-NRLF 
 
 ^li--*. 
 
 
 ^f^,"^, ;-Ji-*r'-. 
 
 ^-^^ 
 
 
 '^ ^ 
 
 *^. 
 
 ^- .■ /•> j& 
 
 ••_ {:V%jr^;-^_^, 
 
 -7V 
 
 
 

 ■^^' /// ' 
 
 'y>KJ/- y f/// // & ■ /-/'J 
 
 l(-/ni ''rj/ru <^ (',^ia/tfi/'/ifa 
 
SKETCHES 
 
 THE RELATIONS 
 
 SUBSISTING BETWEEN THE 
 
 a^rWi^l ®iJ)i.j^r$MWf wit in MMUs 
 
 AND 
 
 THE DIFFERENT NATIVE STATES. 
 
 BY 
 
 J. SUTHERLAND, 
 
 Caj)tain, 3d Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry* 
 
 CALCUTTA : 
 
 G. H. HUTTMANN, MILITARY ORPHAN PRESS. 
 
 1837. 
 
SKETCHES 
 
 OF 
 
 THE RELATIONS 
 
 SUBSISTING BETWEEN THE 
 AND 
 
 THE DIFFERENT NATIVE STATES. 
 
 BY 
 
 J. SUTHERLAND, 
 
 Captain, Sd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry. 
 
 CALCUTTA : 
 
 G. H. HUTTMANN, MILITARY ORPHAN PRESS. 
 1837. 
 
l^Sff^. 
 
 5 
 
 yjBNRY MORSE STETPHEMS 
 
SKETCHES, &c. 
 
 THE ARMY. 
 
 Every principality, from the Himalaya to Cape Comorin, and 
 from near the banks of the Indus to those of the Berhampooter, 
 may be considered to l)0w in implicit obedience to the will of the 
 British Government — all look to it as the supreme ruling power — 
 all acknowledge and appeal to it as the arbiter of foreign relations 
 M'ith neighbouring states — all submit with apparent good will to 
 the relations and conditions by which they are bound to that 
 Government. The power of uniting, or of being individually able 
 to free themselves from that supi'emacy is now less obvious than at 
 any former period of our history. Prolonged peace will tend to 
 remove still further that hope and that power, so that with what 
 may be considered the internal states of India, there is every pros- 
 pect of permanent tranquillity. With the external powers there is 
 nothing that immediately threatens to disturb our relations; but 
 with them those relations must rest on less secure grounds than 
 with states more immediately in oixr neighbourhood, more within 
 the influence of our power, and to whom the extent and presence 
 of that power are more obvious ; yet the very remoteness of their 
 position, the little intercourse we hold with them, and the few 
 interests we have in common, are reasons why our relations with 
 them should long i-emain undisturbed. Our treaty with Runjeet 
 Singh has lasted longer without modification, than any other in 
 India. 
 
 Over our own subjects our sway seems complete. Its object is 
 to extend the greatest good to the greatest number, and although ^^ 
 
 with particular classes of the community, and with particular tribes, 
 our rule must ever be unpopular, yet all submit to their destiny ; 
 some cheerfully from the good it brings them, and all patiently, 
 perhaps because in their eyes it is their destiny, and the day has 
 not yet arrived which opens to them any prospect of a beneficial 
 change. 
 
 The Indian Army, by which principally these results are pro- 
 duced, like every other army, naturally looks forward to war and 
 its advantages as the time of promise ; and reverts to the period of 
 its triumphs with pride and satisfaction. Those periods, although 
 aiding foreigners in the conquest of their country and oft h eir own 
 
 
2 THE ARMY. 
 
 tribes, f'Com to bind the old soldier in sympathy to us and to our 
 cause; and there will, I think, be found a heartiness and frankness 
 in the soldier of those days, which are wanting in him of a later 
 period. 
 
 The Hindoos, of whom the great majority of our army consists, 
 have no national cause of their own to support, nor is there any 
 period in their history to which they can revert as furnishing them 
 Avith any thing national. India, under its Hindoo dynasties, was 
 apparently split into numerous petty states, each contending with 
 the other for supremacy, some of them obtaining it for a time, and 
 extending their empire over tracts of country equal to European 
 kingdoms of the first magnitude. But these have ages ago passed 
 away; the Hindoo of the present day knows not to which dynasty 
 his forcfatliers belonged, nor does he care. He belongs himself to 
 some great class or portion of the Hindoo people. The religion and 
 privileges of that class are things very sacred in his ej^es ; and these 
 give to him and to them a separate political existence, Avhich is 
 unconnected with Government, and which is apparently sufficient 
 to all. The tribes accustomed to the use of arms either are, 
 originally, or very soon became, distinct from the great body of the 
 Hindoo people. Those who are disciplined in our ranks have 
 undoubtedly a character which separates them in a great measure 
 from their own families, and which unfits them in old age for those 
 pursuits, and tranquil and domestic enjoyments in which their 
 childhood was spent. They have but little interest in or concern 
 with the form of our civil institutions ; they are generally employ- 
 ed in camps, and separated from the great body of the people ; and 
 although they Avatch with interest and anxiety the effect of our 
 administration on their own villages or possessions, yet this is the 
 extent of their anxiety; and the most arbitrary Governments in 
 India may calculate with certainty on implicit obedience and sup- 
 port from its mercenary soldiery in the most tyrannical of its mea- 
 sures tow ards its subjects. A great majority of the Hindoos in the 
 Bengal army unfortunately belong to foreign possessions; they are 
 more liable to be influenced by our political than by our domestic 
 economy, and the former has been throughout our career less 
 defined and worse regulated than the latter. The Hindoo sepoy of 
 the Madras army is still further removed from the great body of 
 the Hindoo people than his brother of Bengal. He is very gene- 
 rally of low caste, born and bred in camp. His regiment is his home, 
 he neither knows nor cares for any other. It is a little moveable 
 colony, separated in a great measure fi'om every other regiment, 
 and from the rest of the world. The Hindoo and Jew of the Bom- 
 bay army, are perhaps less removed from civil life than the Madras 
 soldier; but they too, that is, the Hindoos, are very often of sepa- 
 rate caste from the great majority of their fellow-countrymen, have 
 no rights or privileges in civil society worth defending, and like the 
 Madras sepoy, are satisfied with their condition in our army, 
 because they have advantages there which Avould not belong to 
 them elsewhere. 
 
THE ARMY. 3 
 
 The Indian Malionimodan, w lu'tlu'r in our ranks, in cities, or in 
 villages umU'r our CJovi'mment ; wlu'tlior in tlio ranks, the cities, 
 or the villages of foreign states, will every where be found nearly 
 the same. lie belongs to a great family, having a united religion 
 and united interests. He will every where be ready to supjjort with 
 Jiis services or with his purse his national cause against all others. 
 Religion and Government with Mahomniedans are never separated, 
 and it is never forgotten that the supremacy of the Mahonunedans 
 in India has been tinally overthrown by us. The eyes of the whole 
 IVIahommedan population of India will be .turned towards him who 
 shall successfully proclaim a crusade against infidel (iovennnents 
 and infidel people. He in the most remote village of the Dekhan 
 will turn towards such a prospect with the same anxious attention 
 as he of Calcutta or Dehlee. No one in communication with the 
 Mahonnnedan population of India was blind to the anxiety with 
 which the crusade preached by the late Seyud Ahmed against the 
 Siklis and against us was watched by that united people. In his 
 triumphs over the fanatical army of Seyud Ahmed, Runjeet Singh 
 claimed our sympathy and congratulations, considering them tri- 
 umphs in a common cause. Levies of men to the extent or five or 
 six hundred might be seen assembling in the neighbourhood of 
 Dehlee from our own pi'ovinces, and traversing desert and hostile 
 regions to join his standard in his well selected position (the Ma- 
 honnnedan world in his rear, the infidel world in his front) in the 
 neighbourhood of Peshawur ; contributions in money and goods 
 and jewels were freely given from the palace at Dehlee, from the 
 cities of Lucknow, Calcutta, Hyderabad, and the palace at Tri- 
 plicane ; all JNIahommedans, whether Sheeas or Soonees, and al- 
 though professing tenets differing widely from the Wahabeeism 
 and purer doctrines of Seyud Ahmed and lijs disciples, joined in 
 prayers and more substantial offerings for his success. It is more 
 difficult to say what efteet was produced on the minds of the 
 INIahonunedans of our ai'my, for it was of course more hidden. They 
 are more mixed up Avith their Hindoo fellow-soldiers, and more 
 watched by them and by us than the inhabitants of cities. They 
 have other duties to attend to, and their minds are more subdued 
 by discipline and a long course of service. It may therefore be 
 fairly supposed that they would be the last of the Mahommedan 
 population whom this infection would reach. Fortunately the Sikh 
 army of Runjeet Singh stood between us and these crusaders, and 
 we never came in contact with them, and wisely never noticed their 
 proceedings in India. Seyud Ahmed and his Moolavee instructors 
 and friends struggled for a time with adverse fortune, supported 
 principally by the YoosufFzies and levies of men and money from 
 India. Could he have called to his support the Afghauns or Per- 
 sians as he expected, defeated the armies of Runjeet Singh and 
 gained possession of Lahore, our position would have become 
 more precarious than a combination against us of all the prin- 
 ces of India could make it. The doctrines of Seyud Ahmed 
 
 B 2 
 
4 THE ARMY. 
 
 have reached in a greater or less degree to every part of India. 
 They are preached at Dehlee, in Rohilkund, in Rajpootana, in 
 Calcutta, at Boorhanpoor, and in the Hyderabad territories. It 
 is not however probable that they will spread in any great degree 
 amongst the Mahommedans of India, for they are too pure, and 
 too far removed fiom the taint of Hindooisra, which they have 
 imbibed. If they should prevail, we may be sure that a struggle 
 for government will go hand in hand with them. We lately saw 
 a fanatic of this persuasion, with a few wretched Bengalee followers, 
 worked into a degi'ee of religious enthusiasm, which led them to 
 oppose, at the very seat of our Government, with sticks and 
 stones, the sabres, and pistols of our troopers ; and who, believing 
 themselves invulnerable, stood forward to be cut down by the grape 
 of our artillery with a degree of boldness and self-devotion, which 
 must have left on the minds of all, who witnessed this spectacle, an 
 impression of the effects which this religion is capable of producing 
 in the most ordinary men. We have lately a remarkable instance 
 of the spirit and union which may be produced in the Mahomme- 
 dan population by the measures of our Government. The unwise 
 and arbitrary proceedings of the Commissioner who first assumed 
 the Government of Mysore, and who seems to have resumed grants 
 of land and money, which threw 8,000 families destitute on the 
 world, until they could prove their rights to these possessions, and 
 who commenced his operations by the discharge of troops, has 
 raised a spirit in the Mahommedan population of those parts which 
 may not easily be subdued. Mahommedan soldiers from our own 
 ranks, seem to have slaughtered a pig at the Eedgah or in the 
 mosque at Bangalore, and to have proclaimed that the mosque was 
 defiled by Christians ; such was the feeling against us, that the 
 story was for a time eagerly believed, and produced great excite- 
 ment in the Mahommedan population. A still stronger proof of the 
 hatred to us is, that when the perpetrators of this atrocity were de- 
 tected, they escaped death at the hands of their brethren, and were 
 even said to have been sheltered from the punishment which was 
 due to their crime by our Government. The example of polluting 
 mosques has been followed or threatened by other Mahommedans 
 at Cuddapah, Arcot, Palaveram, and Triplicane. The actors in 
 these scenes do not seem to have brought on themselves the hatred 
 or vengeance of Mahommedans, solely because they were directed 
 against us ; and it has now become a part of the duty of our Govern- 
 ment to protect the mosques from pollution by those who worship 
 them. A still moi'e recent instance of hostile spirit has arisen in 
 Mysore. A drunken drummer boy of one of the regiments insult- 
 ed a Fukeer. It was immediately proclaimed that he was instigat- 
 ed to this by the other Christians, and a collision was apprehended. 
 This spirit may die away, but these are instances of its existence, 
 if any such were wanting, and of the readiness with which it may 
 be called into extensive operation. 
 
 I may here add two instances which have come within my own 
 observation in the last four years, of the prevalence of this spirit 
 
THE ARMY. O 
 
 amongst the Mahonuncdan soldiery. In the Madras Cavalry, 
 which almost exclusively consists of that class, Major O'Donell was 
 shot by one of his troopers about 1817. Five years ago, Lieute- 
 nant-Colonel Smyth was wounded, and Major Wallace killed in the 
 same way. The latter officer was harsh with the men and un- 
 popular, but had not particularly offended the trooper who shot 
 him. In a fit of jealousy, this man killed one of his comrades, 
 concealed himself, and shot his commanding-officer at morning 
 stables, saying afterwards that as he was sure to die, it was as well 
 to perform a good work before going out of the world. He was 
 tried, convicted, and hanged in chains on a hill near the Regi- 
 mental Lines, and about six miles from the city of Hyderabad. 
 Pi-esently it was given out that those who visited the body were 
 cured of disease, that barren women produced children, with other 
 stories, which Fukeers and priests know so well how to propagate 
 for their own benefit. Thousands of Mahommedans poured from 
 the city of Hyderabad, and all pai'ts of the country, to the spot, to 
 touch the body, and to catch the drippings which fell from it in its 
 progress towards decay. It was the corpse of a Mahommedan, 
 who had suffered by the hands of infidels in a cause which it is to 
 be feared too many of that tribe would consider meritorious. A 
 guard was placed over the body to prevent the crowd from ap- 
 proaching, but persons lingered near the spot, principally during 
 the night, and at last it was thought right to remove the body. 
 
 The other instance has reference to the fate of my first and best 
 friend Lieutenant-Colonel Davies. It is unnecessary to enter in 
 any detail into the circumstances which produced such dissatisfac- 
 tion throughout the Nizam's Cavalry Brigade, which he com- 
 manded from its first organization in 1817 ; and where his gallant 
 bearing on all occasions had gained him the admiration, and his 
 conciliatory disposition, his justice, and his attention to their wants, 
 ensured him the affection of his men. It is sufficient to say, that 
 the nature of the discipline introduced about 1826 was disagree- 
 able to them ; that some of the officers had not been selected with 
 sufficient care, and that they had risen too I'apidly to command, in 
 a service where none but men of temper and discretion should be 
 entrusted with authority. Some of these officers thought that 
 Mahommedans in the ranks looked better without than Avith beards ; 
 promoted and otherwise rewarded those who cut of! what to a 
 Mahommedan is the principal ornament of his face, and to which, all 
 who wear it, attach some religious prejudices. At last, in May, 
 1827, a party of thirty or forty men of the 3rd Regiment planted a 
 flag on the parade, and at day-light, were found drawn up in a 
 state of mutiny. Colonel Davies attended only by a few orderlies 
 rode to the spot. The mutineei^s signalled him off, calling out that 
 they were irritated, and advising him not to approach. With that 
 fearless confidence which belonged to him in so remarkable a 
 degree, he sent his orderlies to a distance, and rode uj) to them. 
 After listening to their grievances individually, and sending 
 most of them on one side, he came to the ringleader and 
 
6 THE ARMY. 
 
 unwisely told him that he would not be pardoned. The man drew 
 his pistol, seized Colonel Davies' reins, and before he had time to 
 draw his sword, shot his commanding-oiRcer through the body. 
 Other shots were fired at him, and he was cut almost to pieces by 
 men who, only a few short months before, would have laid down 
 their lives to save his. The mutineers were charged by a s(pia- 
 dron of cavalry, their own comrades, which had been drawn up 
 near the spot, and most of them, with the ringleader, were killed. 
 
 Shortly after my arrival in camp from Dehlee, in 1827, to as- 
 sume the command of the brigade, I saw that the grave of the ring- 
 leader had become an object of interest to tlie Mahommedans of 
 camp, and those of the surrounding country. A Fukeer, who had 
 before established himself there, had been removed, and Fukeers 
 were forbidden to visit the spot. It was known however that 
 assemblages of people continued to visit the grave during the night, 
 and that Fateeas and other religious ceremonies were performed 
 there. Those whitewashed and upright stones which mark the 
 grave of a Peer were placed round it, and at last, during the 
 Mohurrum, lights were placed at the tomb, and the green flag was 
 raised over it. 
 
 It was impossible any longer to endure such proceedings in the 
 neighbourhood of camp, and when the Mohurrum was over and the 
 religious feelings of the people had a little subsided, I rode to the 
 grave, and sent for the commanding-officer of the troop, in whose 
 lines the priest of the cei'emonies had been harboured. He happen- 
 ed at the time to be under a tree at his devotions. I asked the 
 Jemadar how he permitted such a scene in the neighbourhood of 
 his troop lines ; whether his respect for the memory of Colonel 
 Davies, whom he had so long known, and with whom he had serv- 
 ed with so much distinction, was not sufficient to save it from 
 such an outrage ; whether he did not know that there was a positive 
 order against any Fukeer performing any rites at the gi'ave of Colonel 
 Davies' murderer, and whether there was any objection to hanging 
 the Fukeer on the tree under which he then was ? Mahommed Beg 
 Khan told me that he could not as a Mahommedan move of himself 
 in the affair, without bringing on him the reproaches of the Mahom- 
 medan world, but that he and his men were perfectly ready to do 
 whatever I might order. The Fukeer was put in irons, the troop 
 was ordered from its lines to encamp on the parade, and the regi- 
 ment was put under marching orders. In the evening I inspected 
 the troop, talked to the men individually, most of whom I had 
 known for ten years, eight of which I had commanded the regi- 
 ment to which they belonged, found them in perfect good humour, 
 and they were sent back to their regimental lines. The regiment con- 
 tinued under marching orders, and on the third or fourth night, the 
 flags were taken from the grave ; and the white stones, Avhich mark- 
 ed it as the resting place of a Peer, were taken up and thrown to a 
 distance. The men knew what was requiredof them, did it of their 
 own accord, were relieved from marching orders, and returned to 
 their duty. They were at the time several months in arrears of 
 
THE ARMY. 7 
 
 pay, which is always a stitticieiit _u;ronnd to demur, but on this 
 occasion that sccnu-d to uiake no iliti'crencc. There were no other 
 troops within a hundred luih's of the Cavahy, and I received their 
 conduct as a proof of their good taste aiul feelino;. IJut it obvi- 
 ously depended on the hunu)ur they Avere in, and on the extent to 
 which their religious feeling was excited, what turn an afi'air of 
 this kind should take. 
 
 Such is the material of w Inch our army is composed ; that of 
 Bengal is perhaps one-eighth or one-teutli ^lahommedan ; those of 
 jNIadras and Bombay, one-third Mahommedan and two-thirds 
 Hindoo; consisting of 10 or 12,000 Cavalry, about 1,10,000 
 Inlantry, and supporteil by 30,000 European troops of all arms; 
 protecting a land frontier of 3,536 British miles, and covering and 
 giving protection to 1,111,162 square miles within that frontier, 
 with a population of 123,000,000 souls. 
 
 Such with the force, moral and physical, of our civil institutions, 
 are our resources for the government of this conquered land. 
 
 It cannot have escaped the most ordinary observation, that the 
 army which we have thus raised up for the support of our power, 
 anil which even at its present reduced numbers is perhaps sufficient 
 for this purpose, whilst we are not assailed from Avithout, may in 
 the progress of events become the instrument that will Avork our 
 OAvn destruction. Except this, Ave have not I conceive any thing 
 to fear in internal India. Whilst an army sufficiently extensive to 
 meet danger Avhere it shall arise, and sufficiently powerful to put it 
 down, remains true in its allegiance to us, Ave must be safe. 
 
 Those Avho have confidence in the fidelity of our native army 
 may Avell appeal to its past history. It has fought our battles Avith 
 a gallantry and a devotion to our cause Avhich could hardly have 
 been surpassed by our oavu countrymen. Examples are not Avant- 
 ing of its rejection of the most tempting offers that could be made 
 to soldiers to desert our cause in the day of our utmost necessity. 
 The fcAv instances of either individual or general disaftection, or 
 treachery, that have occurred in the long period of their connec- 
 tion Avith us, may Avell be considered to give promise of future 
 security : yet there are not Avanting, those Avho see a change in the 
 spirit and temper of our native army, Avhich they consider to be 
 full of forebodings of evil ; Avho call to mind Avithin the fcAv last 
 years the assassinations or attempted assassinations of officers of the 
 Madras army, the conduct of the 47th Regiment, and the men 
 of some of the other Regiments at Barrackpore, the conduct of the 
 native troops in Arracan, and above all the partial disaffi^ction of 
 a great portion of a division of the army before Bhurtpore. The 
 material of combination is more apparent in the Bengal Infantry 
 than in any other branch of our service. The men composing it 
 are mostly of the same caste, from the same part of the country, 
 and have a similarity of interests and of feelings — touch one regi- 
 ment touch them all, and it Avould not I think be very surprising 
 to see a mutiny Avhich might originate in very inadequate causes 
 like that at Bhurtpore, extend rapidly to every portion of those 
 
8 THE ARMY. 
 
 troops. The Madras army would be almost as far removed from 
 the probability of catching the infection as so many Europeans, 
 but there is no calculating on the degree in which their fidelity to 
 us might be shaken by the scenes which they either witnessed, or 
 heard of as affecting the stability of our power generallJ^ The 
 Bombay army assimilates more with that of Bengal than with the 
 Madras army, and might be supposed to be influenced by either. 
 Indeed, what portion of the whole of the delicate fabric of our 
 administration. Military or Civil, in this vast empire can receive a 
 shock without being felt in a degree injurious to us, whetlier it 
 commence at the centre or the extremities. The day for such 
 events may still be distant, but it is incumbent upon us to look at 
 things as they are, and to adopt such measures of precaution as 
 are calculated, in our short-sighted and finite vicM's, to save us 
 from evils of such magnitude. 
 
 As in our conquests in India we succeeded principally through 
 the disunions which existed amongst its people, and their division 
 into tribes, so are we likely to render our supremacy over them most 
 durable by holding an army composed as far as we can of different 
 tribes of men, most of whom are likely to be equally faithful to 
 us, whilst they will not possess that power of combining against us 
 which at present so strongly characterises the Infantry of Bengal. 
 
 The ground-work of our power in India is our substantial body 
 of British soldiers. But they are scattered over a vast tract of 
 country, and liable at any time to be carried away on foreign ser- 
 vice. Our next safeguard is the difference between the Infantry of 
 the several Presidencies, and next to that the difference between the 
 whole body of our Cavalry and our Infantry to whichever Presi- 
 dency they belong. Then follows the body of Irregular Cavalry, 
 and the Goorka, and other Local Corps. 
 
 In Europe a period of peace is the season when Governments can 
 afford to forget their armies, for there are few countries in which 
 either kings or ministry do not receive some support from the 
 interests and affections of their people. In India a large standing 
 army is absolutely necessary to our existence ; without it we should 
 not collect a shilling of revenue from any portion of the country, 
 nor hold its administi-ation for a day. A period of peace is too 
 the time when the native army is most calculated to become an 
 instrument of danger to us. It will not then have the incentives 
 of war and conquest to carry it along with us. Its numbers will 
 probably be greatly reduced, whilst the same amount of all those 
 duties which are most harassing to our native soldiers will 
 remain. It is left under these circumstances comparatively neg- 
 lected by its Government, to brood over its present condition, its 
 future prospects, and to contrast both with its past glories and 
 its claims on the state. Such is said to be the present condition 
 of the Bengal army, nor must it be supposed that the late 
 discussions and dissatisfactions amongst the European officers 
 are disregarded by the troops, or that we are free from the 
 danger of this disaffection extending to them, in a shape far more 
 
THE ARMY. 9 
 
 serious and alarming. Mr. Elphinstone perhaps said truly, that 
 "we are more likfly tolosc India by eausing dissatisfaction amongst 
 our European officers, which shouhl spread in the shajje of mutiny 
 to the troops, than in any other way." 
 
 Tliat we must maintain a large native army in India, and that 
 danger greater or less must exist from this instrument of power, is 
 not to be doubted. The question then is, from what descrijjtion of 
 force, which is sufficient for the support of our power, is there least 
 danger to ourselves ? 
 
 I would not exclude from our ranks, nor from promotion to the 
 highest grade in our service, people of all classes who are willing 
 to submit to the necessary degree of discipline ; and if there are 
 objections to entertaining high and low caste Hindoos in the ranks 
 of the same regiment, I would form separate regiments from each 
 class. The measure of shutting our ranks against the outcast Hin- 
 doos, as has been done in the Madras and Bombay armies, where 
 they have hitherto formed the gi'eat bulk of these armies, and when 
 their fidelity to our cause, and competency for the performance of 
 all the duties required of them has not been questioned, is of very 
 doubtful policy, and ought surely to cease. Their fidelity may be 
 the more relied on, as they certainly hold a higher place in our 
 service than tliey would in any other. The Mahommedans have 
 been brought too prominently forward in the army of Madras : for 
 they are the people from whom we have most to fear. The new 
 modelling of our Cavalry, in the manner I have already suggested 
 to the Governor General, would without any additional expence go 
 far both to satisfy that branch of the service, to afford a provision 
 for the sons of the native officers of the army, and to increase their 
 efficiency as a useful body of horse. 
 
 The only relief that it appeal's to me we can extend to our Infan- 
 try is, to save them, as far as possible, from treasure escorts, which 
 might generally be done by making our remittances through 
 Soukai's, and which would perhaps cost less than the present charge 
 for l)atta to the officers and men, and for carriage for the treasure : 
 to relieve them from those duties of guard and sentries at our Civil 
 and 3Iilitary stations which are so harassing to the troops, so de- 
 striictive to their discipline, and which are generally to an extent 
 that should only be necessary in presence of an enemy. 
 
 At Barraekpore, where it might be supposed that hardly any 
 guards would be necessary, the six regiments are frittered away by 
 constant duty, more than one-half of their number being employed. 
 British soldiei's would not submit to this ; they expect that they 
 should have three nights out of four in bed, and why should we 
 put the fidelity of the Bengal sepoy to so severe a trial ? I would 
 order, that in all situations, except in presence of an enemy, the 
 men should only be brought on duty every third or fourth day. It 
 is far from my intention to say any thing in dispi'aise of the Raj- 
 poot sepoy of the Bengal army ; there cannot be a more patient or 
 obedient soldier in any army under the sun. But it is our duty to 
 
 c 
 
10 THE ARMY. 
 
 lead him and not to drive him, for once turned against us, and we 
 may find his obstinacy and his inveteracy, those qualities which 
 belong to the degree of his civilization, as prominent as his loyalty 
 has hitherto been. 
 
 We are very apt to fall into the error of measuring every thing 
 according to the standard of European discipline, forgetting the 
 different characters of the native and the Englishman. No officer 
 of the French army ever thinks of requiring the same order on a 
 line of march, or the same strict discipline in quarters, as we I'equire 
 of the British soldier. Great latitude may be given to the French 
 soldier in foraging and marautling without endangering his disci- 
 pline, and he will live when the English soldier will either starve or 
 die drunk. The drum will call him back to his ranks in the condi- 
 tion in which he left them, and without any further evil than that 
 which he may have inflicted on those whom he chose to visit. If 
 the severe discipline which it is evidently necessary to uphold in the 
 British army be not necessary in that of France, how much less in 
 that of India. There is an Asiatic sensitiveness about, and propriety 
 in, the conduct of the sepoy, which renders the roughness and 
 severity with which we treat English soldiers, offensive and unne- 
 cessary towards him. 
 
 Greater latitude, except when there is a prospect of plunder, may 
 be given to the sepoy than to the soldier of almost any other coun- 
 try. All that sort of discipline and parade which is necessary to 
 keep the English soldier sober and orderly may be entirely dispens- 
 ed with in the case of the native : an army of infantry in parti- 
 cular without its united and strong field discipline is of course a 
 rabble, and the army of India requires this discipline as much as any 
 other. But this is almost the only form of discipline that it needs. 
 The Madras army is more harassed by needless parade than any 
 other, and its Cavalry more than its Infantry, until the condition 
 and legs of the horses have been altogether, and the temper of the 
 men almost, destroyed. 
 
 The greatest of all injuries has perhaps been inflicted on the dis- 
 cipline of the Indian army by taking too much power and authority 
 out of the hands of commanding-officers of regiments. The native 
 soldier looks more to the individual authority of his officer than to 
 the general authority of the Government, under which all serve ; 
 and although it may be necessary to hold checks over men in power, 
 it is still more necessary to leave in the hands of officers command- 
 ing native regiments the power to reward and to punish. 
 
 We should too, without any very great expence, give great satis- 
 faction to the old soldiers of the army, and hope to the young, by 
 allowing them an increase of pay, corresponding with their period 
 of service. A sepoy might receive one rupee per mensem after ten 
 years' service ; two rupees after twenty, and the same system would 
 extend to the Naick, the Havildar, the Jemadar, and the Subadar. 
 The only boon that I am aware of that has been conferred on our 
 native army, for the last twenty years, is a slight increase of pay, 
 
CIVIL INSTITUTIONS. 11 
 
 and the designation of Subadar-Major to an individual in each re- 
 giment. Wlien it is recollected, that no native in the whole of tliis 
 vast army can rise above that rank and that pay, and that this 
 has been their condition for the last twenty years, it is surely time 
 to think of extending to them some pecuniary advantages. 
 
 I shall not here attempt to advocate the cause of the European 
 officers, for they will find able advocates every where, and tliere 
 may even be some danger that the advocating of their cause too 
 prominently, whilst tlieir native brother soldier is neglected, may 
 lead to inviilious and injurious comparisons on the part of the latter. 
 Observing only that if something be not done to accelerate promo- 
 tion, more particularly in the upper ranks, the Indian army, as 
 compared with the British, will very soon have but few officers, for 
 even the ordinary commands ; and those more fitted for invalid and 
 pension establishments, than for the active duties of their profession. 
 
 CIVIL INSTITUTIONS. 
 
 Certain great changes are, within the last few years, apparent in 
 our civil administration, which cannot fail to be attended with 
 beneficial results. We have ceased to think that the best collector, 
 and lie to be most rewarded, is the individual who could collect most 
 revenue from a given tract of country. We have discovered that 
 the labor in the revenue and judicial aifairs of this vast country is 
 far beyond the competency of the few European hands that we can 
 bring to bear upon it, and we have sought, and are seeking, to raise 
 up by education and competent remuneration, from amongst East 
 Indians, and the higher classes of natives, persons the best qualified 
 and the most willing to assist in these great works. We are gra- 
 dually discovei'ing, that truth, and honesty, and attachment to our 
 cause are the only requisites in which a great portion of the people 
 of India are inferior to ourselves, in all the attainments that are 
 necessary for the performance of the ordinary duties that have 
 hitherto devolved more exclusively on the members of our European 
 Civil Service ; and we are endeavouring to correct these imperfec- 
 tions of the native character by education, and by giving them emo- 
 luments, and fixing responsibility on them, Avhich shall render it 
 their interest to be honest ; and a place in our service, and in our 
 confidence, which shall attach them to our rule. We have in a 
 great measure ceased to look on the press as an instrument of evil, 
 and we can now witness with complacency, and without fear, dis- 
 cussions in both the Eviropean and Native portion of the press, 
 touching the character and effects of our Government on the happi- 
 ness of the people, the proceedings good and bad of the Government 
 itself, and of every functionary employed under its authority. We 
 see in these discussions a great preventive and corrective of public 
 abuses and delinquencies ; an incentive to good actions ; and we may 
 yet go further and witness in this great instrument a guide which 
 
 c 2 
 
12 TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT. 
 
 shall direct our Government and its European officers in the de- 
 tection of corruption and extortion where they exist in the great 
 majority of its native Civil Servants ; and which in this respect 
 may work a beneficial change in our courts of justice, in our terri- 
 torial and custom revenue departments, and in the police of the 
 country. We may discover in the progress of free discussion 
 greater good than evil towaids the stability of our power: and if the 
 instrument which is to work so much good must also produce some 
 individual suffering or agony, it is satisfactory to think that the 
 characters of individuals most subject to this are, after all, gene- 
 rally public property ; and they must, with the advantages, take 
 the disadvantages of their official station. 
 
 Those secret and mysterious communications and combinations 
 which Sir John Malcolm so forcibly and so justly describes, which 
 every person who has been prominently emijloyed in the interior of 
 India, and has paid common attention to what was passing around 
 him, must have been put on his guard against ; and which are 
 generally levelled at the stability of our power, may be expected to 
 yield before free discussion. Our secret news-writers, and those 
 spies and intelligence establishments, the employment of which is 
 so repugnant to the feelings of an Englishman, bvit which most 
 persons in power have thought it necessary to maintain, will gra- 
 dually be swept away when the present enlightened Government 
 shall accord to the provincial press, that freedom and encourage- 
 ment which have been extended to the press of the capitals. Free 
 discussion is now inevitable. If Governments can deport Euro- 
 peans for offending against their press laws, they cannot hold East 
 Indians or natives subject to other than British law, and the ver- 
 dict of a British Jury, publish they Avhat they please. 
 
 It should therefore be the object of our Government to encourage 
 rather than discourage the ablest of their servants to enter the lists 
 as editors of, or writers in, the public journals, against such as 
 may appear unjustly to assail their measures, or those of their 
 servants. 
 
 TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Much has been said and written on the nature of our India reve- 
 nue assessment, and on land tenures, by Sir Thomas Munro, and 
 persons of his time ; and of later date, Mr. Mill, Mi\ Chaplin, Mr. 
 Sullivan and Mr. Ellis, are the great advocates of Ryotwar or Assame- 
 war assessments. Mr. Elphinstone seems to consider it immaterial to 
 the great body ofthe people, whether the assessment be a permanent 
 one, extending to a large tract of country ; \vhether it be aMozewar 
 or village assessment ; or whether it be the more minute Ryotwar 
 or Assamewar assessment, provided that it bears light on the people, 
 and leaves them a fair return for the labor and capital employed. 
 But by his minute field measurement, classification, and assessment 
 
TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT. 13 
 
 of a great portion of tho Pooiia territory, ho showed his opinion that 
 all systems must eonmienee there. Few writers that I am aequaiut- 
 od with have eome very prominently forward on tliis (piestion in 
 Bengal ; most of the persons of Lord Cornwallis' time Mere in 
 favor of j)ermanent setth-mcnts on a large scale, and many of the 
 revenue servants of that presidency, having been l)rought up in 
 the Bengal Provinces, are advocates of the same form of settlement. 
 Except the Bengal permanent settlement of those days, less has 
 been done in the way of fixing or defining the rights of the 
 Government and those of the people in Bengal, than in either of 
 the other presidencies. No progress has hitherto been made in 
 defining those important jjoints in the western provinces, although 
 Government has been urging its revenue officers for the last ten or 
 twenty years to commence and proceed in this good work. 
 
 I believe I am right in describing Sir Charles Metcalfe's opinion 
 to be in favor of the villiage assessment for a period of years, 
 leaving the village institutions unimpaired to assist in the collection 
 of the revenue, and in the police of the country ; and yet defining, 
 as far as is compatible with this system, the rights of the several 
 cultivators in the village, and the amount of rent which each is to 
 pay. 
 
 A late writer in the Edinburgh Review gives a very broad pre- 
 ference to the permanent settlement of Bengal over the Ryotwar 
 settlement, jirincipally on the ground, that the latter is calculated 
 to reduce the great mass of the people to great poverty, whilst the 
 former will raise up a rich native aristocracy in the country, which 
 will turn their accumulations into channels of commerce, or local or 
 national works of public utility. There can be no question that 
 the sacrifice by a Government, of a portion of its rents in favour 
 of a portion of its people, will tend to enrich them, and that the 
 smaller the portion of people for whom this sacrifice is made, and 
 the greater the sacrifice, the richer will they become. But whether 
 it is most just and most reasonable that Governments should 
 sacrifice in favor of the few or in favor of many, is a question 
 which does not seem to admit of a doubt ? whether too the great 
 ma-jority of the people vxnder the Bengal permanent Zumindaree 
 settlement are more prosperous than those under a Ryotwaree, or 
 produce more than £4 19s. each, per annum, would be very pro- 
 blematical, but that Bengal is a richer country than the ceded 
 provinces — wdiether through this permanent settlement the people 
 are so much under the protection of our laws, as under the Ryot- 
 war assessment managed by our own officers must be doubtful 
 likewise. What hope has a poor Ryot of meeting with support 
 and redress in our Zillah Adawduts against the oppressions of a 
 powerful and permanent Bengal Zumindaree family, compared 
 with that which he would have against a transitory collector? 
 Yet, although our Adawluts may be considered powerless, as 
 affording protection to the people, it will most probably be found 
 that the rights and possessions which the simple cultivator had in 
 the soil, at the time the permanent settlement was completed, have 
 
14 TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT. 
 
 remained untouched to this day, whilst the benefits which we 
 meant to confer on the great families with whom the settlement 
 was made, have long since passed away, — such is the sacred tenure 
 by which through all changes of dynasties the cultivating classes 
 in India cling to their homes and their fields. 
 
 The enormous increase which the writer in the Edinburgh 
 Review calculates on as having taken place in the value of landed 
 property in certain parts of Bengal, under the permanent settle- 
 ment, will most likely be found to arise from the Government 
 officers having made either through ignorance or corruption, an 
 unnecessary sacrifice of the rights of the Government. I am not 
 aware of any great works which have been undertaken by the 
 Zumindars of Bengal, that should have so enhanced the value of 
 their property. Cultivation has most probably increased greatly 
 since the introduction of our Government, and so it will under 
 ordinary protection throughout every country in India.* 
 
 Those portions of the country which at the period of settlement 
 were least cultivated, or least known, and which had for a series of 
 years paid least rent, have of course benefited most. The Bengal 
 Baboos and persons of that description, who now appear to be the 
 principal Zumindars, are as much foreigners in their habits and 
 pursuits to the cultivating classes as we are. They live in cities 
 and towns far away from their Zumindarees, and know less of the 
 people than either our judges or collectors who live amongst them 
 — the recklessness with which they allow their Zumindarees and 
 family possessions to go to the hammer, and the vast transfers of 
 landed property that have taken place since the permanent settle- 
 ment, are proofs that their's is not a very beneficent form of admi- 
 nistration, and that whatever sacrifice we made, has been ill bes- 
 towed on them. This sacrifice Avas however made in favor of those 
 whom we considered the first Zumindars : the property has now 
 attained a marketable value like every other property, has in verj' 
 manj'^ instances long since passed out of their hands, and the 
 present occupants have most likely paid its full price. 
 
 Persons practically acquainted with the several tenures enjoyed in 
 land by the several classes throughout India, whether as in the 
 Dekhan and southern parts of India they be styled Zumindars, 
 Patails, Bara Baloota, Meerasdars, Ooperas, or common Ryots, or 
 whether as in Rajpootana and Hindoostan they be styled Zumindars, 
 or Istumrardars, or Mokudums or common Ryots, are surprised, that 
 officers like Mr. Christian and others of the Bengal service, should 
 experience difficulty in defining the various interests of these 
 
 * There is no reason why cultivation and population should not proceed 
 in India in the same ratio as in America and other unimproved countries, 
 except that the government of foreigners cannot be so favorable to in)prove- 
 menl, as the home government of other countries, and that we are here more 
 subject to famines than most other parts of the world : there is therefore no 
 fear that population will follow so close on the heels of produce, that there 
 will be DO more waste laud worlh cultivating, or that those horrors will 
 eoon commence which the present school of Political CEconomists anticipate 
 from such a state of things. 
 
TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT. 15 
 
 classes ; or that thoy slioiiUl consider their several interests a bar 
 to the formation of a permanent settlement, that settlement being 
 the same in prineij)Ic whether it extends to a single field, a village, 
 a I^ergunnah, a Sirkar, or a Sooba. Is it supposed that these riglits 
 in the soil did not extend in some shape or other to Bengal at the 
 time the permanent settlement was made, land being there more 
 valuable than in most otlier parts of India ; or is it supposed that 
 they do not now exist under the permanent settlement itself? Is it 
 because these tenures and rights were neither known nor inquired 
 into at the time of the permanent settlement, and that the holders 
 of them and their possessions were consigned over to a Zumindar, 
 who in the administration of revenue affairs took the place of the 
 Government itself; because a set of regulations was framed suited 
 to this new condition of things ; because many of our Bengal re- 
 venue servants have been trained under these regulations, and have 
 had all their views formed under this influence, that they have so 
 often failed to investigate the real nature of property, and have so 
 generally, as in the western provinces, failed to define the rights of 
 any class of occupants, and those of the Government itself, as well 
 as to arrive at any fixed or defined settlement of the revenue. 
 
 Wherever I have been employed in revenue affairs, that is in 
 Hindoostan, in Rajpootana, and in the Dekhan, one uniform 
 system seemed to me to prevail ; though, perhaps, under different 
 designations. 
 
 The Pi-ince or the Government, for the time being, is the uni- 
 versal proprietor ; all lands pay I'ent either to him, or to some 
 person to whom he or former Princes or Governments may have 
 assigned it, either on a life tenure, for a term of years, or in 
 perpetuity. No person in India will claim the rent of land or 
 exemption from the payment of rent as belonging to himself or his 
 family, except through some such grant. The person to whom 
 the rent, or a portion of the rent of a village or a district, is as- 
 signed, may either take the place of the Government in the man- 
 agement of the village or the district, or the management may be 
 held by the Government itself. In either case, the rights of the 
 district, and village officers, and of the occupiers of the fields, re- 
 main untouched. The person holding this right is styled Jageer- 
 dar or Enamdar. 
 
 Zumindar is a very undefined term amongst Mahommedan 
 Governments. The Princes of Rajpootana, Jeypore, Oudeepore, 
 Kotah, &'C. were designated by the Dehlee Government Zumindars : 
 so are the Gudwal and Soorapore chiefs of the present day, 
 although only tributaries, designated by the Nizam's Government ; 
 so is the person to whom it consigns the revenue management of 
 a district, granting him 5 or 10 per cent, on the amount of his 
 collections. Next below him comes the Patail or the Mokudum, 
 w ho in addition to some rent-free land has, or may not have, a 
 percentage on the collections from his village ; the village ac- 
 countant is generally in the same condition ; the priest or other 
 persons necessary for the internal government of the village have 
 
16 TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT. 
 
 eaeli an allowance from each cultivator, generallj' in kind, but the 
 amount is always defined, and the offices are hereditary. In case 
 of failure of heirs, some of these ofllices under Mahommedan 
 Governments revert to the state, and are saleable ; others are by- 
 election or sale through the members of the village community 
 amongst the cultivators. Some are hereditaiy occupiers of whole 
 villages or of fields, for which under good Governments they pay a 
 fixed rent ; nor is there any reason why the oflicers of Govern- 
 ment, whether district or village, should not hold land on this 
 tenure. The local and hereditary village oflicers, the Patails, 
 Mokudums, &c. and the several members of their families, will 
 indeed be found the principal holders ; others are tenants on lease, 
 or at will, either holding from these hereditary proprietors, if such 
 they may be called, or from the Government. The hereditary 
 field is of course saleable, and its value is in proportion to the 
 favorableness of the terms on which it is held, and to the confidence 
 in Government. I have known the most arbitrary minister of an 
 arbitrary prince (Raja Chundoo Lall) endeavour to purchase this 
 Meeras, or Mokururee, or Istumrar land (or as in Bengal it has 
 been called this Pottedar land, from the Zvuiiindars having grant- 
 ed, at the time of the settlement, Pottas to the Ryots) and failing 
 to obtain it in this way, rent it as an ordinary farmer would have 
 done. The rent in this case not being that which belongs to 
 Government, for the use of the land, but the difference between the 
 Government rent, which the hereditary field proprietor has to pay, 
 and the intrinsic value of the land ; which intrinsic value may 
 arise either from the favorableness of the terms on which it was 
 originally granted, or from its improved condition by outlay on it 
 in the shape either of labor or of capital. Under an arbitrary 
 government, it is possible to raise from these permanent village 
 landholders a greater rent than could be obtained from common 
 farmers, because they have an interest in the soil superior to the 
 others, and remain under these exactions longer than the others 
 would, in the hope of some change for the better.* Under good 
 Governments they have advantages over fai-mers, more I think 
 from having improved their lauds, than from originally having 
 obtained them at a lower rate ; for every village and every per- 
 gunnah in the country has its own field rates, regulated by the 
 several qualites of the soil. The principle of taxation is every 
 where governed by this, and the original or improved quality of 
 the soil necessarily governs the crop, sugar-cane, cotton, ginger, 
 tobacco, wheat, gram, and so on to the inferior sorts of grain ; 
 hence the higher rent arising apparently frojii the superior des- 
 cription of crop, and which would seem lately to be considered an 
 objectionable mode of taxation, f 
 
 * See Mr, Elphinstone's Report on the Poona Territory. 
 
 t It has been proposed by the Court of Directors, in a discussion orisi- 
 nating- at Bombay, that tliere sliould only be one descriptson of rent, and tliat 
 in assessing that rent the poorest or lowest description of soil should be takea 
 as the standard from which it is to be levied. Did the diiTereuce in the quality 
 
TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT. 17 
 
 Out of all these apparently conflicting interests, there is no diffi- 
 culty in arriving at a settlement, w liieh, in so far as the pco])le and 
 the Government are concerned, may as easily be made {)ermanent 
 as be fixed for a year or a period of years, provided tlie wliolc 
 fields of the village are under cultivation ; if they are not, to render 
 it equal on all villages, the permanent settlement must of course 
 only be in prospect, and will be completed when the cultivation of 
 the village is complete. The truth is, however, that nothing in 
 revenue affairs can be permanent. Whenever one or more of the 
 fields of a village falls out of cultivation, there is an end to perma- 
 nencj'. The persons with whom we made our permanent settlement 
 are of course svdjject to these fluctuations, and supposing a finnine 
 or some great calamity which should throw whole districts out of 
 cultivation, or when the profits arising from their ten per cent, or 
 w-hatever percentage we have allowed for the sake of this settle- 
 ment, should not cover their loss, there would of coui'se be an end 
 to the contract, and the management of the country must revert to 
 lis. It is even now said that the difference which is working in the 
 relative value of money and of produce has already reduced very 
 
 of soil exist only artiOcially, by the empIoyniRnt of labour or capital on it, 
 this would be a just and equitable decision of the court ; brothiu;^ (hat spirit 
 which governs all their decisions where the interests or the happiness of the 
 people of India are concerned, Butas tbereis a natural as well asan artilicial 
 ditrereoce in the qualities of soil, and as that difl'ereuce is now held to con- 
 stitute what is termed rent, would not governments, whose principal source 
 of iticome is their rent from land, sacrifice unnecessarily a great portion if not 
 the whole of their revenue, by taking the lowest class of soil as the standard 
 of assessment? Suppose that in taxing the people of England, we were to 
 take the lowest standard of income, and tax all according to that ; the richer 
 people would escape comparatively untaxed, and the amount of taxes would 
 be small indeed. This is so obvious, that it must be doubtful wiielher the 
 court's meaning has been correctly expressed in their letters. Yet, if we look 
 to what is the foundation of all money rent in India, a share of the crop, some- 
 thing likethis will be found to exist; for here governments lake an equal 
 share of all crops, (charging separately for outlay of capital in the construc- 
 tion of works to facilitate irrigation, &c ) whether the crop be valuable wli<-Ht 
 or valueless rale. The expence of ploughing, sowing, and reaping is nearly 
 the same in each case, or if there be a dilt'erence, it is proportiouubly in favor 
 of the superior crop. The share of wheat taken by government is of course 
 of far greater value to it than the share of rale, but so too, is that which 
 remains with the cultivator of more value to him. I he quantity in each in- 
 stance being the same in amount, the government advantage from its superior 
 land arises from the superior value of the crop which it produces, and this 
 constitutes a dilference between that mode of assessment and the money rent 
 which the court now authorizes to be levied, and which is a money rent limit- 
 ed to the lowest class of soil : the superior value of the cultivator's share is 
 too a sufiicienl inducement to him to prefer the cultivation of the superior 
 description of soil. There is to my understanding a similarity between the 
 mode of assessment proposed by the court, and that arising from the share of 
 crop ; but it requires a clearer head than mine to describe it. 
 
 In making the division of crop, there is great minuteness. In some crops, 
 where a greater quantity of seed is necessary than in others, or where there 
 is a great chance of its perishing from being sown amongst rocks, thorns, or 
 briers, a corresponding allowance is made to the cultivator ou the division of 
 the produce. 
 
 D 
 
18 TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT. 
 
 much tlie ])rofits of tlie Bengal Zumindars, and that a further 
 change will in many places destroy the settlement. The more 
 remote the tract of country from the capital, and fi*om rivers, the 
 more of coui'se will this change be felt. But even at Dacca, it is 
 said to be in rapid operation. Bengal is less subject to calamities 
 arising from famine, and to fluctuations in price, than other parts 
 of India. In most places, a much greater proportion than 10 per 
 cent, would be necessary to enable the person with whom a settle- 
 ment was made to bear the contingencies of failure from season and 
 other causes. In any case, the person who has one-tenth or two- 
 fifths need not be designated a proprietor to the exclusion of the 
 Government, which has a larger share, and a share without risk. 
 
 To form a settlement of a village, it is only necessary to know 
 what rent the whole of the fields under the village, belonging to, or 
 taxable by Government yield. From this deduct the value either in 
 kind or in money of the several Government assignments to Zumin- 
 dars, Patails, Mokudums, or any other description of persons, (for 
 these as surely fall on the Government or proprietor as the tithes 
 of England and Ireland do,) and the remainder, either in money 
 or in kind, is the Government share. If the Government wishes to 
 make what we style a permanent settlement, it has only to deduct 
 from the revenue thus shown 10 or 20 or any other percentage, 
 which may be considered equal to cover contingencies for a period 
 of years. If this remission be made to the individual holders of 
 fields, the settlement would be a Ryotwar ; if to a village and in 
 favor of the village manager or managers, it would be a ^lozewar : 
 if it be extended to a district, each of the villages of which has 
 been subjected to the same operation, and the remission granted in 
 favor of an individual, it would be a district or a Zumindaree 
 settlement ; and in either case, the tenures by which land is indi- 
 vidually held, and the several rights or claims on it, would remain 
 undisturbed, unless indeed the people Avere consigned over, bound 
 hand and foot, to a powerful Zumindar, and placed beyond the pale 
 of the laws : even then, they would struggle for their rights, either 
 individually or collectively, and in all probability they would pre- 
 vail. In the Ryotwar settlement, the remission is made for the 
 benefit of the individual cultivator ; in the Mozewar, it is made for 
 the benefit of the managers of the village ; in the Zumindaree, it 
 may be made for the benefit of a person altogether unconnected 
 with cultivation, or with the people : the first is calculated to pro- 
 duce a prosperous and happy peasantry, the second to raise up a 
 middle class, the third an aristocracy : — each of course reaping 
 profit just in proportion as the remission extends beyond the risk. 
 In either case, the mode of managing the collections is sufficiently 
 simple ; for the village manager will pay the amount of the two 
 first modes of settlement into the public treasury, the same as the 
 Zumindar will do in the third. There is nothing new in these forms 
 of settlement, the Ryotwar and the Mozewar will be found all over 
 
TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT. 19 
 
 India, so povliaps will the Zumindareo, although not with the re- 
 gularity and to tiie extent that wv introduced it into Bengal. 
 
 It is ditticult to understand what important duties the present 
 Collectors of Bengal should have to perform, or what important 
 duties can any wiiere belong to the receiving of a fixed rent. One 
 of the great benefits arising from a permanent settlement, whether 
 a l{yotwar, a Mozewar, or a district settlennMit, would be the jiros- 
 pect of dispensing witli this higidy paid class of servants, and of 
 substituting inferior and worse paid instruments. TrcMsurcn's would 
 appear to be sufhcient, and on this account, th(> district settlement 
 is, so far as the mere saving to Government, on account of collec- 
 tion is concerned, preferable to the Mozewar, and the Mozewar 
 preferable to the Ryotwar. In the expense attending the opera- 
 tions so ably conducted by Mr. Pringle, under the orders of the 
 Bombay Government, and in other operations of that nature, the 
 prospective saving of the yearly charge of our present expensive 
 machinery should surely be taken into account. Those who ar- 
 gue so strongly and so conscientiously on the advantages of the 
 Zumindaree over the llyotwaree system of management urge, ge- 
 nerally, in adtlition to the tendency which they believe the latter 
 to have, to impoverish the people. 
 
 1st. That Government is never sure of receving for a series of 
 years the same amount of revenue — and 2dly, that the Ryotwaree 
 is not so permanent as the Zumindaree ; but that it carries in it 
 the seeds of destruction. 
 
 On the 1st proposition, I would observe, that it is only the 
 favorableness of the terms granted which enables the Zumindar 
 to meet the fluctuations that must take place in all revenue affairs 
 through a period of years ; and that where his losses are through 
 a long period of time greater than his gains, he must fail. Go- 
 vernments can through other instruments collect in a period of 
 years the same amount of revenue that the contractor can ; and 
 thus like him make the profits on good cover the loss on bad sea- 
 sons. In the progress of time, when these Zumindarees come to 
 the hammer, and are bought at their market value, on a calculation 
 grounded on the mean rents of too favorable a state of things, 
 where ^^ ill be the Zumindars' power to meet the losses arising 
 from bad seasons* ? 
 
 In the 2nd proposition, it seems to be forgotten, that if the Ryot- 
 war system of even Sir Thomas Munro has in some respects failed, 
 or that if any other Ryotwar system fails, a Zumindaree, on similar 
 remissions, could not last. For Governments have as much the 
 means of exacting to the uttermost farthing as the Zumindar 
 Avould have, although perhaps not the same inclination, for ours 
 are British collectors, who do not pocket the money, and he is a 
 
 • If too these Zumindarees are divisible, arcording to tiie Hindoo laws of 
 inheritance, they must very soon lose whatever importance may belonp; to 
 theui as district revenue settlements ; and like all other Hindoo property, 
 except priuripalities, wiiieh apparently are not subject to those laws only 
 because there is no one to administer then), be reduced to the nature and 
 extent of Mozewar and liyotv?ar settlements. 
 
 D 2 
 
20 CUSTOMS — EXCISE. 
 
 native collector, who does. Is it because Sir Thomas Munro's 
 estimates were too high, or that the value of money is enhanced 
 every where since the period of that settlement — is it because we 
 carry aAvay specie in the bulk to purchase our teas in China, our 
 piece goods and other articles in England, and like the absentees 
 of Ireland, send the revenues and the accumulations of individuals 
 out of the country ; whilst we do not allow the sugars and other 
 products of India a fair competition in the English market with 
 those of our slave colonies, that the Ryotwar system of India, to 
 the great bulk of the people the most beneficent of all systems, and 
 which might be extended with so much present advantage to mox'e 
 civilized countries, is to be condemned before the people have been 
 heard in its defence ? The Zumindaree settlement will last, accord- 
 ing to the favorableness of its terms, through this unnatural state of 
 things ; but it too must sooner or later break down. Those who 
 doubt the poM'Cr of the Ryotwar settlement to last through centuries 
 of good government with undoubted benefit to the people, may with 
 advantage consult Mr. Sullivan's late evidence before the Select 
 Committee of the House of Conunons, the principles on which the 
 Ryotwar assessment of Mulik Umber was framed in the Dekhan, 
 that of the Polegar chiefs of Nuggur Bednor, and of the native chiefs 
 in Canara and other parts of Southern India. 
 
 CUSTOMS. 
 
 This branch of revenue, exclusive of our salt monopoly, is said 
 to yield returns very disproportioned to the expence incurred in 
 the collection, the tax which it imposes on the people, and the 
 obstructions which it off'ers to commerce. Mr. Mackenzie, I think, 
 calculates the nett revenue in Bengal at 22 lakhs per annum, and the 
 revenue throughout India is perhaps not double that amount. The 
 additional cost to the people could only be estimated by discovering 
 the charge of our custom-house establishments, and the amovmt 
 which the officers of custom levy in fines, as bribes, and which they 
 receive as douceurs. Mr. Elphinstone's scheme of levying a custom 
 tax on exports by sea, (although apparently contrary to all princi- 
 ple,) and abolishing our inland customs with their thousand and one 
 inflictions, would be hailed as the greatest blessing by the people ; 
 and might be made a relief to commerce without involving any 
 sacrifice of revenue. 
 
 EXCISE. 
 
 I am not aware that any calculation has ever been made of the 
 amount of excise revenue separate from the opium monopoly, or of 
 the expence of collecting this tax. It has never, that I am aware 
 of, been bade a matter of calculation in India, whether by reducing 
 
OPIUM AND SALT MONOPOLY. 21 
 
 tlie amount of our tax, we should incicas:c con>uinption ? For 
 Governments have never so trifled with tlio morals of the people. 
 In India every thing in the shape of spirits and intoxicating articles 
 is of the worst description, injurious to tlie health of the people, 
 and destructive to their morals ; for the use of them in any degree 
 is considereil to degrade a person from his station in society, and is 
 therefore calculated to render him a worthless or desperate charac- 
 ter. There is neither the ^^ holesome and invigorating ale of Eng- 
 land, nor the generous Mines of the other parts of Europe ; nor 
 Avould even these or any other stimulants of that nature be required 
 by the inhabitants of this climate. The nearer therefore that our 
 tax serves as a prohibition by checking consumption, the better. 
 
 OPIUM MONOPOLY. 
 
 In defence of this monopoly, except in so far as it may be neces- 
 sary to our revenue, I am not aware that one word can be said. 
 It seems to be on the eve of dying a natural death, for in spite of 
 all our attempts to limit cultivation, in the fertile regions of ^lalwa 
 and liajpootana, or to g<.'t what is produced in the tributary states 
 of that country into our own hands, production has there been so 
 abundant, and the drug has found its way so extensively in the last 
 few years to the China market ; as to reduce its value to one-half 
 the original standard, and pretty nearly to destroy our Patna and 
 Benares mono^ioly price. 
 
 SALT MONOPOLY. 
 
 Nearly the same may be said of the defencelessness of this as of 
 the opium monopoly ; but what tax is not objectionable, and would 
 not be resisted if Governments could not persuade the people that 
 it was necessary for their defence, or for the administration of their 
 affairs, or if they had not the power of enforcing it ? It seems a 
 question whether the revenues of India will suffer by the abolition 
 of all the commercial speculations of the Company in that country ; 
 but there is no question that great loss will be sustained by the 
 abolition of the monopoly in tea, and as both these events are now 
 likely to happen, this is not the period for relinquishing the advan- 
 tages of the salt monopoly ; on the contrary, similar measures with 
 those existing in Bengal might be extended, if likely to prove 
 ecjually productive of revenue, to Madras and Bombay. 
 
 There is perhaps no other article on which the Government could 
 derive an equal amount of revenue at so little cost to the people, 
 provided the monopoly be well administered. Salt seems, to even 
 the poorest class, to be generally cheap enough every where. But 
 when one hears that there are places (Assam, Cachar), where the 
 poor man cannot get salt to his rice, and sees that the fisherman is 
 
22 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 not allowed to carry in liis boat siifficiont salt to cure the produce 
 of his night's toil, one wishes tax-gatherers where salt comes from 
 in the deep blue sea. 
 
 The stories of hardships inflicted on the Molungees or manufac- 
 turers are most probably very much overcharged ; if those sufferings 
 exist in any degree, they may very easily be removed, and the 
 simple management of the monopoly in its present shape is certainly 
 a less evil than a custom tax with its cloud of gatherers Avould inflict 
 on the public. The defence of the system and the management of 
 it may very safely be left in the hands of the talented Secretary to 
 the Board of Customs, Salt and Opium. 
 
 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 It is a common observation that our laws and revenue regula- 
 tions of tlie times of Hastings and Cornwallis were more applicable 
 to tlie condition of native i:)roperty and native society than those of 
 a later period. The servants of those days had a superior acquaint- 
 ance with the native character, they consulted more natives of 
 intelligence and learning, they were altogether more thrown amongst 
 and mixed up with natives ; and therefore had advantages in legis- 
 lating for them beyond servants of a later date. The science of 
 jurisprudence has since those days made great progress through- 
 out Europe, principally by simplifying the laws and suiting them 
 to the understandings and the wants of the people. In India those 
 most qualified for this great work lead such an oflftcial existence, 
 they are so far above and so removed from the people, so little 
 acquainted with them, except when trying them or taxing them, 
 that the formation of a Code of Laws suited to their wants and 
 condition by the officers that could be brought to w ork upon it, 
 would seem a hopeless task. The nature of society in the ditferent 
 portions of so extensive a region must be supposed very dissimilar, 
 and the laws which woidd be applicable in one portion might be 
 very inapplicable in another. 
 
 Some progress was made in a Code of Laws under the enlight- 
 ened administration of Mr. Elphinstone at Bombay. It is proba- 
 ble that Sir Thomas Munro was not inattentive to such a work at 
 Madras ; and that out of the various changes and attempts at legis- 
 lation in Bengal, something that is good nmst be found. 
 
 Call together therefore these scattered laws, and those of the 
 olden time ; with the ablest of the Company's servants from the 
 several presidencies; join Mith them the judges of the several 
 Supreme Courts who may be most able and willing to assist in 
 such a work ; with them unite the most learned of the Mahomme- 
 dan and Hindoo Law Officers of India ; and a Code of Laws 
 which the judges, the lawyers, and the people may understand, 
 must, although lawyers are said not to be the best legislators, be 
 the result. Years may be necessary to the fulfilment of tliis great 
 work ; but when completed, it would be a monument of our 
 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 23 
 
 wisdom to vhicli ve could appeal, and wliicli the natives of India 
 might respect throngli future ages. One system of Mahommedan 
 Law prevails every where, and the laws of the Hindoos arc too 
 everv where ntnu'ly the same. Our Government has howevi'r to 
 legislate for both these great classes of society, ajid for Christians 
 (European and Indian), who are already extensively settled 
 throughout Lulia, and who in the progress of time must hold a still 
 more prominent ])lace there. This Code of Laws must therefore 
 not only be modified in conformity with the local interests of the 
 people of the several portions of India, but it must extenil to each 
 class of our subjects its own Uim s, and blend those laws together so 
 as in civil processes to embrace the conflicting interests of all. A 
 more difficult undertaking never was submitted to the wisdom of 
 legislators ; those of Indian experience may be supposed more 
 fitted for the task than those of European. But united, and witli 
 the experience of the present age in legislation before them, there 
 is surely wisdom enough in the land for any undertaking. Much 
 assistance may be expected from the able writer who has lately 
 appeared in Bengal on this subject. 
 
 A Code of Laws which should bring home to the understandings 
 of the various classes of our subjects a knowledge of their rights, 
 and the decision which they might expect from an appeal to our 
 tribunals, would necessarily be of the utmost importance to the 
 people, as well as to those by whom the laws are administered. 
 Those who are to administer our laws cannot much longer continue 
 to have and to struggle with one another, and with Government, 
 for separate and extended jurisdiction. It may be supposed that 
 the whole of the law officers of India will be united for one pur- 
 pose, and acting in concert for one great object. That instead of 
 the anomaly of one set of judges calling themselves King's, and 
 another calling themselves Company's, all will, in so far as it is 
 right or necessary that judges should, in administering the laws, be 
 subject to either legislative or other council, yield to one supreme 
 and ruling authority. 
 
 Such a code in full operation, with a sufficient number of respect- 
 able and educated natives to administer its laws in all the minor 
 concerns of life, civil and criminal, with European judges to appeal 
 to in all cases from their decision, and we should have the best 
 security that justice would be brought to every man's door — Supreme 
 Courts at the presidencies, and wlienever required in the provinces, 
 a judge of circuit in each division of the country, and district 
 judges, should be the whole of the European machinery. There 
 might be as many grades of^native judges as seemed necessary, and 
 the whole, European and native, should be criminal as well as civil. 
 One of the great advantages attending the (employment of natives 
 more extensively in a judicial capacity is, that they may so easily 
 be multiplied to any degree that may be necessary to work off all 
 arrears of business ; the whole should be magistrates and justices 
 of the peace, but uo prosecution should originate against any person 
 
24 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 ill the court of the authority by whom the accused was committed. 
 There should be an appeal in all cases frojn the decision of native 
 judges to an European judge ; but, in any case, the decision of the 
 Court of Appeal, confirming the award of the lower court, that 
 decision should be final. In case of a reversal oftlecree, an appeal 
 should be made to the next tribunal, until two uniform decisions 
 were obtained, or until the appellant reached the Supreme Court, 
 whose decision in all cases should be final. Plaints or prosecutions 
 might be directed into the several courts, according to the amount 
 of property or of crime involved. But the Supreme Court being 
 reserved as a Court of Appeal, no prosecution should originate 
 there ; although the individual judges of that court, when the 
 business there was not pressing, or wlien their services were required 
 in the provinces, might be employed as judges of circuit. The 
 great object being to open as wide as possible the door of justice to 
 the people, and to render its stream pure, it would be necessary to 
 increase or limit our checks and our instruments according to their 
 demands. Advantage might be taken of Europeans or natives of 
 respectability throughout the country as referees or arbitrators, at 
 the option of the parties seeking redress, or they may be admitted 
 to assist the judge as assessors. Europeans and natives not in the 
 service might too be employed as justices of the peace, and on 
 reference by the parties to them have powers conferred on them to 
 decide in matters of trifling criminal ofi'ences or inferior civil suits. 
 The Punchait, that instrument under native Governments which is 
 as sacred in the eyes of their subjects as our juries are in ours, might 
 be had recourse to with great advantage as an aid to our judicial 
 institutions. The members of a Punchait having been elected by 
 the plaintiff and defendant, each of course naming his own members, 
 and a Sirpunch or head appointed either by their united voice, or 
 by the judge who has the power of confirming their decree, its 
 decision must be final, unless there be proof of corruption. It is 
 the want of this support which has hitherto rendered the Punchait 
 of so little avail, and so little calculated to live with our judicial 
 system. The Punchait system after all may be found to flourish 
 only when there is a denial of justice throvigh courts instituted for 
 its administration, or when these courts are corrupt, or so expensive 
 as to amount to a denial of justice ; yet arbitration amongst ourselves 
 is not uncommon ; and the native Punchait, though more subject 
 to rules and better defined, does not differ materially from the 
 system as known in our own civilized land. The remarkalile 
 instance of the most intelligent of all our native subjects, the 
 Parsees of Bombay, withdrawing in a great degree from the 
 Supreme Court there, and instituting Punchaits amongst them- 
 selves for the regulation of their own affairs in civil cases, may 
 have its origin in the ruinous expence attending appeals to our 
 laws. 
 
 The instruments which will thus be at work throughout India 
 may be expected to bring us nearer to the people, to give them an 
 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 25 
 
 interest in our cause, and to l)e of more a'Jsistance in the formation 
 and regulation of an t'ttieient police than in even tlie otiier branches 
 ofadniiuistration. It is the distance to which we have been removed 
 from native society, the want of connecting links between that 
 society and ourselves, and the absolute revolutions that some of our 
 sweeping measures have introduced, which have enabled bodies of 
 men like the Dakoits of Bengal, or Dakoits wherever they are 
 found, to combine aiul become the enemies of all property. It 
 must not be supposed that there were not influential persons in the 
 society acquainted or perhaps connected with these miscreants, or 
 that the great majority of the society did not know them. But 
 thev saw that we had not the power to protect them, and that their 
 chief hope of safety consisted in their silence. The second descrip- 
 tion of land revenue settlement which I have noticed, whicli pre- 
 serves the village institutions unimpaired, and which throws respon- 
 sibility upon them, would be the most efficient instrument of police. 
 Under such a system, it would be impossible that offenders against 
 property should attain combination, or that they should remain long 
 undetected. 
 
 The great question of combining judicial and revenue powers in 
 the hands of the same persons, remains to be considered. This 
 union is admirably suited for a certain condition of society, in an 
 inferior state of civilization, and consequently inferior complica- 
 tion of affairs, in which rights and interests are more easily defin- 
 ed ; and if we could calculate on good instruments, and none but 
 good instruments, I should be disposed to the system which placed 
 a small district under the exclusive management of an individual 
 European officer, wMth sufficient native instruments in subor- 
 dination to him, and w ith a superior European functionary Avho 
 should have the general superintendance of a given number of 
 these districts, in all their judicial and revenue concerns. But as 
 we cannot calculate on the necessary degree of industry and 
 integrity in any service which it would be possible to organise, I 
 see no alternative but to separate for ever these two great branches 
 of administration, the officers employed in them being held avail- 
 able for either, according to their qualifications and the exigencies 
 of the service. There is no reason why both Europeans and 
 natives employed in the revenue department should not be the 
 most useful of our magistrates. But they should have no judicial 
 bench, nor should our judicial authorities have any concern with 
 revenue affairs ; — the rights and interests of those paying land 
 revenue, as of the other classes of society, whether with reference to 
 the claims of Government or of individuals being left exclusively 
 to the protection of the laws. 
 
 The danger of the officers administering revenue and judicial 
 affairs, when colonization becomes more extended, getting involved 
 in property which should give to them a bias, either in reality or 
 in the opinion of the people, in the performance of their duty ; 
 and thus injure that high reputation which the Civil Service has 
 
 E 
 
26 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 hitherto held, and that confidence in its integrity and impartiality 
 V hich has hitherto so justly existed in our native subjects ; must 
 have struck every body as the principal, if not the only danger, 
 which would result from granting to Europeans free permission to 
 hold property in land. Those administering our laws and our 
 revenue have hitherto Ijeen far removed from the people. Oppos- 
 ing interests which shovdd bring the parties into collision would 
 be full of danger. Laws will of course l)e enacted for the purpose 
 of saving the people and ourselves from this worst of evils. But 
 whether these laws can be effectual for such a purpose, time alone 
 can show. The probability is that they will not. 
 
 It is a cjuestion of old standing whether an exclusive Civil Service 
 consisting of about 950 members and costing upwards of a crore 
 and a half of rupees per annum, or nearly one-ninth of the territo- 
 rial revenue of India, is the best suited to administer our affairs. 
 Whatever objections may be taken to a service in such a form, it 
 has at least hitherto maintained a reputation for high-toned honor, 
 and for talent, which has certainly never been surpassed by any 
 service in the world, and which will perhaps never be equalled by 
 any thing that may take its place. It is true that this service has 
 had incentives to exertion in the importance of the duties entrust- 
 ed to its management, in the confidence which has been reposed in 
 it, and in its splendid emoluments and prospects which have never 
 before been enjoyed by any service of equal magnitude, and which 
 cannot be expected to last. Whether the Civil Service is to con- 
 tinue in its present shape, whether India is to be thrown open 
 to adventurers from England, or whether there is to be one united 
 service for India, are questions of great importance as concerns our 
 future administration. It is probable that the present exclusive 
 and highly-paid service will not last under the doctrines which will 
 now govern people at home. Yet it will probably be found expedi- 
 ent that there should be an united service in India, and that persons 
 to administer the affairs of that country should have an Indian 
 education : on the other Iiand it may be supposed that new vigour 
 and energy would be imparted by the introduction from home of 
 persons of matured judgment, who had experience in the adminis- 
 tration of affairs in our own or other countries. 
 
 If rendered, as has so often been proposed, one united service, 
 that service would of course require to be military, and those 
 entering it to be trained in the first instance to habits of military 
 life. W'hat would free England say to a country, whose civil insti- 
 tutions were administered entirely by military men ? Yet there is 
 no reason why military men, educated as they Mould be, should 
 not lay aside their swords and their regimentals, and take their 
 seat on the judgment bench in this conquered land, carrying with 
 them all the attributes for the administration of justice. The united 
 service, although still an exclusive one, would give great advantage 
 to Government by extending the sphere of its selection for employ- 
 ments the most important. An evil to be guarded against would 
 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 27 
 
 be that of seloctinsc for Civil employ, wliorc it may bo supposed the 
 pay would be bettor, those of most talout aud ])roniiso ; and so 
 leaving the ariuy degraded, and the otHoers who remained with it 
 a discontentetl portion of the service. This would in some measure 
 bo corrected by interest and i)atromige, but still it must bo suppos- 
 ed that this c\\\ would exist to a greater and more injurious degree 
 than it now does. 
 
 But whatever the form in which the Civil Service may be main- 
 tained, it is quite clear that the country cannot aftbrd, nor will it 
 any longer be necessary, to extend to it the present high rate of pay. 
 The first step tiiat Mas takini for increasing the pay of our native 
 establishment, bv ])laeing it on a respectable and substantial footing, 
 was likewise a signal for the reduction of the ])ay of our European 
 establislmuMits. Formerly, the European Civil Service had a mono- 
 poly of high pay, and it is very evident that wo cannot atlbrd to pay 
 both highly. The pay of the principal Sudder Amoons and other 
 native judges is perhaps higher than was ever given by native 
 Governments for the performance of similar duties. The natural 
 tendency is too towards increase of expenditure. The only reduc- 
 tions that have hitherto been made are in the Military and Political 
 Departments. The increase of expence in the European portion 
 of the Bengal Civil Service alone is said in the last year to bo eight 
 lakhs, as compared with the former year ; whilst the expense of the 
 principal Sudder Ameons, the Sudder Amoons, and Moonsiffs will 
 amount to upwards of three lakhs and a half.* Bj' what corres- 
 ponding reduction is this charge to bo met ? Similar increase in 
 the Civil Service of the other presidencies would in one year give 
 in the whole, as compared with the civil expenditure only a year 
 or two ago, twenty lakhs, a prospect sufficiently disheartening. 
 
 With our forty millions of debt, and with the uncertainty of con- 
 tiniung to hold these monopolies, which at jDrosent give us a sur- 
 plus revenue for the payment of that debt, it is surely unwise to 
 increase our expenditure in any department, unless the necessity 
 for this is very apparent, or unless the increase can be met by cor- 
 responding reductions either in that or in some other department 
 of our administration. 
 
 * Former native Judicial establisbmenf, ... 7,28,844 
 
 Increase, 3,64,416 
 
 10,93,260 
 E 2 
 
28 
 
 POLITICAL RELATIONS. 
 
 POLITICAL RELATIONS. 
 
 These are of three kmds : 
 
 1st. — Foreign. 
 
 Persia, Cabul, Senna, Arab Tribes, Siam, and Acheen. 
 
 2nd. — External, on her Frontier. 
 Ava, Nepaul, Lahore, and Sind. 
 
 Sd. — Internal. All of which have relinquished political rela- 
 tions with one another and with all other states. 
 
 They may according to the nature of our treaties w'ith them 
 be divided into four great classes. 
 
 1st Class. — Treaties, offensive and defensive — right on their pai-t 
 to claim protection, external and internal, from the British Go- 
 vernment — right on its part to interfere in their internal affairs. 
 
 1st Oude. 
 
 2nd. — Mysore. 
 
 3rd. — Berar. 
 
 4th. — Travancore. 
 
 5th. — Cochin. 
 
 2nd Class. — Treaties, offensive and defensive — right on their 
 part to claim protection, external and internal, from the British 
 Government, and to the aid of its troops to realize their just claims 
 from their own subjects. No right on its part to interfere in their 
 internal affairs. 
 
 1 St. — Hyderabad. 
 
 2nd. — Baroda. 
 
 3rd Class — Treaties, offensive and defensive — states mostly tribu- 
 tary, acknoAvledging the supremacy of, and promising subordinate 
 co-operation to, the British Government ; but supreme rulers in 
 their own territory. 
 
 1. Indore. 
 ■ 2. Oudeepore. 
 
 3. Jeypore. 
 
 4. Joudpore. 
 
 5. Kotah. 
 
 6. Boondee. 
 
 7. Ulwur and Machery. 
 
 8. Beekaneer. 
 
 9. Jessulmere. 
 
 10. Kisengurh. 
 
 11. Banswarra. 
 
 12. Purtabgurh. 
 
 13. Doongerpore. 
 
 14. Kei'owlee. 
 . 15. Serowee. 
 
 16. Bhurtpore. 
 
 17. Bhopal. 
 
 18. Cutch. 
 
 Rajpootana, 
 
FOREIGN RELATIONS. 29 
 
 19. Dhar. 
 
 20. Dlioljiore Baree. 
 
 Saugor and Buiullokuiul,. 
 
 25. Sawiiut Waroo. 
 4th Class. — Guarantee and protection — subordinate co-opera- 
 tion ; but supremacy in tlieir own territory. 
 
 1. Ameer Khan. 
 
 2. Puttcalah. 
 
 3. Naba. 
 
 4. Keytul. 
 
 5. Jeend, and otlier protected Seik and Hill States. 
 5th Class. — -Amity and tVicndship. 
 
 Gwalior. 
 
 6th Class. — Protection, with right on the part of the -^British 
 Government to controul internal affairs. 
 
 1. Sattara. 
 
 2. Kolapore. 
 
 3. Dehlee. 
 
 FOREIGN. 
 
 Persia. — The relations of England with Persia may be consider- 
 ed to arise altogether from our position in India, from the appre- 
 hension at one time of designs on the part of France against our 
 possessions there, and at another on the part of Russia. Whether 
 either of these powers ever in reality entertained any such designs 
 may be considered doubtful, and whether any of our measures in 
 Persia would have tended in any great degree to frustrate those 
 designs, may be considered doubtful likewise. Whether, but from 
 the fear of injury to our position in India, it would not have been, 
 oris not still, desirable to see either of these great powers, or any 
 other European power, establish their influence in the possessions 
 of the Porte, of Persia, or other eastei-n nations, is still more 
 doubtful. The spread of their possessions eastward would tend 
 to weaken them in the seat of their own power ; to give at no 
 distant period rise to new dynasties : and in either case a degree 
 of civilization, compared with what now exists in those countries, 
 must be the result. 
 
 But whilst we fear the encroachments of Russia, Persia from her 
 position must always be an object of great interest to us. We 
 never can hope by any exertion that we can make in that quarter 
 to save Persia from entire conqiiest by Russia, should such be the 
 Avill of the latter. Our treasures and military stores woidd be 
 more wasted in the attempt than they were in our first efforts to 
 5?ave Spain from Napoleon's usurpation. She is too remote in posi- 
 
30 FOREIGN RELATIONS. 
 
 tion, and the consequences which her downfal wonhl involve are 
 too little apparent, to render it desirable, even if we had the means, 
 to employ a portion of the army of England for her support. 
 
 England may however afford to put forth one of her best known and 
 most approved ambassadors to support the interests of India in Persia, 
 and India can afford to pay the expense. All the political and com- 
 mercial powers in the gulf of Persia might be brought under H. E. 
 and the post would not be unworthy of one of the first ambassadoi's 
 of England. Our relations political and commercial, in the Red Sea, 
 and in Arabia, or wherever authority is claimed by the Porte, 
 might in the same manner be brought under our ambassador at 
 Constantinople, until Mahommed Ali Pasha has founded a separate 
 empire for himself : and these two measures would tend to identify 
 England with her Indian empire. It has been supposed that the 
 ministry of England has withheld their countenance from Persian 
 negotiations, and left the responsibility with the Company, that they 
 might thereby be safe from involvement with Russia. 
 
 Our treaties with Persia, looking back at them with our present 
 experience, show that the Indian diplomacy of those days was not 
 very well calculated to manage distant relations. We have wasted 
 vast treasures to obtain the support of Persia against the invasion 
 of the French and the Afghauns, from which we never in reality 
 had any thing to fear* ; and it is surely to the eternal disgrace of 
 Indian diplomacy that we should have obtained the Firman of the 
 King of Persia to his governors and servants, " to expel and 
 extirpate the French, and never to allow them to obtain a footing 
 in any place ;" and his announcement to them, " you are at full 
 liberty to disgrace and slay them." In the treaty we stipulate 
 with Persia, " Should an army of the French nation, actuated by 
 design and deceit, attempt to settle Avith a view to establishing 
 themselves on any of the islands or shores of Persia ; a conjoint 
 force shall be appointed by the two high contracting states, to act 
 in co-operation for their expulsion, and extirpation, and to destroy 
 and put an end to the foundation of their treason." The same 
 article of the same treaty concludes, " and if ever any of the 
 great men of the French nation express a wish or desire to obtain 
 a place of residence or dwelling on any of the islands or shores of 
 the kingdom of Persia, that they may raise the standard of abode 
 or settlement, leave for their residing in such place shall not be 
 granted." This treaty was negotiated by Sir John Malcolm, in 
 1801, under powers delegated to him by the Marquis of Wellesley, 
 Governor General in India. 
 
 Whatever the power of Persia may at that time have been, it is 
 now very limited. The expedition of the Prince Roj'al into Kho- 
 rasan, with the flower of the Persian army, for the purpose of sub- 
 jugating the revolted portion of that pi-ovince, and of collecting 
 
 * We have only lately escaped from our subsidiary obligations to Persia, 
 by paying two hundred thousand tomans of thesis hundred tiiousand which 
 Russia compelled her to pay as indemaity fur the expences incurred in the 
 war of 1828. 
 
FOREIGN RELATIONS. 31 
 
 the arrears of tribute from Herat, promises at present to be a com- 
 plete fuihire. He lias api»areiitly not received supplies either in 
 men or money from Tehran, anil the resources of Khorasan have 
 already faih'd. The chief of Koochan, the Usbcks of Khiva, and 
 the Afghauns of Herat under their Prince Kanu-an, have appa- 
 rently united against him, whilst the Persian army at Meshed is 
 hardly eipud to cope with either of these tribes, and its position 
 has become highly critical, although Dost Mohannned Khan would 
 appear, from C'abul, to have opened a negotiation, oflbring to assist 
 the Prince Hoyal in his designs against Herat. In Persia itself the 
 Princes of Kerman Sha, Huroojun, Pars, and Kurman have some 
 of them revolted from the throne, and their armies are now opposed 
 to one another. 
 
 If there be any truth in the notion that Russia is interested in 
 the operations of the Prince Royal in Khorasan, as paving the way 
 to their united designs on India, we could not surely be in a falser 
 position than that of assisting with our officers and military stores 
 in this enterprise against ourselves. 
 
 The presence of some members of the Russian Embassy, or of 
 some Russian officers with the Prince Royal's army, lias led in 
 India to the belief that the designs of Persia, whatever they are, 
 have the support of that great power ; whilst in reality the object 
 of Russia seems to be the humane purpose of releasing from cap- 
 tivity her own Russian and Georgian slaves, or the Christian slaves 
 of other nations, who are described to be in great numbers in a 
 state of the most hopeless bondage. 
 
 But however this may be, the Russian officers have left the 
 Persian army, satisfied most probably that that army has not the 
 power of assisting them, either in obtaining the release of slaves, 
 the extension of commerce, or of forwarding the ambitious views 
 which Russia is supposed to entertain. 
 
 The present period, and the nature of Russia's power would 
 seem peculiarly ill calculated for entertaining designs against a ter- 
 ritory so remote as India. Her moderation, her want of means, 
 or the necessity she was under of yielding to the will of the other 
 powers of Europe in her late wars with Turkey and Persia, when 
 being at the very gates of their capitals, she turned back her vic- 
 torious army from the prosecution of a just w^ar, to a result almost 
 certain and glorious to herself; do not justify the belief which is 
 now so generally prevalent of her designs on India. It is natural 
 enough that the Russian governor of Georgia and the officers of 
 her army there, and in Persia, should think and talk of India, and 
 that persons should have been deputed to survey the several routes, 
 and report on the topography and the resources of the intermediate 
 country : and even if any doubt could be entertained of the ambi- 
 tious views of Russia, there is sufficient in these incidents to give rise 
 to the reports w hich have been so prevalent of her designs on India. 
 
 Russia is in Europe surrounded by powers which only await the 
 absence of her ai'mies to endeavour to throw otf the yoke which 
 
32 FOREIGN RELATIONS. 
 
 she has imposed on them ; and there is a spirit abroad in most of 
 tlie nations which will re(juii"e, for years to come, all the armies 
 that the most despotic powers can bring to bear upon it. Russia 
 it is true has an army of sufficient magnitude to conquer most of 
 the nations of Asia, supposing that army could be spared from 
 home. But has she or any other nation of Europe resources to 
 send forth an army of such magnitude as could march from the 
 banks of the Caspian or from Orenburg to those of the Indus, 
 through hostile and desert regions, equipped in artillery, stores, 
 and comraissariat as modern armies must be ? Must Russia or 
 any other Christian power which attem^Jts the conquest of India by 
 land, conciliate, conquer, or colonise the intermediate nations ? or 
 may she attempt so extended a line of march* with the Persians, 
 the Usbeks, the Afghauns, and the Dooranees in her rear, with the 
 army of India posted on the Indus in her front, its ordnance and 
 engineer departments equal in magnitude and in science to those 
 of any army in the world ; and the steam-boats and floating bat- 
 teries of England covering that river to oppose her advance, inter- 
 rupt her communications, and cut off her retreat? The former 
 system of enterprise will take years to accomplish, and we shall 
 know of the commencement of the attempt in sufficient time to arm 
 ourselves against it, and to give our assistance in organizing and 
 preparing the intermediate powers, as well as those of India. The 
 latter is an enterprise which it may easily be supposed would stag- 
 ger the boldest general of the age. We ourselves have looked with 
 something like wonder at General Goddard's march across the 
 peninsula of India, and cannot forget that the Bengal army could 
 not find a road from Arracan or Silhet to join their brethren in the 
 neighbouring province of Ava. 
 
 The army of Alexander, after conquering and retaining possession 
 of Persia for a period of years, and it may be supposed organizing 
 in some degree the intermediate countries for his purpose, failed in 
 the enterprise, and turned back after crossing one or two of the 
 rivers of the Punjaub, although it had not at the end of its march 
 an army in discipline equal to its own to contend with. The Rus- 
 sian army, by the time it reached the same point, would perhaps in 
 the present day be as tired of the enterprise as the Grecian army of 
 Alexander was. The first Mahommedan conquerors of India made 
 descents on that country from their advanced position at Gizni ; 
 and if Zengis Khan, Timoor, Baber, and Nadir Shah performed 
 long marches, the latter nearly the same that Russia would have to 
 do, and Timoor ranged from the wall of China to Moscow, it must 
 be remembered that their armies consisted mostly of large divisions 
 of light cavalry, moving most probably on different lines of opei'a- 
 tions ; that they carried along with them in the enterprise the 
 Mahommedansof Western and Central Asia, and stood in a position 
 altogether different from that of a Christian and foreign army 
 
 * The following: infoiniation OQ (hit subject is from Major Everest, Sur- 
 veyor General uf iQdia. 
 
STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER. 33 
 
 eiitorinj; tliese tracts. I purposely omit the consideration of the 
 (jiu'stioii whether any European power eouhl advautaj^eously hold 
 possession of India through a land coinniunieation, a hostile fleet 
 having conunand of the seas and the niontlis of her rivers. 
 
 Calbul. — Tlie unfortunate kingofCaubul, Slia Sooja-oolMoolk, 
 having been dethroned so shortly after the trtaty was concluded 
 witii him by the Honorable ^Tounstuart Elphinstone, and having 
 been almost ever since a pensioner of tiie British Government at 
 I^oodeanah, that treaty may b(> supposed a dead letter. It is re- 
 markal)le that in the treaty Mr. Elphinstone is made to say, that 
 the French and Persians had entered into a confederacy for the 
 purpose of invading the dominions of His Majesty tlie King of the 
 Dooranees. 
 
 The treaties with Siam, Acheen, Senna, the Arab tribes, and 
 other foreign states, being mostly either commercial, or directed 
 against piracy, need hardly be noticed here. 
 
 STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER. 
 
 AvA. — The condition of Ava, at the commencement of the strug- 
 gle Avith ns, and her resources both in men and money, were very 
 imposing. The state Avhich could send fortli ten or twelve thou- 
 sand men to such distant points as Arracan on the one hand, and 
 eight thousand to Assam, Cachar, and Muneepore, on the fi'ontier 
 of Silhet on the other, which could place in position an army esti- 
 mated at sixty thousand men, to oppose our advance from Rangoon ; 
 and which, during a contest of two years with us, preserved, to all 
 appearance, her internal condition and resources unbroken, must 
 be of the first magnitude. 
 
 It is true, that in all our contests with the Burmese, her raw levies 
 proved themselves the leai«t formidable enemy that we have ever 
 encountered. The disaster at Ramoo, where 500 regidar sepoys and 
 500 irregulars were overthrown by the Arracan division of the Bur- 
 mese army, is the only reverse of any magnitude that occurred on 
 our own frontier during the war. Even this " might have perhaps 
 been avoided by a more decided conduct on the j^art of the officer 
 commanding, and by greater promptitude, than was shown in the 
 dispatch of the expected reinforcements."* On the Silhet frontier, 
 Colonel Bowen retired from before the stockade of Doodpatlee, after 
 several unsuccessful attempts to carry it. At Talain, Colonel Innes 
 similarly failed, and although, in the last instances, the troops were 
 not withdrawn in the best order, yet the Burmese had not sufficient 
 enterprise to leave their stockades and harass them on their retreat ; 
 neither did they after the overthrow of the Ramoo detachment fol- 
 low up their success by a demonstration against Chittagong ; when, 
 at Dacca, and even at Calcutta it^elf^ tlieir sliort-lived and ill-merit- 
 ed success caused no small excitement. oNIaha Bundoola's attention 
 
 H. H. WilsoD. 
 F 
 
34 STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER. 
 
 was however about the same time (May 1 824) called to the defence 
 of Rangoon, where 13,000 British and native troops landed for 
 offensive operations against Ava. 
 
 On the Silhet frontier operations ceased from the inclemency of 
 the season, and the nature oi' the country ; the Burmese retaining 
 their advanced positions Mhich our troops had failed to carrj'. On 
 the opening of next season they were easily expelled from Assam 
 and Cachar. The division of the army which was assembled under 
 General Shuldham on that frontier, for operations in Ava, through 
 Muneepore and the Kuboo valley, struggled through February and 
 March, against difficulties which no exertions could overcome, and 
 eventually gave up the pursuit. This afforded Lieutenant Pember- 
 ton a fine opportunity for the display of his enterprising spirit. 
 With Gumbheer Singh, the chief of Muneepore, and with his undis- 
 ciplined levy, that officer advanced to the capital, expelled the Bur- 
 mese from the valley, and established the authority of its ancient 
 chief there. It must never be forgotten, that the army of Rangoon, 
 with the usual assistance from our glorious navy, dislodged the 
 60,000 Burmese from the entrenchments they had drawn round the 
 British position ; mostly at the point of the bayonet, and with the 
 loss of only fifty men killed, and 300 wounded, capturing two hun- 
 dred and forty pieces of ordnance of every kind, and killing, it is 
 said, 5,000 of their numbers ; nor that the army of Sir Archibald 
 Campbell pursued its victorious career through the heart of his 
 country, never (where European troops were employed) receiving a 
 check, except at the stockades in front of Donabew, where 500 men 
 in two columns, after carrying one stockade, were at the second, 
 *' received by a destructive fire from all parts of the works, which 
 checked the progress of the columns, and inflicted so severe a loss 
 upon them, that it became necessary to retreat. Captain Rose, who 
 commanded, and Captain Cannon, of the 89th Regiment, and the 
 greater number of the men were killed or wounded."* The force, 
 which latterly consisted of only 3,000 P2uropean and 2,000 native 
 troops, advanced to within forty-five miles of the capital, and there 
 dictated peace on its own terms to the Burman empire. 
 
 The only other disasters that occurred in the camjiaign were the 
 defeat of 1,100 Madras sepoys with four howitzers and some Pio- 
 neers under the command of Colonel Smith, which had been detach- 
 ed from Rangoon against the stockaded positions at Kyloo. The 
 force was repulsed, and instead of taking up a position for the night, 
 fell back rapidly to Yadagee; and eventually, to head-quarters. 
 Colonel Macdowell's force, consisting of two brigades of Madras 
 Infantry, moved from Prome to attack the Burmese stockades at 
 Wattegong ; they were unprovided with artillery, and coming in 
 front of works of greater strength, with far greater numbers oppos- 
 ed to them than was expected, estimated at ten or twelve thousand 
 men, the whole force, after sustaining severe loss in front of the 
 stockades, and on the retreat, returned unsuccessful to Prome. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Conry, with the 3rd Madras Light Infantry, was 
 
 • H. H. Wilson. 
 
STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER. 35 
 
 repulsed in his attack on the stockade of Latang near Pegue. Tliere 
 were no European troops in either of tliese instances, nor in those 
 where we sustained defeat or repulse on our frontier in our defen- 
 sive operations, to point the columns of attack ; and although 
 it is possible, if there had been, that they might still have been 
 defeated, yet as Europeans were so seldom def(>atcd, and as their 
 enemy had been taught to respect them, the impression naturally 
 must be that it was their absence which led to these disasters. 
 
 There seems nothing in our relations with Ava calculated to 
 disturb the harmony which has existed since the conclusion of the 
 treaty between the two states, unless it be that the King of Siara 
 is included in the provisions of the treaty as our ally. Why it was 
 necessary to include that state in our treaty with Ava, in a manner 
 calculated hereafter to embarrass ourselves, does not appear. It 
 seems a question whether the possessions in Arracan, which we 
 gained from the Burmese in the war, pay the expence of maintain- 
 ing our Civil and Military establishments there ; and whether, if any 
 of the old dynasty, to w hom we might entrust the defence of that 
 unhealthy and inhospitable region, remain, we might not withdraw 
 within our former frontier of Chittagong. There is no question 
 that our new possessions on the Tenasserim Coast have entailed an 
 expence on us of ten or twelve lakhs a year, and that we ought if 
 possible to relinquish them. These distant possessions, indepen- 
 dently of their expence, tending to weaken our position in India by 
 withdrawing our European and native troops. Selling them, be- 
 cause we sell the inhabitants with them, and the interest of those 
 who have been led to settle there under our protection, may be 
 objectionable. But our relation to these people cannot surely be 
 considered a reason for our maintaining, for ever, expensive estab- 
 lishments in a country useless to us. 
 
 The conduct of the Burmese in the payment of the amount set- 
 tled by treaty as indemnity to us for the expences of the war, and 
 their conduct with respect to any frontier differences, may be 
 received in proof, that the lesson which they Avere taught of our 
 power has not been forgotten ; and this may render us the less 
 scrupulous in the concessions which we now make to them, parti- 
 cularly as they well understand that neither the Tenasserim Pro- 
 vinces nor the Kuboo valley are of any value to us however they 
 may be prized by themselves. 
 
 One of the advantages of the war, for which we paid so dearly, 
 is the knowledge which it has opened to us of our own and the 
 Ava frontier. If we had to go to war again with that power, we 
 know the season for commencing operations, and we know that 
 whilst a division of the Madras army lands at Rangoon, another 
 can ascend the Aeng Pass from Arracan, and that both may reach 
 the Burmese capital in one campaign ; whilst another division of the 
 Bengal army from Silhet can, through Muneepore and the Kuboo 
 valley, make a diversion in their favor, taking the capital in 
 reverse. 
 
 F 2 
 
36 STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER. 
 
 In February, 1829, Sir Archibald Campbell, who is the first 
 authority in such a question, reports to Government : 
 
 " For my own part I should enter on such a service with every 
 certainty of success, with from three to four thousand European 
 Infantry, two or three native corps, a brigade of Horse Artillery, a 
 company of Foot ditto, a detachment of the Rocket Corps, a Corps 
 or strong detachment of Cavalry, with the same of Pioneers." " At 
 no period of the late war had I any thing to the amount of it avail- 
 able in the field." The whole to advance through the Aeng Pass. 
 
 Nepaul. — Although not the next in importance, Nejiaul is the 
 next in position on ovir external frontier. 
 
 As a power to carry on offensive operations, Nepaul Avas not 
 formidable even before her position was so much circumseri])ed by 
 the results of her war with us, and was not likely to become so. 
 The nature of her army confined her to her hills, and although in 
 the progress of time she might have organized force capable of 
 acting in the plains, yet there is not at any period of her history 
 any appearance of this. The course of her conquests was westward 
 through mountains, extending only into the forest tracts at their 
 foot. It spread rapidly fi^om the valley of Nepaul through Kumaon 
 and Gurwal, had crossed the Sutleje, and came in contact with the 
 " hill people of Kote Kangra." It might have flown still more 
 westward and northward, had it not in the Sikhs met a rising, and 
 therefore a victorious army like their own, Avhich gave to the 
 Goorkas their first defeat, and obliged them to retire behind the 
 Sutleje. 
 
 In coming into collision Avith the British power, at the foot of 
 their hills, when endeavouring to extend their frontier and to taste 
 of the rich fruits of conquest in the plains, the Goorkas found an 
 army whose Cavalry could keep possession of the latter, and whose 
 Infantry could follow and punish them in the fastnesses of their 
 mountains. The struggle was however more severe, and in the 
 connnencement of it far more disastrous, than any we had before 
 encountered ; for we met an enemy in courage, in discipline, and 
 endurance more like ourselves, and more worthy of our steel. The 
 principal divisions of our army, where was the strength of our 
 European force, and which were directed against the capital, did 
 not receive that impulse which was necessary to carry them there ; 
 but remained inactive, and paralized throughout the first campaign. 
 The left division under General Gillespie, where there wei-e Euro- 
 pean troops likewise, wasted its strength and lost its commander in 
 its attack on the stockaded position of Kalunga, Avlien it had not 
 the material of a siege, and where the place, but that it was garri- 
 soned by Goorkas, hardly seemed to deserve one. That portion of 
 the army on the extreme left under Colonel Ochterlony, which had 
 no European troops, played a game more of manoeuvre than of 
 battle with the Goorkas, turned their positions, fought them, and 
 generally defeated them, when to fight them was necessary ; and 
 by the end of the first campaign, possessed itself of most of their 
 
STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER. 37 
 
 positions on tlioir \vest(>rn frontier, rodneinp; the (ioorka gonoral, 
 (tho patriotic Umnicr Siiigli Tappa,) and Iii.s troops to snbniit to 
 the condition of retiring to tlieir own valley. Colonel Ciardener, 
 with a body of partisan Ilohillaiis, amounting to 3 or 4,000 men, 
 raised and end)odieil for the occasion, played nearly the same game 
 in Kumaon that Ochterlony did in Gurwal, turned the enemy's 
 positions on his line of march, and crowned the heights of Almorah. 
 A brigade of native troops under Colonel Nicolls marched to his 
 support, carried the positions round that capital, and reduced the 
 Goorka force to the condition of submitting to be sent behind the 
 Gogra. 
 
 The results of the first campaign must have confounded the 
 calculations of the noble Marquis and every one else. That portion 
 of the army, with which it was meant to make an impression on 
 the enemy, in the seat of his jiower, remained inactive ; whilst the 
 skirmishes on the left flank, which could only have been intended 
 to produce a diversion, succeeded to an extent that shook the 
 Goorka on his throne. 
 
 Having been reinforced by troops from the westward, whom 
 Colonels Ochterlony and Nicolls had sent back to Nepaul, that 
 Government at the connuencement of the next season still consi- 
 dered itself strong enough to renew the contest ; but our army 
 having been concentrated and brought, under the master mind of 
 Ochterlony, to bear directly on his capital, almost unconditional 
 submission or entire subversion became the alternative, and Nepaul 
 chose the former. 
 
 The military resources of Nepaul are highly respectable. Her 
 army, which is paid principally by assignments in land, is upwards 
 of 40,000 strong. One-third of this force is on constant duty, 
 relieved at fixed periods by the remaining portions. But for the 
 limited sphere in which they are posted, all can be called into 
 action at the shortest notice. Their discipline under this feudal or 
 militia system, even for offensive operations, is far more perfect 
 than we (accustomed only to regular, and in many respects, to 
 native troops, harassing and unnecessary, discipline,) would readily 
 imagine. 
 
 Since the termination of this contest, a well defined frontier, and 
 a wholesome conviction of our resources and power, have preserved 
 peace with the state of Nepaul, which thei'e is nothing in our 
 present relations calculated to disturb. 
 
 Lahore. — The most important of the states on our exterior 
 frontier, whether we consider the character of its people, its re- 
 sources, the degree of their civilization, or the position of the 
 country itself. 
 
 ''The progress of the British power northward found two nations 
 about to contend for supremacy in Upper India, each of them in 
 their character of conrpierors nearly as new to those parts as our- 
 selves. The Mahrattas from the south, and the Sikhs from the 
 north. The former people, from their condition, only a hundred 
 
38 STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER. 
 
 years before, of obscure cultivators in a corner of the Dekhan, had 
 overthrown the Mogul empire and were organizing a power which 
 promised to claim supremacy throughout India. The latter, which 
 likewise, only a few years before, was unknown in its religion, and 
 which became know'n at a still later date for its military exploits, 
 had obtained possession of the Punjaub, one of the most important 
 divisions of the empire, and had pushed its advanced post almost 
 to the gates of the capital. From their position and character, 
 these two nations must at no very distant period have appeared in 
 hostile array on the plains of Dehlee, and tlie Mahrattas would no 
 doubt have prevailed. 
 
 The appearance of the British on this theatre pushed back the 
 Mahrattas within the Gwalior and Indore frontiers, and the Sikhs 
 were a few years after persuaded by Sir Charles Metcalfe, backed 
 by a military force, to retire behind the Sutleje. 
 
 We have never come to blows with Runjeet Sing, nor have we 
 any very good standard by which to judge of the martial character 
 of the Sikhs, or of the condition of Runjeet Sing's army. Of the 
 former we must not judge from the dastardly behaviour of our own 
 Sikh partisans in the Goorka war ; for the Sikhs on the left of the 
 Sutleje are universally allowed to be inferior in every martial qua- 
 lity to their brethi'en of the Punjaub, and we may be sure that, they 
 are not a very inferior people, who have conquered Multaun and 
 Cashmere, and who hold the Afghauns of Peshawur tributary. Yet 
 the very qualities, (their discipline,) which enabled them to prevail 
 on those occasions, may in a contest with us only lead the more 
 suddenly to their defeat. Their discipline under their few French 
 and East Indian officers, we may be assured, is not, and never can 
 be, equal to our own ; their Artillery and Engineers must be immea- 
 surably inferior ; and as in a contest with us they must depend on 
 these alone, and would meet us, as the Mahrattas did, in a pitched 
 battle, instead of pursuing their own irregular, and to us harassing 
 mode of warfare, their overthrow would be immediate and complete. 
 Runjeet Sing's revenues cannot exceed two crore of rupees. We 
 know that these wall not enable him to maintain a standing army of 
 more than 20,000 horse and 80,000 foot, and as he is avaricious, 
 the probability is that he does not keep up near that number. He 
 is however considered to be rich, and in case of a contest with us, 
 could draw from our own provinces, almost any number of men on 
 whom he could depend ; and from Baloochistaun and Afghaunis- 
 taun as many as he would trust in his ranks. There is however 
 little chance of this wise and moderate prince ever provoking a war 
 with us, until some reverse offoi'tune gives him a better chance of 
 success than he has hitherto had. During our late operations 
 against Bhurtpore, he drew back his forces towards our frontier, to 
 watch the progress of events. Had any thing happened to shake 
 our supremacy in Upper India, and the conduct of a great portion 
 of one of the divisions of the army before Bhurtpore was sufficient 
 to give hope to Runjeet Sing, Dehlee must have fallen before his 
 
STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER. 39 
 
 power. Although still young, he is inlinn in health, and it is 
 hardly to be supposed that on his death, any leading mind like his 
 own will spring up, to retain the Sikhs in their present united 
 position, and to serve as a barrier between us and the i)owers of 
 the north and west. 
 
 There is nothing in our relations with Lahore calculated in any 
 way to embarrass either us or Runjeet Sing, unless it be that the 
 Sutleje is by treaty made the boundary between that country and 
 ours, and that this river loses its name and takes that of the Gharra 
 before it enters tlie territories of Bhawulpore. It is of course our 
 object to confine Runjeet Sing to the right bank of the Gharra, as 
 well as of the Sutleje ; for the territories of the protected states of 
 Beekaneer and Jessulmere, as well as those of our fric^nd the 
 Newab of Bhawulpore, would otherwise be open to Runjeet Sing. 
 However, if the Gharra be not a boiuidary to Runjeet Sing, on the 
 one side, neither is it by the terms of the treaty a boundary to us 
 on the other. 
 
 SciND. — Our first treaty of 1809, with the Ameers is of amity 
 and friendship, they binding themselves not to allow the establish- 
 ment of the tribe of the French in Scind. In the second of 1820, 
 they bind themselves not to allow any European or American to 
 settle in their dominions. But subjects of either state are allowed 
 mutually to establish their residence in the dominions of the other. 
 In the treaty of the present year, the Indus is opened to our mer- 
 chants, and navigation, except for the conveyance of military stores 
 or armed vesssels. English merchants are not allowed to settle in 
 Scind, but a Tariff is to be established by mutual agreement, and 
 its provisions are to be binding. 
 
 Our first treaty was with three of the Ameers, our second with 
 two, and the last with two. 
 
 By a note of Mr. N. H. Smith's, appended to the 2nd vol. of Sir 
 John Malcolm's History of Persia, it appears, that after Nadir 
 Sha's invasion of India, the Calore family, the rulers of Scind, 
 became tributary to Persia. In 1197 Hejree, the Calorees were 
 expelled by Meer Fatte Ulee Talpooree, and the present dynasty 
 (the Talpoorees) established in that country. The chief of the 
 ancient dynasty of the Calorees is residing at Joudpore under the 
 protection of its Raja, and frequently calls for our assistance, to 
 enable him to gain his lost possessions. The Ameers of the Tal- 
 pooree family appear to be now united, considering themselves the 
 head of the powerful tribe of Baloochees, each exercising supreme 
 power within that portion of the ancestral dominions which fell to 
 his share ; all tributary to the throne of Cabul, but all ready to 
 unite to oppose aggression, whether it comes from that quarter, from 
 the Sikhs, or from us. The Kheyrpore chief, whose possessions 
 touch on those of Runjeet Sing, would eagerly have entered on 
 any treaty with us which should have promised to save him from 
 the grasp of his powerful neighbour, to whom he would apj^ear to 
 be tributary for some of his possessions. His brother of Hyderabad, 
 
40 STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER. 
 
 and the other members of his family, would have benefited hj this 
 stipulation as well as himself. But he would not treat with us on 
 a footing which should have separated his interests from those of 
 the Hyderabad branch, which all acknowledge as the superior. 
 
 Our relations with the Ameers of Scind are likely to be very 
 much improved by our late negotiations with them : and if no great 
 benefit should resvdt from the opening of the Indus to our trade, 
 and the establishing of a fixed Tarift"; an advantage of first rate 
 importance in a political point of view has been gained by the 
 knowledge which we have attained of the character of that noble 
 river, of its capabilities of becoming, in a more important degree 
 than it ever has been, a powerful barrier between India and the 
 nations of the west ; and of its fitness to become the channel of 
 commerce with the people of Northern India, and the various tribes 
 lying between us and Persia. The Ameers of Scind, when their 
 jealousy of us ceases, and they have reason to fear the encroach- 
 ment of other powers, may be turned to great account in strength- 
 ening this boundary ; and the spirit in which they have now come 
 forward to aid in the punishment of the Nuggur Parkur tribe, and 
 others, their svdjjects or dependants, who are implicated in violating 
 our frontier, or that of states in alliance with us, may be received 
 in proof of their disposition to cultivate terms of amity and friend- 
 ship Avith us. 
 
 We have but little knowledge of the resources of the Ameers of 
 Scind, either in men or money. They do not appear to have a 
 standing army, but that they can command the services of the 
 powerful tribe of Baloochees seems undoubted, and that they might 
 obtain the aid of Cabul in any struggle with us, seems probable 
 likewise, if they did not fear to trust to such assistance. Their 
 position behind the Ii?in and the deserts of Jessulmere and Joudpore, 
 and the nafrui-e of their power, which is clannish, and therefore not 
 calculated like a regular army for oflfensive, however much so for 
 defensive, operations, must prevent their ever being formidable to 
 us as an invading army. The material of combination between 
 them and the Rajpoot powers is Manting, and they would find that 
 people as much opposed to their advanced movement as ourselves. 
 They might become a useful auxiliary to the Sikhs, or the Sikhs to 
 them. The stories which are told of their enormous wealth are 
 most likely as unfounded as any of those with which we have been 
 deluded in former days. The arid plains of Baloochistan, and the 
 neglected banks of the Indus, are not the description of country 
 from which to collect wealth, and the family is not of old standing. 
 
 The territories of these four great states constitute the line of 
 our external defence, which extends to 3,536 British miles, being 
 from Cape Negrais on the north-east, to the boundaries of Scind 
 on the west.* The area of the tract comprehended within that 
 line is 1,111,162 square miles. Our regular army of 150,000 men, 
 giving of course 42 men for the defence of each mile of external 
 
 • Major Everest, Survej or General of India. 
 
STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER. 41 
 
 frontier, and an average of one man to every seven miles Avitlun 
 that frontier. 
 
 Whether these external powers have the means of combining 
 against us or of acting in concert, must be doubtful.* The Burmese 
 and the Nepaulese may be supposed to hold communication with one 
 another, and so may the Nepaulese and tlieir neighbours the Sikhs. 
 The Burmese and the Nepaulese cannot have forgotten that we 
 have stripped them of some of the fairest portions of their empires, 
 and the Sikhs do not forget that we pushed them beyond the Sut- 
 leje. But although they might so regulate their operations that 
 their attacks on our frontier might be simultaneous, yet they have 
 not, from their positions, the power of uniting, nor would they 
 have that of combining, their operations, after war had conmien- 
 ced. Our communications with their several courts, and our 
 positions on their frontiers, would give us timely notice of tlieir 
 designs, and enable us to mature a system offensive and defensive 
 to meet such an exigency. 
 
 INIadras and Bombay, with their twelve regiments of European 
 Infantry, their two regiments of Dragoons, their eleven regiments 
 of Native Cavalry, and their twenty-six regiments of Native Infan- 
 try, could put forth six regiments of European Infantry, a regiment 
 of Dragoons, and as many regiments of Native Infantry as might 
 be wanted. One division could land at Rangoon, the other on the 
 coast of Arracan to ascend the Aeng Pass, and these two forces 
 moving straight on Umerapoora with such diversion as we might 
 make in their favor from the Silhet frontier, to take the Burmese 
 capital in reverse, would be sufficient to dictate terms to that state. 
 Bengal witli her nine regiments of European Infantry, her two 
 regiments of Dragoons, ten of Native Cavalry, and seventy-four of 
 Native Infantry, could furnish a division of four regiments of 
 European and ten of Native Infantry, to move on the capital of 
 Nepaul ; whilst, by strengthening our position at Almorah, we 
 should confine that state within its own limits in the hills. Two 
 European regiments of Infantry, the Dragoons, the Native Cavalry, 
 and as many regiments of Native Infantry as might be necessary, 
 supported, if still further necessary, by the advanced divisions of the 
 Madras and Bombay armies, would remain for operations against 
 the Sikhs in the plains of the Punjaub. 
 
 Could we afford so to drain India of her European and native 
 army ? In our present position almost every body will answer that 
 ■vve could not. If in addition to this state of affairs on our frontier, 
 some of the native powers in Internal India should arm against us, 
 our position would become highly critical. Such a combination is 
 not probable, but it is possible, and it should be our business to 
 prepare and to guard against it. Can any force which we can 
 
 * They are, curiously enough, all of different religions, and dilTerent races 
 of ineo. 
 
42 STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER, 
 
 afford to maintain be sufficient to save us from this danger ; and if 
 not, where is our remedy ? 
 
 Our conquest or subjugation of the native states of Internal India 
 has been so gradual, and our supremacy over them has been so 
 partially and so irregularly enforced and acknowledged, that we do 
 not, even at this advanced period of our administration, stand in 
 that position with respect to them which is necessary as well for 
 their safety as our own, always supposing that our interests are 
 united, to guard India from foreign conquest. 
 
 As we deny them the exercise of foreign relations, protect them 
 from foreign conquest, and secure the stability of, and the succes- 
 sion to the principality or throne ; whence the use of their armies, 
 except as auxiliaries to us, for the maintenance of their position and 
 our own ? Would these armies in case of foreign invasion, or any 
 contingency, which should call our troops from their present posi- 
 tions, be likely to co-operate in the general cause, or would they with- 
 out any reference to their obligations to us, be applied to forward 
 the individual and separate views of their several princes, and would 
 not many of them be thrown into the scale against us ? 
 
 Past experience, witness the treacherous attacks at Poona and 
 Nagpore in 1817, on the weak brigades left at those capitals, when 
 the strength of the subsidiary forces moved in advance ; the pre- 
 sent state of their organization, and the temper of the majority of 
 the states in India, who have all long accounts to settle with us, 
 and we need have no doubt on this head ; these considerations may 
 serve to convince us that our army can never be withdrawn from 
 its local positions, until we have organized the forces of these states 
 under our own officers, as we have done the army of Hyderabad, and 
 as we did that of Nagpore, and a portion of that of Poona. We had 
 not in either of the last instances any difficulty in bringing these con- 
 tingents, thus organized, into action against the princes who paid 
 them, when they became our enemies ; and portions of the Nizam's con- 
 tingent thus organized served throughout the last Mahratta war, in 
 Malwa, in Berar, and in the Poona territory, with the same gallan- 
 try and devotion to our cause as our own army. In this condition 
 they may be rendered each amply sufficient to support our interests 
 in the dominions of their own prince, and to aid in the general 
 military defence of the empire. The manner however in which this 
 important result could best be produced, may more suitably be con- 
 sidered under the next general class of our political relations. 
 
 In the present reduced state of our military power, and with 
 the material of combination against us, which we should leave 
 behind, it is evident, that we could not now place 100,000 men 
 in position on the Indus, or at whatever point it may become 
 necessary to make our first stand. In preparing for the gene- 
 ral defence of India against foreign invasion, we naturally turn 
 to the north-west, for that is the only quarter from which it can 
 come in any formidable shape ; and although the best military 
 
STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER. 43 
 
 authorities of the present day may satisfy us that we must not put 
 our faitli either in rivers or in mountains as ati'onliiig even lines of 
 defence, yet there is no doubt, whenever India is seriously threat- 
 ened from that quarter, that we must step in advance to the Indus, 
 and we shall then have reason to congratulate ourselves that the 
 topography and resources of the country in its neighbourhood have 
 been ascertained and im^^roved ; that the noble river itself is capable 
 of supporting our steam-boats and our floating batteries, that all 
 the steam-boats of India have been built with a view to the naviga- 
 tion of that river, and that they can so easily advance or retire with 
 a division of our army, to operate either on the front or rear of our 
 enemy, through the TOO miles which separate Attock from the 
 mouths of the Indus. 
 
44 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 All of which have relinquished political relations with one another 
 and with all other states : these may, according to the nature of 
 their several treaties with us, be divided into four great classes : 
 
 1st Class. Treaties, offensive and defensive. Right on their part 
 to protection, external and internal, from the British Government. 
 Right on its part to interfere in their internal aiBTairs. 
 
 L OuDE. Li 1768, the Wuzeer agreed not to maintain an army 
 of more than thirty-five thousand men, of whom not more than ten 
 thousand should be trained and disciplined like English troops. 
 
 In 1773, the King of Dehlee having abandoned Allahabad, and 
 given Corah and Currah to the Mahrattas, which places had been 
 assigned by the British Government for H. M.'s maintenance, that 
 Government bound itself to place the Wuzeer in possession of those 
 districts, on his paying fifty lakhs of rupees ; and the Wuzeer fur- 
 ther agreed to pay a brigade consisting of two battalions of Euro- 
 peans, six battalions of Sepoys, and a company of Artillery, at the 
 rate of two lakhs and ten thousand rupees per mensem, whilst their 
 services should be required. 
 
 In 1775, the British Government undertakes the defence of the 
 Oude country, for which the Wuzeer makes certain cession of 
 territory. 
 
 In 1781, the temporary brigade is withdrawn, and the troops left 
 in the Oude territory limited, the cost to be only Rupees 3,10,000 per 
 mensem. The Wuzeer is permitted to resume all Jageers, except 
 those guaranteed by the Company. The Governor Geveral recom- 
 mends the Wuzeer to reduce his troops to the number he has the 
 means of paying ; that he receive into his private purse, only a sum 
 sufficient for the expences of his person and household, and that 
 he leave the remainder in the public treasury, under the manage- 
 ment of his minister, and the inspection of the resident. 
 
 In 1787, the Marquis Cornwallis negociates with the Wuzeer 
 the terms of his future subsidy, which was to be fifty lakhs a year ; 
 •when more troops were required, the Wuzeer was to pay for them ; 
 ■when any of those for which this payment was made, were recalled, 
 the amount was to be reduced accordingly. The entire manage- 
 ment of his country is to remain Avith the Wvizeer. 
 
 In 1797, the Wuzeer agrees to defray the cost of a regiment of 
 Dragoons, and one of Native Cavalry, provided it does not exceed 
 five lakhs and a half of rupees per annum. 
 
 In 1798, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance is entered 
 into with the Wuzeer. The subsidy is encreased to seventy-six 
 lakhs of rupees, to commence from the accession of Saadat Alii 
 Khan to the Musnud. The subsidiary force maintained in Oude 
 never to be less than ten thousand men of all arms. The fortress 
 of Allahabad ceded to the Company. The Wuzeer agrees to reduce 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 45 
 
 his establishments and to consult the Company's Govornmcnt oh 
 the best mode of effecting this. No political relations to exist on 
 the part of the Nuwab, without the knowledge of the Company- 
 
 In 1801, the Wuzeer cedes to the Company in perpetuity, and in 
 commutation of his money payments on all accounts, territory 
 yielding one crore and thirty-tive lakhs of rupees per annum. The 
 number of the Wuzeer's own troops limited, the British Govern- 
 ment undertaking the defence of his territories against all foreign 
 and domestic enemies, a detachment of British troops, with a pro- 
 portion of Artillery, remaining at all times attached to H. E. The 
 possession of the remaining territory guaranteed to H. E., his heirs 
 and successors, with the exercise of his and their authority therein. 
 His Excellency will always advise with and act in conformity to 
 the councils of the officers of the Hon'ble Company in the Go- 
 vernment of his country. 
 
 In 1816, certain territory, conquered from the Goorkas, was ceded 
 to the Wuzeer, in commutation of the second loan of a crore of 
 rupees, furnished to the Company in the previous year. 
 
 There is no state in India with whose Government we have inter- 
 fered so systematically and so uselessly as with that of Oude. But 
 this interference has been more in favor of men, than of measures ; 
 and has apparently been utterly useless for the purpose of securing 
 to the people of Oude any improvement in their institutions, or in 
 the form of administering them. We at one time sent our officers 
 and troops to enforce the payment of the revenue claimed by the 
 Oude Government from its subjects, without having the means of 
 judging whether that claim Avas just or unjust, and we have lent 
 our troops almost for the performance of the ordinai'y duties of 
 police. We at another time supported a minister in his office, and 
 during our support of him, borrowed money from the treasury of 
 the state, the interest of which we guaranteed in 2)erpetuity to him 
 and his family, though in lending it he was guilty of betraying the 
 interests of his sovereign. We have at another time withdrawn 
 our troops from the support of the minister, and left him to his 
 own resources. We have on several occasions placed ourselves in 
 the humiliating condition of debtors to the Oude Government; we 
 have shut our eyes to extortions and oppressions which have driven 
 its subjects into rebellion, and then we have lent our army to 
 punish and reduce them to obedience. But in the whole history of 
 our interference, there does not seem to be one measure calculated 
 to produce any lasting benefit to the people of Oude. 
 
 The present sovereign of Oude is just what might be expected 
 of a person brought up in a harem, and who had never been per- 
 mitted to enter on even the ordinary concerns of life, until the 
 period for acquiring habits of business or usefulness had gone by. 
 He is suddenly raised to administer the affairs of a small sovereign- 
 ty, and being himself unequal to the task, wisely called to his 
 councils, an old dismissed servant of the state, whose abilities had 
 before been conspicuous in the revenue management of a portion of 
 the country, but whose honesty was of a very doubtful kind, and 
 
46 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 who had been obliged to fly for refuge to the neighbouring territo- 
 ry of the Company, with the treasures which he had amassed. He 
 is suddenly, by his over indulgent master, placed in the exercise of 
 almost supreme power. His administration very soon restored the 
 Oude territory to a degree of comparative prosperity. The amount 
 of assessment was considerably reduced, the police of the country 
 was organized, courts of justice were established. The rabble, 
 amounting, it was said, to 60,000 men, which had been raised by 
 the former administration, to aid in the collection of the revenue, 
 when the assistance of our troops was withheld, were mostly paid 
 up and discharged. There was a degree of protection both of per- 
 son and property throughout the country, which bore some comjja- 
 rison with the neighbouring districts of the Company ; and the able 
 minister, who had so suddenly produced all these admirable results, 
 seemed to enjoy the entire confidence of his sovereign. He was 
 however a reformist in too broad a sense for the meridian of 
 Lucknow, and whether trusting to our support, or from whatever 
 other cause, had failed to strengthen his interests with the Queen 
 Mother and the ladies of the seraglio. He had even been impro- 
 vident enough to touch the stipends of the King's uncles and other 
 relations. They had not much difficulty in prejudicing the royal ear 
 against him, and at the very time that His Majesty Avas sounding 
 the praises of his minister to the Governor General, and receiving 
 his lordship's congratulations on the admirable effects of the minis- 
 ter's administration, he had resolved on his dismissal and degrada- 
 tion. The pretended cause was disrespectful language on the part 
 of the minister towards the King's mother, and something insult- 
 ing towards the picture of the King's father ; all showing that the 
 King was at a loss for a reason on which to justify his measure to 
 the Governor General, to whom indeed no justification was neces- 
 sary, for the King had been told, that he was supreme both to 
 appoint and to dismiss his servants. The whole proceeding is 
 however a good sample of the duplicity and the folly which we 
 may expect from Eastern Princes, educated as they now are, having 
 no sympathy with their people, and whose misgovernment can have 
 no effect on the stability of their dominion, guaranteed as it is by 
 us against invasion from without, and insurrection within. 
 
 This imbecile Prince thinks to hold the reins of government in 
 his own hands, and professes himself equal to the administration of 
 the affairs of an extensive country in all their departments. He is 
 encouraged in this belief by the interested and sycophant courtiers 
 by whom he is surrounded. In the mean time, rebellion is stalking 
 abroad in every part of his dominions. Half the amount of 
 revenue only is collected ; there is insecurity of life and property 
 every where, and this state of anarchy must endanger the tranqui- 
 lity of neighbouring countries, whose sovereigns have a right to 
 hold him answerable for the due administration of his own. Unless 
 therefore some great improvement takes place, a very short period 
 must witness the reins of government fall from hands which could 
 never have been destined by Providence to hold them. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 47 
 
 2. Mysore. — On tho subjugation of the Mahomedan dynasty 
 of Mysore, we were fortunate in finding, amongst Tippoo's minis- 
 ters, a virtuous man like Purneah, to be entrusted with the aiUni- 
 nistration of that portion of the country which was reserved for the 
 minor son of the ohl Hindoo princes. We were further fortunate 
 in finding amongst our own servants men like Close, Webbe, Mal- 
 colm, and Wilks, to aid and support Purneah in his administration 
 When the young Prince attained maturity, his able and virtuous 
 minister delivered over to his charge a flourishing country, well 
 administered in all its departments, and a treasury containing 
 75,00,000 Pagodas, the accumulation of his stewardship. 
 
 The British Government had the merit of restoring this Hindoo 
 Prince to the throne of his fathers, from which they had been 
 driven by a Mahomedan usurper; it had further the merit of with- 
 drawing from interference in the administration of his affairs, to 
 which from the nature of his education under Purneah, and from 
 the place which his family held in the estimation of the Hindoo 
 population of the country, he should have been more competent 
 than any other sovereign in India. Tippoo Sultan was in the first 
 war stripped of half his dominions; and half of what remained, on 
 the final conquest of his country, was transferred to the Raja. 
 This did not however, as appears by Schedule C of the treaty, 
 exceed 1 3,74,000 Pagodas a year, and by a subsidiary treaty with 
 the British Government, the Raja agreed to an yearly payment 
 of seven lakhs of Pagodas. The management of a country yielding 
 at the time of the transfer the above sum was thus left in the hands 
 of a descendant of its ancient princes. 
 
 The political relations with Mysore rested with the Madras 
 Government. The interference of the resident, except in adminis- 
 tering advice, was interdicted, and little notice seems to have been 
 taken of the Raja or his afiairs until Sir Thomas Munro's govern- 
 ment of Madras. It was then seen that matters were not proceed- 
 ing prosperously in Mysore, and good advice was not wanting. 
 But our interference proceeded no further until the Raja's mis- 
 government drove the inhabitants of a portion of his country into 
 open rebellion ; to quell which it was necessary to call for the aid 
 of our troops. Further inquiry proved that the Raja's own troops 
 and entire establishments were greatly in arrears, and in a state of 
 mutiny : that he had during his profligate career not only squander- 
 ed the accumulations left him by Purneah, but that he had incur- 
 red debts to a large amount. All confidence in the Raja and his 
 servants had boen destroyed in the minds of the people of Mysore. 
 The material of a native Government had been destroyed, and the 
 Governor General was, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, 
 under the necessity of setting aside the administration of the Raja, 
 and appointing under his own authority a Commission for the 
 management of affairs in Mysore. 
 
 3. Ber AR. — This principality was, at the termination of the first 
 Mahratta war, in which it joined against us a^ Scindea's confeder- 
 
48 INTERNAL RELATION^. 
 
 ate, stripped of the province of Cuttaek, of the country to thewest- 
 •\vard of the Wurda, and to the southward of the NernuUah and 
 Gawil Gurh range of hills. Tlie territory of Sumbulpore and 
 Patvin was afterwards restored gratuitously. 
 
 In 1816, Berar subsidized a British force, consisting of a regi- 
 ment of Cavalry, six battalions of Infantry, &c., agreeing to pay 
 therefore Rupees 7,50,000 a year. 
 
 In the following year, it joined the Mahratta confederacy against 
 us, Avas defeated, and its possessions were at the disposal of the 
 British Government. The Ra,ja was again restored on conditions, 
 amongst which was that of ceding territory in lieu of the money 
 subsidy. He again confederated with the Peshwa against us ; was 
 deposed, and the next heir, a minor, placed in succession to him. 
 During the minority, the Nagpore territory remained under the 
 management of the Resident, Mr. Jenkins, who placing British 
 officers in charge of small and compact districts, administered all 
 ^1 its affairs, revenue, judicial, and police. This best of all systems of 
 || Indian administration could not have fallen into better hands. The 
 amount of revenue was defined, cheap and abundant justice offered 
 to the people, both by European and native instruments, and re- 
 sponsibility was thi'own on the people themselves for the regulation 
 of the police. Under almost any instruments a country through 
 such a system of management must prosper, under the general 
 superintendance of Mr. Jenkins, assisted by such officers as Captains 
 Gordon, Hamilton, Wilkinson, and Cameron. Nagpore, in the ten 
 years during which this administration lasted, became comparatively 
 a garden ; those who knew that country and the nature of its 
 government when this system commenced, and who saw it when 
 it terminated, can alone judge of the benefits produced in so short 
 a time. 
 
 When the Raja attained his majority, certain portions of his ter- 
 ritory were retained for the payment of the contingent which had 
 been disciplined by British officers, consisting of four regiments 
 of Cavalry and five of Infantry. The surplus revenue, if any, after 
 the payment of the contingent, was to be accovmted for to the 
 Raja ; and the management of this tract of country was to remain, 
 as the whole had formerly been, under the Resident and British 
 superintendants. The remainder of the dominions of Nagpore 
 were transferred to the Raja's sole management. It was further 
 declared that whenever the success of the Raja's management 
 should justify the measure, the reserved districts should also be 
 transferred, His Highness appropriating sufficient funds from his 
 resources for the payment of the contingent. By the concluding 
 articles of the treaty, it remained for the British Government to 
 controul the Raja's administration in all its branches ; and when a 
 failure of resources should be apprehended from the mal-adminis- 
 tration of the Raja, it was at the option of that Government to 
 resume the management of all or any portion of his dominions. The 
 instrument by which these conditions were I'ecorded, need not have 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 49 
 
 been called a treaty. They were terms dictated by us to a con- 
 quered country, and to a person wlioni we chose to raise to such 
 authority over it as it suited our purpose to give to iiini. 
 
 Tiiat portion of the treaty, which anticipated tiie restoration to 
 the Kaja of tiie tract of" country reserved tor the payment of the 
 contingent, was tiie first retrograde step from tlie most desiral)le 
 position in which we can stand with respect to the native j)rinces. 
 The army which in their hands must be useless to them for any 
 purpose except to be employeil against us, and which is generally 
 an undisciplined, ill paid, and mutinous rabble, becomes under our 
 management, an efficient portion of the forces for the defence of 
 the empire, sufficient not only to maintain our position in the ter- 
 ritory of the particular state to which it belongs, when it may be 
 necessary to call our armie.s to an advanced scene of action ; but 
 sufficient either for the purpose of accompanying these armies, or 
 of aiding in the maintenance of our authority and of tranquillity in 
 neighl:)ouring states. By accepting of a money payment, instead of 
 a territorial cession for this contingent, we weaken our position by 
 placing our resources at the mercy of the native state. It is true 
 that in this treaty we reserved to ourselves the power of resuming 
 a competent portion of country when the money resource should 
 fail. But whence the benefit of giving up a stronger position and 
 taking a weaker, when the end to be obtained is the same ? 
 
 The view taken in the treaty of 1826, regarding this contingent is 
 the more to be lamented, since it apparently led only three years there- 
 after, to a revised engagement with the Berar state, by which we 
 made the most, or only retrograde movement, that has been car- 
 ried into effi?ct since the days of Sir George Barlow. Through it 
 we sacrificed without remorse the whole of this contingent, forget- 
 ting the services which it had performed, and overlooking those 
 which it was prepared to perform for us, receiving in lieu thereof 
 a promised subsidy of eight lakhs per annum, and thereby rendering 
 the British subsidiary force an appendage to the Berar Government, 
 necessary for the support of our relations there, and unavailable for 
 any extended movements for the general defence of the empire. 
 As we have thus ceded what Avas of the utmost value to ourselves, 
 we might as well restore Sumbulpore and Sirgooja, territories 
 which are of no use, but entail much trouble on us, and which 
 would be highly prized by Nagpore. 
 
 By the new and definitive treaty, the British Government re- 
 serves to itself the right of advising, remonstrating, and when the 
 stability of the resources of the state for the discharge of its obli- 
 gations are considered to be endangered, of re-appointing its own 
 officers for the management of districts in His Highness' name, for 
 as long a period as it may deem necessary. A thousand horse 
 are to be maintained by the state under the command of tlieir own 
 officers, and liable to serve with the British forces in the field in 
 time of war. 
 
50 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 4. Travancore. — The Raja of Travancore having failed, in 
 1788, to obtain the loan of British officers to discipline six of his 
 regiments, entertained two battalions of the Company's troops, 
 which he was to pay either in money or in paper, with these tlie 
 Company undertook the defence of the Travancore territories, 
 strengthening these battalions, or adding others as might be neces- 
 sary, at their own cost. On the termination of the first war with 
 Tippoo, certain districts, which he had conquered from this state, 
 were restored to it. The subsidiary force was at the same time 
 strengthened by an additional battalion with artillery, and the 
 Raja agreed to aid our troops, in case of need, with troops of his 
 own, to serve beyond his own frontier. In 1805, the Raja agreed 
 to pay a sum equal to the expense of one more regiment, the 
 distribution of the force was to rest entirely with the Company, and 
 the expense of any further force required for the defence of his 
 country, was to be borne jointly by the parties. When failure of 
 resources is apprehended, the Company's Government has full 
 power to introduce its own regulations and ordinances. 
 
 The subsidiary force has lately been withdrawn from the Travan- 
 core territory. And a Nair Brigade is organized under the com- 
 mand of British officers, for the support of the Raja in his internal 
 administration. 
 
 5. Cochin. — The Raja of Cochin pays to the British Government 
 2,76,000 Rupees a year, on which account it binds itself to defend 
 and protect the territories of the Raja with a force which shall not 
 cost beyond this sum, against all enemies whomsoever. If however 
 a larger force becomes necessary, the Raja is to bear a just and fair 
 proportion of the expense. Whenever failure of funds shall be 
 apprehended for the fulfilment of these obligations, the British 
 Government has the right to introduce such regulations and ordi- 
 nances as shall be deemed necessary. 
 
 These five states constitute the first class into which our internal 
 relations are by the nature of these treaties divided. These diff'er 
 principally from those with other states, in the right w^hich we have 
 to interfere in their internal affairs. The revenues of the Mysore 
 country would appear to be very much under-estimated in the treaty. 
 
 2nd Class. Treaties, offensive and defensive. Right on their part 
 to protection, external and internal, from the British Government, 
 and to the aid of its troops, to realize their just claims from their own 
 subjects. No right on its part to interfere in their internal affairs. 
 
 1. Hyderabad. — This is the most important of all the states of 
 Internal India, whether we consider the extent of its dominions, its 
 resources, the variety and richness of its soil, or the extent of its 
 disciplined army. 
 
 It is unnecessary to enter on the early period of our relations 
 with the Nizam's Government. The Peshkush payable by the 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 51 
 
 Company to the Nizam for the Nortlioni Sirkars (7,00,000 a yoar) 
 began to be regularly litiuitlated after Lord Cornwallis assumed the 
 Government of India in 1788, and the Nizam's order to SeyfJung, 
 to deliver up the Guntoor Sirkar to the Company, was passed at the 
 same time. A treaty offensive and defensive ^^■as concluded with 
 the Nizam in 1790. Two battalions were subsidized for the pro- 
 secution of the war against Tippoo ; tlie Peishwa agreed to join the 
 league on the same conditions, each furnishing troops to act in 
 concert with those of the Company, and all receiving an equal 
 share of conquests. In the same year, it was further agreed, that 
 from four to six more battalions, Avith a complement of Artillery, 
 should be lent to the Nizam at the charge in which they stood the 
 Company : — the detachment to be at any time recalled, or dismiss- 
 ed by the Nizam. In the war which ensued, Tippoo ceded to the 
 three allied powers half his dominions, and the Nizam received, for 
 his share, territory yielding 13,16,000 Pagodas a year. 
 
 In 1798, a further addition was made to the subsidiary force, 
 extending it in all to 6,000 men, with a comjilemeut of Artillery, at 
 a yearly cost to the Nizam of 21-, 17, 100 rupees. The Nizam's 
 Government at the same time agreed to disband the French regi- 
 ments in its service, promised never to commit any excess or 
 aggression against the Peishwa, and in the event of any differences 
 arising between the two states, the British Government agreed to 
 mediate. 
 
 In 1800, a further treaty of perpetual and general defensive alli- 
 ance was entered into. The subsidiary force was rendered perma- 
 nent, and increased to 8,000 firelocks, with two regiments of 
 Cavalry and a proportion of Artillery, Sec. 
 
 The Nizam's share of the second conquests from Tippoo was 
 7,93,000 Pagodas, which, with his share of the former conquests, 
 13,16,000 Pagodas, he now ceded to the Company in lieu of a money 
 payment for the above subsidiary force. Two of the battalions are al- 
 ways to remain near the Nizam ; the remainder to be held available for 
 general service, joined by as many more of the Company's troops as 
 the exigency may require, by 6,000 Infantry and 9,000 horse of 
 His Highness' own troops, and by whatever other force he may be 
 able to supply from his dominions. His Highness relinquishes 
 foreign relations, and the Company agrees not to have any concern 
 with his children, relations, subjects, or servants. The subsidiary 
 force to be ready to reduce to obedience any of His Highness' sub- 
 jects or dependents who shall withhold the payment of the Sirkar's 
 just claims, after the reality of the fact shall be duly ascertained. 
 By the partition treaty of 1804', the Nizam received of the territo- 
 ry conquered, from Berar that to the westward of the Wurda river, 
 and to the southward of the Nurnulla and Gawil Gurh range of hills ; 
 and of the territory conquered from Scindia, that lying between the 
 Adjunta range of hills and the Godavery, including the districts of 
 Jalnapore and Gandapore. By the second Mahratta war, the Ni- 
 zam escaped from the payment of Chout to both the Poona and 
 
 II 2 
 
52 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 Berar Governments, except the sum of 1,20,000 Rupees, Avliich had 
 been guaranteed to the Peishwa's Jagcerdars, Appah Dessae, and tlie 
 Putwurduns. He also received territory conquered from the Poona, 
 Nagpore, and Indore states, which was intermixed with His High- 
 ness', yielding Rupees 8,83,013, whilst he transferred territory to 
 the Company and to Berar, intermixed with their's, and yielding 
 Rupees 5,05,735, and this was his amount of benefit from conquests 
 in which his troops so largely participated, and to which by treaty 
 he was entitled to share. It is doubtful however whether the con- 
 quests in this war have ever met the expences incurred by the Com- 
 pany during and subsequent to it. 
 
 A lietter place for discussing the possibility or impossibility of 
 refraining from interference in the internal affairs of the internal 
 states of India will occur after the various relations in which we 
 stand to these states shall have been descri]:)ed : but I may now 
 describe the circumstances which have led us so largely to interfere 
 in the internal affairs of the Nizam's Government, whilst by treaty 
 we are bound not to interfere in them at all. 
 
 After the war with Tippoo and the first Mahratta war, which 
 left us in a very strong position in the Dekhan, the Nizam's prime 
 minister, Meer AUum, who had negotiated the first treaty with the 
 Marquis Cornwallis at Calcutta, and Avho had been our friend and 
 supporter in the councils of Hyderabad, died. Yet we did not 
 apparently find ourselves strong enough, with the Poona Mahrattas 
 on the one hand, and the Nagpore Mahrattas on the other, to be 
 without a leader in the Nizam's councils, and we accordingly inter- 
 ested ourselves in the appointment of a minister. Nuwab Mooneer- 
 ool-Moolk was, by the Nizam, appointed Dewan, on a salary of six 
 lakhs of rupees a year, but under an arrangement through which he 
 was by no means to meddle in state affairs. A talented Plindoo, 
 Raja Chundoo Lai, Avas appointed Peishkar. 
 
 There is something curious and interesting in the disjiatches of 
 this period, Avhen compared with the opinions which now regulate 
 our proceedings in the jDolitical department. 
 
 On the 25th of December, 1809, the Resident at Hyderabad ob- 
 serves, " Whoever should be minister, it woidd be for our interest 
 that Chundoo Lai should possess the largest share of active influ- 
 ence in the administration, and as long as he held a confidential 
 situation about the Nizam, we might almost be assured of the secu- 
 rity of our interests at this court. On the other hand, it is impos- 
 sible to mention the name of any Omra at this court, who is quali- 
 fied for the situation of principal minister. One person may be 
 less objectionable than another, but they are all equally incapable. 
 " Although I am far from ascribing to the Raja any distinguish- 
 ed or extraordinary merit in his capacity of minister, yet when his 
 character and qualifications are brought into comparison with those 
 of any other pulilic officer at this court, I can conscientiously declare, 
 that in my judgment there is no other arrangement which is likely to 
 be more conducive to the prosperity andhappiness of this country." 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 53 
 
 On tlie 31st Docomber, 1809, the Chief Secretary to Government 
 observes to the Resident: 
 
 "The riglit of the British Goveninient to interpose its influence 
 in the selection of a successor to the office of Prime Minister to 
 the state of Hyderabad is a point so well understood, and Mas so 
 fully discussed in the instructions of Government contained in my 
 dispatcii to your predecessor of 22nd May, 1804, on the occasion 
 of the death of Azeem-ool-Onira, that it is unnecessary to state any 
 observations on it upon the present occasion. It is hoAvever ob- 
 viously inexpedient to exercise that right, excepting only in the 
 event of the Nizam manifesting a resolution to adopt an arrange- 
 ment for the administration of his affairs incompatible with the 
 security of the interests of the alliance. At the same time, it is 
 not only extremely desirable, but essential to those interests, that 
 the person appointed to the situation of minister should consider 
 liimself indebted for it to the approbation of tlie British Govern- 
 ment, and should believe tlie favor and support of that Government 
 necessary to enable him permanently to hold that situation, and to 
 discharge its duties. The Governor General therefore highly 
 approves your intention of inducing the Nizam to suspend a final 
 arrangement, until the sentiments of Government should be made 
 known with regard to that which His Highness may propose to 
 adopt." 
 
 It is curious enough that a common Moonshee of the Residency 
 was employed to negotiate the important matter of the appointment 
 of a successor, both with the Nizam and with Chundoo Lai ; and 
 accordingly in the following month, the Nizam addressed a letter 
 to the Governor General. 
 
 " Raja Chundoo Lai has made a representation to me, on the 
 subject of adopting some arrangement for the management of the 
 affairs of my Government. On this point, Captain Sydenham has 
 received the fullest information. 
 
 " By the favor of God, the political connection subsisting between 
 the two states is firmly established, and will last as long as the sun 
 and moon shall remain. 
 
 " The respected Buhadoor above-mentioned is well acquainted 
 with all affairs. Such an executive minister is necessary for the 
 duties of administration, as will devote himself entirely to the con- 
 duct of the affairs of his sovereign, in the spirit of obedience to the 
 orders with which he may be furnished for that purpose. 
 
 " As your Lordship is celebrated for your distinguished virtues 
 I desire to consult your judgment also, with regard to what is 
 advisable and proper to be done on this occasion. 
 
 " Let your Lordship write me a short answer, communicating 
 detailed information of your sentiments to Captain Sydenham." 
 
 The Governor General woidd have preferred the nomination of 
 Shums-ool-Omra, but there was no objection to Mooneer-ool-Moolk 
 provided he was satisfied to receive his splendid salary, and to leave 
 Raja Chundoo Lai undistui'bed iu the administration of affairs. 
 
54 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 Chundoo Lai's father is understood to have been engaged as a 
 farmer of customs in the Hyderabad territory, in which department 
 it may be supposed that the son received a useful business educa- 
 tion. He became subsequently better known to us from having 
 held charge of the territory which the Nizam received as his share 
 of the conquests from Tippoo, and which Chundoo Lai delivered 
 over to our officers when it was ceded in commutation of the money 
 subsidy. Fi'om this situation he had a rapid rise to that of Supreme 
 Governor of the Hyderabad dominions : the sole dispenser of good 
 and evil ; and the depository of its magnificent revenues of nearly 
 three millions a year. The Nizam did make a struggle against the 
 condition into which he found himself falling under our supremacy, 
 but having been defeated in rather a rough collision by the Resi- 
 dent of that day, His Highness desisted from further concern in the 
 affairs of his own dominions, retired to his Zenana, was believed 
 subject to occasional fits of melancholy or madness, and continued 
 in this state till his death three years ago. An endeavour was 
 made at a later period, when the British Govei-nment inter- 
 fered extensively to promote the real benefit of his subjects, to 
 interest His Highness in that good work, but he either was or 
 assumed to be so entirely ignorant of the state of things in his own 
 country, that the attempt was given up as hopeless. His Highness 
 on one occasion issued orders to persons who had been in office when 
 he exercised authority, but most of whom were now long dead. 
 
 Maha Raja Chundoo Lai leaned for support on the Resident, at 
 the court of his master, and on the British Government. Knowing 
 that his place and his power depended on that support, he was 
 ready to sacrifice every thing at this shrine, and necessarily gained 
 the I'ejiutation of being our friend. Every movement hostile to 
 him was attributed, and most probably justly so to this cause ; 
 and these struggles only tended to bind him faster, to us, and the 
 more to ensure our support. At last something like a pledged 
 support was given to him. This state of things at Hyderabad was 
 undoubtedly highly favorable to our interests. It was a position 
 in which Chundoo Lai must necessarily sacrifice something in the 
 duty and allegiance which he owed to his own master, but the 
 condition might have been less dishonorable to him and to us, had 
 the interests of the Nizam and the welfare of his subjects been the 
 rule by which the conduct of both parties was governed. In a 
 compact of this nature, that interest was however too likely to be 
 lost sight of. We had not the power of controlling Chundoo Lai 
 either in his financial, his territorial, or his judicial administration ; 
 we did not allow the prime minister to interfere, and the Nizam did 
 not or could not : so that the administration of Chundoo Lai was 
 more irresponsible to, and uncontrolled either by the people, the 
 sovereign, or the foreign state, than was perhaps ever any other 
 administration in the world for so long a period. 
 
 Unhappily it was not an administration for good, but for evil. 
 Where, amongst the most virtuous of mankind, is the servant who 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 5o 
 
 can be trusted witli such power, ami what right liad we to expect 
 that a man educated as Chuiuloo Lai had been, in all the corruption 
 of perha})s tlie most corrupt court in tlic world, would be an excep- 
 tion ? From the very position in which lie was placed and main- 
 tained, we ourselves taught him the lessons of treachery, and a 
 betrayal of the interests of his master, to serve our own purposes. 
 
 I was for seven years a witness of the afflictions in which the 
 reign of Chundoo Lai in tlie Hyderabad provinces, and that of his 
 brother Govind Buksh in those of Berar, involved this unhappy 
 country. Like most irresponsible rulers, he was lavish of the 
 public money, and cared not by what means it was obtained. His 
 connexion with us too involved him in large expenditures, for it is 
 not to 1)6 supposed that without some corresponding advantages we 
 would have continued our suppoi't. Of this description was the 
 disciplined force which he maintained under British officers, and 
 from which there was a treble advantage, that of employing them 
 on duties of internal coercion, for which the subsidiary force w ould 
 not have so readily been lent; that of supporting his own authority, 
 and being an instrument of intimidation at coui't ; and that of 
 aiding more effectually our army in foreign wars, than any other 
 portion of His Highness' troops could have done. There was too 
 the expense of winning and keeping in his interests those who 
 cither were or pretended to be powerful in any way to support him 
 with us. 
 
 The system of administering the revenues was that of farming 
 large tracts of country to whomsoever could best aiford to pay for 
 them. Portions of these tracts were again sub-let to other farmers ; 
 large advances were taken from all in anticipation of their collec- 
 tions, and the tenure on which all held office w^as insecure, for it 
 ■was a common saying in the country, that these farmers proceeded 
 from the capital to their districts, looking over their shoulders all 
 the way, to see whether other farmers were not following on their 
 heels. These fanners were supreme in the several tracts of country 
 entrusted to their charge. They had even the power of life and 
 death in their own hands, and there was no appeal either to the 
 head of the Government or to the Laws, from their tax-gatherers ; 
 who, be it observed, w ere gathering for their own benefit. Those 
 barriers which the village communities of India, or which groups 
 of villages form, like small repulilics, for their mutual defence 
 against bad Governments, were broken down by the power of the 
 Nizam's ; and Avhen these combinations became more extended, as 
 mis-government increased, troops organized by British officers were 
 brought to bear upon them, and British blood was spilt in this bad 
 cause. The evil of rebellion against authority was apparent to all, 
 but the cause of that rebellion was unknown, for the British 
 Government and the Resident had not the right of interfering in 
 the internal affairs of the Nizam's Government ; although their 
 interference had effectually polluted at the fountain-head the stream 
 of good government, and their power had prevented the people 
 
56 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 from rising and redressing their own wrongs. At length, although 
 not until the country was half depopulated, and the insecurity of 
 all property amongst the cultivating classes and others had raised 
 the price of the common necessaries of life almost to famine rates : 
 the employment of British officers, whose eyes and ears could not 
 be closed to the condition of the country, and the grievances of the 
 people, drew the attention of those in high })laces to these intole- 
 rable evils, and Mr. Russell, before he resigned the office of Resi- 
 dent, made several steps towai-ds the attainment of an improved 
 condition of things ; amongst others, the appointment of collectors 
 instead of farmers of revenue ; and he obtained authority from the 
 Governor General to exercise, on the part of the British Govern- 
 ment, interference in every branch of His Highness' administration, 
 for the amelioration of the condition of his people. Having accom- 
 plished so much of this good work, Mr. Russell resigned his office, 
 and proceeded to Europe. 
 
 It is unnecessary to cite instances of the evils which this system 
 of government had produced in Hyderabad. The whole country 
 was an instance of it, and its inhabitants and foreigners were the 
 witnesses. Almost all government had ceased, the country was in 
 the possession of organized bands of plunderers, the roads were 
 only to the travelled under the protection of armed bodies of men, 
 and life and property were every w here insecure. In travelling on 
 the great road between Aurungabad and Hyderabad, I have had, 
 when moving before day-light, an alarm that the baggage was 
 attacked ; it was saved by the presence of a party of horse, and was 
 afterwards only considered safe under its protection. These were 
 not common night robberies, but open attacks by bodies of armed 
 men. When the Company's Government took the place of the 
 Peishwa's, and our eastern frontier touched the Nizam's territory, 
 the insecurity of the one very soon spread to the other, and the 
 voice of tlie Poona and Ahmednuggur authorities was about the 
 first that roused the Nizam's Government to a sense of its duty 
 and danger. 
 
 About this time, Sir Charles Metcalfe, from the situations of 
 Political Secretary to the Supreme Government and Private Secre- 
 tary to the Governor General, arrived on the scene to assume the of- 
 fice of Resident at Hyderabad. Almost the first thing that attract- 
 ed his attention was a party of 200 of the Reformed Horse under 
 the command of a British officer, arrested before a Ghuree of some 
 strength, and calling for reinforcements. After some hesitation, 
 and inquiry into the circumstances which led to this condition of 
 things, reinforcements of Infantry and Ordnance were granted, and 
 the Nizam's officers were put in possession of five or six places of 
 this description, within a circumference of fifty miles, which had for 
 some time been in possession of rebels, and which had effectually 
 resisted the endeavours of the Government to gain possession of 
 them. The more formidable rebels Naosaju Naig, Luximun Naig, 
 Kone Rao, and others, had before been reduced to subjection. The 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 57 
 
 first tiling to bo dono Avas to establish the authority of tho Govorn- 
 nu'iit througliout tho country. But Sir C'harlos INIotcalfo had 
 experience enough of Indian atlairs to know that this was not the 
 only, nor the most important, thing to be tlone, and to see that it 
 was necessary above all things to save from the tyranny and op- 
 pression of a bad Government those whom our power had placed 
 at its mercy. It was soon discovered that nothing short of the 
 employment of British officers in the several divisions of the terri- 
 tory, who should define the amount of revenue which the Govern- 
 ment, the district, and the village officers were entitled to levy 
 from the people, and who should watch for a period of years that 
 only this amount was collected, could be sufficient for the purpose 
 of extending effectual protection. The system adopted was to 
 inqiure, with the assistance of the Nizam's revenue officers, into the 
 present capability of villages, the average amount of revenue wiiich 
 they had paid in the last few years, and the means of the people to 
 increase cultivation : from these various sources of information, a 
 village assessment Avas formed generally for a period of five years. 
 Leases were granted on these terms, and a written acceptance of 
 the conditions, and a promise to abide by them, was taken from the 
 people. One of the errors of this settlement was, that of taking too 
 much into consideration the means of the people to extend cultiva- 
 tion, and fixing an yearly increase on the village accordingly. This 
 was too sudden a tax on improvement, and drew into the coffers of 
 the Government the profits arising from increased outlay of capital 
 and lal)our, wliich would much more advantageously have remained 
 with the people. When no increase of cultivation followed the 
 settlement, this increasing demand was still more injuriously felt; 
 altogether it was detrimental to the interests of the Government 
 and of the people, and any future settlement of this nature, for so 
 siiort a period, had much better be made without it. 
 
 No sooner however had Government commenced the good work 
 of inquiring into the rights of the people, thought of redressing 
 their grievances, and fixed the extent of their own demands on 
 them, than the country was restored to comparative tranquillity. 
 Men began to feel secure of reaping a return proportioned to their 
 exertions, and industry took the place of rapine and sloth. There 
 was no element in which the rebel and the robber could live ; police 
 responsibility was thrown on the heads of villages, and it became 
 the interest and the object of the whole community to rise against 
 him and to put him down. It was no longer necessary to emploj' 
 troops in the collection of the revenue, or in asserting the rights of 
 the Government, and I believe I may safely say, that from the period 
 when the Nizam's country came under the superintendance of 
 British officers, until that superintendance ceased, not a trooper 
 marched, not a musket was shouldered in support of their measures, 
 except in tracts inhabited by Bheels and professional plunderers. 
 This too in a country where for years before no measure of Govern- 
 ment could be carried into execution without their aids, and when 
 
 I 
 
58 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 without them the principal roads of the country could not be 
 travelled. In India, a moderate village revonuc-settlement for a 
 period of years, in a country that has before been oppressed, gives 
 more innnediate relief, goes further to quiet and satisfy men's 
 minds, and does more to restore prosperity, than perhaps any one 
 measure that could be adopted by a Government in any other part 
 of the world. The Catholic Emancipation Bill and the Reform 
 Bill arc nothing to this. The occupation of the turbulent asserter 
 of the people's rights is gone, he sinks peaceably amongst the rest 
 of the community, and becomes for a time at least a harmless if 
 not a useful subject. He is sooner absorbed than the demagogue 
 of a more civilized land, for he is generally only a desperate 
 character, without any mental superiority, who is either pvit for- 
 ward or calls others to aid him in asserting, with arms in their 
 hands, the rights of the people. The employment is generally 
 attended with danger to all, and when the people no longir require 
 a leader, he is concealed or deserted, though seldom betrayed, and 
 they return to their several occupations. 
 
 A short period of security drew capital and labour in great 
 quantities from other employments to agriculture, which was con- 
 sequently so rapidly extended, that prices were soon injuriously 
 affected. From a country situated as the Dekhan is, there can be 
 few exports, particularly of grain, and produce remained on the 
 hands of the growers. This was so rapid in its progress, that it 
 was felt in even the first years of the settlement, and by the fifth 
 year, wheat and gram, which for years before had sold for twelve 
 and fifteen seers per rupee, might now be bought for fifty or sixty. 
 This may be felt as a great evil by Governments, as affecting their 
 revenues, but it is at all events a great blessing to the poor man, 
 and in India more than in most other countries. Government will 
 very soon reap the benefit of his labour in some shape or other. 
 When he is at his ease as to the means of subsistence for himself 
 and his family, he turns his attention to other articles of produce 
 than grain, and accordingly in the fifth year of the settlement, the 
 people had in many districts the means of paying their rents from 
 sugar, cotton, tobacco, and ginger cultivation alone. There is no 
 country in India so highly favored as a great portion of the Nizam's, 
 both in climate and soil. Blessed with a good Government, it 
 would soon become a garden. Cursed as it has been and is, with 
 that of Raja Chundoo Lai, and, his Kaets and Kutries, it had almost 
 become and is again likely to be a desert. 
 
 This failure of price, in parts of the country where grain was the 
 only produce, materially affected all our calculations, and at the end 
 of the five years' settlement, there was a considerable outstanding 
 balance, and the whole equal perhaps to the amount that had been 
 fixed as an increasing settlement on the period, or as it is there 
 termed the " Istoiva." The country here, as elsewhere, no doubt 
 suffered from that struggle which alw ays prises bet\veen the collec- 
 tor and the people when there is a failure of his estimates, and 
 
INTERNAL RKLATIONS. 59 
 
 whon tliero is no Adavlut to appeal from his operations. The more 
 valuable villages of the Nizam's country, and those whieii at tlie 
 time of the settlement were found the most prosperous, generally 
 sufi'ered under its operations, for they were of course settled up to 
 the mark of their tiien capabilities. Less cultivated and less pros- 
 perous villages gained fast on their heels ; the one was rising, the 
 otiier stationary or gradually retrograded. ]'eople broke through 
 their engagements, souglit cheaper and found equally good lands 
 elsewhere : the amount of rent, whieli according to the principle of 
 the village settlement, they were obliged to pay, fell on those who 
 remained, and eventually it becanu^ necessary in these villages, 
 which before might be consitlered to have held a monopoly of cul- 
 tivation ami of prosperity, to make large remissions. These were 
 trifling evils, and the reminly is always in the hands of Government : 
 the great good which the village settlement afforded to the great 
 bulk of the people in the Nizam's countrj' M'as on a scale which, in 
 so short a period, has perhaps never been surpassed in India. 
 
 About the end of the first five years' settlement, Sir Charles INIet- 
 calfe was called from Hyderabad to a still more important scene. 
 His successor was selected from amongst the most talented of the 
 Company's Civil Servants, for his qualifications alone. Many of 
 the fii-st superintendants had too disappeared. The best of them 
 were Colonel Seyer, Captains HoUis and Clark, Mr. Wells, Lieute- 
 nant Sutherland and Lieutenant Hislop ; and as Sir Charles Met- 
 calfe has added my name to the list, I need not omit it, Captain 
 Sutherland. Two of these were dead, and three had sought other 
 employment. Under a new Resident, and with new assistants, that 
 bane of all good government in India, rapid change of measures 
 took place with change of men. One of the great merits of the 
 whole system was that of working with the native instruments of 
 the Nizam's Government, and introducing none of our own. These 
 it may be supposed were corrupt, and bad enough at first, and 
 perhaps continued so to the last. They were however better and 
 far more respectable than any that we could have put in their 
 places, and by the end of five years, they seemed to us in many 
 instances so much improved and so efficient, that comparatively 
 little interference on the part of the superintendants was necessary. 
 One of the great e\ils that we had to contend with throughout the 
 whole of these measures, was the counteraction of the Nizam's 
 minister. It may be supposed, that the man who had for so long 
 a period been all-powerful, did not sit easy under the control which 
 was now exercised over him and his officers. When he found, how- 
 ever, that the resident was supported by his GoAernment, and the 
 superintendant by the Resident, the struggle which at first he 
 himself maintained, and which he taught his officei's to maintain 
 against us, gradually ceased. 
 
 The management of these affairs, when brought to this point, 
 should therefore have been comparatively easy. But I consider 
 that some important errors were committed in the commencement 
 
 I 2 
 
60 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 of Mr. Martin's administration. The most important was that of 
 taking the old settlement as the standard on which to form the 
 new. It was even proposed to fix the new assessment of each 
 village at the sum at which it had arrived, with the increasing 
 " Istowa," at the expiration of the former five years' settlement. 
 But it was soon discovered that the former settlement was not 
 sufficiently perfect to admit of its extension to five more years, 
 that circumstances had materially changed the condition of villages, 
 for that although the great majority had improved, some had 
 deteriorated. "This scheme was therefore after long discussion 
 abandoned. But instead of taking a new departure, and allowing 
 superintendants to frame the new settlement, according to their 
 capabilities, it was resolved to adhere to the general amount of the 
 former Pergunnah settlement, and to distribute it amongst the 
 villages ; thus going from the aggregate to the detail, instead of 
 proceeding from the detail to the aggregate. This too was an 
 evil, for it may be supposed that the original settlement was not 
 in all cases perfect, but tliat some Pergunnahs received more 
 favorable terms than others, and that they, from this very cause, 
 must have proportionably improved. There was however in the 
 distribution of the amount amongst villages, some discretion left 
 with superintendants. But there was in the measure alone an 
 evident want of confidence displayed on the Resident's part to- 
 wards the assistants with wliom he had to act, which the minister 
 was not slow to perceive. The whole system gradually became 
 impaired. The minister had not much difficulty in representing to 
 the Resident at the capital, that the measures of the superintendants 
 in the provinces were injudicious ; of which neither he nor the 
 Resident could have much means of judging. A struggle arose in 
 many instances between the Resident and the superintendants. He 
 on the showing of the minister assailing and objecting, and they 
 defending, vmtil at last that interference, from which in its first 
 3'ears so much good had resulted, became in many respects injuri- 
 ous by establishing double Government, leaving the people in 
 some measure unprotected, and not knowing to whose authority to 
 look. 
 
 The old Nizam died, and his successor having claimed the pri- 
 I vilege of administering the affairs of his country in his own way, 
 the right was conceded to him, and interference on our part in 
 the civil affairs of his Government ceased, except that of watching, 
 that the amount settled on villages under our guarantee should not 
 be exceeded till the expiration of the period for which the several 
 settlements had been made. His Highness did for a time take a 
 part in public affairs, but the general belief at Hyderabad was, 
 that Chundoo Lai, overwhelmed and confounded with business a 
 person who had hardly ever been out of his Zenana till his fortieth 
 year, and who had never been schooled in pulilic affairs ; holding 
 out to him at the same time temptations far more alluring, that it 
 is no wonder His Highness preferred the latter. He has accord- 
 
IN i'LHNAl. Ur.l.ATIONS. 61 
 
 inply rntirfly m itlulrawn from public life, adding to the vices and 
 follies of his father that of tiruiikeiiness. 
 
 At the time the civil interference was withdrawn on the desire 
 of the new Nizam, His Iliglmess was told that he was supreme to 
 dismiss or retain his minister, and the other servants of his Govern- 
 ment. Chundoo Lai is said to have had address enough to convince 
 the Nizam that his influence with the British Government gained 
 His Higlmess quiet succession of the throne, which else there was 
 a chance of being disputed by Meer Tufuzool Ali, a younger son 
 of the Nizam's, but of more legitimate birth, being also the son of 
 a latly of rank, the niece of Mooneer-ool-Moolk ; whilst the mother 
 of the present Nizam is a person of low condition, witli whom only 
 the ceremony of the Niha, and not the Shadee, hail been performed. 
 But however this may be, there is no doubt that Chundoo Lai is 
 now, in so far as the Nizam and his subjects are concerned, as 
 supreme for good and evil, as he was in the first years of our sup- 
 port. He will, however, be more watched by us, and neither he nor 
 any other minister will in all proI)ability, whilst our supremacy lasts, 
 be permitted to inflict on the inhabitants of that country all those 
 sufferings from which our Government so lately stepped forward to 
 save thera. It is of course now seen, that from the very nature of 
 our position at Hyderabad, we may lend the sanction of our autho- 
 rity to measures which may be injurious to the Nizam's subjects. 
 To lessen this evil, it has been resolved that a person in the capa- 
 city of commissioner shall on all occasions accompany the troops 
 when called on to act in the Nizam's territory, and that he shall 
 have the right and the power of inquiring into and redressing the 
 grievances of the people. If this is fairly done, and the people are 
 satisfied that it is his wish and intention to redress the wrongs 
 which have led them to take up arms, it will never be necessary to 
 call the troops into active ojieration against the Nizam's subjects, 
 nor perhaps even to call them to the scene of disturbance. For 
 the people of India are not fond of rebellion for its own sake, nor 
 do they ordinarily take up arms, except under a consciousness of 
 suffering, from which it is the interest and the duty of all Govern- 
 ments to relieve them. When they do assemble, there is however 
 greater danger than in more civilized countries, that they will do 
 so with arms in their hands. We may be sure that the wasteful 
 extravagance of the public resources by the Nizam's minister, will 
 lead to undefined and intolerable exactions from the people ; and 
 that if no ear is open to their grievances, they will in all pai'ts of 
 the country rise in rebellion. In proof that these evils are again 
 in operation, we need only look to the freijuent calls for the aid of 
 troops, which is to the extent of five or six times in tlie last five or 
 six months. The system which is now in operation at Hyderabad 
 must necessarily have the effect of restraining in some measure the 
 oppressive acts of the Nizam's minister. There is danger however 
 that it may prove a premium to rebellion, by leading the people to 
 resist the measures of their own Government whenever they want 
 
62 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 our interference ; and the interference may become nearlj' as great, 
 whilst for all good purposes it must be far less effectual than that 
 from which wc escaped when the present Nizam ascended the 
 throne. 
 
 The auxiliary force, which has been organized under British 
 officers at Hyderabad, is the substitute for the six thousand Infantry 
 and the nine thousand Cavalry which the Hyderabad Government 
 is bound by treaty to provide, to serve with our troops in time of 
 war; and which were on the old footing generally useless or worse 
 than useless for the purposes for which we required them. The 
 auxiliary force consists of five regiments of Cavalry, eight regiments 
 of Infantry, three small corps of Artillery, and an Engineer Corps ; 
 all as highly disciplined, as efficient, and as devoted to the cause 
 of the British Government, as any troops in India. The value of 
 such a body of troops, either to maintain our position at Hyderabad 
 and in the neighbouring countries, when it may be necessary to 
 call our own forces to another scene of action, or to accompany 
 those forces to fight our battles, as they so often have done, will 
 not be doubted by any one. It costs the Nizam's Government 
 about thirty lakhs a year, or one-seventh of what a few years ago were 
 the state revenues, exclusive of Jageers. There is an irregularity in 
 the payment of this force, which should be corrected ; and if the 
 Nizam's Government will not enter into measures for this purpose, 
 it might not be too much to require that the revenues of a tract of 
 country equal to the amount should be set aside to meet the 
 demand. 
 
 Baroda. — In 1780, a treaty, offensive and defensive, was con- 
 cluded with the Guikowar. It was agreed by the contracting parties, 
 there being war with the Poona ministry, as the Peishwa's adminis- 
 tration was then called, to expel that Government from Guzerat : 
 the Guikowar to keep the share of that country which he then 
 had, and the Company to take that which belonged to Poona. From 
 the advantages derived by the Guikowar, through this treaty, he 
 agreed to cede to the Company the district of Zinnore, and certain 
 villages in the Broach Pergunnah. 
 
 In 1802, the Guikowar subsidized a force of 2,000 men with 
 Artillery, the monthly cost of which was sixty-five thousand rupees. 
 Pie likewise ceded the district of Chickley in return for favors 
 conferred on him. The Company advanced money to the Guikowar 
 to aid him in the payment of arrears to his troops. Also entered 
 into a private engagement with the minister of the Baroda Govern- 
 ment, to render his office permanent, and to secure him, his heirs, 
 and relations in their just rights. 
 
 In 1803, one thousand more troops were subsidized at the 
 yearly cost of 2,90,000 rupees, Avhich with the cost of the former 
 subsidiary force makes in all 11,70,000 rupees per annum, for 
 which amount territory was ceded to the Company. 
 
 In 1805, a definitive treaty, offensive and defensive, is entered 
 into with the Guikowar, and the subsidiary force is made permanent. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 63 
 
 It is to protect the person of tlie Guikowar, his heirs and succes- 
 sors ; to punisli rebels, and correct subjects or dependants who 
 may withhold the payment of the Sirkar's just claims ; but it is 
 not to be employed on trifling occasions. The Companj^ liaving 
 lent money and guaranteed loans to the Guikowar to the amount 
 of rupees 4-1,38,732, the yearly revenue of territory yielding 
 12,95,000 rupees, is ceded, until the debt is liquidated with nine 
 per cent, interest at half-yearly settlements. In case of war, the 
 Guikowar troops to serve with the Company's to the frontiers of 
 Guzei'at. 
 
 In 1817, a further increase of one battalion of Native Infantry 
 and two regiments of Cavalry was nuide to the subsidiary force, 
 Territory was ceded for the payment of the additional force, and 
 certain exchanges and cessions of territory were entered into. In 
 case of war, the Guikowar engages to bring forward the whole of 
 the military resources of his country. An efficient body of 3,000 
 Cavalry is to be maintained by the Guikowar, to act with'tlie sub- 
 sidiary force wherever it may be employed, and to be subject to 
 the general control of the officer commanding the British troops, 
 to be formed, paid, equipped, and armed in conformity with the 
 advice and suggestion of the British Government, but according to 
 the customs of that of the Guikowar. 
 
 The murder of the Guikowar minister in 1817, at Punderpore, by 
 the minister of the Peishwa, Trimbukjee Dainglea, at the instiga- 
 tion, it was believed, of the Peishwa himself, led to the war in which 
 the PeishAva lost his throne. 
 
 The British Government was under an obligation to effect the 
 adjustment of some pecuniary claims between the two states, and 
 the Guikowars minister was sent to Poona under its guarantee for 
 his safety, and with the object of effecting this purpose. 
 
 " The British Government demanded the punishment of Trim- 
 bukjee. This was refused until an army had been marched to sup- 
 port the demand. Yet it made no claim on the Peishwa for its 
 expenses, and inflicted no punishment for his protection of a mur- 
 derer. It simply requii'ed the surrender of the criminal, and on 
 Bajee Rao's compliance, it restored him to the undiminished enjoy- 
 ment of all the benefits of the alliance. Notwithstanding this 
 generosity, Bajee Rao immediately commenced on a new system of 
 intrigues, and used eveiy exertion to turn all the powers of India 
 against the British Government. At length before the signal for 
 disturbance, by fomenting an insurrection in his own dominions, 
 and preparing to suppoi-t the insurgents by open force, the Bri- 
 tish Government had then no remedy but to arm in turn.' — The 
 Honhle Mr. Elphinstone s Proclamation. 
 
 Three questions have lately arisen, all of some difficulty, and 
 giving rise to much acrimonious spirit in our negotiations and 
 relations with the Guikowar. 
 
 1. The irregular payment of the contingent by H. 11. which 
 led to the sequestration of certain portions of H. H. territory, 
 yielding a revenue equal to the amount of the pay of the troops. 
 
64 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 2. The sequestration in 1828 of a poition of H. H. territory, 
 calculated in five years to pay the guaranteed debt, with six per 
 cent, interest, whilst in 1832, it appeared tliat the debt was not like- 
 ly to be paid in five more years ; it being then between forty and 
 fifty lakhs of rupees. 
 
 In both cases, the territory was managed from year to year, by 
 natives appointed by the British Government ; the Raja complain- 
 ing that the management was bad, and that he was not allowed 
 credit according to the amount levied from liis country ; and both 
 parties agreeing that such a system of management must be injuri- 
 ous to the best interests of the people. 
 
 During the Earl of Clare's visit to Baroda, a settlement was 
 effected on both these points ; the bankers coming to an un- 
 derstanding Avith H. II. for the adjustment of the amount of 
 the debt, and releasing the British Government fi'om the gua- 
 rantee and all further concern in their pecuniary transactions. 
 But we are not quite free from future involvement on account 
 of these bankers, for thej^ have been promised protection from the 
 Guikowar's persecutions on account of the part which they took in 
 the late discussions regarding the loan. For the settlement of the 
 first question, the regular payment of the contingent, the Guikowar 
 lodged 10,00,000 of rupees in the Company's Treasury, to be 
 applied to this purpose, whenever his regular monthly payments 
 should fail ; and agreed that the amount taken from this sum, on 
 any such occasion, was to be replaced at the earliest period. After 
 these satisfactory adjustments the portions of territory reserved to 
 meet these demands were restored to H. H. The efficient main- 
 tenance of the contingent of Cavalry is declared by Lord Clare to 
 be necessary to the preservation of tranquillity in Guzerat. 
 
 The third question is still unadjusted. It relates to the guaran- 
 tee by Sir John Malcolm, whilst Governor of Bombay, of certain 
 allowances in land and money to Wittul Rao, (extending to upwards 
 of a lakh of rupees joer annum,) the late Dewan of the Baroda Go- 
 vernment, with remainder to his adopted son. The authority of the 
 Guikowar's Government to this guarantee and to the adoption of a 
 son by Wittul Rao, not having been obtained, that Government 
 refuses to recognize either measure of Sir John Malcolm's. In the 
 mean time, the money is paid by the Company, and the question 
 referred to the decision of the Court of Directors. The guarantee 
 was apparently given in return for services to us, extending most 
 likely to measures injurious to the interests of his master, for the 
 Guikowar considers him a traitor. It does not appear whether he 
 is the same, or a descendant of the Dewan, whose office was render- 
 ed permanent in his own person, by a private stipulation with him 
 in 1802, and whose heirs and relations were guaranteed by the 
 same instrument in their just rights. 
 
 Our relations with the two states which come under this class 
 by the terms of our treaties are of the very worst description, and 
 diff'er from all othei's in this ; that they are entitled to demand the 
 assistance of our troops, to levy their just rights from their own 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 65 
 
 subjects, whilst we have not the right of interfering in their inter- 
 nal affairs. The formation of the contingents of troops in these 
 two states, under British orticers, may l)e traced to the obligation 
 under Miiich we are to afford this aitl, for these contingents would 
 be more readily applied to the purposes of internal goverinuent, 
 than the sul)sidiary forces; whilst at the time it was probaljly not 
 seen that their organization ^^■oldd go far to strengthen our position 
 in India; as well by weakening the military power of the native 
 state, as by giving us a body of troops calculated at all times, to 
 support our interests in their territories, and to accompany our 
 armies into other scenes of action. 
 
 It is curious enough that in the two states comprised under this 
 class our pecuniary transactions and guarantees have been of a 
 different nature from those with other states. From Oude, Gwa- 
 lior, and Puttealah we have borrowed money ; here we have lent, 
 guaranteed, or appeared to guarantee, the loans made by others. 
 Transactions of this nature with the Guikowar Government having 
 been already described, it remains to notice a similar transaction 
 at Hyderabad, in which our Government got involved, and about 
 which a whole folio volume has been written and published ; simi- 
 lar, except that in the one case, the loan contractors were mostly 
 British subjects, and in the other the native sul)jects of the foreign 
 state. It is only necessary to notice it here, because proceedings 
 regarding it are still pending. 
 
 Mr. William Palmer, a son of the late ]Major-General Palmer, 
 and a brother of Mr. John Palmer of Calcutta, sought employment 
 in the Military Service of the Nizam, and after filling various situa- 
 tions rose to the command of something like a regular regiment of 
 Cavalry. This regiment was defeated, together with other troops of 
 the Nizam, by an Ex-Governor of Berar, Moyput Ram, against whom 
 the subsidiary force was eventually employed. ]Mr. Palmer made a 
 narrow escajie, and from that time relinquished military employment 
 in the Nizam's service, and established himself as a broker, banker, 
 and merchant of Hyderabad. From his talents, acqviirements, and 
 adoption of native habits, and manners, Mr. Palmer, who is an 
 East Indian by bii'th, but who has received a liberal education in 
 England, was peculiarly calculated for the meridian of Hydei'abad, 
 and was employed on affairs of some delicacy by the minister 
 Chundoo Lai, and by the Resident. He rose rapidly in his trading 
 concerns, Avhich if not in reality, had in appearance, the support of 
 the British Government, from the house of business having been 
 within the Residency grounds. Mr. Palmer was joined in busi- 
 ness by Mr. Russell, an officer belonging to the Engineers on the 
 Madras Presidency; and as this gentleman was a personal friend of 
 the Resident's, he was entrusted for a time by that high authority 
 with a large sum of money to be employed on his account. Even- 
 tually the first assistant to the Resident, INIr. Sotheby, and the 
 Surgeon, Mr. Currie, joined the house ; and latterly Sir William 
 Rumbold, who had come to India in the suite of the Marquis of 
 
 K 
 
66 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 Hastings, joined it likewise. It has been before said that Chundoo 
 Lai needed two things, money and support with our Government. 
 Here then was material for supplying both ; they were not slow in 
 proffering loans and support, and he was not wanting in rewarding 
 them abundantly ; Chundoo Lai's necessities had driven him to 
 borrow from Messrs. Palmer and Co. a sum of money, it is believed, 
 amounting to forty lakhs of rupees. Reform in the Nizam's admi- 
 nistration was about the same time, 1820, pressed on the minister; 
 and for the payment of arrears to troops, and advances to cultiva- 
 tors, and other good works, he pretended to want sixty lakhs of 
 rupees, and they pretended to lend that sum. It was afterwards 
 discovered, that to the amount of the former advances was added 
 a bonus of eight lakhs of rupees ; and to the sum thus produced, was 
 added what was wanting to make up the sixty lakhs loan. The 
 nominal interest was eighteen per cent, per annum, Avith half yeai'ly 
 settlements, but the real interest from these half yearly settlements, 
 and through the bonus, was about twenty-five per cent, and this 
 loan was negotiated under the sanction of the British Government 
 in the year 1819, whilst money was in great abundance in India, 
 and the merchants of Calcutta were lending that which they did 
 not otherwise know how to apply, at nine per cent, to the Dutch 
 Government at Java, on Avoi'se security than the splendid revenues 
 of the Nizam's Government, encumbered only to this amount 
 afforded. One of the first merchants of Calcutta told me that a 
 loan to any amount might at the time have been negotiated for the 
 Nizam's Government at six per cent., but that in Calcutta the 
 transaction at Hyderabad was considered a sealed letter. It has 
 been seen that in 1805, a similar loan was negotiated for the Baro- 
 da Government, at nine per cent., and latterly that Government 
 only paid six. When the Marquis of Hastings sanctioned this 
 usurious loan he did not however know of the bonus, for that jiart 
 of the transaction was concealed from the Government. 
 
 Shortly after this transaction was closed, Sir Charles Metcalfe 
 assumed the office of Resident. He soon saw that the payment of 
 such interest was unnecessary, that it must be destructive to the 
 Native Government, and he jiroposed to open a loan at the three 
 presidencies for the payment of the debt at the market rate of 
 interest. Such a monopoly was however not to be relinquished 
 without a struggle, and the very same question which was lately 
 overruled by the Earl of Clare, and the Bombay Government, when 
 settling the Guikowar loan, was urged in their behalf, i. e. because 
 it was stipulated that the loan should be paid off by a given time, 
 would it not be unjust to pay it off sooner ? An indemnity was 
 proposed for any loss they might sustain, through the calculations 
 they had made regarding repayment, at the enormous sacrifice to 
 the Nizam's Government of six lakhs of rupees. But nothing could 
 come up to their anticipated gains; else these six lakhs of rupees with 
 the bonus of eight, all of which was clear gain, (for the particulars 
 of the bonus affair were not then known,) would have been a splen- 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 67 
 
 did winding up of tlioir peouniaiy transactions at Hyderabad. The 
 probability is that tlie members of the tirm will not eventually wind 
 up their affairs to such advantage, and that they must ofti'U have 
 regretted that those terms were not accepted. The head of the 
 IJritish Government went along with the tirm, and the proposal of 
 the Resident for the benefit of the native state was never even 
 acknowledged. 
 
 The same firm had an arrangement with the Nizam's Govern- 
 ment, ncgociated through the Resident, by which it received with 
 great profit to itself, but which was also productive of great benefit 
 to the troops, the revenues of an extensive tract of country from 
 the Nizam's collectors, and issued them regularly to the Nizam's 
 contingent. This system went on for a time, but when the collec- 
 tors failed to pay the estimated amount to the firm, it of course 
 failed in its advances to the troops. About the same time the 
 arrangement was disapproved of by the home authorities, and 
 ordered to be discontinued. The departure of the Marquis of 
 Hastings from India, coupled with the disapproval by the home 
 authorities of this arrangement, naturally affected the influence of 
 the firm at Hyderabad. Their funds to a large extent were locked 
 up with the Native Government, and they soon found that with 
 Native Governments, more than with most other creditors, the 
 operations of paying and borrowing are considered very different 
 things. The means of the firm to meet the demands of its numer- 
 ous Native and European creditors, from whom it had been bori'ow- 
 ing largely at twelve per cent, or even at higher rates, for the 
 purpose of lending at still higher to the Nizam's Government, 
 became impaired. The firm wished a portion of the loan to be 
 paid, and it was impossible that the Nizam's Government should 
 pay it. If paid at all, it must be paid through the aid of the British 
 Government, whose guarantee, it was for a long time believed, had 
 been given to the loan. After thinking of various expedients for 
 the payment of the debt, which in 1823, amounted to nearly a crore 
 of rupees, it was at last settled to redeem the seven lakhs of 
 Peshkush payable yearly by the Company to the Nizam, which at 
 its fair value yielded considerably beyond that amount. Messrs. 
 Palmer and Co. accordingly received from the Resident's treasury 
 nearly a crore of rupees in liquidation of the whole of their claims 
 on the Nizam's Government, with the exception of the bonus, and 
 the accumulation of interest thereon, and the stipends to the indi- 
 vidual members of the firm, and their dependents, amounting to a 
 large sum, on one occasion upwards of a lakh of rupees a year. 
 These items are still claimed by the Trustees of the firm from the 
 Nizam's Government. 
 
 Besides these transactions the firm had large dealings with needy 
 noblemen of the court, and officers of the Government, and very 
 few of those accounts have been closed. Bankei's will very well 
 understand, that it must always be difficult to close accounts, where 
 the interest has been cither 18 or 2i per cent. It is curious 
 
 K 2 
 
68 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 enoufijh that a law which was passed to save Native chiefs from the 
 extortions of British subjects, and which was pronounced by the 
 Attorney and Solicitor General of England, to render all transac- 
 tions at Hyderabad which included an interest above 12 pe^r 
 cent, illegal ; has since been declared by the twelve judges not to 
 extend to the territory of a foreign state like Hyderabad, althoi^gh 
 British subjects were concerned in these transactions. 
 
 The difficulties in which we have been involved at Baroda and 
 Hyderabad, as well as those which Ave formerly experienced in the 
 Carnatic, may teach our Government to avoid such guarantees, or 
 any concern in loans to native states. The termination of that of 
 Hyderabad was peculiarly unfortunate. For the Nizam lost his 
 Peshkush, and very few in that territory could understand that it 
 did not go to the Company, or could separate the interests of 
 Messrs. Palmer and Co. from those of the Hon'ble Company. The 
 Hon'ble Company and the Palmer Company, the Residency ka 
 kotee and the Palmer ka kotee, were almost synonymous terms 
 with them. 
 
 3rd Class. — Treaties, offensive and defensive — states mostly tribu- 
 tary, acknowledging the supremacy of, and promising subordinate 
 co-operation to, the British Government. But supreme rulers in 
 their Qwn territory. 
 
 1. Indore. We were brought into contact Avith this state, when 
 the troops under General Wellesley advanced to Poona in 1 802, to 
 restore the Peishwa to his throne, forcing Holkar to yield his 
 supremacy, and his army to quit its position there and to return to 
 Malwa. When the Sister Mahratta states of Gwalior and Berar 
 confederated in the following year, to resist the influence which the 
 British Government had thus established over the head of the 
 IMahratta empire, Holkar failed to join that coufedei-acy. 
 
 Yet in 1804, he singly forced a collision Avith the British poAver, 
 ■which is perhaps the most remarkable in the history of our Indian 
 Avars. The force from Guzerat under Colonel Murray, and that 
 from Hindoostan under Colonel Monson, having failed to act Avith 
 that concert Avhich Avas expected, the latter Avas obliged, from the 
 neighbourhood of Kotah, to retire before Holkar's ai-my on Agra. 
 It made good its retreat, Avith the loss of its ordnance, baggage, 
 and considerable casualties in officers and men. The most unto- 
 Avard event in this disastrous retreat Avas the detection of a corres- 
 pondence betAveen some of the native officers of the force and the 
 enemy, and the desertion of nearly two companies of the 1st 
 battalion 14th regiment. Holkar advanced, took possession of 
 Muttra and laid siege to Dehlee ; and his Cavalry carried the war 
 into the heart of the Doab, and into Rohilkund ; a calamity, from 
 Avhich the British territories had been free since the days of Hyder 
 in the Carnatic. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 69 
 
 The Cavalry under Lord Lake and General Smith proved that 
 even Maliratta horse eoulil not in the long run eseape the vigilance 
 and the perseverance of regnlar Cavalry. It is said that a larger 
 tract of country was traversed in the pursuit, as well by the Cavalry 
 under Lord Lake, as by that under the command of General Smith, 
 in a shorter space of tinu' tlian in any ])erfornuuice yet on record 
 by regular troops. His Infantry was overthrown and lost its ord- 
 nance at the battle of Deeg, but served to augment tiie garrison of 
 Bhurtpore, and nuiterially contributed to the disasters which at- 
 tended the first siege of that fortress. Afterjoining Seindia's army 
 their united forces contemplated oflering battle. When Lord Lake 
 advanced to indulge them, Ilolkar is said to have observed to Scin- 
 dia, " You may fight them if you like, I have had enough of it." He 
 proceeded northward, and the position where the treaty of peace 
 ami amitj' Mas signed is not the least remarkable circumstance of 
 that remarkable war ; being on the banks of the Beyah (or Hyphasis) 
 one of the rivers of the Punjab ; and in the heart of the territory 
 of a foreign state, where he had neither right to go, nor we to 
 follow. Tie was here forced to cede a considerable portion of his 
 territories, and permitted to return to Malwa. The treaty m itli 
 Holkar is dated the 24'th of December, 1805.. Lord Wellesley had 
 left India, Lord Cornwallis who assumed the Government in July 
 died in October, and Sir George Barlow was then Governor Gene- 
 ral. A material change had taken place in the views and policy of 
 the British Government; and on the 2nd of February, 1806, a 
 declaratory article was added to the treaty of peace w ith Llolkar, 
 by which the British Government relinquished certain of the dis- 
 tricts acquired by the former treaty ; withdrew, without the consent 
 of the Jeypore Raja, from the conditions on which it had entered 
 with him ; and left that state and Boondee, which had stood our 
 friend, to the tender mercies of the ^Nlahrattas. 
 
 This system of non-interference or withdraw^al frominterferenc. : 
 in the affairs of Central India led to the strengthening of predatory 
 forces under the command of Ameer Khan, a General of Holkar's, 
 and others, which inflicted great miseries on the states of Rajpoo- 
 tana; which threatened the existence of the Berar Government, and 
 compelled us to make a demonstration of our power in 1809, by 
 advancing into ^Nlalwa from the Madras and Bengal Presidencies a 
 military force of some strength under the command of Colonel 
 Close. Ameer Khan withdrew his army towards Rajpootana ; and 
 the British Government not being yet prepared to take the lead in 
 Central India, the force under Colonel Close was recalled. The field 
 thus left open was occupied by those hordes of Pindarees, which a 
 few years subsequently forced us, in our own defence, to take a 
 more prominent part in the affairs of that country. In 1817, a nego- 
 tiation of rather a doubtful character was entered on fi'om Dehlee 
 with Ameer Khan, and eventually an engagement was concluded 
 •with that chief, by which the British Government guaranteed to 
 him and his heirs in perpetuity, the possessions which he held in 
 
70 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 grant from his master Maha Raja Ilolkar, TIolkar'sGovornmcntjoin- 
 ecl the Mahratta confederacy of this year, and his army was put in 
 march towards Poona. It encountered the divisions of Sir Thomas 
 Hislop and Brigadier General Malcohii, and a battle was fought at 
 Mehidpore, in which it was overthrown with the loss of its Artillery, 
 and the dominions of Ilolkar were at the disposal of the British 
 Government. 
 
 By the treaty of the 6th of January which followed, the territo- 
 ries of Ilolkar were taken luider the protection of the British 
 Government. He confirmed the engagement of the previous year 
 Avhicli had been entered into with his General Ameer Khan, ceded 
 certain tributes and territories, and agreed to maintain for co-opera- 
 tion with the British troops a body of not less than 3,000 horse, 
 for whose regular payment a suitable arrangement " must be made." 
 He ceded also to Guffoor Khan certain territory in perpetuity, from 
 the revenues of which he is to maintain in constant readiness for 
 service a body of 600 select horse, which quota is to be increased 
 with the increasing revenue. Since the conclusion of this treaty, 
 various negotiations have been entered into with the Indore Govern- 
 ment, for the purpose of limiting the quantity of poppy cultivation 
 in the fertile regions of Malwa, and of getting into our own hands 
 all the opium produced in that country beyond the quantity required 
 for home consumption ; these measures, it was supposed, tending to 
 keep up prices in China, and to protect our Benares and Patna 
 monopolies. But being a struggle against nature (as described by a 
 talented financial Secretary,) they have all failed, and the system 
 has now been relinquished ; a transit duty on exportation being 
 substituted. It is supposed that opium can be produced much 
 cheaper in our own provinces than in Malwa, and that an extension 
 of cultivation there will drive the Malwa opium-growers out of the 
 market ; but in this struggle its value will in all probability be so 
 reduced as to destroy monoj^oly prices. 
 
 The terms on which we stood with Tantiah Jogh, the minister of 
 Holkar, are believed considerably to have facilitated our negotiation 
 of opium treaties with this state, and with the other smaller states 
 in Malwa. Tantiah Jogh, originally a Sahookar, joined to hisoccvipa- 
 tion of minister those of banker and merchant, and was the princi- 
 pal in either department in Central India. Our prohibitory measures 
 are generally believed to have facilitated his private speculations in 
 opium, which he had greater power of conducting in secrecy than 
 other traders, and opium seized was frequently found to be under his 
 pass and to bear his mark. Tantiah Jogh died in 1826, leaving half a 
 million sterling, and having transactions at most of the capitals of 
 India. The arrangement which took place on the death of this minis- 
 ter, who was supported by us during the minority, is not far from the 
 imputation of having been suggested and supported by our influence. 
 The Maha Raja was then in his twentieth year. The infant grand- 
 son of the late minister was appointed titular Dewan, and a person 
 called Raojee Trimbuck, who had been the late minister's confiden- 
 
' INTERNAL RELATIONS. 71 
 
 tial deputy, was appointed his representative in the executive charge 
 of the Government. On the same day these personages received 
 khehiuts from the Resident, in testimony of his approbation of the 
 JNIaha Raja's appointment of them. 
 
 2. OuDEEPORE OR Mewar. — It Is impossible to approach this 
 subject without reverting to ages long gone by, when the illustrious 
 house of Oudeepore, which belongs to the highest anti(|uity, jind 
 wliose Prince is still considered king of the Hindoos, led the 
 chivalry of Mewar against the encroachments of Mahomedan power; 
 when it stood so nobly forward in the breach of its princijnd for- 
 tress, the far-famed Chittoor ; when its cavalry swept the jihiins of 
 Rajpootana in defence of its hundred lakes and islands, and of a 
 country, which in natural and artificial beauty is not surpassed by 
 any in India. 
 
 It is the pride of this house, that it never gave a daughter in 
 marriage to the solicitations of the thi'one of Dehlee, when in the 
 meridian of its power ; and it is the reproach on the other houses 
 of Rajpootana, that they yielded to that solicitation and made that 
 sacrifice. It remained for later and more degenerate days to wit- 
 ness a still more distressing, though to the mind of a Rajpoot, a 
 less degrading sacrifice, when the beautiful daughter of the late, 
 and the sister of the present Maha Rana was privately put to death, 
 Kishna Koomara Baee herself consenting to save the effusion of 
 blood between the armies of Jeypore and Joudpore, whose sovereigns 
 sought that valued prize ; to save her native country from being 
 overrun by the armies which would have advanced to the plains of 
 Oudeepore, to contend in the usual vulgar fashion for that one thing 
 which neither force can gain nor gold can buy, woman's love. 
 
 On the withdrawal of the British power in 1806, from the 
 position, which even then belonged to it in Central India, in virtue 
 of the control, which it exercised over the head of the Mahratta 
 state at Poona, and from its possession of the throne of Dehlee, the 
 ground was very unworthily occupied by the armies of Scindia and 
 Holkar, by the organized band of plunderers vmder Ameer Khan, 
 and by bodies of Pindarees, which were gradually organising them- 
 selves under their several leaders, Cheeto, Kureem Khan, Kader 
 Buksh, (ic. No state in Rajpootana suffered more from all the ^.^-'As 
 which such combinations could inflict than the fertile regions of 
 Mewar ; where from their abundant supply of water and forage, a 
 tempting retreat was offered to mounted adventurers of every kind. 
 At last the excesses of the Pindarees led the British Government 
 to resolve on attacking them in the seat of their power ; to assume 
 the offensive, when the defensive system proved insufficient to 
 check their enormities : and we were thus brought into more close 
 connection with the states of Rajpootana. The first result of this 
 advanced movement was the negotiation through Sir Charles 
 Metcalfe, the Resident at Dehlee, of treaties with the several 
 states of that region, which placed them under the pro- 
 tection of the British Government. That with Oudeepore is 
 
72 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 dated the 13th January, 1818*, and by the end of the follow- 
 ing month, the several bands of plunderers and Mahratta horse 
 were expelled from that territory. In return for this protec- 
 tion, the Maha Rana ceded one-fourth of the revenues of his terri- 
 tories for the first five years, and after that term three-eighths in 
 perpetuity. The Oudeepore state had lost in the various struggles 
 in Rajpootana a large share of its dominions, and the British 
 Government promised to effect the restoration of these in as far as 
 this was possible, receiving three-eighths of the revenue of all 
 territories thvis restored. This has been done in some degree, but 
 not to the extent the Maha Rana contemplated ; and hence a never 
 failing cause of complaint on his part, particularly with respect to 
 the district of Neembahera, which is so near his capital : but as this 
 is one of the places guaranteed to Ameer Khan, it is lost for ever to 
 Oudeepore. The troops of Oudeepore are to be furnished, accord- 
 ing to its means, to act in subordinate co-operation with tlie British 
 forces. Under such protection, the Oudeepore country advanced 
 rapidly in improvement. But the Maha Rana had the usual vices 
 of extravagance and improvidence, and his finances very soon 
 became involved. When remonstrated with, and recommended 
 to be more prudent and circumspect in his transactions, he 
 replied, " Does the British Government not know that these 
 are qualities, which never belonged either to Rajas or to whores, 
 
 * Treaty with the Raja of Oudeepore. 
 
 Article I. There shall be perpetual friendship, alliance, and unity of in- 
 terest between the two stales from generation to generation, and the friends 
 and enemies of one shall be the friends and enemies of both. 
 
 n. Tiie British Government engages to protect the principality and terri- 
 tory of Oudeepore. 
 
 in. The Maharaja of Oudeepore will always act in subordinate co-opera- 
 tion with the British Government, and acknowledge its supremacy, and will 
 not have any connexion with other chiefs or states. 
 
 IV. The Maharaja of Oudeepore will not enter into any negotiation with 
 any chief or state without the knowledge and sanction of the British Govern- 
 ment ; but the usual amicable correspondence with friends and relations shall 
 continue. 
 
 V. The Maharaja of Oudeepore will not commit aggressions upon any 
 oiirf : and if by accident a dispute arise with any one, it shall be submitted 
 to the arbitration and award of the British Government. 
 
 VI. One-fourth of the revenues of Oudeepore shall be paid annually as 
 tribute to the British Government for five years ; and after that term, three- 
 eighths in perpetuity. The Maharaja will not have connexion with any 
 other power on account of tribute ; and if any one advance claims of that 
 nature, the British Government engages to reply to them. 
 
 Vir. This article relates to the restoration of portions of his dominions 
 which the Maharaja represents he had lost. The British Government 
 engages to use its best exertions f'./ their restoration when this can be done 
 witii propriety. 
 
 VIII. The troops of the state of Oudeepore shall he furnished according 
 to its means, at the requisition of the British Government. 
 
 IX. The Maharaja of Oudeepore shall always be absolute ruler of his 
 own country, and the British jurisdiction shall not be introduced into that 
 principality. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 73 
 
 •who in these matters are always considered entitled to do as 
 they like." His tribute fell in arrears, and in 1826, His High- 
 ness was in nearly as degraded a condition as that from which 
 he had escaped only eight years before. The demand for a portion 
 of his revenues rendered it the duty of the political agent at 
 his court to institute inquiries into the amount levied from the 
 several districts; and a banker living under our protection, to 
 whom, as well as to us, the Maha Rana was indebted, had 
 become a sort of receiver general of his revenues, and allowed 
 him a daily pittance of 1,000 rupees for his expences. Measures 
 were tak(>n for fixing the amount of tribute at three lakhs per 
 annum, which was below the average of his former payments. A 
 portion of the arrear was struck off, and he was with our assistance 
 relieved in some degree from his pecuniary embarrassments. The 
 entire management of his country was placed in His Highness' own 
 hands, and he has since paid the yearly tribute with greater regu- 
 larity. Latterly, the management of the political relations with 
 this, as with the other courts of Rajpootana, has been transferred 
 to the Governor General's Agent at Ajmere, and the local agent 
 has been withdrawn ; an arrangement Avhich, although at first 
 distasteful to His Highness, cannot fail to be eventually highly 
 beneficial, as tending to give union and system to our political 
 relations generally, and to remove that suppoi't of individuals and 
 that intermeddling with the internal affairs of the several states, so 
 offensive to their princes, and which lead to those guarantees that 
 never fail sooner or later to involve and embarrass the Government 
 itself. 
 
 The tract of country called Mhairwara, belonging partly to 
 Oudeepore, jiartly to Joudpore, and in virtue of its possession of 
 Ajmere, partly to the British Government, was in 1820 and 21 
 brought under subjection by the emploj'ment of a British force. 
 Like the Bheels, the Goands, the Ramoosees, and the Coles of other 
 parts of India, the IMhairs are a predatoiy people over whom no 
 Government had exercised effectual controul for a long period of 
 years. With a view to their subjugation, and in the hope of im- 
 proving their condition, it was resolved in 1823, to bring the m hole 
 tract under the management of a British officer, in its civil and 
 military relations. A regiment, like the Bheel regiments of Kandeish 
 and the Satpoora range, was formed of iNIhaii's ; the expense of 
 management was to be borne by the three powers, and the surplus 
 revenue to be paid to Oudeepore and Joudpore in proportion to 
 their several claims on this tract of country. The measure was 
 distasteful, particularly to Oudeepore, but it has nevertheless been 
 carried into complete effect, to the great improvement of the condi- 
 tion of the Mhair population and country. 
 
 The Maha Rana Bheem Singh, with whom our relations commen- 
 ced in 1818, Avas then advanced in years, and in the course of his 
 long life had witnessed greater changes and reverses of fortune 
 than perhaps any of the former princes of his illustrious house. In 
 
74 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 1826, he talked of the wouclei'ful revohitions that had taken place 
 in India, since the supremacy of his house had yielded to Ma- 
 hommedan invaders, anil their's again to the Mahrattas ; but consi- 
 dered that none of these conquests were so unintelligible as that of 
 the foreigners who came from the west in ships from a country 
 before unknown. Seated in Durbar, in the halls of his ancestors, 
 with his princely son (the present Maha Rana) on his right hand, 
 and surrounded by the nobles and chiefs of his house, Maha liana 
 Blieem Singh discussed these subjects with a frankness and good 
 humour which belong in a more remarkable degree to a Rajpoot 
 than to any other native of India. 
 
 3. Jeypore. — The first treaty is of offensive and defensive alli- 
 ance, and is dated the 12th of December, 1803. The British Go- 
 vernment is neither to interfere in internal affairs nor to demand 
 tribute. The Jeypore Government binds itself to assist with the 
 whole of its army, in repelling any attack made on the possessions 
 of the Company in Hindoostan. The Company becomes guarantee 
 for the security of the Jeypore country against external enemies, 
 the Maha Raja paying for the aid that may be afforded. When 
 Holkar, in 1805, advanced to Hindoostan, and laid siege to Dehlee, 
 the Jeypore state was considered to have violated its engagements 
 by not co-operating with us against him ; yet in the following 
 year the Raja's troops joined the Bombay army under Major-Ge- 
 neral Jones, was prepared to co-operate efficiently, and, from the 
 aid Avhich the Raja afforded, that officer was enabled to maintain a 
 position of the greatest consequence to the success of the war. 
 Lord Lake considered, that after accepting the assistance of the 
 Jeypore state in the last instance, we were bound to overlook the 
 breach of faith in the first. But Sir George Barlow, the Governor 
 General, was of a different opinion, and dissolved the alliance with 
 Jeypore ; contrary to the M'ish and in defiance of the remonstrances 
 of that state. Jeypore was therefore, like the other states of Raj- 
 pootana, left at the mercy of Scindia and Holkar. 
 
 The treaty of the 2nd of April, 1818, is the same in terms with 
 that of Oudeepore. Except that Jeypore is bound to pay eight 
 \akhs per annum of tribute, until its revenues shall exceed forty lakhs, 
 when it is to pay five-sixteenths of the excess, in addition to the 
 eight lakhs. 
 
 Jeypore is the state in Rajpootana, like Oude amongst the other 
 vStates of India, in which we have interfered most largely, and with 
 least benefit either to ourselves, the rulers, or the people of the 
 country. So far as the interests of the British Government are con- 
 cerned, we have had no object whatever in interfering, nor was it 
 obligatory on us in the first instance in any way to interfere. We 
 are not bound by treaty, nor have we by treaty the right to inter- 
 fere, to preserve internal tranquillity. Our duty is to save the state 
 from external aggression. But as we are bound, or have been 
 considered to be bound, to uphold the present family, it is of course 
 1 doubtful to what extent our non-interference, even in internal dis- 
 I putes or wars, can be carried. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 75 
 
 Shortly after the death of the last Raja, the Mahjec or Queen 
 Mother, succeeded to tlie Kegeney, during tlie minority of her son. 
 The present Maha Raja Jey Singh is a posthumous child, and doubts 
 have at various times been entertained, (as must always be the case, 
 when by usage, wives and widows are secluded,) whether he is 
 the son of the late Raja or even of the present Ranee. The claims 
 of a boy, Man Singh, adopted in the lifetime of the late Raja, were 
 however, by the principal chiefs of the state, set aside in favor of 
 the present Raja. Latterly, there has been a struggle between a 
 powerful Thakoor, Rawul Byree Saul, and a person of inferior station, 
 named Sungee Jotah Ram, for the office of minister. The former 
 supported by the British Government, on the supposition of hissupe- 
 rior fitness ; the latter, by the Queen ^lother ; and eventually he pre- 
 vailed, although on several occasions it has been deemed neces- 
 sary to call out troops in support of his rival, and our political 
 agent has discontinued our relations with the court, Vjecause Jotah 
 Ram was not excluded from the councils of the Regent Mother. 
 
 In 1826, when the young Raja attained his seventh year, it 
 became a question with some of the principal Thakoors, w^hether, 
 according to former usage, it was not necessary to remove him from 
 the female apartments, and to place him under the guardianship 
 of certain nobles, who should become a council of regency during 
 the remaining years of the minority. Rawul Byree Saul was at the 
 head of the chiefs who supported these views, and they were desired 
 by the British Government to assemble at the capital, for the pur- 
 pose of discussing these points. They assembled accordingly in 
 Parliament at Jeypore ; those opposed to the Queen Mother being 
 considered under the protection of the British Government. Such 
 an assemblage of chiefs, seventy-thi-ee in number, for a peaceable 
 and legitimate object, was certainly one of the most interesting 
 spectacles ever Avitnessed in Rajpootana, or pei-haps in any other 
 country. Each chief, who from his station in the state, was entitled 
 to certain honors, was considered qualified to vote, and eventually 
 the votes were in favor of the Queen Mother, to the exclusion of 
 the council of Thakoors. The chiefs who had opposed her views 
 returned defeated to their respective homes, requiring and receiv- 
 ing in some shape the guarantee of the British Government for 
 their future safety, in consequence of the part they had taken 
 against the Regent Mother. 
 
 This guarantee has unfortunately been appealed to too often in 
 the subsequent disputes of the Thakoors with the head of their 
 government, whatever the nature of these disputes. There is a 
 sort of federal government in most of the states of Rajpootana, and 
 this is more apparent in Jeypore than in any of the other states. 
 It may be supposed, in a community of nobles, most of them living 
 at a distance from court, having their own possessions and follow- 
 ers, held almost independent of the throne, that there must be a 
 power of combining, and of regulating the measures of their 
 government. When the regular army of the state becomes more 
 
 L 2 
 
76 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 powerful than their united forces, they are necessarily controlled. 
 But during a minority, or under a weak Government, which had 
 not foreign support, their influence, it may be supposed, would pre- 
 vail, and there is a power amongst them which has preserved their 
 order against the encroachments of either the throne or the peo- 
 ple. In the last season, a civil war raged in Jeypore, which arose 
 from an attempt on the part of the Government to infringe the 
 rights of this privileged class, and which terminated in a sort of 
 compromise on the side of the court. Runtumboor, which is the 
 oldest and principal fortress in the country, is held partly l)y the 
 Raja, and partly by these nobles, each having the honor of defend- 
 ing a particular gate or portion of the works. 
 
 The guaranteed Thakoors are necessarily obnoxious persons in 
 the eyes of the Jeypore Government, and Rawul Byree Saul, the 
 chief of them, and the ex-minister, who is opposed to the Queen 
 Mother and Jotah Ram, her minister and favorite, is of course the 
 most obnoxious of all. The charge which has lately been got up 
 against the Rawul, of instigating persons to murder the brother of 
 the present minister, was apparently with the view of ascertaining 
 how far the British Government would protect the Rawul. If that 
 Government had not been prepared to uphold its guarantee, the 
 Jeypore troops would have proceeded against him ; but a declara- 
 tion of its views was of course sufficient to stay further proceed- 
 ings. 
 
 it is curious enough to witness the sense of honor displayed by 
 other powers, all of whom evince some bitterness towards Jeypore, 
 for having rendered up to the British Government, Vizier Ally, 
 the deposed Nawab of Oude, and the atrocious murderer of Mr. 
 Cherry, who had sought refuge from the punishment due to his 
 crime in the Jeypore territory. That state, in submitting to a mea- 
 sure which amongst more civilized nations is in conformity with 
 international law, has disgraced itself in the estimation of the peo- 
 ple of India. In 1806, the Wukeels of Holkar observed to Sir John 
 Malcolm, "The Raja of Jeypore will no doubt continue to enjoy the 
 friendship of the English, as he had disgraced himself to please that 
 nation by giving up to their vengeance the unfortunate Vizier Ally 
 who had sought its protection ;" and a year or two ago, when Maha 
 Raja Man Singh of Joudpore was required to render up Appah 
 Sahib, the Ex-Raja of Nagpore, who had sought refuge in his ter- 
 ritory, and was told that the Jeypore Government had given up 
 some of Appah Sahib's followers, apprehended in that territory, he 
 observed, Jeypore has before "disgraced itself in that way, but 
 that is no reason that Joudpore should do so likewise." The head 
 of a common village on the Dehlee frontier, on being required to 
 render up a plunderer, said, " Do you think I am a Raja of Jey- 
 pore that I should do this ?" 
 
 The withdrawal of the local political agent from Jeypore, and 
 the placing of our relations with that court, under the general 
 superintendence of the agent in Rajpootana, cannot fail to have a 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 77 
 
 healing effoct on those evils m hioh liavc hitherto arisen chi-efly from 
 over-iiitert'i-rence on the part of agents, generally in favor of indi- 
 viduals, and not in recomnunding or enforcing salutary measures. 
 Such support of individuals naturally setting them in opposition to 
 their own Government, and tending to divide and paralize the 
 influence of any administration. 
 
 4. JouDPORE or Makwar. — Our first treaty with this state is 
 dated the 6th of January, 1818. It is in substance the same as 
 the other treaties with the Rajpoot states of this period. The tri- 
 bute formerly paid to Scindia is henceforward to be paid to the 
 British Government. The state is to furnish 1,500 horse for gene- 
 ral service, whenever required, and when necessary, the whole 
 disposable force of Joudpore. 
 
 Joudpore, from its remote position and from the sandy and desert 
 nature of the country, might have been expected to escape from 
 those evils which befel most of the states of Rajpootana, when the 
 British Government withdrew from the exercise of a controlling 
 power. But there was no country which the insidious policy of 
 the Mahratta did not reach ; the instrument of Holkar in this case 
 being his general, Ameer Khan. The present Raja Man Singh 
 succeeded his cousin in 1805, to whom a posthumous son, Dhokul 
 Singh, was born. The infant received protection fi-om the Raja 
 of Ketree, a feudatory of Jeypore ; and his pretensions to the throne 
 were supported in 1806, by that state, by Beekaneer, by Ameer 
 Khan, and certain Joudpore nobles. Their united forces defeated 
 the army of Joudpore in a pitched battle, and took the capital ; but 
 the principal fortress stood a siege of eight months. In the mean- 
 time, the Raja won over Ameer Khan to desert the cause of the 
 confederates. He proceeded to lay waste the Jeypore countiy, and 
 compelled his late friends to raise the siege ; and he murdered Sowae 
 Singh and the other principal Thakoors who had supported the cause 
 of the pretender, instigated thereto, it is sup^Dosed, by the Raja 
 Man Singh himself. Dhokul Singh escaped, and was carried to the 
 Dehlee territory. In 1814, Ameer Khan returned with his army 
 to Marwar, and overran the country. In the same year, he put to 
 death the Raja's ministers, when the Raja himself, terror-struck, 
 abdicated and became a recluse. Ameer Khan with the son of the 
 murdered minister managed the country for him till 1816, when 
 he levied a heavy contribution and retired to Jeypore. The Raja's 
 only son assumed the regency in 1817, but died at the end of eight 
 months. 
 
 Such was the condition of Joudpore when the British alliance 
 commenced with that state. The Raja was prevailed upon to x*e- 
 sume his duties, but his conduct has since on many occasions been 
 such as to give colour to the supposition entertained of his insanity 
 at the time of his abdication. Yet after much personal communi- 
 cation with him in 1822, Mr. Wilder observed in his despatch to 
 Government, " Raja Man Singh is undoubtedly a man of superior 
 sense and understanding." There has been less comuiunication 
 
78 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 between the British representatives and the Joudpore state than 
 perhaps any other state in Internal India, of equal magnitude. 
 
 In 1824, the conduct of the Raja towards certain of the chiefs 
 of his country rendered it necessary to depute a British officer to 
 mediate in the settlement of their differences. The chiefs were then 
 considered to be in the wrong, and no settlement very satisfactory 
 towards either party took place. In 1828, some of these feudal 
 chiefs whose possessions had been attacked, and who had been 
 banished from the Joudpore territory, called Dhokul Singh to their 
 assistance ; and after collecting a considerable body of men in the 
 Jeypore territory, proceeded to invade Joudpore, where they were 
 joined by other Thakoors and followers. The Regent Mother of 
 Jeypore was supposed to favor the pretensions of Dhokul Singh, 
 from a grudge she owes to the sister of the Joudpore Raja ; who 
 was, with herself, one of the wives of the late Jeypore Raja, but 
 who left that country on the birth of a posthumous son by the 
 rival Queen, carrying to Joudpore some scandal from the palace. 
 Maha Raja Man Singh urged on the British Government, 
 through his agents at Dehlee and Ajmere, that the time had arrived 
 when he was entitled to the aid of British troops to support him 
 on his throne. That it was not an internal insurrection, but an 
 invasion headed by a pretender, and supported by a foreign state. 
 The decision of the British Government was, " If insui*rection 
 should be so general as to indicate the desire of chiefs and subjects 
 for the downfal of the prince, there does not exist any reason for 
 our forcing on the state of Joudpore a sovereign whose conduct 
 has totally deprived him of the support and allegiance of his 
 people. Against unjust usurpation, or against wanton, but too 
 powerful rebellion, the princes of protected states may fairly 
 perhaps call on us for assistance ; but not against universal disaf- 
 fection and insurrection, caused by their own injustice, incapacity, 
 and misrule. Princes are expected to have the power of control- 
 ling their own subjects, and if they drive them into rebellion, they 
 must take the consequences. There is no obligation on us to 
 support them in such cases." Jeypore was considered to have 
 acted in breach of engagements with us in allowing an armed con- 
 federacy to form against Joudpore, within its territory. That state 
 cannot retaliate because of our supremacy. Thence its claim to 
 conditional aid ; the condition being the admission on the part of 
 the sovei'eign and chiefs of our right to settle their differences on 
 fair and equitable principles. Jeypore may be held i-esponsible for 
 the injury done to Joudpore. 
 
 Eventually Dhokul Singh was required by the British Govern- 
 ment to withdraw from the confederacy, and the chiefs settled 
 their differences amongst themselves in a manner satisfactory to 
 all parties. In such a contest, when there is a pretender to the 
 throne, it will generally be impossible for the British Government 
 to stand aloof ; for if it does not uphold its supremacy, other pow- 
 ers, who have interests on each side, will step in with their assist- 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 79 
 
 ance. In the present case, a body of Scindians Avas reported to 
 be advancing to support the pretender, sent l)y the Ameers of 
 Scind, and the Uaja was said to have appealed to the support of 
 Runjeet iSingli. 
 
 In 18'29, Ai)pah Sahib, the Ex- Uaja of Nagpore, returned from 
 the Punjaub, anil found an asyUun in Beekaneer, from which he was 
 expeUeil, very rehictantly, by its chief, on the urgent demand of the 
 agent at Ajmcre, to the resident at Dehh;e, and through him to 
 the Beekaneer Wukeels. He proceeded to the Joudpore territory, 
 whose chief was required to seize and deliver him up as an enemy of 
 the British Government, or to expel him on the side of Scind and 
 prevent his proceeding southwai'd. The great reluctance evinced 
 by Malia Kaja Man Singh to treat the Ex-Raja, who had sought 
 an asylum in his territory, so uncivilly, induced the Britisli Go- 
 vernment to come to the resolution, that the Joudpore state should 
 not l)e required to render up Appah Sahib ; provided it became 
 responsible for his safe custody and peaceable conduct whilst he 
 remained in Joudpore. This mode of disposing of the question, 
 the most advantageous after all to ourselves, was received in Raj- 
 pootana with much satisfaction, in proof of the moderation of 
 Govermnent in receding from its former demand ; and of its deli- 
 cacy and consideration for the honor and feeling of the Rajpoot 
 state. 
 
 Maha Raja Man Singh has generally in his communications 
 with the agents of our Government maintained a tone of superiority, 
 or at all events not of that submission which has marked the con- 
 duct of the other chiefs of Rajpootana. On the Governor 
 General's late visit to Ajmere, he did not, like the other chiefs, 
 visit his lordship ; he had allowed his tribute to fall two years into 
 arrear ; he is supposed to have opened some political correspon- 
 dence with the autocrat of the north ; to have afforded on the fron- 
 tiers of his dominions an asylum to certain Nuggur Parkur and 
 Kosa plundei*ers, who violated the frontiers of other states ; 
 he did not meet in good spirit the measures adopted for the adjust- 
 ment of cei'tain boundary disputes between his own and the terri- 
 tory of other states ; and he did not readily supply the contin- 
 gent of troops, which by treaty he is bound to bring forward on the 
 demand of the British Government. This is a long catalogue of 
 offences, but there is nothing very important in any of them, or 
 which need be allowed to disturb our relations with Man Singh. 
 He has since paid up his tribute, and supplied two contingents ; 
 one of 1,500 horse for Ajmere, to be employed in Sheickhawutee, 
 or wherever else they may be required ; the other of 500 horse 
 and 1,000 foot, to be employed in the operations undertaken ])y the 
 British Government, Scind and Jessulmere, against the Nuggur 
 Parkur and other plunderers in that quarter. 
 
 There is no doubt that the contingent furnished by Joudpore for 
 the purpose of assisting in the operations of the present year against 
 the Kosas has failed in the performance of its duty; and the 
 
80 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 probability is that it lias acted treacherously. Neither circumstance 
 need much surprise us, for Joudpore has been too long and too 
 intimately connected with these plunderers to render it probaI)le 
 that we should have its cordial support in their subjugation, Avhich 
 brings our power nearer to the capital than coidd be agreeable to 
 its haughty chief. It is like expecting the assistance of the Mah- 
 ratta powers in the overthrow of the Pindarees. 
 
 5. KoTAH, is a junior branch of the Boondee House, and was 
 separated from it about two centuries ago, but has risen in political 
 importance superior to the parent state. Here as at Poona we 
 found that sovereign powers had been confided to or usurped by 
 the minister. It does not appear that the Prince was under per- 
 sonal restraint as at Poona, but the poMcrs of government were 
 not the less in the hands of Zalim Singh, who was alone known or 
 heard of, and but for his own scruples our treaties would, as at 
 Poona, have been negotiated in his name, instead of in that of the 
 Maha Rao. 
 
 Raj Rana Zalim Singh was the most remarkable man that had 
 of late years appeared in Rajpootana. Under his administration, 
 the Kotah territory was respected by all parties, whether Mahome- 
 dan, Mahratta, or Rajpoot. Whilst the other portions of that 
 region were devastated, and had nearly become deserts, Kotah was 
 in the highest state of cultivation and prosperity, benefiting appa- 
 rently by the misfortunes of its neighbours. This was owing in a 
 great measure to the personal character of Zalim Singh, who was 
 proverbial for justice and honor in his dealings with other men, 
 when these qualities seemed to have disappeared from amongst the 
 rest of the world. Zalim Singh's word was as the bond or the 
 oath of others, and few negotiations during ten or twelve years, 
 from 1805 to 1817, the period of anarchy in Rajpootana, were 
 contracted between chiefs and states without his guarantee. 
 
 When the force under Colonel Monson advanced from Hindoo- 
 stan to co-operate with that from Guzerat, under Colonel Murray, 
 in defence of the Jeypore territory against the threatened invasion 
 of Holkar, Zalim Singh received it at his capital with much cordi- 
 ality, and afforded it supplies and assistance of every kind ; but when 
 it commenced its retrograde movement, he shut his gates, refused 
 supplies, and was no longer our friend. He could not then afford 
 to follow what seemed to be our falling fortunes, at the risk of 
 bringing on the Kotah state the vengeance of Holkar, who was 
 likely to rise on our downfal. 
 
 From this period, as has already been stated, the British Go- 
 vernment withdrew from interference in the affairs of Rajpootana, 
 until the end of 1817. On the 26th of December of that year, a 
 treaty was concluded with Kotah, which is in substance the same as 
 the other treaties belonging to this class. Kotah cedes to the 
 British Government the tribute which it had before paid to the 
 Peishwa, Scindia, Holkar, and Puwar. The treaty is concluded 
 between " The East India Company on the one hand, and Maha 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 81 
 
 Rao, Omod Siii<;li Ruhadoor, the Raja of Kotali, ami his heirs {ind 
 suceessors, ihrouuh llaj Raua Zaiiin !Sin<;h Buhadoor, tlie adminis- 
 trator of the alfairs oi' that ))riiici))ality on the other." Sir Charles 
 Metcalfe, by whom this treaty was nejj-otiated, did not apparently 
 taive on hin)self the responsil)ility of rendering the administration 
 perpetual in the family of the minister. But by a supplementary 
 artiele, tlated the 20th of February, 1818, " The contracting 
 parties agree, that after Maha Rao Omed Singh, the Raja of Kotah, 
 the prineijiality shall descend to his eldest son, and heir-apparent, 
 Maha Raja Kour Kishen Singh, and his heirs in regular succession 
 and perpetuity. And that the entire administration of the affairs of 
 the princi])ality shall be vested in the Raj Rana Zalini Singh, and 
 after him in his eldest son, Kour Madhoo Singh, and his heirs, iu 
 regular succession and perpetuity." 
 
 About the time this treaty was negotiated by Sir Charles Met- 
 calfe, at Dehlee, Captain Tod was deputed to Kotah to give a direc- 
 tion to the resources of that state in our operations against the 
 Pindarees, and for the purpose of settling points of minor impor- 
 tance. In the negotiations conducted by the agent directly with 
 Zalim Singh, as well as in those conducted by the resident at Dehlee, 
 he alone appeared. The Prince was so little known that the agent, 
 like the resident, was prepared to make certain cessions of triljute 
 and territoiT, in the name and on behalf of the minister ; and if this 
 had been done, the Governor General was in each case prepared to 
 approve and confirm the measure. 
 
 It is perhaps difficult to account for the moderation which led a 
 crafty and ambitious statesman, like Zalim Singh, to hang back at 
 such a time from the responsibility of such a measure. We may 
 be sure, however, that he Avas restrained from this direct usurpation 
 of supreme power by the general voice of the princes and people 
 of Rajpootana ; who, even supported as Zalim Singh w ould have 
 been by us in this first act of treachery, would have scouted the 
 measure and branded his name with infamy ; for although each 
 prince and each peasant in this country is ready enough for his own 
 benefit to adopt or to join in such measures, all are here more ready 
 than in most other countries to condemn such acts in others. We 
 have sufficient proof of the extent of this feeling in the manner in 
 which Kishen Singh, the son of the then Maha Rao Omed Singh, 
 was, only three yeai's afterwards, supported by the people of Raj- 
 pootana, in liis endeavour to regain his lost position, and to throw 
 off the authority of Zalim Singh. 
 
 Five hundred Cavalry, a thousand Infantry, and four guns, was 
 the force which Zalim Singh placed at Captain Tod's disposal, for 
 operations against the Pindarees, and it does not appear that they 
 rendered any service of importance. After the battle of Me- 
 hid])ore, Zalim Singh was forward enough to seize upon such 
 portions of Holkar's territory as lay contiguous to his own. 
 
 On tiie death of Maha Rao Omed Singh, under whom Zalim 
 Singh had attained such power, and tlie accession of his son, 
 
 M 
 
82 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 Kishen Singh, it soon became apparent, that the relations which 
 had for nearly fifty years subsisted between these two authorities, 
 and which were now guaranteed by the British Government, would 
 not long remain undisturbed. In December, 1820, Kishen Singh 
 left Kotah ; visited Muttra, Bindrabund, and Dehlee, and deputed 
 an agent to Calcutta, who entered on an intrigue with the princi- 
 pal native servants in the Political Secretary's Office, and made his 
 master believe that he was well received there, and that Govern- 
 ment was favorably disposed towards him. He further enlisted the 
 Treasurer of the Dehlee Residency in his cause, and through his 
 assistance raised large sums of money ; the Maha Rao proceeded 
 towards Rajpootana with 2,000 followers, disseminating the belief 
 tliat the measures of the local agent were disapproved by the 
 Government, and that he had the support of the latter. He called 
 to his assistance the chiefs and servants of his family, and appealed 
 to the princes of the neighbouring states to assist him in his views 
 against Zalim Singh, and to regain the lost fortunes of his house. 
 Having assembled about 6,000 men, he advanced from Jeypore into 
 the Kotah territory, determined to risk a contest with our troops, 
 which were called from Neemuch and Nusseerabad to oppose his 
 views. On the 30th of September, 1821, the Maha Rao's force was 
 defeated at Mangroll, his brother killed, and his principal ad- 
 herents, including a brother of the Raj Rana's, Govurdhun Doss, 
 put to flight. 
 
 After this defeat, the Maha Rao retired to the sanctuary or 
 Nathdwara, in the Joudpore territory, whence he returned to Kotah; 
 and on the 31st of December was restored to his pageant throne. 
 A fixed allowance of one lakh and sixty-four thousand rupees per 
 annum was set aside from the revenues of the state, for the support 
 of the Maha Rao and his establishment ; over which, as in his own 
 palaces he was declaimed to be supreme. One hundred horse and 
 200 foot, under his own conti'ol, were appointed for his protection ; 
 and by a separate instrument, he recognized the perpetual adminis- 
 tration of Zalim Singh, his heirs and successors, over the country, 
 its revenues, the army, &c. The inadequacy of the Maha Rao's per- 
 sonal allowances is a never-failing cause of complaint, and it is 
 generally admitted to be barely sufficient for his most ordinary wants. 
 The revenue of the Boondee state is hardly 10,00,000 rupees a 
 year, and the Durbar expences are upwards of 2,50,000. The reve- 
 nues of Kotah, in 1823, were estimated by Colonel Caulfield at 
 40,00,000. 
 
 It was not supposed by Government that the Maha Rao and Raj 
 Rana would ever be cordially reconciled to each other, or that the 
 former could be satisfied with his condition ; and it was contem- 
 plated to make a division of the Kotah territory ; any share of which 
 it was believed would be acceptable to the Prince, compared with 
 his present condition, possessing the titular dignity only ; whilst 
 the family of the minister might prefer the enjoyment of princely 
 rank at the head of a less considerable territory, to the advantages 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 83 
 
 of administoring oven such a state as Kotah, with the subordinate 
 tith^ of jNIanager. 
 
 Tlic absence of a contruHinn; power in our rehitions \\ itii Uajpoo- 
 tana vas, from the distanci" of the seat of Government from tliose 
 provinces, felt to be an evil ; a separate political ailment was ap- 
 pointed to Kotah, and general authority over all the agents and 
 states of that region was conferred on Sir David Oehtcrlony. 
 
 The bad spirit which must be expected to continue between the 
 legitimate Prince and his hereditary and guaranted minister was 
 not lessened by late events. The Prince considered that the minis- 
 ter's conduct, or usurpation, as he called it, had involved the death 
 of his beloved brother Pertu Singh, in the action at Mangroll ; 
 whilst the minister freely confessed that his apprehension, lest 
 the conduct of the young Prince should not be the same as that 
 of his respected father, was the inducement to him to secure his 
 authority by an alliance with the British Government, under 
 whose protection he felt secure and happy. 
 
 llaj liana Zalim Singh died on the 15th of June, 1824'. It was 
 soon discovered that the son of the late minister, whose succession 
 to the office and power of his father was guaranteed by the supple- 
 mentary article of the treaty, had been kept in that state of tutelage 
 and inactivity which in all countries and under all circumstances 
 seems now to be the fate of the sons and relations of the native 
 chiefs. His vuifitness to conduct the affairs of government, compar- 
 ed with the talents displayed in all departments by his late father, 
 soon became apparent. But supported by our power he took almost 
 vmdisturbed possession of his supremacy in the Kotah principality. 
 The only indications against him were on the part of some batta- 
 lions, which showed a disposition to support and serve the Prince 
 rather than the minister; and Malia Raja Buhvunt Singh, an uncle 
 of the Rao Raja of Boondee, likewise encouraged and supported the 
 pretensions of the Prince, levying men for this purpose. It was 
 eventually necessary, in concert with the Kotah and Boondee autho- 
 I'ities, to employ a detachment of our troops against Buhvunt Singh ; 
 he resisted, and was killed, with some loss on our side. 
 
 The x'eputation of Zalim Singh suffered in the estimation of our 
 Government in the last years of his life, by a want of liberality 
 towards the pecuniary necessities of the unfortunate chief, whose 
 power had been permanently subverted through the connexion of 
 the minister with us. There Avas also an apparent want of delicacy 
 and respect on his part to the wants and dignity of his master, 
 towards whom he professed attachment and loyalty. The necessity 
 of constantly urging these things on his attention rendered him, 
 too, somewhat sore and regardless of the admonitions of our poli- 
 tical agents. 
 
 It must be recollected, that the chief of Kotah, who had been the 
 friend of Zalim Singh, and under whose Government he had risen to 
 such power, was dead ; that he had been succeeded by a son between 
 Avhom and Zalim Singh there had never been any cordiality; 
 
 M 2 
 
84 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 that tho minister declared that the fear of the future Raja's 
 proving less manageable than his father, had led him to seek an 
 alliance with the British Government; and that the young Prince 
 had, in an appeal to arms, disjiuted the minister's right to deprive 
 him of his inheritance. It appeared to Zalim Singh necessary to 
 adopt one of two lines of conduct ; either to conform rigidly to 
 the terms of the several engagements with his Prince, or to resign 
 the resources of the Kotah state to his will, and he rather pertina- 
 ciously adhered to the former. 
 
 An unfortunate interpretation had from the first been given to 
 the supplementary article of the treaty, for although by that article 
 it might be considered necessary to continue in perpetuity to the 
 Raj Ranas of Kotah the administration of the affairs of the princi- 
 pality, it was surely unnecessary to hold the entire resources of that 
 state at the minister's disposal, uncontrolled by his sovereign ; and 
 it would have been wiser and far more just to have limited the 
 minister's expenditure to what was necessary to the effectual admi- 
 nistration of affairs, under the control either of his sovereign or of 
 the British Government, than to have assigned to the chief a bare 
 subsistence, leaving the minister to squander or to hoard the surplus 
 at his OAvn pleasure. 
 
 It still continues to require the constant services of a political 
 agent, and the interposition of the British Government, to preserve 
 a balance of power between these conflicting authorities ; and if our 
 supremacy closed, it may be fairly assumed that the minister's power 
 would not endure a single month, but that it would be assailed by 
 almost all the princes and people of Rajpootana. It is possible that 
 without our support the minister might continue to maintain his 
 place at Kotah against his sovereign. The possession of power, and 
 of the resources of the state, will secure the fidelit}' of a mercenary 
 army. But a struggle would infallibly arise between that army, 
 and whatever may remain of the hereditary nobility of Kotah, and 
 the result would of covirse be doubtful. If the other princes of 
 Rajpootana were allowed to take a part in such a contest, there can 
 be no doubt that the sacred right of kings Avould then prevail. 
 
 Our support of this state of things is attended with considerable 
 odium to ourselves ; and if the system is found to work so badly, the 
 Kotah ministers can hardly expect that obligations, incurred by us 
 under circumstances so different, are to continue binding for ever. 
 
 They might be informed that when the treaty was negotiated, we 
 concluded that future ministers would continue to carry along with 
 them the good-will of the Prince and the favoraI)le opinion of the 
 people, as Zalim Singh had done; that failing to do this, our support 
 of them must necessarily, after a given time, cease ; that we should 
 leave them to stand or to fall by their own resources, or that if they 
 feared to be left in such a condition, we would lend our aid, to 
 secure for them, such a tei'ritorial provision as might, in communi- 
 cation with the chief of Kotah, and the other chiefs of Rajpootana, 
 be deemed an adequate remuneration for the position which they 
 relinquished. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 85 
 
 No one who has considered the soh^mn ol)ligations involved in 
 treaties, or the importance to nations of maintaining; their terms 
 inviohite, uill lightly talk of dissolving tliem, except by mutual con- 
 sent. But the best authorities on international law distinguish 
 ■widely between treaties which are purely personal and tliose that 
 are national ; between those that are for the mutual benefit of 
 nations, and those where the benefit originally was, or where it has 
 through changes of cii'cumstances become, on one side ; and no 
 treaty surely ever was more personal, or had the benefit more on one 
 side, than that of the British (jovernment with the minister of Kotah. 
 In announcing to the Raj Rana an intention to modify the terms 
 of our alliance Mith him, or altogether to recede from it ; we do not 
 save ourselves from any immediate responsibility from any fear of 
 involvement in war or other consequences ; nor do we resign the 
 state to foreign conquest or aggression : considerations which could 
 alone render it dishonorable in either party to retire from the 
 obligations of international relations. But the period ^a hen it may 
 be necessary to make such a declaration may still be distant ; and 
 under good management, may never arrive. 
 
 In December, 1825, an engagement was entered into with the 
 Raj Rana ; the object of which was to protect our Benares and 
 Patna opium monopoly. The agent reported that the minister 
 made no difficulty, whatever, in complying with the wishes of the 
 British Government, although he was very candid and free in his 
 observations upon the consequences, which, he said, could not fail 
 to result from a policy destructive to the commerce of Central 
 India. Yet he considered it his duty to obey. It has since appeared, 
 that there were very strong objections taken both on the part of the 
 Kotah and Boondee states to entering on this engagement, the one 
 professing its willingness to do so, after the other should have 
 complied : thus showing a combination to resist encroachment, 
 which they had not formerly recourse to on more trying occasions. 
 These objections Avere however overruled, and Kotah agreed to 
 collect from its cultivators, and to deliver to our opium agent, at a 
 fixed price, all the opium produced in its territory, and to prevent 
 the exportation and importation of the drug. Persons guilty of 
 clandestinely exporting or importing opium were to be held liable 
 to punishment, agreeably to the opinion and advice of the political 
 agent, and the opium to be liable to confiscation. The value of 
 opium so confiscated to be divided in equal shares between the 
 Kotah Government and the persons making the seizure. An allow- 
 ance was also made to the Kotah Government for the loss it sus- 
 tained in transit duty. Custom-house officers, or other servants, 
 or subjects, of the Kotah state, intentionally or otherwise, allowing 
 of the importation or exportation of opium, to be punished accord- 
 ing to the advice of the political agent. One-third of the value of 
 the opium was to be paid for at the time the poppy was sown, one- 
 third at the time the juice was extracted, and one-third at the time 
 of delivery. The Raj Rana declared these advances to be necessary, 
 
86 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 that he might establish a claim on the people to the produce of 
 their labour, at the prices fixed by the opium agent ; which else 
 would fall into the hands of merchants and bankers. 
 
 Kotah is the principal state in llajpootana where opium is grown, 
 and I have been thus particular in describing the nature of our en- 
 gagements with that state, because it will show the nature of the 
 system established throughout llajpootana and Malwa. In those 
 states, which were the principal thoroughfares towards the coast, 
 such as Oudeepore, larger allowances were made for the loss of 
 transit duties ; and these were so much greater than had ever been 
 derived from that source of revenue, whilst their profits on the 
 confiscation of the drug were also considerable, that they favored 
 and supported rather than otherwise our views. Scindiah, Jey- 
 pore, Kishengurh, and some other states considered these mea- 
 sures to be so injurious to their interests, and those of their 
 subjects, that they resisted all our endeavours to draw them into our 
 views, and gained great credit with the peoj^le generally, but with 
 the mercantile community in particular, for so doing. 
 
 It is remarkable enough that in discussing and negotiating these 
 measures, the Government of that day avoided the agency of the 
 most distinguished of their servants who held the principal politi- 
 cal authority, Sir David Ochterlony and Sir Charles Metcalfe, 
 whose opinions were known to be adverse to the system ; and went 
 to work either through the medium of the opium agent, Avho had 
 been established in Malwa and llajpootana, or directly with the 
 local agents at the several courts. Government must have known 
 that their measures were both offensive and injurious to the chiefs 
 a))d people of those regions, but they did not know the extent to 
 which they were so. They did not know that they had raised up a 
 cloud of spies, and opium-seizers, whose hand was in every man's 
 house, and in every man's cart ; that they Avere teaching the 
 Governments of those countries to lend us their aid to forward 
 views most opposed to the interests of their own subjects, wliether 
 agricultural or commercial, or the extent to which the odium of the 
 whole system fell upon themselves. 
 
 It has often been a source of just complaint, that the Indian Go- 
 vernments do not receive from their officers that free and manly 
 description of the evils which peculiar measures are calculated to 
 produce, when it is known or suspected that such exposition would 
 not be palatable ; and in no case has this been more apparent than 
 in the negotiation of our opium treaties in Malwa and Rajpootana, 
 and in the adoption of measures necessary to support their stipu- 
 lations, all of which were alike subversive to the power of the 
 princes of those regions, and destructive to the ])est interests of 
 their subjects. Government was not entirely ignorant of the in- 
 justice and evil tendency of those measures, but neither was it 
 fully aAvarc of the extent of the evil which they inflicted. 
 
 It was however soon discovered, that the system did not work 
 well for us ; that opium found its way to the foreign settlements of 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 87 
 
 Damaun and Diu, for exportation to the China market, in such 
 quantities as injuriously to atl'eet our monopoly prices there ; and it 
 Mas sought to negotiate new treaties with the several states, which 
 should strike at the root of this evil by limiting production, for 
 prices in Mahva and Rajpootana had continued so high as to serve 
 as a premium. The Raj Rana of Kotah was the first who had 
 courage to speak out, and Sir Charles Metcalfe being at the time 
 on a tour through Rajpootana, he was not only listened to, but the 
 voice of complaint was sure to reach Government in a shape that 
 could not be resisted. Revenue to the extent of iipwards of a 
 million sterling was however considered to be involved in the dis- 
 cussion, and as tliat is a sum which no Government can readily 
 afford to part Avith, this struggle against nature continued for some 
 time longer. At last, opium-carriers armed to oppose opium- 
 seizers, and a sort of civil war had in some places arisen, mIucIi was 
 likely to become more extended. It was therefore found necesssary 
 to relinquish the system, and to endeavour to bolster up our inter- 
 nal agriculture and trade, by levying a protecting duty on the com- 
 merce of those states. 
 
 6. BooNDEE is the principal state from its antiquity in that 
 portion of Rajpootana called Harowtee; Kotah being a branch state. 
 The other three divisions of that great region are Doondar, of which 
 Jeypore is the capital, and Ulwar, a branch state ; Marwar, of which 
 Joudpore is the capital, and Beekaneer, Kishengurh, and Sirohee 
 are branch states; and Mewar, of which Oudeepore is the capital, 
 and Banswarra, Purtabgurh, and Doongerpore are branch states. 
 The Raja of Boondee had been of important assistance to Colonel 
 Monson in his disastrous retreat before the army of Holkar, in 
 1804, and was believed in the subsequent operations of the Mah- 
 rattas in that quarter to have suffered the more on that account. 
 We were not bound by any stipulations, like those with Jeypore, of 
 the same period, to protect Boondee, which was left to its fate, 
 without subjecting us, as in the other case, to the imputation of 
 being guilty of a breach of faith. 
 
 The treaty with Boondee is of the 10th of February, 1818. The 
 tribute amounting to 88,000 Rupees, which the state had formerly 
 paid to Plolkar, was remitted in return for former services ; and 
 some territorial possessions, which had passed from it, were reco- 
 vered and gratuitously restored. The other articles of the treaty 
 were conformable v.ith those of other treaties of the same 
 class. 
 
 Our friend Rao Raja Bishen Singh died on the 14th of July, 
 1821. He had conducted the affairs of his Government from the 
 period of his alliance with us, in a manner perfectly satisfactory, 
 and was succeeded in his possessions l)y the present Rao Raja Ram 
 Singh, then a boy of eleven years of age. 
 
 On the Raja's death, a Council of Regency Mas established, 
 consisting of four influential persons, servants of the late Rao Raja, 
 named apparently by the political agent of the day, and approved 
 
88 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 by the British Government ; by whom however he was desired to 
 avoid all direct interference in the internal affairs of Boondee. 
 
 Very soon after this arrragement was completed, the Mother of 
 the young Raja informed the political agent, " that the system 
 would not work; that four English Gentlemen might conduct state 
 affairs in concert, but that four natives never could." An arrange- 
 ment through which the bank(>r of the political agent was substitut- 
 ed for the former banker of the state, was deemed particularly 
 objectionable ; and it was declared that most of the mend)ers of the 
 Regency were leagued with the English ; that as the political agent 
 had assumed the entire executive authority in Mewar, and merely 
 allowed the Rana sufficient for his daily expenses, so would he take 
 upon himself the entire management of Boondee affairs, and allow 
 them a daily stipend, by which means the reins of Government 
 would fall from their hands. 
 
 The administration of affairs was therefore entrusted by the 
 Queen Mother to an individual minister, Bora Sumboo Ram, and 
 the agent's measure set aside, which was of easier accomplishment, 
 as he resigned his office about the same time. Some measures of 
 the Regent Mother, which character she now assumed, were con- 
 sidered objectionable ; and she was informed by Government that 
 unless ceconomy, and the interests of the young Raja, were more 
 attended to, it might become necessary to entrust the management 
 of affairs to abler and better hands. 
 
 In January, 1823, the minister died, and the young Raja reported 
 to the agent that he had made an election in his room. The poli- 
 tical agent was much surprised at this exhibition of independent 
 spirit. But after proceeding to Boondee, for the purpose of inquir- 
 ing into the fitness of the person named, he found that there was 
 no better man in the principality, and the arrangement was allowed 
 to stand. 
 
 In April, 1823, the young Rao Raja, then in his twelfth year, 
 espoused a daughter of Maha Raja Man Singh of Joudpore, who 
 was in her twenty-fifth, a very unusual disparity in years amongst 
 Rajpoots on the wrong side ; but tlie alliance was considered high- 
 ly advantageous to Boondee. The political agent had the support 
 of a single minister very much at heart, and required the removal 
 from the mother's councils of three persons of low station, who 
 were supposed to be inimical to that officer, viz. an eunuch, a 
 Budarun, and a barber, and the British Government authorized the 
 agent to insist on their removal from the presence and councils of 
 the Regent. They were accordingly removed; but others of similar 
 character immediately took their place, and the perverse disposi- 
 tion of the Ranee was excited to constant opposition by a Bloot- 
 sudee and a JFurash of the palace. The Ranee continued to beg 
 hard for the restoration of her former servants, and the agent to 
 oppose their admission, even into the palace, in which he was sup- 
 ported by his Government. These arc not singular instances of the 
 exercise of the political poAver of our agents, and of our Govern- 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 89 
 
 ment to secure the removal of menials. At Jeyporc we insisted 
 on the removal of Roopa Budarun, and in Chota Nagpore, we 
 insisted on the removal of a certain Dhae, probably the Rajah's 
 wet nurse. 
 
 The atiairs of the Boondee state continued however to prosper 
 under the superintendance of the political agent, and thi; adminis- 
 tration of an able minister, during the minority of the Rao Raja. 
 
 The Queen Mother was suspected during the whole period of the 
 minority, of witiiholding from her son that description of education, 
 and of denying him access to those friends and associates, which 
 would have most tended to improve his mind and form his morals, 
 in a manner conducive to his future fitness for the high station 
 which it was his destiny to fill. She was even suspected of pander- 
 ing to the vices of her son, and this, of course, for the purpose of 
 prolonging the period of her own power. 
 
 The education of the young Raja was here, as at Jeypoi'e and 
 other places, considered by the chiefs of the state a national object. 
 But it was on the pai't of the mothers, who claimed in each case to 
 be the natural guardians, asserted that those chiefs only desired to 
 exercise a controul over the state, in the name of the Raja, to 
 serve their own interested purposes. At Boondee, as has already 
 been stated, the young Raja was married to a sister of the Raja of 
 Joudpore. She, as seems to be always the case in these Rajpoot 
 states, was accompanied to the court of her loi*d, by certain attend- 
 ants, who permanently took up their residence, to watch over her 
 interests. In the case of a minority in particular, these persons 
 maj' be supposed generally to exercise, or to desire to exercise, 
 some influence in coui't affairs ; and as few characters are more scorn- 
 ed in the eyes of natives, than even a brother ( Sala) who follows, 
 or attaches himself to the fortunes of a sister, these personages ai-e 
 not likely to be treated with much respect at the court where they 
 reside. In the present instance, they resented the treatment of the 
 young Princess by her still younger lord, and publicly declared 
 that, but for the appx'ehonsion they entertained of exciting the dis- 
 pleasure of the British Government, they would revenge the wrongs 
 and insults ottered to their misti'ess. In 1827, they appealed to the 
 political agent, to interfere, for the purpose of inducing the Queen 
 Mother and the minister, (between whom, as usual, a criminal con- 
 nexion was suspected,) to conduct the affairs of the Zenana in a 
 manner more conformable with usage, and consonant to the dignity 
 of the Prince and the character of the ladies of the palace. We 
 shall see presently that this spirit produced more serious results. 
 It is to be observed, that the females in these states are kept as 
 rigidly secluded as under any Mahomedan Government, although 
 they exercise far greater influence in state affairs. The line of 
 eunuchs guarding the approach to the Zc^crHa of Jey])ore is greater 
 than perhaps in any other court in India ; and as might be expected, 
 the state of morals under such guardianship is believed to be laxer 
 than elsew here. 
 
90 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 From the nature of the international authority exercised by the 
 British Government, these domestic affairs force themselves under 
 our cognizance. Even the haughty Maha Raja Man Singh of Joud- 
 pore has been obliged to enter on stipulations with our agent, re- 
 garding the treatment of one of his wives, a sister of the late Raja 
 of Jeypore, who too was married to a daughter of Man Singh. 
 In 1820, Man Singh dismissed the Jeypore attendants on iiis wife, 
 because of tl^eir meddling with state affairs. He told the agent, in 
 1824', that he would have stated certain grievances on this head 
 against Jeypoi-e, but that he thought it would be very unbefitting in 
 him to refer a subject purely of a private and family nature to Bri- 
 tish arbitration. He consented, however, if the Jeypore Govern- 
 ment would send agents of their own selection, that his wife's 
 estates and other property should be immediately made over to 
 them ; that he would likewise depute an agent to Jeypore to super- 
 intend the possessions of his daughter ; an arrangement by which 
 mutual intercourse might at once be renewed, and their domestic 
 differences amicably settled among themselves. He objected how- 
 ever to send his Avife back to her family because the Raja of Jey- 
 pore was a child ; and knowing nothing, the arrangements of the 
 interior were not then properly observed. 
 
 In 1829, the Boondee Government urged on the political agent, 
 with much pertinacity, the obligations under which the British 
 Government was, in conformity with the 5th article of the treaty, 
 to restore to it, a two-third share of the district of Patun, held by 
 Scindia ; the other third having before been recovered from Holkar, 
 and restored to Boondee. By the 5th article of the treaty, it was 
 stipulated, that Boondee should pay to the British Government the 
 tribute and revenue formerly paid to Scindia, for which it became 
 answerable to that state : and in a schedule to the treaty, 40,000 
 rupees was stated to be the tribute on account of the shares in 
 question. But this amount of tribute was never claimed from 
 Boondee, because the shares of Patun could not be i-ecovered from 
 Scindia ; for, by the treaty it was only incumbent on us to recover 
 for Boondee such portions of its territory as had been mortgaged 
 to Scindia, on account of ari'ears of tribute or debt. Inquiries, after 
 the negotiation of the treaty, proved, that Patun had been ceded to 
 the Peishwa during the ministry of Nana Furnivese for certain 
 services rendered to the then Raja of Boondee, in assisting to ex- 
 pel a pretender to the throne, who had the support of Jeypore. It 
 had been afterwards ceded by the Peishwa to Scindia, on what 
 account was immaterial, for it was obvious that we could not effect 
 its restoration ; the two-thirds of Patun are worth about 80,000 
 rupees, the tribute which Boondee would pay to us being only 
 40,000, its interest in the recovery of the purgunnah is sufficiently 
 obvious. But beyond this it is an old family possession, whose 
 magnificent temple Avas built by the Rajas of Boondee, and is the 
 sanctuary of their household gods. It may be possible, through a 
 money payment, or by an exchange of territory, for Boondee to 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 01 
 
 recover from Sciiulia this much valued possession. But slic is not 
 likely to enter conlially on either scheme, whilst there is a probabi- 
 lity of effecting the object on more advantageous terms through our 
 influence. 
 
 Boondee suffered less than Kotah through our opium arrange- 
 ments. In 1829, the finances of the former principality were de- 
 scribed by the political agent to be in the most prosperous condition, 
 the treasury full, and every thing connected with the Rao Raja's 
 pecuniary affairs in the most flourishing state. The revenues of 
 the latter principality were described to be greatly impaired by the 
 effects of our opium monopoly, the commerce of the country having 
 been annihilated by our I'estrictive measures, " which condition 
 following so immediately on the steps of a high state of prosperity, 
 has occasioned great distress and universal discontent." 
 
 " On communicating to the authorities of Kotah and Boondee, 
 the modiflcation which the Right Hon'lile the Governor General in 
 Council has directed me to make in our opium treaties, they ex- 
 pressed a deep sense of the boon which the Governor General has 
 been pleased to bestow on the suffering inhabitants of Harowtee, 
 and earnestly urged me to make their gratitude known to his lord- 
 ship in council." In 1828, Maha Raja Bukhtowur Singh, a near 
 relation of the Raja of Boondee, was killed in an affray with a body 
 of opium smugglers. 
 
 The Raj Rana of Kotah desired to have a picture of his lordship, 
 " that he might have the image of the benefactor constantly in his 
 view, who rescued him from an impending ruin, and the principa- 
 lity of Kotah from misery, which no exertion of his could avert or 
 assuage." 
 
 In May, 1830, a deputation, accompanied by 300 armed men, was 
 sent from Joudpore, for the alleged purpose of securing some 
 modification of the treatment experienced by the daughter of the 
 Prince of that state, M-ho was married to the chief of Boondee. It 
 is curious enough, that the news-writer of the political agent 
 stationed at Joudpore, on the 1st of May, gave intimation of the in- 
 tention of the Prince of that state to put the Boondee minister to 
 death, and that this notice had been republished in the newspapers 
 at Dehlee, apparently without attracting notice from any one. The 
 deputation encamped outside of the city of Boondee, and on the 
 third day after its arrival, its virtuous minister was assassinated in 
 the hall of his Prince, by a servant attached to the chiefs who had 
 originally attended the young Princess to the court of her lord, and 
 who were living in the city. 
 
 They fortified themselves in their house, and prepared for defence, 
 and the deputation retired from before the city walls, when the 
 guns of the hill fort, and others placed in position, oi^ened on the 
 residence of their countrymen. The officiating political agent heard 
 the boom of the artillery at his residence at Kotah, and on learn- 
 ing the cause of the cannonade, galloped the following morning to 
 assist our ally with his council, and found the young chief fully 
 
 N 2 
 
92 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 resolved to avenge the insult offered to his honor. After the batte- 
 ries were open for three or four days, and the water and supplies of 
 the besieged had been cut off, the two leaders of the party and the 
 supposed instigators of the assassination were apprehended in an 
 attempt to escape, and publicly executed by the Rao l^aja's order. 
 Persons of inferior note gradually surrendered themselves, and were 
 sent beyond the Boondee frontier. On the sixth day, Baboot Sing, 
 a nobleman of the court of Joudpore, who had swoi*n a solemn oath 
 to put to death the Bondee minister, who accompanied the depu- 
 tation from Jovidpore, but who had joined the city party, and who 
 was supposed to be the instrument of the Joudpore llaja in this in- 
 famous transaction, was killed ; and in the death of these three 
 men, the assassination of the Boondee minister was considered to 
 be sufficiently avenged. During the operations against the city 
 partj^ the deputation evinced great impatience, and made several 
 demonstrations of affording relief to their companions ; other parties 
 of Joudpore troops were also a pproaching, and but for the position 
 of the British Government, and the conduct of its officiating agent, 
 there can be no doubt that war between these states must have fol- 
 lowed, and that as usual, the principalities of Rajpootana would 
 have taken their respective sides in the contest. " The Rao Raja 
 carried his measures through with a degree of firmness, which is 
 uncommon in a youth under nineteen years of age ; nor was his re- 
 solve sullied by any disposition to cruelty and recklessness of human 
 life : — showing throughout the affair strong natural sense, and a 
 firm and generous disposition." Nor was the conduct of the Raja's 
 adviser, the officiating political agent, who was hardly his senior in 
 years, less admirable. 
 
 In Raj Debae Kishen Ram, the Boondee principality lost a minis- 
 ter, by whom during his administration of six and a half years, 
 the whole of the debt had been discharged ; all the revenue was 
 paid into the Raja's treasury to the last rupee; a regular system of 
 finance was maintained ; all the establishments had been placed on 
 the most efficient footing ; the military was regularly paid, content- 
 ed, and attached ; the revenue had been raised from three lakhs to 
 nearly five lakhs, and a treasure in ready money of about two lakhs 
 had been collected. He was succeeded in the ministry by his son. 
 From the time that Man Singh married his daughter to the Boon- 
 dee Raja, he desired to establish a dominant influence in the affairs 
 of that state. A force of 2,000 men accompanied the bride, and 
 remained with her till her father's objects had been obtained ; and 
 after their departure, from 150 to 250 armed men composed her 
 escort at the residence of her lord, overawing the minister and 
 people ; and it was the opposition of the minister to this influence 
 which led to his assassination. 
 
 The political agent for the affairs of Joudpore did not believe 
 that the Prince of that state was concerned in instigating the assas- 
 sination of the Boondee minister ; although he allowed that such a 
 proceeding was quite in conformity with the character of ]Man 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 93 
 
 Singh, and noticed a belief prevaleiit in tliose parts, that the death 
 of tiie minister had been planned by the Boondee Haja himself, on 
 account of the intimacy uhieh was l)elieved to subsist between the 
 minister and his motlier, and because the minister was supposed to 
 be favored by the British Cjovernment, from wiiom he had received 
 a title. This opinion was sutiicicntly refuted by the officiating poli- 
 tical agent at Boondee. Tlie young chief of that place had never 
 before taken any share in public life. He was not likely to con- 
 spire with a foreign prince and foreign people to compass the death 
 of his own favorite minister ; if he did so, he was not likely to take 
 so vigorous a part against his fellow conspirators, nor when they 
 fell into his hands, to put them to death. 
 
 In this transaction, as in almost every other in which we take a 
 part in the aftairs of foreign states, there remained a responsibility 
 on us. If the daughter of the chief of Joudpore did not, as the senior 
 wife of the Raja of Boondee, receive that treatment at the hands of 
 her husband, or his servants, which was due to her station : and if 
 our position prevented the father fi'om enforcing on the allied state, 
 the rights of his daughter, or from sending an army to bring her to 
 her home, it was incumbent on us to take the place of the father in 
 this domestic affair. The scruples of a native chief, Avho was not 
 likely to discuss with our agents a question of this delicacy, were a 
 further bar to the attempt to effect so delicate a purpose w ith ad- 
 vantage ; for it could only have been on the father's appeal to us, 
 that we coidd have interposed our authority with the chief of 
 Boondee. The father did open a communication with our political 
 agent at that court, but, apparently purposely abstained from the 
 mention of his daughter. On the present occasion, our interference 
 was supposed to be the less necessary, from the perfectly good dis- 
 position of the young Raja of Boondee tow ards his w ife ; and from 
 her being for the first time in that interesting condition, which 
 promised to bind faster the ties of affection between them. 
 
 Yet notwithstanding these appearances, the Rao Raja's suspicion, 
 that his wife was concerned in instigating the murder of his minis- 
 ter, kept possession of his mind ; and although a son and heir to 
 the throne was born four months after the assassination of the 
 minister, the Rao Raja only saw the infant on the night of its birth, 
 and never his wdfe, until the beginning of 1832, w^hen he Avas pro- 
 ceeding on a visit to the Governor General at Ajmere. Preparatory 
 to his departure, the child, then sixteen months old, was brought 
 into public, and received the homage of the chiefs of the state ; a 
 reconciliation having before taken place between the parents. The 
 mother never trusted the child out of her own sight, nor allowed 
 it to quit her own apartments, till after her reconciliation with the 
 father. 
 
 It has been already mentioned, that an arrangement, which sub- 
 stituted the banker, supported by the political agent, for the banker 
 of the state, in pecuniary transactions, w as deemed at Boondee par- 
 ticularly objectionable. From the important part which this bank- 
 
94 IP3TERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 ing establishment has acted in the affairs of Rajpootana, it is neces- 
 sary here to notice the nature of its transactions. 
 
 In January, 1830, the officiating political agent at Kotah, Mr. 
 Trevelyan, reports, " There was one Saokar of superior resources 
 to any of the others, and of far superior abilities. This was Baha- 
 dur Mul, who was originally the Boondee Gomashtaof the Jeypore 
 house of Dhurumsee Pudunisee. He is a person of great address, 
 and of unbounded liberality when he has the accomplishment of any 
 favorite object in view ; but it was the patronage of Major Tod 
 that first gave him importance and general consideration. That 
 gentleman procured for him, and his brother, Zorawar Mul, the 
 situation of treasurer to the Oudeepore Rana ; and by keeping him 
 in their debt, they got the entire revenues of the state under their 
 control." 
 
 In 1822, the political agent, Lieutenant-Colonel Caulfeild, reports 
 on the affairs of Boondee. " It now becomes my duty to advert to 
 the branch of a very opulent house in Kotah, established at this 
 place under Kessoo Ram, (the Gomashta of Seit Bahadur Mul,) who 
 is in the habit of making advances to the Raj upon the following 
 terms : First, receiving four per cent, on the sums requii-ed, as a 
 kind of usurious bait, and one per cent, per mensem, and a draft 
 for the amount of the loan upon a particular Pergunnah. When 
 this draft becomes due, the banker receives part of the amount in 
 cash and part in grain, according as it suits his own interest. The 
 house has also the payment of the Infantry stationed at Boondee, 
 in the same way as the firm of Ingle and Co. have of the Cavalry, 
 and issue advances in like manner according to its pleasure, in 
 money or grain, whichever affords the most ample means of 
 defrauding to an unlimited extent a class of people Mho have no 
 appeal from griping avarice." 
 
 " This banker likewise supplies the Toshakhana, and his accounts 
 in this department are settled every six months, without any previ- 
 ous valuation of the articles provided ; the price being left entirely 
 to the conscience of the contractors. The revenue of the Pergunnah 
 of Gundolee is made over to the banker as an advance of payment 
 on the part of Government." In 1823, the same officer reports a 
 conversation which he had with the Boondee minister : 
 
 " Having been induced," continued the Dubae (the minister), 
 " by your earnestness to declare so much, it is right that I should 
 lay aside all reserve." 
 
 '" He then stated that Seit Bahadur Mul had for a considerable 
 length of time enjoyed undisputed influence in the affairs of Boon- 
 dee ; that his annual profits were enormous, considering the com- 
 paratively small revenue of the state ; that the suppression of mal- 
 versation to be beneficial must be effectual, and that he dreaded to 
 come in contact with a person who by emissaries declared his 
 influence to be uncontrolled. Ignorant therefore as he was of the 
 actual footing on which I Avas with the Seit, he judged it the 
 wisest plan to allow an apparent want of energy and decision to 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 96 
 
 attest Ills inaptitiule for the duty confided to his trust. By tlie 
 iiitiuonce of such au opinion, added he, 1 lioped to effect my resig- 
 nation witliout giving unihrage to the Rana." 
 
 In January, 1830, the officiating political agent observes: " Major 
 Caulfeikl tlien proceeds to detail tiu3 manner in which he endea- 
 voured to obviate the impression, that it was his wish to support 
 Buhadur Mul ; and (Major Caulfeild) concludes by lamenting the 
 facility with which the minds of these people receive impressions 
 full of the most mischievous effects to the public interests and 
 tranquillity, the British character, and their own peace ; and the 
 difficulty of coming to the knowledge of an evil of so much magni- 
 tude as the supposed influence of interested native agents and others 
 of that class over the conduct of British officers employed in situa- 
 tions of high trust and confidence." 
 
 Mr. Trevelyan proceeds in his dispatch of 8th August, 1830 : 
 "Having made a large fortune out of the spoils of the Oudeepore 
 Rana, and of the Rao Raja of Boondee, Buhadur Mul took advan- 
 tage of the Raj Rana's difficulties, to play the same game at Kotah. 
 Owing to his immense Avealth, he was able to make advances as 
 they were required with a degree of facility of which the rest of the 
 bankers were quite incapable. The Raj Rana soon fell many lakhs of 
 rupees into arrears, and Buhadur Mul's influence then became predo- 
 minant. The assignments which had been made to some of the other 
 Saokars were stopped; nearly the whole revenue of the state was paid 
 in to Buhadur Mul's coffers, and all the current expences were furnish- 
 ed by him. But the main cause of the ascendancy which Buhadur 
 Mul had gained over the Raj Rana was the impression he enter- 
 tained, that Buhadur Mul possessed the support of the officers of 
 the British Government. They had made him what he was, and 
 the Raj Rana had always been accustomed to view him as a person 
 w ho possessed their confidence. He was in constant attendance at 
 the agency, and had often been employed as the medium of com- 
 munication with it. It must be well known to you that this predi- 
 cament, to Avhich the native Governments of India are so liable, is 
 one of the most miserable which can befal an independant state. 
 The government falling into the hands of merchants and bankers 
 becomes a matter of traffic and individual profit. If grain or any 
 kind of stores or equipment were required, Buhadur Mul furnished 
 them at an inuuense profit to himself. If orders for the pay of the 
 troops and the rest of the establishments were taken to him to be 
 cashed, he previously deducted a portion for himself, or gave the 
 applicants a nominal equivalent in grain, which fetched a value in 
 the market far below what was really due to them. If a civil officer 
 was to be appointed, a large douceur must first be given to Buha- 
 dur Mul. The officers of the state were supported by him in every 
 kind of malversation, upon an understanding that they were to take 
 no notice of his own peculations-; and last of all, to support this 
 lucrative traffic, and this preponderating influence, he took care to 
 keep the Raj Rana in arrears to himself by continual advances, and 
 
06 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 by an accumulation of profit and interest. In short, the state of 
 affairs had become as bad at Kotah, as it ever was at Oudeepore 
 and Boondce. But this is not all. Having no interest in the state, 
 except so far as he could turn it to his individual profit, Buhadur 
 Mul prevailed upon the Raj liana to have recourse to a measure, 
 which though common in most other native states, had never been 
 resortetl to at Kotah, during the whole of the long administration 
 of Zalim Singh, nor upon any former occasion l)y his successor the 
 present administrator. The person who had charge of this depart- 
 ment was a creature of his own, and Buhadur Mul himself fixed 
 upon the people from whom the fines were to be levied, and settled 
 their amount. The natural consequence of this was, that he received 
 on his own account large sums of money in consideration of a lenient 
 assessment, or to let off part of what had been already assessed ; 
 and when the Raj Rana, soon after my arrival at Kotah, came to 
 take an account of what he had realized from their oppressive ex- 
 actions, he was astonished at the smallness of the amount, and 
 bitterly repented that he had ruined his reputation as a mild and 
 considerate ruler, for so small a consideration. Buhadur Mul had 
 given the Raj Rana to understand, that these exactions would enable 
 him to pay off his debt. But the truth is, that the real power of 
 the state was vested in Buhadur Mul, and the Raj Rana was only 
 an instrument in his hands. The Raj Rana is of a kind, timid dis- 
 position, and he would never have had recourse to such atrocious 
 proceedings, if he had not been under the control of an ascendant 
 influence. This Avas the state of affairs at Kotah, in April, 1830. 
 All the real objects of Government had been lost sight of, and it 
 had been converted into a source of profit in the hands of a banker. 
 The people Avere subject to the most grinding and oppressive ex- 
 actions, and the evil was becoming evei-y day more inveterate, as 
 the Raj Rana became more involved with Buhadur Mul, and con- 
 sequently more a cypher in his hands." 
 
 The Raj Rana, on being urged by the political agent to reduce 
 his disbursements within the limits of his receipts, said that both 
 receipts and disbursements Avere in the hands of Buhadur INIul, and 
 AvhatCA'er effort Avas made to reduce the one and increase the other, 
 he always found that at the end of the year, from the accumulation 
 of interest and profit which Buhadur Mul continued to heap upon 
 him, he Avas more involved than ever. 
 
 If eAcr there Avas an occasion in Avhich it Avas alloAvable for a 
 political agent to mterfere, to save the native state from the CA'ils 
 Avhich our opium monopoly and our friend the banker had brought 
 on it, the occasion had arriAxd at Kotah, and Mr. Trevelyan did 
 interfere effectually. The revenue of a tract of country, Avhich it 
 Avas calculated Avould in fiA^e or six years pay off the debts of the 
 state, Avas set aside for that pin-pose. All further dealings Avith 
 Buhadur Mul ceased. The Raj liana gave orders for the recal of 
 the persons who had been deputed to collect the additional cess 
 and fines, and that the measure should be discontinued. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 97 
 
 There is not perhaps in the whole range of our political transac- 
 tions in India, any thing more remarkable than the rise of a person 
 from the condition of an agent of a banking establishment at Jey- 
 pore, to become, in the course of ten or twelve years, the instru- 
 ment of governing three of the principal states in Rajpootana. In 
 all of them his measures were nearly the same, attended with 
 consequences equally baneful to the people and the reputation of our 
 officers and Government. It is remarkable enougli that in 1823, a 
 banker was recommended on some account to the notice of the Haj 
 liana Zalim Singh, by the })olitical agent at Kotah. That old and 
 crafty politician immediately saw the danger of encouraging, at 
 Kotah, an influence which had been so conspicuous at Oudeepore, 
 received the banker badly, and hinted at expelling from his domi- 
 nions a person who needed the introduction of a foreign party. 
 The political agent, who did not understand the object of either the 
 banker or the governor, was astonished at this uncourteous recep- 
 tion of the person who was the bearer of a letter from him to Zalim 
 Singh, and made his ingratitude the subject of a disjjatch to Go- 
 vernment. 
 
 There is nothing that more requires discretion on the part of our 
 political officers than their dealings Avith money-lenders, or the 
 countenance or support of such characters at native courts. They 
 never fail to take advantage of it, and to turn it to the worst of 
 purposes. The raonied interests of India do not in their fair dealings 
 need our support ; for they are generally sufficiently powerful, and 
 exercise without it, for good or for evil, as great an influence over 
 the Governments of India, as in any other part of the world. 
 
 Wherever in addition to its own natural influence, this predo- 
 minant power has had the support of our Government or officers, 
 whether in the Carnatic, at Hyderabad, Aurungabad, Baroda, or 
 in Rajpootana, it has been exercised in a manner most injurious to 
 the native Government and its subjects : and to the reputation of 
 our Government and its officers. We cannot touch this influence 
 without the danger of being defiled. We may support a bad 
 minister, and have often done so for political advantages to our- 
 selves. But we cannot support the usurious aud grasping specula- 
 tions of the loan contractors of India, without raising them into 
 political influence, and without gaining the reputation of being 
 ourselves governed hy sordid and unworthy motives. 
 
 7. Ulwur and Machery. — This principality is generally under- 
 stood to be composed of usurpations from Jeypore, conquests from 
 Bhurtpore. and cessions from the British Government. Ulwur 
 having been usurped from the former some fifty or sixty years ago ; 
 Machery conquered fi-om the latter at a later period. These two 
 possessions amount to about nine lakhs a year. Tijara and other 
 pergunnahs were ceded to Ulwur by the British Government at the 
 termination of the fii'st Mahratta war, and yield a like sum. 
 
 Ahmed Buksh Khan, since better known as the chief of Feroze- 
 pore, joined the army of Lord Lake as the Wukeel of the Rao 
 
 o 
 
98 INTERNAL RELATIONS'. 
 
 Raja, on its first appearance in that quarter, " and is now by the 
 bounty of the British Government the independent lord of a con- 
 siderable territory." He has since exercised great influence in the 
 affairs of Uhvur, as will hereafter appear. 
 
 The first and only treaty with Ulwur is dated the 14th of No- 
 vember, 1803. Although differing in some respects from those of 
 a later period, it is not so much so as to exclude that state from 
 taking its place amongst this class of treaties. It is offensive and 
 defensive. The state is not subject to tribute : independent in its 
 internal administration : and its troops are to aid those of the Bri- 
 tish Government. 
 
 Being in a comparatively inferior condition to either the princi- 
 palities of Jeypore or Bhurtpore, the Rao Raja clung for support to 
 the British Government, when the friendship of the former state 
 became doubtful, and the latter was our enemy. 
 
 In 1812, the Rao Raja, in continuance of his former system of 
 usurpation, got possession of two forts and the territory subordi- 
 nate to them, belonging to Jeypore. He resisted through that and 
 the following year all the persuasions of the resident at Dehlee to 
 relinquish those possessions. He was told that his conduct was in 
 violation of the terms of his engagements with us, and that it 
 would be sure to bring down upon him the displeasure of the Bri- 
 tish Government. He had however so long remained in security, 
 that he had forgotten the danger of involving himself with his 
 neighbours, and thought the British Government would not arm 
 against him in support of the interests of Jeypore. He was, too, 
 supposed to have collected a treasure of nearly half a million stir- 
 ling. It became a question whether in this state of affairs, we 
 should withdraw from the terms of our alliance with the Rao Raja, 
 and allow Jeypore to avenge its own wrongs, bringing on Ulwur 
 all the evils of an invasion from the forces of that state, those of 
 Ameer Khan, Mahommed Shah Khan, and other leaders of preda- 
 tory bands, which swarmed in its neighbourhood ; or whether we 
 should ourselves assemble an army to punish the Rao Raja. In the 
 latter case, it was proposed to direct the army on his capital, and 
 if necessary, to subvert the Government. The latter measure was 
 eventually adopted, and although the army was assembled at Re- 
 waree, in the immediate neighbourhood of Ulwur, the Rao Raja 
 allowed our military preparations to proceed, and the force to 
 advance to within a march of his capital, before he agreed to the 
 terms requii'ed of him, Avhich were only the restoration of the 
 places usurped from his neighbour, our ally, and the jjayment of 
 our expences. 
 
 In 1815, the Rao Raja died, and a diffei'cnce arose as to the 
 succession ; one party in the state supporting the pretensions of a 
 nephew, and another those of an illegitimate son : eventually the 
 parties came to a compromise by deciding, that the nephew should 
 be raised to the dignity of Rao Raja, the son possessing the power 
 and resources of the state. The nephew was then nine, and the 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 9.0 
 
 son ciglit years of age ; and it is probable that their friends did not 
 calculate on both ever attaining years of maturity, uhen so pre- 
 posterous an arrangement couUl not last. Nawab Alimed Buksh 
 Khan was left the guardian of the illegitimate son, and produced 
 some papers by which it appeared that a general superintendance 
 over the affairs of the principality had been entrusted to him by his 
 friend the Rao Raja. 
 
 In the exercise of these powers, Ahmed Buksli Khan rendered 
 himself obnoxious to the nephew and his adherents, and his assassi- 
 nation having been attempted in 182i, when he was dangerously 
 wounded, whilst on a visit to the resident at Dehlee, and living 
 near his country residence at that city, and consecpiently within the 
 British territory, suspicion immediately fixed ou the Ulwur party. 
 
 The measure had here, as in some other places, been resorted to 
 of requiring the remov^al from the Rao Raja's (the nephew's) pre- 
 sence and council of certain obnoxious persons, who were suppos- 
 ed to be evil counsellors ; and as Ahmed Buksh Khan was the 
 friend and guest of the resident, he was naturally enough supposed 
 to influence this measure. It was these persons who were now 
 charged with instigating his assassination. 
 
 The assassin having been apprehended, and there being sufficient 
 evidence to implicate certain persons at the court of Ulwur of 
 instigating the assassination, the Ulwur Government was required 
 by the resident to send those persons for trial to Dehlee, which 
 summons that Government continued to I'esist, and eventually the 
 measure of the resident was deemed objectionable by his own 
 Government. 
 
 It was not until after the fall of Bhurtpore and the advance of 
 the ax'my under the Commander-in-Chief towards Ulwur, that the 
 suspected persons were sent to camp. 
 
 On the proceedings in a formal inquiry held by the resident at 
 Dehlee, it was declared by Government, " that whilst sufficient evi- 
 dence is not forthcoming to convict any of the accused, and to 
 warrant our demanding their punishment, very strong suspicion of 
 guilt continues to attach to the two principals, Mulla and Nund 
 Lai, and their supposed accomplices, Jehoz and Khooshal." " The 
 Governor General in Council trusts that Rao Raja Benne Singh 
 will not for his own credit and that of his Government deem it 
 fitting to employ hereafter, in any public capacity, persons who 
 have rendered themselves justly obnoxious to the suspicion of so 
 foul a crime as that of incitement to assassination." 
 
 A provision was forced on the Ulwur Government for the illegi- 
 timate son, and his heirs in perpetuity, but not to descend to adopt- 
 ed children, and failing heirs, to revert to the state, being an equi- 
 valent, half in territory and half in money, to the amount of four 
 lakhs of rupees per annum, for a portion of those districts formerly 
 granted to his father by the British Government. 
 
 The Rao Raja continued to employ the obnoxious persons in the 
 highest offices of the state. In 1826, the resident at Dehlee 
 
 2 o 
 
100 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 declined on this account to visit the Rao Raja of Uhvur, as he 
 had done the other chiefs of Rajpootana, and in the following year 
 the Governor General would not receive a deputation from that 
 principality on that account. 
 
 The British Government was very unnecessarily drawn into this 
 most unsatisfactory affair. It had nothing to do with the preposter- 
 ous arrangement of 1815, although it is probable that the son's 
 adherents made very undue use of the influence which they were 
 unjustly believed to possess, to bring about that arrangement. It 
 was impossible that the illegitimate son should have become Rao 
 Raja, and it would have required more influence than the Mahom- 
 medan party at Ulwur should have expected to be able to exercise, 
 to maintain him in the position of administrator, in opposition to 
 the legitimate prince and the chiefs of the state. The power of 
 this foreign party at Ulwur, throughout this proceeding, is there- 
 fore not a little remarkable. It was exercised for a period of years, 
 and arose entirely from the influence which that party was suppos- 
 ed to possess at the Dehlee residency, or at the presidency, without 
 its really having such influence, or without the authorities of our 
 Government knowing that it professed to possess it. Yet that 
 influence must have been very great, else the chiefs of Ulwur 
 could have had no difficulty in setting aside the illegitimate son of 
 the Rao Raja, who in reality was entitled to nothing beyond a 
 subsistence. The attempt to assassinate his guardian friend, for the 
 part which he aspired to exercise in the internal affairs of the state, 
 was sufficiently infamous, and seems to belong to a former period, 
 but the instigators of the attempt unfortunately escaped with im- 
 punity. 
 
 The Rao Raja, in the beginning of 1828, afforded such explana- 
 tion with respect to the non-employment of the obnoxious persons, 
 as induced the Governor General to renew with him the usual 
 complimentary correspondence. Whilst residing at Dehlee the 
 odious favorite of the Rao Raja, MuUa Khowas, was seized by the 
 resident, and sent in March, 1828, a state prisoner to the Fort of 
 Hansi, apparently more to put an end to the communication whicli 
 he was holding by letter with his master, than for any other pur- 
 pose. The measure was of course disapproved by Government, 
 and his release ordered. He proceeded to Ulwur, and towards the 
 end of the year, the chiefs of the state combined to put an end to 
 the system of favoritism. MuUa lost his life, and that legitimate 
 power was asserted for the correction of abuses in the Government, 
 which, although more sanguinary in India than in most other coun- 
 tries, is not on that account the less efficacious. 
 
 In 1831, a negotiation was discovered between the courts of 
 Ulwur and Jeypore, originating with the former, the object of 
 which was to obtain a dress of investiture from the latter, in recog- 
 nition of that fealty which it had formerly acknowledged, and for 
 which it was prepared to pay a considerable sum of money. The 
 thing, although in breach of engagements with us, Mas considei-ed 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 101 
 
 unimportant. But it is rcmarkablo, that a state, independent 
 through its rohitions with us, of all others, shoukl voluntarily do 
 homage to a neighbour but little superior to itself. 
 
 An aggravated case of border dispute, between Ulwur and the 
 territory of Ferozepore, in which the former failed to atf'ord that 
 redress to the latter which Avas decided by the British Governnient 
 to be due to it, led to the imposing of a tine as indemnity : and to 
 the threat of employing a detachment of British troops to enforce 
 the decision, should redress be further withheld, which of course 
 produced the desired effect. 
 
 8. Beekaxeer is a junior branch of the Joudpore house. Our 
 first treaty with this small state is dated the 9th of March, 1818, 
 and is the same in substance as the other treaties of this period, 
 and region. It had ten years before applied for our assistance, 
 when its territories were invaded by Joudpore and other states, as 
 a punishment for the interference of its chief in the dispute between 
 Joudpore and Oudeepore, in their contest for the hand of a daugh- 
 ter of the latter house. At that period its revenues were estimat- 
 ed at only five lakhs of rupees, but its military establishments, 
 which are maintained chiefly by assignments on land, consisted of 
 2,000 horse, 8,000 foot, wdth thii^^'-five pieces of artillery. 
 
 No tribute had been paid by this state to the Mahrattas, nor 
 was any required by us. Its position on the verge of the desert, 
 and the nature of its soil and produce, were suflicient protection 
 against the incui'sions of even Mahratta Cavalry ; for water is 2 
 or 300 feet below the surface. The principal obligations imposed 
 on it were those of rendering secure the roads through its domi- 
 nions for merchandize passing from Caubul and Khorasan to India, 
 and the restoration of plundered property ; both of which obliga- 
 tions have been faithfully fulfilled. 
 
 Those incurred by the British Government, besides what were 
 in common to all other states, Avere to reduce to subjection the 
 Thakoors and other inhabitants of the principality, who had 
 revolted and thrown off the Raja's authority, he paying the 
 expense of the force thus employed. A detachment of troops 
 was accordingly employed for this purpose, in the end of the same 
 year, under the command of Brigadier Arnold, and the Raja's 
 authority A\as established throughout his dominions. No opposi- 
 tion was offered to our troops, but some difficulty was experienced 
 from the scarcity of water. It was soon found necessary to send 
 back the Cavalry. The water which the inhabitants collect in 
 reservoirs for the consumption of the year, was very soon exhaust- 
 ed by our troops, and they were left without their usual supply. 
 
 From the situation of Beekaneer, we seem to have been less led 
 into discussions of any kind with that state, than with almost any 
 other state under our protection. Boundary disputes between the 
 officers of the British Government in the Hissar district, and those 
 of our friend of Beekaneer, wei*e the only cases into Avhich we 
 were led. 
 
102 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 There had for some years been a disposition on the part of some 
 of the subjects of Beekaneer to appeal to the political agent at 
 Ajmere, against some exactions or intended exactions on the part 
 of the Raja ; and their appeal was in some degree attended to. 
 At last, in 1827, the Raja invited the political agent to proceed to 
 his capital, apparently for the purpose of inquiring into the nature 
 of these demands ; a compliance with which request was of course 
 foreign to the nature of our policy at that period. 
 
 In 1828, a settlement of long existing boundary differences 
 between the Beekaneer and the British territory was effected, after 
 a long and patient investigation into the nature of the claims, by 
 an officer deputed for the purpose from Dehlee, met by commis- 
 sioners on the part of the Beekaneer Government. In the same 
 year the Raja died, and was succeeded by his son Kour Ruttun Singh. 
 
 In consequence of some attack made by persons from Jessulmere 
 on the Beekaneer territory, in revenge of former injuries, or sup- 
 posed injuries sustained by the latter, through subjects or servants 
 of the former, the Beekaneer Government, assisted by the chief of 
 Pokurn, a feudatory of Joudpore, proceeded, in 1829, to invade 
 the territory of Jessulmere, and carried its operations to the gates 
 of his capital. This was in breach of treaty with the British 
 Government, and their military operations wei'e calculated to 
 involve the peace of Rajpootana. Jessulmere prepared an army 
 to resent the injury, and the armies of Joudpore and Jeypore 
 assembled on their respective frontiers ; whilst the belligerent 
 powers were drawing reinforcements of men from Scind and 
 Bahawulpore, and engaging the several states in their cause. 
 The British Government, to stay further proceedings, required the 
 Jessulmere state to make reparation for the injury done in the 
 first instance to its neighbour, and Beekaneer to repair to Jessul- 
 mere the injury inflicted during the war. We were saved the 
 necessity of entering on a mediation of their differences by the 
 Maha Rana of Oudeepore, who was brother-in-law to both parties, 
 and who undertook the office. It appeared, in the course of the 
 discussion, that the Beekaneer Raja had intimated to the British 
 authorities his intention to take into his own hands the punishment 
 of the Jessulmere aggressions on his territory ; and he afterwards 
 stated, " Had I received a prohibitory reply, the troops had not been 
 sent to Jessulmere, but now you write that it is contrary to treaty." 
 
 The seventh article of the treaty with Beekaneer stipulates : 
 
 " The British Government, on the application of the Maha Raja, 
 will reduce to subjection the Thakoors and other inhabitants of 
 his pi'incipality, who have revolted and thrown off his authority." 
 
 A misapprehension of the obligations thus incurred led the offi- 
 ciating resident at Dehlee, in the end of 1830, to order a brigade 
 of our troops to support from Nusseerabad, the authority of the 
 Maha Raja against some revolted Thakoors. The principal of 
 them. Byre Saul, had found refuge in Bahawulpore. The resident 
 required the Nawab to seize the offender and send him back to 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 103 
 
 Beekanecr. The latter of course objected ; stating that it was alto- 
 gether unusual between him and his neighbour of Beokaneer to 
 expect from one another the surrender of fugitive criminals : — l)ut 
 that in consideration of the shocking atrocities attributed to Byre 
 Saul, he had expelled that otfender from his dominions. The chiefs 
 of Jeypore, Joudpore, and Jessulmere were suspected of either aiding 
 or designing to aid the Beekanecr rebels, and were requii-ed by the 
 resident to desist from this coui'se. 
 
 Some delay occurred in the march of the trooj^s, at so late a 
 period of the sea.-^on, into so inhospitable a region ; but considerable 
 expenditure was involved in the resident's resolution, who was 
 reminded that it had been laid down as a principle of action by 
 the authorities in England, that the military aid of the British 
 Government shall never be afforded to a native state in alliance 
 with us, for the suppression of insurrections, or for internal pur- 
 poses of any kind, except under the specific authority of the Go- 
 vernment. On the present occasion, the Governor General saw no 
 occasion for any British troops to move from either Nusseerabad 
 or Neemuch. 
 
 The merits of the dispute between the prince of Beekaneer and 
 liis nobles was either not sufficiently vmderstood or not reported. 
 The officiating resident considered that the simple measure of pre- 
 paring our troops to march, to espouse the cause of the fonuer, was 
 productive of good in driving the revolted nobles either to fly the 
 country or to retui'n to their allegiance. 
 
 On the visit of the Governor General to Rajpootana, Beekaneer, 
 with other states, gave in a statement of its demands, either against 
 us or others. But like those of the other states, it contained nothing 
 requiring our intei'position, further than the adjustment of boun- 
 dary differences, and questions of trifling aggression, which, from 
 the absence of any general controlling authority in Rajpootana, 
 had too long remained unnoticed and unadjusted. These will rea- 
 dily yield to the exercise of judicious authority, by the political 
 agent who has now been established at the central position of Aj- 
 mere : he will immediately know of the aggression of any one state on 
 its neighbour, and possesses power either to prevent such aggressions, 
 or to compel those guilty of them to afford timely redress. The 
 conditions by which these states are bound to abstain from politi- 
 cal relations with one another, may he supposed to render such 
 differences of more frequent occurrence, and of more difficult adjust- 
 ment to them and to vis, than if they maintained their original rela- 
 tions uncontrolled. It should perhaps be the object of our Govern- 
 ment to encourage the adjustment of such diffei'cnces, either by 
 themselves or through the arbitration of some friendly neighbour- 
 ing state — there is no danger that such intercourse would lead to 
 combination against us. There is at present no object for such 
 combination, nor is there any united interest amongst them which 
 would lead to it. When the time for it arrives we shall very soon 
 discover that their ti'eaties with us will be a very slender bar to the 
 
104 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 fulfilment of their purposes, and that all the measures which we can 
 adopt will be inftectual towards preventing their holding clandes- 
 tine negotiation with one another. 
 
 In July, 1832, the political agent reported that the chief of Bee- 
 kaneer had, during the past year, paid very little attention to the 
 advice of the resident at Dehlee. That he had not deputed an 
 agent to Ajmere, although he talked of complying with the Gover- 
 nor General's wishes for so doing, but on that point showed an 
 evident reluctance. His dissatisfaction arose appai'ently from an 
 objection taken by the British Government to his assuming a title 
 which he had obtained through his Wukeel at Dehlee from the King, 
 without having the sanction of the British Government for entering 
 on the negotiation with His Majesty. 
 
 9. Jessulmere Our first treaty with this state is dated the 
 
 12th of Decembei', 1818. It had paid no tribute to the Mahrattas, 
 from whose encroachment its desert position was its protection ; nor 
 did we require any. The treaty provides, that the posterity of the 
 Maha Rawul shall succeed to the principality ; and that in case of 
 serious invasion, directed to the overthrow of the principality, or 
 other danger of great magnitude, the British Government will exert 
 its power for the protection of the state, provided that the cause of 
 the quarrel be not ascribed to the Rawul. He is always to act in 
 subordinate co-operation with the British Government, and with 
 submission to its supremacy. 
 
 In 1820, Jessulmere was described by the political agent to be 
 groaning under the oppression of the minister, Salim Singh Mehta, 
 whose atrocities were unparalleled — the father and grand-father of 
 the present prince had been put to death by him, and the city was 
 depopulated through his cruelty and oppression. The commerce of 
 the country beyond the Indus was described as being interrupted, 
 because the caravans were plundered in the Jessulmere country, in 
 the plunder of which the minister participated, the Maha Rawul 
 being a mere puppet in the hands of the minister. 
 
 In 1821, the Maldotes, a tribe of desert plunderers, subject to 
 Jessulmei'e, made an incursion into Beekaneer, to revenge which, 
 the army of the latter state was sent to invade the territory of the 
 former, and a civil war was likely to arise between the two coun- 
 tries ; the Khosas, another ti'ibe of professional plundei-ers subject 
 chiefly to Joudpore, having been dismissed by that state and Jessul- 
 mere, joined and strengthened the Maldotes, who were accustomed 
 to commit depredations in Bahawulpore, Joudpore, and Beekaneer. 
 
 Up to 1823, the Rawul continued to urge his claims to certain 
 territory in the possession of other chiefs, and proposed a visit to 
 Calcutta, for the purpose of urging those claims. He was then 
 distinctly informed, that it was impossible consistently with the 
 engagement subsisting with other states, to attend to his claims to 
 territories in their possession. 
 
 In 1824, an attempt was made to assassinate the minister Salim 
 Singh, who was so strongly persuaded that the assassin was insti- 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 105 
 
 gated by his sovereign, that lie sent his family to the fort of Kish- 
 eiigurli, Ills Jageer. Both the Rawiil and the Ranee failed to satisfy 
 his mind that they were innocent of instigating the attempt on his 
 life. But his apprehensions were only allayed by the intervention 
 of some Charuns, who became security for the safety of himself and 
 his family. 
 
 On the death of the minister, in the same year, his eldest son 
 was appointed to the vacant office, in conjunction with a younger 
 son, by a different mother, the favorite wife of the late minister. 
 The eldest son discovering or pretending to discover a criminal 
 connexion between the widow and her confidential servant, put both 
 to death ; on which account he was placed in confinement by his 
 Prince. The chiefs of the state, and even the Prince's body-guard, 
 were disposed to support the elder son of the late ministei-, whom 
 they soon expected to see in place and power ; they believed too that 
 this hereditary succession would have the support of the British 
 Government. In this state of things, the Rawul appealed to our 
 authority, and an agent Avas deputed to Jessulmere. When it was 
 discovered at court that we did not mean to interfere with the 
 legitimate authority of the Prince, in the appointment or punish- 
 ment of his minister, all parties returned to their allegiance, and 
 the power of the Prince was then found to be sufficient for the 
 ordinary administration of his affairs. 
 
 He was in his 23rd year, and assumed the personal administration. 
 His measures were of that just and conciliatory nature as to render 
 him popular with his people. This did not fail to excite the appre- 
 hension and counteraction of the nobles, who in this, as the other 
 states of Rajpootana, are feudatory ; and whose power depends on 
 the weakness of their sovereign. That struggle accordingly arose 
 between them which we have so often seen maintained for similar 
 purposes in higher places. 
 
 In 1826, the Rawul represented, that he sustained a loss in his 
 transit duties thi'ough our opium arrangements, and expected to be 
 indemnified in the same manner as Oudeepore and Kotah had been. 
 He Avas told however that the compensation paid to those states 
 was in exchange for advantages yielded by them to us with detri- 
 ment to themselves. That he had not ceded any advantages to us, 
 nor deprived himself of any within his power; that our opium 
 monopoly could have no result beyond the effect which arrange- 
 ments in one country may often produce in another, by shutting up 
 the channels of trade ; and that our opium monopoly arrangements 
 were not enforced in any state of Rajpootana, with the exception of 
 those with which we have treaties on that subject. 
 
 The invasion of the territoi-ies of Jessulmere, in 1829, by the 
 army of Beekaneer, in violation of the treaty with us, has already 
 been described in the sketch on our political relations with that state 
 
 In 18S2, the Rawul renewed his complaints of aggressions on the 
 part of his neighbour of Beekaneer, and in handing up the represen- 
 tation to Government, the agent observed, that the Beekaneer chief 
 
106 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 seemed entirely to have forgotten the obligation under which he 
 was to abstain from plundering or molesting his neighbours, and 
 to cause the restoration of plunckn-ed property. 
 
 10. KiSHENGURH is a branch from the Joudpore principality. 
 
 The treaty with Kishengurh is dated the 20th of March, 1818, 
 and does not differ in any thing from other treaties of the same 
 period. It pays no tribute to the British Government. 
 
 Malia Raja KuUian Singh of Kishengvirh, whose eccentricities 
 have often led to the belief that he is not of sane mind, left his 
 capital in 1825, and came to Dehlee, apparently for the purpose of 
 representing to the resident his fears lest the political authorities 
 of the British Government should meddle with his internal admi- 
 nistration. He was easily convinced that there was no such inten- 
 tion, and returned to his capital. He had at this time most pro- 
 bably some intention of making certain encroachments on the 
 privileges of the chiefs of his country, for shortly after he sent 
 troops to attack the possessions of two of the principal of them, 
 proceeding at the time of the conflict himself to Dehlee. The chiefs 
 were as usual believed to be supported in their opposition to their 
 Prince by the Jeypore or Joudpore Rajas, or the feudatories of 
 those states. The effects of the war were soon felt in the neigh- 
 bouring district of Ajmere, where either or both parties committed 
 depredations, and the Maha Raja was told that the British Go- 
 vernment would look to him, for the conduct, not only of his own 
 troops but the troops of his chiefs, he being alike answerable for all. 
 
 The INIaha Raja returned from Dehlee with certain raw levies, 
 assembled the other chiefs of the state, and made some marches 
 towards the seat of war. But he soon found that it was not the 
 interest of his nobles to assist him in his encroachments on tliose of 
 their order ; they accordingly deserted his cause, and endeavoux-ed 
 to take possession of his OAvn capital for the avowed purpose of 
 deposing him, and setting up his infant son. The Raja fled to 
 Ajmere, referred his differences with his chiefs to the arbitration 
 of the British Government, and offered the farm of his country for 
 12 years. Previously to entering on this contest himself, the 
 Maiia Raja had appealed to his brother-in-law of Boondee, as one 
 of the rebellious chiefs had, to his relation the chief of Kotah, for 
 aid, which was in violation of the terms of his treaty with the 
 British Government. 
 
 The chiefs of Kishengurh also proceeded to Ajmere, and all parties 
 were agreed to leave the adjustment of their ditterences to the Joud- 
 pore Raja, provided that his decision received the guarantee of the 
 British Government, which was refused. The Jageerdars agreed on 
 the restitution of their own rights to march against the two princi- 
 pal chiefs who had first taken up arms, if those chiefs refused to per- 
 form the usual duties which devohed on them from time immemorial. 
 The principal objection of all the feudatories seemed to be the 
 Raja's wish to effect a commutation of personal services for a 
 money payment, which money payment they very well understood 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 107 
 
 would strongtlicn tho Prince's niraiis of arming against Ihcm, whilst 
 it would have tho cttect of disarming thcmsolves. Tho chiofs pro- 
 ceeded to take possession of the principal places of the Kishcngurh 
 state in the name of the son and heir-apparent without committing 
 anj' excesses ; but travellers and merchandise fared otherwise, and 
 the communications through this princij)ality were entirely cut off. 
 It became evident that the Raja either had not the disposition or 
 the m(>ans to settle these differences, and it was considered inexpedi- 
 ent that he should any longer remain at Ajmore in the immediate 
 vicinity of his own disturbed country. On his failing to come to 
 a settlement with his chiefs, he was to be informed that it was 
 desirable that he should remove to a greater distance from the 
 scene of contest, or on his failing to do so, the political agent at 
 Ajmere was to cease to hold any further communication with him 
 except on the terms of mediation before authorized. 
 
 After the chiefs of the Kishengurh principality had laid siege to 
 the capital, and it was in danger of falling into their hands, the 
 Prince thought it high time to come to terms with them ; and the 
 terms entered into by the parties are remarkable, as showing the 
 position in which these Rajpoot feudatories stand towards their 
 sovereign. 
 
 1. Whenever the Maha Raja shall restore us, as heretofore, to 
 the forts and cities, we Avill desist from the siege of Kishengurh, 
 and restore to the Maha Raja all places seized and now held by us. 
 
 2. Whenever Ave may be restored to our rights and privileges, 
 as handed down to us, or settled by Mr. Cavendish, we will pro- 
 tect the principality from all internal and foreign enemies, in due 
 obedience to the Maha Raja's orders. 
 
 3. Whatever croAvn villages, lands, &c. may be now held by us, 
 or by all persons acting in concert M'ith us, we agree to restore 
 and cause to be restored to the Maha Raja. 
 
 11. To be obedient and faithful, and to serve whenever direct- 
 ed, as in times past, on receiving the usual additional pay. 
 
 13. No one to enter the city or fort of Kishengurh until permit- 
 ed by the Maha Raja, on condition that he neither destroys their 
 houses nor possessions. 
 
 14. No one to interfere in the expenditure of the Maha Raja. 
 16. Binds them to carry into execution the orders of the Maha 
 
 Raja when consulted, as heretofore, according to the customs of 
 the Jeypore, Joudpore and Kishengurh courts. 
 
 1. The Maha Raja binds himself to permit the Jageerdars and 
 Rajpoots to reside, as heretofore in the cities and forts, with the ex- 
 ception of the town and fort of Kishengurh. 
 
 2. The INIaha Raja neither to resume, distrain, destroy, nor 
 give away their houses and possessions. 
 
 3. The Maha Raja to discharge all his foreign troops, excepting 
 nine hundred. 
 
 4. The Maha Raja to pardon all concerned in the late distur- 
 bances. 
 
 p 2 
 
108 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 6. The Malia Raja to consult on state affairs, as heretofore, the 
 four counseUors called Misl, as is the custom at the Jeypore, 
 Joudpore, and Oudeepore courts. 
 
 Shortly after the settlement of these terms, the Raja left Kislien- 
 gurh. He was urged to return to his own principality, and it was 
 resolved, if he did not do so, to consider the authorities exercising 
 the functions of Government at Kishengurh as the Regencj^ the 
 principal of Avhom was understood to be the Ranee Mother of the 
 Raja. 
 
 The Raja did return to Kishengurh, but never came to any cor- 
 dial understanding with the chiefs of the state, and eventually in 
 May, 1 832, abdicated in favor of his son, and retired to the British 
 territories, at a distance from Kishengurh, on the small allowance 
 of thirty-six thousand rupees per annum. 
 
 11. Banswara. — In 1812, the Rawul of this principality sent an 
 agent to Baroda with the draft of a treaty. He engaged to pay 
 six annas per rupee, for the aid of the British Government, to ex- 
 pel from his territories the armies of Scindia, Holkar, and the 
 Powar. The resident at Baroda referred the envoy to Dehlee for the 
 negotiation of these terms. He was accordingly accredited to 
 Dehlee by his master, and five years afterwards, on the same creden- 
 tials, concluded a treaty there, which Avas afterwards ratified by his 
 principal. 
 
 In November, 1818, the RaAvul denied his obligations to abide by 
 these terms, and although they were at the time declared to be 
 binding on him, it was deemed best to negotiate a new treaty, 
 which was accordingly done on the 25th of December, 1818. 
 
 He agrees to pay the tribute formerly levied by the Dhar Govern- 
 ment from him, with arrears. He further agrees to pay whatever 
 tribute the British Government may deem adequate to cover the 
 expense, which it incurs in his protection, provided that does not 
 exceed three-eighths of the revenue of th^ country. This treaty 
 differs from most others of that period in this, that we agree to 
 aft'ord the Maha Rawul aid in bringing his connexions or relations 
 who may prove disobedient under control. 
 
 In 1819, all demands for arrears of tribute on Banswara were 
 limited to 35,000 rupees. The tribute of the fii'st year was fixed 
 at 7,000, the second at 20,000, the third at 25,000. The revenues 
 of the state Avere described to be only one lakh ; those of the nobles 
 a like sum. 
 
 In 1825, the revenue had reached 300,000, and, as described by the 
 political agent, would have been much greater, but for the vices and 
 misconduct of the Rawul and his favorite minister, whose proceed- 
 ings had been generally very unsatisfactory, " marked not only by 
 much inattention to the admonitions of superior authority, but by 
 neglect of the best interests of their country." The political agent 
 found it difficult to say, whether Prince or minister Mas most unwor- 
 thy. The tribute paid to us, in 1824', Avas 33,000 rupees; that fixed 
 for 1825, 34,000; and for 1826, 35,000, which was the amount paid 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 109 
 
 to the ^lahrattas in the days of Banswara's prosperity. No increase 
 ■was to take place till 1832, when our six annas claim was to com- 
 mence. This territory has enjoyed much internal tranquillity since 
 the suppression in 1824? of the tribes of Bhecls and other plunder- 
 ers, who infested the country from the heights of Rangah. The 
 tributary Thakoors are 33 in number, and their forces, with those 
 of the state, 300 horse and 1000 foot. 
 
 In 1829, the political agent. Captain Sjiears, proceeded to Bans- 
 wara, and whilst there, in pursuance of the orders of Government, 
 discharged the police posts which had been estahlished in that 
 country. The Jumadar of these posts was found to have exercised 
 the same sort of authority as persons similarly situated did lately 
 in Chota Nagpore. lie received a yearly salary of 250 rupees 
 from the Kaja, and held a village worth 2.50 or 300 rupees a year 
 in Jagcei', and is described by one of our ablest residents to have 
 been in " a state little infei'ior to that of the ruler of Banswara." 
 Tliese advantages naturally terminated Avith his loss of office. 
 He incessantly importuned Captain Sjiears to intercede Avith the 
 Raja in his behalf, and Captain Spears' resolution not to interfere 
 determined this wretch to poison that officer, in the hope, that his 
 successor might be more compliant. Poison Avas accordingly 
 administered by a JNIahomedan serA^ant of the Brahmin Jumadar, 
 from the effects of Avhieh Captain Spears died. There Avas no 
 doubt of their guilt, though the evidence Avas only circumstantial; 
 and both Avere sentenced to transportation for life, but the princi- 
 pal unfortunately escaped on his Avay to Bombay. 
 
 In 1831, the tribute Avas again fixed for a period of five years, 
 at 25,000 ru])ees, M'hich is much less than the three-eighth share, 
 to Avhich the British Government is entitled, Avould give. 
 
 12. PuRTABGURH is a junior branch of the Oudeepore house. 
 It pays a tribute of 72,700 rupees. The treaty Avith this state 
 difftrs from all others of the same class in the stipulation, by Avhich 
 the British GoA^ernment agrees to aid the Raja in all his just 
 demands on his own subjects, should he not be able to enforce 
 them. It is dated the 5th of October, 1818. 
 
 Kour Deep Singh, the son of the Raja of Purtabgurh, to Avhom 
 the administration of affairs in that principality had been entrusted 
 by his father, having put certain persons avIio Avere obnoxious to 
 him to death, his removal from office and banishment to a place 
 called Ueolah Avere insisted on by the British Government. The 
 Prince shoAved great I'cluetance to comply with this sentence 
 against his son, but found that there Avas no resisting the supreme 
 mandate, and the Kour Avas banished accordingly, 
 
 After remaining there some months, the Kour returned to the 
 capital in No\-ember, 1823. The Raja Avas then informed by theresi- 
 dent " that the very existence of Purtabgurh as a separate state, and 
 the perpetuity of its continuance under your authority and that 
 of your grand-son, depend upon how you act on the present occa- 
 
110 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 sion. If you do not take a decided part, and put Kour Deep Singh 
 under restraint, your state is at an end." 
 
 The father either had not the inclination or the power to send 
 his son from the capital, in the manner prescribed by the political 
 authority. A palankeen was considered a safer and a more suit- 
 able conveyance for a person under sentence of banishment than a 
 horse. But the Kour would not condescend to go in a palankeen, 
 and commenced his journey on foot. Some threatening appear- 
 ances rendered it necessary to employ a detachment of British 
 troops as his escort to the Fort of Kernora, where he was lodged, 
 and left under a guard from the detachment which escorted him there. 
 
 The Raja of Purtabgurh, Sawunt Singh, had twenty years before 
 abdicated in favor of Kour Deep Singh, as he stated, from an ap- 
 prehension, in retaining power, his life was endangered, from the; 
 ambition and violence of his son. He now resumed authority, and 
 desired that the claim of his son, as his successor, might be consi- 
 dered to be set aside in favor of his grand-son. 
 
 In 1826, the old Raja of Purtabgurh drew u^p a petition, pray- 
 ing that his son should be released from confinement, pledging him- 
 self and the other members of his family for the Kour's future good 
 conduct, and offering on his own and their part to relinquish their 
 claim to their possessions, if this pledge Avas not fulfilled. It was 
 evident that the Kour was considered by the whole principality to 
 be held in confinement by the British Government, and not in con- 
 formity with the wish of his Prince or the voice of the people. 
 Kour Deep Singh died in confinement on the 21st of May, 1826, 
 attended however in his last illness by the members of his family, 
 and after his release had been determined on by the political autho- 
 rities in Malwa. 
 
 In 1825, the political agent reported that " the territory of the 
 Raja of Purtabgurh was in the enjoyment of uninterrupted and in- 
 creasing prosperity, The Bheels and Meenas are settled or sub- 
 dued." 
 
 In 181 Y and 1818, the revenues, including the lands of Thakoors 
 and Jageerdai's, were 2,42,215 rupees; their increase was progres- 
 sive, particvdarly after the confinement of Kour Deep Singh, until 
 in 1825, they amounted to 500,000 rupees. The tributary Tha- 
 kooi's and Rajpoot chiefs amounted to 44, and their and tlie Raja's 
 forces to 146 horse and 600 foot. 
 
 In 1829, the aflairs of Purtabgurh had fallen into disordei% and 
 from the infirm condition of the Raja, there Mas little prospect of 
 improvement. The disorderly habits of the Bheels and other pre- 
 datory tribes were calculated to distur)) the trancpiillity of neigh- 
 bouring states, which would render it necessary for the political 
 agent, in concert with the Raja, to adopt some measures for the 
 correction of the evil. 
 
 The political agent apprehended 83 persons belonging to a gang 
 of Thugs on their route from Guzerat to Hindoostan, who as usual. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. Ill 
 
 hail eonunitteil some atrocious immUM's, ami tliis was one of the first 
 cHectual measures taken against tliose ilreadt'ul murderers. He 
 also reported that two successful attempts had been made by parties 
 of 3 or 400 armed men to smuggle opium. They were encounter- 
 ed by a detachment of the Jowra Contingent, and several lives were 
 lost on the part of the smugglers, whilst several of the Contingent 
 were wounded. 
 
 13. DoNOEUPORE. — The chief of this state claims to be a senior 
 branch of tlie Oudeepore house. The treaty with it is dated the 
 11th of December, 1818. It is tributary to the British Govern- 
 ment, the tribute to increase with increasing prosperity ; but never 
 to exceed three-eighths of the actual revenue. We agree to afford 
 the Malia liawul aid in bringing his connexions under due control. 
 
 The political relations with the three small states of Dongerpore, 
 Banswara, and Purtabgurh, the tAvo former belonging to the dis- 
 trict of Bangur, the latter to that of Kuntul, have generally been 
 conducted by an agent residing at Neemuch, under the control of 
 the resident in ^Nlalwa. 
 
 Fi'om some old records of the Government obtained in 1819, the 
 revenues of this state in the time of Rawul Sheo Singh were 
 shown to be 502,128, and the political agent indulged in the 
 hope that in five years they would again reach that sum, although 
 when he was writing, they amounted to only rupees 92,187. In 
 1820, it was necessary to afford this state the aid of our troops to 
 expel certain mercenaries from its territory. 
 
 In the end of the same year, the chief called to his aid, a party 
 of Arabs and other foreigners, to assist in the expulsion of a minis- 
 ter who had our support. It was supposed as usual that this 
 minister " had lost the favor of his Prince by becoming the instru- 
 ment of that reform and improvement in the administration which 
 we desired to introduce." The Prince was described as weak and 
 profligate ; the minister was considered wise and virtuous, and was 
 accordingly to be supported in the most decided manner ; for this 
 purpose, two detachments of our troops were put in motion. 
 
 In 1824, it was deemed necessary to make a requisition for the 
 aid of British troops to coerce certain chiefs of this state, who had 
 called the neighbouring Bheels to assist in asserting their rights or 
 pretended rights on their own Government. This demonstration 
 was, however, sufficient to bring the chiefs to tei'ms ; they retui'ncd 
 to their allegiance, and the troops to their quarters. 
 
 A rebel chief of Eeder had, in 1822, found refuge in the territory 
 of Dongerpore and protection from its minister. On this and other 
 accounts, the minister was removed from office. In the end of 
 1824, the same Eeder rebel escaped from confinement at Baroda, 
 and was followed up l^y a detachment of Bombay troops, The 
 Kawul of Dongerpore had espoused the cause of the late and depos- 
 ed minister, in opposition to the minister then in power, who had 
 our support. He was aided in this by some of the principal chiefs 
 of the state and joined by the Eeder rebel, and further aided by 
 
112 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 certain chiefs of Oudecpore. The Bombay detachment followed 
 up the rebel of Eeder to this capital, and was joined by our friend 
 the minister. The Rawul's party was however too strong to be 
 attacked and the minister not being prepared to carry matters to 
 such extremities as would have accorded with the views of the 
 officer commanding the troops, persuaded him that the life of the 
 Rawul depended on his forbearance, for that, if attacked, the Rawul 
 would be put to death by his own party. Eventually the Rawul, 
 the ex-minister, and the chiefs evacuated Dongerpore, and joined 
 the political agent on his summons ; and that officer and the resi- 
 dent in Malwa resolved between themselves that this attempt of 
 the chief of Dongerpore, to assert his own authority in opposition 
 to the order of things that they had established, should be resented 
 by requiring him to renounce all interference in the conduct of 
 affairs. That an ample allowance should be made fi'om the revenues 
 of the state, to support his personal and household expenses, and 
 his dignity as Raja. That a minister should be appointed to con- 
 duct the affairs of the state in the Rawul's name, but under our 
 control ; and that whatever remained of the revenues of the state, 
 after supplying their demands, shovdd with our tribute, be appro- 
 priated to the support of a local force to be provided by us. 
 
 Government was not, however, prepared to go along with their 
 political authorities in these extreme measures ; the right of enfor- 
 cing them, in conformity with treaty, was questioned, as was the 
 expediency of the measures themselves, particular!}^ the relinquish- 
 ment of ouv tribute for the maintenance of a force whose services 
 were not calculated to be of utility to us. 
 
 The tribute of Dongerpore is exactly the same as that of Bans- 
 wara, whicli has been elsewhere described. The tributary chiefs 
 liolding lands on military tenure are only eight in number, and their 
 forces, with those of the state, amount to 278 horse and 853 foot. 
 
 The political agent in Bangur and Kuntul observed, in 1825, 
 " as the progress of improvement must frequentlj'- be expedited or 
 impeded by the competency of the native rulers, it would perhaps 
 promote the general interests to allow to the subjects of those 
 states, when a degree of inefficiency prevailed, but not to such an 
 extent as to demand further interposition, a right to appeal to the 
 British agent, not in extreme cases alone, but, in all instances in 
 which they miglit be aggrieved. This woidd not only ameliorate 
 the condition of the cultivator, but it would tend to the personal 
 improvement of the native governor by supplying a stimulus to 
 his exertions," 
 
 So little at that time and place were the rights of native gover- 
 nors, as guai'anteed to them by treaty, considered, and so little was 
 the effect of foreign interference on the character of native or other 
 rulers understood. 
 
 In 1827, Kour Dulput Singh, who had been adopted out of the 
 Purtabgurh family, and who had thereby become heir-apparent to 
 the throne, was with the sanction of the Rawul, appointed Regent. 
 
INTERNAL RELATI(3NS. 113 
 
 In 1829, the Regent came forward with several propositions. 
 To be relieved from a demand on account of a police corps enter- 
 tained by us, and from -which he said the Dongcrpore state derived 
 no benefit. The object of this corps was partly that of keeping 
 open the road between Malwa and Guzerat, the advantage of which 
 to the native state was too indirect to be very apparent ; and as it 
 had no voice in the measure, the whole amount levied from it on 
 tliis account, has this year (1832) been refunded, amounting to 
 rupees 1-5, 150; further, to receive compensation for loss of transit 
 duties sustained through our opium arrangements. 
 
 In 1830, the assistant political agent from CJuzerat moved w^ith 
 a detachment of British troops to assist the Regent of Dongerpore 
 in bringing to subjection the Bheels and other plunderers inhabit- 
 ing those tracts, and the service was effected without much difficul- 
 ty. The political agent at Serowe and the assistant political agent 
 in Guzerat recommended that a body of Regular Infantrj'- should 
 be stationed at or in the neighbourhood of Dongerpore, Avhich 
 measure was rejected bj"^ Government. 
 
 It appears that the resources of this small state have rather 
 deteriorated under the administration of the Regent, and that the 
 condition of the people cannot be considered to have improved. 
 The Regent, not feeling quite firm in his seat, was restrained through 
 the federal chiefs from adopting certain measures, which he consi- 
 dered would be beneficial to the general interests of the principal- 
 ity. He found too that the Rawul might turn round and join those 
 chiefs as he had before done. Under these circumstances, he 
 applied in 1831, with the sanction of the Rawul, for such assistance 
 from the British Government as should enable him to curb the 
 undue influence of those chiefs, and reduce them to their former 
 condition of servants to the state. He was of course told that the 
 British Government looked to the ruler of each independent state 
 for adopting such measures as might be necessary to maintain his 
 own power, and for the preservation of general ti'anquillity. 
 
 14. Kerowlee. — The chief of this small Rajpoot state is of a 
 family which formerly reigned at Biana befoi-e that place was 
 conquered by the Jauts. 
 
 The treaty with Kerowlee is dated the 9th of November, 1817. 
 The tribute which it formerly paid to the Mahrattas was gratuitously 
 remitted. When the British Government was involved in the 
 Burmese wai', and Bhurtpore prepared for defence under the usur- 
 pation of Doorjun Saul, there was no doubt that Kei'owlee sent 
 troops to the aid of Bhurtpore, and assembled troops for its own 
 defence on the fall of that fortress. Kerowlee made strong profes- 
 sions of attachment, and it was not deemed necessarj' to take any 
 serious notice of its proceedings. Beyond the adjustment of some 
 border differences between the states of Kerowlee and Jeypore, 
 there seems to have been hardly any communication with the Raja 
 of this small principality since the negotiation of the treaty. 
 
 Q 
 
114 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 15. Serovve. — From the position of tnis principality, being on 
 the line of communication betweeji Rajpootana and Guzerat, 
 rather than from any importance which belongs to itself, a treaty 
 was concluded with it and ratitied on the 31st of October, 1823, 
 and a political agent has until lately been stationed at its capital. 
 The iirst establishment of a political agent at Serowe was unpa- 
 latable, both to the Jondpore Government and certain Thakoors of 
 that state, to whom it was either tributary, or who themselves 
 exercised an influence in its affairs. The Serowe chief did not 
 relish some of our measures, and only returned to his capital in the 
 end of 1825. 
 
 The Rao of Serowe had been deposed by his chiefs and people, 
 for tyranny and oppression, before the negotiation of our treaty, 
 the right of inheritance being however reserved for the offspring of 
 the deposed chief. His younger brother Rao Sheo Singh was then 
 the ruler. 
 
 From the turbulent nature of the inhabitants of this part of the 
 country, who are chiefly Bheels and Meenas, it has on several 
 occasions been necessary to call for military aid from the Bombay 
 Government to support the Rao's authority, and to preserve tran- 
 quillity ; at last, confidence seems to have been restored, and 
 merchandise passes freely from the ports of Guzerat by this route 
 to Pali and the northern markets. 
 
 The revenues of Serowe hardly amount to half a lakh of rupees, 
 and the objects for which an agent was stationed there having 
 been attained, he was recalled in the middle of 1832, and our 
 political relations with this small state were placed under the agent 
 at Neemuch. As at Oudeepore and Jeypore, the measure of 
 recalling the political agent was disagreeble to Serowe, the chief of 
 which petitioned hard, not only to have an agent permanently 
 stationed at his capital, but also a detachment of regular troops. 
 The measure will, however, as at the other places, in all probabi- 
 lity prove eventually beneficial, by throwing the chief more on his 
 own resources, and giving a more wholesome and national tone to 
 his administration. 
 
 16. Bhurtpore is the only Jaut principality of any magnitude 
 in India, and is perhaps the only Government which bears a truly 
 national character, where a great proportion of the people belong 
 to the same tribe with the princes and nobles of the state. Dhol- 
 pore, Baree, and Bulemgurh, are also small Jaut possessions. Hatras 
 is, or was, a Jaut Zemindaree, and the chiefs of Pvittialah and 
 others of the Phoolkea family belonging to the protected Sikh 
 states, are converted Jauts. The tribe of Jauts are said to have 
 migrated from the province of Multan early in last century, and 
 to have settled in the Dooab as cultivators, from which condition 
 they rose rapidly to notice as conquerors and founders of principali- 
 ties. Sooruj Mul, the first acknowledged Jaut Raja of Bhurtpore, 
 was killed in an engagement with Nujuf Khan near Dehlee, in 1763. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 115 
 
 The first treaty of BInirtpore with the British Government is 
 dated the 14-th of November, 1803 : it is of t)ffensive and defensive 
 alliance : tlirou<ili it the Blnirtpon! state escaped from the paj^nent 
 of tribute, and gained considerable acquisitions of territory, amount- 
 ing to twenty pergunnahs ; yet in the following year, it allowed 
 tlie forces of Holkar, then our enemy, to encamp under the guns 
 of its fortress of Deeg, which guns opened on our army in the })at- 
 tle that ensued with the troops of Holkar in that position. The 
 town of Deeg was carried by assault and the citadel evacuated, its 
 garrison retiring to Bhurtpore. 
 
 The story of the disastrous siege of that fortress, which followed, 
 need not be here repeated. 
 
 On the termination of the war with Bhurtpore, the treaty of 
 offensive and defensive alliance was renewed ; that Government 
 agreeing to pay twenty lakhs of rupees as indemnity for the expences 
 of the war, and the Bi-itish Government retaining possession of 
 its fortress of Deeg, and holding one of the Raja's sons as a hos- 
 tage, until satisfied of his better disposition. Bhurtpore for its 
 treachery also lost a portion of the territory which had been con- 
 quered from Scindia in the war of 1803, and conferred on it. Tlie 
 new treaty is dated the 17th of April, 1805. 
 
 During the whole series of years, in which the neighbouring 
 states were involved in one scene of ruin, through the rapacity and 
 excesses of the Mahrattas, Bhurtpore and Ulwur were alone saved 
 by the terms of their alliance with the British Government, and 
 never was so much good so badly requited as by the former state. 
 
 In 1818, the resident at Dehlee observes, " still the comparison 
 which tlie Raja could not avoid making between the prosperi- 
 ty and security of his country under our safeguard, and the ruin 
 and wretchedness of neighbouring territories excluded from the 
 same advantage, has not sufficed to excite his attachment or allay 
 his hostile suspicions. 
 
 " But the greatest indulgence shewn to the Raja may be said to 
 be, his having been allowed with impunity to exclude from his 
 court British agents of every description, and successfully to resist 
 the desire evinced to establish one near his person for purposes 
 peculiarly friendly. 
 
 " His conduct in this particular, considering the relative situa- 
 tion of the parties, I suppose to be unexampled, either in Europe 
 or Asia ; yet it has not diminished the spirit of kindness and for- 
 bearance, with which the state of Bhurtpore has uniformly been 
 treated. 
 
 " The only notice taken of the Raja's unfriendly conduct, on that 
 occasion, consisted in directing the resident at Dehlee to exclude 
 the Raja's agent from Dehlee, and in conformity to this order, there 
 has not been any accredited agent from Bhurtpore stationed at 
 Dehlee from that time." 
 
 Boundary disputes, and the question of granting protection to 
 refugees from one state within the territories of another, continued 
 
 Q 2 
 
116 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 the only questions of any importance under discussion between the 
 British and the Bhurtpore Government. In the former case, the 
 Bhurtpore Government sent, in 1823, a battalion with some guns, 
 to attack a village belonging to Nawab Ahmed Buksh Khan of 
 Ferozepore, instead of submitting the question in dispute to the 
 arliitration of the British Government, as bound by treaty to do. 
 
 Old Runjeet Singh, who was opposed to us in the defence of 
 Bhurtpore, left four sons, and was succeeded by the eldest, Rundeer 
 Singh, who died without issue. The succession was then claimed 
 by Doorjun Saul, the son of Luchman Singh, the third son of old 
 Runjeet, on the ground that he had been adopted by the late Raja 
 Rundeer Singh, to the exclusion of his own brother Buldeo Singli. 
 Buldeo Singh, the second son, however, took his seat on the 
 Musnud, on the 26th of February, 1824', in succession to his brother, 
 without opposition, received the congratulations of tlie chiefs and 
 ministers of the state, and a dress of investiture with a letter from 
 the Governor General through the hands of a British officer, who 
 was deputed by the resident of Dehlee, to be present at the cere- 
 mony. 
 
 In August, 1824, Maha Raja Buldeo Singh addressed a letter to 
 Government, requesting for Bulwunt Singh, whom in one part of 
 his letter he called his son and in another his nephew, a dress of 
 investiture from the British Government, recognizing Bulwunt 
 Singh as heir-apparent to the principality. Before avithorizing that 
 measure, Government called on the resident on the 1st of October, 
 to report on the relationship in which Bulwunt Singh stood to the 
 Raja, and the claims of the other members of the family to the 
 succession. 
 
 In the end of 1824, the Bhurtpore Government required us to 
 render vip a lady, who had made her escape from the Raja's family, 
 who was represented to be of infamous character, and who had 
 found refuge within our territory. It w as agreed to render up the 
 lady to the Bhurtpore Government, " as her character and proceed- 
 ings had been of a nature, which affected injuriously the Raja's 
 honor, according to the native feelings and usages. The stipula- 
 tion required in return will be a pledge that the Ranee's personal 
 safety shall be secured, and that she shall experience no unneces- 
 sarily harsh and severe restraint or deprivation." 
 
 On the 26th of January, 1825, the resident at Dehlee reported to 
 Govermnent, that, in obedience to its commands, he was marching 
 from Jeypore to Bhurtpore, to comply with the wishes of the chief 
 of that principality, by acknowledging his son Bulwunt Singh as the 
 heir-apparent. On the 16th of March, he forwarded letters from 
 the young Raja, announcing the death of his father, and reported, at 
 the same time, that attempts had been made to disturb the succession, 
 but with what effect was not then known. The resident learnt on 
 the same day, through a letter, from the judge and magistrate of 
 Agra, that Doorjun Saul had, from the place of his confinement on 
 the outside of the town, won over the principal portion of the 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 117 
 
 troops, bloflTi open tho gates of the fortress, and got possession of 
 the person of his eousin, the young Raja, and the treasure of the 
 state. Doorjun Saul stated his intention to be to displace Ram 
 Ruttun, tho brother of Ranee Imrut Kour, the widow of the late 
 Raja, (wlio had adopted and was not the motlier of his son Bulwunt 
 Singh,) who was exercising the powers of Regent in the name of 
 his sister in a manner distasteful to himself and the other chiefs of 
 the state. Ram Ruttun was a foreigner, and Doorjun Saul declared 
 that no foreigner ever had exercised or could in conformity with 
 the usuages of the Bhurtpore principality, exercise jurisdiction 
 there. 
 
 On the ISth, the resident required the officers commanding the 
 neighbouring divisions of the arnij'^ to put such portion of the troops 
 as could be spared in march towards Bhurtpore, to support the suc- 
 cession of the Prince, whose title we had formally acknowledged. 
 
 On receiving intimation of the resident's measure of calling out 
 troops to support the succession without its authority,, and whilst 
 engaged in a foreign war, the measure was disapproved by Govern- 
 ment, and the troops were ordered back to their respective stations. 
 Government did not acknowledge any^ obligation under which we 
 were to support the succession of Bulwunt Singh to his father's 
 throne. The recognition of the heir-apparent, during tlie life time 
 of the reigning Raja, at his earnest solicitation, was not considered 
 as binding on us to maintain him in the event of a disputed succes- 
 sion, as it might be in opposition to the wishes of the chiefs and 
 people. 
 
 Doorjun Saul threw off the mask, and assumed the style and title, 
 with the exercise of the authority, of the sovereign of Bhurtpore. 
 A civil war very soon arose between him and his brother, Mehadoo 
 Singh, who had co-operated with him in the first instance, in gain- 
 ing possession of Bhurtpore, but who now took separate possession 
 of Deeg, which he professed to hold on behalf of the young Raja 
 whose subject he declared himself. 
 
 In the mean time, Doorjun Saul sought to strengthen his 
 position by forming alliance with the chiefs of Lahore, Jeypore, 
 Uhvur, &c. 
 
 It was eventually deemed necessary, that the British Govern- 
 ment should arm in defence of the rights of Maha Raja Bulwunt 
 Singh. Bhurtpore was carried by assault on the 18th of January, 
 1826, the rightful Prince restored to his throne, and the usurper 
 sent a state prisoner to Allahabad. 
 
 Ranee Imrut Kour, the principal widow of the late Raja, and 
 the ostensible mother of his sou, [for the real mother was another 
 and an inferior person,] was allowed to be the proper Regent dur- 
 ing the minority. Two of the principal officers of the Bhurtpore 
 state, Dewan Jowahir Lai and Foujdar Chooramun, were placed at 
 the head of the ministry. After his first interview with the Regent, 
 the political agent reports, " After a short pause, she informed 
 me that she wdshed to continue Foujdar Chooramun in his present 
 
118 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 office. She appeared unwilling to proceed, but named after 
 another pause, and not without what appeared to be considerable 
 reluctance, Dewan Jowahir Lai as his associate. She then proposed 
 Govind Ram, Chooramun's nephew, as first Dewan, and expressed 
 a strong desire to invest Lala Janee Buyjnauth, with the general 
 superintendence of the whole affairs of the country. This high 
 office he appeared anxious to decline, and requested he might be 
 left out of the arrangement. In a private interview, the Regent in- 
 formed the political agent, that she had many great objections to 
 the character of Dewan Jowahir Lai, and did not like to continue 
 him in his present employment under the Govei-nment. She spoke 
 of his character during the entire period of our past disturbances, 
 and assured me it was such as to disqualify him for any confiden- 
 tial employment under the state. She reverted to Lala Janee Buyj- 
 nauth, as a person whose long and faithful attachment to the family 
 entitled him to some mark of consideration ; she did not, however, 
 name any particular office for him, but contented herself with speak- 
 ing of him as qualified for any. Her obvious wish was to place 
 him over them all. 
 
 The necessity for selecting Cliooramun and Jowahir Lai was un- 
 fortunate, from the position in which they stood, both with resjject 
 to us, and in the estimation of the public. They were naturally 
 suspected by us from having betrayed their own Prince, and joined 
 the ranks of the usurper ; and they were unpopular from a belief 
 which, however unfounded, very generally prevailed, and which 
 has never been removed, that during the siege they held clandes- 
 tine communication with the resident, who reported, on the 10th of 
 February, 1826. 
 
 " Since the fall of the fortress, a false notion, that it had been 
 effected with the connivance of those persons, has obtained credence 
 to an astonishing degree, and strange to say they have been robbed, 
 plundered, and maltreated in our own camp, as traitors to Doorjun 
 Saul, or more perhaps, with reference to the popular feeling, as 
 traitors to the cause of all the existing states of India, which was 
 absurdly supposed to depend on the defence of Bhurtpore." 
 
 It was therefore peculiarly unfortunate that such persons should 
 have been selected for such offices under our superintendence, but 
 this was a necessary evil, because there were none other of equal 
 rank, or indeed of any rank, which fitted them for these offices; and 
 it was still more unfortunate that it should, at the request of the 
 Regent and ministers, have been necessary to appoint a British 
 agent to reside at the court during the minority, who was almost 
 certain to mix himself up with their affaii's, to destroy the sem- 
 blance of a native administration, and to paralyze their operations, 
 without himself having the power or the means of governing accoi'd- 
 ing to our fashion. 
 
 It must always be a question, whether, in cases like this, it were 
 not the better policy to withdraw and leave the native administra- 
 tion to its own resources. This would of course be disagreeable to 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONF. 1 H) 
 
 the party which hopes to benefit througli our interference and sup- 
 port. But a more whok^sonie form of government would arise, 
 after a few, perhaps bloodless, stf uggh s, Mitliout our interposition, 
 and we should at all events have the merit of leaving matters to 
 find their own level, and the satisfaction of escaping from a situa- 
 tion which never fails to bring on us tiie odium of all the evil, with- 
 out gaining us credit for any of the good that may be done. It is 
 true that the whole structure of the Bhurtpore Ciovernmcnt, had 
 been destroyed in the revolution which had placed Doorjuu Saul on 
 tlie throne ; and in the operations which followed, to restore the 
 rightful heir, the treasures which had not been dissipated ))y the 
 usurper had fallen in the shape of prize to our army ; yet under all 
 these disadvantages, it must bo doubtful, whether the system of 
 native administration which would have arisen on our withdrawal, 
 would not have worked better for them, and certainly with less 
 trouble to us, than any which it was possible to form under foreign 
 domination and with divided councils. 
 
 We shall accordingly see, if it be worth while to pursue minute- 
 ly the inquiry, that this Jaut administration, which for years had 
 been the most united and efficient of any Government in India, and 
 whose territories would bear a comparison with the best governed 
 in the British possessions, fell to a mere state of dependence on our 
 will and our support. It is true that in this, as in most other cases, 
 where we either are, or think that we are, called on to interfere, 
 some crisis has arisen, when the good of former administrations has 
 passed away, and the Government has fallen into the hands of Re- 
 gent mothers, and their worthless favorites during minorities, 
 whilst it is uncertain, but for the measures of our adoption, whether 
 still greater evils than those resulting from them would not have 
 arisen. 
 
 On the fall of Bhurtpore, Goberdhun was resumed by the Bri- 
 tish Government. It had been granted in life Jageer to Kour 
 Luchman Singh, the third son of Maha Raja Runjeet Singh, who 
 was the hostage with the British camp at one time after the con- 
 clusion of the second treaty, but had not been resumed on his 
 death. 
 
 Two battalions of Infantry, with Artillery and some Cavalry, were 
 required for service in the Bhurtpore territory, until a national force 
 and government could be organized, and these were granted on the 
 condition of that state paying for the same. 
 
 A change of some importance very soon took place in the minis- 
 try, a nephew of the Foujdar's having been brought in to supersede 
 the former Dewan — a change which promised to be beneficial as 
 uniting the ministry, if an united ministry be in itself considered 
 good. It was in less than three months, however, from the first 
 formation of the ministry evident that it would not work. 
 
 The regent desired to bring more prominently forward her favo- 
 rite Buj'jnauth, whilst the political agent supported the administra- 
 tion, and <' conceived it a duty on my part to discourage every 
 
120 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 attempt to supersede the legitimate authority of the ministers. I made 
 it a rule to summon them, whenever I had any communication of 
 importance to make to the Bhurtpore Government, that seemed 
 to require discussion." The agent soon found that the regency 
 had the power of shutting the mouths of the ministers, whenever 
 they did attend, by appointing some third person to be present at 
 the conference ; and that the ministers still felt themselves sufficient- 
 ly the servants of the Bhurtpore state to hesitate to enter on any 
 discussion Avith him which would be disagreeable to the Regent. 
 In any discussions between the Regent and the agent, the ministers 
 were likewise excluded. 
 
 " On these occasions, I usually desired Janee Buyjnauth to send 
 for them, principally to convince the Ranee that I would not ac- 
 knowledge her favorite as their substitute, and that those persons 
 only who had been formally nominated by the Ranee, and approv- 
 ed of by you [the resident at Dehlee] and the British Government, 
 would be recognised by me as the responsible ministers of the 
 state." 
 
 " I took occasion in an interview I had with the Ranee a few 
 days afterwards, to express to her my sentiments on it, [a note 
 had been written, but not sent, on the subject of the ineffici- 
 ency of the administration.] As Janee Buyjnauth was present at the 
 time I addressed myself particularly to him, and in a style that 
 could not possibly be misunderstood, either by him or by tlie Ranee ; 
 I called his attention first to the mystery that was thrown over every 
 transaction connected with the management of public affairs, and 
 secondly to the studious efforts made to keep me unacquainted with 
 every thing that was going on. Why, I asked, was information 
 cautiously concealed from me regarding the state of the country ? 
 Why was I not made acquainted with the arrangements that had 
 been made with the zemindars for the present year, and a state- 
 ment of the revenue of the country furnished me ? He was aware, 
 I observed, of the large demands we had against the Bhurtpore 
 state, on account of the expenses incurred on the Raja's restoration — 
 it was therefore my duty to ascertain what arrangements were in 
 progress to meet those demands. The Bhurtpore Government 
 requested that an agent might be stationed at the court, to give them 
 the countenance and support of the British Government, and to aid 
 them with his advice ; but an agent could not give advice on mat- 
 ters respecting which he was denied all information, and he cer- 
 tainly would neither countenance nor support a course of proceed- 
 ing so objectionable, nor any proceedings carried on by concealed 
 agents, instead of the responsible ministers of the state. He ought 
 to remember, I said, that the Ranee as Regent could not possibly, 
 from the situation she was placed in, be accurately acquainted with 
 the state of the country, or the real conduct of the public officers 
 in any part of it. She must look to others for information, and 
 who were so competent to afibrd her information as the old expe- 
 rienced responsible ministers of the state." I added, that I wished 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 121 
 
 it " to be distinctly understood, that solonj^ as the British Govern- 
 ment took any part in the guidance of afi'airs here, the ministers 
 only could be regarded as the etficient and responsible Government 
 of the country. I then alluded to his own apparent efforts to 
 displace the old ministers, and assured him that whatever change 
 might possibly take place in the present arrangements, he never 
 could be acknowledged as Dewan or revenue minister; his ignorance 
 of the duties rendered him entirely unqualified for such an office. I 
 did not deny, I said, that the claims he had established on the Go- 
 vernment, by his attacliment to the Raja and his family, were 
 considerable, (provided they were such as he had himself described;) 
 but I recommended him to exert the influence he was thereby sup- 
 posed to possess, rather in improving than destroying the efficiency 
 of the administration, and convince the world, that his attachment 
 to the Raja's Government was founded on principle, and not oa 
 personal advantage." The political agent goes on to say, after 
 recounting all the measures of the Regent, for displacing the mem- 
 bers of the first administration and raising her favorite Janee Buyj- 
 nath and Govind Ram to office, and enumerating all the evils aris- 
 ing from their conduct of affairs. " I am persuaded therefore, 
 taking into consideration the age of the Raja, (seven years,) and 
 the confused condition of affairs at this court, that no plan or 
 arrangement that it may become necessary to adopt, for the intro- 
 duction of an improved system of administration in this Govern- 
 ment, can ever be rendered respectable, or in any way really efficient, 
 without placing Janee Buyjnath and the ministers (whoever they 
 may be) under the immediate guidance and control of the British 
 agent, and vesting him with power to exercise a direct interference 
 in the internal affiiirs of the state." 
 
 A mutiny, or a strike for want, or increase of pay, in a battalion 
 of the new levies brought the question of the fitness of the present 
 state of things more prominently forward, and on the 28th of May, 
 the resident at Dehlee wrote to the political agent : 
 
 " It seems to be requisite to take steps immediately to amend 
 the faulty and mischievous system of administration Avhich the 
 Ranee has hitherto followed. For this purpose, it only seems 
 necessary to revei't to the plan of Government originally designed, 
 ■which the Ranee and Janee Buyjnath have contrived to set aside. 
 
 " This was that the country should be governed by the old 
 ministers of the state, on their own responsibility, under the nomi- 
 nal Regency of the Ranee, but with suitable limitations to her 
 authority. 
 
 <' The experiment, -which has been tried, of admitting the unli- 
 mited exercise of power on her part, has served to prove the 
 impracticability of its continuance without utter ruin to the princi- 
 pality. 
 
 " I therefore authorize you, pending the receipt of ordei'S from 
 the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, to carry into 
 effect the arrangement described in the following paragraphs : 
 
 R 
 
12*2 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 " The administration of the Government to be vested in respon- 
 sible ministers. 
 
 " Dewan Jawahir Lai to be placed at the head of the Dewanee or 
 Revenue Department. 
 
 " Foiijdar Chooramun and Govind Ram to have charge of the 
 Foujdaree Department. The latter to aid the former on account 
 of his illness and consequent inability. 
 
 " I mention these three persons, because tliey are those who 
 were originally nominated, and because they are the only persons 
 that I know of that can be employed in the highest offices. But, 
 if there be better, let them be chosen. Every proper mark of respect 
 to be paid to the Ranee, and her reasonable wishes to be attended 
 to by the ministers ; but the responsibility, and consequently the 
 powers of Government, to rest entirely with the ministers. 
 
 " You will be pleased to maintain a cordial intercourse with the 
 ministers, leaving the administration entirely in their hands, and 
 offering your advice whenever it may be necessary." 
 
 During these discussions, Janee Buyjnath had the advice of Mr. 
 Wright, an Englishman, who was formerly concerned in some 
 commercial speculations with Buyjnath, and who was believed to 
 have violated an Act of Parliament by lending money to the native 
 state without the sanction of the British Government. This gen- 
 tleman was eventually required to quit the Bhurtpore territoiy. 
 
 As the Regent declined to take a part in this form of administra- 
 tion, the following provision was made : 
 
 " That the most efficient administration that can be selected be 
 formed out of the old officers of the Bhurtpore state. 
 
 " That the administration so appointed have the Government of 
 the country in their hands. That they repoi't their proceedings to 
 the Ranee, if she be disposed to play her part as Regent, with limited 
 authority, and that they attend to her wishes, when they may be 
 consistent with the welfare of the state; or in the event of her 
 declining to co-operate with them, that their proceedings be carried 
 on under the countenance of the British agent, and in communica- 
 tion with him. His advice and influence to be interposed in either 
 case, whenever necessary to check measures oppressive to the 
 people, or tending to sacrifice the interests of the state to the cupi- 
 dity of individuals, but no interference to take place on his part with 
 any other other object. 
 
 " The system of administration is to be that heretofore establish- 
 ed at Bhurtpore, without any innovation on the part of the agent, 
 or any introduction on his part of British rules of Government, in 
 order that the state may be made over to the Raja on his arrival at 
 maturity, governed by its own laws, and such as it was in the hands 
 of his ancestors." 
 
 This sketch of administration was drawn out by the resident at 
 Dehlee, and sanctioned by Government ; it was submitted to the 
 Regent, who having either in reality or in semblance cordially ap- 
 proved of it, the measure was carried into effect at Bhurtpore. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 123 
 
 The Regent did not liowovei' lonu; remain satisfied with such 
 limited powers; slie intrigued against the ministers, eaUed the ehiel's 
 of the state to aid her in opposing them, and eventually locked 
 herself up for many days in the palace, k.eei)ing i)ossession of the 
 young Raja, and threatening to destroy herself and him, if any 
 opposition was oftered to her, or attempt made to remove him. At 
 la.<;t, on tiie 4th of September, 1826, Ranee Imrut Kour was dis- 
 placed from the exercise of the functions of Regent, and the minis- 
 ters formed into a council of Regency, with the entire administra- 
 tion of the Goverinnent in all departments. 
 
 One of the first measures of the new administration was to request 
 the aid of British troops to assist in coercing certain Zemindars of 
 the Bhurtjiore country into payment of revenue. The resident at 
 Dehlee did not approve of this mode of employing our troops, but 
 Go\ernment was of opinion that in the condition, to which the 
 military power of the state was reduced, it might be expedient to 
 grant this aid, provided it were clearly shewn that the Zemindars 
 of Bhurtpore withheld the just dues of Government, and that the 
 ministry had not the power of enforcing them. 
 
 On the 6th of March, 1827, the agent reported the death of 
 Foujdar Chooramun, and added that he had appointed Foujdar 
 Govind Ram to supply his place, pending a reference to the Right 
 Honorable the Governor General. In July, 1830, the principal 
 minister of the Bhurtpore Government, Jawahir Lai, died. "He 
 had been the principal revenue minister for upwards of twenty-five 
 years : it was his thorough knowledge of these affairs, combined Avith 
 a degree of temper, patience, and forbearance, Avhich have seldom, 
 perhaps never, been surpassed, that enabled him to discharge the 
 duties of his high office, so much to the general satisfaction of the 
 country. 
 
 " The highly respectable character of Foujdar Govind Ram, and 
 his alliance with the Raja's family, gave him importance in the eyes 
 of the natives, and will enable him, 1 hope, with the aid of his son, 
 and of some able and experienced native officers in his employ, to 
 superintend the administration of this Government during the Raja's 
 minority ; which cannot exceed two or three years. 
 
 " My instructions as political agent at this court were to leave 
 the administration entirely in the hands of the ministers, and to offer 
 my advice when it appeared necessary. I have acted up strictly to 
 these instructions all along, and shall continue to do so, being satis- 
 fied they are founded on principles of strict justice and expediency. 
 This system I hope to see continued, and it will be continued, 
 if the plan of administration now in force be approved, and the ap- 
 pointment of Govind Ram as Regent minister be sanctioned by the 
 Right Honorable the Governor (jeneral in Council." 
 
 Since the death of Jawahir Lai, and the appointment of Govind 
 Ram to be his successor, the condition of the Bhurtpore Govern- 
 ment had deteriorated. The new minister was too old and weak 
 to leave anv hope of an amendment in the state of affairs ; and at 
 
 R 2 
 
124 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 length, on the 10th of June, 1831, a native of Bhurtpore, but not a 
 Jaut, Bholanath, was raised by the British Government to the 
 office of Dewan, the son of the late Dewan being continued in the 
 inferior department of Foujdar. 
 
 The debt incurred by Bhurtpore to the British Government for 
 the expence of the campaign, by which the Raja was restored to 
 his throne, was 25,49,000 rupees. The expence of the troops 
 maintained in that territory, for the service of the Bhurtpore Govern- 
 ment, and the expence of agency, amounting to upwards of a lakh 
 of rupees per annum, were justly chargeable to that Government. 
 The debt was by agreement to have been liquidated in six years, 
 but it appears that up to the middle of 1831, only 14,70,969 rupees 
 were paid ; so that Bhurtpore is still considerably indebted to the 
 British Government. 
 
 The following are the observations of the Hon'ble the Court of 
 Directors on the subject of this debt : 
 
 " A considerable share of the expences of the war against Bhurt- 
 pore may be justly charged to the Raja's Government ; but as the 
 charge is of the natui'e of a compensation, not a penalty, and will 
 fall not only upon the active adherents of the usurper Doorjun 
 Saul, but upon the people in general of the Bhurtpore state, it 
 will be your duty, more especially now that you have been forced to 
 interfere in the administration of its affairs, to be careful that the 
 amount demanded shall not exceed what the Raja's Government has 
 the means to pay, and that no extortion be practised upon the 
 Thakoors, or over-assessment uj)on the ryuts, under the pretence of 
 liquidating the debt." 
 
 17. Bhopal. — It is curious to witness this small Mahomedan 
 principality maintaining its independence since the days of Aurung- 
 zebe, surrounded by the Mahratta and other Hindoo powers of Cen- 
 tral India, composed of elements so different from its own, and so 
 full of enmity towards the chief of the country, and the soldiers of 
 which his small army was principally comjiosed. 
 
 The Afghaun colony of Bhopal, even in the days of its founder, 
 Dost Mahomed Khan, seems to have been of sufficient importance 
 to be courted both by the throne of Dehlee and Nizam-ool Moolk, 
 the Soobadar of the Dekhan, in their civil war of 1720. 
 
 The state of Bhopal, was the only power in Central India that 
 aflPorded friendly aid to the force under General Goddard, which 
 crossed, fifty-fovir years ago, from the Bengal to the Bombay pro- 
 vinces ; and like tlie state of Boondee in later days, it was believed 
 to have suffered on account of its good offices towards us. In the 
 long period which intervened between 1778 and 1809, when the 
 next British army, under Colonel Close, appeared on that theatre, 
 the chiefs of Bhopal had been frequently leagued with Pindarics, or 
 any other plunderers, or people who were likely to aid them in re- 
 sisting the encroachments of tlie superior Mahratta powers. This 
 connexion with the Pindarics and Ameer Khan was nearly bring- 
 ing on the Bhopal Government the vengeance of the British, when 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 125 
 
 tlie first demonstration of our power was made in those regions in 
 1809. Wuzeer Maliomed, the then able and enerj^etic chief, suc- 
 cessfully excused himself, however, on the plea of necessity for 
 atfording refuge to these plunderers, and petitioned hard as he had 
 before done, and continued for the next seven years to do, to be 
 taken under British protection. We were not however until a very 
 late period prepared to enter so largely into the politics of Central 
 India, as a compliance with Wuzeer Mahomed's wishes would 
 liave rendered necessary. 
 
 The siege of Bhopal, which folloAved in 1813-11', by divisions of 
 Scindia's and the Nagpore arniy, amounting to 50 or 60,000 men, 
 is one of the most remarkable in later days; and the conduct of the 
 chief, whose garrison at the conuuencement of the siege did not 
 exceed 8 or 10,000 men, is the theme of praise and the admiration 
 of the Mahomedans of India. The division of the Nagpore army 
 was commanded by a Mahomedan, and there were of course great 
 numbers of that ti'ibe in the united army. Their sympathy was 
 naturally awakened by the situation of their Pathan brethren of 
 Bhopal ; and it is probably as much owing to this circumstance as 
 to Wuzeer Mahomed's masterly conduct in the defence of his 
 position, during a siege of jiine months' duration, that the fortunes 
 of the house of Bhopal were saved from destruction. It Mas of 
 course this unfriended condition of the small principality of Bhopal, 
 which led it to look to the rising influence of the British Govern- 
 ment from 1788, till the establishment of its paramount power in 
 1817 and 1818. 
 
 There appears good reason to believe, that it was the friendly 
 interposition of our residents at the courts of Gwalior and Nag- 
 pore, which saved the Bhopal principality from destruction, when 
 the disciplined brigades of Jean Baptiste prepared in 1814, for 
 offensive operations against that state. The able chief who had so 
 successfully conducted the affairs of Bhopal for nine years, through 
 a period of almost unequalled difficulty, died early in 1816, little 
 more than a year before Centi'al India Mas rescued from its long 
 period of anarchy and deep desolation by the effectual exhibition of 
 British poM-er. He Mas succeeded by his son, Nuzzer Mahomed, 
 who although not the eldest Mas on eveiy account the fittest, or the 
 only son fit, to administer the affairs of such a state at such a time. 
 It is in periods like these Mdien the necessity and justice of that 
 ruleof succession must be acknoMledged, which, amongst Mahome- 
 dans, decrees the reins of poM'er to the hands which shall be declar- 
 ed the fittest to guide them for the benefit of the state. And how- 
 ever necessary the introduction of our laM's of primogeniture in 
 their strictest sense, as applicable to succession to thrones may be, 
 to presei've that universal tranquillity, which it is the great object 
 and merit of our supreinacy to have secured to India, it must 
 nevertheless be allowed that to the individual states of that country, 
 we could hardly have introduced any one measure more generally 
 depressing or destructive to the best energies of both sovereigns 
 
126 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 and states. Nuzzer Mahomed had to tho age of thirty-five been 
 bred under the eye of his gallant and patriotic father, in a school 
 which taught him to defend in the field the interests of his country, 
 and the still more important and rarer lesson that institutions so 
 dearly bought and so safely won were not lightly to be risked in 
 more peaceable times. It is only scenes such as this chief had 
 witnessed, or an education under freer institutions than now belong, 
 or perhaps ever can belong to India, that can teach to princes the 
 advantages of governing in the hearts of their people, or that can 
 reconcile interests which, under more ordinary circumstances, will 
 generally appear in conflict. Sir John INIalcolm, from whose history 
 of Central India, this brief sketch of Bhopal is chiefly taken, (and 
 to whose writings we are so much indebteil for what we know of 
 the political history of our own times, particularly in that region,) 
 observes of this worthy successor of Wuzeer Mahomed, " His 
 whole soul was absorbed, during the last two years, in plans for 
 improving his country. He investigated every account himself, 
 heard every complaint ; and while all speak of his kindness, bene- 
 volence, and justice, his memory is unstained by the reproach of a 
 single act of tyranny." When shall we see a prince of this charac- 
 ter rise up under the present Zenana system of education, and our 
 laws of primogeniture, to emulate the virtues of Nuzzer Maho- 
 med ? He succeeded his father in February, 1816, and had governed 
 Bhopal only three years and five months, when he was accidentally 
 killed by a pistol discharged by the hands of a child, his bi-other- 
 in-law, whilst playing in his inner apartments with his infant 
 daughter. 
 
 Our treaty with Bhopal is dated 26th of February, 1818. It was 
 negotiated by Captain Stewart, and is of subsequent date to the 
 treaties with the Rajpoot states of Kotah, Joudpore, Oudeepore, 
 &c. negotiated by Sir Charles Metcalfe at Dehlee, with whom origi- 
 nated the " subordinate co-operation, and acknowledged suprema- 
 cy," which is the leading features in all this class of treaties. Bhopal 
 stipulates to furnish a contingent of six hundred horse, and four 
 hundred infantrj-, for the service of the British Government, when 
 required ; and when necessary, the whole disposable forces are to 
 join the British army. To mark its sense of former fidelity, and 
 to enable the state to maintain this contingent, the British Go- 
 vernment granted in perpetuity to Bhopal five districts of great 
 value, which were taken from the Peishwa, and which comprise 867 
 villages. In 1790, the revenues of Bhopal were estimated at ten 
 lakhs of rupees. From this period to the date of the treaty they 
 had fluctuated, and were sometimes so low as one lakh ; latterly 
 they extended again to ten lakhs, and Sir John JNIalcolm indulges 
 in the expectation of their soon exceeding thirty. Six thousand 
 rupees per annum were settled by the Nawab on Kunder Rao, and 
 on his descendants, under the guarantee of the British Government, 
 for services rendered about the time of the negotiation of the 
 treaty. In 1820, the military force of Bhopal consisted of 2,000 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 127 
 
 Cavalry and 5,000 Infantry, of Miiich LOOO were AfFijlians from 
 Cabul and Peshawar. The orcUiance, garrison and fiehl, amounted 
 to 180 pieces. The revenues were by tiie political agent estimated 
 at only nine lakhs. But the full revenue, including Jageers, under 
 good management, was supposed to be forty. 
 
 In 1821, an attempt was made to disturb the succession, as estab- 
 lished on the death of Nuzzer Mahomed, his nephew being his in- 
 fant successor. A relation of the family, Jumal Mahomed Khan, 
 conceived the design of secui'ing the succession of his own son, 
 through a marriage with the daughter of Nuzzer Mahomed, and it 
 was only on finding that a British force was prepared to march to 
 uphold the original measure, that this was relinquished. 
 
 The political agent had recourse to a measure of very doubtful 
 justice in threatening the widow of the late Nawab, who was sup- 
 posed to favor the design of disturbing the succession, with the pro- 
 bability of this scheme being met on the part of the British Govern- 
 ment by a claim " of a fourth or such other portion of the revenue 
 as may be determined, in the same manner as with the states of 
 Oudeepore, Jeypore, &c." whilst the treaty should have been a 
 sufficient assurance to them, that such a measure could not be seri- 
 ously entertained. 
 
 Referring to the conduct of Jumal Mahomed Khan, who seized on 
 a portion of the Bhopal territory, in furtherance of his design, the 
 political agent observes with great naivete to the court : " For it is 
 obvious that if the chiefs of Bhopal, who have no claims upon the 
 state commence dividing its possessions among themselves, there 
 no longer remains any consideration to prevent the Company's 
 Government, to whose interposition the princii^ality owes its exist- 
 ence, from demanding remuneration for its expenditure proportion- 
 ate to the benefit derived from its protection." 
 
 During the minority of the Prince, the form of administration is 
 somewhat remarkable. The w idow of the late Nawab was consi- 
 dered the head of the administration ; the other influential per- 
 sons being a Mahomedan, a Hindoo and a Christian. Of the last, 
 Sir John Malcolm observes, " Shazad Musseah, or Belthazar 
 Bourbona, with whom I am well acquainted, is an able man and a 
 brave soldier, is the descendant of a Frenchman called Bourbon, 
 who had come to India in the time of the Emperor Akbar." 
 
 The small districts of Burseah and Shajawulpore, yielding in 
 1821-22 a revenue of rupees 2,22,977, were so satisfactorily man- 
 aged by the political agent, that it was resolved to retain possession 
 of them, and to extend to them a further revenue settlement for 
 five years. 
 
 The Pathan Government of the principality of Bhopal, is more 
 of a popular form than any other Mahomedan Government in India ; 
 the principles which govern the Aff'ghan councils of central Asia, 
 having infused themselves into this small colony planted in the very 
 heart of India. Two of the members of the reigning family were 
 therefore, during the minority, joined to the former administration 
 
128 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 Shazad Musseah being apparently still the leading ministei', it was 
 the object of a family coalescence to remove this person from the 
 administration, but he was supported by the Regent Begum, " who 
 had firmness enough to resist the importunities of her family on 
 tliis point, and discernment to appreciate the qualities of an able 
 and most loyal servant." The political agent was authorized to 
 " exert his influence, though with the least jDossible degree of di- 
 rect and ostensible interference, to preserve concord and harmony, 
 and to uphold the just ascendancy of Shazad Musseah in the coun- 
 cils of the Bhopal Government." 
 
 In 1824, the important object was here attained of organizing 
 the Bhopal contingent, placing it under the command of an Euro- 
 pean officer, with whom the distribution of its regular monthly pay 
 and the promotion of its several ranks were to rest, and without 
 which important points it is of course impossible to extend to troops 
 such a degree of discipline, as Avould render them available for opera- 
 tions with our forces, or which would enable us to rest secure in 
 their fidelity to our cause. To secure these important oljjeets it 
 was here, as at Hyderabad, necessary to relinquish a poi-tion of the 
 contingent of Cavalry stipulated by treaty, in order to secure the 
 discipline and services of the remainder. The complement was now 
 fixed at 300 Cavalry, 673 Infantry, with two six-pounders manned 
 by 20 golandaz. The political agent, Mr. Maddock, and the resi- 
 dent, Sir David Ochterlony, were both sensible of the vital import- 
 ance of securing the services of such a body of troops in this posi- 
 tion ; but Government sanctioned the measure withovit apparently 
 responding to the sentiments of either party on this point. It may 
 be observed, that our Government was about this time assuming a 
 position which directed its attention more to civil than military con- 
 siderations. It enters justly and warmly into the measures of the 
 political agent, for relieving the small districts of Burseah and 
 Shajawulpore from the evils of over assessment, but responds cold- 
 ly to that of assuming an important military position. In the days 
 of a Wellesley or a Hastings, the former measure would have gain- 
 ed their high approbation, the latter their highest. Such too in a 
 later period of Lord Amherst's administration, when our protract- 
 ed struggle with the Burmese, and the absence of a large portion 
 of our army from India, brought us into collision with Bhurtpore, 
 and had nearly done so with Ulwur, Kerowlee, Jeypore, and other 
 states of Central India, wovdd have been the predominating tone. 
 In handing up to Government the propositions of the political agent, 
 Sir David Ochterlony observes on the former : " I have replied 
 that I would forward it for the consideration of Government, but 
 did not Avish to say moi'e than that it appeared to me, from Mr. 
 Maddock's experience and established character, that the concur- 
 rence of Government in his suggestions, might with much confi- 
 dence be anticipated." On the latter " I take the liljerty to state 
 my opinion, that Mr. Maddock's proposed arrangements, respecting 
 the Bhopal contingent, are of the most beneficial and eflicacious 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 129 
 
 nature, pecurin<T to us a liniitod but truly efficient force in a situation 
 Avhere their services may be eminently useful, and at the same time 
 reducing the expence to the state in a manner at once just and 
 judicious." The political agent had the nunit of giving due im- 
 l)ortance to either measure, and of discussing both subjects in able 
 and luminous despatches. 
 
 In 1S27, a contest arose between the Begum, widow of Nuzzur 
 ^lalionied, and the young NawabMooneer Mahomed Klian. By an 
 arrangement framed in 1819, by the Begum and the chiefs, and 
 formally recognized by the Britisli (iovernment, Mooneer Maho- 
 nunl Khan, the nephew, was declared the successor of the late Na- 
 Mab, and betrothed to his only daughter. Tlie Regency continued 
 in the hands of the mother during the minority, as has already been 
 described. When the Nawab arrived at a period of life to assert 
 his own authority, the Begum was naturally very reluctant to ren- 
 der up that which she had so long exercised, and came forward 
 with the declaration, that as she had adopted the Nawab he had 
 only a right to exercise during her life time such authority as she 
 chose to delegate to him. She declared him to be impotent and 
 therefore disqualified to become the husband of her daughter, and 
 that on this account the betrothal was virtually cancelled. He 
 levied troops, and endeavoured to gain over those of the state for 
 the purpose of asserting his rights. She attacked his positions 
 with the troops of the state, the chiefs being mostly with her, and 
 was likely to prevail against him. 
 
 At this period of the contest the British Government came for- 
 ward with the declaration, that it considered the authority of the 
 Begum to terminate on the Nawab's attaining his majority, that 
 her objections to his union with her daughter originated as much 
 in personal hostility, and an anxiety to retain the sovereign autho- 
 rity in her own hands, as in a belief that the charge of impotency 
 was well founded. The lady had not attained a marriageable age, 
 and the Nawab agreed that if he did not give sufficient proofs of 
 his virility, she should be married to his younger brother, who would 
 be adopted as heir to the principality. It still remained for consider- 
 ation, whether it was incumbent on the British Government to 
 espouse the cause of the Nawab, or whether from the pecu- 
 liar constitution of the Bhopal familj^, the aristocracy of the 
 state, who put him up, had not also the power of declaring 
 him disqualified to govern, if dissatisfied with his conduct, cha- 
 racter, and qualifications. " On the whole, the Governor Ge- 
 neral in Council is disposed to authorize you, if the know- 
 ledge of the sentiments of the British Government, as to the i*ight 
 of tlie Nawab, fail to produce tranquil submission to his rule, and 
 if you consider the general voice to be decidedly against the 
 Nawab, to intimate to the chiefs of Bhopal, and principal members 
 and relations of the ruling family, that the British Government is 
 anxious they should settle the existing dispute amongst themselves, 
 and determine according to their own view of the laws and usages 
 
 ,s 
 
130 INTEHNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 of the state, and its real interests, in whose liands the Government 
 of the country shall hereafter be vested. After making a declara- 
 tion to the above effect, the duty of your assistant and yourself 
 ■will be to stand aloof for a time, and to observe accurately 
 and report continually the progress of events. Your chief 
 care will naturally be to prevent the spread of disturbances, 
 should such unhappily arise, into neighbouring districts, either 
 under British rule or entitled to our protection. If the dis- 
 pute should be protracted, and entail consequences threatening 
 eerious danger to the internal tranquillity and prosperity of our 
 own dominions, or those of our allies, the British Government 
 would then be compelled to interpose eff'ectually on the principle 
 of self-defence, and adopt such measures for the suppression of 
 disorder, and the establishment of an efficient Government in 
 Bhopal, as circumstances, and its own notions of right and justice 
 might permit or dictate. It may be proper to state explicitly in 
 conclusion, that the contingent which the state of Bhopal is bound 
 by treaty to furnish for the service of the British Government in 
 lieu of tribute, Avould not of course be available for the aid of either 
 side, and must stand perfectly neutral, shovild any contest for the 
 Government ensue." 
 
 Before the order of Government reached Bhopal, the Nawab's 
 party had been subdued by the Begum's. It was the opinion of 
 the chiefs of the state that the Begum was supreme head, and that 
 he would not be justified in attempting to establish his authority 
 by the subversion of hers. He would not submit to the tests re- 
 quired of his virility, and finally relinquished his claim to the hand 
 of the young Princess, with that of his succession to the throne, in 
 favor of a younger brother. The chiefs of the state did not arm to 
 oppose the Nawab's pretensions to power, but to save the Begum 
 and her daughter from a forced matrimonial connexion, which 
 throughout the contest was more an object with the impotent 
 Nawab than the possession of a throne. It appeared on further 
 inquiry, that according to the usages of the family, the chiefs hav- 
 ing declared the Begum and her daughter the rightful heirs of 
 the late Nawab, their allegiance to them Avas not abrogated by her 
 adoption, with their consent, of her husband's nephew ; and tliat 
 she was considered not as regent, but as absolute sovereign in lier 
 own right. The Nawab himself had never aspired to any thing 
 further than the administration of affairs under her control. 
 
 Hakeem Shazad Mussiah, who had retired from office to his 
 Jageer at Itechawur, died on the 1st of January, 1829. On hearing 
 of his illness, the Begum and the minister proceeded there to visit 
 him, and it was supposed in the hope of inducing him to return to 
 office. The position and character of this Christian minister of a 
 state situated like Bhopal are very remarkable. " In his youth he 
 was the friend of the distinguished ruler of Bhopal, Nuzzer Ma- 
 homed Klian, became his companion in arms, and distinguished 
 himself as an enterjirising and succesful leader. When vii'tually 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 131 
 
 at the head of the administration, lie displayed more rectitude of 
 intention anil firmness of eonduct in his public capacity, and more 
 integrity and disinterestedness in what regarded his private fortune, 
 than can be often found united in the same individual. Such qua- 
 lities necessarily commanded the respect and confidence of the 
 court, and combined with the expenditure of a large portion of his 
 private income, in unostentatious acts of chanty and munificence, 
 secured for him the affections of the people. 
 
 " The general knowledge of the Hukeem was superior to 
 any native prince or gentleman with whom I am acquainted, while 
 the candid and unreserved manner in which he expressed himself 
 on all subjects, unlike the habit of other Asiatics, rendered his con- 
 versation such as could not fail to be pleasing to an English gen- 
 tleman, and must have procured for him the regard and esteem of 
 every one who was thrown so much as I have been into his 
 societj'."* 
 
 The sanguine anticipations of increasing revenue and resources, 
 indulged by the authorities first employed in Bhopal, after the 
 tranquillization of Central India, have been here, as every where else, 
 disappointed. The revenues which in 1819 were nine lakhs, and 
 then estimated to ascend in five years to twenty, did not increase 
 in those five years, and are now (1832) not more than eight. We 
 have apparently discovered that it is not easy to increase the reve- 
 nues of an inland country whose jiroduce is chiefly grain, and that 
 until some other and more valuable sources of agriculture and trade 
 are ingrafted on those of India, or until the markets of Europe are 
 freely opened to that country, we must expect not an increase but 
 a defalcation in the present amount of land revenue, which is per- 
 haps less than the average of the last twenty years. The enhanced 
 value of money, as compared with that of produce, and the proba- 
 bility that its comparative value must be yet more enhanced, will 
 very materially affect all the calculations, the income, and the 
 expenditure of a principality like Bhopal. The revenue affairs of 
 the Bhopal Government have hitherto been wisely and prudently 
 managed, the farming system w^hich prevails so extensively in 
 Scindia's neighbouring districts, never having been adopted in 
 Bhopal. 
 
 The Begum seems now as reluctant to celebrate the marriage of 
 the young Nawab, who is in his fourteenth year, with her daughter, 
 and to admit of his assuming that place in the state which belongs 
 to him, or to establish that system of education and instruction, 
 which are necessary to his future respectaljility, as she was in the 
 case of his brother. 
 
 18. CuTcir. — The first notice of this principality may commence 
 in 1802, when an overture was made through the horse merchant 
 Soonderjee, who in those days was a person of more influence in 
 the affairs of Scind and Cutch than his occupation would indicate, 
 to obtain the aid of our troops to expel the Scindians from the fort 
 
 * Mr Maddock's Report lo Ooveroment, 
 s 2 
 
132 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 of Vusta-bunder, of which they had, six months before, possessed 
 themselves; and to assist in the concjuest of Scind. The chief of 
 Cutch being an imbecile, a civil war was imaging in that country 
 between the ex-minister, tlie notorious Futteh Mahomed, and 
 Huns Raj, tlie minister then in power, and it was probably as much 
 to assist in this war as in the expulsion of the Scindians that these 
 overtures were made to us. The Raja was at his capital Booj, 
 whilst Futteh Mahomed was besieged by the minister in the fort 
 of xlnjar, the former having 3 or 4,000, the latter 10,000 men. 
 
 It was considered, both by the Court of Directors and the Su- 
 preme Government, in the then unsettled state of Cutch, inexpctli- 
 ent to enter on any other terms with that state than those of amity 
 and friendship. 
 
 Overtures were again made in 1806 for assistance to release the 
 Raja from the thraldom, in which he was held by Futteh Maho- 
 med, and they were answered in the same spirit. 
 
 As our relations with the Guickwar extended into Kattywar, we 
 were brovight more closely into contact with Cutch, and in 1809, 
 overtures commenced on our part, and an agent was deputed to 
 Booj, who contracted certain relations with the Wuzeer Futteh 
 Mahomed and the Dewan Finns Raj, to the effect that no troops 
 of theirs should cross to the east side of the Gulf and Run lying 
 between Cutch and Guzerat, nor should any claim or interference 
 on their part be therein maintained. But as the Maha Rao of 
 Cutch had various claims on the countries thus situated, it was 
 agreed that they should be adjusted by arbitrators ; one on the 
 part of the Company, one on the part of the Maha Rao, and one on 
 behalf of those on Avhom the claims were made. 
 
 Huns Raj further proposed, that an agent should be stationed at 
 Mundavee, on the part of the British Government, for whose ex- 
 pense he offered to assign 18,000 rupees a year; that Mundavee 
 should be placed under his own charge, until his master the Maha 
 Rao should be competent to assume the direction of affairs; and 
 that British aid should be lent for the defence of Mundavee, if 
 threatened, the cost of which he was ready to pay ; which proposi- 
 tions were entertained, and Huns Raj and his heirs guaranteed in 
 possession of Mundavee. 
 
 The proceedings in Cutch, and the presence of a detachment of 
 troops in Kattywar, under Colonel Walker, the resident at Baroda, 
 caused some anxiety on the part of the Ameers of Scind, and led 
 them to call for explanation on the subject from the Bombay 
 Government. The Ameers had been before told through a letter 
 from the Governor General, that we would not tolerate any project 
 of hostility on their part towards Cutch. 
 
 On the death of the Dewan Huns Raj, and the accession of his 
 son Shew Raj to the office, a civil war again arose between the 
 Wuzeer and Dewan, and on the strength of the engagement before 
 described, the latter claimed the aid of two battalions of our troops 
 for the protection of Mundavee ; the Cutch territory then apparently 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 133 
 
 beinjT divided between tlie rival ministers. lie sliowed however 
 his distrust ol" us sutHciently l)y wishing to stipuhite that our troops 
 should not be admitted into the fort of Mundavee, but that when 
 the Wuzeer was .subdued and their arrears paitl, they should return 
 witliin our own frontier, for which he required security. 
 
 The imbecile cliief of Cutch was the head of the brotherhood of 
 Jey Kaja Rajpoots ; certain mendjers of the family were attached 
 respectively to the Wuzeer Futteh Mahomed and the Dewan Shew 
 Raj. By the measures adopted in 1809, we had espoused the cause 
 of the latter, and yet informed the former that we liad taken no 
 measure injurious to his interests, or of which we had any right to 
 complain. For since we could tell him that we had no intention of 
 accpiiring territory, or of aggrandizing ourselves, it was thouglit 
 he could have no just cause of complaint, because we guaranteed the 
 possessions of his rival, sent an agent to reside with him, and were 
 prepared to send troops to support him. He showed that soreness 
 which might have been expected at our interference to this extent 
 in the affairs of Cutch, and produced letters from tlie imbecile Raja, 
 objecting to, and refusing to recognize the part, which we had 
 taken. The other members of the Jey Raja brotherhood showed 
 the same jealousy of the position which we had assumed, and it was 
 evident that we were about to support the weaker party, which in 
 reality had no rights in Mundavee, in opposition to the stronger, in 
 whose hands was the Ra,ja, and with whom were the principal mem- 
 bers of his family and the majority of the people of the country ; 
 neither had we in reality any interest in this contest of rival minis- 
 ters, for it should rather have been our object to have raised up an 
 united and substantial administration in Cutch, which might have 
 been able to defend itself against the Ameers of Scind, and which 
 would have had the jiower of putting down, and might have been 
 held responsible for, any aggressions committed on the frontiers of 
 our ally, the Guickwar, which we were bound to protect. Yet in 
 spite of these considerations, the Bomljay Government was prepa- 
 red to put forth a military force to support the phantom power which 
 it had set up at Mundavee. The Supreme Government more wise- 
 ly considered that our engagements with the father, whose office in 
 its nature was not hereditary, did not bind us to the same terms 
 with the son, unless they had been renewed, particularly as the 
 first measure of that son was to demur at receiving our agent, to 
 show jealousy in receiving our troops into his fort, and to require 
 security for the withdrawal of them, when the services for which 
 they were lent should be completed. The Bombay Government 
 ■was therefore in August, 1810, directed to stay furtlier military pre- 
 parations and to recal its agent from Mundavee. But before the 
 injunctions of the Supreme Government reached Bombay or indeed 
 before the instructions of the Bombay Government reached its agent 
 in Cutch, he had already called troops from Kattywar to Mundavee, 
 to support the Hindoo against the Mahomedan minister. The pre- 
 sence of our troops hastened the settlement of their difterences. 
 
134 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 The Hindoo very soon became desirous of avoiding the expense of 
 maintaining them, and the Mahomedan more disposed to attend to 
 the claims of tlie other. Their differences were referred to arbi- 
 tration, and long l)efore the award was given, both jiarties required 
 the withdrawal of the two battalions. Futteh Mahomed, however, 
 resisted an overture, Mhich was made to him, to connect himself 
 more closely with us. 
 
 The obligations which we had incurred to secure to the Cutch 
 Government its just claims from the territory of Kattywar, lying 
 between Cutch and Guzerat, and which was chiefly tributary to our 
 ally the Guickwar, rendered it necessary, in 1812, to equip a force 
 of some strength under the command of Sir Lionel Smith, to operate 
 against one of those tributary chieftains, the Rana of Naonuggur, 
 who refused to abide by the terms of our and the Guickwar's settle- 
 ment of the Cutch claims on him, and it was in consequence neces- 
 sary to coerce him into obedience. 
 
 From this period up to 1815, the territories of our allies in 
 Kattywar had been constantly subject to the incursions of the people 
 of Wagur, who, in breach of the engagements of the Cutch Govern- 
 ment with us, had crossed the Run to commit depredations in that 
 province. The loss sustained thereby, with the expense incurred for 
 the repression of the evil, was at the end of this year estimated at 
 twenty lakhs of rupees. 
 
 The Government of Cutch having failed to afford, either redress 
 for the past, or indemnity for the future, a force was at the close of 
 the year assembled, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel East, 
 in Kattywar, to compel that Government to adopt those measures 
 which negotiation had failed to produce. On its advance by the direct 
 route towards the capital, the water was found to have been poisoned, 
 bags of wheat and arsenic having been discovered in the tanks ; it 
 was therefore necessary to turn towards Anjar, which town surren- 
 dered shortly after the batteries were opened against it, and on the 
 force advancing from that place towards Booj, Wvikeels were dis- 
 patched by the Rao to camp to adjust terms with the agent who 
 accompanied the force. 
 
 The first question to be adjusted was the conflicting claims of 
 Ladooba and Burmuljee to the guddee ; and the election was left to 
 the principal Jey Raja chiefs, forming the federal brotherhood of 
 the Rao of Cutch. They were unanimous in favor of the latter, 
 declaring him to be the legitimate son of the late Rao, whilst the 
 former it was insinuated, was spurious. 
 
 A treaty of amity and friendship was concluded at Boqj, on the 
 14t]i of January, 1816, which was delivered to the agent by tlie^Rao 
 in full Durbar, with the expression of a hope that its provisions 
 Avould ever continue binding on both parts. They were principally 
 indemnity to the subjects of the Peishwa and Guickwar, for losses 
 sustained by them, through the irruptions of the people of Cutch 
 into Kattywar ; and to us for the expences of the Avar, and promised 
 security for the future, both from land aggressions and piracy. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. J 35 
 
 The British Govornnient a<rrot'(l to aid witli a forco to arrange af- 
 fairs in the disturbed Talooiv of Wagur, and the Rao ceded in per- 
 petuity the fort and district of Aiijar, engaged to pay the annual 
 sum of two lakhs of cowries, and to receive at his capital, a repre- 
 sentative of the British Government. The Supreme Government, 
 considered the amount of indemnity for the expenses of the war, 
 i. e. eiglit lalvhs of rupees, and tlu; annual tribute, calculated to im- 
 poverish the principality of Cutch to a degree which ^^•ould destroy 
 its substantive power, and both were by a supplementary article to 
 the treaty remitted. Tlie revenues of Cutch were, in 1809, stated 
 to be only 10,00,000 rupees. This measure, with the restoration 
 of the Jey Raja Rao of Cutch, aftertlie suspension of his authority for 
 twenty years, was represented to have diffused great joy through- 
 out the country, and to place our relations on the most propitious 
 footing. 
 
 Yet scarcely were these terms concluded, when the Rao of Cutch 
 begun to evince a disposition hostile to us. He murdered the un- 
 fortunate Ladooba, who had been his rival in his claims to the 
 throne, began to levy troops for the purpose of attacking Anjar, 
 and attacked one of the Wagur chiefs, whose possessions were un- 
 der our guarantee ; to show others, as he openly avowed, the 
 punishment which awaited those who depended for protection on 
 the British Government. 
 
 The conduct of the Rao left little doubt that he was deranged in 
 intellect, either through inheritance from his father, or from the 
 inordinate use of spirits ; and it became necessary to assemble a 
 military force under the command of Sir William Grant Keir, to 
 act against him. 
 
 A new treaty was concluded with the Jey Raja brotherhood, on the 
 13th of October, 1819. The Rao was agreeably to their desire de- 
 posed, placed as a state prisoner in Booj, and his infant son was 
 raised to the guddee under the name and title of Maha Raja Mirza 
 Rao Dessuljee. A Regency was framed during the minoritj', of whom 
 the British resident, at the particular desire of the brotherhood, 
 formed one of the six members. A British force was left for the pro- 
 tection of Cutch, the expense of which that Government binds it- 
 self to pay, to be reduced or entirely withdrawn at the option of the 
 British Government. The Jey Raja chiefs, and generally all Rajpoot 
 chiefs, in Cutch and Wagur, are guaranteed in the full enjoyment 
 of their possessions. All agree to abolish the practice of female in- 
 fanticide. 
 
 In 1822, the town and district of Anjar were restored to the 
 Rao for a money payment of 88,000 rupees a year. 
 
 Fi'om that period up to the present time, the irruptions of plun- 
 derers from the neighbouring district of Nuggur Parkur, either an 
 integral part of the dominions, or a country tributary to Scind, 
 has been loudly complained of as an evil requiring redress. The 
 Khosas, or inhabitants of the country to the north east of Parkur, 
 have also found a resting place there, and it has been supposed that 
 
136 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 the (loprodations of the former people were countenanced by the 
 Ameers of Scind, and those of the latter by the Raja of Joudpore. 
 The obligations, under which we are to protect the frontiers of 
 our allies of Baroda and Cutch, from foreign aggression, have at 
 length forced us to arm against tliese depredators, and to act against 
 them in the seat of their power ; and our operations are seconded by 
 the troops of the above-mentioned allies, by those of Scind, Joud- 
 pore and Jessulmere. 
 
 The inability of the principality of Cutch to meet the demands 
 which are due to us by treaty has led to constant remissions on our 
 part. At length, t!ie Court of Directors, in a letter dated the 1st 
 of February, 1832, inform the Bombay Government, that the de- 
 mands on Cutch, on account of the cession of An jar, are considered 
 to be much above what that pergunnah can ever yield, and as they 
 are consequently a charge upon the other resources of the state, 
 they should be permanently relincpxished. The Bombay Govern- 
 ment accordingly resolve, on the 4th of Septemljer, 1832, that the 
 amount of arrears, seven lakhs of cowries, two lakhs of rupees, should 
 be struck off, and that the equivalent for Anjar, 88,000 rupees per 
 annum, should be remitted. The subsidy hereafter payable being 
 2,00,000 rupees per annum, that this amount shall diminish in 
 propoi-tion as we may diminish the troops in Cutch ; and if they 
 should be diminished so as to fall below the amount of the Anjar 
 compensation, or altogether withdrawn, then in either case, that 
 amount only shall be demandable. This is a great boon conferred 
 on our ally of Cutcli, and the young Rao will now enter on the 
 administration of a country comparatively unshackled in its resour- 
 ces; an object of no little importance to ourselves on a frontier 
 situated like Cutch. 
 
 The resident states in a memorandum on the financial condition 
 of Cutch, in November, 1831, that the state loses upwards of two 
 lakhs of covfr'iesper annum, by what he considers our dictatorial and 
 perhaps unauthorized prohibition as to the opium trade. It does 
 not appear what our measures are on this head, but they may be 
 considered similar in their object and nature to those relinquished 
 in Malwa and Rajpootana ; and it is curious enough to lind our 
 Patna and Benares opium monopoly leading to simihir measures in 
 countries so remote in position. 
 
 Our first relations with Cutch, in connection with those in Kattj'- 
 war, commenced under the political superintendence of that most 
 virtuous and enlightened of the Company's servants, the late Briga- 
 dier-General Walker, the Governor of St. Helena. How far his 
 measures for the suppression of female infanticide, which prevails 
 in a greater degree amongst the Jey Rajas than any other tribe of 
 Rajpoots, have had any effect, is still doubtful, and how far that 
 unnatural system will yield to negotiation yet remains to be seen. 
 As the influence of our administration pervades the councils of 
 Cutch, and as civilization dawns in that hitherto more than usually 
 benighted land, measures of such atrocity must, like the Suttee, be 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 137 
 
 STiipposcd to come within the influoiiece of our power ; and the 
 proseut Government will not be inattentive to the call of humanity in 
 the one case, any more than in the other. 
 
 The net revenues of Catch in 1 829-30 were 27,00,000 cowries, 
 exclusive of 4',38,000 " voluntary contributions," on the occasion of 
 the Rao's marriage. The expenditure, 32,35,000, including the 
 marriage expences, amounting to 9,20,000 cowries. 
 
 19. Dhar. — This small but ancient principality, on whose Raj- 
 poot family, a Mahratta stock seems to have been grafted, main- 
 tained its position, surrounded by enemies, with almost as great 
 difficulty as the Afghan house of Bhopal, until admitted by the 
 British Government to the condition of a protected state. The 
 treaty with it is dated the 13th of March, 1819. For the protec- 
 tion afforded, it ceded the tribute which it was entitled to levy 
 from the Rajpoot states of Banswai'a and Dongerpore. Certain 
 districts, w liich it had lost in the troubles of the last thirty years, 
 were recovered and restored ; and the tribute of Ali Mohun was 
 secured to it. 
 
 By an additional engagement, concluded on the ISth of December, 
 1821, Dhar ceded to the British Government the district of 
 Bairseah and the tribute of Ali Mohun for a money payment of 
 1,10,000 rupees. 
 
 The Powarof Dhar, although reduced in circumstances, was con- 
 sidered by the resident at Indore equal in rank to Scindia, Holkar, 
 the Guickwar, orany other ofthe principal chiefs of the late Mahratta 
 Empire ; and the marriage of the young chief of Dhar with the 
 grand-daughter of Scindia, in 1822, was an occasion of great 
 rejoicing at Gwalior. 
 
 In 1826, opium treaties were concluded with Dhar, similar to 
 those already described, also with the neighbouring state of Dewas. 
 The measure was also in progress w ith the other states of Malwa ; 
 for it was determined that it should pervade all our operations in 
 those parts. The political agent reported, in 1825, on "the good 
 disposition of the young Raja of Dhar, the efficiency ofthe manage- 
 ment of Bapoo Rugonath, and the strong interest, which the Regent 
 Bae takes, in all that concerns the interests of her adopted son. 
 The Powars of Dewas, who with those of Dhar feel they owe 
 much to the British Government, always evince the same good 
 feeling, and seem to value the safety, tranquillity, and comfort they 
 now enjoy under our control." 
 
 In 1831, the district of Bairseah was given up to the Dhar 
 Government, it having been discovered that, in receiving that dis- 
 trict, in 1821, we made a very impi'ovident bargain, the collections 
 being less than the amount paid for it by 50 or 60,000 rupees a 
 year. 
 
 The late insurrection amongst the Bheels of the Dhar principal- 
 ity was through the instigation of Oochet Rao Powar ; tliis person 
 is the reputed son of Morar Rao, the sou of Moheput Rao ; whose 
 
 T 
 
138 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 father Raja Jtswuiit Rao Powar was killed at the battle of Parice- 
 put. Oochet Rao had for a series of years been treated by the Dhar 
 autlioritics in a way very unsuitable to his pretended relationship 
 to the family, and at last appealed to the Bheel population, who, 
 partly to assert his rights and partly to gratify their own restless 
 disposition, broke out into open rebellion, descended into the 
 plains, and inflicted on the peaceable community all those evils 
 which they so well know how to produce. 
 
 In virtue of the fifth article of the treaty, the Dhar Government 
 appealed to our assistance, which was granted, and through our 
 means peace was restored. But when the Dhar authorities discover- 
 ed that the exercise of power on our part would also entitle us to 
 influence their future treatment of Oochet Rao, they would when 
 tranquillity was restored, have willingly escaped from this inter- 
 ference, and professed their ability to x'cstrain their own Bheel 
 subjects, if we would only save them from aggressions on the part 
 of the Bheel subjects of foreign states. 
 
 Our relations with the Powars of Dewas are similar to those 
 with the Powars of Dhar, the treaty with them being dated the 
 12th of December, 1818. 
 
 20. Dholpore Baree. — Rana Keerut Singh is of the Jaut tribe ; 
 the father of this chief seems to have conquered Gwalior about 
 1761, but lost it again to Madhajee Scindia, in 1784. 
 
 The draft of articles of agreement made and concluded at Fort 
 William in Bengal with Raja Lukendur Behadur, Rana of Goluid, 
 on the 2nd of December, 1779, is a document of some curiosity, 
 negociated in the infancy of our art of treaty-making, and of our 
 acquaintance with the political affairs of Upper India. Whenever 
 a war might take place between the contracting parties and the 
 Mahrattas, and the Maha Raja should require an English force for the 
 defence of his country, or the acquisition of territory, it was to be 
 granted to remain with him, " as long as he shall require it, and 
 retui-n when he shall dismiss it," at the rate of 20,000 rupees a 
 month for each battalion of Sepoys with its Artillery. The revenue 
 of the territory acquired by the united forces, whether by war or 
 by treaty, except the fifty -six Mahals which constitute the Maha 
 Raja's Jageer, and which are now in the possession of the Mahrat- 
 tas, to be divided between the parties in the proportion of nine annas 
 to the Company and seven to the Raja. The Raja was to prescribe the 
 nature of the service to be performed, the officer commanding the 
 English troops to regulate the mode of performing it. Whenever 
 peace shall be concluded between the Company and the Mahi-atta 
 state, the Maha Raja shall be included as a party in the treaty 
 which shall be made for that purpose ; and his present possessions, 
 together with the fort of Gwalior, which of old belongs to the 
 family of the Maha Raja, if it shall be then in his possession, and 
 such countries as he shall have acquired in the course of the war, 
 and which it shall then be stipvdatcd to leave in his hands, sliall be 
 guaranteed to him by treaty. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 139 
 
 " No En£rUsh factory shall be etablislicd in the dominions of 
 the Malia llaja. No persons of any denomination shall be sent 
 into his dominions on the part of the English Company, or with 
 the license of the Governor General in Council, without his previous 
 consent. Neither shall his ryuts be pressed for any military 
 service, nor any authority exercised over them but his own." 
 
 By the next treaty, dated the 17th of January, 1804, we agreed 
 to establish Maha Raja Keerut Singh in the sovereignty of his 
 hereditary countries of Gohud and the undermentioned districts, to 
 be possessed by him his heirs and successoi-s, free from all deduc- 
 tions, under the guarantee of the Honorable Company : — Gwalior, 
 Khas, Antra, &c. altogether forty places. 
 
 The Maha Raja subsidized three battalions, and agreed to pay 
 for them nine lakhs of rupees annually. It became however in the 
 moan time a question, whether by the terms of the treaty of the 
 30th of December, 1803, with Scindia, these territories were ours tc 
 grant, and as under the pacific administrations of the Marquis 
 Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow, it was not the policy to make this 
 a question of arms, a second treaty was concluded with the Rana, 
 on the 19th of December, 1805, by which the "Maha Raj Rana hereby 
 agrees to relinquish the possession of the country and fort of Gohud 
 and of the other districts guaranteed to him by the former treaty, to 
 the officers of the British Government, to be disposed of as may 
 appear expedient to the Honorable Company." " The Honorable 
 Company, from the consideration that the failure in the stipulations 
 of the former treaty on the part of the Maha Raj Rana has arisen 
 from inability and want of means, is inclined to grant to the Maha 
 Raj Rana an adequate provision, and liereby agrees that the districts 
 of Dholpore Baree and Raj Kera shall l)e delivered over to the 
 Maha Raj Rana in sovereignty to him, his heirs and successors." 
 
 The Maha Raj Rana thus received a provision of four or five lakhs 
 of rupees per anniun^ instead of a principality with a subsidiary 
 force for his protection. But for the treaty of 17th January, 1804, 
 even this was far more than he had any right to expect from us ; 
 and if through that treaty he gained nothing, neither did he lose 
 any thing. The policy of the Marquis Wellesley Avould certainly 
 have led him to carry through the arrangement by which Gwalior 
 and Gohud were ceded to this chief; and with the measures which 
 would have followed for the pacification of India, had the noble 
 Marquis remained at the head of its administration, the Maha Raj 
 Rana of Gohud would not have had much difficulty in conducting 
 the affairs of his new principality. Gwalior would then have be- 
 come in all probability our principal military station in those parts. 
 Raj Rana Keerut Singh is still alive, but must be near his ninetieth 
 year. In 1826, he was full of liopc that the approaching death of 
 Dowlut Rao Scindia would turn to his advantage, and then talked 
 of recovering Gwalior and Gohud ; but the changes which have 
 since taken place must have satisfied him that the day for obtaining 
 such acquisitions has long since passed away. 
 
 T 2 
 
140 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 21. Rewah. — "When on the extension of the British power into 
 Bogelkund and Bundlekund, through the treaty of Bassein, it be- 
 came desirable to enter into relations of amity and friendiihip with 
 the Rewah state, and advances for that purpose Ave re made in 1803, 
 those advances were rejected by the Rajah. 
 
 The irruption of a body of Pindarics into the Mirzapore district 
 in March, 1812, through the Rewah country, proved to us that it 
 was necessary to strengthen our frontier in that direction. Kurreera 
 Khan, the leader of the Pindarics, had an interview with the Rewah 
 Raja in his progress towards the British tei-ritory ; and as he res- 
 pected the Rewah country, the impression necessarily was that the 
 Pindarics either Avere supported by the Raja, or that he had not 
 the power of opposing them. 
 
 A treaty was accordingly negotiated on the 5th of October, 1812, 
 through which the Raja's supremacy was acknowledged, and his 
 possessions secured under the guarantee of the British Government^ 
 to whose mediation he submitted all relations Avith foreign states ; 
 mutual delivery of enemies and rebels was agreed to, and co-opera- 
 tion in military affairs. 
 
 When, however, it Avas intended to establish a military post Avith- 
 in the Raja's territory, he objected to that measure, endeavoured to 
 starve out the troops, objected to and opposed our opening a com- 
 munication through his country by post, expelled our neAvs-writer, 
 and showed an unfriendly disposition in the whole of his measures 
 tOAvards our political agent and troops. 
 
 A force (the usual remedy) AA^as accordingly sent into RcAvah, to 
 compel the Raja to adhere to the tei'ms stipulated in the treaty, 
 and on the 2nd of June, 1813, a second ti'eaty Avas negotiated. 
 
 The Raja bound himself to engage in no correspondence of a 
 political nature Avith any foreign state ; to receive a neAvs-writer 
 or other agent ; to permit the establishment of Daks through his 
 country, &c. Shortly after the negotiation of this treaty, the Raja 
 abdicated in favor of his son, apparently in the hope of evading the 
 fulfilment of these conditions. The son Avas required to execute an 
 instrument binding himself to abide by the terms of the treaties 
 negotiated with his father, and after considerable evasion he con- 
 sented. 
 
 After a suspension of hostilities, for the purpose of negotiating 
 the above treaty, had been agreed on, a small detachment of 
 sepoys were treacherously attacked by the troops of Rewah. The 
 aggressors in this affair Avere surrounded in the fortified post of 
 Entouree, Avhich Avas gallantly defended, and carried by assault by 
 a detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, on 
 the 4th of December, 1813. This example seemed necessary, and 
 Avas the first military operation conducted in those parts, the cost 
 of Avhich the Raja Avas made to bear. 
 
 On the 11th of March, 1814, a third treaty was negotiated Avith 
 RcAvah : some lands Avhich by the terms of the former treaty Avere 
 forfeited to the British Government by subjects of ReAvah, Avere 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 141 
 
 transferred on certain conditions to that state, whose Government 
 bound itself not to levy on certain of its subjects any portion of the 
 penalty imposed upon itself. Some of its chiefs were guaranteed 
 from the consequence which they apprehended as likely to arise 
 from having taken part with us in the contest against their own 
 Government. 
 
 In 1823, the Jageerdar of Simerea, one of the guaranteed chiefs, 
 and a relation of the Raja's appealed to the British Government 
 against his chief, who had sent a military force into his Jageer to 
 enforce his demands for; 1st, arrears of tribute;, amounting by his 
 showing to rupees 1,50,250; 2nd, an outstanding balance of 
 rupees 1,95,843, claimed from the Jageerdar dui'ing the jieriod of 
 his administering the affairs of Rewah ; and 3rdly, to enforce a 
 settlement regarding some disputed villages. The Raja was required 
 to stay military operations, and to submit his differences with the 
 Jageerdar to the arbitration of the British Government. And 
 eventually, it was settled, that the demand for tribute for a period 
 antecedent to the guarantee covild not be recognised ; that the claim 
 arising from unadjusted accounts was met by a counterclaim on the 
 part of the Jageerdar ; that the demand for arrears of tribute 
 from the period of the negotiation of the treaty was cancelled by 
 the conduct of the Raja in sending an armed force into the Jageer 
 of Simerea : and that the demand for tribute should for the future 
 be limited to 2,500 rupees per annum. 
 
 It was evident that that change which is produced every where 
 by the British Government forming relations with a native state was 
 already working between the Raja and his feudatories. The mea- 
 sure of guaranteeing any of those, dependant chiefs necessarily at 
 once produces that change, for they then look to the protection of 
 the British Government, and the tie that before bound all together 
 is severed. But there is another although less perceptible manner 
 in which this change in their relative positions is sure to be w^ork- 
 ed. The original tenure, by which most of the subordinate chiefs 
 under the native states of India hold their possessions, is that of 
 supplying troops for the service of the state. The safety of the 
 dominions depend on their acting in concert with the chief, who is 
 as forward to court the favorable opinion and support of his feuda- 
 tories as they are proud to receive his countenance, and to defend 
 his and their own rights. When guaranteed from external danger 
 by a foreign power, this dependence of the prince upon the support 
 of his chiefs and people is necessarily in a great degree destroyed. 
 His resources are gradually concentrated and improved, and he 
 begins to look around him for the chief amongst them Avho is most 
 likely " to make a bonny rebel." If our authority is ajjpealed to, 
 we generally have not the right to mediate between them ; and if 
 we attempt it without this right, we are sure sooner or later to do 
 harm to him whose cause it is our object to support. It is to be 
 feared, that this check on bad Government, which, although im- 
 measurably inferior to that of representatives elected by the people 
 
142 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 themselves, is still far superior to a pure despotism, will gradually 
 disappear from amongst the native states most nearly conneeted 
 with or supported by us. Those of Rajpootana are the finest 
 examples of this description of Government, and unless the feuda- 
 toiy chiefs of those independent states watch narrowly over 
 their own interests, and maintain a union amongst themselves 
 sufficient to protect their order against the usurpations of the 
 throne, there is every probability that they will in the progress of 
 time fall before its insidious encroachments and superior power. 
 
 In 1828, the Simerea Jageerdar came forward with an application 
 to have the third and fourth articles of the third treaty by which 
 he was guaranteed in his possessions expunged. It did not appear 
 what inducement the Raja held out to him to make this proposi- 
 tion. But there was no difficulty in complying Avith a request 
 " which relieved us from an inconvenient obligation, and conferred 
 a benefit on the state of Rewah." It was afterwards discovered 
 that the guarantee of the Jageerdar of Simerea extended only to 
 his own lifetime, and that he had allowed the stipulated tribute to 
 run considerably into arrears. The minister of Rewah too, whom 
 he had considered principally inimical to him, was dead ; and on 
 those accounts he was induced to forego the guarantee of the 
 British Government. Scarcely had he taken this imprudent step 
 when he M^as expelled from his possessions by an armed force sent 
 from Rewah, and his nephew installed in his room — his appeal to 
 our protection was then of course of no avail. 
 
 The tone of Rewah has generally been considered hostile through- 
 out the period of its connection with the British Government, and 
 when the Raja of Ocheyrah was proceeding as a state prisoner 
 through those territories in the end of 1831, under charge of two 
 companies of Infantry, the Rewah Government was supposed to 
 have collected a force of 1,400 men on the route by which he was 
 proceeding, either Avith the view of effecting his rescue or of op- 
 posing his further progress. On account of these threatening 
 appearances, the officer commanding the detachment applied for 
 re-inforcements, and reported his intention of taking post in the 
 fort of Myheer ; but eventually the detachment proceeded to its 
 destination unopposed. 
 
 The revenues of Rewah are estimated at twenty lakhs joer anmcm ; 
 its standing army not to exceed 4,000 men. But it can on a very 
 short notice assemble a militia force of from 10 to 15,000. 
 
 22. DuTTEAH. — The chief of this principality came under the 
 authority of the British Government through the cessions in Bun- 
 dlekund negotiated with the Peishwa in the treaty of Bassein. A 
 treaty was subsequently negotiated with Dutteah, and is dated the 
 15th March, 1804. The Rao Raja submits to the arbiti-ation of 
 the British Government in matters of dispute with his neighbours, 
 promises to join the British forces with his troops, and to act in 
 subordinate co-operation. The ancient territories of his house are 
 guaranteed ; also protection against foreign aggression. By the 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 143 
 
 treaty of Poona of 13tli Juno, 1817, llie Peishwa ccdoci to the 
 Britit;Ii Government certain lands belonging to his Vinchortkiu' 
 Jageerdar. These •were through a treaty dated the 31st of July, 
 1818, transferred to the Dutteah Raja in reward for the zeal, fide- 
 lity, and attachment which he had uniformly manifested to the 
 British Government since the date of his former treaty. The 
 Wukeel of the former Jageerdar received an assignment of ten 
 thousand rupees per annum on these lands. The Raja engaged to 
 give no asylum to criminals or defaulters of the British Government, 
 and the remaining articles of the treaty are conformable with those 
 of the former treaty. 
 
 The revenues of Dutteah are estimated at 12,00,000; and the 
 state maintains 1,000 horse, and 4,000 foot. 
 
 23. Jax.see. — The Soobadar of this place came under the cog- 
 nizance of the British Government, through the treaty of Bassein ; 
 he being a tributary of the Peishwa. The treaty concluded with 
 him is dated 6tli February, ISO^. He professes entire submission 
 and sincere attachment ; submits to arbitration in disputed matters, 
 promises to join the British army with his forces, and to act in 
 co-operation, and to pay to the British Government the tribute he 
 had heretofore paid to the Peishwa. 
 
 From the treaty of Poona of the 13th of June, 1817, wherein 
 the Peishwa ceded to the British Government the whole of his ter- 
 ritories and tributes in Bundlekund, our relations with the Sooba- 
 dar of Jansee became still more intimate. In its instructions to 
 the political agent of 29th July, 1817, Government observed, ad- 
 verting to the " respectable character, fidelity, and attachment of 
 the late Soobadar, Sheo Rao Bhow, and to the general conduct 
 of that principality since his decease, the Governor General con- 
 siders the family to be entitled to every practicable indulgence. 
 His Lordship has accordingly resolved to declare the territory of 
 Jansee to be hereditary in the family of the late Sheo Rao Bhow, 
 to perpetuate with his family the treaty concluded w'ith the late 
 Bhow, and to relinquish all claim to tribute, on condition of the 
 chief furnishing at all times, when required by the British Govern- 
 ment, a small body of good horse." 
 
 By a paper of " instructions" left by the late Soobadar, his 
 daughter-in-law and the mother of his grand-son and heir was 
 excluded from all interference in public affairs ; and the adminis- 
 tration continued to be conducted by a manager of the Soobadar's 
 appointment, until 1822, when the manager died. Rao Beekajee 
 Nana was then named by the political agent to be the administra- 
 tor during the minority of the young Soobadar, and the nomination 
 w as confirmed by Government. 
 
 It appeared in 1826, that this manager had not only failed to 
 improve the resources of the state during the four years of his 
 administration, but that he had squandered all the accumulations 
 of the former minister. The political agent was therefore desirous 
 of introducing certain other persons, whom he named, to a share 
 
144 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 in the administration, but this was resisted by the young Soobadar, 
 who was then in his nineteenth year, and who wished to leave 
 things as they were until he should be considered to have attained 
 his majority. 
 
 Notv, ithstanding the injunctions of the late Soobadar, it appeared, 
 that his daughter-in-law and the mother of the young Prince had, 
 as might have been expected, occupied a prominent part in the 
 administration during the whole period of the minority. 
 
 The revenues of Jansee are twelve lakhs a year, and the state 
 maintains 700 horse and 3,000 Infantry. 
 
 24-. Teh REE. — The Raja of Tehree seems to have maintained his 
 independence Avhen most of the other chiefs of Bundlekund came 
 under the authority of the Peishwa. 
 
 A treaty of friendship and defensive alliance was negotiated with 
 this state on the 25th of December, 1812, which does not materially 
 differ from other treaties of this class. 
 
 The revenues of Tehree are twelve lakhs, and it maintains 1,200 
 Cavalry and 4,000 Infantry. 
 
 The other principal states besides Rewah, Dutteah, Jansee, and 
 Tehree, under the Bundlekund and Saugor political agencies, are 
 Jaloun, Sumptur, Pannah, Chutterpore, Ocheyrah, &c. 
 
 The revenues of the whole, including those alreadj"" described, 
 have been lately estimated at one crore and seven lakhs of rupees 
 per annum ; their military force at 7,000 Cavalry and 30,000 
 Infantry. 
 
 In 1830, the Raja of Ocheyrah, a state yielding about a lakh and 
 a half of yearly revenue, was accused of instigating the assassina- 
 tion of his brother, who had a Jageer independent of his authority. 
 The brother was intercepted and put to death by a party of the 
 Ocheyrah troops when proceeding unprepared for such an attack, 
 and attended only by a few unarmed followers, with his young bride 
 from her father's house to his own. The Ocheyi-ah state is bound, 
 like all the states in Internal India, to abstain from acts of aggres- 
 sion on its neighbours ; and this barbarous proceeding came ac- 
 cordingly under the cognizance of the British Government. 
 
 It afforded a tine opportunity for establishing a new principle in 
 the trial of the Ocheyrah Raja, of which the Governor General took 
 advantage. Native chiefs, as assessors, were invited to assist the 
 political agent in finding a verdict and deciding on the degree of 
 punishment, and the Raja was found guilty by his peers, sentenced 
 to be deposed, and to perpetual imprisonment within the British 
 territories. 
 
 25. Sawuntwaree. — This state seems to have had its origin 
 since the time of Sewajee. The first " agreement" of the British 
 Government with it was negotiated through the Envoy of Goa 
 on the 3rd of October, 1812. Its object was to save us from piracy, 
 to which British commerce had long been subject. 
 
 Its chief who was styled Bhonsla, ceded the fort of Vingorla with 
 the poit and limit thereof; and agreed to deliver up all armed vessels. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 145 
 
 Negotiation havinpr failed, a force under the command of Sir 
 William Grant Keir moved to the frontier of this state, early in 
 1819, to enforce the following demands — 1st, the surrender of the 
 offenders whose names are annexed into the hands of the British 
 Government ; 2nd, the repayment of the amount of property plun- 
 dered ; 3rd, the removal from all command under the Sawuntwaree 
 Government of Lambaja Sawunt, and Babna Gopaul, the principal 
 instigators in the outrages complained of; 4th, the surrender of 
 the forts of Raree and Newtee, to be held for three years as pledges 
 of good behaviour. The surrender of Waree was easily obtained, 
 but Raree was invested. A Portuguese force from Goa had been 
 before the place twenty-nine days, and had employed in the siege 
 twenty-five pieces of ordnance, of which ten were of the largest 
 calibre. The British batteries were opened on the 13th of Febru- 
 ary, and on the evening of the same day, the general defences were 
 considered sufficiently impaired to admit of the outworks being 
 assaulted, and they were carried accordingly. The principal portion 
 of the garrison evacuated the place during the same night, and the 
 remainder surrendered on the following morning. A treaty followed 
 these operations, and is dated the 17th of February, 1819. It does 
 not differ in any material point from other treaties of this period, 
 except that subjects of Sawuntwaree committing ci-imes within, or 
 plundering the British territories, are to be tried by the laws of 
 that country. Certain districts and forts were ceded to the British 
 Government, together with the line of sea-coast connecting its 
 territory with that of the Portuguese. By another treaty of the 
 same date, in the following year, the districts, with the exception 
 of the line of sea-coast, were retroceded to Sawuntwaree, in proof 
 that the British Government demanded the cession of those places 
 only to put a stop to the depredations of the people of Sawuntwaree 
 within its territory. 
 
 These measures failed, however, to produce what we desired, 
 protection within our own border from the depredations of the 
 people of Sawuntwaree ; and it was found necessary to give the 
 assistance of our Government to form in that principality an admi- 
 nistration sufficiently powerful to subdue some of its turbulent 
 chiefs, who impeded the efficient working of the machine. 
 
 In 1822, the Raja, though then in his 19th or 20th year, was de- 
 barred from all authority in the state by the Ranees, who, with the 
 assistance of an influential minister, wished here, as elsewhere, to 
 keep the administration of affairs in their own hands, whilst the most 
 influential person in the principality, named Chundroba, favored the 
 Raja's pretensions, and would have assisted him to break through 
 the thraldom in which he was kept, had he not feared to lose there- 
 by a substantial pension, which he held under the guarantee of our 
 Government. 
 
 The weakness and disorganization of the Government of this 
 petty state have again in the present year compelled the British 
 Government to an armed iiiterfereuce in its internal affairs, and 
 
 u 
 
146 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 the forts of Mahdogurh and Narraingurh, and the town of Waree 
 are now occupied by British troops. 
 
 4th Class. — Guarantee and protection, subordinate co-opera- 
 tion ; but supremacy in their own territory. 
 
 1. Ameer Khan. — From a low station in Rohilkund, Ameer 
 Khan rose to an inferior command in the service of the gallant 
 Nawab of Bliopal, and from that station entered the service of 
 Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with whose fortunes those of this great pre- 
 datory leader are blended, until they returned with the wreck of their 
 army from the Punjab in the early part of 1806. 
 
 It is unnecessary to follow this chief through his great career of 
 crime, in the eleven years which intervened between that period 
 and the " engagement" into which he entered with the British 
 Government, in 1817. Amongst other events of his checquered 
 life, his demonstrations against the Nagpore territory, in 1809, 
 which at one time promised to subvert that Government led to 
 the advance of the British army under Colonel Close to his capital 
 of Seronje. 
 
 The " engagement" with Ameer Khan is dated November, 1817. 
 It guarantees to the Nawab and his heirs in perpetuity the posses- 
 sion of the places which he held in grant from Maha Raja Holkar ; 
 the principal of which were Tonk, Seronje, and Neembahera— 
 Rampore was afterwards granted to him by the British Government; 
 and in all, they are understood to yield fifteen lakhs a year. 
 
 Since that period Ameer Khan has settled down into a quiet and 
 respectable administration of his country, having incurred in the 
 estimation of his followers, and his tribe, considerable odium for 
 overlooking their interests in his engagements with us ; and still 
 more by forsaking the cause in which Holkar and the other 
 Mahratta principalities were then engaged, before the fate of that 
 cause had been decided by the battles of Poona, Mahedpore, and 
 Nagpore. 
 
 In the eventual adjustment of the territory to be settled on 
 Nawab Ameer Khan, he laid claim to the Jageer which Guffoor 
 Khan, his agent with Holkai"'s army, had secured to himself from 
 that chief; amounting to five lakhs of rupees joer annum, and which 
 by the treaty with Holkar had been guaranteed to him in the same 
 manner as the Nawab's possesions were guaranteed to himself; his 
 claim to Guffoor Khan's possessions was therefore of course disal- 
 lowed. 
 
 In 1821, the Nawab was considered to show a bad disposition, in 
 first harbouring, and afterwards aiding in the escape of, Goverdun 
 Doss, the son of the Raj Rana of Kotah, who had joined the party 
 of the Maha Rao in opposing his own father and our troops. 
 
 In 1825, the Nawab made a proposal, to farm for a period of 
 twenty years, the whole of his possessions to the British Govern- 
 ment, the object of which was not apparent if there was indeed any 
 object, or he had any such intention. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 147 
 
 In 1827, the Nawab took a strong olijoction to the measures of 
 our opium agent at Sehore ; to the seizure of some ojjium })assing 
 from one of his districts, where it was produced, to his residence at 
 Tonk, and to the conduct of the persons employed by us to seize 
 and purchase opium. It was not considered necessary, however, 
 by Government to restore this opium, but it was proposed to make 
 him compensation for any defiilcation of revenue which he might 
 sustain through our opium arrangements. 
 
 In 1827, the Nawab revived the discussion of his claim to the 
 possession of the late Guffoor Khan, wliieh he pretended were 
 assignments made by himself to that chief, for the support of 
 troops, and proposed to make a suitable allowance for GufFoor 
 Khan's son. The decision of Government on this question remain- 
 ed unaltered, GufFoor Khan and his heirs being considered guaran- 
 teed 1)y the treaty of Mundesoor in his possessions. 
 
 The son and heir to the possessions of Nawab Ameer Khan is a 
 disciple of the late Seyud Ahmed, and will be the only independent 
 chief in India pi-ofessing tliose doctrines. Seyud Ahmed was a 
 native of the same part of the country as Ameer Khan, and was 
 originally in the Nawab's service. When he entered on his 
 northern crusade against the infidels of India, he left his family under 
 the Nawab's care at Tonk, which however remained a secret until 
 after the Seyud's first important defeat by the army of Runjeet 
 Singh in the neighbourhood of Peshawur. 
 
 In discussing the important events of his life at Dehlee, in 1827> 
 Ameer Khan considered that he was fairly entitled to a chout on 
 the territories which we conquered from the Peishwa and the 
 Bhonsla ; arguing that but for the expedition under his command 
 to Nagpore, in 1809, and the fear which the Nagpore Raja enter- 
 tained of him, that chief would never have subsidized a force of 
 ours ; and that but for llolkar's expedition to Poona in 1802, in 
 which he acted so conspicuous a part, we should never have had a 
 subsidiary force there ; and that without these subsidiary forces, we 
 should never have gained such important acquisitions of territory. 
 
 2. Protected Sikh States. — These states came under British 
 protection when Maha Raja Runjeet Singh was induced, through 
 the negociations with him, in 1809, terminating in the treaty of the 
 25th of April of that year, to retire behind the Sutleje, maintaining 
 on its left bank only sufficient troops for the internal duties of his 
 territories there, and renouncing all authority over the Sikh states 
 so situated. 
 
 We have no treaties with any of the states — they were I'eceived 
 •under British protection without any stipulations on either side, 
 and have since continued the most favored of the states of India, 
 enjoying perfect security against foreign invasion, and arbitration 
 in their international aftairs, without paying tribute to the power 
 by whom they are protected, and which seeks to avoid all concern 
 with their internal administration. There ai'e about 150 Sirdars 
 and propi'ietors in this tract of country, of whom 135 arc Sikhs and 
 
 u 2 
 
148 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 the rest Mahomedans. The revenue of the whole is estimated at 
 55 lakhs of rupees, and it is supposed that these chiefs can without 
 any difficultj'^ support an army of 5,000 horse and 20,000 Infantry. 
 
 Putteala is the largest state, its revenues being nearly 20,00,000 
 a year, 
 
 Keytul is the next in importance, its revenues being about 
 4,00,000. Jeend and Naba are of nearly equal magnitude, their 
 revenues being about 2,50,000 rupees each. 
 
 The others are of inferior importance, three or four of them 
 yielding a lakh a year, and the others under that sum. 
 
 The only questions of any importance that occur in these states, 
 requiring our mediation, are the aggressions of one state towards 
 another, for they maintained for many years their original preda- 
 tory habits, which were hardly inferior to those of the Mahrattas 
 and Pindarees ; the settlement of boundaiy disputes, and those 
 relating to succession. 
 
 In Putteala Kour Ajeet Singh contended for a series of years 
 against his brother's possession of the entire principality. After 
 the death of their father he retired to Dehlee to prosecute his claim, 
 which was for a half share of the territory ; professing that if we 
 did not interfere, he could through an appeal to the justice of the 
 neighbouring Sikh states, particularly to that of Maha Raja Run- 
 jeet Singh, force from his brother the share which he claimed. It does 
 not of course suit our purpose, which is the maintenance of univer- 
 sal tranquillity, to admit of the armed interference of one state in 
 the adjustment of disputed questions in another. But as we prohi- 
 bit this, it is our duty to bring those questions to a speedy and final 
 decision. After Kour Ajeet Singh had remained absent from Putte- 
 ala for seven years, an inquiry was held in November, 1826, into 
 his pretensions. But he failed to establish any one instance in 
 which a division of territory had taken place in the tribe to which 
 he belonged (the Phoolkeas,) in what could be considered a Reeasut 
 or Government. And it was obvious, if the laws or usages of inhe- 
 ritance in property of this nature were different amongst the Sikhs 
 from those Avhich prevail in the other Hindoo states of India, 
 whether Rajpoot, Mahratta, or any other, that Sikhs could not 
 long maintain a national Government. It was therefore decided 
 that Kour Ajeet Singh was not entitled to share in the possessions 
 of Putteala. Dropping this pretension there was little difficulty 
 in securing a suitable provision for him, for Maha Raja Kurm 
 Singh Mas perfectly well disposed towards his brother, and an 
 adjustment of their differences according to his new pretensions 
 was effected without our interference. 
 
 In tlie Naba chiefship Raja Jeswunt Singh, who had married a 
 young wife, influenced by her, desired to set aside his elder son 
 Kour Runjeet Singh, in favor of her offspring. This has of late 
 years been the principal object of the Naba chief. He had, as is 
 usual in such cases, originally made a separate provision for his 
 elder son, from which he latterly displaced him, and under the 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 149 
 
 pretence that an attempt had, through his instigation, been made 
 on his own life, the son Avas placcil in confinement. From tliis 
 situation however lie effected his escape, and sought enipU)ynient 
 in the Panjab. The British Government steadily refused to sanc- 
 tion any change in the established rules of succession, and Kour 
 Uunjeet Singh would in the service of the Maha Raja have quietly 
 awaited the death of his father, but he has himself lately died in 
 exile. 
 
 These are the questions which disturb tlie harmony of these 
 petty states ; in other respects they are more happily circumstanced 
 than most of the principalities under our protection. Situated on 
 the frontier which separates Hindoostan from the nations of the 
 north and west, on the great commercial tract between these 
 countries, they must benefit from the operations of all, whilst their 
 position affords a ready outlet for their productions, whether agri- 
 cidtural or commercial. They Mill too participate largely in any 
 benefits that may ai'ise from the opening of the Indus and Sutleje 
 to the commerce of Western India ; although their position on 
 the Junma must afford a ready enough means of transport for their 
 commodities to the plains of Bengal. 
 
 5th Class. — Amity and friendship. 
 
 1. GwALioR. — The first treaty of the British Government with 
 Scindia is dated the 13th of October, 1781, and was negotiated 
 with Madhajee Scindia, the son of Ranajee, the founder of this 
 family. The Mahrattas had lost their possessions in Hindoostan 
 and Malwa with the battle of Paniput, in 1760, but their tide of 
 conquest soon again rolled northward, and before his death we find 
 this chief at the head of a powerful army, organised under French 
 officers, the principal of whom was general De Boigne, the actual 
 ruler of the greater portion of Hindoostan and Rajpootana. He 
 was recognised as an independent Prince by the treaty of Salbye, 
 negotiated by the British Government Mith the Mahratta Empire, 
 in 1782. He died at Poena, whither it is supposed he marched 
 with no friendly intentions towards the British Government, during 
 the first siege of Seringapatam. He was succeeded by his grand- 
 nephew Dowlut Rao Scindia, who was then in his fourteenth year, 
 and on whom devolved the control of a regular army, sufficient, had 
 there been no British army in that field, to govern the destinies of 
 India. Dowlut Rao Scindia's first great effort against the British 
 Government w^as to resist the position which it had assumed, when 
 through the treaty of Bassien of December, 1802, it bi'ought the 
 Peishwa back to Poena, and restored him to the throne from which 
 he had been driven by Scindia's rival, Holkar, who through the for- 
 tune of war obtained for a moment the ascendancy at that capital. 
 
 Scindia in confederation with the Bhonsla, Holkar, and it is even 
 supposed with the Peishwa himself, advanced towards Poena ; but 
 the defeat of the united armies of Scindia and the Bhonsla at the 
 battles of Assye and Worgaom by the Duke of Wellington ; an^l 
 
150 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 the defeat of Scindia's army in Hindoostan by the forces under Lord 
 Lake, at the battles of Dehlee and Luswaree, with the loss of the 
 fortresses of Ahmcdnuggur, Asseergurh, Gawilgurh, A.lligurh, Agra, 
 and Gwalior, led to the treaty of Sirjee Anjungaum, negotiated on 
 the 30th of December, 1803. This treaty is of friendship and 
 alliance. By the results of the war, the Maha Raja must have lost 
 more than half his dominions : that which remained to him being 
 confined almost to Malwa, extending to Boorhanpore, on the one 
 hand, and Gwalior on the other, with the isolated positions of Pow- 
 engurh and Dhond in Guzerat. To save certain of the chiefs of 
 the state from loss, whose Jageers were situated within the territory 
 ceded by this treaty, the British Government agreed to indemnify 
 these chiefs for such losses, provided their claims did not in all 
 exceed seventeen lakhs of rupees per annum. It was agreed to 
 restore certain family possessions of Scindia in the Dekhan, which 
 had been conquered in the course of the war ; and these are the 
 towns and villages which, since the conquest of the Peishwa's coun- 
 try, intermix with those of the Company, and over which, Scindia's 
 exercising sovereign rights, gives us so much trouble. By the 
 treaty it became optional with Scindia to claim the services of a 
 subsidiary force, without incurring any expence on that account, to 
 the extent of six battalions of Infantry with ordnance attached. 
 But he never required the services of this force. In the mean time, 
 a treaty was negotiated with the neighbouring Rana of Gohud, 
 dated 17th January, 1804, by the second article of which, " The 
 Honorable the East India Company hereby agree to establish Maha 
 Raj Rana Keerut Singh, in the sovereignty of his hereditary coun- 
 tries of Gohud and the undermentioned districts, to be possessed 
 by him, his heirs, and successors, free from all deductions, under 
 the guarantee of the Honorable Company, viz. Gwalior Khas, &c." 
 On the 16th of December, 1803, a treaty was concluded with the 
 farmer of Scindia's possessions of Gwalior, Gohud, &c. through 
 which he was to render up certain portions of Scindia's possessions, 
 ■which had belonged to the Rana of Gohud, on condition of our 
 guaranteeing to himself in sovereignty the remaining territories 
 held under his management. But this farmer (Umbajee Rao Jug- 
 liah) either could not or did not fulfil his agreement, and it was 
 found necessary to conquer this as the other portions of Scindia's 
 territory. By the treaty of the 30th of December, 1803, with 
 Scindia, it was doubtful whether he had ceded the territories of 
 Gwalior and Gohud, which we had thus disposed of. Scindia 
 argued that he had not, and even the highest authorities of the 
 British Government were divided on the question. He was averse 
 to the resident at his court quitting, pending the discussion that 
 took place on this subject. He knew, as Sir Charles Metcalfe has 
 remarked, that the withdrawal of the former resident was the 
 signal for the former war ; and when the resident, in preparing to 
 depart, sent forward his baggage, Scindia sent some troops to 
 plunder it. The resident was therefore considered to be a prisoner 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 151 
 
 in Scindia's camp. The Governor General required his release, 
 and Scindia I'eplied, " that the acting resident was agreeably to 
 usage delayed until a successor arrived in his camp." 
 
 In the mean time the Marquis Cornwallis who had assumed the 
 reins of Government, died, and Sir George Barlow became Governor 
 General. In accordance with the pacific views of the then 
 Government, a new and definitive treaty was concluded with Scin- 
 dia on the 22nd of November, 1805, by which Gwalior and Gohud 
 were given up to him, and H. H. was to receive for himself per- 
 sonally four lakhs of rupees per annum ; w hilst his wife and daugh- 
 ter received Jageers, the former of two lakhs and the latter one lakh ; 
 he relinquishing in return for these benefits all claim to the 
 seventeen lakhs of rupees per anmim granted to his chiefs by the 
 former treaty, also the districts of Dholpore Baree and Raj Kcrah, 
 and all claims to tribute on the countries north of the Cliumbul to 
 the limit of Kotah, to which place that river became the boundary. 
 
 The disposition of Scindia towards the British Government is 
 believed to have continued favorable till 1813 or 14, when the 
 Peishwa's negotiations with him commenced. On the 26th of 
 March, 1815, the resident at Gwalior reported that an embassy 
 had arrived from Holkar's court, and in July, 1818, the officiating 
 resident submitted to Government a copy of a treaty of 1815, 
 between those states, which he considered had for its object the 
 re-union of the Mahratta powers under the Peishwa. The first article 
 is " in the same manner in which you and I formerly agreed in 
 obeying the orders of Shreemunt, and in serving him with fidelity, 
 so we shall now with sincerity devote ourselves to such service as 
 may be agreeable to Shreemunt." 
 
 Sixth article. — " The Bhonsla is our friend ; let us act so as to se- 
 cure his friendship as formerly. By friendship each will accomplish 
 his wishes." The treaty is in the usual native fashion. The proposi- 
 tions are stated by Holkar, and the assent of Scindia given on the 
 same paper. In the period that followed, to the commencement of 
 the Pindaree Avar, his assistance for the suppression of those plun- 
 derers located chiefly in his territories, and w^ho thence ravaged 
 most of the countries of India, was either not cordially aflforded, 
 or failed signally of success. Negotiations between H. H. and the 
 Goorkas having a hostile tendency towards the British were 
 detected, and it w as not until two divisions of the British array, 
 destined for operations against the Pindarees, the one amounting 
 to 12,500 men, at the head of which w^as the Governor General; 
 the other to 7,000, were within one march of his frontier, and 
 moving directly on his capital, that the treaty of the 9th of No- 
 vember, 1817, was signed. 
 
 By this treaty Dow lut Rao Scindia agreed to co-operate with the 
 British Government for the subversion of the Pindarees and all other 
 freebooters. Five divisions of H. H. Cavalry, amounting to 1000 
 each, were to be attached to divisions of the British forces, and each 
 to be under the controul of a British officer. For the more efficient 
 
152 INTERNAL RELATIONS 
 
 payment of these troops, H. H. agreed to relinquish for three years 
 the sums which he received from the British Government, and for 
 two years the tribute which he levied from the Rajpoot states ; any 
 surplus of either amount, in excess to the pay of the troops to be 
 afterwards accounted for. British garrisons were also to be 
 admitted into the forts of Asseergurh and Hindia during the war. 
 The eighth article of the treaty of 22nd November, 1805, was abro- 
 gated, and the British Government was declared to be at liberty to 
 enter into engagements with all the substantive Rajpoot states on 
 the left of the Chumbul. In the event of its forming engagements 
 with those states it bound itself to pay to Scindia the tribute 
 which he might be entitled to levy from them. 
 
 There was, as might have been expected, great dilatoriness on 
 the part of Scindia's officers in preparing the Contingent for the 
 field, and it was not until the 27th of February, that the superin- 
 tendant was able to move with about 2000 Cavalry from Gwalior, 
 such as he certainly would not willingly have marched through 
 Coventry with. Some of them were described as little else than 
 gi'ass- cutters mounted on their tatoos, some of the men without 
 arms, and the horses without saddles. 
 
 That portion of the treaty of Gwalior which stipulated that 
 British garrisons should be admitted into the fortress of Asseergurh, 
 and the fort of Hindia, was violated by the commandant of the 
 former place, who fired on the British troops. A garrison was ad- 
 mitted into the latter, and it was restored when the Pindarees Avere 
 subdued. Scindia continued to profess that the commander of 
 Asseergurh, Jeswunt Rao Lar, Scindia's maternal uncle, would not 
 on his orders deliver up the fortress to the British Government, 
 and that he had not the means of compelling him to do so. It 
 therefore became necessary to prepare an army for its reduction. 
 On the fall of the place some original letters from Scindia to the 
 commander of the fortress were found in a casket of his. They 
 were presented to Scindia, and he confessed that they were in his 
 own hand-writing. He had thus at the very time when he had 
 publicly made over to us the right to occupy the fortress, privately 
 commanded Jeswunt Rao Lar to support the Peishwa, and conse- 
 quently to resist us. " The Maha Raja entered into a long apology 
 for his conduct, which turned chiefly on the ties by which he had 
 felt himself bound to Bajee Rao, and the pressure which had been 
 brought to bear upon him to obtain some proof of his attachment 
 to that chief." Although Scindia had shown his allegiance to the 
 head of the Mahratta empire, by causing the commander of his for- 
 tress to receive the Peishwa favorably, there was no proof that 
 Jeswunt Rao Lar was afterwards acting in obedience to Scindia, in 
 opposing us when the place was besieged, and Scindia solemnly 
 protested the contrary ; yet the probability of course is, that with- 
 out the authority of the sovereign, the servant would not have 
 resisted. Towards the middle of 1818, the final exchange of ter- 
 ritory took place with Scindia. The British Government receiving 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 153 
 
 Ajmpre, Islamnagur, i"v:c. and ceding to Scindia places of equal 
 value. On the 1st of March, IS 19, Scindia's Contingent had been 
 reduced to about '2000 horse, at a monthly expence of rupees 1/20,000. 
 This anaount exceeded however the funds set aside by the terms of 
 the treaty of Gwalior for the payment of the Contingent, and for 
 the excess, which had been disbursed by the British Government, 
 H. H. .was indebted. It was therefore agreed on the 6th of Fe- 
 bruary, 1820, that the Contingent should be so reduced as to bring 
 the cost within tlie amount originally assigned for its payment, and 
 that for the debt incurred on account of it the revenue of certain 
 territory intermixed with that of the Company should be assigned. 
 The questions which continued under discussion with the Gwa- 
 lior court for some time referred principally to territorial cessions in 
 the Dekhan and Malwa, having for their objects the improvement or 
 better detining of our respective frontiers, and the facilitating our 
 system of police in our own territory. Scindia clung with a perti- 
 nacity to his Dekhan possessions, for Mhich our Government did 
 not sometimes see any adequate reason. Neither money payments, 
 nor cessions elsewhere would induce him to forego his connexion 
 with those isolated possessions, some of which were hereditary in 
 the house of Scindia, distinct from the exercise of those sovereign 
 powers which elsewhere belonged to him, and to which Mahrattas 
 and other Hindoo inhabitants of India cling with a pertinacity 
 which Scotchmen better than others will understand. Maun Singh 
 Rao Patunker, who held possession of Scindia's districts in Guzerat, 
 had for some time shown a disposition to resist the orders of the 
 court, and to disregard its summons of recal. The aid of the 
 British Government was required by Scindia to effect this pur- 
 pose, principally on the ground that his recal was determined on 
 at our instance, for that chief in the exercise of his administra- 
 tion of Powungurh had invaded, or was considered by the Baroda 
 Government, and the resident at that court, to have invaded, 
 the territories of our ally. He was connected with Scindia, his 
 son being married to H. H. daughter, and the son was supposed to 
 be detained by the father after the period when according to Hindoo 
 customs he ought to cohabit with his wife ; his absence was there- 
 fore considered in some respect to be dishonorable to that lady. 
 Scindia, whilst he desired to make us the instrument of reducing 
 his disloyal subject, showed a disposition to exclude us from the 
 right of exercising any authority in regulating the eventual adjust- 
 ment of their differences. A correspondence was opened with 
 Patunker by the residents at Gwalior and Baroda, and as it was 
 considered by those officers that it would be necessary to arm for 
 his reduction, preparations were accordingly made to detach a force 
 against him from the Bombay presidency. It was represented by 
 Scindia, that this note of preparation would be the signal for the 
 plunder by himself and his Arab and Mekrane mercenaries of the 
 districts under his charge ; and it was deemed necessary in May, 
 1824. to push fonvard the Contingent under British officers to save 
 
 X 
 
154 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 those districts from such consequences ; to take possession of the 
 open country ; to block up Patunker in the fortress of Powungurh, 
 if he should retire to it; and in conjunction with a body of the 
 Guickwar Contingent Horse, to force that chief to submit to the 
 terms of the Gwalior court, without the necessity of calling into 
 operation a British force. The Contingent was found sufficient to 
 bring the refractory chief to the terms prescribed by the court of 
 Gwalior without the necessity of calling for the assistance of 
 British troops ; although advantage was taken of some corps 
 passing from Baroda to the relief of others at Mhow for the pur- 
 pose of intimidation. It was a question of considerable difficulty 
 on what conditions, or for what reason, our troops should be sent 
 to aid Scindia in a measure of so purely an internal character, as 
 that of coercing a servant of his own. We were under no obliga- 
 tion to afford such assistance, nor did it appear that before the 
 promise of such assistance was given any exertion had been made 
 on the part of Scindia's Government to assert its own power or to 
 fulfil its duty. The question of evil to ourselves or our allies from 
 any distracted state of our or their possessions during this internal 
 struggle had not arisen, nor was Scindia called on to declare his 
 inability to perform his sovereign duties, or to abide by the con- 
 sequences of his failure to do so. The assistance was asked and 
 granted, and with the important principle of international Govern- 
 ment which it involved was mixed up the view of conciliating 
 Scindia into an acquiescence with certain objects of ours, in obtain- 
 ing the cession of territories in Nimawar and the Dekhan. Another 
 question which caused great anxiety at the court of Gwalior was 
 the seizure by the Raja of Colapore of the Jageer of Hindoo Rao, 
 the brother of the Baeza Baee, Scindia's favoi"ite wife. This Jageer, 
 consisting of 69^ villages, was held under a grant from the King of 
 Dehlee, but lying within the Colapore territory, Avas attached by that 
 chief under circumstances very offensive to Hindoo Rao, obliging 
 his mother and the other female members of his family residing 
 there to fly from his oppressions, and to seek protection in the 
 Nepanee territory. Scindia required our mediation in this matter 
 with the chief of Colapore to an extent which we did not feel our- 
 selves justified in granting, and hence great disappointment on his 
 part. Scindia observed, " that an utter stranger, a Mussulman, 
 would not have treated females with the indignity and barbarity 
 that the Colapore Raja had treated those of his own tribe and 
 nearly allied to himself." The Colapore Raja required Hindoo 
 Rao to attend at his court as a suppliant for the restoration of his 
 Jageer of Kungal. But after the treatment which the members of 
 his family had experienced, this concession on his part, it was con- 
 sidered, would be derogatory to his character. 
 
 Some surprise was expressed by Government at Scindia's having 
 about this time addressed Doorjun Saul, the Bhurtpore usurper, by 
 the style and title appertaining to the chief of that house. There 
 was no doubt as to the fact, which however Scindia endeavoured 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 155 
 
 to explain away as arising from inadvertency in addressing him on 
 some trivial oeeasion. 
 
 After a protraeted illness, Dowlut Hao Seindia died on the 21st 
 of Mareh, 18'27, in his 4-Stii year. He had no son, and had not 
 adopted one. The only indication that he gave relative to the 
 future management of aftairs was in a conference with his friend 
 the resident, when he said, " A man's wife, if she has any sense 
 or understanding, is the person entitled to manage his affairs after 
 his death." " But your Highness has two wives, I observed." ** True," 
 he replied, " but I suppose yoii know that one of them is entirely 
 out of the question in a case of this kind. I admit," he continued, 
 that according to usage (serishia), she is the person. But to 
 assume a charge of this kind, a woman must have sense, knowledge 
 of the world, and experience in business ; all of which she has not. 
 She is entirely unsuited for any thing of the kind ; in fact, she is 
 fit only to sit quietly in her house, and to eat her food and nothing 
 more." The following account of the closing scene of Dowlut 
 Rao Scindia's life is given from Major Stewart's letter of the 22nd 
 of March, as well because the occurrences of the time are beautiful- 
 ly and feelingly described, as because it is an unusual position for 
 an English Gentleman to be placed in ; and that it shows the 
 advantage of having such a man, at such a place, at such a time. 
 
 " About nine o'clock yesterday morning a horseman came at full 
 speed from the Maha Raja's camp to the residency, with a mes- 
 sage from Hindoo Rao, stating that the Maha Raja had expressed 
 an anxious wish to see me, and begging that I would as soon as 
 possible proceed to the palace. Conceiving that the Maha Raja must 
 be in his last moments, I instantly mounted a horse, and accompani- 
 ed by Captain Dyke alone, I reached the palace in a very short 
 time after I had received this message. I found an anxious crowd 
 outside, and all the chiefs and people of respectability assembled 
 in the different apartments of the palace. As soon as I met Hin- 
 doo Rao, I anxiously inquired after the INIaha Raja. Hindoo Rao 
 said that he was very ill, and that I should see him immediately, 
 &c. &c. During this conversation, messages were can-ied back- 
 wards and forwards, from the interior apartments, where the Maha 
 Raja was, and it was at last announced that H. H. was ready to 
 receive me. I proceeded to his apartment, accompanied by Hindoo 
 Rao, Raojee Khosjee Walla, Atmaram Pundit, and perhaps there 
 were one or two more. Captain Dyke also accompanied me. H. H. 
 lay or rather reclined on a couch supported by pillows, and a 
 number of female servants were in attendance around him. Behind 
 a purdah close to him was the Baeza Baee, Rookma Baee ana 
 Bala Baee, and their attendants. I was much shocked to observe the 
 sad change that had taken place in the Maha Raja's appearance : 
 his arms and upper part of his body had become quite emaciated, 
 his belly and lower extremities were greatly swelled. I went up 
 to him, took his hand in mine, and leant over him, so as to hear 
 what he might say. He remained silent for some time, apparently 
 
 X 2 
 
156 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 vinable to speak. At last he said in a distinct and audible voice, 
 so as to be heard by every one present, and even I believe behind 
 the pui'dah, I wish you to do whatever you think proper, 
 ('•'•Jo loom moonasib jano so Iwro^ ) I rrpliofi tl t every thing 
 should be arr-^nged according to His Highness's ^"' "'-'=. and I added 
 some words of consolation, and said, I trusted by t' ' Messing of 
 God he would yet recover. He appeared affected, and said, ' By the 
 sight of you, and your friends! -p,' ( Aj) he dekhne se, our ap he 
 mohubct se,) but he could not finish the sentence. A long pause 
 now ensued, and I at last said; " Is *here any thing else that your 
 Highness would wish to say to me." He replied, I have a great deal 
 to say to you, f^" hhoutera set kiiJoia hy^ ) But after waiting a consi- 
 derable time he could add no more. I then proposed to retire into 
 another room for a short time, and to return, when His Highness 
 might revive a little and be able to speak. TJiis was agreed to by 
 all present. When I was about to retire, I heard the voice of the 
 Baeza Baee suggesting that Dr. Panton should be sent for. I asked 
 the Maha Raja if it was his wish that that Gentleman should be 
 called, when His Highness made a faint sign of assent. 
 
 " I have been thus particular in giving the expressions used by 
 the Maha Raja on this occasion, as tliey were probably the last 
 words he uttered. I had not retired above an hour to an upper 
 apartment, when the screams of females announced that the Maha 
 Raja's life had fled. 
 
 " It would be difficult for me to give any adequate notion of the 
 scene that ensued ; the cries of women and the lamentations of men, 
 the uproar, and the tumult, were beyond all description. 
 
 " With reference to what I have stated in the last paragraph of 
 my letter of the 20th instant, I immediately determined to remain 
 at the palace till the Maha Raja's body should be carried to the 
 funeral pile, and a request to that eftect was also made to me by 
 Hindoo Rao, and the other principal persons present. It was very 
 satisfactory to me to find that though there was a great appearance 
 of grief, there were none of the appearances that indicated an in- 
 tended Suttee. When a woman intends to ascend the funeral pile 
 of her husband, her grief assumes a more sublime character : she 
 sheds no tears, she makes no lamentation, she lays aside her veil, 
 and no longer conceals herself from the sight of men. There were 
 none of these signs. When therefore I was informed that the 
 Baeza Baee had declared she would follow the Maha Raja, I was 
 certain that it would not be difficult to restrain her. For this 
 purpose however I was called on to speak to the lady, with only a 
 •lin piece of cloth held up by two females between us. 
 
 " It is not necessary to detail all that was said on this occasion. 
 I terminated the discussion by assuming the authority which the 
 Maha Raja's dying declaration had, I said, given me, and I desired 
 that she would withdraw to her own apartments. She was at last 
 dragged away by her female attendants. Shortly after, amemorandum 
 consisting of seven articles was brought to the resident, purporting 
 
INTEKNAL RELATIONS. 157 
 
 to be the Maha Raja's last will, but not Ixnir'mj? his signature, the 
 principal of which were, The Maha Uaja's declared intention to 
 adopt a son. Tiie appointment of Hindoo Rao to be tlie sujjerin- 
 tendant, and another person to be the Mookhtar. In case of the 
 birth of a son, he is to be heir to tlie possessions ; ' and it is added, 
 that the adopted son shall be obedient to the orders of tlie Maha 
 Raja and the Baeza Baee as long as they live.' For the fulHlnient 
 of all these intentions he appeals to the support of the British 
 Government. 
 
 " It was a singular and a melancholy sight to see the Maha Raja 
 dressed in his last apparel, adorned with jewels and pearls, seated 
 in his palankeen with his face uncovered, as if still alive, accom- 
 panied by all his state-elephants and led horses, set out on this 
 last procession. He was accompanied to the funeral pile by 
 almost every man in camp, and the tears of the multitude showed, 
 that however deficient in many of the qualities of a good prince, 
 he was neither a cruel nor a tyraiuiical sovereign. The Maha 
 Raja was by no means deficient in understanding, to which indeed 
 he owed the salvation of his state amid the wreck of the Mahratta 
 Empire. In conversation the comparisons and illustrations he used 
 were frequently very striking and happy. His temper was mild 
 and gentle in the extreme, tbough his courage was never doubted. 
 Whatever may have been the vices and crimes of his youth, (and 
 these I believe are more to be ascribed to evil counsellors than to 
 himself,) his latter years have been unmarked by any gross viola- 
 tion of morality. Apathy and indolence were his besetting faults, 
 which through life prevented him from ever executing the duties 
 of a sovereign with efficiency. On the whole, when it is consi- 
 dered that he was raised to a sovereignty at that time the most 
 extensive in India, at the early age of 14, and that he was brought 
 up from childhood amid the scenes of treachery and rapacity that 
 characterise a Mahratta camp, it is easy to find an excuse for many 
 of the errors and vices of his reign. If in any part of this dispatch 
 I have transgressed the rules of official correspondence, I trust the 
 occasion will plead my excuse. I should be insensible indeed if I 
 could with feelings unmoved report the death of a chief whom I 
 have long known, and with whom I may of late be said to have 
 been on terms of intimacy. Nor is it the least affecting circum- 
 stance attending his death, that the last act of his life showed his 
 unbounded confidence in the justice and generosity of the British 
 Government." 
 
 It appeared on further inquiry that the document produced as 
 the Maha Raja's last will was hardly finished at the moment of his 
 death, that it was prepared quite publicly, although the Baeza 
 Baee afterwards denied having any knowledge of or share in the 
 transaction, and tliat it had been intended by those who prepared 
 it, and into whose hands the powers of the state now fell, to be pre- 
 sented by the Malia Raja to the resident as a testamentary docu- 
 ment at their last interview. 
 
158 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 On Scindia's death, the Baeza Baee virtually assumed the sove- 
 reignty of the state, professedly in the capacity of Regent ; her 
 brother Hindoo Rao acting under her order;^. From her talents 
 and character, it was supposed that she was not likely to leave much 
 authority in the hands of even her own brother. The resident at 
 that time foresaw that the struggle which has commenced, or is now 
 about to commence, between the Regent and the adopted heir could 
 hardly be avoided, after he had arrived at years of discretion. 
 
 On the death of Scindia, various schemes were brought forward 
 by the neighbouring political authorities for improving our own 
 frontier by getting possession, either by cession in sovereignty, or 
 in perpetual farm, of certain districts which were supposed to dove- 
 tail badly with ours. It did not seem to be a part of their scheme 
 to give up any of our districts to Scindia, nor did they appear much 
 to take into consideration that we must have a frontier somewhere, 
 and that all the vexations attending the management of border 
 relations must form part of the disagreement of all Governments. 
 These desired encroachments were however resisted by Government. 
 Tlie resumption of certain Dekhanee possessions, which it did not 
 appear by the treaty of Sirjee Anjungaum that we had transferred 
 to Scindia, (for on the terms of that treaty clearly depended H. H. 
 rights in that quarter,) must have been an unpalatable ingredient 
 in the new terms which it was proposed to negociate. But the most 
 or only thoroughly unpalatable demand was that for the payment 
 of a sum of money. The payment of fourlakhs of rupees stipulated 
 by treaty from the British Government terminated with the life 
 of the Maha Raja. This sum had been applied in part payment of 
 the Contingent of Horse, and that resource failing, some other was 
 necessary. It was thei-efore at fii'st proposed to place in our trea- 
 sury, by way of loan, a sum of money, the interest of which should 
 be equal to this object. But preferable to this, was deemed an out 
 and out loan of eighty lakhs or a crore, at five per cent. On the 
 strength of this accommodation to us Avas revived, on the pai't of 
 the Baeza Baee, an intention of pawning on the Scindia state and 
 family, a relation of her own by the adoption of a boy, whom it 
 was proposed to bring from the Colapore family, to Avhich she be- 
 longs, instead of one from the Scindia family, with whom was the 
 right and the voice of the chiefs and people of the countiy. This 
 intention the Baeza Baee soon found would not be any where tolerat- 
 ed. A batch of boys, five in number, were brought from the Dek- 
 han, and the choice fell on Moogut Rao, a youth of eleven years 
 of age, who was declared to be the nearest relation of the late 
 Maha Raja, who could from his age be adopted. This was too ad- 
 vanced an age to secure that protracted minority which suited the 
 views of the Baeza Baee ; some delay accordingly took place, and 
 greater delay was apprehended. It is remarkable enough that the 
 decision of the question was hastened more apparently by the voice 
 of the bankers, than any other class : " who do not consider 
 matters secure here, until the Musnud is occupied, began to show 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 159 
 
 their alarm by discontinuing their business. These circumstances 
 probably had the principal ett'ect in making the Baee give her assent 
 to the elevation of Moogut Rao." 
 
 On the 19th of June, the resident reports, " I have the satisfaction 
 to report to you, for the information of tlie Right Hon'bic the 
 Governor General, that the boy Moogut Rao was married to the 
 youngest grand-daughter of the late Maha Raja on Sunday, and 
 yestei'day seated on the jNIusnud (under the style and title of 
 Maha Raja Ali Jah Junkojee Rao Scindia Bahadoor.) 
 
 " My letters to your address of the 8th and 18th instant will 
 have prepared his Lordship for these events. On Saturday even- 
 ing the whole of the chiefs and ministers of this Government were 
 assembled at the Durbar, when the Baeza Baee's intention to adopt 
 JNIoogut Rao, and place him on the Musnud was formally announc- 
 ed, and the opinion of the assembly on the subject was asked : not a 
 dissenting voice wa-s raised on the occasion ; all agreed to and ap- 
 plauded the measure. The Shastrees wei'e next consulted as to the 
 propriety of uniting Moogut Rao in marriage unto the youngest 
 grand-daughter of the late Maha Raja ; the Shastrees having 
 declared the union legal, and that it might take place either before 
 or after Moogut Rao was placed on the iNIusnud, it was determined 
 that the marriage should be solemnized immediately. That cere- 
 mony having accordingly been solemnized on Sunday, I was invited 
 to assist at the ceremony of Moogut Rao's installation yesterday." 
 It did not of course escape the observation of the resident that such 
 a marriage could hardly be legal, but dispensations may be obtain- 
 ed for crowned heads at Gwalior as well as at Lisbon. 
 
 After this important arrangement was concluded, little remained 
 for future adjustment with the court of Gwalior. The lady who 
 was betrothfed to the young Prince unfortunately died ; and we 
 had in a greater degree than elsewhere all the difficult questions 
 which arise during a minority and tlie Regency of a woman. That 
 Avoman not being the mother of the Raja, and the adoption having 
 been, in a measure, forced upon her ; much cordiality or good 
 feeling towards the young Prince were not to be expected, particu- 
 larly after the death of her grand-daughter. We had accordingly 
 constantly to remonstrate with the Regent Mother on her treatment 
 of the young prince, whose approach towards maturity, as it was 
 calculated to place a rival near the throne, also tended to render 
 him more obnoxious to her. His education was neglected, every- 
 thing tending to raise or bring him forward in the estimation of 
 his people was studiously avoided ; her open declaration was that 
 she would be sovereign or nothing. " Nobody," she said, " ever 
 wished to qualify another for the exercise of power they themselves 
 wished to retain." It continued her object to obtain from the 
 British Government an acknowledgment of a life Regency, and it 
 is the less surprising that the Baeza Baee should feel reluctance to 
 render up her authority, since the resident has stated so short a 
 time since as the 14th of June, 1830. " It was by no means 
 
160 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 imperative on the Baee to make an adoption, and she might, I 
 conceive, have continued to rule this state during her life, without 
 raising a boy to the Musnud," Being a clever and spirited woman, 
 she appears to have conducted the affairs of the principality without 
 involving us in trouble. The loan was a point open to discussion. 
 It became a question whether a receipt should be granted for the 
 money as her property or the property of the state, and when Go- 
 vernment came to the resolution of paying off the amount rather 
 than consider it in the former light, it was found that this did not 
 at all accord with her expectations ; for she calculated on the inter- 
 est becoming a pei-petual fund from which, like one of our Lucknow 
 loans, various provisions might be made for ministers or dependents. 
 Of this loan, which was eventually paid, ten lakhs was understood 
 to be Her Highness's private property, 40 or 50 advances by 
 bankers on assignments on the revenue, and the remainder from 
 the Maha Ra,ja's treasury. 
 
 In 1830, the funds from which the Auxiliary Horse 
 were paid arose from the appropriation of the proceeds 
 of the Baeza Baee's Jageer granted to her by the British 
 
 Government, Sa. Rs. 2,00,000 
 
 Kotah Tribute, 1,02,430 
 
 Kotrees ditto, 10,610 
 
 Jeypore ditto, 1,00,000 
 
 llutlam and Sillana ditto, 1,12,140 
 
 Revenues of Gui'a Kotah, and Multan 70,000 
 
 Ditto of Yowla and Chopira in Kandeish, 73,560 
 
 making in all an annual amount of rupees 6,75,696, whilst the 
 expence of the Contingent was 7,09,224, and on the death of the 
 Baeza Baee the revenue of her Jageer will lapse. 
 
 The Gwalior Government effectually resisted or evaded all our 
 endeavours to bring them into our Malwa opium arrangements, and 
 frequently complained of the loss sustained by commerce, and in 
 revenue, through our measures, exaggerating the amount at one 
 time to 10 or 12 lakhs a year. 
 
 In June, 1830, two things were required of the Regent — first, 
 that she should adopt the seal of the Maha Raja, and administer 
 the Government in his name. Secondly, that she should allow a 
 free and unreserved intercourse between the Maha Raja and the 
 resident ; and to both of these, after long and protracted discus- 
 sions, she agreed. 
 
 The following specimen of the young Maha Raja's character, as 
 developed in his first interview wath the resident when in his fifteenth 
 year, is not very promising : — " He declared that he was happy, 
 and he then said that the Baee possessed all the authority. I re- 
 plied that of course at his age he could not expect to have the 
 authority in his hands, that he must be under the control of some 
 person, and the Baee was the most proper person. I still urged 
 him, if there was any thing in the treatment he received of which 
 he had reason to complain, to state it to me. He again replied in 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 10 I 
 
 an indifferent kind of way that he was liappj'. I then said, If you 
 are, as you say, happy, and luxvo nothinij; to conipUiin of, how came 
 you to act in such an extraordinary manner as you have done oc- 
 casionally in (h'awinf^ your sword on your attendants, and more 
 recently on the occasion of your marriage, wiiy did you shoot arrows 
 on the people ? Are you awan> that on that occasion you killed a 
 man ! (this is the ease, a servant of tlie Powar Raja's, who was wound- 
 ed, died of the wound.) He replied with tlic greatest indiflt^rence, 
 '' God (Bugwan) diil it !" I said that (Jod had been very kind to him 
 in raising him to a station of such dignity, but that if he conducted 
 himself in such a manner he would forfeit the good opinion of all 
 men. To this he replied, "I have given up all that !" Conceiving 
 that he meant he had given up sucli conduct, I said I was most 
 happy to hear it. But he did not allow me to remain under this 
 erroneous impression. He immediately said, " That is not what I 
 mean. I mean that I have given up all regard for the opinion of 
 people, I do not care for any body." 
 
 In the last interview which Major Stewart had with His High- 
 ness before quitting Gwalior, he declared that he was perfectly 
 happv. " When I suggested to him the propriety of attending on 
 the Baee at the transaction of public business, he said he did at- 
 tend unless when indisposition prevented him. On the whole, 
 instead of showing any disposition to confide in me, and to impart 
 his grievances to me if he had any, he seemed inclined to show 
 a kind of indifference and disregard of my proffered services bor- 
 dering on rudeness."' 
 
 From that period up to the present there has been little at Gwa- 
 lior calling for the interference or notice of the British Government 
 in the affairs of tliat principality. The Baeza Baee continues her 
 administration without requiring our support, and the young Raja, 
 if he has any adherents in the state, has so far failed to make any 
 impression on her power. It may be supposed that as he advances in 
 years and approaches manhood, he must, if he has the ordinary ambi- 
 tion, and the proper feelings of a man, desire to exercise a portion 
 of that power which sooner or later must be his own ; that those of 
 the chiefs of the state Avho are likely to worship the rising sun, as 
 well as tliose who would prefer the (jovernment of a man to that of 
 a woman, will at no very distant period array themselves on his 
 side ; and that the Government of the Regent will fall before their 
 united force. The command of the treasury and the resources of 
 the state must for a time give a preponderance to her party, and 
 may enable her to prolong the struggle. In such a contest it will 
 be very possible for the British (jovcrnment to stand aloof, and the 
 more we allow the parties to have a fair field and no favor, the 
 more shall we secure a national and efficient Government for that 
 country, and the less will it hereafter be necessary for us to interfere 
 in its affairs. 
 
]G2 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 6th Class. — Protection with right on the part of the British 
 Government to control internal aftairs. 
 
 1. Sattara. — Sevajee the first sovereign of the Mahrattas assum- 
 ed the title of Raja, and struck coins in his own name in 1664-. The 
 first Peishwa or minister had been appointed previously to this ; but 
 Sattara did not become the capital till 1698. The grants to the Mah- 
 rattas for the chout on the six soubas of the Dekhan were obtained at 
 Dehlee through the Peishwa in the reign of Mohamud Shah, and 
 are dated in 1719. In 1749 the Brahmin PeishwaorministerBallajee 
 Bajee Rao, who had long exercised almost sovereign power in the 
 empire, obtained or pretended to obtain, from the fourth Raja 
 on his death-bed, " a deed empowering the Peishwa to manage 
 the whole Government of the Mahratta empire on condition of his 
 perpetuating the Raja's name, and keeping up the dignity of the 
 house of Sevajee through the grand-son of Tara Bye and his de- 
 scendants." (For the above particulars see Duff's Mahrattas.) From 
 this period the Peishwas have been considered the sovereigns of the 
 empire, negociated with as such by other powers, and obeyed by 
 the chiefs and princes ; the Raja being subjected to an honorable 
 and not very rigid confinement in the fortress of Sattara. 
 
 After the commencement of the war of 1817, the first notice of 
 the Sattara Raja, and indeed the first notice that ever had been 
 taken of H. H. by the British Government, who found him a prison- 
 er and his minister in possession of his throne, is in the conclud- 
 ing part of a proclamation issued on the 11th of Feb. 1818, by the 
 Commissioner at Poona to the chiefs and people of the Peishwa's 
 country. " The Raja of Sattara, who is now a prisoner in Bajee 
 Rao's hands, will be released and placed at the head of an iudepen- 
 dant sovereignty of such an extent as may maintain the Raja and 
 his family in comfort and dignity : with this view the fort of Sattara 
 has been taken, the Raja's flag has been set up in it, and his former 
 ministers have been called into employment. Whatever country is 
 assigned to the Raja will be administered by him. 
 
 In the Cavalry affair at Ashte on the 20th of February, where 
 for the first and only time during the campaign the Mahratta horse 
 chai-ged with any eftect the British line, composed of two squa- 
 drons of dragoons and two regiments of native cavalry supported 
 by horse artillery, and in which Gokla the leader of the Mahrattas 
 Avas killed, the head of the Mahratta empire was released from a 
 confinement of 69 years duration. In Sir Lionel Smith's letter to the 
 Commissioner at Poona on the 21st of February he says, " I have 
 infinite satisfaction in reporting that the Sattara Raja, his brothers 
 and mother, were in these circumstances rescued and brought safe 
 into camp to their great satisfaction and joy." 
 
 The Commissioner reports on the 9th of Maj' — " The Raja now 
 ma le his entiy in procession (into Sattara) escorted by detachments 
 from all the corps of the division, and accompanied by most of the 
 officers in camp. On this occasion he formally took his seat on 
 his throne in full Durbar, and soon after published a proclamation 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 163 
 
 announcincj his connot'tu)n with the British Govcrnmrnt, and tho 
 j)C'culiur iiijurios ho iiad rt'ccivcd tVoin Bajce llao. Among them 
 was? an order, tlie t'xistence ol' which was confirnunl liy the Kiila- 
 dar of Wussota, to put tlie whole family to death ratlier than 
 suffer them to be rescued."' 
 
 In his instructions to the political agent appointed to superintend 
 the affairs of the new Sattara principality, which were kept very 
 much under our management during the minority of the Raja, the 
 Commissioner observes — " The Governor General's intention in 
 founding a small state for the Raja is to afford an honorable main- 
 tenance to the representative of the ancient princes of this country, 
 and to establish among the Mahrattas a counterpoise to the remain- 
 ing influence of the former Brahmin Government. In the extent 
 which I intend to propose for the Raja's territories, I have taken 
 in the further object of providing for a portion of the soldiery of the 
 country whose habits might be unsuitable to our sei'vice, and like- 
 wise of retaining some of the civil and religious orders whom it 
 might be difficult to dispose of under our own direct Government." 
 
 The question as to which of the southern Jageerdars should 
 come under the authority of the Raja of Sattara, and the degree in 
 which they should be subject to his authority, were left open for 
 further consideration. 
 
 The young Raja proved of good disposition and sufficiently in- 
 telligent, but it was found necessary to interfere more than would 
 otherwise have been desirable on account of an extravagance, 
 foi'cign to the natural disposition of a Mahratta, whicli showed 
 itself in his first proceedings. As a sample of this H. H. gave in 
 an estimate of his expences, amounting to nearly half a crore. He 
 considered that half a lakh and half a crore were the same to the 
 Company's Government when disposed to bestow a favor. The 
 political agent told him that he should confine his expenditure 
 within his income. " He gravely assured me that it was impossible, 
 that on such a pittance he could scarcely feed his immediate de- 
 pendants ; elephants and equipage were out of the question. After 
 much conversation I found him so very unreasonable that I could 
 not help telling him that he ought to contrast what was proposed 
 with his former situation, that it was a temporary arrangement, and 
 his affairs would gradually improve, if he did not mar his ov.u 
 jDrospects by attending to the opinions of foolish people." 
 
 The Raja's mother was found more difficult to manage than even 
 the Raja liimself, as we seem to find invariably the case, whether 
 amongst Rajpoots, Mahomedans, or Mahrattas. " Balajee Punt on 
 his return from his first visit described the Raja's mother as so ex- 
 tremely violent that he was afraid of losing his character by being 
 abused by her. I therefore told him to address himself entirely to the 
 Raja, and to take little notice of any thing the others might say. On 
 finding that her opinions were little attended to, the mother com- 
 plained of 1)eing insulted, cried bitterly, said she would juni]) off' the 
 rampart of the fort, or throw herself down a well; regretted that she 
 
 Y 2 
 
1G4 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 had not gone Suttee with her husband, and said she would that 
 instant apply to nie to be sent to Benares." 
 
 The conduct of this good lady bears a remarkable resemblance to 
 that of the elder wife of the Shao Raja in 1749, the last closing 
 scene of the power of the Sattara family ; who " true to the in- 
 herent violence and ambition of her family" acted a part as much 
 in conformity to the troubled times in which she lived, as that of 
 the mother of the present Raja was to the more subdued and tran- 
 quillized period of his accession. Her threat of going to Benares 
 was turned against herself by the wily Brahmin of the latter period, 
 in the same manner as the threat of the other to become Suttee was 
 turned against her by Ballajee Bajee Rao, though not with equal 
 effect ; and both the Raja and his mother agreed for the present 
 to limit their expences to 27,000 rupees a month. Eventually the 
 political agent reported that the year had passed without their 
 having exceeded the amount specified. Bajee Rao, it appeared, 
 " scarcely allowed them half a lakh of rupees annually in ready 
 money, but he used to send them presents of very rich clothes on 
 all the great festivals, which must have been very expensive." 
 
 The naturally good disposition of the young prince very much 
 assisted the political agent in arranging the affairs of the princi- 
 pality. Like the Maha Rana of Oudepore, whom one of his at- 
 tendants asked, " What was the use of being a Raja if he could 
 not act according to his inclination ?" the Maha Raja himself 
 turning round suddenly observed, Dajeeba, you are a blockhead, 
 don't you see I may do whatever I like, provided I do what is 
 right ? for neither amongst Rajpoots nor Mahrattas has the re- 
 finement that " the king can do no Avrong" been maintained. Like 
 political agents elsewhere Captain Grant found that the Raja's 
 own natural disposition to do good was counteracted by a 
 Avorthless set of people about him, so situated as not to be dis- 
 placed. After some months' intercourse I found no difficulty in 
 obtaining his confidence (partially of course), and he has frequently 
 told me things which I should otherwise never have become ac- 
 quainted with. Opposed to the Raja's good qualities, he is veiy 
 sly, and this he mistakes for wisdom ; some of the intrigues and 
 tricks he practised during his confinement prove that he is an adept 
 at dissimulation. He had cei'tainly great excuse for this, but it 
 has given liim a taste for intrigue, and unfortunately this dangerous 
 propensity is a weakness on which he is easily flattered. The 
 Raja's disposition is in itself encouraging, but almost all those who 
 are near his person, and who must naturally have influence over his 
 actions, are worthless. 
 
 " The name of the elder of liis brothers is Raja Ram, familiarly 
 Rao Sahib. He is the best brother of the family, but possesses 
 none of the Raja's quickness or intelligence. He dresses well, rides 
 well, and has a great turn for show. He is idle and dissipated, but 
 he is gentlemanlike and spirited in his notions, and something 
 could be made of him if withdrawn from the example and influence 
 of his mother." 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 165 
 
 " The name of the younger brother is Sevajee, Aimiliarly Appah 
 Sahib. lie is an obstinate ill-disposed lad, M'ith very low vicious 
 habits, whieh all the admonition of the Raja cannot get the better 
 of. 
 
 " The name of the Raja's mother is Omda Baee, and styled Baee 
 Sahiba ; she is the daughter of Bowanjee Raja Sirkee ; she is good 
 looking, and her manners are extremely plausible. Since the death of 
 the Raja's grandmother, about five years ago, she has not only quit- 
 ted the seclusion proper for Mahratta ladii-s of rank to observe, but 
 become notoriously infamous in her habits. She is a bold ambitious 
 intriguing woman, exceedingly violent, vindictive, and obstinate. 
 
 '• Balla Sahib Bhosla is an exception to all the rest. He is the 
 Raja's first cousin, and the son of the late unfortunate Chittoor 
 Singh. He is said to resemble his father in disposition as well as 
 in appearance, but I have had occasion to remark a great deal of 
 good sense and propriety of conduct in Balla Sahib. He certainly 
 has the same (jualifications as his father for becoming a popular 
 leader, but I hope with better sense to direct him." 
 
 There is something interesting in this description of the character 
 and disposition of persons so long prisoners, and so lately raised to 
 rank and afiluence, from a pen like Captain Grant's. 
 
 On the 25th of September, 1819, a treaty was concluded with the 
 Raja of Sattara, by which the British Government ceded to H. H., 
 his heirs and successors in perpetual sovereignty, certain districts 
 specified in a schedule annexed. 
 
 The territory to be held in subordinate co-operation to the 
 British Government, and the Raja to be guided in all matters by 
 the British agent at H. H.'s court. The military force never to 
 be increased or diminished without consent. To forbear from all 
 intercourse with foreign states, even to the conti'acting of marriages, 
 otherwise than through the political agents. The possessions of 
 the Jageerdars within His Highness's territory to be under the gua- 
 rantee of the British Government, together with the possessions of 
 the Raja of Akulkote, the Punt Suchew, the Prittee-nidhee and the 
 Jageer of the Dufflays in the pergunnah of Ihutt. 
 
 The British Government wisely reserved to itself the administra- 
 tion of the country, until the officers of H. H. Government shall 
 acquire experience and evince ability to govern, when it will gra- 
 dually transfer the whole administration into their hands. 
 
 Still that withering stipulation — " He will at all times attend, 
 as above agreed, to the advice which the political agent shall offer 
 him, for the good of the state and the maintenance of general tran- 
 quillity," remains for ever. 
 
 The revenue of the tract of country transferred to the Raja 
 amounted in 1820, to about fifteen lakhs of rupees, when the Com- 
 missioner observed, " The highly cultivated state of a great por- 
 tion of the Sattara territory nmst preclude any considerable aug- 
 mentation of revenue, except from the more easterly pergunnahs, 
 where there is abundance of waste land susceptible of tillage. 
 
166 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 I am of opinion that the direct revenue to be placed at the Raja's 
 disposal might under tolerable government eventually approximate 
 to the maximum contemplated to be given to him, m hich in the 
 dispatch No. 78 of the Hon'ble the late Commissioner to the 
 Governor General was stated at 18,00,000 of rupees." 
 
 In March 1821, Mr, Chaplin, the Commissioner at Poona, re- 
 ported to the Bombay Government — " In my late tour to the 
 southward I had an opportunity of personally witnessing the gene- 
 ral prosperity and good order that prevailed thi'oughout the Raja's 
 districts, and the satisfaction which was shown by all classes of the 
 people towards H. H. Government and the existing system of ma- 
 nagement. 
 
 " The Raja himself at a private interview which I had with him 
 reiterated the expression of his respect and gratitude for the bene- 
 fits that have been conferred on him, and in acknowledging with 
 much apparent sincerity the obligations under which he was placed, 
 he repeatedly declared to me his determination to be regulated in 
 every act of his administration by the wishes of the BritisU 
 Government. He was by no means urgent in soliciting that he 
 might be emancipated from the restraint under which he at pre- 
 sent exercises his authority, but he trusted, he said, that when he 
 should be found qualified, a more unlimited freedom of controul 
 would be entrusted to him, assuring me at the same time he would 
 never adopt any measures without previously obtaining the political 
 agent's assent to them. 
 
 " The Raja was warm in expressing how sensible he was of the 
 kindness and consideration which Captain Grant had viniformly 
 observed towards him, both publicly and privately ; and I took my 
 leave of him, impressed with a very favorable opinion of the good 
 sense and judgment and the respectability of the acquirements 
 which H. H. evinced, both at this interview, and on the occasion 
 of a visit at which I received and entertained H. H. on the follow- 
 ing day." 
 
 The young Raja of Sattara continued to evince the same good 
 disposition and attention to business. And on the 5th of April, 
 nearly the same date on which three years before he was raised by 
 the Hon'ble Mr. Elphinstone to the Musnud of his forefathers, the 
 entire management of his future principality was transferred to his 
 charge. He was then in his twenty-fourth year. He considered the 
 laws and revenue regulations introduced by Captain Grant, so like 
 the laws of the Medes and Persians, that on the next political agent 
 suggesting some alteration calculated to be beneficial, the Raja like 
 a true Hindoo objected, saying, that they had so long worked so well 
 that he had rather continue them as they were than run the risk, 
 by altering any portion, of injuring them as a whole. 
 
 The designation of political agent was changed for that of resi- 
 dent. The resident's advice was only to be enforced under the 
 second article of the treaty when the Raja's conduct was likely to 
 lead to inconvenience or injustice, but always to be given when 
 
INTERNAL RKLATIONS. 167 
 
 requested ; the resident beaviiisx in mind tli(> wish of Government 
 to leave the Raja uncontrolled in his iiitirnal (lovernment. 
 
 The Raja was not to have the power of punishing his .Jagcerdars 
 by tine or sequestration without the previous consent of the resident, 
 V ho, in important cases, shouUl refer to Government for orders. 
 In issuing orders to the Jageerdars the Raja to communicate all of 
 importance to the resident. When desirous of quitting Sattara 
 for the purpose of visiting his territories, the Raja to communicate 
 his intention to the resident, who, if for any reason the measure 
 appears very objectionable, may advise to the contrary. Comnm- 
 nications between the Raja and British subjects, or the subjects of 
 foreign states, to be conducted through the resident. 
 
 In 1829, the Governor of Bombay, in a minute on this subject, 
 describes the Raja's territories as well governed, and that he himself 
 continued to do justice to the trouble that had been bestowed on 
 his education. It appears that the survey made of his country has 
 never been practically useful in revenue affairs, but that it is valu- 
 able from the minute information which it contains both fiscal and 
 geographical. 
 
 In describing the condition of the countiy subject to the south- 
 ern Jageerdars, extending over a tract yielding a revenue of twenty 
 lakhs a year, the Governor observes — " I was surprised to find from 
 the most minute inquiry how comparatively little the character of 
 this rule depended upon that of the chief. But the principal reason 
 of this I discovered to be in the village system being preserved 
 complete, and the almost invariable usage of the local officers (even 
 to the highest) being seldom ever changed. Many of the finest 
 districts have Umuldars and other officers who have succeeded to 
 those duties like an inheritance. The consequence is, that all the 
 money made in the districts is spent in them." 
 
 " Whatever may be the reason, it is impossible not to acknow- 
 ledge the fact, that the towns and villages under these Jageerdars 
 are in a better condition than any in our provinces of the Deckan ; 
 and notwithstanding the impressions of some to the contrary, I must, 
 from all I saw and heard, be of opinion that justice is in most cases 
 administered in a way fully as satisfactory to the inhabitants as 
 under our improved system."* 
 
 The late Mr. Thackeray, contrasting the advantages of our admi- 
 nistration with the advantages of the Jageerdars, observes — "with- 
 out allowing that, whichever Government is best administered is 
 best; we may I think infer, from the liourishing state of some of 
 the Jageers where the Government is patriarchal, and where the 
 machine of state seems to work imperceptibly, that the simplest 
 form of administration is best adapted to this country. The 
 
 * It incurious enough lliat in lliesp Jaspers \vp liavp assumed to oursplves 
 the rijilit ot Ihj inj;of>t'ii their towns and villHi^esjlo llie \ isHaliims of our p(due 
 in pursuit of crinnnals from ihe Britisli teiritory, whilst in liie Jagetr of 
 Ftrozf pore and oilur Jageers in the Dehlee lerriloiy, couferred by ourselves, 
 we do uul cluiiu this privilege, 
 
168 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 Jageerdars, however, have certainly advantages wliich we shall never 
 possess. They require less revenue and can afford better terms to 
 tlieir ryuts. Their managers are generally their friends and relations, 
 who live and die in the country they manage, and look as much to 
 their own popularity with the ryut as to the favor of the Jageer- 
 dars. 
 
 A great portion of these Jageerdars do not come under tlie juris- 
 diction of Sattara.* But some of them who wci'c formerly dependent 
 on that house preferred being again brought under its authority. 
 " Two of these, the Phultun and Duffela Jageers, have been brought 
 under his (the Raja's) direct rule, from the incompetence and in- 
 volved state of their possessions, and he has just taken charge of the 
 country of Akulkote from its chief, being a minor." 
 
 The charge of this latter possession, yielding between tliree and 
 four lakhs a year, did not continue under the tranquil management 
 of the Raja. He assumed an authority over the Jageer which was 
 not justified by usage, nor had it the sanction of the resident ; 
 governing it as a portion of his own dominions. Those interested 
 in the young Jageerdar, naturally resisted this assvunption of 
 authority ; and A\hen the Raja found that his measures had excited 
 an insurrection wjiich he had not the means of quelling, he called 
 for the aid of our troops. The resident took the management of 
 the affair into his own hands ; the troops Mere opposed and sus- 
 tained some loss, and eventually it Ijecame necessary to station a 
 detachment of Sepoys under an European oflicer at Akulkote, to 
 watch over the interests of the minor Jageerdar. There are four 
 other Jageerdars belonging to the Sattara principality under the 
 guarantee of the British Government, which render our relations 
 with that state somewhat complicated, and moi'e requires the pre- 
 sence of a political authority at that court than any other portion of 
 our relations with it. 
 
 2. KoLAPORE. — The " engagement" of the British Government 
 with this small state, which was then a dependency on the Peishwa, 
 is dated the 1st October, 1812. Its chief, like the Raja of Akul- 
 kote, derives importance from his connexion with the Sattara 
 family. 
 
 The principal object of the " engagement" was to settle some 
 differences between the Peishwa and the Raja through our media- 
 tion, in the same manner as was done with the Putwurdun family 
 
 • Against one of these, Cliinlamnn Rao of iMeritcli, il was ner ossary to em- 
 p!o) a force ill 1822, under the coninuuid ofColonfl !Molli>. He had been 
 required by the Commissioner to render up l.aliijne Punl Gnkhi, the murderer 
 of Captain Vau};!iai) and bis brollier ; and liis reply was — '' You write to (ue 
 that Gokia should be sent under a guard to Darwar, liut to deliver up to pun- 
 ishment a cow or a Hrahiniu who may have happened to commit a crime 
 against I lie Com pan y'stiov eminent, and niay have fallen into my baiuis^.wi.uld 
 be a reproach to my fanuly (or caste). I therefore n quest \ou will not write 
 again to this r(}'e( I. It was the duty of that person (Gokla) to perform the 
 Service and obey ilie orders of whomsoever he served, aud on litis coiisiUera- 
 tiou he does uot appear to be guilty of any crime." 
 
INTERNAL RLLATIONS. 169 
 
 at the same period. To save itself from piracy tlie British Govorn- 
 )ucnt obtainetl the cession of the harbour of Alalwan, with that of 
 certain forts in its neighbourhood, and the lauds dependant on 
 them. In consideration of these cessions the Raja was guaranteed 
 in his remaining possessions against all foreign powers and states ; 
 he agreeing to abide by the mediation of the British Government 
 in all his difierences with other powers. 
 
 At the termination of the JNIahratta war the Kolapore state re- 
 ceived from tlie British Government tlie districts of Chickoree and 
 Manowlee, yielding three lakhs of rupees per annum. 
 
 In July, 1821, the Raja of Kolapore was murderd in his own 
 palace by Saeajee Bajee Mohite, whose Jageer the Raja had resumed. 
 
 During the disturbances at Kittoor, in 1824, and the reports 
 which were so prevalent in the southern part of India of disasters 
 in the Burmese War, the conduct of the chief of Kolapore was 
 considered very suspicious. lie suddenly left his capital at the 
 head of 5000 Infantry, 1000 Horse, with seven guns, and it was 
 i*eported by the commissioner that his proceedings, if not actually 
 hostile, had, at such a conjuncture much the effect of hostility. He 
 continued to increase his levies, and to summon his dependants 
 with their armed followers. Yet there was no certain proof that 
 his designs were hostile to the British Government, and the fall of 
 Kittoor put a stop to his proceedings, " which had been to give 
 countenance to the rebellion, and to inspire insurgents with 
 confidence." 
 
 Mr. Chaplin described the Raja — " Though not wholly desti- 
 tute of occasional shrewdness, to be a youth of the most capricious, 
 suspicious, and vindictive disposition; violent in temper and abusive 
 in his language, addicted to the lowest company and the most 
 vicious pleasures. I entertain very little expectation of any per- 
 manent amendment in his Government. In the mean time, his 
 extravagance ajipears likely, if it has not already done so, to exhaust 
 his finances, and to compel him to continue in the same course of 
 extortion which has already rendered him highly unpopvdar." 
 
 Under these circumstances his mother requested that a British 
 officer might be deputed to reside for three or four years at Kola- 
 pore, and she and the chiefs ofiered to defray the expense ; and if 
 no amendment took place it was thought likely that the respectable 
 part of the subjects of Kolapore would come forward with a request 
 to the same effect. 
 
 The Honorable Mr. Elphinstone observed on this—" The resi- 
 dence of an European gentleman at Kolapore, as desired by the 
 Ranee, would be attended with no good effect : it would only involve 
 us more deeply in the internal affairs of the Raja's Government, 
 and would encourage His Highness by repeated contests, in which, 
 as our interfei'ence is not supported by treaty, he must invariably 
 be successful. 
 
 The only point on which the Raja could be accused of an infrac- 
 tion of the treaty, was his refusal to abide by the a^ard of the 
 
 z 
 
170 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 British Government regarding a dispute with the neighbouring 
 territory of Sawuntwaree, and this was considered to justify an 
 appeal to arms on our part when the proper time should arrive. 
 
 On the question of Scindia's and Hindoo Rao's claims to Kungal, 
 it was agreed — " It is doubtful whether the Raja is not entitled to 
 dispossess Hindoo Rao for his refractory conduct, even if he were 
 the rightful Jageerdar of Kungal. It is doubtful whether Hindoo 
 Rao is the rightful Jageerdar, and it is again doubtful Avhether he 
 would have any claim to Wiswas Rao's villages if his title to Kun- 
 gal were undisputed." 
 
 In March, 1825, the Kolapore Raja proceeded to reduce the fort 
 of Kungal and its subordinate villages, which he soon effected, 
 having a battering train of four guns, two mortars, with some field 
 artillery. This measure of the Ra,)a's was considered indecently 
 precipitate. In the mean time Hindoo Rao produced at Gwalior a 
 Sunnud for these possessions, from the father of the present Raja 
 of Kolapore, to his father Surjee Rao Gutkea, which went to 
 prove the relative position of the parties. 
 
 In the following year, the Raja moved with a similar force to the 
 frontier of the Sattara territory, without any communication with 
 our Government, and as was supposed by our ally, with hostile 
 intentions, which led both H. H. and us to prepare to act on the 
 offensive. 
 
 In 1825, the conduct of the Raja compelled the British Govern- 
 ment to march a force into the Kolapore territory, and on the 30th 
 December, a treaty was negotiated with that state, the principal 
 stijiulations of which were, that the Raja was to reduce his force, 
 and maintain it at a strength not calculated to disturb the public 
 tranquillity Avithin or without his territories ; to attend to the 
 advice of the British Government on all measures calculated to affect 
 the public tranquillity ; to be independent within his own territories, 
 and not to molest Hindoo Rao, and certain other Jageerdars in their 
 ancient rights. 
 
 Shortly after the conclusion of this treaty, the Kolapore Raja 
 proceeded to Poona, the object of his journey being to induce the 
 Governor of Bombay to relieve him from the conditions by which 
 he was bound. Failing in this, he returned to Kolapore, committing 
 some extravagances and aggressions on the road, and conducting 
 himself on his journey, as he had done at Poona, in a manner that 
 showed him hardly to be of sane mind. On his return to Kolapore 
 he was immediately guilty of an infraction of the terms of the treaty, 
 by levying troops in excess to the stipulated number, and in seizing 
 on the possessions of his Jageerdars, who were under our guarantee. 
 A force had been assembled on the Kolapore frontier to chastise the 
 Raja for this breach of treaty, but as some delay occurred in the 
 discussions necessary for calling it into active operation, and as the 
 season got far advanced, it was in the end of April broken up. 
 The political agent reported in his letter of 10th April, 1827 — ■ 
 " With respect however to the reducing of his army to the peace 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 171 
 
 establishment, or adjusting: the nimiorous demands for which ho 
 has been calleil to make rejjaratioii, I sec not the sniaUest chance 
 excepting by the presence of an over-awing British force at his very 
 capital. " 
 
 Tlie Raja accordingly proceeded in the career of strengthening 
 his forces, and in August commenceil aggressions on his neighbours. 
 It was therefore necessary again to order a force into the field, to 
 operate against him. It reached his capital on the 1,5th of October, 
 which was found to be in possession of 2 or 3000 Arabs and 
 Scindians. It was peaceably delivered up to the British troops, the 
 Arabs and Scindians marching in search of other service, and the 
 rabble that the llaja had collected from all quarters dispersing in 
 all directions. 
 
 A definitive treaty was concluded at Kolapore on the 23rd of 
 October, 1827. The Ra;ja was not to maintain more than 400 horse 
 and 800 foot, exclusive of garrison. The Talooks of Chickoree and 
 Manowlee, formerly granted to the Raja, were resumed. Certain 
 chiefs whom the Raja had molested received perpetual instead of 
 life guarantees, and certain villages which he had resumed were 
 restored. The forts of Kolapore and Pannallagurh to be garrisoned 
 by British troops, the Raja paying the expense. The sum of 
 Ij^TjQiS rupees was charged to tlie Raja for the damage done by 
 him to his neighbours, and territory yielding 50,000 rupees a year 
 was reserved until the amount was liquidated. A minister was 
 appointed by the British Government to administer the affairs of 
 Kolapore, the power of removing and appointing resting with it. 
 
 In February, 1829, the Govei'nor of Bombay visited Kolapore and 
 observed, " Mr. Nisbet's last report which has been delivered into 
 the Board is very satisfactory, and I am quite of opinion with the 
 political agent, that the fort of Punnallagurh may be given up, and 
 our regiment now at Kolapore spared. The management of the 
 country is at present in the hands of a Dewan of the Raja's own 
 choosing, but who could not maintain his place, or discharge the 
 obligations imposed upon this petty state, without the complete 
 support of the political agent, wliicli is given on the full understand- 
 ing that every proper attention and respect will be paid by the 
 minister to his proud though incompetent prince. 
 
 " All my intercourse with the Raja of Kolapore was regulated by 
 the same forms as that with the Raja of Sattara, with whom he 
 claims equality, being of the same family, and with full as high pre- 
 tensions to rank and consideration. His court has the same officers, 
 and he assumes on all points similar state. Several of his chiefs 
 ■were at Kolapore, during my visit, and they, though possessed of 
 independent Jageers and forts, give him as their prince, every res- 
 pect and obedience. 
 
 " The part of the Kolapore country through which I passed is 
 well cultivated, notwithstanding the injuries to which it has been 
 exposed from the incompetence and (piarrels of its late rulers. The 
 ryuts appear satisfied, and I was surpx-ised to find that the acknow- 
 
 z 2 
 
172 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 ledgetl excesses and weakness of character of the present ruler, had 
 in no degree deprived him of the regard and attachment of his 
 subjects. He is on the contrary popular among the lower classes, 
 and the inhabitants of the villages are, I was assured by those who 
 mixed with them, still vain of their allegiance to a descendant of 
 Sevajee." 
 
 DEHLEE. 
 
 Before closing these sketches, meant to describe the political 
 relations of the British Government in India Avith tlie native states, 
 it may be necessary to notice the condition of the royal family 
 of Dehlee, for altliough its political importance had ceased long 
 before we sought to establish our supremacy, yet its importance in 
 some shape or other in the estimation of the princes a,nd people 
 Mill long continue. 
 
 His present Majesty Akbur Shah is the twenty-fifth sovereign in 
 decent since the establishment of the Timoor dynasty on the throne 
 of Dehlee in 1413. Eighteen kings had reigned before that period 
 from the first conquest of Dehlee by the Mahommedans under 
 Kootub-ud Deen in 1193. But the sovereign power of the present 
 house of Dehlee may of course be considered to have terminated 
 with the life of Aurungzebe in 1 707. 
 
 It is unnecessary to repeat the story of the first conquest of 
 Dehlee, since that period, by the Mahrattas : the conquest by Nader 
 Shah ; by Ahmed Shah Dooranee ; the second conquest by the Mah- 
 rat, or its subjugation to British supremacy by the army of Lord 
 Lake in 1803. 
 
 The king of Dehlee was then released from an honorable capti- 
 vity. The houses and lands outside of the palace walls, and belong- 
 ing to the royal family, had been appropriated by the ofticers of the 
 Mahratta Government ; and a sum amounting to about two lakhs of 
 rupees per annum was allowed by Scindiah for the maintenance of 
 the royal household. The houses and lands were of course imme- 
 diately restored, tlie latter yielding a revenue of about a lakh a year ; 
 and the sum of 76,500 rupees per mensem was set aside for the 
 support of His Majesty and the members of his family. 
 
 No stipulations were entered into witli His Majesty, and the 
 following is the declaration of Government in November, 1804. 
 
 " The Governor General does not deem it advisable to enter into 
 any written engagement whatever with His Majesty ; nor is it His 
 Excellency's intention to solicit any concession." 
 
 In 1805, the resident at Dehlee recommended to Government — 
 " That the provision to be assigned to the king should he a fixed 
 stipend, payable in ready money, out of revenues of our territory on 
 the west of the Jumna." And after receiving the orders of Govern- 
 ment on the subject, he appears to have delivered to His INIajesty a 
 paper founded thereon ; and on the strength of which the king now 
 claims certain innnunities, tlie withholding of which has lately led 
 to an appeal to the king of England, through Ram Mohun Roy. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. J 73 
 
 The principal articles in the paper delivered to the king in 180.5 
 were : That certain districts situated v est of tiio Jumna shall l)e 
 considered crown lands, the management of them to remain in the 
 hands of the resident. TJie sum specified below (76,500 rupees) 
 to be paid to His Majesty, whether the territory so situated should 
 yield that amount or not. When the collections from this territory 
 increase, a proportionate augmentation of the king's stipend will 
 take place. The king's stipend was increased in 1809, and is now 
 twelve lakhs per annum. 
 
 It does not appear that the communication made to His Majesty, 
 by the resident at Dehlee, in 1805, of the intentions of Government, 
 was authorised ; and " it was never proposed either to limit the 
 stipends by the amount of the produce of the territory, or to aug- 
 ment them to an extent equal to the revenue which the territory 
 might eventually yield: the obligation which the British Govern- 
 ment had imposed on itself was that of providing adequate means 
 for the support of the king and his household in a manner suitable 
 to the condition in which he was placed; while in i^olicy it was 
 inexpedient that the provision granted should exceed an amount 
 sufficient for that purpose." 
 
 On the occasion of the Governor General's visit to Dehlee, in 
 1827, the king came forward with a paper containing certain de- 
 mands, grounded on the communication wdiich the resident had 
 made in 1805, and through which His Majesty claims the revenue 
 of what have lately been called " the assigned districts." The 
 gross revenue of the territory on the right of the Jumna is now 
 supposed was designated by the terra " assigned," or how any 
 portion of it acquired that designation, does not very clearly appear, 
 for all was alike conquered from the Mahrattas. A great portion of 
 it was afterwards assigned in Jageer to individuals, and has since 
 reverted to Government; if it be charged with the civil establish- 
 ments, and the troops maintained within its limits, at the statipns 
 of Dehlee, Kurnal, and Hansce, but little would remain for the 
 payment of the stipend of the king of Dehlee. 
 
 The king of Dehlee has lately either deputed Rammohun Roy 
 as his agent to England, or taken advantage of that person's pro- 
 ceeding there to convey a letter to our most gracious Sovereign on 
 the subject of the insufficiency of his stipend. The same letter 
 conveyed also the expression of His Majesty's dissatisfaction with 
 the footing on which the Governor General had met His Majesty in 
 1827; although the ceremonial on that occasion had been either 
 dictated by the king himself, or was settled in conformity with 
 His ^Majesty's wishes. 
 
 As the ceremonials of that occasion were described as derogating 
 from His Majesty's dignity, and as His Lordship the Governor 
 General on his late visit to Upper India could not depart from the 
 forms observed by his predecessor, and woukl not consent to im- 
 pose on His Majesty any terms which could bear such an interpre- 
 tation, no civilities of this nature were exchanged between them. 
 
 One of the most remarkable proofs of the attachment of the 
 
174 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 people of India to the forms and ceremonies \vhich their forefatheru 
 have been accustomed to observe, is the avidity with which all 
 court and pay for honors emanating from the pageant throne of 
 Dehlee. It might be expected that in the long period which has 
 intervened since the power of the house of Dehlee terminated, it 
 would have ceased to be considered as the fountain of all honor: 
 but such is not the case. The princes of Rajpootana, the Nizam, and 
 generally the Princes of India do not consider their accession to their 
 several principalities complete, until they have done homage to the 
 throne of Dehlee. If this arose from sentiments of loyalty or devotion 
 to his fallen Majesty, all would honor and respect such principles; 
 but they are purely selfish, and may be received in proof of the subor- 
 dinate condition in which those states have heretofore existed; and 
 in which, even in their own estimation, they must continue to exist. 
 
 All-powerful and supreme as the British Government now is in 
 India, certainly more so than ever was His Majesty of Dehlee, it 
 must be doubtful, Avhether it can turn this tide of loyalty towards 
 itself. The establishment of the Royal Government in India might 
 produce some effect in this respect. The King of England, although 
 far removed from the scene, may, through a Viceroy or a Governor 
 General, confer honors and distinctions which would be prized by 
 the princes of India. But even then there would be an absence of 
 that majesty in the ceremonials, to which people in their degree of 
 civilization attach so much importance. 
 
 It may be a question, whether it be worthy of us to do violence 
 to the feelings of the king of Dehlee, and the princes and peo- 
 ple of India, by endeavouring forcibly to restrain the inclination on 
 the one part to receive, and on the other to pay, that fealty and 
 homage which has been sanctioned by the practice of ages. It is 
 absurd that we ourselves should ever have done, or that we should 
 now do homage, to the king of Dehlee, or that we should encourage 
 it in others. But as no political consequences are involved, or likely 
 to follow these pageant exhibitions by others, it would perhaps be 
 wise to allow them to pass vmnoticed. The cupidity of those by 
 wdioni the king is surrounded would very soon render such honors 
 too common to be much prized any where; and when they ceased 
 to have attraction for the people, we might with greater effect 
 substitute some titles or honors of our own in their jjlace. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 The above classification of our political relation shows, that in 
 Internal India thei'e are four independent Mahommedan states; viz. 
 Hyderabad, Oude, Bhopal, and Tonk. 
 
 That there are eight Mahratta states, if Dhar and Dewas may be 
 classed amongst them, the others being Sattara, Gwalior, Berar, 
 Indore, Baroda, and Kolapore. 
 
 There are nineteen Rajpoot states; viz. Oudepore, Jeypore, 
 Joudpore, Kotah, Boondee, Ulwui-, Beekaneer, Jessulmere, Kishen- 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 175 
 
 g\irh, Banswara, Piutabgurli, Dongerpore, Kerowlee, Serowee, 
 Cutch, Rewah, Dhuttea, Maliratta, Jansee, and Tere. 
 
 There are six other Hindoo states, viz. Mysore, Travancore, 
 Cochin, Bhurtpore, Dolpore and Sawunt Waree. 
 
 There are the Seik protected states, the principal of which are 
 Putteala, Keytul, Naba, and Jeend. 
 
 Besides these there are smaller states and Jageerdars under 
 British protection, amongst which may be ranked the remaining 
 states of Saugor and Bundlekund. 
 
 The chiefs of the northern hills — Siccum, Muneepore, Singboom, 
 Chota Nagpore, Sirgooja, Sumblcpore, Oudepore, Tanjore, Coorg ; 
 the Bareitch family, Ferozpore ; and the Jageerdars of the south- 
 ern Mahratta country. 
 
 It is remarkable enough, that of all the splendour of the Mahom- 
 medan Empire of Dehlee, and of the kingdoms of Ahmedabad, 
 Ahmednuggur, Beejapore, Koolburgah, Golkonda, Beeder, Malwah, 
 &c., there should now only remain the independent states of Hydera- 
 bad, Oude, Bhopal, and Tonk ; neither of them possessing any 
 claims to antiquity. The Nawab of Hyderabad and the king of 
 Oude were, to a very late period, officers of the Dehlee Government. 
 The former still considers himself in that capacity, and the latter 
 did so, until we endeavoured to exalt him, by conferring a few 
 years since, a kingly designation ; this has however never been con- 
 ceded to him beyond the limits of his own court or territory, and 
 his assumption of the title has been the cause of much ridicule 
 amongst his Mahommedan brethren throughout India. 
 
 More fortunate than either of the other Dehlee Soobas they 
 maintained their positions amidst the wreck of the other portions 
 of the empire, and eventually, with our assistance, have secured 
 their supremacy. The chief of Bhopal if not of later date, is of 
 much inferior station, and he of Tonk is of our own ci'cation. The 
 revenues of these four Mahommedan states cannot exceed four 
 crore of rupees. 
 
 When Aurungzebe, the last of the emperors who exercised a 
 shadow of sovereignty, conquered the kingdoms of the Dekhun, and 
 failed to establish any permanent power in their stead, the Mahrat- 
 tas rose rapidly on the ruin which he had worked to occupy the 
 vacant space. The latter days of this sovereign's existence were 
 embittered by seeing Mahratta outposts and plunderers at the 
 gates of his capital of Aurungabad ; and in his last march from the 
 neighbourhood of Singurh to Ahmednuggur, the imperial army 
 was defeated, and the emperor narrowly escaped falling into their 
 hands. 
 
 In fifty-three years after Aurungzebe's death, or in 1760, the 
 Mahrattas were in possession of Dehlee, Sirhind, Lahore, and Moul- 
 tan ; and were levying contributions through the whole extent of 
 what had been the Mogul empire. 
 
 The Mahommedans certainly never possessed the genius of 
 governing in peace an empire so extensive as India, for thei'e can 
 
176 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 hardly have been in the world, through so long a period of time, 
 scenes of greater devastation and bloodshed than attended their 
 great career, whether in their conquests of the Hindoo jDrincipali- 
 ties of Anagoonde, Wurungul, Deogurh, Oujein, Gurra, &c. ; 
 whether in the struggles of the several Mahommedan kingdoms with 
 one another ; or in those of the imperial house of Dehlee against 
 the other powers of India. 
 
 We need seek for no better proof than we have in the rapidity 
 of their downfal, and in the wretched condition and insignificance 
 of the states that have survived, and generally in the condition of 
 the Mahommedan people and power throughout India, of the im- 
 possibility that, that form of Government should take deep root ia 
 the affections of the people. 
 
 The despotic form of Mahommedan Governments and institutions 
 was calculated to produce some bright periods in their history. 
 And accordingly we find that both under the imperial house of 
 Dehlee, and in the separate kingdoms of the Dekhun, greater splen- 
 dour and prosperity were attained through the individual character 
 of kings and princes, than can be expected to arise out of afox'eign 
 administration conducted like that of the British in India, however 
 superior and enlightened the instruments whom it may employ, or 
 however benevolent their intentions in seeking to suit the nature of 
 their institutions to the character and wants of the people subject 
 to their sway. But as these bright periods in the history of the 
 Mahommedans depended on the individual character of their rulers ; 
 as there were no fixed or permanent principles of administration 
 emanating from the people themselves ; as the governing party was 
 of a different religion and a different race from the great majority 
 of the people, as it gradually ceased to receive an infusion of new 
 material from abroad, and in energy of character and licentiousness, 
 sunk below the natives of the country ; it was a moral impossibility 
 that this condition of things should last ; and that it lasted so long 
 is to be attributed to the character of the great body of the Hindoo 
 people over whom the INIahonimedan rule prevailed. 
 
 The population of the four Mahommedan states that now exist 
 does not differ materially from that of the other countries of India. 
 It is remarkable to find in the form of the Afghaun Government of 
 Bhopal an infusion of those popular principles which govern the 
 Afghaun kingdoms of Central Asia. But in the institutions of the 
 other states there is nothing different from the usual despotism of 
 Mahommedan Governments. They are neither grounded in the 
 affections of the people nor supported by an aristocracy, for there 
 are no rights of either inheritance or titles belonging to an aris- 
 tocracy under Mahommedan rule. All are servants obeying 
 implicitly the will of a master; and in the Vizier's dominions His 
 Highness claims to be heir to the property of all that die in his 
 service. It is therefore no wonder that such Governments do not, 
 over a foreign people like that of India, whose very laws they 
 have subverted, take root in their affections.^ 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 177 
 
 There is no instance in late days of INIahommedan states com- 
 bining against the British Government, for althoiigli higlily nation- 
 al, and inimical to all other forms of Govennnent, ami all other 
 religions, the material of combination is generally wanting amongst 
 them, from their separate interests and isolated positions. Neither 
 Avould they carry along -with them the great bulk of the jx'ople, 
 for they are generally considered to be in the proportion of only 
 one in ten to the Hindoos. However hostile therefore the whole 
 of this race may be to our power, they are the less formidable from 
 their scattered condition amid the Hindoo population. We may 
 be almost certain that in any attempt of the ^lahommedans to sub- 
 vert our power, religious fanaticism will be the mainspring in all 
 their operation ; and as this must necessarily bring tiiem into 
 collision with the Hindoos as well as with us, we have the less to 
 fear from their united hostility. 
 
 Of the eight Mahratta states neither possess any claim to great 
 antiquity. Sattara is of course the most ancient, and dates it origin 
 from 1664, although great fluctuation, if not complete subversion 
 of its political power, has taken place since that period. The others 
 are of later acquisition, and were conquests from the Mahommedans, 
 conferred on relations of the Sattara family, or on distinguished 
 military commanders to be held in subordination to the empire. 
 Berar and Kolapore are of the former, and the others of the latter 
 description. The revenues of these eight states amount to about 
 three crore per annum. 
 
 The Mahrattas possessed in a greater degree than the Mahom- 
 medans the means of governing India in peace ; although appa- 
 rently not as an united empire. For even in the first years of the 
 supremacy of the house of Sevajee (1750,) the sovereignty was 
 usurped by a Bramin minister, whose descendants continued to 
 exercise the nominal power of the head of the empire until its sub- 
 version in 1817, by the British Government. The other chiefs had 
 in a great measure long before that period gradually seceded from 
 their allegiance and were for all the purposes of Government inde- 
 pendent in their several principalities. There is too, good reason 
 to believe, that Nana Furnavese had in the intermediate period 
 nearly succeeded in usurping the place of Peishwa. 
 
 It is remarkable enough that in all the wars of the British Go- 
 vernment Avith the Mahrattas, none of the principalities have been 
 entirely subverted, nor have either of their capitals been perma- 
 nently conquered, for that of Poena had to all intents and purposes 
 become a Bramin and not a Mahratta Govei'ument. This prol)ably 
 arises from the Mahratta form of administration and institutions, 
 being calculated to take deeper root in the affections of the people 
 than those of the Mahommedans. 
 
 The most distinguished period of the Mahratta history is 1760, 
 w^hen the united army of the several states into which the empire 
 had then divided assembled in Upper India, under the command of 
 the heir-apparent Wiswas Rao, and the chief minister of the empire, 
 
 A A 
 
178 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 Sliudashoo Bhow. Such discordant materials could only have been 
 brought to act in concert by religious and national feeling. They 
 were joined too by an army of 30,000 Jauts, under their great 
 leader, Sooraj Mull, and by contingents from the states of Ilajpoo- 
 tana, which even then were tributary to the Mahrattas. It seems 
 the last struggle of the Hindoos against their ^lahommedan con- 
 querors ; and there is no doubt that all the JNIahommedan powers 
 of India must have fallen before this mighty army. But the occa- 
 sion which called it forth, the invasion of Ahmed Shah, the Doora- 
 nee King of Cabul, Avas sufficient to meet the exigency ; and the 
 defeat of the Mahratta army at Panniput, by the more hardy sons 
 of the north, with the loss of its principal leaders and two hundred 
 thousand of its numbers, threw back the tide of their conquest for 
 a period of years. 
 
 The power of the Mahrattas was, however, of a nature not to be 
 easily subdued, for it had already taken deep root in different parts 
 of India. The army consisted of a light national force, composed 
 chiefly of Cavalry, capable of performing long and rapid marches ; 
 which if defeated in one quarter could readily re-assemble in another, 
 and which, from the position of the several states of the empire in 
 Malwa, Berar, Guzerat, and the Dekhan, found a resting place 
 every where. It was not the object of the king of the Dooranees 
 to establish an empire in India, and after the defeat of the Mahrat- 
 tas at Panniput, he returned to his own kingdom of Cabul, leaving 
 them in almost undisputed possession of the field. 
 
 It is unnecessary to my 2'>urpose to follow this people through 
 the series of divisions, discords, and internal wars that intervened 
 between the battle of Panniput and the period that placed the 
 British Government in the position of controlling the head of the 
 Mahratta empire. Towards the close of the last century, Scindia 
 had established himself in the vicinity of Poona, at the head of a 
 powerful army, controlling the councils of the Peishwa. In the 
 end of 1802, the army of Scindia was defeated by Holkar, who 
 took possession of Poona, from which the Peishwa had fled, to seek 
 the protection of the British Government. On the 31st of Decem- 
 ber, of the same year, the treaty of Bassein was negotiated, and on 
 the 13th of the following May, the Peishwa returned to his capital, 
 and resumed his functions as head of the Mahratta empire, protect- 
 ed by the British force Avhich he had subsidized ; and which had 
 before, under the command of the Duke of Wellington, expelled 
 the army of Holkar from Poona. 
 
 The states of the empire Avere not likely quietly to resign this 
 control to the hands of foreigners, and accordingly the league 
 between Scindia and the Berar Raja folloAved, and in the subsequent 
 year the war Avith Holkar. The united armies of the former poAA^ers 
 in the Dekhan Avere subdued by the Duke of Wellington at the 
 battles of Assye and Wurgam, Avhich Avith the loss of the fortresses 
 of Ahmednuggur, Asseergurh, GaAvilgurh, Chandore, and Golna, 
 completed our triumphs, and the subjugation of those powers in 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 179 
 
 tliat rop^ion. Lord Lakc-subdnotl the arniios of Scindlaand Ilolkar 
 ill Hiiidoostan, at the battles of Dildco, Laswano, and Dccir, uldcii 
 with the conquest of the fortresses of Allighur, Agra, and (jualior, 
 established our supremacy in that qnarter. 
 
 In 1817, the Muhratta nation, vith the exception of the Baroda 
 principality, with Mhieh we have n(;ver been at war, again combin- 
 ed against us. The Peishwa lost his dominions, and has since been 
 a pensioner on the bounty of the British Government. Berar and 
 Indore lost a great portion of their territory, and their political 
 importance; and Scindia was only prevented from joining the 
 confederacy by the position of the grand army. A small princi- 
 pality was conferred on the long imprisoned Sattara family, out of 
 the territory conquered from the Peishwa. 
 
 Except in the Sattara and Kolapore principalities, the Malirattas 
 are as much foreigners in the countries which they govern as the 
 JMahonniiedans are in theirs. There may be a few Malirattas in 
 the western portions of Berar, but there are none in the Gwalior, 
 Indore, or baroda territory. Their Government is nearly as des- 
 potic as that of the Mahommcdans, but being Hindoos they conje 
 nearer to the great body of the people, and are better calculated to 
 take root in their affections, than either the Mahommedan or 
 British Government. Sattara and Berar are j^erhaps the best Native 
 Governments, and the most prosperous countries in India. The 
 machinery of a Mahratta Government is certainly more easily 
 directed than that of a INIahommedan, and that people are free from 
 many of the vices and corruptions of the other; which, arising from 
 the system of education, and security under our protection, have 
 rendered them unecjual to administer the alfairs of an extensive 
 country. 
 
 Of the nineteen Rajpoot states, many are of the highest, and 
 most of them of great antiquity. Here too the rulers are generally 
 of a distinct tribe from the great majority of their subjects. But 
 the same system of administration, and the same institutions will 
 be found under Rajpoot Governments, to prevail every where. In 
 countries the most remote, in Rajpootana, in Cutch, and in Chota 
 Nagpore, we find institutions calculated to ensure permanency, 
 and a beneficent form of administration. The will of the prince is 
 every where directed and controlled by a body of powerful heredi- 
 tary nobles, who have rights and possessions separate from his; 
 and whom, through all times, we find ready to unite with him to 
 defend his and their possessions against foreign encroachment, as 
 well as to unite against him to support their order against his 
 usurpations. These -struggles are necessarily calculated to bring • 
 both parties to lean on the people for support, and consequently to 
 infuse democratic principles into Rajpoot councils. 
 
 The princes of Rajpootana, although generally unequal to forming 
 a confederacy against the encroachments of foreigners, made indi- 
 vidually glorious stands in defence of their country; and some of 
 them were hardly ever subdued, whilst others took their places as 
 
 A A 2 
 
180 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 the first nobles under the throne of Dehlee, commanding armies, and 
 conquering and governing provinces even beyond the limits of 
 India. The Mahrattas found but little difficulty in imposing tri- 
 butes on the unprotected country of Rajpootana, as in almost every 
 other country in India, for the Rajpoots had not Cavalry to meet 
 the Mahrattas in the field, who inflicted such evils on the unpro- 
 tected inhabitants that Governments were always ready to purchase 
 relief from these sufferings by a sacrifice of a portion of their reve- 
 nues. Yet this did not long afford protection, but on the contrary, 
 may be supposed to have encouraged a repetition on their part of 
 visits which proved so profitable. 
 
 The states of Rajpootana gladly placed themselves under the 
 protection of the British Government, engaging to pay for their 
 protection the same amovmt of fixed tribute as they had formerly 
 paid to the Mahrattas ; and escaping from the future encroach- 
 ments, and the extra collection levied by that people. Holkar 
 ceded to the British Government, after the battle of Mahidpore, 
 the tribute which he had formerly collected from Rajpootana; and 
 the British Government agreed to pay to Scindia the amount which 
 he had collected, thus saving that region from any further connexion 
 with the Mahratta powers. Tlie Mahratta system of collecting a 
 fractional part of the revenue, which was found to be injurious to 
 the independence of the native states, by leading to constant inter- 
 ference in their internal affaire, has been discontinued every where; 
 and a fixed sum has been substituted. In some instances, Oude- 
 pore and Jeypore, the tributes bear a large proportion to the 
 amount of revenue, and are perhaps so heavy as to injure the sub- 
 ^stantive character of those states. The days of Mahratta anarchy 
 have been forgotten, and it may be doubted whether some of the 
 states would not rather revert to the period of unequal and uncer- 
 tain exaction, than continue the payment of a fixed and never- 
 ceasing tribute, which they will feel to be enhanced too, with tlie 
 increasing value of money. 
 
 The alliance of these states with a powerful Government like the 
 British can hardly fail to produce a great change in the relative 
 positions of the prince and the federal nobles. The former has now 
 ceased to require military service or support from the latter. His 
 resources will be concentrated and augmented, and his encroach- 
 ments on their privileges may be expected to keej^ pace with his 
 power. It might be supposed too that princes were likely covertly 
 to support one another with their standing armies, in the struggle 
 against tlie rights of their subordinate chiefs. But in the contests 
 that we have already witnessed in Joudpore, Kishenghur, and 
 Dongerpore, the feudal chiefs seem to have gained more assistance 
 from abroad than the princes did. It may however in a long period 
 of peace be expected that the power of these chiefs, as in some of 
 the feudal nations of Europe, will gradually fall before the power 
 of the throne. Such a result is certainly not desirable, in so far as 
 the interests and freedom of the people of those countries are con- 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 181 
 
 ccrned ; noi' is it perhaps for the eventiial interest of the sove- 
 reigns themselves that the union should be dissolved, which has 
 hitherto given stability to their power, when most of the other 
 Governments of India have passed away. 
 
 The yearly revenues of these nineteen states hardly exceed two 
 crore and a half of rupees. 
 
 Of the other six Hindoo states, Bhiirtpore is perhaps more na- 
 tional than any other principality in Internal India, and it was this 
 Avliich enabled it to oppose so formidable a resistance to Lord Lake 
 al"ter most of the other powers of India had been subdued. When 
 the army was last advancing to the siege of that fortress, an intel- 
 ligent native observetl that they were to be attacked with caution, 
 for although they had only mud walls, they were an united people, 
 and that we had to war against a tribe of men fighting for their 
 country. The revenues of these six states may be estimated at a 
 crore of rupees. 
 
 The Sikh states on the left bank of the Sutlege are a confeder- 
 acy of po\vers, w hieh like the INIahrattas, could no doubt unite, and 
 would be joined by the great Sikh power their neighliour, to op- 
 pose foreign aggression. But like IVIahommedans and Mahrattas 
 the Sikhs are foreigners in the country vuider their rule, and cannot 
 therefore be expected readily to take root in the affections of their 
 subjects. Runjeet Singh's rule is a pure despotism, and so is that 
 of each of the states under our protection. The yearly revenue of 
 the whole is estimated at fifty lakhs. 
 
 The other petty states and Jageerdars under British protection 
 may be considered to yield a revenue of a crore and a half per 
 annum. 
 
 The revenues of the -whole of these states by this estimation 
 amount to twelve crores and fifty lakhs. 
 
 The accompanying sketch map, prepared under Major Everest's 
 instructions, shows the territorial possessions of each of the prin- 
 cipal states, in square miles. There were not sufficient materials in 
 the Surveyor General's Office to mark off the boundaries of all the 
 minor states, but the whole extent of territory is square miles 
 44'9,84'5 whilst that of the British possessions is 626,746. The 
 condition of this community of states has materially changed since 
 their connexion with the British Government, which found them 
 independent principalities, each holding foreign relations with its 
 neighbour, and with all other states, as suited their mutual conve- 
 nience ; each striving for power and extension of territory ; main- 
 taining or extending its place in the scale of nations, either by 
 combination or by the extent of its military resources ; and all 
 subject to great change and convulsion. 
 
 The consequence of one great power undertaking the direction of 
 political relations, has necessarily caused the loss of much political 
 importance on the part of the minor states. Their former con- 
 nexion with one another is cut off, and they appeal for the adjust- 
 ment of their differences, not as formerly to the sword, or to the 
 
182 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 aid of neighbouring states, but to the decision of that governing 
 power whose supremacy all acknowledge. 
 
 The rise of the British Government to this prominent station 
 has been gradual, certainly unsought, and almost forced upon it by 
 the progress of events. 
 
 The alliance M-ith the Nizam and the Peishwa, the defeat of our 
 great enemy Tippoo, under the walls of his own capital, and the 
 conclusion of a treaty Avith him, in which he lost half his territory 
 and almost all his treasure, were the great political results of Lord 
 Cornwallis's administration, and forced us into a position in which 
 we necessarily assumed a higher tone in our political i-elationswith 
 the states of India. 
 
 The administration of the Marquis of Wellesley overthrew the 
 remaining power of Tippoo, restored the head of the Mahratta 
 empire to his throne, overthrew the discijilined army of Scindia, 
 the armies of Indore and Berar, established our supremacy in the 
 Dekhun, and our dominion in Hindoostan, leaving us for a series of 
 years, in spite of our vain attempt to Avithdraw from that position, 
 almost without a rival to dispute our j^ower. 
 
 The administration of the Marquis of Hastings imposed humili- 
 ating terms on the Goorkas, conquered the territories of the 
 Peishwa, subdued w hat remained of the armies of Indore and Berar, 
 extirpated the hordes of Pindarees and plunderers by whom Central 
 India was infested, and left us thirteen years thereafter without a 
 power in India to dispute our supremacy. 
 
 This condition of things has necessai'ily imposed new and dis- 
 tinct duties on the British Government, which do not appear to 
 have been ever properly defined ; and which, judging from the 
 conduct of our political authorities, as shown by their proceedings 
 in the accompanying sketches of our relations with the several states, 
 are not generally understood. 
 
 Whilst we were rising to power, and struggling against hostile 
 combinations, it w as naturally our object to seek for partisans and 
 friends. An alliance with one of the principal states, or a friend 
 in its councils, were considered of the highest importance to us. 
 It was in short our object to divide and to govern. When our 
 supremacy became acknowledged by all, we should have withdrawn 
 from interference in the internal affairs of the several states, beyond 
 what was necessary to insure universal tranquillity. We had little 
 interest or object beyond that of securing peace to those states, of 
 saving each from the aggression of its neighliour, and of mediating 
 between them in all questions of dispute. We had to give a direc- 
 tion to the energies of states which had been established under our 
 supremacy, and with our guai'antee, more particularly during mino- 
 rities, as in the case of Sattara and Berar, and in each of these 
 cases this duty was performed in a manner that called forth the ad- 
 miration of their subjects andthe applauseof the surrounding states; 
 and which has secured, in so far as can at present be judged, the 
 lasting gratitude of their chiefs. With respect to other powers, it 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 183 
 
 should have been our object to have k ft the conflicting parties of 
 vhom they wore composed to find tlieir own level; to have left 
 them in short to form national administrations, which could not 
 have failed, sooner or later, to have produced measures of beneficial 
 intern;d administration ; anil which eventually would have relieved 
 us from much of that interference into which we have througli a 
 different line of policy been forced, alike productive of embarrass- 
 ment to ourselves, and calculated to paralyze the energies of the 
 native state. 
 
 Those Governments in whose internal affairs we have interfered 
 the least are the most united and the most prosperous : Kotah, 
 Bhopal, Joudpore, Gwalior, Ulwur, Bickaneer, Jessulmere, are in- 
 stances of this. Mysore is unhappily an instance to the contrary. 
 Hyderabad, Oude, and Jeypore, are the states in which we have 
 interfered most largely, without in most instances doing so either 
 for the purpose of benefiting, or in a manner calculated to benefit 
 the people of those countries ; and they are undoubtedly the Avorst 
 governed in India. 
 
 It is, too, curious to observe how little our interference in the 
 affairs of the states of India has depended on the nature of our 
 treaties Mith them. In Mysore, Avhere we had the right by treaty 
 to interfere, we were too long in exercising that right. In Hydera- 
 bad, Jeypore, Oudepore, and some other states, where we had not 
 the right, we have been constantly interfering even to the nomi- 
 nation and support of ministers. 
 
 It may howcA er, with respect to Hyderabad and Oude, be feared, 
 that there is in the form of a INIahommedan Government, supported 
 as it now is by our power, and administered by a prince educated as 
 the Mahommedan princes of India must now be, something incompa- 
 tible with the interests of the great majority of the peojile, and the 
 prosperity or advancement of any country. It would not be difficult 
 to trace the causes that have produced this change in the^Iahomme- 
 dan character, if indeed any change has been produced; for it is doubt- 
 ful, whether that people were calculated to govern an extensive 
 country in peace, or whether this can be the province of an unedu- 
 cated and an ignorant despot, placed in authority over a race of 
 men, the great majority of whom differ from himself in religion, 
 and in all the ordinary pursuits and relations of life ; and between 
 whom all the ordinary sympathies and interests that bind men to- 
 gether are wanting. He is naturally jealous of the rising poAver or 
 the interference of other men, and they have neither the right to 
 council him, nor the power to take the direction of affairs into 
 their own hands. 
 
 There are therefore causes, arising out of the connexion of the 
 native states Avith the British Government, which, in spite of its 
 anxiety to uphold or advance their individual supremacy, and to 
 continue their independent position (certaiidy amongst the most 
 sacred as well as the most interesting duties tliat belongs to it in 
 India,) must, it is feared in some instances gradually work their 
 
184 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 subversion. It may be quostloned, whether the paralyzing effects 
 produced in these iudependant states Ijy their reliance on a foreign 
 poAver for protection ; whether tlie absence of all motive to gener- 
 ous exertions ; and whether the severing of that sympathy which 
 binds the chief and his people together, when tliey have to strug- 
 gle against other power, either for their liberties, or for their indi- 
 vidual or national advancement, are not reasons, not only why 
 they should fail to attain future greatness, but that whatever is 
 great or good amongst them, must gradually pass away. I have 
 often heard it remarked by those best fitted to judge, that amongst 
 JNIahommedans one never sees a son equal his father in energy of 
 character or in virtue. Who would have expected to see any thing 
 virtuous or heroic in the character of the people of Greece whilst 
 under the domination of Turkey, or in the character of the Poles 
 whilst under the yoke of Russia, except what might arise in their 
 exertions to free themselves from the dominion of foreigners. 
 
 Formerly the princes of India had to struggle either for the 
 maintenance or the advancement of their several positions, almost 
 throughout the whole period of their rule : nothing appeared to 
 stand still. They were either advancing or retrograding. There 
 is no country in the world where revolutions wei-e so frequent, and 
 although to our notions there may be something revolting in these 
 wars and struggles, they were nevertheless the scenes in which 
 men were formed and rose to greatness. The son fought by the 
 side of his father, and from the very dawn of his career entered on 
 those scenes which were calculated to bind the prince and the 
 people in mutual ties of affection and allegiance. He who was 
 fittest to govern was, by the support of his people, and in confor- 
 mity with the laws, raised to the succession. 
 
 The change that has now taken place is very remarkable. The 
 future ruler of a covintry is brought up without education or know- 
 ledge of the world, under the care of women. He is through the 
 jealousy of his father exckuled from all interference or share in 
 public affairs, until the time of life for attaining habits of usefulness 
 has passed away. Whether suited to govern or not, his succession 
 is secured through the introduction of our deadening laws of pri- 
 mogeniture; and when brought, under all these disadvantages, 
 into public life, the British functionaries are disappointed if they 
 do not find him an accomplished prince, having the interests of his 
 people at heart, and disposed to govern his country in conformity, 
 in some degree, with their own advanced and enlightened views. 
 Neither is an ignorant or a jealous despot the least likely to give 
 the reins to others which his own fingers have so long itched to 
 handle, or if he be of this supine disposition himself, we are sure 
 to find some one behind the scenes, who will talk to him of the 
 danger of power altogether passing out of his hands if he ceases to 
 exercise it. If he does exercise power, it is almost certain, from 
 the lamentable state of ignorance in which he has been bred, to be 
 for evil; or if he entrusts it to another, and the British Govern- 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 185 
 
 ment comes forward to approve of that person's measures, to ap- 
 plaud or to support liim ; he is sure to take alarm, and to meditate 
 how to accomplish his destruction. 
 
 It is not on the native character alone that the changes M-hich 
 the last twenty years have worked in India is felt. Furtunately 
 education qualifies the Englishman to govern in tranquil as in trou- 
 bled times. But in the present condition of things, and in the com- 
 paratively limited sphere of indiviilual operation, we must ndt ex- 
 pect to see such men as Muin-o, Elphinstone, Malcolm, Metcalfe, 
 Oehterlony, Close, Wilks, Walker, Russell, or Jenkins. 
 
 When tiiis unnatural condition of things has produced conse- 
 quences which all the world acknowledge to be destructive to the 
 best interests of the community, or results calculated to endanger 
 the tranquillity of neighbouring states, it necessarily becomes a 
 question A\hat part the British Government is to take ; for from its 
 position in India it will be forced sooner or later to interfere. The 
 very existence of our treaty promising protection ; the presence of 
 our resident ; and, above all, the presence of a subsidiary force, 
 may be considered measures of interference which will be felt by 
 the people to be altogether on the side of their prince. 
 
 The remedy seems a very simple one. It is only necessary to 
 announce to our ally that the British Government considers that a 
 long period of misrule, persisted in, in opposition to its advice and 
 remonstrances, and destructive to the best interest of his subjects, 
 in a degree that it is impossible that we can countenance, by the 
 presence of our political authorities or troops, has foi-ced on us 
 the declaration that our interference must be admitted for the cor- 
 rection of these evils, or that all the stipulations which before 
 bound the Governments together must be annulled. It is true that 
 in this case we place ourselves in the position of judges in what 
 may seem our own cause. But there can belittle danger that in 
 such a question the Governor General in Council, or those appoint- 
 ed to the investigation, will judge wrongfully. The magnitude of 
 the evils complained of, the prevalence of intestine wars and com- 
 motion, the insecurity of life and property, and other proofs of 
 misgovernment must be obvious (as in the Mysore, the Oude, and 
 the Hyderabad countries) to all. 
 
 If our ally be satisfied to undertake the Government of his coun- 
 try w ithout our assistance, our ofiicers and troops may at once be 
 withdrawn, continuing of course to save the country from foreign 
 conquest ; and we may be sure that after a period of commotion the 
 people will force on their Government such measures of internal 
 administration as will relieve them from the pressure of which they 
 complain. If in progress towards this relief such effects are produced 
 as may fairly be considered to endanger the tranquillity of the Bri- 
 tish territory, or the territories of its allies, then the prince may 
 be given to understand that the British Government will consider 
 itself entitled to interfere authoritatively for the correction of such 
 abuses, in whatever manner may seem best to itself. Should, on 
 
 B B 
 
186 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 the other hand, tlie prince fear to place himself in that situation of 
 dependence on his svdjject which would necessarily result from the 
 withdrawal of our political authorities and troops, and call for our 
 assistance in the future administration of his affairs ; then of course 
 we could negotiate our own terms, and adopt such measures as to 
 ourj^elves should seem best. In a country like Hyderabad, where 
 the evils are chiefly of our own working, where our interference has 
 been so long and often so minutely exercised, and where the inter- 
 ests involved are so complicated, it would be almost impossible to 
 withdraw ; nor could the Government in all probability, unsupport- 
 ed by us, exist for a single month. There would however be no 
 chance that the question of withdrawal Avould be there entertained 
 by any administration ; when therefore the necessity for a more 
 direct interference on our part shall be considered to have arrived, 
 it will be a mere question of mode and degree ; and we have in 
 that which has already been adopted, the finest example of that 
 which we should again adopt. 
 
 There is nothing more simple or more beneficial to the people 
 than the mode of administration conducted during our interference 
 at Hyderabad, Nagpore, and Sattara. It is unnecessary to repeat 
 here what has already been described in the political sketches of 
 those states : contrasted with what has hitherto resulted from our 
 interfei-ence in the affairs of Mysore, no doubt can exist as to 
 Avhich is best. In the latter instance, the commissioners commen- 
 ced with a resumption of land and money stipends, and a discharge 
 of troops, which must have been more unpalatable to the people 
 than any of the measures of the former administration against 
 wliicli they were in arms. They were measures of aggravation 
 rather than of healing ; nor does it appear that any thing has yet 
 been done to quiet men's minds, by fixing and defining the Govern- 
 ment demands on them. The commissioners have apparently 
 been too much employed in their own quarrels to be able to turn 
 their thoughts to any measures of real public utility. A single 
 commissioner, like Mr. Elphinstone in the Poena territory, Sir 
 Charles Metcalfe in the Hyderabad, or Mr. Jenkins in the Nag- 
 pore, with European officers in subordination to him in each dis- 
 trict, would long before this have given to the Mysore country 
 that most healing and beneficial of all measures, a moderate vil- 
 lage asssessment for a period of years, which would have drowned 
 the voice of the dissaffected; or, at all events, have prevented its 
 reaching, and tampering with the spirit of our troops, where it is 
 so calculated to lead to fatal results. 
 
 The employment of natives in authority, except under the strict- 
 est superintendance of Europeans ; every Avhere, in the present 
 condition of their morals, destructive in a great degree to the 
 condition of their morals, destructive in a great degree to the best 
 interests of the people, must be more so in a country circumstan- 
 ced like Mysore than in most other places. We have instan- 
 ces of the injurious effects of entrusting natives with too much 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 187 
 
 power, and at too great a distance from the eye of tlu ir master, 
 in Kandoish, Assam, Chota Nagporc, and tiie Jungle iNIehals, 
 Avhicli may serve as a warning to avoid tiie system elsewhere. 
 
 The exercise of authority, for the adjustment of boundary dis- 
 putes, and of meiliation in tlie other differences that may arise 
 between the native states, are the most usual and important of the 
 duties of liu' British CJovernment towards them. We may allow 
 them, and encourage them, as far as possible to adjust those 
 differences themselves; but when they I'ail to do so, and appeal to 
 our ilecision, the question must be taken up more in a judicial than 
 in a political point of view ; our decision must be respected by both 
 parties, and when necessary enforced with the whole weight of our 
 power. AVhcn questions arise afl'eeting the general tran(|uillity or 
 the well-being of the connnunity, such as the extirpation of the 
 Pindarees and the Thugs, both enemies to all mankind, our 
 sovereign power must be asserted. We are entitled to expect 
 the cordial co-operation of the states of India in such a cause, and 
 where they, from interested motives, either thwart or resist our 
 measures, we may proclaim them public enemies, and proceed 
 against them accordingly. 
 
 A political code, which should define the duties of the British 
 Government and its officers towards the states of India, and wiiicli 
 would be calculated to bring home to the understandings of the 
 princes and people of those countries, the obligations by Avhicli 
 they are bound to that (Jovernment; would be of very easy con- 
 struction, and might prove highly beneficial. It would have the 
 effect too of fixing the British Government to one system of mea- 
 sures, which would soon become understood, and on Avhich all 
 would be prepared to act. A system has undoubtedly guided 
 the British Government in the last few years in its relations with 
 the natives states, but it may be doubtful whether it is understood 
 throughout the political department, although the diaries of j)ro- 
 ceedings which are now required to be furnished, must tend gradu- 
 ally to produce this result. 
 
 It is difficult to estimate the number of troops which the twelve 
 and a half crore of revenue belonging to the native states will 
 enable them to' maintain : nor is this very important; for in times 
 of war, troops are entertained for the occasion; and in the unsettled 
 condition of India, have heretofore been found in any number that 
 Governments could afford to pay. If, as has generally been calcu- 
 lated, every 500 rupees of revenue enables a Government to main- 
 tain one horseman, according to the native fasliion; that one horse- 
 man is equal in expence to four foot; and should a moiety of the reve- 
 nue be expended on each arm ; there would be in Internal India 
 120,000 horse and 480,000 foot. But this, which was the 
 former mode of estimating the armies of the native states, must be 
 very inapplicable to the present condition of things : since they 
 are now secured against foreign invasion, and almost against inter- 
 nal convulsion, through our supremacy. No Government in any 
 
 jj b2 
 
188 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 part of the world now stands, or apparently ever did stand, in the 
 same relation to a community of states, heretofore acciistomed to 
 exercise, and, still in internal affairs, entitled to exercise sovereign 
 powers ; as the British Government does to the states of Internal 
 India. The present relations of the great powers of Europe to the 
 thirty-eight states of Germany, as settled at the Congress of Vienna, 
 has been supposed to bear some comparison with that of the British 
 Government to the thirty-six states of Internal India, with which it 
 has relations through treaty. But, besides that the powers of 
 Europe are many, and we ai'e one, the states of Germany have a 
 federal union, " the object of which is the external and internal 
 security of Germany, and of the independence and inviolability of 
 the separate states ;" " all the members of the confederation, as 
 such, have equal rights ;" " every member engages to protect not 
 only all Germany, but each state of the confederacy against any 
 hostile attack." 
 
 Such a combination as this amongst the states of India is just 
 what the British Government would most fear, and against which 
 it has been its object to contend, and to stipulate with the several 
 states under its protection. There is therefore no arguing with 
 respect to our position according to any of the received axioms of 
 international law. We must be considered the great protecting 
 power, bound to preserve the substantive integrity of each state ; 
 entitled therefore to judge what measures may be necessary for 
 that purpose, and to dictate to each and to all such terms as the 
 exigency of the occasion may seem to us to i-equire for the general 
 good. 
 
 The only question of really vital importance to the British Go- 
 vernment, beyond that of maintaining universal tranquillity, is the 
 degree of authority which it is entitled to exercise over the armies 
 of the several states for the general defence of the empire. Those 
 armies are of sufficient magnitude to render it in the highest 
 degree important that we should look to the nature of their temper, 
 and the degree of their organization. The very existence of this 
 military force is at present almost unknown to us ; it rests quietly 
 in its several positions, and apparently subject to our will. But 
 should any thing occur to call our forces to an advanced scene of 
 action, or which may be calculated to disturb the stability of our 
 power, we shall find this enormous mass of men rise into active 
 existence, if not in combination, or directed immediately against us, 
 at least for the purpose of asserting the authority, and aggrandiz- 
 ing the power of their several sovereigns. 
 
 No one who has thought of the nature of our position in India ; 
 of the character of the four great powers on our external frontier ; 
 their united armies superior in numbers to our own ; and those of 
 Nepaul and Lahore alike formidable from their discipline, and the 
 character of tlie people of whom they are composed ; can consi- 
 der our condition in the present reduced and neglected state of our 
 army, broken into exactly a hundred different detachments, other- 
 wise than highly critical. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS, 189 
 
 The army of India may be considered to consist of about 30,000 
 Euro])ean troops of all arms, ten or twelve thousand Native Cavalry, 
 and about 110,000 Native Infantry. It protects a land frontier 
 of 3,536* British miles, and covers an area of 1,111,162* square 
 miles within that frontier, giving of course about 42 men to each 
 frontier mile, and only one man to every seven miles of Internal 
 India. 
 
 It mav be possible to augment our army as the occasion requires, 
 and by extending promotion and employment to the sons and bro- 
 thers of our old soldiei's, we may at the commencement of a war 
 give an impulse to native feeling which may once more carry us to 
 a glorious termination. But we cannot afford, as mc have lately 
 been doing, to turn our whole attention in times of peace to the 
 improvement of our civil institutions, and to the advancement of 
 the condition of the persons of whom that branch of administration 
 is composed ; and to neglect and over-work our army until the 
 respectable classes of whom it formerly consisted refuse to take 
 service in our ranks, and seek for other employment. 
 
 Next in importance to the efficiency of our own army, for the 
 general defence of our position in India, is the extent of the 
 armies of the several states, the nature of their organization, and 
 the manner in which they stand affected towards us. An estimate 
 has already been made of their numbers. The nature of their 
 organization, except in the few instances where they are under 
 the control or command of British officers is of the very worst 
 description. Ill paid, undisciplined, and dissatisfied to a degree 
 which renders their allegiance to their own sovereign a matter 
 of very doubtful contingency, and prejjares them to enter on 
 any enterprise promising better pay or a prospect of plunder ; yet 
 all disposed to look upon us and our power as the principal cause 
 of their degradation. 
 
 It has at all times been found impossible for the native states of 
 India to maintain, without the assistance of European officers, a re- 
 gularly disciplined army. The absence of system and energy in the 
 native character seems unsuited to this. But above all, the absence 
 of any regular system of payment, where the prince has a private 
 as well as a public treasury, and draws into the former every far- 
 thing that he can appropriate without any reference to the wants 
 of the latter. 
 
 Neither is there in any of the states of India any thing approach- 
 ing to a national army. It is probable that there was at Bhurtpore 
 before the conquest of that place. But then, as elsewhere, there is 
 now a force composed mostly of mercenary foreigners, in the shape 
 of a few battalions, approaching in formation and appearance to 
 those in the Company's service. The same description of force exists 
 at Hyderabad, Sattara, Oude, Nagpore, and most of the states of 
 Kajpootana. In Guzcrat and most parts of the Dekhun, Kandeish, 
 and Malwa ; Arabs, Sindees, Mekranees, and Sikhs arc common 
 
 • Major Everest. 
 
190 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 and in considerable numbers ; but these have not found their way 
 into the service of the states of Rajpootana and Hindoostan. The 
 Cavalry of most of the powers bears a more national character than 
 their Infantry, and is always composed of a superior description of 
 men, who with regular pay and good management may be rendered 
 a very valuable force. 
 
 Our control over the army of the Nizam is of sufficient extent to 
 secui-e our supremacy in His Highness' dominions, if the subsidiary 
 force should be entirely withdrawn. It consists of five regiments 
 of Cavalry, eight of Infantry, four small corps of Artillery, and an 
 Engineer corps ; all of tlie finest description of native troops, and 
 equal to any of either presidency in ovir own service. Fortius 
 advantage we are indebted to our connexion with Rajah Chundoo 
 Lall, and to the energetic measures of Mr. Russell whilst resident 
 at Hyderabad. Our position in the dominions of the Rajah of 
 Nagpore was equally advantageous, and was the more acceptable 
 as we owed it to conquest, and neither to negotiation nor to favor. 
 But that we have relinquished. We can thrftugh treaty command 
 the services of 4,000 horse at Mysore, 3,000 at Baroda, 3,600 at 
 Indore, 600 at Bhopal, and under particular circumstances 1,000 at 
 Nagpore, and 1500 at Joudpore,* and under a sort of sulference we 
 have the services of about 2,000 liorse at Gwalior. — But of these 
 15,700 horse there is only the Bhopal Contingent, and a small por- 
 tion of the Contingent of Indore, organized in a manner that would 
 render them efficient to act with British troops. The manner in 
 which the Joudpore Contingent has lately been brought into the 
 field on our requisition, and the natiu-e of the troops of whom it is 
 composed, are sufficient proofs of Avhat we may expect even when 
 our power is at its meridian. If that power were shaken, or its 
 permanency doubtful, we need have little hesitation in believing that 
 but few of these contingents, in the present degree of their organ- 
 ization, would be at our disposal, and that most of them, as at 
 Poona and Nagpore in 1817, would be thrown into the scale against 
 us. 
 
 The degree of control whicli Napoleon introduced into the con- 
 tingent of sixty thousand men, forming the army which the states 
 of the Confederation of the Rhine placed at his disposal, for the 
 maintenance of his supremacy in that region, would not be found 
 sufficient to suit our purposes with the contingents of the native 
 states of India. To be useful to us, or indeed to cease to be dan- 
 gerous to our powei', our authority over these auxiliaries must be 
 superior to that which Napoleon fovuid it necessary to exercise over 
 the contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine. If we could 
 calculate on the states of India acting in co-operation with us for the 
 general defence of the empire, or if we could hope that their inter- 
 est would ever be blended with ours, or cease to be opposed to them, 
 then indeed might Ave intrust those contingents to their own ma- 
 nagement, interfering only in so far as might be necessary to see 
 
 * By the terms of the treaty, we can call for these at any time, — Ed. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 191 
 
 tliat their numbers were complete. But as there is littU^ chance that 
 the states of India will ever consider their interests blended with 
 ours, or that they will cease to look upon us rather as their great 
 enemy, against whose encroachments they most require to combine 
 and to arm, than as a friendly power whose interests they are call- 
 ed upon to defend, it is obvious that troops acting under their au- 
 thority cannot be calculated upon as likely to prove useful to us. 
 
 To be efficient for our purpose, tliose troops must be under the 
 immediate command of our own officers, dependant on them for the 
 regularity witli which they are paid, for their promotion ; and rely- 
 ing on our (iovernnuMit for the pennanency of their service. Hold- 
 ing these essentials in our own hands, the contingents may be com- 
 posed of the old soldiers of the native states, for tliere is nothing 
 national in the character of their armies which need lead us to fear 
 that in the day of our adversity they will turn against us, as the 
 Gei'man contingents did against Napoleon after the battle of Leip- 
 sic. We have in the conduct of the Mysore, the Hyderabad, 
 the Poona, and the Nagpore Contingents during the last war, proof 
 that under this form of organization their gallantry and fidelity to 
 our cause will not be inferior to those cjualities in the troops of our 
 service. 
 
 Most of the native states are bound by treaty to aid the British 
 Government in time of war with the whole or a specified portion of 
 their armies. But those stipulations would be little binding on 
 them, nor could we under any circiunstances of adversity calculate 
 on their fidelity or usefulness, unless, like the contingent of the 
 Nizam, tliey were placed under the command of our own officers. 
 No one will doubt the importance to our cause of the services of 
 such auxiliaries thus organized, either for the purpose of fighting 
 our battles in advanced positions, or for the maintenance of our 
 interests and of general tranquillity in Internal India, when it may 
 be necessary to call our own army to other scenes of action. 
 
 We have not generally the right of drawing portions of the native 
 armies from their sovereigns in a degree tliat would render them 
 useful to us. And it is at present doubtful how, or whether ever, 
 this most important of our political objects can be attained. We may 
 be sure that the native powers will not readily or voluntarily render 
 up their armies to our control ; for their confidence is not, and 
 probably never will be, so great in our good faith, and in the per- 
 manency of our power, as to lead them implicitly to trust to vis for 
 their defence. The real condition to w hich they have resigned them- 
 selves by treaty, or to which they have fallen in the progress of 
 time and in the course of events, is very dift'crent from that which 
 tliey would arrogate to themselves. Cut off' from foreign relations, 
 and protected as they substantially are and have been, for the last 
 fifteen years, almost without an excei)tion to the contrary, each 
 against the aggressions of his neighbour and of all other powers, 
 their armies have virtually become useless, except for the purpose 
 of internal government. 
 
192 INTERNAL RELATIONS. 
 
 It is a question whether without an army a Government can exist 
 even for the purposes of internal administration, and the instances 
 which we have of late seen of the necessity which Governments are 
 under, in more civilized countries than India, of calling for the aid 
 of troops in support of civil institutions, may serve to convince us 
 that even for this purpose an army is necessary. 
 
 We must calculate upon such portions of these contingents as are 
 placed under British officers being as entirely withdrawn as our own 
 troops from the support of the native Government in its internal 
 administration, and applicable only to the general defence of the 
 empire. Some of the states already pay a subsidiary force for this 
 purpose, others pay tribute, and in addition nearly all promise to 
 supply a specific contingent, or to hold their whole army at our 
 disposal. It is on this latter account that we may consider our- 
 selves justified in endeavouring to gain a control over such portion 
 of the native armies as is extra to what they re(|uire for internal 
 government. From the nature of their organization, and their 
 temper, those armies are at all times dangerous to us ; and on these 
 accounts, Avhen we were assailed from without, might become 
 destructive to our power. Self-preservation therefore requires, that 
 when we have the right these portions of the native armies should 
 be brought under our authority, for the purpose of fighting their 
 battles and our own. 
 
 If the employment of troops under British officers in support of 
 vicious native Governments be an evil, as no doubt it is, the 
 greater the extent to which this system Avere carried, the greater 
 of course would the evil become ; but if enough remained with the 
 native Governments for the purposes of internal administration, 
 there would be no more reason for the employment of these contin- 
 gents on such duties, than for the employment of the British forces 
 stationed in their territory, for the general defence of the country. 
 The system of employing troops under British officers in support of 
 the measures of native Governments is chiefly objectionable for 
 these reasons. We must under any circumstances become ourselves 
 the judges, whether there be occasion for their active employment. 
 We must interpose between the Government and its subjects, as 
 well to inquire into the necessity for coercive measures, as to guard 
 the interests of those whom we have been the instruments of reduc- 
 ing to the tender mercies of the native state. In either case the 
 measure tends to give rise to a double or divided and therefore a 
 weak and loose, form of government. There is too the danger 
 that this constant interposition of our authority may serve as a pre- 
 mium to resistance or rebellion on the part of the people against 
 their sovereign, in the hope of eventually gaining our mediation. 
 But, as I have said before, there is no greater reason for employing 
 the contingents, placed at our disposal by the native states for the 
 general defence of the empire, in matters of internal government, 
 than there is for employing any portion of our own army. 
 
INTERNAL RELATIONS. 193 
 
 Great difficulty will necessarily be experienced in gaining such 
 control over the contingents of our alli(s as would roiulor tluni 
 ctHcitMit anil f'aitlii'ul to us. When mc ])ropos((l lately to render up 
 one of the three thousand horse niaintainiil fur general service by 
 the Guh'kwar, provided he would j)laee the remaining two thousand 
 on a footing considered more desirable by us, he would not yield to 
 the arrangement. Yet until tins control over those arnues has been 
 obtaiiu'd, our situation in India, under particular eireumstanc»'s, 
 must bcconu' highly critical ; for it is obvious that we cannot afibrd 
 to pay an army in India suthciently extensive to fight our frontier 
 battles, and to support our position against hostile combinations 
 within. It will become a house divided against itself. 
 
 No opportunity should therefore be lost of taking advantage of 
 every oj)ening promising a result so favourable to us. It is the point 
 on which the greatest importance to ourselves now hinges, in our 
 relations Mith the states of Internal India. Every man gained is 
 a double gain, by strengthening ourselves, and taking away from 
 theirstrength and their power to do us harm. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 G. H. Hultmmin, Bertgnl Mililmy <)rph<m Press. 
 
THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 STAMPED BELOW 
 
 AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS 
 
 WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN 
 THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY 
 WILL INCREASE TO 50 CENTS ON THE FOURTH 
 DAY AND TO $1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY 
 OVERDUE. 
 
 MAY 2 1940 
 
 MfiYB t940 
 
 a Qc'57WJ 
 
 l?F?!!rD ED 
 
 IrJitR LiBRA; t LOAN 
 
 SEP 1 6 1982 
 
 iJNIV. OF CALiF,, BEf?i< 
 
 — SENTONtLL 
 
 SEP 2 2 1969 
 
 -4W-i 
 
 BECDLD jmi(!7?. '' gPW0 
 
 LD 21-100m-7,'39(402s) 
 
YD 09682 
 
 LiSE^'^ 
 
 5t30()2 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA UBRARY 
 
^^ V 
 
 
 '■'... \:;^ 
 
 .v' '•^^:: 
 
 
 V-*i; 
 
 ^^•^-V.^S#d: 
 
 V. A 
 
 
 -'•-■-^•jr:-^'