, 
 suddenly presented to China, in the month of March, 1917, 
 Twelve Demands concerning Tibet. Previous negotiations 
 in 1913 had failed to secure unanimity of action. In the 
 whirl of events in 1917, China was again urged to be 
 reasonable. Japan, in 1915, presented to China, under 
 President Yuan Shih-kai, Twenty-one Demands; Great 
 Britain, in 1917, presented to China, under President Li 
 Yuan-hung, Twelve Demands. Two Allies, mistrustful of 
 each other alike, were playing havoc with China. The 
 Demands, as made public by the Japanese press, and trans- 
 lated into Chinese newspapers, are as follows: 
 
 1. Great Britain shall have the right to construct railways 
 between India and Tibet. 
 
 2. The Chinese Government shall contract loans from the 
 British Government for the improvement of the administration of 
 Tibet. 
 
 3. The treaty obligations between Tibet and Great Britain 
 shall be considered valid as heretofore. 
 
 4. British experts shall be engaged for the industrial enter- 
 prises of Tibet. 
 
 5. China shall secure the redemption of loans contracted from 
 the British people by Tibetans. 
 
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 125 
 
 6. Neither China nor Great Britain shall send troops to Tibet 
 without reason. 
 
 7. The Chinese Government shall not appoint or dismiss of- 
 ficials in Tibet on its own responsibility. (Italics ours.) 
 
 8. The British Government shall be allowed to establish tele- 
 graph lines in Lhassa, Chianghu, Chamutao, etc. 
 
 9. British postal service shall be introduced in Lhassa and 
 other places. 
 
 10. China shall not interfere with the actions of the British 
 Government in Tibet. (Italics ours.) 
 
 11. No privileges or interests in Tibet shall be granted to other 
 nations. 
 
 12. All mines in Tibet shall be jointly worked by the British 
 and Chinese Governments. 
 
 Surely Great Britain is not the one to east the first stone 
 at Japan. And between these two Allies — upper and nether 
 millstones — China is being ground. 
 
 Miss La Motte,^ writing of these same Demands, says : 
 
 Remember, over here it is not customary to think of or speak 
 of anything but " Japanese aggression." Japan, you see, offers 
 the only stumbling-block to the complete domination of the Orient 
 by Europe. But for Japan — China might possibly become another 
 India. 
 
 These Demands, as well as final Agreement, were kept in 
 abeyance till after the Great War. But the Chinese in 
 official circles knew well enough that sooner or later they 
 must come to an agreement by agreeing vnth Great Britain. 
 The matter was again broached in 1919, and the Chinese are 
 being pressed to sign an official document. Since the arm- 
 istice, Great Britain has been busy safeguarding her po- 
 sition in Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, Burma and 
 India, and in widening her influence and beneficent sway 
 in Afghanistan, Mesopotamia, Persia, the Caucasus, and 
 
 »" Peking Dust," p. 223. 
 
126 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 far-away Tibet, all strategic points in the Asiatic portion 
 of world-wide empire. 
 
 And China, like Persia, like Egypt, will have to submit, 
 unless — unless — she yields to the other dominating force, 
 Japan. 
 
 Mr. C. C. Wu, in a memorandum, issued in the same 
 year, 1917,^ wrote: 
 
 China wants nothing more than the re-establishment of Chinese 
 suzerainty over Tibet, with recognition of the autonomy of the 
 territoiy immediately under the control of the Lhassa Govern- 
 ment, she is agreeable to the British idea of forming an effective 
 buffer territory in so far as it is consistent with equity and jus- 
 tice; she is anxious that her trade interest should be looked after 
 by her trade agents as do the British, a point which is agreeable 
 even to the Tibetans, though apparently not to the British; in 
 other words, she expects that Great Britain would at least make 
 with her an arrangement regarding Tibet which should not be 
 more disadvantageous to her than that made with Russia respect- 
 ing Outer Mongolia. 
 
 II. The LoMsing-Ishii Agreement. 
 
 No sooner had the United States declared war than the 
 Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium 
 designated some of their ablest men for special commissions 
 to visit the United States and to secure American help, 
 financial, military and political. The Japanese Govern- 
 ment did the same, designating a former Minister of For- 
 eign Affairs and Ambassador to Paris, Viscount Ishii. He 
 was equal to the task. The Chinese Government, on the 
 other hand, did nothing. After frequent conferences of 
 this Japanese Envoy with Secretary Lansing, at opportune 
 times and in a friendly spirit, there appeared on November 
 2, 1917, the exchange of Notes between the two. The 
 Agreement being in this form did not need to be referred 
 to the Senate for ratification. 
 
 * Putnam Weals, " Fight for the Republic in China," p. 479. 
 
A SERIES OF AGGHAVATIONS 127 
 
 On the one hand the Notes reaffirmed the "open door" 
 principle in China and the preservation of China's inde- 
 pendence and territorial integrity; and on the other hand 
 there were introduced phrases capable of more than one 
 interpretation, as follows: 
 
 The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize 
 that territorial propinquity creates special relations between 
 eountries, and, consequently, the Government of the United 
 States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, par- 
 ticularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous. 
 
 It was known that only in a narrow sense was there an 
 ''open door" in China, so long as spheres of interest existed 
 and preferential concessions were granted to particular 
 countries in particular parts of China. Japanese and also 
 Chinese would naturally give more attention to the other 
 words quoted above, "special relations" and "special in- 
 terests. ' ' However much Americans might claim that these 
 words meant nothing or only reaffirmed the principle of the 
 "open door," Orientals were positive that a new day had 
 come in which Japan, through recognition of the United 
 States, had a prior position in China, ahead of all others. 
 
 The Japanese Legation in Peking was the first to make 
 announcement of the new agreement. A translation into 
 Chinese was made, in which the Japanese used a strong 
 term for "interests," implying both power and benefit. 
 The American Legation, later on, made another translation, 
 implying simply relationship. The American Minister also 
 issued a formal statement that these words which attracted 
 go much attention were meant to harmonize with the tradi- 
 tional policy of the "open door" and equal opportunity. 
 
 Dr. Reinsch wrote: 
 
 The visit of the Imperial Japanese Mission to the United States 
 afforded an opportunity for free and friendly discussion of the 
 
128 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 United States and Japan in the Orient by openly proclaiming 
 that the policy of Japan as regards China is not one of aggression 
 and by declaring there is no intention to take advantage com- 
 mercially or indirectly of the special relations to China created 
 by geographical position. 
 
 The Japanese preferred to explain for themselves what 
 was, and will be, **the policy of Japan," and their ex- 
 planation carried greater weight. 
 
 Secretary Lansing also issued a statement in Washing- 
 ton, practically overlooking the words which made the stir : 
 
 The statements in the Notes require no explanation. They 
 not only contain a reafi&rmation of the " open door " policy, but 
 introduce a principle of non-interference with the sovereignty and 
 territorial integrity of China, which, generally applied, is essential 
 to perpetual international peace, as clearly declared by President 
 Wilson, and which is the very foundation, also, of Pan-American- 
 ism, as interpreted by this Government. 
 
 The Chinese Government, seeing a meaning in the words, 
 and the particular meaning attached thereto by the Jap- 
 anese, issued a kind of protest to both Japan and the United 
 States, and so to all the world: 
 
 The principle adopted by the Chinese Government toward the 
 friendly nations has always been one of justice and equality, and 
 consequently the rights enjoyed by the friendly nations derived 
 from the treaties have been consistently respected, and so even 
 with the special relations between countries created by the fact of 
 territorial contiguity it is only in so far as they have already 
 been provided for in existing treaties. Hereafter the Chinese 
 Government will still adhere to the principles hitherto adopted, 
 and hereby it is again declared that the Chinese Government will 
 not allow herself to be bound by any agreement entered into by 
 other nations. 
 
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 129 
 
 Thus, as the United States sent an identic Note in 1915 
 to China and to Japan about agreements those two coun- 
 tries had made, China in 1917 sends an identic Note to 
 Japan and the United States about an agreement which 
 they had just made. 
 
 China had good reason to complain. Was it a friendly 
 act for two Governments to consult among themselves about 
 rights in China, without ever consulting China ? All along, 
 in previous arrangements with Great Britain, France, 
 Russia and the United States, Japan had pursued the same 
 policy of negotiating about China, with China left out. As 
 Japan has prior position in Japan, so China, and no outside 
 country, has prior position in China. To infringe to the 
 least degree on this simple rule is to put an entering wedge 
 into China's national integrity. 
 
 III. TJie reign of military autocracy with the overthrow 
 of the democratic system of government. 
 
 Probably no aspect of the Great War, as affecting China, 
 has proved a greater misfortune to China and the Chinese 
 people than this which concerns China's internal and po- 
 litical condition. 
 
 Autocracy was supposed to be an essential characteristic 
 of monarchies, just as true of Chinese, Manchu or Mongol 
 monarchies as of the monarchies of the Romanoffs, Haps- 
 burgs and HohenzoUerns. But here we find something 
 anomalous : autocracy flourishing in the seventh and eighth 
 years of the Chinese Republic and among a people who for 
 centuries had enjoyed local self-government and believed 
 in the fundamental ideas of liberal institutions. 
 
 As for militarism it had never been the political creed 
 of the old dynasties where the literati ruled as it was in 
 days of the Republic, where Military Governors assumed 
 to dictate national and international policies as well as 
 those of their own provinces. 
 
130 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 This ascendancy of autocracy and militarism began, 
 strange to say, when the scholarly representative of the 
 American Republic first broached a topic for discussion 
 and then strenuously agitated for a definite and prompt 
 line of action — that of breaking relations between China 
 and Germany. From February, 1917, to the time of arm- 
 istice, in November, 1918, and even since, the military 
 faction of autocratic mould under the leadership of General 
 Tuan Chi-jui, Premier and Minister of War, dominated 
 China's political affairs, both in the preliminaries of the 
 declaration of war and in the character and degree of 
 subsequent participation. 
 
 Nations which stood for free democracy in the Western 
 ■world — France, Great Britain and the United States — 
 gave in the Orient their sympathetic countenance to the 
 plans and deeds of men who stood for despotic rule and 
 the military system. That which united these divergent 
 elements was the common readiness to wage war on a com- 
 mon enemy, when for safety's sake a dividing line should 
 have separated that which was democratic from that which' 
 was autocratic. The union which existed might bring 
 victory on the field of battle, but never a victory for de- 
 mocracy; it could effect the conquest of a nation but not 
 the defeat of a wrong principle. 
 
 It is here that the Great War made China suffer. The 
 Republic under President Li Yuan-hung had had a chance 
 to prove its worth, but the injection of the poison of war 
 and the passion of hate brought on dissension and turmoil, 
 turbulence and bloodshed, resulting in a complete collapse 
 of a diseased body politic. 
 
 Dr. Arthur J. Brown ^ says : 
 
 China has a weary road to travel before the discordant ele- 
 ments of her vast population settle themselves into a compact 
 
 * " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 294. 
 
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 131 
 
 and well-governed republic j but the monarchy has gone beyond 
 possibility of recovery. 
 
 True, the monarcliy has gone, but not autocracy. Give 
 men power anywhere, and they will love to keep it for 
 themselves, and this is autocracy. 
 
 Dr. Wu Ting-fang^ in an address, July, 1917, after he 
 had retired from Peking, used these words: 
 
 We are engaged in a struggle between democracy and mili- 
 tarism. Between fifty-five and sixty per cent, of the taxes of 
 China ax'e now going to support militarism in China. This must 
 be changed, but the change must be gradual. I ask Americans 
 to be patient and give China a chance. Democracy will triumph. 
 
 IV. The renewal of revolution and internecine strife. 
 
 When the first revolution arose in 1911, I was conserva- 
 tive enough to favour the peaceful but advancing movement 
 of the liberal, constitutional government of the Manchu 
 House, and was wont to say: "The fever of revolution is 
 hard to check. When about to cease, there comes a relapse. 
 One revolution will lead to a second, and this to a third, 
 and no telling when it will stop among a populous nation 
 like China." 
 
 The revolution which began in July, 1917, was the fourth 
 revolution. By introducing the war question — ^war the 
 other side of the globe — there came a clash between the 
 liberal and military elements with the ascendancy of the 
 military, the dissolution of Parliament, and the revolt and 
 protest of the constitutional element, with headquarters in 
 Canton. These constitutionalists are commonly spoken of 
 as revolutionists, but the real revolutionists were the Mili- 
 tary Governors who declared independence from the author- 
 ized government in May and June, 1917, and shattered 
 the fabric of the Republic. 
 
 * China Press, July 14, 1917. 
 
132 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 The overthrow of the Tuan Chi-jui military faction in 
 the autumn of 1920 seemed to many to be a sign of hope, 
 but it meant the establishment in power of another military 
 faction, not the strengthening of democratic ideas. Up to 
 1921 the Republic has not yet been restored as a real en- 
 tity and a living factor. 
 
 It may be said that the cause of all strife in early 1917 
 was neither the wrangling over war or the dissolution of 
 Parliament, but the germ of revolutionary fever. The 
 germ, however, was dormant, and in a healthy constitution 
 would soon have been destroyed. When the more lively 
 germ of a great war-fever was taken into the system, it at 
 once set into action the old revolutionary germ, and no 
 Western physician has been able to effect a cure. 
 
 As an outsider, I would say to the Chinese in the words 
 of Hiawatha, 
 
 " I am weary of your quarrels, 
 Weary of your wars and bloodshed, 
 Weary of your prayers for vengeance, 
 Of your wranglings and dissensions: 
 All your strength is in your union. 
 All your danger is in discord; 
 Therefore be at peace henceforward, 
 And as brothers live together." 
 
 V. Increased scope for bringing China in thraldom to 
 Japan. 
 
 Japan through the fortunes of war had from August, 
 1914, to August, 1917, many chances to strengthen her 
 position in China. When China declared war, August 14, 
 1917, very largely at Japan's behests, new opportunities 
 appeared to Japan to augment her growing advantages. 
 She was aided by the good luck of having the pro-Japan 
 faction in power in Peking. The President, Feng Kuo- 
 chang, was an opportunist and was easily managed. The 
 
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 133 
 
 Premier, head of the militarists, had already taken his 
 orders from Japan, though presented in the form of 
 friendly advice. 
 
 Even before China declared war, there was pretty good 
 evidence that the two Governments were negotiating a se- 
 cret Convention on military affairs and the sale of arms to 
 China by means, strange to say, of a loan to China. This 
 Military Convention got wrought into shape early in 1918, 
 when Japan was called upon by the Allies to make an ex- 
 pedition into Siberia. Japan made use of this necessity to 
 urge upon China co-operation in the military advance 
 under the military leadership of Japan, When pressure 
 was brought to bear by true patriots of China to make 
 public the secret arrangements, this innocuous portion 
 bearing on joint action to be taken in Siberia was duly 
 published. Other arrangements were still kept secret. 
 
 "Two agreements were concluded," as the Chinese Min- 
 ister wrote in a dispatch to Viscount Motono, * ' one relating 
 to the army being signed, May 16, and the other relating 
 to the navy, May 19." He continues in the exchange of 
 Notes : 
 
 These Agreements only embody concrete arrangements as to 
 manner and conditions under which the armies and navies of the 
 two countries are to co-operate in common defence against the 
 enemy, on the basis of the above mentioned Notes exchanged on 
 March 25. The details of the arrangements constituting as they 
 do a military secret, cannot be made public, but they contain no 
 provision other than those pertaining to the object already defined.^ 
 
 The Peking Government, namely, that of Tuan, which 
 was recognized by the Allied Powers for the declaration 
 of war, was also ready to hold confidential conferences with 
 various Japanese that money and arms might be secured 
 
 * The Agreement, so far as the military part is concerned, was 
 rescinded in the early part of 1921. 
 
134 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE! 
 
 for carrying on war with the Southern Chinese. A 
 new department called War Participation Bureau was 
 formed, of which General Tuan Chi-jui was head, even 
 when he was no longer Premier. This Bureau took matters 
 out of the hands of the Foreign Office, of which Lou Tseng- 
 tsiang was Minister, being afterwards the chief delegate at 
 the Paris Conference. A writer in Asia ^ says : 
 
 ... Of between $200,000,000 and $225,000,000 loaned, much 
 has gone into the hands of corrupt officials and the Military 
 Governors and by them wasted instead of being used for the 
 demobilization of the troops and for the constructive purposes 
 declared. 
 
 With civil war on hand, the Peking Government was 
 helpless in securing revenue from the provinces sufficient 
 for its own needs and also for the requirements of the 
 loyal Military Governors. European countries and the 
 United States, even if so disposed, were too absorbed in the 
 war in Europe to give attention or help to China. Japan 
 remained sole benefactor. Moreover, the Japanese are 
 intensely patriotic, placing Japanese interests and the 
 honour of their country first. Money to supply China's 
 needs was loaned again and again, on most liberal terms 
 as to control of expenditure, thus placing China in bondage, 
 financially, to Japan. Loans were made not only to the 
 Central Government, but to the provincial authorities, con- 
 trary to law, and even to the opposing Government in the 
 south. By further loans to the Bank of Communications 
 and the Bank of China, these two financial institutions of 
 the Government came under the control of Japanese banks. 
 
 The other important circumstance in Japan's path of 
 opportunity was the facility granted through loan-bargain- 
 ing for receiving concessions of various kinds as security 
 
 »"A8iaticus" in Asia, March, 1919, p. 216. 
 
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 135 
 
 for monies lent and as quid pro quo for deeds of generous 
 helpfulness. As the article in Asia cites for a sample, 
 "for a paltry $15,000,000 loan China has signed away a 
 lien in all her forests in the two northern provinces of 
 Heilungkiang and Kirin, equal in area to the combined 
 area of all the states of the United States touching the 
 Atlantic seaboard from Maine to, but not including, 
 Florida." 
 Millard's Review for July 27, 1918, says: 
 
 To pay for these loans China has mortgaged railway lines, 
 gold, coal, antimony and iron mines. She has mortgaged the 
 Government printing office at Peking, the Hankow electric light 
 and water works and native forests in various parts of the coun- 
 try. There is a chance in each of these loan agreements to the 
 effect that the Chinese authorities shall not obtain additional 
 funds upon these securities unless the consent of the Japanese 
 bankers first has been obtained. 
 
 The year 1898 has been called the year of the war of 
 concessions, wherein Great Britain, France, Germany and 
 the United States were competitors. Twenty years later, 
 1918, saw another war of concessions, but exclusively for 
 Japan's benefit. 
 
 It has been estimated that Chinese and Japanese agents 
 in 1918 made upwards of 40 contracts, and their Govern- 
 ments a dozen Agreements or exchanges of Notes. 
 
 With all this growth of peaceful expansion, even after 
 the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the Japanese Govern- 
 ment has maintained a rigid attitude as to the conduct of 
 Chinese officials, especially in Peking, Manchuria, Shantung 
 and Fukien as to whether their conduct be friendly and 
 obliging or antagonizing and annoying. Not only under the 
 Terauchi rule but under that of Hara, who is supposed 
 to stand for democratic ideas, has Japan's influence in 
 China been both commercial and political. 
 
136 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 The Associated Press telegraphed from Peking, March 
 27, 1919, the followmg: 
 
 The Japanese Minister here has warned the Chinese Govern- 
 ment that if the premature disclosures of secret documents by 
 China causes loss to Japanese financial and conamercial interests, 
 Japan will hold China responsible for such loss. 
 
 Baron Goto afterwards explained that as with all con- 
 fidential negotiations or agreements, the parties concerned 
 must in all honour consult each other as to the time and 
 mode of publications. 
 
 In fairness to Japan it must be acknowledged that in 
 1918 as in 1915 Japan safeguarded her predominant po- 
 sition by definite Agreements with the recognized Peking 
 Government. If fault there be, it must rest with the agents 
 of the Peking Government, men who urged on war with 
 Germany and were then congratulated for their noble deed. 
 
 "VT. Dictation hy the Governments with which China had 
 associated herself in war. 
 
 I have already referred to the warning I gave President 
 Feng Kuo-chang, on the eve of China's declaration of war, 
 as to the impossibility of China acting alone. China's dif- 
 ficulty in this regard became more apparent as the months 
 passed by. I have just outlined Japan's engrossing grip 
 on China's finances and political policies and war measures. 
 But all the eight Legations forming the one group were 
 equally persistent in asserting their superior position and 
 the negligence, remissness or incapacity of the Peking Gov- 
 ernment. Sometimes they acted as a body, sometimes 
 singly. The British Minister, Sir John Jordan, versed in 
 Chinese affairs, was doyen of the diplomatic body as well 
 as chief among the eight. Of course, they issued no orders ; 
 they generally gave advice, or insinuated some misfortune 
 
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 137 
 
 if China continued to act foolishly. Frequently China was 
 presented with an cuids memmre. Not a week passed, it 
 may be safely said, that the Chinese Foreign Office did not 
 receive some reminder that the Associated Nations expected 
 to have their wishes followed. The nearer the end of war, 
 the greater this outside pressure. Even after the armistice, 
 China was being admonished. Notice the joint Allied Note 
 of October 29, 1918 : ^ 
 
 1. At the commencement of China's declaration of war against 
 the Central Powers, the Allied Governments agreed to the post- 
 ponement of the payment of the Boxer indemnity and other 
 privileges in the hope that the Chinese Government would use the 
 proceeds for the betterment of China's industry and economical 
 conditions to the mutual advantage of both China and the Allied 
 Powers; but, to the dissatisfaction of the Allies, it is reported 
 that the proceeds have been squandered by certain high Govern- 
 ment authorities for party strifes. 
 
 2. Although the War Participation Bureau has been estab- 
 lished for some time in Peking, nevertheless it has done nothing 
 to assist the Allies, and it is rumoured that part of the troops 
 who were originally trained for services in Europe have been 
 misused for civil war in certain provinces of China. 
 
 3. Without previous consultation or knowledge of the Allied 
 Powers, the Chinese Government suddenly appointed Tai Chen- 
 lin as China's representative to the Vatican. 
 
 4. The ineffective manner in which the Chinese Government 
 have acted towards the liquidation of enemy properties in China 
 is unsatisfactory to the Allies, as in the case of the Deutsche- 
 Asiatische Bank, etc. 
 
 5. The movements of enemy subjects in China are not effec- 
 tively scrutinized by the Chinese Government authorities, so that 
 dangerous Germans, such as Hanneken and others, are not in- 
 terned up to the present time. It is said that the recent dispute 
 between the American Mongolian Trading Company and General 
 Tien Chung-yu of Chabar was also mentioned in this category. 
 
 * From Asiatic News Agency. 
 
138 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 6. The prohibition of Chinese subjects to trade with the ene- 
 mies as promulgated by the last Cabinet was not carried out by 
 China. 
 
 7. It was known to everybody that the Hotel du Nord was 
 enemy property and it was used as headquarters of enemy sub- 
 jects in North China for their unlawful conferences and activities 
 against the Allied cause; that the Chinese Government did not 
 do anything to close it until the matter had been many times 
 brought to the notice of China by the Allied Legations in Peking. 
 This is a strong witness that China does not intend to help the 
 Allies to cheek German activities. 
 
 8. In spite of the protest of the Allied Legations, the Chinese 
 Government has done nothing to punish the Taoyin or Neiho, of 
 Heilungkiang, on account of his pro-Bolshevik German actions. 
 
 9. The lack of sincerity on the part of the Chinese Govern- 
 ment authorities in conducting cases concerning Allied subjects 
 and enemies and the arrested enemy subjects was quoted as an 
 example, because China refuses to permit Allied consuls to act 
 as witnesses in the court. 
 
 10. The enemy internment camps are not properly conducted, 
 and in consequence many dangerous Germans are not interned at 
 all. The action of the Chinese authorities in certain eases is quite 
 unsatisfactory to the Allies. 
 
 11. Chinese bandits have been permitted to overrun the dis- 
 tricts along the Tientsin-Pukow and Lunghai railways, so that 
 Allied interests are suffering greatly on account of these bandit 
 activities. 
 
 12 There is still ample time for China to do something to 
 satisfy the Allied Powers; as one of the members, the Chinese 
 Government will pay attention to the twelve points enumerated 
 by the Allied representatives so as to gain for China equal rights 
 of speech in the future peace conference in Europe. 
 
 Let me briefly review these twelve points. 
 
 The first admonition is sound, except that men who had 
 been praised and congratulated, Au^st, 1917, should not 
 be thus reproved, October, 1918. 
 
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 139 
 
 The second is a slur on China's aid rendered to Russian 
 Siberia and on the Manchurian border. Moreover, the 
 eight Allies had never represented that China was expected 
 to aid in a military way. 
 
 The third rebuke is a case of outside interference in 
 China's affairs. It was a wedge thrust into the indepen- 
 dence and national integrity of China, which the Lansing- 
 Ishii agreement and other conventions had guaranteed to 
 respect. For over twenty years the priests of the Roman 
 Catholic Missions other than French had been withdrawn 
 from the French protectorate. In this war the French saw 
 an opportunity to bring back the German missions under 
 French control. This plan disagreed with the desire of the 
 Chinese, who favoured a complete separation of political and 
 ecclesiastical affairs, and direct dealing with the authorities 
 of the Church. The incidents of war seemed to have 
 blinded the eyes of British and American diplomats as to 
 what was best for China. 
 
 The fourth specification, that of liquidating enemy 
 property, deserves special consideration. I shall only re- 
 mark here that the Allied Ministers regarded the destruc- 
 tion of German business as indispensable to winning the 
 war, and thereby came into conflict with the modern spirit 
 of the law of nations. 
 
 The fifth point as to internment of enemy subjects de- 
 volved upon the Chinese Government to act as it saw fit. 
 It was no affair of the Allies as to the way the Chinese 
 Government acted, any more than the way the Japanese 
 Government acted on the same matter. 
 
 The sixth specification is misleading. Almost from the 
 beginning of the war there had been no trade between Ger- 
 many and China. Since China declared war, the only busi- 
 ness dealings of Germans were of those living in China, 
 acting as commission agents for Chinese and American 
 goods. 
 
14Q CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 The seventh makes special reference to the Hotel du 
 Nord, which was kept by a subject of Austria-Hungary, not 
 of Germany. The Germans rented a room for their round- 
 table, and the Chinese kept close oversight as to whether 
 this club went beyond the bounds of propriety. The Ger- 
 man Protestant community also held divine service on 
 Sunday in the dining-room of the hotel. What displeased 
 the Allies was the failure of the Chinese to expel the Ger- 
 mans. In fact, the Chinese treatment of the Germans was 
 generous, like the policy of the Japanese. 
 
 The eighth specification was another case of intermed- 
 dling. The Chinese officer who was complained of merely 
 gave protection to refugees from Russian Siberia or in- 
 terned them, whatever their supposed political affiliations. 
 
 The ninth is more intermeddling. When German and 
 Austrian consuls were given their passports, German and 
 Austrian subjects remaining in China came under Chinese 
 jurisdiction, not under British or French. 
 
 The tenth is a case of useless worry. There was certainly 
 no more remissness than in Japan or even in the United 
 States. Anyway, the kind of internment was China's sole 
 affair. So far as I know, there was more cause of complaint 
 on the part of those interned. Those interned were non- 
 combatants, not prisoners of war as in Japan. The un- 
 healthy condition of these internment-camps was brought 
 to the notice of the American Red Cross Society for pos- 
 sible relief. 
 
 The eleventh point deserves no notice. In time of war 
 and revolution is it usual to have law and order as in 
 piping days of peace? 
 
 The twelfth point is a summary, but it gives the gist of 
 the Allied motif, namely, that compliance with Allied 
 wishes must be forthcoming, if China is to secure "equal 
 rights of speech in the future peace conferences in 
 Europe." 
 
'A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 141 
 
 After the armistice, not before, the Allied Ministers 
 (with whom was associated the American Minister) insisted 
 on the issue of two mandates by the new Chinese President, 
 one concerning repatriation of enemy subjects and the other 
 concerning liquidation of enemy property. Failure here 
 implied refusal to China's participation in the Peace 
 Conference. 
 
 Several joint dispatches or oral reminders were given 
 the Chinese Government as to restoration of internal peace. 
 As a result the two Governments at Peking and Canton 
 appointed delegates to their own Peace Conference in 
 Shanghai, and thus were allowed to send delegates to the 
 Peace Conference in Paris. 
 
 What the reader must bear in mind is China's loss of 
 independent action, with the increased power of outside 
 nations to interfere in the affairs of China. In all this 
 interference, the European Allies were as active as was 
 Japan, and with them the United States was sympathet- 
 ically and officially associated. This was the goal of China's 
 entry into the war, under Allied pressure. 
 
 VII. Kindred with the previous calamity that has be- 
 fallen China, is the other possible calamity of being placed 
 under a foreign protectorate. This was the possibility dur- 
 ing the Boxer craze of 1900; it was held in check by the 
 generous policy of the American Government through 
 action taken by Secretary of State, John Hay. It may be 
 said that the United States saved China twenty years ago 
 both from dismemberment and from a foreign protectorate. 
 
 Today China faces the same alternative dangers, or 
 rather three alternatives, dismemberment, a foreign pro- 
 tectorate, or a Japanese protectorate. It remains to be 
 seen whether China's salvation will again come from the 
 United States, by a wise and generous policy. 
 
 As opposed to the threatened domination by Japan of 
 
142 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Eastern Asia, there stands a threefold combination. One 
 is euphemistically called the League of Nations, but which 
 actually consists of the victorious nations. A.nother com- 
 bination is that of the four financial as well as military 
 Powers, forming the consortium, the United States, Japan, 
 Great Britain and France. A third combination, as op- 
 posed to Japan as well as to Germany, is that of Great 
 Britain, France and the United States. Either form of 
 governing China would be not only a wrong to China, but 
 a reproach to the nations participating in the war. Ex- 
 Senator Burton,^ writing of a "joint protectorate" or a 
 "protectorate by a single nation," says: 
 
 To both these plans there is the objection that jealousies and 
 conflicting interests would render agreement difficult if not im- 
 possible. Then there is the more substantial objection that 
 eventually every nation must work out its own salvation. 
 
 The only true policy is that of the "open door," one that 
 includes as before the war "equal opportunity" in all 
 parts of China for all nations. To profess the ' * open door ' * 
 and to practise exclusion of some one nation stultifies all 
 right, generous and remedial policy in treatment of China. 
 
 Towards the end of 1919 the British Chambers of Com- 
 merce in China, which assembled in Shanghai in confer- 
 ence with the British Minister, Sir John Jordan, passed 
 the following resolution: 
 
 That this conference is of the opinion that the time has come 
 when the policy of the open door should be reaffirmed as an 
 essential commercial principle and that its reaffirmation be ac- 
 companied by an international agreement for the abolition of 
 spheres of influence. 
 
 This action is most commendable. It is worthy of the 
 traditional spirit of the British merchant. But the reso- 
 
 * New York Times, April 4, 1920. 
 
A SERIES OP AGGRAVATIONS 143 
 
 lution must mean what it says. That is, (1) the policy of 
 the open door must be internationally observed, (2) Ger- 
 many, Austria, Hungary and Russia must be again in- 
 eluded, and (3) the combination of all nations, with aboli- 
 tion of spheres of influence, must not lead to an interna- 
 tional protectorate or a mandate from the "five great Allied 
 and Associated Powers." 
 
 Through the war China has grown weaker and the power 
 and dictation of the victorious group of foreign nations 
 have grown stronger. Hence the renewal of the old cry, 
 "A foreign protectorate for China!" 
 
 VIII. Another trouble to arise for China comes from 
 the spread of Bolshevism. The end is not yet, it lies in the 
 future. It looks now as if an Asiatic conflagration is to 
 take the place of the European conflagration. Unless pre- 
 ventive measures are taken and a just scheme of recon- 
 struction is initiated, the danger of the peace to Asia is 
 imminent. 
 
 How Bolshevism may become a disturbing factor is easily 
 explained. Of all the countries of Asia, China borders on 
 Russia to the longest extent. When Japan took the lead in 
 repelling the Bolshevist advance in Russian Siberia, over- 
 tures were made to the Peking Government to join forces 
 under Japan's leadership. This plan enabled China like 
 Japan to take part in the war near to the home base. Thus 
 the military government of Japan first joined with the 
 militarists of China, and then they unitedly joined with 
 the dictator rule of Russia. 
 
 At the same time the democratic element of China, which 
 was arrayed against the military autocracy of Peking, was 
 receiving no countenance from democratic nations of the 
 Western world. Appeal for help in democratic develop- 
 ment was ignored. The power of militarism grew apace. 
 Here and there a few Chinese, revolting against the rule 
 
144 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 of Peking oflfieialdom, ventured into Russia and became 
 mercenary troops for the Bolshevik leaders. Is it not ap- 
 parent that if the democratic element in China finds no 
 succour or encouragement from Western democracy, while 
 the Peking militarists are hand-in-glove with the Japanese 
 militarists, then approach will be made to the proffered aid 
 of Bolshevik Russia ? The mast discontented in China will 
 join the most discontented in Russia and together work for 
 the overturn of all government. The extreme of conserva- 
 tism leads to the extreme in liberalism; autocracy breeds 
 anarchy. It is becoming clearer every day that all the 
 peoples of Asia are agreed in casting off European rule. 
 John Spargo^ points out the coming danger. He says: 
 
 Bolshevism is peculiarly adapted to the Orient, both as regards 
 its philosophy and its methods. Indeed, the whole political ex- 
 perience and psychology of these Asiatic peoples tend to make 
 them ready recipients of Bolshevism as a political system. It is 
 far easier for them to accept and believe in political dictatorships 
 established by eonspiratory uprisings than it is for Occidental 
 peoples who for centuries Jiave been subject to the discipline of 
 stable government and of established political and legal forms. 
 . . . For desperate and unthinking and even fanatical hordes to 
 follow daring political adventurers and give allegiance to them is 
 as common today in Asia as it was in Europe ten centuries ago. 
 In surveying the recent history of China, Persia and India, for 
 example, it is remarkable how many close and striking parallels 
 to the Lenin-Trotzsky regime one finds. 
 
 Dr. W. D. P. Bliss, an expert on the problems of Asia 
 Minor, refers in an illuminating article ^ to the possibility 
 of the Turkish Pan-Turanian movement being linked to the 
 Russian Bolshevist movement, and still further of the 
 "combination of Qerman science and militarism with Bol- 
 shevist communism, Turkish nationalism and Tartar fierce- 
 
 » New York Times, February 29, 1920. 
 * New York Times, March 14, 1920. 
 
'A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 145 
 
 ness." He mentions a statement of Radek, Bolshevist rep- 
 resentative at Berlin, that if they cannot be consulted on 
 measures for restoring peace, they will set the Near East 
 and the Far East on fire. "We will," so Radek is reported 
 as saying, "stir up such trouble in Turkey, Afghanistan, 
 Turkestan, Kurdistan, Persia and India that England will 
 not have another moment of peace." Then Dr. Bliss gives 
 this advice: 
 
 The best cure ror Bolshevism is industry. Give both Germany 
 and Russia a chance to get busy and ere long Bolshevism will 
 disappear. 
 
 The discontent and desperation of different peoples are 
 apt to ignore true logic in forming combinations, but unite 
 in spite of the inherent dissimilarity of other elements in 
 the problem. It is not at all a question of China adopting 
 a Soviet form of government, but of her favouring the gen- 
 eral spirit of revolution. 
 
 What would have kept her from this new menace of 
 Bolshevism was the continuance of the Republic 's evolution 
 under President Li Yuan-hung in 1917, free from all the 
 perils and entanglements of war. This was the course of 
 safety, the policy of moderation. But Fates, that is, the 
 Allied and Associated Nations, decided otherwise. New in- 
 tricate problems arise for China to solve, if her perpetuity 
 is to be assured. 
 
 A fitting summing-up may be given in the following 
 forcible language of President Wilson ■ as addressed to a 
 group of pro-League Republicans, October 27, 1920 : 
 
 We should not be deceived into supposing that imperialistic 
 schemes ended with the defeat of Germany, or that Germany is 
 the only nation that entertained such schemes or was moved by 
 sinister ambitions and long-standing jealousies to attack the very 
 
146 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 structure of civilization. There are other nations which are likely 
 to be powerfully moved, or are already moved by commercial 
 jealousy, by the desire to dominate and to have their own way in 
 politics and in enterprise, and it is necessary to check them and 
 to appraise them as it was against Germany, if attempt of any 
 similar thing is made. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES AS AFFECTING CHINA 
 
 One of the misfortunes which has befallen China as a result 
 of her participation in the war is the way the political and 
 commercial equilibrium has been upset. China's compli- 
 cations in the sphere of commerce are inferior only to those 
 in the sphere of international politics. 
 
 * ' Economic rivalries and hostilities, ' ' as much as * ' special 
 alliances," as President Wilson has pointed out, have been 
 the source of all wars; they had to do with China's part in 
 the Great War. It was commercial jealousy that fired war 
 passions and emblazoned war policies. President Wilson 
 in one of his late addresses (in St. Louis, September 5, 
 1919) said: "This was a commercial and industrial war. 
 It was not a political war. ' ' How much more true that part 
 of the war which touched China. 
 
 When the European War began there were four great 
 trading peoples in China, British, Americans, Germans and 
 Japanese, of whom the Germans were more and more forg- 
 ing to the front, competitors of British and American mer- 
 chants, though often having a part in British and Amer- 
 ican trade and helping it on. In the matter of railway and 
 mining concessions the rivals were British, Americans, 
 French, Belgians and Germans, while in Manchuria there 
 were two other rivals, Russians and Japanese. 
 
 From the outset of the war, as conducted in the Far East, 
 the clash was between British and Germans more than be- 
 tween any other two peoples. To the eyes of the Britisher 
 living in the Far East "the German menace" to be up- 
 rooted by Japan was the menace to British trade. If as a 
 
 147 
 
148 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 result of war a stop could be put to German enterprise, the 
 war would not have been fought in vain. War was simply 
 one way to destroy German business. To the Japanese, 
 on the other hand, the object in mind was more political 
 than military or commercial. 
 
 In the early months of the war the contest was not so 
 much between belligerents, like British and Germans, as 
 between belligerents on the one side and neutrals on the 
 other. In the former group were British, French, Rus- 
 sians, Belgians and Japanese. In the latter group were 
 Americans, Italians, Hollanders, Swiss, Danes, Norwegians, 
 Swedes, Spaniards, and above all the Chinese. In large 
 treaty-ports like Shanghai the British element predomi- 
 nated. British oflScials took it upon themselves to dictate 
 to everybody. The Orders in Council as to Trading with 
 the Enemy were made to apply to neutrals as well as to 
 Britishers. For an American in China in those days to 
 trade with a German in China was to place him on the 
 British black-list. Neutral rights had to give place to ques- 
 tions of expediency and livelihood. Most Americans, for 
 convenience in trade and banking, consented to yield to 
 the superior force and persistent dictation of British au- 
 thorities. Americans in China as in the home country were 
 neutral, but through force of circumstances became aligned 
 with the British as the pressure increased. After the fall 
 of Tsingtao there were no more battles to be fought; the 
 only object then was to destroy German business, and in- 
 cidentally to oppress every neutral who declined to be 
 amenable to British behests. The ones most affected were 
 neutral Americans and neutral Chinese. 
 
 The method of restrictive procedure was not difficult. 
 If an American firm, for instance, desired to sell Amer- 
 ican goods to a German firm to be in turn sold to the 
 Chinese, or to sell Chinese goods through a German firm 
 to some company in the United States, there were two ways 
 
CO^IiVIERCIAL RIVALRIES 149 
 
 to hamper the transaction. One was to refuse transporta- 
 tion by British or Japanese ships. Another was for the 
 banks to refuse a draft. An American bank would make 
 the same kind of refusal, under warning that action taken 
 contrary to British orders would mean closing up the 
 business of the bank's branches under British jurisdiction. 
 In a word, bankruptcy stared a neutral firm in the face, if 
 it proposed to trade with opposing belligerents in the same 
 manner. It was not a question of law and right, but for 
 the neutral trader one of expediency and self-preservation. 
 It was a practical question, not one of theory, precedent 
 or morals. 
 
 In attacking German business all that was necessary was 
 to attack some neutral, notably an American or Chinese. 
 
 It was one thing for the British to seize and sell out 
 German business houses in British possessions. It was an- 
 other thing to bring this about within the confines of China. 
 
 This destruction of German business was the controlling 
 purpose in trying to get China to enter the war against 
 Germany. It was not disclosed till China, under American 
 persuasion, severed relations with Germany, and was not 
 consummated till China actually declared war, or, strange 
 to say, till armistice was declared.^ 
 
 Definite action was taken early in March, 1917, by the 
 secret agreement of France and Japan. In return for the 
 guarantee to Japan of all German rights in Shantung and 
 of all German colonies north of the equator, it was made 
 
 ' It may seem that this judgment of the British is wrong, owing 
 to the apparent friendly attitude of the British Government towards 
 German industrial restoration. This new symptom of friendliness, a 
 stroke of good policy, is partly due to a liberal sentiment of the 
 average Briton and to insistent demands of English labourites, and 
 partly to the fact of British investments in big business in Germany 
 and by the use of the consequences of war for the supremacy of the 
 Briton over the German in matters of trade the world over. So long 
 as Great Britain is on top why should a Briton be anything but 
 generous to the defeated German foe ? 
 
150 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 known to Japan, as outlined in a previous chapter,^ that 
 the French Premier, M. Briand, demanded, among other 
 things, first, the repatriation from China of all German 
 subjects, and second, "requisition of German commercial 
 houses established in China." France thus became the 
 active supporter of British designs, and through her Japan 
 became another supporter. 
 
 The Chinese, accustomed to trade with Germans as with 
 the British, the French and Japanese, little realized the 
 commercial complication of taking part in a European 
 war. 
 
 No sooner had China severed relations with Germany, 
 March 14, 1917, than the French ordered closed the best 
 scientific school in China, namely, the German Medical and 
 Engineering School, situated in the French Concession of 
 Shanghai. The Chinese immediately took steps to re-start 
 the school outside Shanghai under Chinese jurisdiction. 
 
 British and French plans could not be carried out with 
 any show of legality till China should actually become an 
 associate in war. It was also necessary to have the United 
 States an associate, ready to yield to the British and French 
 interpretation of international law. 
 
 The Chinese, left to their own sense of justice, and fol- 
 lowing the precedent of their recent wars with France and 
 with Japan, or of the war between Russia and Japan, were 
 not disposed to follow the ancient and more rigid rule of 
 confiscating property of enemy subjects. In this attitude 
 they opposed British and French demands, and in the early 
 stages of the war found encouragement in the more liberal 
 policy of Japan and the United States. When the United 
 States altered her policy to the harsh one of ancient days, 
 China, too, had to change. 
 
 In the Regulations issued by the Chinese Government in 
 August, 1917, reference was made to the transfer or sale of 
 
 * See Chapter V, last part. 
 
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 151 
 
 , property of enemy subjects, ''whenever such transfer or 
 sale is rendered necessary either by special circumstances 
 or for the convenience of safe-keeping. " It is then added : 
 "The sale of said property must be assented to hy the owner 
 of such property." 
 
 The Chinese, however, refrained from such action until 
 the spring of 1919 (after the armistice), by which time, as 
 before mentioned, pressure from eight Allied and Associ- 
 ated Nations was too great to be resisted. 
 
 It is recalled that on the eve of armistice these eight 
 foreign Ministers, representing a higher civilization, had 
 admonished the Peking Government under twelve specifi- 
 cations. One was remissness in interning enemy subjects, 
 and another, failure to liquidate enemy properties. Intern- 
 ment regulations, in fact, were not issued by the Chinese 
 Government until October 5, 1918. November 9, the In- 
 spector-General of Maritime Customs and of Salt Gabelle, 
 and the Director-General of the Post Office, two British and 
 one a Frenchman, decided that no Germans were to be re- 
 admitted to these three services after the war. About the 
 same time French -soldiers also gave a pitiable spectacle to 
 the Chinese populace in dynamiting the Von Keteler mon- 
 ument in Peking, and the German bank, .situated within 
 the Legation quarter. 
 
 Towards the end of January, 1919, the new President of 
 China issued two Mandates, one for repatriation of all 
 enemy subjects, and the other for sequestration of enemy 
 property. For repatriation needs the British Government 
 agreed to provide the ships, but the cost would be charged 
 against the Chinese Government. For meeting this ex- 
 pense, the Allied banks agreed to loan $500,000, at 8 per 
 cent, interest ! In this way the British could consummate 
 their designs with no burden to themselves. The disposal 
 of German property at the treaty-ports, while properly a 
 Chinese affair, if done at all, met constant intrusion from 
 
152 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 British and American municipal authorities, thus retarding 
 the free action of the Chinese. 
 
 When the question of deportation of enemy subjects came 
 up for discussion at an earlier date, the editor of the Japan 
 Chronicle, an Englishman, wrote: 
 
 It is stated that negotiations are proceeding between the 
 Chinese Government and those of Japan and France for obtaining 
 a supply of vessels for the transportation of these enemy subjects. 
 It is difficult to believe that in these days of tonnage scarcity such 
 a proceeding can be contemplated. In any case, unless it be for 
 the benefit of the enemy subjects themselves — e.g., against a possi- 
 ble uprising — the whole proceeding appears to be as unnecessary 
 as it is likely to be futile and expensive. 
 
 (However, while peacemakers were conferring in Paris, 
 Germans and Austrians, both men and women and children, 
 were being sent home at China's expense, and all German 
 business houses were being liquidated and sold. As an 
 English writer, July 20, 1919, in the North China Herald 
 says: "The liquidation of all enemy business in the coun- 
 try, and the repatriation of enemy subjects, were matters 
 of the most vital importance to the Allied cause in China, 
 from the point of post bellum considerations." The war 
 was thus a tool for commercial advantage in the piping days 
 of peace. 
 
 German merchants, German educationists, German mis- 
 sionaries, whether from North Germany or South Germany, 
 were made to suffer as an outcome of China's entry into 
 war and through the pressure of the Allied and Associated 
 Nations. Whether just or unjust was not much considered. 
 So long as one was German, that was enough to condemn 
 him even in far-away China. It must be said that not every 
 Britisher living in the Far East approved these harsh and 
 drastic measures. 
 
 If it had not been for American example, the Chinese 
 
Commercial rivalries 153 
 
 would have refrained from anything more than intern- 
 ment of a few enemy subjects. "What, then, is American 
 example? One thing one day, and another thing another 
 day, but in the end conforming to the dominating mind of 
 Britain and France, our associates on the field of battle, 
 in the struggle between Right and Wrong. 
 
 At the time the United States broke with Germany, there 
 was anxiety as to the probable effect on Germans living in 
 the United States. John B. McMaster ^ says : 
 
 To quiet the anxiety felt by Gdrman subjects residing in our 
 country lest their bank deposits and other property should be 
 seized by the Government in the event of war, the President in- 
 structed the Secretary of State to say that such fears were un- 
 founded. Under no circumstances would the Government take 
 advantage of a state of war to seize property to which interna- 
 tional law and the law of the land gave it no just claim or title. 
 All rights of property both of American citizens and of subjects 
 of foreign states would be respected. 
 
 That the American Government would abide by this an- 
 nouncement of the President was all the more to be ex- 
 pected from the remarkable Agreement of Prussia and the 
 United States made in 1785 and reaffirmed in the Treaty 
 of 1828. This Treaty, which has never been abrogated, 
 provided that Germans in the United States, in ease of war 
 between the two countries, should be given nine months to 
 wind up their business affairs, to dispose of their property, 
 and to return to Germany "without molestation or hin- 
 drance. "^ 
 
 In due time, at request of the Executive Department, a 
 legislative act was passed giving power to a Custodian of 
 Alien Property, A. Mitchell Palmer, to take over the prop- 
 
 ^ " The United States in the World War," p. 329. 
 
 ' The Treaty of 1785 was negotiated by Benjamin Franklin, 
 Thomas JeflFerson and John Adams, and that of 1828 by Henry Clay- 
 all great and true Americans. 
 
154 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 erty of German aliens living in the- United States. Thus 
 from an American point of view the seizure of enemy 
 property became a legal act. 
 
 In the spring of 1918 the same rule was applied to Ger- 
 mans doing business in the Philippine Islands. A large 
 number of Germans were deported to the United States, 
 and here interned. All German business was liquidated and 
 sold to Americans or Filipinos, the money being held by 
 the Custodian. 
 
 When the American Government acted in the Philip- 
 pines in the same way as the British Government acted in 
 Hongkong, it became well-nigh impossible for the Chinese 
 Government, taking the example of the United States, to 
 deal differently in treatment of Germans living in China. 
 China had to do as others did. She had entered the war 
 and must bear some of the war's burdens. 
 
 The question is: Did this harsh method conform to the 
 best spirit of international law, and was it a good rule 
 to teach an Oriental people ? 
 
 Chief Justice Marshall once said: "When war breaks 
 out, the question what shall be done with enemy property 
 in our country is a situation rather of policy than of law." 
 
 The policy, and the law, too, of America's Custodian of 
 Alien Property is seen in the following language delivered 
 in Philadelphia, November 7, 1918: 
 
 Germany must be made to understand that her plan has failed 
 in the industrial field as in the military. Industrial disarmament 
 must come along with military disarmament. Autocracy in in- 
 dustry must fall with the fall of the Hohenzollern dynasty. The 
 same peace which frees the world from the menace of the auto- 
 cratic militarism of the German Empire should free it from the 
 menace of its autocratic industrialism as well. 
 
 American ideas have travelled far since the early days 
 of the war, when the United States stood as champion of 
 
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 155 
 
 neutral rights, and as the coming pacificator in a world of 
 passion. 
 Oppenheim, the English authority, says: 
 
 Under a former rule of international law belligerents could ap- 
 propriate all public and private enemy property they found on 
 enemy territory. This rule is now obsolete.^ 
 
 Ho adds: 
 
 Private personal property which does not consist of war ma- 
 terial and means of transport serviceable to military operations 
 can regularly not be seized. 
 
 Hall, of Oxford University, is even more explicit. He 
 says of sequestration of private property of enemy subjects 
 that it "would be looked upon with extreme disfavour." He 
 continues: "It is evident that although it is within the 
 bare rights of a belligerent to appropriate the property of 
 his enemies existing within his jurisdiction, it can very 
 rarely be wise to do so." Once again: 
 
 The absence of any instance of confiscation in the more recent 
 European wars, no less than the common interests of all nations 
 and present feelings, warrant a confident hope that the dying right 
 will never again be put in force, and that it will soon be wholly 
 extinguished by disuse.^ 
 
 The text-book in American schools of Wilson and Tucker 
 says: 
 
 The most recent practice has been to exempt personal property 
 of the subject of one belligerent state from all molestation, even 
 though it was within the territory of the other at the outbreak of 
 war.^ 
 
 a (( 
 
 International Law," Vol. II, pp. 127, 144. 
 International Law," pp. 368, 373. 
 • " International Law," p. 249, 
 
156 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 The modern spirit of liberality was embodied in the 
 Hague Convention of 1907, Article 46: *' Private property 
 cannot he confiscated." 
 
 From an American point of view it is interesting to go 
 back in memory to over a hundred years ago, to the Jay 
 Treaty of the United States made with the British Gov- 
 ernment. Article X stipulates that in the event of future 
 wars between the United States and the United Kingdom 
 private property shall be inviolable. Alexander Hamilton 
 in a memorandum to President Washington wrote thus on 
 Article X : 
 
 In my opinion this article is nothing more than an affirmation 
 of the modern law and usage of civilized nations, and is valuable 
 as a check upon a measure which, if it could ever take place, 
 would disgrace the government of the country, and injure its true 
 interests. 
 
 What is most remarkable is that men whose countries 
 had been fighting for righteousness should embody in the 
 Versailles Treaty the very opposite of this recognized prin- 
 ciple of the Hague Convention and the Law of Nations. 
 Thus Article 297 (B) reads: 
 
 Subject to any contrary stipulations which may be provided 
 for in the present treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve 
 the right to retain and liquidate all property rights and interests 
 of German nationals and companies controlled by them, within 
 their territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, including 
 territories ceded to them by the present treaty. 
 
 This means the possible liquidation of German property 
 in the larger part of the globe. It means at least the pos- 
 sibility of liquidating German property in China, The 
 ground for hope that the Chinese Government will continue 
 to protect the property rights of all nationals within the 
 
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 157 
 
 limits of China, making no discrimination against those of 
 German nationality, is that the Chinese delegate has not 
 signed the treaty, and that the President of China has 
 already declared a state of peace with Germany. Moreover, 
 the act of sequestrating German private property, though 
 approved by the Big Five Military Nations, is not agreeable 
 to the Chinese for three reasons. One is that many Chinese 
 have had satisfactory business relations with Germans in 
 the past, A second is that such procedure does not appeal 
 to the Chinese sense of fairness. A third is that the British 
 and French at treaty-ports insist on taking the liquidating 
 out of Chinese hands and on managing it themselves. 
 
 Concerning this last point, it is well for citizens of ad- 
 vanced nations to bear in mind that at most of the treaty- 
 ports, especially at Shanghai, the largest foreign eomw 
 munity of all, the British and French, and not the Chinese, 
 exercise control within extensive areas, where Germans in 
 the past have built up business and owned property. The 
 Chinese attempt to sequestrate German property therein 
 is sure to meet with British and French interference — none 
 from Americans. 
 
 Moreover, it has been customary in past years for Com- 
 panies, formed of shareholders other than British, to be 
 incorporated under the Ordinances of the Colony of Hong- 
 kong, When war was declared, dividends due to enemy 
 shareholders were held back from payment till the close 
 of the war. By another Ordinance in 1915 a Custodian of 
 Alien Property was appointed by the Governor of Hong- 
 kong, but this only affected property within the jurisdiction 
 of Hongkong. In 1919, after the armistice, a new Ordi- 
 nance was passed recognizing the Custodian appointed by 
 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and so by the 
 British Minister in Peking, as to all China Companies with 
 British registration. ' ' In the ease of every China Company 
 the term 'Custodian' means 'the Custodian of Enemy 
 
158 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEt 
 
 Property in China' " — a Britisher, not a Chinese. "SueK 
 Custodian shall be deemed to have had and shall have full 
 powers of selling, managing and otherwise dealing with 
 and transferring such shares, stocks, annuities and other 
 obligations of such China Company." Every Company 
 must report to this British Custodian — in China — all enemy 
 shares, and these shares will be invested in his name. 
 
 Here, then, is introduced a most bewildering compli- 
 cation for the Chinese Government in its new experiment 
 of trying out the laws of war, as inculcated by one side 
 in the Great "War. Incidentally it can now be seen that 
 if the British are to acquire German property at the large 
 treaty-ports, they cannot object to Japanese possession of 
 German rights in Shantung. 
 
 That the clauses in the Treaty of Peace relating to seizure 
 of enemy property in private hands have not been more 
 generally criticized by liberty-loving Englishmen and 
 Americans is probably due to a fear of being dubbed pro- 
 German. If, however, the settlement reached is to be more 
 righteous than any in past history, then the leader of polit- 
 ical thought and world-rejuvenation should have the moral 
 courage to defend recognized principles of international 
 law and the innate sense of right and fair-play, without 
 regard to race or nationality. 
 
 Furthermore, according to the Treaty, Germans are to 
 be deprived of the regular processes of law, or of counter- 
 claims, or of appeal or protest ; they must bow to the ruling 
 of arbitrary Might. And this is to be the new teaching 
 of moral ideas to enter into the life of the Orient. Thus 
 Article 298, under the head of "Claims," reads: 
 
 No claim or action shall be made or brought against any Allied 
 or Associated Power or against any person acting on behalf of 
 or under the direction of any legal authority or department of 
 the government of such a Power by Germany or by any German 
 
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 159 
 
 national wherever resident in respect of any act or omission with 
 regard to his property, rights or interests during the war or in 
 preparation for war. 
 
 Not only is this drastic ruling applied to German prop- 
 erty and investment in the Allied and Associated Powers, 
 of whom China is one, but also to all German ' ' rights and 
 titles over her oversea possessions," which by Article 119 
 "Germany renounces in favour of the principal Allied and 
 Associated Powers." Thus Article 120 reads: 
 
 All movable and immovable property in such territories be- 
 longing to the German Empire or to any German State shall pass 
 to the Government exercising authority over such territories. 
 
 As Article 297 stipulates that private property in ** terri- 
 tory ceded" may also be liquidated, the transaction of 
 world-wide appropriation may be regarded as complete. 
 
 In the future, Germans are to have a hard time of it in 
 former German possessions. Article 122 reads: 
 
 The Government exercising authority over such territory may 
 make such provisions as it thinks fit with reference to the re- 
 patriation from them of German nationals and to the conditions 
 upon which German subjects of European origin shall, or shall 
 not, be allowed to reside, hold property, trade or exercise a 
 profession therein. 
 
 How different the opportunities of all nationals of vic- 
 torious Powers, as seen in Article 277: 
 
 The nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy 
 in German territory a constant protection for their persons and 
 for their property, rights and interests, and shall have free access 
 to the courts of law. 
 
 Verily this is the day of the rule of Might. How strange 
 this guarantee of lasting and just peace! 
 
160 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 When these economic phases of the Treaty were tele- 
 graphed to the New York Globe from Paris, June 2, 1919, 
 the correspondent began : 
 
 For many years the United States has contended for the in- 
 violability of individual property rights in war. 
 
 And then he proceeded to state these remarkable Articles 
 of the economic clauses, depriving Germans of property 
 rights within the sway of other nations. 
 
 The leader of the Administration in the United States 
 Senate, Senator Hitchcock, discussed, September 3, 1919, 
 the bearings of these Articles on the United States, and his 
 words make one doubt the moral aims of the peace settle- 
 ment. He said : 
 
 Again, take the matter of German property in the United 
 States — the matter of private property owned by German na- 
 tionals in the United States when the war broke out. Under Acts 
 of Congress that property was seized and much of it has been 
 sold and liquidated. In the aggregate its value runs into hun- 
 dreds of millions of dollars — not less than $750,000,000 and possi- 
 bly more than $1,000,000,000. 
 
 Under this Treaty all acts of the United States and of the Alien 
 Property Custodian with regard to that property are validated 
 unless Germany can show actual fraud. 
 
 Under this Treaty they are validated. Under this Treaty the 
 money derived from the liquidation of German property can be 
 used to pay for the debts of Germans to Americans and the 
 balance is subject to the absolute disposition of the Congress of 
 the United States. This power can be used to protect American 
 claims and property in Germany. 
 
 Suppose Germany refuses to validate our acts with regard to 
 this property. Suppose she points to the Treaties of 1799 and 
 1828, under which we agreed that we would respect the private 
 property of German nationals in the United States, under which 
 we agreed that we would give them nine months after the out- 
 
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 161 
 
 break of any war between Germany and the United States, during 
 which time they could sell their property and leave the United 
 States ; under which we agreed that Germans engaged in business, 
 agriculture or manufacturmg in this country could continue 
 peacefully in carrying on their occupations under the protection 
 of law, even though war existed between the United States and 
 Germany. Can any one doubt that we would have a serious and 
 dangerous controversy with Germany over that question which 
 might last for generations? 
 
 Another day, after a long conference with President Wil- 
 son, Senator Hitchcock issued a statement containing these 
 words : 
 
 Through the Treaty, we will yet get very much of importance. 
 ... In violation of all international law and treaties we have 
 made disposition of a billion dollars of German-owned property 
 here. The Treaty validates all that. 
 
 Is this the kind of law, politics and morals that American 
 people and English people desire to see taught to Oriental 
 nations, brought up under other systems of ethics? 
 
 May I quote President Wilson, when he called upon Con- 
 gress to agree to a declaration of war: 
 
 We shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents 
 without passion, and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the 
 principles of right and fair-play we profess to be fighting for. 
 
 Defenders of the moral value of these portions of the 
 treaty have been known to point to a new mode of protect- 
 ing the property rights of German citizens, who have had 
 residence outside the Fatherland. The world's conscience 
 is directed to this sentence that closes Article 297: 
 
 Germany undertakes to compensate its nationals in respect of 
 the sale or retention of their property, rights or interests in Al- 
 lied or Associated States. 
 
162 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Naturally one may conclude that if Germans still fail 
 of compensation, the blame lies with the German Gov- 
 ernment, and not with the Allied and Associated Powers. 
 But how is the German Government to possess the capac- 
 ity, or even the opportunity, of reimbursing the great losses 
 of Germans all over the world, amounting to many hundreds 
 of millions of dollars and billions of marks? Will the Al- 
 lied nations postpone reparation charges till the rights of 
 German citizens have been met? Is not this hold of a pri- 
 vate German on his own Government like a third mortgage 
 rather than a first ? No German merchant whose property 
 has been seized in Shanghai, Hongkong, Calcutta, Bombay, 
 East Africa or Cape Colony need expect any restitution in 
 this roundabout fashion, till the rival merchants of Eng- 
 land and the United States have successfully pre-empted 
 the ground and closed the door. 
 
 Granted that ten years hence the then German Govern- 
 ment, out of the taxes of the people, advance the money 
 to the former heads of business firms in China for 
 rebuilding their establishments and resupplying a mar- 
 ketable stock of goods, will not these men be greatly 
 handicapped in the new competition and find themselves at 
 an unjust disadvantage? Help may come from Chinese, 
 and it probably will, but others of Western nations will 
 be seen, as they are, the opposing influence to German 
 enterprise. 
 
 The wrong done will never be realized till some one of 
 the present conquering nations enters on another war, is 
 then defeated, and learns anew that no law exists for pro- 
 tecting private property. It is henceforth an absurdity to 
 speak of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" as 
 "the inalienable rights of man." 
 
 Another absurdity is that in overthrowing German mili- 
 tarism it is equally legitimate to destroy German business 
 and uproot the ambition to be strong commercially. Does 
 
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 163 
 
 any one imagine that this is the way to guarantee a lasting 
 peace? Or that this is justice? 
 
 Worse than all, the Treaty of Peace did not limit itself 
 to political and commercial issues. It ventured forth into 
 the realm of ethics and religion. Commercialism swamped 
 the boat of Christian missions. At the very end of the 
 Treaty — a sort of climax — an Article is drawn concerning 
 the work, the interests and property of German missions. 
 The property of Christian missions under German man- 
 agement "shall continue to be devoted to missionary pur- 
 poses" (Article 438), but under control of "boards of 
 trustees appointed by or approved by the Governments and 
 composed of persons holding the Christian Faith." Ger- 
 many must agree to such arrangements as these Govern- 
 ments will make. Germany as to these missions "waves all 
 claims on their behalf. ' ' ^ 
 
 Is this not the limit of dictatorial determination? Is 
 this not the greatest surprise of all, that President Wood- 
 row Wilson and Premier Lloyd George should, in the name 
 of Righteousness and "impartial justice," countenance re- 
 strictions of this nature to the world-wide commands of 
 the great Head of the Church? 
 
 My own views are best expressed by a Memorial to the 
 Peace Conference of the Society of Friends in London : 
 
 It is understood that it has been proposed to exclude, at any 
 rate temporarily, all German missionaries and missionary societies 
 from British possessions, that China is being urged to take a 
 similar course, and that it is likely that German colonies handed 
 over to mandatory Powers will be in the same position. If this 
 were carried out, it is not impossible that some five-sixths of this 
 splendid work would be terminated. We desire to point out: 
 (1) That any such policy or exclusion means that Christian enter- 
 prise becomes a matter for exclusive national treatment. This 
 
 * See Appendix III. 
 
164 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 work should be essentially both international and supra-national, 
 and to legislate for it on a merely national basis would be to 
 mistake its contribution to the world order. (2) That the 
 churches of Germany will have scarcely any opportunity for out- 
 ward expression. This will surely lead to disastrous results for 
 Germany and the world. (3) That temporary exclusion for more 
 than a very short time (say, twelve months) would be tantamount 
 to permanent exclusion. There has already been a long interrup- 
 tion, and it will be difficult enough to resume the work in any 
 case. (4) That, on the other hand, a different policy would do 
 a great deal to help in the strengthening of the best elements in 
 German national life, and in enabling her to take a right and 
 helpful place in the society of nations. 
 
 In view of these and other weighty considerations, we urge 
 that all these matters be not hastily decided, but rather be 
 referred to a special commission, which, besides Government of- 
 ficials should include representative missionary leaders from the 
 different countries, whose duty it shall be to discover means by 
 which this valuable work may be continued, by which German 
 missions and missionaries may, under suitable guarantees and 
 safeguards, be readmitted to the territories concerned, and to 
 emphasize the supra-national character of the Christian enter- 
 prise. . . . 
 
 An admirable memorandum on German missions, both 
 Protestant and Roman Catholic, was presented in Novem- 
 ber, 1919, by Professor Julius Richter of Berlin University 
 to Dr. Arthur J. Brown of the American Presbyterian 
 Board of Foreign Missions.* I make a few citations : 
 
 About half of the fields of the German missions are wholly or 
 almost wholly deprived of the paternal care of their fathers in 
 Christ. ... A million and a half of native Christians under the 
 care of German missions, Protestant and Roman Catholic, are in 
 serious danger of disintegration for lack of the necessary super- 
 vision and leadership. . . . An enormous amount of spiritual 
 capital seems to be hopelessly lost. The knowledge of the lan- 
 
 * In Chrieti<m Work, February, 1920. 
 
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 165 
 
 guage and of the customs of the peoples, the confidence won by 
 the patient work of generations of missionaries, scientific re- 
 search, Bible translations and other literary work pursued with 
 usual German thoroughness will fade away. ... On the other 
 hand, the repatriated missionaries, most of them, stand at the 
 market, looking out eagerly for a corner in the vineyard of the 
 Lord where they can pursue their noble work, and nobody calls 
 them. Many of them are really in serious distress. And so about 
 two thousand German missionaries, Protestant and Roman Catho- 
 lic, are pushed aside at a time when the non-Christian world 
 seems to cry out loud with one voice, " Come over and help us," 
 and when the missionary conferences are sounding forth again 
 and again the call for more labourers in the harvest. . . . Para- 
 graph 438 of the Peace Treaty creates a new international law, 
 and this law seems to be disastrous for the rest of the German 
 missions. If this paragraph should be put into operation to its 
 full extent, nine-tenths of the German missions which have been 
 saved through the stormy years of war-time would be lost by and 
 by — the missions in German Southwest Africa, in German New 
 Guinea, in Usambara, and on the slopes of the Kilimanjaro, in 
 South Africa, China and Japan; only the rest which lie in 
 the Dutch Colonial empire might perhaps be retained in spite of 
 Paragraph 438. . . . Remember in China now for two years 
 and a half the German missionaries know that the Entente is 
 demanding their expulsion; more than once the situation seemed 
 critical. At any time missionaries had already been ordered to 
 the harbours. Happily the majority of them have been able to 
 remain up to the present time. They do not know how long. 
 This awful Paragraph 438 gives them no security. It eats out 
 the life of mission work; it puts the whole property of German 
 missions at the disposal of the colonizing power, only under the 
 condition that the profit of it must be spent for missionary and 
 educational purposes. It is the strongest contradiction of the 
 super-nationahty of Christian missions.^ 
 
 As I have stated concerning commercial penalties in- 
 flicted on Germany, so in regard to Christian missions and 
 * See Appendix IV. 
 
166 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 mission property financed by the gifts of German Chris- 
 tians, there is more hope that justice will be rendered by 
 the Chinese than by the Entente and Associated Powers. 
 Through China's declination to sign the Versailles Treaty, 
 due to injustice in the Shantung settlement, she may yet 
 become an example to the rest of the world in just treat- 
 ment of peoples, once enemy, now friends, once belligerent, 
 now reconciled. Not only does the cause of justice receive 
 a blow from these treaty demands, but the cause of Chris- 
 tianity will inevitably suffer in the estimation of all classes 
 of the Chinese, when comparison is made both with the 
 teachings and the practice of the old Faiths of China. It is 
 certain that Chinese officials and the Chinese people, even 
 those outside the Christian constituency, if free to act with 
 no pressure from outside nations, will accord in the future 
 as in the past equal opportunities to the commerce and 
 missionary enterprises of all nations, in the spirit of fair- 
 ness and hospitality. That which is beneficial China will 
 never reject. She opposes that which works her harm, 
 whether from Buddhist Japan or Christian Europe. 
 
 Would not the cause of justice and world-wide law have 
 fared better, if the negotiators at Paris, in respect both to 
 private property and to Christian missions, had observed 
 international law as already established? Was it wise to 
 ignore the Hague Conventions in forming a League of Na- 
 tions? Was it fitting to overlook the fundamentals of the 
 Christian Faith? 
 
 Bishop Gore, when speaking in this country in 1918, 
 said: 
 
 The mere determination to beat Germany is apt to absorb all 
 else. Whereas, in fact, we might defeat Germany and at the same 
 time absorb so much of what is false in the spirit of the war as 
 to defeat our professed aims in entering upon it. That is what 
 makes me ready to do anything that lies in my power to keep the 
 right moral principles of the war to the fore. 
 
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 167 
 
 The late Governor-General of Canada, the Earl of Grey, 
 shortly before his death, said: 
 
 You know the idea of those words, " He being dead, yet speak- 
 eth." A voice from the dead often gets a hearing. That's what 
 I'm after. . I want you to make my voice sound from the grave. 
 I want to say to the people, there's a real way out of the mess 
 materialism has got us into. I've been t»rying to tell them for 
 thirty years — "It's Christ's way." Mazzini saw it. We've got 
 to get together. We've got to realize we're all members of one 
 family. There's nothing can help humanity, I'm perfectly sure 
 there isn't, except Love. Love's the way out and the way up. 
 That's my farewell to the world. 
 
 So far as the victorious nations conform to these noble 
 sentiments, will they be able to exert an influence that will 
 work out for China moral regeneration and national 
 salvation. 
 
CHAPTER Vni 
 
 THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA AT THE PEACE TABLE 
 
 We now reach the climax of the War's great drama as 
 affecting China. If, indeed, it was a wise move to induce 
 China to enter the war, then the high hopes held out to her 
 for redressing past wrongs should have met at least a fair 
 measure of fulfilment. If the results were bad, then the 
 initiative move of Americans, supported by seven Allies, 
 was a wrong to China additional to all past wrongs. 
 
 In brief, the war has brought havoc to China, and gain 
 to Japan. Germany's interests in China have been injured 
 commercially; China's interests have been injured polit- 
 ically and morally. Japan's position in China has been 
 strengthened both commercially and politically, but not 
 morally. The confirmation of these charges is to be found 
 in the Versailles Treaty of Peace and the Covenant of the 
 League of Nations. It is in respect to China that the Treaty 
 and the Covenant show how far short they fall in meeting 
 the high ideals and professions of Americans and the 
 Allied peoples — victors in the greatest war of the ages. 
 
 When armistice was declared, and a Peace Conference 
 was to take place, the Japanese tried to persuade the 
 Chinese Government to leave all matters in the hands of 
 Japanese negotiators. This proposition was not altogether 
 unacceptable, for the Chinese Government ever since its 
 entrance into the war was of the military faction under 
 General Tuan Chi-jui, and had more and more entered into 
 close relations with Japan, culminating in numerous Agree- 
 ments of 1918. However, the new President of China, Hsii 
 Shih-chang, backed by popular sentiment, insisted on a rep- 
 
 168 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 169 
 
 resentation from the Chinese Government. At once there 
 appeared divergence of opinion between China and Ja- 
 pan, until the antagonists seemed not so much to be Ger- 
 many on the one side and China and Japan on the other, 
 as China arrayed against Japan. There has grown to be 
 more enmity between Chinese and Japanese, kindred in 
 race and culture, than between Chinese and Germans, or 
 between Japanese and Germans. 
 
 As soon as the Chinese delegation appeared in Paris, the 
 demand came for making public all secret agreements be- 
 tween the Chinese and Japanese Governments. This move, 
 which was meant to strengthen China's claims, was dis- 
 pleasing not only to Japan, but to the military pro-Jap- 
 anese Peking Government. However, the Chinese delegates 
 gained their wishes in part, but cordiality between the two 
 countries was weakened. At different times during discus- 
 sion of the League or the Treaty the two delegations ap- 
 peared as opponents. The final settlement of the China- 
 Japan question depended on other than the strength of 
 argument; Japanese military power and all possible com- 
 plications arising therefrom cast a spell over the thoughts 
 and purposes of the Supreme Council. 
 
 Because Japan was a strong military nation, she was 
 welcomed to the inner group, known as the Council of Five, 
 and later on was assured a permanent position in the Coun- 
 cil of the League. China, though she represented a great 
 population and an ancient civilization, was not thus 
 honoured.^ 
 
 Moreover, Japan was allowed five delegates, and China 
 only two. The five of Japan were Marquis Saionji, one 
 of the Elder Statesmen, a veteran in years and experience, 
 and in his early days educated in France ; Baron Makino, 
 
 ^ It is pleasing to record that through the capable statement of 
 Dr. Wellington Koo, the first meeting of the League at Geneva elected 
 China as one of the Council. 
 
170 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Matsui and Ambassador 
 Ijuin, all of whom had received an education or held a 
 diplomatic position in some one of the countries of Europe. 
 
 Of the Chinese delegation the chief was Lou Tseng-tsiang, 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs and for many years Minister 
 to France. He spoke elegant French, had married a Bel- 
 gian lady and had joined the Catholic Church. He rep- 
 resented the Peking Government, though not the military 
 and pro-Japan faction. He was more in touch with the 
 French aims than with the American. The second dele- 
 gate was C. T. Wang. He had been educated at Michigan 
 and Yale Universities, was active in the Y. M. C. A. and 
 connected with the Protestant body. He was first the rep- 
 resentative of the constitutional or revolutionary govern- 
 ment centred at Canton, but afterwards, for his recognized 
 patriotism and ability as well as for the impression to be 
 made of national unity, he was formally designated by the 
 President of China as representative of the Peking Gov- 
 ernment. He was an exponent of the American idea, and 
 had taken an active part in following America 's advice that 
 China sever relations with Germany and be aligned with 
 the United States. He, like his chief, was opposed to the 
 pro- Japan clique and to Japan's ambitious aggressions. 
 
 With this delegation there was associated a group of 
 young men, who were more in sympathy with the de- 
 mocracy of the Southern Government than with the mili- 
 tarism of the recognized Peking Government. They were 
 all antagonistic to Japan. Of these the leader was Minister 
 Wellington Koo, an honoured graduate of Columbia Univer- 
 sity. As Minister at Washington, he was given a place on 
 the special committee in Paris for drafting the Covenant 
 of the League of Nations. He and Dr. Wang had an elo- 
 quent command of the English language, which was un- 
 matched by the Japanese delegation. As the months passed 
 by, the impression made was that the Chinese delegation 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 171 
 
 stood not only against the Japanese demands, but in sup- 
 port of President Wilson's well-known principles. It was 
 thought that China by aligning herself with the United 
 States had a better chance to frustrate the designs of Japan 
 and to win liberty, democracy and political independence. 
 
 The Japanese achieved a victory over their neighbour and 
 ally by choosing the right moment for calling for a deci- 
 sion. It was at the close of the deliberations. The Italian 
 delegation had already withdrawn. Japan's argument for 
 equality had been cast aside. The hint was thrown out 
 that if Japan's claims as to German rights in Shantung 
 should also be rejected, Japan, like Italy, might also with- 
 draw. The decision was hastily made in Japan's favour. 
 The ones who made the decision were not all the members 
 of the Assembly and not even the Japanese delegation, but 
 three men — the Big Three — Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd 
 George and M. Clemenceau. For making a wrong decision 
 these three men, one an American who stood at the pinnacle 
 of fame, and not Japan, must bear the blame. Moreover, 
 Britain, France and Italy, in the secret compacts of early 
 1917, had guaranteed to Japan all German rights in Shan- 
 tung, and had not disclosed the fact to President Wilson 
 prior to the Peace Conference. 
 
 Bearing closely on the Treaty I advance the thought 
 which has revolved in my own mind, but which I have not 
 seen expressed by others, "Is it really right that Germany, 
 the new Germany, should be compelled by her conquerors to 
 'renounce' all her rights in Kiaochow and Shantung, and 
 to sign a treaty consenting to such renunciation?" This 
 termination of German rights is a vital feature of these 
 Articles of peace settlement. No one of President Wilson 's 
 Fourteen Points bears directly on this requirement. But 
 the fifth point, concerning "a free, open-minded and abso- 
 lutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims," while 
 not regarded as very imperative in the matter specified, 
 
172 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 might properly be applied to territory that is only leased, 
 or to concessions that have been legitimately acquired, as 
 was true of Germany in Shantung. To this fifth point the 
 President adds a principle, a most important one, that ' ' the 
 interests of the populations concerned" must have weight. 
 And here the Chinese are concerned. On July 4, 1918, 
 President Wilson enlarged on this principle thus : 
 
 The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of 
 sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, 
 upon the basis of free acceptance of that settlement by the ma- 
 terial interest or advantage of any other nation or people which 
 may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior 
 influence or mastery. 
 
 The people and the territory concerned are Chinese. The 
 Germans are concerned in only a minor way. Kiaochow 
 had never ceased to be Chinese territory. It was never a 
 German colony; it was only leased to Germany for a lim- 
 ited period of years. If self-determination is to mean any- 
 thing, it means that Chinese territory is not to be appro- 
 priated by Japan without China's free consent, and, par- 
 ticularly, that the Chinese people living in Kiaochow ter- 
 ritory shall determine for themselves whether they prefer 
 to remain Chinese, be under German rule, or come under 
 Japanese rule. 
 
 Considering only the best interests of China, and not 
 "the material interest or advantage of any other nation or 
 people," it would have been better if Germany had not 
 renounced her rights in Shantung in favour of Japan. With 
 Germany in Shantung, the spheres of influence of rival na- 
 tions were more nearly equalized, except that Germany's 
 sphere was a little less than that of France, Great Britain, 
 Russia and Japan. By a transfer under compulsion to 
 Japan, Japan acquired thereby a preponderating influence 
 over all the rival nations, while Germany was totally elim- 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 173 
 
 inated. Moreover, by the elimination of Germany the 
 Chinese lost their most conciliatory friend, even surpassing 
 the United States. This statement will be startling to 
 many, but it is true to the facts. Germany after the Boxer 
 upheaval changed her policy from the forceful kind of Ger- 
 man officialdom to the co-operative kind of German com- 
 mercialism. Since 1900 the Chinese have had little cause 
 to complain of German aggressiveness. 
 Alpheus H. Snow says : 
 
 There appears to have been no abuse by Germany of the social, 
 political and economic privileges granted to her. That such privi- 
 leges are capable of gross abuse in the hands of a Power dis- 
 posed to use them for political purposes goes without sajdng.^ 
 
 Prof. John Dewey, after a late tour through Shantung 
 and able to revise his preconception as to the superiority 
 of Japan over Germany in their bearings on China, says : * 
 
 No foreigner can be found who will state that Germany used 
 her ownership of port and railway to discriminate against other 
 nations. No Chinese can be found who will claim that this owner- 
 ship was used to force the Chinese out of business, or to extend 
 German economic rights beyond those definitely assigned her by 
 treaty. Common sense should also teach even the highest paid 
 propagandist in America that there is, from the standpoint of 
 China, an immense distinction between a national menace lo- 
 cated halfway around the globe, and one within two days' sail 
 over an inland sea absolutely controlled by a foreign navy, 
 especially as the remote nation has no other foothold and the 
 nearby one already dominates additional territory of enormous 
 strategic and economic value, namely, Manchuria. 
 
 He then enlarges on this comparison of Germany and 
 Japan. This statement being one of facts, should effectu- 
 
 * The Nation, September 20, 1919. 
 
 * The New Republic, March 3, 1920. 
 
174 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? " " 
 
 ally offset the somewhat prevalent opinion that Germany's 
 elimination was desirable, and that Japan's substitution- 
 ary position is equally to be desired. He says : 
 
 The Germans exclusively employed Chinese in the railway shops 
 and for all the minor positions on the railway itself. The rail- 
 way guards (the difference between police and soldiers is nominal 
 in China) were all Chinese, the Germans merely training them. 
 As soon as Japan invaded Shantung and took over the railway, 
 Chinese workmen and Chinese military guards were at once dis- 
 missed and Japanese imported to take their places. . . . Within 
 a few hundred feet of the railway [at Tsinan-fu] that connects 
 Shanghai, via the important centre of Tientsin, with the capital, 
 Peking, you see Japanese soldiers on the nominally Chinese street, 
 guarding their barracks. Then you learn that if you travel upon 
 the ex-German railway towards Tsingtao, you are ordered to show 
 your passport as if you were entering a foreign country. And as 
 you travel along the road (remember that you are over two 
 hundred miles from Tsingtao) you find Japanese soldiers at every 
 station, and several garrisons and barracks at important towns on 
 the line. Then you realize that at the shortest possible notice, 
 Japan could cut all communications between southern China and 
 the capital, and with the aid of the Southern Manchurian Railway 
 at the north of the capital, hold the entire coast and descend at its 
 good pleasure upon Peking. 
 
 Theodore E., Burton, who has also made a visit to Japan 
 and China, expresses much the same opinion:* 
 
 It is the practically universal opinion that the control exercised 
 by Japan since the expulsion of the Germans, in the autumn of 
 1914, has been more severe and much more extensive than that of 
 its predecessors. The Germans were at first somewhat ruthless. 
 Clashes occurred in which Chinese were killed. But about the 
 year 1908 [really after the Boxer year] a more lenient policy was 
 adopted. The inhabitants were treated with marked considera- 
 
 * New York Times, February, 1920. 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 175 
 
 tion, . . . Last October all conductors, oflScials at stations and 
 most of the trainmen, were Japanese. The spacious barracks for 
 soldiers which have been constructed or are under construction at 
 many stations certainly look like permanent occupation. 
 
 Herbert Adams Gibbons writes in a similar strain : * 
 
 In fact, an open-minded examination of the documents sub- 
 mitted by the Chinese delegation to the Peace Conference leads 
 one to believe that the Chinese had much less to complain of in 
 regard to the Germans in Shantung than in regard to the Russians 
 and Japanese in Manchuria and Liao-tung. The Germans were 
 not oppressive masters of the natives within the leased territory. 
 Their control led to improved sanitary conditions and to eco- 
 nomic prosperity. Germany did not follow the tactics of Russia 
 and Japan in using the railway concession as a means of perma- 
 nent military control. 
 
 Mr. F, Anderson, Chairman of the China Association, in 
 his annual message of July 17, 1920, said : 
 
 The Japanese administration of Shantung is worse than the 
 German. While there were only about five hundred Germans 
 resident in Tsingtao, all of whom were officials or leaders, there 
 are now over 35,000 Japanese residents. 
 
 These facts as to Japan indeed refer to her military occu- 
 pation of German rights and sphere of interest in Shan- 
 tung the past six years, and of course are no criterion as 
 regards the future. Whether Japan's policy changes for 
 the better or becomes even worse, there is nothing in the 
 settlement of the Versailles Treaty to determine one way or 
 the other. 
 
 Even Americans living in Shantung must soon realize 
 that the substitute for Germany is a bane to their enter- 
 prise, whether commercial or missionary. They must re- 
 
 » " The New Map of Asia," p. 489. 
 
176 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 call that when this German-constructed port was formed, 
 the German authorities donated the ground for the estab- 
 lishment of the Presbyterian mission, adjoining the site of 
 the German Protestant mission. Since Japanese occupation 
 the American missionaries and Chinese teachers and evan- 
 gelists have been subjected to many annoying regulations, 
 while below the girls' school has been erected a palace of 
 vice, lit up by electric light, and an alluring tempter to the 
 unfortified Chinese. 
 
 In general, Japan in capturing Tsingtao and forcibly 
 taking possession of all German properties in Shantung, 
 without any one 's leave, became more high-handed than the 
 Germans had been prior to 1900. Through these five years, 
 Japan has shown herself both a menace and an exasperation 
 to China. The immoral influences of the Japanese, espe- 
 cially in morphine and the social evil, as compared with 
 the missionary and educational influence of the Germans, 
 cause the Chinese to look longingly to the former days of 
 German administration. 
 
 I next draw attention to that which the German Govern- 
 ment is called upon to renounce, namely, German "rights." 
 That Germany has had any rights, lasting through the war 
 down to the peace settlement, is beyond dispute ; it is rec- 
 ognized by all the nations signing the Treaty; the word, 
 "rights," is even introduced by the Japanese delegates, 
 who, it is understood, drafted these three important Art- 
 icles relating to Shantung. For Germany to renounce rec- 
 ognized rights is an act of unparalleled, though compul- 
 sory, self-abnegation. For Japan to acquire them, when 
 Germany held them only through a grant from China, is a 
 transaction that will not stand in any court of equity. 
 
 The German "rights, titles and privileges" in Shan- 
 tung, as the Treaty words it, came by contract, by treaty. 
 The other contracting party was the Chinese Government, 
 not the Japanese or the American, or all Europe combined. 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 177 
 
 For dignitaries, who set out to make a Treaty and a 
 League of Nations based on justice, to compel Germany to 
 break the treaty made with China twenty years before, is 
 an anomaly so great as to throw into the shade all other 
 inconsistencies of the Versailles Treaty. 
 
 The question then becomes: Did these German rights 
 still exist in 1919? The Chinese and Japanese have both 
 advanced arguments against the validity of the claim. But 
 the inference is not the same. The Chinese are wont to say : 
 ''China's declaration of war on the Teutonic Powers in 
 August, 1917, abrogated all treaties and agreements exist- 
 ing between China and the former German Government, 
 and automatically terminated at the same time the Chino- 
 Japanese Treaty of May 25, 1915, respecting the province 
 of Shantung. Upon this abrogation and termination of 
 treaties and agreements, including the lease of Kiaochow, 
 China is the only one who has the right to claim back all 
 interests and privileges conceded to the former German 
 Government. ' ' ^ 
 
 So Alpheus H. Snow argues against the falsity of the 
 assumption that the Peace Conference in 1919 had the 
 authority to dispose of German rights to Japan. He says : 
 
 So long as China was neutral, the concessions to Gennany 
 doubtless remained in force. The military operations of Great 
 Britain and Japan, outside the leased territory, and probably 
 also within it, were violations of China's neutrality. By China's 
 co-belligerency with Great Britain and Japan (as from August, 
 1917) these violations were doubtless condoned. On the declara- 
 tion of war by China, Germany's privileges of all kinds in Shan- 
 tung lapsed, and her state property in the leased territory re- 
 verted to China. The action of the Allied and Associated Powers 
 is, therefore, not a transfer of Germany's sphere of influence to 
 Japan, but the attempted institution by the Allied and Associated 
 States other than China of a new sphere of influence in favour 
 
 ' » " China's Claims at the Peace Table," p. 15. 
 
178 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 of Japan in Shantung similar to that which Germany had before 
 the war; and an attempted transfer to Japan of the title of 
 China to the former public property of Grermany in Tsingtao.^ 
 
 Therefore what was transferred to Japan under compul- 
 sion of the Peace Conference was Chinese rights, which pre- 
 viously were German rights, but rights under grant from 
 China. 
 
 On the other hand, the inference of the Japanese is that 
 the Chino- Japanese Treaty of 1915 could not be abrogated, 
 and that by it German rights had passed to Japan. Japan 
 had safeguarded her claim, before she sent delegates to the 
 Peace Conference, and even before she allowed China to 
 declare war on Germany in August, 1917. She rested her 
 claim on these Agreements of 1915, which followed the 
 Twenty-one Demands. It is here that Japan was strong 
 and China was weak, in the dispute that was argued before 
 the Big Four and afterwards decided by the Big Three, 
 Italy's delegates having withdrawn. Through American 
 advice, the Chinese delegate, in presenting his country's 
 case, placed the emphasis on this their weakest point, and 
 Japan's strongest point. And Japan won out. 
 
 Mr. Snow, and nearly all the writers who come forward 
 as protagonists of China, assert that "the Twenty-one 
 Demands of Japan, backed by military force, are in law 
 nugatory." But this form of statement is not the question. 
 The Japanese make no claim as to the original Twenty-one 
 Demands, which were plainly unjust and unfriendly, but 
 they claim that the Agreements, whose main features had 
 been agreed to by China before Japan issued her ultimatum, 
 were binding and could not be broken, all the more that 
 China at the time entered no formal protest. 
 
 The wording of these Agreements of 1915, as mentioned 
 in a previous chapter, is more favourable to China than the 
 
 * In The Nation for September 20, 1919. 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 179 
 
 wording of the Versailles Treaty. According to the latter, 
 all German rights are handed over in 1919 to Japan with 
 no stipulation (in the treaty) that anything is to be re- 
 stored to China. According to the Chino-Japanese Treaty 
 of May, 1915, (a) all German ** rights, interests and con- 
 cessions" in Shantung were to be left, with China's con- 
 sent, to subsequent agreement of the German and Japanese 
 Governments; (b) the leased territory of Kiaochow, though 
 "left to the free disposal of Japan," is to be restored to 
 China under certain conditions; (c) "the buildings and 
 properties of Germany" in Kiaochow are to be disposed of 
 by subsequent arrangement of "the Japanese Government 
 and the Chinese Government." 
 
 The one who signed for China this agreement of 1915 was 
 Lou Tseng-tsiang, who was also the chief Chinese delegate 
 to the Peace Conference at Paris. The Japanese delegates 
 at Paris felt pretty safe in holding to the great principle 
 professed by the Allied nations — sacred observance of all 
 treaties. This assured them a hold on its Treaty of 1915, a 
 treaty to Japan's advantage. 
 
 Japan had further safeguarded her position by secret 
 Agreements with three Allied Governments in February 
 and March, 1917. By these all German rights in Shantung 
 were to be ceded to Japan — for favours received. 
 
 It was thus no easy task for Woodrow Wilson, in secret 
 conclave, to outvote his colleagues from London, Paris and 
 Rome. It was no easy task to insist on abolishing secret 
 agreements of all kinds ; if he looked for success, it should 
 have been through strong action taken at the very beginning 
 of the conference, and not at the very end. Neither was it 
 an easy task to vote for China as against Japan in insist- 
 ing on the nullification of the Chino-Japanese Agreements 
 of 1915. 
 
 It can thus be seen that the Chinese have suffered three 
 delusions. (1) They were deluded in putting trust in 
 
180 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 American nelp, should they enter the war. (2) They were 
 deluded in putting trust in American help, along with the 
 help of Great Britain, France and Italy, should they pre- 
 sent their case against Japaa at the Peace Conference. 
 (3) Later they were deluded by putting trust in action of 
 the United States Senate, and so augmenting the antag- 
 onisms between China and Japan. The Chinese are now 
 disillusioned; but only in part. They are still under the 
 delusion that Japan, and Japan alone, has worked harm 
 to China. 
 
 We are now able to examine specifically the decision 
 which was made as to the respective claims of China and 
 Japan concerning German rights in Shantung and other 
 parts of China. Both the Versailles Treaty made with Ger- 
 many and the Covenant of the League of Nations show 
 clearly the results attained by exclusive negotiations of vic- 
 torious Powers. 
 
 L The Articles of the Treaty, under the separate head 
 ** Shantung" (as if Shantung were distinct from China), 
 deserve first attention. They present a fairly accurate in- 
 dication of the conferees' conception of justice and law, 
 when applied to an historic but unmilitary nation like 
 China and to an equally historic but strongly military na- 
 tion like Japan. The result is a profit and loss account, 
 in which the profit is to Japan and the loss to China. The 
 cause of righteousness is even more a loser. Why should 
 China, first a neutral and then an associate in arms on the 
 Allied side — fighting for justice and freedom as against 
 despotism — be made to lose? Why should President Wil- 
 son, Lloyd George and Clemeneeau decide against China 
 and for Japan, after inducing China to forego the securi- 
 ties and impartialities of neutrality and to join the Allies 
 in the world contest? 
 
 The Articles in the Treaty bearing on Shantung (the 
 province known as the "sacred" province of China, from 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 181 
 
 being the home of China's Sages, Confucius and Meneius) 
 are numbered 156, 157 and 158. The word "China" is 
 only used once and then only in an incidental way. The 
 words "Germany" and "German" appear seven times. 
 The word "Japan," a talisman, is used six times. Though 
 everything mentioned pertains to Chinese territory and 
 China's national sovereignty, the conferees at Paris recog- 
 nize only two dominating factors, Germany and Japan, the 
 one of the past and the other of the future. A person from 
 Mars — Mars in Europe or Mars in the heavens — reading 
 the clauses would not suppose there is any China, or, at 
 least, that Kiaochow or Shantung had ever been a part of 
 Chinese territory. 
 Article 156 reads as follows: 
 
 Germany renounces in favour of Japan all her rights, titles and 
 privileges — particularly those concerning the territory of Kiao- 
 chow, railways, mines and submarine cables, which she acquired in 
 virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 
 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the province of 
 Shantung. 
 
 All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinan-fu Railway, includ- 
 ing its branch lines, together with its subsidiary stock of all 
 kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and 
 material for the exploitation of the mines, are to remain acquired 
 by Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto. 
 
 The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai 
 and from Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and 
 properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free 
 and clear of all charges and incumbrances. 
 
 This Article, then, relates to three things: (1) to German 
 rights in the territory of Kiaochow leased by China, in- 
 cluding the port of Tsingtao ; (2) to German concessionary 
 rights from China in railways, mines and their further ex- 
 ploitation (a fine word for a righteous treaty), and (3) to 
 German rights in submarine cables. 
 
182 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Article 157 relates to German State property in the ter- 
 ritory of Kiaochow. It reads: 
 
 The movable and immovable property owned by the German 
 State in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as the rights that 
 Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improve- 
 ments made or of the expense incurred by her directly or indi- 
 rectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired 
 by Japan, free and clear of all charges and incumbrances. 
 
 Article 158, as if to fill out some possible defect, enlarges 
 on Japan's magnificent acquisition — her "spoils of war" 
 at China's expense as much as at Germany's expense. It 
 reads : 
 
 Germany shall hand over to Japan, within three months from 
 the coming into force of the present Treaty, the archives, reg- 
 isters, plans, title deeds and documents of every kind, wherever 
 they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, 
 financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kiaochow. 
 
 Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to 
 Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the 
 rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles. 
 
 In all this Germany, not the victorious Allies, is com- 
 pelled to designate Japan to be, what may be called, the 
 "mandatory" of all German rights in Shantung. China, 
 evidently, is one of the backward nations, though kindly 
 invited to sign such a Treaty, 
 
 Assuming that it is lawful to deprive Germany of her 
 rights bestowed by China, the disposal of these rights as 
 determined by the Treaty must now be studied. 
 
 (1) The Kiaochow transfer. By the Treaty this territory 
 passes to the control of Japan. This transfer is obligatory. 
 Any subsequent retrocession to China is not obligatory, for 
 it is not in the Treaty. Germany, too, is required to sign 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 183 
 
 the Treaty, confirming such a transfer — transfer of a lease 
 of territory, situated not in Germany, not even in Japan, 
 but in China, and of which China alone is proprietor. Ger- 
 many merely held a temporary lease, and the lease had to 
 do only with administrative jurisdiction, and was not a 
 lease or a sale of landed property. ''Under the deed of 
 conveyance," as a Chinese student at Columbia University 
 has well expressed it, "the lessor's sovereign rights were 
 expressly reserved during the period of the tenancy." By 
 the terms of the contract it was assumed that if Germany 
 ever relinquished the leasehold, it would revert to China, 
 the original and real owner. The trouble with the Treaty 
 at this point is not so much that possibly by Japan's good 
 grace the poorest portion of the territory may yet come 
 under Chinese administration — (the best part being an In- 
 ternational "Settlement," with China left out, and Japan 
 predominant, or an out-and-out Japanese "Concession" ex- 
 isting alongside) — but that Japan is confirmed in her 
 claim that her wishes and not those of China are to be re- 
 spected, and that tJie right of conquest still rules in modern 
 international law. The Treaty not only enforces the cession 
 of Kiaochow to Japan, but confirms a bad principle, sup- 
 posed to have no place in a model treaty. 
 
 The Treaty, moreover, practically condones Japan's il- 
 legal method of effecting the conquest. It seems strange 
 that moralists and legalists — and they thronged Paris — 
 who complain of Germany's violations of international law 
 should have so readily countenanced a clear violation of 
 law on the part of Japan. It is also strange that, under 
 advice, the Chinese delegates omitted reference to these vio- 
 lations, a matter that should have appealed to the eon- 
 science of the Supreme Council. The Chinese dwelt much 
 on the point that the Agreements made with Japan in 1915 
 had been signed under duress, but the Big Four, being en- 
 gaged in making a Treaty also to be signed under duress, 
 
184 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE! 
 
 could not be expected to give serious consideration to such 
 a plea. 
 
 It may here be noted to China's credit that when the 
 Japanese claims became known at the Peace Conference, 
 the Chinese delegates, according to Thomas F. Millard,^ 
 made the following proposal: 
 
 China would assent to have the German concessions in Shantung 
 ceded directly to Japan in the treaty of peace, thus saving Japan's 
 " face " in the matter. 
 
 Japan to promise, same also to be written in the treaty, to 
 restore Shantung and Tsingtao to China in two years. 
 
 China would agree to repay Japan for all expenses incurred by 
 Japan in the military operations required to take Tsingtao from 
 Germany. 
 
 This proposal was rejected by the Japanese delegation. 
 "While it showed good spirit on the part of the Chinese 
 towards an aggravating neighbour, it is my opinion that it 
 was too flabby a proposal to merit success. The Chinese 
 delegates from the start should have maintained a strong 
 position by pressing points that were strong in law, equity 
 and reason. 
 
 In connection with this possible restoration of territory to 
 China, not by the Treaty but by Japan, there have been 
 many misconceptions and misrepresentations, such as al- 
 ways tarnish truth in periods of war. Even President Wil- 
 son ia his many speeches upholding the League of Nations 
 has unwittingly misled the public. Thus at Denver, Sep- 
 tember 25, 1919, he spoke of "the provision in regard to the 
 transfer from the German Empire of the Shantung prov- 
 ince to Japan." Even the Chinese delegation at Paris, 
 or Mr. Millard, in the statement above, falls into the same 
 error, as to what Japan is to restore to China. The restora- 
 tion of Shantung is not in the Treaty. Shantung was not 
 
 * In New York Times, July 25, 1919. 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 185 
 
 a province of the German Empire, but of China. All that 
 is transferred to Japan is the territory or administrative 
 rights of Kiaochow, being 100 kilometres from the Bay of 
 Kiaochow on all sides. 
 
 Another misstatement, emanating from the Japanese 
 delegates, is that Japan, in return for ** economic rights," 
 will restore "Shantung in complete sovereignty." It was 
 never known before that Chinese sovereignty had been 
 taken away. As for the Japanese they had disclaimed any 
 infringement of China's sovereignty. Either Japan has 
 been deluding the world as to her intentions, or she is now 
 assuming to give to China that which was already China's 
 and not Japan 's. She affects a generosity by giving up that 
 which she had never acquired, and China gets back that 
 which she has never given up. 
 
 (2) The economic concessionary rights. All these with 
 all the property ' ' are to remain acquired by Japan. ' ' The 
 Treaty confirms far more than did the Chino-Japanese 
 Agreement of 1915. It was this allocation of the spoils of 
 war that the Allied Ambassadors in Tokio had secretly 
 agreed to early in 1917. There is even no private under- 
 standing that ultimately these rights shall pass to China, 
 although the Japanese first secured them, in 1914, by 
 military force and military occupation. This illegal 
 acquisition of another's property, this triumph of Force, 
 and these secret machinations of Governments on the same 
 side, are all condoned and confirmed by the Treaty of 
 Peace. 
 
 As the Chinese Government was one of the contracting 
 parties when granting the railway and mining concessions 
 to Germany, in the form of joint German-Chinese Com- 
 panies, it would seem as if these German rights and German 
 property on Chinese territory should pass into Chinese 
 hands in case it should be necessary for Germany to relin- 
 quish them. But Japan said, "No, possession is nine points 
 
186 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 of the law." And the peace conferees said, "Japan is 
 strong, let her have what she wants." 
 
 Here, then, were two strong points for the Chinese to 
 press. One may be stated thus: "We cannot agree to Ja- 
 pan's unheard-of and illegal seizure of German property 
 within our domains. We do not claim this property for 
 ourselves. It belongs to the Germans. In any case it does 
 not belong to Japan." The other point may also be stated 
 thus: "We had no part in the secret intrigues going on in 
 Tokio. We disapprove of such secrecy and such intrigue. 
 We resent the intrusion on our national dignity and sov- 
 ereign rights. We demand a just settlement. ' ' 
 
 But the Chinese again omitted what was China's strong- 
 est point and Japan's weakest. 
 
 The Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway in its construction cost 
 $14,500,000. The money invested in the mines already in 
 operation is reckoned as amounting to $4,000,000, though 
 no exact official statement has been issued. It is known, 
 however, that the coal mines in 1914 produced upwards of 
 1,500,000 tons, and that one iron mine, just opened at the 
 beginning of the war, was capable of producing ore with 
 66.4 per cent of iron. Japan acquires all this "free of 
 charge. ' ' With this as a beginning Japan will find the task 
 of developing mines and maintaining railways much easier 
 than have the Germans. There is a start with a bonus. 
 There is even no royalty to be paid the Chinese Govern- 
 ment. "Her railway and mining concessions will yield at 
 least $40,000,000 a year." ^ 
 
 As to any favours to be extended to China hereafter there 
 is no mention in the Treaty. China's rights are not im- 
 portant enough to be noticed or guaranteed. The Treaty 
 is even less considerate of China in this respect than the 
 Agreement made in September, 1918, by the Japanese Gov- 
 ernment and by the militaristic, pro-Japanese Government 
 
 * Charles Merz in Asia for September, 1919. 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 187 
 
 of Peking. Concerning this Agreement K. K. Kawakami ^ 
 writes : 
 
 In the above-named instrument Japan agreed to (1) withdraw 
 all troops along the railway lines, (2) entrust the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment with the policing of the lines, (3) defray the expenses of 
 such policing from the funds of the railway company, (4) employ 
 Chinese for the operation of the lines, and (5) abolish the civil 
 government established by Japan for the administration of Kiao- 
 chow and the railway zone. 
 
 Young China, however, takes exception to Japan's re- 
 tention of economic rights, judging Japan of the future by 
 Japan of the past. ''Japan," it is said, ''will keep the 
 oyster and return to us only the shell." 
 
 Dr. Arthur J. Brown, by no means unfriendly to Japan, 
 writes : ^ 
 
 While the Germans had employed less than a hundred of their 
 own nationals on the railway, including the officials of the Com- 
 pany and had used Chinese for all the other places, the Japanese 
 staffed and operated the railway exclusively with their own people. 
 They now talk of joint control by Japanese and Chinese, but no 
 one in Shantung believes that the Chinese share of the control 
 would be anything more than nominal. 
 
 Besides acquiring by the terms of the Treaty valuable 
 concessions already undertaken — concessions granted by 
 China to Germany alone — Japan acquires what is called 
 "the exploitation of the mines." In the condensed draft 
 first made public it was glaringly stated as "the rights of 
 exploitation." Some of us had dreamed that Woodrow 
 Wilson would be able to persuade his diplomatic comrades 
 to abandon the baneful policy of exploiting weak nations, 
 
 * In Asia for September, 1919. 
 *In Asia, September, 1919. 
 
188 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEt 
 
 but, instead, we find exploitation incorporated as a prin- 
 ciple in the Treaty of Peace. Among the schemes of exploi- 
 tation are two new railway lines to reach into the two other 
 provinces, Kiangsu and Chihli, and near to a third prov- 
 ince, Honan. Knowing how Japanese-controlled railways 
 in Manchuria have been managed to the weakening of 
 China's political strength and the retarding of foreign 
 commercial enterprises, the prospect for Chinese and other 
 nationals in the provinces directly south of Peking is by 
 no means assuring. Mr. Kawakami * says : 
 
 The cost of building these two lines is estimated at $35,000,000. 
 Of this total $10,000,000 was advanced to China in September, 
 1918, when the agreement was made. It should be emphasized 
 that these lines are not to be built or owned or operated by Japan 
 or Japanese interests. They are to be built by China herself, and 
 will be owned and operated by her. Japan's only part in the 
 enterprise is to advance the necessary funds, which is absolutely 
 legitimate. 
 
 In calculating on the future it is indeed only fair to rec- 
 ognize the bare possibility of Japan's adopting a concilia- 
 tory, co-operative policy towards the development of China, 
 just as the equally energetic Germans have pursued for 
 nearly two decades. Even so, Japanese by advancing the 
 capital hold first mortgage on the railways. It is this 
 method of exploiting China, in which all concessionaires 
 participate, that serves to enslave China. 
 
 (3) Japan's possession of German State submarine 
 cables. This is a new feature of the peace settlement that 
 goes beyond the Arrangements made by Japan with China 
 in either 1915 or 1918. It is a loss to China only in the 
 sense that it adds to Japan, In the first place, I see no 
 justice in taking these cables away from Germany. In the 
 
 * In Asia, September, 1919. 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 189 
 
 second place, I see no justice in transferring them to Japan 
 rather than to China, should it be necessary to take them 
 from Germany. As England, France and Japan insist on 
 controlling the land end of all cables that touch their soil, 
 so China should have control of these particular cables 
 that connect Chinese ports, Shanghai, Tsingtao and Chefoo. 
 Moreover, by previous arrangements these submarine cables 
 are all linked with the Chinese telegraph system. They con- 
 cern China and no outside country. 
 
 (4) All German State property in Eiaochow, i. e., in 
 Tsingtao, is acquired by Japan, "free and clear of all 
 charges and incumbrances." Why by Japan and not by 
 China? This, too, goes beyond the Agreement of 1915, 
 which stipulates that their disposal, along with that of other 
 German property, shall be by "mutual agreement" of the 
 two Governments, Chinese and Japanese. For Japan to 
 possess such valuable property on Chinese sovereign ter- 
 ritory places her in a stronger position than China. The 
 only country to have first place in China should be China. 
 
 (5) All German official documents bearing on the ter- 
 ritory of Kiaochow are to be handed over to Japan. Most 
 of these documents which do not concern Germans among 
 themselves, concern China. None probably concern Japan. 
 But Japan is to come into possession. She is a kind of 
 super-state, as by appointment of the Peace Conference. 
 
 Beside all these astounding dispositions of what was once 
 German, beside the recognition by the Treaty of Peace of 
 various illegalities, of the principle of conquest, of the 
 spoils of war, of the reign of Force, of secret compacts, and 
 of the continued prevalence of exploitation, the Versailles 
 Treaty and the League of Nations, one and inseparable, 
 tacitly confirm Japan in her position of supremacy in 
 China. This is in addition to previous confirmation in the 
 Lansing-Ishii Exchange of Notes in 1917. For Japan to 
 secure such recognition is all-important. China, on the 
 
190 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 other hand, is slighted, ignored, deserted. The Chinese are 
 disappointed, chagrined, and, in some cases, indignant. 
 
 Dr. Arthur J. Brown ^ mentions that while at the begin- 
 ning of the war there were only 3,740 Germans in all China, 
 the Japanese at Tsingtao increased from a few dozen to 
 50,000 by the end of 1917, and at Tsinan-fu, the provincial 
 capital, to 22,000. "Colonies of varying size," he says, "are 
 to be found in other important cities, and traders, engineers 
 and other Japanese on various quests are in evidence, in 
 almost every part of the province," where, by the way, they 
 have no right to be, as by all treaty arrangements not yet 
 annulled. He also says: "Politically, their ascendancy is 
 absolute. It is true that outside Tsingtao Chinese officials 
 theoretically have 'unimpaired sovereignty'; but the aver- 
 age official finds a Japanese ' advisor ' at his elbow and that 
 it is the part of prudence to heed the 'advice' that is given." 
 He then quotes from a local observer: 
 
 This province is quite under the power of the Japanese. There 
 is scarcely a department that has not been entered by them. They 
 are in strategic posts and positions everywhere. Non-residents of 
 China cannot conceive of the situation. Foreign gold bribes un- 
 scrupulous leaders to fight each other. The boundary of the 
 " leased territory " is being illegally extended. 
 
 More important in the eyes of the Japanese than the 
 ultimate disposal of Kiaochow has been a commanding polit- 
 ical principle, and that is, that all matters affecting the 
 relationship of Japan and China do not lie within the pur- 
 view of the Peace Conference or the League of Nations and 
 must not even be mentioned, but must await some future 
 conference of Chinese and Japanese. And the Supreme 
 Council saw fit to bow to this assumption. Where, then, was 
 advantage to accrue to China through personal represen- 
 
 ' In Asia for September, 1919. 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 191 
 
 tation at the Peace Conference — the beau ideal of all the 
 dreams when in 1917 China threw herself into the war 
 maelstrom ? 
 
 Mr. David Fraser, the Peking correspondent of the Times 
 of London, writing of the claims of the Chinese delegates, 
 says : ^ 
 
 They did not explain that the real point at issue was not 
 Kiaochow, or the economic rights of Germany, but the fact that 
 these things in the hands of Japan meant something quite different 
 from what they meant in the hands of Germany. 
 
 C. T. "Wang, the second Chinese delegate at the Peace 
 Conference, in an article in the Outlook of August, 1919, 
 speaks of Japan's hold on ** China's vastly rich mineral 
 resources," and her training of "the great reservoir of 
 man power" in China, and asks, "Can you not see that 
 there would be a menace to the world much more serious 
 than Germany could ever be ? " He then refers to the way 
 Japan, by her railway schemes jutting from Shantung, 
 will flank the two grand trunk lines from Tientsin to 
 Nanking and from Peking to Hankow. He also cites the 
 railway system being worked out in Manchuria and Mon- 
 golia. He sums up most clearly : 
 
 That means that Peking will be isolated. ... At any time 
 the Japanese can close their pincers and nip Peking. 
 
 That this discussion may be fair to Japan, I here quote 
 from a speech of Kuo Tai-chi, an advisor to the Chinese 
 delegation, given July 25, 1919, in New York City. He 
 said: 
 
 Shortly before the Fiume question came up in Paris, two 
 Japanese oflfieials came to me personally with an offer that was 
 
 * North China Herald, August 2, 1919. 
 
192 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 obviously inspired by the higher Japanese authorities. Their 
 offer in brief was this: If China would agree to the indirect 
 restitution of Germany's former rights in accordance with the 
 1915 treaties, Japan would agree (1) to relinquish the right of 
 establishing an exclusive settlement in Kiaochow, (2) to operate 
 the trans-Shantung Railway jointly with China, (3) to renounce 
 any claim to spheres of influence in Shantung, thus taking the 
 lead in this matter among the Great Powers, and (4) to invite 
 other foreign capital to aid in the building of the two projected 
 railroad lines connecting northern and southern China. 
 
 This offer was obviously more modest than what Japan actually 
 got through the treaty. A week after the offer was made the 
 Fiume question came up so as to obscure everything else, but the 
 Japanese saw that they could use it to get more than they ex- 
 pected. They threatened to withdraw from the conference, and it 
 was pointed out that if she did so, England, through her de- 
 fensive alliance with Japan and as a result of the pact of London, 
 might be compelled to follow suit. Thus she forced a decision in 
 her favour through simple bluff and intrigue. 
 
 It is to be doubted whether the Chinese were wise in put- 
 ting aside the proposals as here made. They were, as Mr. 
 Kuo says, "more moderate" than appear in the final draft 
 of the Treaty. In a word, it seems more and more evident 
 that China got less from the Peace Conference than she 
 would have got, or will yet get, by direct negotiation with 
 Japan. 
 
 II. To complete this study, attention must be given to 
 a few minor blessings bestowed on China in another part 
 of the Versailles Treaty. They are Articles 128-134, in- 
 clusive, under the separate head ''China," as if China and 
 Shantung were in different parts of the world. I only give 
 a summary, for that is all these Articles deserve. 
 
 (1) Germany renounces in favour of China "all benefits 
 and privileges" from the Protocol of September, 1901, after 
 the Boxer uprising, and "any claim to indemnity." This 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 193 
 
 relief actually came to China when she declared war on 
 Germany, August, 1917, but the Treaty makes it appear 
 that the relief was granted through the thoughtfulness of 
 the Peace conferees. The Chinese had indeed asked that 
 they be relieved of the Boxer indemnity to all countries, but 
 all that the Allied countries can now promise is that Ger- 
 many shall be forced to renounce her share. Others may 
 follow later. Thus far only the United States and Ger- 
 many see eye to eye! 
 
 (2) ** China will no longer be bound to grant to Ger- 
 many" any advantages from the Chinese tariff arrange- 
 ment of 1902, or the arrangements of 1905 and 1912 re- 
 garding the Whang-Poo River Conservancy. This auto- 
 matically occurred when China declared war, and needs no 
 mention in the treaty. It only remains for China and Ger- 
 many to make new treaties after peace is restored, as has 
 already been done by proclamation of the President of 
 China. The Chinese sought for revision of all treaties with 
 all countries and for complete control of China's own 
 tariff. It may be that the German Republic will set an 
 example to all the rest of kind treatment of the Chinese 
 nation. 
 
 (3) All German State property in the once German 
 "Concessions" of Tientsin, Hankow or elsewhere in China 
 (except of course Kiaochow) is acquired by China. This is 
 most considerate. Why did not Japan ask for all of it? 
 There is one limitation to China's sovereignty ; she must not 
 touch the public or private property of Germany within the 
 Legation quarter of Peking, a quarter which is an eyesore to 
 all Chinese. 
 
 (4) The astronomical instruments seized by official Ger- 
 many in 1900 and 1901 are to be sent back to Peking. Sev- 
 eral years ago the German Government offered to return 
 the instruments, but the Chinese politely declined. Now 
 the great restitution will be made. 
 
194 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 (5) Germany relinquishes to China the German Conces- 
 sions of Tientsin and Hankow. China in acquiring them 
 must "open them to international residence and trade," 
 thus granting more than the Japanese, under the Treaty, 
 need grant in the territory of Kiaochow. The Chinese have 
 longed for the extinction of all extra-territorial jurisdiction 
 at the treaty-ports. A start is made in the ex-German Con- 
 cessions of two treaty-ports. 
 
 (6) Germany is forbidden to present any claims against 
 China or the Allied and Associated Nations in connection 
 with the internment and repatriation of Germans, or the 
 liquidation and sequestration of German property in China. 
 Properly handled, the Chinese Government ought to get 
 quite a sum of money by this dubious transaction duly 
 legalized by the Allied and Associated Governments. The 
 two Allied nations, Britain and France, reap an even 
 greater harvest. And no German can find redress under 
 any known law of these advanced nations. 
 
 (7) German State property in the British Concession at 
 Shameen in Canton reverts to Great Britain. This is only 
 a drop in the bucket of the British treasury, but it helps 
 to soothe the thirst for gold. 
 
 (8) The Medical and Engineering School established by 
 the Germans in Shanghai, and unfortunately located in the 
 French Concession, must be given over to the joint control 
 of the French and Chinese. As the German educational 
 work in Tsingtao is to be directed by Japanese, that in 
 Shanghai will be directed by Frenchmen. The Chinese will 
 be "assistants." The future will reveal results. The 
 astounding fact remains that German scientific skill for the 
 benefit of the Chinese is by Treaty placed under a ban. 
 
 Comparing what China got under the section entitled 
 "China," and what Japan got under the section entitled 
 * ' Shantung, ' ' it seems to me much as if the Big Three — the 
 greatest men in the world — ^had given Japan a most sump- 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 195 
 
 tuous repast, and at the close had handed as a " tip " a few 
 dimes or paper rubles to China, standing by in "watchful 
 waiting." 
 
 III. The Covenant of the proposed League of Nations, 
 incorporated as a part of the Treaty, also affects China, 
 equally to her disadvantage. 
 
 (1) In Article 21 of the Covenant it has been inserted 
 that '' regional understandings" shall be exempt from con- 
 trol of the League. These words with special mention of 
 the American Monroe Doctrine were introduced into the 
 re-draft with the idea of satisfying those Americans 
 who felt that the form of Covenant was endangering 
 this traditional American Doctrine. But if reference 
 was needed, there should have been a distinct and 
 sole reference; the Monroe Doctrine should not have been 
 made subordinate to any superior idea called "regional 
 understanding." What the American Senate asked 
 for was a "specific exemption" of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine, but here in the League it is wrapped up in a new 
 terminology, originating in a British brain, "regional 
 understanding." The Japanese can now claim that 
 whether they have any Monroe Doctrine of their own or 
 not, to be applied to Eastern Asia, they certainly have a 
 "regional understanding" with the United States, in the 
 Lansing-Ishii agreement, as to Japan's "special interests" 
 in China through "territorial propinquity." Quite prob- 
 ably Japan has also an understanding with Great Britain 
 and France. The phraseology is a most unwise selection 
 for preserving a particular American policy. 
 
 (2) An indirect harm to China was the rejection of the 
 clause which the Japanese desired to have introduced into 
 the preamble: "by the endorsement of the principle of 
 equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals." 
 This is generally spoken of as "the no-racial discrimina- 
 tion" clause. Japan has not sought for what is commonly 
 
196 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE! 
 
 called racial equality, but for equality of nations, with no 
 discrimination against one on account of race. This was 
 an eminently fair proposal, prudently and moderately 
 phrased. The Japanese laid great stress upon its adoption. 
 It was heartily supported by the Chinese, for China and 
 Japan are the only two countries of the world which are 
 discriminated against merely because of nationality or race. 
 Even when the principle was rejected, the Japanese re- 
 served the right to bring it up before the Assembly at some 
 future time. This was one reservation which did not need 
 to be submitted to the Peace Conference for approval or 
 disapproval. The principle is distinct from the right which 
 every nation possesses to make its own laws concerning im- 
 migration, only that those excluded are excluded because 
 of a general requirement, based on character or other qual- 
 ity rather than on nationality or race. By adoption of the 
 principle, Japan and China would have been satisfied. 
 Moreover, President Wilson's principle of religious liberty 
 might also have been adopted at the same time. On the 
 other hand, by rejection of these two great principles, the 
 League lost much of its power for good, and the Japanese 
 delegates were placed in an ignominious position. They 
 were mortified still more, because, having been honoured by 
 a seat among the ruling Five in the Supreme Council, their 
 presence after the first few sessions was no longer sought. 
 They were further offended by the insistence that Japan 
 adopt the mandatory system as to the late German colonies 
 north of the Pacific, instead of being allowed actual pos- 
 session as they claimed to be their just dues. The result 
 was that they insisted on being satisfied in all their de- 
 mands concerning German rights in Shantung. If Japan 
 had lost out here, it is needless to say her delegates would 
 never have dared to return home, the Japanese nation 
 would have been aroused, the League would have been re- 
 jected and the German Treaty with it, and Japan would 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 197 
 
 have made a separate treaty with Germany, in which the 
 clause of no race discrimination would have been incorpo- 
 rated. Thus failure to be just on one matter — just to both 
 Japan and China — ended in being glaringly unjust to 
 China. 
 
 There seems to be a difference of opinion as to whati 
 Japan would have done, if her claims as to Shantung had 
 been rejected. Secretary Lansing before the Senate Com- 
 mittee asserted that even if the Shantung agreement had 
 not been made, the Japanese signature to the League of 
 Nations would have been obtained, as also the Chinese ; but 
 President Wilson reached the conclusion that the Japanese 
 signature would have been lacking.^ E, T. Williams, one 
 of the expert advisors, thoroughly familiar with Chinese 
 questions, also expressed the opinion that "Japan probably 
 would have refused to sign the treaty, ' ' if she had not been 
 awarded the Shantung settlement. "An impasse would 
 have resulted, " ^ he said. 
 
 IV. To complete an understanding of the feelings of 
 the Chinese, as well as of the Japanese, it is necessary to 
 know just what the Chinese delegates claimed or wanted. 
 They presented desiderata rather than claims. They asked, 
 perhaps, too much, but their much asking was in proportion 
 to their great faith in the League idea and in the justice of 
 the Peace Conference. Their requests included seven im- 
 portant particulars: 
 
 1. Spheres of influence and special interests. "The 
 Powers are to declare that they neither possess nor claim" 
 any of these, and "are ready to revise all treaties, agree- 
 ments, notes and contracts establishing such." 
 
 2. Troops and police. "All foreign troops and police 
 on Chinese soil to be immediately withdrawn," especially 
 Legation guards. 
 
 ' Press notices, August 20, 1919. 
 * Press reports, August 23, 1919. 
 
198 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? ' 
 
 3. Foreign post-oflBces, wireless stations and telegraphs. 
 "All the post-offices to be suppressed before January 1, 
 1921, and no telegraphic installation to be established after- 
 ward." 
 
 4. Consular jurisdiction. On China's promulgation of 
 five new codes by end of 1924 and creating new tribunals, 
 extra-territorial jurisdiction is to be abandoned. 
 
 5. Leased territories. "These are to be restored to 
 China." 
 
 6. Foreign municipal Concessions. "All such are to be 
 restored to China at the end of 1924." 
 
 7. Autonomy in respect of customs tariff. "After a time 
 to be agreed upon mutually, China is to have the right to 
 fix her own tariffs." 
 
 All these were just requests. Their fulfillment depended 
 on all the Treaty Powers, and not on Japan alone. If Great 
 Britain, France and the United States had complied, Japan 
 would have followed suit. Japan's excessive demands 
 would have disappeared. China would have been helped 
 forward on the path of progress, independence, self-deter- 
 mination and a national spirit. President Wilson, in an 
 address delivered at Pueblo, September 25, 1919, confessed 
 • that China had not been treated rightly, but trusted to the 
 League to rectify what the past and present had failed to 
 accomplish. Better men in the future were to come to 
 China's rescue. I quote in part: 
 
 You have heard a great deal, something that was true and a 
 great deal that was false, about that provision of the Treaty which 
 hands over to Japan the rights enjoyed in the province of 
 Shantung in China. In the first place, Germany did not enjoy any 
 rights there that other nations had not already claimed. For my 
 part, my judgment, my moral judgment, is against the whole set 
 of concessions. They were all of them unjust to China, they ought 
 never to have been enacted, they were all exacted by duress from 
 a great body of thoughtful and ancient and helpless people. 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 199 
 
 There never was any right in any of them. Thank God, America 
 never asked for any, never dreamed of asking for any. But when 
 Germany got this concession in 1898, the United States made no 
 protest whatever. . . . Immediately following that concession to 
 Germany there was a concession to Russia of the same sort, of 
 Port Arthur, and Port Arthur was handed over subsequently to 
 Japan on the very territory of the United States. Do you re- 
 member that when Russia and Japan got into war with one 
 another, the war was brought to a conclusion by a treaty written 
 at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and in that treaty, without the 
 slightest intimation from any authoritative sources in America 
 that the Government of the United States had any objection, Port 
 Arthur, Chinese territory, was turned over to Japan? . . . 
 Article X says that no member of the League, and that includes 
 all these nations that have demanded these things unjustly of 
 China, shall impair the territorial integrity or the political inde- 
 pendence of any other member of the League ; and China is going 
 to be a member of the League. ... I for my part have a pro- 
 found sympathy for China and I am proud to have taken part in 
 an arrangement which promises the protection of the world to the 
 rights of China. 
 
 This is aU very well to say; the promises are glowing. 
 But China has had promises before — when she declared war 
 to please the Allies, and when she appeared through official 
 representation at the Conference in Paris. What did the 
 promises amount to? Why postpone an act of redress? 
 President Wilson took part in the arrangement not only 
 of a League of Nations but of the Treaty of Peace. The 
 Treaty was the first-fruits of the League. That Treaty 
 compelled Germany to renounce all that was hers in Shan- 
 tung in favour of Japan. And China was deserted. "By 
 their fruits ye shall know them."^ 
 
 It was said that compromise was unavoidable. But on 
 matters of principle there can be no compromise. This 
 
 * See Appendix V. 
 
200 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Treaty, as a lesson to Germany, was to be a treaty of justice. 
 High moral ideas had been proclaimed by the head of the 
 American nation and had been accepted by both sides in 
 the deadly conflict as a basis for negotiation. The Covenant 
 of a great League was drafted, safeguarding peace and up- 
 holding righteousness. And at the end the Chinese are told, 
 "Yes, we have all done wrong. There is no help for it. 
 We promise by an oath on the Covenant that we will not 
 wrong you in the future." 
 
 When the decision of April 30, 1919, was made known to 
 the Chinese delegation, and consolation was offered in the 
 remedial powers of the League of Nations, if the Chinese 
 only remained patient, one of the delegates gave this apt 
 reply ; 
 
 Sirs, your assurances do not give us any ground for hope. In 
 the first place the League of Nations as yet has no existence; 
 secondly, if it is organized its power and authority are prob- 
 lematical; thirdly, in any event the real ruling power of the 
 League will be the same nations that made the decision in the 
 Shantung case and wrote the terms of the Treaty and the Cove- 
 nant of the League; fourthly, it is not logical to assume that a 
 League that is created in conjunction with the Treaty, and by the 
 same body, is intended to reverse the provisions of that Treaty; 
 fifthly, it is only the weak nations that are told to depend on the 
 League for justice, while the strong Powers refuse to depend on 
 it for their own security and rights, but state openly that other 
 guarantees are necessary. 
 
 What happened a few days later when the Treaty, em- 
 bodying the Covenant, was signed, is that the Chinese dele- 
 gates, having been humiliated and wronged, were absent, 
 and all because their requests as to how they r-ould sign in 
 honour and self-respect were spumed as had been all their 
 requests at the Peace Table before the Supreme Council. 
 I quote the Chinese Statement to President Wilson, June 
 28, 1919: 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 201 
 
 Our country has given way step by step in our claim. At first, 
 we wanted to embody a reservation in the Treaty itself; it was not 
 granted. Then we modified our demand to mentioning it in an 
 annex; it was also disallowed. We further asked that a declara- 
 tion guaranteeing restitution be given us independently of the 
 Treaty; again not granted. At last we even offered to accept a 
 mere declaration without any guarantee; our offer was again re- 
 jected. We were obliged to say that as a final compromise we 
 would accept a letter from each of the Great Powers, simply 
 stating that our signature on the Treaty would not prejudice any 
 readjustment that we might propose in the future. Up to this 
 noon all our requests have been entirely rejected to our disap- 
 pointment. . . . It is to our surprise and indignation that the 
 Plenary Council should have acted in such an autocratic way, 
 without showing even an infinitesimal degree of consideration 
 toward the honour and dignity of our country. 
 
 China made many requests to the Peace Conference, and 
 from the standpoint of reason and the sense of right argued 
 well. China had, indeed, a hearing. Secret agreements 
 made by China's military faction and Japan were brought 
 to the light. China opposed Japan, antagonized Japan and 
 trusted America, Great Britain and France. After all this, 
 it is not China, but Japan in China, that is stronger than 
 before the war, yea, before the framing of that Treaty which 
 is to assure the world a reign of justice under lasting 
 peace. 
 
 Japan cannot alone be blamed. Even the United States 
 must be held responsible, especially the Executive Branch 
 of the Government. The American Minister in Peking for 
 more than two years buoyed China up with assurances of 
 American succour. The President of the United States, 
 chief exponent of right principle at the Peace Conference, 
 failed to satisfy China's hopes or the world's sense of jus- 
 tice. The whole procedure from February, 1917, to June, 
 1919, has been detrimental to American prestige and in- 
 
202 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 fluence in China. The Japanese may be blamed, but not by 
 Americans. 
 
 Having failed at Paris with the executive and diplomatic 
 agents of the three mighty nations whose word is law, a few 
 of the Chinese delegation had recourse to the United States 
 Senate, like a drowning man clutching at a straw. As 
 early as May, 1919, they urged the Senate to assist in se- 
 curing a revision of the Shantung settlement "by speedily 
 passing a resolution affirming the same to be inconsistent 
 with the national honour and interests of America, an in- 
 credible injustice to China, and a danger to the world 
 peace." After much agitation the Senate Committee of For- 
 eign Relations presented to the Senate a majority report 
 favouring as an amendment the substitution of "China" 
 for "Japan" in the three Articles 156, 157 and 158. With 
 my knowledge of the Oriental temperament, this drastic 
 alteration seems unnecessarily offensive to the Japanese, 
 while it will accomplish nothing for China. 
 
 Later on, November 18, 1919, the Senate adopted by a 
 majority vote fifteen reservations, the seventh of which 
 reads : 
 
 The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157 and 
 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any con- 
 troversy which may arise under said Articles between the Re- 
 public of China and the Empire of Japan. 
 
 Still later the words at the close referring to China and 
 Japan were omitted, and the reservation as such was again 
 adopted by a majority vote. Either form being linked with 
 all the other reservations and then with ratification of the 
 Treaty as thus modified requires a two-thirds vote to be 
 effective. The reservation, however, defends American 
 prestige in the estimation of the Chinese, and so far is a 
 patriotic move. But no one need suppose that China will 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 203 
 
 be rescued thereby from her present entanglements. If 
 China is rescued, it will not come from the Versailles 
 Treaty, even as thus modified, neither will salvation come, I 
 am sorry to admit, from the United States Government. 
 China's rescue depends, strange to say, on a changed 
 Japan. 
 
 After all the discussion that has taken place, in the Sen- 
 ate, in the White House, on many a platform and in the 
 secular and religious press, the conscientious-minded man 
 must be amazed at the way America's chief delegate at 
 Paris failed so conspicuously to match principle with prac- 
 tice. Such an one must all the more be amazed when he 
 sees the stand taken by the President, even in February, 
 1920, in reference to the Adriatic or Fiume question, and 
 how he remained indifferent on the Shantung or Tsingtao 
 question. Both questions concern two allies in the late war. 
 Both may equally well be settled by the same principles. 
 This is what the President promulgated February 10, 1920 : 
 
 The American Government, while no less generous in its desire 
 to accord to Italy every advantage to which she could offer any 
 proper claims, feels that it cannot sacrifice the principles for 
 which it entered the war to gratify the improper ambitions of one 
 of its associates, or to purchase a temporary appearance of calm 
 in the Adriatic at the price of a future world conflagration. 
 
 Substitute the word "Japan" for "Italy," and "Shan- 
 tung" for "the Adriatic," in the above, and the problem of 
 Eastern Asia is well stated. 
 
 Note also these words : 
 
 It [the American Government] is unwilhng to recognize p.n 
 unjust settlement based on a secret treaty, the tprms of which are 
 inconsistent with the new world conditions, or an unjust settle- 
 ment arrived at by employing that secret treaty as an instrument 
 of coercion. 
 
204 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Apply this to the China-Japan question, and what would 
 the plain Chinese reasonably infer? But the President 
 even more aptly, and without any change in language, 
 states the truth as adapted to China and Japan, just as well 
 as to Jugo-Slavia and Italy. The words may be pondered 
 as to whether their significance is the same in Eastern Asia 
 as in Southern Europe : 
 
 If substantial agreement on what is just and reasonable is 
 not to determine international issues; if the country possessing 
 the most endurance in pressing its demands rather than the coun- 
 try armed with a just cause is to gain the support of the Powers; 
 if forcible seizure of coveted areas is to be permitted and con- 
 doned, and is to receive ultimate justification by creating a situa- 
 tion so difficult that decision favourable to the aggressor is 
 deemed a practical necessity; if deliberately incited ambition is, 
 under the name of national sentiment, to be rewarded at the 
 expense of the small and the weak; if, in a word, the old order 
 of things which brought so many evils on the world is to prevail, 
 then the time is not yet come when this Government can enter a 
 concert of powers, the very existence of which must depend upon 
 a new spirit and a new order. 
 
 How the Chinese nation, yea, how the whole world would 
 be stirred with new moral vigor, if it could realize that such 
 words were to be applied as much to one question and to 
 one portion of humanity as to another ! If President Wil- 
 son has had a duty to speak positively to Italy and the 
 European Allies, how much greater his duty to warn Japan 
 and to help China, bearing in mind that it was the Amer- 
 ican Government which thrust the war issue into China and 
 assured the Chinese of the dawning everywhere of a new 
 era. 
 
 It has been well said that nothing is settled until it is 
 settled right. And there are many wrong settlements in 
 this Treaty even more than in the League. The following 
 
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 205 
 
 brave words of Dr. Felix Adler ^ form a fitting summing-up 
 on the basis of high ethics : 
 
 It is sometimes said that we must be satisfied with the begin- 
 nings of a League of Nations, and trust to future development 
 to improve it. But if it begins with the seeds of mischief in its 
 very constitution, future development can only serve to ripen the 
 evil seeds into full-blown fruition. It is said that half a loaf is 
 better than no bread, and that compromises are unavoidable. But 
 no bread is better than a fraction of a loaf if that fraction con- 
 tains poison; and compromise, while indispensable as to the 
 means by which policies and principles are effectuated, is wholly 
 inadmissible in respect to the principles themselves. To give 
 way in first-rate matters of principle is not to compromise but to 
 capitulate. 
 
 The great men of mighty nations, who were assembled 
 in Paris, in the memorable year, 1919, thought perhaps in 
 their hearts, as they arranged so delicately the sad obse- 
 quies for China, that she was now laid away to rest, never 
 again to breathe the breath of life. 
 
 China's national entity and her glory were indeed badly 
 shattered by the potentates of peace who met in Paris. But 
 was her life wholly extinct ? Is there hope for China in the 
 future? 
 
 » The Nation, May 24, 1919. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 
 
 The obsequies of China have taken place, but she is not yet 
 dead ; she is not even asleep. She has only suffered a severe 
 operation and is now convalescent. 
 
 The feeling of the Ch::iese over the decision reached at 
 the Paris Conference concerning the demands of China and 
 Japan is well expressed by a statement from a delegate to 
 Paris, the seventy-fourth descendant of Confucius, a state-'' 
 ment sent out by the Associated Press from the home of 
 Confucius, September 6, 1919: 
 
 We trusted Mr. Wilson entirely too much. We sent a note to 
 President Wilson asking him how he could reconcile assurances he 
 had given to China before she had entered the war with the 
 decision. He sent a representative to us expressing his sorrow 
 and he suggested that he would help us when the League of Na- 
 tions was formed. 
 
 On the morning of the day set for the signing of the Treaty, 
 after China had been refused the right of signing with reserva- 
 tions, crowds of students patrolled in front of the hotel of Lou 
 Tseng-tsiang, our chief delegate, who had been suffering ill-health 
 and was again confined to his bed. The question of signing had 
 not been decided when the delegates gathered in his room. He 
 was asked for the last time if he would consent to sign and he 
 replied with tears streaming from his eyes: 
 
 " I signed the Twenty-one Demands. Can I, must I, also sign 
 this?" It was the only answer he gave and the delegates under- 
 stood. That is why when the Conference was called to order the 
 Beats of the Chinese were vacant. 
 
 206 
 
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 207 
 
 Facts are hard things to face, but they must be faced by 
 China if she hopes for rehabilitation, prosperity and con- 
 tentment. Facts are of the past and shape the destiny of 
 the future. That is the reason so few Chinese are hopeful. 
 They feel themselves in bondage to Fate, for facts are fatal- 
 istic. A fadt accompli is irreversible. Wrongdoing, more 
 of the nation than of the individual, cannot be wiped out, 
 though it may be condoned or forgiven. Wrong done to a 
 nation — to China, for example — is a blow, not only at na- 
 tional existence, but at the indispensable quality of hope- 
 fulness. There is not any such thing as return to statiis 
 quo ante. Considering, then, what has happened to China 
 these last five years, all the calamities unnecessarily im- 
 posed upon her by outside nations, how can we Westerners 
 expect to find buoyant, sanguine, joyful Chinese? 
 
 The people of China through hereditary influences are 
 stoical and patient. They bow to the inevitable. Let me 
 give to them, and to every one else interested in China's 
 future, this philosophy of an ancient Greek Stoic: "When 
 what thou wiliest befalls not, thou then must will what be- 
 f alleth. ' ' To this let me add the philosophy of Christian- 
 ity, that over all is a kind Providence, overruling evil, 
 ' ' making the wrath of man to praise Him, ' ' and so shaping 
 human events that for him who follows the will of God 
 "all things work together for good." As I look at events 
 that have just hurried by, this philosophy is the only con- 
 solation and stay for the millions of China, distracted and 
 keenly disappointed. "Some trust in horses and some in 
 chariots" — some in Governments and some in Presidents — 
 but, let the Chinese now say, "we will trust in the Lord 
 our God. ' ' On the negative side, the Chinese will do well 
 if they no longer look for succour to outside nations, not 
 even to the American Government, and on the positive 
 side, let them rely on Heaven and then on themselves. 
 "Heaven," it is said, "helps those who help themselves," 
 
208 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 A people who have pushed ahead for so many centuries are 
 not going to be wiped off the map. A few selfish, grabbing, 
 callous officials have not the power to write over China, 
 "Mene, Mene, Tekel, Upharsin." If China escaped the 
 fatality of the Boxer folly, how much more is it possible 
 to escape the fatality of the Great War's folly. China, 
 indeed, presents a bewildering maze, but no more so than 
 most of the countries of Europe. "Where there's a will, 
 there's a way.'* 
 
 A correspondent of the Far-Eastern Bureau writes : * * It 
 is unfair to say that China must suffer because 'it is her 
 own fault,' and 'China ought to help herself.' " He then 
 proceeds to denounce Japan for solitary, outstanding culpa- 
 bility. In my opinion, China, to be sure, "ought to help 
 herself, ' ' and she will suffer — not must suffer — because it is 
 partly "her own fault." Let not the Chinese any more 
 than others be imposed upon by the fallacies of self-com- 
 placency. As for their sufferings, there is a way of escape. 
 
 In giving a forecast of China's future, I outline in part 
 what is probable and in part what is possible. 
 
 In general, all the elements that have brought misfortune 
 to China and that retard the free action of China's devel- 
 opment, should be reversed in the reconstructive policies of 
 the future. It is not restoration — going back to the past — 
 that is needed in China, but reconstruction — a remodelling, 
 the building of a new structure. 
 / (1) In particular, in this new structure, there must 
 dwell a new soul, vivified by the highest moral energies. 
 During the war period, and even from the overthrow of 
 an alien dynasty in the first revolution of 1911, the Chinese 
 have laid emphasis on the unessential and subsidiary qual- 
 ities of national prosperity, rather than on the essence of 
 the inner life. And, unfortunately, this attitude of mind 
 has been encouraged by outside environment. The Chinese 
 have been thinking, discussing, wrangling about such mat- 
 
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 209 
 
 ters as forms of State — a monarchy or a republic, parlia- 
 mentary government, centralization in the President or the 
 Cabinet, and provincial autonomy. They have divided 
 into two opposing factions over the war issue, and then over 
 militarism versus democracy. All the time corruption has 
 been rampant in the government. Persuasion to action by 
 the free use of money played a part when China severed 
 relations with Germany, and later in the negotiations of 
 1918 between China and Japan over loans and concessions, 
 the sale of arms and military conventions. 
 
 "China," says an American resident in Shantung, "the 
 land richest in natural resources, richest in territory, has 
 already become the power of heartless, militaristic Japan, 
 sold out to her by her own corrupt militaristic clique, sedu- 
 lously, incessantly solicited with Japanese gold."^ 
 
 If Japan and other countries, in their war-propaganda, 
 in their political ambitions or through military necessity 
 and commercial advantages, have appealed to the baser in- 
 stincts of Chinese oflficialdom, and are to this degree blame- 
 worthy, the Chinese themselves must bear the blame for a 
 quick readiness to be enticed, and for the existing enslave- 
 ment that appalls the Chinese mind. Conservative officials 
 of the old-time regime, though prejudiced against foreign 
 innovations and the material improvements of the Western 
 world, were as a whole more upright, patriotic and public- 
 spirited than the new type of progressive officials. I regard 
 the crux of the question of China's permanency to rest 
 with this moral factor. 
 
 The China Press, an American paper in Shanghai, for 
 June 10, 1919, used these wor(?s: 
 
 First and foremost, if China is ever to rise out of her present 
 shameful condition, every one of her sons must be taught that 
 treason to his country is man's greatest crime. . . . The Peking 
 
 » Far-Eaatem FortnighUy, September 29, 1919. 
 
210 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 officials have not only sold the wealth of the country, but they 
 have betrayed her integrity. The worst enemies of China are not 
 in Tokio but in Peking. 
 
 It is not political reform or any kind of superficial, ma- 
 terial reform that can save China in her present entangle- 
 ments; it must be a downright moral reform, it must be 
 I spiritual reformation. Here is a task for Christian mis- 
 sionaries; they have had their interlude of magnifying 
 I war, let them now revert to fundamental principles of the 
 1 religious consciousness. And the Chinese will respond. No 
 greater opportunity for appeal to the conscience, to reason, 
 to the sense of fairness, exists anywhere than among the 
 Chinese people. Their future is promising, if they with the 
 aid of foreigners build their new structure with righteous- 
 ness as the corner-stone. 
 J (2) China's future lies in the abandonment of militar- 
 istic methods and in the pursuit of peace and international 
 conciliation. If there is any one object which Americans, 
 and to a certain extent the Allied peoples, have proclaimed 
 to the world more than any other, it is the overthrow of 
 Prussian militarism. But men are learning gradually that 
 some other tag beside "Prussian" must be affixed to that 
 enemy of mankind, militarism. In reality the Allied na- 
 tions have been more keen on destroying the Prussian 
 species of the genus militarism than in destroying the genus 
 itself. It is recognized that the strongest Allied nation in 
 the Orient has been Japan, and that Japan is the prototype 
 both of militarism and oi its Prussian form. It must also 
 be recognized that Japan, Ijecause of her superiority in a 
 military way, has been accoided a permanent position in 
 the Supreme Council of the League of Nations as "one of 
 the five great Powers. " Is it anj wonder, then, that young 
 Chinese, fired with a new national spirit, should come to 
 believe that China, in order to be pieserved, must also be- 
 
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 211 
 
 come military? Prof. John Dewey, writing of the con- 
 ditions in China after the war, says : ^ 
 
 At present the militaristic faction whose power was confirmed 
 by the happenings of the summer of 1917 is still in control of the 
 government. . . . They have welcomed the demonstration offered 
 at Paris that Might still makes Right in the case of weak nations, 
 so that in a strange and subtle way the diplomatic victory of 
 Japan in particular and of imperialism in general has been a 
 vindication of their own anti-democratic and militaristic policy. 
 
 One of the younger class in China, a representative at 
 Paris of the Canton Government and of Christian adher- 
 ents, in a speech in New York City, July 25, 1919, spoke 
 these sensible words: 
 
 We hope our defeat will serve to arouse the sentiment of all 
 China, to the end that she will depend upon herself and that her 
 sorrow will be her national salvation. The war started as a 
 conflict of Right over Might, but I do not see that the end of the 
 war justifies that idea. Germany is crushed, but there is another 
 Germany in the Far East, and perhaps this will not be the last 
 war, for there surely will be another if justice is not done now. 
 
 It would have been better, so far as China is concerned, 
 if Americans and other democratic peoples, instead of con- 
 centrating their energies and hate on the overthrow of 
 Germany had fought for the overthrow of militarism and 
 had refused for any reason to give any countenance to it, 
 whether found in Germany, in Japan, or in the military 
 faction, the governing body of China. By the support given 
 to such a body of men in China by such nations as the 
 United States and Great Britain, and by China 's participa- 
 tion in the war and her advocacy of all kinds of war-meas- 
 ures, the view now held is that China, too, must build up 
 
 * The New Republic, September 10, 1919. 
 
J 
 
 212 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 a strong army and navy, in order to find a place in the 
 family of nations, and perhaps later on become one of a 
 future Big Six in the Supreme Council of the world. But 
 this view is superficial. The craze for war and disbelief in 
 the power of ideas cannot last forever. Even the Covenant 
 of the League intimates a coming universal disarmament, 
 making a start with the Central Powers. Let the Chinese 
 consider how much greater the gain of their country would 
 have been, if they had remained at peace at home and 
 abroad and had pursued all peaceful pursuits. Their dire- 
 ful experiences from the war should make them turn away 
 from war in disgust, and forego hereafter the military am- 
 bition. That extreme lover of universal peace termed a 
 pacifist may be a fool in virile America, but he fits in well 
 to life in China, where the indigenous religion known as 
 Taoism teaches both pacifism and passive-ism. 
 
 Let it be borne in mind that if China should begin to 
 spend millions on a vast army and a strong navy as a dis- 
 tinctively national movement, the Japanese under existing 
 conditions would assume direction, or, in case of a navy, 
 would wait until it became a valuable prize and then cap- 
 ture it. Or, if China should join with Japan in a defensive 
 and offensive military alliance, the development of China's 
 military capacity under Japanese guidance would prove 
 the menace of the future and the opening of the next war. 
 Is this to be the result of the world's wisdom which arises 
 from the horrors of the last World War ? Are the Chinese 
 to continue to be infatuated by the war spirit and along 
 this line go to their doom? 
 
 (3) There are great possibilities for China if reunion is 
 brought about by the opposing governments centred in Pe- 
 king and Canton, and commonly designated as the North 
 and the South. The fourth revolution of China has been 
 going on for over three years. During the period of the 
 Great War no reconciliation was possible, for the military 
 
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 213 
 
 autocratic Government at Peking was receiving the com- 
 mendation and recognition of all the Powers, and was 
 therefore in too sure a position to talk peace with the 
 "rebels" of the Canton Constitutional. Government. When 
 armistice was granted to the Central Powers and a Peace 
 Conference opened in Paris, another Peace Conference be- 
 gan in Shanghai between chosen representatives of the op- 
 posing factions. They met and discussed all manner of 
 questions, but came to no agreement. It looked as if this 
 Shanghai Peace Conference was a camouflage for the Al- 
 lied Powers so that no objection might be raised to China's 
 appearing at the Paris Peace Conference. When the Treaty 
 of Peace was signed at Versailles, the Peace Conference at 
 Shanghai took a vacation. When the President of China 
 proclaimed a state of peace with Germany, renewed efforts 
 were put forth to bring together China 's opposing factions. 
 At the outset the hindrances seemed too great. But Chinese 
 leaders should persist till civil strife has come to an end, 
 and China is again a united land as she was from July, 
 1916, to February, 1917, under the leadership of President 
 Li Yuan-hung. 
 
 Professor Jenks ^ says, quite correctly : 
 
 The Japanese policy in China has been, clearly, to keep con- 
 ditions unsettled by fomenting disturbances and hostilities be- 
 tween the so-called North and South factions, and to keep China 
 weak. This is not a matter of suspicion or careless observation 
 on the part of prejudiced Americans. It is a matter oflScially 
 known, reported upon and recorded in our State Department, and 
 supported by the overwhelming testimony of Chinese, American 
 and British officials both North and South who are fully con- 
 versant with the facts. 
 
 This task, then, set before the Chinese is an easy one as 
 compared with the attainment of even a modicum of their 
 * In North American Review, September, 1919. 
 
214 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 aims at the Paris Peace Conference. The first thing is to 
 hold themselves aloof from Japanese blandishments as ex- 
 tended to either side in the civil strife, and to determine 
 that the Chinese must draw near to each other — an internal 
 entente cordiale — before they draw near to others, who 
 have State interests of their own. The second thing is for 
 the two factions to agree on a perfectly legitimate compro- 
 mise, vastly different from all the Paris compromises, that 
 both the old Parliament holding over at Canton and the 
 National Council peculiarly chosen for Peking alike dis- 
 solve themselves and that new members of the National 
 Parliament be elected according to the Regulations drawn 
 up under the Provisional Constitution and voted upon by 
 the old legitimate Parliament. Other divisive questions can 
 easily await the reconstructive period. The only fear is 
 that the Military Governors and their militaristic com- 
 rades, having had a taste of power and having felt the 
 glamour of gold, will put self ahead of nation. Even here, 
 appreciating as I do the moral substratum of Chinese char- 
 acter, I believe in the efficacy of persuasive argument when 
 brought to bear on the higher instincts of these same mili- 
 tary men. 
 
 (4) Another task set before the Chinese is to seek 
 friendly co-operation mth the Japanese, rather than to in- 
 tensify the spirit of alienation and antagonism in either 
 people. This is, of course, a double task, as great for Japan 
 as for China, but for the moment I emphasize China's part 
 in the laudable undertaking. That which makes it hard for 
 the Chinese to adopt this policy of reconciliation is the 
 plain fact that China has been woefully wronged by Japan 
 in these years of perilous association. Another hindrance 
 comes from the prevailing unwillingness among the strong 
 Powers to be reconciled to their own enemies in war. A 
 third obstacle comes from the atmosphere which the Chinese 
 . daily breathe from British and American environment in 
 
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 215 
 
 China, that Japan is the wrongdoer, that Japan is the fu- 
 ture world-menace, that Japan must be fought sooner or 
 later, and that Japan cannot be trusted. Let me give two 
 or three illustrations. 
 
 At the end of May, 1919, the Peking Missionary Associa- 
 tion, composed of British and American missionaries, 
 passed a resolution to be dispatched to the Peace Confer- 
 ence, expressing in a most commendable spirit and in mod- 
 erate language **the deep disappointment and apprehension 
 caused in all the best sections of Chinese opinion" over the 
 Shantung settlement in the peace treaty. Where these mis- 
 sionaries erred was in their limited horizon. They saw 
 clearly how Japan should not gain at China's expense, but 
 they overlooked all the wrong which their own British and 
 American Governments had wrought upon China in days 
 gone by, especially during the period of the war, and their 
 backwardness to release to China powers and privileges ac- 
 corded Japan. I here quote from a letter written by an 
 American missionary in Shanghai : 
 
 The poor Japanese are now the Pariahs of Shanghai, They 
 are absolutely boycotted by Chinese and Americans, and many 
 of the English. So far as Shantung is concerned, I don't see the 
 justice of condoning the secret treaty of England, France and Co., 
 giving Shantung to the Japs, then frothing at the mouth at Japan 
 for proposing to abide by the treaty. It is so funny to hear 
 English people out here blaming America and especially Wilson 
 for the Shantung tragedy. They have not one word of criticism 
 for England's giving away Shantung to Japan, but criticize 
 American weakness and Wilson's hypocrisy as the cause of the 
 debacle. 
 
 Another illustration is a Resolution of the Anglo-Amer- 
 ican Association in Peking, telegraphed to the New York 
 Times, June 7, 1919. The British and American Ministers 
 are reported as being present at the meeting. The Resolu- 
 
216 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 tion is more strongly worded than that of the missionary 
 body. The implication is that the wrong and the danger 
 come from the gain which Japan acquires. This is true, 
 but what about English and American complicity ? I quote 
 a few sentences : 
 
 We express our solemn conviction that this decision will create 
 conditions that must inevitably bring about extreme discord be- 
 tween the Chinese people and Japan and raise a most serious 
 hindrance to the development of economic interests in China and 
 other countries . . . conditions, which are not only subversive 
 of the principle of national self-determination but also a denial 
 of the policy of the open door principle of equal opportunity will 
 greatly be accentuated, if Japan, a near neighbour, be now sub- 
 stituted for Germany, whose centre of political and economic 
 activities was on the other side of the globe. 
 
 The real question to put before men's consciences is this: 
 Why was not a call made to the home governments by 
 these good folk in Peking that England and America ap- 
 point a day of prayer and humiliation for their national 
 complicity in international wrongdoing? Moreover, was 
 it quite playing the game for the representatives of Eng- 
 land and America to pass censure on an Ally, when in war 
 and peace they were all supposed to be working together in 
 a holy cause and by the use of holy means ? As for China 
 it is her mistake and danger to concentrate all her wrath 
 on one nation. 
 
 A third illustration is found in the action in the month of 
 May, 1919, of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the 
 Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, who sent to 
 Peking a telegram, suggesting that an envoy be sent to 
 Tokio to negotiate for the return of Kiaochow, and that 
 friendly relations continue with Japan. This action 
 brought the wrath of the Chinese onto the heads of these 
 
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 217 
 
 two men, for it was a time of intense excitement over the 
 decision of the Paris Conference. 
 
 My own conviction, looking at the facts as the/ are, is _ 
 that the Chinese, while not grovelling in the dust to Japan, \ 
 would do well not to stand aloof from a better understand- \ 
 ing and rapprochement with Japan. Japan by the events 
 of war, fortunate for her though unfortunate for China 
 and, as will be seen, also for others, has acquired a pre- 
 dominant position in China. It is of no benefit to China 1 
 to increase the estrangement. She must exert herself to 
 cement the old bonds of friendship and to regain her rights 
 by direct approach to Japan. Sooner or later, this direct 
 negotiation will come about, and the Chinese might as well 
 conform gracefully. 
 
 The dilemma in which China is placed has been made 
 conspicuous by the offer of the Japanese Government, made 
 January, 1920, to negotiate with China as to the restoration 
 to China of the Kiaochow territory and the carrying into 
 effect of the Versailles treaty bearing on Shantung. The 
 general sentiment of the Chinese people as voiced by the 
 student class is to stand aloof from such direct negotiation. 
 At the same time no sign of relief, no cloud on the horizon 
 as large even as a man's hand, is anywhere to be seen. Hol- 
 lington K. Tong ^ while plainly opposed to direct negotia- 
 tions, presenting the argument for the other policy, says: 
 
 Another view taken by the pro-direct-negotiation Ministers is 
 that following its ratification by Germany and the principal Al- 
 lied Powers, the Treaty of Peace has come into force, and its 
 Shantung provision has likewise become effective. China is too 
 weak to oppose the Allies* arbitrary decision and the United 
 States has resumed her former " too-proud-to-fight " attitude and 
 taken up her hermit life once again, leaving European and 
 Asiatic affairs singularly alone, until possibly another world-wide 
 
 * Milla/rd'8 Review, January 31, 1920. 
 
218 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 war menaces her own shores. In the meantime, Japan has pos- 
 sessed herself of all the German rights in Shantung and is not 
 disposed to relinquish them in China's favour although she is 
 willing to return an empty shell in the form of Kiaoehow by 
 negotiations. If her overtures for the restoration of Kiaoehow 
 were rejected, Japan would continue functioning in that territory 
 and might one day perpetuate her possession of it as she has done 
 in Korea. 
 
 It really comes down to one question: Acknowledging 
 that relief from other sources is futile, has the Chinese 
 Government such capable men today as to dare to meet 
 Japan in the contest of diplomacy with a prospect of suc- 
 cess, or at least with gain surpassing either an antagonistic 
 or passive and stationary attitude? I am confident that 
 while China may not gain all that she deserves by right, 
 she can gain more by direct negotiation than by reliance on 
 Powers which have evolved the Versailles treaty of peace. 
 
 What makes it doubly hard for calm-minded Chinese to 
 consent to a rapprochement to Japan is that Japan prior 
 to China's consent to enter on negotiations about ex-Ger- 
 man rights in Shantung, has begun to discuss the renewal 
 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Now such an Alliance, 
 which concerns Chinese affairs, is an offense to all public- 
 spirited Chinese, who have felt the glow of a new national 
 life. How inconsiderate, then, is the proposition of Dr. 
 Henry Van Dyke, made in Tokio, June 7, 1920, that the 
 United States join the Alliance? Do Americans realize 
 that China is still a treaty-making power, and that the 
 Chinese, remembering their glorious past, have sentiments 
 of national dignity which resent persistent humiliation 
 from others ? ^ 
 
 (5) It is also desirable, as well as probable, that the 
 Chinese and Germans renew their old friendships. During 
 
 ' See Appendix VI. 
 
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 219 
 
 these past years of German enterprise, commercial, educa- 
 tional and religious, many Chinese have become good 
 friends of the Germans. During the war China's Allies 
 annoyed China more than China's enemies did. Prof. 
 John Dewey ^ has said, quite correctly : 
 
 The German nationals in China were upon the whole more 
 popular personally than those of any other country unless perhaps 
 those of the United States. For however arrogant Germany was 
 as a nation, Germans taken individually were sufficiently bent on 
 successful business to be unassuming, friendly and attentive to 
 native wishes and customs. 
 
 I regard it that a great opportunity lies before China in 
 renewing and improving the old relations with German 
 friends and with the German Government. It is very likely 
 that Germany will go much further than the Allied nations 
 or even the United States in granting China's expressed 
 desires for larger scope in the development of the Chinese 
 spirit and in the exercise of authority and control in af- 
 fairs political and economic. The Chinese, moreover, will 
 be quick to make amends for the personal and business in- 
 jury which they have done to Germans through compulsion 
 of zealous rivals. 
 
 Already, April 27, 1919, a presidential mandate was is- 
 sued from Peking that the citizens of nations having no 
 treaties with China, as newly-created nations, will be de- 
 nied the extra-territorial privileges foreigners have hitherto 
 enjoyed, and will be placed under Chinese law. They in 
 return will be granted residence, like the Chinese, away 
 from the circumscribed area of the treaty-ports. It is 
 within possibility that the new German Government will, 
 in the new treaty to be made with China, fall in with this 
 worthy desire of the Chinese to their mutual advantage. 
 
 * Xa The New Republic, September 10, 1919. 
 
220 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 (6) China, moreover, must guard herself against any 
 attempt to break, in future, ties of friendship with any 
 nation. To be at peace with all the world produces a better 
 temper of mind than irritating ainmosity towards any par- 
 ticular nation. The diplomacy which China needs is that 
 of good-feeling. She can very well leave all hate and 
 rancour, all clamour and bitterness, to "outside nations." 
 She has enough territory and population to look after for 
 many a year, so that no need exists for again mixing in the 
 bewildering, complicated problems of the Western world. 
 With renewed devotion to Chinese interests, the Chinese 
 people of all classes will find it helpful to cultivate the in- 
 ternational mind, the cosmopolitan spirit, with no barriers 
 of sentiment, though barriers of boundaries must ever re- 
 main, each nation dwelling securely within its own ' ' bounds 
 of habitation." 
 
 (7) Whether China should favour a so-called interna- 
 tional consortium or not, I am not so sure as to speak posi- 
 tively. I am dubious of the scheme. In the first place it is 
 an exclusive scheme, much like the League of Nations. 
 Britain, France, the United States and Japan are the finan- 
 cial factors. In the second place it is an extraneous scheme. 
 China is not included, except in taking the terms of this 
 foreign combine. In the third place the group of bankers, 
 backed by their respective governments, may easily evolve 
 into a Debt Commission, controlling China's finances, and 
 then controlling China. 
 
 V If all the railways of China could be nationalized and 
 J brought into one system under direction of the Chinese 
 Government and aided by foreign experts, China would fare 
 better than under a scheme of internationalization. 
 
 Comparing China's indebtedness with that of other coun- 
 tries, she has an easy task in straightening out her financial 
 affairs. Let civil strife come to an end, and the nation be 
 united as one man, then in a few years by honest adminis- 
 
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 221 
 
 tration all debts may be paid off, concessions redeemed and 
 China made strong. China does not need foreign capital 
 for the development of her resources, until the time when 
 complete direction shall be in Chinese hands under Chinese 
 laws. Putnam Weale in his latest book ^ has given utter- 
 ance to these sentiments : 
 
 There should not have been a constant policy of frightening the 
 Chinese with visions of a Foreign Debt Bureau under foreign 
 control on the Egyptian-Turkish model. A real Chinese service 
 of the national debt, in place of the present semi-foreign pawn- 
 broking methods. A proper currency system, with token coins 
 and banknotes maintained at parity — these things would be far 
 more beneficial to the world at large than spheres of influence or 
 personal victories signalized by the appointment of favoured na- 
 tionals to sinecures. 
 
 The new President of China in an interview with Carl 
 W. Ackerman ^ gave the Chinese view of this question : 
 
 Some Western people hold the view that it would be a great 
 benefit to China if the railroads, present and prospective, could 
 be internationalized until such time as China could take full con- 
 trol of all the leased zones and concessions, and likewise be inter- 
 nationalized as a temporary measure. From the point of view 
 of China, however, a very different policy receives general in- 
 dorsement, namely, that, with the view of preserving her terri- 
 torial integrity, all railroads, leased zones and concessions should 
 revert to her absolute and complete control, internationalization 
 being unthought of. 
 
 (8) In a special way the Chinese should build up a 
 large merchant marine. The Government would do better 
 by helping the China Merchants Steamship Company or 
 the China Mail Company than by adding on more cruisers 
 
 » "Truth about China and Japan," p. 118. 
 * New York Times, January 17, 1919. 
 
222 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 and torpedo-boats to be generously donated to neighbour 
 Japan sometime in the future. When I went to China in 
 1882, I had the pleasure of meeting the head of the China 
 Merchants Company, Tong King-Sing, one of the most pub- 
 lic-spirited and unselfish men that China has ever had. He 
 had just returned from a tour of Europe and the countries 
 of the Americas, with a view of extending trade and com- 
 munication along the ocean routes. At that time the 
 Chinese had more shipping than the Japanese. Since then 
 the Chinese have lagged behind, while Japan with astound- 
 ing energy has become one of the great shipping nations of 
 the world. The Chinese merchants still retain their skill, 
 industry and thrift. In the Philippine Islands they have 
 seven-tenths of all the trade. In the other islands of the 
 Pacific and along the Malay Peninsula the business mag- 
 nates as well as the little shopkeepers are Chinese. When 
 lecturing through the Philippines to Chinese audiences in 
 1918, I urged this duty upon them as one way to make 
 China strong. The ships plying along the coast of China, 
 or between China and the near trading neighbours, and, 
 later on, the far-away countries of the world, should be a 
 part of this new merchant marine of China. If Chinese 
 merchants and officials at home lack the enterprise, then 
 those who venture abroad and become successful — men 
 mostly from Amoy and Canton — should make the start in 
 this new line of business, raise capital and form companies, 
 and thus stimulate the whole Chinese Government to plans 
 of self -development, sure in the end to bring about true, 
 fully-evidenced self-determination and national indepen- 
 dence. The innate capacity of the mass of the Chinese 
 should make one hopeful as to the future of China. 
 
 These are a few suggestions as to China's relief from dis- 
 tress, which I humbly offer as one whose life interest centres 
 in that land of splendid record and great potentialities. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 japan's future influence in china 
 
 From the facts narrated in the previous chapters the reader 
 is able to form his own judgment as to the future of Japan's 
 influence in China as made possible by events of the Great 
 War and the joint participation of China and Japan. I 
 only fear that, without further comment and the presenta- 
 tion of other facts, the judgment rendered may not be 
 wholly fair to Japan. It is only "impartial justice" that 
 can satisfy. 
 
 It is extremely hard to speak well of Japan, when one 
 considers what she has done in Korea and in China, par- 
 ticularly during the tragic days of war. But even an oppo- 
 nent or an enemy has his good points. Even a bad policy 
 gains its strength from the good that is in it. Misrepre- 
 sentation only succeeds because it appears in the garb of 
 truth. 
 
 Most modern writers on Sino-Japanese questions have 
 little that is good to say of Japan. I may cite Putnam 
 Weale, J. 0. P. Bland, Thomas F. Millard, Professor Jere- 
 miah W. Jenks, Millard's Review and the Far-Eastern Bu- 
 reau. The one writer who has evidently tried to be fair 
 all-around is Dr. Arthur J. Brown in his "Mastery of the 
 Far East." 
 
 Japan is manifestly placed at a disadvantage by one's 
 preconceptions as to China's losses and Japan's gains re- 
 sulting from the war. She is at further disadvantage 
 through many bad policies pursued through the war in 
 haste to make sure her future position. But Japan has also 
 adopted and tried to carry out many sound measures and 
 
 223 
 
224 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 good ideas, joined as they are with an intense nationalism 
 and the growing imperativeness of self-preservation. I here 
 quote from Dr. Brown : ^ 
 
 If one is to err at all, it is better to do so on the side of 
 charity, to magnify good qualities rather than to minimize them. 
 It is unreasonable to expect an Asiatic people to exemplify within 
 sixty years standards of Christian character and conduct which 
 Europe and America but imperfectly exemplify after fifteen hun- 
 dred years. The Japanese have many fine qualities. They have 
 also some grave defects. So have we. It is easy to pick out 
 flaws in any people under heaven, including our own. 
 
 This is fair talk emanating from a missionary Secretary. 
 
 One way to be fair to Japan is to divide with others the 
 responsibility for what has taken place in China, and to 
 share the blame for evident wrongs inflicted on China. This 
 I have tried to do. Here and there I have held accountable 
 Allied action, especially that of the British and American 
 Governments, and to a minor degree the military clique of 
 the Peking Government. I have had little occasion to blame 
 the action of the Central Powers, so far as China's well- 
 being has been affected during the period of war. Ger- 
 many has received her full quota of condemnation for what 
 she has done elsewhere. Above all, it is well to be reminded 
 that the decision reached at the Peace Conference was not 
 rendered by the Japanese delegate, but by the three chief 
 men sitting at the Peace Table, and that the German Gov- 
 ernment gave assent through unavoidable coercion. The re- 
 sponsibility of Japan and China consisted merely in pre- 
 senting their respective claims. 
 
 This effort or desire to discriminate may account for the 
 fact that I have been able to retain the friendship of many 
 Japanese, even when I have criticized Japanese treatment 
 
 * " Mastery of the Far East," p. 242. 
 
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 225 
 
 of China. Mr. Kawakami rightly says:^ "If she [China] 
 singles out Japan and makes her the sole object of attack, 
 her purpose is obviously sinister." 
 
 Another element of fairness is to recognize the assump- 
 tion that as between Japan and all Western nations, the 
 former has a prior position in Eastern Asia, but as between 
 Japan and China the former has prior position in her own 
 bounds but not in the confines of China, not even in Man- 
 churia and Mongolia. Britain's obstruction to Japan's in- 
 roads into China is due, not to concern for China's interests 
 but solicitude for British interests. American suspicion of 
 Japan's motives must be traced to the future relations or 
 possible war between the two countries, not to a thought of 
 the destiny of China's national existence. No Japanese 
 resents criticism of Japan's conduct towards China, if it is 
 out of consideration, primarily, for China. 
 
 Again, the Japanese resent the assumption that Japan 
 must forego spheres of influence in China, while other na- 
 tions retain the same for themselves. Still more do they 
 resent the idea that Western nations, besides expanding on 
 other continents and even in large portions of Asia, have 
 also first place in China ; or on the other hand, that Japan 
 not only may be excluded from British colonies and the 
 countries of North, Central and South America, but has 
 no right to expand on the mainland of Eastern Asia. 
 
 Senator Phelan on October 16, 1919, said in the Senate, 
 "If she [Japan] must expand, then her expansion in Shan- 
 tung, by agreement with China, is more acceptable to us 
 than her expansion in America both North and South. ' ' It 
 is with the idea that Japan must be given scope somewhere, 
 that censure from other nations irritates Japanese suscepti- 
 bilities. So, too, the query arises as to why Americans 
 should seek to be greater than the Japanese in China and 
 Siberia, when they have the leadership in the New World, 
 Japan and World Peace," p. 155. 
 
 1 « 
 
226 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 and now claim the privilege of joint decision in the affairs 
 of Europe. Is Japan to be content with a second place, 
 even in territory near to her own doors? Is world ambi- 
 tion suitable alone for Great Britain, France and the United 
 States? 
 Mr. Kawakami, referring to this idea, says : * 
 
 If she [China] proposes to discuss Japanese railway conces- 
 sions at the Peace Congress, why not also discuss more extensive 
 concessions granted to other Powers? While China's hands were 
 tied by the constant revolutionary uprisings in recent years, Rus- 
 sia and England steadily encroached upon Mongolia (1,300,000 
 square miles), and Tibet (500,000 square miles), and yet China 
 does not propose to bring this grave matter before the Peace 
 Congress. 
 
 Dr. Arthur J. Brown, who throws out the same idea, 
 says : ^ j 
 
 Some Americans talk as if they had a right to the control of 
 the Pacific. If they were familiar with the history of their own 
 country, they would know that the United States did not possess 
 a clear title to any territory bordering on the Pacific Ocean till 
 1846. Why should we regard our claim to the supremacy of the 
 Pacific as superior to that of nations which have occupied terri- 
 tory on that ocean for more than two thousand years? It may 
 be that the Japanese are over-ambitious and oflfensively self- 
 assertive. I suspect that they are and that we ourselves belong 
 in the same category. 
 
 One of the latest writers on the problems of Asia, Herbert 
 Adams Gibbons, writes with discrimination of Japan's pri- 
 ority in Eastern Asia. He says : ^ 
 
 Japan has no aggressive intentions against America or Europe. 
 The ideas of Japan about the future of Asia and the islands of 
 
 » " Japan and World Peace," p. 157. 
 
 ' " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 252. 
 
 • " The New Map of Asia," p. 476. 
 
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 227 
 
 the Pacific form a different problem — a totally different problem. 
 If we expect that we Americans and Europeans are going to con- 
 tinue indefinitely to keep Asiatics out of our continents and out 
 of Africa as well and at the same time pretend in most places to 
 superior and in many places to equal rights, politically and com- 
 mercially, in Asia, we shall precipitate a great struggle that may 
 have its repercussions in our own hemisphere. The " Yellow 
 Peril " is far from imaginary so long as Europe asserts the right 
 to dominate and exploit Asia. But if we reconcile ourselves to 
 treating Asiatics equitably in their own continent (they do not 
 ask more than that!), we shall not need to prepare for " the next 
 war " with Japan. 
 
 Another factor is the feeling which Japanese naturally 
 have that for far-away nations to concern themselves with 
 what Japanese and Chinese have settled between them- 
 selves is an act of presumption, if not of out-and-out in- 
 terference. 
 
 What the peoples of the Western world must now take 
 into account is that as the result of the war, into which 
 Japan and China were invited to enter, Japan, as a matter 
 of fact, has now the position of predominance in Eastern 
 Asia. No Western nation, except through war, can dispos- 
 sess Japan. Western nations may feel chagrin at the 
 altered status of East and West, but they are reimbursed 
 by wider scope and larger power in other parts of the 
 earth's surface. 
 
 Dr. lyenaga has written : ^ — 
 
 Japan wants her position in the Far East recognized and 
 appreciated, and to her should be confided the maintenance of 
 peace and order there. 
 
 This fact of Japan's predominance, as I have said in 
 previous chapters, must be faced by the Chinese. So, too, 
 
 * New York Evening Post, Jime 30, 1917. 
 
228 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 the Japanese may recognize the fact, but in the recognition 
 they do well to place a curb on their vanity and ambition, 
 lest in the use of this new power they work injury to China, 
 which in the end will prove a boomerang to themselves. 
 
 If Japan can only be wise, act decently, preserve moder- 
 ation, and become altruistic, considerate and helpful, she 
 and China can come together in bonds of spiritual alliance, 
 to their mutual advantage. The test for Japan is in her 
 attitude, not towards expansion, which is a legitimate am- 
 bition, but towards territorial aggrandizement. Instead of 
 following the example of Western nations and seizing 
 Chinese territory, will she help China to retain that which 
 is her own, and so become a benefactor ? 
 
 Enlightened Japanese, especially those who are the heads 
 of great mercantile houses, are fully conscious that the ter- 
 ritorial ambition has so aroused the resentment of the 
 Chinese that through strikes of student bodies and a boy- 
 cott of Japanese goods relentlessly and persistently adhered 
 to, Japan in a commercial way is a loser and in a moral way 
 is being disgraced in the estimation of the rest of the world. 
 
 Besides this propensity to get possession of that which is 
 another's, whether under the name of suzerainty, protec- 
 torate, colony or complete absorption, there are other phases 
 of influence to which Japan has as much right as other 
 nations. 
 
 The first form is commercial influence. This, of course, 
 is unobjectionable, so far as China is concerned, if so be it 
 is co-operative with China and repudiates the aid and in- 
 trusion of the Japanese Government. Mr. Kawakami, after 
 referring to Japan's necessity of finding "a field of activ- 
 ity" in Eastern Asia, says:^ 
 
 With this in view, Japan is eager to convert herself into a 
 great industrial and commercial nation. If she fails in this at- 
 
 ' " Japan and World Peace," pp. 163-166. 
 
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 229 
 
 tempt, she must eventually perish from congestion, stagnation 
 and inanition. And in order to become a foremost industrial 
 nation she must have the essential materials of modern industry. 
 
 To her great disadvantage, Japan has little of such materials 
 in her own country. The volume of iron ores produced at home 
 is but a fraction of what Japan actually consumes. . . . That 
 is why Japan is anxious to secure mining concessions in China, 
 before China's mines and colleries, imutilized by herself, will be 
 all but mortgaged to Western nations — nations which have already 
 secured vast colonies in different parts of the world, and which 
 have plenty of raw materials and mineral supplies in their own 
 territories. . . . 
 
 For three years — from the fall of 1914 to the summer of 
 1917 — Japan's shipyards and iron-works were enabled to work 
 almost entirely with material furnished by steel mills in America. 
 But in July, 1917, the United States, too, declared an embargo 
 upon steel, and the activities of Japanese shipyards and iron- 
 works came suddenly to a halt. . . . 
 
 The American embargo intensified Japan's national desire, long 
 uppermost in the minds of her industrial leaders, for the inde- 
 pendence of her steel industry from foreign mills. . . . Unless 
 Japan succeeds in entering into a satisfactory agreement with 
 China for the further development of China's iron resources, her 
 industrial structure will never be placed upon a secure founda- 
 tion. . . . 
 
 Whether Japan succeeds in this attempt is not a question of 
 aggrandizement, but a question of life or death. With her grow- 
 ing population forbidden to seek opportunities in countries where 
 profitable employment awaits their toil, with her food products 
 inadequate to supply her own need, Japan must perforce become 
 an industrial country. Surely the Western nations, which have 
 agreed among themselves to exclude the Japanese from their own 
 territories will not conspire to block Japan's way in that part of 
 Eastern Asia where she seeks nothing more than the means of 
 self-preservation. 
 
 This reasoning is reasonable. It appeals to one's sense 
 of fair-play. If Japan, indeed, ** seeks nothing more than 
 
230 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEf 
 
 the means of self-preservation," she will be sure of the 
 world's commendation, and China will no longer stand aloof 
 with a feeling of dread suspicion. As between the indus- 
 trial and commercial requirements of Japan and those of 
 all Western nations, Japan deserves sympathy even from 
 her many competitors. But when the profit is exclusively 
 Japan's, with China left destitute, or when China is being 
 exploited by Japan more than by all the other countries 
 put together, as seen in the contracts of 1918, then Japan's 
 reasonable claim for self-preservation is weakened by an 
 undue amount of self-assertiveness and voracious ambition. 
 Just a little self-restraint mixed with a little altruism will 
 safeguard the reputation of Japan. 
 
 Dr. Arthur J. Brown, referring to bad features of Jap- 
 anese commercialism, sums up the matter thus : * 
 
 Rebates, adulteration, evasion of customs, short weight, unfair 
 crushing of competitors and kindred methods are not so un- 
 familiar to Americans that they can consistently lift hands of 
 pious horror when they hear of them in Asia. 
 
 The next form of influence is political. This may, or may 
 not be a menace to China. There is no harm in Japanese, 
 as other nationals, exerting an influence on the political life 
 of China, but not for the purpose of weakening or destroy- 
 ing, or of absorbing China into the Japanese State, as Korea 
 has already been absorbed. The temptation of land-grab- 
 bing is so great that all influences which are political are 
 generally looked upon with disfavour — except in one's own 
 case. For China's sake, I appeal to the Japanese to set the 
 pace for other nations in right, praiseworthy treatment of 
 a neighbour's property, rights and jurisdiction. The con- 
 duct pursued by Japan during the war cannot but leave an 
 impression on Chinese and Europeans and Americans as 
 
 » " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 289. 
 
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 231 
 
 being of a high-handed, grasping character, meaning some- 
 thing else than friendly co-operation or legitimate expan- 
 sion. Thus far, then, the Japanese are handicapped in the 
 estimate formed by public opinion. 
 
 Most Japanese writers, in the effort to defend the action 
 of their Government in reference to Shantung or to allay 
 the fears of critics concerning Japan's ultimate aims, are 
 prone to deny the political character of Japanese ambition. 
 This is, however, untrue to the facts, and an entirely un- 
 necessary argumentation for re-establishing the confidence 
 of their fellow-men. A nation that holds international re- 
 lations is of necessity actuated by political motives. Dr. 
 lyenaga is one who does not disclaim these motives, though 
 he seems to resent the political motives of others. He 
 writes : * 
 
 Let me say quite frankly that Japan will resent an attempt at 
 extending the political influence of the United States in China. 
 Our political interest in China is greater than yours. China is 
 closer to us. But there is no disposition on the part of Japan to 
 close the open door or to create inequalities in the terms on which 
 the United States may engage in Far Eastern trade. 
 
 Thus Americans, according to this opinion, may exert 
 commercial influence in China, but not political. Japanese 
 may exert both kinds of influence. 
 
 Mr. Kawakami also writes on the same matter : ^ 
 
 To Americans, unable to understand Japan's singular position 
 in the Far East, it perhaps makes but little difference whether 
 China is dominated by England, Germany, France, Russia or 
 Japan. From the Japanese point of view it is different. With the 
 history of European diplomacy in the Near and Far East before 
 them, the Japanese cannot but shudder at thought of the day 
 when China shall be held fast in the grip of Western Powers. 
 
 * New York Evening Post, June 30, 1917. 
 » "Japan and the World Peace," p. 171. 
 
232 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEt 
 
 With this prevalent feeling of intelligent Japanese I 
 have fullest sympathy. The Chinese, too, if they had been 
 treated with fair consideration, would undoubtedly have 
 gone so far in sympathetic approach as to favour even an 
 offensive and defensive alliance. This would have been po- 
 litical action of an extreme kind, but without detriment to 
 China, if arranged under proper conditions of equality and 
 practicality. There is far more reason that Japan have an 
 alliance with China than with Great Britain or Russia. 
 Miss La Motte, who is one writer who can see two sides to 
 this Oriental question, like Mr. Gibbons already cited, 
 says : ^ 
 
 And the Japanese, facing race discrimination and exclusion 
 from most of the European countries, and many of their colonies, 
 as well as America, cannot afford to have China under European 
 control. It is a question of self-preservation. 
 
 Here the same word, self-preservation, is used as in the 
 writings of Mr. Kawakami. The word states what is su- 
 preme in Japanese thought. 
 
 The Outlook (of New York), while usually a supporter 
 of the Japanese side in the questions of the Far East, con- 
 demns the policy of ' ' political domination ' ' as compared to 
 "peaceful commercial penetration." It says: ^ 
 
 The first of these would lead her to continue in the road which 
 she is now travelling. It would aim at a more or less complete 
 control of Chinese finances, both public and private, exclusive 
 concessions for the building of railways, the development of mines 
 and the erection of factories. . . . This programme is that of 
 many Japanese, for they learned their diplomacy from the preda- 
 tory policies of certain European governments in the last half of 
 the nineteenth century. Japan's ancient feudal system prepared 
 her for bureaucratic militarism. This policy of ruthless domina- 
 
 » " Peking Dust," p. 223. 
 
 ■ The Outlook, May 14, 1919. 
 
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 233 
 
 tion would, however, mean sorrow for China, turmoil for the 
 world and ultimate disaster for Japan. 
 
 Why this domination by Japan should mean "turmoil 
 for the world ' ' any more than domination insisted upon by 
 Western nations is hard to see. Whether it brings sorrow 
 or not to China depends on the degree of the domination, 
 which may supersede merely that of other nations or may 
 go further and take the place of Chinese rule on Chinese 
 soil. This latter seems to me most unlikely. Japan's po- 
 litical influence, in all probability, will stop short of actual 
 military occupation of the whole vast territory of China. 
 Should the Japanese Government continue its predatory 
 policy, in imitation of Western nations, then North China, 
 with the militaristic Peking Government, is likely to come 
 under the protectorate of Japan, but all South China will 
 secede from the present Government which is thus subservi- 
 ent to an alien nation, will form a real Republic, and become 
 a distinct nation, progressive, enlightened, democratic and 
 prosperous. 
 
 The third form of influence is moral. For any nation 
 to aspire to such influence is most commendable. It looks, 
 however, as if the Japanese were more ready to exert an 
 immoral influence on the Chinese people than a moral one. 
 It looks, too, as if the Japanese Government countenanced 
 the immoral conduct of its subjects, for the purpose of 
 weakening the stamina of the Chinese people. If the Jap- 
 anese Government really stands for morality in personal 
 life and honesty in public life, it must make quick use of 
 the strong arm of the law and put a check to the inroads 
 of immorality into China. 
 
 Two powerful and disastrous evils have been introduced 
 by the Japanese into those parts of China where they have 
 been exerting authority. The one is the social evil, the 
 other the morphine or drug evil. The former is not of the 
 
234 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 degrading, repugnant, brothel type, but made glaring and 
 attractive, of the elegant, palace type. Vice is flaunted in 
 the eyes of the Chinese, and is too alluring to be resisted. 
 I quote from a late article on the condition in Shantung by 
 Dr. Arthur J. Brown : ^ 
 
 Morally, oonditions have beeome distinctly worse imder 
 Japanese influence. The Chinese are far from being a moral 
 people, but vice was never so rampant in Shantung as it is now. 
 The social evil has a closer relation to Japanese officials than 
 among any other people of my acquaintance. When the Japanese 
 enter a country like China or Korea, they build houses of prosti- 
 tution just as they build court houses, post-offices and railway sta- 
 tions. They set aside sections for brothels, erect handsome build- 
 ings, provide them with music and electric lights, and make them 
 as attractive as any place in the city. Nor are retired locations 
 selected. An elaborately equipped vice district was opened last 
 winter in Tsinan-fu opposite one of the Mission compounds. 
 . . . A particularly embarrassing situation has developed at 
 Tsingtao. One of the early acts of the Japanese was to select a 
 spacious tract for a " red light " quarter and to put several blocks 
 of buildings upon it. The site chosen was close to the Presby- 
 terian Mission compound, with its residences and schools. . . . 
 Conditions substantially similar, although on a smaller scale, exist 
 in practically every Japanese colony in Shantung. Even where 
 the number of Japanese is very small it includes prostitutes. 
 
 The other vice, that of morphine, is equally a disgrace 
 to Japanese civilization and a menace to China far beyond 
 the opium menace of the British or the beer menace of the 
 Germans. I quote on this point from an English physician 
 in Tsinan-fu, as cited in Dr. Brown's article: 
 
 I know the wholesale debauchery of the Chinese that is going 
 on at our very doors in morphine shops and houses of ill-fame 
 opened and run by the Japanese. Since their seizure of Tsingtao 
 
 ' Asia for September, 1919. 
 
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 235 
 
 they have been transporting literally tens of thousands of eases 
 of morphine into China through this port, all of them labelled 
 " Government stores." These are received and distributed by 
 Japanese agents, with the result that hundreds and thousands of 
 Japanese " drug shops " and peddlers are taking this accursed 
 drug all over the country. . . . The methods in whieh this 
 morphia is being used are even more sinister. Every one of these 
 drug shops and most of these morphia peddlers possess one or 
 more hypodermic syringes, and for the matter of a few cash the 
 poor Chinaman gets an injection. 
 
 There is no palliation for either of these curses inflicted 
 on China. If the Japanese permitted them in their own 
 land, outsiders could not complain, but it becomes a scan- 
 dal, a complaint, a clear case of culpability, when the Jap- 
 anese, under the guise of military measures or in the name 
 of legitimate peaceful penetration, inflict upon China, al- 
 ready cursed enough, these two curses from Japan. The 
 Chinese may well rue the day when Japan first issued an 
 ultimatum to German Tsingtao, and at the call of England 
 drove out the Germans. 
 
 But the Japanese even here are not the sole offenders. 
 As to the social evil, notice the British municipal rule in 
 the "Model Settlement" of Shanghai, where thousands of 
 young Chinese girls, called "singing girls," throng the 
 busiest thoroughfares of the business section in the night- 
 hours, and ply their trade of song, amusement and lust. 
 
 As to the morphine habit, it takes the place of opium, 
 but vnth more fatal consequences, and, in fact, Japanese 
 morphia is the offspring of British Indian opium. The 
 Chinese in waging their gallant war against opium are to- 
 day beset by the hostile action of two strong Allies, Britain 
 and Japan. Now that British trade in opium directly with 
 China is forbidden, the indirect method is utilized. The 
 Japanese are the purveyors. In both opium and morphia 
 they act as agents through ports in China under Japanese 
 
236 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 control. A correspondent to the British official organ in 
 Shanghai writes:^ 
 
 The chief agency in the distribution of morphia in China is the 
 Japanese post-office. Morphia is imported by parcels post. . . . 
 A conservative estimate would place the amount of morphia im- 
 ported by the Japanese into China in the course of a year as 
 high as eighteen tons, and there is evidence that the amount is 
 steadily increasing. In South China morphia is sold by Chinese 
 peddlers, each of whom carries a passport certifying that he is 
 a native of the Island of Formosa and therefore entitled to 
 Japanese protection. . . . Through Tairen morphia circulates 
 throughout Manchuria and the province adjoining; through 
 Tsingtao morphia is distributed over Shantung province, Anhui 
 and Kiangsu, while from Formosa morphia is carried with opium 
 and other contraband by motor-driven fishing-boats to some point 
 on the mainland, from which it is distributed throughout the prov- 
 ince of Fukien and the north of Kuangtung. Everywhere it is 
 sold by Japanese under ex-territorial protection. 
 
 The same writer then shows Britain's part in the sale to 
 Japan of Indian opium: 
 
 In the Calcutta opium sales Japan has become one of the con- 
 siderable opium purchasers of Indian opium. She purchases for 
 Formosa, where the opium trade shows a steady growth and 
 where opium is required for the manufacture of morphia. Sold 
 by the Government of India [the British Government, remember], 
 this opium is exported under permits applied for by the Japanese 
 Government [another Government, please notice], is shipped to 
 Kobe and from Kobe is trans-shipped to Tsingtao. . . . It is 
 smuggled through Shantung into Shanghai and the Yangtsze 
 Valley. This opium is sold in Shanghai and the Yangtsze Valley. 
 This opium is sold in Shanghai at $500 [Mexican dollars] a 
 ball, forty balls to the chest, a total valuation of about $20,000 
 a chest. There is reason to believe that between January 1 
 
 • North China Herald, December 21, 1918. 
 
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 237 
 
 and September 30, 1918, not less than 2,000 chests of opium 
 purchased in India were imported into Tsingtao through Kobe. 
 Upon this amount the Japanese authorities levy a tax, which does 
 not appear in the estimates, equivalent to 2,000,000 pounds ster- 
 ling. ... At both Dalny and Tsingtao these offices are wholly 
 under the control of the Japanese. 
 
 It is a matter of chagrin to right-minded Americans, 
 zealous for the good name of their country, that clandes- 
 tine trade in morphia has also heen carried on by Ameri- 
 cans, through connivance with Japanese. According to the 
 Japan Chronicle (English edited) 113,000 ounces of mor- 
 phia were shipped from the United States to Kobe for 
 trans-shipment to China in the first five months of 1919. 
 It is a criminal offense to ship this drug direct to China, 
 but not to Japan. The Covenant of the League of Nations, 
 however, enjoins on all members of the League to exercise 
 control over "the traffic in opium and other dangerous 
 drugs. ' ' Surely the American people are not willing to be 
 partners in drugging China with opium as used in its worst 
 form. 
 
 To be true to the facts, a great deal of opium has been 
 brought the last few years into Japan via Siberia from 
 Persia, the agents being a motley sort of traders, subject 
 to no law, though possessed of passports of different 
 governments. 
 
 The chief agents, however, in introducing morphia into 
 China are the Japanese, and the ports through which it 
 passes into Chinese territory are mostly those under control 
 of Japanese authorities. 
 
 It is shameful, unfortunate, unwise, that the Japanese 
 Government in collusion either with the Indian Government 
 or evil-minded Americans, should perpetuate, rather than 
 help to exterminate, this curse of China, opium and mor- 
 phia. Cannot the high-minded men of Japan, embued with 
 
238 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 the great moral precepts of Eastern Religions, see how 
 much Japan as well as China is losing by these immoral 
 practices ? If the Japanese are friends to China, they must 
 at once put forth efforts, in conjunction with the best in 
 China, to drive out these vices which are sapping the life- 
 blood of the Chinese people. 
 
 It is clear, then, that Japan in her approach to China, 
 with a desire for closer and more cordial relationship, has 
 at the present crisis in world affairs certain distinct respon- 
 sibilities, as well as rights. Let me specify: 
 
 (1) Men of moral and religious conviction in Japan, 
 whether advocates of democracy or imperialism, must join 
 hands with kindred minds in China for the spiritual re- 
 juvenation of both these ancient nations of the Far East. 
 
 (2) The Japanese must abandon their harsh, high- 
 handed, intermeddling in China 's political affairs, and show 
 themselves sincerely friendly, helpful and fair. It is quite 
 possible that Japanese merchants, bankers, educationists 
 and reformers will insist on a saner policy of adaptation 
 and co-operation. 
 
 (3) How much greater the achievement, with permanent 
 advantage to both Japanese and Chinese, if the present 
 estrangement gives place to a fellowship based on restored 
 confidence. 
 
 (4) Japan is fitted to be the leader of Eastern Asia, but 
 her leadership will be null and void without a hearty, spon- 
 taneous following. The Chinese can be taught to follow, 
 but not ordered or bullied. A combination of the peoples of 
 Eastern Asia, under Japan's leadership, for their liberation 
 and uplift, seems to me a worthy object and not a terror to 
 the rest of mankind, but it can never be brought about, 
 unless Japan, its Government and people, reverse their pol- 
 icy of the past five years. 
 
 (5) Whether Japan ever adopts a republican form of 
 state does not matter, but it is good policy for her to en- 
 
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 239 
 
 courage at home the spread of democratic ideas, which 
 means the rights of man, and to foster among other Asiatic 
 peoples the same liberalizing spirit, which can never be re- 
 strained for any length of time. Mr. Gibbons writes thus : ^ 
 
 Internal signs of democratic evolution in Japan are encourag- 
 ing. If America and Europe make a sincere effort to form a 
 society of nations on the basis of equality, the growth of demo- 
 cratic feeling and liberalism in Japan will undoubtedly lead to 
 anti-militarism, A new era will open for the Far East — an era 
 of Korean autonomy, if not independence, and of reapproachment 
 between Japan and China. It behooves us to study carefully 
 recent events in Japan. 
 
 (6) If Japan, in these days of secret, selfish diplomacy, 
 acts with chivalry, and hands over to China the whole ter- 
 ritory of Kiaochow for Chinese administration, and not for 
 Japanese or for any international ex-territorial jurisdic- 
 tion; and if in addition she withdraws from the railway 
 and mining occupation in Shantung, for either German or 
 Chinese possession, she will establish herself in the affec- 
 tions of the Chinese and will assure herself a moral predom- 
 inance. Through the boycott raised by the Chinese against 
 the Japanese, the latter 's trade diminished 50 per cent. The 
 Chinese may have been mistaken in overlooking the com- 
 plicity of Western nations in war intrigues and in the peace 
 settlement, but they recognized clearly the main fa«t that 
 it was Japan's claims, successfully won, that brought shame 
 and danger to China. 
 
 The American Minister to China, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, 
 on arriving in San Francisco, October 9, 1919, after resign- 
 ing from his official position, stated ^ that ' * Japan holds a 
 wonderful trump card if she will only play it, which is the 
 return to China of those things wrung from her by Ger- 
 
 * " The New Map of Asia," p. 477. 
 
 ' The New York World, October 10, 1919. 
 
240 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 many." The Japanese may not be likely to accept this 
 advice from one who assured the Chinese of aid against 
 Japan, but they can respond to these words of the Outlook : 
 
 The Japanese must win the confidence and friendship of the 
 Chinese. That they have not succeeded in doing. They have so 
 far been confronted by the almost unanimous distrust and hate 
 of their neighbours — an attitude which augurs ill for the future. 
 A necessary preliminary step would seem to be the voluntary re- 
 turn of Tsingtao to China, the cancellation of part or all of the 
 concessions wrung from her in 1915, the strict repression of 
 Japanese purveyors of morphine and all other predatory traders, 
 and a hearty willingness to co-operate with the Powers in any 
 joint attempt to rehabilitate China. 
 
 (7) The Japanese must treat the Chinese with respect, 
 not with contempt or superciliousness, which always nulli- 
 fies the best intentions. If the Chinese, under outrages re- 
 ceived, speak with anger of Japan, the Japanese have been 
 wont to look with condescension upon China. If the Jap- 
 anese, more advanced in Western knowledge, change their 
 attitude towards China, they will be met with hearty re- 
 sponse. In too many ways the Japanese have adopted the 
 worst features of Western civilization, so contrary to the 
 teachings of Buddhism and Confucianism, which entered 
 Japan from China. One of these bad qualities is the over- 
 bearing attitude in social and political intercourse. An 
 American who lives in Shantung, under date of July 23, 
 1919, writes : ^ 
 
 The one thing noticeable to all foreigners in the Far East is 
 that the honeyed words of Japanese leaders, as to solicitude for 
 the welfare of China, inspired by their Government's cunning 
 press propaganda, are always at variance with the arrogant, 
 cynical, cruel, sinister Prussian policy of despoiling China — ^that 
 
 * Far-Eastern Fortnightly, September 29, 1919. 
 
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 241 
 
 policy pushed relentlessly, and every day, with new and un- 
 dreamed-of aggressions and brutalities against the sovereignty of 
 the Chinese Government and the right of the Chinese people j 
 against their own persons, legitimate pursuits and their soil. 
 
 Personally I have not come in contact in China with this 
 class of Japanese, but the testimony of others as to the 
 repulsive side of Japanese life must be accepted as true. 
 
 A more favourable view of Japanese characteristics and 
 possibilities is given by an English writer, H. M. Hyndman. 
 These are his words : ^ 
 
 That Japan should use the present terrible state of affairs in 
 Europe to impose upon the unwilling population of China — 
 possessing even by the admission of the highest Japanese states- 
 men qualities superior to their own — is a policy which ought to 
 be resisted as soon as possible, if the Chinese themselves desire 
 help against this aggression. The Japanese are not popular in 
 Asia, and their unpopularity has undoubtedly increased during 
 the past four years. On the other hand, whatever their differ- 
 ences may be, Asiatics understand one another at bottom far 
 better than they understand or trust or like Europeans or Ameri- 
 cans. This the United States is beginning to comprehend. 
 
 J. W. Robertson, a publicist in Tokio, recognizes that 
 whatever the difficulties, Japan is to be leader in Asia. He 
 sums up thus : ^ 
 
 Japan in her best manifestations is the hope of Asia. Her 
 friends trust that she may be so guided as to be the light of 
 Asia. The great experiment in the adaptation of Western ideas 
 and methods to Eastern traditions and conditions must not fail. 
 That Japan shall succeed in her gallant attempt, for which she has 
 sacrificed so freely, is a great American, a great British, a great 
 world interest. 
 
 * " The Awakening of Asia," p. 155. 
 •New York Times, March 23, 1919. 
 
242 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 The Great War has, indeed, enlarged the possibilities of 
 Japan in all Eastern Asia, especially in China, but her real 
 future, whether one of growing strength or one of decline, 
 will be determined by the way she abandons policies proved 
 by the war to be bad everywhere, by her readiness to sanc- 
 tify opportunity for purposes of the common good, and to 
 do to China as she would have China do to Japan. 
 
 I close with an extract of a Japanese writer, Mr. lehi- 
 hashi : ^ 
 
 China is close at hand and possesses what Japan needs; there- 
 fore, a friendly attitude on the part of China is most earnestly 
 desired by Japan. . . . There is a set of foreign residents in 
 China who have inherited the old Occidental prejudice against 
 Orientals. These men think they would lose their monopolistic 
 power, be it commercial or racial, unless they fight Japan's activi- 
 ties in China. Another obstacle in the way of co-operation be- 
 tween Japan and China is the fact that in the past Japan has 
 made blunders in dealing with China. These have caused many 
 of the Chinese to lose confidence in the Japanese. Some actually 
 distrust them and still others fear Japan. Japan must acknowl- 
 edge her past blunders and endeavour to rectify them. . . . 
 When confidence has been restored between China and Japan 
 then the two nations can co-operate in the true sense of the word 
 with mutual benefit. Moreover, Japan should adopt some positive 
 measures of service for the benefit of the Chinese. Japan's 
 friendship must be substantiated. 
 
 * "The Industrial Plight of Japan," in Asia for September, 1919. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS IN CHINA 
 
 The relative influence of all nations in China, commercial, 
 financial, political and missionary, has been greatly changed 
 by the war. The elimination of German influence, whether 
 permanent or only temporary, has for the moment en- 
 hanced the already growing influence of Japan. The result 
 has been the supremacy of Japan in the Far East not only 
 over Germany, but over Great Britain, the United States, 
 France and Russia, all of whom connived at bringing about 
 the change, and also over China, who preferred to retain 
 the status quo. The movement set on foot by Westerners 
 to direct the animosity of the Chinese toward Japan, made 
 manifest in the greatest boycott of Japanese goods that 
 China has ever been able to carry out for a considerable 
 length of time with unflagging energy and unanimity, has 
 been the one factor to minimize Japanese influence. This 
 assault on Japan's influence has been almost as pleasing to 
 Western peoples as was the previous assault on German 
 influence. Whether Japan will retain her exclusive dom- 
 ination, or will have to yield to new conditions, and take an 
 equal place with the other great Powers; and whether 
 China, by the separate action of one nation or the joint 
 action of all, as in a big financial consortium, loses control 
 of her own affairs — becomes an Egypt, a Turkey, a Persia, 
 an India, a Korea or a Filipino subject nation — or 
 by the helpful, reformative influences of others is able to 
 regain sovereign rights and national autonomy as in past 
 centuries — these two things and many others must remain 
 conjecture. In previous chapters I have pointed out what 
 
 243 
 
244 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 is probable or at least desirable as to China's permanency 
 and Japan's leadership. 
 
 As to the influence of Entente nations and of the United 
 States, it must be recognized that they are handicapped by 
 the wrong done to China at the Peace Table. As factors of 
 moral power they are far below their past record, which 
 has been none too good. By the decision reached at Paris, 
 the three nations, the United States, Great Britain and 
 France, have left on the Chinese mind a more unfavourable 
 impression than the two Central Powers. Herbert Adams 
 Gibbons touches on this supreme mistake of the victorious 
 Powers in the following language : ^ 
 
 In the discussion and solution of no problem before the Con- 
 ference of Paris were the insincerity and bad faith of the great 
 powers more apparent than in the disposition of the Shantung 
 question. The facts of history were distorted, the principles for 
 which the Entente Powers and the United States declared they 
 had fought were ignored. The Powers showed their inability to 
 rise to the high level of international morality essential for the 
 creation of a society of nations. Instead of trying to lay the 
 foundations of a durable peace in the Far East, the statesmen 
 of the Entente Powers and the United States decided for the 
 continuation of a policy that has provoked several wars and given 
 rise to injustice and oppression. For the European Powers and 
 Japan, the solution proposed for the Shantung question was the 
 holding fast to traditions and practices of the past. For the 
 United States, it was the abandonment by our government of 
 the idealism and disinterestedness that for more than half a cen- 
 tury have characterized American diplomacy in the Far East. 
 The solution of the Shantung question incorporated in the Treaty 
 dictated to Germany is the triumph of the policy of economic 
 exploitation through political blackmail against which John Hay 
 and his predecessors in the American State Department struggled 
 with skill and a large measure of success. 
 
 » "The New Map of Asia," p. 385. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 245 
 
 Briefly we may now consider the future prospects in 
 China of Western nations. As for Russia, China 's nearest 
 neighbour, her power has departed, though it will doubtless 
 return in future years. Japan in Siberia will be of more 
 concern to China than Russia in Siberia. Already the Jap- 
 anese, through many concessionary privileges from various 
 Russian leaders, have pre-empted the resourceful regions of 
 Eastern Siberia. Americans, striving as best they may, can 
 never outstrip the Japanese in those regions of Northern 
 Asia. Japan's position in Siberia is more assured than her 
 position in China. With the disappearance of Russian 
 influence, the Japanese have been laying plans for also 
 pre-empting the ground in Outer Mongolia and Northern 
 Manchuria. As yet the Chinese Eastern Railway running 
 across Northern Manchuria, and built by Russian capital, 
 has not been seized by Japan instead of controlled by China, 
 co-partner with Russia in the Railway Company. Harbin, 
 also, is still regarded as a Chinese-administered town, tak- 
 ing the place of Russian administration. Thus Japan's 
 only check in these regions is from China, not from West- 
 ern nations. 
 
 As for France, she is not eliminated as is Germany, 
 neither has she disappeared as a factor to be reckoned with 
 as Russia, but it will be some time before she can do more 
 than retain the railway concessions which she had before 
 the war. She will not have the capital, unless underwrit 
 by American capitalists, to develop new concessions, and 
 as for general trade she has never been so conspicuous as 
 even smaller nations, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and 
 Switzerland. 
 
 As for Italy, honoured as one of the Big Five for her 
 military power alone — a rather poor standard in the New 
 Era — she, too, from lack of capital will be of small account 
 in the international relations of China. 
 
 There remain, then, three Western peoples of strong eom- 
 
246 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 mercial capacity, with an instinct for venturesome enter- 
 prise, whose future possibilities demand more minute con- 
 sideration, as an offset to the present predominating in- 
 fluence of Japan. These are British, Americans, Germans. 
 
 (1) First, then, British future influence in China. 
 
 Before the war no one outside nation was dominant in 
 China. But, clearly, Great Britain was predominant. By 
 calling for the intrusion of Japan, in order to oust Ger- 
 many, predominance passed to Japan. Should the Anglo- 
 Japanese Alliance continue, for political reasons, Japan's 
 predominance in China will not be greatly modified, much 
 less endangered, and China will then have to reckon with 
 a combined menace rather than a divided menace or a 
 menace of one. Should the Alliance be allowed simply to 
 terminate at the expiration of the Agreement — in 1921 — 
 then Japan will either seek, for her own safety, to draw 
 nearer to Russia, whatever the Government, and to Ger- 
 many, or will be isolated except as she succeeds in com- 
 bining the Orient against the Occident. While, then, a 
 section of the Japanese is anti-British and a very 
 large section of the British in China is anti-Jap- 
 anese, yet, politically, it may be expedient to both the 
 British and Japanese Governments to renew the Alliance. 
 In conjunction with this, the Japanese will not forego the 
 aspiration for predominance in China, and, as in 1916, they 
 made a separate alliance with Russia, so at a fitting time 
 they may form an alliance with China or with some other 
 Power of suitable potentialities. 
 
 In political influence the action of the British Govern- 
 ment in appealing to Japan to join her in the great strug- 
 gle, and the subsequent machinations with Japan to bring 
 China into the war, naturally leave an unfavourable im- 
 pression on the Chinese mind; but the British in China, 
 and especially the press propaganda, have had the requi- 
 site ingenuity to lead the Chinese to overlook Britain's 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 247 
 
 part, and to concentrate attention on Japan's part in the 
 varied complications to China. 
 
 A Britisher is still Inspector-General of Chinese Mari- 
 time Customs and another the head of the Salt Gabelle. 
 If Japan forges ahead, some Japanese will in a few years 
 legitimately supersede the British in these positions — un- 
 less competent Chinese are deemed worthy. 
 
 In a missionary way the British have exerted most benefi- 
 cent influence, and will continue so to do, and more and 
 more in hearty union with American missionaries — a noble 
 example of Anglo-American alliance. This combination 
 may be reckoned upon to resist any immoral or unjust in- 
 fluences coming from Japan. 
 
 In a commercial way the British will find more intense 
 competition from the Japanese and Americans than in 
 former years from Germans, Japanese and Americans. 
 The British, moreover, will be more efficient competitors 
 than in the past. England has commercial preparedness. 
 
 Isaac F. Marcosson has made special investigations of 
 England's preparedness for trade- war. He shows the great 
 changes, the new life, brought into the Board of Trade and 
 the new British Trade Corporation of which at the time 
 Sir Albert Stanley was sponsor. He says : ^ 
 
 It would take a book to explain the entire trade exploitation 
 scheme of the Board of Trade. . . . England is giving many 
 evidences of her determination to take every possible leaf out of 
 the book of German efficiency. In the Board of Trade is a special 
 German department to study German newspapers and German 
 economic literature. A pet sponsorship of the Board of Trade 
 is the encouragement of organization of specific industries for the 
 foreign field. ... No undertaking is quite so significant or so 
 far-reaching in its effects as its establishment of an adequate com- 
 mercial intelligence department. . . . After the war the com- 
 mercial intelligence department will take over the staff of records 
 
 * Saturday Evening Post, January 26, 1918. 
 
248 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 of the war trade intelligence and statistical departments. No ally 
 could be more powerful. . . . Meantime England is being con- 
 verted into a monster Trust. 
 
 The Far Eastern section of this mammoth Trust has been 
 going through the same course of thorough preparation. 
 A school in Chinese has been in operation for some four 
 years in Shanghai under the superintendence of a gifted 
 "Welsh missionary. Young men of the big English firms, 
 who might have been conscripted, were exempted, that they 
 might be lieutenants in the coming trade war. German 
 trade secrets, as well as the trade itself, have been zealously 
 seized, except where Japanese and Americans have come 
 in ahead. It is just possible that in attempting to trip up 
 the German merchants, the English merchants may them- 
 selves be tripped. 
 
 Francis H. Sisson, Vice-President of the Guaranty Trust 
 Company, after a visit to Europe, returned with a glowing 
 report of England's financial strength.^ He speaks of the 
 ** returns from investments abroad and the receipts of 
 British-owned ocean carriers." England's "power of pro- 
 duction has been increased by about 50 per cent by the 
 speeding-up process induced by war needs." The follow- 
 ing summing-up is 'made by Mr. Sisson: 
 
 All in all, the outlook for industrial progress in England is 
 favourable. The manufacturing capacity of the country has been 
 greatly increased during the war. Even more notable have been 
 the improvements in port and warehouse facilities. Ships are 
 being turned out rapidly, and the British merchant marine still 
 exceeds in tonnage that of any other nation. A system of prefer- 
 ences which unites the various parts of the Empire commercially 
 more closely than ever before will give the vast colonial resources 
 a new significance for the development of British industry and 
 trade. . . . The recent removal of restrictions on the exporta- 
 tion of capital for investment will naturally result in an ex- 
 
 * Reported in New York Sun, October 19, 1919. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 249 
 
 pansion of the export trade and a stimulation of domestic produc- 
 tion. Much depends upon the spirit and temper of a people. 
 Their record of achievements in industry and finance has amply 
 demonstrated the capacity of the English for doing big things in 
 a big way, and for meeting emergencies with the requisite energy 
 and ability. 
 
 Perhaps the only threatening drawback to this portrayal 
 is the overturn of the industrial system and commercial 
 enterprise by a big upheaval in the labour section of Brit- 
 ain's life, united with revolutionary schemes among other 
 peoples. 
 
 Comparatively speaking, Great Britain has come through 
 the war catastrophes more unscathed than other bellige- 
 rents, unless we except the United States. Moreover, she 
 is more ready than all others for world domination. * * The 
 British Empire has expanded from about 11,500,000 square 
 miles to about 15,000,000. The character of the British 
 control ranges from actual annexation to military occupa- 
 tion or political domination. ' ' ^ 
 
 As a whole, and more than ever in the past, British 
 merchants have all the push which guarantees success. 
 They started early to reap every advantage possible from 
 the war situation. On the one hand, hardly had armistice 
 been declared, when British merchants in China brought 
 pressure to bear on the Chinese Government to carry into 
 effect, even when hostilities had ceased, the closure and 
 liquidation of all German firms. On the other hand, Brit- 
 ish merchants at home, as soon as the Treaty with Germany 
 was signed, hastened to renew such trade with Germany as 
 would be of profit to British interests. Thus an ^^nglish 
 newspaper report for August, 1919, reads: 
 
 The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, the 
 British India Steam Navigation Company, and the Well Line, will 
 
 * New York Independent, September 27, 1919. 
 
250 CfilNA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 this month and onwards have steamers loading in Hamburg, 
 Bremen (if sufficient offers) and Rotterdam in connection with 
 their service to India. 
 
 Major Sanford Griffith of the Inter-Allied Commission 
 on Industrial Restitution, writing of British commercial 
 preparedness in Germany, and just as applicable to other 
 parts of the world, says : ^ 
 
 The British have invested too heavily in German industries to 
 share the enthusiasm of French soldiers for further crippling 
 Germany. Substantial trade relations with Germany mean more 
 to the English than with any other country on the Continent, and 
 are a necessary preliminary to extended trade relations with 
 Russia. 
 
 Thus capturing German trade, the British outstrip all 
 others, including even Americans. 
 
 British merchants in China begin the new campaign with 
 certain peculiar advantages. They have long-established 
 firms, with branches at all the great centres of Asia and 
 Australasia. They are for the moment free of the German 
 competitor. In reputation for honourable and fair dealing 
 with the inhabitants of Asiatic countries, they hold a com- 
 manding position for inspiring confidence, if not always 
 affection, and need fear no comparison with their Japanese 
 rivals — or shall we call them Allies? It is evident that, in 
 a political and commercial way, for bringing about the 
 exploitation of China and other Asiatic countries. Great 
 Britain and Japan must reckon with each other. 
 
 (2) Next to be noticed is American influence in China. 
 
 When the Great War opened, and early began to entangle 
 China, Americans had a decided advantage over all others 
 for expanding their influence, in perfectly legitimate ways, 
 to the profit and security of China. Both the American 
 
 * The Qlohe, March 26, 1920. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 251 
 
 Government and the American individual, through many 
 years of creditable conduct, were looked upon by Chinese 
 as the truest friends of China. The return of a part of the 
 Boxer indemnity for educational purposes evinced not only 
 a sense of justice on the part of the American Government, 
 but feelings of generosity in accord with the general sen- 
 timent of American people. Early in the Wilson Admin- 
 istration American bankers withdrew from the "Five- 
 Power Consortium," dominating loans to China, since the 
 Administration regarded that guarantees of security to 
 American bankers by the American Government rather 
 than by the Chinese Government were a form of interfer- 
 ence in China's political affairs. This action, criticized 
 by American bankers, made an impression on the Chinese 
 of America's regard for China's sovereign rights. 
 
 These advantages and opportunities were not properly 
 utilized by Americans in China, as the war waged far and 
 wide, and other nations were absorbed in plans near the 
 centres of conflict. Financially Americans were the only 
 ones able to make loans to China. The American banking 
 group of J. P. Morgan and others were bound not to act 
 separately from the original ''Five-Power Consortium." 
 Other bankers hesitated to make the venture, even from 
 motives of national prestige. When Chicago bankers stood 
 ready to make loans on proper security, they misunderstood 
 the Chinese situation by approaching the Chinese, not di- 
 rectly as welcomed business men, but through the American 
 Legation. Instead of open reference to Parliament, which 
 alone can sanction a loan and whose members would gladly 
 have favoured American advances in money, private or con- 
 fidential or secret negotiations were carried on with the 
 militaristic Premier, who afterwards fell under the spell 
 of Japanese financiers. As an amusing incident, when I 
 wrote in my Peking paper an article making inquiries as 
 to these mysterious conferences, just as I had previously 
 
252 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 probed Japanese proposals in finance, I was placed before 
 the United States Court for China under charge of libelling 
 Paul S. Reinsch, the American Minister — a case, however, 
 which like two other charges never came to trial. 
 
 The Wilson Administration has since reversed its position 
 on "dollar diplomacy," and in 1920 assisted in forming 
 a larger consortium, with bigger groups of national bankers 
 from the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan. 
 This perpetuates the "special alliance" theory in the world 
 of finance. 
 
 While, financially, American bankers were losing their 
 golden opportunities in China all through the war, Jap- 
 anese bankers, financiers, merchants and diplomats were 
 quietly progressing, with even more than customary se- 
 crecy, to gain a dominant financial position in China, and 
 with this a political position. 
 
 Even greater, so it seems to me, and as is confirmed by 
 facts already described, was the failure of Americans to 
 use their outstanding influence to keep China in a state of 
 peace. Instead of this, American reputation was lowered 
 by the effort to induce China to sever relations with Ger- 
 many. Harm to America's good name has since developed 
 by the failure to make good the assurances of help which 
 were given by the American Minister to the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment. The expression of assuring words became an 
 expression of assuring friendship. But when at the Peace 
 Table, no American assistance was given to China, not even 
 by President Wilson, the high hopes of the Chinese re- 
 versed themselves into intense disappointment. 
 
 Prof. John Dewey, after personal investigation, sums 
 up the status of American influence in the following 
 language : ^ 
 
 Our prior behaviour has left with many Chinese, especially 
 those who have not been in the United States, the impression that 
 '■ The New Republic, December 3, 1919. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 253J 
 
 we are not, in our foreign dealings, a very practical people, that 
 we lack alertness, quickness of decision in emergencies, prompt- 
 ness of action and especially pei-sistence. We are thought of as, 
 upon the whole, a well-disposed people, but somewhat ineffectual 
 in action. 
 
 Hsu En-yuan, Vice-President of a new China-American 
 Bank, also says : ^ 
 
 About once every five years American men of big business and 
 finance become interested in China, but this interest does not last. 
 Something always happens to frighten the bankers away. First 
 it is a change in political affairs at home; then international 
 politics is to blame; then, again, the business and financial repre- 
 sentatives sent to China become impatient at the delays and 
 intrigues always present in Chinese affairs, grow tired of the 
 interminable negotiations and go home. 
 
 On the whole, American men of enterprise have greater 
 opportunities in China than the British, but it looks at 
 present as if the British by well-laid plans going back sev- 
 eral years would outstrip Americans. Americans have also 
 a better chance than the Japanese, who through antipathy 
 aroused have been losing commercially, and yet it looks as 
 if a few years hence the Japanese, like the British, would 
 outstrip Americans. 
 
 Only by large schemes persistently adhered to can Amer- 
 ican merchants secure a first or even a second place in the 
 new form of competition. In opportunity America is first/ 
 but not in achievement.^ 
 
 America's influence in China has been retarded not only 
 by a mistaken policy, but by obstruction from associ- 
 
 » New York World, February 23, 1920. 
 
 ' In securing the friendship of the Chinese people, the great gen- 
 erosity of the American public in the China famine more than makes 
 amends for the wrong done to China by the settlement of the 
 Versailles Treaty. 
 
254 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 ates in war. During the war period it was almost a 
 crime for an American to criticize the Allies. Now that 
 war is over, and loyalty to truth may reassert itself, it is 
 well for Americans, who plan for influence in the Far East, 
 to know, on the basis of past conduct, just what help, if 
 any, American merchants may expect from our late asso- 
 ciates in arms. About the time the United States was 
 contemplating relief to the Entente Allies in Europe, these 
 same Allies stood in the way of American enterprise in 
 China. The greatest American syndicate, that of Siems- 
 Carey, was negotiating with the Chinese Government for 
 concessions in different parts of China. The French Lega- 
 tion objected to railway concessions thus negotiated in 
 South China; the British Legation objected to other rail- 
 way concessions in Central China; the Japanese Legation 
 objected to a conservancy concession along the Grand Canal, 
 in or near to Shantung, and the Russian Legation objected 
 to railway concessions in North China. Again, after hostil- 
 ities had ceased, when the secret arrangements of this same 
 syndicate with the Chinese Government had been made 
 public, like Chino-Japanese agreements, the British Min- 
 ister, learning that a concession had been granted for a 
 railway running south from Hangchow in the province of 
 Chekiang, at once hastened to the Chinese Foreign Office 
 and entered an emphatic protest.^ 
 
 So far as experiences in China are concerned during 
 the period of the war, American enterprise met interference 
 not from Germans, but from the European Allies. What 
 may be expected in future is hard to say, but, in general, 
 co-operation with Germans will be no harder than with the 
 British or the French. As something idealistic, I recom- 
 mend the cultivation of friendship on the part of Amer-. 
 
 * A new illustration is the opposition of the British and 
 Japanese Governments to the Chinese desire to allow in China an 
 American wireless station. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 255 
 
 icans with all peoples, the English of course, and also 
 others. t 
 
 In matters of ordinary trade Americans will still have 
 their opportunities, unaffected by Governmental policies. 
 Great corporations like the Standard Oil Company, the 
 British and American Tobacco Company (really an Eng- 
 lish-chartered concern), and Singer Sewing Machine Com- 
 pany, are bound to succeed by their wise methods of send- 
 ing agents and goods direct to the interior towns of China. 
 At the same time, the competition in all branches of trade 
 will be more acute than in former years. 
 
 In religious and educational enterprise Americans have 
 unique opportunities. Their fine record in the past is not 
 going to be upset by any misconceptions of American diplo- 
 macy, unless they advocate and support American policies 
 which are detrimental to China. Officially Americans have 
 lost greatly in China; in commerce and missions, particu- 
 larly the latter, Americans face a bright future. Between 
 British and American missionaries there is a close bond of 
 sympathy. They all wish well to the Chinese people, and 
 to the experiment of a Republic. 
 
 As a distinct matter for consideration is the annoyance 
 and opposition which American merchants, educationists 
 and missionaries have received from Japan. This has re- 
 ceived abundant testimony from Americans in Shantung 
 and the strong protest of different American organizations 
 in Shanghai and Peking. The preferential policy applied 
 in Manchuria before the war has been accentuated during 
 the prosecution of the war. The clash that has come be- 
 tween Japanese ambition and the interests of all others, in- 
 cluding the Chinese, is not surprising, considering the 
 engrossing cares of war assumed by Europeans and Amer- 
 icans. One slight benefit apt to arise is that the victorious 
 nations may now be convinced that the displacement of 
 Germany by Japan has resulted in no good, but in decided 
 
256 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 harm. The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai 
 thus repeats the growing sentiment of intelligent Chinese: 
 
 Germany's control in Shantung province, while irksome, had 
 nothing of the present effect, because Germany was on the other 
 side of the world, and the weight of the iron hand in China was 
 light. 
 
 As to restrictions placed on American enterprise by the 
 Japanese, Charles Hodges writes : ^ 
 
 American trade, confronted by Japanese competition over the 
 Pacific markets, is face to face with the most highly co-ordinated 
 government-backed business in the world. 
 
 And again: 
 
 The American business world must realize that their trade with 
 China is jeopardized wherever the Japanese secure a foothold, be 
 it only " economic rights " or a leasehold. 
 
 And again: 
 
 That is the whole meaning of Japan's determination to duplicate 
 in Shantung the grip she has gotten on Manchuria — a grip which 
 is constantly tightened against American interests in the regions 
 affected. Japan is a business adversary of ours; she will not be 
 swerved from this objective unless she is forced to abandon this 
 scheme to bind the Far East economically to Japan's political 
 enda. 
 
 (3) Lastly I consider the future influence of Germans 
 in China. 
 
 Any other people except the Germans, called upon to 
 face such world-wide and multifarious restraints as the 
 Versailles Treaty of Peace has imposed on Germany, would 
 
 ' The Far-Eastern Fortnightly, September 1, 1919. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 257 
 
 lose heart. The difficulties which beset the Chinese are as 
 nothing in comparison. The complete eradication of Ger- 
 man business and the liquidation of German property 
 everywhere throughout the world, except in a few neutral 
 countries, is the most amazing performance ever sanctioned 
 by professed adherents of high moral aims. I recognize 
 the desirability of overthrowing the military machine and 
 the absolute authority that existed in Germany, or that 
 exists among other peoples, but I candidly confess I see 
 no justice in the attempt to destroy Germany, Austria and 
 Hungary, industrially, economically and commercially. 
 
 H. W. Massingham has stated the case in all the intensity 
 of an aroused English conscience. I quote his words : * 
 
 Is it a legitimate use of military success in modern Europe 
 for one Power to pile up against another a series of perquisitions, 
 requisitions and inquisitions which deprive her of millions of 
 people of her blood and soil, of about half her coal supply and 
 three parts of her iron ore, of all her greater ocean-going marine, 
 of her colonies, of her foreign treaty rights and concessions, of 
 free use of her railways, free disposal of her industrial products, 
 and the effectual right of taxation, which destroy her power to 
 save and limit her power to work? Who gave this jurisdiction 
 of life and death? What conception of the civilized and the 
 moral order does it advance? . . . Under the rule of Paris Ger- 
 many surrendered every absolute political right of nationhood, 
 including the deep underlying human right of self-respect. . . . 
 Within the period of the treaty she ceases to be self-determined. 
 
 As for myself, I do not write of the barriers to German 
 rehabilitation at home, but limit myself to the combined 
 movement to eject from China, German enterprise, com- 
 mercial, educational and religious, for generations to come. 
 It cannot be done. Men 's consciences will protest sooner or 
 later. For the best interests of the victors, for the welfare 
 
 ' In The Nation of New York, May 24, 1919. 
 
258 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 of the Chinese, a welcome must yet be given to those so 
 suddenly and unjustly repatriated. It is cowardice for 
 great Powers like the United States, the British Empire, 
 the French Republic and the Empire of the Mikado, to 
 call for the annihilation of German enterprise, initiative 
 and eflficiency, along with disarmament and the overthrow 
 of the Monarchy. Seventy millions of people who held out 
 for more than four years against the strongest military 
 combination the world had ever known cannot be kept 
 within a vacuum. 
 
 William G. Shepherd, under date of August 25, 1919, 
 writes thus to the New York Evening Post from The Hague : 
 
 However one looks at matters in Germany, it appears, at this 
 close range, that the German commercial firms, so far as within 
 them lies, are doing more to set the sails of their business prop- 
 erly than are the business men of any of the other European 
 countries. 
 
 Under date of August 28 the same correspondent writes : 
 
 In her purchasing, Germany is using a coin that no other 
 nation seems to be employing. She is paying for what she buys 
 in the coin of work. 
 
 What, then, is possible for German enterprise in the Far 
 East in the near future? 
 
 (a) The Chinese are going to receive back their German 
 friends. If the heads of the great German hongs come 
 back empty-handed, the Chinese compradores who have as- 
 sociated with them, and other Chinese merchants who have 
 become rich through German business connections, will 
 advance the capital and provide the rooms for re-starting 
 business. The Chinese merchant is noted for his apprecia- 
 tion of kind deeds and true friendship. 
 
 (b) The Japanese will also seek to make amends for the 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS ^59 
 
 hardships thrust on the Germans in their midst. Commer- 
 cially, the Japanese will link hands with the Germans, if 
 not by ocean routes, then across the land route of Eastern 
 Europe and Northern Asia. If the English P. and 0. and 
 the Glen Line refuse to carry goods between Hamburg and 
 Shanghai, then the Nippon Yusen Kaisha or some new line 
 of steamships will seize the opportunity and facilitate 
 communication. 
 
 (c) German business men are not going to be withheld 
 from Russian Europe and Russian Siberia at the mere be- 
 hest of old-time enemies. To use one's genius in check- 
 mating German enterprise in Eastern Europe, as in West- 
 ern, will not long succeed. Every people have a right to 
 trade somewhere on God's earth. German business capac- 
 ity is needed in Russia. The advance in that direction fol- 
 lows a natural law. In due time German and Japanese 
 enterprise will meet somewhere in Russian Siberia. 
 
 (d) A better spirit will yet come to British and French 
 and American capitalists — who are of necessity interna- 
 tionalists — and they, as of yore, will again hold dealings 
 with the great minds of Germany and Austria, who take 
 big views of big projects along lines of concordant action 
 and mutual well-being. Dr. Alonzo E. Taylor before the 
 American Manufacturers Export Association in the month 
 of October (1919), after serving on the Economic Council 
 of Allies, said: 
 
 Every one now realizes that if Germany is ever to pay the bill 
 she must be allowed to be a going concern. If England, France 
 and Italy want that reparation they have got to help her to earn 
 it. In these circumstances talk of paralysing German industry 
 is idle. 
 
 I know how far the Powers, great and small, were ready 
 to go in the punitive spirit towards China after the Boxer 
 
260 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 cataclysm of 1900, and I know how a better spirit of for- 
 giveness, conciliation and goodwill at last prevailed among 
 all the nations in contact with China. This better spirit 
 will reassert itself before many days have passed after the 
 five defeated nations have duly signed their doom. Retali- 
 ation is not a single-handed force, but reciprocal. Its ad- 
 vance is that of geometrical progression. Its presence is 
 persona non grata to lasting peace. 
 
 The natural relationship before the war in both trade 
 and missions in China and elsewhere was that between 
 Britons, Americans and Germans. To re-unite on this basis 
 will still be for the good of them all. 
 
 Should Germany be excluded from this natural fellow- 
 ship, she must then turn elsewhere, and that means to 
 Russia and Japan. 
 
 The hope of the world is in cultivated fellowship among 
 all peoples, allowing to each its fullest development, no 
 people infringing on the rights of another. Thus may 
 peace be lasting. Thus will China be secure. Thus will 
 Japan be satisfied. Thus will the dread of a second war, 
 arising in the Pacific, pass from the mind, and men every- 
 where may give themselves to the occupations of peace, 
 charity and justice. 
 
 " Peace calls to man to follow her henceforth forever, 
 In brotherhood that binds all lands and tribes, 
 Peace never was the Child of War. 
 But was before War was, 
 And shall be after it, 
 
 Reigning triumphant down the happy years 
 Around the globe." ^ 
 
 * James Harcourt West. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 VITAL PRINCIPLES VERSUS SPOLIATION 
 
 During the period of the World War, President Wilson 
 announced many great principles, eternal verities, which 
 can be gainsaid by no one. Greatest approval has come 
 from peoples the world over who are most oppressed. Men's 
 conceptions have for once been idealized. January 8, 1918, 
 the President enunciated his Fourteen Points, four of which 
 were of general application. July 4, 1918, he enunciated 
 four factors of world peace to take the place of World War. 
 September 27, 1918, he enunciated five requisites of per- 
 manent peace, and also five issues of the war, all of a highly 
 moral character. There is no trouble with the principles. 
 
 Having dwelt on the political problems in China and on 
 plans of reconstruction for China amid her war-entangle- 
 ments; and having stated a large number of facts and 
 shown their bearing on China, it is now possible to deduce 
 a few principles that pertain to China's political future 
 and to her relations with the rest of the world. Whether 
 she is to be captive or free, independent or with no longer 
 a national entity, is still unknown. Much depends on an 
 appreciation of all the facts, on a true perspective to be 
 formed in the mind, and on adherence to correct and well- 
 tested principles. The author in his statement of things as 
 they are, holds to certain definite opinions, which may al- 
 most be called convictions, and which are here outlined as 
 guiding principles. These principles issue forth from a 
 knowledge of the facts already recounted, and are the out- 
 come of actual experience. There are ten specifications of 
 principles which bear particularly on China. 
 
 ^(1) The first may be stated thus: The war as fought in 
 
 261 
 
262 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 Europe, in Africa, in Asia, on land and on all the seas, 
 should have been, as professed, supremely a war for prin- 
 ciple rather than a war to subjugate particular nations. 
 Still more docs this necessity exist in re-establishing a world 
 peace. By concentrating animosity on some one people, 
 good and evil have been marked off according to territorial 
 boundaries. Good men in enemy nations are condemned 
 with the bad, while bad men and bad policies among our 
 Allies or in ourselves are condoned. If the United States 
 had lead the way in siding with Right wherever found, 
 and opposing Wrong wherever found, the sound ideas of 
 President Wilson, who spoke for the best everywhere, would 
 have had better chance of being effected. 
 
 Loyalty, for example, has been gauged by the degree of 
 one's hatred to the "enemy," whether combatant or non- 
 combatant, at home or abroad, rather than by devotion to 
 those principles which are formulated in the National Con- 
 stitution, and in the sacred traditions of the past, and which 
 change not in war or peace. Too much has it been taken 
 for granted that he is the best patriot who hurls tirades 
 at other peoples, rather than the one who aims to live out 
 in daily life the truest and best in his own country as in 
 all humanity. 
 
 Suppose, again, that the supreme motive had been the 
 overthrow of militarism, or the war spirit, wherever found, 
 how would it have been possible for liberty-loving Ameri- 
 cans, Englishmen and Frenchmen, to countenance the mili- 
 tarism of Japan or the military autocrats of the Chinese 
 Government ? How possible to form plans in our own Gov- 
 ernments for military and naval expansion? The Bishop 
 of Oxford, addressing the clergy of Boston, uttered these 
 words of sober counsel : 
 
 I am always dreadfully afraid of the intoxicating power of 
 militarism, I know what it means, . . . Are we in no danger 
 
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 263 
 
 of militarism? I can conceive of no disaster comparable with 
 this — that we should win a great victory and be able to dictate 
 to the military autocracy of Germany a peace the most desirable 
 that we could imagine; that we should have them under our feet, 
 defeated before all Europe, and that then we should return to our 
 several countries, ourselves having imbibed that very disease from 
 which we were seeking to deliver the world. 
 
 And suppose that China catches the disease, will it be 
 good for mankind, an aid to Righteousness ? 
 
 It is currently reported that when Viscount Ishii as Min- 
 ister of Foreign Affairs at the close of 1915, was approached 
 by Great Britain, France and Russia to join with them in 
 urging China to enter the war, he said ^ that Japan could 
 not view without uneasiness "a moral awakening of 400,- 
 000,000 Chinese, ' ' that is, along military lines. Whether he 
 used these exact words or not, and whatever his own as- 
 sumption, I agree that it was no child's play to arouse the 
 vast Chinese population to such form of moral awakening 
 as was contemplated by an ambition for feats of arms. 
 
 I give one other illustration. Suppose that the supreme 
 object of the war had really been to overthrow autocracy, 
 and to make the world safe for democracy. A greater re- 
 sult would have been achieved by applying the purpose to 
 all peoples than by a sole desire to overthrow the consti- 
 tutional Government of Germany or to bring about the dis- 
 memberment of Austria-Hungary. As a matter of fact 
 under modern forms of government and with the growing 
 impact of liberalism, the autocracy of any one ruler has 
 been made impossible, whether with the Kaisers of Germany 
 and Austria-Hungary, the Tsar of all the Russias, the 
 Mikado of Japan, or even the Sultan of Turkey. It is very- 
 much to be doubted whether it will be better to encourage 
 the overthrow of enemy Governments and the upheavals of 
 revolution than to work together for the maintenance of 
 
 * Professor Jenks in North American Review, September, 1919, 
 
264' CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 law and order under the natural development of the demo- 
 cratic spirit. The evil to be uprooted is the autocratic 
 spirit wherever found, whether in a mob or in a monarch, 
 in an Emperor or a bureaucrat. The essential idea of de- 
 mocracy is human freedom. Under this spirit how would 
 it have been possible for the democratic Governments of the 
 world to have accorded highest honour, not to the demo- 
 cratic aspirations of Young China, but to Japan with its 
 repressions in Korea and its coercions in China? How, 
 too, would it have been possible to give support to the 
 Military Governors of China, mostly a group of provincial 
 autocrats, or to the military Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, 
 most autocratic of them all, and at the same time to refuse 
 a modicum of praise for Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Dr. Wu Ting- 
 fang, Mr. Tang Shao-yi and all the supporters of the dem- 
 ocratic, constitutional, parliamentary Government centred 
 at Canton? What controlled diplomatic action was only 
 this: "Whosoever joins with us in fighting the Germans 
 is a true friend and a worthy ally." The question of ad- 
 vancing democratic ideas in either Japan or China or of 
 helping the democratic form of government in China was 
 of minor consideration. If, on the other hand, the main 
 thought had been to safeguard the Republic of China, no 
 encouragement would have been given to embroiling China 
 in the war, and in all probability the result would have 
 been a firmly-established Republic in the Orient. 
 
 The great moral mistake in all of these matters has been 
 that along with wide profession of fine principles there has 
 been a proneness to make use of those methods and to nour- 
 ish that spirit which were condemned in our late enemies. 
 The war gospel has been this : Cast out devils 1 y Beelzebub. 
 But St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, after itemizing 
 the sins of the Gentiles, made special application to his own 
 people ; he asked of them this question : * ' Thou that makest 
 
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 265 
 
 thy boast of the law, through breaking of the law dishon- 
 ourest thou God?" 
 
 (2) It is essential to bear in mind that since November 
 11, 1918, the victorious nations should have been striving 
 to make peace, and to do this they should have placed fore- 
 most the inner spirit of peace. Back of all peace is con- 
 ciliation. Failure to reconcile, no matter which side is at 
 fault, means a failure to make peace. There may be peace- 
 terms but no peace spirit. The breathing of hate and the 
 pronunciamento of fierce anathemas may be of the very 
 nature of war and military necessity, but they have no 
 place in a world of peace within the limits of widespread 
 and lasting conciliation. "To conquer with arms," said 
 President Wilson, addressing Congress on armistice day, 
 "is to make only a temporary conquest; to conquer the 
 world by earning its esteem is to make permanent con- 
 quest. I am confident that the nations that have learned 
 the discipline of freedom and that have settled with self- 
 possession to its ordered practice are now about to make 
 conquest of the world by the power of example and friendly 
 helpfulness. ' ' 
 
 But what do we find? Not so much that a dozen wars 
 are being waged after the signing of the Treaty of Peace, 
 but that leaders of political thought and guides of the 
 Church continue to endorse or inoculate the old war phrase- 
 ology of hate and enmity. Worse than general unrest, yea, 
 that which breeds this unrest, is unholy, un-Christian, 
 unwise adherence to the war spirit. To love peace is to 
 have peace. The whole temper of mind, the very phrases 
 one uses, all need to be changed and sanctified. 
 
 So contrary to the true spirit of peace, of conciliation, 
 and "friendly helpfulness," is that which has occurred in 
 China since the declaration of armistice, very largely under 
 British initiative. And these Britons were mostly Chris- 
 
266 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEt 
 
 tians, with a few Jews; none of them were Buddhists, not 
 even Moslems. I confess that even in wartime I have failed 
 to see the reason, the duty, or the pleasure, out there in 
 China, to vent wrath on the Germans, whose friendship we 
 all had prized in former days. How much less jBtting was 
 any such uncharitableness, when once war had terminated. 
 So far as life in China was concerned, war had terminated 
 November 7, 1914, when all the German combatants became 
 prisoners of war to Japan. To illustrate my point, I take 
 the liberty of quoting from a private letter, dated August 
 23, 1919, written from Shanghai by a devoted Christian : 
 
 I never shall forget the events following the signing of the 
 armistice. In my ignorance I supposed that there would be a 
 cessation of petty hostilities here in Shanghai. But it was only 
 the beginning. There was a big victory procession ending with 
 the burning of the Kaiser and other notables, after they had 
 " kotowed " to the Allies. This will give you a key as to the 
 parade itself, which did not please any Chinese with whom I 
 spoke. " I thought it would be a Peace parade," said one Chinese, 
 " but it was only a Hate parade." I had arranged Christmas 
 decoration for my house with letters of evergreen across the upper 
 veranda, " On earth, peace, good-will to men." But there wasn't 
 any peace in Shanghai and there wasn't any good-will. I was 
 ashamed. Almost at once, and with very short warning, the Ger- 
 mans were evicted from their houses unless they were living in 
 houses owned by neutrals or Chinese. Being winter time, this 
 worked great hardship. Next came the cutting off of telephones 
 for Germans. This also worked hardship, especially for the 
 Paulun Hospital and German doctors. The German School, 
 including its apparatus, was confiscated, and then soon com- 
 menced the deportation of the Germans. To me the saddest thing 
 about that was the gusto, the lack of sympathy, the evident enjoy- 
 ment of their humiliation shown by the foreign community and 
 even by the missionaries. In some eases the proceedings seemed 
 to me very stern. A large number of old Shanghai residents 
 (German) were given less than twenty-four hours' notice to get 
 
•' VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 267 
 
 ready to leave. A tragic procession of about a thousand were 
 passing along the bund on a Sunday morning during divine 
 service. The Te Deum was chanted and the thanksgiving Psalms. 
 No word of prayer for our enemies, now vanquished. 
 
 There were two incidents that made a deep impression on me. 
 One was the repatriation of the German pastor's family. They 
 have two darling little children. The little four-year-old child 
 could not understand why they had to leave their pretty home 
 and why her mother was crying. She was told it was because of 
 the English. " Mother," she asked, " do the English know any- 
 thing about our God, the dear Lord Jesus?" At the church, 
 where they had last been stopping, they were hurriedly getting 
 their packages of condensed milk, water, bedding, etc., ready, 
 while the pastor was trying to make arrangement disposing of 
 the church services and other matters. And so they were not off 
 the place by 8:30 a.m. (though the prison-boat was not to sail 
 till the next day). Soon came a batch of Shanghai Volunteers 
 dressed in Scotch Highland fashion, armed with swords and 
 rifles, and followed by the foreign police. The little children 
 looked up so wonderingly at these big Englishmen all ready to 
 bind and carry away their father, the gentle pastor. The Volun- 
 teers looked ashamed and ill at ease. 
 
 The other incident was of a lady, daughter of an American 
 missionary. She was ill with influenza and the physician had 
 advised against her sailing, but she refused to leave her husband. 
 He had also been exempted by the Chinese, who alone were 
 responsible for the repatriation. But the Municipal Chief of 
 Police, English, said if he was not out of the house within two 
 hours the Volunteers would carry bim to the ship. On receiving 
 the information he expressed his hatred of us Shanghai Allies. 
 His intensity was frightful. I could not really blame him, as I 
 realized that his properties were to be confiscated and auctioned 
 off and he and his wife allowed to take home about three hundred 
 taels (ounces of silver) apiece. He had been very wealthy and 
 had a luxurious home. When I multiplied his hate by that of 
 about 60,000,000 Germans, and that of Frenchmen, Belgians, 
 Americans, Austrians and countless others, I was overwhelmed by 
 the thought of the hate of the world. 
 
268 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 All this, remember, after the deeds and demands of war, 
 when world peace is to be re-established. All this in Far 
 Cathay, under British administration, in the sight of dis- 
 cerning Chinese. 
 
 As a word of hope comes the news from the very centre 
 of the war in Europe that a Franco-German Association is 
 being formed to aflSrm before the world the ardent desire 
 for international peace by means of mutual reconciliation, 
 rallying to the cry of "War against hate! War against 
 war! Live peace and brotherhood among the peoples!" 
 May this vision of holy prophets become the vision of suf- 
 fering and oppressed Asia, as well as of distracted Europe. 
 
 (3) Correct conceptions of the situation in Eastern Asia 
 must be free from preconceptions based on the situation in 
 Europe. It is impossible to get a true perspective of con- 
 ditions in the Far East, if the eye looks merely on condi- 
 tions in Europe or America. Observation true to the facts 
 must be all-around, and, as far as possible, free from the 
 bewilderment of passion. There must be poise of judg- 
 ment. It is only natural to have misconception of the 
 doings and inter-relations of the Chinese on the one side, 
 and of all other peoples, Western or Japanese, on the other, 
 if there is already a preconception either for or against 
 some particular people as shaped by bias incident to war- 
 fare in Europe or on the high seas. Preconception breeds 
 misconception. Animosity to German ways of waging war 
 has caused many an American, otherwise fair-minded, to 
 conclude ipso facto that everything done by Germans in 
 China has been bad and that their extinction ought to be 
 viewed with favour by Chinese and by every one else. So, 
 too, prejudice directed against Japan may lead one to over- 
 look all the misdeeds of the Allies and the United States as 
 perpetrated, somewhat under cover, in both China and 
 Japan. To understand the situation, to appreciate the 
 wrongs done to China and by whom, both in war and at the 
 
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 269 
 
 Peace Table, it is all-important that all predilections — ^the 
 pro and anti spirit — be shaken off, leaving the mind in a 
 state of clarity and unruffled judiciousness. 
 
 One of President Wilson's axiomatic truths is this: "The 
 impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination 
 between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom 
 we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays 
 no favourites and knows no standard but the equal rights 
 of the several peoples concerned. ' ' No doubt the President 
 was thinking particularly of the Germans as "those to 
 whom we do not wish to be just. " As to the Far East, the 
 Pacific, and America's Oriental problems, he would prob- 
 ably include the Japanese in the same category. As for 
 myself, I desire to be just to all, to the Germans as well 
 as to my kin of Scotland and England, to the Japanese as 
 well as to the Chinese people, whose interests I have tried 
 to serve. 
 
 Americans — and I mention no others — can never grasp 
 the intricate problem of the Far East if they continue to 
 read into the study the bugaboo of pro-Germanism or the 
 agitation of anti-Japanese-ism, or the war criterion of pro- 
 Ally or anti-Ally. The war is over, the muzzle is off, let 
 all men see the nations, the Governments, the diplomats, 
 as they really are. 
 
 Already surprise and chagrin have come to Americans 
 and Chinese by the disclosures of the Allied connivance 
 with Japan to deal with China as they saw fit, unknown to 
 both the Chinese and Americans. Other disclosures which 
 have been made in these pages may possibly have displeased 
 those whose minds are already made up, or have passed 
 judgment before trying the case. But truths sometimes 
 hurt as well as soothe. 
 
 The conduct of the two groups of warring nations in 
 their dealings may be stated thus : With China the princi- 
 ples as proclaimed by President Wilson have been better 
 
270 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 adhered to in China by the officials and subjects of the two 
 Central Powers than by the European Allies, by Japan, or 
 even by America. Or it may be stated thus : The policy and 
 conduct of the Allied group in China has been very nearly 
 the reverse of what they professed in Europe. 
 
 (4) A very simple rule is this : Know the facts, the more 
 the better, and accept the truth as derived from facts. This 
 is inductive philosophy as applied to search for truth. 
 
 " Truth, crushed to earth, shall rise again, 
 The eternal years of God are hers, 
 But Error, wounded, writhes with pain. 
 And dies among his worshippers." 
 
 One of the great injuries wrought by war of any kind 
 is the subjection of the moral to the military, as seen in the 
 compulsion, oftentimes legislative, and largely executive, 
 for misrepresenting the facts, for hiding the truth, for mis- 
 construing the aims, speech and conduct of those abroad 
 who are foes in war and those at hf)me who dare to disagree 
 and criticize. 
 
 It will take many a year to know the real situation of 
 the European nations prior to the war and during the war. 
 As to the real intent of the Japanese, the real heart of the 
 Chinese, and the real doings of Allies and Americans in 
 China, much light has been thrown by public discussion, 
 but even yet fallacious arguments are being used, some 
 point is being unduly stretched, Japan is an enigma and 
 China a conundrum. As to the real soul of the nations 
 arrayed against Germany, or at least of their leaders, Pres- 
 ident Wilson on Memorial Day gave in France this startling 
 account of what he had learned : 
 
 You are aware, as I am aware, that the airs of an older day 
 are beginning to stir again, that the standards of an old order 
 are trying to assert themselves again. There is here and there an 
 
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 271 
 
 attempt to insert into the counsel of statesmen the old reckoning 
 of selfishness and bargaining and national advantage which were 
 the roots of this war, and any man who counsels these things 
 advocates a renewal of the sacrifice which these men have made: 
 for if this is not the final battle for right, there will be another 
 that will be final. 
 
 These are serious facts. The more such facts are made 
 known, the better it will be for the peace of the world, for 
 law and order, for justice and good-will. 
 
 (5) In normal times every enlightened State, every pro- 
 gressive people, every man of faith and courage, is under 
 obligation to see that all men everywhere are accorded 
 liberty of conscience, liberty of thought and liberty of 
 speech. As to the latter I put it thus : The right, and with 
 the right the responsibilities, of legitimate free discussion. 
 Abnormal times, as those of war and revolt, place restric- 
 tion on the individual for the sake of the nation, a group 
 or a cause. The world is now trying to become normal 
 again, and so once more free. 
 
 I think I am right in asserting that the British people 
 have held to their free rights all through the war more than 
 have Americans. Men who were opposed to Britain's en- 
 trance into the war, or who believed in the rule of reason, 
 refused to hide their sentiments, after war became a na- 
 tional problem. The United States, however, as "land of 
 the free and home of the brave," sadly stultified itself, as 
 soon as it joined the fray of the Old World. ' ' Conscientious 
 objectors" have received longer sentences in the U. S. A. 
 than have those in England. 
 
 These two countries have in past years had a great repu- 
 tation among the Chinese as defenders of liberty, contrasted 
 with such countries as Russia, Roumania, Turkey, Austria- 
 Hungary and Germany. France, too, has been known to be 
 the home of "liberty, equality, fraternity." These three 
 
272 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 nations, "however, have inflicted on China such things as 
 Trading with the Enemy Acts, "black lists," censorship, 
 boycotts and spies. They have forced China to take extreme 
 measures of old-time oppression. For example, in Peking 
 there were three papers published in English. Of these, 
 two were closed down by the Chinese Government, one 
 under pressure of the Japanese Legation, and the other of 
 the British and French Legations. (I myself was editor 
 of one of these.) 
 
 What I wish to emphasize is the duty in all lands to re- 
 vert to the normal condition of liberal institutions, and 
 wage war by moral forces on all oppression, tyranny, 
 slavery. 
 
 July 4, 1919, President Wilson spoke these words on 
 the ship George Washington: 
 
 We told our fellow-men throughout the world when we set 
 up the free State of America that we wanted to serve liberty 
 everywhere and be the friends of men in every part of the world 
 who wanted to throw off the unjust shackles of arbitrary govern- 
 ment. Now we have kept our pledge to humanity as well as our 
 pledge to ourselves. 
 
 Time has again come for men to have convictions, and 
 with convictions the courage, the right, the chance to ex- 
 press them. 
 
 It was James Russell Lowell who wrote : 
 
 " They are slaves who will not choose 
 Hatred, scoflBng and abuse 
 Rather than in silence shrink 
 From the truth they needs must think; 
 They are slaves who dare not be 
 In the right with two or three." 
 
 (6) I believe it a cardinal duty, made clear by the ex- 
 periences of the war, that in whatever country one finds his 
 
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 273 
 
 lot in life, the interests of that country must he made 
 supreme. Just as all aliens residing in the United States 
 should in times of emergency place America's interests 
 first, or return to the land whence they came, so all for- 
 eigners in China should place first, not the interests of 
 their own country, but the interests of China, or, under the 
 stress of patriotism, return to their native land, at least till 
 the interests of all shall work injury to none. Missionaries 
 and educationists in China ought especially to observe this 
 rule; otherwise their work will be looked upon as political 
 — to denationalize those whom they profess to aim to 
 bless. 
 
 We Americans have learned to detest German propa- 
 ganda under the Stars and Stripes. On principle, ought 
 we not to frown down every other form of propaganda, 
 whether Russian, Soviet, Bolshevik, Polish, Italian, Eng- 
 lish, Japanese? If we Americans want no more German 
 spies, have we really any place for all the kinds of foreign 
 spies who frequent our shores, even when honoured with 
 the name of Intelligence Officers and Naval Attaches ? An 
 Exclusion Law for foreign spies might not be bad for our 
 free land. 
 
 Now apply the same principle to China. What shall we 
 say when the Japanese and British have in their archives 
 complete maps of every part of China, and complete re- 
 ports of every district in the country? What are we to 
 think of political and diplomatic advisors, drawing pay 
 from the Chinese Government, but in the momentous days 
 of war making supreme the war schemes of their respective 
 countries, and using their confidential position to bring 
 China into the fray? Can we commend conduct in China 
 which we condemn in our own land? 
 
 (7) Closely linked with the above principle is another — 
 that the time has come for all nations to allow China a 
 greater part in her own development. In President Wil- 
 
274 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 son's speech of April, 1918, when he enunciated the Four- 
 teen Points, he said: 
 
 What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to 
 ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in, 
 and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving 
 nation, which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine 
 its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair-dealing by the 
 other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. 
 
 The Chinese are a practical people; they are quick to 
 detect pretence and to abhor inconsistency. Now that peace 
 has come, it behooves the nations which have been asso- 
 ciated with China in war — some rather dubious companions 
 — to make good their professions by disowning secret com- 
 pacts to China's disadvantage, by restoring, one and all, 
 territory that has been pressed from her in various ways, 
 particularly the foreign areas, foreign administration, and 
 foreign dictatorship at treaty-ports. Dr. Sidney L. Gulick, 
 while advocate for Japan, is no less a friend of China, as 
 these words show : ^ 
 
 China should be given fair-play and opportunity to become 
 a great self-governing democratic nation. As rapidly as possible 
 she should be given complete control of all her own affairs, with 
 judicial and tariff autonomy. To these ends, not only Japan, but 
 England as well, and France, and every other nation, should 
 undertake to restore to China their respective " rights " — secured 
 in too many cases by force, intimidation or fraud; they should 
 withdraw their troops and police. By the application of the 
 principles of amortization China should be enabled to purchase 
 back all railroad and mining concessions. 
 
 (8) In harmony with the above, all schemes termed in- 
 ternational for reshaping China should include all nations, 
 and not merely the ' * Five Big Powers, ' ' and, what is more, 
 
 * In Christian Work, August, 1919, 
 
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 275 
 
 should include China. In Shanghai, for instance, there is 
 an International Settlement, where most of the population 
 is Chinese, but in which not one Chinese has any part in 
 municipal affairs. Most of the Municipal Councillors are 
 British, with whom are associated one American and one 
 Japanese. Is it not an insult to the Chinese nation to 
 allow a Japanese to serve on this select body, while from 
 all the educated Chinese, graduated from Yale, Columbia, 
 Cambridge, Paris or Berlin, not one is deemed to have the 
 qualifications for municipal office ? 
 
 So, too, as an offset to Japanese designs in Tsingtao, 
 Americans have proposed an International Settlement, 
 which, according to their theory, is to be dominated by 
 Americans and British, from which Germans are to be ex- 
 cluded, and in which Chinese are given no important place. 
 Should an International Settlement be formed there under 
 present circumstances, the Japanese would dominate. 
 
 So the proposed consortium is to consist of bankers from 
 America, Great Britain, France and Japan, and possibly 
 Belgium and Russia. Even if the consortium idea be 
 adopted, what about other nations ? What about Holland ? 
 What about Germany of the future? And what especially 
 about China? 
 
 Too many schemes, contracts, conventions, have been 
 drawn up in the past dealing with China, and China left 
 out. There should have been no Lansing-Ishii agreement, 
 but a Lansing- Wu Ting-fang agreement, both guarantee- 
 ing and recognizing the "special interests" and "prior 
 position" of China, and no other country. 
 
 (9) "The interest of the weakest is as sacred as the inter- 
 est of the strongest." This is so good a formula that I 
 transcribe it from what one may call Wilson's "Analects," 
 more than a match for the * ' Analects of Confucius. ' ' 
 
 Recognition for the sacred character of the Chinese State, 
 which today is weak, is, on this theory, no less a duty than 
 
276 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 that accorded Japan, which today is strong. Smaller States 
 are to have as much "say" in the new dispensation as the 
 Great Powers. The rights of one nation are as great as 
 those of another. Big nations are not to domineer over 
 small nations. The strong are not to arrogate authority 
 over the weak. To begin with, suppose a start be made 
 with China. She is called weak, because her military power 
 is inferior to others ; but she is great in ideas, philosophy, 
 ethics, religion, political theories, great achievements, art, 
 literature, commerce and personal character. She deserves 
 the esteem of mankind; let her have it, in all the glow of 
 intelligent recognition. As to the words quoted from 
 President Wilson, let them be lived out in the political in- 
 tercourse of the nations that are, and of those that are yet 
 to be. 
 
 (10) The final principle is that of universal brotherhood. 
 This means the gradual elimination of racial, religious and 
 national discords that impede the progress of the human 
 race. It is co-operative fellowship among all peoples, not 
 merely those that are free, but even more those that are not 
 free, in a spirit of concord and friendship, educationally 
 developed, and for the combined task of preserving, each 
 in its own sphere, law and order, justice and liberty. This 
 is a task of peoples, not of governments, a spiritual enter- 
 prise, not a political or military one. Such was the world- 
 wide fellowship, of which prophets of old dreamed, and 
 which the greatest of all prophets proclaimed in the King- 
 dom of God. The message of such an idea, again and again 
 passed on from heart to heart along the centuries, is that 
 which I believe suitable to China, and to all the nations 
 of the world. As President Wilson said in Manchester, 
 England, "There is only one thing that can bind peoples 
 together, and that is common devotion to right." 
 
 This is something different from giving approval to the 
 Covenant of the League of Nations as drawn up at Paris, 
 
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 277 
 
 and which already has aroused many discordant notes and 
 deep-seated forebodings. Along with others, I was capti- 
 vated with the original idea, the impulse of souls longing 
 for peace. But candidly, as the months go by, I fail to see 
 how China or the United States will receive good from 
 such a League, in the future any more than in the imme- 
 diate past. 
 
 The New York World has made the surprising statement 
 that there is more to be criticized in the Treaty than in the 
 League. With this I agree, and I am astonished that in 
 the United States so little criticism has been given the 
 Treaty. Both the League and the Treaty fall far short of 
 the great ideals set forth by President Wilson. The end 
 is that of a decline. Judge the League by the Treaty and 
 then judge the Treaty by its treatment of China. ''A chain 
 is no stronger than its weakest link!" The Treaty as a 
 whole must be judged by the section headed, "Shantung." 
 I quote from the President of China, Hsii Shih-chang, at 
 the beginning of the year 1919 : ^ 
 
 The proposal of President Wilson for making the League one 
 of the terms of peace and for the cancellation of the doctrines 
 of spheres of influence and balance of power in Europe and else- 
 where naturally receives the whole-hearted indorsement of China. 
 If the proposed League becomes a fact, the nations of the world 
 should stand on an equal plane, and secret diplomacy will then 
 naturally be deprived of its sanction. If this is not so, the prin- 
 ciple involved in the proposed League will not prove really 
 effective or a source of benefit to the undeveloped Powers. 
 
 The President of the Republic of America may well listen 
 to the President of the Republic of China. The Chinese, we 
 may rest assured, will no longer applaud a League, or a 
 Treaty, or even any of the professed principles, that have 
 
 * New York Times, January 11, 1919. 
 
278 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? 
 
 treated the claims and aspirations of their country in such 
 a shameful fashion as disclosed in the final settlement. 
 
 For one I disapprove of the proposed League, because it 
 is one of Governments, not of peoples, because it represents 
 imperialism not democracy, because it was conceived in 
 secret conclave of a select few and not in open court, be- 
 cause it sanctioned "special alliances" and not "the com- 
 mon interest of all," and because it is more a League of 
 War and Force than a League of Peace and free, individual 
 and national initiative. I commend to the attention of all 
 Americans these words of President Wilson spoken before 
 the actual deed was done, September 27, 1918 : 
 
 Only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize 
 and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to 
 hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and 
 clear the air of the world for common understandings and the 
 maintenance of common rights. 
 
 I also commend the words of J. A. Hobson, written after 
 the deed was done, February 8, 1919 : ^ 
 
 Nowhere does the breath of democracy enter its frame. Every- 
 where the arbitrary and despotic will of the five big fighting 
 Powers of the Entente holds sway. Everywhere the functions of 
 the League are to be administered by this little group of war 
 Ministers, so as to continue their domination over Europe and 
 to extend it even beyond the ultimate limits of the League. 
 
 The true principle, not illustrated in this League, or 
 probably attainable in any political project called a League 
 or Alliance, whether "holy" or not, is taught in the calm 
 discriminating language of Washington's Farewell Ad- 
 dress : 
 
 Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none 
 or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent 
 
 ^ The Nation of London, February 8, 1919. 
 
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 279 
 
 controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our 
 concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate 
 ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her 
 politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friend- 
 ships or enmities. 
 
 This principle I have from the very opening of the war 
 held paramount for China — that it was unwise, and ever 
 will be, to ''implicate" herself in "the vicissitudes" of 
 European or American "politics," "combinations and col- 
 lisions," revolutions and wars. 
 
 As for the American people, the British, the German and 
 the Japanese, I am confident that they will all ever be ready 
 to give China a helping hand. They need no League of 
 Governments to force them to right action. 
 
 The first mistake of the negotiators of peace was that 
 the great and true principles accepted by vanquished and 
 victors were not introduced definitely into the Preamble of 
 the Treaty as a "Whereas" to subsequent Articles, and as 
 a basis of what was expected, namely, mutual negotiation. 
 The second mistake was that the association of nations for 
 preventing war and establishing peace was not left to the 
 calm conference of all nations, after the termination of the 
 present war, and as a natural evolution and historical de- 
 velopment of the Conventions of the Hague Peace Confer- 
 ences. The present League seems to ignore recognized in- 
 ternational law as already established, and sets out to re- 
 construct the world as a de novo transaction. Moreover, 
 the League has too little of the legal and judiciary quality 
 and too much of the quality of political disputes and na- 
 tionalistic ambitions. "In my opinion," says Oppenheim,'- 
 "the organization of a new League of Nations should start 
 from the beginning made by the two Hague Peace Con- 
 ferences." This is the reason I would rejoice to see the 
 
 * " The League of Nations and its Problems," p. 36. 
 
280 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FEEE? 
 
 present League vanish into thin air, and all nations get 
 back to the solid foundation of a third Hague Conference 
 for completing the eminently just, sane and judicial work 
 already accomplished, worthy of hearty recognition. 
 David Jayne Hill has well said : ^ 
 
 The experience of the war has taught us that henceforth no 
 nation can preserve its seclusion and live apart. Actively or 
 passively, its life is affected by the needs, the animosities and 
 the purposes of other nations. Whatever our theories of national 
 policy may be, we cannot escape some kind of relation with 
 every other nation in the world. The important question is, what 
 shall be the basis of those relations? Shall we base them upon 
 a combination of world power, or shall we base them upon the 
 principles of free co-operation under the regulation of accepted 
 law? . . . It is of vital importance to recognize the indisputable 
 fact that this Covenant (of the League of Nations) not only 
 makes no advance in the development of International Law, but 
 wholly overlooks the status attained by it, through the work of 
 the great international congresses since the Congress of Vienna 
 in 1815. 
 
 These, then, are the ten principles which have shaped 
 themselves in my mind from the opening of the awful 
 struggle in August, 1914, as bearing indeed upon world 
 problems of friend and foe, and particularly upon the des- 
 tiny of China. For one and all let this be our prayer : 
 
 " Faith of our fathers, we will love 
 Both friend and foe in all our strife. 
 And preach Thee, too, as love knows how. 
 By kindly words and virtuous life j 
 Faith of our fathers, holy faith, 
 We will be true to Thee till death." 
 
 * Nortk American Review, October, 1919. 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 Appendix I 
 
 [Note: A full discussion of Japan's violation of international law 
 was attempted in an article by the author in the Yale Law Journal 
 for December, 1915.] 
 
 THE NEUTRALITY OP CHINA 
 
 In the December number (1914) of The North American^ 
 Review an able legal argument on "The Neutrality of Bel- 
 gium" appeared from the pen of Prof. A. G. De Lapra- 
 delle of Paris. The argument proves to be an indictment 
 of Germany. Others may, perhaps, advance an argument 
 which may be an indictment of both Great Britain and 
 France. Our purpose in writing, is to make use of the 
 sound legal principles, advanced by this distinguished 
 Frenchman, to indict Japan for her violation of the neu- 
 trality of China. To discuss the subject, Japan must suffer 
 criticism. 
 
 There is a marked difference between the character of 
 Belgian neutrality and of Chinese neutrality. Belgium 
 represents what is known as perpetual neutrality, when the 
 neutral nation ''renounces the right to make war" and is 
 in turn "protected from all hostilities." China represents 
 simple or temporary neutrality, wherein there is less guar- 
 antee of protection from others, while its sovereignty as a 
 state remains intact. In the case of perpetual neutrality, 
 it is imposed on the neutral state ; in the case of temporary 
 neutrality, it is inherent in every sovereign state. The 
 rights and duties of neutral states, as recognized in inter- 
 national law, not only apply to perpetual neutrality but 
 also to every non-belligerent state. We desire, therefore, 
 
 281 
 
282 APPENDICES 
 
 to apply the ordinary and well-known principles and laws 
 of neutrality to the situation in China, when Japan pro- 
 ceeded to wage war on Germany, 
 
 Scarcely had war in Europe been declared when the 
 Chinese Government issued regulations for the observance 
 of neutrality, in accordance with the law of nations. Real- 
 izing that the great warring powers of Europe had inter- 
 ests or leased territory in China, the Chinese Government 
 desired two things, that the war be limited to Europe, and, 
 that if any conflict arose in China between the warring na- 
 tions, the neutrality of China might be respected. To bring 
 this about, negotiations took place between the foreign 
 Ministers chiefly cbneerned, especially the British and Ger- 
 man. The German representative, knowing that Tsingtao 
 was open to attack, and thus likely to involve China, was 
 willing, with the consent of the German governor-general 
 at Tsingtao, to consent to three things : first, that the Ger- 
 man squadron remain away from Tsingtao; second, that 
 the small gunboat and torpedo boats still in harbour be in- 
 terned; and, third, that Tsingtao with the Shantung Rail- 
 way be placed under Chinese jurisdiction or be neutralized, 
 until the end of the war. The German Legation also prom- 
 ised to abstain from hostile operations, if Japan remained 
 neutral. 
 
 The Chinese Government, anxious to avoid danger of 
 complications, determined upon a policy of equal treat- 
 ment, namely, that no obstacle should be placed in the way 
 of belligerent action within any territory leased to the na- 
 tions at war, and not neutralized, that is, to Germany, 
 Great Britain and France. Any fighting within these 
 leased territories at Kiaochow, at Weihaiwei, at Kowloon 
 (opposite Hongkong), and at Kuangchowan would not 
 be regarded as fighting on Chinese territory; thus would 
 China's neutrality be preserved. 
 
 China approached both Japan and the United States and 
 
APPENDICES 283 
 
 asked them to remain neutral in the Far East. Japan, 
 after some delay, decided to reject China's proposal, and 
 to yield to Great Britain 's request for aid. If Great Britain 
 needed Japan's help on the seas, she did not need it on 
 Chinese soil. Even if an attack on Tsingtao was found to 
 be unavoidable, the fighting should have been confined to 
 the leased territory, going back for more than 30 miles 
 from the shore, a restriction which the British contingent 
 faithfully observed. 
 
 If the Alliance forced Japan to enter the war, it should 
 also have forced her to ** preserve the independence and 
 integrity of China," for which the Alliance was ostensibly 
 formed. 
 
 Tsingtao, or the larger leased area of Kiaochow, lies on 
 the south side of the long Shantung promontory. On the 
 north side, running from east to west, are three ports, Wei- 
 haiwei, leased to Great Britain ; Chefoo, a treaty-port ; and 
 Lungkow, only a Chinese harbour, but at the time not yet 
 a treaty-port. In all this section of the country, Germany 
 had no railway or other established interests. The German 
 ** sphere of interest" runs west of Tsingtao. It should 
 also be noted that Lungkow is on the side of the Pehchihle 
 Gulf opposite Port Arthur, which is leased to Japan. 
 
 Very early in the war Japanese cruisers and transports 
 entered the harbour of Lungkow and remained there be- 
 yond the 24 hours' limit, while troops forcibly landed and 
 occupied the town, and later on marched across Chinese 
 territory to the rear of Tsingtao. The Chinese customs and 
 post offices were taken possession of, and a military tele- 
 graph and railway were stretched across the country, with- 
 out regard to the rights of the Chinese people and despite 
 repeated protests of the Chinese Government. 
 
 May we be allowed to quote Professor De Lapradelle : 
 
 "Furthermore, to demand of Belgium to allow the Ger- 
 man troops to pass through Belgian territory was not only 
 
284 APPENDICES 
 
 contrary to perpetual neutrality, it was contrary to tem- 
 porary neutrality. ' ' What Japan did was contrary to tem- 
 porary neutrality; the law of nations was broken. No 
 Western nation apparently regards the matter of any 
 consequence. 
 
 "The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, on the 
 rights and duties of neutral states, signed by Germany and 
 Belgium [by Japan and China], is explicit on this point: 
 *Art, 1. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. 
 Art. 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or con- 
 voys, whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across 
 the territory of a neutral power.' " What is a sacred obli- 
 gation in Europe should be a sacred obligation in Asia as 
 well, especially since Japan is an honoured Ally of Great 
 Britain. 
 
 * * To ask passage of her troops was for Germany to asso- 
 ciate Belgium with her in the war, to expose her, in the 
 improbable case of her assenting, to a just punishment by 
 the Powers from such treason to her duties. If the neutral- 
 ity of Belgium had been temporary, Germany could not, 
 without forcing her to enter into an alliance with her, have 
 demanded passage; such a concession would have been on 
 the part of the neutral state an act of belligerence." The 
 same principle applies to Japan's conduct towards China. 
 
 The Chinese Government barely escaped becoming a bel- 
 ligerent on Japan's side. Japan forced a passage, and 
 China protested ; this was safe and proper. Following the 
 advice of Dr. Ariga, 'the Japanese legal advisor to the 
 Chinese Government, and with the approval of the British 
 Minister, China consented to a war zone. The Japanese 
 legal expert cited as precedent the Russo-Japanese War, 
 when Manchuria east of the Liao River was made a war 
 zone. 
 
 China was placed in an awkward position; not more so, 
 perhaps, than neutral countries in Europe. China had one 
 
APPENDICES 285 
 
 of three courses open to her. One was to defend her neu- 
 trality, and resist by force of arms the passage of Japanese 
 soldiers. Such action would not conflict with international 
 law, for the Hague Convention of 1907, Article 10, says: 
 "The fact of a neutral power resisting, even by force, at- 
 tempts to violate its neutrality cann,ot be regarded as a 
 hostile act." Such resistance was what Belgium made, and 
 in so doing she had the promised help of Great Britain and 
 France. If China, in resisting Japan, had looked to Great 
 Britain and France for help, she might have looked in vain. 
 She might have expected help from Germany, but in that 
 case the ties between Japan, Great Britain and France 
 would have been knit the stronger. In fact Japan treated 
 the rules of The Hague as "a scrap of paper," so far as 
 her relations with China were concerned. If China had 
 resisted, Japan would beyond doubt have declared war 
 upon China as well as on Germany, and China's dangers 
 would have increased a thousand-fold. She would have 
 suffered more than Belgium suffered when she decided to 
 resist Germany. China, knowing the danger, was wise, 
 therefore, in not adopting the method of resistance. 
 
 A second course to pursue was simply to protest, and to 
 record her protest for future deliberation and decision. 
 China was advised to adopt this method, but she was finally 
 persuaded to adopt another method, namely, that of pro- 
 testing and also granting a war zone. By so doing, she, in 
 accordance with recognized principles, practically became 
 a belligerent on the side of Japan as against Germany. The 
 precedent cited from the Russo-Japanese War was in reality 
 no precedent ; the circumstances were in no wise the same. 
 In that war, Russian troops had already for several years 
 occupied Southern Manchuria ; in the present case, German 
 troops had never gone outside the limits of the German 
 leased territory. In the former war, Russia as well as 
 Japan had agreed to the proposition of a war zone; in the 
 
286 APPENDICES 
 
 present war, Germany had not given her consent, and was 
 not even consulted. In the former war, the war zone was 
 of equal benefit to Russia and to Japan ; in the present case 
 it was to Japan's advantage and to Germany's disadvan- 
 tage. Though it now appears from these and other reasons 
 that China should never have consented to a war zone, 
 through which Japanese troops were permitted to pass, the 
 consent was given that conflict with Japan might be 
 avoided. This yielding of China to Japan's wishes has 
 not been appreciated by Japan; rather, the leniency has 
 been made a pretext for Japan to assume the role of sov- 
 ereign on Chinese soil. 
 
 The forced passage of Japanese troops from Lungkow 
 to Tsingtao was called a ' ' military necessity. ' ' The absurd- 
 ity of such a claim is readily seen, when one considers that 
 on the one side were less than 5,000 Germans, a poorly- 
 fortified garrison, facing Japanese and British men-of-war, 
 with 30,000 Japanese soldiers equipped for action, and the 
 whole Japanese army within a few hours' call. There was 
 no military necessity, but only a political necessity to carry 
 out a political strategy for the occupation of the province 
 of Shantung. 
 
 The first violation of China's neutrality was soon fol- 
 lowed by a more pronounced violation. Japanese troops 
 marched outside the war zone, took possession of the rail- 
 way station at Weihsien, to the west of Tsingtao, and then 
 occupied the entire railway as far as Tsinan-fu and also all 
 the mines worked by the Germans. The occupation con- 
 tinues. The military guard was not removed after Tsingtao 
 was captured. 
 
 Defenders of Japanese action hold two positions which 
 are irreconcilable the one to the other. The claim is made 
 that the railway was a German Government railway, and 
 another claim is made that the Germans had first violated 
 China's neutrality by the transport of troops and muni- 
 
APPENDICES 287 
 
 tions of war. If the railway belonged to the German Gov- 
 ernment, then the transport of troops and munitions would 
 have been legitimate, and therefore no infringement of 
 Chinese neutrality. 
 
 As a matter of fact the railway has been built and is 
 the property of a German-Chinese Company, incorporated 
 in Germany, just as other companies or syndicates have 
 been incorporated in other countries. The railway and 
 mines were "concessions" granted by the Chinese Govern- 
 ment through treaty arrangement with the German Gov- 
 ernment; it was clearly stipulated that, as in the leased 
 territory of Kiaochow, there were "no treacherous inten- 
 tions towards China" on the part of Germany. The com- 
 pany was a German-Chinese Company, a private and not a 
 government company ; the territory through which it runs 
 is Chinese and neutral territory, over which China's sov- 
 ereign rights are retained. By special agreement with the 
 Chinese Government only Chinese soldiers were to act as 
 railway guards. 
 
 Taking, then, the position that the railway was on Chi- 
 nese, not on German territory, were the Germans the first to 
 be guilty of violating China 's neutrality ? From the outset 
 the Chinese Government determined to make no discrim- 
 ination between one belligerent and another in the matter 
 of travel by land or by sea. If belligerents traveled as 
 civilians, in civilian dress and without weapons, the Chinese 
 authorities would present no objection. Chinese action was 
 one of impartiality, the essence of neutrality. German 
 action conformed to the Chinese arrangement just as much 
 as the British, the Russian and the French, and far more 
 than the Japanese. 
 
 With reference to the transport of munitions of war by 
 Germany, no protest was entered at the time by any bellig- 
 erent, and China, a neutral Power, was under no obligation 
 to lay upon herself additional burdens, because of war be- 
 
288 APPENDICES 
 
 tween other nations. There was, moreover, no question of 
 the Chinese selling contraband. If there were any arms 
 transported over neutral territory, they were already in 
 German possession, and before Japan declared war. So far 
 as international law has established a clear principle, seiz- 
 ure by an enemy can only take place *'on the high seas." 
 No enemy thinks of capturing contraband of war on neutral 
 soil. 
 
 Even if China was "liable to penalty," the wrong kind 
 of penalty was inflicted by Japan, namely, forceful, mili- 
 tary occupation of the Shantung Railway in neutral terri- 
 tory, and the refusal to China of the right of management, 
 control and protection. Japan drove out not only Ger- 
 many, but China as well. Continued occupation from 
 Tsingtao to Tsinan-fu, like continued occupation from 
 Lungkow to Tsingtao, is a contir'ued infringement not only 
 of China's neutrality, but of China's sovereignty, and this 
 in the face of an alliance guaranteeing China's indepen- 
 dence and autonomy. 
 
 In this additional violation of China's neutrality, Japan 
 made the same excuse as in the previous case, namely, "mil- 
 itary necessity"; but this was only to conceal her real 
 purpose, that of political aggression. It was plain that in 
 capturing Tsingtao there was no need of occupying the 
 railway westward as far as Tsinan-fu. In fact the obliga- 
 tion to defend China's neutrality or to consult China's 
 wishes carried no weight with Great Britain's chosen Ally, 
 Japan. 
 
 It is somewhat diflBcult to understand the feeling of 
 Americans regarding the rights of nations and the wrongs 
 done by one nation to another. Americans seem to con- 
 demn Germany for violating the neutrality of Belgium, but 
 seem at the same time to overlook Japan's infringement of 
 China's neutrality. The length of territory thus violated 
 by Japan in China is twice the length of that violated by 
 
APPENDICES 289 
 
 Germany in Belgium. Americans seem to applaud Great 
 Britain for claiming that her purpose was to defend the 
 weaker nations, and so the neutrality of Belgium, and yet 
 at the same time seem to countenance her action in abetting 
 Japan's violation of the neutrality of China. They pity 
 Belgium for what she suffers in resisting Germany, but 
 they do not show even interest in the political misfortunes 
 which threaten China at the hands of Japan, although 
 China has scrupulously refrained from giving offence or 
 from committing any act of war. They lament the reported 
 German atrocities to Belgium, but they practically ignore 
 the good which Germany has wrought, in missions, in sci- 
 ence, in education and in trade, for the Chinese people. 
 Americans declare that Germany should pay for the losses 
 she has inflicted on Belgium, but they excuse the harm, the 
 loss, the encroachment which China continues to suffer at 
 the hands of Japan, abetted by Great Britain. Does it 
 mean, then, that Americans regard these questions of in- 
 ternational intercourse, not from the standpoint of high 
 principle, law and justice, but from a standpoint prejudiced 
 by natural preference? 
 
 *'If Belgium [China] is now suffering more than any 
 people has ever suffered, it does not mean that in the mass 
 of legal institutions that of neutrality is particularly fragile 
 or more particularly imperfect, but that international law 
 is at this moment too weak to resist the audacious onslaught 
 of those Powers whose military pride has perverted their 
 sense of right and whose devouring ambition has corrupted 
 their sense of justice. ' ' How can we hope that the careless 
 unconcern of the Great Powers towards the rights of China 
 can fail to bring upon themselves unlooked-for suffering 
 in the generations yet to come ? Every country professing 
 to believe in international law should come forward to the 
 defence of China and the indictment of Japan. 
 
Appendix II 
 
 A CHINESE president's PROCLAMATION ON THE WAS AND 
 EDITORIAL COMMENTS 
 
 The Proclamation of President Feng Kuo-chang, August 
 14, 1917, declaring war against the two Central Powers is 
 a most important document. It deserves careful reading, 
 that China's aims in participating in the Great War may 
 be fully understood. It is as follows: 
 
 On the 9th day of the 2nd month of this year we addressed a 
 protest to the German Government against the policy of sub- 
 marine warfare inaugurated by Germany, which was considered 
 by this Government as contrary to international law, and im- 
 perilling neutral lives and property, and declared therein in case 
 the protest be ineffectual we would be constrained, much to our 
 regret, to sever diplomatic relations with Germany. 
 
 Contrary to our expectations, however, no modification was 
 made in her submarine policy after the lodging of our protest. 
 On the contrary, the number of neutral vessels and belligerent 
 merchantmen destroyed in an indiscriminate manner was daily 
 increasing and the Chinese lives lost were numerous. Under such 
 circumstances, although we might yet remain indifferent and 
 endure suffering, with the meagre hope of preserving a tem- 
 porary peace, but in so doing we would never be able to satisfy 
 our people who are attached to righteousness and sensible to 
 disgrace, nor would we justify ourselves before our sister States 
 which had acted without hesitation in obedience to the dictates 
 of the sense of duty. Both here as well as in the friendly Powers 
 the cause of indignation was the same, and among the people of 
 this country there could be found no difference of opinion. This 
 Government, thereupon, being compelled to consider the protest 
 
 290 
 
APPENDICES 291 
 
 as being ineffectual, notified, on the 14th day of the 3rd month, 
 the German Government of the severance of the diplomatic rela- 
 tions and at the same time the events taking place from the 
 beginning up to that time were announced for the general in- 
 formation of the public. 
 
 What we have desired is peace j what we have respected is 
 international law; what we have to protect are the lives and 
 property of our own people. As we originally had no other grave 
 causes of enmity against Germany, the German Government, if 
 it had manifested repentance of the deplorable consequences 
 resulting from its policy of warfare, might still be expected to 
 modify that policy in view of the common indignation of the whole 
 world. That was what we eagerly desired, and it was the reason 
 why we felt reluctant to treat Germany as a common enemy. 
 Nevertheless, during the five months following the severance of the 
 diplomatic relations the submarine attacks continued in operation 
 as vigorously as before. It is not Germany alone, but Austria- 
 Hungary as well, which pursued this policy without abatement. 
 Not only has international law been thereby violated, but also 
 our people are suffering injury and loss. The most sincere hope 
 on our part to bring about a better state of affairs is now shat- 
 tered. Therefore, it is hereby declared, against Germany as well 
 as Austria-Hungary, that a state of war exists commencing from 
 10 o'clock of the 14th day of the 8th month of the 6th year of 
 the Republic of China. In consequence thereof all treaties, agree- 
 ments, conventions, concluded between China and Germany, and 
 between China and Austria-Hungary, as well as such parts of the 
 international protocols and international agreements as concern 
 the relations between China and Germany, and between China 
 and Austria-Hungary, are, in conformity with the law of nations 
 and international practice, all abrogated. This Government, how- 
 ever, will respect the Hague Conventions and her international 
 agreements respecting the humane conduct of war. 
 
 The chief object in our declaration of war is to put an end to 
 the calamities of war and to hasten the restoration of peace, 
 which it is hoped our people will fully appreciate. Seeing, how- 
 ever, that our people have not yet at the present time recovered 
 from sufferings on account of the recent political disturbances 
 
292 APPENDICES 
 
 and that calamity again befalls us in the breaking out of the 
 present war, I, the President of this Republic, cannot help having 
 profound sympathy with our people when I take into considera- 
 tion their further suffering. I would never resort to this step of 
 striving for the existence of our nation unless and until I, con- 
 sidering it no longer possible to avoid it, am finally forced to this 
 momentous decision. 
 
 I cannot bear to think that through us the dignity of inter- 
 national law should be impaired, or the position in the family 
 of nations should be undermined or the restoration of the world 
 peace and happiness should be retarded. It is, therefore, hoped 
 that all of our people will exert their utmost in these hours of 
 hardship, with a view to maintaining and strengthening the 
 existence of the Chinese Republic, so that we may establish 
 ourselves amidst the family of nations and share with them the 
 happiness and benefits derived therefrom. 
 
 The same day in the Peking Post, of which I was editor 
 and proprietor, I extended my congratulations in the fol- 
 lowing brief statement : 
 
 We congratulate the President of China, Feng Kuo-chang, on 
 issuing with the aid of his Cabinet Ministers a Declaration of 
 War that is dignified and stately in form, without hatred and 
 animosity in spirit, adhering to the basal principle of international 
 law, and actuated by high and enduring aims. In spite of the 
 declaration being one of war against hitherto friendly States — 
 which for many reasons we regret — the Chinese Government de- 
 serves credit for the way an unpleasant act is gracefully per- 
 formed. The two enemy countries are not denounced in fierce and 
 excessive terms; and possibly future Allies are not exonerated or 
 applauded. Amid all minor motives there looms aloft this mag- 
 nificient chief object, to which as citizen of an allied country 
 we give our sincere allegiance : to put an end to the calamities 
 
 OF WAR AND TO HASTEN THE RESTORATION OF PEACE. 
 
 The next day I published a longer editorial, advising at 
 the end that China act out her noble professions. I reprint 
 
APPENDICES 293 
 
 it here as illustrative of a continued interest in China's 
 well-being : 
 
 We Americans know the sensation of being transferred over 
 night from the state of neutrality into a state of war, from being 
 advocates of peace into advocates of belligerency, tempered with 
 mUd doses of democracy. Some who had only pretended to be 
 neutral and impartial found no great difficulty in the passing 
 transformation; others of us rolled over to the other side less 
 gracefully and so got into trouble. 
 
 As to China, it does not much matter whether she goes to war 
 against two distant countries in Central Europe or remains at 
 peace. So we told President Feng the other day. Under present 
 circumstances no large number of the German navy will attack 
 Chinese ports and fortresses and no startling crowd of China's 
 brave Generals and soldiers will find passage to the western front. 
 It does not look as if the Chinese and their newly-created enemies 
 would have much of a chance to get at each other. Most probably 
 the first time they meet will be at the Peace Conference. There is 
 more likelihood of China being able to send tea to England than 
 to send Kiangnan guns to France. 
 
 Merely to declare war — which is all that a war declaration 
 means — is nothing very dangerous or alarming. Of course, it is 
 a serious affair in point of democracy's safety, when war is de- 
 clared without regard to Parliament, but that is internal politics, 
 not external. 
 
 What creates a little sensation of fright is the associations that 
 get tagged on to war's declaration. President Feng and his 
 Proclamation are clear enough on this matter — no obligations to 
 the enemies of Germany and Austria-Hungary. This, too, was the 
 American attitude, but any number of Americans are more keen 
 on linking up with France or Great Britain or the Russian Pro- 
 visional Government (seldom is Japan mentioned) than on fight- 
 ing Germany. 
 
 It will be harder with weak China. If she withstands all form 
 of pressure, she will deserve to be called one of the Great Powers. 
 
 But we will not worry or complain or ridicule. We hope for 
 the best. 
 
294 APPENDICES 
 
 China's political and financial condition could hardly be worse 
 than it is or has been for some weeks. This war declaration is 
 only a ripple on the waves. 
 
 Having declared war, China should now get ready; she should 
 get her house in order. Having the German and Austro- 
 Hungarian Ministers out of the way, the house-cleaning should 
 be easy. 
 
Appendix III 
 
 THE VERSAILLES TREATY CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN MIS- 
 SIONS OP GERMANY 
 
 Article 438 — The Allied and Associated Powers agree that 
 where Christian religious missions were being maintained 
 by German societies or persons in territory belonging to 
 them, or of which the Government is entrusted to them in 
 accordance with the present treaty, the property which 
 these missions or missionary societies possessed, including 
 that of trading societies whose profits were devoted to the 
 support of missions, shall continue to be devoted to mis- 
 sionary purposes. 
 
 In order to ensure the due execution of this undertaking 
 the Allied and Associated Governments will hand over such 
 property to boards of trustees appointed by or approved by 
 the governments and composed of persons holding the 
 Christian faith. It will be the duty of such boards of trus- 
 tees to see that the property continues to be applied to 
 missionary purposes. 
 
 The obligations undertaken by the Allied and Associated 
 Governments in this article will not in any way prejudice 
 their control or authority as to the individuals by whom 
 the missions are conducted. 
 
 Germany, taking note of the above undertaking agrees 
 to accept all arrangements made or to be made by the Allied 
 or Associated Governments concerned for carrying on the 
 work of the said missions or trading societies, and waives 
 all claims on their behalf. 
 
 Article 439 — ^Without prejudice to the provisions of the 
 
 295 
 
296 APPENDICES 
 
 present treaty, Germany undertakes not to put forward, 
 directly or indirectly, against any Allied or Associated 
 Power, signatory of the present treaty, including those 
 which, without having declared war, have broken off diplo- 
 matic relations with the German Empire, any pecuniary 
 claim based on events which occurred at any time before 
 the coming into force of the present treaty. 
 
 The present stipulation will bar completely and finally 
 all claims of this nature, which will be thenceforward ex- 
 tinguished, whoever may be the parties in interest. 
 
Appendix IV 
 
 THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN MISSIONS 
 
 Some Personal Impressions from a Recent Visit to Holland 
 and Germany 
 
 By Rev. Arthur J. Brown, D.D., LL.D. 
 {Christian Work, May, 1920) 
 
 Imagine, however, what it means if the major Powers are 
 to deal in a nationalistic spirit with the hundreds of mil- 
 lions of people that they directly or indirectly rule in Asia 
 and Africa, and hold that missionary work for the evan- 
 gelization and moral uplifting of these vast populations 
 must be conducted with supreme reference to the political 
 plans of the ruling government. Only a small fraction of 
 the non-Christian world would be left for free missionary 
 work. 
 
 Let us bear in mind that if this principle is to be recog- 
 nized and acquiesced in it will almost certainly react upon 
 ourselves. Why should not France adopt the same policy 
 toward British and American missionaries? Instructive 
 from this viewpoint is the French dealing with British mis- 
 sionary work in Madagascar and American missionary 
 work in West Africa and Indo-China. 
 
 At this moment a new danger is threatening in Syria. 
 During the dark days of the war Great Britain entered into 
 an agreement with France that, in the event of the victory 
 of the Allies, French claims in Syria would be recognized. 
 In accordance with that agreement, France is now adminis- 
 tering that country. A French official has intimated to a 
 
 297 
 
298 APPENDICES 
 
 representative of the Paris Missionary Society that he 
 hoped that the society would prepare itself to take over the 
 Protestant missionary work in Syria, as the French author- 
 ities do not like to have missionary work in that country 
 conducted by American and British Protestants. Some ir- 
 ritation has recently developed between the British and 
 French Governments. The former views with concern the 
 pushing of a French wedge across the road to Britain's 
 interests in Mesopotamia, and the French allege that the 
 British military and civilian officials, connected with and 
 following General Allenby's expedition, have made the 
 French task harder by words and acts which have tended 
 to prejudice the minds of the Syrian people against their 
 new masters. The French involve the American Presby- 
 terian missions and the faculty of the Syrian Protestant 
 College in their irritation, believing that their use of the 
 English language and their English ancestry and sympa- 
 thies make them a hindrance to the French plans. It is not 
 at all improbable at this writing that both the mission and 
 college, as well as the British missions, may face in the 
 near future very serious diflBculties from the disposition of 
 the French authorities to regard Syria as their national 
 preserve in which it is deemed undesirable that American 
 Protestant Christians should continue to conduct the ex- 
 tensive missionary work which they have been doing for 
 generations, unless they strictly conform to French ideas 
 and methods as interpreted by authorities on the ground, 
 who will probably get their advice in religious matters from 
 the French Roman Catholic bishops. 
 
 What France is inclined to do in Syria she may do in 
 other non-Christian lands under her control, so that British 
 and American missionaries may either be excluded or so 
 hampered that they will be crippled and ultimately forced 
 out, just as they were forced out of the valley of the Gaboon 
 river in West Africa. One of the French Protestant mis- 
 
APPENDICES 299 
 
 sionary leaders said, in our conference in Paris, that he 
 believed that the French Government was disposed to be 
 more friendly than formerly to the missionary work of the 
 French Protestant Society and to appreciate the value of 
 its work; and he thought that this more liberal attitude 
 might be extended to British and American missionaries, 
 if they are careful and tactful. The trouble in the past, 
 however, has not been so much with headquarters in Paris 
 as with local officials on the field. Another member of our 
 Paris conference, good-naturedly but with undoubted mean- 
 ing, gave us of other lands food for thought by remarking 
 that Anglo-Saxon missionaries, both British and American, 
 take Anglo-Saxon ideas with them to a greater extent than 
 they realize, and he evidently had some sympathy with the 
 feeling which, he said, prevailed in the French Government, 
 that the average British and American missionary fails to 
 adapt himself to the legitimate point of view of another 
 governing power, and that his effort, perhaps unconsciously, 
 is to Anglicize the native population with the result that 
 the Government regards him as a disturbing factor. One 
 is reminded of the remark of a Norwegian delegate at the 
 Edinburgh Conference, that many American and British 
 missionaries apparently imagine that what our Lord actu- 
 ally commanded His disciples to do was to go into all the 
 world and teach the English language to every creature. 
 
 And why should not Japan follow the example of "West- 
 ern Powers ? Every well-informed student of the Far East 
 knows perfectly well that the Japanese authorities regard 
 the large American and British missionary work in Korea 
 as an obstacle to their plans for the amalgamation of that 
 country with Japan. I am aware that responsible officials 
 of the Japanese Government are not likely to say this pub- 
 licly, and when spoken to on the subject will suavely and 
 courteously deny it. I am also aware that the statement is 
 absolutely true, and that Japan would like nothing better 
 
300 APPENDICES 
 
 than to have the confessedly Christian Powers of the West 
 set the example of regarding foreign missionary work as 
 a political instrument to be utilized or eliminated as the 
 furtherance of a government's political plans may require. 
 A foretaste of what may be expected is seen in the fact that 
 last May the Japanese, assigning Section 438 of the Peace 
 Treaty as their reason, expelled all the German mission- 
 aries, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, from the Car- 
 oline Islands, although some of them had been allowed to 
 remain throughout the war. 
 
 The instances cited do not by any means exhaust the 
 list of probabilities. China is rapidly falling under Jap- 
 anese influence, and the Japanese attitude toward Amer- 
 ican and British missionary work in certain sections, not- 
 ably the great province of Shantung, finds open expression 
 in the Japanese vernacular press, in which the writers do 
 not hesitate to demand the expulsion of American mis- 
 sionaries as an alleged hindrance to Japan's program. In 
 Siam the king is energetically trying to develop the nation- 
 alistic spirit of the Siamese, and is using Buddhism, the< 
 State religion, as one of the most effective agencies to 
 accomplish his purpose. In spite of all the personal kind- 
 ness of officials to the American missionaries, some of them 
 feel that the large American missionary work in Siam does 
 not fit in well with the king's policy of nationalization, and 
 a veteran missionary has recently said that there is more 
 active opposition to Christianity in Siam today than there 
 has been for thirty years. 
 
 There is danger that, in dealing with a temporary exi- 
 gency regarding German missions, we may see war animos- 
 ities and restrictions projected into the period of peace 
 reconstruction; government inspection and supervision of 
 mission schools established in ways that exacting or hostile 
 officials may render oppressive; the freedom of unselfish 
 missionary work for the evangelization and moral uplift 
 
APPENDICES 301 
 
 of non-Christian people subordinated to the nationalistic 
 political program of a ruling power, and principles adopted 
 which will ere long be turned with disastrous effect against 
 British and American missionary work in several import- 
 ant fields. 
 
 The Church cannot always take her orders from Caesar, 
 nor can her missionary work wait indefinitely upon politi- 
 cal considerations. The notion that the State is certain to 
 be right and that its officials are infallible was the heresy of 
 the HohenzoUerns. Let us who fought against it be careful 
 how we fall into it ourselves. If the followers of Christ 
 in England and France had not withstood their govern- 
 ments in former centuries Protestantism in these countries 
 would have been strangled at its birth. From the days of 
 Peter and John to the present, Christian men have some- 
 times found it necessary to say: "We ought to obey God 
 rather than men." A Christianity which stands for uni- 
 versalism inevitably collides at times with politics which 
 stand for nationalism. Christian obligation cannot always 
 be defined in terms of governmental expediency. There are 
 times when we must obey the higher law, in the spirit of 
 Lord Hugh Cecil, who is reported to have said recently: 
 "I am a Christian first and an Englishman afterwards." 
 
Appendix V 
 
 CONVERSATION OP PRESIDENT WILSON AND U. S. SENATORS 
 AUGUST 19, 1919 
 
 Senator Borah — When did the secret treaty between 
 Great Britain, France and the other nations of Europe with 
 reference to certain adjustments in Europe first come to 
 your knowledge? Was that after you had reached Paris 
 also? 
 
 The President — ^Yes, the whole series of understandings 
 was disclosed to me for the first time then. 
 
 Senator Borah — Then we had no knowledge of these 
 secret treaties so far as our Government was concerned until 
 you reached Paris ? 
 
 The President — Not unless there was information at the 
 State Department of which I know nothing. 
 
 Senator Borah — Do you know when these secret treaties 
 between Japan, Great Britain and other countries were first 
 made known to China? 
 
 The President — No, sir ; I do not. I remember a meeting 
 of what was popularly called the Council of Ten, after our 
 reaching Paris, in which it was first suggested that all these 
 understandings should be laid upon the table of the con- 
 ference. That is some time after we reached there, and I 
 do not know whether that was China's first knowledge of 
 these matters or not. 
 
 Senator Borah — Would it be proper for me to ask if 
 Great Britain and France insisted upon maintaining these 
 secret treaties at the Peace Conference as they were made ? 
 
 The President — I think it is proper for me to answer that 
 
 302 
 
APPENDICES 303 
 
 question, sir. I will put it in this way : They felt that they 
 could not recede from them, that is to say that they were 
 bound by them, but when they involved general interests 
 such as they realized were involved, they were quite willing, 
 and indeed I think desirous, that they should be reconsid- 
 ered with the consent of the other parties. I mean with the 
 consent so far as they were concerned of the other parties. 
 
 Senator Swanson — Can you tell us, or would it be proper 
 to do so, of your understanding with Japan as to the return 
 of Shantung — a question which has been very much dis- 
 cussed ? 
 
 The President — I have published the wording of the 
 understanding, Senator. I cannot be confident that I quote 
 it literally, but I know that I quote it in substance. It was 
 that Japan should return to China in full sovereignty the 
 old province of Shantung so far as Germany had had any 
 claims upon it, preserving to herself the right to establish 
 a residential district at Tsingtao, which is the town of 
 Kiaochow Bay ; that with regard to the railways and mines 
 she should retain only the rights of an economic concession 
 there, with the right, however, to maintain a special body 
 of police on the railway, the personnel of which should be 
 Chinese under Japanese instructors nominated by the man- 
 agers of the company and appointed by the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment. I think that is the whole of it. 
 
 Senator Borah — Was that understanding oral? 
 
 The President — Senator Borah asked whether this under- 
 standing was oral or otherwise. I do not like to describe 
 the operation exactly if it is not perfectly discreet, but as 
 a matter of fact this was technically oral, but literally writ- 
 ten and formulated, and the formulation agreed upon. . . . 
 
 Senator Pomerene — Mr. President, if I may, I should 
 like to ask a question or two along that same line. If this 
 treaty should fail of ratification then could not the oppor- 
 
304 APPENDICES 
 
 tunity be opened to Japan to treat the Shantung question 
 just as she has treated the Manchurian situation? 
 
 The President — I think so; yes. 
 
 Senator Pomerene — So that if the treaty should fail of 
 ratification China, so far as Shantung is concerned, would 
 be practically at the mercy of Japan, whereas if the treaty 
 is ratified then at least she will have the benefit of the moral 
 assistance of all the other signatory Powers to the treaty 
 to aid in the protection of Chinese rights. 
 
 The President — Senator, I conceive one of the chief bene- 
 fits of the whole arrangement that centres in the League of 
 Nations to be just what you have indicated ; that it would 
 bring to bear the opinion of the world and the controlling 
 action of the world on all relationships of that hazardous 
 sort, particularly those relationships which involve the 
 rights of the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are 
 likely to come are most likely to come by aggression against 
 the weaker nations. Without the League of Nations they 
 have no buttress or protection. With it, they have the 
 united protection of the world, and inasmuch as it is the 
 universal opinion that the great tragedy through which we 
 have just passed never would have occurred if the Central 
 Powers had dreamed that a number of nations would be 
 combined against them, so have I the utmost confidence that 
 this notice beforehand that the strong nations of the world 
 will in every case be united will make war extremely un- 
 likely. 
 
 Senator Johnson — Mr. President, I am quite hesitant 
 about asking certain questions which I wish to ask. I apol- 
 ogize in advance for asking them and I trust you will stop 
 me at once if they are questions which you deem inappro- 
 priate or that ought not to be asked. 
 
 The President — Thank you. 
 
 Senator Johnson — I think the question I am about to ask 
 you answered to Senator Borah, so pardon me if it is re- 
 
APPENDICES 305 
 
 petitive. The question is, Was the United States Govern- 
 ment officially informed at any time between the rupture of 
 diplomatic relations with Germany and the signing of the 
 armistice of agreements made by the Allied Governments 
 in regard to the settlement of the war? 
 
 The President — No; not so far as I know. 
 
 Senator McCumber — Senator Johnson, may I ask the 
 President right here whether or not any treaties were made 
 after we entered into the war between any of our co-bellig- 
 erents that were not given to us? 
 
 The President — No, sir. I do not know of any. 
 
 Senator Johnson — ^When our Government, through you, 
 Mr. President, in January, 1918, made the fourteen points 
 as the basis for peace, were those points made with the 
 knowledge of the existence of the secret agreements ? 
 
 The President — No; oh, no. 
 
 Senator Johnson — It was not intended, then, by the ex- 
 pression of those fourteen points, to supplant the aims 
 contained in the secret treaties? 
 
 The President — Since I knew nothing of them, necessar- 
 ily not. . . . 
 
 Senator Johnson — ^You would have preferred, as I think 
 most of us would, that there had been a different conclusion 
 of the Shantung provision, or the Shantung difficulty or 
 controversy, at the Paris Peace Conference? 
 
 The President — Yes; I frankly intimated that. 
 
 Senator Johnson — Did it require the unanimous consent 
 of the members of the Peace Conference to reach a decision 
 like the Shantung decision? 
 
 The President — Every decision, yes, sir. . . . 
 
 Senator Johnson — May I ask one or two more questions 
 concerning Shantung which I omitted or forgot? 
 
 The President — Certainly, Senator. 
 
 Senator Johnson — First: Did Japan decline to sign the 
 award as made or provided in the peace treaty? 
 
306 APPENDICES 
 
 The President — Her representatives informed us, Sena- 
 tor, that they were instructed not to sign in that event 
 (the refusal to award Shantung to Japan). 
 
 Senator Johnson — Was the decision reached, if you will 
 pardon the perfectly blunt question, because Japan de- 
 clined to sign unless that decision was reached in that 
 way? 
 
 The President — No, I do not think it would be true to 
 say "Yes" to that question. It was reached because we 
 thought it was the best that could be got, in view of the 
 definite engagements of Great Britain and France, and the 
 necessity of a unanimous decision, which we held to be 
 necessary in every case we have decided. 
 
 Senator Johnson — Great Britain and France adhered to 
 their original engagements, did they not? 
 
 The President — They said that they did not feel at liberty 
 to disregard them. 
 
 Senator Johnson — Do you mind stating, or would you 
 prefer not, what it was that caused you ultimately to accede 
 to the decision that was demanded by Japan ? 
 
 The President — Only the conclusion that I thought it was 
 the best that could be got under the circumstances. 
 
 Senator Brandegee — May I interpolate there without dis- 
 turbing you, Senator Johnson. 
 
 Senator Johnson — Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Brandegee — In Part VI of the hearings before 
 our committee on page 182, Senator Johnson of California 
 asked Secretary Lansing: (Reading.) 
 
 Was the Shantung decision made in order to have the Japanese 
 signatories to the League of Nations? 
 
 Secretary Lansing — That I cannot say. 
 
 Senator Johnson — In your opinion was it ? 
 
 Secretary Lansing — I would not want to say that, because I 
 really have not the facts on which to form an opinion along that 
 line. 
 
APPENDICES 307 
 
 Senator Johnson — Would the Japanese signature to the League 
 of Nations have been obtained if you had not made the Shantung 
 agreement ? 
 
 Secretary Lansing — I think so. 
 
 Senator Johnson — You do? 
 
 Secretary Lansing — I think so. 
 
 Senator Johnson — So that even though Shantung had not been 
 delivered to Japan, the League of Nations would not have been 
 injured. 
 
 Secretary Lansing — I do not think so. 
 
 Senator Johnson — ^And you would have had the same sig- 
 natories that you have now ? 
 
 Secretary Lansing — Yes, one more — China. 
 
 Senator Johnson — One more — China. So that the result of the 
 Shantung decision was simply to lose China's signature rather 
 than to gain Japan's? 
 
 Secretary Lansing — No, that is my personal view, but I may 
 be wrong about it. 
 
 Senator Johnson — Why did you yield on a question on which 
 you thought you ought not to yield and that you thought was a 
 principle ? 
 
 Secretary Lansing — Because naturally we were subject to the 
 direction of the President of the United States. 
 
 Senator Johnson — And it was solely because you felt that you 
 were subject to the decision of the President of the United States 
 that you yielded? 
 
 Secretary Lansing — Yes. 
 
 Senator Johnson — The decision is his? 
 
 Secretary Lansing — Necessarily. 
 
 Now I v?ondered whether Secretary Lansing was well in- 
 formed about this question or not? 
 
 The President — ^Well, my conclusion is different from 
 his, sir. 
 
 Senator Brandegee — You could not have got the signa- 
 ture of Japan if you had not given Japan Shantung. 
 
 The President — That is my judgment. 
 
308 APPENDICES 
 
 Senator Brandegee — ^You say you were notified to that 
 effect. 
 
 The President — Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Swanson — As I understand, you were notified 
 that they had instructions not to sign unless this was in- 
 cluded. 
 
 The President — ^Yes. 
 
 Senator Borah — And was it your judgment that after 
 the treaty had been ratified, China's rights would be pro- 
 tected and Japan would surrender to China what she said 
 she would? 
 
 The President — ^Yes. 
 
 Senator Swanson — As I understand it you considered 
 this verbal agreement effective as relating to Shantung, and 
 you understood that this conveyance would be followed by 
 a conveyance to China. 
 
 The President — Not to supersede it, but the action by 
 Japan is to follow. 
 
 Senator Johnson — ^Yes. But, Mr. President, you would 
 have much preferred to have a different disposition not- 
 withstanding the promise of Japan in the treaty, would 
 you not ? 
 
 The President — ^Yes, sir. 
 
Appendix VI 
 
 china's attitude to the ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCE 
 
 Peking, June 6, 1920. — The Foreign Office has handed to 
 Renter's Agency the following statement of the position 
 China has taken up in matters arising out of the Anglo- 
 Japanese Alliance: 
 
 Three months ago the attention of the Chinese Govern- 
 ment was drawn to statements appearing in the world's 
 press regarding the renewal or termination of the Anglo- 
 Japanese Alliance. 
 
 Inasmuch as an important element in the text of both 
 of the 1905 and 1911 Agreements was Section B of the 
 Preamble which treated of matters affecting China's inter- 
 national standing and international relations without the 
 prior assent of China having been obtained, and inasmuch 
 as public opinion throughout the Eepublic had long shown 
 deep resentment at this condition of affairs, the Govern- 
 ment decided that the time has arrived to address repre- 
 sentations to the British Government. 
 
 Instructions were consequently sent to the Chinese Min- 
 ister in London to make formal inquiries regarding the 
 reports appearing in the press and to point out that while 
 obviously the international arrangements of other Powers 
 did not in the ordinary course of events concern others than 
 the High Contracting Parties, the treatment of China 
 merely as a territorial entity in the written text of any such 
 agreements would no longer be tolerated by the public opin- 
 ion of the country and would indeed be viewed by all as an 
 unfriendly act. 
 
 To these first inquiries China received the following 
 
 309 
 
310 APPENDICES 
 
 verbal reply : First that the question of the renewal or ter- 
 mination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had not yet come 
 up for consideration; secondly, that inasmuch as the suc- 
 cessive Agreements had been couched in the same language, 
 it would naturally follow that if the Alliance were renewed 
 it must follow the same lines. 
 
 In consequence of this reply a memorandum was pre- 
 pared analysing the three successive Alliance instruments 
 and establishing clearly: (a) that the original instrument of 
 1902 was radically different from the 1905 Agreement in 
 that the independence of Korea was specifically guaranteed 
 in the first ; (b) that the second Agreement of 1905 far from 
 being identical included India for the first time within its 
 scope, whilst Korea was relegated to a subordinate position 
 and clearly earmarked for annexation; (c) that the third 
 Agreement introduced into the Preamble the definite state- 
 ment having in view the important changes which have 
 taken place in the situation, etc., and then definitely 
 dropped all reference in the numbered articles to either 
 Korea or the Indian frontier, because the act to which Rus- 
 sia's assent had been obtained had made mutual pledge 
 regarding these matters superfluous. 
 
 In view, then, of the fact that beneath the framework 
 of what is on the surface a self-denying ordinance, vital 
 and far-reaching changes have acquired the sanction of the 
 High Contracting Parties, Chinese opinion is not unnatu- 
 rally distrustful of any renewal of this agreement, all men 
 holding that China has suffered enough from its operation 
 during the World War in the matter of Shantung. 
 
 Furthermore, as the formal ratification of the Austrian 
 Treaty has made China a member of the League of Nations, 
 which she assumes was created in good faith, she is advised 
 that a contract regarding her affairs between other mem- 
 bers of the League cannot be entered into without her prior 
 
APPENDICES 311 
 
 consent has been obtained, Article 10 being a sufficient 
 guarantee that her territorial integrity will be respected. 
 
 So far China has not received from Britain a reply to 
 her memorandum. She is anxious for that reply so that 
 she may address an identical note to Japan and establish 
 definitely the national attitude on a question vital to the 
 peace and prosperity of her people. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abrogation of treaties: claimed 
 by China and resisted by 
 Japan, 177-179. 
 
 Ackerman, Carl W. : interview 
 with China's President, 221. 
 
 Adler, Felix: criticizes League 
 of Nations, 205. 
 
 Advisors, foreign, in China: 
 sought by Japan in Man- 
 churia, 76; by Japan in Mon- 
 golia, 76; by Japan in all 
 China postponed for future ne- 
 gotiations, 79. 
 
 Aggrandizement, territorial : 
 
 should cease, 228. 
 
 Agreements: see Treaties. 
 
 Alliance: Anglo-Japanese, 44-46, 
 49, 218, 283, Appendix VI. 
 
 Allies: author's feeling about, 
 Pref., 36; Japan and Britain 
 as allies, 43-48, 78; silent as 
 America brought war issue 
 into China, 98; China not to 
 join Allies in war on Germany, 
 109, 110; Allied Ministers 
 hold different theory from 
 President Feng, 110, 111; in- 
 trigue with Japan unknown to 
 China or U. S. A., 112-117; 
 helped autocracy and not de- 
 mocracy in China, 129-131, 
 263, 264; all eight in Peking 
 make twelve complaints of 
 China's negligence, 136-141 ; 
 arrayed against China at 
 Peace Table, 179; handicapped 
 in China, 244; attitude to 
 principle as compared with 
 Central Powers, 269, 270. 
 
 America, Americans, U. S. A.: 
 in the war, Pref.; generous to 
 China, 2, 251 ; aid in neutral- 
 ity sought by China, 38; criti- 
 cize Japan, 65, 223, 225; 
 checkmated by Japan in Fu- 
 
 kien, 78; protests the 1915 
 Si no- Japanese agreements, 82, 
 83; tied up with intrigue, 84; 
 part played in bringing China 
 into the war, 84-111; leader 
 of neutral nations and then 
 changed, 89, 90; alliance with 
 China against Japan, 92, 93; 
 responsibility with others in 
 leading China into war, 96, 97, 
 104; note to China declaring 
 China's enrtry into war second- 
 ary, 104, 105; restricted when 
 neutral by the British, 148, 
 254 ; how help was given to 
 Britain in destroying German 
 trade, 150, 153; policy about 
 enemy property changeable, 
 153; better treated by Ger- 
 mans than by Japanese, 175; 
 looked up to by China at 
 Paris, 171, 180; help to China 
 a delusion, 70, 178, 180, 200, 
 201, 206, 207; to be blamed at 
 Paris along with Japan, 201, 
 224; join English in dislike of 
 Japan, 215; tr^da-.in opium, 
 237 ; future influence in China, 
 250-256; reputation as China's 
 friend, 251, 253; hampered 
 by Entente and Japan, 254- 
 256. 
 
 American Minister in Peking: 
 see Reinsch. 
 
 Anderson, F.: on Germans and 
 Japanese compared, 175. 
 
 Anderson, Roy S.: help to Dr. 
 Reinsch on war issue, 91. 
 
 Appeal: of Britain to Japan, 46- 
 48. 
 
 Ariga, Dr.: advises China on 
 war zone, 56. 
 
 Arthur, Port: given up by 
 Japan, 4; acquired by Russia, 
 7 ; in Japanese hands, 75. 
 
 813 
 
314 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Asahi, Osaki: sees no good to 
 China for entry into war, 122. 
 
 Asia: affected badly by the war, 
 36, 38. 
 
 Associated Press: agent in Pe- 
 king, helping war campaign, 
 91. 
 
 Astronomical instruments at Pe- 
 king: taken by Germany to be 
 returned, 193. 
 
 Austria-Hungary: China declares 
 war against, 106; Minister in 
 Peking sends humorous note 
 to China, 111; its dismember- 
 ment, 263. 
 
 Autocracy: takes place of de- 
 mocracy in China through war 
 issue, 84, 101; its ascendency 
 in China, 129, 130; to be over- 
 thrown everywhere, 263, 264. 
 
 Balfour, Arthur: keeps hid se- 
 cret treaties, 115, 116. 
 
 Barnardiston, Gen.: at Tsingtao, 
 54. 
 
 Belgium: neutrality compared 
 with China's, 56, Appendix I; 
 losses compared with those of 
 China, 73. 
 
 Bland, J. 0. P.: on Britain's 
 commercial aims, 2; on Brit- 
 ish, railway concessions, 11; 
 on Japan's ideas of treaties, 
 13; on Japan's growing power, 
 15; critic of Japan, 223. 
 
 Bliss, Dr. W. D. P.: on Bolshe- 
 vism in Asia, 144. 
 
 Blythe, Samuel G.: quoted as to 
 " Flying Wedge," in Saturday 
 Evening Post, 89-94; helps Dr.. 
 Reinsch on war issue, 91. 
 
 Board of Trade in London: its 
 plans for extending trade, 247. 
 
 Bolshevism: possibility of spread- 
 ing to China, 143-145. 
 
 Borah, Senator: quotes Balfour 
 versus Wilson and Lansing as 
 to secret treaties, 115, 116. 
 
 Boxer uprising: why begun, 11; 
 indemnity for, to be given up 
 by Germans, 92, 192, 193; as 
 viewed by John Hay, 141. 
 
 Boycott of Japanese goods: by 
 Chinese, 228, 239, 243. 
 
 Briand, M.: demands on Japan 
 in action against Germany, 
 115, 150. 
 
 Britain, Great, British, English: 
 first attack on China, 1 ; trade 
 in China, 2, 147-149, 247-250; 
 leases Weihaiwei, 7; France a 
 rival, 8, 9, 10; sphere of in- 
 terest, 9; dispute with Russia, 
 6, 9, 10; dispute with Ger- 
 many, 9, 10; has railway con- 
 cessions, 11; with Germany 
 one group, 13; both Japan and 
 Germany as rivals, 15; must 
 not be partial against, 36; 
 changes European war into 
 World War, 37, 45; culpabil- 
 ity with Japan compared, 43- 
 62; dubious of Japan, 65, 77, 
 78, 246; secret agreement with 
 Japan as to Germany and 
 China, 112, 113; demands on 
 China about Tibet, 124-126; 
 plan to uproot German trade 
 in China, 147-149; seizes Ger- 
 man property at Chinese 
 treaty-ports, 157, 158, 162; 
 complaint against Japan, 215, 
 216; alliance with Japan, 218, 
 283, Appendix VI; trade in 
 opium, 236; her future in 
 China as compared with Japan 
 and America, 246, 247, 250; 
 checking American railway 
 concession, 254; conduct in 
 China after armistice. 265-268; 
 as land of freedom, 271. 
 
 Brothels in China: started hy- 
 Japanese, 234; under British 
 rule in Shanghai, 235. 
 
 Brotherhood, universal: still a 
 true principle, 276. 
 
 Brown, Arthur J.: on Britain 
 and Japan conferring about 
 Tsingtao, 44; on secret diplo- 
 macy, 117; doubts benefit to 
 China from the war, 121; tells 
 of weary road for China's Re- 
 public, 130; receives letter 
 from Prof. Richter on German 
 
INDEX 
 
 315 
 
 Missions, 164; on Germans 
 and Japanese compared, 187; 
 on increase of Japanese in 
 Shantung, 190; fair critic, 
 223; on Japan's ambitions, 
 226; on Japan's business meth- 
 ods, 230; on Japanese vices in 
 China, 234; on nationalizing 
 Christian Missions, Appendix 
 IV. 
 
 Bryan, William Jennings: sends 
 identic note to Japan and 
 China, 82. 
 
 Burton, Theodore E. : objects to 
 protectorate for China, 142; 
 on Germans and Japanese com- 
 pared, 174. 
 
 Cables touching China: pass to 
 Japan in Peace Treaty, 188, 
 189. 
 
 Castis "belli: by China more 
 against Japan than Germany, 
 88. 
 
 Central Powers: no request of 
 China to side with them in 
 war, 123; compared with Big 
 Three, 244, 269. 
 
 Chamber of Commerce: of China, 
 opposed to entry into war, 
 106; British, on open door, 
 142; in Shanghai, advise ne- 
 gotiating with Japan, 216; 
 American, on Japan's restric- 
 tions, 256. 
 
 Chang Hsun, Gen.: called by 
 President Li to mediate, 102; 
 demands a mandate to dissolve 
 Parliament, 102; declared res- 
 toration of Manchu Emperor, 
 103; defeated by Tuan Chi-jui, 
 103. 
 
 Chang Tsung-hsiang: of pro- 
 Japan group, 99. 
 
 Chen Chin-tao : helps Reinsch on 
 war issue, 91. 
 
 Chen, Eugene: helps bring China 
 into war, 91; praises Chinese 
 note to Germany, 95, 96. 
 
 China, Chinese: pro-Chinese, 
 Pref. ; conflict with Japan, 1, 
 49, 168, 169; encroachments 
 
 on, see Encroachments; loses 
 Hongkong, 1 ; loses Amur, 2 ; 
 loses Tongking, 2; loses Ko- 
 rea, 4; loses Formosa, 4; loses 
 Burma, 9; ignored in her own 
 afifairs, 13, 129, 275; agree- 
 ments made with Germany, 19- 
 32, 176, 177; kept in turmoil 
 by Japan, 14, 213; trying to 
 maintain neutrality, 38, 39, 
 66, 61 ; injured by the war, 
 42, 52, 55, 69-83, 100-103, 168; 
 neutrality violated by Japan, 
 54-62, Appendix I; weakened 
 by Japan's Demands, 63-83, 
 178; has always hope of future 
 help, 71, 180, 199-202; did not 
 complain about Shantung in 
 1915 negotiations, 73, 80; 
 Sino-Japanese agreements and 
 Versailles treaty compared, 70, 
 72, 73, 80, 179; injured by in- 
 trigues leading her into war, 
 84-118; reasons of, for enter- 
 ing the war, 88, 106, 107; at 
 first opposed to entering the 
 war, 90; proposal of alliance 
 with U. S. A. against Japan, 
 92; note of rebuke and threat 
 to German Minister, 95; three 
 groups on war issue, 99; be- 
 comes land of upheaval and 
 strife over war issue, 101, 102, 
 105, 109; receives American 
 Note counselling internal peace 
 before entry into war, 104, 
 105; declares war against Cen- 
 tral Powers without Parlia- 
 mentary sanction, 106; reasons 
 against entering the war, 107, 
 108; waging war independent- 
 ly, 109, 110, Appendix II; de- 
 ceived by intrigues in Tokio, 
 112-118, 179; receives promises 
 on entry into war, 118-120; 
 benefit from entry into war 
 doubted, 121, 122; has trou- 
 bles after entry into war, 121- 
 146; gets demands from Brit- 
 ain about Tibet, 124, 125; ob- 
 jects to Lansing-Ishii agree- 
 ment, 126-129; in thraldom to 
 
8ie 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Japan, 132-136; gets com- 
 plaint from eight Legations, 
 137, 138; forced after armis- 
 tice to issue mandates for 
 repatriation and liquidation of 
 Germans, 141; threatened by 
 foreign protectorate, 141, 142; 
 aflfected by commercial rival- 
 ries, 147-162; opposed to liqui- 
 dating German property, 150, 
 151 ; inclined to treat Germans 
 justly, 150, 162, 166; delega- 
 tion at Peace Conference, 168- 
 170, 197-201; aligns with 
 America at Paris, 170, 171; 
 decision against, made by Big 
 Three, 171; her past treaties 
 not abrogated, 177, 178; how 
 deluded, 70, 71, 178, 180, 200, 
 201, 206, 207; the losses in 
 Versailles treaty, 182-197; 
 badly treated at Paris, 200, 
 201, 277; future prospects and 
 duty, 206-222 ; reconciliation 
 with Japan needed, 214-218, 
 239, 240; affected by Anglo- 
 Japanese Alliance, 218, 283, 
 Appendix VI; chance for self- 
 development, 273, 274; ad- 
 vised by author to get ready 
 in war, 294; war declaration 
 as viewed by author when 
 editor in Peking, 292-294. 
 
 China Merchants Steamship Co.: 
 suggested expansion, 221, 222. 
 
 Chinda, Viscount: delegate at 
 Paris, 170. 
 
 Christianity: as shown in diplo- 
 macy, 63; forgotten in restric- 
 tions on German missions, 
 163-167; only hope for Chi- 
 nese, 207; badly shown to 
 Chinese after armistice, 265- 
 268. 
 
 Chronicle, Japan: quoted on 
 folly of deporting Germans, 
 152; on trade in morphia, 237. 
 
 Civilization: European as shown 
 in China, 63, 266-268; Chinese, 
 1; bad, of the West in Japan, 
 240. 
 
 Claims: Gkrmans can present 
 
 none against Allies, 158, 194; 
 Allies can present against 
 Germans, 159; made by Japan 
 at Peace Table, why agreed to, 
 196, 197; of Chinese at Peace 
 Table rejected, 197, 198. 
 
 Cleraenceau, M. : decides against 
 China at Paris, 171. 
 
 Colonies, German : Wilson's point 
 bearing thereon, 171. 
 
 Commerce: German, to be de- 
 stroyed, an early secret com- 
 pact, 115; rivalries therein 
 brought trouble to China, 147- 
 162; of Chinese, 222; of 
 Japan in Eastern Asia, 228- 
 230; of British in China, 11, 
 247-250; of French in Chin.,, 
 245; of Americans in China, 
 11, 251-255. 
 
 Commercial aims: of British in 
 Great War, 45, 46, 113, 149. 
 
 Competition: of British and 
 others in China, 147-149, 243- 
 260. 
 
 Compromise: followed at Peace 
 Table, 199, 205. 
 
 Compton, Major T. E.: on Ja- 
 pan's feeling to Germany, 45. 
 
 Concession at Chinese ports: ac- 
 quired for sole control, 7, 16; 
 by Germany at Tsingtao, 21 ; 
 at treaty-ports, how different 
 from Tsingtao, etc., 21 ; de- 
 manded by Japan at Tsingtao, 
 70, 71, 183; international, at 
 Tsingtao, 71, 183, 275; German 
 at Tientsin and Hankow al- 
 lotted China, 194; in Shang- 
 hai no voice by Chinese, 275. 
 
 Concessions in railways and 
 coal: battle of, 10, 11; also 
 sought by Americans, 10; 
 Britain gets most, 11; by 
 groups in China, 13, 14; Grer- 
 man, in Shantung, 14, 27-33; 
 those of Germany seized by 
 Japan, 59-61 ; those of Ger- 
 many allotted Japan, 185-188. 
 
 Conciliatory spirit: adopted by 
 Germans, 14, 173-175, 188; 
 may be adopted by Japanese, 
 
INDEX 
 
 317 
 
 188; of all nations after 
 Boxer cataclysm, 260; needed 
 in all the world, 265, 268. 
 
 Confucianism: opposed to meth- 
 ods of foreign diplomacy, 63. 
 
 Consortium in China: its pros 
 and cons, 220, 221, 251, 275. 
 
 Conquest, right of: claimed by 
 Japan, 60, 61, 64; confirmed 
 in treaties, 72, 73, 189. 
 
 Conty, M. : congratulates China 
 on declaring war, 110. 
 
 Conventions: see Treaties. 
 
 Co-operation: of Germans and 
 Chinese, 24, 27, 28, 173, 258; 
 of Chinese and Japanese, 75, 
 77, 228. 
 
 Coimcil of the League: Japan 
 sure member, 169; China mem- 
 ber for one year, 169. 
 
 Council, Supreme, at Paris: see 
 Supreme. 
 
 Craddock, Admiral: defeated by 
 German Admiral, 41. 
 
 Culpability; of Germany in 
 1898 same as that of others, 
 6, 16, 33-35; of Japan and 
 Britain in bringing war into 
 China, 43-54; of all in bring- 
 ing China into war, 84-86, 96- 
 98, 103, 106, 110, 112, 117, 
 224; of all in settlement at 
 Peace Table, 201, 208, 224; 
 in immoralities, all the same, 
 235-238. 
 
 Custodian of Alien Property: in 
 America, 153, 154 ; in the 
 Philippines, 154; in Hongkong, 
 154, 157; as to China Com- 
 panies registered in Hongkong, 
 157, 158. 
 
 Delegation at Peace Conference: 
 Chinese, 169, 170, 183, 184, 
 191, 192, 196, 197, 200, 202, 
 206; Japanese, 169, 171, 184, 
 192; Chinese, concerning Wil- 
 son, 203, 206; Chinese on 
 Right over Might, 211. 
 
 Delusions and vain hopes for 
 China: 70, 71, 108, 178-180, 
 199-204, 206, 252. 
 
 Demands on China: twenty-one 
 by Japan, original, revised 
 and accepted, 62-83, 178, 206; 
 twelve by Britain about Ti- 
 bet, 124-126. 
 
 Democracy: abandoned by China 
 for autocracy, 84, 106, 129- 
 131, 263, 264; Li Yuan-hung, 
 exponent of, 88, 130, 145; out- 
 look for, in China bright, 89; 
 not encouraged by democratic 
 countries, 143, 144; outlook 
 in Japan, 239; how far an 
 object in the world, 263, 264. 
 
 Dewey, John: in praise of Ger- 
 mans in China, 173, 174; on 
 Chinese militarism, 211; on 
 friendship between Chinese 
 and Germans, 219; on Amer- 
 ican influence in China, 252. 
 
 Diplomacy: has fine phrases, 20; 
 Japanese, 63, 64, 171; old kind 
 and new, 88; played by Amer- 
 icans in Peking, 89, 94; as 
 pursued by Entente in Tokio, 
 117; of good-feeling, 220. 
 
 Diplomatic relations: severed by 
 China with Germany as U. S. 
 A. had done, 85-100, 123. 
 
 Donald, W. H. : an Australian 
 helping Dr. Reinsch in war 
 agitation, 91. 
 
 Duress: in making treaties, see 
 Force majeure; before and 
 after war, 34; as seen at 
 Peace Table, 183. 
 
 Elimination of Germany from 
 China: a bad policv, 43, 65, 
 74, 172-176, 235; the Allied 
 aim, 49, 113; ends in Japan's 
 supremacy, 243. 
 
 Embroiling China in the war: 
 through Intrigue in Peking, 
 84-112; through intrigue in 
 Tokio, 112-118. 
 
 Empress Dowager: coup d'etat 
 of, 8; not punished as head of 
 Boxer war in 1900, 11. 
 
 Encroachments on China: for- 
 eign, 1-15; by European war, 
 36-62; by Japan in the war. 
 
318 
 
 INDEX 
 
 52-62; by Japan through 
 Twenty-one Demands, 63-83. 
 
 Entanglements: of China with 
 European Powers and Japan 
 prior to Great War, 1-15; of 
 Germany, 6, 7, 16, 17; of 
 China with Britain and Japan 
 on entrance of war, 36-62; of 
 China with Japan in Twenty- 
 one Demands, 63-83; of China 
 with America, Entente and 
 Japan, 84-118; of China with 
 Britain about Tibet, 124-126; 
 of China with America and 
 Japan in Lansing-Ishii Agree- 
 ment, 126-129; of China with 
 Japan during the war, 132- 
 136; of China with Allied and 
 Associated Nations, 136-143; 
 of China with Bolsheviki 
 movement, 143-145; of China 
 bv commercial rivalries, 147- 
 162; of China at Peace Table, 
 168-205; of China with Japan 
 in the future, 223-242; of 
 China with Britain, America 
 and Germany in the future, 
 243-260; to be avoided by U. 
 S. A. and China, 278, 279. 
 
 Equal opportunities: in China, 
 see Open Door; stipulated by 
 Japan and others, 13; sought 
 by Germany, 21 ; should still 
 prevail, 142, 143. 
 
 Equality, racial and national : re- 
 jected at Paris, 195, 196. 
 
 Expansion : Japanese, 5, 43, 45, 
 66, 67, 225-227. 
 
 Exploitation: in foreign groups, 
 14; the principle recognized in 
 Peace Treaty, 187, 188; see 
 Encroachment. 
 
 Extra-territoriality in China: to 
 be given up some time, 22, 
 274 ; removal of, a Chinese aim 
 at Peace Table, 198. 
 
 Facts: should be knbwn, vi, 270; 
 shaping principles, 261. 
 
 Fairness: the basis of discus- 
 sion, V, 16, 43, 223; deserved 
 
 by Japan, 43, 223-227; world- 
 wide, 158, 269, 274. 
 
 Fait accompli: a theory in 
 Japan, 64; binds China, 207. 
 
 Far East: China aiming to pre- 
 serve neutrality of, 38; peace 
 of, not through war, 42, 50; 
 Gibbons on failure of perma- 
 nent peace therein, 244. 
 
 Fatalism: of Chinese in meeting 
 trouble, 121, 207. 
 
 Feng Kuo-chang: becomes Presi- 
 dent, 103; declares war, 106; 
 conversation with author on 
 declaring war independently, 
 109; speech against siding 
 with Entente, 110; in conver- 
 sation with author expresses 
 no hope for China, 122; an op- 
 portunist, 132; gets warning 
 concerning foreign dictation, 
 136; proclamation on going to 
 war against Central Powers, 
 Appendix II ; congratulated 
 by the author, while editor, 
 292-294. 
 
 Ferguson, Dr. John C. : helps 
 Reinsch on war issue, 91. 
 
 Finances: influence of, in China's 
 declaration of war, 106, 107; 
 of China in Japan's hands, 134, 
 135. 
 
 Fiume: Wilson's words to be ap- 
 plied to Shantung, 203, 204. 
 
 Force majeure: of Boxer Proto- 
 col, 11; of German 1898 treaty, 
 6, 17, 18, 34; of Sino-Japa- 
 nese agreements of 1915, 34, 
 68, 79; at Peace Table, 183. 
 
 Formosa: acquired by Japan, 4, 
 9. 
 
 France, French: in opening 
 China, 1; in Opium War, 2; 
 protector of Catholic Mis- 
 sions, 2, 18; hostilities of 
 1883, 2; menace to China, 3; 
 aiding Russia, 4; leases 
 Kuang-chow-wan, 8 ; checked 
 by Britain, 8, 9, 10; sphere of 
 interest, 8; builds railway into 
 Yunnan, 11; with Russia, one 
 group, 13; at Lao-shi-kai a 
 
INDEX 
 
 319 
 
 grievance, 88 ; Minister's 
 speech in Peking, 110; secret 
 agreement with Japan as to 
 Germany and China, 112-115; 
 seizes German school in 
 Shanghai, 150; future influ- 
 ence in China, 245; checking 
 American railway concession, 
 254 ; unfavourable to Christian 
 Missions of other nationals, 
 Appendix IV. 
 
 Franco-German Association : 
 
 against war and hate, 268. 
 
 Fraser, David: doubts value of 
 Japan's special position in 
 Shantung, 105; shows harm 
 from Japan, 191. 
 
 Freedom of the seas: given up, 
 if there are to be no neutral 
 nations in war, 85. 
 
 Friends, Society of: protests 
 against excluding German mis- 
 sionaries, 163, 164. 
 
 Friendship: of Americans to 
 China, 2, 16, 251, 253; of Ger- 
 many to China, 25, 31-33; by 
 China to all nations prior to 
 American pressure, 86; still 
 needed by China with all na- 
 tions, 220; needed between 
 China and Japan, 214, 217, 
 218; of Chinese for Germans, 
 219. 
 
 Fukien province: as Japan's 
 sphere of interest, 9; has 
 growing influence of Japan, 78. 
 
 Gains of Japan: by the war, 43, 
 69-79, 116, 168, 227, 242, 243; 
 by the Peace Conference, 171, 
 180-192, 195, 201. 
 
 George, Lloyd: receives warning 
 from Dr. Sun on China's entry 
 into war, 108; countenances 
 restriction of German mis- 
 sions, 163; decides against 
 China at Paris, 171. 
 
 Germany, Germans: friend of, a 
 pro-German, vi, 123, 158, 269; 
 people to be treated as friends, 
 vi, 269; aiding Russia, 4; first 
 move in China in 1898, 6; am- 
 
 bitions later than others', 6, 
 16; murder of missionaries in 
 1897, 6, 17, 18; check on 
 others as China's gain, 6, 7; 
 treaty of 1898, 7, 19-34; 
 sphere of interest, 9; clash 
 with Britain avoided, 9, 10; 
 rights in Shantung acknowl- 
 edged by Britain, 10; railway 
 of, in Shantung, 11, 27, 28, 
 186; with Britain, one group 
 in China, 13; adopts concilia- 
 tory policy in China, 14, 173- 
 176, 219; terms of Tientsin- 
 Pukou Railway, 14, 31 ; rival 
 of Britain, 15, 147-149, 246; 
 called a menace to China, 6, 
 16-18, 25, 65, 191; rights in 
 Shantung, 19, 66. 69, 171-178; 
 should have equal chance with 
 others, 21, 22, 29; culpability 
 like that of others, 16, 17, 22, 
 33, 35; rule in Kiaochow to be 
 praised, 26, 27, 30-33, 174-176; 
 does not obstruct China's neu- 
 trality in World War, 38; 
 anxious to keep war away 
 from Tsingtao, 38; proposed 
 direct transfer of Tsingtao to 
 China, 39; proposes plan of 
 neutrality to Japan, 40; Pa- 
 cific Squadron kept away from 
 Tsingtao, 41, 42, 44; receives 
 ultimatum, 50; defence of 
 Tsingtao, 53, 54, 57, 58; elimi- 
 nation from China, bad policy, 
 43, 65, 74, 172-176, 235; 
 rights in Shantung pass to 
 Japan by conquest and treaty, 
 19, 69-74. 180-189; ready to 
 consult China, 70; rebuked 
 and threatened by note from 
 China, 94, 95 ; receives China's 
 severance of relations, 98-100; 
 China declares war against, 
 106, Appendix II; all rights 
 in Shantung and North Pacific 
 guaranteed to Japan by secret 
 compact, 113-115; repatriation 
 of, agreed upon by Entente and 
 Japan, 115, 150; destruction 
 of trade of, planned for by 
 
320 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Entente, 113-115, 137, 139, 147- 
 153, 158-162, 257, 258; defeat 
 did not end imperialistic 
 schemes in others, says Wilson, 
 145; Germans as Germans to 
 suffer, 152, 268; no chance to 
 present claims, 158; German 
 Government allowed to reim- 
 burse losses of nationals, 161 ; 
 German Missions attacked in 
 treaty, 163, 164; work of Ger- 
 man missionaries, 165, 166; 
 may expect just treatment 
 from Chinese, 157, 166; forced 
 in Versailles treaty to break 
 treaties with China and re- 
 nounce all rights in China in 
 favor of Japan, 171-189; pol- 
 icy and conduct compared with 
 others', 244, 269, 270, 274 ; can 
 co-operate with Americans, 
 254; future chances and influ- 
 ence in China, 256-260; its 
 militarism, should be de- 
 stroyed, but not its trade and 
 industry, 210, 211, 257, 258, 
 262; will renew friendship 
 with Chinese, 219, 258; link- 
 ing hands with Japan, 45, 58, 
 259; must have trade in Rus- 
 sia, 259, 260; hatred to Ger- 
 mans in China a disgrace, 
 268; violation of international 
 law given as the cause of war 
 by CWna, Appendix II. 
 
 Gibbons, Herbert Adams: on 
 blaming Germans alone, 33 ; in 
 praise of German conduct in 
 Shantung, 175; on Japan's 
 priority in Asia, 226; on fail- 
 ure of Peace Conference, 244. 
 
 Globe, N. Y. : on private prop- 
 erty inviolable, 160. 
 
 Goodnow, Frank J.: quoted as 
 to Japan's designs, 118. 
 
 Gore, Bishop: counsels moral 
 ideals in war, 166; on mili- 
 tarism among ourselves, 262. 
 
 Goto, Baron: says agreements 
 must be secret, 136. 
 
 Grey, Earl of: dying message 
 one of love, 167. 
 
 Grey, Sir Edward: tried to cir- 
 cumscribe the war, 37. 
 
 Griffith, Major Sanford : on Brit- 
 ish trade with Germany, 250. 
 
 Gulick, Sidney L. : on Twenty- 
 one Demands, 67; on China 
 getting fair-play, 274. 
 
 Hague Conventions: broken in 
 Shantung, 59, 284, 285; 
 against confiscating private 
 property, 156; should have 
 been given natural develop- 
 ment after Great War, 279. 
 
 Hall's "International Law": 
 quoted on duties of neutrality, 
 61; against confiscating pri- 
 vate enemy property, 155. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander: on private 
 property as inviolable, 156. 
 
 Hanyehping Company: growing 
 control of, by Japan, 77. 
 
 Hara, Premier: for Japanese in- 
 fluence in China, 135. 
 
 Hart, Sir Robert: as Inspector- 
 General of Chinese Customs 
 arranges about Tsingtao, 24. 
 
 Hate: in war and after, un- 
 christian, 265-268. 
 
 Hay, John: his open door policy, 
 11; saved China, 141. 
 
 Hegemony of Far East: Japan's 
 aim, 64. 
 
 Hill, David Jayne: criticizes 
 League of Nations, 280. 
 
 Hintze, von: ready to consult 
 China, 70; commends himself 
 to the Chinese, 100; leaves 
 Peking, 100. 
 
 Hioki, Mr.: presents Twenty-one 
 Demands, 65 ; negotiates agree- 
 ments with China, 68. 
 
 Hitchcock, Senator: argues that 
 only by ratifying Versailles 
 treaty is liquidation of Ger- 
 man property made legal, 160, 
 161. 
 
 Hobson, J. A.: criticizes League 
 of Nations, 278. 
 
 Hodges, Charles: on Japanese 
 hampering Americans, 256. 
 
INDEX 
 
 321 
 
 Hopes, China's: many, in future, 
 69, 199, 201. 
 
 Hornbeck, S. K. : on Germans In 
 Tsingtao, 26; on Germans In 
 Shantung, 31-33; on peril 
 from Japan's position in 
 China, 74; on reason of Ja- 
 pan's ultimatum to China, 81. 
 
 Hsu En-yuan: on failure of 
 Americans in trade in China, 
 253. 
 
 Hsii Shih-chang: sends Chinese 
 delegation to Paris conference, 
 168; on internationalizing 
 China's railways, 221; on 
 League of Nations, 277. 
 
 Hyndman, H. M.: on Japanese 
 unpopularity, 241. 
 
 Ichihashi: on Japan's duty to- 
 wards China, 242. 
 
 Ijuin, Ambassador: delegate at 
 Paris, 170. 
 
 Immoral deeds of Japan in 
 China: seen in sale of opiiun, 
 morphine and brothels, 176, 
 233-237. 
 
 Indemnity: Boxer, to be partly 
 cancelled, 92, 192, 193. 
 
 Independence: of Korea recog- 
 nized, 4; of Korea, taken 
 away, 12; of China, guaran- 
 teed, 13; Military Governors 
 declare for, as against Presi- 
 dent Li, 102; from foreign con- 
 trol needed in China, 222, 274. 
 
 Independently, waging war : 
 President Feng's idea, 109, 
 110. 
 
 Independent, N. Y.: on great in- 
 crease of British Empire, 249, 
 
 Influence in China: of Japan, 
 223-242; of Western nations, 
 243-260. 
 
 Influence, spheres of: see 
 Spheres. 
 
 Inspector-General of Chinese 
 Customs: a Britisher, 5; 
 makes arrangement with Ger- 
 many, 24; acts against Ger- 
 mans, 151. 
 
 interests, special: see Special. 
 
 Interest, spheres of: see Spheres. 
 
 International Law: violated in 
 bringing war into China, 54- 
 60, 281-289; violated in seizure 
 of private property, 61, 153- 
 162; violations of, by Japan 
 condoned in Peace Treaty, 
 183; violation of, by Germany 
 led to China's declaration of 
 war. Appendix II. 
 
 Internationalizing, plans of : 
 China's railways, 220, 221; 
 should include all, and China, 
 274, 275. 
 
 Intrigue: American and Allied, 
 in Peking, 84-111; abhorred by 
 President Li, 100; Allied in 
 Tokio, 112-118. 
 
 Ishii, Viscount: keeps hid secret 
 compacts of Tokio, 115; see 
 also Lansing-Ishii agreement; 
 speaks of moral awakening of 
 China as a danger, 263. 
 
 Italy: her future in China, 245; 
 Wilson's ideas concerning, ap- 
 plied to China, 203, 204. 
 
 Ito, Count: peace negotiator, 4; 
 Resident-General in Korea, 12. 
 
 lyenaga. Dr.: on Japan's prior 
 position in Far East, 227; on 
 Japan's political influence in 
 China, 231. 
 
 Japan, Japanese: an American 
 as pro or not, vi; conflict with 
 China, 1, 3; compared with 
 Western nations, 1, 33, 113, 
 224, 225; ambitions for ex- 
 pansion, 5, 45, 64, 66, 225-228 ; 
 war by decades, 3; sphere of 
 interest in China, 9, 12, 225; 
 gains from Russo-Japanese 
 war, 12; as leader in conven- 
 tions about China, 13; helping 
 to keep China in turmoil, 14, 
 213; growing rival of Britain, 
 15, 243, 246; no right to 
 Kiaochow, 22, 34, 183; exclud- 
 ing Chinese from railway in 
 Shantung, 30; spurns China's 
 request on neutrality, 38; ig- 
 nores German neutral scheme, 
 
322 
 
 INDEX 
 
 40; gains through Great War, 
 43, 69-82, 112, 113; culpabil- 
 ity with Britain compared, 43- 
 49; friendly to Germans, 45, 
 58; ultimatum to Grermany, 
 50-53; violates China's neu- 
 trality, 54, 59, 61, Appendix 
 I; in battle at Tsingtao, 54- 
 58; promises restoration of 
 Kiaochow, 52, 71, 179, 239, 
 303, 308; twenty-one demands 
 on China and forced agree- 
 ment, 63-83, 178; wins in 
 China by Might, 60, 64, 81, 
 185; diplomacy, 60, 64, 171; 
 at first opposed to China's en- 
 trance into the war, 87, 98; 
 finds U. S. A. and China com- 
 bined against her, 92, 98; per- 
 suasive voice in getting China 
 to declare war, 97, 98, 106; 
 oflfended by American intru- 
 sion, 105; scheme as to China 
 in war to detach her from 
 America, 111; intrigues with 
 Entente as against China, and 
 U. S. A., as well as Germany, 
 112-118, 302, 305; gets quid 
 pro quo, 113; gets from 
 America recognition of spe- 
 cial interests in China, 126- 
 128 ; increased power in China, 
 66, 79, 132-135, 189, 190, 227; 
 tactics at Peace Table, 168, 
 169, 171, 195, 196; delegation 
 at Paris, 169; conduct com- 
 pared with Germans, 173-176, 
 187, 191; immoral influence, 
 176, 233-237; as to abroga- 
 tion of treaty with China, 
 177-179; claims met in Ver- 
 sailles treaty, 180-190; Japan 
 not solely blamable, 33, 35, 
 
 43, 171, 201, 209, 224; possible 
 withdrawal from Paris Con- 
 ference, 197, 305-308; should 
 be reconciled to China, 214- 
 218, 228, 238, 240; blamed by 
 British and Americans, 215, 
 216; Alliance with Britain, 
 
 44, 45, 49, 218, Appendix VI; 
 future prospects and duty in 
 
 China, 223-242; hard to get 
 commendation, 43, 223; possi- 
 ble relations with Germans, 45, 
 58, 259; attitude to Christian 
 Missions, 299, 300. 
 
 Jay treaty: teaches private 
 property inviolable, 156. 
 
 Jenks, Jeremiah W.: on North 
 and South factions in China, 
 213; critic of Japan, 223; 
 quotes Viscount Ishii, 263. 
 
 Jones, Jefferson: on Britain 
 seeking Japan's aid, 47 ; on re- 
 storing Kiaochow to China, 
 52; quotes Chinese Note on 
 war zone in Shantung, 57; on 
 fall of Tsingtao, 58; on Japa- 
 nese occupation, 58, 59. 
 
 Jordan, Sir John: dealing with 
 Yuan Shih-kai about China's 
 joining the war, 86 ; as doyen, 
 136; confers about open door, 
 142. 
 
 Justice: in passing judgment, v, 
 16, 43, 223-227; lacking in 
 Japan's refusal to indemnify 
 China, 73; none in seizing 
 private property, 158, 161; 
 none in restricting missions 
 of Germans, 163; lacking in 
 dealing with German rights, 
 176; a loser in Versailles 
 treaty, 180, 198, 200, 205; a 
 world-wide need, as voiced by 
 Wilson, 269, 274. 
 
 Kaiser, the: orders not to sur- 
 render Tsingtao, 54; after- 
 wards allows surrender, 58. 
 
 Kamio, Gen.: at Tsingtao, 54; 
 reported treatment of Ger- 
 mans, 58. 
 
 Kang Yiu-wei: noted reformer, 
 opposed to China's entry into 
 war, 106. 
 
 Kato, Baron: on Britain asking 
 for aid, 46; on Japan's aid 
 sought by Britain, 47; dis- 
 claims promise to restore 
 Kiaochow, 53. 
 
 Kawakami, K. K. : on Britain 
 seeking Japan's aid, 47, 48; 
 
INDEX 
 
 323 
 
 on China's reason for joining 
 the Allies, 86, 87; on Sino- 
 Japanese agreement of 1918, 
 187; on new railways to be 
 built by Japan, 188; on 
 China's criticisms, 225; on 
 Japan's rights equal with 
 others, 226; on Japan's com- 
 mercial needs, 228; on domi- 
 nation of China, 231. 
 
 Kiaochow and Tsingtao: aimed 
 at by Russia, 6; contracted 
 for by Germany, 7; Britain 
 advised to get, 6; Germany's 
 treaty concerning, 20-27; not 
 to be sublet, 22; administra- 
 tion by Germany beneficial, 26, 
 27; China's proposal to neu- 
 tralize in time of war, 38; 
 transfer to China proposed by 
 Germany, 39; captured by Ja- 
 pan in battle, 54, 57, 58; res- 
 toration of, promised to China, 
 52, 71, 179, 239, 303, 308; how 
 disposed of, by 1915 treaty, 70, 
 71, 178, 179; how disposed of, 
 in Versailles treaty, 183, 184. 
 
 Koo, Dr. Wellington: in League 
 Council, 169; delegate to 
 Paris, 170; on committee to 
 draft League Covenant, 170. 
 
 Korea: centre of dispute, 3; 
 cause of China- Japan war, 3; 
 independence recognized by 
 China, 4; under predominance 
 of Japan, 12; absorbed by Ja- 
 pan, 12; an example of Ja- 
 pan's ambition in Shantung, 
 65. 
 
 Kung, Prince : classed opium and 
 missionaries together, 2. 
 
 Kuo Tai-chi: tells of generous 
 offer of Japan, 191, 192. 
 
 La Motte, Miss : on lofty tone of 
 China's note to Germany, 96; 
 on Britain's demands on 
 China, 125; on Japan in 
 China, 232. 
 
 Lansing, Secretary: as partly re- 
 sponsible for China's joining 
 the war, 84, 90; ignorant of 
 
 secret compacts made in To- 
 kio, 115, 116; see also Lansing- 
 Ishii agreement; on Japan's 
 threatened withdrawal from 
 Peace Conference, 197, 306, 
 307. 
 
 Lansing-Ishii Agreement : two 
 sides, open door and Japan's 
 special interests, 126-128; ob- 
 jected to by China, 129; failed 
 in not recognizing China's spe- 
 cial interests, 275. 
 
 Lapradelle, A. G. de: article 
 quoted, 281-289. 
 
 Lawrence, T. J.: disapproves di- 
 vision of sovereign powers, 24. 
 
 League of Nations: endorses the- 
 ory of a potential world-war 
 with no neutral nations, 85; 
 on regional understandings as 
 affecting China, 195; as 
 China's hope, 200, 206, 304, 
 307; criticized by Felix Adler, 
 205; far short of Wilson's 
 ideals, 277; why a failure, 
 279. 
 
 Lease of Chinese ports: begun 
 in 1898, 6, 7, 16; of Kiao- 
 chow, to end by agreement 
 with Japan, 70, 71, 72; of two 
 kinds, treaty, and under ex- 
 clusive control of one nation, 
 21. 
 
 Lease of land away from Chinese 
 ports: right to Japan in Man- 
 churia, 75. 
 
 Li Hung-chang: peace envoy, 4; 
 as diplomat, 4, 7. 
 
 Li Yuan-hung: successor to 
 Yuan Shih-kai as President 
 and representative of Democ- 
 racy, 80, 100; ready to follow 
 Wilson in neutrality, 89; op- 
 posed to China's leaving neu- 
 trality, 91, 100; did not favor 
 war, 100, 102, 106; in conflict 
 with war party, 100-102; .is- 
 sues mandate dissolving Par- 
 liament, 102; chagrined, he re- 
 signs as President, 103; gave, 
 real chance for a Republic," 
 100, 130; remaining at the 
 
324 
 
 INDEX 
 
 head of China could have 
 saved her from Bolshevism, 
 145. 
 
 Liang Chi-chiao: was of pro- 
 Ally group on war question, 
 99. 
 
 Liaotung: see Manchuria. 
 
 Liberty: as upheld or not by 
 English and Americans, 158, 
 271; too often only a profes- 
 sion, 162; versus slavery, 272; 
 the goal for all peoples, 271, 
 276. 
 
 Liquidation of German property: 
 planned for by Entente, 113, 
 115; demanded by eight Lega- 
 tions, 137, 139, 151; China's 
 mandate concerning, after 
 armistice, 141, 149, 151; op- 
 posed and then helped by 
 America, 149, 153, 154; con- 
 trary to American-Prussian 
 treaties, 153; contrary to in- 
 ternational law, 155, 156; 
 contrary to Chinese ideas, 157 ; 
 contrary to morality, 257. 
 
 Loans to China: first made by 
 British, French, Germans, 5; 
 made by Japan in war time, 
 134, 135; chance for Ameri- 
 cans, 251. 
 
 London Times: on utilizing the 
 war for commerce, 45; on 
 England appealing to Japan, 
 47; on British area of fight- 
 ing at Tsingtao, 56. 
 
 Losses of China : by the war and 
 its complications, 43, 52, 69- 
 82, 101, 103, 107-109, 115, 116, 
 124-145, 168; in Versailles 
 treaty, 180-191, 194, 195, 199- 
 201, 205, 206. 
 
 Lou Tseng-tsiang: negotiates on 
 Twenty-one Demands, 68, 179; 
 was of pro-Ally or pro-French 
 group, 99; chief delegate at 
 Paris, 170; laments the Peace 
 Treaty, 206. 
 
 Lowell, James Russell: sings of 
 true freemen, 272. 
 
 Loyalty: how wrongly gauged in 
 war time, 262, 
 
 Lu Tsung-yu: of pro- Japan 
 group, 99. 
 
 Lungkow: Chinese port where 
 Japanese landed to attack 
 Tsingtao, 54, 283, 286. 
 
 McCarthy, Justin : criticizes 
 Opivun War, 1. 
 
 McDonald, Sir Claude: supports 
 German action in 1897-8, 17, 
 18. 
 
 McMaster, John B.: on Presi- 
 dent's promise not to seize 
 German property, 153. 
 
 Makino, Baron: delegate at 
 Paris, 169. 
 
 Manchu House: overthrown, 14; 
 temporary restoration, 103. 
 
 Manchuria: Russia in, 5, 7, 9; 
 has Liaotung controversy, 4, 
 5, 9; has railway built by 
 Russia, 11; seat of Russo- 
 Japanese war, 12; finds Japan 
 taking Russia's place, 75-77. 
 
 Marcosson, Isaac F.: on British 
 preparedness for trade war, 
 247. 
 
 Marine, merchant: needed in 
 China, 221, 222. 
 
 Marshall, Chief Justice: on deal- 
 ing with enemy property, 154. 
 
 Massingham, H. W. : on wrong 
 done to Germany, 257. 
 
 Matsui, Ambassador: delegate at 
 Paris, 169. 
 
 Menace to China: French, 3; 
 Russian, 2; German, 6, 16-18, 
 25, 65, 191 ; Japanese, 65, 173- 
 176. 
 
 Meyer- Waldeck, Gov.-Gen. : hoists 
 white flag at Tsingtao, 58. 
 
 Might, rule of: that of Japan, 
 60, 64, 81, 186; in seizing 
 enemy property, 158; shown 
 in Great War and at Paris, 
 210, 211. 
 
 Militarism: Japanese, 60, 64, 
 210; strengthened in China, on 
 entry into war, 102, 103, 129, 
 130; Prussian and other kinds, 
 210, 257, 258, 262; bad for 
 China, 212, 264. 
 
INDEX 
 
 325 
 
 Militaristic faction in China: in 
 the saddle, 102, 103, 168, 169, 
 214; declare for independence, 
 102; in control, says Dewey, 
 214. 
 
 Military Convention : between 
 China and Japan, 133, 134. 
 
 Military Governors : support 
 Premier in calling for war, 
 102; retire to Tientsin and de- 
 clare independence, 102; sup- 
 ported by democratic nations, 
 264. 
 
 Military necessity: claimed by 
 Japan in violating China, 61, 
 286, 288; in Belgium and 
 Shantung compared, 42. 
 
 Military railway : built by Japan 
 in China and asked removed, 74. 
 
 Military strength of Japan: rec- 
 ognized at Paris, 169. 
 
 Millard, Thomas F.: on bringing 
 war into China as a pawn, 42; 
 on Japan taking initiative, 45; 
 on restoring Kiaochow to 
 China, 52, 53; on Japanese 
 army in Shantung, 55; on 
 seizing enemy property in neu- 
 tral country, 61; on Japan's 
 high-handedness, 68 ; on Yuan's 
 wise course, 69 ; on China's 
 early proposal to enter the 
 war, 86; on China and U. S. 
 A. joining in alliance, 93; on 
 Japan's scheme to detach 
 China from U. S. A., Ill; on 
 proposals of Chinese delega- 
 tion, 184; critic of Japan, 223. 
 
 Mines: in Shantung, as conces- 
 sion to Germans, 28, 31 ; in 
 South Manchuria, given to Ja- 
 pan, 76; in Hanyehping Com- 
 pany, held by Japan, 77; in 
 Shantung, pass to Japan by 
 Peace Treaty, 185, 186. 
 
 Ministers in Peking, foreign: 
 urge on China close associa- 
 tion with Allies, 110; send 
 Note to China on her entry 
 into war, giving assurances, 
 118; action of, as viewed by 
 author, 119, 120. 
 
 Missions, missionaries: Catholic 
 and France, 2; as viewed by 
 Prince Kung, 2; German, 
 killed, 6; riots against, 17, 18; 
 under German protectorate, 
 18; Allied Ministers on 
 China's sending delegate to the 
 Pope, 137, 139; of Germans, 
 prohibited in treaty and this 
 a wrong, 163-166, Appendix 
 III and IV; as treated by 
 Germans and Japanese, 176; 
 nationalizing missions a dan- 
 gerous policy, see Appendix 
 IV; good work of British in 
 China, 247; good work of 
 Americans in China, 255. 
 
 Mixed Court procedure: adopted 
 in Manchuria, 75. 
 
 Mongolia: position there gained 
 by Japan, 76, 77. 
 
 Monroe Doctrine: applied to Ja- 
 pan, 195. 
 
 Moral influence: of Japan in 
 China, 233-238. 
 
 Moral reform: needed in China, 
 208-210; needed in Japan, 238. 
 
 Morphine, trade in: by Japan, 
 233-237 ; by British and Amer- 
 icans, 236, 237. 
 
 Morrison, Dr. George E. : China's 
 official advisor, but helps 
 American Minister on war 
 question, 91 ; gives financial 
 reason for China's entering the 
 war, 107. 
 
 Morse, H. B.: on Li Hung- 
 chang's finesse, 4; on Britain 
 as being against break-up of 
 China, 9; on Chinese sov- 
 ereignty in Kiaochow, 24; on 
 Tsingtao as free-port, 24. 
 
 Motono, Viscount: Note to 
 French and Russian Embassies 
 as to German rights to pass 
 to Japan, 114; about Military 
 Convention, 133. 
 
 Nationalizing: of Christian Mis- 
 sions as viewed by English. 
 Friends, 164, Appendix IV. 
 
326 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Naval base: as referred to 
 Tsingtao, 25, 40, 41, 44. 
 
 Negotiation, mutual: disallowed 
 at Paris Conference, 279. 
 
 Neutrality: of China, infringed 
 in Russo-Japanese war, 12; 
 China's efforts at, fail in 
 World War, 38-40; of China, 
 violated by Japan, 56, 59, 61, 
 Appendix I; China urged to 
 give up, 85, 86, 89, 93, 100; 
 Wilson's plan to eliminate, 85 ; 
 neutral Americans, how treated 
 by British in China, 148, 149. 
 
 North and South: as divided in 
 China an evil, 212-214. 
 
 North China Herald: quoted on 
 liquidating enemy property, 
 152; quoted on morphine trade 
 in China, 236. 
 
 Occupation, forceful: by Japan 
 of Shantung, 59, 288. 
 
 Okuma, Count: on Japan's op- 
 portunity, 43 ; consulting about 
 Britain's request for aid, 48; 
 professes well, 52. 
 
 Open covenants: as professed but 
 as absent from part played in 
 China, 115, 117, 118. 
 
 Open door: policy favoured by 
 Lord Salisbury, 9; Hay's pol- 
 icy, guaranteed by Japan and 
 others, 11; violation of, by 
 Japan receives American pro- 
 test, 82; modified by Lansing- 
 Ishii agreement, 126-129; still 
 needed, 142, 143. 
 
 Opium: curse to China, 1; trade 
 in, by Japanese, British and 
 Americans, 235-238. 
 
 Oppenheim : teaches non-appro- 
 priation of private enemy 
 property, 155; says League of 
 Nations should start in Hague 
 Conferences, 279. 
 
 Outlook, The : on Japan's control 
 in China, 232; on Japan's true 
 course, 240. 
 
 Overlack, T. W. : on spheres of 
 interest, 8. 
 
 Pacifism: in China, 212. 
 
 Palmer, A. Mitchell: as Cus- 
 todian of Alien Property, 153; 
 on right to ruin (Jerman busi- 
 ness, 154. 
 
 Parliament, Chinese: restored by 
 President Li, 89 ; acts on ques- 
 tion of severing relations with 
 Germany, 100; began to oppose 
 war proposals, 101 ; refuses to 
 be coerced on war question, 
 102; dissolved, 102, 103; re- 
 starts in Canton " Constitu- 
 tional Government," 103; 
 gives no sanction to China's 
 declaration of war, 106; new 
 election needed, 214. 
 
 Passive-ism : in Taoism of China, 
 212. 
 
 Peace: of Far East upset by 
 war, 38, 50; China urged to 
 forsake, 84; Wilson's teaching 
 concerning, a mistake, 85 ; best 
 for China, 211, 212; how to be 
 lasting, 260; world-wide, as 
 once taught by Wilson, 261 j 
 in the spirit, 265. 
 
 Peace Conference, Paris: China's 
 desire to attend, 87, 91, 99, 
 191; receives Memorial from 
 Society of Friends, 163; bound 
 by previous compacts, 171, 
 
 179, 306; wrongs China, 176, 
 
 180, 199, 200, 201; Sino- 
 Japanese questions outside 
 purview of, 190; displeases 
 China, 205, 206; camouflaged 
 by Shanghai Conference. 213; 
 its bad impression on Chinese, 
 244, 252. 
 
 Peace conference in Shanghai: 
 its purpose and work, 213. 
 
 Peace Table at Paris: see Peace 
 Conference. 
 
 Peace Treaty: of China in 1842, 
 1; of China- Japan, 4, 5; at 
 Portsmouth between Japan 
 and Russia, 12; of Versailles, 
 see Versailles. 
 
 Peking: as centre of intrigue in 
 war, 85-112. 
 
 People: German, as friends, vi; 
 
INDEX 
 
 327 
 
 British, different from govern- 
 ment, 40, 49; Japanese, differ- 
 ent from government, 40, 63. 
 
 Phelan, Senator: on Japan's ex- 
 pansion in Asia, 225. 
 
 Philippines: Chinese trade in, 
 222. 
 
 Political influence in China: how 
 far right for Japan, 230-233. 
 
 Ports, Chinese: leased to foreign 
 nations, 6, 7, 16, 21; of Kiao- 
 chow, 7, 20-27; of Tsingtao as 
 free-port, 24, 26; of two kinds, 
 treaty and under exclusive 
 control of one nation, 21 ; 
 called commercial, in interior 
 of China, 76. 
 
 Portsmouth treaty: its gains to 
 Japan, 12. 
 
 Preconceptions : as to war in Eu- 
 rope wrongly applied to con- 
 ditions in China, 268. 
 
 Predominance: of Japan in 
 China, 66, 81, 135, 189, 226- 
 228, 232, 233, 245; of Japan 
 and Great Britain as rivals, 
 15, 243, 246, 247. 
 
 Preferential rights to foreign na- 
 tions in China: to France in 
 South China, 8; to Germany 
 in Shantung, 29; to Japan in 
 Shantung, 72; to Japan in 
 Manchuria, 71; to Japan in 
 Fukien, 78. 
 
 Principles, much needed: to be 
 applied on all questions, 261- 
 280; as taught by Wilson, 261. 
 
 Pro-Ally: as a party in China, 
 acting on the war question, 99. 
 
 Pro-Chinese : versus pro- Japa- 
 nese by the author, v, vi. 
 
 Pro-German: as to events in 
 China author more so than 
 pro-Ally, vi; accused as being, 
 when one argues that China 
 should take no sides in the 
 war, 123; accused as being, 
 when one criticizes seizure of 
 private enemy property, 158; 
 suspicion of being a bugaboo, 
 269. 
 
 Pro- Japan: party in China fa- 
 
 voured close relations with Ja- 
 pan, 99, 100, 169. 
 
 Propaganda: of all kinds equally 
 bad, 273. 
 
 Property, private enemy: seized 
 in a neutral country, 60, 61; 
 to be sequestrated, 115; liqui- 
 dation of, demanded by eight 
 Legations in Peking, 137, 139, 
 141, 151; mandate for liqui- 
 dation of, issued by China, 
 after Armistice, 137, 139, 141, 
 151 ; forced sale of, contrary 
 to Chinese ideas, 150; seizure 
 of, opposed and then helped 
 by Americans, 150, 154, 161; 
 safe under American-Prussian 
 treaties, 153, 160; liquidation 
 of, contrary to international 
 law, 155, 156 
 
 Property, German State : at Kiao- 
 chow allotted Japan, 189; in 
 German concessions of Chinese 
 ports allotted China, 193. 
 
 Protectorate: of Catholic mis- 
 sions in China, 2, 18, 139; by 
 Japan in China suggested, 141, 
 142; by joint foreign control, 
 proposed for China, 141-143. 
 
 Protest: none made by Britain 
 on Japanese action in Shan- 
 tung, 59; none by China over 
 Japanese demands about Shan- 
 tung, 73, 178; made by Ameri- 
 can Government over Sino- 
 Japanese agreements, 82 ; made 
 by China over Lansing-Ishii 
 agreement, 128. 
 
 Railways: by Russians in Man- 
 churia, 11; by French, 11; by 
 Germans in Shantung, 11, 27, 
 28, 186; by British, 11; by 
 Americans, 10; Tientsin-Pukou 
 line, 14, 31, 60; in Shantung, 
 seized by Japan, 59, 60, 61 ; 
 those to be built in Shantung 
 give preference to Japan, 72, 
 187, 188; extended rights to 
 Japan in Southern Manchuria, 
 75; Shantung Railway passes 
 to Japan in Peace Treaty, 185; 
 
328 
 
 INDEX 
 
 under Japanese control, a dan- 
 ger to China, 188, 191 ; should 
 be under Chinese control, 220, 
 221 ; concessions for, to Japan 
 and to others compared, 191, 
 226. 
 
 Rape of Shantung: a wrong 
 phrase, 33, 34. 
 
 Rapprochement: needed between 
 China and Japan, 218. 
 
 Reconciliation: needed between 
 China and Japan, 218, 240, 
 242; needed by China with 
 Germany, 218, 219; needed 
 among all belligerents, 260, 
 265, 266, 268. 
 
 Reforms in China: begun in 
 1889, 8; of moral kind needed, 
 209, 210. 
 
 Reinsch, Paul S. : American 
 Minister, partly responsible 
 for China's entrance into the 
 war, 84, 89, 90, 96-98; advises 
 China to join Allies while 
 America was neutral, 86; agi- 
 tates in turning China against 
 Germany, 90-94; doubt as to 
 his responsibility in China's 
 declaring war, 103, 104; on 
 June 9, 1917, has to send a 
 note to China declaring entry 
 into war only secondary mat- 
 ter, 104; interprets Lansing- 
 Ishii agreement different from 
 Japanese view, 127; how he 
 helped autocracy in China, 
 130; on Japan's trump card, 
 239; sued author, when editor 
 Peking Post, for libel, 252. 
 
 Repatriation of Germans: from 
 China, secretly agreed upon 
 by Japan and Entente, 113, 
 115;- mandate for, issued by 
 China after Armistice, 141 ; as 
 carried out, 151, 152, 266, 267. 
 
 Republic, Chinese: a chance un- 
 der President Li, 100, 130; 
 through war agitation, ceases 
 to be. 103. 
 
 Requisition of Grerman property: 
 secretly agreed upon for China, 
 113, 115; demanded by eight 
 
 Legations, 137, 139; by Chi- 
 nese mandate, 141, 151 ; as re- 
 lated to law and right, 152-162. 
 
 Reservations to Peace Treaty: as 
 proposed in the Senate, 202. 
 
 Restoration of Kiaochow: in 
 promise made to Germany, 52; 
 agreed upon with China, 70, 
 80; ought to be carried out, 
 239, 303. 
 
 Restricting area of war: in lan- 
 guage of Earl Grey, 37; as 
 seen in German and English 
 purpose, 42, 45. 
 
 Reunion: essential to China, 
 212-214. 
 
 Revolution in China: of 1911 
 and after, 14; the fourth, 131. 
 
 Richter, Prof. Julius: on Ger- 
 man Missions, 164. 
 
 Righteousness and Right: mixed 
 up with intrigue, 117; pro- 
 fessed at Peace Table, 199, 
 200; how far it has ruled or 
 failed, 153, 180, 204, 263, 265. 
 
 Rights: German, how acquired, 
 19, 171, 172, 176-178; Chinese, 
 trampled upon, 19, 178; Rus- 
 sian, ceded to Japan, 12; Ger- 
 man, claimed by Japan, 66, 
 69; of Germany, allotted Ja- 
 pan at Peace Conference, 171, 
 177, 179, 182, 185, 188, 189. 
 
 Riots: in 1897 in China, 17. 
 
 Rivalries, commercial: in China, 
 10, 13, 15, 147-162, 243, 245, 
 246, 247, 250, 254, 255. 
 
 Robertson, J. W.: on Japan as 
 hope of Asia, 241. 
 
 Rockhill, W. W.: on Britain 
 seeking Japan's aid, 47. 
 
 Rosthorn, Dr. von: Austrian 
 Minister, China's friend, and 
 his note to China, 111. 
 
 Russia, Russians : encroaching 
 on China, 2; understanding 
 witli Li Hung-chang, 4; push- 
 ing into Manchuria, 5, 6; rail- 
 way in Manchuria, 6, 11; aims 
 at Kiaochow, 6; leases Port 
 Arthur, 7; sphere of interest, 
 9; dispute with Britain over 
 
INDEX 
 
 329 
 
 Manchuria, 9, 10; certain 
 rights ceded to Japan, 12 
 with France, one group, 13 
 itg Bolshevist menace, 143-145 
 future influence in China, 245 
 will have relations with Ger 
 mans, 259. 
 
 Saionji, Marquis: delegate at 
 Paris, 169. 
 
 Salisbury, Lord: about Kiao- 
 chow, 6; in clash with Russia, 
 9; in clash with Germany, 9; 
 hears about German action of 
 1897-8, 17. 
 
 Schools in China: German in 
 Shanghai, seized by the 
 French, 150; German in 
 Shanghai allotted French and 
 Chinese together, 194. 
 
 Secret diplomacy: insisted on in 
 Twenty-one Demands of Ja- 
 pan, 65; in schemes of Entente 
 and Japan to China's injury, 
 112-117, 179, 302, 303, 305; 
 called a dubious way by Dr. 
 Arthur J. Brown, 117. 
 
 Selden, Charles A.: gives out in 
 N. Y. Times secret agree- 
 ments in Tokio, foot-note, 114, 
 115. 
 
 Self-determination : applied to 
 Kiaochow, 171, 172; needed in 
 China, 222, 274. 
 
 Self-development : granted to 
 China, 274. 
 
 Senate, United States: reserva- 
 tion on Shantung Articles in 
 treaty, 202. 
 
 Sequestration : see Liquidation 
 or Requisition. 
 
 Settlements, foreign: see Conces- 
 sions. 
 
 Severance of diplomatic relations 
 with Germany: China urged 
 to follow America and then 
 complies in so doing, 85-100, 
 123. 
 
 Shantung, province of: under in- 
 fluence of Germany and Brit- 
 ain, 7; occupied by Japan, 
 
 59, 64; suffers from Japan's 
 demands for German rights, 
 68, 69; forms separate Head 
 in Versailles Treaty, 180-190; 
 subject to two misconceptions, 
 184, 185. 
 
 Shepherd, William G.: on Ger- 
 man plans to renew trade, 258. 
 
 Siam: unfriendly attitude to 
 Christian Missions because of 
 Peace Treaty, 300. 
 
 Sisson, Francis H. : on England's 
 trade schemes, 248. 
 
 Smith, Charles Stevenson: helps 
 Dr. Reinsch in war issue, 91. 
 
 Snow, A. H. : on German action 
 in China in 1897-8, foot-note 
 17, 18; on German conduct in 
 China, 173; against Japan's 
 claim, 177. 
 
 South and North: division in 
 China, 213, 214. 
 
 Sovereignty: Chinese, still held 
 in Kiaochow, 23; held by 
 China in Shantung, 32, 185; 
 of Shantung, Manchuria and 
 Mongolia threatened by Ja- 
 pan, 77. 
 
 Spargo, John: on Bolshevism in 
 Asia, 144. 
 
 Special interests and position in 
 China: sought by Japan, 77, 
 225; recognized as Japan's in 
 Lansing-Ishii agreement, 126- 
 128; not accorded China, 273, 
 275. 
 
 Spee, Admiral von: head of Ger- 
 man Pacific Squadron, 41; de- 
 feated, 41. 
 
 Spencer-Cooper, Commander: on 
 aims of German squadron in 
 Pacific, when war opened, 41. 
 
 Spheres of interest or influence 
 in China: begun by France, 8; 
 by Russia, 9; by Germany, 9, 
 27, 29; by Britain, 9; by Ja- 
 pan, 9, 78; Japan's, grows 
 after war with Russia, 12; 
 British, threatened by Japan, 
 77. 
 
 Spies, foreign: to be warned 
 against, 273. 
 
330 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Spiritual factor : must be first in 
 China, 208. 
 
 Steps taken to bring China into 
 the war: were three, 85. 
 
 Sturdee, Admiral: defeats Ger- 
 man Admiral, 41. 
 
 Sun-Yat-sen: in first revolution, 
 14; opposed to China's entry 
 into war, 106, 109; warns 
 Lloyd George on entangling 
 China, 108; of constitutional 
 party, 264. 
 
 Supreme Council in Peace Con- 
 ference: Japan a member, 169; 
 decides China's fate, 171, 180, 
 200, 224; spurns China's re- 
 quests, 200, 201. 
 
 Suspicion: by Chinese of Japan, 
 74. 
 
 Tang Shao-yi : opposed to China's 
 entry into war, 106; of con- 
 stitutional party, 264. 
 
 Taylor, Alonzo E.: on no repara- 
 tion without German trade, 
 259. 
 
 Terauchi, Premier : favours Japa- 
 nese influence in China, 135. 
 
 Territory, acquisition of : by Ger- 
 mans in China, 19; by Britain 
 in Hongkong and Burma, 1, 
 9; by French in Annam, 2; by 
 Japan in Korea, 12; ought to 
 cease in China, 22, 276; a bad 
 policy pursued by Japan, 230, 
 233. 
 
 Tibet: subject of Britain's de- 
 mands on China, 124-126. 
 
 Times, New York: prints secret 
 agreements of Tokio, 114, 115. 
 
 Tokio: as centre of intrigue in 
 the war, 112-117. 
 
 Tong, Hollington K. : on direct 
 negotiation with Japan, 217. 
 
 Tong King-Sing: unselfish Chi- 
 nese merchant, 222. 
 
 Trade: see Commerce. 
 
 Treaty: see Peace Treaty; of 
 1898, by China with Britain, 
 France, Germany and Russia, 
 7; between China and Ger- 
 many, 19-31; by Japan with 
 
 others about China, 13; con- 
 ception of, by Japan, 13, 179; 
 signed at Versailles, see Ver- 
 sailles; when made under 
 duress, 17, 34, 68, 69, 183; 
 Sino-Japanese, of 1915, 69-79; 
 about abrogating, 177-179; of 
 1918 between China and Ja- 
 pan, 133-135, 188. 
 
 Tribune, New York: warns of 
 danger of China joining En- 
 tente with Japan as leader in- 
 stead of joining America, 101. 
 
 Tsai Ting-kan: helps bring 
 China into war, 91. 
 
 Tsai Yun-pei: of pro- Ally group 
 on war question, 99. 
 
 Tsao Yu-lin : of pro- Japan group, 
 99. 
 
 Tsinan-fu: railway to, from 
 Tsingtao, 27 ; entered by Japa- 
 nese troops, 59, 60. 
 
 Tsingtao: see Kiaochow. 
 
 Tuan Chi-jui: as premier, 89; 
 at first opposed to war pro- 
 posals, 91 ; came under Japan's 
 influence, 99; took lead in ar- 
 guing for war, 101 ; gets aid 
 of Military Governors in de- 
 manding war, 102; dismissed 
 from office, 102; defeats Chang 
 Hsun, 103; again becomes 
 Premier, 103; head of mili- 
 tarists, 132, 168; makes agree- 
 ments with Japan, 133, 134, 
 168; a military Premier, 264. 
 
 Ultimatum: by Japan to Ger- 
 many, 50. 51; by Japan to 
 China, 68, 81. 
 
 United States: see America. 
 
 Unity, national: needed in 
 China, 212-214. 
 
 Universal brotherhood: see 
 Brotherhood. 
 
 Van Dyke, Dr. Henry: favours 
 an Anglo-American-Japanese 
 Alliance, 218. 
 
 Versailles Peace Treaty: uses 
 phrase, " German rights," 19, 
 176; compared unfavourably 
 
INDEX 
 
 331 
 
 ' with 1915 Sino-Japanese agree- 
 ments, 70, 71, 72, 79, 80, 178, 
 179, 188; stipulates right to 
 confiscate private property and 
 companies, 156, 158, 159; on 
 restricting German Missions, 
 163, 165, Appendix III and 
 IV; confirms wrongs already 
 done to China, 168, 183; be- 
 low professed ideals, 168; 
 forces Germany to renounce 
 her treaty rights in China, 
 176-178; makes disposition un- 
 der head " Shantung," 180-190; 
 also, under head " China," 192- 
 194; brings wrong into Cove- 
 nant, 195; not signed by 
 China, 200, 206 ; first-fruits of 
 League, 199; reservations to, 
 by U. S. Senate, 202; puts re- 
 straint on German opportuni- 
 ties in China, 256; more to be 
 criticized than League of Na- 
 tions, 277; its weakest link is 
 " Shantung," 277 ; should have 
 been based on Wilson's princi- 
 ples, 279; not satisfactory to 
 Wilson, 305, 308; agreed to 
 from fear of Japan, 307, 308. 
 
 Viviani, M.: keeps secret trea- 
 ties of Tokio hid from Ameri- 
 cans, 115. 
 
 Wang, C. T.: delegate at Paris, 
 170; eloquent in English, 170; 
 speaks of Japan's hold on Pe- 
 king like pincers, 191. 
 
 War: the "Opium," 1; the 
 Great War, see World War; 
 with France in 1883, 2; by 
 China with Japan, 3, 4; 
 Russo-Japanese, 12; to be fol- 
 lowed by treaties, 34; first 
 European and then World 
 War, 36-43; the war spirit 
 still alive, 262. 
 
 Washington's Farewell Address: 
 quoted, 278. 
 
 ^\eak nations: like China, to be 
 helped, 275, 276. 
 
 Weale, Putnam: on Germans in 
 Tsingtao, 27; on Britain's ap- 
 
 peal to Japan, 43; on Twenty- 
 one Demands, 65; on Japan 
 as sword of Damocles, 79; on 
 Foreign Debt Bureau, 221; 
 critic of Japan, 223. 
 
 Westlake, J.: on lease of terri- 
 tory as alienation, 23. 
 
 Wheeler, W. Reginald: on 
 Reinsch as factor in inducing 
 China to join the Allies, 103. 
 
 White peoples: fighting each 
 other in presence of yellow 
 races, 57. 
 
 Williams, E. T. : thought Japan 
 might leave Peace Conference, 
 197. 
 
 Wilson and Tucker's " Interna- 
 tional Law " : against molest- 
 ing private enemy property, 
 155. 
 
 Wilson Administration : policy 
 of, in China, vi; concerned in 
 China's entrance into war, 84; 
 as related to consortium, 251, 
 252. 
 
 Wilson, Woodrow: on German 
 people, vi; only partly re- 
 sponsible for China's joining 
 the war, 84, 85, 89, 90, 96, 97 ; 
 asks China to break with Ger- 
 many, 85, 90; new theory of 
 making war a potential world 
 war, 85; followed by Presi- 
 dent Li as a neutral, 89; dis- 
 claims that help was promised 
 China, 97, 98; ignorant of se- 
 cret compacts made in Tokio, 
 113, 116, 171, 302, 305; per- 
 haps suggested to President of 
 China idea of warring not as 
 an ally, 110; speaks of com- 
 mercial war, 147; speaks of 
 danger still from imperialistic 
 schemes, 145; promised not to 
 seize German property, 153; 
 later seemed to sanction such 
 liquidation, 153, 161; exhorts 
 observance of right with proud 
 punctilio, 161 ; countenances re- 
 striction of German Missions, 
 163; followed at Paris by 
 Chinese delegates, 171 ; decides 
 
332 
 
 INDEX 
 
 China issue at Paris, 171; on 
 colonial claims, 172; hard task 
 in helping China at Paris, 179, 
 303 ; has a misconception as to 
 transfer of Shantung, 184; 
 wished to insert in treaty 
 clause on religious liberty, 
 196; feared Japan might re- 
 tire from Peace Conference, 
 197, 307, 308; speaks of in- 
 justice to China and explains 
 his action, 198, 199; discusses 
 Fiume, 203, 204; should apply 
 to China, 204; was trusted too 
 much at Paris, says Chinese 
 delegate, 206 ; disappointed the 
 Chinese, 252; announced great 
 principles on war and peace, 
 261 ; quoted on a conquest by 
 " friendly helpfulness," 265 ; 
 on " impartial justice," 269 ; 
 on " airs of an older day " 
 stirring again, 270; on serv- 
 ing liberty everywhere, 272; 
 on each nation living its own 
 life, 274; on "interest of the 
 weakest," a sacred task, 275; 
 on " common devotion to 
 right," 276; approved by 
 China's President, 277; on a 
 " general alliance " of " com- 
 mon rights," 278; should have 
 made his principles Preamble 
 to treaty, 279; conversation 
 with U. S. Senators on Peace 
 Treaty and China, Appendix 
 V. 
 
 World, N. Y.: on Versailles 
 Treaty worse than League of 
 Nations, 277. 
 
 World War: succeeds European 
 War, 36 ; no business in China, 
 36-43 ; brought havoc to China, 
 168; should have been a war 
 for principle, 262; should have 
 overthrown autocracy, 263 ; 
 ended on basis of Wilson's 
 principles, 279. 
 
 Wu, C. C: helps bring China 
 into war, 91; supposed to 
 draft letter to German Min- 
 ister, 94; favoured imion with 
 America on war question, 99; 
 quoted concerning Britain's 
 demands about Tibet, 126. 
 
 Wu Ting- fang: Minister Foreign 
 AflFairs, 91; favoured aligning 
 with America on war question, 
 99; wanted China at Peace 
 Table, 99; becomes acting 
 Premier, 102; refuses to coun- 
 tersign mandate to dissolve 
 Parliament, 103; quoted on 
 democracy versus militarism, 
 131 ; of constitutional party, 
 264. 
 
 Wyllie, W. L.: on Grerman Pacific 
 Squadron, 41. 
 
 Young China: appealed to, on 
 China's entering the war, 91 ; 
 captivated by sweeping away 
 the " archaic," 92 ; favoured 
 aligning with America, 99; 
 turned away from Premier's 
 leadership on war question, 
 101; democratic ideas of, not 
 backed by democratic nations, 
 264. 
 
 Yuan Shih-kai: in Korea, 3; in 
 coup of 1898, 8; becomes Presi- 
 dent, 14; not liked by Japa- 
 nese, 3, 14, 39, 65; improves 
 arrangement with Germans, 
 29; asks author to work for 
 China's neutrality, 38; accepts 
 Japanese advice as to war 
 zone, 56; receives Twenty -one 
 Demands, 65; has plan to save 
 face, 67; prevented revolt, 68; 
 able to lessen Japan's demands, 
 69; makes tentative overture 
 on joining the var, 86, 87 ; as 
 compared with Li Yuan-hung, 
 88. 
 
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