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CHINA, CAPTIVE OE FEEE
CHINA,
CAPTIVE OR FREE?
A Study of
Chinas Entanglements
BY
Rev. gilbert REID, A.M., D.D.
DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHINA
Author of "Glances at China," " Anti-foreign DisturbanceB
in China," "Revolution and Religion," and "A
Christian's Appreciation of Other Faiths,"
and many books in Chinese
NEW YORK
DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY
1921
u/ t) i£j ,ij
CorrRioHT, 1921
Bv DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY, IHO.
PRINTED IN U. S. A.
eOOK MANUFACTURERS
R A H W A V N E.W JERSEY
i
w
ZD5
PEEFACE
"Now it can be told" — ^not because the facts have not
fy been known or because any censor has forbidden their
fj publication, but because the temper of the reading public
t^ has not yet escaped the bias of war and resumed the calm-
i\^ ness, poise, fairness and broad-mindedness of days before
the war. America by entering the war and through glory
of achievement has not suffered militarily, but morally.
Not until one reaches the lofty idealism of ** being just
. to those to whom we wish to be just, and just to those to
^ I whom we do not wish to be just," will he read with patience
' such a book as this.
^ The author primarily is an advocate of justice the world
over, but, to be intelligently just, there comes the task of
accommodating thinking to the process of discrimination.
In times of war, and under the behests of war, conscience
; must be set to sleep, and loyalty must shape itself by cur-
.^ rent opinion, loftily proclaimed, that one's own nation and
^ all her associates are of necessity immaculate, and the op-
v^ posing group without any virtue which Heaven or man
may recognize. When peace dawns, and reconstruction is
undertaken — undertaken on the basis of real re-conciliation
— then policies and systems, customs and governments must
be discriminated from peoples and the individual, and even
in the individual one must learn to see both good and evil.
So far as peoples are concerned, and not the character
of their dominating, governmental policies, the author
acknowledges that as a resident in China of nearly four
decades, he is pro-Chinese, rather than pro-Japanese or
even pro- American, but, even so, the views presented are
Y
vi PREFACE
not altogether the Chinese view; they are his own views.
His views are based on a knowledge of existing facts, such
as the average person does not generally see, and the ex-
pression of these views is made with the intent of being
fair, undetermined by prejudice for or against any par-
ticular people. In being loyal to the truth and true to
the facts, the author does not gainsay that other fact, that
lie is, and has been, and will continue to be, supremely
interested in the welfare of the Chinese people and of
China as a nation.
As to the treatment meted out to China by other nations,
or, more specifically, other governments, the reader will
observe that Japan at certain stages vis-a-vis China is
severely criticized, but after all no worse than the criticism
of Great Britain and no worse as to Great Britain than the
criticism of the author's own government, or the policy
pursued towards China by the Wilson Administration dur-
ing the delirium of war. Other readers who read here and
there a line will refuse to face the facts as they reveal
favourably the German temper of mind on the eastern out-
skirts of Asia, far removed from the real seat of the awful
conflict in arms. All that the author asks for in the way
of indulgence is a patient study of the facts. He acknowl-
edges that as to the comparative relationship of Allies and
Central Powers to China during the last few years, and
as to the policy pursued and their general demeanour, he
may be classed more as pro-German than pro-Ally, but here
again the reader is asked to study the facts. At bottom,
the worst that can be said is that by the behests of Pres-
ident Wilson he has had, and still has, "friendship and
sympathy for the German people," and has refused to
discard his friendship because certain governments were
determined on war.
A certain amount of respect may be accorded the author,
if it be known that for adhering to his convictions and out
PREFACE vii
of love for China he was made to suffer not only for China,
but with China, and underwent some tragic, amusing and
puerile persecution from the great diplomats of four Le-
gations, British, French, Japanese and even American. The
U. S. Constitution, like the Sermon on the Mount, both
"slumbered and slept."
Out of supreme interest in the permanency and well-
being of China, he foregoes the personal factor, and callj
on all peoples to give China a chance and to help her
defend her rights.
Let the reader — and may there be many in many lands —
"read, learn, and inwardly digest" the facts as here told
and the truth at which the author has aimed.
Gilbert Beid.
February, 1921.
CONTENTS
I A Background of Foreign Encroachments 1
II Germany's Menace to China and Ger-
many's Rights 16
III Intrusion op the War into China : Britain
AND Japan in the Lead .... 36
IV Japan's Inroads in China .... 63
V The Injury to China through American
AND Allied Intrigue 84
VI A Series of Aggravations and Perils to
China 121
VII Commercial Eivalries as Affecting China 147
VIII The Blow Struck at China at the Peace
Table 168
IX The Future Prospects of China . . . 206
X Japan's Future Influence in China . . 223
XI The Future Influence of "Western Na-
tions in China 243
XII Vital Principles versus Spoliation . . 261
' APPENDIX
I The Neutrality of China .... 281
II A Chinese President's Proclamation on
the War, and Editorial Comments . . 290
III The Versailles Treaty Concerning the
Christian Missions of Germany . . 295
IV The Problem of German Missions . . 297
V Conversation of President Wilson and
U. S. Senators . . . . . .302
VI China's Attitude to the Anglo- Japanese
Alliance 309
Index 313
CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE
CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
CHAPTER I
A BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS
The contact of European civilization with the peoples
of Asia and Africa, and the American continents, makes
sad reading for the man of justice. As to the one country
of China, with a long record of civilization, statecraft,
philosophy, art and religion, the question arises, "Has
China been blessed or cursed by Western civilization?"
The seriousness of China's international relations began
in the early eighties in the growing rivalry and conflict
between China and Japan, with Korea as a centre. Before
that time. Great Britain, France and Russia were the chief
countries in the forceful opening of China to the trade,
missions and diplomacy of the rest of the world, accompa-^
nied by minor acts of encroachment, interference and
seizure of territory under the legal guise of treaties. Look-
ing at the sad havoc of the years, Japan may well claim that
she is no worse than European nations in their treatment of
China. From China's standpoint all outsiders are bad, with
no sign of repentance. I mention a few outstanding facts.
Great Britain began her aggressive policy with the
"Opium War," ending in the treaty of 1842, whereby the
island of Hongkong became an English crown colony.
Justin McCarthy, speaking of ways to justify British
action, says:
But no considerations of this kind can now hide from our eyes
the fact that in the beginning and the very origin of the quarrel
1
2 CHINA, CAPTIVE OE FREE!
we were distinctly in the wrong. We asserted, or at least acted
on the assertion of, a claim so unreasonable and even monstrous
that it never could have been made upon any action strong enough
to render its assertion a matter of serious responsibility.^
France seconded the war operations of the British and
directed her efforts henceforth to the religious task of being
Protector of Catholic Missions, and indirectly of Chinese
converts. It is hence easy to understand the desire once
expressed by Prince Kung that China might be free of
* ' opium and missionaries. ' ' Opium from 1842 spread more
and more throughout China, while missionaries, both Cath-
olic and Protestant, harassed the Chinese Government by
so-called "difficulties," dependent for settlement on the
frequent application of the "gun-boat policy."
Concerning the view that China presented "a vast field
of lucrative opportunities for British merchants," J. 0. P.
Bland writes : *
The wars of 1842 and 1858 were deliberately undertaken for the
development and protection of that field, at a time when Eng-
lishmen had no reason to anticipate serious rivalry in the reaping
of its harvests.
Russia during these years had encroached from the north
on the Amur region of Manchuria, and from the northwest
on Chinese Turkestan. China more and more realized that
Russia was the "Big Bear."
The general policy of the United States to China as to
Japan was that of generosity, made conspicuous by Caleb
Cushing and Anson Burlingame.
In 1883 and 1884 hostilities arose between China and
France, resulting in China's losing the suzerainty of
Annam and Tongking, which passed to the control of
* "A History of Our Own Times," p. 166.
* " Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 256.
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 3
France as part of her colonial empire. France became the
menacing factor on China's southern frontier, as Russia
was on the north.
About the same time — actually in 1882 — after Great
Britain and the United States had induced Korea to make
with them commercial treaties, thus impairing China's
suzerainty of Korea, the Chinese Government dispatched
to Korea a young officer, Yuan Shih-kai, with a small force
of 3,000 men, to maintain China's rights and prestige.
Friction between Chinese and Japanese ambitions grew
more intense. This young Chinese was viewed by Japan as
an antagonist and became still more so, some twenty years
later, when as President he was the "strong man" of China.
Russia, too, in the early eighties, entered upon the scene,
and was looked at askance by Japan even more than by
China. Korea was already the centre of international
intrigue.
The question of Korea, whether or not to be attached to
China as to a suzerain Power, was an object of interest to
Japan. Out of this question has sprung Japan's ever-
expanding ambition — or, in another phraseology, has be-
come a progressive nation like those of the West. Japan's
"peaceful expansion" on the Asiatic continent goes by the
decade and in terms of war : first, 1894, in war with China ;
second, 1904, in war with Russia; and third, 1914, in war
with Germany. By 1924 will it be war with Britain, or the
United States, or a decadent white race?
It was 1894 when Japan found a sufficiently plausible
reason for announcing a casus belli against China. In the
conflict the Chinese navy, trained by British officers, fell
into the hands of Japan. The Chinese army, mostly of
the old style, was defeated, retreating from Korea and
Manchuria. Peking, the national capital, was threatened.
The Chinese Government sued for peace. China was humil-
iated in the eyes of the world. Japan of a sudden rose to a
4 CHINA, CAPTIVE OB FREE?
commanding position among the Great Western Powers —
the only strong Eastern Power in all Asia.
The man to make peace on the Chinese side was the great
Oriental diplomat, Li Hung-chang, aided by an American,
John W. Foster. The Japanese diplomat was Count Ito,
already known to Li Hung-chang, and more sure of success
because his diplomacy was backed by military conquest.
All that China had to do was to submit.
In the first article of the treaty the responsibility was
laid on China to "recognize definitely the full and com-
plete independence and autonomy of Korea, ' ' a captivating
phrase. As for Japan, she made no declaration to this
effe^.
"Besides an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels (about 40,000,-
000 pounds sterling) which Japan demanded of China,
there was also the cession of the island of Formosa, of the
Pescadores group, and of the peninsula of Liaotung at the
southern end of Manchuria. This latter comprised Port
Arthur, China's strongest fortification. It was in reference
to the latter cession that Li Hung-chang displayed his
skill as an Oriental diplomat. Before leaving Peking for
peace negotiations at Shimonoseki, he came to an under-
standing with the Russian Minister to intervene on China's
behalf. Thus, no sooner was the treaty signed, than the
Russian Government, backed by France and Germany,
** recommended" to Japan the retrocession of Liaotung, in
lieu of a further indemnity of 7,500,000 pounds sterling.
The joint advice was in these words :
Such territorial acquisition constitutes a menace against the
capital of China, renders Korea's independence merely nominal,
and jeopardizes the perpetual peace in the Far East.
Concerning this act of finesse, H. B. Morse writes :
Mr. Foster declares that he first heard of the demand during his
stay in Peking, April 24th to May 2nd, and that "Li Hung-
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 5
Chang waited anxiously for some indication from Russia, but
none was received by him till we reached Tientsin on our return."
This disposes of the possibility of any direct assurance having
been given; but none the less, the viceroy must have had a rear
sonable expectation that the action would be taken.^
In this connection, as bearing on Japan's future policy
of expansion, John W. Foster writes :
I have reason to believe that the demand for territory on the
mainland of China was contrary to the better judgment of
Marquis Ito. ... In my conversations with Count Mutsu, I
told him I was satisfied Russia would not pei-mit Japan to occupy
the mainland so threateningly near to Peking, and that it was not
good policy to insist upon it.^
The war, and then the peace settlement, of China and
Japan in 1894 and 1895, have had serious, unexpected,
and far-reaching bearings, all linked up in one way or
another with the political manoeuvers of the present war.
(1) First of all, the way was open for Russia to push
her interests in Manchuria as China's "true friend," and
to find at last an outlet to the sea.
(2) The policy of China's dependence on loans from
European Powers was initiated for meeting at once the
indebtedness to Japan. France and Russia made a joint
loan of 400,000,000 francs, and British and German bankers
advanced jointly two loans of 16,000,000 pounds sterling
each. The British required of the Chinese that as the
maritime customs was to be the security, the Inspector
General of the customs should be a Britisher so long as
Britain held the preponderance of foreign trade. This
arrangement now spurs on the Japanese to be preponderant
' " The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. HI,
p. 47.
• " Diplomatic Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 163.
6 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
in China, both politically and commercially, in place of
Britain.
(3) More serious for the political integrity of China was
the policy adopted in 1898 of acquiring in the name of lease
small sections of Chinese territory and some of China's
most important harbours, capable of fortification. The
country responsible for the first move was Germany, a new
factor in China's international relations. Germany's am-
bitions to have a place in the sun, as it shines in old Cathay,
succeeded those of Great Britain, France,* Russia, the
United States, and Japan. The impelling cause of Ger-
many's action, so calamitous to China, was these two fol-
lowing facts: — (a) Two Catholic missionaries of German
nationality, and connected with a new diocese in western
Shantung under a German bishop, were killed by a Chinese
mob near the close of 1897. A fitting penalty, in line with
the long-established policy of Force, was demanded. Rep-
aration had in fact been made prior to the ingenious pro-
posal — no part of the reparation — that Germany have a
port of her own. This policy, along with the circumstances
that gave rise to it, I criticized then, and criticize still more
strongly today, (b) Still more important was the fact that
Russia had already begun the Chinese Eastern Railway in
Manchuria, and was advancing to a position of dominating
influence, if not territorial acquisition, at Port Arthur, at
the harbour of Dalny, and in Liaotung, which only two
years before had been retroceded by Japan to China. Russia
was also reported as having been assured by China of a
concession in Shantung of Kiaochow Bay and harbour.
Moreover, a memorial had been presented to Lord Salisbury
in 1896, by one who had investigated the region, that the
British Government take steps to get co^trol of this un-
developed port.^
Amid such a clash of powerful rivals, China preferred
* I Baw the memorial while living in Peking at the time.
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 7
Germany to both Russia and Great Britain, who already
had won a dominating influence. By admitting Germany,
a check could be placed on Russia and Britain, just as
Russia, France and Germany had been a check to Japan.
It had always been the diplomacy of Li Hung-chang (and
successful it had proved to be) to play one nation against
another. This meant equilibrium for China, and national
security.
The German Government, conscious that German inter-
ests were deprived of the special advantages which Britain,
France, Russia and even Japan had acquired, negotiated
with the Chinese Government for the leasehold of Kiao-
chow. This included the harbour and hamlet of Tsingtao,
as yet undeveloped. The treaty was signed March 6, 1898.
The lease was made out for ninety-nine years.
March 27, following the example of Germany, a Conven-
tion was signed by China and Russia, leasing Port Arthur
and Talien-wan (Dairen) to Russia for a term of twenty-
five years. Russia thus secured the strongest fortification on
the China coast. She acquired that which was objected to
in the case of Japan three years before, but it is well to
remember that Japan's stipulation was for permanent ces-
sion, while that of Russia was for a lease during a short
period of years.
April 3, Great Britain insisted on a Convention with
China, and, July 1, signed the Convention, leasing Wei-
haiwei in the province of Shantung to Great Britain "for
so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occu-
pation of Russia.'* This port, together with the island of
Liukungtao, was opposite to Port Arthur, on the other side
of the Gulf of Pehchihli, and opposite to Tsingtao, on the
other side of the Shantung peninsula. Next to Port Arthur
it was China's most important naval base and land fortress.
France, too, had her demands. May 27, France and
China signed a Convention leasing to France a harbour on
8 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
the sonthem coast of Canton province (Kuang-tung),
known as Kuang-chow-wan, for a period of ninety-nine
years.
— It IS interesting here to note that in this same year, 1898,
though after the forced lease of territory to the four Euro-
pean Powers, there came, under the leadership of Emperor
Kuang-hsii, the hundred days of reform, succeeded by the
coup d'etat of the Empress Dowager and her reactionary
measures. Yuan Shih-kai, back from Korea, was conspic-
uous in bringing on the coup. This was an internal blow
at China's well-being.
(4) Another intrusion on China's sovereign position was
the adoption of the policy of spheres of interest, sometimes
called spheres of influence. The latter is more a political
term, leading gradually to China's dismemberment. Con-
cerning a sphere of interest, T. W. Overlach says:
Its essential element is a negative one: namely, the term ex-
presses the principle that no other power except the one in
whose favour the "sphere of interest" exists shall be permitted
to acquire concessions or to exert any control or influence whatso-
ever — not to speak about military occupation — at the same time
giving the privileged power a monopoly of the right to seek
concessions.^ .
The root of this dubious policy was in the special demands
made by France, after the hostilities of 1883 and 1884, with
reference to Chinese provinces bordering on Annam. The
southwestern province of Yunnan was especially affected.
After the China-Japan war, the French extended their
sphere to the provinces of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi,
where was located the leased territory of Kwang-Chou-wan.
Great Britain, however, managed to secure counter conces-
sions both in Kuang-tung and Yunnan, as a check on
* " Foreign Financial Control in China," p. v.
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 9
France. Most important of all, as a counterbalance to
the French Indo-China empire, Great Britain, July 24,
1886, arranged with China that Burma should pass from
the suzerainty of China to the complete control of Great
Britain.
^ Recognition of the Russian sphere of interest in the three
provinces of Manchuria, leading up to the acquired lease
of the Liaotung peninsula in 1898, succeeded that of France
in the southern provinces, and was also contrary to the
original desires of the British Government as represented
by Lord Salisbury. Russia's insistence on her right to
make her own arrangement with the Chinese Government
led finally to Britain's acquiescence.
Germany's sphere of interest was a part of the momen-
tous transactions pertaining to Kiaochow in 1898. Lord
Salisbury did not like the trend of events, but in true diplo-
matic style yielded to Germany 's wishes to avoid all danger
of a clash. H. B. Morse says :
England had no desire to see the " break-up " of China, of
which these successive cessions (of 1898) seemed to be the be^-
ning; and, acting on her unvaiying policy in China, her one wish
was to maintain the equality of opportunity which had existed up
to that time.^
Japan also had her sphere of interest in Fukien province,
as a natural corollary of the cession in 1895 of the island of
Formosa.
Great Britain, in this nice political game of tit for tat,
brought forward the claim, to which she has held to the
present time, that the whole Yang-tsze valley, even includ-
ing the western province of Szechuan, must be the British
sphere of interest. The British Government, however, has
^ " The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. Ill,
p. 113.
10 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
found it no easy task to exclude other nationals from acts
of exploitation in the Yang-tsze basin.
As between Britain and Russia, an arrangement was
reached in April, 1899, that Britishers were not to seek
railway or mining concessions north of the Great Wall, and
Russians were not to seek similar concessions in the
Yang-tsze valley.
As between Britain and France, each has had the habit
of intruding on the "preserve" of the other, France gen-
erally making use of Belgium to soothe British suscepti-
bilities.
As between Britain and Japan, the former has never
wounded the Japanese sense of honour as related to prior
position in Fukien, though reciprocity has been made im-
possible through Japanese ambitions along the Yang-tsze
river.
As between Britain and Germany, the lease of Weihaiwei
to Britain was viewed by Germany as an infringement of
the German "preserve." Friction, however, was avoided
by Britain disclaiming any desire to obstruct. Notice the
official statement:
The British Government, in view of the approaching occupa-
tion of Weihaiwei, has spontaneously intimated to the German
Government that it has not the intention of injuring or calling
into question German rights or interests in the province of Shan-
tung, or of creating any difiBeulties for the German Government
in that province.^
(5) A final circumstance in the international relation-
ship of China was the battle for commercial concessions.
All nations took part in the scramble. Americans, disap-
proving of the other forms of encroachment, appeared as
active concessionaires, acquiring the concession for railway
* Rockhill, " Treaties with China," p. 180.
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 11'
between Hankow and Canton. The Russians were push-
ing the great Chinese Eastern Railway system, crossing
Manchuria from the Amur to Port Arthur. The French
began to build a line through Tongking into Yunnan. The
Germans were building the first line in the sacred province
of the Sages, across Shantung from Tsingtao to Tsinan-fu,
the provincial capital.
The British had rather the preponderance of first claim
in mines and railways. The Peking Syndicate acquired
control of the vast coal area in the northern provinces of
Shanse and Honan, and as to railways J. 0. P. Bland
writes :
In 1898, with the acute development of the " spheres of influ-
ence " regime and the assertion by Great Britain of special rights
in the Yangtsze Valley, five exclusively British railway concessions
in that region were extracted from China under severe diplomatic
pressure by the British Minister.*
These five phases of outside intrusion into Chinese life,
and often of unjust encroachment and inconsiderate inter-
ference, helped to bring on the Boxer uprising of 1899
and 1900.
This uprising, resulting in the siege of the Legations,
was disastrous to China. The Protocol, signed by all, and
forced on the Chinese, was from first to last punitive. In the
midst of much that was harsh, inconsiderate, and, as seen
today, unfair, there were two favourable circumstances,
one the preservation of Chinese autonomy through adher-
ence to the equitable policy of spheres of interest, linked
with the Hay policy of the open door in matters of ordinary
trade, missions and residence, and the other the preserva-
tion of the Manchu monarchy with protection accorded to
the old Empress Dowager, who was in many respects the
most guilty person in the whole anti-foreign uprising.
* " Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 270.
12 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
When, ten years after the China-Japan war, the war
arose in 1904 between Japan and Russia, Japan had her
second great opportunity to establish herself in China, not
so much on an equality with Western nations as in a po-
sition ahead of them.
This war had also certain effects on Chinese political
life: — (1) In waging the war the Chinese Government was
induced to give up its neutrality by granting a war zone
in Manchuria for both belligerents. As for Russia and
Japan, they both infringed on China's neutral territory.
(2) Russian rights and privileges in southern Manchu-
ria, including the retroceded Liaotung peninsula, were
ceded by the Portsmouth treaty to Japan. This established
Japanese influence not only in the south, in Fukien, but in
the north, in Manchuria.
(3) The arrangements made were first between Russia
and Japan and then between them and China. A clause
was introduced into the Sino-Japanese Convention, giving
Japan an exclusive position in southern Manchuria.
(4) Japan more than ever acquired a position in Korea
to the exclusion of both China and Russia.
(5) Japan, by her military operations, greatly enhanced
her prestige among the nations of the world.
Following close upon Japan's gain, if not complete vic-
tory, in the war with Russia, came the gradual absorption
of Korea. In the Portsmouth treaty of 1905 the indepen-
dence of Korea is not mentioned, but it states that Japan
"possesses in Korea paramount political, military and eco-
nomical interests. ' ' By 1906 Japan had a Resident-General
in Seoul, in the person of Count Ito. Then followed com-
plete control of Korea's affairs, in the name of a protec-
torate, and finally, in a very diplomatic way, the absorption
of Korea into Japan's national life in 1910. This, along
with the rights acquired from Russia in Manchuria, gave
a preponderance to Japan in affairs of the Far East. It
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 13
remained for Japan to make her power a menace or a help
to China.
A further move on the part of Japan for establishing
her leadership, and for having it recognized, was to make
Conventions concerning China with Great Britain, first in
1902, then in 1905, and then in 1911 ; with Russia in 1907 ;
with France in the same year ; and with the United States
in 1908. These conventions recognized, if they did not
guarantee, "the independence and territorial integrity of
China. ' ' This was much like the policy in Europe of strong
Powers neutralizing smaller States. The insult to China
was in the fact that outside nations proceeded, under Ja-
pan 's initiative, to negotiate about China, without negotiat-
ing with China, or doing it at China's request. China was
ignored in her own affairs.
These conventions also stipulated "equal opportunities
for the trade and industries of all nations," a splendid
theory if meant to be carried out, whether in peace or in
war.
There has never been anything sentimental in the foreign
policy of Japan, and her statesmen have from the first displayed
a thorough appreciation of the fact that Treaties and Conven-
tions between the great Powers may serve to conceal, but not to
hinder, the processes of geographical gravitation and the ulterior
purposes of statesmen.^
In a general way, there were two groups of concession-
hunters and financial exploiters. The one group was
French and Russian, with whom Belgium generally asso-
ciated. The other group was British and German, with
whom Americans and Japanese were more apt to join, as
the stronger combination. As early as 1895 the Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation made an agreement
^ J. 0. P. Bland, " Recent Events and Present Policies in China,"
p. 293.
14 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
with the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank to share all business
acquired from the Chinese Government. This co-operation
extended with only a slight break down to the Great War.
There were exceptional acts in this general grouping, as
when Belgians joined with British and Americans in con-
cessionary schemes, or British and French formed a Com-
pany for joint exploitation.
It should not be overlooked that after the Boxer up-
rising, the Germans, acting on business principles, rather
than under orders from German officialdom, adopted an
attitude to the Chinese that was conciliatory, friendly,
adaptable and co-operative. By this change Germans won
great success in matters of trade in China. The terms of
the agreement made with the Germans for building the
railway between Tientsin and Nanking (Pukou) were more
generous to the Chinese than in all previous concessions,
and when the British were admitted to the arrangement for
building the southern half, they had to agree to the same
liberal terms. In proportion as Germans succeeded, others
became jealous and plotted ruin.
The last great event prior to the World War was the
first revolution which took place in 1911, bringing about
the abdication of the Manchu House in 1912. In this revo-
lution as also in the second revolution of 1913, Japan had
the peculiar opportunity, if she cared to utilize it, of help-
ing to keep China weak by keeping her in turmoil. The
Japanese Government, as was natural, was more in sym-
pathy with the Manchu monarchy, while radical Japanese
were ready to give aid to the revolutionary party under
Dr. Sun Yat-sen. On the other hand, when Yuan Shih-kai
became President, he had but little support from any fac-
tion in Japan, owing to the old disagreements when he was
Chinese-Resident in Korea, prior to the China-Japan
Var.
_In the main, then, through the last two decades. Great
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS 15
Britain's preponderating influence was passing to Japan.
To both, Germany was the great competitor, and next came
the United States, with Russia and France receding in
matters of trade, but still busy in matters political. These
rivalries with threatening collisions encircled China. J. 0.
P. Bland says of Japan's steady advance:
By virtue of her geographical situation and her new military
prestige, Japan could not only assert preponderant political
claims at Peking, but she could hope to push her trade and
industries throughout China in successful competitioii with the
European Powers, her ally included.^
China's unfortunate position today, and the new crisis
in her political existence, are involved in the events of
previous years, wherein China was made to bend to the
will of stronger Powers. China may give thanks to High
Heaven, but to no one else. If she survives, it will be by
a Providential interposition, and not by the favour of men.
* " Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 294.
CHAPTER II
Germany's menace to china and Germany's rights
In nothing is it more difficult to exercise discrimination
of judgment, which is essential to being just, than con-
cerning Germany's position in China. The first disclosure
of German designs as a political factor, though coming after
the movements of Britain, France and Russia, and even of
Japan, did not increase the reputation of Germany. Other
countries made inroads after waging a war; Germany
threatened a war and then marched forward. The Chinese,
like the rest of civilized peoples, can never forget the threat
of the "mailed fist." It was a bad way to seek ac-
quaintance.
But, to be fair, Germany's strong action in 1897 and
1898 was no worse than the encroaching policy of other
Powers. The only great Power that was free from high-
handedness and territorial aggrandizement was, up to that
time, the United States.
Moreover, the forced lease of Chinese ports for exclusive
foreign control, and the insistent demand for concessionary
Tights, as pursued in 1898 by Germany, Russia, Great
Britain and France, were all on a par.
The one to complain or to censure was China alone, and
the four great military Powers of Europe were equally at
fault, if fault there was.
It is well to remember that Germany's menace to China
was not during the period of a World War or since,, but
sixteen years before. If menace there has been in these
latter years it has not been to China, but rather to the
commercial ambitions of rival nations.
16
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 17
Even in the year 1898, when the action of Germany for
gaining a foothold in China is open to condemnation, a
clear-cut, discriminatory analysis is incumbent, in the in-
terests of the law of righteousness. The treaty as to Kiao-
chow made between the two governments of Germany and
China was not the reprehensible part of their inter-rela-
tions, was in no wise an act of duress, but where the Ger-
mans are open to censure was in the settlement previously
reached for the massacre of two German missionaries. The
treaty, as a matter of fact, was subsequent to the use of ^
force and to what, after the event, may be called a harsh
settlement. At that time the general feeling among for-
eigners in China was that Germany aided all jother govern-
ments in insisting that Chinese officials give proper pro-
tection to missionaries. Riots had arisen in different parts
of China, and the British, French and American Legations
were wont to use pretty strong language to bring the
Chinese Foreign Office to terms. Let me quote from a
dispatch of Sir Claude McDonald, the British Minister, to
Lord Salisbury under date of December 1, 1897, as it ap-
pears in the Parliamentary Papers : ^
During the summer there were prevalent in this province
rumours of the kidnapping of children of foreigners, which pro-
duced much excitement, and placed the mission<aries in the in-
terior in great danger. The Governor, in spite of much pressure,
did nothing to suppress these rumours, and even by his attitude
gave them tacit encouragement. After repeatedly calling the
Yamen's attention to his conduct, I was at last obliged to desire
them to warn him that if any serious incident occurred as a result
of his anti-foreign spirit, he would find himself in jeopardy. This
I did in a note so long ago as the 27th of July and the result
was, according to a report from His Majesty's consul at Chefoo,
that active measures were at length taken to check the rumours
and the ferment thereupon subsided.
* See A. H. Snow's article in the Nation, September 20, 1919.
18 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
It is not possible at present to ascertain whether this agitation
has indirectly led to the present outrage, but the Governor's atti-
tude has been such as to induce full approval of the Qerman
demand for his dismissal.
Sir Claude writes thus of the dispatch of three small
German cruisers to Kiaochow Bay, on the massacre of two
German Catholic missionaries:
If the German occupation of Kiaochow is only used as a
leverage for obtaining satisfactory reparation . . . for the mur-
der of German missionaries, the effect on the security of our own
people will be of the best.
If, on the other hand, the German object is to secure Kiaochow
as a naval station under cover of their demands for reparation, it
is by no means clear that their acquisition of it will prejudice our
interests.
Mr. Snow, from whom I derive these valuable citations,
sums up in this admirable fashion :
The terms of the reparation settlement were agreed upon about
two months before the treaty was signed. The Governor was
degraded. The money reparation included compensation to the
relatives of the murdered priests, damages for injury to the
mission buildings, and a contribution to the building of mission
chapels near the scene of the murder. The reparation-money was
paid to the Roman Catholic authorities. Germany obtained for
itself and all foreign states an Imperial tablet condemnatory of
the anti-Christian and anti-foreign proceedings. The next year
the Vatican granted to Germany the ecclesiastical protectorate
over Roman Catholics in Shantung; this religious sphere of influ-
ence being subtracted from that of France, which had theretofore
extended over all China.
The treaty stated that the Chinese Government regarded the
occasion of the amicable closing of the reparation settlement as
an appropriate one for giving a concrete evidence of its grateful
recognition of friendship shown to it by Germany.
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 19
As to the compacts themselves, which were diplomatically
negotiated between the Chinese and German governments,
they deserve careful analysis, if only that we may judge
with a righteous judgment concerning the bewildering
action taken at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.
According to past usage, and even in the identical lan-
guage of the Versailles treaty, what Germany had in Shan-
tung was certain "rights." If she had any rights, they
were granted her by China and by China alone. These
rights, moreover, were determined by treaty of the two
governments of China and Germany, and by the action of
no other government. For others to strike a blow at this
contract is an offence to China as much as to Germany.
China has been wronged amid the upheaval of war just
because Germany has been wronged. Righteousness has
suffered even more. A contract has been ignored, a treaty
has been cast aside, and that by outsiders. Rights, both
of Chinese and Germans, have been trampled in the dust.
What, then, were German rights in China, particularly
in Shantung? What was the compact, solemnly sealed and
signed by the two governments, in March, 1898?
The contract is in two parts, the one a treaty respecting
the lease of Kiaochow to Germany by the Chinese Govern-
ment, and the other a treaty respecting railway and mining
concessionary rights in the province of Shantung. Note
the chief features.
I. The Territorial Lease
There are several features in this lease arrangement
which deserve special attention.
(1) Friendly relations between China and Germany
were asserted. In the preamble it is stated:
The Imperial Chinese Government considers it advisable to give
a special proof of their grateful appreciation of the friendship
shown to them by Germany.
20 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
And again:
The Imperial German and the Imperial Chinese Governments,
inspired by the equal and mutual wish to strengthen the bonds of
friendship which unite the two countries, etc., etc.
Article I also says:
His Majesty the Emperor of China, guided by the intention to
strengthen the friendly relations between China and Germany,
etc., etc.
»
All the treaties made by foreign nations with China, with
the notable exception of the punitive Protocol of 1901, suc-
ceeding the Boxer uprising, have given profuse expressions
of everlasting peace, amity and friendship. Fine phrase-
ology and professions of kindly sentiments characterize
both Occidental and Oriental diplomacy. They are gen-
erally tucked away in some preamble, which too often is
sugar coating to a bitter pill. Germany, therefore, was
conforming to good usage in proceeding to negotiate ter-
ritorial acquisition in China.
(2) The German acquisition of Kiaochow territory of
the Bay and the islands in the Bay was in the form of a
lease. Article II says :
His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Germany in
lease, provisionally for ninety-nine years, both sides of entrance
to the Bay of Kiaochow.
The leased zone was "a zone of 50 kilometres (100
Chinese U) surrounding the Bay of Kiaochow at high
water." Also "the whole water area of the Bay up to the
highest watermark at present known," and "all islands
lying seaward from Kiaochow Bay, which may be of im-
portance for its defence."
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 21'
The land zone, which was less than the zone of the Bay,
was about 117 square miles, smaller than that allotted to
either Russia, Great Britain, France or Japan. In the
hinterland, there was a neutral zone of some 2,500 square
miles. In the more limited area of the peninsula between
the east shore of the Bay and the sea lay Tsingtao and the
German Concession proper.
This was a new mode of getting control of another
country's land and harbour. Heretofore, the aim had been
to possess land and sea in perpetuity. The new aim was
better, but still bad. The nearest example was the leasing
of certain ports as treaty ports for the trade of all nations
and placed for the most part under foreign administration.
At treaty ports, the British had what is called a Settle-
ment of their own at Canton, Shanghai, Tientsin, and a few
other places ; and the French had what they called a Con-
cession in Shanghai, Tientsin and Hankow. In all these
cases the land was leased by the Chinese Government. Ac-
cording to the new arrangement Germany was to have
exclusive control of a port or leased territory. As to China,
the original owner and the other contracting party, it is
to be assumed that she was ready to make out the lease to
Germany and to no one else.
The treaty made special reference to the reasonable desire
of Germany to be treated in the same way as other nations.
Thus Article II :
With the intention of meeting the legitimate desire of his
Majesty the German Emperor that Germany, like other Powers,
should hold a place on the Chinese coast for the repair and equip-
ment of her ships, for the storage of materials and provisions
for the same, and for other arrangements connected therewith,
etc., etc.
Seeing that France had a great colonial empire on the
Pacific coast, and Great Britain had possessions all the waj^
22 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
from the Atlantic through the Mediterranean Sea and In-
dian Ocean to Hongkong in the Pacific, with an ever-
expanding grasp of power, it does not seem so reprehensible
for Germany to possess in a modified sense one open port,
that of Tsingtao in Shantung.
(3) The evident intention of both parties to the contract
was clearly that the arrangement made was between Ger-
many and China alone. For the territory to pass to Japan
or to any other country was not to be thought of. Article
V says:
Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return
Kiaoehow to China before the expiration of the lease, China
engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred
at Kiaoehow and to cede to Germany a more suitable place.
Germany engages at no time to sublet the territory leased from
China to another Power.
It is to be supposed that if any country was to secure all
the improvements gratis, that country was to be China, not
Japan, or any group of allied nations, representing them-
selves to the world as international.
While the phrasing used implies that Germany would
always want some place for her own special administra-
tion, it may be taken for granted that if other countries
should at any time withdraw from their leased territory
and give up extra-territorial jurisdiction, Germany would
consent to do the same.
The use, however, of the word "provisionally" in describ-
ing the limit of the lease to ninety-nine years gives the
natural implication that the occupation was thought of as
permanent. It is here that Germany did a great wrong
to China, but Great Britain, Russia, France and after-
wards Japan have been unable to pose as innocent, while
denouncing German culpability.
An English authority, writing of this form of lease, says ;
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 23
We must agree with Despagnet, who, after remarking that the
restoration of the temtory at the specified time is very unlikely,
says that these pretended leases are alienation disguised in order
to spare the susceptibility of the state at whose cost they are
made.*
Still, this possible alienation should not be stretched so
far as to allow at any time transfer to a third party in vio-
lation of other stipulations to the contrary. According to
the terms of the grant, the rights acquired by Germany
were unassignable and non-transferable.
(4) Chinese sovereignty was to be retained in the leased
territory, though administration was to pass to the Ger-
mans. Article III begins thus :
In order to avoid the possibility of conflicts, the Imperial
Chinese Government will abstain from exercising rights of sov-
ereignty in the ceded territory during the term of the lease, and
leaves the exercise of the same to Germany.
Article I defines the leased zone as granted by the
Chinese Emperor, and adds the clause, "while reserving to
himself all rights to sovereignty."
Article III also contains a clause that is slightly equivo-
cal. It reads :
In virtue of the rights of sovereignty over the whole of the
water area of the Bay transferred to Germany.
In this phraseology it is the water area of the Bay, not
the land zone, which admits of transfer of sovereignty.
Even so, it is the exercise of sovereignty that must be meant.
This was particularly necessary in regard to harbour regu-
lations in the Bay of Kiaochow.
Of Chinese residing in the leased area Article V says :
* J. Westlake, " International Law," p. 136.
24 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
The Chinese population dwelling in the ceded territory shall at
all time enjoy the protection of the German Government, pro-
vided that they behave in conformity with law and order.
H. B. Morse adds an important footnote:
The Chinese city of Kiaochow, situated inland from the head
of the bay, within the fifty-kilometre neutral zone, remained under
Chinese jurisdiction; the German port and administration centre
were at Tsingtao at the mouth of the bay.^
T. J. Lawrence disapproves of this division of sovereign
powers. He says:
In private law both lease and usufruct imply that the property
continues to belong to the grantor, while the grantee has the use
and beneficial enjoyment of it for the time and under the con-
ditions fixed in the grant.^
Then after referring to these leased territories in China,
he sums np thus:
In fact, the attempt to separate property or sovereignty on the
one hand from possession on the other, by the use of phrases
taken from the law of lease or usufruct, is in its very nature
deceptive ! ^
To show how far the Grermans, in acquiring this leased
area, were willing to co-operate with the Chinese, it was
agreed that Tsingtao should become a free port of trade,
and by subsequent agreements with Sir Robert Hart, In-
spector-General of Customs, it was arranged that the
Chinese customs administration should be established at
* " The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. Ill,
p. 109.
' " Principles of International Law," pp. 176, 177.
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 25
Tsingtao itself, and not on the boundary of the Chinese-
administered territory. "The free depot," says Mr. Morse,
"aided by the railway, prospered, but it was prosperity
based on an English free-trade policy, and not on the policy
adopted elsewhere in German territory. ' ' ^ This fact ought
to be kept in mind, when one feels called upon to exclude
Germany from all rights in Kiaochow territory as from
all her colonial possessions.
(5) There was also a military character to the purposes
and plans of the German leased territory. The preamble
states that the chief purpose or wish of both countries was
"to strengthen the bonds of friendship, which united the
two countries, and to develop the economic and commercial
relations between the subjects of the two States," while
Article I outlines two intentions in the mind of the Chinese
Emperor, the one "to strengthen the friendly relations
between China and Germany," and the other "to increase
the military readiness of the Chinese Empire." This par-
ticular feature of the contract has been overlooked by most
war-critics. Tsingtao was never meant by either party as
a menace to China (though possibly it might be construed
as a menace to Japan), but as an auxiliary agency in
Chinese plans for national self-defence. Hence not only
German troops were to be allowed "free passage" in the
leased zone, but Chinese troops were to be allowed to be
stationed within that zone.
Article II refers to the new fortifications thus :
Germany engages to construct, at a suitable moment, on the
territory thus ceded, fortifications for the protection of the build-
ings to be constructed there and of the entrance to the harbour.
Here, very clearly, the newly-built German fortifications
were for defensive purposes alone, not for offensive war-
fare, or as a naval base for attacking an enemy.
* " The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. IIL
p. 110.
26 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Chinese ships of war were also to be free from all re-
strictions, and from all dues, except those necessary in
harbour arrangements.
In a word, the new port became under German direction
more of a commercial town and a summer resort than a
military fortification. By the expenditure of vast sums of
money, provided annually by the German Imperial Gov-
ernment, Tsingtao became the model city of the Far East,
administered largely on the single-tax theory. By the in-
crease of trade, by the establishment of a high-grade gov-
ernment hospital and of technical schools under joint Ger-
man and Chinese control, and by the inauguration of Ger-
man missionary operations, carried on, side by side, with
those of American Societies, the Chinese had reason to
express a sincere admiration for the service being thus ren-
dered by an alien government to their own country.
Let us take the opinion of S. K. Hornbeck, once a teacher
in a Chinese Government College, and now professor in
the University of "Wisconsin. He says :
Before long a substantial breakwater, granite docks with com-
plete equipment and a floating dock capable of handling vessels
of 16,000 tons displacement had been installed. At Tsingtao there
soon appeared a modem German city, carefully planned, artisti-
cally and substantially built. Forts, shops, military departments
and well-equipped barracks gave the character of a fortified base ;
but Kiaochow was never given the military equipment or aspects
of a Port Arthur or a Vladivostok — as the comparative ease with
which it was recently taken (in 1914) shows.*
And again:
At Tsingtao and its environs more than 60,000 metres of ex-
cellent roads were built. Systematic afforestation was undertaken
both there and in the hinterland. Schools of all sorts were estab-
* " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 296.
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 27
lished, including a German High School with well-equipped
laboratories and library, and several faculties.^
Putnam Weale, writing ten years before the Great War,
says:
As has already been stated, this town of Tsingtao, on which
part of the Berlin millions have been spent, is excellently well
laid out. The streets are broad and admirable, and provided
with sidewalks of noble dimensions. Electricity lights all the
town, and a complete water-supply system has been installed.
There are good hotels and passable shops, a splendid parade
ground and fine military roads darting everywhere into the
country. Tsingtao is an unique creation in the Far East.^
//. The Concessionary Bights in Shantung
Perhaps the more important of the arrangements made
between China and Germany in 1898 had to do with railway
and mining concessions in Shantung province. They were
a part of Germany's subsequent demand for a sphere of
interest, to match the spheres of other countries, Great
Britain, Russia, France and Japan.
(1) Germans, in this new arrangement, received sanc-
tion to build a railway from Kiaochow (or Tsingtao) to
Tsinan-fu, the provincial capital, and from each of these
places to the Shantung boundary.
(2) To carry on this railway construction, **a Chino-
German Company shall be formed, " " and in this Company
both German and Chinese subjects shall be at liberty to
invest money if they so choose, and appoint directors for
the management of the undertaking. ' '
Here was a project for joint co-operation and manage-
ment, most commendable at that time, and capable of ulti-
mate good to the Chinese.
* " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 297.
» "The Re-Shaping of the Far East," p. 348.
28 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Another Article, No. Ill, adds: "All arrangements in
connection with the works specified shall be determined by
a future conference of German and Chinese representa-
tives." The arrangement of 1898 was merely an initial
move. But the general principle was a good one, that
nothing should be determined except by conference with
the Chinese authorities.
The same Article adds: "Profits derived from the work-
ing of these railways shall be justly divided pro rata be-
tween the shareholders, without regard to nationality."
(3) This railway enterprise, thus inaugurated by the
Germans, was to be separate from all political designs.
There might result a sphere of interest, commercial in
character, but not a sphere of influence, political in char-
acter. So Article III closed with these words :
The object of constructing these lines is solely the development
of commerce. In inaugurating a railway system in Shantung
Germany entertains no treacherous intention towards China, and
undertakes not to unlawfully seize any land in the province.
(4) Beside the project of railway building there was
another for opening mines. Article IV reads thus:
The Chinese Government will allow German subjects to hold
and develop mining property for a distance of 30 li (some 10
miles) from each side of these railways and along the whole
extent of the lines.
(5) Co-operation was also to be encouraged in these
mining operations, thus : * ' Chinese capital may be invested
in these operations." And again: "All profits derived
shall be fairly divided between Chinese and German share-
holders. ' '
(6) The improvement of commerce and of friendly re-
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 29
lations between the two countries is stated as the sole object
in mind.
(7) Then comes in a far-reaching stipulation, establish-
ing once for all a German sphere of interest, such as other
countries were allowed to have, thus:
The Chinese Government binds itself in aU cases where foreign
assistance, in persons, capital or material, may be needed for
any purpose whatever within the province of Shantung, to offer
the said work or supplying of materials, in the first instance, to
German manufacturers and merchants engaged in undertakings
of the kind in question. In case German manufacturers and
merchants are not inclined to undertake the performance of such
works or the furnishing of materials, China shall be at liberty
to act as she pleases.
(8) The concession for the railway was actually made out
in June, 1899, and granted to a syndicate, to be called
Shantung Railway Company (Sehantung-Eisenbahn-Ge-
sellschaft), with a capital of 54,000,000 marks, by the
German Imperial Government, which in turn had secured
the concessionary rights the previous year through treaty
from the Chinese Imperial Government.
This participation in railway schemes in China by the
German Government is similar to the way any American
syndicate, seeking for exploitation in China, must receive
a charter from some State Legislature.
(9) According to this new arrangement between the
German Government and the newly-formed syndicate, it is
specially stipulated that "German material shall be used,
as far as possible, in the construction of the railways."
In 1900, the noted Boxer year, while Yuan Shih-kai was
Governor of the province of Shantung, a new agreement
was made between him, as representing the Chinese Gov-
ernment, and the German Company. The authority for
policing and protecting was taken out of the hands of the
30 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Germans and placed exclusively in the hands of the Chinese
provincial authorities. China bound the Germans not to
utilize their railway rights in Shantung as Russians were
using theirs in Manchuria, and as Japan afterwards used
hers in the same region. Article 16 reads thus :
Should it ever happen that it becomes necessary for soldiers
to protect the railway outside of the 100-li zone, the Governor
of Shantung shall detail such soldiers, and foreign soldiers cannot
be used. The Governor of Shantung having consented to use his
utmost endeavours to protect the railway both in time of construc-
tion and operation, he must see to it that the railway receives no
injury from bandits.
If in any way it had seemed that China 's sovereignty had
been infringed upon by the original concessionary rights
granted to Germans, it was made clear in the new agree-
ment that China had complete sovereignty and political
control along the line of the railway, which were not
claimed by Germany.
Article 17 is equally specific:
The object of constructing this line is solely the development of
commerce, and it will not be permissible to transport foreign
soldiers or munitions used by foreign soldiers to any place outside
of the 100-li zone. If by any chance the peaceful relations
existing between China and any foreign Power become broken,
the railway will still remain under the management of the Com-
pany, but the Company must still observe the above rule. But
if the oflBces are seized by an enemy, and the Company loses its
control, then this province will no longer assume the responsibility
of protecting the Une.
The anomalous feature of the Great War was that Japan,
a friend, not an enemy of China, proceeded to seize the of-
fices of the Company and to exclude all Chinese provincial
protection.
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 31
Thfs railway from Tsingtao to Tsinan-fu, of about 250
miles in length, was completed in 1904 at a cost of 52,900,-
000 marks. The railway proved a paying investment, but
the mines were operated at a loss to the German Company.
Whatever the reason, by 1911, the Mining Area Delimita-
tion Agreement renounced most of the mining rights
granted in the Convention of 1898. In fact the German
Company retained for itself only two collieries and one
mine. The Japanese, however, in occupying Shantung,
made no distinction between mines worked by Germans and
those worked by Chinese.
After the completion of the Shantung railway there came
the building, as a Chinese Government enterprise, of the
grand-trunk line from Tientsin south to Pukou, opposite to
Nanking, wherein the northern section to the southern
border of Shantung was to be built and financed by a Ger-
man Company and the southern section by a British.
Towards the end of 1913, the Chinese Government
granted to Germans the further right to build two other
railway lines running west and southwest to connect with
railway systems already built, but on terms more favourable
to the Chinese than in the original agreements of 1898-9,
and like the terms governing the Tsin-Pu line.
Concerning the character of German commercial enter-
prise, let us quote from S. K. Hornbeek :
At first the Germans appeared bent upon asserting themselves
politically in Shantung. Practically everything in connection
with the railway was kept in German hands. German guards
were installed for the " protection " of the railway. A German
post-office was established. Germany seemed to be following a
policy similar to that which Russia had pursued in Manchuria.
But at the end of 1905 they began to withdraw their troops; they
handed over their post-offices to the Chinese; they made an agree-
ment whereby the Chinese Customs administration was to func-
tion at Tsingtao much as elsewhere in China — with the special
32 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
provision that twenty per cent, of the duties collected be con-
tributed toward the expenses of the local Tsingtao administration ;
and they began to employ Chinese in various capacities.^
In referring to the latest German concession of 1913, this
writer adds:
The Germans gave evidence of having relinquished the last
vestiges of an actively aggressive political policy, in favour of
commercial co-operation.^
He sums up the situation in the following language :
Since the original seizure of Kiaochow the Germans had made
no additional attempt to extend their territorial holdings or
special privileges in China. They had not undertaken to extend
their administration over Shantung — or even over the Railway
Zone. The Shantung Railway Company had never attempted to
assume a political status and perform political functions. The
German Government had not sought to stretch the terms of the
Convention of 1898. There had been no creating of issues and
demanding of immediate settlement such as had characterized the
progress of the Japanese in Manchuria. German subjects had not
exceeded their plainly stipulated rights; they had not invaded
the interior; they had not become engaged in personal and police
conflicts with the Chinese. There was in the later years of
German presence in Shantung little of which from the point of
view of the open-door policy, complaint could be made. For ten
years past the Germans had done practically nothing calculated to
complicate the politics of the Far East, and, except commercially,
they disturbed no peace in the Far East but the peace of mind
of Japanese expansionists. Judged upon the basis of substantial
accomplishment, successful and just administration and real con-
tribution to the economic and social welfare of the people who fell
within the range of their influence, none of the Powers holding
* " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 296.
• Jbid., p. 298.
/
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 33
fjases on the China coast can offer better justification for its pres-
ence than could the Germans.^
This was written in 1916, before the United States Gov-
ernment entered on war and began to put restraint on the
free, full and fair expression of opinions or the statement
of facts. My own observation leads me to corroborate what
is here said by Professor Hornbeck. "With a clearer knowl-
edge of German use of concessionary rights acquired from
China, one may the better judge of both the military and
commercial ambition of rival nations to uproot German
influence in China. He will be the just man who takes
the facts as they are in China, however favourable to the
Germans, and bases the attempt at righteous judgment on
real truth, untainted by the passions of war and bloodshed.
One of the latest books on the Far East, "The New Map
of Asia" by Herbert Adams Gibbons, makes this reference
to Germany's inroad into China in 1898.^
To assert that the Germans were alone to blame or even the
first to blame, as has been so frequently done during the recent
war, is to deny the facts.
And again:
The Japanese have no more contempt and the Chinese no more
dislike for Germans than for other Europeans. All are tarred
with the same brush. All have set the same example to Japan.
All have acted in the same way toward China.
In concluding this analysis it may be well to note two
exaggerations — slight deviations from truth — perpetrated
both on Germans and Japanese in their relation with the
Chinese. The one is spoken of as " the rape of Shantung, ' '
or the robber's seizure. Today Japan is thus condemned;
• " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," pp. 298, 299.
» " The New Map of Asia," p. 390.
34 CHINA, CAPTIVE OE FREE?
yesterday it was Germany. Of the two Germany is looked
upon as the greater criminal. *' Japan," it is said, "only
took stolen goods from the robber." If German rights and
the leased territory were stolen goods, then Japan should
hand them back to the rightful owner. If not stolen from
China in the first place, Japan had no legal right thereto,
for the contract was a personal one, between China and
Germany alone. In strict justice there was no robbery, or
plunder, or rape, on Germany's part, but a legal transac-
tion, a treaty agreement. Whatever measure of wrong may
be detected, the same measure must be meted out to Great
Britain, France and Russia, and, later on, to Japan, who
acquired similar leases of harbours and territory. Moreover,
if a forced lease is a theft, how much more a permanent
possession, as Great Britain in Hongkong, France in Tong-
king, and Japan in Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores.
The second exaggeration is that the transaction of Ger-
many leasing a Chinese port was illegal, because the treaty
was made under duress. The same charge has been since
made of the Sino-Japanese Conventions of 1915, one of
which bears on Shantung. If all treaties are to be abro-
gated because of the charge of force majeure, where are we
to stop? What treaties made with China would be left?
As a matter of fact, in most eases, the duress did not come
when a treaty was made, but before. Thus France secured
an indemnity in 1856, after some French missionaries had
been killed, and Great Britain acquired Hongkong by
treaty, after the Opium War. So the German Government
forced things when in 1897 two German missionaries were
killed, but the treaty of 1898 was of the same character as
all others made with China, or, if you please, forced on
China. The treaty part of Germany's action was similar
to the treaties made the same year by Great Britain, Russia
and France, and was subsequent to the reparation act al-
ready completed.
GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA 35
From a moral point of view the violence done to China
again and again by foreign Powers is to be reprobated, the
guilt or innocence of each is to be determined relatively, and
the righteous or commendable thing for all to do is for all
to hand back to China all that they have taken from her,
however acquired.
CHAPTER III
mTRDSION INTO CHINA OP THE EUROPEAN WAB: BRITAIN AND
JAPAN IN THE LEAD
The war that was raging in 1914 was not yet a World
War, it was only a European war. In it, Germany and
Austria-Hungary were arrayed on the one side, and Serbia,
Russia, Prance, Great Britain and Belgium were on the
other side. Hence this war had no business in Asia. What-
ever the diplomacy which carried the lighted torch from
the conflagration of western Europe far away into eastern
Asia, it was a diplomacy deserving our severest con-
demnation. Who, then, was the guilty party? Shall
China, in lamenting her present unfortunate situation, for-
get the primal source of all these woes in the political
manceuverings of the year 1914, August to December, and
the daring, drastic, unfeeling intrusion on China's political
integrity by the two island empires, Britain and Japan ?
If it is hard for an American of English and Scotch stock
to speak favourably of German conduct, even as seen in dis-
tant China, it is just as hard, yea, uncongenial and almost
irreverent, to acknowledge any wrong, or error of judg-
ment, or diplomatic waywardness, in those of one's own
kith or kin, our cousins across the sea, in their dealings,
past or present, with the yellow and brown races of the
Asiatic continent. But facts should overrule personal pro-
clivities in matters so serious as the destiny of an ancient
people. Personally I still hold in highest esteem the re-
ligious qualities, the mental alertness, the sense of fair-play
and the courageous resolve to defend among men civil and
religious liberty, which characterize the Anglo-Saxon race,
3e
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 37
but I cannot close my eyes to the diplomatic blunder and
illegal transaction concerning the neutral rights of China,
in the closing months of 1914, which characterized the pol-
icy of the British Imperial Government and then the joint
action of the Japanese Government. It was so-called "mil-
itary necessity" and arbitrary behaviour, with no concern
for China's rights, that went marching on through the
Shantung peninsula, under the two flags of Japan and
England, the mightiest of the East and the West.
What I here relate as to the actual facts that bear so
heavily on China's destiny comes from intimate knowledge
and close observation of the varied factors. To criticize
Japan is expedient and sane; to say aught of England is
both perilous and imprudent. What, however, are the
facts?
Two questions must be answered : first, Should the Euro-
pean War have been brought into China at all? and, sec-
ond. Who was responsible for bringing the war into China,
Japan alone, or Japan and Great Britain together? Fol-
lowing this, a little study will be worth while as to how
Japan waged the war in violation of international law, and
how afterwards she seized all German concessionary rights
in Shantung, in further violation of international law.
I. WJiy bring tJie war into Eastern Asia and on to
Chinese soil? If the war had been limited at the outset to
the four great belligerents of continental Europe, Austria-
Hungary, Germany, Russia and France, not only would
there have been a straight, fair fight, but also no occasion
for projecting war into the continents of the Americas, of
Africa and of Asia. But when England took part on the
one side, the whole British Empire was involved, and that
meant commotion in all the continents and on all the seas.
Before the first declaration of war, Sir Edward Grey had
exerted himself, not only to avoid war, but to keep it cir-
cumscribed to the narrowest limits, if war should actually
95032
38 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEt
arise. He wrote of "the gravity of the situation if the war
could not be localized"; he dreaded "the possibility of a
European conflagration. ' ' How much more a conflagration
spreading, as on the wings of the wind, to the populous
regions of eastern Asia. Surely the act of wisdom was to
put forth effort to keep Asia quiet, not to stir up turmoil.
As to whether China should be embroiled, she was the
nation most concerned, and her wishes should have been
first considered. In accordance with usage, the Chinese
Government promptly issued a proclamation of neutrality.
Efforts were also made to secure the co-operation of all
foreign residents in China for making easy the Chinese task
of preserving neutrality. I did my part at the request of
President Yuan Shih-kai. China also sought the govern-
mental action of Japan and of the United States, two neu-
tral nations to be deeply affected. Formal request was
made of Japan to join in measures for defending the neu-
trality of the Far East and for mutual well-being along
lines of peace. Japan was a neighbour, and might have
given China 's request a first place in her diplomatic action.
Japan as showing her trend abstained from declaring
neutrality, as China had done. Moreover, she had begun
to mobilize her forces. Japanese papers stated it thus:
**The war in Europe gives wings to the Tiger" (Japan).
The Chinese Government, realizing possible danger of
conflict on the territories leased to Great Britain, France
and Germany, as also to Japan, proposed a plan for neutral-
ization, thus making these territories as neutral as all ter-
ritory under Chinese control, or as the larger treaty-ports
under foreign control.
No obstruction came to the proposition from Germany.
She was as anxious to keep the war away from Tsingtao
as China was to keep it away from the whole of the China
coast. The German Minister, finding that Japan was de-
laying to give consent to the plan of neutralization, went
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 39
so far as to negotiate with the Chinese Government for
transfer to China of complete authority over the German-
leased area of Kiaochow. This re-cession to China was even
brought to the attention of the American Government by
the Chinese Government. Events were sweeping on with
electric speed, and this plan, like the other, failed of con-
summation. Japan's speed was too great for the rest of
the world.
Should these negotiations come to naught, it was the
wish of China, that if war by any means should approach
the China coast, it should continue to avoid the treaty-ports,
such as Shanghai, Tientsin, or Canton, and also Chinese-
administered territory; it must rigidly be restricted to the
limited areas held under lease by the nations at war. Even
this yielding on China's part ought never to have been
necessary. Certainly no more was to be expected.
The places likely to be affected under these contingencies
were the British leasehold of Kowloon (opposite to Hong-
kong), her leasehold of Weihaiwei on the north coast of
the Shantung peninsula, and the German leasehold of Kiao-
chow, with fortifications at Tsingtao, on the south coast of
the Shantung peninsula.
Much, therefore, depended on the respective purposes
of mind of the two antagonists, England and Germany, or,
more properly, of the British and German governments.
Much also depended on the tendency of the Japanese Gov-
ernment towards war or towards peace, towards helping
China and Yuan Shih-kai to remain neutral, or towards
embroiling China in the many complications incident to war
at one's own door. As for Japan, jealous of Yuan Shih-kai
since the early antagonisms over Korean affairs, and averse
to China's experiment in a democratic government, she was
more likely to make it hard for China than easy. When
China formally requested that Japan use her influence to
render China immune from warlike activities, the reply
40 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
was that the time was not ripe to consider the proposal and
that Japanese action awaited the war measures of Great
Britain.
As for Great Britain and Germany, everything depended
on the war schemes of the home governments and on the
larger issues of military strategy. In a word, China 's fate
rested not with the thoughts of peoples but with imperial-
istic governments, engaged in the great but perilous game
of war. The entrance of Japan into the war was not pop-
ular with the Japanese people ; and as for the majority of
British residents in China, there was sympathy felt for
China and dread of coming trouble, if Japan should enter
the fray. It was not until the British Government took
action, that the British resident in the Far East began to
discipline himself into enjoying the prospect of Japan as
an Ally waging war on Chinese soil.
As for the German Government, it sent on August 12
(1914) the following telegram to its ambassador in Tokio:
East Asiatic squadron instructed to avoid hostile acts against
England in case Japan remains neutral. Please inform Japanese
Government.^
The Japanese Government gave no reply, as it had given
no favourable response to the proposals of China.
The German Government, while anxious that Tsingtao
should not be attacked, did the fair thing by making no
attack or threat of attack, on either British or French
leased territories or on their colonial possessions. Russian
Vladivostok also remained immune.
But what was the cry from Japan and accepted as truth
the world round? Namely this: "Tsingtao is a naval
base." But what were the facts? This: the German Pa-
cific squadron, having left the China and Japan seas in
* German White Book, Appendix 40.
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 41
the summer months, sailed towards the southern Pacific
waters, not back to the China coast; all that remained be-
hind in Tsingtao was what an Englishman has described
as * ' only obsolete craft. ' ' Only one ship, the Embden, came
into Tsingtao harbour with dispatches from Admiral von
Spee, of the German Pacific Squadron, but by August 4,
along with four colliers, "apparently proceeded to cruise
in the neighbourhood of Vladivostok, where she captured a
Russian auxiliary cruiser and one or two merchant ships,
before going south to make history in the Bay of Bengal. ' ' ^
This author outlines five possible objects which the German
Admiral may have had in mind in this peculiar naval
strategy. Among these there is no mention of any purpose
to wage war in either the China or Japan Sea. He con-
cludes that the object "likely to yield a richer harvest"
than any other scheme was ' ' to harass our trade with South
America." For Britain or even Japan to make the attack
in that part of the broad Pacific was legitimate. In equal
proportion it was both wrong and needless to make attack
on the China coast.
Another Englishman, W. L. Wyllie, writes : ^ " The Ger-
man squadron was in the Carolines at the opening of war,"
and ' * curiously enough, made no attempt to return to their
base at Tsingtao." "During August and the first half of
September, Count Von Spee's ships steamed about in the
South Pacific." October 30, the squadron was about fifty
miles west of Valparaiso. November 1st there came the
battle with Admiral Craddock's ships, the Good Hope and
the Monmouth, in which the latter were sunk, the British
defenders dying an heroic death. December 8th, there oc-
curred the second naval battle, off the Falkland Islands,
in which Admiral Sturdee's squadron was victorious, and
* Commander Spencer-Cooper, " Battle of the Falkland Islands,"
p. 11.
» " Sea Fights of the Great War," pp. 83, 84.
42 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
the German ships were sunk, the German defenders dying
an heroic death. Thus before 1914 had come to an end, the
assumed threat of Tsingtao as a naval base had vanished.
The German purpose, different from the English, was to
restrict the war to Europe. If any fighting should take
place, far away from the centre of military action, let it be
on the high seas and not in a neutral country like China.
A battle between British and German fleets on any ocean
would have been legitimate, bringing no harm to others.
For either fleet to take possession of the island colonies of
the other country was also a fair game in war. But there
was dynamite in the proposal that an attack be made on
Tsingtao, still remaining under Chinese sovereignty, and
situated on the China coast.
To infringe on the neutral rights of Belgium may have
been construed by the German Staff as a "military ne-
cessity, ' ' but for Germany or Great Britain or any one else
there was no "military necessity" to thrust the European
War into the Far East, on to Chinese soil, for attack on
either British Weihaiwei or German Tsingtao. For a few
thousand isolated Germans, 4,500 in all, to be subjugated
by any kind of enemy force, whatever the flag, could have
no bearing on the ultimate issue of the war, either for or
against Germany. "Foreign leased territories in China,"
says Thomas F. Millard, * ' were only pawns in the war, and
could have been eliminated without affecting in the slight-
est degree the essential strategical zones of operations. ' ' ^
If the combined naval forces of Russia, France and Great
Britain, Germany's immediate antagonists, were insuffi-
cient to vanquish Tsingtao, it would have been better if
they had preserved the peace of the Far East by keeping
war nearer home and by using peaceful means in relation
to the Far East. Being unnecessary, uncalled-for, a mere
incident in a mighty struggle, such belligerent activities
' " Oux Eastern Question," p. 89.
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 4?
should have been discountenanced, all the more that
China's national entity and well-being might be impaired
or imperilled. This was the view I took at the time, think-
ing of China 's interests. What has happened since has con-
firmed me in this view. To bring the war from Europe to
Asia has been a calamity to China, though so worked as to
be a gain to Japan. Marquis Okuma was no doubt right
in thinking that the new circumstances afforded Japan "the
one opportunity of 10,000 years." As for China, they
brought the one catastrophe of 10,000 years. As between
Great Britain and Germany, the blow which Germany re-
ceived in the loss of Tsingtao and the glory which Great
Britain received have been too insignificant to deserve a
passing thought. Britons there are who now see that the
elimination of Germany and the expansion of Japan is no
more good to them than to China.
II. We now come to another question, one more of fact
than of opinion: Which country brought the war into
China, Japan alone or Japan in conjunction with Great
Britain?
Most writers and speakers have been accustomed to refer
to Japan as the guilty interloper. Few Americans or Brit-
ishers, especially those living in the Far East, have so much
regard and admiration for Japan as to exonerate her
through a division of culpability. An easier way of ren-
dering judgment is to assume one's own innocence and
cast all blame on one individual or on one nation. So far
as this is done, Japan is unfairly treated, and the cause of
justice dishonored.
Putnam Weale^ states the matter thus, in one of his
books :
Japan, after some rapid negotiations with her British Ally,
had filed an ultimatum on Germany.
* " Fight for the Republic of China," pp. 71, 84.
44 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Again, more explicitly:
There was also the feeling abroad [in Japan] that England
by calling upon her Ally to carry out the essential provisions of
her Alliance had shown that she had the better part of a bar-
gain, and that she was exploiting an old advantage in a way
which could not fail to react adversely on Japan's future world's
relationships.
Dr. Arthur J. Brown,^ relying for information on many
sources, sums up thus:
Great Britain early gave Japan a fine opportunity in connec-
tion with the German fortified post at Tsingtao in the province of
Shantung, China, which had been made one of the most formidable
fortifications in the world. Of course the British could not afford
to leave the Germans in possession of a naval base from which
the immense commerce of the Allies in the Far East could be
successfully raided and, as the British had their hands full in
Europe, it was natural that they should expect their more con-
veniently situated ally, Japan, to attend to this matter for them.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, one of many unholy al-
liances, was at the bottom of the unfriendly intrusion.
But in Dr. Brown's statement two slight errors are found.
One, the formidability of the fortification is stated with
exaggeration ; and the other, Tsingtao was not used as naval
base for raiding purposes, as is made clear above. The
main idea that Britain was the agent to present Japan with
a new opportunity of achievement is correct. How great
was the opportunity was probably not realized by the over-
burdened British Government. Britons might have hesi-
tated to call in such an ally, had they known where such
opportunity might lead.
Thomas F. Millard, who is known to be anti-Japan more
than anti-England, in two books, **Our Eastern Question,"
» " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 416.
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 45
published in 1916, and * ' Democracy and the Eastern Ques-
tion," published in 1919, holds to the view that "Japan
herself took the initiative contrary to the real desire of her
ally, and by force of circumstances compelled Great Britain
to acquiesce with, and officially to sanction, this diplomatic
fiction." He also says the belief held in America, that
"Japan entered the war because she was required to do so
by the Anglo- Japanese Alliance," is not a "correct" one.
There seems to be circumstantial evidence to uphold this
view. But official utterances speak otherwise. Too much
sympathy for Germany existed among educated men in
Japan, and particularly in the Army, to lead the Japanese
Government to make the first move towards expanding the
area of war or towards antagonizing Germany.
Major T. E. Compton, an English officer, writing in
November, 1918, says:
Whatever preoccupations the appearance of the Teuton in
China may have caused her, Japan, after her recovery of Port
Arthur in 1905, had no quarrel with Germany, from which
country her schools of medicine and science and, above all, her
army had obtained great benefits.
The fact which induced Japan to enter the war was the
opportunity for territorial expansion.
On the other hand, when Great Britain once entered the
war, it became her policy to call in the resources of all her
possessions for both offensive and defensive war. As Great
Britain was in the Far East, war, ipso facto, came there
also. She seemed ready to go to the ends of the earth and
there capture German possessions, both great and small.
From London the lines went out to all the world.
At the very time Japan entered the war, a correspondent
in the London Times (Aug. 24) urged British merchants
"to take advantage of every opportunity which may pre-
sent itself for diverting German commerce to our advan-
'46 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
tage. ' ' If Japan had an ulterior end in projecting the war
into China, the British had the same, except that perhaps
the Japanese end was political and tTie British commercial.
Subsequent events make clear the motive of both.
Now as to the origin of the war in the Far East, Baron
Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time in Marquis
Okuma's cabinet, said, in a speech in the Diet on Septem-
ber 4:
Early in August the British Government asked the Imperial
Government for assistance under the terms of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance.
Then, after recounting the terms of this Alliance, he
continued :
Therefore, inasmuch as we were asked by our Ally for assist-
ance ... we could not but comply to the request to do our part.
And again :
The Japanese Government therefore resolved to comply with
the British request, and if necessary to open hostilities against
Germany.
A statement previously issued by the Japanese author-
ities for publication in the press used these words: "The
Governments of Great Britain and Japan, having been in
communication with each other, etc., etc."
The British Government has never denied the statement
of fact, or charge, if you so desire to call it, that the British
Government asked for the assistance of Japan. The actual
documents of the negotiations have not been made public,
but the results are so obvious that they reveal the "inner
consciousness" of the two governments. In a true technical
sense, Japan was the only Ally which Great Britain had.
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 47
The relations of Great Britain to France and Russia were
only of an entente cordials.
The London Times on August 18, some two weeks be-
fore Baron Kato made his speech in Tokio, used these
words :
It should be said at once that the Japanese intervention has
not taken place without full consultation with Great Britain.
Later on, under date of September 25th, the London
Times used stronger language :
We appealed to our Ally in the terms of the Treaty, and she
has answered that appeal with the loyalty we have learned to
expect of her. . . . Japan had no desire to intervene in the
war. She has done so, the Emperor and his Ministers tell us,
because she could not break her promises.
According to Jefferson Jones ^ (a nom de plume), who
was familiar with the facts as they took place in Tokio, the
Japanese Government on August 2d expressed to the Brit-
ish a willingness to put in force the Anglo-Japanese Al-
liance, and by August 7 the British Ambassador in Tokio
"handed to the Foreign Office at Tokio a request that Japan
join in the European war."
The American diplomat, W. W. Rockhill, in an address
which he delivered in New York, November 12, the last
speech before his death, gave utterance to this careful
statement :
The action of Japan was taken after consultation with the
ally, Great Britain, and, inferentially, with the approval of
France and Russia.
Mr. K. K. Kawakami,^ who is in a position to know, de-
scribes how the war plan of Japan was set in motion by the
» "The Fall of Tsingtau," pp. 18, 20.
' " Japan and the European War," in Atlantic Monthly, November,
1914.
48 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
British Government, even prior to Britain's declaration of
war against Germany. These are his words :
The assertion that Japan thrust herself upon the war ■without
England's invitation is as sinister as it is unwarranted. Japan
did not join hands with England without England's request.
When it became evident that England must come to the rescue
of France and Belgium, the press of Japan, without exception,
hoped that Japan would not be called upon to aid her western
ally. But the western ally did call upon Japan.
On August 3, that is, the day before England declared war on
Germany, the British Ambassador to Japan hurried back to Tokio
from his summer villa and immediately requested an interview
with Baron Kato, Foreign Minister. At this conference the
British Ambassador informed Baron Kato that his government
was compelled to open hostilities against Germany and that it
desired to ascertain whether Japan would aid England in the
event of British interests in the Far East being jeopardized by
German activities.
Baron Kato answered that the question put to him was such a
serious one that he could not answer it on his own account.
On the evening of the same day Count Okuma convened a
meeting of all the Cabinet members. Bearing the resolution of
this meeting. Baron Kato, on August 4, called upon the British
Ambassador and told the latter that Japan would not shirk the
responsibilities which the alliance with England put upon her
shoulders.
At this time Japan did not expect to be called upon to aid
England for at least a few months. But on August 7 the British
Ambassador suddenly asked for an interview with Baron Kato
and told the Foreign Minister that the situation had developed
in such a manner as to oblige England to ask for Japan's assist-
ance without delay. On the evening of that day Premier Okuma
requested the " Elder Statesmen " and his colleagues to assemble
at his mansion. The conference lasted until two o'clock the next
morning. Before it adjourned the policy of Japan was definitely
formulated.
What caused Downing Street to invite Japan's co-operation so
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OP EUROPEAN WAR 49
soon is not clearly known to the outside world. But the Japanese
press is in all probability right when it says that Japan and
England were obliged to act promptly in order to frustrate the
German scheme to transfer Kiaochow to the Chinese Govern-
ment before Germany was compelled to surrender it at the point
of the sword. Had Germany succeeded in carrying out this scheme
she would still have enjoyed, in virtue of Article Five of the
Kiaochow Convention of 1898, the privilege of securing in some
future time " a more suitable territory " in China. This was
exactly the condition which the Allies did not want to see estab-
lished in China. If, on the other hand, Germany were forced to
abandon Kiaochow by the arbitrament of the sword, China would
no longer be under obligation to "cede to Germany a more
suitable place."
These words show plainly that the war measures to be
carried out in China originated with the British Govern-
ment. It is also disclosed that Japan and the European
Allies at the early days of the war had formed the great
plan to forestall Germany in her desire to ever have in
China a port of her own, as others had. Already the great
purpose was made clear that Germany must not only be
destroyed militarily, but eliminated, even from China.
It may be taken for granted that the British Government
— not the British people, or the British resident in China —
while approving and even desiring the military assistance
of Japan in the initial stages, was not bound to approve of
all that Japan did, to the very end of the war. But an
alliance is oftentimes a burden to either ally as well as a
prolific source of evil to others. Hence, if we desire to
overlook the personal factor, we may lay the blame for these
unfortunate transactions in China to so impersonal a factor
as the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, just as we may blame the
horrors and evils of the whole war, not on Germany or
Russia or Britain, but on war or ''special alliances."
The ultimatum which was sent to the German Imperial
50 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Government August 15 was not sent by Great Britain, a
belligerent, but by Japan, officially still a neutral, but of
course an ally of a belligerent. The document was diplo-
matically perfect. Japan bound herself by no unnecessary
limitations and proclaimed the most laudable of motives.
Notice the phraseology :
1. **To take measures to remove the causes of all dis-
turbances of the peace of the Far East."
2. "To secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern
Asia."
3. "To safeguard the general interests as contemplated
by the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great
Britain."
One not trained in the school of militarism or even in the
school of diplomacy might suppose that the best measure
for effecting peace would be a peaceful, rather than a war-
like measure, and for removing any cause of disturbance all
that might be needed would be to avoid creating a disturb-
ance through one 's own actions. For such peaceful designs,
Japan could have solicited the aid of so great a neutral as
the United States, and especially of China, the country most
affected. By mentioning "the Far East," and "Eastern
Asia" Japan was given a wide sweep of activity, but the
main concern was the little spot on the Shantung peninsula
known as Tsingtao. As stated above, this spot could have
been neutralized or re-ceded to China. As it was, there was
no disturbing element, for the German squadron had left
not only Tsingtao but "Eastern Asia," and the military
operations of the Germans were for defensive purposes
alone in the eventuality of attack by some outside enemy.
It was the entrance of Japan into war, on Chinese soil and
in Chinese waters, not the presence of a few Germans in
Tsingtao, that brought about * * disturbances of the peace of
the Far East," which have not yet ended with the signing
of the Versailles treaty of peace. Peace in all China was
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 51
upset by Japan's "measures" of war. The only "general
interests" safeguarded were those of Japan. Not only did
Germany lose the "equal opportunities of all," but Great
Britain, viewed relatively, lost much at the hands of this
her Ally. As for the "interests" of China they have been
totally neglected.
The ultimatum made to Germany had two demands :
First — To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese
waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and
to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.
Second — To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to
the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensa-
tion, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to the
eventual restoration of the same to China.
The Japanese, surely, are humourists, without the appear-
ance of humour. This might be called comedy, were it not
for the tragic events which followed.
An ultimatum, presented at so early a date to a Teuton,
was the surest way to bring about armed resistance. If the
real desire of the Japanese, and with them of the British,
was preservation of peace, they could have tried negotia-
tion, not an ultimatum ; and negotiation would have fared
better if left in Chinese hands, with Japanese rendering
hearty approbation. If the object was to bring about hos-
tilities, rather than to "remove the causes of all disturb-
ances," Japan, seconded by Great Britain, adopted the
wisest course.
Left in Chinese hands, the first element presented in the
ultimatum could have been quickly satisfied. The German
men-of-war had already left the confines of "Chinese and
Japanese waters," and the only way for Japanese men-of-
war to find them was to hurry after them in mid-Pacific
and take up a few German islands on the way. The other
52 CHINA, CAPTIVE OE FREE?
"armed vessels" left at Tsingtao might have been interned
at the request of China to Germany.
Left also in Chinese hands, the second element of the
ultimatum could easily have been complied with, except
that the restoration of Kiaochow to China would have been
immediate and not ** eventual."
Again we say, how much better it would have been for
China, for the peace of Eastern Asia, for the prevalence of
right, free from all sorts of complications and hindrances,
if Great Britain and Japan had jointly planned to put out,
rather than to kindle, the fires of both war and revolution.
It may be here noted that the promise of "eventual res-
toration" of Kiaochow to China was made to Germany
alone, and also on condition of immediate surrender of the
same to Japan. The words used freed Japan from obligation
to make transfer to China, if the territory should be ac-
quired in some other way than by compliance with an
ultimatum.
It has been reported that prior to the ultimatum, in con-
sultation with the Foreign Office in London, consent was
given to this proposal of Japan, if she "confine her war
operations to the China Sea," and "eventually turn over
Kiaochow to China. " ^ It is also stated that the day before
the ultimatum expired, the Japanese Minister in Peking
"tried to reassure China by stating verbally" that if
"Japan was compelled to occupy Kiaochow, that territory
would be returned to China after the war. ' ' ^
This matter of "eventual restoration" to China has con-
flicting interpretation from Japanese statesmen. "While
Premier Okuma, August 20, declared that Japan "harbours
no design for territorial aggrandizement and entertains
no desire to promote any other selfish end, ' ' and, August 24,
telegraphed the New York Independent that Japan had "no
* Jefferson Jones, " The Fate of Tsingtau," pp. 23, 24.
* Thomas F. Millard, " Our Eastern Question," p. 90.
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 53*
desire to secure more territory" (making no mention of
Tsingtao), Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said
in the Diet, early in December, that ** Japan had never com-
mitted herself to any foreign Power" "in the matter of
final disposition of Kiaoehow. " ^ It is clear now, that it
would have been easier for China to get back Kiaoehow
with no conditions fixed thereto, if this roundabout and
warlike method of Japan had been discarded. Intervention
has seldom proved a blessing to China, in her long ex-
periences with outside nations.
About the time the ultimatum was made known, the
Press Bureau in England gave out this announcement:
It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to
the Pacific Ocean, beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it
may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the
Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas,
nor to any foreig:n territory, except territory in German occupa-
tion on the continent of Eastern Asia.^
How far the Japanese conformed to this understanding
as to operations on the high seas, need not here be consid-
ered. There was really more reason for the two Allies to
unite in capturing enemy-ships or enemy-colonies, than for
them to attack the territory of China temporarily leased to
Germany. The latter operations brought more harm to
neutral rights and to the law of nations than the former
could possibly have done.
The fall of Tsingtao, as compared with battles in other
areas of the war, needs only brief notice. What happened
by way of supplement — the victory of Japanese diplomatic
finesse — will require years of investigation by students of
history, political science, and ethics, the world over.
When the time-limit of Japan's ultimatum to Germany
* Thomas F. Millard, " Democracy and the Eastern Question," p. 82.
* London Times, August 18, 1914.
54 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEf
expired, August 23, the Japanese were fully prepared to
win a victory, even if the 4,500 Germans should be exter-
minated in an awful holocaust, as seemed likely under re-
ported orders from the German Kaiser ' ' to defend the place
to the last man."
The great Japanese navy had its ships, both large and
small, arranged in a semi-circle outside the Bay of Kiao-
chow. The Japanese army, under command of Lieut.-Gen-
eral Kamio, had three divisions aboard transports, ready to
land with great guns, smaller arms, and ammunition, with
a fully equipped commissariat and hospital service. Later
on the Japanese were aided by some 1,200 men under com-
mand of Major-General Barnardiston, who came from the
British garrison at Tientsin. The fortifications on the hills,
litis, Bismarck, and Moltke, to the rear of Tsingtao city,
were got ready for the siege. The supply of guns and am-
munition was only enough for a short siege. The main
thing the Germans had to rely upon was their courage.
They were practically isolated from the leaders of the
campaign in Europe. Tsingtao might have held out against
an Anglo-Franco-Russo combination, but not against the
army and navy of Japan, conducting the assault as they
did.
III. We here approach the third question of our present
discussion, as to how Japan, with at least no objection by
the British, violated the neutral rights of China, as
guaranteed by the law of nations, in making attack on
Tsingtao.
Japanese transports by September 2 entered the port
of Lungkow, on the northern coast of the peninsula, west
of the treaty-port of Chefoo and the British-leased territory
of Weihaiwei. Lungkow was not a treaty-port, open to
trade, neither was it leased to any foreign government. It
was purely a "native" port, for the exclusive use of the
Chinese. It was a thoroughly neutral port, into which
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 55
belligerents had less right of entrance than even into the
treaty-ports.
The Japanese transports proceeded to land their soldiers,
guns and military outfit for transport across the neutral
Shantung peninsula, 150 miles, to attack Tsingtao from the
land side — and to do other things which they could do only
as contrary to the law of nations.
Bodies of Japanese troops, says Thomas F. Millard,^ made
detours, occupying important cities and towns in the province
wide of a direct line of march. Wherever they went, the Japanese
assumed control of the country, means of communication, posts
and telegraphs; and subjected the Chinese population to many
hardships, deprivations and indignities, which were obserx'ed and
reported by American and British missionaries in that region.
Supposing that the Japanese navy, attacking from the
sea, was unable to overthrow a small body of Germans, the
Japanese army, helped by the navy, ought to have been
able to accomplish it, making the attack within the area
leased to Germany, or within the much larger "neutral
zone," so-called, stretching 37 miles from the shores of the
wide Bay of Kiaochow. There was no necessity to wage
war outside these limits, on the neutral soil of China.
The British overlooked Japanese wrongdoing in that no
protest was made, suitable to an old Ally, but at the same
time they appeared well to the world and magnified their
friendship for China, by landing their own little military
force within the narrow limits of the German protectorate.
They came in late, towards the end of September, but, as
the London Times said, ''the distance which separated
Laoshan Bay from Tsingtao was so much shorter, and pre-
sented so much less of difficulty than the Japanese had to
encounter in their preliminary advances, that the British
* " Our Eastern Question," p. 107.
56 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
really arrived on the scene just as the Japanese were fin-
ishing their first engagement in force, ' '
The London Times, while exalting the sagacity of Great
Britain in landing her force inside the German-leased ter-
ritory, comments : ' ' thus avoiding the breach of neutrality
alleged by the Chinese against the Japanese." This word,
"alleged," is more a slap at Chinese stupidity than a re-
buke to Japanese illegality. But we must remember that
Eastern Asia is not Central 'Europe. Good and evil, for
four years and more, have been divided according to lines
of longitude and latitude.
The Chinese Government, being unable to resist the en-
croachments of Japan, took a different position to that of
Belgium when she refused to allow German troops to be
transported across Belgian territory. China accepted the
advice of Dr. Ariga, Japanese advisor to President Yuan
Shih-kai, and proposed a war zone, favourable to Japan's
plans, but unfavourable to the German defence of Tsingtao.
Japan evaded and then rejected the proposal. The fol-
lowing, however, is the Note presented by the Chinese For-
eign OfBce to the Foreign Legations on September 4 :
The Government of China declared its neutrality toward the
present European war and is faithfully maintaining it. Accord-
ing to reports from the Chinese local authorities in the province
of Shantung, the Germans have commenced war operations at
Kiaochow Bay and their sphere of influence there, and the allied
forces of Japan and Britain have also started war operations
at Lungkow, Kiaochow, Laichow, and in their neighbouring dis-
tricts. Germany, Japan and England are all in friendly relations
with China, and it is to be regretted that unfortunately these
Powers have taken such unexpected courses in China's territory;
therefore the Chinese Government has decided to propose special
limitations as regards the extent of the present war operations
as China limited the scope of war operations at Liaotung penin-
sula at the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Chinese
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 57
Government will not accept responsibility for the passing of
troops or any war operations at Lungkow, Laichow, Kiaochow,
and their adjacent districts, but in the other districts in China the
Government will strictly enforce neutrality as declared.^
After many obstructions from the "elements," but not
from the Chinese or Germans, the Japanese at last, on Sep-
tember 11th, came in contact with a German detachment —
of 10 men. From that time on, to the end of October, there
were many skirmishes, forcing back the German defenders
to the limits of their forts. From the middle of September,
Tsingtao was in a state of siege, the only communication
with the outside world being by wireless. The white peo-
ples of the United Kingdom, of the French Republic, and
of the Holy Russian Empire, mostly Christians, were be-
ginning to exult that at last their brothers of the same race
and religion, friends in the social and business life of the
Far East, were to be caught like "rats in a trap." The
Japanese maintained self-restraint. They were embarked
on a bigger expedition than the pigmy game of personal
hate. The whole spectacle left a peculiar impress on the
Chinese mind. Here for the first time white men fought
white men, and called for the help of their little yellow
brothers, on the soil of China's millions.
Real fighting began October 31, anniversary of the
accession to the throne of the Mikado. Guns of all sizes,
from the Japanese and British land forces, and from their
cruisers outside the harbour, as well as from the German
forts, began to fire back and forth, making the sound as it
echoed and re-echoed among the Shantung hills fiercer and
more overwhelming to the imagination than was the deadly
reality. The Japanese had maps of the whole country,
around and inside the besieged town. By use of telephone
from land to sea, the gunners learned the exact spot where
* Jefferson Jones, " The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 46.
5g CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
the shells fell. By day or by night the investing forces
closed in upon the Germans. One redoubt after another
was taken. One battery after another was silenced. By
November 6, "twenty-five yards from the front wall that
skirted the Tsingtau fortresses for three miles from the Bay
of Kiaochow on the right, to the Yellow Sea on the left, was
entrenched the front line of the Japanese and British ex-
peditionary forces. Behind this line of underground
fighters was another line, a third, and then the large, mas-
sive twenty-eight-centimetre siege guns of the Japanese."^
They had 142 guns on the firing line.
In the final rush up the sides of litis Fort there were
"17,000 men against 3,800." The Germans, who had held
on bravely and untiringly, had fired their last shells ; their
ammunition was exhausted. The Kaiser had sent word that
they might surrender, and so at 7.05 on the morning of
November 7, the white flag was hoisted at the residence
of Governor-General Meyer- Waldeck, and 3,800 Germans
became prisoners of war in Japan. The bushido spirit had
won; Great Britain stood by and watched the growing
power of Japan.
Of the siege, Mr. Jefferson Jones writes:
From an Oriental standpoint the siege of Tsingtau will always
stand out as remarkably free from hatred. During the opera-
tions, Japanese oflBcers sent many messages into the Tsingtau
garrison, wishing their German friends and former tutors luck
and safety during the siege. The Japanese officers seemed always
courteous. They placed courtesy foremost, instead of indulging
in recrimination such as usually goes on between the German and
British officers and troops. General Kamio and his officers did
not desire to humiliate the defeated German officers. The mes-
sages that were interchanged during the siege and afterwards
were couched in the most courteous language, nor did Govemor-
' Jefferson Jones, " The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 87.
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF EUROPEAN WAR 59
General Waldeek and his staff officers lose their swords after the
final surrender.^
What concerns the moralist is the astounding fact that
in attacking German Tsingtao, the British condoned the
Japanese infringement of the Hague Convention in insist-
ing on transport of troops and arms across the neutral soil
of the Shantung peninsula.
Though the Chinese had been advised by the Japanese
advisor to give a form of legality to Japan's war operations
by establishing a war zone, it was only a matter of a few
days when Japanese soldiers were marched outside the pre-
scribed area, and infringed again on the Hague Convention
by marching 250 miles along the Shantung Railway to
Tsinan-fu, the provincial capital. Japan not once but twice
reduced the Hague Convention to a "scrap of paper," and
Britain, though an Ally, entered no protest and passed no
criticism.^
No sooner had the Japanese force succeeded in marching
through quagmires from Lungkow to the rear of the Ger-
man defences, near the middle of September, than a detach-
ment was sent westward to Weihsien, an important centre
on the Shantung Railway. **A11 of northern China rose in
revolt against the Japanese action. The Japanese troops
took command of the Shantung Railroad, shooting down
native employees who seemingly rebelled at the invasion.
The troops pushed on to Tsinan-fu, leaving small garrisons
in every Chinese town to keep 'Japan's peace,' and in a
few days western Shantung was practically in the control
of Japan." ^
The Japanese did it all in quick time, the only ones to
obstruct their march being Chinese. And one might ask the
» "The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 118.
* See Appendix I.
• Jefferson Jones, " The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 48.
60 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
question: Ought the Chinese to be treated as an 'enemy,'
while trying to remain neutral? From the standpoint of
law and equity, which nation in the Far East went more
astray, Germany or Britain and Japan? And did China
suffer, and continue to suffer, for her own misdeeds, or for
the misdeeds of outsiders ?
By October 3, and before the forts of Tsingtao were
silenced, a Japanese military force took over the whole of
the Shantung Railway, outside of German-leased territory,
or the war zone granted by China. Besides planning the
conquest of the German-leased territory of Kiaochow, Ja-
pan had a deep-laid plan, to make conquest of all German
rights in Shantung, in the form of railway and mining
concessions granted in treaty by the Chinese Government.
All this was within the bounds of China, The Japanese
seemingly did not surmise that it would ever occur to diplo-
matic minds to discountenance and repudiate the right of
conquest ; so they went boldly forward, fully confident that
Might in the end would win the day.
When the Japanese entered Tsinan-fu, capital of Shan-
tung province, they proceeded to occupy it with a military
guard. They also planned the bigger scheme to occupy the
German-built railway from Tsinan-fu to Tientsin, but now
the British, having schemes of their own, strongly objected.
Japan was thus left to Shantung as a sphere of conquest,
illegal but none the less actual, and afterwards to be con-
doned by statesmen believing in self-determination.^
Where before, in the laws governing the waging of war,
as to the obligations of belligerents and the rights of neu-
trals, has it been taught that one nation in war with another
nation can go into a third and neutral nation and forcibly
^ Prof. John Dewey in "The New Republic," March 3, 1920, writes:
" Japanese troops overran the province before they made any serious
attempt to capture Tsingtao. It is only a slight exaggeration to say
that they took the 'Chinese' Tsinan before they took the German
Tsingtao."
INTRUSION INTO CHINA OP EUROPEAN WAR 61
take possession of all enemy property? If this be new in-
ternational law, suggested by Japan and adopted by Europe
and America, then investments in a foreign land become a
risky venture. Should Japan some time be at war with the
United States, then Japanese soldiers may seize in China
some Standard Oil concession or some of the railway con-
cessions granted to American bankers. With equal right in
the late war, British marines might have landed in New
York, when America was neutral, and have taken over all
German Companies from New York to Philadelphia.
Thomas F. Millard touches on the same proposition :
Japan's seizure of the entire Tsinan-Tsingtau Railway was not
a necessary military measure, as was pretended, but was a po-
litical move. The seeming acquiescence of Great Britain with
that move gives it additional importance. Does Great Britain
regard the Canton-Kowloon Railway (extending from British-
leased territory opposite Hongkong) as also constituting, in
Japan's phraseology, " an indivisible part " of Great Britain's
Kowloon leasehold ? These considerations make this question very
significant to China ; and also significant to all foreign investments
existing in China now, and those which may hope to get a legiti-
mate foothold in China hereafter.^
What concerned China was her responsibility in permit-
ting or in forbidding any attempt of a belligerent to in-
fringe on her sovereignty or neutrality. Strong states not
only forbid, but actually take steps to resist, all violation
of their rights. "If a state has neutrality laws, it is under
obligation to enforce these laws. ' ' So, on the other hand, if a
neutral not only permits, but condones any violation of her
neutrality, she ceases to be neutral, and becomes a belliger-
ent. "A neutral state," says Hall in his "International
Law," "which overlooks such violations of its neutrality as
it can rightly be expected to prevent, or which neglects to
* " Our Eastern Question," p. 113.
62 CHINA. CAPTIVE OR FREE?
demand reparation in the appropriate cases, becomes itself
an active offender." Considering all the circumstances,
however, China's failure to resist must be judged with a
degree of palliation and not with condemnation. If any
nation might have complained of China's remissness, it was
Germany, and not Great Britain or Japan.
CHAPTER IV
japan's inroads in CfflNA
The starting-point in the weakening of China by outside
attack was in 1914, when Britain and Japan spurned the
wishes of China and brought the firebrand of war all the
way from Europe to the shores of Shantung, where Con-
fucius and Mencius had instilled wise teachings as to
human relationship. In fact, the diplomatic move and the
military hard-heartedness was contrary both to Confucian-
ism and to Christianity. The year 1914 was thus a bad year
for China, as for European civilization.
But the year 1915 was even worse for China. This was
the year when Japan made gigantic strides in the military
domination of her nearest neighbour, and threatened as
never before attempted by any Power, East or West, the
very existence of the Chinese state. This was the period of
the "Twenty-one Demands." The manoeuverings thereon
were so intricate, that without a special effort an unjust
judgment will be rendered and misrepresentation will gain
currency. Out of a natural indignation at Japan's high-
handedness there is danger of going too far in condemning
Japan. At least it is incumbent, as in other judgments, to
distinguish the policy of the Japanese Government and that
of the mass of the Japanese people.
We must tread warily, if we are to avoid a stumble, either
in holding to principles or in passing judgment on both
Chinese and Japanese.
In 1914 a little band of Germans had been overpowered
by the Japanese army and navy, aided by a small British
force. It remained for Japan alone in 1915 to overpower
!63
64 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
China by skill of diplomacy, by force of arms, or by a threat
and an ultimatum. China, being weak militarily as com-
pared with Japan, had been forced to yield, as had the few
Germans stranded on the shores of Shantung. The Ger-
man surrender was no disgrace. The Chinese surrender
was humiliating. Japan won by Might, not by Right. She
did as all belligerents were doing — sought victory, and then
the spoils of war, by superior military strength. The only
difference was that Japan's chance came early. The
chances for her Allies came late, after over four years of
slaughter, anguish and struggle. Japan, arriving early on
the field of glory, had no need to wait for a Peace Con-
ference ; she pre-empted the ground, forestalled events, out-
ran all runners, by reaching a settlement with China — a
victorious belligerent dictating to a neutral about a van-
quished belligerent. Japan trusted to fait accompli. * ' Pos-
session is nine-tenths of the law." Militarism was plainly
in evidence on the hills around Tsingtao. It was not in
evidence in negotiations of the Japanese and Chinese Gov-
ernments, but, none the less, it backed up the negotiations,
it commandeered success, it was the power behind the
throne.
The face of a Japanese diplomat is impassive, but his
diplomacy is very active. As was once said of the Russians,
so it may be said of the Japanese: "They can wait a
hundred years." At the end of 1914, the Japanese saw no
need to wait longer; their day had come; they had the
chance to carry out great plans, far-reaching plans, not
merely to take the place of Germans in a part of China, but
to become the great predominating power in all China.
Japan's ambition was the hegemony of the Far East, and
then in due time to have it recognized — signed and sealed —
by all the great Powers.
November 16, 1914, 3,800 Germans surrendered to
Japan. January 18, 1915, only two months later, the
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 65
Japanese Minister in Peking, Mr, Hioki, made a presenta-
tion to President Yuan Shih-kai of an official document
commonly spoken of as the Twenty-one Demands. The char-
acter of each point in the document and the way it was
presented seemed almost a duplicate of demands once made
on the Emperor of Korea prior to the absorption of that
country by Japan. It was a startling venture in the realm
of territorial expansion. As Putnam Weale says, it was
"a list designed to satisfy every present and future need
of Japanese policy and to reduce China to a state of
vassalage."^
Properly any such official document should have been
presented, if presented at all, to the diplomatic department
of the Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was
an impropriety, and almost an insult, for the Japanese
Minister to ask for an audience with the President of the
Chinese Republic, and then to go beyond ceremonial usages
and hand to him such a menacing and dictatorial document.
The Japanese, never having any great liking for Yuan
Shih-kai, were no doubt delighted to have the chance to
present him as President — "the strong man of China" —
an offensive document whose demands he was powerless
to resist.
Moreover, the Japanese Minister insisted on complete
secrecy. Any disclosure would prove disastrous to China
as a nation and to Yuan Shih-kai personally.
From the beginning of the war to the present nothing
stands out in Japanese politics more deserving of severest
condemnation than the presentation and attempt at exe-
cution of these Twenty-one Demands. As they gradually
became known, the British and French, as well as Amer-
icans and Chinese, joined in one great uproar of denun-
ciation. The British were beginning to doubt their wisdom
in inviting Japan to eliminate "the German menace";
» " Fight for the Republic in China," p. 87.
66 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
they already saw a Japanese menace, and did not hesitate
to warn against it.
The Twenty-one Demands as actually made known to
the President of China were in five groups. The first, quite
logically, bore on the confirmation of Japan's possession
of German rights in Shantung. The second enlarged and
prolonged the Japanese hold on rights acquired in Southern
Manchuria in the war with Russia ten years before, and
linked on with this certain demands concerning Inner
Eastern Mongolia. The third related to increased control
in the Hanyehping Company, China's greatest industrial
enterprise, and in the development of mines, in the geo-
graphical centre of China Proper, thus projecting into
the British sphere of interest. The fourth, a very brief
one, but apparently magnanimous on Japan's part, was
the obligation resting on China to lease no more harbours or
islands on the China coast to a third Power. The fifth
group, most vital of all, related to railway concessions in
the Yangtsze Valley, to Japan's priority in Fukien prov-
ince, recognized for some time as Japanese sphere of in-
terest, and, more than all, to an astounding influence and
authority on the part of Japan in the internal and political
affairs of all China, deeply affecting China's sovereignty
for all future time.
Looking backward, it is clear that Group I, which bore
Upon cession to Japan of all German rights in Shantung,
to be agreed to by China, automatically arose from Japan's
method of attacking Tsingtao, and this in turn arose from
the appeal to Japan by the British Government to enter
the war against Germany in the Far East. Nothing more
needed negotiation.
Looking forward, the Demands made as to the province of
Shantung afforded Japan the rare opportunity, not to be
neglected, of fixing once for all Japan's predominance not
only in Shantung, but in Southern Manchuria, in Inner
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 67
Mongolia, in the province of Fukien, in the British sphere
of interest, and, in a political way, in the whole of China.
The Japanese Government, trusting that secrecy could be
kept — "clothed in impenetrable mystery," as Putnam
Weale writes — assured foreign governments, who pressed
for information, that there "had never been twenty-one
demands, as the Chinese alleged, but only fourteen, the
seven items of Group V being desiderata which it was in
the interests of China to endorse but which Japan had no
intention of forcing upon her. ' ' ^
Dr. Sidney L. Gulick says: "I have it on pretty high
authority that Group V was put up for purposes of trad-
ing. Japan arranged that Yuan Shih-kai could say to
China that he had forced Japan to back down on the most
important demands and thus 'save his face' for having
yielded the rest. ' ' ^
This mode of reasoning rests on a foundation of moving
sand. If the mention of Group V was a bargaining pro-
cess, why insist at the end that the points were to be
deferred for future consultation? And why in 1918 was
the attempt again made to carry them out through a number
of secret agreements with the militaristic faction con-
trolling the Peking Government?
The full text of the Demands was not revealed by Japan
to the Governments of Japan's Allies or the United States
till rumours had become so loud, as well as manifold,
that all denial was threatening to the moral standing of
Japan. It was a month before even the limited, and less
objectionable, list was made known officially, while the
complete list was delayed still longer, until in fact the
Twenty-one Demands were modified in a revised list, pre-
sented to China, April 26 (1915). In all probability the
revision of the original list was due as much to foreign
* Putnam Weale, " The Fight for the Republic in China," p. 100.
» Arthur J. Brown, " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 425.
68 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
criticism and world-wide outcry as to the argumentative
powers of the Chinese Foreign Office and President Yuan
Shih-kai.
The reader should bear in mind that after many con-
ferences concerning the original Twenty-one Demands
Japan presented, April 26, a revised list, less drastic than
the previous one, of twenty-four Articles, but arranged in
three Groups instead of five; that, on May 1, the Chinese
Foreign Office presented to the Japanese Minister a memo-
randum discussing the general matters at issue, and en-
closing China's proposed list of thirteen Articles in three
Groups; that, on May 7, Japan presented an ultimatum,
demanding acceptance of Japan's revised list and calling
for a favourable reply within 48 hours, or ''the Imperial
Government will take steps they may deem necessary";
that, on May 9, China complied, presenting, however, an
able "Official Statement" in defence of China's position,
and that, on May 25, treaties were made, or exchange of
notes passed, between Mr. Hioki, the Japanese representa-
tive, and Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, the Chinese representative,
settling once for all, as it was supposed, the right of Japan
to dictate in Chinese affairs, and the duty of China to
comply on pain of war and complete subjugation.
Thus Japan handed out an ultimatum first to Germany,
a belligerent, and then to China, a neutral and neighbour.
All along China has been treated less as a neutral or even as
an ally or associate than as an enemy. "Japan," says
Thomas F. Millard, "employed bludgeoning tactics all
through the negotiations. She reinforced her military
forces in Shantung and Manchuria and made strategical
dispositions unmistakably directed against China, ' ' All this
gave force and significance to the ultimatum. Had it not
been that the "strong man," Yuan Shih-kai, was President,
the forces of internal revolt or the forces of external war
could never have been held in cheek. There was force
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 69
majeure, plenty of it, in negotiation and in the settlement,
as in many a treaty before, but through kind words from
Britons and Americans the hope sprang in the Chinese
breast that in some way and at some time High Heaven
would rescue China from the grip of an outside nation,
"Yuan chose the wiser cause," says Mr. Millard, with
whom all familiar with the circumstances must agree. ' ' He
conceded what he must, and saved such exceptions as he
could, hoping that China's case would get a hearing before
civilization later. ' ' ^
Thus in 1915 Japan acquired certain rights in China by
means of a treaty with China; legality enshrouded mili-
tarism; China had consented. To understand just how
much Japan gained, and how much China was forced to
lose, these investigations may be made along two lines, one
the direct result of the war as seen in acquisition of previous
German rights in Shantung, and the other the indirect
result as seen in acquisition of rights in other sections of
China, along with the promise of more blessings still in
store.
I. Japan's direct gain through rights in Shantung.
(1) The new Chino- Japanese Treaty, Article 1, reads:
The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all mat-
ters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree
with the German Government relating to the disposition of all
rights, interests and concessions which Germany by virtue of
treaties or otherwise possesses in relation to the province of
Shantung.
The significance of this agreement as bearing on the
wisdom of China's own entrance into the war has been
generally overlooked. All the rights which China originally
ceded by treaty to Germany in 1898 are to be disposed of
by mutual consultation of Germany and Japan. And
* " Our Eastern Question," p. 154.
J
70 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
China is to agree to it. Was it wise for China later on to
antagonize either Germany or Japan by going to war with
the one and by conflicting with the other at the Peace Con-
ference in Paris? Would it not have been wiser to keep
on friendly terms with both than to rely on the assuring
phraseology of America, Britain and France, that China
would be befriended, if she entered the war, and would be
allowed a seat, however lowly, at the Peace Table?
In conversations which I personally had with the German
Minister, Admiral von Hintze, before either China or the
United States declared war, I know that Germany was
ready to urge on Japan the presence of a Chinese repre-
sentative at the proposed conference of Germany and
Japan. In the Official Statement presented by China, May
7, 1915, it is said :
The suggestion relating to participation in conference between
Japan and Germany was made in view of the fact that Shantung,
the object of future negotiations between Japan and Germany, is
a Chinese province, and therefore China is the Power most con-
cerned in the future of that territory.
It certainly seemed very probable that more advantage
would have accrued to China by following such a line of
action than by the policy she was led to pursue from 1917
until the signing of the Versailles Treaty, June 28, 1919 —
an occasion on which China, alas, was forbidden even to
*'sign with reservations."
(2) The disposition of the German-leased territory of
Kiaochow was settled by exchange of notes. This terri-
tory is to be "left to the free disposal of Japan," thus
recognizing, as the Versailles Treaty has also recognized,
Japan's supremacy over both Germany and China in ref-
erence to this territory. However, Japan by her sovereign
grace "will restore the said leased territory to China."
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 71
Free salvation again, but — but — ' * under the following con-
ditions." And what are they? Four in all, but two are
noteworthy :
*'A Concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan
to be established at a place designated by the Japanese
Government";
"If the Foreign Powers desire it, an International Con-
cession may be established."
What is left as a residuum is to go to China, but under
the stipulation that Tsingtao "be opened as a Commercial
Port," as it had been in fact by agreement with Ger-
many.
This arrangement would make the once free-port of
Tsingtao under German jurisdiction a second Shanghai, in
which there exists a French Concession, an International
Settlement, and the Chinese native city and suburbs.
Showing the pressure that Japan constantly brought on
China by dangling the promise of the restoration of Kiao-
chow, it is stated that when Japan presented the revised
Demands, April 26, "the Japanese Minister stated that the
Japanese Government would restore the leased territory of
Kiaochow to China at an opportune time in the future and
under proper conditions"; and then it is added — "if the
Chinese Government would agree to the new list of Twenty-
four Demands without modification." A pretty big if, a
preliminary ultimatum.
Was it at all likely that China by being embroiled in the
war would be able to alter the Chino-Japanese agreement
of 1915? The restoration of Kiaochow, if it ever takes
place, is to be on the conditions defined in 1915 and by
Japan's "free disposal." Japan, to strengthen her posi-
tion from 1915 to 1919, purchased much land in the de-
sirable portion of Tsingtao and around, to be set apart as
a Japanese Concession. Whether an International Settle-
ment is formed or not, Japan has acquired through a grow-
J
72 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
ing population at Tsingtao and through delay a predom-
inant influence in all administration.
(3) Another Article reads:
The Chinese Government agrees that as regards the railway to
he huilt by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect
with the Kiaochow-Tsinan-fu Railway, if Germany abandons the
privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will ap-
proach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.
The Versailles Treaty of Peace has not improved on this
arrangement. "China herself" is to build the railway,
according to the terms agreed upon by China and Japan.
If she has money of her own, as she ought to have under
proper management, there will be no necessity for Jap-
anese or German financing. What others object to is that
they do not have an equal chance.
(4) One more stipulation is the following:
Within the province of Shantung or along its coast no territory
or island will be leased or ceded to any foreign Power under any
pretext.
It is generally supposed that this stipulation was meant
to check the designs of Germany, to whom according to the
Treaty of 1898 was to be given by China "a more suitable
place," "should Germany at some future time express the
wish to return Kiaochow Bay to China."
It is to be acknowledged that the principle here laid down
is a good one, and that Japan deserves credit for bringing
it forward — ^namely, that the habit of seizing Chinese ports
and territory comes to an end. May, 1915. Japan, too,
according to this, is never to occupy territory, at least in
the province of Shantung.
r" Thus, in the above four stipulations, what Japan had
gained by right of conquest in 1914, in Shantung, she has
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 73
confirmed by treaty in 1915, except that a few points were
to be amicably settled through negotiation after the ter-
mination of war. The Treaty of Versailles was no better,
for it, too, gave its sanction to the principle of conquest, i
without the definite agreement of future negotiation.
The Chinese in the negotiations preceding the ultimatum
of May 7 did not specially complain of what Japan insisted
on concerning Shantung. In fact in China's Memorandum
of May 1st, it is stated :
As regards matters relating to Shantung, the Chinese Govern-
taent has agreed to a majority of the demands.
Thus so far as Shantung is concerned, it is hard to under-
stand why more stress was laid at the Peace Conference on
Shantung affairs than on other matters to which China
strongly objected in the 1915 negotiations. If China ex-
pected to have altered or abrogated the agreements of 1915,
she should have placed on record her protest and not de-
clared that she ' ' agreed. ' ' Still less could China complain
at the Paris Peace Conference that the Treaty of 1915, so
far as Shantung was concerned, was made under duress.
Duress was applied to other matters.
There were, however, two particulars in the Shantung
settlement of 1915 which China brought forward and
which Japan as a good neighbour might have agreed to.
One, as given out in China's "Official Statement," reads:
Another supplementary proposal suggesting the assumption by
Japan of responsibility for indemnification of the losses arising
out of the military operations by Japan in and about the leased
territory of Kiaochow was necessitated by the fact that China was
neutral vis-d-vis the war between Japan and Germany.
This was simple justice. As Germany is called on to
indemnify the losses in Belgium, much more should Japan
74 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
indemnify the losses of China. Why so clear a duty slipped
from notice at the Peace Conference at Paris can only be
explained by the skilful manceuvering of the Japanese
delegates.
Another reasonable request reads:
That the military railway, the telegraph lines, etc., which were
installed by Japan to facilitate her military operations should be
removed forthwith; that the Japanese troops now stationed out-
side of the leased territory should be first withdrawn, and those
within the territory should be recalled at the time when Kiaochow
is returned to China.
Knowing of the inroads made by Japan in Manchuria
after the war with Russia through a military railway and
refusal to withdraw troops and police, it was China's duty
to avert such evils in Shantung. Japan 's persistent refusal
to comply with such a reasonable request can only increase
Chinese suspicion of Japanese designs.
The Agreements of 1915 were thus bad, not so much in
what they affirmed as in what they omitted to affirm.
p' The peril to China was also not so much in the actual
' specifications of the Treaty bearing on Shantung as in the
j substitution of Japan for Germany, thus excluding a strong
balancing power and transferring it all to the increased
(predominance of Japan. S. K. Hornbeek has written :
With the Manchurian railways penetrating the heart of Man-
churia and the Shantung Railway extending to the heart of
Shantung — and with the right to extend the latter line to join the
Peking- Hankow line — Japan is in a position, should she so
choose, at any moment to grind Peking between the millstones of
her military machine. So far as strategy is concerned, Japan has
North China commercially, militarily and politically at her
mercy. ^
* " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 346.
b
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 75
II, Japan's indirect gains in other parts of China.
(1) Japan's demands in Manchuria are agreed to in the
following particulars :
(a) The lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (or Dairen) is
extended to 99 years.
(6) "The terms of the South Manchuria Railway and
the Antung-Mukden Railway" also extend to 99 years.
The Chinese Memorandum acknowledges that it must
* * abandon its own cherished hopes to regain control of these
places and properties at the expiration of their respective
original terms of lease."
(c) "Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by
negotiation, lease land necessary for erecting suitable build-
ings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricul-
tural enterprises." They also "shall be free to reside and
travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and
manufacture of any kind whatsoever." Thus, merchants,
manufacturers and farmers, if they are Japanese, may live
anywhere in South Manchuria, as in China's treaty-
ports.
(d) "In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring
jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries
incidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its
permission." Such co-operation is unobjectionable.
(e) Japanese subjects "shall also submit to the police
laws and ordinances and taxation of China." The treaty
on this point is a slight improvement on the revised list of
the Japanese, in that the latter stipulated that the laws and
ordinances must be "approved by the Japanese Consul,"
while the former adds merely that ' ' the Chinese authorities
will notify the Japanese Consul."
(/) A rule is laid down, to which no exception can be
made, as to Mixed Court procedure in litigation between
Chinese and Japanese, similar to that at treaty-ports. Then
the clause is added ;
76 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
When, in future, the judicial system in the said region is com-
pletely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese
subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese law
courts.
This feature while not appearing in the original copy of
the Demands, appears both in the revised list and in the
final agreement.
(g) A revision is made in the terms of the Kirin-Chang-
chun Railway Loan Agreement, giving Japan the conces-
sion, and to this China had already assented.
(h) It is agreed that in building railways "if foreign
capital is required, China may negotiate for a loan with
Japanese capitalists first." This merely establishes South
Manchuria as a Japanese sphere of interest, just as British,
French and Germans had secured in other parts of China.
(i) New commercial ports are opened in Manchuria,
wherein all foreigners may carry on trade.
(j) Japan is allowed certain mining areas, heretofore
not worked. In this way South Manchuria more than ever
becomes Japan's special and exclusive sphere of interest,
similar to the position of other countries in other parts of
China.
(k) "Hereafter, if foreign advisors or instructors on
political, financial, military or police matters are to be em-
ployed in South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed
first." This is like the original form of the Demands, ex-
cept that "may be employed" is the improved form of the
phrase, "the Japanese Government shall be consulted."
To this the Chinese commissioner presented no objection.
(2) Japan's demands in Inner Eastern Mongolia are
agreed to in only a few particulars, namely, (a) opening
of commercial ports, (b) applying for loans to Japanese
capitalists first, and (c) employing Japanese advisors and
instructors first. These are similar to the revised list,
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 77
while the original list aimed at much more, giving to the
Japanese nearly the same position in Mongolia as in
Manchuria.
In reference to Japan's position in South Manchuria and
Eastern Mongolia, the Treaty says that it is concluded
"with a view to developing their economic relations," while
the original Demands state that ''the Chinese Government
has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Ja-
pan." In either ease China was set to lose in her sovereign
position in Manchuria and Mongolia far more than in_
Shantung.
^(3) Japan secures greater control of the Hanyehping
Company, consisting of iron and coal mines and a great
steel foundry. Greater co-operation of capitalists from
both countries is to be allowed. ' * The Chinese Government
further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor,
without the consent of the Japanese capitalists, to convert
it into a State enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use
foreign capital other than Japanese."
The mines and works of this great industrial Company
are in the very centre of China, within the British sphere
of interest.
The original Demands extended Japan's influence in the
Yangtsze Valley by insisting that * ' all mines in the neigh-
bourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall ^
not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company,
to be worked by other persons outside of the said
Company."
Naturally the opposition by Britons to the Twenty-one
Demands was directed more to Group III, which related to
this Company, than to the settlement of either the Shan-
tung or the Manchurian and Mongolian questions. The
Chinese Minister also could not agree to the insertion of the
original form, as it ''seriously affected the principle of
equal commercial opportunity. ' ' Few foreigners or Chinese
78 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
I at that time of discussion had much to say about the Jap-
\ anese acquisition of German rights and concessions in Shan-
^ \ tung, which, therefore, was not particularly a work of force
\ majeure.
As Great Britain was and is a formal Ally of Japan,
Japan yielded to British criticism about the Hanyehping
Company, and simply omitted, but did not abandon, the
objectionable part of the original Demands.
(4) Japan secures an agreement from China through
exchange of notes to the effect "that the Chinese Govern-
ment hereby declares that it has given no permission to
foreign nations to construct, on the coast of Fukien prov-
ince, dockyards, coaling stations for military use, naval
bases, or to set up other military establishments, nor does it
entertain an intention of borrowing foreign capital for the
purpose of setting up the above-mentioned establish-
ments. ' '
This recognized Japanese priority in Fukien province,
where for many years Japan had claimed a sphere of in-
terest. The new wording gave recognition to Japan's po-
litical influence, by warning off all other foreigners.
In the original form of the Twenty-one Demands, the ref-
erence to Fukien is contained in the objectionable Group V
as Article 6.
It was understood at the time that Japan desired such
an agreement, out of fear that the United States was
designing some scheme of intrusion into the Fukien
province.
Thus Japan, in as early an hour as possible, by means of
the Treaties of 1915, protected and expanded her interests
not only against Germany but against Great Britain and
the United States and even against China herself.
^ (5) China also agrees in the final arrangement to the
modified form of Group IV, that she will "give a pro-
nouncement by herself in accordance with the following
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 79
principle: *No bay, harbour or island along the coast of
China may be ceded or leased to any Power.' "
This is an expansion of a very desirable article in the
Shantung arrangement. If all the countries, Japan in-
cluded, would now agree to give up all harbours or territory
already held on lease, China's national integrity and the
peace of the Far East would be greatly solidified.
(6) In the reply of the Chinese Government, May 8,
to the ultimatum of Japan, it is agreed that "five articles
of Group V" are "postponed for later negotiation."
These five "refer to (a) the employment of advisors,
(b) the establishment of schools and hospitals, (c) the
railway concessions in South China, (d) the supply of arms
and ammunition and the establishment of arsenals, and
(e) right of missionary propaganda." "It is this fact [of
postponement] which remains the sword of Damocles hang-
ing over China's head, and until this sword has been flung
back into the waters of the Yellow Sea the Far Eastern
situation will remain perilous" (Putnam Weale).
Several of the items to be postponed came up for "nego-
tiation" and also for settlement in 1918 before the an-
nouncement of armistice. What Japan thus acquired, in
Shantung, in Manchuria, in Mongolia, in the Yangtsze Val-
ley, in Fukien, in all China (potentially), was startling.
This much can be said, however, of Japanese attitude to ""
China that there was more readiness to negotiate than in
most treaties concluded under coercion. -4
Moreover, while the original form of the Twenty-one
Demands deserves the severest censure, the ultimate agree-
ment is less objectionable. What China agrees to after
receipt of the ultimatum is in the main what she had agreed
to in conference prior to the ultimatum. The subsequent
complaint, made known at the Peace Conference in Paris,
that the Agreements of 1915 should be abrogated by the
League of Nations because they were signed under duress,
80 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
is worthy of no consideration, in face of the far greater act
of duress, with exclusion of all negotiation, as revealed in
the Versailles Treaty with Germany as well as in most
treaties with China. In the " Official Statement" which
China made May 8, it may be seen that according to
China's own acknowledgment she had consented to prac-
tically all that the ultimatum required, and that therefore
coercion, if it existed at all, was insignificant :
Of the twenty-one original demands there were six, as previ-
ously mentioned, to which China could not agree.
And these six were not included in the "Revised List,"
concerning which — and not the ** Twenty-one Demands" —
Japan had issued her ultimatum.
Still less could the Shantung settlement be made a matter
of objections, except so far as it omitted certain points which
China desired to have inserted.
The restoration of Kiaochow to China seems to have been
the chief factor in the Chinese claim as made to the Su-
preme Council in Paris, but, May 7, 1915, the Japanese
Government declared: "If the Chinese Government accept
all the articles as demanded in the ultimatum the offer
of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow to China,
made on the 26th of April, will still hold good." In fact,
the Versailles Treaty accorded more to Japan, and took
more away from China, than the settlement of 1915 as made
between China and Japan direct.
'^ If China has complaint to make, it should be against the
entrance of war into China in 1914, from which has issued
] a variety of evils, annoyances and misfortunes.
A minor complaint might be this: why did not Japan
content herself with reaching a settlement on the one ques-
tion of disposal of former German rights in Shantung?
Why did she compel China to drag in other matters, con-
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 81
nected perhaps with the former war with Russia, but not
with the war with Germany? And why, too, did the
Chinese delegates at Paris lay stress on only the matters
relating to Shantung, and not to the major part of the
1915 Agreement?
S. K. Hornbeek ^ presents the reader with a philosophical
conundrum :
The ultimatum demanded little of importance to which China
had not already agreed. Was it then really nothing but a stuffed
club, a mere bluff, its presentation a " grand-stand play " ? Was
the threat of war made simply to save the face of the Chinese
Government before the Chinese people, to enhance the prestige
of the Japanese Government with the Japanese people, to place
before the world a picture of Japan provoked by Chinese ob-
structionist tactics to the point of raising the sword and then,
rather than break the peace, magnanimously foregoing the easy
glory of an easier conquest and the full fruits of an assured and
early military success? Or was Japan really asking for a little
more in addition to the very much which China had already con-
ceded, actually ready to go to war rather than be denied?
My own opinion is that Japan presented the original ;
Twenty-one Demands with the probability of having them ,
accepted, but when by official conference and public agi-
tation complete acceptance seemed improbable, Japan
issued an ultimatum as to what China had already agreed, %/:.■
knowing that refusal on China's part was unlikely, and
that compliance under circumstances of an ultimatum
would imply a yielding to Japan's superior Might, with a
world-wide recognition of Japan's predominance.
Still, Japan has suffered through the prevalent miscon-
ception that Japan forced on China the Twenty-one
Demands.
Looking at the whole transaction, illustrative of Force
* " Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 327.
82 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
and characteristic of War, the Chinese, and the whole
world, may well complain that as a result of excluding
Germany from China and substituting Japan, a way is
found in the garb of legality, and by the sacredness of trea-
ties, to establish irrevocably the supremacy of Japan in all
Eastern Asia.
No sooner had China and Japan come to an agreement,
which was all to Japan's gain and China's loss, than the
United States Government, through the Secretary of State,
William Jennings Bryan, sent an identic note to Japan
and China as follows :
In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have
taken place and which are now pending between the Government
of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements
which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of
the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the
Chinese Republic [of Imperial Japan] that it cannot recognize
any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or
which may be entered into between the Governments of China
and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and
its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the
Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China
commonly known as the Open Door policy.
It is evident that an official utterance of this kind would
inspire in the Chinese confidence of American help, and
in the Japanese resentment at American intrusion. On
the one hand, the confidence of the Chinese was futile, for
if the American Government, in the face of past treaties,
did nothing to prevent the Japanese annexation of Korea,
how could she be expected to help China in a matter so
indefinite as these agreements of Japan and China, during
the administration of that strong man, President Yuar
Shih-kai? On the other hand, the resentment of the Jap-
anese foreboded no good ; to stir it up was an act of folly.
JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA 83
Unless America had something definite to complain about,
rather than utter general insinuations, it would have been
better to remain silent and observe the customary proprie-
ties. Reading the words of the Note one might suppose
something substantial was about to take place, when in
reality there was a combination of illusion and offensive-
ness. The Chinese, or even the "Open Door," received
no help, while the Japanese were offended. Unless the
United States Government intended to rescue China from
a harmful situation there was no reason for such a formal
utterance.
CHAPTER V
THE INJURY TO CfflNA THROUGH AMERICAN AND ALLIED
INTRIGUE
Viewing events in China in historical order, we now come
to the next scene in the great drama, to the events oi 1917.
The narration, for an American, is most humiliating. For
the first time in history, the American Government tied
itself up with intrigue, chicanery, secret diplomacy and
selfish agreements. Eather, it was that part of the Amer-
ican Government called the Executive branch, that is, the
"Wilson Administration. The intricacies of intrigue make it
hard to separate the responsibility of one government from
that of others. In bringing China into the meshes, perils
and enthrallment of the World War, how far was the
United States accountable, how far the Entente Allies, and
how far Japan ? And as to the United States, how far was
President Wilson the accountable party, how far Secretary
of State Lansing, and how far the American Minister at
Peking, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch ?
In any case, it was most disastrous to China that outside
advice, appeal, threat, pressure, by means of diplomatic
intrigue under the semblance of friendly solicitude, induced
China to forsake the safe path of peace and neutrality and
enter the whirlpool of a World War and of world chaos.
It was unfortunate for America's fair name that her
agents should counsel China to forsake peace for war,
democracy for autocracy, liberty for enslavement and quiet-
ness for confusion, discord and upheaval.
There were two centres of intrigue, the one in Peking
tinder American instigation, and more and more eneour-
84
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 85
aged by the European Allies and by Japan; the other in
Tokio, where the European Allies connived with Japan in
secret compact not only against Germany, but against
China and the United States.
I. First, then, the intrigue in Peking to embroil China
in the Great War.
There were three steps for China in diplomatic procedure :
first, to send Germany a letter of reproof and of threat,
February 9, 1917 ; second, to sever diplomatic relations with
Germany, March 14; and, third, to declare war against
Germany and Austria-Hungary (without Parliamentary
action), August 14.
The war issue did not specially engross the attention of
China until February 4 (1917), and then through action
of the American Government and by definite request of
President Wilson.
Heretofore advocates of war and of peace, except out-
and-out pacifists, have generally theorized thus: Never
go to war except as a last alternative. But President,
Wilson announced a new dictum to all neutral nations for
assuring a real world war: Whether with or without just
cause, every neutral nation is advised to do what the United
States does — first, be neutral ; second, break off diplomatic
relations with Germany; and, third, declare war on Ger-
many. On this new theory, there will be no neutral nations,
no neutral rights, and no laws on neutrality or freedom of
the seas. This new doctrine, more chaotic than idealistic,
was subsequently introduced into the Covenant of the
League of Nations, as invented at Paris for maintaining
peace and also for assuring a world war, if war is ever to
come again. So far, then, President Wilson was solely re-
sponsible for getting China on the war-path.
Prior to President Wilson's innocent suggestion of Feb-
ruary, 1917, China had managed to remain at peace, on
86 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
equally friendly terms with all nations. During the in-
cumbency of President Yuan Shih-kai, there had been two
or three slight, tentative overtures — properly mere queries
— on the part of President Yuan to his old friend, Sir John
Jordan, the British Minister, as to the advisability of the
Chinese entering the war. There is no question as to the
friendship of this Britisher for the Chinese President, or
as to his sincere concern for China's development and
progress. Thomas F. Millard,^ from his varied sources of
information, states that the British Minister did not look
upon these suggestions with favour, probably on account of
Japan's opposition, but that the French and Russian Le-
gations gave some encouragement. However, there was no
unity of purpose in Peking and Tokio among these diplo-
matic representatives. As to the American Minister, rep-
resenting a neutral country, Mr. Millard asserts: "I am
informed that the American Minister expressed his private
opinion to Yuan Shih-kai that such a move probably would
save China." This was some time towards the end of 1915,
■when the United States was not yet a belligerent. It was
strange advice to come from a neutral and an advocate of
universal peace.
A somewhat different account of President Yuan's atti-
tude to the war is given by Mr. Kawakami. I quote his
words : 2
What Yuan really had in mind in declaring himself in favour
of the Entente Powers was the attainment of his ambition to
become an emperor. . . . The resourceful Yuan, unwilling to
give up his imperial designs, secretly conferred with England
proposing that he would declare war upon Germany and drive
German interests from China, if the Entente Powers would, in
return, support his scheme to enthrone himself. England, eager
* " Democracy and the Eastern Question," pp. 95-100.
» " Japan and World Peace," p. 129.
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 87
to exterminate German influence in China, was favourably dis-
posed towards this proposal.
This was the impression which I also received as to polit-
ical manoeuvres going on in Peking. I was told that when
President Yuan actually launched his imperial scheme
towards the end of 1915, he had a secret understanding
with the British Minister that British recognition would be
accorded, if the scheme was successful, and if the new Im-
perial Government declared war on Germany. When the
scheme failed. President Yuan, as I was informed, asked
Sir John Jordan to come and consult with him, but the
request was not granted, and President Yuan, mortified
over his failure, was taken ill and died. Needless to say,
this nice little intrigue for bringing China into the war
also came to naught.
Mr. Kawakami is probably correct in saying that Japan
did not join England in perfecting this scheme ; but I re-
gard it that the opposition was not so much due to
Japan's being "unalterably opposed to the crowning of
Yuan Shih-kai," as being opposed to the man, and also
to China's war purposes, unless Japan's ambitions were
satisfied.
In a general way, if China's entry into the war should
have effect on the spread of righteousness, truth, love and
liberty throughout the world, or even on the military opera-
tions of the war in Europe as distinct from commercial
rivalries and jealousies, then it was a duty of the United
States to put forth every effort to persuade China to be-
come one of the belligerents on the side of the majority,
and probably also on the side of the victors. Moreover, if
China could only get her wrongs righted, that is, wrongs
done by Japan, through being present at the future Peace
Table, and if she could be present there only by going to
war with Germany, then it was wise, though not imper^-
88 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
tive, to yield to outside persuasion under the leadership of
the United States. Should the presence of Chinese dele-
gates at the Peace Conference be without effect, then
it would have been better for her to have remained
neutral, at peace within her own borders and with all
peoples.
Furthermore, if China wanted a casus belli, she had a
better one against Japan than against Germany. The
China Sea and the Japan Sea were more vital to China
than the North Sea or the English Channel. To get ahead
of Japan by warring on Germany: to force compensation
from Japan by joining the Allies, of whom Japan was one,
partook too much of the old diplomacy of intrigue and
chicanery rather than the new diplomacy, widely pro-
claimed, of "open covenants" and straightforward
dealing.
At that particular time, also, China had greater grievance
against France than against Germany, owing to French
high-handed occupation of Lao-shi-kai, adjoining the
French Concession in Tientsin.
The President of China, successor to Yuan Shih-kai, was
Li Yuan-hung. He assumed office June 6, 1916. He had
been military leader of the first revolution which overthrew
the Manchu Monarchy, of which Yuan Shih-kai had been
the last Premier. Yuan was monarchical in his sympa-
thies; Li was devoted to the democratic idea. Yuan left
the country broken by discord and strife; Li set out to
unite the country, to stop fighting and to establish a bona
fide Republic. All factions, all sections of the country,
were brought together under the centralizing, or rather
harmonizing influence of President Li. Every one trusted
him. He only needed a fair chance and sufficient time to
show to the world that Democracy was suited to the
Chinese. If the country could be kept at peace, if war
could be put at arm's length, he was sure of success. His
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 89
Premier was General Tuan Chi-jui, last Secretary of State
under Emperor-President Yuan, who, like President Li, was
opposed to all monarchical schemes.
The Parliament, which had been dissolved by President
Yuan, was re-called by the new President. This Parliament
early began the discussion of a permanent Constitution, and
by the spring of 1917 had almost completed its task.
Clashes had arisen between the different branches of au-
thority, but none so serious as to forebode defeat to liberal
institutions or renewed strife in the land. The outlook for
democracy, peace and national prosperity was bright.
Thus it was until February 4, 1917, when the American
Minister in Peking, Paul S. Reinsch, made known to Pres-
ident Li the request of President Wilson, that China, as
well as all other neutral nations, should imitate the example
of the United States by severing diplomatic relations with
Germany. Thus it was that the leader of neutral nations
became a leader in belligerency. I had previously conveyed
to President Wilson the desire of President Li to follow
the lead of the United States in bringing together all neu-
tral nations in a common effort to effect peace. Now the
Chinese President was forced by another and diametrically
opposite proposition, looking to active participation in
war.
If this proposal or request had been communicated to
China merely in the usual official way without pressure, no
harm would have been done to China and no confusion
would have arisen. China, in all probability, would have
remained neutral and at peace. Moreover, no further ad-
vantage would have accrued to Japan at China's expense.
Samuel G. Blythe, who was in Peking those critical days,
has described the character of the campaign and propa-
ganda, which was carried on with prudent secretiveness, to
embroil China in war against Germany in the probable
^eventuality that war would arise between Germany and
90 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
the United States. He speaks of this political crusade as
a "Flying Wedge." ^
(1) First, then, the initial step of sending a threatening
letter — a kind of ultimatum — to Germany. The great mass
of Chinese officials, merchants, students, farmers, labourers,
had no desire to take sides in the calamitous struggle going
on in Europe. They resented what Japan and Great Britain
had already done on Chinese soil in the years 1914 and
1915 ; they knew no reason why they should join such com-
pany as against Germans and Austrians. They did not wish
to become entangled in affairs in Europe,
"When a really friendly nation like the United States,
one that had professed to follow the same path of neutrality
and impartiality, came forward to counsel association in the
task of upholding law and righteousness, Chinese officials
who were thus approached felt bound to consider the new
suggestion from a sister Republic. America had not yet
declared war or joined the Allies. But never mind ; diplo-
macy is far-reaching.
As already stated, President Wilson was solely respon-
sible for instructing on February 4, 1917, all his agents in
neutral countries to advise them to sever relations with
Germany. How it was carried out in Peking was left to
the responsibility of the American Minister, Dr. Paul S.
Reinsch, sometimes acting with, and sometimes without, the
instructions of Secretary of State Lansing. To show
America's abundant power and to hasten compliance on
China's part, Dr. Reinsch secured an entourage of capable
experts, skilled in manipulating Chinese political thought.
He himself was **at the apex of the wedge," to use Mr.
Blythe's phrase. Next in point of capacity was Dr. John
C. Ferguson, counsellor of the Chinese Red Cross Society,
and so in semi-official relations with the Chinese Govern-
» Saturday Evening Post, April 28, 1917, " The First Time in Five
thousand Years."
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 91
ment. Next came Roy S. Anderson, son of a Methodist
missionary and familiar with the intricacies of Chinese
officialdom. Along with these two Americans there were
brought into the secret two Australians. One was Dr.
George E. Morrison, a paid political advisor of President
Li Yuan-hung to look after the special interests of China.
The other was W. H. Donald, editor of the American mag-
azine, the Far Eastern Review, and for some time Peking
correspondent of the New York Herald. Then came an-
other duet, "writing men," Charles Stevenson Smith, rep-
resenting the Associated Press, and Samuel G. Blythe, rep-
resenting the Saturday Evening Post. With all these were
associated four young Chinese, Dr. Chen Chin-tao, a Yale
graduate and then Minister of Finance ; Admiral Tsai Ting-
kan, also educated in America, and naval A. D. C. to the
President; C. C. Wu, son of Dr. Wu Ting-fang, educated
both in America and in England, and associated with his
father in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Eugene
Chen, an English University man, a master of style, and
at the time editor of the Peking Gazette.
The President was first approached by Admiral Tsai
and Dr. Morrison, both drawing salaries from Chinese rev-
enues. "That genial dignitary told them he was opposed
to the matter in its entirety and in all its parts." (I quote
from Mr. Blythe 's disclosure.)
Who next? Naturally the Premier, General Tuan Chi-
jui, but he "was opposed." "Most of the older generals"
were also opposed. "The Young China party must be
appealed to." Arguments were ready to hand, forceful
arguments, when only one side is heard. Here they are :
(1) "China will secure in her own right a place in
the Peace Conference." This was probably the great out-
standing reason for China's acceptance of the American
proposal. The Chinese looked upon the coming Peace Con-
ference as the open sesame.
92 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
(2) "It is the one great chance for Young China to
sweep away this archaic, inefficient governing class and
come into Young China 's own. ' ' This thought, full of sug-
gestion, captivated Young China — more than it did the old
mandarins.
(3) China would be "in a position to repudiate the
German and Austrian share of the Boxer indemnity. ' ' This
was just what the Chinese liked: getting rid of a debt
through legal processes. Of course, the possibility implied
that China must declare war; nothing less could win the
stakes. The mere thought of shuffling off a treaty obligation
and financial indebtedness was most alluring.
These were reasons for breaking off relations or even for
going to war, but at the time, considering all the complex
factors, the play was to persuade China to do something
less, that is, to threaten Germany. If possible, China was
to be blindfolded, so that the future might be involved un-
escapably in the present.
Let me again quote from Mr. Blythe, who wa.s on the
inside of this renowned American exploit and this unfortu-
nate Chinese venture:
For hours and hours, day and night, Peking resounded with
speeches to timid Chinese made by these urgent Americans and the
two invaluable Australians, urging, forcing, begging, cajoling
and showing the Chinese who were needful to toe the mark. There
was no rest. There was no soft-pedal business. It was a big,
hard, two-fisted campaign, and he who dallied was a dastard;
and he who doubted was roundly damned !
Two other arguments began to be used: (1) that China
associate herself with the United States — an informal alli-
ance of two Republics, and (2) that China with the help
of her sister Republic would then be able to checkmate the
ambitious designs of Japan.
As to the former point, "a long course of argument wasj
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 93
necessary to make it plain that the Americans were not
asking China to join the Allies, but were asking China to
join America and the other neutrals, which was an entirely
different matter." Mr. Millard says that ** among for-
eigners in China, except Japanese, there was almost una-
nimity of opinion that China's opportunity to escape for-
eign domination and a further restriction of her autonomy
and territory lay in getting under the wing of America."
So far as the Chinese listened to any words of mi*ne, I
warned them that all this fine talk was illusive and that
once started on the slippery down-hill path, it would not
be long before China would, willy nilly, take orders from
all the Allies, and that Japan would not be found in that
dread day the smallest and most gentle.
As to the second point, the Chinese were ready enough
to put a check on Japan, but they were apprehensive. And
there "was more than apprehension." There was "actual
fear" — "fear of what the Japanese might do." From my
side (and I edited the only paper in English which sup-
ported the Chinese President in his policy of neutrality),
I warned the Chinese against anything like sharp practice
in resisting the Japanese. "What you do," I said again
and again, "let it be done aboveboard. Don't aspire to be
tricky."
Mr. Blythe again:
There was no let-up to the campaign. Dr. Eeinsch was inde-
fatigible. He had repeated audiences with the President and with
the Premier. He worked night and day, and he captained the
squad that was working with him. . . .
At this juncture Dr. Reinsch rose and declared himself in a
vigorous and American manner. He told the Chinese exactly
what was proposed to them; what the benefits to China would be.
And he also told them that their attempt at a compromise would
not suffice. They must go the distance or not start. Also, the
Flying Wedge enunciated the same sentiments — not in the diplo-
94 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
hiatie language employed by Dr. Reinsch, mayhap, but in words
that were to the point. No compromise! That was the watch-
word. All or nothing! To be sure, we didn't expect a definite
break in diplomatic relations; but we demanded just that, none
the less. What we wanted was an adequate declaration that would
align China with the United States, and were content to leave the
question of breaking off diplomatic relations to a later date.
The Chinese did not know this, and they were much perturbed
Chinese. They argued shrewdly that they had no grievance with
Germany; that there had been no situation anterior; and that to
do this thing would be like walking up and assaulting an old and
unoffending friend.
Thus the American Minister in Peking and his coterie
of friends were aspiring to high diplomacy of a typical
kind, so familiar in past ages; they were playing politics,
and the Chinese were the tools. There can be no doubt of
Dr. Reinsch 's friendly intentions in China's interests, but
one may well doubt the wisdom or utility of his diplomatic
venture.
The result was the first step, namely, a mere formal
dispatch from the Chinese Foreign Office to the German
Minister, protesting against Germany's method of waging
war and advising in solemn terms a speedy reversal of
policy. In phraseology and moral ideas China was, indeed,
aligned with the United States. As to the authorship of
the document, supposedly prepared by Mr. C. C. Wu, act-
ing for his father who was laid aside by illness and was
being medically treated by a German physician, Samuel
G. Blythe says :
The form of the Notes was to be decided. It is not necessary
to say when or where or by whom the Note to Germany and the
Note to the United States, presented by China, were written.
All that is necessary is to say that before these Notes were agreed
upon by the Cabinet and given to the German Minister and to
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 95
the American Minister, they were entirely satisfactory both in
manner and in matter to all intimately concerned.
The dispatch to the German Minister, dated February 9,
five days after the receipt by the Chinese Government of
the American Minister's dispatch, contains this magnifi-
cently conceived sentence:
The new measures of submarine warfare inau^rated by Ger-
many, imperilling the lives and property of Chinese citizens to
even a gi-eater extent than the measures previously taken which
have already cost China so many lives, constitute a violation of the
principles of international law at present in force, and an inter-
ference with legitimate commercial intercourse between neutral
states and between neutral states and belligerent powers; if we
submit to this method of warfare it will be equivalent to an
admission on our part that this arbitraiy and unjustifiable course
of action is in accordance with international law.
Beside the rebuke and protest, the Note contained this
warning — it might almost be called an ultimatum — con-
ceived by a brilliant brain:
In case, contrary to its expectations, its protest be ineffectual,
the Government of the Chinese Republic will be constrained, to its
profound regret, to sever diplomatic relations at present existing
between the two countries. It is necessary to add that the atti-
tude of the Chinese Government has been dictated purely by the
desire to further the cause of the world's peace and the mainte-
nance of the sanctity of international law.
The Chinese were delighted with their literary effort and
diplomatic ingenuity. In fact the version in English far
surpassed the version in Chinese. Eugene Chen, editor of
the Peking Gazette, exulted that the two Republics were
taking together such a lofty moral position. He wrote;
96 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
The decision arrived at is in every sense a victory of the
younger intellectual forces over the older mandarinate, whose
traditions of laissez faire and spineless diplomacy have hitherto
cost China so much.
Miss La Motte * gives expression to a somewhat prevalent
view:
Again I marvelled at the lofty tone of this note, and wondered
how this moral strength had been so suddenly acquired. Thought
I to myself, can this be poor old browbeaten China — humbled
and prostrate before the Powers of Europe, unable to protest
when her territory is snatched away from her, — now suddenly
giving voice to these exalted ideas'? Does it not seem rather
ludicrous that she should suddenly proclaim herself the upholder
of international law? Like Moses of old, she is now stretching
forth her arms; but who are they who uphold those arms? These
solemn notes are given forth to the world, and the world is asked
to believe sincerely, as China herself states, that they were " dic-
tated purely by the desire to further the cause of the world's
peace and by the maintenance of the sanctity of international
law." Let us believe it, if we can.
For the moment the Chinese were captivated by an hal-
lucination.
There are those who now blame the American Minister
for giving assurance of help to the Chinese Government
and which the President failed at the Peace Conference to
have realized. He would, indeed, be to blame, if he was not
authorized by the President. Others blamed the President
for not guaranteeing to China all that she had been led to
believe was to be hers. But here it is to be supposed that he
authorized assurances to China. Discrimination here is
most important. To be sure, the President was the one re-
sponsible for requesting China along with other neutral
nations to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, as an-
» " Peking Dust," p. 142.
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 97
PoajQced in his Message to Congress, but he was not to blame
jfor all of China's subsequent entanglements for the very
reason that what he definitely authorized was the official
presentation of his personal request. What occurred in
Peking in the way of assurance* of American help must be
traced to the difficulties of executing the President's re-
quest and to the policy pursued in reference to what is
called both the first and second steps of the Peking Gov-
ernment.
What the President has understood as to his own inten-
tions in early 1917 has been made clear in the conversation,
August 19, 1919, between the President and the Senatorial
Committee of Foreign Affairs. I quote:
Senator Johnson — Did China enter the war upon our advice,
the advice of the United States?
The President — I cannot tell, sir. We advised her to enter and
she soon after did. Whether she had sought our advice, and
whether that was the persuasive advice or not, I do not know.
As will be seen in the subsequent discussion of China's
taking the third step, that of declaring war, the chief factor
or ''persuasive voice" was Japan, while Great Britain and
France came next in point of persuasiveness, and the
United States was a passive third. It was in the initial
stages of persuading China to threaten and warn Germany
and then to sever diplomatic relations that the American
Government was the active factor and "persuasive voice."
What the President recognizes to be his responsibility in
those initial stages is further disclosed in this peculiar
"official inquiry":
Senator Johnson — Do you recall, Mr. President, that preceding
that advice we had asked China, as one of the neutral nations, to
sever diplomatic relations with Germany?
Mr. President — I do not recall, Senator. I am sure Mr.
^Lansing can tell, though, from the records of the department.
98 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Senator Johnson — Do you know, Mr. President, whether or not
our Government stated to China that if China would enter the
war we would protect her interests at the Peace Conference t
The President — ^We made no promises.
It is quite likely that no promise in this identical form
was given. It is equally probable that the President him-
self was not kept posted as to the real form of assurances
which lured the Chinese Government on to coming danger.
As to the arguments advanced by Americans in Peking
for embroiling China in the war the Allied Ministers in
Peking passed no criticism so long as the end was attained.
They were conscious that the best way to get China started
on the war-path was to leave the counselling to America
alone, and that the two arguments of aligning China with
the sister republic and of putting a check to Japan's de-
signs were more impelling than any argument of their
own.
Japan, on the other hand, was both jealous and indignant
at American intrusion and at the kind of argument used.
Her ingenuity was equal to the occasion. Hitherto she had
opposed all plans for bringing China into the war, now she
suddenly wheeled around, rushed in ahead of the American
propagandists, and ever since has held the position of pre-
dominance, superior not only to American influence in
China, but to that of the British and French. She was
more insistent than any American or European that China
must delay no longer to sever relations with Germany, not
because she hated Germany, but because she could give good
proof that what Americans and Europeans could not do,
she was able to do.
(2) We thus come to the second step, that of severing
diplomatic relations with Germany. The campaign against
China for effecting this object was triangular. The Chinese
who argued for action grew in numbers and were of three
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 99
groups according to the leadership to which they attached
themselves. One group advanced the argument that China
should align herself with the United States ; this was mostly
the Young China party. The second group argued that
China should align herself with the Allies, meaning Euro-
pean Allies, as against the Central Powers and Turkey;
this was under the leadership of returned students from
those countries and of those who had held offices at the
European capitals. The third group did not so much
argue, as they secretly plotted, to bring China and Japan
into closer relations under Japan's military direction; this
was composed of the pro-Japan party, which grew stronger
as the war continued and as China's entanglements in-
creased.
The Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, fell under the in-
fluence of the third group and of Japan. In a conversation
which I had with him at the time, he said, "We are bound
to take the second step. We are helpless. We are pressed
to act, ' ' meaning the pressure of Japan, which worked with
no ostentation or open propaganda.
Dr. Wu Ting-fang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his
young son, C. C. Wu, joined the American group; they,
very reasonably, thought it best that China should have a
place at the Peace Table.
Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs when
Japan presented the Twenty-one Demands, and once Min-
ister to France, Mr, Liang Chi-chiao, the noted reformer
and active participant in the revolution against Yuan Shih-
kai's monarchical movement, and Mr. Tsai Yun-pei, noted
educationist, who had just returned from a visit to Europe,
were three of the strongest agents of the pro-Ally party.
Really it was a pro-French party.
Tsao Yu-lin, who had been educated in Japan, and was
Minister in the Chinese Government, Lu Tsung-yu, for-
merly Minister to Japan, and Chang Tsung-hsiang, Min-
100 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
ister to Japan during these critical times, were of the pro-
Japan party.
Agitation flourished as never before. Money in abun-
dance was forthcoming to make sure all doubtful ones. The
Allied Legations of Europe, Japan and the United States,
all from different angles, pressed the Chinese to make what
was called a "masculine decision." President Li Yuan-
hung was chief of the party of strict neutrality. He wished
to see China on friendly terms with all nations. More than
all, he abhorred intrigues, secrecy, trickery and bribery.
His one desire was to see China a real Republic, and that
he and all officials abide by the law and Constitution. At
the same time he refused to force his own will on the Gov-
ernment. As the situation became more intense, and his
own views clashed with those of the Premier and the Cab-
inet and the whole group of agitators, he consented to refer
the matter of severance of relations with Germany to the
two Houses of Parliament, and to submit his own judg-
ment to the decision of the people's representatives.
The Lower House, March 10, voted 330 to 87 in favour
of the Cabinet 's recommendation. The Upper House voted
the next day, 158 to 37.
By a strange coincidence the reply of the German Gov-
ernment to the Chinese dispatch of February 9 was made
on the same day. It had no effect in altering the general
result of the campaign of enlightenment. The German Min-
ister and his staff received their passports, March 14. Many
Chinese officials really regretted the departure of Admiral
von Hintze, who had commended himself and his govern-
ment by his geniality as well as by his thoughtfulness for
China's best interests. It was not till March 25 that he and
his suite left Peking, some of the Chinese having taken the
unusual position that he might live on quietly at some sea-
side resort till the war came to an end ; this, they thought,
would not be far away.
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE ' 101
(3) The third step, most serious of all, but one in which
the United States was less implicated, was to get China to
declare war. Here confusion, already great, became worse
confounded. For five months China's turmoil increased
from day to day and from one plot into another. China
became a land of upheaval and strife, of the passions of
war and of autocratic domination.
The Premier and his coterie argued that the third step
was logical and even necessary. The President favoured a
declaration of war even less than he had favoured the break
in diplomatic relations. Members of Parliament, who saw
that all the nice things which the Allies had suggested as
quite possible, and which the Premier had represented as
** assurances," were mere fancies of an excited brain, be-
came antagonistic to the Premier and his proposals of war.
The Young China party, while ready for war, all the more
that the United States had declared war in April, was not so
ready to allow leadership and added power to the Premier
and his military associates. The war issue had brought
schism between the President and the Premier, and now
was bringing schism between Parliament and the Premier,
between democracy and militarism. There was a growing
feeling that China had done enough in connection with
the European War, and that more should not be expected
unless some decided advantages were to appear.
As to the change going on in the arguments used, I quote
from the Washington correspondent of the New York
Tribune for April 12, 1917 :
It is understood that the principal question confronting the
Peking Government at this moment is not whether China should
enter the war, as this virtually has been decided, but whether
China should continue to align herself with the United States and
follow this country's lead, or should join the Entente Alliance
under the leadership and direction of Japan, If a decision fol-
lowing the latter course is made it is believed here that Japan
102 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
•will obtain control of China's army and military resources, and
establish a semi-protectorate over China that would make it dif-
ficult for either China or the other Powers to induce Japan to sur-
render after the war.
The Premier towards the end of April called a confer-
ence of all the Military Governors, who decided to follow
the lead of their military chief. The military element was
now in the saddle. On May 1, the Cabinet unanimously
decided in favour of a declaration of war. The President,
still opposed to these war schemes, consented in the con-
stitutional way to refer the matter to Parliament. A dis-
patch was sent to Parliament by the President, on May 7.
By May 10, Parliament met to discuss and decide. A howl-
ing mob, hired by the militarists, gathered outside Parlia-
ment building, to force compliance to the patriotic demand
for war. Naturally Parliament refused to act under such
methods of coercion. Moreover, all of the Cabinet Min-
isters except one resigned. The Military Governors sup-
porting the Premier memorialized the President to dissolve
Parliament. Being rebuffed, they retired to Tientsin. The
Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, was dismissed from ofSce
by mandate of the President, and Dr. Wu Ting-fang be-
came acting Premier. The militarists formed a "Provi-
sional Government" of their own in Tientsin. Different
provinces or their Military Governors declared independ-
ence. The cry was, "On to Peking!" The President
was firm, and issued a proclamation to warn these of-
ficers of the government who were plotting revolt. General
Chang Hsun, the most reactionary of all, but holding ideas
of his own, was invited to mediate. He arrived in Tientsin
June 7. An ultimatum from the mediator came to the
President to dissolve Parliament. The mediator, moreover,
had troops, as had the Premier and Military Governors.
The President yielded and prepared a mandate for Dr. Wu
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 103
Ting-fang to countersign. This veteran statesman showed
a lofty courage: "You may take off my head, but I will
sign no such mandate." He was allowed to retire. An-
other man was chosen, who signed, and the mandate went
forth. Parliament disappeared, and the militarists were
in the saddle. In fact, the Republic was no more; this was
the result of a crusade for war. Men who wanted war with
Germany were having war with themselves. Civil strife
had begun. Meanwhile, in all this confusion and lawless-
ness, General Chang Hsun came with his soldiers to Pe-
king, compelled more mandates to be issued, declared the
restoration of the Monarchy, and then by a quick reversal
was in a few days defeated by the troops of the ex-premier,
General Tuan Chi-jui.
Most of the Parliamentarians retired to Shanghai and
then to Canton, where they established a "Constitutional
Government." President Li Yuan-hung, chagrined at his
failure, resigned, and the Vice-President, General Feng
Kuo-chang, came to Peking as acting President. General
Tuan Chi-jui, who had once more shown his loyalty to the
Republic, again became Premier, but without sanction of
a Parliament. The militarists were in complete possession.
The war issue could again come to the front with chance of
favourable consideration.
So long as the act of inducing China to enter the war
was looked upon as a great achievement for a worthy cause,
credit was given to Dr. Reinsch ; but no sooner did the act
begin to appear unwise than America's responsibility began
to be denied. Thus W. Reginald Wheeler^ writes, in a
foot-note however:
The personal influence of the American Minister and his asso-
ciates at Peking, throughout all the negotiations leading up finally
to a declaration of war, was one of the strongest factors in induc-
ing China to join the Allies.
* " China and the World War," p. 79.
104 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Whatever the purpose of the American Minister, the
policy of the American Government, and of Americans
familiar with Chinese conditions, was, if not hostile to the
inoculation of China with the war-fever, at least of a neg-
ative and somewhat inoperative character. It is not quite
the truth to say that China entered the war at America's
invitation.
During the months of turmoil and civil strife, the Amer-
ican Minister, as if to make amends for past zeal, was in-
structed to send, on June 5, the following dispatch to the
Chinese Government :
The Government of the United States learns with the most pro-
found regret of the dissension in China and desires to express the
most sincere desire that tranquillity and political co-ordination
may be forthwith re-established.
The entry of China into war with Germany — or the continuance
of the status quo of her relations with that Government — are mat-
ters of secondary consideration.
The principal necessity for China is to resume and continue her
political entity, to proceed along the road of national development
on which she has made such marked progress.
With the form of Government in China or the personnel which
administers the Government, the United States has an interest
only in so far as its friendship impels it to be of service to China.
But in the maintenance by China of one central, united and alone
responsible Government, the United States is deeply interested and
now expresses the very sincere hope that China, in her own inter-
est, and in that of the world, will immediately set aside her
factional political disputes, and that all parties and persons will
work for the re-establishment of a co-ordinate Government and
the assumption of that place among the Powers of the world to
which China is so justly entitled, but the full attainment of which
is impossible in the midst of internal discord.
This was another of America's admirably phrased mes-
sages to China. To one not trained in the manoeuvrings
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 105
of diplomacy it would seem that real interest in China
might have been better effected by keeping the war issue
entirely away from China's political life. If it had never
been broached by the American Government or pushed by
the persuasive reasonings of Americans the European
Allies would have had no lever to move China to enter
the war and no raison d'etre to intrigue with Japan to
consent to the general scheme. Without the war issue, Par-
liament would hardly have been dissolved, and civil strife
have had no chance to begin.
Shortly before the United States sent this Note, an Eng-
lish correspondent of the North China Herald, David
Fraser, on May 17, expressed his doubts as to the wisdom
of seeking Japan's co-operation. He wrote thus:
It was one thing to admit Germany to a special position in
Shantung because her military power could never have been ex-
erted in the Far East. It is quite another thing to see Japan
become so privileged, ambitious as she is of predominance in
China.
The action of the United States Government in issuing
a warning to China probably resulted in more harm than
good. (1) The Note was futile in restoring peace to China.
(2) The action of the American Government soon changed
to its original form, of advising China to follow the United
States and enter the war, thereby nullifying the force of
the warning. (3) Japan was offended at American in-
trusion into Chinese affairs, without consulting the Powers
most concerned. Thus, then, as all through the subsequent
events of war and peace, China, the United States, the
Entente Allies and Japan, all of whom were associated in
the overthrow of Germany, were jealous and suspicious of
each other, now giving more power to Japan and then
trying to withdraw it.
106 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
When General Tuan Chi-jui again became Premiei', JvAyf
15, and General Feng Kuo-ehang formally became Pres-
ident, August 1, little argument was needed to bring to a
successful end the long campaign of inducing China to
take part in the Great War. The Cabinet and the Pres-
ident declared war against both Germany and Austria-
Hungary, August 14. No parliamentary sanction was pos-
sible. China's entrance into the war was an autocratic
move, not a democratic one, and yet China, too, professed
to believe that she was fighting to make the world * ' safe for
democracy. ' '
China declared war more at the behest of Japan than
from the irresistible pressure of public sentiment. There
were stronger reasons against the fatal action than for it.
Arguments on both sides turned Peking into a Debating
Society, but they were never the propelling force. Japan
held the reins.
Some of China's leaders who were opposed to a declara-
tion of war were ex-President Li Yuan-hung, military
leader of the first revolution ; Dr. Sun Yat-sen, great revo-
lutionist and first Provisional President ; Tang Shao-yi, first
Premier; and Kang Yiu-wei, the noted reformer of 1898,
and one who still held fast his original views for twenty
years. Most of the Chambers of Commerce, fearful of the
growing power of the military autocrats, and of the spread
of internal strife, counselled neutrality so far as was then
possible.
The chief argument in support of a declaration of war
was the financial one. On the one hand China would be
free from paying the enemy countries monies due them,
altogether amounting to $170,000,000, and on the other
could receive from abroad a big loan, estimated at $200,-
000,000 to be floated if not in London, Paris or New York,
at least in Japan. Japan's proffered aid in reality was
already assured.
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 107
Another reason was that having put their hand to the
plough, the Chinese should not look back. There could be no
assurance of having Allied promises fulfilled, if China
stopped halfway. With an actual declaration of war, one
blessing after another would follow.
Dr. George E. Morrison, the President's diplomatic ad-
visor, thought out two other reasons, which carried weight
with the intellectuals, though not with the mass of the
people. They were :
By terminating her treaties with Germany China would be able
to make new and more advantageous treaties after the war, and
possibly have a general revision of treaties.
In the Customs there are 118 Germans employed, 41 in the
indoor and 77 in the outdoor. By their removal vacancies would
be made which could be filled by Chinese students, of whom 24
per year are turned out by the Customs College and are waiting
employment.
Another reason, which had had more weight at the open-
ing of the crusade by the American Minister than after
the political upheaval, was that through representation at
the coming Peace Conference all China's international
problems could be solved and past wrongs could be righted.
This was the dream-land in which not a few continued to
live until the day the Versailles Treaty was signed.
The arguments opposed to the declaration of war may
be summarized as follows:
1. As the war issue had led China into confusion, it was
wiser to put it to one side.
2. China's internal difficulties were too many and too
serious to allow scope for action on outside and far distant
questions. Better for China to reorganize than to enter
the European War.
3. As complications had already arisen, more must be
expected, if China joined one side or the other.
108 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
4. So long as the people saw no reason for the war, and
there was no Parliament to sanction, the declaration of war
had better be postponed.
5. Promises of outside help must be taken as illusory.
China had better start out to help herself.
6. If China declared war, she would be compelled to take
orders from others, and to that degree lose her power of
independent action. A strong nation like the United States
might avoid subjection to the will of others, but not a weak
nation like China.
7. Many who had favoured war as an abstract proposi-
tion, were opposed to the way the war was declared and to
the type of government consummating the act. In a word,
it was not the Chinese nation, but the Peking Government
that was to make the decision.
8. To use a figure of speech, China was asked to spring
into the fire with no weapons to put the fire out. Or to use
another figure, China was asked to float out to the whirl-
pool, from which she would then be admonished to escape
and come to the shore.
The views of Dr. Sun Yat-sen were made known in an
open letter to Premier Lloyd George as early as March 7.
They were ridiculed by the Allied press (not by the Jap-
anese) , but at this later date may be regarded as good fore-
sight. I quote in part:
... I have been approached by prominent English to con-
sider the question of China joining the Allies, After careful
study I come to the conclusion that it would be disastrous to both
countries should China break her neutrality. For China is yet an
infant Republic and as a nation she may be likened to a sick man
just entering the hospital of constitutionalism. Unable to look
after herself at this stage, she needs careful nursing and support.
Therefore China cannot be regarded as an organized country. She
is held intact only by custom and sentiment of a peace-loving
AMEEICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 109
people. But at once, should there arise discord, general anarchy
would result. . . .
. . . Should China enter the war, it would prove dangerous
to her national life and injurious to the prestige of England in
the Far East. The mere desire to get China to join the Allies is
to Chinese minds a confession of the Allies' inability to cope
with Germany. Just now comes Premier Tuan's report to the
President that the Entente Powers are coercing China to join the
Allies. Already the question has raised bitter dissensions among
our statesmen. Discord now may evoke anarchism which will
arouse the two strong but perilous elements in China, anti-foreign
fanatics and Mohammedans.
The dissensions which arose after Dr. Sun penned these
words, and which have continued to the present, show the
foreign thinker and schemer that it may be prudent as to
things Chinese to give heed to the warnings of the Chinese,
who place first the interests of their own country.
I may here recount part of a conversation with President
Feng Kuo-chang, August 13, the day before he issued the
declaration of war.
I said to him: "There is no objection to China's declar-
ing war on Germany, if that is all. It will be a declaration,
but nothing will be done. Germany has no troops or ships
to send here, and you are not likely to send any to fight
Germany. What I fear is that you will have to join the
Allies, of whom Japan is chief, and henceforth you will
have to obey them. This wiU be your disaster."
"I am opposed to joining either side," the President
said, and then added: "China will fight Germany inde-
pendently. China is opposed to violations of international
law, and therefore joins with the United States in opposing
such violations. We will take orders from no one."
"Very good," I replied, "I hope so. Wait and see."
This idea of making war without joining the Allied na-
tions, including Japan, was where President Feng differed
110 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
from the more zealous agitators. Possibly he had derived
the idea from President Wilson. Before leaving Nanking
for Peking, late in July, to enter the Presidential Palace,
he made a speech containing these words :
Originally I was absolutely opposed to the declaration of war.
But after my attempts to oppose it proved futile, I have had to
follow the general trend of public opinion. Although I now have
no objection to the declaration of war upon Germany, yet I am
still opposed to the idea of my country entering into alliance
with the Entente Powers. If our entry into the war on the side
of the Entente Powers becomes a matter of imperative necessity,
we may do so on certain conditions, without which I deem it were
better for us to keep out of it. For it must be understood that in
the case of declaring war upon Germany independently, we can do
so at our own perfect will, but if we go to war on the side of
the Entente, we should not be as free as we should like to be.
Here, then, we are able first to detect the varying course
Chinese thought had taken from those early days in Feb-
ruary. The scheme of China aligning herself with the
United States had vanished, the subsequent scheme of join-
ing the Entente Allies was not accepted by all the Chinese,
and was advocated by Japan only on the understanding
that she was to act for the Entente in Far Eastern affairs,
and might ultimately become the sole Ally of China.
As illustrating the attempt to get China to do what the
new President was anxious not to do, I cite an instance on
August 6, when the seven Ministers for France, Portugal,
Russia, Japan, Belgium, Great Britain, and the United
States had audience with the new President. The capable
French Minister, M. Conty, was spokesman for the group.
He not only extended congratulations as befitted a cere-
monial call, but seized the opportunity to express apprecia-
tion that China was going to declare war on Germany. He
added the hope that the bonds between China and these
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 111
Allied nations would be cemented by a closer association in
the great struggle. These words did not harmonize with
the American Note of warning, issued shortly before.
Neither did they harmonize with President Feng's explicit
desire that China go to war in an independent capacity.^
Thomas F. Millard ^ writes thus of the purposes of Japan :
When it was evident that the united urging of the American,
British and French Grovernments, and the influence of individual
foreigners, would bring China into the war, Japanese diplomacy
made a characteristic manoeuvre. The Chinese Government was
advised by Japan to declare war as one of the Allies, and not as
a separate nation. This was a scheme to detach China from the
United States, which power never had formally joined the Allies,
and attach her to the Allies, thereby making her a part of and
subject to the private agreements made among the nations com-
posing the original alliance.
The climax of the tragic and momentous moulding of
China's destiny received a touch of pleasant humour from
the hand of the Minister for Austria-Hungary, Baron von
Rosthorn, who had remained in Peking till the middle of
August, 1917. This diplomat had originally been in the
Chinese Customs Service, was a Chinese sinologue, and was
a protagonist of Chinese rights. His term of service in
the Legation was longer than that of all the seven Ministers
combined who formed the opposing group.
On the day war was declared by the Peking Government,
he sent to the Chinese Minister this most unusual Note :
Peking, August 14, 1917.
YouB Excellency,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of
today of the following tenour:
(Text of Chinese Note)
* See Appendix II.
* " Democracy and the Eastern Question," p. 131.
112 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
In reply I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I
have taken cognizance of your note and am awaiting instructions
from my Government.
I cannot here enter into the arguments contained in the declara-
tion of war, but feel bound to state that I must consider this
declaration as unconstitutional and illegal, seeing that according
to so high an authority as the former President Li Yuan-Hung
Such a declaration requires the approbation of both houses of
Parliament.
Etc., etc.
II. The Intrigue going on in ToMo to embroil China in
the war.
To make clear the peculiar windings of diplomacy in
inducing China to take the three steps that bound China to
one group of warring nations, a study must be made of
the greater and wider intrigue going on in Tokio, in which
the Governments of Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy,
and at first Russia, all had a part.
As soon as the Entente Allies detected that the United
States was seeking in early February to take the lead in
Oriental polities by inducing China to align herself with
the sister Republic in all war measures, the Ambassadors in
Tokio for Russia, Great Britain, France and Italy secretly
negotiated with Japan as to Japan's connections with
China's war measures. The one intrigue conflicted with
the other. The American Legation in Peking was pointing
out how China could get ahead of Japan in reference to
German and other rights which Japan had planned to ap-
propriate. At the same time the four European Embassies
were pointing out to Japan how she could appropriate all
German rights not only in Shantung but in the German
colonies north of the equator. Europe agreed with the
United States, a future associate in the war, in the one
matter of arraying China against Germany. But Japan
had previously resisted the European advice that China
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 113
should enter the war. To resist American advice in the
same direction was less feasible, for China would probably
accept the advice. Japan, therefore, would do well to ac-
cede to the combined advice of Europe and America, if so
be that her gains would be greater. To induce Japan to
allow China, first to break with Germany and then to de-
clare war, all that was necessary was to give Japan a
reasonable quid pro quo. This was to guarantee to Japan,
whatever China or the United States might wish, all the
German rights in Shantung and the South Seas north of
the equator. In making this guarantee, which proved of
highest value at the Paris Peace Conference, Japan, too,
was requested to give a quid pro quo, namely, to assist in
bringing about the repatriation of all Germans, and the
requisition of German commercial houses in China. In fact
it seems clear that the British and French were more anx-
ious to consummate these last designs than to lead China
into the war. China 's entrance into war was the means for
facilitating and legalizing the total elimination of Germans
from China and the destruction of German trade.
Thus while China supposed, at American suggestion, that
her entrance into war would afford her the chance of ter-
minating treaties with Germany and possibly of nullifying
the agreements with Japan of 1915, and so of restoring all
German rights to China, the European Allies were conniv-
ing with Japan, unknown to China or to the United States,
that what China hoped to get would all pass to Japan. If
these facts had been known to the Peking Government, the
arguments of all groups of outside agitators would have
lost most of their persuasiveness. As to the United States,
even as late as August 11 and 19, 1919, both President
Wilson and the Secretary of State asserted that they had
been kept in ignorance of these wonderful compacts of our
associates in war.
One informing document is a dispatch of Viseoimt
114 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Motono, February 19 (1917), to the French and Russian
Ambassadors. It is as follows:
... In view of recent developments in the general situation
and in view of the particular arrangements concerning peace
conditions such as arrangements relative to the disposition of the
Bosporus, Constantinople and the Dardanelles, being already
under discussion by the Powers interested, the Imperial Japanese
Government believes that the moment has come for It also to
express Its desire relative to certain conditions of peace essential
to Japan and to submit them for the consideration of the Gov-
ernment of the French Republic.
The French Government is thoroughly informed of all the ef-
forts the Japanese Government has made in a general manner to
accomplish its task with the present war, and particularly to
guarantee for the future the peace of Oriental Asia and the
security of the Japanese Empire, for which it is absolutely neces-
sary to take from Germany its bases of political, military and
economic activity in the Far East.
Under these conditions the Imperial Japanese Government pro-
poses to demand from Germany at the time of the peace negotia-
tions the surrender of the territorial rights and special interests
Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands
situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean.
The Imperial Japanese Government confidently hopes the Gov-
ernment of the French Republic, realizing the legitimacy of these
demands, wUl give assurance that, her case being proved, Japan
may count upon their full support on this question. . . .^
The reply of the French Ambassador at Tokio, under
date of March 2, 1917, reads thus :
The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give
the Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of
the Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shan-
tung and the German Islands on the Pacific north of the equator.
* Charles A. Selden, New York Times, April 12, 1919.
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE ll5
It also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese
Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed
before the war in this Chinese province and these islands.
M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its sup-
port to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations
with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance.
The consequences in China should be the following:
First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and
consuls ;
Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to
leave Chinese territory;
Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and
the ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at
the disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and
Portugal ;
Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established
in China; forfeiting the rights of the Germans in the Concessions
she possesses in certain parts of China.^
The fact that these secret Agreements were not disclosed
to the Peking Government bespeaks no real friendliness to
China. The fact that they were not disclosed to the Wash-
ington Government, at the very time America's help was
being sought by the Entente Allies, and at the time Amer-
ican arguments were deluding the Chinese, bespeaks no
real friendliness to the United States. This was hardly
playing the game. According to the statement of Secre-
tary Lansing, August 11, 1919, before the Senate Com-
mittee of Foreign Relations,^ neither Mr, Arthur Balfour,
nor M. Viviani, nor Viscount Ishii, on coming to the United
States in 1917 on special missions, confidential and far-
reaching, disclosed to any one in the American Government
the arrangements arrived at in Tokio the early part of the
same year. Senator Borah, at the same Committee meeting,
^ Charles A. Selden, New York Times Paris correspondent, April 21,
1919.
' New York Sim, August 12, 1919.
116 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
read the following from the records of the House of Com-
mons March 4, 1918 :
Mr. King asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether
there have been communicated to President Wilson copies of all
treaties, whether secret or public, and memoranda of all other
agreements or undertakings to which this country has become a
party since August 4, 1914; and if not, whether copies of all
such documents will be handed to the American Ambassador in
London ?
Balfour — The honourable Member may rest assured that Presi-
dent Wilson is kept fully informed by the Allies.
At least the Secretary of State was kept ignorant of these
arrangements made by the Allies in Tokio, for when Sen-
ator Borah asked Mr. Lansing, "Notwithstanding the state-
ment of Ishii and the statement of Balfour, it is a matter of
fact that the Secretary of State of the United States had
no knowledge of these treaties until after the signing of
the armistice, is it not?" Mr. Lansing replied: ''That is
true." It is even more likely that President Wilson was
left in ignorance.
More serious was the omission of informing China. She
was the one country vitally affected. Germany had no
rights in Shantung except as granted by China, the sover-
eign State. For American agents to urge on China the
severance of relations with Germany in order that China
might strengthen her position in Shantung as against both
Germany and Japan, at the very time that the Allies were
trying to eliminate China from having possession of Ger-
man rights that Japan might be the gainer, was hardly
playing fair with China, a past friend and a potential ally.
The rights which Germany had had in Shantung prior to
the war were all embraced within the bounds of China, not
of Japan. China, not Japan, had sole responsibility for the
disposal of German rights, German property, German title-
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 117
deeds and German investments within the confines of
China. Japan had the same responsibility within her own
confines.
It was a sorry spectacle this trickery and chicanery being
perpetrated on China. And, how blind was American
statecraft and how inconsistent American idealism to pro-
claim on one side of the globe righteousness, democracy,
open covenants and the emancipation of the oppressed, and
to share in intrigue, secrecy, selfishness and deception on
the other side of the globe.
In a general way, the United States was trying to help
China as against Japan, while Great Britain, France and
Italy were seemingly helping Japan as against China. The
American attitude to Japan, as represented by the doings of
the American Legation in Peking, was not hid from the
statesmen of Japan : but the attitude of the three European
Allies towards China, as revealed by their scheming in
Tokio, was the very opposite of what the Ministers in Pe-
king for Britain, France and Italy loudly proclaimed to
the Chinese. As we now read the facts, these six countries
not only were forming plots to overwhelm Germany, but
were at loggerheads with each other on the very eve of
combining against Germany. Above all, this medley of
war scheming was taking place during the months of Feb-
ruary and March before either the United States Congress
or the Chinese Parliament was asked to declare a state of
war with Germany. The intrigue was a motley mixture of
semi-neutrality and defiant belligerency. Secrecy envel-
oped all. Strange associations for President Wilson and
the American people, who from the founders' day have
stood for straightforward dealing with all peoples of men,
Oriental as well as Occidental.
Dr. Arthur J. Brown,^ referring to Japan's change of
mind in reference to China under influences so adroit and
* " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 436.
118 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
unholy, comments thus: "Verily, dubious are the ways of
secret diplomacy." And he quotes from Dr. Frank J.
Goodnow of March 14, 1917 :
China would never have broken off relations but for urgings of
Japan, which has sinister designs against the integrity of China.
And unfortunately she will be able to carry out her scheme. One
obvious motive is the opportunity it wUl afford Japan to gain
control of China's army and navy, a step that will put her abso-
lutely at the Mikado's mercy.
The Englishman of the Far East has as a rule a high
sense of honour, a reputation for probity, straightforward
dealing and playing fair, but the diplomatic tactics pur-
sued in Tokio by the four European Allies were of the
Old World type, made feverish by contact with a sly kind
of Oriental diplomacy. There was in those days, on en-
trance into war of both the United States and China, a lot
of humbug, and some buncombe, a fair amount of self-
complacency and an immense amount of secrecy, inconsist-
encies galore, and selfish national ambition beyond measure.
A few days after the Chinese President issued the decla-
ration of war, all the eight Ministers of the new group
(arrayed against Grermany) sent to the Foreign Office in
Peking, in almost similar phraseology, notes of congratula-
tion and profound assurances of renewed friendship. I
append the one from the United States as being the one
nation whose word was more likely to be fulfilled.
. . . My Government is happily desirous of taking this op-
portunity to make it definitely known that in friendship, co-
operation and support my Government will do what it can to
enable China to enjoy the position and special regard that are
due to a great country.
The reception of such Notes had only one effect, to in-
spire in the Chinese breast hope and joy and to remove all
fears of future trouble.
AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE 119
My views on the situation have been clarified by sub-
sequent events, but what I thought at the time is shown
in an editorial which I wrote, somewhat sceptically, I con-
fess, August 21 :
It is a pity that the Chinese Government and the various Allied
Legations have not given more publicity to the replies sent to the
Chinese Government by the Allied Ministers (including the
American) in congratulation of having another ally against
Germany.
China in entering the war at the behests of friendly advisors
from near and far was just a little tremulous as she neared the
fateful hour, but now she is assured, yea, seven times reassured,
that she will now have more gains than her fondest fancies had
painted for her.
We have had the impression, and we told President Feng
so, that the outlook for China had never been so hopeless. We
must reverse this extravagant statement, until facts prove that
our revised view is wrong.
Ministers Plenipotentiary of eight countries assure China
(yes, assure her) that she is now to receive their united " friend-
ship, solidarity and assistance." Japan goes still further. She
says, " That at this moment the friendship of these two countries
has been much enhanced and their relations have grown still
closer." This is comforting. Moreover, all the eight Ministers
point China forward and upward, for she is now to enjoy the
position " due to a great Power."
At one bound, by a simple Declaration of War, China attains
to all this glory, distinction and assured friendship of other
Powers. She has become with less trouble than Japan one of the
family of nations.
On our part we have no doubt but that the ex-Ministers for
Germany and Austria-Hungary would be pleased to write the
same Notes with the same assurances, if so be the Notes were not
returned.
Several years ago Japan took the lead in making an arrange-
ment with Great Britain, France and Russia, for guaranteeing
120 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
equal opportunity in China to all nations, and the sovereign
independence of China.
Today she takes the lead — for leader she is — in bringing not
only Great Britain, France and Russia, but the United States,
Belgium, Italy and Portugal, to the policy of solidarity and
assistance.
Premier Tuan Chi-jui deserves all the honour he can get for
effecting this tangible result.
For half a year we have written upwards of 120 squibs against
the abandonment of neutrality and peace. We now see how
foolish we have been; China gets into no trouble at all, but has
abundant assurances of blessing that are never to end.
CHAPTER VI
A SERIES OP AGGRAVATIONS AND PERILS TO CHINA'
When the Peking Government, with no sanction of Parlia-
ment, declared war on the two Central Powers, August 14,
1917, the mass of the Chinese took the result with their
customary spirit of fatalism. What matter if the outcome
be good or bad ? What would happen was inevitable ; why
complain? Already China had been carried along for six
months by complex and hidden forces, as in a current, and
the future no man could see. That complications, en-
tanglements, annoyances, and all sorts of troubles, with
possible catastrophes, would arise, seemed to be a certainty.
War seldom brings blessing to the weak ; and China surely
was weak. Dr. Arthur J. Brown, writing at the close of
1918, says: ^
Time alone will show whether China embroiled herself in the
world war to her benefit or to her hurt. We suspect that, in spite
of the virtuous and well-meant declarations of the various Powers
regarding " the rights of weaker nations," poor, helpless China
will get only what the representatives of stronger governments
deem expedient and that Japan will have a good deal to say as
to what that shall be.
Coincidentally the United States and China should fare
well, for the former declared war on Good Friday and the
latter on the day the Holy Pontiff made his appeal for
peace.
Most of the Japanese papers, more familiar than others
* " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 436.
121
1^2 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
with the part played by the Japanese Government, wrote in
commendatory language of China's decision. One paper,
however, the Osaki Asahi, wrote in a different strain, a few
days prior to the decision, thus :
China's participation in the war has now become a matter of
time. No one has doubted that it will come. Now after Vice-
President Feng Kuo-ehang's arrival in Peking, the decision has
been arrived at. Whether it is necessary for her to take that
step or not is not the question now. An independent nation to
be forced by others to do anything, to talk about humanity which
is not in her mind and to declare war which is not necessary, is
indeed a regrettable thing from the point of view of national
existence of that nation. To be sure, even Japan is not free
from doing things which are not altogether necessary but because
forced by others. Some persons are inclined to regard Japan's
declaration of war against Germany merely from the point of
view of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. We supported the war
from the point of view of the Oriental problem, independently
of all else. As for the question of China's participation in the
war, judged from the history and effect of it, it is doubtful
whether it is advantageous to China or not.
As I viewed the probabilities at the time, I was more than
doubtful, I was pessimistic as to the outcome for China. In
a conversation with President Feng on the eve of declaring
war, I said :
' ' I have seen China in many difficulties ; I passed through
the Boxer uprising; but I have never been so hopeless as
to China's future as I am now."
"And I, too," he replied, "have no hope."
China, even more than vigorous and prosperous America,
would have done well to heed these words of Washington's
Farewell Address : ' ' Harmony and liberal intercourse with
all nations are recommended by policy, humanity and in-
terest. But even our commercial policy should hold an
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 123
equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting ex-
elusive favours or preferences."
The question was never presented to China to enter the
war on the side of the Central Powers; therein these two
(Powers showed themselves true friends of China. The
question urged on China by eight Legations — I will not say
Governments — was to join the United States, or the Entente
Allies, or Japan, or all of them, against the Central Powers,
until the latter should be vanquished not only on the field
of battle, but in the marts of trade and even within the
sacred domain of missions, science and education. For one
to argue otherwise was to lay himself open to being called
pro-German, and few cared to take the risk. I was among
the number to follow my own conscience, and I had the joy
of suffering for it. If China had persisted in remaining
neutral, she would have had good company, Spain, Hol-
land, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, and two
of the A. B. C. Republics of South America — Argentine and
Chile. If China had merely severed diplomatic relations
with Germany^ as President Wilson requested, China's sole
associates of any importance would have been Peru and
Ecuador. To go further, and declare war, China was in
the company of Brazil, Guatemala, Siam and Greece, and
still more of the United States, Great Britain, France,
Italy, Belgium, Portugal, the Czarist Russia (still retaining
a Minister in Peking) and Japan. It certainly seemed as
if China in going with the crowd was on the winning side,
both by superiority of military power, by combination of
financial resources, and by a widespread profession of lofty
aims, righteous ideals and untarnished justice. When all
these eight foreign Ministers solemnly assured China that
she could rely on their help and solidarity for placing her
high among the great nations of the world, it was simple
folly for a private individual like myself to sing in a
minor key.
124 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FEEE? '
Hardly, however, had China made her choice as to the
side of righteousness and the policy of prudence and secur-
ity than one by one a series of complications, annoyances
or troubles befell her, held sway through the Paris Peace
Conference, and has not yet come to an end. These troubles
which have come to China have come from China's associ-
ates in war, not from enemies in war. Some of the more
glaring misfortunes and annoyances I will now briefly
mention.
I. British demands as to Tibet.
While China was all stirred by the hot discussion on the
war question, the British Government, having kept silent
for several years, with no fixed agreement in her possession,
suddenly presented to China, in the month of March, 1917,
Twelve Demands concerning Tibet. Previous negotiations
in 1913 had failed to secure unanimity of action. In the
whirl of events in 1917, China was again urged to be
reasonable. Japan, in 1915, presented to China, under
President Yuan Shih-kai, Twenty-one Demands; Great
Britain, in 1917, presented to China, under President Li
Yuan-hung, Twelve Demands. Two Allies, mistrustful of
each other alike, were playing havoc with China. The
Demands, as made public by the Japanese press, and trans-
lated into Chinese newspapers, are as follows:
1. Great Britain shall have the right to construct railways
between India and Tibet.
2. The Chinese Government shall contract loans from the
British Government for the improvement of the administration of
Tibet.
3. The treaty obligations between Tibet and Great Britain
shall be considered valid as heretofore.
4. British experts shall be engaged for the industrial enter-
prises of Tibet.
5. China shall secure the redemption of loans contracted from
the British people by Tibetans.
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 125
6. Neither China nor Great Britain shall send troops to Tibet
without reason.
7. The Chinese Government shall not appoint or dismiss of-
ficials in Tibet on its own responsibility. (Italics ours.)
8. The British Government shall be allowed to establish tele-
graph lines in Lhassa, Chianghu, Chamutao, etc.
9. British postal service shall be introduced in Lhassa and
other places.
10. China shall not interfere with the actions of the British
Government in Tibet. (Italics ours.)
11. No privileges or interests in Tibet shall be granted to other
nations.
12. All mines in Tibet shall be jointly worked by the British
and Chinese Governments.
Surely Great Britain is not the one to east the first stone
at Japan. And between these two Allies — upper and nether
millstones — China is being ground.
Miss La Motte,^ writing of these same Demands, says :
Remember, over here it is not customary to think of or speak
of anything but " Japanese aggression." Japan, you see, offers
the only stumbling-block to the complete domination of the Orient
by Europe. But for Japan — China might possibly become another
India.
These Demands, as well as final Agreement, were kept in
abeyance till after the Great War. But the Chinese in
official circles knew well enough that sooner or later they
must come to an agreement by agreeing vnth Great Britain.
The matter was again broached in 1919, and the Chinese are
being pressed to sign an official document. Since the arm-
istice, Great Britain has been busy safeguarding her po-
sition in Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, Burma and
India, and in widening her influence and beneficent sway
in Afghanistan, Mesopotamia, Persia, the Caucasus, and
»" Peking Dust," p. 223.
126 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
far-away Tibet, all strategic points in the Asiatic portion
of world-wide empire.
And China, like Persia, like Egypt, will have to submit,
unless — unless — she yields to the other dominating force,
Japan.
Mr. C. C. Wu, in a memorandum, issued in the same
year, 1917,^ wrote:
China wants nothing more than the re-establishment of Chinese
suzerainty over Tibet, with recognition of the autonomy of the
territoiy immediately under the control of the Lhassa Govern-
ment, she is agreeable to the British idea of forming an effective
buffer territory in so far as it is consistent with equity and jus-
tice; she is anxious that her trade interest should be looked after
by her trade agents as do the British, a point which is agreeable
even to the Tibetans, though apparently not to the British; in
other words, she expects that Great Britain would at least make
with her an arrangement regarding Tibet which should not be
more disadvantageous to her than that made with Russia respect-
ing Outer Mongolia.
II. The LoMsing-Ishii Agreement.
No sooner had the United States declared war than the
Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium
designated some of their ablest men for special commissions
to visit the United States and to secure American help,
financial, military and political. The Japanese Govern-
ment did the same, designating a former Minister of For-
eign Affairs and Ambassador to Paris, Viscount Ishii. He
was equal to the task. The Chinese Government, on the
other hand, did nothing. After frequent conferences of
this Japanese Envoy with Secretary Lansing, at opportune
times and in a friendly spirit, there appeared on November
2, 1917, the exchange of Notes between the two. The
Agreement being in this form did not need to be referred
to the Senate for ratification.
* Putnam Weals, " Fight for the Republic in China," p. 479.
A SERIES OF AGGHAVATIONS 127
On the one hand the Notes reaffirmed the "open door"
principle in China and the preservation of China's inde-
pendence and territorial integrity; and on the other hand
there were introduced phrases capable of more than one
interpretation, as follows:
The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize
that territorial propinquity creates special relations between
eountries, and, consequently, the Government of the United
States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, par-
ticularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous.
It was known that only in a narrow sense was there an
''open door" in China, so long as spheres of interest existed
and preferential concessions were granted to particular
countries in particular parts of China. Japanese and also
Chinese would naturally give more attention to the other
words quoted above, "special relations" and "special in-
terests. ' ' However much Americans might claim that these
words meant nothing or only reaffirmed the principle of the
"open door," Orientals were positive that a new day had
come in which Japan, through recognition of the United
States, had a prior position in China, ahead of all others.
The Japanese Legation in Peking was the first to make
announcement of the new agreement. A translation into
Chinese was made, in which the Japanese used a strong
term for "interests," implying both power and benefit.
The American Legation, later on, made another translation,
implying simply relationship. The American Minister also
issued a formal statement that these words which attracted
go much attention were meant to harmonize with the tradi-
tional policy of the "open door" and equal opportunity.
Dr. Reinsch wrote:
The visit of the Imperial Japanese Mission to the United States
afforded an opportunity for free and friendly discussion of the
128 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
United States and Japan in the Orient by openly proclaiming
that the policy of Japan as regards China is not one of aggression
and by declaring there is no intention to take advantage com-
mercially or indirectly of the special relations to China created
by geographical position.
The Japanese preferred to explain for themselves what
was, and will be, **the policy of Japan," and their ex-
planation carried greater weight.
Secretary Lansing also issued a statement in Washing-
ton, practically overlooking the words which made the stir :
The statements in the Notes require no explanation. They
not only contain a reafi&rmation of the " open door " policy, but
introduce a principle of non-interference with the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of China, which, generally applied, is essential
to perpetual international peace, as clearly declared by President
Wilson, and which is the very foundation, also, of Pan-American-
ism, as interpreted by this Government.
The Chinese Government, seeing a meaning in the words,
and the particular meaning attached thereto by the Jap-
anese, issued a kind of protest to both Japan and the United
States, and so to all the world:
The principle adopted by the Chinese Government toward the
friendly nations has always been one of justice and equality, and
consequently the rights enjoyed by the friendly nations derived
from the treaties have been consistently respected, and so even
with the special relations between countries created by the fact of
territorial contiguity it is only in so far as they have already
been provided for in existing treaties. Hereafter the Chinese
Government will still adhere to the principles hitherto adopted,
and hereby it is again declared that the Chinese Government will
not allow herself to be bound by any agreement entered into by
other nations.
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 129
Thus, as the United States sent an identic Note in 1915
to China and to Japan about agreements those two coun-
tries had made, China in 1917 sends an identic Note to
Japan and the United States about an agreement which
they had just made.
China had good reason to complain. Was it a friendly
act for two Governments to consult among themselves about
rights in China, without ever consulting China ? All along,
in previous arrangements with Great Britain, France,
Russia and the United States, Japan had pursued the same
policy of negotiating about China, with China left out. As
Japan has prior position in Japan, so China, and no outside
country, has prior position in China. To infringe to the
least degree on this simple rule is to put an entering wedge
into China's national integrity.
III. TJie reign of military autocracy with the overthrow
of the democratic system of government.
Probably no aspect of the Great War, as affecting China,
has proved a greater misfortune to China and the Chinese
people than this which concerns China's internal and po-
litical condition.
Autocracy was supposed to be an essential characteristic
of monarchies, just as true of Chinese, Manchu or Mongol
monarchies as of the monarchies of the Romanoffs, Haps-
burgs and HohenzoUerns. But here we find something
anomalous : autocracy flourishing in the seventh and eighth
years of the Chinese Republic and among a people who for
centuries had enjoyed local self-government and believed
in the fundamental ideas of liberal institutions.
As for militarism it had never been the political creed
of the old dynasties where the literati ruled as it was in
days of the Republic, where Military Governors assumed
to dictate national and international policies as well as
those of their own provinces.
130 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
This ascendancy of autocracy and militarism began,
strange to say, when the scholarly representative of the
American Republic first broached a topic for discussion
and then strenuously agitated for a definite and prompt
line of action — that of breaking relations between China
and Germany. From February, 1917, to the time of arm-
istice, in November, 1918, and even since, the military
faction of autocratic mould under the leadership of General
Tuan Chi-jui, Premier and Minister of War, dominated
China's political affairs, both in the preliminaries of the
declaration of war and in the character and degree of
subsequent participation.
Nations which stood for free democracy in the Western
■world — France, Great Britain and the United States —
gave in the Orient their sympathetic countenance to the
plans and deeds of men who stood for despotic rule and
the military system. That which united these divergent
elements was the common readiness to wage war on a com-
mon enemy, when for safety's sake a dividing line should
have separated that which was democratic from that which'
was autocratic. The union which existed might bring
victory on the field of battle, but never a victory for de-
mocracy; it could effect the conquest of a nation but not
the defeat of a wrong principle.
It is here that the Great War made China suffer. The
Republic under President Li Yuan-hung had had a chance
to prove its worth, but the injection of the poison of war
and the passion of hate brought on dissension and turmoil,
turbulence and bloodshed, resulting in a complete collapse
of a diseased body politic.
Dr. Arthur J. Brown ^ says :
China has a weary road to travel before the discordant ele-
ments of her vast population settle themselves into a compact
* " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 294.
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 131
and well-governed republic j but the monarchy has gone beyond
possibility of recovery.
True, the monarcliy has gone, but not autocracy. Give
men power anywhere, and they will love to keep it for
themselves, and this is autocracy.
Dr. Wu Ting-fang^ in an address, July, 1917, after he
had retired from Peking, used these words:
We are engaged in a struggle between democracy and mili-
tarism. Between fifty-five and sixty per cent, of the taxes of
China ax'e now going to support militarism in China. This must
be changed, but the change must be gradual. I ask Americans
to be patient and give China a chance. Democracy will triumph.
IV. The renewal of revolution and internecine strife.
When the first revolution arose in 1911, I was conserva-
tive enough to favour the peaceful but advancing movement
of the liberal, constitutional government of the Manchu
House, and was wont to say: "The fever of revolution is
hard to check. When about to cease, there comes a relapse.
One revolution will lead to a second, and this to a third,
and no telling when it will stop among a populous nation
like China."
The revolution which began in July, 1917, was the fourth
revolution. By introducing the war question — ^war the
other side of the globe — there came a clash between the
liberal and military elements with the ascendancy of the
military, the dissolution of Parliament, and the revolt and
protest of the constitutional element, with headquarters in
Canton. These constitutionalists are commonly spoken of
as revolutionists, but the real revolutionists were the Mili-
tary Governors who declared independence from the author-
ized government in May and June, 1917, and shattered
the fabric of the Republic.
* China Press, July 14, 1917.
132 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
The overthrow of the Tuan Chi-jui military faction in
the autumn of 1920 seemed to many to be a sign of hope,
but it meant the establishment in power of another military
faction, not the strengthening of democratic ideas. Up to
1921 the Republic has not yet been restored as a real en-
tity and a living factor.
It may be said that the cause of all strife in early 1917
was neither the wrangling over war or the dissolution of
Parliament, but the germ of revolutionary fever. The
germ, however, was dormant, and in a healthy constitution
would soon have been destroyed. When the more lively
germ of a great war-fever was taken into the system, it at
once set into action the old revolutionary germ, and no
Western physician has been able to effect a cure.
As an outsider, I would say to the Chinese in the words
of Hiawatha,
" I am weary of your quarrels,
Weary of your wars and bloodshed,
Weary of your prayers for vengeance,
Of your wranglings and dissensions:
All your strength is in your union.
All your danger is in discord;
Therefore be at peace henceforward,
And as brothers live together."
V. Increased scope for bringing China in thraldom to
Japan.
Japan through the fortunes of war had from August,
1914, to August, 1917, many chances to strengthen her
position in China. When China declared war, August 14,
1917, very largely at Japan's behests, new opportunities
appeared to Japan to augment her growing advantages.
She was aided by the good luck of having the pro-Japan
faction in power in Peking. The President, Feng Kuo-
chang, was an opportunist and was easily managed. The
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 133
Premier, head of the militarists, had already taken his
orders from Japan, though presented in the form of
friendly advice.
Even before China declared war, there was pretty good
evidence that the two Governments were negotiating a se-
cret Convention on military affairs and the sale of arms to
China by means, strange to say, of a loan to China. This
Military Convention got wrought into shape early in 1918,
when Japan was called upon by the Allies to make an ex-
pedition into Siberia. Japan made use of this necessity to
urge upon China co-operation in the military advance
under the military leadership of Japan, When pressure
was brought to bear by true patriots of China to make
public the secret arrangements, this innocuous portion
bearing on joint action to be taken in Siberia was duly
published. Other arrangements were still kept secret.
"Two agreements were concluded," as the Chinese Min-
ister wrote in a dispatch to Viscount Motono, * ' one relating
to the army being signed, May 16, and the other relating
to the navy, May 19." He continues in the exchange of
Notes :
These Agreements only embody concrete arrangements as to
manner and conditions under which the armies and navies of the
two countries are to co-operate in common defence against the
enemy, on the basis of the above mentioned Notes exchanged on
March 25. The details of the arrangements constituting as they
do a military secret, cannot be made public, but they contain no
provision other than those pertaining to the object already defined.^
The Peking Government, namely, that of Tuan, which
was recognized by the Allied Powers for the declaration
of war, was also ready to hold confidential conferences with
various Japanese that money and arms might be secured
* The Agreement, so far as the military part is concerned, was
rescinded in the early part of 1921.
134 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE!
for carrying on war with the Southern Chinese. A
new department called War Participation Bureau was
formed, of which General Tuan Chi-jui was head, even
when he was no longer Premier. This Bureau took matters
out of the hands of the Foreign Office, of which Lou Tseng-
tsiang was Minister, being afterwards the chief delegate at
the Paris Conference. A writer in Asia ^ says :
... Of between $200,000,000 and $225,000,000 loaned, much
has gone into the hands of corrupt officials and the Military
Governors and by them wasted instead of being used for the
demobilization of the troops and for the constructive purposes
declared.
With civil war on hand, the Peking Government was
helpless in securing revenue from the provinces sufficient
for its own needs and also for the requirements of the
loyal Military Governors. European countries and the
United States, even if so disposed, were too absorbed in the
war in Europe to give attention or help to China. Japan
remained sole benefactor. Moreover, the Japanese are
intensely patriotic, placing Japanese interests and the
honour of their country first. Money to supply China's
needs was loaned again and again, on most liberal terms
as to control of expenditure, thus placing China in bondage,
financially, to Japan. Loans were made not only to the
Central Government, but to the provincial authorities, con-
trary to law, and even to the opposing Government in the
south. By further loans to the Bank of Communications
and the Bank of China, these two financial institutions of
the Government came under the control of Japanese banks.
The other important circumstance in Japan's path of
opportunity was the facility granted through loan-bargain-
ing for receiving concessions of various kinds as security
»"A8iaticus" in Asia, March, 1919, p. 216.
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 135
for monies lent and as quid pro quo for deeds of generous
helpfulness. As the article in Asia cites for a sample,
"for a paltry $15,000,000 loan China has signed away a
lien in all her forests in the two northern provinces of
Heilungkiang and Kirin, equal in area to the combined
area of all the states of the United States touching the
Atlantic seaboard from Maine to, but not including,
Florida."
Millard's Review for July 27, 1918, says:
To pay for these loans China has mortgaged railway lines,
gold, coal, antimony and iron mines. She has mortgaged the
Government printing office at Peking, the Hankow electric light
and water works and native forests in various parts of the coun-
try. There is a chance in each of these loan agreements to the
effect that the Chinese authorities shall not obtain additional
funds upon these securities unless the consent of the Japanese
bankers first has been obtained.
The year 1898 has been called the year of the war of
concessions, wherein Great Britain, France, Germany and
the United States were competitors. Twenty years later,
1918, saw another war of concessions, but exclusively for
Japan's benefit.
It has been estimated that Chinese and Japanese agents
in 1918 made upwards of 40 contracts, and their Govern-
ments a dozen Agreements or exchanges of Notes.
With all this growth of peaceful expansion, even after
the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the Japanese Govern-
ment has maintained a rigid attitude as to the conduct of
Chinese officials, especially in Peking, Manchuria, Shantung
and Fukien as to whether their conduct be friendly and
obliging or antagonizing and annoying. Not only under the
Terauchi rule but under that of Hara, who is supposed
to stand for democratic ideas, has Japan's influence in
China been both commercial and political.
136 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
The Associated Press telegraphed from Peking, March
27, 1919, the followmg:
The Japanese Minister here has warned the Chinese Govern-
ment that if the premature disclosures of secret documents by
China causes loss to Japanese financial and conamercial interests,
Japan will hold China responsible for such loss.
Baron Goto afterwards explained that as with all con-
fidential negotiations or agreements, the parties concerned
must in all honour consult each other as to the time and
mode of publications.
In fairness to Japan it must be acknowledged that in
1918 as in 1915 Japan safeguarded her predominant po-
sition by definite Agreements with the recognized Peking
Government. If fault there be, it must rest with the agents
of the Peking Government, men who urged on war with
Germany and were then congratulated for their noble deed.
"VT. Dictation hy the Governments with which China had
associated herself in war.
I have already referred to the warning I gave President
Feng Kuo-chang, on the eve of China's declaration of war,
as to the impossibility of China acting alone. China's dif-
ficulty in this regard became more apparent as the months
passed by. I have just outlined Japan's engrossing grip
on China's finances and political policies and war measures.
But all the eight Legations forming the one group were
equally persistent in asserting their superior position and
the negligence, remissness or incapacity of the Peking Gov-
ernment. Sometimes they acted as a body, sometimes
singly. The British Minister, Sir John Jordan, versed in
Chinese affairs, was doyen of the diplomatic body as well
as chief among the eight. Of course, they issued no orders ;
they generally gave advice, or insinuated some misfortune
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 137
if China continued to act foolishly. Frequently China was
presented with an cuids memmre. Not a week passed, it
may be safely said, that the Chinese Foreign Office did not
receive some reminder that the Associated Nations expected
to have their wishes followed. The nearer the end of war,
the greater this outside pressure. Even after the armistice,
China was being admonished. Notice the joint Allied Note
of October 29, 1918 : ^
1. At the commencement of China's declaration of war against
the Central Powers, the Allied Governments agreed to the post-
ponement of the payment of the Boxer indemnity and other
privileges in the hope that the Chinese Government would use the
proceeds for the betterment of China's industry and economical
conditions to the mutual advantage of both China and the Allied
Powers; but, to the dissatisfaction of the Allies, it is reported
that the proceeds have been squandered by certain high Govern-
ment authorities for party strifes.
2. Although the War Participation Bureau has been estab-
lished for some time in Peking, nevertheless it has done nothing
to assist the Allies, and it is rumoured that part of the troops
who were originally trained for services in Europe have been
misused for civil war in certain provinces of China.
3. Without previous consultation or knowledge of the Allied
Powers, the Chinese Government suddenly appointed Tai Chen-
lin as China's representative to the Vatican.
4. The ineffective manner in which the Chinese Government
have acted towards the liquidation of enemy properties in China
is unsatisfactory to the Allies, as in the case of the Deutsche-
Asiatische Bank, etc.
5. The movements of enemy subjects in China are not effec-
tively scrutinized by the Chinese Government authorities, so that
dangerous Germans, such as Hanneken and others, are not in-
terned up to the present time. It is said that the recent dispute
between the American Mongolian Trading Company and General
Tien Chung-yu of Chabar was also mentioned in this category.
* From Asiatic News Agency.
138 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
6. The prohibition of Chinese subjects to trade with the ene-
mies as promulgated by the last Cabinet was not carried out by
China.
7. It was known to everybody that the Hotel du Nord was
enemy property and it was used as headquarters of enemy sub-
jects in North China for their unlawful conferences and activities
against the Allied cause; that the Chinese Government did not
do anything to close it until the matter had been many times
brought to the notice of China by the Allied Legations in Peking.
This is a strong witness that China does not intend to help the
Allies to cheek German activities.
8. In spite of the protest of the Allied Legations, the Chinese
Government has done nothing to punish the Taoyin or Neiho, of
Heilungkiang, on account of his pro-Bolshevik German actions.
9. The lack of sincerity on the part of the Chinese Govern-
ment authorities in conducting cases concerning Allied subjects
and enemies and the arrested enemy subjects was quoted as an
example, because China refuses to permit Allied consuls to act
as witnesses in the court.
10. The enemy internment camps are not properly conducted,
and in consequence many dangerous Germans are not interned at
all. The action of the Chinese authorities in certain eases is quite
unsatisfactory to the Allies.
11. Chinese bandits have been permitted to overrun the dis-
tricts along the Tientsin-Pukow and Lunghai railways, so that
Allied interests are suffering greatly on account of these bandit
activities.
12 There is still ample time for China to do something to
satisfy the Allied Powers; as one of the members, the Chinese
Government will pay attention to the twelve points enumerated
by the Allied representatives so as to gain for China equal rights
of speech in the future peace conference in Europe.
Let me briefly review these twelve points.
The first admonition is sound, except that men who had
been praised and congratulated, Au^st, 1917, should not
be thus reproved, October, 1918.
A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 139
The second is a slur on China's aid rendered to Russian
Siberia and on the Manchurian border. Moreover, the
eight Allies had never represented that China was expected
to aid in a military way.
The third rebuke is a case of outside interference in
China's affairs. It was a wedge thrust into the indepen-
dence and national integrity of China, which the Lansing-
Ishii agreement and other conventions had guaranteed to
respect. For over twenty years the priests of the Roman
Catholic Missions other than French had been withdrawn
from the French protectorate. In this war the French saw
an opportunity to bring back the German missions under
French control. This plan disagreed with the desire of the
Chinese, who favoured a complete separation of political and
ecclesiastical affairs, and direct dealing with the authorities
of the Church. The incidents of war seemed to have
blinded the eyes of British and American diplomats as to
what was best for China.
The fourth specification, that of liquidating enemy
property, deserves special consideration. I shall only re-
mark here that the Allied Ministers regarded the destruc-
tion of German business as indispensable to winning the
war, and thereby came into conflict with the modern spirit
of the law of nations.
The fifth point as to internment of enemy subjects de-
volved upon the Chinese Government to act as it saw fit.
It was no affair of the Allies as to the way the Chinese
Government acted, any more than the way the Japanese
Government acted on the same matter.
The sixth specification is misleading. Almost from the
beginning of the war there had been no trade between Ger-
many and China. Since China declared war, the only busi-
ness dealings of Germans were of those living in China,
acting as commission agents for Chinese and American
goods.
14Q CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
The seventh makes special reference to the Hotel du
Nord, which was kept by a subject of Austria-Hungary, not
of Germany. The Germans rented a room for their round-
table, and the Chinese kept close oversight as to whether
this club went beyond the bounds of propriety. The Ger-
man Protestant community also held divine service on
Sunday in the dining-room of the hotel. What displeased
the Allies was the failure of the Chinese to expel the Ger-
mans. In fact, the Chinese treatment of the Germans was
generous, like the policy of the Japanese.
The eighth specification was another case of intermed-
dling. The Chinese officer who was complained of merely
gave protection to refugees from Russian Siberia or in-
terned them, whatever their supposed political affiliations.
The ninth is more intermeddling. When German and
Austrian consuls were given their passports, German and
Austrian subjects remaining in China came under Chinese
jurisdiction, not under British or French.
The tenth is a case of useless worry. There was certainly
no more remissness than in Japan or even in the United
States. Anyway, the kind of internment was China's sole
affair. So far as I know, there was more cause of complaint
on the part of those interned. Those interned were non-
combatants, not prisoners of war as in Japan. The un-
healthy condition of these internment-camps was brought
to the notice of the American Red Cross Society for pos-
sible relief.
The eleventh point deserves no notice. In time of war
and revolution is it usual to have law and order as in
piping days of peace?
The twelfth point is a summary, but it gives the gist of
the Allied motif, namely, that compliance with Allied
wishes must be forthcoming, if China is to secure "equal
rights of speech in the future peace conferences in
Europe."
'A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 141
After the armistice, not before, the Allied Ministers
(with whom was associated the American Minister) insisted
on the issue of two mandates by the new Chinese President,
one concerning repatriation of enemy subjects and the other
concerning liquidation of enemy property. Failure here
implied refusal to China's participation in the Peace
Conference.
Several joint dispatches or oral reminders were given
the Chinese Government as to restoration of internal peace.
As a result the two Governments at Peking and Canton
appointed delegates to their own Peace Conference in
Shanghai, and thus were allowed to send delegates to the
Peace Conference in Paris.
What the reader must bear in mind is China's loss of
independent action, with the increased power of outside
nations to interfere in the affairs of China. In all this
interference, the European Allies were as active as was
Japan, and with them the United States was sympathet-
ically and officially associated. This was the goal of China's
entry into the war, under Allied pressure.
VII. Kindred with the previous calamity that has be-
fallen China, is the other possible calamity of being placed
under a foreign protectorate. This was the possibility dur-
ing the Boxer craze of 1900; it was held in check by the
generous policy of the American Government through
action taken by Secretary of State, John Hay. It may be
said that the United States saved China twenty years ago
both from dismemberment and from a foreign protectorate.
Today China faces the same alternative dangers, or
rather three alternatives, dismemberment, a foreign pro-
tectorate, or a Japanese protectorate. It remains to be
seen whether China's salvation will again come from the
United States, by a wise and generous policy.
As opposed to the threatened domination by Japan of
142 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Eastern Asia, there stands a threefold combination. One
is euphemistically called the League of Nations, but which
actually consists of the victorious nations. A.nother com-
bination is that of the four financial as well as military
Powers, forming the consortium, the United States, Japan,
Great Britain and France. A third combination, as op-
posed to Japan as well as to Germany, is that of Great
Britain, France and the United States. Either form of
governing China would be not only a wrong to China, but
a reproach to the nations participating in the war. Ex-
Senator Burton,^ writing of a "joint protectorate" or a
"protectorate by a single nation," says:
To both these plans there is the objection that jealousies and
conflicting interests would render agreement difficult if not im-
possible. Then there is the more substantial objection that
eventually every nation must work out its own salvation.
The only true policy is that of the "open door," one that
includes as before the war "equal opportunity" in all
parts of China for all nations. To profess the ' * open door ' *
and to practise exclusion of some one nation stultifies all
right, generous and remedial policy in treatment of China.
Towards the end of 1919 the British Chambers of Com-
merce in China, which assembled in Shanghai in confer-
ence with the British Minister, Sir John Jordan, passed
the following resolution:
That this conference is of the opinion that the time has come
when the policy of the open door should be reaffirmed as an
essential commercial principle and that its reaffirmation be ac-
companied by an international agreement for the abolition of
spheres of influence.
This action is most commendable. It is worthy of the
traditional spirit of the British merchant. But the reso-
* New York Times, April 4, 1920.
A SERIES OP AGGRAVATIONS 143
lution must mean what it says. That is, (1) the policy of
the open door must be internationally observed, (2) Ger-
many, Austria, Hungary and Russia must be again in-
eluded, and (3) the combination of all nations, with aboli-
tion of spheres of influence, must not lead to an interna-
tional protectorate or a mandate from the "five great Allied
and Associated Powers."
Through the war China has grown weaker and the power
and dictation of the victorious group of foreign nations
have grown stronger. Hence the renewal of the old cry,
"A foreign protectorate for China!"
VIII. Another trouble to arise for China comes from
the spread of Bolshevism. The end is not yet, it lies in the
future. It looks now as if an Asiatic conflagration is to
take the place of the European conflagration. Unless pre-
ventive measures are taken and a just scheme of recon-
struction is initiated, the danger of the peace to Asia is
imminent.
How Bolshevism may become a disturbing factor is easily
explained. Of all the countries of Asia, China borders on
Russia to the longest extent. When Japan took the lead in
repelling the Bolshevist advance in Russian Siberia, over-
tures were made to the Peking Government to join forces
under Japan's leadership. This plan enabled China like
Japan to take part in the war near to the home base. Thus
the military government of Japan first joined with the
militarists of China, and then they unitedly joined with
the dictator rule of Russia.
At the same time the democratic element of China, which
was arrayed against the military autocracy of Peking, was
receiving no countenance from democratic nations of the
Western world. Appeal for help in democratic develop-
ment was ignored. The power of militarism grew apace.
Here and there a few Chinese, revolting against the rule
144 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
of Peking oflfieialdom, ventured into Russia and became
mercenary troops for the Bolshevik leaders. Is it not ap-
parent that if the democratic element in China finds no
succour or encouragement from Western democracy, while
the Peking militarists are hand-in-glove with the Japanese
militarists, then approach will be made to the proffered aid
of Bolshevik Russia ? The mast discontented in China will
join the most discontented in Russia and together work for
the overturn of all government. The extreme of conserva-
tism leads to the extreme in liberalism; autocracy breeds
anarchy. It is becoming clearer every day that all the
peoples of Asia are agreed in casting off European rule.
John Spargo^ points out the coming danger. He says:
Bolshevism is peculiarly adapted to the Orient, both as regards
its philosophy and its methods. Indeed, the whole political ex-
perience and psychology of these Asiatic peoples tend to make
them ready recipients of Bolshevism as a political system. It is
far easier for them to accept and believe in political dictatorships
established by eonspiratory uprisings than it is for Occidental
peoples who for centuries Jiave been subject to the discipline of
stable government and of established political and legal forms.
. . . For desperate and unthinking and even fanatical hordes to
follow daring political adventurers and give allegiance to them is
as common today in Asia as it was in Europe ten centuries ago.
In surveying the recent history of China, Persia and India, for
example, it is remarkable how many close and striking parallels
to the Lenin-Trotzsky regime one finds.
Dr. W. D. P. Bliss, an expert on the problems of Asia
Minor, refers in an illuminating article ^ to the possibility
of the Turkish Pan-Turanian movement being linked to the
Russian Bolshevist movement, and still further of the
"combination of Qerman science and militarism with Bol-
shevist communism, Turkish nationalism and Tartar fierce-
» New York Times, February 29, 1920.
* New York Times, March 14, 1920.
'A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS 145
ness." He mentions a statement of Radek, Bolshevist rep-
resentative at Berlin, that if they cannot be consulted on
measures for restoring peace, they will set the Near East
and the Far East on fire. "We will," so Radek is reported
as saying, "stir up such trouble in Turkey, Afghanistan,
Turkestan, Kurdistan, Persia and India that England will
not have another moment of peace." Then Dr. Bliss gives
this advice:
The best cure ror Bolshevism is industry. Give both Germany
and Russia a chance to get busy and ere long Bolshevism will
disappear.
The discontent and desperation of different peoples are
apt to ignore true logic in forming combinations, but unite
in spite of the inherent dissimilarity of other elements in
the problem. It is not at all a question of China adopting
a Soviet form of government, but of her favouring the gen-
eral spirit of revolution.
What would have kept her from this new menace of
Bolshevism was the continuance of the Republic 's evolution
under President Li Yuan-hung in 1917, free from all the
perils and entanglements of war. This was the course of
safety, the policy of moderation. But Fates, that is, the
Allied and Associated Nations, decided otherwise. New in-
tricate problems arise for China to solve, if her perpetuity
is to be assured.
A fitting summing-up may be given in the following
forcible language of President Wilson ■ as addressed to a
group of pro-League Republicans, October 27, 1920 :
We should not be deceived into supposing that imperialistic
schemes ended with the defeat of Germany, or that Germany is
the only nation that entertained such schemes or was moved by
sinister ambitions and long-standing jealousies to attack the very
146 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
structure of civilization. There are other nations which are likely
to be powerfully moved, or are already moved by commercial
jealousy, by the desire to dominate and to have their own way in
politics and in enterprise, and it is necessary to check them and
to appraise them as it was against Germany, if attempt of any
similar thing is made.
CHAPTER VII
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES AS AFFECTING CHINA
One of the misfortunes which has befallen China as a result
of her participation in the war is the way the political and
commercial equilibrium has been upset. China's compli-
cations in the sphere of commerce are inferior only to those
in the sphere of international politics.
* ' Economic rivalries and hostilities, ' ' as much as * ' special
alliances," as President Wilson has pointed out, have been
the source of all wars; they had to do with China's part in
the Great War. It was commercial jealousy that fired war
passions and emblazoned war policies. President Wilson
in one of his late addresses (in St. Louis, September 5,
1919) said: "This was a commercial and industrial war.
It was not a political war. ' ' How much more true that part
of the war which touched China.
When the European War began there were four great
trading peoples in China, British, Americans, Germans and
Japanese, of whom the Germans were more and more forg-
ing to the front, competitors of British and American mer-
chants, though often having a part in British and Amer-
ican trade and helping it on. In the matter of railway and
mining concessions the rivals were British, Americans,
French, Belgians and Germans, while in Manchuria there
were two other rivals, Russians and Japanese.
From the outset of the war, as conducted in the Far East,
the clash was between British and Germans more than be-
tween any other two peoples. To the eyes of the Britisher
living in the Far East "the German menace" to be up-
rooted by Japan was the menace to British trade. If as a
147
148 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
result of war a stop could be put to German enterprise, the
war would not have been fought in vain. War was simply
one way to destroy German business. To the Japanese,
on the other hand, the object in mind was more political
than military or commercial.
In the early months of the war the contest was not so
much between belligerents, like British and Germans, as
between belligerents on the one side and neutrals on the
other. In the former group were British, French, Rus-
sians, Belgians and Japanese. In the latter group were
Americans, Italians, Hollanders, Swiss, Danes, Norwegians,
Swedes, Spaniards, and above all the Chinese. In large
treaty-ports like Shanghai the British element predomi-
nated. British oflScials took it upon themselves to dictate
to everybody. The Orders in Council as to Trading with
the Enemy were made to apply to neutrals as well as to
Britishers. For an American in China in those days to
trade with a German in China was to place him on the
British black-list. Neutral rights had to give place to ques-
tions of expediency and livelihood. Most Americans, for
convenience in trade and banking, consented to yield to
the superior force and persistent dictation of British au-
thorities. Americans in China as in the home country were
neutral, but through force of circumstances became aligned
with the British as the pressure increased. After the fall
of Tsingtao there were no more battles to be fought; the
only object then was to destroy German business, and in-
cidentally to oppress every neutral who declined to be
amenable to British behests. The ones most affected were
neutral Americans and neutral Chinese.
The method of restrictive procedure was not difficult.
If an American firm, for instance, desired to sell Amer-
ican goods to a German firm to be in turn sold to the
Chinese, or to sell Chinese goods through a German firm
to some company in the United States, there were two ways
CO^IiVIERCIAL RIVALRIES 149
to hamper the transaction. One was to refuse transporta-
tion by British or Japanese ships. Another was for the
banks to refuse a draft. An American bank would make
the same kind of refusal, under warning that action taken
contrary to British orders would mean closing up the
business of the bank's branches under British jurisdiction.
In a word, bankruptcy stared a neutral firm in the face, if
it proposed to trade with opposing belligerents in the same
manner. It was not a question of law and right, but for
the neutral trader one of expediency and self-preservation.
It was a practical question, not one of theory, precedent
or morals.
In attacking German business all that was necessary was
to attack some neutral, notably an American or Chinese.
It was one thing for the British to seize and sell out
German business houses in British possessions. It was an-
other thing to bring this about within the confines of China.
This destruction of German business was the controlling
purpose in trying to get China to enter the war against
Germany. It was not disclosed till China, under American
persuasion, severed relations with Germany, and was not
consummated till China actually declared war, or, strange
to say, till armistice was declared.^
Definite action was taken early in March, 1917, by the
secret agreement of France and Japan. In return for the
guarantee to Japan of all German rights in Shantung and
of all German colonies north of the equator, it was made
' It may seem that this judgment of the British is wrong, owing
to the apparent friendly attitude of the British Government towards
German industrial restoration. This new symptom of friendliness, a
stroke of good policy, is partly due to a liberal sentiment of the
average Briton and to insistent demands of English labourites, and
partly to the fact of British investments in big business in Germany
and by the use of the consequences of war for the supremacy of the
Briton over the German in matters of trade the world over. So long
as Great Britain is on top why should a Briton be anything but
generous to the defeated German foe ?
150 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
known to Japan, as outlined in a previous chapter,^ that
the French Premier, M. Briand, demanded, among other
things, first, the repatriation from China of all German
subjects, and second, "requisition of German commercial
houses established in China." France thus became the
active supporter of British designs, and through her Japan
became another supporter.
The Chinese, accustomed to trade with Germans as with
the British, the French and Japanese, little realized the
commercial complication of taking part in a European
war.
No sooner had China severed relations with Germany,
March 14, 1917, than the French ordered closed the best
scientific school in China, namely, the German Medical and
Engineering School, situated in the French Concession of
Shanghai. The Chinese immediately took steps to re-start
the school outside Shanghai under Chinese jurisdiction.
British and French plans could not be carried out with
any show of legality till China should actually become an
associate in war. It was also necessary to have the United
States an associate, ready to yield to the British and French
interpretation of international law.
The Chinese, left to their own sense of justice, and fol-
lowing the precedent of their recent wars with France and
with Japan, or of the war between Russia and Japan, were
not disposed to follow the ancient and more rigid rule of
confiscating property of enemy subjects. In this attitude
they opposed British and French demands, and in the early
stages of the war found encouragement in the more liberal
policy of Japan and the United States. When the United
States altered her policy to the harsh one of ancient days,
China, too, had to change.
In the Regulations issued by the Chinese Government in
August, 1917, reference was made to the transfer or sale of
* See Chapter V, last part.
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 151
, property of enemy subjects, ''whenever such transfer or
sale is rendered necessary either by special circumstances
or for the convenience of safe-keeping. " It is then added :
"The sale of said property must be assented to hy the owner
of such property."
The Chinese, however, refrained from such action until
the spring of 1919 (after the armistice), by which time, as
before mentioned, pressure from eight Allied and Associ-
ated Nations was too great to be resisted.
It is recalled that on the eve of armistice these eight
foreign Ministers, representing a higher civilization, had
admonished the Peking Government under twelve specifi-
cations. One was remissness in interning enemy subjects,
and another, failure to liquidate enemy properties. Intern-
ment regulations, in fact, were not issued by the Chinese
Government until October 5, 1918. November 9, the In-
spector-General of Maritime Customs and of Salt Gabelle,
and the Director-General of the Post Office, two British and
one a Frenchman, decided that no Germans were to be re-
admitted to these three services after the war. About the
same time French -soldiers also gave a pitiable spectacle to
the Chinese populace in dynamiting the Von Keteler mon-
ument in Peking, and the German bank, .situated within
the Legation quarter.
Towards the end of January, 1919, the new President of
China issued two Mandates, one for repatriation of all
enemy subjects, and the other for sequestration of enemy
property. For repatriation needs the British Government
agreed to provide the ships, but the cost would be charged
against the Chinese Government. For meeting this ex-
pense, the Allied banks agreed to loan $500,000, at 8 per
cent, interest ! In this way the British could consummate
their designs with no burden to themselves. The disposal
of German property at the treaty-ports, while properly a
Chinese affair, if done at all, met constant intrusion from
152 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
British and American municipal authorities, thus retarding
the free action of the Chinese.
When the question of deportation of enemy subjects came
up for discussion at an earlier date, the editor of the Japan
Chronicle, an Englishman, wrote:
It is stated that negotiations are proceeding between the
Chinese Government and those of Japan and France for obtaining
a supply of vessels for the transportation of these enemy subjects.
It is difficult to believe that in these days of tonnage scarcity such
a proceeding can be contemplated. In any case, unless it be for
the benefit of the enemy subjects themselves — e.g., against a possi-
ble uprising — the whole proceeding appears to be as unnecessary
as it is likely to be futile and expensive.
(However, while peacemakers were conferring in Paris,
Germans and Austrians, both men and women and children,
were being sent home at China's expense, and all German
business houses were being liquidated and sold. As an
English writer, July 20, 1919, in the North China Herald
says: "The liquidation of all enemy business in the coun-
try, and the repatriation of enemy subjects, were matters
of the most vital importance to the Allied cause in China,
from the point of post bellum considerations." The war
was thus a tool for commercial advantage in the piping days
of peace.
German merchants, German educationists, German mis-
sionaries, whether from North Germany or South Germany,
were made to suffer as an outcome of China's entry into
war and through the pressure of the Allied and Associated
Nations. Whether just or unjust was not much considered.
So long as one was German, that was enough to condemn
him even in far-away China. It must be said that not every
Britisher living in the Far East approved these harsh and
drastic measures.
If it had not been for American example, the Chinese
Commercial rivalries 153
would have refrained from anything more than intern-
ment of a few enemy subjects. "What, then, is American
example? One thing one day, and another thing another
day, but in the end conforming to the dominating mind of
Britain and France, our associates on the field of battle,
in the struggle between Right and Wrong.
At the time the United States broke with Germany, there
was anxiety as to the probable effect on Germans living in
the United States. John B. McMaster ^ says :
To quiet the anxiety felt by Gdrman subjects residing in our
country lest their bank deposits and other property should be
seized by the Government in the event of war, the President in-
structed the Secretary of State to say that such fears were un-
founded. Under no circumstances would the Government take
advantage of a state of war to seize property to which interna-
tional law and the law of the land gave it no just claim or title.
All rights of property both of American citizens and of subjects
of foreign states would be respected.
That the American Government would abide by this an-
nouncement of the President was all the more to be ex-
pected from the remarkable Agreement of Prussia and the
United States made in 1785 and reaffirmed in the Treaty
of 1828. This Treaty, which has never been abrogated,
provided that Germans in the United States, in ease of war
between the two countries, should be given nine months to
wind up their business affairs, to dispose of their property,
and to return to Germany "without molestation or hin-
drance. "^
In due time, at request of the Executive Department, a
legislative act was passed giving power to a Custodian of
Alien Property, A. Mitchell Palmer, to take over the prop-
^ " The United States in the World War," p. 329.
' The Treaty of 1785 was negotiated by Benjamin Franklin,
Thomas JeflFerson and John Adams, and that of 1828 by Henry Clay-
all great and true Americans.
154 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
erty of German aliens living in the- United States. Thus
from an American point of view the seizure of enemy
property became a legal act.
In the spring of 1918 the same rule was applied to Ger-
mans doing business in the Philippine Islands. A large
number of Germans were deported to the United States,
and here interned. All German business was liquidated and
sold to Americans or Filipinos, the money being held by
the Custodian.
When the American Government acted in the Philip-
pines in the same way as the British Government acted in
Hongkong, it became well-nigh impossible for the Chinese
Government, taking the example of the United States, to
deal differently in treatment of Germans living in China.
China had to do as others did. She had entered the war
and must bear some of the war's burdens.
The question is: Did this harsh method conform to the
best spirit of international law, and was it a good rule
to teach an Oriental people ?
Chief Justice Marshall once said: "When war breaks
out, the question what shall be done with enemy property
in our country is a situation rather of policy than of law."
The policy, and the law, too, of America's Custodian of
Alien Property is seen in the following language delivered
in Philadelphia, November 7, 1918:
Germany must be made to understand that her plan has failed
in the industrial field as in the military. Industrial disarmament
must come along with military disarmament. Autocracy in in-
dustry must fall with the fall of the Hohenzollern dynasty. The
same peace which frees the world from the menace of the auto-
cratic militarism of the German Empire should free it from the
menace of its autocratic industrialism as well.
American ideas have travelled far since the early days
of the war, when the United States stood as champion of
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 155
neutral rights, and as the coming pacificator in a world of
passion.
Oppenheim, the English authority, says:
Under a former rule of international law belligerents could ap-
propriate all public and private enemy property they found on
enemy territory. This rule is now obsolete.^
Ho adds:
Private personal property which does not consist of war ma-
terial and means of transport serviceable to military operations
can regularly not be seized.
Hall, of Oxford University, is even more explicit. He
says of sequestration of private property of enemy subjects
that it "would be looked upon with extreme disfavour." He
continues: "It is evident that although it is within the
bare rights of a belligerent to appropriate the property of
his enemies existing within his jurisdiction, it can very
rarely be wise to do so." Once again:
The absence of any instance of confiscation in the more recent
European wars, no less than the common interests of all nations
and present feelings, warrant a confident hope that the dying right
will never again be put in force, and that it will soon be wholly
extinguished by disuse.^
The text-book in American schools of Wilson and Tucker
says:
The most recent practice has been to exempt personal property
of the subject of one belligerent state from all molestation, even
though it was within the territory of the other at the outbreak of
war.^
a ((
International Law," Vol. II, pp. 127, 144.
International Law," pp. 368, 373.
• " International Law," p. 249,
156 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
The modern spirit of liberality was embodied in the
Hague Convention of 1907, Article 46: *' Private property
cannot he confiscated."
From an American point of view it is interesting to go
back in memory to over a hundred years ago, to the Jay
Treaty of the United States made with the British Gov-
ernment. Article X stipulates that in the event of future
wars between the United States and the United Kingdom
private property shall be inviolable. Alexander Hamilton
in a memorandum to President Washington wrote thus on
Article X :
In my opinion this article is nothing more than an affirmation
of the modern law and usage of civilized nations, and is valuable
as a check upon a measure which, if it could ever take place,
would disgrace the government of the country, and injure its true
interests.
What is most remarkable is that men whose countries
had been fighting for righteousness should embody in the
Versailles Treaty the very opposite of this recognized prin-
ciple of the Hague Convention and the Law of Nations.
Thus Article 297 (B) reads:
Subject to any contrary stipulations which may be provided
for in the present treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve
the right to retain and liquidate all property rights and interests
of German nationals and companies controlled by them, within
their territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, including
territories ceded to them by the present treaty.
This means the possible liquidation of German property
in the larger part of the globe. It means at least the pos-
sibility of liquidating German property in China, The
ground for hope that the Chinese Government will continue
to protect the property rights of all nationals within the
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 157
limits of China, making no discrimination against those of
German nationality, is that the Chinese delegate has not
signed the treaty, and that the President of China has
already declared a state of peace with Germany. Moreover,
the act of sequestrating German private property, though
approved by the Big Five Military Nations, is not agreeable
to the Chinese for three reasons. One is that many Chinese
have had satisfactory business relations with Germans in
the past, A second is that such procedure does not appeal
to the Chinese sense of fairness. A third is that the British
and French at treaty-ports insist on taking the liquidating
out of Chinese hands and on managing it themselves.
Concerning this last point, it is well for citizens of ad-
vanced nations to bear in mind that at most of the treaty-
ports, especially at Shanghai, the largest foreign eomw
munity of all, the British and French, and not the Chinese,
exercise control within extensive areas, where Germans in
the past have built up business and owned property. The
Chinese attempt to sequestrate German property therein
is sure to meet with British and French interference — none
from Americans.
Moreover, it has been customary in past years for Com-
panies, formed of shareholders other than British, to be
incorporated under the Ordinances of the Colony of Hong-
kong, When war was declared, dividends due to enemy
shareholders were held back from payment till the close
of the war. By another Ordinance in 1915 a Custodian of
Alien Property was appointed by the Governor of Hong-
kong, but this only affected property within the jurisdiction
of Hongkong. In 1919, after the armistice, a new Ordi-
nance was passed recognizing the Custodian appointed by
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and so by the
British Minister in Peking, as to all China Companies with
British registration. ' ' In the ease of every China Company
the term 'Custodian' means 'the Custodian of Enemy
158 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEt
Property in China' " — a Britisher, not a Chinese. "SueK
Custodian shall be deemed to have had and shall have full
powers of selling, managing and otherwise dealing with
and transferring such shares, stocks, annuities and other
obligations of such China Company." Every Company
must report to this British Custodian — in China — all enemy
shares, and these shares will be invested in his name.
Here, then, is introduced a most bewildering compli-
cation for the Chinese Government in its new experiment
of trying out the laws of war, as inculcated by one side
in the Great "War. Incidentally it can now be seen that
if the British are to acquire German property at the large
treaty-ports, they cannot object to Japanese possession of
German rights in Shantung.
That the clauses in the Treaty of Peace relating to seizure
of enemy property in private hands have not been more
generally criticized by liberty-loving Englishmen and
Americans is probably due to a fear of being dubbed pro-
German. If, however, the settlement reached is to be more
righteous than any in past history, then the leader of polit-
ical thought and world-rejuvenation should have the moral
courage to defend recognized principles of international
law and the innate sense of right and fair-play, without
regard to race or nationality.
Furthermore, according to the Treaty, Germans are to
be deprived of the regular processes of law, or of counter-
claims, or of appeal or protest ; they must bow to the ruling
of arbitrary Might. And this is to be the new teaching
of moral ideas to enter into the life of the Orient. Thus
Article 298, under the head of "Claims," reads:
No claim or action shall be made or brought against any Allied
or Associated Power or against any person acting on behalf of
or under the direction of any legal authority or department of
the government of such a Power by Germany or by any German
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 159
national wherever resident in respect of any act or omission with
regard to his property, rights or interests during the war or in
preparation for war.
Not only is this drastic ruling applied to German prop-
erty and investment in the Allied and Associated Powers,
of whom China is one, but also to all German ' ' rights and
titles over her oversea possessions," which by Article 119
"Germany renounces in favour of the principal Allied and
Associated Powers." Thus Article 120 reads:
All movable and immovable property in such territories be-
longing to the German Empire or to any German State shall pass
to the Government exercising authority over such territories.
As Article 297 stipulates that private property in ** terri-
tory ceded" may also be liquidated, the transaction of
world-wide appropriation may be regarded as complete.
In the future, Germans are to have a hard time of it in
former German possessions. Article 122 reads:
The Government exercising authority over such territory may
make such provisions as it thinks fit with reference to the re-
patriation from them of German nationals and to the conditions
upon which German subjects of European origin shall, or shall
not, be allowed to reside, hold property, trade or exercise a
profession therein.
How different the opportunities of all nationals of vic-
torious Powers, as seen in Article 277:
The nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy
in German territory a constant protection for their persons and
for their property, rights and interests, and shall have free access
to the courts of law.
Verily this is the day of the rule of Might. How strange
this guarantee of lasting and just peace!
160 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
When these economic phases of the Treaty were tele-
graphed to the New York Globe from Paris, June 2, 1919,
the correspondent began :
For many years the United States has contended for the in-
violability of individual property rights in war.
And then he proceeded to state these remarkable Articles
of the economic clauses, depriving Germans of property
rights within the sway of other nations.
The leader of the Administration in the United States
Senate, Senator Hitchcock, discussed, September 3, 1919,
the bearings of these Articles on the United States, and his
words make one doubt the moral aims of the peace settle-
ment. He said :
Again, take the matter of German property in the United
States — the matter of private property owned by German na-
tionals in the United States when the war broke out. Under Acts
of Congress that property was seized and much of it has been
sold and liquidated. In the aggregate its value runs into hun-
dreds of millions of dollars — not less than $750,000,000 and possi-
bly more than $1,000,000,000.
Under this Treaty all acts of the United States and of the Alien
Property Custodian with regard to that property are validated
unless Germany can show actual fraud.
Under this Treaty they are validated. Under this Treaty the
money derived from the liquidation of German property can be
used to pay for the debts of Germans to Americans and the
balance is subject to the absolute disposition of the Congress of
the United States. This power can be used to protect American
claims and property in Germany.
Suppose Germany refuses to validate our acts with regard to
this property. Suppose she points to the Treaties of 1799 and
1828, under which we agreed that we would respect the private
property of German nationals in the United States, under which
we agreed that we would give them nine months after the out-
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 161
break of any war between Germany and the United States, during
which time they could sell their property and leave the United
States ; under which we agreed that Germans engaged in business,
agriculture or manufacturmg in this country could continue
peacefully in carrying on their occupations under the protection
of law, even though war existed between the United States and
Germany. Can any one doubt that we would have a serious and
dangerous controversy with Germany over that question which
might last for generations?
Another day, after a long conference with President Wil-
son, Senator Hitchcock issued a statement containing these
words :
Through the Treaty, we will yet get very much of importance.
... In violation of all international law and treaties we have
made disposition of a billion dollars of German-owned property
here. The Treaty validates all that.
Is this the kind of law, politics and morals that American
people and English people desire to see taught to Oriental
nations, brought up under other systems of ethics?
May I quote President Wilson, when he called upon Con-
gress to agree to a declaration of war:
We shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents
without passion, and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the
principles of right and fair-play we profess to be fighting for.
Defenders of the moral value of these portions of the
treaty have been known to point to a new mode of protect-
ing the property rights of German citizens, who have had
residence outside the Fatherland. The world's conscience
is directed to this sentence that closes Article 297:
Germany undertakes to compensate its nationals in respect of
the sale or retention of their property, rights or interests in Al-
lied or Associated States.
162 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Naturally one may conclude that if Germans still fail
of compensation, the blame lies with the German Gov-
ernment, and not with the Allied and Associated Powers.
But how is the German Government to possess the capac-
ity, or even the opportunity, of reimbursing the great losses
of Germans all over the world, amounting to many hundreds
of millions of dollars and billions of marks? Will the Al-
lied nations postpone reparation charges till the rights of
German citizens have been met? Is not this hold of a pri-
vate German on his own Government like a third mortgage
rather than a first ? No German merchant whose property
has been seized in Shanghai, Hongkong, Calcutta, Bombay,
East Africa or Cape Colony need expect any restitution in
this roundabout fashion, till the rival merchants of Eng-
land and the United States have successfully pre-empted
the ground and closed the door.
Granted that ten years hence the then German Govern-
ment, out of the taxes of the people, advance the money
to the former heads of business firms in China for
rebuilding their establishments and resupplying a mar-
ketable stock of goods, will not these men be greatly
handicapped in the new competition and find themselves at
an unjust disadvantage? Help may come from Chinese,
and it probably will, but others of Western nations will
be seen, as they are, the opposing influence to German
enterprise.
The wrong done will never be realized till some one of
the present conquering nations enters on another war, is
then defeated, and learns anew that no law exists for pro-
tecting private property. It is henceforth an absurdity to
speak of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" as
"the inalienable rights of man."
Another absurdity is that in overthrowing German mili-
tarism it is equally legitimate to destroy German business
and uproot the ambition to be strong commercially. Does
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 163
any one imagine that this is the way to guarantee a lasting
peace? Or that this is justice?
Worse than all, the Treaty of Peace did not limit itself
to political and commercial issues. It ventured forth into
the realm of ethics and religion. Commercialism swamped
the boat of Christian missions. At the very end of the
Treaty — a sort of climax — an Article is drawn concerning
the work, the interests and property of German missions.
The property of Christian missions under German man-
agement "shall continue to be devoted to missionary pur-
poses" (Article 438), but under control of "boards of
trustees appointed by or approved by the Governments and
composed of persons holding the Christian Faith." Ger-
many must agree to such arrangements as these Govern-
ments will make. Germany as to these missions "waves all
claims on their behalf. ' ' ^
Is this not the limit of dictatorial determination? Is
this not the greatest surprise of all, that President Wood-
row Wilson and Premier Lloyd George should, in the name
of Righteousness and "impartial justice," countenance re-
strictions of this nature to the world-wide commands of
the great Head of the Church?
My own views are best expressed by a Memorial to the
Peace Conference of the Society of Friends in London :
It is understood that it has been proposed to exclude, at any
rate temporarily, all German missionaries and missionary societies
from British possessions, that China is being urged to take a
similar course, and that it is likely that German colonies handed
over to mandatory Powers will be in the same position. If this
were carried out, it is not impossible that some five-sixths of this
splendid work would be terminated. We desire to point out:
(1) That any such policy or exclusion means that Christian enter-
prise becomes a matter for exclusive national treatment. This
* See Appendix III.
164 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
work should be essentially both international and supra-national,
and to legislate for it on a merely national basis would be to
mistake its contribution to the world order. (2) That the
churches of Germany will have scarcely any opportunity for out-
ward expression. This will surely lead to disastrous results for
Germany and the world. (3) That temporary exclusion for more
than a very short time (say, twelve months) would be tantamount
to permanent exclusion. There has already been a long interrup-
tion, and it will be difficult enough to resume the work in any
case. (4) That, on the other hand, a different policy would do
a great deal to help in the strengthening of the best elements in
German national life, and in enabling her to take a right and
helpful place in the society of nations.
In view of these and other weighty considerations, we urge
that all these matters be not hastily decided, but rather be
referred to a special commission, which, besides Government of-
ficials should include representative missionary leaders from the
different countries, whose duty it shall be to discover means by
which this valuable work may be continued, by which German
missions and missionaries may, under suitable guarantees and
safeguards, be readmitted to the territories concerned, and to
emphasize the supra-national character of the Christian enter-
prise. . . .
An admirable memorandum on German missions, both
Protestant and Roman Catholic, was presented in Novem-
ber, 1919, by Professor Julius Richter of Berlin University
to Dr. Arthur J. Brown of the American Presbyterian
Board of Foreign Missions.* I make a few citations :
About half of the fields of the German missions are wholly or
almost wholly deprived of the paternal care of their fathers in
Christ. ... A million and a half of native Christians under the
care of German missions, Protestant and Roman Catholic, are in
serious danger of disintegration for lack of the necessary super-
vision and leadership. . . . An enormous amount of spiritual
capital seems to be hopelessly lost. The knowledge of the lan-
* In Chrieti<m Work, February, 1920.
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 165
guage and of the customs of the peoples, the confidence won by
the patient work of generations of missionaries, scientific re-
search, Bible translations and other literary work pursued with
usual German thoroughness will fade away. ... On the other
hand, the repatriated missionaries, most of them, stand at the
market, looking out eagerly for a corner in the vineyard of the
Lord where they can pursue their noble work, and nobody calls
them. Many of them are really in serious distress. And so about
two thousand German missionaries, Protestant and Roman Catho-
lic, are pushed aside at a time when the non-Christian world
seems to cry out loud with one voice, " Come over and help us,"
and when the missionary conferences are sounding forth again
and again the call for more labourers in the harvest. . . . Para-
graph 438 of the Peace Treaty creates a new international law,
and this law seems to be disastrous for the rest of the German
missions. If this paragraph should be put into operation to its
full extent, nine-tenths of the German missions which have been
saved through the stormy years of war-time would be lost by and
by — the missions in German Southwest Africa, in German New
Guinea, in Usambara, and on the slopes of the Kilimanjaro, in
South Africa, China and Japan; only the rest which lie in
the Dutch Colonial empire might perhaps be retained in spite of
Paragraph 438. . . . Remember in China now for two years
and a half the German missionaries know that the Entente is
demanding their expulsion; more than once the situation seemed
critical. At any time missionaries had already been ordered to
the harbours. Happily the majority of them have been able to
remain up to the present time. They do not know how long.
This awful Paragraph 438 gives them no security. It eats out
the life of mission work; it puts the whole property of German
missions at the disposal of the colonizing power, only under the
condition that the profit of it must be spent for missionary and
educational purposes. It is the strongest contradiction of the
super-nationahty of Christian missions.^
As I have stated concerning commercial penalties in-
flicted on Germany, so in regard to Christian missions and
* See Appendix IV.
166 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
mission property financed by the gifts of German Chris-
tians, there is more hope that justice will be rendered by
the Chinese than by the Entente and Associated Powers.
Through China's declination to sign the Versailles Treaty,
due to injustice in the Shantung settlement, she may yet
become an example to the rest of the world in just treat-
ment of peoples, once enemy, now friends, once belligerent,
now reconciled. Not only does the cause of justice receive
a blow from these treaty demands, but the cause of Chris-
tianity will inevitably suffer in the estimation of all classes
of the Chinese, when comparison is made both with the
teachings and the practice of the old Faiths of China. It is
certain that Chinese officials and the Chinese people, even
those outside the Christian constituency, if free to act with
no pressure from outside nations, will accord in the future
as in the past equal opportunities to the commerce and
missionary enterprises of all nations, in the spirit of fair-
ness and hospitality. That which is beneficial China will
never reject. She opposes that which works her harm,
whether from Buddhist Japan or Christian Europe.
Would not the cause of justice and world-wide law have
fared better, if the negotiators at Paris, in respect both to
private property and to Christian missions, had observed
international law as already established? Was it wise to
ignore the Hague Conventions in forming a League of Na-
tions? Was it fitting to overlook the fundamentals of the
Christian Faith?
Bishop Gore, when speaking in this country in 1918,
said:
The mere determination to beat Germany is apt to absorb all
else. Whereas, in fact, we might defeat Germany and at the same
time absorb so much of what is false in the spirit of the war as
to defeat our professed aims in entering upon it. That is what
makes me ready to do anything that lies in my power to keep the
right moral principles of the war to the fore.
COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES 167
The late Governor-General of Canada, the Earl of Grey,
shortly before his death, said:
You know the idea of those words, " He being dead, yet speak-
eth." A voice from the dead often gets a hearing. That's what
I'm after. . I want you to make my voice sound from the grave.
I want to say to the people, there's a real way out of the mess
materialism has got us into. I've been t»rying to tell them for
thirty years — "It's Christ's way." Mazzini saw it. We've got
to get together. We've got to realize we're all members of one
family. There's nothing can help humanity, I'm perfectly sure
there isn't, except Love. Love's the way out and the way up.
That's my farewell to the world.
So far as the victorious nations conform to these noble
sentiments, will they be able to exert an influence that will
work out for China moral regeneration and national
salvation.
CHAPTER Vni
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA AT THE PEACE TABLE
We now reach the climax of the War's great drama as
affecting China. If, indeed, it was a wise move to induce
China to enter the war, then the high hopes held out to her
for redressing past wrongs should have met at least a fair
measure of fulfilment. If the results were bad, then the
initiative move of Americans, supported by seven Allies,
was a wrong to China additional to all past wrongs.
In brief, the war has brought havoc to China, and gain
to Japan. Germany's interests in China have been injured
commercially; China's interests have been injured polit-
ically and morally. Japan's position in China has been
strengthened both commercially and politically, but not
morally. The confirmation of these charges is to be found
in the Versailles Treaty of Peace and the Covenant of the
League of Nations. It is in respect to China that the Treaty
and the Covenant show how far short they fall in meeting
the high ideals and professions of Americans and the
Allied peoples — victors in the greatest war of the ages.
When armistice was declared, and a Peace Conference
was to take place, the Japanese tried to persuade the
Chinese Government to leave all matters in the hands of
Japanese negotiators. This proposition was not altogether
unacceptable, for the Chinese Government ever since its
entrance into the war was of the military faction under
General Tuan Chi-jui, and had more and more entered into
close relations with Japan, culminating in numerous Agree-
ments of 1918. However, the new President of China, Hsii
Shih-chang, backed by popular sentiment, insisted on a rep-
168
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 169
resentation from the Chinese Government. At once there
appeared divergence of opinion between China and Ja-
pan, until the antagonists seemed not so much to be Ger-
many on the one side and China and Japan on the other,
as China arrayed against Japan. There has grown to be
more enmity between Chinese and Japanese, kindred in
race and culture, than between Chinese and Germans, or
between Japanese and Germans.
As soon as the Chinese delegation appeared in Paris, the
demand came for making public all secret agreements be-
tween the Chinese and Japanese Governments. This move,
which was meant to strengthen China's claims, was dis-
pleasing not only to Japan, but to the military pro-Jap-
anese Peking Government. However, the Chinese delegates
gained their wishes in part, but cordiality between the two
countries was weakened. At different times during discus-
sion of the League or the Treaty the two delegations ap-
peared as opponents. The final settlement of the China-
Japan question depended on other than the strength of
argument; Japanese military power and all possible com-
plications arising therefrom cast a spell over the thoughts
and purposes of the Supreme Council.
Because Japan was a strong military nation, she was
welcomed to the inner group, known as the Council of Five,
and later on was assured a permanent position in the Coun-
cil of the League. China, though she represented a great
population and an ancient civilization, was not thus
honoured.^
Moreover, Japan was allowed five delegates, and China
only two. The five of Japan were Marquis Saionji, one
of the Elder Statesmen, a veteran in years and experience,
and in his early days educated in France ; Baron Makino,
^ It is pleasing to record that through the capable statement of
Dr. Wellington Koo, the first meeting of the League at Geneva elected
China as one of the Council.
170 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Matsui and Ambassador
Ijuin, all of whom had received an education or held a
diplomatic position in some one of the countries of Europe.
Of the Chinese delegation the chief was Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs and for many years Minister
to France. He spoke elegant French, had married a Bel-
gian lady and had joined the Catholic Church. He rep-
resented the Peking Government, though not the military
and pro-Japan faction. He was more in touch with the
French aims than with the American. The second dele-
gate was C. T. Wang. He had been educated at Michigan
and Yale Universities, was active in the Y. M. C. A. and
connected with the Protestant body. He was first the rep-
resentative of the constitutional or revolutionary govern-
ment centred at Canton, but afterwards, for his recognized
patriotism and ability as well as for the impression to be
made of national unity, he was formally designated by the
President of China as representative of the Peking Gov-
ernment. He was an exponent of the American idea, and
had taken an active part in following America 's advice that
China sever relations with Germany and be aligned with
the United States. He, like his chief, was opposed to the
pro- Japan clique and to Japan's ambitious aggressions.
With this delegation there was associated a group of
young men, who were more in sympathy with the de-
mocracy of the Southern Government than with the mili-
tarism of the recognized Peking Government. They were
all antagonistic to Japan. Of these the leader was Minister
Wellington Koo, an honoured graduate of Columbia Univer-
sity. As Minister at Washington, he was given a place on
the special committee in Paris for drafting the Covenant
of the League of Nations. He and Dr. Wang had an elo-
quent command of the English language, which was un-
matched by the Japanese delegation. As the months passed
by, the impression made was that the Chinese delegation
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 171
stood not only against the Japanese demands, but in sup-
port of President Wilson's well-known principles. It was
thought that China by aligning herself with the United
States had a better chance to frustrate the designs of Japan
and to win liberty, democracy and political independence.
The Japanese achieved a victory over their neighbour and
ally by choosing the right moment for calling for a deci-
sion. It was at the close of the deliberations. The Italian
delegation had already withdrawn. Japan's argument for
equality had been cast aside. The hint was thrown out
that if Japan's claims as to German rights in Shantung
should also be rejected, Japan, like Italy, might also with-
draw. The decision was hastily made in Japan's favour.
The ones who made the decision were not all the members
of the Assembly and not even the Japanese delegation, but
three men — the Big Three — Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd
George and M. Clemenceau. For making a wrong decision
these three men, one an American who stood at the pinnacle
of fame, and not Japan, must bear the blame. Moreover,
Britain, France and Italy, in the secret compacts of early
1917, had guaranteed to Japan all German rights in Shan-
tung, and had not disclosed the fact to President Wilson
prior to the Peace Conference.
Bearing closely on the Treaty I advance the thought
which has revolved in my own mind, but which I have not
seen expressed by others, "Is it really right that Germany,
the new Germany, should be compelled by her conquerors to
'renounce' all her rights in Kiaochow and Shantung, and
to sign a treaty consenting to such renunciation?" This
termination of German rights is a vital feature of these
Articles of peace settlement. No one of President Wilson 's
Fourteen Points bears directly on this requirement. But
the fifth point, concerning "a free, open-minded and abso-
lutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims," while
not regarded as very imperative in the matter specified,
172 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
might properly be applied to territory that is only leased,
or to concessions that have been legitimately acquired, as
was true of Germany in Shantung. To this fifth point the
President adds a principle, a most important one, that ' ' the
interests of the populations concerned" must have weight.
And here the Chinese are concerned. On July 4, 1918,
President Wilson enlarged on this principle thus :
The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of
sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship,
upon the basis of free acceptance of that settlement by the ma-
terial interest or advantage of any other nation or people which
may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior
influence or mastery.
The people and the territory concerned are Chinese. The
Germans are concerned in only a minor way. Kiaochow
had never ceased to be Chinese territory. It was never a
German colony; it was only leased to Germany for a lim-
ited period of years. If self-determination is to mean any-
thing, it means that Chinese territory is not to be appro-
priated by Japan without China's free consent, and, par-
ticularly, that the Chinese people living in Kiaochow ter-
ritory shall determine for themselves whether they prefer
to remain Chinese, be under German rule, or come under
Japanese rule.
Considering only the best interests of China, and not
"the material interest or advantage of any other nation or
people," it would have been better if Germany had not
renounced her rights in Shantung in favour of Japan. With
Germany in Shantung, the spheres of influence of rival na-
tions were more nearly equalized, except that Germany's
sphere was a little less than that of France, Great Britain,
Russia and Japan. By a transfer under compulsion to
Japan, Japan acquired thereby a preponderating influence
over all the rival nations, while Germany was totally elim-
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 173
inated. Moreover, by the elimination of Germany the
Chinese lost their most conciliatory friend, even surpassing
the United States. This statement will be startling to
many, but it is true to the facts. Germany after the Boxer
upheaval changed her policy from the forceful kind of Ger-
man officialdom to the co-operative kind of German com-
mercialism. Since 1900 the Chinese have had little cause
to complain of German aggressiveness.
Alpheus H. Snow says :
There appears to have been no abuse by Germany of the social,
political and economic privileges granted to her. That such privi-
leges are capable of gross abuse in the hands of a Power dis-
posed to use them for political purposes goes without sajdng.^
Prof. John Dewey, after a late tour through Shantung
and able to revise his preconception as to the superiority
of Japan over Germany in their bearings on China, says : *
No foreigner can be found who will state that Germany used
her ownership of port and railway to discriminate against other
nations. No Chinese can be found who will claim that this owner-
ship was used to force the Chinese out of business, or to extend
German economic rights beyond those definitely assigned her by
treaty. Common sense should also teach even the highest paid
propagandist in America that there is, from the standpoint of
China, an immense distinction between a national menace lo-
cated halfway around the globe, and one within two days' sail
over an inland sea absolutely controlled by a foreign navy,
especially as the remote nation has no other foothold and the
nearby one already dominates additional territory of enormous
strategic and economic value, namely, Manchuria.
He then enlarges on this comparison of Germany and
Japan. This statement being one of facts, should effectu-
* The Nation, September 20, 1919.
* The New Republic, March 3, 1920.
174 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? " "
ally offset the somewhat prevalent opinion that Germany's
elimination was desirable, and that Japan's substitution-
ary position is equally to be desired. He says :
The Germans exclusively employed Chinese in the railway shops
and for all the minor positions on the railway itself. The rail-
way guards (the difference between police and soldiers is nominal
in China) were all Chinese, the Germans merely training them.
As soon as Japan invaded Shantung and took over the railway,
Chinese workmen and Chinese military guards were at once dis-
missed and Japanese imported to take their places. . . . Within
a few hundred feet of the railway [at Tsinan-fu] that connects
Shanghai, via the important centre of Tientsin, with the capital,
Peking, you see Japanese soldiers on the nominally Chinese street,
guarding their barracks. Then you learn that if you travel upon
the ex-German railway towards Tsingtao, you are ordered to show
your passport as if you were entering a foreign country. And as
you travel along the road (remember that you are over two
hundred miles from Tsingtao) you find Japanese soldiers at every
station, and several garrisons and barracks at important towns on
the line. Then you realize that at the shortest possible notice,
Japan could cut all communications between southern China and
the capital, and with the aid of the Southern Manchurian Railway
at the north of the capital, hold the entire coast and descend at its
good pleasure upon Peking.
Theodore E., Burton, who has also made a visit to Japan
and China, expresses much the same opinion:*
It is the practically universal opinion that the control exercised
by Japan since the expulsion of the Germans, in the autumn of
1914, has been more severe and much more extensive than that of
its predecessors. The Germans were at first somewhat ruthless.
Clashes occurred in which Chinese were killed. But about the
year 1908 [really after the Boxer year] a more lenient policy was
adopted. The inhabitants were treated with marked considera-
* New York Times, February, 1920.
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 175
tion, . . . Last October all conductors, oflScials at stations and
most of the trainmen, were Japanese. The spacious barracks for
soldiers which have been constructed or are under construction at
many stations certainly look like permanent occupation.
Herbert Adams Gibbons writes in a similar strain : *
In fact, an open-minded examination of the documents sub-
mitted by the Chinese delegation to the Peace Conference leads
one to believe that the Chinese had much less to complain of in
regard to the Germans in Shantung than in regard to the Russians
and Japanese in Manchuria and Liao-tung. The Germans were
not oppressive masters of the natives within the leased territory.
Their control led to improved sanitary conditions and to eco-
nomic prosperity. Germany did not follow the tactics of Russia
and Japan in using the railway concession as a means of perma-
nent military control.
Mr. F, Anderson, Chairman of the China Association, in
his annual message of July 17, 1920, said :
The Japanese administration of Shantung is worse than the
German. While there were only about five hundred Germans
resident in Tsingtao, all of whom were officials or leaders, there
are now over 35,000 Japanese residents.
These facts as to Japan indeed refer to her military occu-
pation of German rights and sphere of interest in Shan-
tung the past six years, and of course are no criterion as
regards the future. Whether Japan's policy changes for
the better or becomes even worse, there is nothing in the
settlement of the Versailles Treaty to determine one way or
the other.
Even Americans living in Shantung must soon realize
that the substitute for Germany is a bane to their enter-
prise, whether commercial or missionary. They must re-
» " The New Map of Asia," p. 489.
176 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
call that when this German-constructed port was formed,
the German authorities donated the ground for the estab-
lishment of the Presbyterian mission, adjoining the site of
the German Protestant mission. Since Japanese occupation
the American missionaries and Chinese teachers and evan-
gelists have been subjected to many annoying regulations,
while below the girls' school has been erected a palace of
vice, lit up by electric light, and an alluring tempter to the
unfortified Chinese.
In general, Japan in capturing Tsingtao and forcibly
taking possession of all German properties in Shantung,
without any one 's leave, became more high-handed than the
Germans had been prior to 1900. Through these five years,
Japan has shown herself both a menace and an exasperation
to China. The immoral influences of the Japanese, espe-
cially in morphine and the social evil, as compared with
the missionary and educational influence of the Germans,
cause the Chinese to look longingly to the former days of
German administration.
I next draw attention to that which the German Govern-
ment is called upon to renounce, namely, German "rights."
That Germany has had any rights, lasting through the war
down to the peace settlement, is beyond dispute ; it is rec-
ognized by all the nations signing the Treaty; the word,
"rights," is even introduced by the Japanese delegates,
who, it is understood, drafted these three important Art-
icles relating to Shantung. For Germany to renounce rec-
ognized rights is an act of unparalleled, though compul-
sory, self-abnegation. For Japan to acquire them, when
Germany held them only through a grant from China, is a
transaction that will not stand in any court of equity.
The German "rights, titles and privileges" in Shan-
tung, as the Treaty words it, came by contract, by treaty.
The other contracting party was the Chinese Government,
not the Japanese or the American, or all Europe combined.
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 177
For dignitaries, who set out to make a Treaty and a
League of Nations based on justice, to compel Germany to
break the treaty made with China twenty years before, is
an anomaly so great as to throw into the shade all other
inconsistencies of the Versailles Treaty.
The question then becomes: Did these German rights
still exist in 1919? The Chinese and Japanese have both
advanced arguments against the validity of the claim. But
the inference is not the same. The Chinese are wont to say :
''China's declaration of war on the Teutonic Powers in
August, 1917, abrogated all treaties and agreements exist-
ing between China and the former German Government,
and automatically terminated at the same time the Chino-
Japanese Treaty of May 25, 1915, respecting the province
of Shantung. Upon this abrogation and termination of
treaties and agreements, including the lease of Kiaochow,
China is the only one who has the right to claim back all
interests and privileges conceded to the former German
Government. ' ' ^
So Alpheus H. Snow argues against the falsity of the
assumption that the Peace Conference in 1919 had the
authority to dispose of German rights to Japan. He says :
So long as China was neutral, the concessions to Gennany
doubtless remained in force. The military operations of Great
Britain and Japan, outside the leased territory, and probably
also within it, were violations of China's neutrality. By China's
co-belligerency with Great Britain and Japan (as from August,
1917) these violations were doubtless condoned. On the declara-
tion of war by China, Germany's privileges of all kinds in Shan-
tung lapsed, and her state property in the leased territory re-
verted to China. The action of the Allied and Associated Powers
is, therefore, not a transfer of Germany's sphere of influence to
Japan, but the attempted institution by the Allied and Associated
States other than China of a new sphere of influence in favour
' » " China's Claims at the Peace Table," p. 15.
178 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
of Japan in Shantung similar to that which Germany had before
the war; and an attempted transfer to Japan of the title of
China to the former public property of Grermany in Tsingtao.^
Therefore what was transferred to Japan under compul-
sion of the Peace Conference was Chinese rights, which pre-
viously were German rights, but rights under grant from
China.
On the other hand, the inference of the Japanese is that
the Chino- Japanese Treaty of 1915 could not be abrogated,
and that by it German rights had passed to Japan. Japan
had safeguarded her claim, before she sent delegates to the
Peace Conference, and even before she allowed China to
declare war on Germany in August, 1917. She rested her
claim on these Agreements of 1915, which followed the
Twenty-one Demands. It is here that Japan was strong
and China was weak, in the dispute that was argued before
the Big Four and afterwards decided by the Big Three,
Italy's delegates having withdrawn. Through American
advice, the Chinese delegate, in presenting his country's
case, placed the emphasis on this their weakest point, and
Japan's strongest point. And Japan won out.
Mr. Snow, and nearly all the writers who come forward
as protagonists of China, assert that "the Twenty-one
Demands of Japan, backed by military force, are in law
nugatory." But this form of statement is not the question.
The Japanese make no claim as to the original Twenty-one
Demands, which were plainly unjust and unfriendly, but
they claim that the Agreements, whose main features had
been agreed to by China before Japan issued her ultimatum,
were binding and could not be broken, all the more that
China at the time entered no formal protest.
The wording of these Agreements of 1915, as mentioned
in a previous chapter, is more favourable to China than the
* In The Nation for September 20, 1919.
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 179
wording of the Versailles Treaty. According to the latter,
all German rights are handed over in 1919 to Japan with
no stipulation (in the treaty) that anything is to be re-
stored to China. According to the Chino-Japanese Treaty
of May, 1915, (a) all German ** rights, interests and con-
cessions" in Shantung were to be left, with China's con-
sent, to subsequent agreement of the German and Japanese
Governments; (b) the leased territory of Kiaochow, though
"left to the free disposal of Japan," is to be restored to
China under certain conditions; (c) "the buildings and
properties of Germany" in Kiaochow are to be disposed of
by subsequent arrangement of "the Japanese Government
and the Chinese Government."
The one who signed for China this agreement of 1915 was
Lou Tseng-tsiang, who was also the chief Chinese delegate
to the Peace Conference at Paris. The Japanese delegates
at Paris felt pretty safe in holding to the great principle
professed by the Allied nations — sacred observance of all
treaties. This assured them a hold on its Treaty of 1915, a
treaty to Japan's advantage.
Japan had further safeguarded her position by secret
Agreements with three Allied Governments in February
and March, 1917. By these all German rights in Shantung
were to be ceded to Japan — for favours received.
It was thus no easy task for Woodrow Wilson, in secret
conclave, to outvote his colleagues from London, Paris and
Rome. It was no easy task to insist on abolishing secret
agreements of all kinds ; if he looked for success, it should
have been through strong action taken at the very beginning
of the conference, and not at the very end. Neither was it
an easy task to vote for China as against Japan in insist-
ing on the nullification of the Chino-Japanese Agreements
of 1915.
It can thus be seen that the Chinese have suffered three
delusions. (1) They were deluded in putting trust in
180 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
American nelp, should they enter the war. (2) They were
deluded in putting trust in American help, along with the
help of Great Britain, France and Italy, should they pre-
sent their case against Japaa at the Peace Conference.
(3) Later they were deluded by putting trust in action of
the United States Senate, and so augmenting the antag-
onisms between China and Japan. The Chinese are now
disillusioned; but only in part. They are still under the
delusion that Japan, and Japan alone, has worked harm
to China.
We are now able to examine specifically the decision
which was made as to the respective claims of China and
Japan concerning German rights in Shantung and other
parts of China. Both the Versailles Treaty made with Ger-
many and the Covenant of the League of Nations show
clearly the results attained by exclusive negotiations of vic-
torious Powers.
L The Articles of the Treaty, under the separate head
** Shantung" (as if Shantung were distinct from China),
deserve first attention. They present a fairly accurate in-
dication of the conferees' conception of justice and law,
when applied to an historic but unmilitary nation like
China and to an equally historic but strongly military na-
tion like Japan. The result is a profit and loss account,
in which the profit is to Japan and the loss to China. The
cause of righteousness is even more a loser. Why should
China, first a neutral and then an associate in arms on the
Allied side — fighting for justice and freedom as against
despotism — be made to lose? Why should President Wil-
son, Lloyd George and Clemeneeau decide against China
and for Japan, after inducing China to forego the securi-
ties and impartialities of neutrality and to join the Allies
in the world contest?
The Articles in the Treaty bearing on Shantung (the
province known as the "sacred" province of China, from
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 181
being the home of China's Sages, Confucius and Meneius)
are numbered 156, 157 and 158. The word "China" is
only used once and then only in an incidental way. The
words "Germany" and "German" appear seven times.
The word "Japan," a talisman, is used six times. Though
everything mentioned pertains to Chinese territory and
China's national sovereignty, the conferees at Paris recog-
nize only two dominating factors, Germany and Japan, the
one of the past and the other of the future. A person from
Mars — Mars in Europe or Mars in the heavens — reading
the clauses would not suppose there is any China, or, at
least, that Kiaochow or Shantung had ever been a part of
Chinese territory.
Article 156 reads as follows:
Germany renounces in favour of Japan all her rights, titles and
privileges — particularly those concerning the territory of Kiao-
chow, railways, mines and submarine cables, which she acquired in
virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6,
1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the province of
Shantung.
All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinan-fu Railway, includ-
ing its branch lines, together with its subsidiary stock of all
kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and
material for the exploitation of the mines, are to remain acquired
by Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto.
The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai
and from Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and
properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free
and clear of all charges and incumbrances.
This Article, then, relates to three things: (1) to German
rights in the territory of Kiaochow leased by China, in-
cluding the port of Tsingtao ; (2) to German concessionary
rights from China in railways, mines and their further ex-
ploitation (a fine word for a righteous treaty), and (3) to
German rights in submarine cables.
182 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Article 157 relates to German State property in the ter-
ritory of Kiaochow. It reads:
The movable and immovable property owned by the German
State in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as the rights that
Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improve-
ments made or of the expense incurred by her directly or indi-
rectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired
by Japan, free and clear of all charges and incumbrances.
Article 158, as if to fill out some possible defect, enlarges
on Japan's magnificent acquisition — her "spoils of war"
at China's expense as much as at Germany's expense. It
reads :
Germany shall hand over to Japan, within three months from
the coming into force of the present Treaty, the archives, reg-
isters, plans, title deeds and documents of every kind, wherever
they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military,
financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kiaochow.
Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to
Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the
rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles.
In all this Germany, not the victorious Allies, is com-
pelled to designate Japan to be, what may be called, the
"mandatory" of all German rights in Shantung. China,
evidently, is one of the backward nations, though kindly
invited to sign such a Treaty,
Assuming that it is lawful to deprive Germany of her
rights bestowed by China, the disposal of these rights as
determined by the Treaty must now be studied.
(1) The Kiaochow transfer. By the Treaty this territory
passes to the control of Japan. This transfer is obligatory.
Any subsequent retrocession to China is not obligatory, for
it is not in the Treaty. Germany, too, is required to sign
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 183
the Treaty, confirming such a transfer — transfer of a lease
of territory, situated not in Germany, not even in Japan,
but in China, and of which China alone is proprietor. Ger-
many merely held a temporary lease, and the lease had to
do only with administrative jurisdiction, and was not a
lease or a sale of landed property. ''Under the deed of
conveyance," as a Chinese student at Columbia University
has well expressed it, "the lessor's sovereign rights were
expressly reserved during the period of the tenancy." By
the terms of the contract it was assumed that if Germany
ever relinquished the leasehold, it would revert to China,
the original and real owner. The trouble with the Treaty
at this point is not so much that possibly by Japan's good
grace the poorest portion of the territory may yet come
under Chinese administration — (the best part being an In-
ternational "Settlement," with China left out, and Japan
predominant, or an out-and-out Japanese "Concession" ex-
isting alongside) — but that Japan is confirmed in her
claim that her wishes and not those of China are to be re-
spected, and that tJie right of conquest still rules in modern
international law. The Treaty not only enforces the cession
of Kiaochow to Japan, but confirms a bad principle, sup-
posed to have no place in a model treaty.
The Treaty, moreover, practically condones Japan's il-
legal method of effecting the conquest. It seems strange
that moralists and legalists — and they thronged Paris —
who complain of Germany's violations of international law
should have so readily countenanced a clear violation of
law on the part of Japan. It is also strange that, under
advice, the Chinese delegates omitted reference to these vio-
lations, a matter that should have appealed to the eon-
science of the Supreme Council. The Chinese dwelt much
on the point that the Agreements made with Japan in 1915
had been signed under duress, but the Big Four, being en-
gaged in making a Treaty also to be signed under duress,
184 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE!
could not be expected to give serious consideration to such
a plea.
It may here be noted to China's credit that when the
Japanese claims became known at the Peace Conference,
the Chinese delegates, according to Thomas F. Millard,^
made the following proposal:
China would assent to have the German concessions in Shantung
ceded directly to Japan in the treaty of peace, thus saving Japan's
" face " in the matter.
Japan to promise, same also to be written in the treaty, to
restore Shantung and Tsingtao to China in two years.
China would agree to repay Japan for all expenses incurred by
Japan in the military operations required to take Tsingtao from
Germany.
This proposal was rejected by the Japanese delegation.
"While it showed good spirit on the part of the Chinese
towards an aggravating neighbour, it is my opinion that it
was too flabby a proposal to merit success. The Chinese
delegates from the start should have maintained a strong
position by pressing points that were strong in law, equity
and reason.
In connection with this possible restoration of territory to
China, not by the Treaty but by Japan, there have been
many misconceptions and misrepresentations, such as al-
ways tarnish truth in periods of war. Even President Wil-
son ia his many speeches upholding the League of Nations
has unwittingly misled the public. Thus at Denver, Sep-
tember 25, 1919, he spoke of "the provision in regard to the
transfer from the German Empire of the Shantung prov-
ince to Japan." Even the Chinese delegation at Paris,
or Mr. Millard, in the statement above, falls into the same
error, as to what Japan is to restore to China. The restora-
tion of Shantung is not in the Treaty. Shantung was not
* In New York Times, July 25, 1919.
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 185
a province of the German Empire, but of China. All that
is transferred to Japan is the territory or administrative
rights of Kiaochow, being 100 kilometres from the Bay of
Kiaochow on all sides.
Another misstatement, emanating from the Japanese
delegates, is that Japan, in return for ** economic rights,"
will restore "Shantung in complete sovereignty." It was
never known before that Chinese sovereignty had been
taken away. As for the Japanese they had disclaimed any
infringement of China's sovereignty. Either Japan has
been deluding the world as to her intentions, or she is now
assuming to give to China that which was already China's
and not Japan 's. She affects a generosity by giving up that
which she had never acquired, and China gets back that
which she has never given up.
(2) The economic concessionary rights. All these with
all the property ' ' are to remain acquired by Japan. ' ' The
Treaty confirms far more than did the Chino-Japanese
Agreement of 1915. It was this allocation of the spoils of
war that the Allied Ambassadors in Tokio had secretly
agreed to early in 1917. There is even no private under-
standing that ultimately these rights shall pass to China,
although the Japanese first secured them, in 1914, by
military force and military occupation. This illegal
acquisition of another's property, this triumph of Force,
and these secret machinations of Governments on the same
side, are all condoned and confirmed by the Treaty of
Peace.
As the Chinese Government was one of the contracting
parties when granting the railway and mining concessions
to Germany, in the form of joint German-Chinese Com-
panies, it would seem as if these German rights and German
property on Chinese territory should pass into Chinese
hands in case it should be necessary for Germany to relin-
quish them. But Japan said, "No, possession is nine points
186 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
of the law." And the peace conferees said, "Japan is
strong, let her have what she wants."
Here, then, were two strong points for the Chinese to
press. One may be stated thus: "We cannot agree to Ja-
pan's unheard-of and illegal seizure of German property
within our domains. We do not claim this property for
ourselves. It belongs to the Germans. In any case it does
not belong to Japan." The other point may also be stated
thus: "We had no part in the secret intrigues going on in
Tokio. We disapprove of such secrecy and such intrigue.
We resent the intrusion on our national dignity and sov-
ereign rights. We demand a just settlement. ' '
But the Chinese again omitted what was China's strong-
est point and Japan's weakest.
The Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway in its construction cost
$14,500,000. The money invested in the mines already in
operation is reckoned as amounting to $4,000,000, though
no exact official statement has been issued. It is known,
however, that the coal mines in 1914 produced upwards of
1,500,000 tons, and that one iron mine, just opened at the
beginning of the war, was capable of producing ore with
66.4 per cent of iron. Japan acquires all this "free of
charge. ' ' With this as a beginning Japan will find the task
of developing mines and maintaining railways much easier
than have the Germans. There is a start with a bonus.
There is even no royalty to be paid the Chinese Govern-
ment. "Her railway and mining concessions will yield at
least $40,000,000 a year." ^
As to any favours to be extended to China hereafter there
is no mention in the Treaty. China's rights are not im-
portant enough to be noticed or guaranteed. The Treaty
is even less considerate of China in this respect than the
Agreement made in September, 1918, by the Japanese Gov-
ernment and by the militaristic, pro-Japanese Government
* Charles Merz in Asia for September, 1919.
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 187
of Peking. Concerning this Agreement K. K. Kawakami ^
writes :
In the above-named instrument Japan agreed to (1) withdraw
all troops along the railway lines, (2) entrust the Chinese Gov-
ernment with the policing of the lines, (3) defray the expenses of
such policing from the funds of the railway company, (4) employ
Chinese for the operation of the lines, and (5) abolish the civil
government established by Japan for the administration of Kiao-
chow and the railway zone.
Young China, however, takes exception to Japan's re-
tention of economic rights, judging Japan of the future by
Japan of the past. ''Japan," it is said, ''will keep the
oyster and return to us only the shell."
Dr. Arthur J. Brown, by no means unfriendly to Japan,
writes : ^
While the Germans had employed less than a hundred of their
own nationals on the railway, including the officials of the Com-
pany and had used Chinese for all the other places, the Japanese
staffed and operated the railway exclusively with their own people.
They now talk of joint control by Japanese and Chinese, but no
one in Shantung believes that the Chinese share of the control
would be anything more than nominal.
Besides acquiring by the terms of the Treaty valuable
concessions already undertaken — concessions granted by
China to Germany alone — Japan acquires what is called
"the exploitation of the mines." In the condensed draft
first made public it was glaringly stated as "the rights of
exploitation." Some of us had dreamed that Woodrow
Wilson would be able to persuade his diplomatic comrades
to abandon the baneful policy of exploiting weak nations,
* In Asia for September, 1919.
*In Asia, September, 1919.
188 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEt
but, instead, we find exploitation incorporated as a prin-
ciple in the Treaty of Peace. Among the schemes of exploi-
tation are two new railway lines to reach into the two other
provinces, Kiangsu and Chihli, and near to a third prov-
ince, Honan. Knowing how Japanese-controlled railways
in Manchuria have been managed to the weakening of
China's political strength and the retarding of foreign
commercial enterprises, the prospect for Chinese and other
nationals in the provinces directly south of Peking is by
no means assuring. Mr. Kawakami * says :
The cost of building these two lines is estimated at $35,000,000.
Of this total $10,000,000 was advanced to China in September,
1918, when the agreement was made. It should be emphasized
that these lines are not to be built or owned or operated by Japan
or Japanese interests. They are to be built by China herself, and
will be owned and operated by her. Japan's only part in the
enterprise is to advance the necessary funds, which is absolutely
legitimate.
In calculating on the future it is indeed only fair to rec-
ognize the bare possibility of Japan's adopting a concilia-
tory, co-operative policy towards the development of China,
just as the equally energetic Germans have pursued for
nearly two decades. Even so, Japanese by advancing the
capital hold first mortgage on the railways. It is this
method of exploiting China, in which all concessionaires
participate, that serves to enslave China.
(3) Japan's possession of German State submarine
cables. This is a new feature of the peace settlement that
goes beyond the Arrangements made by Japan with China
in either 1915 or 1918. It is a loss to China only in the
sense that it adds to Japan, In the first place, I see no
justice in taking these cables away from Germany. In the
* In Asia, September, 1919.
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 189
second place, I see no justice in transferring them to Japan
rather than to China, should it be necessary to take them
from Germany. As England, France and Japan insist on
controlling the land end of all cables that touch their soil,
so China should have control of these particular cables
that connect Chinese ports, Shanghai, Tsingtao and Chefoo.
Moreover, by previous arrangements these submarine cables
are all linked with the Chinese telegraph system. They con-
cern China and no outside country.
(4) All German State property in Eiaochow, i. e., in
Tsingtao, is acquired by Japan, "free and clear of all
charges and incumbrances." Why by Japan and not by
China? This, too, goes beyond the Agreement of 1915,
which stipulates that their disposal, along with that of other
German property, shall be by "mutual agreement" of the
two Governments, Chinese and Japanese. For Japan to
possess such valuable property on Chinese sovereign ter-
ritory places her in a stronger position than China. The
only country to have first place in China should be China.
(5) All German official documents bearing on the ter-
ritory of Kiaochow are to be handed over to Japan. Most
of these documents which do not concern Germans among
themselves, concern China. None probably concern Japan.
But Japan is to come into possession. She is a kind of
super-state, as by appointment of the Peace Conference.
Beside all these astounding dispositions of what was once
German, beside the recognition by the Treaty of Peace of
various illegalities, of the principle of conquest, of the
spoils of war, of the reign of Force, of secret compacts, and
of the continued prevalence of exploitation, the Versailles
Treaty and the League of Nations, one and inseparable,
tacitly confirm Japan in her position of supremacy in
China. This is in addition to previous confirmation in the
Lansing-Ishii Exchange of Notes in 1917. For Japan to
secure such recognition is all-important. China, on the
190 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
other hand, is slighted, ignored, deserted. The Chinese are
disappointed, chagrined, and, in some cases, indignant.
Dr. Arthur J. Brown ^ mentions that while at the begin-
ning of the war there were only 3,740 Germans in all China,
the Japanese at Tsingtao increased from a few dozen to
50,000 by the end of 1917, and at Tsinan-fu, the provincial
capital, to 22,000. "Colonies of varying size," he says, "are
to be found in other important cities, and traders, engineers
and other Japanese on various quests are in evidence, in
almost every part of the province," where, by the way, they
have no right to be, as by all treaty arrangements not yet
annulled. He also says: "Politically, their ascendancy is
absolute. It is true that outside Tsingtao Chinese officials
theoretically have 'unimpaired sovereignty'; but the aver-
age official finds a Japanese ' advisor ' at his elbow and that
it is the part of prudence to heed the 'advice' that is given."
He then quotes from a local observer:
This province is quite under the power of the Japanese. There
is scarcely a department that has not been entered by them. They
are in strategic posts and positions everywhere. Non-residents of
China cannot conceive of the situation. Foreign gold bribes un-
scrupulous leaders to fight each other. The boundary of the
" leased territory " is being illegally extended.
More important in the eyes of the Japanese than the
ultimate disposal of Kiaochow has been a commanding polit-
ical principle, and that is, that all matters affecting the
relationship of Japan and China do not lie within the pur-
view of the Peace Conference or the League of Nations and
must not even be mentioned, but must await some future
conference of Chinese and Japanese. And the Supreme
Council saw fit to bow to this assumption. Where, then, was
advantage to accrue to China through personal represen-
' In Asia for September, 1919.
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 191
tation at the Peace Conference — the beau ideal of all the
dreams when in 1917 China threw herself into the war
maelstrom ?
Mr. David Fraser, the Peking correspondent of the Times
of London, writing of the claims of the Chinese delegates,
says : ^
They did not explain that the real point at issue was not
Kiaochow, or the economic rights of Germany, but the fact that
these things in the hands of Japan meant something quite different
from what they meant in the hands of Germany.
C. T. "Wang, the second Chinese delegate at the Peace
Conference, in an article in the Outlook of August, 1919,
speaks of Japan's hold on ** China's vastly rich mineral
resources," and her training of "the great reservoir of
man power" in China, and asks, "Can you not see that
there would be a menace to the world much more serious
than Germany could ever be ? " He then refers to the way
Japan, by her railway schemes jutting from Shantung,
will flank the two grand trunk lines from Tientsin to
Nanking and from Peking to Hankow. He also cites the
railway system being worked out in Manchuria and Mon-
golia. He sums up most clearly :
That means that Peking will be isolated. ... At any time
the Japanese can close their pincers and nip Peking.
That this discussion may be fair to Japan, I here quote
from a speech of Kuo Tai-chi, an advisor to the Chinese
delegation, given July 25, 1919, in New York City. He
said:
Shortly before the Fiume question came up in Paris, two
Japanese oflfieials came to me personally with an offer that was
* North China Herald, August 2, 1919.
192 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
obviously inspired by the higher Japanese authorities. Their
offer in brief was this: If China would agree to the indirect
restitution of Germany's former rights in accordance with the
1915 treaties, Japan would agree (1) to relinquish the right of
establishing an exclusive settlement in Kiaochow, (2) to operate
the trans-Shantung Railway jointly with China, (3) to renounce
any claim to spheres of influence in Shantung, thus taking the
lead in this matter among the Great Powers, and (4) to invite
other foreign capital to aid in the building of the two projected
railroad lines connecting northern and southern China.
This offer was obviously more modest than what Japan actually
got through the treaty. A week after the offer was made the
Fiume question came up so as to obscure everything else, but the
Japanese saw that they could use it to get more than they ex-
pected. They threatened to withdraw from the conference, and it
was pointed out that if she did so, England, through her de-
fensive alliance with Japan and as a result of the pact of London,
might be compelled to follow suit. Thus she forced a decision in
her favour through simple bluff and intrigue.
It is to be doubted whether the Chinese were wise in put-
ting aside the proposals as here made. They were, as Mr.
Kuo says, "more moderate" than appear in the final draft
of the Treaty. In a word, it seems more and more evident
that China got less from the Peace Conference than she
would have got, or will yet get, by direct negotiation with
Japan.
II. To complete this study, attention must be given to
a few minor blessings bestowed on China in another part
of the Versailles Treaty. They are Articles 128-134, in-
clusive, under the separate head ''China," as if China and
Shantung were in different parts of the world. I only give
a summary, for that is all these Articles deserve.
(1) Germany renounces in favour of China "all benefits
and privileges" from the Protocol of September, 1901, after
the Boxer uprising, and "any claim to indemnity." This
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 193
relief actually came to China when she declared war on
Germany, August, 1917, but the Treaty makes it appear
that the relief was granted through the thoughtfulness of
the Peace conferees. The Chinese had indeed asked that
they be relieved of the Boxer indemnity to all countries, but
all that the Allied countries can now promise is that Ger-
many shall be forced to renounce her share. Others may
follow later. Thus far only the United States and Ger-
many see eye to eye!
(2) ** China will no longer be bound to grant to Ger-
many" any advantages from the Chinese tariff arrange-
ment of 1902, or the arrangements of 1905 and 1912 re-
garding the Whang-Poo River Conservancy. This auto-
matically occurred when China declared war, and needs no
mention in the treaty. It only remains for China and Ger-
many to make new treaties after peace is restored, as has
already been done by proclamation of the President of
China. The Chinese sought for revision of all treaties with
all countries and for complete control of China's own
tariff. It may be that the German Republic will set an
example to all the rest of kind treatment of the Chinese
nation.
(3) All German State property in the once German
"Concessions" of Tientsin, Hankow or elsewhere in China
(except of course Kiaochow) is acquired by China. This is
most considerate. Why did not Japan ask for all of it?
There is one limitation to China's sovereignty ; she must not
touch the public or private property of Germany within the
Legation quarter of Peking, a quarter which is an eyesore to
all Chinese.
(4) The astronomical instruments seized by official Ger-
many in 1900 and 1901 are to be sent back to Peking. Sev-
eral years ago the German Government offered to return
the instruments, but the Chinese politely declined. Now
the great restitution will be made.
194 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
(5) Germany relinquishes to China the German Conces-
sions of Tientsin and Hankow. China in acquiring them
must "open them to international residence and trade,"
thus granting more than the Japanese, under the Treaty,
need grant in the territory of Kiaochow. The Chinese have
longed for the extinction of all extra-territorial jurisdiction
at the treaty-ports. A start is made in the ex-German Con-
cessions of two treaty-ports.
(6) Germany is forbidden to present any claims against
China or the Allied and Associated Nations in connection
with the internment and repatriation of Germans, or the
liquidation and sequestration of German property in China.
Properly handled, the Chinese Government ought to get
quite a sum of money by this dubious transaction duly
legalized by the Allied and Associated Governments. The
two Allied nations, Britain and France, reap an even
greater harvest. And no German can find redress under
any known law of these advanced nations.
(7) German State property in the British Concession at
Shameen in Canton reverts to Great Britain. This is only
a drop in the bucket of the British treasury, but it helps
to soothe the thirst for gold.
(8) The Medical and Engineering School established by
the Germans in Shanghai, and unfortunately located in the
French Concession, must be given over to the joint control
of the French and Chinese. As the German educational
work in Tsingtao is to be directed by Japanese, that in
Shanghai will be directed by Frenchmen. The Chinese will
be "assistants." The future will reveal results. The
astounding fact remains that German scientific skill for the
benefit of the Chinese is by Treaty placed under a ban.
Comparing what China got under the section entitled
"China," and what Japan got under the section entitled
* ' Shantung, ' ' it seems to me much as if the Big Three — the
greatest men in the world — ^had given Japan a most sump-
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 195
tuous repast, and at the close had handed as a " tip " a few
dimes or paper rubles to China, standing by in "watchful
waiting."
III. The Covenant of the proposed League of Nations,
incorporated as a part of the Treaty, also affects China,
equally to her disadvantage.
(1) In Article 21 of the Covenant it has been inserted
that '' regional understandings" shall be exempt from con-
trol of the League. These words with special mention of
the American Monroe Doctrine were introduced into the
re-draft with the idea of satisfying those Americans
who felt that the form of Covenant was endangering
this traditional American Doctrine. But if reference
was needed, there should have been a distinct and
sole reference; the Monroe Doctrine should not have been
made subordinate to any superior idea called "regional
understanding." What the American Senate asked
for was a "specific exemption" of the Monroe Doc-
trine, but here in the League it is wrapped up in a new
terminology, originating in a British brain, "regional
understanding." The Japanese can now claim that
whether they have any Monroe Doctrine of their own or
not, to be applied to Eastern Asia, they certainly have a
"regional understanding" with the United States, in the
Lansing-Ishii agreement, as to Japan's "special interests"
in China through "territorial propinquity." Quite prob-
ably Japan has also an understanding with Great Britain
and France. The phraseology is a most unwise selection
for preserving a particular American policy.
(2) An indirect harm to China was the rejection of the
clause which the Japanese desired to have introduced into
the preamble: "by the endorsement of the principle of
equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals."
This is generally spoken of as "the no-racial discrimina-
tion" clause. Japan has not sought for what is commonly
196 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE!
called racial equality, but for equality of nations, with no
discrimination against one on account of race. This was
an eminently fair proposal, prudently and moderately
phrased. The Japanese laid great stress upon its adoption.
It was heartily supported by the Chinese, for China and
Japan are the only two countries of the world which are
discriminated against merely because of nationality or race.
Even when the principle was rejected, the Japanese re-
served the right to bring it up before the Assembly at some
future time. This was one reservation which did not need
to be submitted to the Peace Conference for approval or
disapproval. The principle is distinct from the right which
every nation possesses to make its own laws concerning im-
migration, only that those excluded are excluded because
of a general requirement, based on character or other qual-
ity rather than on nationality or race. By adoption of the
principle, Japan and China would have been satisfied.
Moreover, President Wilson's principle of religious liberty
might also have been adopted at the same time. On the
other hand, by rejection of these two great principles, the
League lost much of its power for good, and the Japanese
delegates were placed in an ignominious position. They
were mortified still more, because, having been honoured by
a seat among the ruling Five in the Supreme Council, their
presence after the first few sessions was no longer sought.
They were further offended by the insistence that Japan
adopt the mandatory system as to the late German colonies
north of the Pacific, instead of being allowed actual pos-
session as they claimed to be their just dues. The result
was that they insisted on being satisfied in all their de-
mands concerning German rights in Shantung. If Japan
had lost out here, it is needless to say her delegates would
never have dared to return home, the Japanese nation
would have been aroused, the League would have been re-
jected and the German Treaty with it, and Japan would
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 197
have made a separate treaty with Germany, in which the
clause of no race discrimination would have been incorpo-
rated. Thus failure to be just on one matter — just to both
Japan and China — ended in being glaringly unjust to
China.
There seems to be a difference of opinion as to whati
Japan would have done, if her claims as to Shantung had
been rejected. Secretary Lansing before the Senate Com-
mittee asserted that even if the Shantung agreement had
not been made, the Japanese signature to the League of
Nations would have been obtained, as also the Chinese ; but
President Wilson reached the conclusion that the Japanese
signature would have been lacking.^ E, T. Williams, one
of the expert advisors, thoroughly familiar with Chinese
questions, also expressed the opinion that "Japan probably
would have refused to sign the treaty, ' ' if she had not been
awarded the Shantung settlement. "An impasse would
have resulted, " ^ he said.
IV. To complete an understanding of the feelings of
the Chinese, as well as of the Japanese, it is necessary to
know just what the Chinese delegates claimed or wanted.
They presented desiderata rather than claims. They asked,
perhaps, too much, but their much asking was in proportion
to their great faith in the League idea and in the justice of
the Peace Conference. Their requests included seven im-
portant particulars:
1. Spheres of influence and special interests. "The
Powers are to declare that they neither possess nor claim"
any of these, and "are ready to revise all treaties, agree-
ments, notes and contracts establishing such."
2. Troops and police. "All foreign troops and police
on Chinese soil to be immediately withdrawn," especially
Legation guards.
' Press notices, August 20, 1919.
* Press reports, August 23, 1919.
198 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE? '
3. Foreign post-oflBces, wireless stations and telegraphs.
"All the post-offices to be suppressed before January 1,
1921, and no telegraphic installation to be established after-
ward."
4. Consular jurisdiction. On China's promulgation of
five new codes by end of 1924 and creating new tribunals,
extra-territorial jurisdiction is to be abandoned.
5. Leased territories. "These are to be restored to
China."
6. Foreign municipal Concessions. "All such are to be
restored to China at the end of 1924."
7. Autonomy in respect of customs tariff. "After a time
to be agreed upon mutually, China is to have the right to
fix her own tariffs."
All these were just requests. Their fulfillment depended
on all the Treaty Powers, and not on Japan alone. If Great
Britain, France and the United States had complied, Japan
would have followed suit. Japan's excessive demands
would have disappeared. China would have been helped
forward on the path of progress, independence, self-deter-
mination and a national spirit. President Wilson, in an
address delivered at Pueblo, September 25, 1919, confessed
• that China had not been treated rightly, but trusted to the
League to rectify what the past and present had failed to
accomplish. Better men in the future were to come to
China's rescue. I quote in part:
You have heard a great deal, something that was true and a
great deal that was false, about that provision of the Treaty which
hands over to Japan the rights enjoyed in the province of
Shantung in China. In the first place, Germany did not enjoy any
rights there that other nations had not already claimed. For my
part, my judgment, my moral judgment, is against the whole set
of concessions. They were all of them unjust to China, they ought
never to have been enacted, they were all exacted by duress from
a great body of thoughtful and ancient and helpless people.
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 199
There never was any right in any of them. Thank God, America
never asked for any, never dreamed of asking for any. But when
Germany got this concession in 1898, the United States made no
protest whatever. . . . Immediately following that concession to
Germany there was a concession to Russia of the same sort, of
Port Arthur, and Port Arthur was handed over subsequently to
Japan on the very territory of the United States. Do you re-
member that when Russia and Japan got into war with one
another, the war was brought to a conclusion by a treaty written
at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and in that treaty, without the
slightest intimation from any authoritative sources in America
that the Government of the United States had any objection, Port
Arthur, Chinese territory, was turned over to Japan? . . .
Article X says that no member of the League, and that includes
all these nations that have demanded these things unjustly of
China, shall impair the territorial integrity or the political inde-
pendence of any other member of the League ; and China is going
to be a member of the League. ... I for my part have a pro-
found sympathy for China and I am proud to have taken part in
an arrangement which promises the protection of the world to the
rights of China.
This is aU very well to say; the promises are glowing.
But China has had promises before — when she declared war
to please the Allies, and when she appeared through official
representation at the Conference in Paris. What did the
promises amount to? Why postpone an act of redress?
President Wilson took part in the arrangement not only
of a League of Nations but of the Treaty of Peace. The
Treaty was the first-fruits of the League. That Treaty
compelled Germany to renounce all that was hers in Shan-
tung in favour of Japan. And China was deserted. "By
their fruits ye shall know them."^
It was said that compromise was unavoidable. But on
matters of principle there can be no compromise. This
* See Appendix V.
200 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Treaty, as a lesson to Germany, was to be a treaty of justice.
High moral ideas had been proclaimed by the head of the
American nation and had been accepted by both sides in
the deadly conflict as a basis for negotiation. The Covenant
of a great League was drafted, safeguarding peace and up-
holding righteousness. And at the end the Chinese are told,
"Yes, we have all done wrong. There is no help for it.
We promise by an oath on the Covenant that we will not
wrong you in the future."
When the decision of April 30, 1919, was made known to
the Chinese delegation, and consolation was offered in the
remedial powers of the League of Nations, if the Chinese
only remained patient, one of the delegates gave this apt
reply ;
Sirs, your assurances do not give us any ground for hope. In
the first place the League of Nations as yet has no existence;
secondly, if it is organized its power and authority are prob-
lematical; thirdly, in any event the real ruling power of the
League will be the same nations that made the decision in the
Shantung case and wrote the terms of the Treaty and the Cove-
nant of the League; fourthly, it is not logical to assume that a
League that is created in conjunction with the Treaty, and by the
same body, is intended to reverse the provisions of that Treaty;
fifthly, it is only the weak nations that are told to depend on the
League for justice, while the strong Powers refuse to depend on
it for their own security and rights, but state openly that other
guarantees are necessary.
What happened a few days later when the Treaty, em-
bodying the Covenant, was signed, is that the Chinese dele-
gates, having been humiliated and wronged, were absent,
and all because their requests as to how they r-ould sign in
honour and self-respect were spumed as had been all their
requests at the Peace Table before the Supreme Council.
I quote the Chinese Statement to President Wilson, June
28, 1919:
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 201
Our country has given way step by step in our claim. At first,
we wanted to embody a reservation in the Treaty itself; it was not
granted. Then we modified our demand to mentioning it in an
annex; it was also disallowed. We further asked that a declara-
tion guaranteeing restitution be given us independently of the
Treaty; again not granted. At last we even offered to accept a
mere declaration without any guarantee; our offer was again re-
jected. We were obliged to say that as a final compromise we
would accept a letter from each of the Great Powers, simply
stating that our signature on the Treaty would not prejudice any
readjustment that we might propose in the future. Up to this
noon all our requests have been entirely rejected to our disap-
pointment. . . . It is to our surprise and indignation that the
Plenary Council should have acted in such an autocratic way,
without showing even an infinitesimal degree of consideration
toward the honour and dignity of our country.
China made many requests to the Peace Conference, and
from the standpoint of reason and the sense of right argued
well. China had, indeed, a hearing. Secret agreements
made by China's military faction and Japan were brought
to the light. China opposed Japan, antagonized Japan and
trusted America, Great Britain and France. After all this,
it is not China, but Japan in China, that is stronger than
before the war, yea, before the framing of that Treaty which
is to assure the world a reign of justice under lasting
peace.
Japan cannot alone be blamed. Even the United States
must be held responsible, especially the Executive Branch
of the Government. The American Minister in Peking for
more than two years buoyed China up with assurances of
American succour. The President of the United States,
chief exponent of right principle at the Peace Conference,
failed to satisfy China's hopes or the world's sense of jus-
tice. The whole procedure from February, 1917, to June,
1919, has been detrimental to American prestige and in-
202 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
fluence in China. The Japanese may be blamed, but not by
Americans.
Having failed at Paris with the executive and diplomatic
agents of the three mighty nations whose word is law, a few
of the Chinese delegation had recourse to the United States
Senate, like a drowning man clutching at a straw. As
early as May, 1919, they urged the Senate to assist in se-
curing a revision of the Shantung settlement "by speedily
passing a resolution affirming the same to be inconsistent
with the national honour and interests of America, an in-
credible injustice to China, and a danger to the world
peace." After much agitation the Senate Committee of For-
eign Relations presented to the Senate a majority report
favouring as an amendment the substitution of "China"
for "Japan" in the three Articles 156, 157 and 158. With
my knowledge of the Oriental temperament, this drastic
alteration seems unnecessarily offensive to the Japanese,
while it will accomplish nothing for China.
Later on, November 18, 1919, the Senate adopted by a
majority vote fifteen reservations, the seventh of which
reads :
The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157 and
158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any con-
troversy which may arise under said Articles between the Re-
public of China and the Empire of Japan.
Still later the words at the close referring to China and
Japan were omitted, and the reservation as such was again
adopted by a majority vote. Either form being linked with
all the other reservations and then with ratification of the
Treaty as thus modified requires a two-thirds vote to be
effective. The reservation, however, defends American
prestige in the estimation of the Chinese, and so far is a
patriotic move. But no one need suppose that China will
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 203
be rescued thereby from her present entanglements. If
China is rescued, it will not come from the Versailles
Treaty, even as thus modified, neither will salvation come, I
am sorry to admit, from the United States Government.
China's rescue depends, strange to say, on a changed
Japan.
After all the discussion that has taken place, in the Sen-
ate, in the White House, on many a platform and in the
secular and religious press, the conscientious-minded man
must be amazed at the way America's chief delegate at
Paris failed so conspicuously to match principle with prac-
tice. Such an one must all the more be amazed when he
sees the stand taken by the President, even in February,
1920, in reference to the Adriatic or Fiume question, and
how he remained indifferent on the Shantung or Tsingtao
question. Both questions concern two allies in the late war.
Both may equally well be settled by the same principles.
This is what the President promulgated February 10, 1920 :
The American Government, while no less generous in its desire
to accord to Italy every advantage to which she could offer any
proper claims, feels that it cannot sacrifice the principles for
which it entered the war to gratify the improper ambitions of one
of its associates, or to purchase a temporary appearance of calm
in the Adriatic at the price of a future world conflagration.
Substitute the word "Japan" for "Italy," and "Shan-
tung" for "the Adriatic," in the above, and the problem of
Eastern Asia is well stated.
Note also these words :
It [the American Government] is unwilhng to recognize p.n
unjust settlement based on a secret treaty, the tprms of which are
inconsistent with the new world conditions, or an unjust settle-
ment arrived at by employing that secret treaty as an instrument
of coercion.
204 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Apply this to the China-Japan question, and what would
the plain Chinese reasonably infer? But the President
even more aptly, and without any change in language,
states the truth as adapted to China and Japan, just as well
as to Jugo-Slavia and Italy. The words may be pondered
as to whether their significance is the same in Eastern Asia
as in Southern Europe :
If substantial agreement on what is just and reasonable is
not to determine international issues; if the country possessing
the most endurance in pressing its demands rather than the coun-
try armed with a just cause is to gain the support of the Powers;
if forcible seizure of coveted areas is to be permitted and con-
doned, and is to receive ultimate justification by creating a situa-
tion so difficult that decision favourable to the aggressor is
deemed a practical necessity; if deliberately incited ambition is,
under the name of national sentiment, to be rewarded at the
expense of the small and the weak; if, in a word, the old order
of things which brought so many evils on the world is to prevail,
then the time is not yet come when this Government can enter a
concert of powers, the very existence of which must depend upon
a new spirit and a new order.
How the Chinese nation, yea, how the whole world would
be stirred with new moral vigor, if it could realize that such
words were to be applied as much to one question and to
one portion of humanity as to another ! If President Wil-
son has had a duty to speak positively to Italy and the
European Allies, how much greater his duty to warn Japan
and to help China, bearing in mind that it was the Amer-
ican Government which thrust the war issue into China and
assured the Chinese of the dawning everywhere of a new
era.
It has been well said that nothing is settled until it is
settled right. And there are many wrong settlements in
this Treaty even more than in the League. The following
THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA 205
brave words of Dr. Felix Adler ^ form a fitting summing-up
on the basis of high ethics :
It is sometimes said that we must be satisfied with the begin-
nings of a League of Nations, and trust to future development
to improve it. But if it begins with the seeds of mischief in its
very constitution, future development can only serve to ripen the
evil seeds into full-blown fruition. It is said that half a loaf is
better than no bread, and that compromises are unavoidable. But
no bread is better than a fraction of a loaf if that fraction con-
tains poison; and compromise, while indispensable as to the
means by which policies and principles are effectuated, is wholly
inadmissible in respect to the principles themselves. To give
way in first-rate matters of principle is not to compromise but to
capitulate.
The great men of mighty nations, who were assembled
in Paris, in the memorable year, 1919, thought perhaps in
their hearts, as they arranged so delicately the sad obse-
quies for China, that she was now laid away to rest, never
again to breathe the breath of life.
China's national entity and her glory were indeed badly
shattered by the potentates of peace who met in Paris. But
was her life wholly extinct ? Is there hope for China in the
future?
» The Nation, May 24, 1919.
CHAPTER IX
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA
The obsequies of China have taken place, but she is not yet
dead ; she is not even asleep. She has only suffered a severe
operation and is now convalescent.
The feeling of the Ch::iese over the decision reached at
the Paris Conference concerning the demands of China and
Japan is well expressed by a statement from a delegate to
Paris, the seventy-fourth descendant of Confucius, a state-''
ment sent out by the Associated Press from the home of
Confucius, September 6, 1919:
We trusted Mr. Wilson entirely too much. We sent a note to
President Wilson asking him how he could reconcile assurances he
had given to China before she had entered the war with the
decision. He sent a representative to us expressing his sorrow
and he suggested that he would help us when the League of Na-
tions was formed.
On the morning of the day set for the signing of the Treaty,
after China had been refused the right of signing with reserva-
tions, crowds of students patrolled in front of the hotel of Lou
Tseng-tsiang, our chief delegate, who had been suffering ill-health
and was again confined to his bed. The question of signing had
not been decided when the delegates gathered in his room. He
was asked for the last time if he would consent to sign and he
replied with tears streaming from his eyes:
" I signed the Twenty-one Demands. Can I, must I, also sign
this?" It was the only answer he gave and the delegates under-
stood. That is why when the Conference was called to order the
Beats of the Chinese were vacant.
206
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 207
Facts are hard things to face, but they must be faced by
China if she hopes for rehabilitation, prosperity and con-
tentment. Facts are of the past and shape the destiny of
the future. That is the reason so few Chinese are hopeful.
They feel themselves in bondage to Fate, for facts are fatal-
istic. A fadt accompli is irreversible. Wrongdoing, more
of the nation than of the individual, cannot be wiped out,
though it may be condoned or forgiven. Wrong done to a
nation — to China, for example — is a blow, not only at na-
tional existence, but at the indispensable quality of hope-
fulness. There is not any such thing as return to statiis
quo ante. Considering, then, what has happened to China
these last five years, all the calamities unnecessarily im-
posed upon her by outside nations, how can we Westerners
expect to find buoyant, sanguine, joyful Chinese?
The people of China through hereditary influences are
stoical and patient. They bow to the inevitable. Let me
give to them, and to every one else interested in China's
future, this philosophy of an ancient Greek Stoic: "When
what thou wiliest befalls not, thou then must will what be-
f alleth. ' ' To this let me add the philosophy of Christian-
ity, that over all is a kind Providence, overruling evil,
' ' making the wrath of man to praise Him, ' ' and so shaping
human events that for him who follows the will of God
"all things work together for good." As I look at events
that have just hurried by, this philosophy is the only con-
solation and stay for the millions of China, distracted and
keenly disappointed. "Some trust in horses and some in
chariots" — some in Governments and some in Presidents —
but, let the Chinese now say, "we will trust in the Lord
our God. ' ' On the negative side, the Chinese will do well
if they no longer look for succour to outside nations, not
even to the American Government, and on the positive
side, let them rely on Heaven and then on themselves.
"Heaven," it is said, "helps those who help themselves,"
208 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
A people who have pushed ahead for so many centuries are
not going to be wiped off the map. A few selfish, grabbing,
callous officials have not the power to write over China,
"Mene, Mene, Tekel, Upharsin." If China escaped the
fatality of the Boxer folly, how much more is it possible
to escape the fatality of the Great War's folly. China,
indeed, presents a bewildering maze, but no more so than
most of the countries of Europe. "Where there's a will,
there's a way.'*
A correspondent of the Far-Eastern Bureau writes : * * It
is unfair to say that China must suffer because 'it is her
own fault,' and 'China ought to help herself.' " He then
proceeds to denounce Japan for solitary, outstanding culpa-
bility. In my opinion, China, to be sure, "ought to help
herself, ' ' and she will suffer — not must suffer — because it is
partly "her own fault." Let not the Chinese any more
than others be imposed upon by the fallacies of self-com-
placency. As for their sufferings, there is a way of escape.
In giving a forecast of China's future, I outline in part
what is probable and in part what is possible.
In general, all the elements that have brought misfortune
to China and that retard the free action of China's devel-
opment, should be reversed in the reconstructive policies of
the future. It is not restoration — going back to the past —
that is needed in China, but reconstruction — a remodelling,
the building of a new structure.
/ (1) In particular, in this new structure, there must
dwell a new soul, vivified by the highest moral energies.
During the war period, and even from the overthrow of
an alien dynasty in the first revolution of 1911, the Chinese
have laid emphasis on the unessential and subsidiary qual-
ities of national prosperity, rather than on the essence of
the inner life. And, unfortunately, this attitude of mind
has been encouraged by outside environment. The Chinese
have been thinking, discussing, wrangling about such mat-
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 209
ters as forms of State — a monarchy or a republic, parlia-
mentary government, centralization in the President or the
Cabinet, and provincial autonomy. They have divided
into two opposing factions over the war issue, and then over
militarism versus democracy. All the time corruption has
been rampant in the government. Persuasion to action by
the free use of money played a part when China severed
relations with Germany, and later in the negotiations of
1918 between China and Japan over loans and concessions,
the sale of arms and military conventions.
"China," says an American resident in Shantung, "the
land richest in natural resources, richest in territory, has
already become the power of heartless, militaristic Japan,
sold out to her by her own corrupt militaristic clique, sedu-
lously, incessantly solicited with Japanese gold."^
If Japan and other countries, in their war-propaganda,
in their political ambitions or through military necessity
and commercial advantages, have appealed to the baser in-
stincts of Chinese oflficialdom, and are to this degree blame-
worthy, the Chinese themselves must bear the blame for a
quick readiness to be enticed, and for the existing enslave-
ment that appalls the Chinese mind. Conservative officials
of the old-time regime, though prejudiced against foreign
innovations and the material improvements of the Western
world, were as a whole more upright, patriotic and public-
spirited than the new type of progressive officials. I regard
the crux of the question of China's permanency to rest
with this moral factor.
The China Press, an American paper in Shanghai, for
June 10, 1919, used these wor(?s:
First and foremost, if China is ever to rise out of her present
shameful condition, every one of her sons must be taught that
treason to his country is man's greatest crime. . . . The Peking
» Far-Eaatem FortnighUy, September 29, 1919.
210 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
officials have not only sold the wealth of the country, but they
have betrayed her integrity. The worst enemies of China are not
in Tokio but in Peking.
It is not political reform or any kind of superficial, ma-
terial reform that can save China in her present entangle-
ments; it must be a downright moral reform, it must be
I spiritual reformation. Here is a task for Christian mis-
sionaries; they have had their interlude of magnifying
I war, let them now revert to fundamental principles of the
1 religious consciousness. And the Chinese will respond. No
greater opportunity for appeal to the conscience, to reason,
to the sense of fairness, exists anywhere than among the
Chinese people. Their future is promising, if they with the
aid of foreigners build their new structure with righteous-
ness as the corner-stone.
J (2) China's future lies in the abandonment of militar-
istic methods and in the pursuit of peace and international
conciliation. If there is any one object which Americans,
and to a certain extent the Allied peoples, have proclaimed
to the world more than any other, it is the overthrow of
Prussian militarism. But men are learning gradually that
some other tag beside "Prussian" must be affixed to that
enemy of mankind, militarism. In reality the Allied na-
tions have been more keen on destroying the Prussian
species of the genus militarism than in destroying the genus
itself. It is recognized that the strongest Allied nation in
the Orient has been Japan, and that Japan is the prototype
both of militarism and oi its Prussian form. It must also
be recognized that Japan, Ijecause of her superiority in a
military way, has been accoided a permanent position in
the Supreme Council of the League of Nations as "one of
the five great Powers. " Is it anj wonder, then, that young
Chinese, fired with a new national spirit, should come to
believe that China, in order to be pieserved, must also be-
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 211
come military? Prof. John Dewey, writing of the con-
ditions in China after the war, says : ^
At present the militaristic faction whose power was confirmed
by the happenings of the summer of 1917 is still in control of the
government. . . . They have welcomed the demonstration offered
at Paris that Might still makes Right in the case of weak nations,
so that in a strange and subtle way the diplomatic victory of
Japan in particular and of imperialism in general has been a
vindication of their own anti-democratic and militaristic policy.
One of the younger class in China, a representative at
Paris of the Canton Government and of Christian adher-
ents, in a speech in New York City, July 25, 1919, spoke
these sensible words:
We hope our defeat will serve to arouse the sentiment of all
China, to the end that she will depend upon herself and that her
sorrow will be her national salvation. The war started as a
conflict of Right over Might, but I do not see that the end of the
war justifies that idea. Germany is crushed, but there is another
Germany in the Far East, and perhaps this will not be the last
war, for there surely will be another if justice is not done now.
It would have been better, so far as China is concerned,
if Americans and other democratic peoples, instead of con-
centrating their energies and hate on the overthrow of
Germany had fought for the overthrow of militarism and
had refused for any reason to give any countenance to it,
whether found in Germany, in Japan, or in the military
faction, the governing body of China. By the support given
to such a body of men in China by such nations as the
United States and Great Britain, and by China 's participa-
tion in the war and her advocacy of all kinds of war-meas-
ures, the view now held is that China, too, must build up
* The New Republic, September 10, 1919.
J
212 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
a strong army and navy, in order to find a place in the
family of nations, and perhaps later on become one of a
future Big Six in the Supreme Council of the world. But
this view is superficial. The craze for war and disbelief in
the power of ideas cannot last forever. Even the Covenant
of the League intimates a coming universal disarmament,
making a start with the Central Powers. Let the Chinese
consider how much greater the gain of their country would
have been, if they had remained at peace at home and
abroad and had pursued all peaceful pursuits. Their dire-
ful experiences from the war should make them turn away
from war in disgust, and forego hereafter the military am-
bition. That extreme lover of universal peace termed a
pacifist may be a fool in virile America, but he fits in well
to life in China, where the indigenous religion known as
Taoism teaches both pacifism and passive-ism.
Let it be borne in mind that if China should begin to
spend millions on a vast army and a strong navy as a dis-
tinctively national movement, the Japanese under existing
conditions would assume direction, or, in case of a navy,
would wait until it became a valuable prize and then cap-
ture it. Or, if China should join with Japan in a defensive
and offensive military alliance, the development of China's
military capacity under Japanese guidance would prove
the menace of the future and the opening of the next war.
Is this to be the result of the world's wisdom which arises
from the horrors of the last World War ? Are the Chinese
to continue to be infatuated by the war spirit and along
this line go to their doom?
(3) There are great possibilities for China if reunion is
brought about by the opposing governments centred in Pe-
king and Canton, and commonly designated as the North
and the South. The fourth revolution of China has been
going on for over three years. During the period of the
Great War no reconciliation was possible, for the military
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 213
autocratic Government at Peking was receiving the com-
mendation and recognition of all the Powers, and was
therefore in too sure a position to talk peace with the
"rebels" of the Canton Constitutional. Government. When
armistice was granted to the Central Powers and a Peace
Conference opened in Paris, another Peace Conference be-
gan in Shanghai between chosen representatives of the op-
posing factions. They met and discussed all manner of
questions, but came to no agreement. It looked as if this
Shanghai Peace Conference was a camouflage for the Al-
lied Powers so that no objection might be raised to China's
appearing at the Paris Peace Conference. When the Treaty
of Peace was signed at Versailles, the Peace Conference at
Shanghai took a vacation. When the President of China
proclaimed a state of peace with Germany, renewed efforts
were put forth to bring together China 's opposing factions.
At the outset the hindrances seemed too great. But Chinese
leaders should persist till civil strife has come to an end,
and China is again a united land as she was from July,
1916, to February, 1917, under the leadership of President
Li Yuan-hung.
Professor Jenks ^ says, quite correctly :
The Japanese policy in China has been, clearly, to keep con-
ditions unsettled by fomenting disturbances and hostilities be-
tween the so-called North and South factions, and to keep China
weak. This is not a matter of suspicion or careless observation
on the part of prejudiced Americans. It is a matter oflScially
known, reported upon and recorded in our State Department, and
supported by the overwhelming testimony of Chinese, American
and British officials both North and South who are fully con-
versant with the facts.
This task, then, set before the Chinese is an easy one as
compared with the attainment of even a modicum of their
* In North American Review, September, 1919.
214 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
aims at the Paris Peace Conference. The first thing is to
hold themselves aloof from Japanese blandishments as ex-
tended to either side in the civil strife, and to determine
that the Chinese must draw near to each other — an internal
entente cordiale — before they draw near to others, who
have State interests of their own. The second thing is for
the two factions to agree on a perfectly legitimate compro-
mise, vastly different from all the Paris compromises, that
both the old Parliament holding over at Canton and the
National Council peculiarly chosen for Peking alike dis-
solve themselves and that new members of the National
Parliament be elected according to the Regulations drawn
up under the Provisional Constitution and voted upon by
the old legitimate Parliament. Other divisive questions can
easily await the reconstructive period. The only fear is
that the Military Governors and their militaristic com-
rades, having had a taste of power and having felt the
glamour of gold, will put self ahead of nation. Even here,
appreciating as I do the moral substratum of Chinese char-
acter, I believe in the efficacy of persuasive argument when
brought to bear on the higher instincts of these same mili-
tary men.
(4) Another task set before the Chinese is to seek
friendly co-operation mth the Japanese, rather than to in-
tensify the spirit of alienation and antagonism in either
people. This is, of course, a double task, as great for Japan
as for China, but for the moment I emphasize China's part
in the laudable undertaking. That which makes it hard for
the Chinese to adopt this policy of reconciliation is the
plain fact that China has been woefully wronged by Japan
in these years of perilous association. Another hindrance
comes from the prevailing unwillingness among the strong
Powers to be reconciled to their own enemies in war. A
third obstacle comes from the atmosphere which the Chinese
. daily breathe from British and American environment in
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 215
China, that Japan is the wrongdoer, that Japan is the fu-
ture world-menace, that Japan must be fought sooner or
later, and that Japan cannot be trusted. Let me give two
or three illustrations.
At the end of May, 1919, the Peking Missionary Associa-
tion, composed of British and American missionaries,
passed a resolution to be dispatched to the Peace Confer-
ence, expressing in a most commendable spirit and in mod-
erate language **the deep disappointment and apprehension
caused in all the best sections of Chinese opinion" over the
Shantung settlement in the peace treaty. Where these mis-
sionaries erred was in their limited horizon. They saw
clearly how Japan should not gain at China's expense, but
they overlooked all the wrong which their own British and
American Governments had wrought upon China in days
gone by, especially during the period of the war, and their
backwardness to release to China powers and privileges ac-
corded Japan. I here quote from a letter written by an
American missionary in Shanghai :
The poor Japanese are now the Pariahs of Shanghai, They
are absolutely boycotted by Chinese and Americans, and many
of the English. So far as Shantung is concerned, I don't see the
justice of condoning the secret treaty of England, France and Co.,
giving Shantung to the Japs, then frothing at the mouth at Japan
for proposing to abide by the treaty. It is so funny to hear
English people out here blaming America and especially Wilson
for the Shantung tragedy. They have not one word of criticism
for England's giving away Shantung to Japan, but criticize
American weakness and Wilson's hypocrisy as the cause of the
debacle.
Another illustration is a Resolution of the Anglo-Amer-
ican Association in Peking, telegraphed to the New York
Times, June 7, 1919. The British and American Ministers
are reported as being present at the meeting. The Resolu-
216 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
tion is more strongly worded than that of the missionary
body. The implication is that the wrong and the danger
come from the gain which Japan acquires. This is true,
but what about English and American complicity ? I quote
a few sentences :
We express our solemn conviction that this decision will create
conditions that must inevitably bring about extreme discord be-
tween the Chinese people and Japan and raise a most serious
hindrance to the development of economic interests in China and
other countries . . . conditions, which are not only subversive
of the principle of national self-determination but also a denial
of the policy of the open door principle of equal opportunity will
greatly be accentuated, if Japan, a near neighbour, be now sub-
stituted for Germany, whose centre of political and economic
activities was on the other side of the globe.
The real question to put before men's consciences is this:
Why was not a call made to the home governments by
these good folk in Peking that England and America ap-
point a day of prayer and humiliation for their national
complicity in international wrongdoing? Moreover, was
it quite playing the game for the representatives of Eng-
land and America to pass censure on an Ally, when in war
and peace they were all supposed to be working together in
a holy cause and by the use of holy means ? As for China
it is her mistake and danger to concentrate all her wrath
on one nation.
A third illustration is found in the action in the month of
May, 1919, of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the
Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, who sent to
Peking a telegram, suggesting that an envoy be sent to
Tokio to negotiate for the return of Kiaochow, and that
friendly relations continue with Japan. This action
brought the wrath of the Chinese onto the heads of these
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 217
two men, for it was a time of intense excitement over the
decision of the Paris Conference.
My own conviction, looking at the facts as the/ are, is _
that the Chinese, while not grovelling in the dust to Japan, \
would do well not to stand aloof from a better understand- \
ing and rapprochement with Japan. Japan by the events
of war, fortunate for her though unfortunate for China
and, as will be seen, also for others, has acquired a pre-
dominant position in China. It is of no benefit to China 1
to increase the estrangement. She must exert herself to
cement the old bonds of friendship and to regain her rights
by direct approach to Japan. Sooner or later, this direct
negotiation will come about, and the Chinese might as well
conform gracefully.
The dilemma in which China is placed has been made
conspicuous by the offer of the Japanese Government, made
January, 1920, to negotiate with China as to the restoration
to China of the Kiaochow territory and the carrying into
effect of the Versailles treaty bearing on Shantung. The
general sentiment of the Chinese people as voiced by the
student class is to stand aloof from such direct negotiation.
At the same time no sign of relief, no cloud on the horizon
as large even as a man's hand, is anywhere to be seen. Hol-
lington K. Tong ^ while plainly opposed to direct negotia-
tions, presenting the argument for the other policy, says:
Another view taken by the pro-direct-negotiation Ministers is
that following its ratification by Germany and the principal Al-
lied Powers, the Treaty of Peace has come into force, and its
Shantung provision has likewise become effective. China is too
weak to oppose the Allies* arbitrary decision and the United
States has resumed her former " too-proud-to-fight " attitude and
taken up her hermit life once again, leaving European and
Asiatic affairs singularly alone, until possibly another world-wide
* Milla/rd'8 Review, January 31, 1920.
218 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
war menaces her own shores. In the meantime, Japan has pos-
sessed herself of all the German rights in Shantung and is not
disposed to relinquish them in China's favour although she is
willing to return an empty shell in the form of Kiaoehow by
negotiations. If her overtures for the restoration of Kiaoehow
were rejected, Japan would continue functioning in that territory
and might one day perpetuate her possession of it as she has done
in Korea.
It really comes down to one question: Acknowledging
that relief from other sources is futile, has the Chinese
Government such capable men today as to dare to meet
Japan in the contest of diplomacy with a prospect of suc-
cess, or at least with gain surpassing either an antagonistic
or passive and stationary attitude? I am confident that
while China may not gain all that she deserves by right,
she can gain more by direct negotiation than by reliance on
Powers which have evolved the Versailles treaty of peace.
What makes it doubly hard for calm-minded Chinese to
consent to a rapprochement to Japan is that Japan prior
to China's consent to enter on negotiations about ex-Ger-
man rights in Shantung, has begun to discuss the renewal
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Now such an Alliance,
which concerns Chinese affairs, is an offense to all public-
spirited Chinese, who have felt the glow of a new national
life. How inconsiderate, then, is the proposition of Dr.
Henry Van Dyke, made in Tokio, June 7, 1920, that the
United States join the Alliance? Do Americans realize
that China is still a treaty-making power, and that the
Chinese, remembering their glorious past, have sentiments
of national dignity which resent persistent humiliation
from others ? ^
(5) It is also desirable, as well as probable, that the
Chinese and Germans renew their old friendships. During
' See Appendix VI.
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 219
these past years of German enterprise, commercial, educa-
tional and religious, many Chinese have become good
friends of the Germans. During the war China's Allies
annoyed China more than China's enemies did. Prof.
John Dewey ^ has said, quite correctly :
The German nationals in China were upon the whole more
popular personally than those of any other country unless perhaps
those of the United States. For however arrogant Germany was
as a nation, Germans taken individually were sufficiently bent on
successful business to be unassuming, friendly and attentive to
native wishes and customs.
I regard it that a great opportunity lies before China in
renewing and improving the old relations with German
friends and with the German Government. It is very likely
that Germany will go much further than the Allied nations
or even the United States in granting China's expressed
desires for larger scope in the development of the Chinese
spirit and in the exercise of authority and control in af-
fairs political and economic. The Chinese, moreover, will
be quick to make amends for the personal and business in-
jury which they have done to Germans through compulsion
of zealous rivals.
Already, April 27, 1919, a presidential mandate was is-
sued from Peking that the citizens of nations having no
treaties with China, as newly-created nations, will be de-
nied the extra-territorial privileges foreigners have hitherto
enjoyed, and will be placed under Chinese law. They in
return will be granted residence, like the Chinese, away
from the circumscribed area of the treaty-ports. It is
within possibility that the new German Government will,
in the new treaty to be made with China, fall in with this
worthy desire of the Chinese to their mutual advantage.
* Xa The New Republic, September 10, 1919.
220 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
(6) China, moreover, must guard herself against any
attempt to break, in future, ties of friendship with any
nation. To be at peace with all the world produces a better
temper of mind than irritating ainmosity towards any par-
ticular nation. The diplomacy which China needs is that
of good-feeling. She can very well leave all hate and
rancour, all clamour and bitterness, to "outside nations."
She has enough territory and population to look after for
many a year, so that no need exists for again mixing in the
bewildering, complicated problems of the Western world.
With renewed devotion to Chinese interests, the Chinese
people of all classes will find it helpful to cultivate the in-
ternational mind, the cosmopolitan spirit, with no barriers
of sentiment, though barriers of boundaries must ever re-
main, each nation dwelling securely within its own ' ' bounds
of habitation."
(7) Whether China should favour a so-called interna-
tional consortium or not, I am not so sure as to speak posi-
tively. I am dubious of the scheme. In the first place it is
an exclusive scheme, much like the League of Nations.
Britain, France, the United States and Japan are the finan-
cial factors. In the second place it is an extraneous scheme.
China is not included, except in taking the terms of this
foreign combine. In the third place the group of bankers,
backed by their respective governments, may easily evolve
into a Debt Commission, controlling China's finances, and
then controlling China.
V If all the railways of China could be nationalized and
J brought into one system under direction of the Chinese
Government and aided by foreign experts, China would fare
better than under a scheme of internationalization.
Comparing China's indebtedness with that of other coun-
tries, she has an easy task in straightening out her financial
affairs. Let civil strife come to an end, and the nation be
united as one man, then in a few years by honest adminis-
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA 221
tration all debts may be paid off, concessions redeemed and
China made strong. China does not need foreign capital
for the development of her resources, until the time when
complete direction shall be in Chinese hands under Chinese
laws. Putnam Weale in his latest book ^ has given utter-
ance to these sentiments :
There should not have been a constant policy of frightening the
Chinese with visions of a Foreign Debt Bureau under foreign
control on the Egyptian-Turkish model. A real Chinese service
of the national debt, in place of the present semi-foreign pawn-
broking methods. A proper currency system, with token coins
and banknotes maintained at parity — these things would be far
more beneficial to the world at large than spheres of influence or
personal victories signalized by the appointment of favoured na-
tionals to sinecures.
The new President of China in an interview with Carl
W. Ackerman ^ gave the Chinese view of this question :
Some Western people hold the view that it would be a great
benefit to China if the railroads, present and prospective, could
be internationalized until such time as China could take full con-
trol of all the leased zones and concessions, and likewise be inter-
nationalized as a temporary measure. From the point of view
of China, however, a very different policy receives general in-
dorsement, namely, that, with the view of preserving her terri-
torial integrity, all railroads, leased zones and concessions should
revert to her absolute and complete control, internationalization
being unthought of.
(8) In a special way the Chinese should build up a
large merchant marine. The Government would do better
by helping the China Merchants Steamship Company or
the China Mail Company than by adding on more cruisers
» "Truth about China and Japan," p. 118.
* New York Times, January 17, 1919.
222 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
and torpedo-boats to be generously donated to neighbour
Japan sometime in the future. When I went to China in
1882, I had the pleasure of meeting the head of the China
Merchants Company, Tong King-Sing, one of the most pub-
lic-spirited and unselfish men that China has ever had. He
had just returned from a tour of Europe and the countries
of the Americas, with a view of extending trade and com-
munication along the ocean routes. At that time the
Chinese had more shipping than the Japanese. Since then
the Chinese have lagged behind, while Japan with astound-
ing energy has become one of the great shipping nations of
the world. The Chinese merchants still retain their skill,
industry and thrift. In the Philippine Islands they have
seven-tenths of all the trade. In the other islands of the
Pacific and along the Malay Peninsula the business mag-
nates as well as the little shopkeepers are Chinese. When
lecturing through the Philippines to Chinese audiences in
1918, I urged this duty upon them as one way to make
China strong. The ships plying along the coast of China,
or between China and the near trading neighbours, and,
later on, the far-away countries of the world, should be a
part of this new merchant marine of China. If Chinese
merchants and officials at home lack the enterprise, then
those who venture abroad and become successful — men
mostly from Amoy and Canton — should make the start in
this new line of business, raise capital and form companies,
and thus stimulate the whole Chinese Government to plans
of self -development, sure in the end to bring about true,
fully-evidenced self-determination and national indepen-
dence. The innate capacity of the mass of the Chinese
should make one hopeful as to the future of China.
These are a few suggestions as to China's relief from dis-
tress, which I humbly offer as one whose life interest centres
in that land of splendid record and great potentialities.
CHAPTER X
japan's future influence in china
From the facts narrated in the previous chapters the reader
is able to form his own judgment as to the future of Japan's
influence in China as made possible by events of the Great
War and the joint participation of China and Japan. I
only fear that, without further comment and the presenta-
tion of other facts, the judgment rendered may not be
wholly fair to Japan. It is only "impartial justice" that
can satisfy.
It is extremely hard to speak well of Japan, when one
considers what she has done in Korea and in China, par-
ticularly during the tragic days of war. But even an oppo-
nent or an enemy has his good points. Even a bad policy
gains its strength from the good that is in it. Misrepre-
sentation only succeeds because it appears in the garb of
truth.
Most modern writers on Sino-Japanese questions have
little that is good to say of Japan. I may cite Putnam
Weale, J. 0. P. Bland, Thomas F. Millard, Professor Jere-
miah W. Jenks, Millard's Review and the Far-Eastern Bu-
reau. The one writer who has evidently tried to be fair
all-around is Dr. Arthur J. Brown in his "Mastery of the
Far East."
Japan is manifestly placed at a disadvantage by one's
preconceptions as to China's losses and Japan's gains re-
sulting from the war. She is at further disadvantage
through many bad policies pursued through the war in
haste to make sure her future position. But Japan has also
adopted and tried to carry out many sound measures and
223
224 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
good ideas, joined as they are with an intense nationalism
and the growing imperativeness of self-preservation. I here
quote from Dr. Brown : ^
If one is to err at all, it is better to do so on the side of
charity, to magnify good qualities rather than to minimize them.
It is unreasonable to expect an Asiatic people to exemplify within
sixty years standards of Christian character and conduct which
Europe and America but imperfectly exemplify after fifteen hun-
dred years. The Japanese have many fine qualities. They have
also some grave defects. So have we. It is easy to pick out
flaws in any people under heaven, including our own.
This is fair talk emanating from a missionary Secretary.
One way to be fair to Japan is to divide with others the
responsibility for what has taken place in China, and to
share the blame for evident wrongs inflicted on China. This
I have tried to do. Here and there I have held accountable
Allied action, especially that of the British and American
Governments, and to a minor degree the military clique of
the Peking Government. I have had little occasion to blame
the action of the Central Powers, so far as China's well-
being has been affected during the period of war. Ger-
many has received her full quota of condemnation for what
she has done elsewhere. Above all, it is well to be reminded
that the decision reached at the Peace Conference was not
rendered by the Japanese delegate, but by the three chief
men sitting at the Peace Table, and that the German Gov-
ernment gave assent through unavoidable coercion. The re-
sponsibility of Japan and China consisted merely in pre-
senting their respective claims.
This effort or desire to discriminate may account for the
fact that I have been able to retain the friendship of many
Japanese, even when I have criticized Japanese treatment
* " Mastery of the Far East," p. 242.
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 225
of China. Mr. Kawakami rightly says:^ "If she [China]
singles out Japan and makes her the sole object of attack,
her purpose is obviously sinister."
Another element of fairness is to recognize the assump-
tion that as between Japan and all Western nations, the
former has a prior position in Eastern Asia, but as between
Japan and China the former has prior position in her own
bounds but not in the confines of China, not even in Man-
churia and Mongolia. Britain's obstruction to Japan's in-
roads into China is due, not to concern for China's interests
but solicitude for British interests. American suspicion of
Japan's motives must be traced to the future relations or
possible war between the two countries, not to a thought of
the destiny of China's national existence. No Japanese
resents criticism of Japan's conduct towards China, if it is
out of consideration, primarily, for China.
Again, the Japanese resent the assumption that Japan
must forego spheres of influence in China, while other na-
tions retain the same for themselves. Still more do they
resent the idea that Western nations, besides expanding on
other continents and even in large portions of Asia, have
also first place in China ; or on the other hand, that Japan
not only may be excluded from British colonies and the
countries of North, Central and South America, but has
no right to expand on the mainland of Eastern Asia.
Senator Phelan on October 16, 1919, said in the Senate,
"If she [Japan] must expand, then her expansion in Shan-
tung, by agreement with China, is more acceptable to us
than her expansion in America both North and South. ' ' It
is with the idea that Japan must be given scope somewhere,
that censure from other nations irritates Japanese suscepti-
bilities. So, too, the query arises as to why Americans
should seek to be greater than the Japanese in China and
Siberia, when they have the leadership in the New World,
Japan and World Peace," p. 155.
1 «
226 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
and now claim the privilege of joint decision in the affairs
of Europe. Is Japan to be content with a second place,
even in territory near to her own doors? Is world ambi-
tion suitable alone for Great Britain, France and the United
States?
Mr. Kawakami, referring to this idea, says : *
If she [China] proposes to discuss Japanese railway conces-
sions at the Peace Congress, why not also discuss more extensive
concessions granted to other Powers? While China's hands were
tied by the constant revolutionary uprisings in recent years, Rus-
sia and England steadily encroached upon Mongolia (1,300,000
square miles), and Tibet (500,000 square miles), and yet China
does not propose to bring this grave matter before the Peace
Congress.
Dr. Arthur J. Brown, who throws out the same idea,
says : ^ j
Some Americans talk as if they had a right to the control of
the Pacific. If they were familiar with the history of their own
country, they would know that the United States did not possess
a clear title to any territory bordering on the Pacific Ocean till
1846. Why should we regard our claim to the supremacy of the
Pacific as superior to that of nations which have occupied terri-
tory on that ocean for more than two thousand years? It may
be that the Japanese are over-ambitious and oflfensively self-
assertive. I suspect that they are and that we ourselves belong
in the same category.
One of the latest writers on the problems of Asia, Herbert
Adams Gibbons, writes with discrimination of Japan's pri-
ority in Eastern Asia. He says : ^
Japan has no aggressive intentions against America or Europe.
The ideas of Japan about the future of Asia and the islands of
» " Japan and World Peace," p. 157.
' " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 252.
• " The New Map of Asia," p. 476.
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 227
the Pacific form a different problem — a totally different problem.
If we expect that we Americans and Europeans are going to con-
tinue indefinitely to keep Asiatics out of our continents and out
of Africa as well and at the same time pretend in most places to
superior and in many places to equal rights, politically and com-
mercially, in Asia, we shall precipitate a great struggle that may
have its repercussions in our own hemisphere. The " Yellow
Peril " is far from imaginary so long as Europe asserts the right
to dominate and exploit Asia. But if we reconcile ourselves to
treating Asiatics equitably in their own continent (they do not
ask more than that!), we shall not need to prepare for " the next
war " with Japan.
Another factor is the feeling which Japanese naturally
have that for far-away nations to concern themselves with
what Japanese and Chinese have settled between them-
selves is an act of presumption, if not of out-and-out in-
terference.
What the peoples of the Western world must now take
into account is that as the result of the war, into which
Japan and China were invited to enter, Japan, as a matter
of fact, has now the position of predominance in Eastern
Asia. No Western nation, except through war, can dispos-
sess Japan. Western nations may feel chagrin at the
altered status of East and West, but they are reimbursed
by wider scope and larger power in other parts of the
earth's surface.
Dr. lyenaga has written : ^ —
Japan wants her position in the Far East recognized and
appreciated, and to her should be confided the maintenance of
peace and order there.
This fact of Japan's predominance, as I have said in
previous chapters, must be faced by the Chinese. So, too,
* New York Evening Post, Jime 30, 1917.
228 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
the Japanese may recognize the fact, but in the recognition
they do well to place a curb on their vanity and ambition,
lest in the use of this new power they work injury to China,
which in the end will prove a boomerang to themselves.
If Japan can only be wise, act decently, preserve moder-
ation, and become altruistic, considerate and helpful, she
and China can come together in bonds of spiritual alliance,
to their mutual advantage. The test for Japan is in her
attitude, not towards expansion, which is a legitimate am-
bition, but towards territorial aggrandizement. Instead of
following the example of Western nations and seizing
Chinese territory, will she help China to retain that which
is her own, and so become a benefactor ?
Enlightened Japanese, especially those who are the heads
of great mercantile houses, are fully conscious that the ter-
ritorial ambition has so aroused the resentment of the
Chinese that through strikes of student bodies and a boy-
cott of Japanese goods relentlessly and persistently adhered
to, Japan in a commercial way is a loser and in a moral way
is being disgraced in the estimation of the rest of the world.
Besides this propensity to get possession of that which is
another's, whether under the name of suzerainty, protec-
torate, colony or complete absorption, there are other phases
of influence to which Japan has as much right as other
nations.
The first form is commercial influence. This, of course,
is unobjectionable, so far as China is concerned, if so be it
is co-operative with China and repudiates the aid and in-
trusion of the Japanese Government. Mr. Kawakami, after
referring to Japan's necessity of finding "a field of activ-
ity" in Eastern Asia, says:^
With this in view, Japan is eager to convert herself into a
great industrial and commercial nation. If she fails in this at-
' " Japan and World Peace," pp. 163-166.
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 229
tempt, she must eventually perish from congestion, stagnation
and inanition. And in order to become a foremost industrial
nation she must have the essential materials of modern industry.
To her great disadvantage, Japan has little of such materials
in her own country. The volume of iron ores produced at home
is but a fraction of what Japan actually consumes. . . . That
is why Japan is anxious to secure mining concessions in China,
before China's mines and colleries, imutilized by herself, will be
all but mortgaged to Western nations — nations which have already
secured vast colonies in different parts of the world, and which
have plenty of raw materials and mineral supplies in their own
territories. . . .
For three years — from the fall of 1914 to the summer of
1917 — Japan's shipyards and iron-works were enabled to work
almost entirely with material furnished by steel mills in America.
But in July, 1917, the United States, too, declared an embargo
upon steel, and the activities of Japanese shipyards and iron-
works came suddenly to a halt. . . .
The American embargo intensified Japan's national desire, long
uppermost in the minds of her industrial leaders, for the inde-
pendence of her steel industry from foreign mills. . . . Unless
Japan succeeds in entering into a satisfactory agreement with
China for the further development of China's iron resources, her
industrial structure will never be placed upon a secure founda-
tion. . . .
Whether Japan succeeds in this attempt is not a question of
aggrandizement, but a question of life or death. With her grow-
ing population forbidden to seek opportunities in countries where
profitable employment awaits their toil, with her food products
inadequate to supply her own need, Japan must perforce become
an industrial country. Surely the Western nations, which have
agreed among themselves to exclude the Japanese from their own
territories will not conspire to block Japan's way in that part of
Eastern Asia where she seeks nothing more than the means of
self-preservation.
This reasoning is reasonable. It appeals to one's sense
of fair-play. If Japan, indeed, ** seeks nothing more than
230 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEf
the means of self-preservation," she will be sure of the
world's commendation, and China will no longer stand aloof
with a feeling of dread suspicion. As between the indus-
trial and commercial requirements of Japan and those of
all Western nations, Japan deserves sympathy even from
her many competitors. But when the profit is exclusively
Japan's, with China left destitute, or when China is being
exploited by Japan more than by all the other countries
put together, as seen in the contracts of 1918, then Japan's
reasonable claim for self-preservation is weakened by an
undue amount of self-assertiveness and voracious ambition.
Just a little self-restraint mixed with a little altruism will
safeguard the reputation of Japan.
Dr. Arthur J. Brown, referring to bad features of Jap-
anese commercialism, sums up the matter thus : *
Rebates, adulteration, evasion of customs, short weight, unfair
crushing of competitors and kindred methods are not so un-
familiar to Americans that they can consistently lift hands of
pious horror when they hear of them in Asia.
The next form of influence is political. This may, or may
not be a menace to China. There is no harm in Japanese,
as other nationals, exerting an influence on the political life
of China, but not for the purpose of weakening or destroy-
ing, or of absorbing China into the Japanese State, as Korea
has already been absorbed. The temptation of land-grab-
bing is so great that all influences which are political are
generally looked upon with disfavour — except in one's own
case. For China's sake, I appeal to the Japanese to set the
pace for other nations in right, praiseworthy treatment of
a neighbour's property, rights and jurisdiction. The con-
duct pursued by Japan during the war cannot but leave an
impression on Chinese and Europeans and Americans as
» " The Mastery of the Far East," p. 289.
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 231
being of a high-handed, grasping character, meaning some-
thing else than friendly co-operation or legitimate expan-
sion. Thus far, then, the Japanese are handicapped in the
estimate formed by public opinion.
Most Japanese writers, in the effort to defend the action
of their Government in reference to Shantung or to allay
the fears of critics concerning Japan's ultimate aims, are
prone to deny the political character of Japanese ambition.
This is, however, untrue to the facts, and an entirely un-
necessary argumentation for re-establishing the confidence
of their fellow-men. A nation that holds international re-
lations is of necessity actuated by political motives. Dr.
lyenaga is one who does not disclaim these motives, though
he seems to resent the political motives of others. He
writes : *
Let me say quite frankly that Japan will resent an attempt at
extending the political influence of the United States in China.
Our political interest in China is greater than yours. China is
closer to us. But there is no disposition on the part of Japan to
close the open door or to create inequalities in the terms on which
the United States may engage in Far Eastern trade.
Thus Americans, according to this opinion, may exert
commercial influence in China, but not political. Japanese
may exert both kinds of influence.
Mr. Kawakami also writes on the same matter : ^
To Americans, unable to understand Japan's singular position
in the Far East, it perhaps makes but little difference whether
China is dominated by England, Germany, France, Russia or
Japan. From the Japanese point of view it is different. With the
history of European diplomacy in the Near and Far East before
them, the Japanese cannot but shudder at thought of the day
when China shall be held fast in the grip of Western Powers.
* New York Evening Post, June 30, 1917.
» "Japan and the World Peace," p. 171.
232 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEt
With this prevalent feeling of intelligent Japanese I
have fullest sympathy. The Chinese, too, if they had been
treated with fair consideration, would undoubtedly have
gone so far in sympathetic approach as to favour even an
offensive and defensive alliance. This would have been po-
litical action of an extreme kind, but without detriment to
China, if arranged under proper conditions of equality and
practicality. There is far more reason that Japan have an
alliance with China than with Great Britain or Russia.
Miss La Motte, who is one writer who can see two sides to
this Oriental question, like Mr. Gibbons already cited,
says : ^
And the Japanese, facing race discrimination and exclusion
from most of the European countries, and many of their colonies,
as well as America, cannot afford to have China under European
control. It is a question of self-preservation.
Here the same word, self-preservation, is used as in the
writings of Mr. Kawakami. The word states what is su-
preme in Japanese thought.
The Outlook (of New York), while usually a supporter
of the Japanese side in the questions of the Far East, con-
demns the policy of ' ' political domination ' ' as compared to
"peaceful commercial penetration." It says: ^
The first of these would lead her to continue in the road which
she is now travelling. It would aim at a more or less complete
control of Chinese finances, both public and private, exclusive
concessions for the building of railways, the development of mines
and the erection of factories. . . . This programme is that of
many Japanese, for they learned their diplomacy from the preda-
tory policies of certain European governments in the last half of
the nineteenth century. Japan's ancient feudal system prepared
her for bureaucratic militarism. This policy of ruthless domina-
» " Peking Dust," p. 223.
■ The Outlook, May 14, 1919.
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 233
tion would, however, mean sorrow for China, turmoil for the
world and ultimate disaster for Japan.
Why this domination by Japan should mean "turmoil
for the world ' ' any more than domination insisted upon by
Western nations is hard to see. Whether it brings sorrow
or not to China depends on the degree of the domination,
which may supersede merely that of other nations or may
go further and take the place of Chinese rule on Chinese
soil. This latter seems to me most unlikely. Japan's po-
litical influence, in all probability, will stop short of actual
military occupation of the whole vast territory of China.
Should the Japanese Government continue its predatory
policy, in imitation of Western nations, then North China,
with the militaristic Peking Government, is likely to come
under the protectorate of Japan, but all South China will
secede from the present Government which is thus subservi-
ent to an alien nation, will form a real Republic, and become
a distinct nation, progressive, enlightened, democratic and
prosperous.
The third form of influence is moral. For any nation
to aspire to such influence is most commendable. It looks,
however, as if the Japanese were more ready to exert an
immoral influence on the Chinese people than a moral one.
It looks, too, as if the Japanese Government countenanced
the immoral conduct of its subjects, for the purpose of
weakening the stamina of the Chinese people. If the Jap-
anese Government really stands for morality in personal
life and honesty in public life, it must make quick use of
the strong arm of the law and put a check to the inroads
of immorality into China.
Two powerful and disastrous evils have been introduced
by the Japanese into those parts of China where they have
been exerting authority. The one is the social evil, the
other the morphine or drug evil. The former is not of the
234 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
degrading, repugnant, brothel type, but made glaring and
attractive, of the elegant, palace type. Vice is flaunted in
the eyes of the Chinese, and is too alluring to be resisted.
I quote from a late article on the condition in Shantung by
Dr. Arthur J. Brown : ^
Morally, oonditions have beeome distinctly worse imder
Japanese influence. The Chinese are far from being a moral
people, but vice was never so rampant in Shantung as it is now.
The social evil has a closer relation to Japanese officials than
among any other people of my acquaintance. When the Japanese
enter a country like China or Korea, they build houses of prosti-
tution just as they build court houses, post-offices and railway sta-
tions. They set aside sections for brothels, erect handsome build-
ings, provide them with music and electric lights, and make them
as attractive as any place in the city. Nor are retired locations
selected. An elaborately equipped vice district was opened last
winter in Tsinan-fu opposite one of the Mission compounds.
. . . A particularly embarrassing situation has developed at
Tsingtao. One of the early acts of the Japanese was to select a
spacious tract for a " red light " quarter and to put several blocks
of buildings upon it. The site chosen was close to the Presby-
terian Mission compound, with its residences and schools. . . .
Conditions substantially similar, although on a smaller scale, exist
in practically every Japanese colony in Shantung. Even where
the number of Japanese is very small it includes prostitutes.
The other vice, that of morphine, is equally a disgrace
to Japanese civilization and a menace to China far beyond
the opium menace of the British or the beer menace of the
Germans. I quote on this point from an English physician
in Tsinan-fu, as cited in Dr. Brown's article:
I know the wholesale debauchery of the Chinese that is going
on at our very doors in morphine shops and houses of ill-fame
opened and run by the Japanese. Since their seizure of Tsingtao
' Asia for September, 1919.
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 235
they have been transporting literally tens of thousands of eases
of morphine into China through this port, all of them labelled
" Government stores." These are received and distributed by
Japanese agents, with the result that hundreds and thousands of
Japanese " drug shops " and peddlers are taking this accursed
drug all over the country. . . . The methods in whieh this
morphia is being used are even more sinister. Every one of these
drug shops and most of these morphia peddlers possess one or
more hypodermic syringes, and for the matter of a few cash the
poor Chinaman gets an injection.
There is no palliation for either of these curses inflicted
on China. If the Japanese permitted them in their own
land, outsiders could not complain, but it becomes a scan-
dal, a complaint, a clear case of culpability, when the Jap-
anese, under the guise of military measures or in the name
of legitimate peaceful penetration, inflict upon China, al-
ready cursed enough, these two curses from Japan. The
Chinese may well rue the day when Japan first issued an
ultimatum to German Tsingtao, and at the call of England
drove out the Germans.
But the Japanese even here are not the sole offenders.
As to the social evil, notice the British municipal rule in
the "Model Settlement" of Shanghai, where thousands of
young Chinese girls, called "singing girls," throng the
busiest thoroughfares of the business section in the night-
hours, and ply their trade of song, amusement and lust.
As to the morphine habit, it takes the place of opium,
but vnth more fatal consequences, and, in fact, Japanese
morphia is the offspring of British Indian opium. The
Chinese in waging their gallant war against opium are to-
day beset by the hostile action of two strong Allies, Britain
and Japan. Now that British trade in opium directly with
China is forbidden, the indirect method is utilized. The
Japanese are the purveyors. In both opium and morphia
they act as agents through ports in China under Japanese
236 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
control. A correspondent to the British official organ in
Shanghai writes:^
The chief agency in the distribution of morphia in China is the
Japanese post-office. Morphia is imported by parcels post. . . .
A conservative estimate would place the amount of morphia im-
ported by the Japanese into China in the course of a year as
high as eighteen tons, and there is evidence that the amount is
steadily increasing. In South China morphia is sold by Chinese
peddlers, each of whom carries a passport certifying that he is
a native of the Island of Formosa and therefore entitled to
Japanese protection. . . . Through Tairen morphia circulates
throughout Manchuria and the province adjoining; through
Tsingtao morphia is distributed over Shantung province, Anhui
and Kiangsu, while from Formosa morphia is carried with opium
and other contraband by motor-driven fishing-boats to some point
on the mainland, from which it is distributed throughout the prov-
ince of Fukien and the north of Kuangtung. Everywhere it is
sold by Japanese under ex-territorial protection.
The same writer then shows Britain's part in the sale to
Japan of Indian opium:
In the Calcutta opium sales Japan has become one of the con-
siderable opium purchasers of Indian opium. She purchases for
Formosa, where the opium trade shows a steady growth and
where opium is required for the manufacture of morphia. Sold
by the Government of India [the British Government, remember],
this opium is exported under permits applied for by the Japanese
Government [another Government, please notice], is shipped to
Kobe and from Kobe is trans-shipped to Tsingtao. . . . It is
smuggled through Shantung into Shanghai and the Yangtsze
Valley. This opium is sold in Shanghai and the Yangtsze Valley.
This opium is sold in Shanghai at $500 [Mexican dollars] a
ball, forty balls to the chest, a total valuation of about $20,000
a chest. There is reason to believe that between January 1
• North China Herald, December 21, 1918.
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 237
and September 30, 1918, not less than 2,000 chests of opium
purchased in India were imported into Tsingtao through Kobe.
Upon this amount the Japanese authorities levy a tax, which does
not appear in the estimates, equivalent to 2,000,000 pounds ster-
ling. ... At both Dalny and Tsingtao these offices are wholly
under the control of the Japanese.
It is a matter of chagrin to right-minded Americans,
zealous for the good name of their country, that clandes-
tine trade in morphia has also heen carried on by Ameri-
cans, through connivance with Japanese. According to the
Japan Chronicle (English edited) 113,000 ounces of mor-
phia were shipped from the United States to Kobe for
trans-shipment to China in the first five months of 1919.
It is a criminal offense to ship this drug direct to China,
but not to Japan. The Covenant of the League of Nations,
however, enjoins on all members of the League to exercise
control over "the traffic in opium and other dangerous
drugs. ' ' Surely the American people are not willing to be
partners in drugging China with opium as used in its worst
form.
To be true to the facts, a great deal of opium has been
brought the last few years into Japan via Siberia from
Persia, the agents being a motley sort of traders, subject
to no law, though possessed of passports of different
governments.
The chief agents, however, in introducing morphia into
China are the Japanese, and the ports through which it
passes into Chinese territory are mostly those under control
of Japanese authorities.
It is shameful, unfortunate, unwise, that the Japanese
Government in collusion either with the Indian Government
or evil-minded Americans, should perpetuate, rather than
help to exterminate, this curse of China, opium and mor-
phia. Cannot the high-minded men of Japan, embued with
238 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
the great moral precepts of Eastern Religions, see how
much Japan as well as China is losing by these immoral
practices ? If the Japanese are friends to China, they must
at once put forth efforts, in conjunction with the best in
China, to drive out these vices which are sapping the life-
blood of the Chinese people.
It is clear, then, that Japan in her approach to China,
with a desire for closer and more cordial relationship, has
at the present crisis in world affairs certain distinct respon-
sibilities, as well as rights. Let me specify:
(1) Men of moral and religious conviction in Japan,
whether advocates of democracy or imperialism, must join
hands with kindred minds in China for the spiritual re-
juvenation of both these ancient nations of the Far East.
(2) The Japanese must abandon their harsh, high-
handed, intermeddling in China 's political affairs, and show
themselves sincerely friendly, helpful and fair. It is quite
possible that Japanese merchants, bankers, educationists
and reformers will insist on a saner policy of adaptation
and co-operation.
(3) How much greater the achievement, with permanent
advantage to both Japanese and Chinese, if the present
estrangement gives place to a fellowship based on restored
confidence.
(4) Japan is fitted to be the leader of Eastern Asia, but
her leadership will be null and void without a hearty, spon-
taneous following. The Chinese can be taught to follow,
but not ordered or bullied. A combination of the peoples of
Eastern Asia, under Japan's leadership, for their liberation
and uplift, seems to me a worthy object and not a terror to
the rest of mankind, but it can never be brought about,
unless Japan, its Government and people, reverse their pol-
icy of the past five years.
(5) Whether Japan ever adopts a republican form of
state does not matter, but it is good policy for her to en-
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 239
courage at home the spread of democratic ideas, which
means the rights of man, and to foster among other Asiatic
peoples the same liberalizing spirit, which can never be re-
strained for any length of time. Mr. Gibbons writes thus : ^
Internal signs of democratic evolution in Japan are encourag-
ing. If America and Europe make a sincere effort to form a
society of nations on the basis of equality, the growth of demo-
cratic feeling and liberalism in Japan will undoubtedly lead to
anti-militarism, A new era will open for the Far East — an era
of Korean autonomy, if not independence, and of reapproachment
between Japan and China. It behooves us to study carefully
recent events in Japan.
(6) If Japan, in these days of secret, selfish diplomacy,
acts with chivalry, and hands over to China the whole ter-
ritory of Kiaochow for Chinese administration, and not for
Japanese or for any international ex-territorial jurisdic-
tion; and if in addition she withdraws from the railway
and mining occupation in Shantung, for either German or
Chinese possession, she will establish herself in the affec-
tions of the Chinese and will assure herself a moral predom-
inance. Through the boycott raised by the Chinese against
the Japanese, the latter 's trade diminished 50 per cent. The
Chinese may have been mistaken in overlooking the com-
plicity of Western nations in war intrigues and in the peace
settlement, but they recognized clearly the main fa«t that
it was Japan's claims, successfully won, that brought shame
and danger to China.
The American Minister to China, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch,
on arriving in San Francisco, October 9, 1919, after resign-
ing from his official position, stated ^ that ' * Japan holds a
wonderful trump card if she will only play it, which is the
return to China of those things wrung from her by Ger-
* " The New Map of Asia," p. 477.
' The New York World, October 10, 1919.
240 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
many." The Japanese may not be likely to accept this
advice from one who assured the Chinese of aid against
Japan, but they can respond to these words of the Outlook :
The Japanese must win the confidence and friendship of the
Chinese. That they have not succeeded in doing. They have so
far been confronted by the almost unanimous distrust and hate
of their neighbours — an attitude which augurs ill for the future.
A necessary preliminary step would seem to be the voluntary re-
turn of Tsingtao to China, the cancellation of part or all of the
concessions wrung from her in 1915, the strict repression of
Japanese purveyors of morphine and all other predatory traders,
and a hearty willingness to co-operate with the Powers in any
joint attempt to rehabilitate China.
(7) The Japanese must treat the Chinese with respect,
not with contempt or superciliousness, which always nulli-
fies the best intentions. If the Chinese, under outrages re-
ceived, speak with anger of Japan, the Japanese have been
wont to look with condescension upon China. If the Jap-
anese, more advanced in Western knowledge, change their
attitude towards China, they will be met with hearty re-
sponse. In too many ways the Japanese have adopted the
worst features of Western civilization, so contrary to the
teachings of Buddhism and Confucianism, which entered
Japan from China. One of these bad qualities is the over-
bearing attitude in social and political intercourse. An
American who lives in Shantung, under date of July 23,
1919, writes : ^
The one thing noticeable to all foreigners in the Far East is
that the honeyed words of Japanese leaders, as to solicitude for
the welfare of China, inspired by their Government's cunning
press propaganda, are always at variance with the arrogant,
cynical, cruel, sinister Prussian policy of despoiling China — ^that
* Far-Eastern Fortnightly, September 29, 1919.
JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA 241
policy pushed relentlessly, and every day, with new and un-
dreamed-of aggressions and brutalities against the sovereignty of
the Chinese Government and the right of the Chinese people j
against their own persons, legitimate pursuits and their soil.
Personally I have not come in contact in China with this
class of Japanese, but the testimony of others as to the
repulsive side of Japanese life must be accepted as true.
A more favourable view of Japanese characteristics and
possibilities is given by an English writer, H. M. Hyndman.
These are his words : ^
That Japan should use the present terrible state of affairs in
Europe to impose upon the unwilling population of China —
possessing even by the admission of the highest Japanese states-
men qualities superior to their own — is a policy which ought to
be resisted as soon as possible, if the Chinese themselves desire
help against this aggression. The Japanese are not popular in
Asia, and their unpopularity has undoubtedly increased during
the past four years. On the other hand, whatever their differ-
ences may be, Asiatics understand one another at bottom far
better than they understand or trust or like Europeans or Ameri-
cans. This the United States is beginning to comprehend.
J. W. Robertson, a publicist in Tokio, recognizes that
whatever the difficulties, Japan is to be leader in Asia. He
sums up thus : ^
Japan in her best manifestations is the hope of Asia. Her
friends trust that she may be so guided as to be the light of
Asia. The great experiment in the adaptation of Western ideas
and methods to Eastern traditions and conditions must not fail.
That Japan shall succeed in her gallant attempt, for which she has
sacrificed so freely, is a great American, a great British, a great
world interest.
* " The Awakening of Asia," p. 155.
•New York Times, March 23, 1919.
242 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
The Great War has, indeed, enlarged the possibilities of
Japan in all Eastern Asia, especially in China, but her real
future, whether one of growing strength or one of decline,
will be determined by the way she abandons policies proved
by the war to be bad everywhere, by her readiness to sanc-
tify opportunity for purposes of the common good, and to
do to China as she would have China do to Japan.
I close with an extract of a Japanese writer, Mr. lehi-
hashi : ^
China is close at hand and possesses what Japan needs; there-
fore, a friendly attitude on the part of China is most earnestly
desired by Japan. . . . There is a set of foreign residents in
China who have inherited the old Occidental prejudice against
Orientals. These men think they would lose their monopolistic
power, be it commercial or racial, unless they fight Japan's activi-
ties in China. Another obstacle in the way of co-operation be-
tween Japan and China is the fact that in the past Japan has
made blunders in dealing with China. These have caused many
of the Chinese to lose confidence in the Japanese. Some actually
distrust them and still others fear Japan. Japan must acknowl-
edge her past blunders and endeavour to rectify them. . . .
When confidence has been restored between China and Japan
then the two nations can co-operate in the true sense of the word
with mutual benefit. Moreover, Japan should adopt some positive
measures of service for the benefit of the Chinese. Japan's
friendship must be substantiated.
* "The Industrial Plight of Japan," in Asia for September, 1919.
CHAPTER XI
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS IN CHINA
The relative influence of all nations in China, commercial,
financial, political and missionary, has been greatly changed
by the war. The elimination of German influence, whether
permanent or only temporary, has for the moment en-
hanced the already growing influence of Japan. The result
has been the supremacy of Japan in the Far East not only
over Germany, but over Great Britain, the United States,
France and Russia, all of whom connived at bringing about
the change, and also over China, who preferred to retain
the status quo. The movement set on foot by Westerners
to direct the animosity of the Chinese toward Japan, made
manifest in the greatest boycott of Japanese goods that
China has ever been able to carry out for a considerable
length of time with unflagging energy and unanimity, has
been the one factor to minimize Japanese influence. This
assault on Japan's influence has been almost as pleasing to
Western peoples as was the previous assault on German
influence. Whether Japan will retain her exclusive dom-
ination, or will have to yield to new conditions, and take an
equal place with the other great Powers; and whether
China, by the separate action of one nation or the joint
action of all, as in a big financial consortium, loses control
of her own affairs — becomes an Egypt, a Turkey, a Persia,
an India, a Korea or a Filipino subject nation — or
by the helpful, reformative influences of others is able to
regain sovereign rights and national autonomy as in past
centuries — these two things and many others must remain
conjecture. In previous chapters I have pointed out what
243
244 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
is probable or at least desirable as to China's permanency
and Japan's leadership.
As to the influence of Entente nations and of the United
States, it must be recognized that they are handicapped by
the wrong done to China at the Peace Table. As factors of
moral power they are far below their past record, which
has been none too good. By the decision reached at Paris,
the three nations, the United States, Great Britain and
France, have left on the Chinese mind a more unfavourable
impression than the two Central Powers. Herbert Adams
Gibbons touches on this supreme mistake of the victorious
Powers in the following language : ^
In the discussion and solution of no problem before the Con-
ference of Paris were the insincerity and bad faith of the great
powers more apparent than in the disposition of the Shantung
question. The facts of history were distorted, the principles for
which the Entente Powers and the United States declared they
had fought were ignored. The Powers showed their inability to
rise to the high level of international morality essential for the
creation of a society of nations. Instead of trying to lay the
foundations of a durable peace in the Far East, the statesmen
of the Entente Powers and the United States decided for the
continuation of a policy that has provoked several wars and given
rise to injustice and oppression. For the European Powers and
Japan, the solution proposed for the Shantung question was the
holding fast to traditions and practices of the past. For the
United States, it was the abandonment by our government of
the idealism and disinterestedness that for more than half a cen-
tury have characterized American diplomacy in the Far East.
The solution of the Shantung question incorporated in the Treaty
dictated to Germany is the triumph of the policy of economic
exploitation through political blackmail against which John Hay
and his predecessors in the American State Department struggled
with skill and a large measure of success.
» "The New Map of Asia," p. 385.
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 245
Briefly we may now consider the future prospects in
China of Western nations. As for Russia, China 's nearest
neighbour, her power has departed, though it will doubtless
return in future years. Japan in Siberia will be of more
concern to China than Russia in Siberia. Already the Jap-
anese, through many concessionary privileges from various
Russian leaders, have pre-empted the resourceful regions of
Eastern Siberia. Americans, striving as best they may, can
never outstrip the Japanese in those regions of Northern
Asia. Japan's position in Siberia is more assured than her
position in China. With the disappearance of Russian
influence, the Japanese have been laying plans for also
pre-empting the ground in Outer Mongolia and Northern
Manchuria. As yet the Chinese Eastern Railway running
across Northern Manchuria, and built by Russian capital,
has not been seized by Japan instead of controlled by China,
co-partner with Russia in the Railway Company. Harbin,
also, is still regarded as a Chinese-administered town, tak-
ing the place of Russian administration. Thus Japan's
only check in these regions is from China, not from West-
ern nations.
As for France, she is not eliminated as is Germany,
neither has she disappeared as a factor to be reckoned with
as Russia, but it will be some time before she can do more
than retain the railway concessions which she had before
the war. She will not have the capital, unless underwrit
by American capitalists, to develop new concessions, and
as for general trade she has never been so conspicuous as
even smaller nations, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and
Switzerland.
As for Italy, honoured as one of the Big Five for her
military power alone — a rather poor standard in the New
Era — she, too, from lack of capital will be of small account
in the international relations of China.
There remain, then, three Western peoples of strong eom-
246 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
mercial capacity, with an instinct for venturesome enter-
prise, whose future possibilities demand more minute con-
sideration, as an offset to the present predominating in-
fluence of Japan. These are British, Americans, Germans.
(1) First, then, British future influence in China.
Before the war no one outside nation was dominant in
China. But, clearly, Great Britain was predominant. By
calling for the intrusion of Japan, in order to oust Ger-
many, predominance passed to Japan. Should the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance continue, for political reasons, Japan's
predominance in China will not be greatly modified, much
less endangered, and China will then have to reckon with
a combined menace rather than a divided menace or a
menace of one. Should the Alliance be allowed simply to
terminate at the expiration of the Agreement — in 1921 —
then Japan will either seek, for her own safety, to draw
nearer to Russia, whatever the Government, and to Ger-
many, or will be isolated except as she succeeds in com-
bining the Orient against the Occident. While, then, a
section of the Japanese is anti-British and a very
large section of the British in China is anti-Jap-
anese, yet, politically, it may be expedient to both the
British and Japanese Governments to renew the Alliance.
In conjunction with this, the Japanese will not forego the
aspiration for predominance in China, and, as in 1916, they
made a separate alliance with Russia, so at a fitting time
they may form an alliance with China or with some other
Power of suitable potentialities.
In political influence the action of the British Govern-
ment in appealing to Japan to join her in the great strug-
gle, and the subsequent machinations with Japan to bring
China into the war, naturally leave an unfavourable im-
pression on the Chinese mind; but the British in China,
and especially the press propaganda, have had the requi-
site ingenuity to lead the Chinese to overlook Britain's
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 247
part, and to concentrate attention on Japan's part in the
varied complications to China.
A Britisher is still Inspector-General of Chinese Mari-
time Customs and another the head of the Salt Gabelle.
If Japan forges ahead, some Japanese will in a few years
legitimately supersede the British in these positions — un-
less competent Chinese are deemed worthy.
In a missionary way the British have exerted most benefi-
cent influence, and will continue so to do, and more and
more in hearty union with American missionaries — a noble
example of Anglo-American alliance. This combination
may be reckoned upon to resist any immoral or unjust in-
fluences coming from Japan.
In a commercial way the British will find more intense
competition from the Japanese and Americans than in
former years from Germans, Japanese and Americans.
The British, moreover, will be more efficient competitors
than in the past. England has commercial preparedness.
Isaac F. Marcosson has made special investigations of
England's preparedness for trade- war. He shows the great
changes, the new life, brought into the Board of Trade and
the new British Trade Corporation of which at the time
Sir Albert Stanley was sponsor. He says : ^
It would take a book to explain the entire trade exploitation
scheme of the Board of Trade. . . . England is giving many
evidences of her determination to take every possible leaf out of
the book of German efficiency. In the Board of Trade is a special
German department to study German newspapers and German
economic literature. A pet sponsorship of the Board of Trade
is the encouragement of organization of specific industries for the
foreign field. ... No undertaking is quite so significant or so
far-reaching in its effects as its establishment of an adequate com-
mercial intelligence department. . . . After the war the com-
mercial intelligence department will take over the staff of records
* Saturday Evening Post, January 26, 1918.
248 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
of the war trade intelligence and statistical departments. No ally
could be more powerful. . . . Meantime England is being con-
verted into a monster Trust.
The Far Eastern section of this mammoth Trust has been
going through the same course of thorough preparation.
A school in Chinese has been in operation for some four
years in Shanghai under the superintendence of a gifted
"Welsh missionary. Young men of the big English firms,
who might have been conscripted, were exempted, that they
might be lieutenants in the coming trade war. German
trade secrets, as well as the trade itself, have been zealously
seized, except where Japanese and Americans have come
in ahead. It is just possible that in attempting to trip up
the German merchants, the English merchants may them-
selves be tripped.
Francis H. Sisson, Vice-President of the Guaranty Trust
Company, after a visit to Europe, returned with a glowing
report of England's financial strength.^ He speaks of the
** returns from investments abroad and the receipts of
British-owned ocean carriers." England's "power of pro-
duction has been increased by about 50 per cent by the
speeding-up process induced by war needs." The follow-
ing summing-up is 'made by Mr. Sisson:
All in all, the outlook for industrial progress in England is
favourable. The manufacturing capacity of the country has been
greatly increased during the war. Even more notable have been
the improvements in port and warehouse facilities. Ships are
being turned out rapidly, and the British merchant marine still
exceeds in tonnage that of any other nation. A system of prefer-
ences which unites the various parts of the Empire commercially
more closely than ever before will give the vast colonial resources
a new significance for the development of British industry and
trade. . . . The recent removal of restrictions on the exporta-
tion of capital for investment will naturally result in an ex-
* Reported in New York Sun, October 19, 1919.
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 249
pansion of the export trade and a stimulation of domestic produc-
tion. Much depends upon the spirit and temper of a people.
Their record of achievements in industry and finance has amply
demonstrated the capacity of the English for doing big things in
a big way, and for meeting emergencies with the requisite energy
and ability.
Perhaps the only threatening drawback to this portrayal
is the overturn of the industrial system and commercial
enterprise by a big upheaval in the labour section of Brit-
ain's life, united with revolutionary schemes among other
peoples.
Comparatively speaking, Great Britain has come through
the war catastrophes more unscathed than other bellige-
rents, unless we except the United States. Moreover, she
is more ready than all others for world domination. * * The
British Empire has expanded from about 11,500,000 square
miles to about 15,000,000. The character of the British
control ranges from actual annexation to military occupa-
tion or political domination. ' ' ^
As a whole, and more than ever in the past, British
merchants have all the push which guarantees success.
They started early to reap every advantage possible from
the war situation. On the one hand, hardly had armistice
been declared, when British merchants in China brought
pressure to bear on the Chinese Government to carry into
effect, even when hostilities had ceased, the closure and
liquidation of all German firms. On the other hand, Brit-
ish merchants at home, as soon as the Treaty with Germany
was signed, hastened to renew such trade with Germany as
would be of profit to British interests. Thus an ^^nglish
newspaper report for August, 1919, reads:
The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, the
British India Steam Navigation Company, and the Well Line, will
* New York Independent, September 27, 1919.
250 CfilNA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
this month and onwards have steamers loading in Hamburg,
Bremen (if sufficient offers) and Rotterdam in connection with
their service to India.
Major Sanford Griffith of the Inter-Allied Commission
on Industrial Restitution, writing of British commercial
preparedness in Germany, and just as applicable to other
parts of the world, says : ^
The British have invested too heavily in German industries to
share the enthusiasm of French soldiers for further crippling
Germany. Substantial trade relations with Germany mean more
to the English than with any other country on the Continent, and
are a necessary preliminary to extended trade relations with
Russia.
Thus capturing German trade, the British outstrip all
others, including even Americans.
British merchants in China begin the new campaign with
certain peculiar advantages. They have long-established
firms, with branches at all the great centres of Asia and
Australasia. They are for the moment free of the German
competitor. In reputation for honourable and fair dealing
with the inhabitants of Asiatic countries, they hold a com-
manding position for inspiring confidence, if not always
affection, and need fear no comparison with their Japanese
rivals — or shall we call them Allies? It is evident that, in
a political and commercial way, for bringing about the
exploitation of China and other Asiatic countries. Great
Britain and Japan must reckon with each other.
(2) Next to be noticed is American influence in China.
When the Great War opened, and early began to entangle
China, Americans had a decided advantage over all others
for expanding their influence, in perfectly legitimate ways,
to the profit and security of China. Both the American
* The Qlohe, March 26, 1920.
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 251
Government and the American individual, through many
years of creditable conduct, were looked upon by Chinese
as the truest friends of China. The return of a part of the
Boxer indemnity for educational purposes evinced not only
a sense of justice on the part of the American Government,
but feelings of generosity in accord with the general sen-
timent of American people. Early in the Wilson Admin-
istration American bankers withdrew from the "Five-
Power Consortium," dominating loans to China, since the
Administration regarded that guarantees of security to
American bankers by the American Government rather
than by the Chinese Government were a form of interfer-
ence in China's political affairs. This action, criticized
by American bankers, made an impression on the Chinese
of America's regard for China's sovereign rights.
These advantages and opportunities were not properly
utilized by Americans in China, as the war waged far and
wide, and other nations were absorbed in plans near the
centres of conflict. Financially Americans were the only
ones able to make loans to China. The American banking
group of J. P. Morgan and others were bound not to act
separately from the original ''Five-Power Consortium."
Other bankers hesitated to make the venture, even from
motives of national prestige. When Chicago bankers stood
ready to make loans on proper security, they misunderstood
the Chinese situation by approaching the Chinese, not di-
rectly as welcomed business men, but through the American
Legation. Instead of open reference to Parliament, which
alone can sanction a loan and whose members would gladly
have favoured American advances in money, private or con-
fidential or secret negotiations were carried on with the
militaristic Premier, who afterwards fell under the spell
of Japanese financiers. As an amusing incident, when I
wrote in my Peking paper an article making inquiries as
to these mysterious conferences, just as I had previously
252 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
probed Japanese proposals in finance, I was placed before
the United States Court for China under charge of libelling
Paul S. Reinsch, the American Minister — a case, however,
which like two other charges never came to trial.
The Wilson Administration has since reversed its position
on "dollar diplomacy," and in 1920 assisted in forming
a larger consortium, with bigger groups of national bankers
from the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan.
This perpetuates the "special alliance" theory in the world
of finance.
While, financially, American bankers were losing their
golden opportunities in China all through the war, Jap-
anese bankers, financiers, merchants and diplomats were
quietly progressing, with even more than customary se-
crecy, to gain a dominant financial position in China, and
with this a political position.
Even greater, so it seems to me, and as is confirmed by
facts already described, was the failure of Americans to
use their outstanding influence to keep China in a state of
peace. Instead of this, American reputation was lowered
by the effort to induce China to sever relations with Ger-
many. Harm to America's good name has since developed
by the failure to make good the assurances of help which
were given by the American Minister to the Chinese Gov-
ernment. The expression of assuring words became an
expression of assuring friendship. But when at the Peace
Table, no American assistance was given to China, not even
by President Wilson, the high hopes of the Chinese re-
versed themselves into intense disappointment.
Prof. John Dewey, after personal investigation, sums
up the status of American influence in the following
language : ^
Our prior behaviour has left with many Chinese, especially
those who have not been in the United States, the impression that
'■ The New Republic, December 3, 1919.
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 253J
we are not, in our foreign dealings, a very practical people, that
we lack alertness, quickness of decision in emergencies, prompt-
ness of action and especially pei-sistence. We are thought of as,
upon the whole, a well-disposed people, but somewhat ineffectual
in action.
Hsu En-yuan, Vice-President of a new China-American
Bank, also says : ^
About once every five years American men of big business and
finance become interested in China, but this interest does not last.
Something always happens to frighten the bankers away. First
it is a change in political affairs at home; then international
politics is to blame; then, again, the business and financial repre-
sentatives sent to China become impatient at the delays and
intrigues always present in Chinese affairs, grow tired of the
interminable negotiations and go home.
On the whole, American men of enterprise have greater
opportunities in China than the British, but it looks at
present as if the British by well-laid plans going back sev-
eral years would outstrip Americans. Americans have also
a better chance than the Japanese, who through antipathy
aroused have been losing commercially, and yet it looks as
if a few years hence the Japanese, like the British, would
outstrip Americans.
Only by large schemes persistently adhered to can Amer-
ican merchants secure a first or even a second place in the
new form of competition. In opportunity America is first/
but not in achievement.^
America's influence in China has been retarded not only
by a mistaken policy, but by obstruction from associ-
» New York World, February 23, 1920.
' In securing the friendship of the Chinese people, the great gen-
erosity of the American public in the China famine more than makes
amends for the wrong done to China by the settlement of the
Versailles Treaty.
254 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
ates in war. During the war period it was almost a
crime for an American to criticize the Allies. Now that
war is over, and loyalty to truth may reassert itself, it is
well for Americans, who plan for influence in the Far East,
to know, on the basis of past conduct, just what help, if
any, American merchants may expect from our late asso-
ciates in arms. About the time the United States was
contemplating relief to the Entente Allies in Europe, these
same Allies stood in the way of American enterprise in
China. The greatest American syndicate, that of Siems-
Carey, was negotiating with the Chinese Government for
concessions in different parts of China. The French Lega-
tion objected to railway concessions thus negotiated in
South China; the British Legation objected to other rail-
way concessions in Central China; the Japanese Legation
objected to a conservancy concession along the Grand Canal,
in or near to Shantung, and the Russian Legation objected
to railway concessions in North China. Again, after hostil-
ities had ceased, when the secret arrangements of this same
syndicate with the Chinese Government had been made
public, like Chino-Japanese agreements, the British Min-
ister, learning that a concession had been granted for a
railway running south from Hangchow in the province of
Chekiang, at once hastened to the Chinese Foreign Office
and entered an emphatic protest.^
So far as experiences in China are concerned during
the period of the war, American enterprise met interference
not from Germans, but from the European Allies. What
may be expected in future is hard to say, but, in general,
co-operation with Germans will be no harder than with the
British or the French. As something idealistic, I recom-
mend the cultivation of friendship on the part of Amer-.
* A new illustration is the opposition of the British and
Japanese Governments to the Chinese desire to allow in China an
American wireless station.
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 255
icans with all peoples, the English of course, and also
others. t
In matters of ordinary trade Americans will still have
their opportunities, unaffected by Governmental policies.
Great corporations like the Standard Oil Company, the
British and American Tobacco Company (really an Eng-
lish-chartered concern), and Singer Sewing Machine Com-
pany, are bound to succeed by their wise methods of send-
ing agents and goods direct to the interior towns of China.
At the same time, the competition in all branches of trade
will be more acute than in former years.
In religious and educational enterprise Americans have
unique opportunities. Their fine record in the past is not
going to be upset by any misconceptions of American diplo-
macy, unless they advocate and support American policies
which are detrimental to China. Officially Americans have
lost greatly in China; in commerce and missions, particu-
larly the latter, Americans face a bright future. Between
British and American missionaries there is a close bond of
sympathy. They all wish well to the Chinese people, and
to the experiment of a Republic.
As a distinct matter for consideration is the annoyance
and opposition which American merchants, educationists
and missionaries have received from Japan. This has re-
ceived abundant testimony from Americans in Shantung
and the strong protest of different American organizations
in Shanghai and Peking. The preferential policy applied
in Manchuria before the war has been accentuated during
the prosecution of the war. The clash that has come be-
tween Japanese ambition and the interests of all others, in-
cluding the Chinese, is not surprising, considering the
engrossing cares of war assumed by Europeans and Amer-
icans. One slight benefit apt to arise is that the victorious
nations may now be convinced that the displacement of
Germany by Japan has resulted in no good, but in decided
256 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
harm. The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai
thus repeats the growing sentiment of intelligent Chinese:
Germany's control in Shantung province, while irksome, had
nothing of the present effect, because Germany was on the other
side of the world, and the weight of the iron hand in China was
light.
As to restrictions placed on American enterprise by the
Japanese, Charles Hodges writes : ^
American trade, confronted by Japanese competition over the
Pacific markets, is face to face with the most highly co-ordinated
government-backed business in the world.
And again:
The American business world must realize that their trade with
China is jeopardized wherever the Japanese secure a foothold, be
it only " economic rights " or a leasehold.
And again:
That is the whole meaning of Japan's determination to duplicate
in Shantung the grip she has gotten on Manchuria — a grip which
is constantly tightened against American interests in the regions
affected. Japan is a business adversary of ours; she will not be
swerved from this objective unless she is forced to abandon this
scheme to bind the Far East economically to Japan's political
enda.
(3) Lastly I consider the future influence of Germans
in China.
Any other people except the Germans, called upon to
face such world-wide and multifarious restraints as the
Versailles Treaty of Peace has imposed on Germany, would
' The Far-Eastern Fortnightly, September 1, 1919.
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS 257
lose heart. The difficulties which beset the Chinese are as
nothing in comparison. The complete eradication of Ger-
man business and the liquidation of German property
everywhere throughout the world, except in a few neutral
countries, is the most amazing performance ever sanctioned
by professed adherents of high moral aims. I recognize
the desirability of overthrowing the military machine and
the absolute authority that existed in Germany, or that
exists among other peoples, but I candidly confess I see
no justice in the attempt to destroy Germany, Austria and
Hungary, industrially, economically and commercially.
H. W. Massingham has stated the case in all the intensity
of an aroused English conscience. I quote his words : *
Is it a legitimate use of military success in modern Europe
for one Power to pile up against another a series of perquisitions,
requisitions and inquisitions which deprive her of millions of
people of her blood and soil, of about half her coal supply and
three parts of her iron ore, of all her greater ocean-going marine,
of her colonies, of her foreign treaty rights and concessions, of
free use of her railways, free disposal of her industrial products,
and the effectual right of taxation, which destroy her power to
save and limit her power to work? Who gave this jurisdiction
of life and death? What conception of the civilized and the
moral order does it advance? . . . Under the rule of Paris Ger-
many surrendered every absolute political right of nationhood,
including the deep underlying human right of self-respect. . . .
Within the period of the treaty she ceases to be self-determined.
As for myself, I do not write of the barriers to German
rehabilitation at home, but limit myself to the combined
movement to eject from China, German enterprise, com-
mercial, educational and religious, for generations to come.
It cannot be done. Men 's consciences will protest sooner or
later. For the best interests of the victors, for the welfare
' In The Nation of New York, May 24, 1919.
258 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
of the Chinese, a welcome must yet be given to those so
suddenly and unjustly repatriated. It is cowardice for
great Powers like the United States, the British Empire,
the French Republic and the Empire of the Mikado, to
call for the annihilation of German enterprise, initiative
and eflficiency, along with disarmament and the overthrow
of the Monarchy. Seventy millions of people who held out
for more than four years against the strongest military
combination the world had ever known cannot be kept
within a vacuum.
William G. Shepherd, under date of August 25, 1919,
writes thus to the New York Evening Post from The Hague :
However one looks at matters in Germany, it appears, at this
close range, that the German commercial firms, so far as within
them lies, are doing more to set the sails of their business prop-
erly than are the business men of any of the other European
countries.
Under date of August 28 the same correspondent writes :
In her purchasing, Germany is using a coin that no other
nation seems to be employing. She is paying for what she buys
in the coin of work.
What, then, is possible for German enterprise in the Far
East in the near future?
(a) The Chinese are going to receive back their German
friends. If the heads of the great German hongs come
back empty-handed, the Chinese compradores who have as-
sociated with them, and other Chinese merchants who have
become rich through German business connections, will
advance the capital and provide the rooms for re-starting
business. The Chinese merchant is noted for his apprecia-
tion of kind deeds and true friendship.
(b) The Japanese will also seek to make amends for the
THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS ^59
hardships thrust on the Germans in their midst. Commer-
cially, the Japanese will link hands with the Germans, if
not by ocean routes, then across the land route of Eastern
Europe and Northern Asia. If the English P. and 0. and
the Glen Line refuse to carry goods between Hamburg and
Shanghai, then the Nippon Yusen Kaisha or some new line
of steamships will seize the opportunity and facilitate
communication.
(c) German business men are not going to be withheld
from Russian Europe and Russian Siberia at the mere be-
hest of old-time enemies. To use one's genius in check-
mating German enterprise in Eastern Europe, as in West-
ern, will not long succeed. Every people have a right to
trade somewhere on God's earth. German business capac-
ity is needed in Russia. The advance in that direction fol-
lows a natural law. In due time German and Japanese
enterprise will meet somewhere in Russian Siberia.
(d) A better spirit will yet come to British and French
and American capitalists — who are of necessity interna-
tionalists — and they, as of yore, will again hold dealings
with the great minds of Germany and Austria, who take
big views of big projects along lines of concordant action
and mutual well-being. Dr. Alonzo E. Taylor before the
American Manufacturers Export Association in the month
of October (1919), after serving on the Economic Council
of Allies, said:
Every one now realizes that if Germany is ever to pay the bill
she must be allowed to be a going concern. If England, France
and Italy want that reparation they have got to help her to earn
it. In these circumstances talk of paralysing German industry
is idle.
I know how far the Powers, great and small, were ready
to go in the punitive spirit towards China after the Boxer
260 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
cataclysm of 1900, and I know how a better spirit of for-
giveness, conciliation and goodwill at last prevailed among
all the nations in contact with China. This better spirit
will reassert itself before many days have passed after the
five defeated nations have duly signed their doom. Retali-
ation is not a single-handed force, but reciprocal. Its ad-
vance is that of geometrical progression. Its presence is
persona non grata to lasting peace.
The natural relationship before the war in both trade
and missions in China and elsewhere was that between
Britons, Americans and Germans. To re-unite on this basis
will still be for the good of them all.
Should Germany be excluded from this natural fellow-
ship, she must then turn elsewhere, and that means to
Russia and Japan.
The hope of the world is in cultivated fellowship among
all peoples, allowing to each its fullest development, no
people infringing on the rights of another. Thus may
peace be lasting. Thus will China be secure. Thus will
Japan be satisfied. Thus will the dread of a second war,
arising in the Pacific, pass from the mind, and men every-
where may give themselves to the occupations of peace,
charity and justice.
" Peace calls to man to follow her henceforth forever,
In brotherhood that binds all lands and tribes,
Peace never was the Child of War.
But was before War was,
And shall be after it,
Reigning triumphant down the happy years
Around the globe." ^
* James Harcourt West.
CHAPTER XII
VITAL PRINCIPLES VERSUS SPOLIATION
During the period of the World War, President Wilson
announced many great principles, eternal verities, which
can be gainsaid by no one. Greatest approval has come
from peoples the world over who are most oppressed. Men's
conceptions have for once been idealized. January 8, 1918,
the President enunciated his Fourteen Points, four of which
were of general application. July 4, 1918, he enunciated
four factors of world peace to take the place of World War.
September 27, 1918, he enunciated five requisites of per-
manent peace, and also five issues of the war, all of a highly
moral character. There is no trouble with the principles.
Having dwelt on the political problems in China and on
plans of reconstruction for China amid her war-entangle-
ments; and having stated a large number of facts and
shown their bearing on China, it is now possible to deduce
a few principles that pertain to China's political future
and to her relations with the rest of the world. Whether
she is to be captive or free, independent or with no longer
a national entity, is still unknown. Much depends on an
appreciation of all the facts, on a true perspective to be
formed in the mind, and on adherence to correct and well-
tested principles. The author in his statement of things as
they are, holds to certain definite opinions, which may al-
most be called convictions, and which are here outlined as
guiding principles. These principles issue forth from a
knowledge of the facts already recounted, and are the out-
come of actual experience. There are ten specifications of
principles which bear particularly on China.
^(1) The first may be stated thus: The war as fought in
261
262 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
Europe, in Africa, in Asia, on land and on all the seas,
should have been, as professed, supremely a war for prin-
ciple rather than a war to subjugate particular nations.
Still more docs this necessity exist in re-establishing a world
peace. By concentrating animosity on some one people,
good and evil have been marked off according to territorial
boundaries. Good men in enemy nations are condemned
with the bad, while bad men and bad policies among our
Allies or in ourselves are condoned. If the United States
had lead the way in siding with Right wherever found,
and opposing Wrong wherever found, the sound ideas of
President Wilson, who spoke for the best everywhere, would
have had better chance of being effected.
Loyalty, for example, has been gauged by the degree of
one's hatred to the "enemy," whether combatant or non-
combatant, at home or abroad, rather than by devotion to
those principles which are formulated in the National Con-
stitution, and in the sacred traditions of the past, and which
change not in war or peace. Too much has it been taken
for granted that he is the best patriot who hurls tirades
at other peoples, rather than the one who aims to live out
in daily life the truest and best in his own country as in
all humanity.
Suppose, again, that the supreme motive had been the
overthrow of militarism, or the war spirit, wherever found,
how would it have been possible for liberty-loving Ameri-
cans, Englishmen and Frenchmen, to countenance the mili-
tarism of Japan or the military autocrats of the Chinese
Government ? How possible to form plans in our own Gov-
ernments for military and naval expansion? The Bishop
of Oxford, addressing the clergy of Boston, uttered these
words of sober counsel :
I am always dreadfully afraid of the intoxicating power of
militarism, I know what it means, . . . Are we in no danger
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 263
of militarism? I can conceive of no disaster comparable with
this — that we should win a great victory and be able to dictate
to the military autocracy of Germany a peace the most desirable
that we could imagine; that we should have them under our feet,
defeated before all Europe, and that then we should return to our
several countries, ourselves having imbibed that very disease from
which we were seeking to deliver the world.
And suppose that China catches the disease, will it be
good for mankind, an aid to Righteousness ?
It is currently reported that when Viscount Ishii as Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs at the close of 1915, was approached
by Great Britain, France and Russia to join with them in
urging China to enter the war, he said ^ that Japan could
not view without uneasiness "a moral awakening of 400,-
000,000 Chinese, ' ' that is, along military lines. Whether he
used these exact words or not, and whatever his own as-
sumption, I agree that it was no child's play to arouse the
vast Chinese population to such form of moral awakening
as was contemplated by an ambition for feats of arms.
I give one other illustration. Suppose that the supreme
object of the war had really been to overthrow autocracy,
and to make the world safe for democracy. A greater re-
sult would have been achieved by applying the purpose to
all peoples than by a sole desire to overthrow the consti-
tutional Government of Germany or to bring about the dis-
memberment of Austria-Hungary. As a matter of fact
under modern forms of government and with the growing
impact of liberalism, the autocracy of any one ruler has
been made impossible, whether with the Kaisers of Germany
and Austria-Hungary, the Tsar of all the Russias, the
Mikado of Japan, or even the Sultan of Turkey. It is very-
much to be doubted whether it will be better to encourage
the overthrow of enemy Governments and the upheavals of
revolution than to work together for the maintenance of
* Professor Jenks in North American Review, September, 1919,
264' CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
law and order under the natural development of the demo-
cratic spirit. The evil to be uprooted is the autocratic
spirit wherever found, whether in a mob or in a monarch,
in an Emperor or a bureaucrat. The essential idea of de-
mocracy is human freedom. Under this spirit how would
it have been possible for the democratic Governments of the
world to have accorded highest honour, not to the demo-
cratic aspirations of Young China, but to Japan with its
repressions in Korea and its coercions in China? How,
too, would it have been possible to give support to the
Military Governors of China, mostly a group of provincial
autocrats, or to the military Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui,
most autocratic of them all, and at the same time to refuse
a modicum of praise for Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Dr. Wu Ting-
fang, Mr. Tang Shao-yi and all the supporters of the dem-
ocratic, constitutional, parliamentary Government centred
at Canton? What controlled diplomatic action was only
this: "Whosoever joins with us in fighting the Germans
is a true friend and a worthy ally." The question of ad-
vancing democratic ideas in either Japan or China or of
helping the democratic form of government in China was
of minor consideration. If, on the other hand, the main
thought had been to safeguard the Republic of China, no
encouragement would have been given to embroiling China
in the war, and in all probability the result would have
been a firmly-established Republic in the Orient.
The great moral mistake in all of these matters has been
that along with wide profession of fine principles there has
been a proneness to make use of those methods and to nour-
ish that spirit which were condemned in our late enemies.
The war gospel has been this : Cast out devils 1 y Beelzebub.
But St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, after itemizing
the sins of the Gentiles, made special application to his own
people ; he asked of them this question : * ' Thou that makest
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 265
thy boast of the law, through breaking of the law dishon-
ourest thou God?"
(2) It is essential to bear in mind that since November
11, 1918, the victorious nations should have been striving
to make peace, and to do this they should have placed fore-
most the inner spirit of peace. Back of all peace is con-
ciliation. Failure to reconcile, no matter which side is at
fault, means a failure to make peace. There may be peace-
terms but no peace spirit. The breathing of hate and the
pronunciamento of fierce anathemas may be of the very
nature of war and military necessity, but they have no
place in a world of peace within the limits of widespread
and lasting conciliation. "To conquer with arms," said
President Wilson, addressing Congress on armistice day,
"is to make only a temporary conquest; to conquer the
world by earning its esteem is to make permanent con-
quest. I am confident that the nations that have learned
the discipline of freedom and that have settled with self-
possession to its ordered practice are now about to make
conquest of the world by the power of example and friendly
helpfulness. ' '
But what do we find? Not so much that a dozen wars
are being waged after the signing of the Treaty of Peace,
but that leaders of political thought and guides of the
Church continue to endorse or inoculate the old war phrase-
ology of hate and enmity. Worse than general unrest, yea,
that which breeds this unrest, is unholy, un-Christian,
unwise adherence to the war spirit. To love peace is to
have peace. The whole temper of mind, the very phrases
one uses, all need to be changed and sanctified.
So contrary to the true spirit of peace, of conciliation,
and "friendly helpfulness," is that which has occurred in
China since the declaration of armistice, very largely under
British initiative. And these Britons were mostly Chris-
266 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREEt
tians, with a few Jews; none of them were Buddhists, not
even Moslems. I confess that even in wartime I have failed
to see the reason, the duty, or the pleasure, out there in
China, to vent wrath on the Germans, whose friendship we
all had prized in former days. How much less jBtting was
any such uncharitableness, when once war had terminated.
So far as life in China was concerned, war had terminated
November 7, 1914, when all the German combatants became
prisoners of war to Japan. To illustrate my point, I take
the liberty of quoting from a private letter, dated August
23, 1919, written from Shanghai by a devoted Christian :
I never shall forget the events following the signing of the
armistice. In my ignorance I supposed that there would be a
cessation of petty hostilities here in Shanghai. But it was only
the beginning. There was a big victory procession ending with
the burning of the Kaiser and other notables, after they had
" kotowed " to the Allies. This will give you a key as to the
parade itself, which did not please any Chinese with whom I
spoke. " I thought it would be a Peace parade," said one Chinese,
" but it was only a Hate parade." I had arranged Christmas
decoration for my house with letters of evergreen across the upper
veranda, " On earth, peace, good-will to men." But there wasn't
any peace in Shanghai and there wasn't any good-will. I was
ashamed. Almost at once, and with very short warning, the Ger-
mans were evicted from their houses unless they were living in
houses owned by neutrals or Chinese. Being winter time, this
worked great hardship. Next came the cutting off of telephones
for Germans. This also worked hardship, especially for the
Paulun Hospital and German doctors. The German School,
including its apparatus, was confiscated, and then soon com-
menced the deportation of the Germans. To me the saddest thing
about that was the gusto, the lack of sympathy, the evident enjoy-
ment of their humiliation shown by the foreign community and
even by the missionaries. In some eases the proceedings seemed
to me very stern. A large number of old Shanghai residents
(German) were given less than twenty-four hours' notice to get
•' VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 267
ready to leave. A tragic procession of about a thousand were
passing along the bund on a Sunday morning during divine
service. The Te Deum was chanted and the thanksgiving Psalms.
No word of prayer for our enemies, now vanquished.
There were two incidents that made a deep impression on me.
One was the repatriation of the German pastor's family. They
have two darling little children. The little four-year-old child
could not understand why they had to leave their pretty home
and why her mother was crying. She was told it was because of
the English. " Mother," she asked, " do the English know any-
thing about our God, the dear Lord Jesus?" At the church,
where they had last been stopping, they were hurriedly getting
their packages of condensed milk, water, bedding, etc., ready,
while the pastor was trying to make arrangement disposing of
the church services and other matters. And so they were not off
the place by 8:30 a.m. (though the prison-boat was not to sail
till the next day). Soon came a batch of Shanghai Volunteers
dressed in Scotch Highland fashion, armed with swords and
rifles, and followed by the foreign police. The little children
looked up so wonderingly at these big Englishmen all ready to
bind and carry away their father, the gentle pastor. The Volun-
teers looked ashamed and ill at ease.
The other incident was of a lady, daughter of an American
missionary. She was ill with influenza and the physician had
advised against her sailing, but she refused to leave her husband.
He had also been exempted by the Chinese, who alone were
responsible for the repatriation. But the Municipal Chief of
Police, English, said if he was not out of the house within two
hours the Volunteers would carry bim to the ship. On receiving
the information he expressed his hatred of us Shanghai Allies.
His intensity was frightful. I could not really blame him, as I
realized that his properties were to be confiscated and auctioned
off and he and his wife allowed to take home about three hundred
taels (ounces of silver) apiece. He had been very wealthy and
had a luxurious home. When I multiplied his hate by that of
about 60,000,000 Germans, and that of Frenchmen, Belgians,
Americans, Austrians and countless others, I was overwhelmed by
the thought of the hate of the world.
268 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
All this, remember, after the deeds and demands of war,
when world peace is to be re-established. All this in Far
Cathay, under British administration, in the sight of dis-
cerning Chinese.
As a word of hope comes the news from the very centre
of the war in Europe that a Franco-German Association is
being formed to aflSrm before the world the ardent desire
for international peace by means of mutual reconciliation,
rallying to the cry of "War against hate! War against
war! Live peace and brotherhood among the peoples!"
May this vision of holy prophets become the vision of suf-
fering and oppressed Asia, as well as of distracted Europe.
(3) Correct conceptions of the situation in Eastern Asia
must be free from preconceptions based on the situation in
Europe. It is impossible to get a true perspective of con-
ditions in the Far East, if the eye looks merely on condi-
tions in Europe or America. Observation true to the facts
must be all-around, and, as far as possible, free from the
bewilderment of passion. There must be poise of judg-
ment. It is only natural to have misconception of the
doings and inter-relations of the Chinese on the one side,
and of all other peoples, Western or Japanese, on the other,
if there is already a preconception either for or against
some particular people as shaped by bias incident to war-
fare in Europe or on the high seas. Preconception breeds
misconception. Animosity to German ways of waging war
has caused many an American, otherwise fair-minded, to
conclude ipso facto that everything done by Germans in
China has been bad and that their extinction ought to be
viewed with favour by Chinese and by every one else. So,
too, prejudice directed against Japan may lead one to over-
look all the misdeeds of the Allies and the United States as
perpetrated, somewhat under cover, in both China and
Japan. To understand the situation, to appreciate the
wrongs done to China and by whom, both in war and at the
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 269
Peace Table, it is all-important that all predilections — ^the
pro and anti spirit — be shaken off, leaving the mind in a
state of clarity and unruffled judiciousness.
One of President Wilson's axiomatic truths is this: "The
impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination
between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom
we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays
no favourites and knows no standard but the equal rights
of the several peoples concerned. ' ' No doubt the President
was thinking particularly of the Germans as "those to
whom we do not wish to be just. " As to the Far East, the
Pacific, and America's Oriental problems, he would prob-
ably include the Japanese in the same category. As for
myself, I desire to be just to all, to the Germans as well
as to my kin of Scotland and England, to the Japanese as
well as to the Chinese people, whose interests I have tried
to serve.
Americans — and I mention no others — can never grasp
the intricate problem of the Far East if they continue to
read into the study the bugaboo of pro-Germanism or the
agitation of anti-Japanese-ism, or the war criterion of pro-
Ally or anti-Ally. The war is over, the muzzle is off, let
all men see the nations, the Governments, the diplomats,
as they really are.
Already surprise and chagrin have come to Americans
and Chinese by the disclosures of the Allied connivance
with Japan to deal with China as they saw fit, unknown to
both the Chinese and Americans. Other disclosures which
have been made in these pages may possibly have displeased
those whose minds are already made up, or have passed
judgment before trying the case. But truths sometimes
hurt as well as soothe.
The conduct of the two groups of warring nations in
their dealings may be stated thus : With China the princi-
ples as proclaimed by President Wilson have been better
270 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
adhered to in China by the officials and subjects of the two
Central Powers than by the European Allies, by Japan, or
even by America. Or it may be stated thus : The policy and
conduct of the Allied group in China has been very nearly
the reverse of what they professed in Europe.
(4) A very simple rule is this : Know the facts, the more
the better, and accept the truth as derived from facts. This
is inductive philosophy as applied to search for truth.
" Truth, crushed to earth, shall rise again,
The eternal years of God are hers,
But Error, wounded, writhes with pain.
And dies among his worshippers."
One of the great injuries wrought by war of any kind
is the subjection of the moral to the military, as seen in the
compulsion, oftentimes legislative, and largely executive,
for misrepresenting the facts, for hiding the truth, for mis-
construing the aims, speech and conduct of those abroad
who are foes in war and those at hf)me who dare to disagree
and criticize.
It will take many a year to know the real situation of
the European nations prior to the war and during the war.
As to the real intent of the Japanese, the real heart of the
Chinese, and the real doings of Allies and Americans in
China, much light has been thrown by public discussion,
but even yet fallacious arguments are being used, some
point is being unduly stretched, Japan is an enigma and
China a conundrum. As to the real soul of the nations
arrayed against Germany, or at least of their leaders, Pres-
ident Wilson on Memorial Day gave in France this startling
account of what he had learned :
You are aware, as I am aware, that the airs of an older day
are beginning to stir again, that the standards of an old order
are trying to assert themselves again. There is here and there an
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 271
attempt to insert into the counsel of statesmen the old reckoning
of selfishness and bargaining and national advantage which were
the roots of this war, and any man who counsels these things
advocates a renewal of the sacrifice which these men have made:
for if this is not the final battle for right, there will be another
that will be final.
These are serious facts. The more such facts are made
known, the better it will be for the peace of the world, for
law and order, for justice and good-will.
(5) In normal times every enlightened State, every pro-
gressive people, every man of faith and courage, is under
obligation to see that all men everywhere are accorded
liberty of conscience, liberty of thought and liberty of
speech. As to the latter I put it thus : The right, and with
the right the responsibilities, of legitimate free discussion.
Abnormal times, as those of war and revolt, place restric-
tion on the individual for the sake of the nation, a group
or a cause. The world is now trying to become normal
again, and so once more free.
I think I am right in asserting that the British people
have held to their free rights all through the war more than
have Americans. Men who were opposed to Britain's en-
trance into the war, or who believed in the rule of reason,
refused to hide their sentiments, after war became a na-
tional problem. The United States, however, as "land of
the free and home of the brave," sadly stultified itself, as
soon as it joined the fray of the Old World. ' ' Conscientious
objectors" have received longer sentences in the U. S. A.
than have those in England.
These two countries have in past years had a great repu-
tation among the Chinese as defenders of liberty, contrasted
with such countries as Russia, Roumania, Turkey, Austria-
Hungary and Germany. France, too, has been known to be
the home of "liberty, equality, fraternity." These three
272 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
nations, "however, have inflicted on China such things as
Trading with the Enemy Acts, "black lists," censorship,
boycotts and spies. They have forced China to take extreme
measures of old-time oppression. For example, in Peking
there were three papers published in English. Of these,
two were closed down by the Chinese Government, one
under pressure of the Japanese Legation, and the other of
the British and French Legations. (I myself was editor
of one of these.)
What I wish to emphasize is the duty in all lands to re-
vert to the normal condition of liberal institutions, and
wage war by moral forces on all oppression, tyranny,
slavery.
July 4, 1919, President Wilson spoke these words on
the ship George Washington:
We told our fellow-men throughout the world when we set
up the free State of America that we wanted to serve liberty
everywhere and be the friends of men in every part of the world
who wanted to throw off the unjust shackles of arbitrary govern-
ment. Now we have kept our pledge to humanity as well as our
pledge to ourselves.
Time has again come for men to have convictions, and
with convictions the courage, the right, the chance to ex-
press them.
It was James Russell Lowell who wrote :
" They are slaves who will not choose
Hatred, scoflBng and abuse
Rather than in silence shrink
From the truth they needs must think;
They are slaves who dare not be
In the right with two or three."
(6) I believe it a cardinal duty, made clear by the ex-
periences of the war, that in whatever country one finds his
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 273
lot in life, the interests of that country must he made
supreme. Just as all aliens residing in the United States
should in times of emergency place America's interests
first, or return to the land whence they came, so all for-
eigners in China should place first, not the interests of
their own country, but the interests of China, or, under the
stress of patriotism, return to their native land, at least till
the interests of all shall work injury to none. Missionaries
and educationists in China ought especially to observe this
rule; otherwise their work will be looked upon as political
— to denationalize those whom they profess to aim to
bless.
We Americans have learned to detest German propa-
ganda under the Stars and Stripes. On principle, ought
we not to frown down every other form of propaganda,
whether Russian, Soviet, Bolshevik, Polish, Italian, Eng-
lish, Japanese? If we Americans want no more German
spies, have we really any place for all the kinds of foreign
spies who frequent our shores, even when honoured with
the name of Intelligence Officers and Naval Attaches ? An
Exclusion Law for foreign spies might not be bad for our
free land.
Now apply the same principle to China. What shall we
say when the Japanese and British have in their archives
complete maps of every part of China, and complete re-
ports of every district in the country? What are we to
think of political and diplomatic advisors, drawing pay
from the Chinese Government, but in the momentous days
of war making supreme the war schemes of their respective
countries, and using their confidential position to bring
China into the fray? Can we commend conduct in China
which we condemn in our own land?
(7) Closely linked with the above principle is another —
that the time has come for all nations to allow China a
greater part in her own development. In President Wil-
274 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
son's speech of April, 1918, when he enunciated the Four-
teen Points, he said:
What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to
ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in,
and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving
nation, which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine
its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair-dealing by the
other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.
The Chinese are a practical people; they are quick to
detect pretence and to abhor inconsistency. Now that peace
has come, it behooves the nations which have been asso-
ciated with China in war — some rather dubious companions
— to make good their professions by disowning secret com-
pacts to China's disadvantage, by restoring, one and all,
territory that has been pressed from her in various ways,
particularly the foreign areas, foreign administration, and
foreign dictatorship at treaty-ports. Dr. Sidney L. Gulick,
while advocate for Japan, is no less a friend of China, as
these words show : ^
China should be given fair-play and opportunity to become
a great self-governing democratic nation. As rapidly as possible
she should be given complete control of all her own affairs, with
judicial and tariff autonomy. To these ends, not only Japan, but
England as well, and France, and every other nation, should
undertake to restore to China their respective " rights " — secured
in too many cases by force, intimidation or fraud; they should
withdraw their troops and police. By the application of the
principles of amortization China should be enabled to purchase
back all railroad and mining concessions.
(8) In harmony with the above, all schemes termed in-
ternational for reshaping China should include all nations,
and not merely the ' * Five Big Powers, ' ' and, what is more,
* In Christian Work, August, 1919,
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 275
should include China. In Shanghai, for instance, there is
an International Settlement, where most of the population
is Chinese, but in which not one Chinese has any part in
municipal affairs. Most of the Municipal Councillors are
British, with whom are associated one American and one
Japanese. Is it not an insult to the Chinese nation to
allow a Japanese to serve on this select body, while from
all the educated Chinese, graduated from Yale, Columbia,
Cambridge, Paris or Berlin, not one is deemed to have the
qualifications for municipal office ?
So, too, as an offset to Japanese designs in Tsingtao,
Americans have proposed an International Settlement,
which, according to their theory, is to be dominated by
Americans and British, from which Germans are to be ex-
cluded, and in which Chinese are given no important place.
Should an International Settlement be formed there under
present circumstances, the Japanese would dominate.
So the proposed consortium is to consist of bankers from
America, Great Britain, France and Japan, and possibly
Belgium and Russia. Even if the consortium idea be
adopted, what about other nations ? What about Holland ?
What about Germany of the future? And what especially
about China?
Too many schemes, contracts, conventions, have been
drawn up in the past dealing with China, and China left
out. There should have been no Lansing-Ishii agreement,
but a Lansing- Wu Ting-fang agreement, both guarantee-
ing and recognizing the "special interests" and "prior
position" of China, and no other country.
(9) "The interest of the weakest is as sacred as the inter-
est of the strongest." This is so good a formula that I
transcribe it from what one may call Wilson's "Analects,"
more than a match for the * ' Analects of Confucius. ' '
Recognition for the sacred character of the Chinese State,
which today is weak, is, on this theory, no less a duty than
276 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
that accorded Japan, which today is strong. Smaller States
are to have as much "say" in the new dispensation as the
Great Powers. The rights of one nation are as great as
those of another. Big nations are not to domineer over
small nations. The strong are not to arrogate authority
over the weak. To begin with, suppose a start be made
with China. She is called weak, because her military power
is inferior to others ; but she is great in ideas, philosophy,
ethics, religion, political theories, great achievements, art,
literature, commerce and personal character. She deserves
the esteem of mankind; let her have it, in all the glow of
intelligent recognition. As to the words quoted from
President Wilson, let them be lived out in the political in-
tercourse of the nations that are, and of those that are yet
to be.
(10) The final principle is that of universal brotherhood.
This means the gradual elimination of racial, religious and
national discords that impede the progress of the human
race. It is co-operative fellowship among all peoples, not
merely those that are free, but even more those that are not
free, in a spirit of concord and friendship, educationally
developed, and for the combined task of preserving, each
in its own sphere, law and order, justice and liberty. This
is a task of peoples, not of governments, a spiritual enter-
prise, not a political or military one. Such was the world-
wide fellowship, of which prophets of old dreamed, and
which the greatest of all prophets proclaimed in the King-
dom of God. The message of such an idea, again and again
passed on from heart to heart along the centuries, is that
which I believe suitable to China, and to all the nations
of the world. As President Wilson said in Manchester,
England, "There is only one thing that can bind peoples
together, and that is common devotion to right."
This is something different from giving approval to the
Covenant of the League of Nations as drawn up at Paris,
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 277
and which already has aroused many discordant notes and
deep-seated forebodings. Along with others, I was capti-
vated with the original idea, the impulse of souls longing
for peace. But candidly, as the months go by, I fail to see
how China or the United States will receive good from
such a League, in the future any more than in the imme-
diate past.
The New York World has made the surprising statement
that there is more to be criticized in the Treaty than in the
League. With this I agree, and I am astonished that in
the United States so little criticism has been given the
Treaty. Both the League and the Treaty fall far short of
the great ideals set forth by President Wilson. The end
is that of a decline. Judge the League by the Treaty and
then judge the Treaty by its treatment of China. ''A chain
is no stronger than its weakest link!" The Treaty as a
whole must be judged by the section headed, "Shantung."
I quote from the President of China, Hsii Shih-chang, at
the beginning of the year 1919 : ^
The proposal of President Wilson for making the League one
of the terms of peace and for the cancellation of the doctrines
of spheres of influence and balance of power in Europe and else-
where naturally receives the whole-hearted indorsement of China.
If the proposed League becomes a fact, the nations of the world
should stand on an equal plane, and secret diplomacy will then
naturally be deprived of its sanction. If this is not so, the prin-
ciple involved in the proposed League will not prove really
effective or a source of benefit to the undeveloped Powers.
The President of the Republic of America may well listen
to the President of the Republic of China. The Chinese, we
may rest assured, will no longer applaud a League, or a
Treaty, or even any of the professed principles, that have
* New York Times, January 11, 1919.
278 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?
treated the claims and aspirations of their country in such
a shameful fashion as disclosed in the final settlement.
For one I disapprove of the proposed League, because it
is one of Governments, not of peoples, because it represents
imperialism not democracy, because it was conceived in
secret conclave of a select few and not in open court, be-
cause it sanctioned "special alliances" and not "the com-
mon interest of all," and because it is more a League of
War and Force than a League of Peace and free, individual
and national initiative. I commend to the attention of all
Americans these words of President Wilson spoken before
the actual deed was done, September 27, 1918 :
Only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize
and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to
hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and
clear the air of the world for common understandings and the
maintenance of common rights.
I also commend the words of J. A. Hobson, written after
the deed was done, February 8, 1919 : ^
Nowhere does the breath of democracy enter its frame. Every-
where the arbitrary and despotic will of the five big fighting
Powers of the Entente holds sway. Everywhere the functions of
the League are to be administered by this little group of war
Ministers, so as to continue their domination over Europe and
to extend it even beyond the ultimate limits of the League.
The true principle, not illustrated in this League, or
probably attainable in any political project called a League
or Alliance, whether "holy" or not, is taught in the calm
discriminating language of Washington's Farewell Ad-
dress :
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none
or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent
^ The Nation of London, February 8, 1919.
VITAL PRINCIPLES VS. SPOLIATION 279
controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our
concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate
ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her
politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friend-
ships or enmities.
This principle I have from the very opening of the war
held paramount for China — that it was unwise, and ever
will be, to ''implicate" herself in "the vicissitudes" of
European or American "politics," "combinations and col-
lisions," revolutions and wars.
As for the American people, the British, the German and
the Japanese, I am confident that they will all ever be ready
to give China a helping hand. They need no League of
Governments to force them to right action.
The first mistake of the negotiators of peace was that
the great and true principles accepted by vanquished and
victors were not introduced definitely into the Preamble of
the Treaty as a "Whereas" to subsequent Articles, and as
a basis of what was expected, namely, mutual negotiation.
The second mistake was that the association of nations for
preventing war and establishing peace was not left to the
calm conference of all nations, after the termination of the
present war, and as a natural evolution and historical de-
velopment of the Conventions of the Hague Peace Confer-
ences. The present League seems to ignore recognized in-
ternational law as already established, and sets out to re-
construct the world as a de novo transaction. Moreover,
the League has too little of the legal and judiciary quality
and too much of the quality of political disputes and na-
tionalistic ambitions. "In my opinion," says Oppenheim,'-
"the organization of a new League of Nations should start
from the beginning made by the two Hague Peace Con-
ferences." This is the reason I would rejoice to see the
* " The League of Nations and its Problems," p. 36.
280 CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FEEE?
present League vanish into thin air, and all nations get
back to the solid foundation of a third Hague Conference
for completing the eminently just, sane and judicial work
already accomplished, worthy of hearty recognition.
David Jayne Hill has well said : ^
The experience of the war has taught us that henceforth no
nation can preserve its seclusion and live apart. Actively or
passively, its life is affected by the needs, the animosities and
the purposes of other nations. Whatever our theories of national
policy may be, we cannot escape some kind of relation with
every other nation in the world. The important question is, what
shall be the basis of those relations? Shall we base them upon
a combination of world power, or shall we base them upon the
principles of free co-operation under the regulation of accepted
law? . . . It is of vital importance to recognize the indisputable
fact that this Covenant (of the League of Nations) not only
makes no advance in the development of International Law, but
wholly overlooks the status attained by it, through the work of
the great international congresses since the Congress of Vienna
in 1815.
These, then, are the ten principles which have shaped
themselves in my mind from the opening of the awful
struggle in August, 1914, as bearing indeed upon world
problems of friend and foe, and particularly upon the des-
tiny of China. For one and all let this be our prayer :
" Faith of our fathers, we will love
Both friend and foe in all our strife.
And preach Thee, too, as love knows how.
By kindly words and virtuous life j
Faith of our fathers, holy faith,
We will be true to Thee till death."
* Nortk American Review, October, 1919.
APPENDICES
Appendix I
[Note: A full discussion of Japan's violation of international law
was attempted in an article by the author in the Yale Law Journal
for December, 1915.]
THE NEUTRALITY OP CHINA
In the December number (1914) of The North American^
Review an able legal argument on "The Neutrality of Bel-
gium" appeared from the pen of Prof. A. G. De Lapra-
delle of Paris. The argument proves to be an indictment
of Germany. Others may, perhaps, advance an argument
which may be an indictment of both Great Britain and
France. Our purpose in writing, is to make use of the
sound legal principles, advanced by this distinguished
Frenchman, to indict Japan for her violation of the neu-
trality of China. To discuss the subject, Japan must suffer
criticism.
There is a marked difference between the character of
Belgian neutrality and of Chinese neutrality. Belgium
represents what is known as perpetual neutrality, when the
neutral nation ''renounces the right to make war" and is
in turn "protected from all hostilities." China represents
simple or temporary neutrality, wherein there is less guar-
antee of protection from others, while its sovereignty as a
state remains intact. In the case of perpetual neutrality,
it is imposed on the neutral state ; in the case of temporary
neutrality, it is inherent in every sovereign state. The
rights and duties of neutral states, as recognized in inter-
national law, not only apply to perpetual neutrality but
also to every non-belligerent state. We desire, therefore,
281
282 APPENDICES
to apply the ordinary and well-known principles and laws
of neutrality to the situation in China, when Japan pro-
ceeded to wage war on Germany,
Scarcely had war in Europe been declared when the
Chinese Government issued regulations for the observance
of neutrality, in accordance with the law of nations. Real-
izing that the great warring powers of Europe had inter-
ests or leased territory in China, the Chinese Government
desired two things, that the war be limited to Europe, and,
that if any conflict arose in China between the warring na-
tions, the neutrality of China might be respected. To bring
this about, negotiations took place between the foreign
Ministers chiefly cbneerned, especially the British and Ger-
man. The German representative, knowing that Tsingtao
was open to attack, and thus likely to involve China, was
willing, with the consent of the German governor-general
at Tsingtao, to consent to three things : first, that the Ger-
man squadron remain away from Tsingtao; second, that
the small gunboat and torpedo boats still in harbour be in-
terned; and, third, that Tsingtao with the Shantung Rail-
way be placed under Chinese jurisdiction or be neutralized,
until the end of the war. The German Legation also prom-
ised to abstain from hostile operations, if Japan remained
neutral.
The Chinese Government, anxious to avoid danger of
complications, determined upon a policy of equal treat-
ment, namely, that no obstacle should be placed in the way
of belligerent action within any territory leased to the na-
tions at war, and not neutralized, that is, to Germany,
Great Britain and France. Any fighting within these
leased territories at Kiaochow, at Weihaiwei, at Kowloon
(opposite Hongkong), and at Kuangchowan would not
be regarded as fighting on Chinese territory; thus would
China's neutrality be preserved.
China approached both Japan and the United States and
APPENDICES 283
asked them to remain neutral in the Far East. Japan,
after some delay, decided to reject China's proposal, and
to yield to Great Britain 's request for aid. If Great Britain
needed Japan's help on the seas, she did not need it on
Chinese soil. Even if an attack on Tsingtao was found to
be unavoidable, the fighting should have been confined to
the leased territory, going back for more than 30 miles
from the shore, a restriction which the British contingent
faithfully observed.
If the Alliance forced Japan to enter the war, it should
also have forced her to ** preserve the independence and
integrity of China," for which the Alliance was ostensibly
formed.
Tsingtao, or the larger leased area of Kiaochow, lies on
the south side of the long Shantung promontory. On the
north side, running from east to west, are three ports, Wei-
haiwei, leased to Great Britain ; Chefoo, a treaty-port ; and
Lungkow, only a Chinese harbour, but at the time not yet
a treaty-port. In all this section of the country, Germany
had no railway or other established interests. The German
** sphere of interest" runs west of Tsingtao. It should
also be noted that Lungkow is on the side of the Pehchihle
Gulf opposite Port Arthur, which is leased to Japan.
Very early in the war Japanese cruisers and transports
entered the harbour of Lungkow and remained there be-
yond the 24 hours' limit, while troops forcibly landed and
occupied the town, and later on marched across Chinese
territory to the rear of Tsingtao. The Chinese customs and
post offices were taken possession of, and a military tele-
graph and railway were stretched across the country, with-
out regard to the rights of the Chinese people and despite
repeated protests of the Chinese Government.
May we be allowed to quote Professor De Lapradelle :
"Furthermore, to demand of Belgium to allow the Ger-
man troops to pass through Belgian territory was not only
284 APPENDICES
contrary to perpetual neutrality, it was contrary to tem-
porary neutrality. ' ' What Japan did was contrary to tem-
porary neutrality; the law of nations was broken. No
Western nation apparently regards the matter of any
consequence.
"The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, on the
rights and duties of neutral states, signed by Germany and
Belgium [by Japan and China], is explicit on this point:
*Art, 1. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.
Art. 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or con-
voys, whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across
the territory of a neutral power.' " What is a sacred obli-
gation in Europe should be a sacred obligation in Asia as
well, especially since Japan is an honoured Ally of Great
Britain.
* * To ask passage of her troops was for Germany to asso-
ciate Belgium with her in the war, to expose her, in the
improbable case of her assenting, to a just punishment by
the Powers from such treason to her duties. If the neutral-
ity of Belgium had been temporary, Germany could not,
without forcing her to enter into an alliance with her, have
demanded passage; such a concession would have been on
the part of the neutral state an act of belligerence." The
same principle applies to Japan's conduct towards China.
The Chinese Government barely escaped becoming a bel-
ligerent on Japan's side. Japan forced a passage, and
China protested ; this was safe and proper. Following the
advice of Dr. Ariga, 'the Japanese legal advisor to the
Chinese Government, and with the approval of the British
Minister, China consented to a war zone. The Japanese
legal expert cited as precedent the Russo-Japanese War,
when Manchuria east of the Liao River was made a war
zone.
China was placed in an awkward position; not more so,
perhaps, than neutral countries in Europe. China had one
APPENDICES 285
of three courses open to her. One was to defend her neu-
trality, and resist by force of arms the passage of Japanese
soldiers. Such action would not conflict with international
law, for the Hague Convention of 1907, Article 10, says:
"The fact of a neutral power resisting, even by force, at-
tempts to violate its neutrality cann,ot be regarded as a
hostile act." Such resistance was what Belgium made, and
in so doing she had the promised help of Great Britain and
France. If China, in resisting Japan, had looked to Great
Britain and France for help, she might have looked in vain.
She might have expected help from Germany, but in that
case the ties between Japan, Great Britain and France
would have been knit the stronger. In fact Japan treated
the rules of The Hague as "a scrap of paper," so far as
her relations with China were concerned. If China had
resisted, Japan would beyond doubt have declared war
upon China as well as on Germany, and China's dangers
would have increased a thousand-fold. She would have
suffered more than Belgium suffered when she decided to
resist Germany. China, knowing the danger, was wise,
therefore, in not adopting the method of resistance.
A second course to pursue was simply to protest, and to
record her protest for future deliberation and decision.
China was advised to adopt this method, but she was finally
persuaded to adopt another method, namely, that of pro-
testing and also granting a war zone. By so doing, she, in
accordance with recognized principles, practically became
a belligerent on the side of Japan as against Germany. The
precedent cited from the Russo-Japanese War was in reality
no precedent ; the circumstances were in no wise the same.
In that war, Russian troops had already for several years
occupied Southern Manchuria ; in the present case, German
troops had never gone outside the limits of the German
leased territory. In the former war, Russia as well as
Japan had agreed to the proposition of a war zone; in the
286 APPENDICES
present war, Germany had not given her consent, and was
not even consulted. In the former war, the war zone was
of equal benefit to Russia and to Japan ; in the present case
it was to Japan's advantage and to Germany's disadvan-
tage. Though it now appears from these and other reasons
that China should never have consented to a war zone,
through which Japanese troops were permitted to pass, the
consent was given that conflict with Japan might be
avoided. This yielding of China to Japan's wishes has
not been appreciated by Japan; rather, the leniency has
been made a pretext for Japan to assume the role of sov-
ereign on Chinese soil.
The forced passage of Japanese troops from Lungkow
to Tsingtao was called a ' ' military necessity. ' ' The absurd-
ity of such a claim is readily seen, when one considers that
on the one side were less than 5,000 Germans, a poorly-
fortified garrison, facing Japanese and British men-of-war,
with 30,000 Japanese soldiers equipped for action, and the
whole Japanese army within a few hours' call. There was
no military necessity, but only a political necessity to carry
out a political strategy for the occupation of the province
of Shantung.
The first violation of China's neutrality was soon fol-
lowed by a more pronounced violation. Japanese troops
marched outside the war zone, took possession of the rail-
way station at Weihsien, to the west of Tsingtao, and then
occupied the entire railway as far as Tsinan-fu and also all
the mines worked by the Germans. The occupation con-
tinues. The military guard was not removed after Tsingtao
was captured.
Defenders of Japanese action hold two positions which
are irreconcilable the one to the other. The claim is made
that the railway was a German Government railway, and
another claim is made that the Germans had first violated
China's neutrality by the transport of troops and muni-
APPENDICES 287
tions of war. If the railway belonged to the German Gov-
ernment, then the transport of troops and munitions would
have been legitimate, and therefore no infringement of
Chinese neutrality.
As a matter of fact the railway has been built and is
the property of a German-Chinese Company, incorporated
in Germany, just as other companies or syndicates have
been incorporated in other countries. The railway and
mines were "concessions" granted by the Chinese Govern-
ment through treaty arrangement with the German Gov-
ernment; it was clearly stipulated that, as in the leased
territory of Kiaochow, there were "no treacherous inten-
tions towards China" on the part of Germany. The com-
pany was a German-Chinese Company, a private and not a
government company ; the territory through which it runs
is Chinese and neutral territory, over which China's sov-
ereign rights are retained. By special agreement with the
Chinese Government only Chinese soldiers were to act as
railway guards.
Taking, then, the position that the railway was on Chi-
nese, not on German territory, were the Germans the first to
be guilty of violating China 's neutrality ? From the outset
the Chinese Government determined to make no discrim-
ination between one belligerent and another in the matter
of travel by land or by sea. If belligerents traveled as
civilians, in civilian dress and without weapons, the Chinese
authorities would present no objection. Chinese action was
one of impartiality, the essence of neutrality. German
action conformed to the Chinese arrangement just as much
as the British, the Russian and the French, and far more
than the Japanese.
With reference to the transport of munitions of war by
Germany, no protest was entered at the time by any bellig-
erent, and China, a neutral Power, was under no obligation
to lay upon herself additional burdens, because of war be-
288 APPENDICES
tween other nations. There was, moreover, no question of
the Chinese selling contraband. If there were any arms
transported over neutral territory, they were already in
German possession, and before Japan declared war. So far
as international law has established a clear principle, seiz-
ure by an enemy can only take place *'on the high seas."
No enemy thinks of capturing contraband of war on neutral
soil.
Even if China was "liable to penalty," the wrong kind
of penalty was inflicted by Japan, namely, forceful, mili-
tary occupation of the Shantung Railway in neutral terri-
tory, and the refusal to China of the right of management,
control and protection. Japan drove out not only Ger-
many, but China as well. Continued occupation from
Tsingtao to Tsinan-fu, like continued occupation from
Lungkow to Tsingtao, is a contir'ued infringement not only
of China's neutrality, but of China's sovereignty, and this
in the face of an alliance guaranteeing China's indepen-
dence and autonomy.
In this additional violation of China's neutrality, Japan
made the same excuse as in the previous case, namely, "mil-
itary necessity"; but this was only to conceal her real
purpose, that of political aggression. It was plain that in
capturing Tsingtao there was no need of occupying the
railway westward as far as Tsinan-fu. In fact the obliga-
tion to defend China's neutrality or to consult China's
wishes carried no weight with Great Britain's chosen Ally,
Japan.
It is somewhat diflBcult to understand the feeling of
Americans regarding the rights of nations and the wrongs
done by one nation to another. Americans seem to con-
demn Germany for violating the neutrality of Belgium, but
seem at the same time to overlook Japan's infringement of
China's neutrality. The length of territory thus violated
by Japan in China is twice the length of that violated by
APPENDICES 289
Germany in Belgium. Americans seem to applaud Great
Britain for claiming that her purpose was to defend the
weaker nations, and so the neutrality of Belgium, and yet
at the same time seem to countenance her action in abetting
Japan's violation of the neutrality of China. They pity
Belgium for what she suffers in resisting Germany, but
they do not show even interest in the political misfortunes
which threaten China at the hands of Japan, although
China has scrupulously refrained from giving offence or
from committing any act of war. They lament the reported
German atrocities to Belgium, but they practically ignore
the good which Germany has wrought, in missions, in sci-
ence, in education and in trade, for the Chinese people.
Americans declare that Germany should pay for the losses
she has inflicted on Belgium, but they excuse the harm, the
loss, the encroachment which China continues to suffer at
the hands of Japan, abetted by Great Britain. Does it
mean, then, that Americans regard these questions of in-
ternational intercourse, not from the standpoint of high
principle, law and justice, but from a standpoint prejudiced
by natural preference?
*'If Belgium [China] is now suffering more than any
people has ever suffered, it does not mean that in the mass
of legal institutions that of neutrality is particularly fragile
or more particularly imperfect, but that international law
is at this moment too weak to resist the audacious onslaught
of those Powers whose military pride has perverted their
sense of right and whose devouring ambition has corrupted
their sense of justice. ' ' How can we hope that the careless
unconcern of the Great Powers towards the rights of China
can fail to bring upon themselves unlooked-for suffering
in the generations yet to come ? Every country professing
to believe in international law should come forward to the
defence of China and the indictment of Japan.
Appendix II
A CHINESE president's PROCLAMATION ON THE WAS AND
EDITORIAL COMMENTS
The Proclamation of President Feng Kuo-chang, August
14, 1917, declaring war against the two Central Powers is
a most important document. It deserves careful reading,
that China's aims in participating in the Great War may
be fully understood. It is as follows:
On the 9th day of the 2nd month of this year we addressed a
protest to the German Government against the policy of sub-
marine warfare inaugurated by Germany, which was considered
by this Government as contrary to international law, and im-
perilling neutral lives and property, and declared therein in case
the protest be ineffectual we would be constrained, much to our
regret, to sever diplomatic relations with Germany.
Contrary to our expectations, however, no modification was
made in her submarine policy after the lodging of our protest.
On the contrary, the number of neutral vessels and belligerent
merchantmen destroyed in an indiscriminate manner was daily
increasing and the Chinese lives lost were numerous. Under such
circumstances, although we might yet remain indifferent and
endure suffering, with the meagre hope of preserving a tem-
porary peace, but in so doing we would never be able to satisfy
our people who are attached to righteousness and sensible to
disgrace, nor would we justify ourselves before our sister States
which had acted without hesitation in obedience to the dictates
of the sense of duty. Both here as well as in the friendly Powers
the cause of indignation was the same, and among the people of
this country there could be found no difference of opinion. This
Government, thereupon, being compelled to consider the protest
290
APPENDICES 291
as being ineffectual, notified, on the 14th day of the 3rd month,
the German Government of the severance of the diplomatic rela-
tions and at the same time the events taking place from the
beginning up to that time were announced for the general in-
formation of the public.
What we have desired is peace j what we have respected is
international law; what we have to protect are the lives and
property of our own people. As we originally had no other grave
causes of enmity against Germany, the German Government, if
it had manifested repentance of the deplorable consequences
resulting from its policy of warfare, might still be expected to
modify that policy in view of the common indignation of the whole
world. That was what we eagerly desired, and it was the reason
why we felt reluctant to treat Germany as a common enemy.
Nevertheless, during the five months following the severance of the
diplomatic relations the submarine attacks continued in operation
as vigorously as before. It is not Germany alone, but Austria-
Hungary as well, which pursued this policy without abatement.
Not only has international law been thereby violated, but also
our people are suffering injury and loss. The most sincere hope
on our part to bring about a better state of affairs is now shat-
tered. Therefore, it is hereby declared, against Germany as well
as Austria-Hungary, that a state of war exists commencing from
10 o'clock of the 14th day of the 8th month of the 6th year of
the Republic of China. In consequence thereof all treaties, agree-
ments, conventions, concluded between China and Germany, and
between China and Austria-Hungary, as well as such parts of the
international protocols and international agreements as concern
the relations between China and Germany, and between China
and Austria-Hungary, are, in conformity with the law of nations
and international practice, all abrogated. This Government, how-
ever, will respect the Hague Conventions and her international
agreements respecting the humane conduct of war.
The chief object in our declaration of war is to put an end to
the calamities of war and to hasten the restoration of peace,
which it is hoped our people will fully appreciate. Seeing, how-
ever, that our people have not yet at the present time recovered
from sufferings on account of the recent political disturbances
292 APPENDICES
and that calamity again befalls us in the breaking out of the
present war, I, the President of this Republic, cannot help having
profound sympathy with our people when I take into considera-
tion their further suffering. I would never resort to this step of
striving for the existence of our nation unless and until I, con-
sidering it no longer possible to avoid it, am finally forced to this
momentous decision.
I cannot bear to think that through us the dignity of inter-
national law should be impaired, or the position in the family
of nations should be undermined or the restoration of the world
peace and happiness should be retarded. It is, therefore, hoped
that all of our people will exert their utmost in these hours of
hardship, with a view to maintaining and strengthening the
existence of the Chinese Republic, so that we may establish
ourselves amidst the family of nations and share with them the
happiness and benefits derived therefrom.
The same day in the Peking Post, of which I was editor
and proprietor, I extended my congratulations in the fol-
lowing brief statement :
We congratulate the President of China, Feng Kuo-chang, on
issuing with the aid of his Cabinet Ministers a Declaration of
War that is dignified and stately in form, without hatred and
animosity in spirit, adhering to the basal principle of international
law, and actuated by high and enduring aims. In spite of the
declaration being one of war against hitherto friendly States —
which for many reasons we regret — the Chinese Government de-
serves credit for the way an unpleasant act is gracefully per-
formed. The two enemy countries are not denounced in fierce and
excessive terms; and possibly future Allies are not exonerated or
applauded. Amid all minor motives there looms aloft this mag-
nificient chief object, to which as citizen of an allied country
we give our sincere allegiance : to put an end to the calamities
OF WAR AND TO HASTEN THE RESTORATION OF PEACE.
The next day I published a longer editorial, advising at
the end that China act out her noble professions. I reprint
APPENDICES 293
it here as illustrative of a continued interest in China's
well-being :
We Americans know the sensation of being transferred over
night from the state of neutrality into a state of war, from being
advocates of peace into advocates of belligerency, tempered with
mUd doses of democracy. Some who had only pretended to be
neutral and impartial found no great difficulty in the passing
transformation; others of us rolled over to the other side less
gracefully and so got into trouble.
As to China, it does not much matter whether she goes to war
against two distant countries in Central Europe or remains at
peace. So we told President Feng the other day. Under present
circumstances no large number of the German navy will attack
Chinese ports and fortresses and no startling crowd of China's
brave Generals and soldiers will find passage to the western front.
It does not look as if the Chinese and their newly-created enemies
would have much of a chance to get at each other. Most probably
the first time they meet will be at the Peace Conference. There is
more likelihood of China being able to send tea to England than
to send Kiangnan guns to France.
Merely to declare war — which is all that a war declaration
means — is nothing very dangerous or alarming. Of course, it is
a serious affair in point of democracy's safety, when war is de-
clared without regard to Parliament, but that is internal politics,
not external.
What creates a little sensation of fright is the associations that
get tagged on to war's declaration. President Feng and his
Proclamation are clear enough on this matter — no obligations to
the enemies of Germany and Austria-Hungary. This, too, was the
American attitude, but any number of Americans are more keen
on linking up with France or Great Britain or the Russian Pro-
visional Government (seldom is Japan mentioned) than on fight-
ing Germany.
It will be harder with weak China. If she withstands all form
of pressure, she will deserve to be called one of the Great Powers.
But we will not worry or complain or ridicule. We hope for
the best.
294 APPENDICES
China's political and financial condition could hardly be worse
than it is or has been for some weeks. This war declaration is
only a ripple on the waves.
Having declared war, China should now get ready; she should
get her house in order. Having the German and Austro-
Hungarian Ministers out of the way, the house-cleaning should
be easy.
Appendix III
THE VERSAILLES TREATY CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN MIS-
SIONS OP GERMANY
Article 438 — The Allied and Associated Powers agree that
where Christian religious missions were being maintained
by German societies or persons in territory belonging to
them, or of which the Government is entrusted to them in
accordance with the present treaty, the property which
these missions or missionary societies possessed, including
that of trading societies whose profits were devoted to the
support of missions, shall continue to be devoted to mis-
sionary purposes.
In order to ensure the due execution of this undertaking
the Allied and Associated Governments will hand over such
property to boards of trustees appointed by or approved by
the governments and composed of persons holding the
Christian faith. It will be the duty of such boards of trus-
tees to see that the property continues to be applied to
missionary purposes.
The obligations undertaken by the Allied and Associated
Governments in this article will not in any way prejudice
their control or authority as to the individuals by whom
the missions are conducted.
Germany, taking note of the above undertaking agrees
to accept all arrangements made or to be made by the Allied
or Associated Governments concerned for carrying on the
work of the said missions or trading societies, and waives
all claims on their behalf.
Article 439 — ^Without prejudice to the provisions of the
295
296 APPENDICES
present treaty, Germany undertakes not to put forward,
directly or indirectly, against any Allied or Associated
Power, signatory of the present treaty, including those
which, without having declared war, have broken off diplo-
matic relations with the German Empire, any pecuniary
claim based on events which occurred at any time before
the coming into force of the present treaty.
The present stipulation will bar completely and finally
all claims of this nature, which will be thenceforward ex-
tinguished, whoever may be the parties in interest.
Appendix IV
THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN MISSIONS
Some Personal Impressions from a Recent Visit to Holland
and Germany
By Rev. Arthur J. Brown, D.D., LL.D.
{Christian Work, May, 1920)
Imagine, however, what it means if the major Powers are
to deal in a nationalistic spirit with the hundreds of mil-
lions of people that they directly or indirectly rule in Asia
and Africa, and hold that missionary work for the evan-
gelization and moral uplifting of these vast populations
must be conducted with supreme reference to the political
plans of the ruling government. Only a small fraction of
the non-Christian world would be left for free missionary
work.
Let us bear in mind that if this principle is to be recog-
nized and acquiesced in it will almost certainly react upon
ourselves. Why should not France adopt the same policy
toward British and American missionaries? Instructive
from this viewpoint is the French dealing with British mis-
sionary work in Madagascar and American missionary
work in West Africa and Indo-China.
At this moment a new danger is threatening in Syria.
During the dark days of the war Great Britain entered into
an agreement with France that, in the event of the victory
of the Allies, French claims in Syria would be recognized.
In accordance with that agreement, France is now adminis-
tering that country. A French official has intimated to a
297
298 APPENDICES
representative of the Paris Missionary Society that he
hoped that the society would prepare itself to take over the
Protestant missionary work in Syria, as the French author-
ities do not like to have missionary work in that country
conducted by American and British Protestants. Some ir-
ritation has recently developed between the British and
French Governments. The former views with concern the
pushing of a French wedge across the road to Britain's
interests in Mesopotamia, and the French allege that the
British military and civilian officials, connected with and
following General Allenby's expedition, have made the
French task harder by words and acts which have tended
to prejudice the minds of the Syrian people against their
new masters. The French involve the American Presby-
terian missions and the faculty of the Syrian Protestant
College in their irritation, believing that their use of the
English language and their English ancestry and sympa-
thies make them a hindrance to the French plans. It is not
at all improbable at this writing that both the mission and
college, as well as the British missions, may face in the
near future very serious diflBculties from the disposition of
the French authorities to regard Syria as their national
preserve in which it is deemed undesirable that American
Protestant Christians should continue to conduct the ex-
tensive missionary work which they have been doing for
generations, unless they strictly conform to French ideas
and methods as interpreted by authorities on the ground,
who will probably get their advice in religious matters from
the French Roman Catholic bishops.
What France is inclined to do in Syria she may do in
other non-Christian lands under her control, so that British
and American missionaries may either be excluded or so
hampered that they will be crippled and ultimately forced
out, just as they were forced out of the valley of the Gaboon
river in West Africa. One of the French Protestant mis-
APPENDICES 299
sionary leaders said, in our conference in Paris, that he
believed that the French Government was disposed to be
more friendly than formerly to the missionary work of the
French Protestant Society and to appreciate the value of
its work; and he thought that this more liberal attitude
might be extended to British and American missionaries,
if they are careful and tactful. The trouble in the past,
however, has not been so much with headquarters in Paris
as with local officials on the field. Another member of our
Paris conference, good-naturedly but with undoubted mean-
ing, gave us of other lands food for thought by remarking
that Anglo-Saxon missionaries, both British and American,
take Anglo-Saxon ideas with them to a greater extent than
they realize, and he evidently had some sympathy with the
feeling which, he said, prevailed in the French Government,
that the average British and American missionary fails to
adapt himself to the legitimate point of view of another
governing power, and that his effort, perhaps unconsciously,
is to Anglicize the native population with the result that
the Government regards him as a disturbing factor. One
is reminded of the remark of a Norwegian delegate at the
Edinburgh Conference, that many American and British
missionaries apparently imagine that what our Lord actu-
ally commanded His disciples to do was to go into all the
world and teach the English language to every creature.
And why should not Japan follow the example of "West-
ern Powers ? Every well-informed student of the Far East
knows perfectly well that the Japanese authorities regard
the large American and British missionary work in Korea
as an obstacle to their plans for the amalgamation of that
country with Japan. I am aware that responsible officials
of the Japanese Government are not likely to say this pub-
licly, and when spoken to on the subject will suavely and
courteously deny it. I am also aware that the statement is
absolutely true, and that Japan would like nothing better
300 APPENDICES
than to have the confessedly Christian Powers of the West
set the example of regarding foreign missionary work as
a political instrument to be utilized or eliminated as the
furtherance of a government's political plans may require.
A foretaste of what may be expected is seen in the fact that
last May the Japanese, assigning Section 438 of the Peace
Treaty as their reason, expelled all the German mission-
aries, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, from the Car-
oline Islands, although some of them had been allowed to
remain throughout the war.
The instances cited do not by any means exhaust the
list of probabilities. China is rapidly falling under Jap-
anese influence, and the Japanese attitude toward Amer-
ican and British missionary work in certain sections, not-
ably the great province of Shantung, finds open expression
in the Japanese vernacular press, in which the writers do
not hesitate to demand the expulsion of American mis-
sionaries as an alleged hindrance to Japan's program. In
Siam the king is energetically trying to develop the nation-
alistic spirit of the Siamese, and is using Buddhism, the<
State religion, as one of the most effective agencies to
accomplish his purpose. In spite of all the personal kind-
ness of officials to the American missionaries, some of them
feel that the large American missionary work in Siam does
not fit in well with the king's policy of nationalization, and
a veteran missionary has recently said that there is more
active opposition to Christianity in Siam today than there
has been for thirty years.
There is danger that, in dealing with a temporary exi-
gency regarding German missions, we may see war animos-
ities and restrictions projected into the period of peace
reconstruction; government inspection and supervision of
mission schools established in ways that exacting or hostile
officials may render oppressive; the freedom of unselfish
missionary work for the evangelization and moral uplift
APPENDICES 301
of non-Christian people subordinated to the nationalistic
political program of a ruling power, and principles adopted
which will ere long be turned with disastrous effect against
British and American missionary work in several import-
ant fields.
The Church cannot always take her orders from Caesar,
nor can her missionary work wait indefinitely upon politi-
cal considerations. The notion that the State is certain to
be right and that its officials are infallible was the heresy of
the HohenzoUerns. Let us who fought against it be careful
how we fall into it ourselves. If the followers of Christ
in England and France had not withstood their govern-
ments in former centuries Protestantism in these countries
would have been strangled at its birth. From the days of
Peter and John to the present, Christian men have some-
times found it necessary to say: "We ought to obey God
rather than men." A Christianity which stands for uni-
versalism inevitably collides at times with politics which
stand for nationalism. Christian obligation cannot always
be defined in terms of governmental expediency. There are
times when we must obey the higher law, in the spirit of
Lord Hugh Cecil, who is reported to have said recently:
"I am a Christian first and an Englishman afterwards."
Appendix V
CONVERSATION OP PRESIDENT WILSON AND U. S. SENATORS
AUGUST 19, 1919
Senator Borah — When did the secret treaty between
Great Britain, France and the other nations of Europe with
reference to certain adjustments in Europe first come to
your knowledge? Was that after you had reached Paris
also?
The President — ^Yes, the whole series of understandings
was disclosed to me for the first time then.
Senator Borah — Then we had no knowledge of these
secret treaties so far as our Government was concerned until
you reached Paris ?
The President — Not unless there was information at the
State Department of which I know nothing.
Senator Borah — Do you know when these secret treaties
between Japan, Great Britain and other countries were first
made known to China?
The President — No, sir ; I do not. I remember a meeting
of what was popularly called the Council of Ten, after our
reaching Paris, in which it was first suggested that all these
understandings should be laid upon the table of the con-
ference. That is some time after we reached there, and I
do not know whether that was China's first knowledge of
these matters or not.
Senator Borah — Would it be proper for me to ask if
Great Britain and France insisted upon maintaining these
secret treaties at the Peace Conference as they were made ?
The President — I think it is proper for me to answer that
302
APPENDICES 303
question, sir. I will put it in this way : They felt that they
could not recede from them, that is to say that they were
bound by them, but when they involved general interests
such as they realized were involved, they were quite willing,
and indeed I think desirous, that they should be reconsid-
ered with the consent of the other parties. I mean with the
consent so far as they were concerned of the other parties.
Senator Swanson — Can you tell us, or would it be proper
to do so, of your understanding with Japan as to the return
of Shantung — a question which has been very much dis-
cussed ?
The President — I have published the wording of the
understanding, Senator. I cannot be confident that I quote
it literally, but I know that I quote it in substance. It was
that Japan should return to China in full sovereignty the
old province of Shantung so far as Germany had had any
claims upon it, preserving to herself the right to establish
a residential district at Tsingtao, which is the town of
Kiaochow Bay ; that with regard to the railways and mines
she should retain only the rights of an economic concession
there, with the right, however, to maintain a special body
of police on the railway, the personnel of which should be
Chinese under Japanese instructors nominated by the man-
agers of the company and appointed by the Chinese Gov-
ernment. I think that is the whole of it.
Senator Borah — Was that understanding oral?
The President — Senator Borah asked whether this under-
standing was oral or otherwise. I do not like to describe
the operation exactly if it is not perfectly discreet, but as
a matter of fact this was technically oral, but literally writ-
ten and formulated, and the formulation agreed upon. . . .
Senator Pomerene — Mr. President, if I may, I should
like to ask a question or two along that same line. If this
treaty should fail of ratification then could not the oppor-
304 APPENDICES
tunity be opened to Japan to treat the Shantung question
just as she has treated the Manchurian situation?
The President — I think so; yes.
Senator Pomerene — So that if the treaty should fail of
ratification China, so far as Shantung is concerned, would
be practically at the mercy of Japan, whereas if the treaty
is ratified then at least she will have the benefit of the moral
assistance of all the other signatory Powers to the treaty
to aid in the protection of Chinese rights.
The President — Senator, I conceive one of the chief bene-
fits of the whole arrangement that centres in the League of
Nations to be just what you have indicated ; that it would
bring to bear the opinion of the world and the controlling
action of the world on all relationships of that hazardous
sort, particularly those relationships which involve the
rights of the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are
likely to come are most likely to come by aggression against
the weaker nations. Without the League of Nations they
have no buttress or protection. With it, they have the
united protection of the world, and inasmuch as it is the
universal opinion that the great tragedy through which we
have just passed never would have occurred if the Central
Powers had dreamed that a number of nations would be
combined against them, so have I the utmost confidence that
this notice beforehand that the strong nations of the world
will in every case be united will make war extremely un-
likely.
Senator Johnson — Mr. President, I am quite hesitant
about asking certain questions which I wish to ask. I apol-
ogize in advance for asking them and I trust you will stop
me at once if they are questions which you deem inappro-
priate or that ought not to be asked.
The President — Thank you.
Senator Johnson — I think the question I am about to ask
you answered to Senator Borah, so pardon me if it is re-
APPENDICES 305
petitive. The question is, Was the United States Govern-
ment officially informed at any time between the rupture of
diplomatic relations with Germany and the signing of the
armistice of agreements made by the Allied Governments
in regard to the settlement of the war?
The President — No; not so far as I know.
Senator McCumber — Senator Johnson, may I ask the
President right here whether or not any treaties were made
after we entered into the war between any of our co-bellig-
erents that were not given to us?
The President — No, sir. I do not know of any.
Senator Johnson — ^When our Government, through you,
Mr. President, in January, 1918, made the fourteen points
as the basis for peace, were those points made with the
knowledge of the existence of the secret agreements ?
The President — No; oh, no.
Senator Johnson — It was not intended, then, by the ex-
pression of those fourteen points, to supplant the aims
contained in the secret treaties?
The President — Since I knew nothing of them, necessar-
ily not. . . .
Senator Johnson — ^You would have preferred, as I think
most of us would, that there had been a different conclusion
of the Shantung provision, or the Shantung difficulty or
controversy, at the Paris Peace Conference?
The President — Yes; I frankly intimated that.
Senator Johnson — Did it require the unanimous consent
of the members of the Peace Conference to reach a decision
like the Shantung decision?
The President — Every decision, yes, sir. . . .
Senator Johnson — May I ask one or two more questions
concerning Shantung which I omitted or forgot?
The President — Certainly, Senator.
Senator Johnson — First: Did Japan decline to sign the
award as made or provided in the peace treaty?
306 APPENDICES
The President — Her representatives informed us, Sena-
tor, that they were instructed not to sign in that event
(the refusal to award Shantung to Japan).
Senator Johnson — Was the decision reached, if you will
pardon the perfectly blunt question, because Japan de-
clined to sign unless that decision was reached in that
way?
The President — No, I do not think it would be true to
say "Yes" to that question. It was reached because we
thought it was the best that could be got, in view of the
definite engagements of Great Britain and France, and the
necessity of a unanimous decision, which we held to be
necessary in every case we have decided.
Senator Johnson — Great Britain and France adhered to
their original engagements, did they not?
The President — They said that they did not feel at liberty
to disregard them.
Senator Johnson — Do you mind stating, or would you
prefer not, what it was that caused you ultimately to accede
to the decision that was demanded by Japan ?
The President — Only the conclusion that I thought it was
the best that could be got under the circumstances.
Senator Brandegee — May I interpolate there without dis-
turbing you, Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson — Yes, sir.
Senator Brandegee — In Part VI of the hearings before
our committee on page 182, Senator Johnson of California
asked Secretary Lansing: (Reading.)
Was the Shantung decision made in order to have the Japanese
signatories to the League of Nations?
Secretary Lansing — That I cannot say.
Senator Johnson — In your opinion was it ?
Secretary Lansing — I would not want to say that, because I
really have not the facts on which to form an opinion along that
line.
APPENDICES 307
Senator Johnson — Would the Japanese signature to the League
of Nations have been obtained if you had not made the Shantung
agreement ?
Secretary Lansing — I think so.
Senator Johnson — You do?
Secretary Lansing — I think so.
Senator Johnson — So that even though Shantung had not been
delivered to Japan, the League of Nations would not have been
injured.
Secretary Lansing — I do not think so.
Senator Johnson — ^And you would have had the same sig-
natories that you have now ?
Secretary Lansing — Yes, one more — China.
Senator Johnson — One more — China. So that the result of the
Shantung decision was simply to lose China's signature rather
than to gain Japan's?
Secretary Lansing — No, that is my personal view, but I may
be wrong about it.
Senator Johnson — Why did you yield on a question on which
you thought you ought not to yield and that you thought was a
principle ?
Secretary Lansing — Because naturally we were subject to the
direction of the President of the United States.
Senator Johnson — And it was solely because you felt that you
were subject to the decision of the President of the United States
that you yielded?
Secretary Lansing — Yes.
Senator Johnson — The decision is his?
Secretary Lansing — Necessarily.
Now I v?ondered whether Secretary Lansing was well in-
formed about this question or not?
The President — ^Well, my conclusion is different from
his, sir.
Senator Brandegee — You could not have got the signa-
ture of Japan if you had not given Japan Shantung.
The President — That is my judgment.
308 APPENDICES
Senator Brandegee — ^You say you were notified to that
effect.
The President — Yes, sir.
Senator Swanson — As I understand, you were notified
that they had instructions not to sign unless this was in-
cluded.
The President — ^Yes.
Senator Borah — And was it your judgment that after
the treaty had been ratified, China's rights would be pro-
tected and Japan would surrender to China what she said
she would?
The President — ^Yes.
Senator Swanson — As I understand it you considered
this verbal agreement effective as relating to Shantung, and
you understood that this conveyance would be followed by
a conveyance to China.
The President — Not to supersede it, but the action by
Japan is to follow.
Senator Johnson — ^Yes. But, Mr. President, you would
have much preferred to have a different disposition not-
withstanding the promise of Japan in the treaty, would
you not ?
The President — ^Yes, sir.
Appendix VI
china's attitude to the ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCE
Peking, June 6, 1920. — The Foreign Office has handed to
Renter's Agency the following statement of the position
China has taken up in matters arising out of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance:
Three months ago the attention of the Chinese Govern-
ment was drawn to statements appearing in the world's
press regarding the renewal or termination of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance.
Inasmuch as an important element in the text of both
of the 1905 and 1911 Agreements was Section B of the
Preamble which treated of matters affecting China's inter-
national standing and international relations without the
prior assent of China having been obtained, and inasmuch
as public opinion throughout the Eepublic had long shown
deep resentment at this condition of affairs, the Govern-
ment decided that the time has arrived to address repre-
sentations to the British Government.
Instructions were consequently sent to the Chinese Min-
ister in London to make formal inquiries regarding the
reports appearing in the press and to point out that while
obviously the international arrangements of other Powers
did not in the ordinary course of events concern others than
the High Contracting Parties, the treatment of China
merely as a territorial entity in the written text of any such
agreements would no longer be tolerated by the public opin-
ion of the country and would indeed be viewed by all as an
unfriendly act.
To these first inquiries China received the following
309
310 APPENDICES
verbal reply : First that the question of the renewal or ter-
mination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had not yet come
up for consideration; secondly, that inasmuch as the suc-
cessive Agreements had been couched in the same language,
it would naturally follow that if the Alliance were renewed
it must follow the same lines.
In consequence of this reply a memorandum was pre-
pared analysing the three successive Alliance instruments
and establishing clearly: (a) that the original instrument of
1902 was radically different from the 1905 Agreement in
that the independence of Korea was specifically guaranteed
in the first ; (b) that the second Agreement of 1905 far from
being identical included India for the first time within its
scope, whilst Korea was relegated to a subordinate position
and clearly earmarked for annexation; (c) that the third
Agreement introduced into the Preamble the definite state-
ment having in view the important changes which have
taken place in the situation, etc., and then definitely
dropped all reference in the numbered articles to either
Korea or the Indian frontier, because the act to which Rus-
sia's assent had been obtained had made mutual pledge
regarding these matters superfluous.
In view, then, of the fact that beneath the framework
of what is on the surface a self-denying ordinance, vital
and far-reaching changes have acquired the sanction of the
High Contracting Parties, Chinese opinion is not unnatu-
rally distrustful of any renewal of this agreement, all men
holding that China has suffered enough from its operation
during the World War in the matter of Shantung.
Furthermore, as the formal ratification of the Austrian
Treaty has made China a member of the League of Nations,
which she assumes was created in good faith, she is advised
that a contract regarding her affairs between other mem-
bers of the League cannot be entered into without her prior
APPENDICES 311
consent has been obtained, Article 10 being a sufficient
guarantee that her territorial integrity will be respected.
So far China has not received from Britain a reply to
her memorandum. She is anxious for that reply so that
she may address an identical note to Japan and establish
definitely the national attitude on a question vital to the
peace and prosperity of her people.
INDEX
Abrogation of treaties: claimed
by China and resisted by
Japan, 177-179.
Ackerman, Carl W. : interview
with China's President, 221.
Adler, Felix: criticizes League
of Nations, 205.
Advisors, foreign, in China:
sought by Japan in Man-
churia, 76; by Japan in Mon-
golia, 76; by Japan in all
China postponed for future ne-
gotiations, 79.
Aggrandizement, territorial :
should cease, 228.
Agreements: see Treaties.
Alliance: Anglo-Japanese, 44-46,
49, 218, 283, Appendix VI.
Allies: author's feeling about,
Pref., 36; Japan and Britain
as allies, 43-48, 78; silent as
America brought war issue
into China, 98; China not to
join Allies in war on Germany,
109, 110; Allied Ministers
hold different theory from
President Feng, 110, 111; in-
trigue with Japan unknown to
China or U. S. A., 112-117;
helped autocracy and not de-
mocracy in China, 129-131,
263, 264; all eight in Peking
make twelve complaints of
China's negligence, 136-141 ;
arrayed against China at
Peace Table, 179; handicapped
in China, 244; attitude to
principle as compared with
Central Powers, 269, 270.
America, Americans, U. S. A.:
in the war, Pref.; generous to
China, 2, 251 ; aid in neutral-
ity sought by China, 38; criti-
cize Japan, 65, 223, 225;
checkmated by Japan in Fu-
kien, 78; protests the 1915
Si no- Japanese agreements, 82,
83; tied up with intrigue, 84;
part played in bringing China
into the war, 84-111; leader
of neutral nations and then
changed, 89, 90; alliance with
China against Japan, 92, 93;
responsibility with others in
leading China into war, 96, 97,
104; note to China declaring
China's enrtry into war second-
ary, 104, 105; restricted when
neutral by the British, 148,
254 ; how help was given to
Britain in destroying German
trade, 150, 153; policy about
enemy property changeable,
153; better treated by Ger-
mans than by Japanese, 175;
looked up to by China at
Paris, 171, 180; help to China
a delusion, 70, 178, 180, 200,
201, 206, 207; to be blamed at
Paris along with Japan, 201,
224; join English in dislike of
Japan, 215; tr^da-.in opium,
237 ; future influence in China,
250-256; reputation as China's
friend, 251, 253; hampered
by Entente and Japan, 254-
256.
American Minister in Peking:
see Reinsch.
Anderson, F.: on Germans and
Japanese compared, 175.
Anderson, Roy S.: help to Dr.
Reinsch on war issue, 91.
Appeal: of Britain to Japan, 46-
48.
Ariga, Dr.: advises China on
war zone, 56.
Arthur, Port: given up by
Japan, 4; acquired by Russia,
7 ; in Japanese hands, 75.
813
314
INDEX
Asahi, Osaki: sees no good to
China for entry into war, 122.
Asia: affected badly by the war,
36, 38.
Associated Press: agent in Pe-
king, helping war campaign,
91.
Astronomical instruments at Pe-
king: taken by Germany to be
returned, 193.
Austria-Hungary: China declares
war against, 106; Minister in
Peking sends humorous note
to China, 111; its dismember-
ment, 263.
Autocracy: takes place of de-
mocracy in China through war
issue, 84, 101; its ascendency
in China, 129, 130; to be over-
thrown everywhere, 263, 264.
Balfour, Arthur: keeps hid se-
cret treaties, 115, 116.
Barnardiston, Gen.: at Tsingtao,
54.
Belgium: neutrality compared
with China's, 56, Appendix I;
losses compared with those of
China, 73.
Bland, J. 0. P.: on Britain's
commercial aims, 2; on Brit-
ish, railway concessions, 11;
on Japan's ideas of treaties,
13; on Japan's growing power,
15; critic of Japan, 223.
Bliss, Dr. W. D. P.: on Bolshe-
vism in Asia, 144.
Blythe, Samuel G.: quoted as to
" Flying Wedge," in Saturday
Evening Post, 89-94; helps Dr..
Reinsch on war issue, 91.
Board of Trade in London: its
plans for extending trade, 247.
Bolshevism: possibility of spread-
ing to China, 143-145.
Borah, Senator: quotes Balfour
versus Wilson and Lansing as
to secret treaties, 115, 116.
Boxer uprising: why begun, 11;
indemnity for, to be given up
by Germans, 92, 192, 193; as
viewed by John Hay, 141.
Boycott of Japanese goods: by
Chinese, 228, 239, 243.
Briand, M.: demands on Japan
in action against Germany,
115, 150.
Britain, Great, British, English:
first attack on China, 1 ; trade
in China, 2, 147-149, 247-250;
leases Weihaiwei, 7; France a
rival, 8, 9, 10; sphere of in-
terest, 9; dispute with Russia,
6, 9, 10; dispute with Ger-
many, 9, 10; has railway con-
cessions, 11; with Germany
one group, 13; both Japan and
Germany as rivals, 15; must
not be partial against, 36;
changes European war into
World War, 37, 45; culpabil-
ity with Japan compared, 43-
62; dubious of Japan, 65, 77,
78, 246; secret agreement with
Japan as to Germany and
China, 112, 113; demands on
China about Tibet, 124-126;
plan to uproot German trade
in China, 147-149; seizes Ger-
man property at Chinese
treaty-ports, 157, 158, 162;
complaint against Japan, 215,
216; alliance with Japan, 218,
283, Appendix VI; trade in
opium, 236; her future in
China as compared with Japan
and America, 246, 247, 250;
checking American railway
concession, 254; conduct in
China after armistice. 265-268;
as land of freedom, 271.
Brothels in China: started hy-
Japanese, 234; under British
rule in Shanghai, 235.
Brotherhood, universal: still a
true principle, 276.
Brown, Arthur J.: on Britain
and Japan conferring about
Tsingtao, 44; on secret diplo-
macy, 117; doubts benefit to
China from the war, 121; tells
of weary road for China's Re-
public, 130; receives letter
from Prof. Richter on German
INDEX
315
Missions, 164; on Germans
and Japanese compared, 187;
on increase of Japanese in
Shantung, 190; fair critic,
223; on Japan's ambitions,
226; on Japan's business meth-
ods, 230; on Japanese vices in
China, 234; on nationalizing
Christian Missions, Appendix
IV.
Bryan, William Jennings: sends
identic note to Japan and
China, 82.
Burton, Theodore E. : objects to
protectorate for China, 142;
on Germans and Japanese com-
pared, 174.
Cables touching China: pass to
Japan in Peace Treaty, 188,
189.
Castis "belli: by China more
against Japan than Germany,
88.
Central Powers: no request of
China to side with them in
war, 123; compared with Big
Three, 244, 269.
Chamber of Commerce: of China,
opposed to entry into war,
106; British, on open door,
142; in Shanghai, advise ne-
gotiating with Japan, 216;
American, on Japan's restric-
tions, 256.
Chang Hsun, Gen.: called by
President Li to mediate, 102;
demands a mandate to dissolve
Parliament, 102; declared res-
toration of Manchu Emperor,
103; defeated by Tuan Chi-jui,
103.
Chang Tsung-hsiang: of pro-
Japan group, 99.
Chen Chin-tao : helps Reinsch on
war issue, 91.
Chen, Eugene: helps bring China
into war, 91; praises Chinese
note to Germany, 95, 96.
China, Chinese: pro-Chinese,
Pref. ; conflict with Japan, 1,
49, 168, 169; encroachments
on, see Encroachments; loses
Hongkong, 1 ; loses Amur, 2 ;
loses Tongking, 2; loses Ko-
rea, 4; loses Formosa, 4; loses
Burma, 9; ignored in her own
afifairs, 13, 129, 275; agree-
ments made with Germany, 19-
32, 176, 177; kept in turmoil
by Japan, 14, 213; trying to
maintain neutrality, 38, 39,
66, 61 ; injured by the war,
42, 52, 55, 69-83, 100-103, 168;
neutrality violated by Japan,
54-62, Appendix I; weakened
by Japan's Demands, 63-83,
178; has always hope of future
help, 71, 180, 199-202; did not
complain about Shantung in
1915 negotiations, 73, 80;
Sino-Japanese agreements and
Versailles treaty compared, 70,
72, 73, 80, 179; injured by in-
trigues leading her into war,
84-118; reasons of, for enter-
ing the war, 88, 106, 107; at
first opposed to entering the
war, 90; proposal of alliance
with U. S. A. against Japan,
92; note of rebuke and threat
to German Minister, 95; three
groups on war issue, 99; be-
comes land of upheaval and
strife over war issue, 101, 102,
105, 109; receives American
Note counselling internal peace
before entry into war, 104,
105; declares war against Cen-
tral Powers without Parlia-
mentary sanction, 106; reasons
against entering the war, 107,
108; waging war independent-
ly, 109, 110, Appendix II; de-
ceived by intrigues in Tokio,
112-118, 179; receives promises
on entry into war, 118-120;
benefit from entry into war
doubted, 121, 122; has trou-
bles after entry into war, 121-
146; gets demands from Brit-
ain about Tibet, 124, 125; ob-
jects to Lansing-Ishii agree-
ment, 126-129; in thraldom to
8ie
INDEX
Japan, 132-136; gets com-
plaint from eight Legations,
137, 138; forced after armis-
tice to issue mandates for
repatriation and liquidation of
Germans, 141; threatened by
foreign protectorate, 141, 142;
aflfected by commercial rival-
ries, 147-162; opposed to liqui-
dating German property, 150,
151 ; inclined to treat Germans
justly, 150, 162, 166; delega-
tion at Peace Conference, 168-
170, 197-201; aligns with
America at Paris, 170, 171;
decision against, made by Big
Three, 171; her past treaties
not abrogated, 177, 178; how
deluded, 70, 71, 178, 180, 200,
201, 206, 207; the losses in
Versailles treaty, 182-197;
badly treated at Paris, 200,
201, 277; future prospects and
duty, 206-222 ; reconciliation
with Japan needed, 214-218,
239, 240; affected by Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, 218, 283,
Appendix VI; chance for self-
development, 273, 274; ad-
vised by author to get ready
in war, 294; war declaration
as viewed by author when
editor in Peking, 292-294.
China Merchants Steamship Co.:
suggested expansion, 221, 222.
Chinda, Viscount: delegate at
Paris, 170.
Christianity: as shown in diplo-
macy, 63; forgotten in restric-
tions on German missions,
163-167; only hope for Chi-
nese, 207; badly shown to
Chinese after armistice, 265-
268.
Chronicle, Japan: quoted on
folly of deporting Germans,
152; on trade in morphia, 237.
Civilization: European as shown
in China, 63, 266-268; Chinese,
1; bad, of the West in Japan,
240.
Claims: Gkrmans can present
none against Allies, 158, 194;
Allies can present against
Germans, 159; made by Japan
at Peace Table, why agreed to,
196, 197; of Chinese at Peace
Table rejected, 197, 198.
Cleraenceau, M. : decides against
China at Paris, 171.
Colonies, German : Wilson's point
bearing thereon, 171.
Commerce: German, to be de-
stroyed, an early secret com-
pact, 115; rivalries therein
brought trouble to China, 147-
162; of Chinese, 222; of
Japan in Eastern Asia, 228-
230; of British in China, 11,
247-250; of French in Chin.,,
245; of Americans in China,
11, 251-255.
Commercial aims: of British in
Great War, 45, 46, 113, 149.
Competition: of British and
others in China, 147-149, 243-
260.
Compromise: followed at Peace
Table, 199, 205.
Compton, Major T. E.: on Ja-
pan's feeling to Germany, 45.
Concession at Chinese ports: ac-
quired for sole control, 7, 16;
by Germany at Tsingtao, 21 ;
at treaty-ports, how different
from Tsingtao, etc., 21 ; de-
manded by Japan at Tsingtao,
70, 71, 183; international, at
Tsingtao, 71, 183, 275; German
at Tientsin and Hankow al-
lotted China, 194; in Shang-
hai no voice by Chinese, 275.
Concessions in railways and
coal: battle of, 10, 11; also
sought by Americans, 10;
Britain gets most, 11; by
groups in China, 13, 14; Grer-
man, in Shantung, 14, 27-33;
those of Germany seized by
Japan, 59-61 ; those of Ger-
many allotted Japan, 185-188.
Conciliatory spirit: adopted by
Germans, 14, 173-175, 188;
may be adopted by Japanese,
INDEX
317
188; of all nations after
Boxer cataclysm, 260; needed
in all the world, 265, 268.
Confucianism: opposed to meth-
ods of foreign diplomacy, 63.
Consortium in China: its pros
and cons, 220, 221, 251, 275.
Conquest, right of: claimed by
Japan, 60, 61, 64; confirmed
in treaties, 72, 73, 189.
Conty, M. : congratulates China
on declaring war, 110.
Conventions: see Treaties.
Co-operation: of Germans and
Chinese, 24, 27, 28, 173, 258;
of Chinese and Japanese, 75,
77, 228.
Coimcil of the League: Japan
sure member, 169; China mem-
ber for one year, 169.
Council, Supreme, at Paris: see
Supreme.
Craddock, Admiral: defeated by
German Admiral, 41.
Culpability; of Germany in
1898 same as that of others,
6, 16, 33-35; of Japan and
Britain in bringing war into
China, 43-54; of all in bring-
ing China into war, 84-86, 96-
98, 103, 106, 110, 112, 117,
224; of all in settlement at
Peace Table, 201, 208, 224;
in immoralities, all the same,
235-238.
Custodian of Alien Property: in
America, 153, 154 ; in the
Philippines, 154; in Hongkong,
154, 157; as to China Com-
panies registered in Hongkong,
157, 158.
Delegation at Peace Conference:
Chinese, 169, 170, 183, 184,
191, 192, 196, 197, 200, 202,
206; Japanese, 169, 171, 184,
192; Chinese, concerning Wil-
son, 203, 206; Chinese on
Right over Might, 211.
Delusions and vain hopes for
China: 70, 71, 108, 178-180,
199-204, 206, 252.
Demands on China: twenty-one
by Japan, original, revised
and accepted, 62-83, 178, 206;
twelve by Britain about Ti-
bet, 124-126.
Democracy: abandoned by China
for autocracy, 84, 106, 129-
131, 263, 264; Li Yuan-hung,
exponent of, 88, 130, 145; out-
look for, in China bright, 89;
not encouraged by democratic
countries, 143, 144; outlook
in Japan, 239; how far an
object in the world, 263, 264.
Dewey, John: in praise of Ger-
mans in China, 173, 174; on
Chinese militarism, 211; on
friendship between Chinese
and Germans, 219; on Amer-
ican influence in China, 252.
Diplomacy: has fine phrases, 20;
Japanese, 63, 64, 171; old kind
and new, 88; played by Amer-
icans in Peking, 89, 94; as
pursued by Entente in Tokio,
117; of good-feeling, 220.
Diplomatic relations: severed by
China with Germany as U. S.
A. had done, 85-100, 123.
Donald, W. H. : an Australian
helping Dr. Reinsch in war
agitation, 91.
Duress: in making treaties, see
Force majeure; before and
after war, 34; as seen at
Peace Table, 183.
Elimination of Germany from
China: a bad policv, 43, 65,
74, 172-176, 235; the Allied
aim, 49, 113; ends in Japan's
supremacy, 243.
Embroiling China in the war:
through Intrigue in Peking,
84-112; through intrigue in
Tokio, 112-118.
Empress Dowager: coup d'etat
of, 8; not punished as head of
Boxer war in 1900, 11.
Encroachments on China: for-
eign, 1-15; by European war,
36-62; by Japan in the war.
318
INDEX
52-62; by Japan through
Twenty-one Demands, 63-83.
Entanglements: of China with
European Powers and Japan
prior to Great War, 1-15; of
Germany, 6, 7, 16, 17; of
China with Britain and Japan
on entrance of war, 36-62; of
China with Japan in Twenty-
one Demands, 63-83; of China
with America, Entente and
Japan, 84-118; of China with
Britain about Tibet, 124-126;
of China with America and
Japan in Lansing-Ishii Agree-
ment, 126-129; of China with
Japan during the war, 132-
136; of China with Allied and
Associated Nations, 136-143;
of China with Bolsheviki
movement, 143-145; of China
bv commercial rivalries, 147-
162; of China at Peace Table,
168-205; of China with Japan
in the future, 223-242; of
China with Britain, America
and Germany in the future,
243-260; to be avoided by U.
S. A. and China, 278, 279.
Equal opportunities: in China,
see Open Door; stipulated by
Japan and others, 13; sought
by Germany, 21 ; should still
prevail, 142, 143.
Equality, racial and national : re-
jected at Paris, 195, 196.
Expansion : Japanese, 5, 43, 45,
66, 67, 225-227.
Exploitation: in foreign groups,
14; the principle recognized in
Peace Treaty, 187, 188; see
Encroachment.
Extra-territoriality in China: to
be given up some time, 22,
274 ; removal of, a Chinese aim
at Peace Table, 198.
Facts: should be knbwn, vi, 270;
shaping principles, 261.
Fairness: the basis of discus-
sion, V, 16, 43, 223; deserved
by Japan, 43, 223-227; world-
wide, 158, 269, 274.
Fait accompli: a theory in
Japan, 64; binds China, 207.
Far East: China aiming to pre-
serve neutrality of, 38; peace
of, not through war, 42, 50;
Gibbons on failure of perma-
nent peace therein, 244.
Fatalism: of Chinese in meeting
trouble, 121, 207.
Feng Kuo-chang: becomes Presi-
dent, 103; declares war, 106;
conversation with author on
declaring war independently,
109; speech against siding
with Entente, 110; in conver-
sation with author expresses
no hope for China, 122; an op-
portunist, 132; gets warning
concerning foreign dictation,
136; proclamation on going to
war against Central Powers,
Appendix II ; congratulated
by the author, while editor,
292-294.
Ferguson, Dr. John C. : helps
Reinsch on war issue, 91.
Finances: influence of, in China's
declaration of war, 106, 107;
of China in Japan's hands, 134,
135.
Fiume: Wilson's words to be ap-
plied to Shantung, 203, 204.
Force majeure: of Boxer Proto-
col, 11; of German 1898 treaty,
6, 17, 18, 34; of Sino-Japa-
nese agreements of 1915, 34,
68, 79; at Peace Table, 183.
Formosa: acquired by Japan, 4,
9.
France, French: in opening
China, 1; in Opium War, 2;
protector of Catholic Mis-
sions, 2, 18; hostilities of
1883, 2; menace to China, 3;
aiding Russia, 4; leases
Kuang-chow-wan, 8 ; checked
by Britain, 8, 9, 10; sphere of
interest, 8; builds railway into
Yunnan, 11; with Russia, one
group, 13; at Lao-shi-kai a
INDEX
319
grievance, 88 ; Minister's
speech in Peking, 110; secret
agreement with Japan as to
Germany and China, 112-115;
seizes German school in
Shanghai, 150; future influ-
ence in China, 245; checking
American railway concession,
254 ; unfavourable to Christian
Missions of other nationals,
Appendix IV.
Franco-German Association :
against war and hate, 268.
Fraser, David: doubts value of
Japan's special position in
Shantung, 105; shows harm
from Japan, 191.
Freedom of the seas: given up,
if there are to be no neutral
nations in war, 85.
Friends, Society of: protests
against excluding German mis-
sionaries, 163, 164.
Friendship: of Americans to
China, 2, 16, 251, 253; of Ger-
many to China, 25, 31-33; by
China to all nations prior to
American pressure, 86; still
needed by China with all na-
tions, 220; needed between
China and Japan, 214, 217,
218; of Chinese for Germans,
219.
Fukien province: as Japan's
sphere of interest, 9; has
growing influence of Japan, 78.
Gains of Japan: by the war, 43,
69-79, 116, 168, 227, 242, 243;
by the Peace Conference, 171,
180-192, 195, 201.
George, Lloyd: receives warning
from Dr. Sun on China's entry
into war, 108; countenances
restriction of German mis-
sions, 163; decides against
China at Paris, 171.
Germany, Germans: friend of, a
pro-German, vi, 123, 158, 269;
people to be treated as friends,
vi, 269; aiding Russia, 4; first
move in China in 1898, 6; am-
bitions later than others', 6,
16; murder of missionaries in
1897, 6, 17, 18; check on
others as China's gain, 6, 7;
treaty of 1898, 7, 19-34;
sphere of interest, 9; clash
with Britain avoided, 9, 10;
rights in Shantung acknowl-
edged by Britain, 10; railway
of, in Shantung, 11, 27, 28,
186; with Britain, one group
in China, 13; adopts concilia-
tory policy in China, 14, 173-
176, 219; terms of Tientsin-
Pukou Railway, 14, 31 ; rival
of Britain, 15, 147-149, 246;
called a menace to China, 6,
16-18, 25, 65, 191; rights in
Shantung, 19, 66. 69, 171-178;
should have equal chance with
others, 21, 22, 29; culpability
like that of others, 16, 17, 22,
33, 35; rule in Kiaochow to be
praised, 26, 27, 30-33, 174-176;
does not obstruct China's neu-
trality in World War, 38;
anxious to keep war away
from Tsingtao, 38; proposed
direct transfer of Tsingtao to
China, 39; proposes plan of
neutrality to Japan, 40; Pa-
cific Squadron kept away from
Tsingtao, 41, 42, 44; receives
ultimatum, 50; defence of
Tsingtao, 53, 54, 57, 58; elimi-
nation from China, bad policy,
43, 65, 74, 172-176, 235;
rights in Shantung pass to
Japan by conquest and treaty,
19, 69-74. 180-189; ready to
consult China, 70; rebuked
and threatened by note from
China, 94, 95 ; receives China's
severance of relations, 98-100;
China declares war against,
106, Appendix II; all rights
in Shantung and North Pacific
guaranteed to Japan by secret
compact, 113-115; repatriation
of, agreed upon by Entente and
Japan, 115, 150; destruction
of trade of, planned for by
320
INDEX
Entente, 113-115, 137, 139, 147-
153, 158-162, 257, 258; defeat
did not end imperialistic
schemes in others, says Wilson,
145; Germans as Germans to
suffer, 152, 268; no chance to
present claims, 158; German
Government allowed to reim-
burse losses of nationals, 161 ;
German Missions attacked in
treaty, 163, 164; work of Ger-
man missionaries, 165, 166;
may expect just treatment
from Chinese, 157, 166; forced
in Versailles treaty to break
treaties with China and re-
nounce all rights in China in
favor of Japan, 171-189; pol-
icy and conduct compared with
others', 244, 269, 270, 274 ; can
co-operate with Americans,
254; future chances and influ-
ence in China, 256-260; its
militarism, should be de-
stroyed, but not its trade and
industry, 210, 211, 257, 258,
262; will renew friendship
with Chinese, 219, 258; link-
ing hands with Japan, 45, 58,
259; must have trade in Rus-
sia, 259, 260; hatred to Ger-
mans in China a disgrace,
268; violation of international
law given as the cause of war
by CWna, Appendix II.
Gibbons, Herbert Adams: on
blaming Germans alone, 33 ; in
praise of German conduct in
Shantung, 175; on Japan's
priority in Asia, 226; on fail-
ure of Peace Conference, 244.
Globe, N. Y. : on private prop-
erty inviolable, 160.
Goodnow, Frank J.: quoted as
to Japan's designs, 118.
Gore, Bishop: counsels moral
ideals in war, 166; on mili-
tarism among ourselves, 262.
Goto, Baron: says agreements
must be secret, 136.
Grey, Earl of: dying message
one of love, 167.
Grey, Sir Edward: tried to cir-
cumscribe the war, 37.
Griffith, Major Sanford : on Brit-
ish trade with Germany, 250.
Gulick, Sidney L. : on Twenty-
one Demands, 67; on China
getting fair-play, 274.
Hague Conventions: broken in
Shantung, 59, 284, 285;
against confiscating private
property, 156; should have
been given natural develop-
ment after Great War, 279.
Hall's "International Law":
quoted on duties of neutrality,
61; against confiscating pri-
vate enemy property, 155.
Hamilton, Alexander: on private
property as inviolable, 156.
Hanyehping Company: growing
control of, by Japan, 77.
Hara, Premier: for Japanese in-
fluence in China, 135.
Hart, Sir Robert: as Inspector-
General of Chinese Customs
arranges about Tsingtao, 24.
Hate: in war and after, un-
christian, 265-268.
Hay, John: his open door policy,
11; saved China, 141.
Hegemony of Far East: Japan's
aim, 64.
Hill, David Jayne: criticizes
League of Nations, 280.
Hintze, von: ready to consult
China, 70; commends himself
to the Chinese, 100; leaves
Peking, 100.
Hioki, Mr.: presents Twenty-one
Demands, 65 ; negotiates agree-
ments with China, 68.
Hitchcock, Senator: argues that
only by ratifying Versailles
treaty is liquidation of Ger-
man property made legal, 160,
161.
Hobson, J. A.: criticizes League
of Nations, 278.
Hodges, Charles: on Japanese
hampering Americans, 256.
INDEX
321
Hopes, China's: many, in future,
69, 199, 201.
Hornbeck, S. K. : on Germans In
Tsingtao, 26; on Germans In
Shantung, 31-33; on peril
from Japan's position in
China, 74; on reason of Ja-
pan's ultimatum to China, 81.
Hsu En-yuan: on failure of
Americans in trade in China,
253.
Hsii Shih-chang: sends Chinese
delegation to Paris conference,
168; on internationalizing
China's railways, 221; on
League of Nations, 277.
Hyndman, H. M.: on Japanese
unpopularity, 241.
Ichihashi: on Japan's duty to-
wards China, 242.
Ijuin, Ambassador: delegate at
Paris, 170.
Immoral deeds of Japan in
China: seen in sale of opiiun,
morphine and brothels, 176,
233-237.
Indemnity: Boxer, to be partly
cancelled, 92, 192, 193.
Independence: of Korea recog-
nized, 4; of Korea, taken
away, 12; of China, guaran-
teed, 13; Military Governors
declare for, as against Presi-
dent Li, 102; from foreign con-
trol needed in China, 222, 274.
Independently, waging war :
President Feng's idea, 109,
110.
Independent, N. Y.: on great in-
crease of British Empire, 249,
Influence in China: of Japan,
223-242; of Western nations,
243-260.
Influence, spheres of: see
Spheres.
Inspector-General of Chinese
Customs: a Britisher, 5;
makes arrangement with Ger-
many, 24; acts against Ger-
mans, 151.
interests, special: see Special.
Interest, spheres of: see Spheres.
International Law: violated in
bringing war into China, 54-
60, 281-289; violated in seizure
of private property, 61, 153-
162; violations of, by Japan
condoned in Peace Treaty,
183; violation of, by Germany
led to China's declaration of
war. Appendix II.
Internationalizing, plans of :
China's railways, 220, 221;
should include all, and China,
274, 275.
Intrigue: American and Allied,
in Peking, 84-111; abhorred by
President Li, 100; Allied in
Tokio, 112-118.
Ishii, Viscount: keeps hid secret
compacts of Tokio, 115; see
also Lansing-Ishii agreement;
speaks of moral awakening of
China as a danger, 263.
Italy: her future in China, 245;
Wilson's ideas concerning, ap-
plied to China, 203, 204.
Ito, Count: peace negotiator, 4;
Resident-General in Korea, 12.
lyenaga. Dr.: on Japan's prior
position in Far East, 227; on
Japan's political influence in
China, 231.
Japan, Japanese: an American
as pro or not, vi; conflict with
China, 1, 3; compared with
Western nations, 1, 33, 113,
224, 225; ambitions for ex-
pansion, 5, 45, 64, 66, 225-228 ;
war by decades, 3; sphere of
interest in China, 9, 12, 225;
gains from Russo-Japanese
war, 12; as leader in conven-
tions about China, 13; helping
to keep China in turmoil, 14,
213; growing rival of Britain,
15, 243, 246; no right to
Kiaochow, 22, 34, 183; exclud-
ing Chinese from railway in
Shantung, 30; spurns China's
request on neutrality, 38; ig-
nores German neutral scheme,
322
INDEX
40; gains through Great War,
43, 69-82, 112, 113; culpabil-
ity with Britain compared, 43-
49; friendly to Germans, 45,
58; ultimatum to Grermany,
50-53; violates China's neu-
trality, 54, 59, 61, Appendix
I; in battle at Tsingtao, 54-
58; promises restoration of
Kiaochow, 52, 71, 179, 239,
303, 308; twenty-one demands
on China and forced agree-
ment, 63-83, 178; wins in
China by Might, 60, 64, 81,
185; diplomacy, 60, 64, 171;
at first opposed to China's en-
trance into the war, 87, 98;
finds U. S. A. and China com-
bined against her, 92, 98; per-
suasive voice in getting China
to declare war, 97, 98, 106;
oflfended by American intru-
sion, 105; scheme as to China
in war to detach her from
America, 111; intrigues with
Entente as against China, and
U. S. A., as well as Germany,
112-118, 302, 305; gets quid
pro quo, 113; gets from
America recognition of spe-
cial interests in China, 126-
128 ; increased power in China,
66, 79, 132-135, 189, 190, 227;
tactics at Peace Table, 168,
169, 171, 195, 196; delegation
at Paris, 169; conduct com-
pared with Germans, 173-176,
187, 191; immoral influence,
176, 233-237; as to abroga-
tion of treaty with China,
177-179; claims met in Ver-
sailles treaty, 180-190; Japan
not solely blamable, 33, 35,
43, 171, 201, 209, 224; possible
withdrawal from Paris Con-
ference, 197, 305-308; should
be reconciled to China, 214-
218, 228, 238, 240; blamed by
British and Americans, 215,
216; Alliance with Britain,
44, 45, 49, 218, Appendix VI;
future prospects and duty in
China, 223-242; hard to get
commendation, 43, 223; possi-
ble relations with Germans, 45,
58, 259; attitude to Christian
Missions, 299, 300.
Jay treaty: teaches private
property inviolable, 156.
Jenks, Jeremiah W.: on North
and South factions in China,
213; critic of Japan, 223;
quotes Viscount Ishii, 263.
Jones, Jefferson: on Britain
seeking Japan's aid, 47 ; on re-
storing Kiaochow to China,
52; quotes Chinese Note on
war zone in Shantung, 57; on
fall of Tsingtao, 58; on Japa-
nese occupation, 58, 59.
Jordan, Sir John: dealing with
Yuan Shih-kai about China's
joining the war, 86 ; as doyen,
136; confers about open door,
142.
Justice: in passing judgment, v,
16, 43, 223-227; lacking in
Japan's refusal to indemnify
China, 73; none in seizing
private property, 158, 161;
none in restricting missions
of Germans, 163; lacking in
dealing with German rights,
176; a loser in Versailles
treaty, 180, 198, 200, 205; a
world-wide need, as voiced by
Wilson, 269, 274.
Kaiser, the: orders not to sur-
render Tsingtao, 54; after-
wards allows surrender, 58.
Kamio, Gen.: at Tsingtao, 54;
reported treatment of Ger-
mans, 58.
Kang Yiu-wei: noted reformer,
opposed to China's entry into
war, 106.
Kato, Baron: on Britain asking
for aid, 46; on Japan's aid
sought by Britain, 47; dis-
claims promise to restore
Kiaochow, 53.
Kawakami, K. K. : on Britain
seeking Japan's aid, 47, 48;
INDEX
323
on China's reason for joining
the Allies, 86, 87; on Sino-
Japanese agreement of 1918,
187; on new railways to be
built by Japan, 188; on
China's criticisms, 225; on
Japan's rights equal with
others, 226; on Japan's com-
mercial needs, 228; on domi-
nation of China, 231.
Kiaochow and Tsingtao: aimed
at by Russia, 6; contracted
for by Germany, 7; Britain
advised to get, 6; Germany's
treaty concerning, 20-27; not
to be sublet, 22; administra-
tion by Germany beneficial, 26,
27; China's proposal to neu-
tralize in time of war, 38;
transfer to China proposed by
Germany, 39; captured by Ja-
pan in battle, 54, 57, 58; res-
toration of, promised to China,
52, 71, 179, 239, 303, 308; how
disposed of, by 1915 treaty, 70,
71, 178, 179; how disposed of,
in Versailles treaty, 183, 184.
Koo, Dr. Wellington: in League
Council, 169; delegate to
Paris, 170; on committee to
draft League Covenant, 170.
Korea: centre of dispute, 3;
cause of China- Japan war, 3;
independence recognized by
China, 4; under predominance
of Japan, 12; absorbed by Ja-
pan, 12; an example of Ja-
pan's ambition in Shantung,
65.
Kung, Prince : classed opium and
missionaries together, 2.
Kuo Tai-chi: tells of generous
offer of Japan, 191, 192.
La Motte, Miss : on lofty tone of
China's note to Germany, 96;
on Britain's demands on
China, 125; on Japan in
China, 232.
Lansing, Secretary: as partly re-
sponsible for China's joining
the war, 84, 90; ignorant of
secret compacts made in To-
kio, 115, 116; see also Lansing-
Ishii agreement; on Japan's
threatened withdrawal from
Peace Conference, 197, 306,
307.
Lansing-Ishii Agreement : two
sides, open door and Japan's
special interests, 126-128; ob-
jected to by China, 129; failed
in not recognizing China's spe-
cial interests, 275.
Lapradelle, A. G. de: article
quoted, 281-289.
Lawrence, T. J.: disapproves di-
vision of sovereign powers, 24.
League of Nations: endorses the-
ory of a potential world-war
with no neutral nations, 85;
on regional understandings as
affecting China, 195; as
China's hope, 200, 206, 304,
307; criticized by Felix Adler,
205; far short of Wilson's
ideals, 277; why a failure,
279.
Lease of Chinese ports: begun
in 1898, 6, 7, 16; of Kiao-
chow, to end by agreement
with Japan, 70, 71, 72; of two
kinds, treaty, and under ex-
clusive control of one nation,
21.
Lease of land away from Chinese
ports: right to Japan in Man-
churia, 75.
Li Hung-chang: peace envoy, 4;
as diplomat, 4, 7.
Li Yuan-hung: successor to
Yuan Shih-kai as President
and representative of Democ-
racy, 80, 100; ready to follow
Wilson in neutrality, 89; op-
posed to China's leaving neu-
trality, 91, 100; did not favor
war, 100, 102, 106; in conflict
with war party, 100-102; .is-
sues mandate dissolving Par-
liament, 102; chagrined, he re-
signs as President, 103; gave,
real chance for a Republic,"
100, 130; remaining at the
324
INDEX
head of China could have
saved her from Bolshevism,
145.
Liang Chi-chiao: was of pro-
Ally group on war question,
99.
Liaotung: see Manchuria.
Liberty: as upheld or not by
English and Americans, 158,
271; too often only a profes-
sion, 162; versus slavery, 272;
the goal for all peoples, 271,
276.
Liquidation of German property:
planned for by Entente, 113,
115; demanded by eight Lega-
tions, 137, 139, 151; China's
mandate concerning, after
armistice, 141, 149, 151; op-
posed and then helped by
America, 149, 153, 154; con-
trary to American-Prussian
treaties, 153; contrary to in-
ternational law, 155, 156;
contrary to Chinese ideas, 157 ;
contrary to morality, 257.
Loans to China: first made by
British, French, Germans, 5;
made by Japan in war time,
134, 135; chance for Ameri-
cans, 251.
London Times: on utilizing the
war for commerce, 45; on
England appealing to Japan,
47; on British area of fight-
ing at Tsingtao, 56.
Losses of China : by the war and
its complications, 43, 52, 69-
82, 101, 103, 107-109, 115, 116,
124-145, 168; in Versailles
treaty, 180-191, 194, 195, 199-
201, 205, 206.
Lou Tseng-tsiang: negotiates on
Twenty-one Demands, 68, 179;
was of pro-Ally or pro-French
group, 99; chief delegate at
Paris, 170; laments the Peace
Treaty, 206.
Lowell, James Russell: sings of
true freemen, 272.
Loyalty: how wrongly gauged in
war time, 262,
Lu Tsung-yu: of pro- Japan
group, 99.
Lungkow: Chinese port where
Japanese landed to attack
Tsingtao, 54, 283, 286.
McCarthy, Justin : criticizes
Opivun War, 1.
McDonald, Sir Claude: supports
German action in 1897-8, 17,
18.
McMaster, John B.: on Presi-
dent's promise not to seize
German property, 153.
Makino, Baron: delegate at
Paris, 169.
Manchu House: overthrown, 14;
temporary restoration, 103.
Manchuria: Russia in, 5, 7, 9;
has Liaotung controversy, 4,
5, 9; has railway built by
Russia, 11; seat of Russo-
Japanese war, 12; finds Japan
taking Russia's place, 75-77.
Marcosson, Isaac F.: on British
preparedness for trade war,
247.
Marine, merchant: needed in
China, 221, 222.
Marshall, Chief Justice: on deal-
ing with enemy property, 154.
Massingham, H. W. : on wrong
done to Germany, 257.
Matsui, Ambassador: delegate at
Paris, 169.
Menace to China: French, 3;
Russian, 2; German, 6, 16-18,
25, 65, 191 ; Japanese, 65, 173-
176.
Meyer- Waldeck, Gov.-Gen. : hoists
white flag at Tsingtao, 58.
Might, rule of: that of Japan,
60, 64, 81, 186; in seizing
enemy property, 158; shown
in Great War and at Paris,
210, 211.
Militarism: Japanese, 60, 64,
210; strengthened in China, on
entry into war, 102, 103, 129,
130; Prussian and other kinds,
210, 257, 258, 262; bad for
China, 212, 264.
INDEX
325
Militaristic faction in China: in
the saddle, 102, 103, 168, 169,
214; declare for independence,
102; in control, says Dewey,
214.
Military Convention : between
China and Japan, 133, 134.
Military Governors : support
Premier in calling for war,
102; retire to Tientsin and de-
clare independence, 102; sup-
ported by democratic nations,
264.
Military necessity: claimed by
Japan in violating China, 61,
286, 288; in Belgium and
Shantung compared, 42.
Military railway : built by Japan
in China and asked removed, 74.
Military strength of Japan: rec-
ognized at Paris, 169.
Millard, Thomas F.: on bringing
war into China as a pawn, 42;
on Japan taking initiative, 45;
on restoring Kiaochow to
China, 52, 53; on Japanese
army in Shantung, 55; on
seizing enemy property in neu-
tral country, 61; on Japan's
high-handedness, 68 ; on Yuan's
wise course, 69 ; on China's
early proposal to enter the
war, 86; on China and U. S.
A. joining in alliance, 93; on
Japan's scheme to detach
China from U. S. A., Ill; on
proposals of Chinese delega-
tion, 184; critic of Japan, 223.
Mines: in Shantung, as conces-
sion to Germans, 28, 31 ; in
South Manchuria, given to Ja-
pan, 76; in Hanyehping Com-
pany, held by Japan, 77; in
Shantung, pass to Japan by
Peace Treaty, 185, 186.
Ministers in Peking, foreign:
urge on China close associa-
tion with Allies, 110; send
Note to China on her entry
into war, giving assurances,
118; action of, as viewed by
author, 119, 120.
Missions, missionaries: Catholic
and France, 2; as viewed by
Prince Kung, 2; German,
killed, 6; riots against, 17, 18;
under German protectorate,
18; Allied Ministers on
China's sending delegate to the
Pope, 137, 139; of Germans,
prohibited in treaty and this
a wrong, 163-166, Appendix
III and IV; as treated by
Germans and Japanese, 176;
nationalizing missions a dan-
gerous policy, see Appendix
IV; good work of British in
China, 247; good work of
Americans in China, 255.
Mixed Court procedure: adopted
in Manchuria, 75.
Mongolia: position there gained
by Japan, 76, 77.
Monroe Doctrine: applied to Ja-
pan, 195.
Moral influence: of Japan in
China, 233-238.
Moral reform: needed in China,
208-210; needed in Japan, 238.
Morphine, trade in: by Japan,
233-237 ; by British and Amer-
icans, 236, 237.
Morrison, Dr. George E. : China's
official advisor, but helps
American Minister on war
question, 91 ; gives financial
reason for China's entering the
war, 107.
Morse, H. B.: on Li Hung-
chang's finesse, 4; on Britain
as being against break-up of
China, 9; on Chinese sov-
ereignty in Kiaochow, 24; on
Tsingtao as free-port, 24.
Motono, Viscount: Note to
French and Russian Embassies
as to German rights to pass
to Japan, 114; about Military
Convention, 133.
Nationalizing: of Christian Mis-
sions as viewed by English.
Friends, 164, Appendix IV.
326
INDEX
Naval base: as referred to
Tsingtao, 25, 40, 41, 44.
Negotiation, mutual: disallowed
at Paris Conference, 279.
Neutrality: of China, infringed
in Russo-Japanese war, 12;
China's efforts at, fail in
World War, 38-40; of China,
violated by Japan, 56, 59, 61,
Appendix I; China urged to
give up, 85, 86, 89, 93, 100;
Wilson's plan to eliminate, 85 ;
neutral Americans, how treated
by British in China, 148, 149.
North and South: as divided in
China an evil, 212-214.
North China Herald: quoted on
liquidating enemy property,
152; quoted on morphine trade
in China, 236.
Occupation, forceful: by Japan
of Shantung, 59, 288.
Okuma, Count: on Japan's op-
portunity, 43 ; consulting about
Britain's request for aid, 48;
professes well, 52.
Open covenants: as professed but
as absent from part played in
China, 115, 117, 118.
Open door: policy favoured by
Lord Salisbury, 9; Hay's pol-
icy, guaranteed by Japan and
others, 11; violation of, by
Japan receives American pro-
test, 82; modified by Lansing-
Ishii agreement, 126-129; still
needed, 142, 143.
Opium: curse to China, 1; trade
in, by Japanese, British and
Americans, 235-238.
Oppenheim : teaches non-appro-
priation of private enemy
property, 155; says League of
Nations should start in Hague
Conferences, 279.
Outlook, The : on Japan's control
in China, 232; on Japan's true
course, 240.
Overlack, T. W. : on spheres of
interest, 8.
Pacifism: in China, 212.
Palmer, A. Mitchell: as Cus-
todian of Alien Property, 153;
on right to ruin (Jerman busi-
ness, 154.
Parliament, Chinese: restored by
President Li, 89 ; acts on ques-
tion of severing relations with
Germany, 100; began to oppose
war proposals, 101 ; refuses to
be coerced on war question,
102; dissolved, 102, 103; re-
starts in Canton " Constitu-
tional Government," 103;
gives no sanction to China's
declaration of war, 106; new
election needed, 214.
Passive-ism : in Taoism of China,
212.
Peace: of Far East upset by
war, 38, 50; China urged to
forsake, 84; Wilson's teaching
concerning, a mistake, 85 ; best
for China, 211, 212; how to be
lasting, 260; world-wide, as
once taught by Wilson, 261 j
in the spirit, 265.
Peace Conference, Paris: China's
desire to attend, 87, 91, 99,
191; receives Memorial from
Society of Friends, 163; bound
by previous compacts, 171,
179, 306; wrongs China, 176,
180, 199, 200, 201; Sino-
Japanese questions outside
purview of, 190; displeases
China, 205, 206; camouflaged
by Shanghai Conference. 213;
its bad impression on Chinese,
244, 252.
Peace conference in Shanghai:
its purpose and work, 213.
Peace Table at Paris: see Peace
Conference.
Peace Treaty: of China in 1842,
1; of China- Japan, 4, 5; at
Portsmouth between Japan
and Russia, 12; of Versailles,
see Versailles.
Peking: as centre of intrigue in
war, 85-112.
People: German, as friends, vi;
INDEX
327
British, different from govern-
ment, 40, 49; Japanese, differ-
ent from government, 40, 63.
Phelan, Senator: on Japan's ex-
pansion in Asia, 225.
Philippines: Chinese trade in,
222.
Political influence in China: how
far right for Japan, 230-233.
Ports, Chinese: leased to foreign
nations, 6, 7, 16, 21; of Kiao-
chow, 7, 20-27; of Tsingtao as
free-port, 24, 26; of two kinds,
treaty and under exclusive
control of one nation, 21 ;
called commercial, in interior
of China, 76.
Portsmouth treaty: its gains to
Japan, 12.
Preconceptions : as to war in Eu-
rope wrongly applied to con-
ditions in China, 268.
Predominance: of Japan in
China, 66, 81, 135, 189, 226-
228, 232, 233, 245; of Japan
and Great Britain as rivals,
15, 243, 246, 247.
Preferential rights to foreign na-
tions in China: to France in
South China, 8; to Germany
in Shantung, 29; to Japan in
Shantung, 72; to Japan in
Manchuria, 71; to Japan in
Fukien, 78.
Principles, much needed: to be
applied on all questions, 261-
280; as taught by Wilson, 261.
Pro-Ally: as a party in China,
acting on the war question, 99.
Pro-Chinese : versus pro- Japa-
nese by the author, v, vi.
Pro-German: as to events in
China author more so than
pro-Ally, vi; accused as being,
when one argues that China
should take no sides in the
war, 123; accused as being,
when one criticizes seizure of
private enemy property, 158;
suspicion of being a bugaboo,
269.
Pro- Japan: party in China fa-
voured close relations with Ja-
pan, 99, 100, 169.
Propaganda: of all kinds equally
bad, 273.
Property, private enemy: seized
in a neutral country, 60, 61;
to be sequestrated, 115; liqui-
dation of, demanded by eight
Legations in Peking, 137, 139,
141, 151; mandate for liqui-
dation of, issued by China,
after Armistice, 137, 139, 141,
151 ; forced sale of, contrary
to Chinese ideas, 150; seizure
of, opposed and then helped
by Americans, 150, 154, 161;
safe under American-Prussian
treaties, 153, 160; liquidation
of, contrary to international
law, 155, 156
Property, German State : at Kiao-
chow allotted Japan, 189; in
German concessions of Chinese
ports allotted China, 193.
Protectorate: of Catholic mis-
sions in China, 2, 18, 139; by
Japan in China suggested, 141,
142; by joint foreign control,
proposed for China, 141-143.
Protest: none made by Britain
on Japanese action in Shan-
tung, 59; none by China over
Japanese demands about Shan-
tung, 73, 178; made by Ameri-
can Government over Sino-
Japanese agreements, 82 ; made
by China over Lansing-Ishii
agreement, 128.
Railways: by Russians in Man-
churia, 11; by French, 11; by
Germans in Shantung, 11, 27,
28, 186; by British, 11; by
Americans, 10; Tientsin-Pukou
line, 14, 31, 60; in Shantung,
seized by Japan, 59, 60, 61 ;
those to be built in Shantung
give preference to Japan, 72,
187, 188; extended rights to
Japan in Southern Manchuria,
75; Shantung Railway passes
to Japan in Peace Treaty, 185;
328
INDEX
under Japanese control, a dan-
ger to China, 188, 191 ; should
be under Chinese control, 220,
221 ; concessions for, to Japan
and to others compared, 191,
226.
Rape of Shantung: a wrong
phrase, 33, 34.
Rapprochement: needed between
China and Japan, 218.
Reconciliation: needed between
China and Japan, 218, 240,
242; needed by China with
Germany, 218, 219; needed
among all belligerents, 260,
265, 266, 268.
Reforms in China: begun in
1889, 8; of moral kind needed,
209, 210.
Reinsch, Paul S. : American
Minister, partly responsible
for China's entrance into the
war, 84, 89, 90, 96-98; advises
China to join Allies while
America was neutral, 86; agi-
tates in turning China against
Germany, 90-94; doubt as to
his responsibility in China's
declaring war, 103, 104; on
June 9, 1917, has to send a
note to China declaring entry
into war only secondary mat-
ter, 104; interprets Lansing-
Ishii agreement different from
Japanese view, 127; how he
helped autocracy in China,
130; on Japan's trump card,
239; sued author, when editor
Peking Post, for libel, 252.
Repatriation of Germans: from
China, secretly agreed upon
by Japan and Entente, 113,
115;- mandate for, issued by
China after Armistice, 141 ; as
carried out, 151, 152, 266, 267.
Republic, Chinese: a chance un-
der President Li, 100, 130;
through war agitation, ceases
to be. 103.
Requisition of Grerman property:
secretly agreed upon for China,
113, 115; demanded by eight
Legations, 137, 139; by Chi-
nese mandate, 141, 151 ; as re-
lated to law and right, 152-162.
Reservations to Peace Treaty: as
proposed in the Senate, 202.
Restoration of Kiaochow: in
promise made to Germany, 52;
agreed upon with China, 70,
80; ought to be carried out,
239, 303.
Restricting area of war: in lan-
guage of Earl Grey, 37; as
seen in German and English
purpose, 42, 45.
Reunion: essential to China,
212-214.
Revolution in China: of 1911
and after, 14; the fourth, 131.
Richter, Prof. Julius: on Ger-
man Missions, 164.
Righteousness and Right: mixed
up with intrigue, 117; pro-
fessed at Peace Table, 199,
200; how far it has ruled or
failed, 153, 180, 204, 263, 265.
Rights: German, how acquired,
19, 171, 172, 176-178; Chinese,
trampled upon, 19, 178; Rus-
sian, ceded to Japan, 12; Ger-
man, claimed by Japan, 66,
69; of Germany, allotted Ja-
pan at Peace Conference, 171,
177, 179, 182, 185, 188, 189.
Riots: in 1897 in China, 17.
Rivalries, commercial: in China,
10, 13, 15, 147-162, 243, 245,
246, 247, 250, 254, 255.
Robertson, J. W.: on Japan as
hope of Asia, 241.
Rockhill, W. W.: on Britain
seeking Japan's aid, 47.
Rosthorn, Dr. von: Austrian
Minister, China's friend, and
his note to China, 111.
Russia, Russians : encroaching
on China, 2; understanding
witli Li Hung-chang, 4; push-
ing into Manchuria, 5, 6; rail-
way in Manchuria, 6, 11; aims
at Kiaochow, 6; leases Port
Arthur, 7; sphere of interest,
9; dispute with Britain over
INDEX
329
Manchuria, 9, 10; certain
rights ceded to Japan, 12
with France, one group, 13
itg Bolshevist menace, 143-145
future influence in China, 245
will have relations with Ger
mans, 259.
Saionji, Marquis: delegate at
Paris, 169.
Salisbury, Lord: about Kiao-
chow, 6; in clash with Russia,
9; in clash with Germany, 9;
hears about German action of
1897-8, 17.
Schools in China: German in
Shanghai, seized by the
French, 150; German in
Shanghai allotted French and
Chinese together, 194.
Secret diplomacy: insisted on in
Twenty-one Demands of Ja-
pan, 65; in schemes of Entente
and Japan to China's injury,
112-117, 179, 302, 303, 305;
called a dubious way by Dr.
Arthur J. Brown, 117.
Selden, Charles A.: gives out in
N. Y. Times secret agree-
ments in Tokio, foot-note, 114,
115.
Self-determination : applied to
Kiaochow, 171, 172; needed in
China, 222, 274.
Self-development : granted to
China, 274.
Senate, United States: reserva-
tion on Shantung Articles in
treaty, 202.
Sequestration : see Liquidation
or Requisition.
Settlements, foreign: see Conces-
sions.
Severance of diplomatic relations
with Germany: China urged
to follow America and then
complies in so doing, 85-100,
123.
Shantung, province of: under in-
fluence of Germany and Brit-
ain, 7; occupied by Japan,
59, 64; suffers from Japan's
demands for German rights,
68, 69; forms separate Head
in Versailles Treaty, 180-190;
subject to two misconceptions,
184, 185.
Shepherd, William G.: on Ger-
man plans to renew trade, 258.
Siam: unfriendly attitude to
Christian Missions because of
Peace Treaty, 300.
Sisson, Francis H. : on England's
trade schemes, 248.
Smith, Charles Stevenson: helps
Dr. Reinsch in war issue, 91.
Snow, A. H. : on German action
in China in 1897-8, foot-note
17, 18; on German conduct in
China, 173; against Japan's
claim, 177.
South and North: division in
China, 213, 214.
Sovereignty: Chinese, still held
in Kiaochow, 23; held by
China in Shantung, 32, 185;
of Shantung, Manchuria and
Mongolia threatened by Ja-
pan, 77.
Spargo, John: on Bolshevism in
Asia, 144.
Special interests and position in
China: sought by Japan, 77,
225; recognized as Japan's in
Lansing-Ishii agreement, 126-
128; not accorded China, 273,
275.
Spee, Admiral von: head of Ger-
man Pacific Squadron, 41; de-
feated, 41.
Spencer-Cooper, Commander: on
aims of German squadron in
Pacific, when war opened, 41.
Spheres of interest or influence
in China: begun by France, 8;
by Russia, 9; by Germany, 9,
27, 29; by Britain, 9; by Ja-
pan, 9, 78; Japan's, grows
after war with Russia, 12;
British, threatened by Japan,
77.
Spies, foreign: to be warned
against, 273.
330
INDEX
Spiritual factor : must be first in
China, 208.
Steps taken to bring China into
the war: were three, 85.
Sturdee, Admiral: defeats Ger-
man Admiral, 41.
Sun-Yat-sen: in first revolution,
14; opposed to China's entry
into war, 106, 109; warns
Lloyd George on entangling
China, 108; of constitutional
party, 264.
Supreme Council in Peace Con-
ference: Japan a member, 169;
decides China's fate, 171, 180,
200, 224; spurns China's re-
quests, 200, 201.
Suspicion: by Chinese of Japan,
74.
Tang Shao-yi : opposed to China's
entry into war, 106; of con-
stitutional party, 264.
Taylor, Alonzo E.: on no repara-
tion without German trade,
259.
Terauchi, Premier : favours Japa-
nese influence in China, 135.
Territory, acquisition of : by Ger-
mans in China, 19; by Britain
in Hongkong and Burma, 1,
9; by French in Annam, 2; by
Japan in Korea, 12; ought to
cease in China, 22, 276; a bad
policy pursued by Japan, 230,
233.
Tibet: subject of Britain's de-
mands on China, 124-126.
Times, New York: prints secret
agreements of Tokio, 114, 115.
Tokio: as centre of intrigue in
the war, 112-117.
Tong, Hollington K. : on direct
negotiation with Japan, 217.
Tong King-Sing: unselfish Chi-
nese merchant, 222.
Trade: see Commerce.
Treaty: see Peace Treaty; of
1898, by China with Britain,
France, Germany and Russia,
7; between China and Ger-
many, 19-31; by Japan with
others about China, 13; con-
ception of, by Japan, 13, 179;
signed at Versailles, see Ver-
sailles; when made under
duress, 17, 34, 68, 69, 183;
Sino-Japanese, of 1915, 69-79;
about abrogating, 177-179; of
1918 between China and Ja-
pan, 133-135, 188.
Tribune, New York: warns of
danger of China joining En-
tente with Japan as leader in-
stead of joining America, 101.
Tsai Ting-kan: helps bring
China into war, 91.
Tsai Yun-pei: of pro- Ally group
on war question, 99.
Tsao Yu-lin : of pro- Japan group,
99.
Tsinan-fu: railway to, from
Tsingtao, 27 ; entered by Japa-
nese troops, 59, 60.
Tsingtao: see Kiaochow.
Tuan Chi-jui: as premier, 89;
at first opposed to war pro-
posals, 91 ; came under Japan's
influence, 99; took lead in ar-
guing for war, 101 ; gets aid
of Military Governors in de-
manding war, 102; dismissed
from office, 102; defeats Chang
Hsun, 103; again becomes
Premier, 103; head of mili-
tarists, 132, 168; makes agree-
ments with Japan, 133, 134,
168; a military Premier, 264.
Ultimatum: by Japan to Ger-
many, 50. 51; by Japan to
China, 68, 81.
United States: see America.
Unity, national: needed in
China, 212-214.
Universal brotherhood: see
Brotherhood.
Van Dyke, Dr. Henry: favours
an Anglo-American-Japanese
Alliance, 218.
Versailles Peace Treaty: uses
phrase, " German rights," 19,
176; compared unfavourably
INDEX
331
' with 1915 Sino-Japanese agree-
ments, 70, 71, 72, 79, 80, 178,
179, 188; stipulates right to
confiscate private property and
companies, 156, 158, 159; on
restricting German Missions,
163, 165, Appendix III and
IV; confirms wrongs already
done to China, 168, 183; be-
low professed ideals, 168;
forces Germany to renounce
her treaty rights in China,
176-178; makes disposition un-
der head " Shantung," 180-190;
also, under head " China," 192-
194; brings wrong into Cove-
nant, 195; not signed by
China, 200, 206 ; first-fruits of
League, 199; reservations to,
by U. S. Senate, 202; puts re-
straint on German opportuni-
ties in China, 256; more to be
criticized than League of Na-
tions, 277; its weakest link is
" Shantung," 277 ; should have
been based on Wilson's princi-
ples, 279; not satisfactory to
Wilson, 305, 308; agreed to
from fear of Japan, 307, 308.
Viviani, M.: keeps secret trea-
ties of Tokio hid from Ameri-
cans, 115.
Wang, C. T.: delegate at Paris,
170; eloquent in English, 170;
speaks of Japan's hold on Pe-
king like pincers, 191.
War: the "Opium," 1; the
Great War, see World War;
with France in 1883, 2; by
China with Japan, 3, 4;
Russo-Japanese, 12; to be fol-
lowed by treaties, 34; first
European and then World
War, 36-43; the war spirit
still alive, 262.
Washington's Farewell Address:
quoted, 278.
^\eak nations: like China, to be
helped, 275, 276.
Weale, Putnam: on Germans in
Tsingtao, 27; on Britain's ap-
peal to Japan, 43; on Twenty-
one Demands, 65; on Japan
as sword of Damocles, 79; on
Foreign Debt Bureau, 221;
critic of Japan, 223.
Westlake, J.: on lease of terri-
tory as alienation, 23.
Wheeler, W. Reginald: on
Reinsch as factor in inducing
China to join the Allies, 103.
White peoples: fighting each
other in presence of yellow
races, 57.
Williams, E. T. : thought Japan
might leave Peace Conference,
197.
Wilson and Tucker's " Interna-
tional Law " : against molest-
ing private enemy property,
155.
Wilson Administration : policy
of, in China, vi; concerned in
China's entrance into war, 84;
as related to consortium, 251,
252.
Wilson, Woodrow: on German
people, vi; only partly re-
sponsible for China's joining
the war, 84, 85, 89, 90, 96, 97 ;
asks China to break with Ger-
many, 85, 90; new theory of
making war a potential world
war, 85; followed by Presi-
dent Li as a neutral, 89; dis-
claims that help was promised
China, 97, 98; ignorant of se-
cret compacts made in Tokio,
113, 116, 171, 302, 305; per-
haps suggested to President of
China idea of warring not as
an ally, 110; speaks of com-
mercial war, 147; speaks of
danger still from imperialistic
schemes, 145; promised not to
seize German property, 153;
later seemed to sanction such
liquidation, 153, 161; exhorts
observance of right with proud
punctilio, 161 ; countenances re-
striction of German Missions,
163; followed at Paris by
Chinese delegates, 171 ; decides
332
INDEX
China issue at Paris, 171; on
colonial claims, 172; hard task
in helping China at Paris, 179,
303 ; has a misconception as to
transfer of Shantung, 184;
wished to insert in treaty
clause on religious liberty,
196; feared Japan might re-
tire from Peace Conference,
197, 307, 308; speaks of in-
justice to China and explains
his action, 198, 199; discusses
Fiume, 203, 204; should apply
to China, 204; was trusted too
much at Paris, says Chinese
delegate, 206 ; disappointed the
Chinese, 252; announced great
principles on war and peace,
261 ; quoted on a conquest by
" friendly helpfulness," 265 ;
on " impartial justice," 269 ;
on " airs of an older day "
stirring again, 270; on serv-
ing liberty everywhere, 272;
on each nation living its own
life, 274; on "interest of the
weakest," a sacred task, 275;
on " common devotion to
right," 276; approved by
China's President, 277; on a
" general alliance " of " com-
mon rights," 278; should have
made his principles Preamble
to treaty, 279; conversation
with U. S. Senators on Peace
Treaty and China, Appendix
V.
World, N. Y.: on Versailles
Treaty worse than League of
Nations, 277.
World War: succeeds European
War, 36 ; no business in China,
36-43 ; brought havoc to China,
168; should have been a war
for principle, 262; should have
overthrown autocracy, 263 ;
ended on basis of Wilson's
principles, 279.
Wu, C. C: helps bring China
into war, 91; supposed to
draft letter to German Min-
ister, 94; favoured imion with
America on war question, 99;
quoted concerning Britain's
demands about Tibet, 126.
Wu Ting- fang: Minister Foreign
AflFairs, 91; favoured aligning
with America on war question,
99; wanted China at Peace
Table, 99; becomes acting
Premier, 102; refuses to coun-
tersign mandate to dissolve
Parliament, 103; quoted on
democracy versus militarism,
131 ; of constitutional party,
264.
Wyllie, W. L.: on Grerman Pacific
Squadron, 41.
Young China: appealed to, on
China's entering the war, 91 ;
captivated by sweeping away
the " archaic," 92 ; favoured
aligning with America, 99;
turned away from Premier's
leadership on war question,
101; democratic ideas of, not
backed by democratic nations,
264.
Yuan Shih-kai: in Korea, 3; in
coup of 1898, 8; becomes Presi-
dent, 14; not liked by Japa-
nese, 3, 14, 39, 65; improves
arrangement with Germans,
29; asks author to work for
China's neutrality, 38; accepts
Japanese advice as to war
zone, 56; receives Twenty -one
Demands, 65; has plan to save
face, 67; prevented revolt, 68;
able to lessen Japan's demands,
69; makes tentative overture
on joining the var, 86, 87 ; as
compared with Li Yuan-hung,
88.
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