F ARMY. REPORT of the Committee on Royal Aircraft Factory, and Report to the War Committee by the Air Board on the Subject of the Royal Aircraft Factory. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty. LONDON: FEINTED UNDEE THE AUTHOEITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONEEY OFFICE BY HAEEISON AND SONS, 45-47, ST. MARTIN'S LANE, W.C., PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO His MAJESTY. To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from WYMAN AND SONS, LIMITED, 29, BREAMS BUILDINGS, FETTER LANE, E.C , and !, ABINGDON STREET, S.W., and 54, ST. MARY STREET, CARDIFF; or H.M. STATIONEEY OFFICE (SCOTTISH BRANCH), 23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH: or E. PONSONBY, LIMITED, 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN; or from the Agencies in "the British Colonies and Dependencies, the United States of America and other Foreign Countries of T. FISHEE UNWIN, LIMITED, LONDON, W.C. 1916. [Gel. 8191] Price ld. (B282) 3000 7/w H&g 34JUwo I. COMMITTEE ON ROYAL AIRCRAFT FACTORY. The Secretary, War Office, London, S.W. Sra, We have the honour to submit our report on enquiries made by us into the affairs of the Royal Aircraft Factory, Farnborough, in compliance with the terms of reference conveyed in your letters of 30th March and extended in that of the 18th April, which are as follows : " To enquire and report whether, within the resources placed by the War Office at the disposal of the Royal Aircraft Factory and the limits imposed by War Office orders, the organization and management of the factory are efficient, and to give the Army Council the benefit of their suggestions on any points of the interior administration of the factory which seem to them capable of improvement." We have received all assistance desired by us from Lieut. -General Sir David Henderson and the Staff of the Military Aeronautics Directorate; Lieut. -Colonel M. O'Gorman, Superintendent, Major Heckstall Smith, Assistant Superintendent, and the Staff of the Royal Aircraft Factory also afforded us every facility for the fulfilment of the duties imposed upon us in our terms of reference. We desire to express our thanks to all these gentlemen. We found the organization and administration of the Royal Aircraft Factory to be as shown on the table attached, marked Appendix " A." The functions of the Royal Aircraft Factory we understand to include original designs of aeroplanes and engines, improvement of existing designs, manufacture of experimental aeroplanes, engines and their parts, and aeronautical devices ; study of and experimental work in all material used in an aeroplane ; preparation of drawings and specifications for contractors, and, in certain cases, supervision of manu- facture ; repair of aeroplanes and engines, and provision of aeroplane and engine spare parts for maintenance ; production of aeroplanes in limited quantity ; and emergency work of all kinds to assist contractors or to make good the failure of contractors. From which it is apparent that the War Office has laid it down that the Royal Aircraft Factory should be devoted to experimental rather than manufacturing purposes. The Royal Aircraft Factory cannot therefore be regarded as an establish- ment working on strictly commercial lines ; it is rather a very large experimental laboratory, probably the largest in the United Kingdom, where experiments are carried out to full scale, therefore expenses must necessarily be high. Experiments upon models to reduced scale are conducted by the National Physical Laboratory as and when required by the Aeronautical Committee or it may be by the Royal Aircraft Factory. The only manufacturing work done since the war began seems to have been an output of about 50 non-experimental machines and the manufacture of spare parts to meet urgent demands. The orders for spare parts are very numerous, but mostly for small quantities ; they, however, aggregate a fair total and their production is an important function of the Royal Aircraft Factory. It is therefore essential that theii manufacture and despatch should be economic and expeditious. The Royal Aircraft Factory has produced : new machines in all since the commencement of the war, while the trade supplies have exceeded * machines. The approximate value of orders placed by Military Aeronautics Directorate from 1st August, 1914, to 31st March, 1916, for aeroplanes, engines and spares of Royal Aircraft Factory design is *, and of private design about half this amount. The strength of the Royal Aircraft Factory on 26th March, 1916, was stated by Captain Douglas to be *. Wages for the week ended 26th March, 1916, amounted to *, excluding the salaries of eight chief officials totalling * per month, and together would, if maintained, show a total of * for a year. It is not considered desirable in the public interest to publish the exact figures. 3 We were informed that the total expenditure on the Royal Aircraft Factory account for the year ended 31st March, 1916, was For wages, salaries, and expenses For materials These figures include sums, not at present precisely known, for increases in capital account ; a rough estimate being mentioned as bstween 60,000. and 70,000. We have been supplied with a copy of the balance sheet for 1914-15, but the conditions of working during that period were so different to the present, that we have not been able to make any very pertinent use of the figures therein contained. Major Heckstall Smith supplied us with diagrams from which we have endeavoured to work out the present percentages of the total absorbed by the various classes of work carried out in the Royal Aircraft Factory. Colonel M. O'Gorman has checked these figures, which are as follows : Per cent. (a.) For experimental work, including a sum of about 5,000/. on indirect expenditure ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 22 (b.) Construction of aeroplanes ... ... ... ... ... ... 35 (c.) Repairs to aeroplanes and manufacture of spare parts ... ... 33 (d.) Repairs to engines and manufactures of spare parts ... ... 10 100 The second item, (6) construction of aeroplanes, will apparently include not only the manufacture of the new aeroplanes in supply already referred to, but the experi- mental aeroplanes made in proof of designs prepared on paper. As far as we are able to analyse these figures, it would appear that miscellaneous items amounting to about 17 per cent, are spread over (/;), (c) and (d). We were informed that the preparation of a complete design of a new aeroplane occupies from 6 to 9 months before any practical building in quantities can commence. During this period it is understood that the full-size experimental machines are being produced in the shops concurrently with the preparation of the working drawings. We were further informed that it does not infrequently happen that the exigencies of war pressure have made it necessary to place orders with the trade for complete machines before the governing designs are completed in all particulars. It is almost inevitable that up to the time the design is actually finished and proved by the experimental machine, alterations in dimensions of parts will be liable to occur. When orders have been placed with the trade before such a condition of affairs has been arrived at, contractors must be called upon to alter, it may be even to scrap and reproduce parts affected. Payment is, we understand, made in compensation for such variations. The whole administrative system appears to us to be extremely elaborate, both as regards the records of all particulars of material used in the manufacture of each part of an aeroplane, or engine, but also as regards the course through which the components pass in the various stages from the raw material to the finished article. During the course of our enquiries, it was brought somewhat prominently to notice that a considerable amount of criticism adverse to the Royal Aircraft Factory administration has been voiced by the Press and apparently also by the aeronautical trade generally. Tt is possible that it may be due to the occurrence of very numerous alterations made after the issue of manufacturing drawings not the fault of the Royal Aircraft Factory and also to absolute errors in drawings the fault of which must wholly rest with the Royal Aircraft Factory. Our attention has been drawn to several cases of errors in drawings issued to the trade, which with proper organization ought not to have been passed. CONCLUSIONS. From the enquiries we have made and the data afforded to us we are led to the following conclusions : We are of opinion that such an experimental establishment as the Royal Aircraft * See footnote on page 2. (3494) A 2 J90001 Factory should be in existence. That on its present wages cost the Factory efficiency could be enhanced as an experimental place and a substantially increased volume of finished work produced provided a sharp line of demarcation be drawn between experi- mentation and commercial productivity, and the factory be reorganized and managed as nearly as possible upon a commercial and engineering basis. From information afforded both at Farnborough and London we conclude that the standard of efficiency required by the War Office for Royal Aircraft Factory finished products is regarded as met, both as to construction and design. The existing undesirable trade feeling referred to we consider should be met and, if possible, overcome, as its existence can hardly fail to have a detrimental effect on all concerned. We do not consider that the competition of the Royal Aircraft Factory with the Trade should, if reasonably administered, be the cause of any detrimental friction or trade feeling. From articles and letters in the Press it seems to be considered that British aviators, as compared with enemy aviators, suffer from want of speed in aeroplanes. If this complaint is well founded, there would appear to have been some lack of foresight (whether on the part of the Royal Aircraft Factory or the War Office is not clear) as to the size of engines required to meet war conditions. We are informed that higher powered engines are now being bought from the trade, that some have already been delivered, and are being fitted into concurrently produced machines. We consider that during the period of war activity the financial resources placed at the disposal of the Royal Aircraft Factory for experimental purposes have been ample to allow experimental work to be expeditiously performed in an efficient manner, and in a degree which should have placed useful and essential data at the disposal of the War Office, Admiralty and private trade. We have no information as to the extent which the Admiralty have availed themselves of the data put at their disposal. It appears to us that the emoluments offered to heads of departments and others of high technical ability have been too low and are hardly likely to attract many highly qualified gentlemen, or, if attracted, to retain their services. We are of opinion that the work done by the Staff merits more consideration than has hitherto been accorded. The weakness inherent to a system of iinder payment has been most materially counteracted since the outbreak of the war, because many gentlemen of the highest ability and standing whose emoluments in private work command salaries of possibly many hundreds or even thousands per annum, are working at salaries so small as to be negligible in their cases. This addition to the technical strength of the establishment has undoubtedly been of the utmost value to the country and the Royal Aircraft Factory. It has appeared to us that the numbers now engaged in the Central Office, Stores, and other departments of a non-productive nature, reveal an organization more liberal than is generally found in Government establishments, and on a scale unknown to us in private works. For instance, the Central Office and Stores are manned by * employees out of a total of *. It has been brought to notice that experiments and other manufacture have not infrequently been delayed owing to lack of material. A carefully selected larger stock of those materials constantly used should more than earn the intere&t upon the capital involved. An experimental establishment of this magnitude should be provided with a full equipment of labour-saving devices which are undoubtedly necessary for economic and most rapid production. From such resources, properly utilized, a reduction in number of employees now necessarily working round a particular operation could be effected. We understood from General Sir David Henderson that he has contemplated strengthening the Department of Aircraft Equipment in London by transferring the designs portion of the Royal Aircraft Factory to London. We are strongly of opinion that any attempt to separate the designs branch from the shops would be disastrous. From the foregoing it will be apparent that while fully alive to the ungrudging work done under the trying conditions of war pressure by the Superintendent and Staff of the Royal Aircraft Factory, we think there are parts of the organization and management where improvements are possible. * See footnote ou page 2. SUGGESTIONS. Arising out of the foregoing conclusions after full consideration, we beg to offer the following; suggestions or recommendations in compliance with our revised terms of reference : We suggest that a Board of Management be formed consisting of a Chairman or Director of the Royal Aircraft Factory, a Superintendent of Designs and a Super- intendent of Manufacture, all of whom should be preferably civilians and should give their whole time to the affairs of the Factory, and a Military Adviser without distinctive executive duties. The three last-named gentlemen should rank equally with one another on the Board. The Director should be well equipped with previous commercial and scientific engineering qualifications and experience. It is not considered essential that he should possess any intimate or previous knowledge of aviation. He should be selected for his recognized ability in administration and management. We believe the organization we are suggesting would be much assisted by the appointment of a civilian of high standing and suitable qualifications as Controller of Aircraft Supplies, who would have his headquarters in London and have among his duties the direct communications with contractors and the Royal Aircraft Factory. As we believe that the capacity of the Factory could be greatly augmented without increase to the present number of employees, we suggest that this should be arrived at in the shape of additional current manufacture of aeroplanes and engines, without impairment, and indeed with increased efficiency of the experimental functions of the Royal Aircraft Factory as now existing. With regard to the shortage of higher-powered engines, of which the need appears to be great, we suggest that special and strenuous efforts should be made immediately both bv the Royal Aircraft Factory and by means of financial assistance, if necessary, to the Trade, so that the most rapid production of all the engines may be secured. We think it would be better that direct contact with contractors, including the issue to them of drawings, should be made through a third party, e.g., the Controller of Aircraft Supplies and not by the Royal Aircraft Factory. It is, of course, undesirable to cut off all communication between the Royal Aircraft Factory and the Trade, but we think it would be preferable that enquiries should first of all be made to the officer issuing drawings, presumably the Controller of Aircraft Supplies, and that he should put any particular contractor into touch with the Royal Aircraft Factory in order that any desired information, data, or explanations, may, when required, be afforded direct. This course would also keep track of alterations, if any, from the original approved designs. Of course, the Controller of Aircraft Supplies and the Director of the Factory would, in fact, be in reasonably close touch. No useful purpose would be served at this juncture by the submission of recommendations as to the Central Office and Stores. If actually too elaborate, as they seem to us to be at present, the re-arrangement of duties suggested herein would naturally lead to some change in this direction, but it should preferably be left for the action of the new board of management. We desire to express our thanks to Mr. R. H. Griffith who has acted as our secretary throughout our investigations. We have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servants, RICHARD BURBIDGE, Chairman. CHARLES A. PARSONS. H. F. DONALDSON. It. H. GRIFFITH, Secretary, \'lth May, 1916. (3494) "S || . 3 - CJ ~ ^ 1 - . ^J.' ,* ^ O * i y~ Q bi. - X - 'i-| ^ K 3 X 3 r. X *2 '"* P5I 3 ""5 B 1 ^ b - ^ S'S f 1 1 J | j >> .2 i , E ^ n. be X pW 1 z^ f, - be S g -|e r! "2 -a "7 r- ^ ^ H 'E. 0) Q be = S i:_; -. .5 "" > t+ 5 be M j o b 3 DM be . 3 a a5 "I! J a as a."" a * i "-" ** 3 ir - s^ a) P __ X ' _ J3 *J ^ *"" "^rt **~ Di 3 jj 1 ^ O ^ * X( 00 2 ^T IB 'be -S u 1 g D - 2 H S 's . & 9 ~ 1) ^ n. 3 D J S d ' 1 1 cc ^ tS 3 . X & a s IB. 3* ^ 90 J "7-1 < ' "2 "2 3 M C J -If x 3 2P.S ' X ~l| p 5 J * be u - a. > = II. REPORT TO THE WAR COMMITTEE BY THE AIR BOARD ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ROYAL AIRCRAFT FACTORY. Among the subjects to which the Air Board have turned their attention has been the administration and organization of the Royal Aircraft Factory. They have taken evidence on the matter, and have further given careful consideration to the annexed Report of the Committee appointed by the Army Council of which Sir Richard Burbidge was Chairman. The Air Board are of opinion that this Committee has rendered a valuable public service by its investigation of the management arid organization of the Factory. They think, however, that in certain respects the Report may give a not altogether correct impression and with some of its recommendations they are not disposed to concur. I will deal with these cases in turn. On page 3 appears a table of percentages of the " total absorbed by the various classes of work carried out in the Royal Aircraft Factory," the figures of which Colonel O'Gorman is stated to have checked. This table gives the percentage of the work of the Factory devoted to the <: construction of aeroplanes " as 35 per cent. The Board have heard Colonel O'Gorman's evidence in regard to this and have communicated with Sir Richard Burbidge on the subject. As a result of their enquiries, it appears that the figure of 35 per cent, accepted by Colonel O'Gorman represented " new experimental, construction, &c., services," and not " construction of aeroplanes." The proportion of the work which represents actual construction of aircraft is very much smaller, probably less than 1 per cent. This is a misapprehension which it appears very desirable to correct. The diagram contained in Appendix A to the Committee's Report is also, whether owing to a printer's error or to other causes, inaccurate, and does not quite correctly represent the organization of the Factory. A correct diagram is appended.* As regards the measures which should be taken to improve the administration of the Factory, the Air Board have come to the following conclusions, which are in conformity with the recommendations of Sir D. Henderson, and in which they are hopeful that the Army Council will concur. They do not share the view of the Committee that the Factory should be placed under a Board of Management. Such an arrangement, however suitable for a private factory, would in practice be found ill-adapted to the exigencies of military organization. They hold strongly that the Factory should be under the direction of a single Superintendent, possessing the special qualifications of business experience and administrative capacity required for the post. Colonel O'Gorman has, in their opinion, rendered eminent public service in the design and construction of aircraft, and they think that these abilities can best be employed in the future in the capacity of Consulting Engineer to the Director-General of Military Aeronautics at the War Office. Under the Superintendent, as now proposed, there should be a head of the Design branch and a head of the Production branch. Every effort should be made to obtain the persons best qualified for these posts. The Air Board do not share the view of the Committee that a Military Adviser with distinctive executive duties should be attached to the Factory. The functions indicated by the Committee can, in their opinion, be better discharged by the Director of Aircraft Equipment at the War Office. The Board share the view of the Committee that communication between the Royal Aircraft Factory and contractors should be reduced to a minimum. Such communications cannot be entirely suspended, as it is necessary for the Factory to buy materials, but it should not deal directly with those contractors with whom the War Office is in relation. * Appendix B. The Board do not, however, think it necessary to create a post of Controller of Aircraft Supplies for the purpose of acting as intermediary between the Facto rv and the contractors. These functions can be adequately discharged by the Department of Military Aeronautics at the War Office, as at present constituted. The proposal of the Committee that the capacity of the Factory should be directed to an increase of the current manufacture of aeroplanes and engines, raises a difficult question. There is no doubt that from a financial point of view such extension is desirable. The larger the proportion of production to experiment, the more creditable will the balance sheet of the factory appear. On the other hand, not only does the present production of the factory, limited as it is, arouse some measure of suspicion in the minds of private manufacturers, but any such extension in the case of engines is, under existing conditions, impracticable. An increased production of engines could only be obtained if new shops were built. But there is no room for their construction ; and even if there were, no output could be obtained in less than 10 months. The object to be aimed at, in the view of the Air Board, is an increase in the output of aeroplanes by an improved organization of the existing staff. No reduction should be macle in the amount of experiment conducted at the Factory. On the contrary, this is the aspect of their work which it is desirable to emphasize by every possible means. The Board have had under special consideration the question of increasing the output of engines by the Trade. Much is being done in this direction, but the limiting factor is not financial assistance, which has not been stinted, but the lack of skilled mechanics. The Board have taken independent action in this respect. The Committee have not dealt with the allegations, which have been made public, of defective internal administration of the Factory, such as that the workmen employed were inadequately employed or extravagantly paid. The Board have examined this point, but think it best that the complaints on these heads should be referred to the new Superintendent of the Factory, who should make it his duty, at an early date, to report upon them and to remedy any abuses which he may find to exist. Any measures of reorganization of the Royal Aircraft Factory should be adopted with the concurrence of the Air Board. (Signed) CURZON OF KEDLESTON. 19th Julij, 1916. e t* S. cc a 3 f? Q 55 W PH fe , s n I I CO +3 I ^2 9 < ._ *03 fajD 1 co c <3 w - 1 * ,* .9 -o -J a I *1 1 41 rt S to a K 0> JB g -2 ^^ Q 3 3 "2.2 * " rf .S 'Zi 1 en "So a w i - S3 -H = " J "P bi) be ^S to 8 - -p << tH -! ^ S S ~K?-S ^5 1 a H c S. 2 bp'n; o }1 e C3 . bo II r * IB bo s CC ho 1 S -S c jj si" 1.1 90 fl 3 O ' o o to -j -II 390001 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY RETURN TO the circulation desk of any University of California Library or to the NORTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY Bldg. 400, Richmond Field Station University of California Richmond, CA 94804-4698 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS 2-month loans may be renewed by calling (510)642-6753 1 -year loans may be recharged by bringing books to NRLF Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days prior to due date. DUE AS STAMPED BELOW SENT ON ILL HAY 2 5 1999 U. C. BERKELEY 12.000(11/95)