/ H" • i-»T'»- ->„ h St date st!> — '•ed b^' SOUTHERN BRANCH UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY LOS ANGELES. CAUF, THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AS REGARDS INTERVENTION LC 7199: STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY Volume XCIII] [Number 2 Whole Number 211 THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AS REGARDS INTERVENTION CHARLES E. MARTIN, Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Government, University of California, Southern Branch COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LONGM.'\NS, GREEN & CO., AGENTS London : P. S. King & Son, Ltd. 1921 3A '^ ^ I Copyright, 1921 BY CHARLES E. MARTIN 44-? MY FATHER AND MOTHER WHOSE CARE AND DEVOTION NO TRIBUTE OF MINE CAN EVER REPAY PREFACE Chief-Justice Marshall, in a famous decisian, significantly declared : " No principle is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights." International law has no more funda- mental principle, and this view is sustained by such author- ities as Grotius and Vattel. The moitive which inspired the Declaration of Indepen- dence was the desire for freedom from foreign political and commercial control, and for individual freedom. It was declared that life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness were the " inalienable rights " oif individual men. As these rights were to be guaranteed to men as individuals, so could they be claimed for states as independent units in the society of nations. The principles which gave to our early statesmen the in- spiration of domestic policy soon found expression in our foreign relations. The most fundamental one was that of " non-intervention." As our foremost principle of foreign policy, it bears a close relation to the rights of the individual as a basis for relations within the state, and to the principle of the equality of nations as the foundation of sound in- ternational intercourse. In effect, the principle of non-in- tervention prevented interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and reserved to each state the right to choose its own fonii of government and to control its political destiny. Moreover, it required abstention from the political arrangements of other governments, and more especially of Europe. 293] 7 8 PREFACE [294 It has been my purpose to set forth the history and de- velopmait of this, the cardinal principle of our foreign policy, which is so typical of our political ideals and institu- tions. This eanibraces not only a discussion of its origin and adoption by our statesmen as a definite principle of foreign policy, but also the extension of that principle so as to apply to the independent states of America in a special sense. This phase of the policy of non-intervention, com- monly called the " Monroe Doctrine," was designed to pre- serve the Western hemisphere from the territorial and poli- tical control of foreign powers. Moreover, it has been my purpose to discuss and explain departures froto the principle of non-intervention by the United States. The capital instances of departure were in Cuba and in Panama. Our inten^entions in these cases sustained a direct relation to the establishment of Cuba and Panama as independent states. They also led to arrange- ments under which the United States guarantees their in- dependence. These interventions rest upon the ground that the principle of non-intervention is subject to excep- tions, and that each case must rest upon its own merits. I have, therefore, linnited my discussions of departures from the principle of non-mtervention to the cases of Cuba and Panama, and shall reserve for the future publication a discussion of special situations which have come to prevail in Santo Domingo, Nicaragua and Haiti, and which invoh'e a degree of supervision w^hich non-American powers would be forbidden to exercise in these countries. Unlike the in- terventions in Cuba and Panama, our interventions in these states have not contributed to the establishment of their in- dependence. These steps have been taken, first, to arrange for the settlement of claims of citizens of foreign states, thus preventing intervention for this purpose by other powers; and, secondly, to restore and preserv^e order and political stability. 205] PREFACE 9 Such measures of control have been exercised in Santo Domingo since 1905, when a rnodiis vivendi was concluded by President Roosevelt which provided for the collection of Dominican customs by an American citizen designated by the President of the United States, and for the payment of the government's obligations. This supervision was con- tinued under the treaty concluded with Santo Domingo in 1907. In 1 91 3, commissioners were sent to supervise the Dominican elections in the capacity of " friendly observers." In June, 191 6, American forces were landed to restore order under the supervision of the United States. Events leading to intervention in Nicaragua occurred in 1909, when the American government refused to recognize further the Zelaya government. In 191 2, marines were landed to restore order, and in 1914, a treaty was signed with Nicaragua, giving the United States exclusive right to build a canal along the Nicaragua route, together with leases of sites for naval stations and a naval base. For these con- cessions, the United States agreed to pay $3,000,000. This tendency of departure has been manifested in Haiti. Certain European governments demanded a settlement of claims. Revolutionary disturbances followed, and in 19151 American forces were landed. In 1916, a treaty was ap- proved by the Senate, under which the United States agreed to supervise the collection and administration of customs and the training of a native constabulary. Haiti agreed to enter into no engagements which would impair her indepen- dence. These sj>ecial situations, whether conventional or de facta in character, are manifestations of a tendency the per- manency of which remains to be tested. It is my purpose hereafter to treat the more recent interventions, some of which are now pending. While it is a matter of prediction as to the direction which these departures will take, it is un- 10 PREFACE [296 likely that the development will ig-nore altogether the pur- poses and limits of the principle which has so distinguished the foreign policy of the United States. I am indebted to Professor Edward Elliott of the Univer- sity of California, who first directed my interests into the field O'f international law; and to Professor John Bassett Moore of Columbia University, for guidance and counsel in all phases of my work. Charles E. Martin Berkeley, California, August, 1920. CONTENTS PART I The Formation and Development of the Policy of Non-Intervention CHAPTER I The Origin and Adoption of the American Policy of Non- Intervention Page Introduction 19 Ancient and European backgrounds as a means for understand- ing American policies. ... . 19 "State interest," allianceij_and the balance of power in the Greek city-states and in Rome 19 Medieval influences 20 The rise of the nations 21 Intervention in Modern Europe . - 22 The doctrine of non-intervention 2ym — Intervention during the Revolutionary period 23 Status of European diplomacy at the outset of the war for American Independence 23 International questions resulting from the Revolution .... 24 Revolutionary diplomacy 24 The desire for diplomatic relations with neutral states . • 24 Wharton's division of " schools " of diplomacy, .... 25 The resolution of Congress 26 Diplomatic agencies during the Revolution 26 Objectives of American diplomacy 26 The question of recognition 27 The attitude of neutral European countries 27 Relations with France 28 French sympathy, aifa interest in the Revolution 28 The mission of Franklin, Deane and Lee 29 Instructions of the secret committee to the mission. . 29 297] II 12 CONTENTS [298 PAGE Agreement of the commissioners not to conclude a separate peace 36 The change in Revolutionary fortunes 31 The audience with Vergennes 31 Note of Louis XVI to Charles III 32 The French treaties of 1778 32 Treaty of amity and commerce 32 Treaty of alliance 33 Ratification . . . 35 Intervention during the post-Revolutionary period 35 The adoption of the Constitution and the outbreak of the French Revolution; the election of Washington 36 Washington's attitude toward the French Revolution 37 The outbreak of war in 1793 37 The appointment of Genet as Minister to the United States. . 38 Questions submitted by Washington to his Cabinet as to the reception of Genet, and the renunciation or suspension of the French treaties 39 The Cabinet meeting of April 19, 1793 40 The Jefferson-Hamilton controversy 41 The views of Jefferson 41—— The views of Hamilton 42_>- The arrival of Genet as French minister 46 His commissioning of privateers, 46 Jefferson's views of neutral rights and duties 47 Genet's recall; his defense 48 Neutrality as related to non-intervention 49 Neutrality proclamation of April 22, 1793 SQ-^rr The Napoleonic wars .... 51 The protection of neutral rights 51 French decrees and complaints • 52 The mission of C. C. Pinckney 55 The course of President John Adams; the mission of Marshall, Pinckney and Dana 56 The X, Y, Z affair 56 Measures approaching war 57 Mission of Ellsworth, Davie and Murray 57 Non-intervention as a principle of American political philosophy. . SQ-mr Difference in geographical conditions 59 ^»^ Difference in government 60^ The views of Locke; the right of revolution and the natural rights of man 61 ~ The views of Congress 62 299] * CONTENTS 13 PAGB The attitude of John Adams. 63, The Farewell Address of President Washington 65 Summary: non-intervention during the Revolutionary and post- Revolutionary periods 66 CHAPTER II The Extension of the Policy of Non-intervention Limitations of the early declarations of policy 69 The question of the attitude of the United States toward the rela- tions of European powers with other American states 69 Steps taken by the United States leading to security in territory and navigation 69 The revolutions in Spanish America 71 Recognition by the United States; Mr. Adams' recognition theory, 73 The policy of the United States with respect to European interven- tion in independent American states . 73 European backgrounds of the American policy yy The Holy Alliance jy The alliance of November 20, 1815 78 The Conference of Troppau 80 The Conference of Laibach 81 The Congress of Verona 81 The application of the principle of intervention as recog- nized by the Holy Alliance to the Americas; concern of the United States 82 Mr. Canning's proposals to Mr. Rush 85 The views of President Monroe 85 The views of Jefiferson and Madison 86 Discussion with Russia over colonization and the question of recognition 86 The definite extension of the policy of non-intervention to the independent states of America 87 Cabinet deliberations 87 The question of a joint declaration 87 The question of an answer to Russia. . . . gi The compromise of the Cabinet as to the form and character of the message . . 93 The Monroe message of December 2, 1823 94 •■ The principle of non-intervention 94 The non-colonization principle . 96 The Panama Congress 97 14 CONTENTS [300 Factors leading to the extension of the principle of non-interven- tion to the independent states of America g8 "^ The United States as the champion of the principle of non-inter- vention; cases involving the application of the principle 99-- Attitude of the United States toward the continued non-recog- nition by Spain of the revolted Spanish colonies gg Cases arising in relation to Mexico 100 Representations made by Minister Poinsett ..... 100 Proposed European interventions, 1858-1860 102 President Buchanan's proposal of American intervention. 105 French intervention in Mexico, 1861-1867 107 Cases arising in relation to Venezuela 109 Question of American interposition 109 Proposed joint intervention, 1871 no The Venezuela boundary dispute. in English, German and Italian reprisals against Venezuela, 1902-1903 115 Cases arising in relation to Brazil 118 Question of American alliance and intervention 118 The Brazilian naval revolt, 1893-1894 119 Cases arising in relation to the Argentine republic ... 123 Question of American intervention 123 The Falkland Islands afifair 124 Question of American interposition 126 Cases arising in relation to Chile 127 The Egan asylum case 127 The Chile-Peruvian war 129 Significance of the cases involving the application of the prin- ciple of non-intervention in its establishment as a definite policy 135/ PART II Departures from the Principle of Non-Intervention BY THE United States CHAPTER III Intervention in Cuba Early Cuban relations 139 Views of early statesmen 139 Opposition to European aims and proposals 140 30l] CONTENTS I D PACK Steps proposed to safeguard American interests 142 The "Ten Years' War," 1868-1878 144 Policy of President Grant and Secretary of State Fish .... 144 Colombian proposal of general interposition by the states of America ... 145 Instruction No. 266; justification of the right to intervene, and the duty of the United States to act 146 Its communication to the European powers; their replies . . • 147 The insurrection of 1895, and steps leading to intervention .... 149 Intervention . . . . 154 The McKinley message of April 11, 1898; grounds of interven- tion 154 The resolution of intervention 156 The outbreak of hostilities 158 CHAPTER IV Intervention in the Revolution at Panama, 1903 The treaty of 1846 between the United States and New Granada. . 162 Guarantee of neutrality and sovereignty 163 Guarantee of free and open transit 165 The recognition of Panama 167 The Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty 167 The Reyes- Hay controversy 168 President Roosevelt's special message to Congress, January 4, 1904. 170 PART I THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION CHAPTER I The Origin and Adoption of the American Policy of Non-intervention The aittempt to find in Ancient and European systems the sources and inspiration of American foreign policy is doomed to failure. Not only is identity lacking, but fancied analogies tend only to mislead. European and American policies differ, both historically and theoretically. At the outset, it is Avell to indicate the scope of the subject and to insist upon the fact that European practice cannot be made to approach American practice, and vice versa. Neverthe- less, knowledge of a system entirely different from our own aids materially in gaining an adequate understanding of the American system, by comparison and contrast, if not by identity and analogy. Moreover, American interna- tional practice during and after the American Revolution has had at leasit an indirect relation to European practice. A brief review of the factors entering into the formulation of American policy will contribute to a more comprehen- sive treatment of the subject. The theories of state-interest and the right of self-pres- ervation, from which is deduced the principle of interven- tion, are by no means peculiar to Modern Europe. The Greek and Roman legal and political theorists eloquently championed these ideas. The feeling of the time is best expressed by Aristotle who contended t^at the state is a self-sufficient body, and that the desires of the individual should be subordinated to the interests of the state. The 305] 19 20 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [306 true interests of the individual, indeed, were identical with ithe interests of the slate, because the state could desire only the best for its citizens. With the conception of the primacy of the state well established, it was not difficult to extend the poHcy of seeking the interests of the state to its international relations, and to cause the will of the state to prevail over exterior, as well as interior, forces. Certain conceptions of the Roman law have been incorporated into international law ; and certain others, while not so incor- porated, have influenced the conduct of nations profoundly. The conception of state-interest, which treats the mainten- ance of the position and prosperity of the state as superior to all other considerations, was expressed in alliances, de- signed to preserve the peace of the Mediterranean, or to check the inordinate power of ambitious states. The adop- tion of the principle of the balance of power, also, led to the formation of alliances for its preservation. When the balance of power was destroyed, crippled, or perhaps threat- ened, it was the duty of the alliance to act. This action, based on the doctrine of necessity, inevitably resulted in in- tervention in the affairs of another state or group of states. We have, then, the Greek and Roman system ante-dating the Modem European system, and differing little from it. The idea of state-interest extended to a group of states, by means of alliances designed to preserve the balance of power, furnishes the key, generally, to the history of the principle of interv^ention. Intervention to preserve rights of succession, and inten^ention by one state alone, consti- tute exceptions to the rule. The practice of intervention continued in the Ancient world until the principle of the balance of power yielded to the expansion of the Roman Empire. Roman Imperialism, while superseding the principle of the balance of power, ser\'-ed to make possible at a later 207] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 2L time the comity of nations by acquainting the colonies com- prised in the imperial domain, subsequently to become states, with the aims and civilization of the Roman world. A family of nations, governed in their exterior relations by a body of rules called international law, could not be estab- lished, based merely on the practice of the Mediterranean area. Christianity was a leavening force, placing emphasis on interests other than those merely national in character, and especially on the belief in a universal brotherhood. The Crusades did much to bring the Western nations to- gether. Thus, a " community of interests " among the nations was getting a firm hold. The Reformation, caus- ing alliances to be formed ostensibly on grounds of faith as opposed to grounds of race, but actually on grounds of con- quest and expansion, played an important part. But it re- mained for the discovery of the New World to quicken the European nations with an appreciation of their international responsibilities and opportunities. The desire for colonies and for the conquest of inferior peoples, while bringing the .nations into conflict, had a distinctly sobering influence on them; for extended colonial expansion has for its counter- part increased complexity in foreign relations. Following the bringing of the states into closer relations, ■certain influences operated to reestablish and preserve the balance of power and alliances. The most potent of these influences was the rise of the nations. The break-up of the Roman empire and of the empire of Charlemagne, and the subsequent rise of France and England as nations, set- tled the fact that European political development should be national in character. The interests of the Papacy were best served, not by European political unity, but by national political unity. The Holy Roman Empire by its failure only ha.stened the development of the nations. Nicolo Machiavelli. writing in the fifteenth century, advocated the 22 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [308 doctrines or *' reasons of state " and political expediency. This was the first concrete expression of the later theory of the balance of power. The Italian states made use of the principle when Naples, the Pope, Tuscany, Venice and Milan attempted to maintain a balance of power between them. The growth of commerce and the dominance of Spain in the sixteenth century further demonstrated the necessity of some sort of equilibrum among the states of Europe. Strong absolutism in France, and the Bourbon and Haps- burg dynastic rivalry were disturbing elements. It re- mained for the Thirty Years ' War and the Peace of West- phalia definitely to establish the balance of power and the status quo in Europe. The Peace of Westphalia did not remove from European politics the danger of an ambitious state. The power of Spain had declined and was no longer to be feared. Louis XIV, desiring to humiliate the Hapsburgs and to give to France the leadership of the Roman states, greatly disturbed the peace of Europe. His doctrine of natural boundaries and frontiers could only lead to intervention. The treaty of Aix-Ia-Chapelle in 1668 served further to establish the balance of power. Intervention for rights of succession is well illustrated in the eighteenth century^. The War of the Spanish Succession, in which France was opposed by the intervention of the Grand Alliance, was settled by the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. By this peace France was reduced to her original position as an ordinary European power. The war of the Austrian Succession, while giving the Hohenzol- ierns a victory over the Hapsburgs, did not settle the points at issue, and the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle proved to be only a truce. The Seven Years' War, however, had definite results. English dominance in 'North America was estab- lished, and France and Sj>ain were humilated. The treaty of Paris in 1763 settled the controversy between. England, 309] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 23 France, Spain and Portugal. The treaty of Hubertsburg brought the war to an end between Austria, Prussia and Saxony. The treaties did little to encourage a " lasting peace." The principle of partition was applied to Poland by the partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795. Intervention, then, was a definite principle in the European political system. Opposed to the theory of intervention was the doctrine of non-intervention. It did not, however, gain much approval, except among the smaller states. It is obvious how dif- ficult it was for such a principle to fiouriih in Europe. Na sovereign state would agree not to intervene in the internal affairs of another state, when such abstinence might seem directly to involve its own existence; and non-intervention might have meant the ruin even of a large European state, so long as the system of alliances continued. The adop- tion of non-intervention as a deliberate and consistent policy was reserved to the United States; the wisdom of which became ver)' real after an instructive exi:)erience with a European alliance and a narrow escape from being drawn into the European conflict during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The status of Euroi)ean diplomacy at the outbreak of the war for American Independence was practically the same as at the close of the Seven Years' War. England had svio ceeded in establishing a position of maritime and colonial supremacy against the opposition of France and Spain. The American colonists had fought valiantly on the side of England. But England did not make proper use of her victory. The colonists wanted individual, governmental and commercial freedom, together with the destruction of the then universal system of commercial monopoly. They finally became convinced that revolt was the only way to secure their natural rights, and they were willing to take this step, together with an assumption of its responsibilities. 24 THE UNITED ST/fTES /IND INTERVENTION [310 The European powers were little in sympathy with Eng- land, but were not prepared to give the colonists any active and open support. The important thing to notice is that Europe was still governed by the principles of the balance of power, alliances and intervention; while the Americans, conscious of the evils of the European system, were to fol- low a new course, in which the principles controlling Europe were to have only a negative influence. It is not strange that the question of intervention or non- intervention as a national policy should have arisen during the Revolutionary period. The Revolution, if successful, meant the creation of a new state with all the usual conse- quences, including the establishment of foreign relations. Questions of treaties, exchange of diplomatic representa- tives, alliances and intervention would naturally arise; and ihere would be a serious responsibility to assume in commit- ting the government to a definite policy, the subsequent abandonment of which, whether forced or voluntary, might result in humiliation. The history of American foreign policy at this time is limited to the definition of our relations with the states of Europe. The extension of that policy, comprehending the other independent states of America and the relation of the United States and of the states of Europe to them, was reserved for a subsequent and different occasion. "^""The new government, soon after entering upon the war with England, sought admission to the family of nations by attempting to enter into diplomatic relations with the neutral states. In this it encountered serious obstacles. Indepen- dent states at war find diplomacy difficult; but a revolution- ary government is more seriously embarrassed. At the out- set American statesmen for the most part not only lacked experience in international relations, but, what is even more 311] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 25 important, they lacked the means and opportunity to conduct such relations effectively. According to Wharton, there were two schools of thought in Congress — -those who favored and those who opposed the exercise of a highly centralized executive authority. The conflict between these schools continued until the adoption of the Constitution, and persisted subsequently in dealing with questions of construction and interpretation. Both schools attempted to extend their ideas of internal administration to diplomacy. The first, represented by Saniuel Adams, John Adams and Richard Henry Lee. did m,uch to spread propaganda against Great Britain, but did not equal the other school in constructive statesmanship during the pro- gress of the Revolution and afterward.^ Such influence in Congress prevented efficiency, not only in diplomacy but in war and finance as well. Dr. Franklin was the ablest and shrewdest diplomatist of the Revolutionary era, as will be shown in considering the negotiation of the French treaties. Morris, Livingston and Jay were constructive diplomatists, whife the work of Jefferson and Hamilton at home was doubtless equal to the work of Franklin in France. It is an easy matter to magnify the importance of Wharton's dis- tinction, and to attempt to explain tendencie.N by it for which it can in no degree be held responsible. The success which our Revolutionary diplomatists even- tually achieved must be credited to their own ability rather than to any guidance or aid from Congress. The organiza- tion of the department of foreign affairs was a:iything but satisfactory. In both the determination and the administra- tion of foreign policies, experience seemed to be the only teacher of Congress. The first diplomatic organ during the Revolution was established by resolution of Congress: ^ Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondcvce of the American Re-volution, rol. j, p. 2S3- 26 THE UNI TED ST A TES A ND IN TERVENTION [312 November 29, 1775. Resolved, That a committee of five be appointed for the sole purpose of corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland and other parts of the world, and that they lay their correspondence before Congress when directed. Resolved, That this Congress will make provision to defray all such expenses as may arise by carrying on such a corres- pondence, and for the payment of such agents as they may send on this service.^ The members chosen for this work were Mr. Harrison, Dr. Franklin, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Dickinson and Mr Jay. The selection of Dr. Franklin and Mr. Jay was not sanc- tioned by John Adams, Samuel Adams and Arthur Lee.* This resolution is doubly important because it was the first step taken to organize a department of foreign affairs and. the first effort to get in touch with European countries. The committee of foreign affairs was established in April, 1777, taking over the work of the committee of secret cor- respondence.^ The constant changing of the personnel of the committee and the lack of a permanent executive officer im- periled the work of the committee from the start. The President of Congress directed the diplomatic correspon- dence when no committee existed for the purpose. On August ID. 1 78 1, Robert R. Livingston was appointed Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Congress, however, en- trusted him with little discretionary authority. The conflict in Congress over the question of administra- tion led to the practice of what Wharton calls " militia " diplomacy. The Congress paid little regard to the rules of diplomacy, w^hile some, like John Adams, chafed under them. Determined to establish diplomatic relations with, 1 Wharton, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 61. *Ibid., vol. i, p. 554- 'Ibid., vol. i, p. 456. 313] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 27 'European g-overnments, Congress insisted upon sending ministers to all foreign courts without inquiring as to whether they would be received. The chief object of these missions was to borrow money. Dr. Franklin regarded them as indiscreet. In a letter to Arthur Lee, March 21, 1777, he very clearly stated his judgment of the ultra-en- thusiasm of Congress in hastening foreign intercourse: " I have never yet changed the opinion I gave in Congress, that a virgin state should preserve the virgin character, and not go about suitoring for alliances, but wait with decent dignity the applications of others. I was overruled; perhaps for the best." ' The quest of recognition at some of the European court-;, resulted unfortunately for the revolted colonies. Contrary to Franklin's advice, Congress commissioned Arthur I>ee to Madrid and to Berlin, William Lee to Vienna, Dana to St. Petersburg, Adams to The Hague, and Izard to Florence; all with instructions to secure both recognition and subsidy. None of these representatives was officially received. The prestige of the United States was wounded, both by the practice of sending unwelcome representa.tives, and by the manner of the appeals. Congress did not seem to take into account the likelihood that the recognition of the United States by neutral powers would be considered by Great Britain as an act of inter\^eiition. Spain did not care to risk the consequences of recogniz- ing the independence of the United States. Frederick the Great of Prussia was by no means opposed to the American revolt, but commercial and neutral interests prevented him from accordinsc recosfnition. Russia was at this time championing neutral rights, and hence cotild not afford to abandon her neutral position. The Netherlands had no inr clination to become involved in the American war, until ' Franklm. Works. voL vi, p 83. 28 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [314 complications with England made it imperative. The French alliance was the only one secured during the Revo- lution. While it proved of value in winning the war for independence, it was at the same time an alliance which some of our ablest statesmen later sought to avoid, and which, without proper leadership, would have led to disastrous consequences. The American-French relations during the Revolution directly involved the question of American interference in European affairs. Encouraged by representations from the French court, Franklin favored seeking an alliance with France, but with no other power. The reasons for French sympathy with the Revolution were older than the Revolu- tion itself. They dated back to the treaty of Paris of 1763. The Seven Years' War brought nothing but humiliation io France. That country- had lost its position in the New World. With her navy destroyed, her army de- feated, and her coniTiierce badly crippled, France at- tempted to repair her fortunes and to restore her former prestige. If an alliance with the revolted American colonies would produce this result, she would not hesitate to enter into negotiations. Louis XV favored the encouragement of discontent in the British colonies. The accession of Louis XVI to the throne was followed by the appointment of Vergennes as foreign minister. Vergennes was not senti- mentally interested in the Revolution. He watched the American situation carefully with the idea of French inter- vention in mind. Bonvouloir was sent to America on a secret mission to secure information and tO' indicate to the American leaders that they might secure aid from France, should war follow. Bonvouloir was received by the secret committee, but refused to commit France to any definite policy of alliance or intervention. He stated that France " wished them well " and might possibly participate in the ^I^J ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 29 war/ His impressions were conveyed to Vergennes, who at once gave himself to a serious study as to how far France should actively aid the Colonies. On October 2, 1776, the secret committee received from Congress a draft of a treaty of commerce and alliance be- tween France and the United States, together with the ap- pointment of Dr. Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and Silas Deane as commissioners to negotiate the treaty. The committee transmitted this information to Silas Deane. In the absence or disability of any one or two of the commissioners, the other was given full power to act. The committee advised Deane. however, to await the arrival of Franklin and Jef- ferson before communicating the commission to the French ministr}\" On December 4, Franklin informed Deane of his arrival, of the appointment of the commissioners, and of the selection of Arthur Lee, then at London, in place of Jefferson who had declii'ied to serve.* Deane at once com- municated the arrival of Franklin to Vergennes.* Congress now gave its attention in earnest to the proposed French alliance. The secret committee warned the American commissioners at Paris of the means England was taking to prevent foreign aid, especially French, from being given America. Prospects of accommodation, the comr mittee declared, would effectually prevent foreign interfer- ence.* It was, therefore, the most decisive note yet received by the American commissioners when the secret committee declared that "all views of accommodation with Great Britain but on principles of peace as independent states and 'Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, vol. i, p. 334. * Ibid., vol. ii, p. 162. 'Franklin, Works, by Bigelow, vol. vi, p. 35. •Wharton, Diplomatic Correspottdence of the American RezotutioH, vol. ii, p. 223. ^Ibid., vol. ii, p. 227. 30 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [316 in a manner perfectly consistent with the treaties our com- missioners may make with foreign states" were " totally at an end sance the Declaration of Independence and the em- bassy to the court of France." ^ On December 30, 1776, Congress again urged the commissioners to hasten with their tenders of alliance.^ The secret committee's correspondence became largely memoranda of the military and financial situations for the intelligence of the commissioners. No further suggestions could help themi. There was no longer any question as to the American policy of seeking foreign aid. The problem now was to complete the negotiations. So intense were the commissioners in their desire to prove America a faithful party to the proposed stipulations, that they agreed to the following personal pledge : We, the commissioners plenipotentiar}' from the Congress of the United States of America, are unanimously of the opinion that if France or Spain shall conclude a treaty of amity and commerce with our states, and enter into a war with Great Britain in consequence of that, or of open aid given to our states, it will be very right and proper for us, or in the absence of the others for anyone of us, to stipulate and agree that the United States shall not separately conclude a peace, nor aid Great Britain against France or Spain, nor intennit their best exertions against Great Britain during the continuance of such war, provided always that France and Spain do on their part enter into a similar stipulation with our states.' This pledge was an entering wedge toward a strong jx>licy of alliance in that the right of making a separate peace was to be abandoned in case of reciprocal agreements with ^ ^^'harton, of>. cit., vol. ii, p. 229. 'Ibid., vol. ii, p. 241. ^ Ihid^ vol. ii, p. 26a 317] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 31 France and Spain. The publication of the Articles of Con- federation and the various state constitutions in French did much to increase confidence in the political sagacity of the Americans/ The commissioners under the leadership of Franklin did not lose courage, but informed the secret committee that while France would not treat with them as regards independence while at peace with Great Britain, yet American commerce was receiving the treatment ac- corded the most favored nation, and nothing could be gained by unreasonable haste. ^ On September 8, 1777, the American commissioners again communicated the status of negotiations to the secret committee.^ France still profes- sed to England that she would observe all treaties. Prizes brought into French ports were restored, persons found fit- ting out armed vessels against England within French juris- diction were imprisoned, and the exportation of warlike stores were prohibited. Privately the French court pro- fessed friendship, winked at the furnishing of supplies t3 America, and at the same time was preparing for war. It was playing a double part, thought the commissioners, the question which part would ultimately predonuinate being un- settled. On December 8, 1777, the same day Congress resolved to recall Silas Deane,* the American envoys addressed a com- munication to Vergennes which soon proved to be effective.^ An audience was granted by Vergennes on December 12.* On December 17, Monsieur Gerard called upon the American representatives by order 01 the king, and informed them ^ Wharton, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 287. 'Ibid., vol. ii, p. 324. *Ihid., vol. ii, pp. 388, 389. *Ibid., vol. ii, p. 444. ^Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 444-445. *Ibid., voL ii, p. 453, 32 '/V//f UNITED STATES ASD INTERyESTlOS [31/^ that His Majesty had decided to enter into a treaty of amity and comimerce. He said that the king desired a perpetual amity, and would Ijoth acknowledge and support American, independence by every means in his power, even to the ex- tent of going- to war, which then seemed likely/ He would not even insist upon America not making a separate peace at her convenience, but he must require that in any peace made with England, the United States should not surrender their independence and return to British rule.^ A courier was to be sent to Madrid to secure the concurrence of Spain. Ihere were legitimate reasons for Spanish delay. Perhaps the clearest expression of the French attitude to- ward the alliance is shown in the note of Louis XVI of France to Charles HI of Spain, January 8, 1788." It is evident that the French in the formation of their alliances were not prompted by purely altruistic motives. His Most Christian Majesty was of the opinion that the Bourbon "system of alliance" would be best maintained by an alliance between himself, His Most Catholic Majesty, and the United States. The defeat of Burgoyne and the dis- couraging position of Howe had entirely changed things. It was the policy of England, thought the king, to pacify America, and then to fall on France with her maritime force, and the time was at hand to act, if reunion with the mother country was to be prevented. Negotiations were hurried, and after certain communica- tions between the commissioners and Gerard, treaties of amity and commerce, and of alliance, were concluded at Paris, February 6, 1778. The treaty of amity and com- merce followed closely the projected Congressional plan.* '^ Wliarton, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 452. ^Ibid., vol. ii, p. 453. * J bid., vol. ii, p. 467. *Ibid., vol. ii, p. 490. ^jcj] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 33 The treaty established '"■ firm, inviolable and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship between the Most Christ- ian King, his heirs and successors, and the United States of America." ^ It was agreed reciprocally to extend *' most favored nation " privileges in commerce and navigation, to prevent discriminator^' duties both in the United States and in France, and to extend reciprocal protection to the vessels of both countries. The remainder of the convention treated mainly of fisheries, contraband goods, treatment of prisoners of war. consuls, and of vessels, trade and naviga- tion. But the crowning achievement of the commissioners was the treaty of alliance, which has been aptly tenned '' the most important diplomatic event of the American Revolu- tion." ' By the first article an alliance was formed against Great Britain. In the event of war between Great Britain and France before the close of the Revolution, the United States and France agreed to " make it a common cause and aid each other mutually with their good offices, their councils and forces, according to the exigence of conjunc- tures, as becomes good and faithful allies." By article II the avowed purpose of the defensive alliance was to *' main- tain effectually the liberty, sovereignty and independence absolute and unlimited, of the United States, as well in mat- ters of government as of commerce.'* There were certain imjKtrtant agreements as to operations. Each party should, acting for itself, do every^thing possible against the common enemy. In case concurrent action was necessary, the de- tails of the case should be settled by a special convention. Any reduction of the British power in North America or in the Bermudas, should result in an enlargement of the terri- tory of the United States. France renounced all claim to ^ Malloy. Treaties and Conventions, etc., vol. i, p. 469. ' Moore, J. B., Principles of Americcin Diplomacy, p. 14. 34 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [320 any territory in North America ot thie Bermudas that had formerly been ceded to Britain, The islands in the Gulf of Mexico were, in case of success, reserved to France. In Article VIII the contracting parties agreed not to conclude a truce or peace without the consent of the other, and engaged not to lay down their arms until American in- dependence had been guaranteed by treaties. No claim of compensation could be made by one ally against the other, and a general invitation was extended to other nations to make common cause against Great Britain. The United States guaranteed to France the possessions held hy the lat- ter in America, and any others which might be gained by the treaty of peace; France guaranteed the liberty, sover- eignty and independence of the United States, and the ter- ritories taken in the war. This reciprocal guarantee was to take effect the moment war occurred betweeii France and England, if such should happen; if not, at the close of the war between the United States and England. A separate act was made, reserving to the king of Spain the right to agree to both treaties.^ Franklin and Deane informed Congress of their success on February 8, 1778. On February 16, the three envoys transmitted the treaties to the committee of foreign affairs, remarking that " this is an event which will give our states '^uch an appearance of stability as must strengthen our credit, encourage other powers in Europe to ally themselves with us. weaken the hopes of our internal as well as our ex- ternal enemies, fortify our friends and be in many other respects so advantageous to us that we congratulate you itpon it most heartily." ^ The best hope for the future of America, thought Congress and the commissioners, lay in * Malloy. Treaties, Conventions, etc., vol. i, p. 482. - Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Rcz'olution, Tol. ii, p. 495. 32 1 ] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 35 the formation of foreign alliances. On May 4, 1778, Con- gress ratified the treaty which later brought the United States face to face with the question of interference in European affairs, and the treaty which brought to the front the question of intervention or non-intervention as an American policy. It was destined to test the statesmanship of Washington, Jefferson and Hamilton, and to be ab- rogated by an act of Congress in support of the policy adopted because of treaty complications with France. It may be said that France fully performed the obligations of the alliance. The unofficial aid privately given before the alliance was only a mere suggestion of the aid subse- quently given. Large sums of money were constantly loaned. Supplies were obtained in France. The Marquis de Lafa}'ette and other French officers and men rendered distinguished military service. And France paid the price for her alliance. — an act of inten-ention which led to war \vith Great Britain. While the Revolution atid the French alliance achieved the independence of the United States, the policy of the country- as regards interference in European affairs was as yet to be finally detennined. It is true that non-inter- vention was theoretically the policy of the United States, and that from the first discerning statesmen regarded America as a nation apart, with a different role to play in the world's affairs. Attention will be given to the in- fluence of the non-intervention principle as a theory, but it is important at this juncture to examine the events leading up to the discussion of the intervention question and the circumstances under which the policy of non-intervention was adopted. Perhaps the most fundamental principle in the American foreign policy, it is essential to understand how it was tested and formally proclaimed in the post-Revo- lutionarv- period. 36 THE UNITED STATES ASD INTERVENTION [322 During the critical period immediately succeeding the Re- vokition, the government of the Confederation had per- plexities enough, without concerning itself with ihe ques- tion of a permanent policy as regards intervention; but this question was not to be long postponed. The year 1789 was a memorable one. The Constitution became operative. Washington assumed his duties as President. Jefferson was relieved of his duties as minister to France and William Short was named in his stead. ^ In the same year the French Revolution broke out — a movement which evoked much American s}Tnpathy ; and it was to be in the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars that the test of the strength of the non-intervention principle was to be made. The political theories of Locke and Rousseau as regards natural rights and especially as regards the right of revolu- tion, had a deep effect in America and in France. It is difficult to detennine just what part American sympathy played at this critical juncture when our non-intervention and neutrality policies were at stake. A celebration was held in New York on December 27, 1792. and a " Civic Feast " occurred in Boston January 2"/, 1793. Many popu- lar demonstrations were held. The term "Citizen" be- came widely adopted. Jefferson, in writing to Monroe, May 5, 1793, said that the war between France and England was rekindling the spirit of 1776." He declared: A French frigate took a British prize off the capes of Delaware the other day and sent her up here. Upon her coming into sight thousands and thousands of the yeomanry of the city crowded and covered the wharves. Never before was such a crowd seen there, and when the British colors were seen re- versed, and the French flag flying above them they burst into peals of exultation. I wish we may be able to repress the spirit of the people within the limits of a fair neutrality. 'Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, %-oI. t, p. 58. 'Jefferson, Writings, by Ford, vol. vi, p. 236. 323] ORIGIN ASD ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 37 The enthusiasm of the f>eople, however, did not extend to the government of the United States. If the former had been the true test of the American attitude, France had good reasons to expect substantial aid from her ally. It was fortunate at this time that Washington, Jefferson and Ham- ilton were in control of the government. In his first in- augural speech and first annual address to Congress, Washington did not place much emphasis on the subject of foreign relations. He did, however, advocate provision for the national defence and the extension of foreign inter- course.^ In his second annual address, December 8, 1790, he reminded Q)ngress that the situation in Europe should invite America to greater circumspection in maintaining peace; that the tendency of a war could not be overlooked and should be met by preparation for war." He prophesied commercial troubles, aiid recommended action to guard against T!t. Washington's private correspondence with La- fayette (July 28, 1 791) reveals -a wholesome attitude to- ward Europe, but also a desire to remain at peace with the world." He cleverly observed that the guarantee of peace caused the people to appreciate and uphold the government. Consistently with his avowed ix>licy, he made no statements favoring or justifying the liberal movement in France ex- cept to Lafayette and on the event of the acceptance of the constitution by the French king.* These statements were characterized by a quiet dignity. The President, when war approached in 1793, was alert to the danger which might threaten America. On April 12, 1793, he wrote Secretarv- of State Jefferson that " War having actually commenced between France and Great ' Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i. pp. 65. 66. ^Ibid., vol. i, p. &. ' Washington, Writings, by Ford, vol. xii, p. 59. * Richardson, Messages and Papers of the PresiJei:ts. vol. i, pp. 116-117. 38 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [324 Britain, it behooves the government of this country to use every means in its power to prevent the citizens thereof from embroiling us with either of those powders, by endeavoring to maintain a strict neutrality." ^ In addition he ordered Jefferson to give the subject " mature consideration,"' in order that appropriate action might be takeii. The news of the war was not the only event complicat- ing the situatioti. The advice came that M. Edmond C. Genet had been appointed minister to the United States, re; presenting the new French republic, and that he was on his way to take up his duties. Minister Morris, in a note dated March 7, 1793, informed the government that Monsieur Genet took out with him three hundred blank commissioiis. to distribute to such as would fit out cruisers in American ports to prey on British commerce." Morris regarded this procedure as pernicious morally as well as leading to dangerous consequences. His note to Thomas Pinckney. American minister to Great Britain, on March 2, was more specific.^ He was certain that the Executive Council had furnished Genet with the three hundred commissions, and was equally certain that France would benefit more as a nation from American neutrality than from an alliance. Feeling strongly on the subject, he suggested a proclamation of neutrality, and a denial of protection to all contravening it. leaving them at the mercy of the party taking them. The Washington cabinet was immediately summoned. On April 18. the President sent a circular letter to the cabinet members, informing them of the delicate situation in which the United States was placed. In forming a general plan for executive action, he submitted the foUo^-ing questions for their consideration : * Washington. Writings, by Ford, vol. xii. p. 278. *Am. State Papers, For. Rel.. vol. i, p. 3=4. ^Ihid., vol. i. p. 396. 325] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 3Q 1. Shall a proclamation issue for the purpose of preventing interference of the citizens of the United States in the war between France and Great Britain, etc. ? Shall it contain a declaration of neutrality or not ? What shall it contain ? 2. Shall a minister from the Republic of France be received ? 3. If received, shall it be absolutely or with qualifications ; and if with qualifications, of what kind? 4. Are the United States obliged by good faith to consider the treaties heretofore made with France as applying to the present situation of the parties? May they either renounce them or hold them suspended until the government of France shall be established? 5. If they have tlie right, is it expedient to do either, and ■which ? 6. If they have an option, would it be a breach of neutrality to consider the treaties still in operation? 7. If the treaties are to be regarded as now in operation, is the guarantee in the treaty of alliance applicable to a defensive war only, or to war either offensive or defensive? 8. Does the war in France appear to be offensive or defensive on her part ? Or of a mixed and equivocal character ? 9. If of a mixed and equivocal character, does the guaran- tee in any event apply to such a war ? 10. What is the effect of a guarantee such as that to be found in the treaty of alliance between the United States and France? 11. Does any article in either of the treaties prevent ships of war, other than privateers, of the powers opposed to France from coming into the ports of tlie United States to act as con- voys to their own merchantmen ? Or does it lay any other re- straint upon them more than would apply to the ships of war of France? 12. Should the future regent of France send a minister to the United States, ought he to be received ? 13. Is it necessary or advisable to call together the two houses of Congress, with a view to the present posture of European 40 THE UNITED STATES A\D INTERVESTION [326 aifairs? If it is, what should be the particular object of such, a call ?^ The foregoing questions, discussed in Cabinet meeting April 19, 1793. indicate Washington's broad grasp of the general situation. The opinion of the Cabinet was expres- sed concerning the tirst two questions only. As to ques- tion I, it was " Agreed by all that a proclamation shall issue, forbidding our citizens to take part in any hostilities on the seas with or against any of the belligerent powers, and warn- ing them against carrying to any such powers any of chese articles deemed contraband according to the modem usage of nations, and enjoining them from aJl acts and proceed- ings inconsistent with the duties of a friendly nation to- wards those at war." ^ As to question II, it was " Agreed unanimously that he shall be received." As to question III, it was decided that " This and the subsequent questions are to be postponed to another day." Following the meeting of the Cabinet, Jefferson on April 28, 1793. delivered to the President his opinion on the general question: Whether the United States ought to de- clare their treaties with France void, or suspended. This opinion contained answers to questions II to VI, inclusive. He held that questions VII-X, being on the guarantee, could not be adequately answered apart from a situation to which they applied.^ On the twelfth question (as to the. reception of a minister sent by the future regent of France) he was of the opinion that if the nation of France should ever reestablish such an office as regent, a minister should be received, but not from a re^gent set up by any other authority.* 'Washington, Writings, by Ford, vol. xij, p. 280. 'Jefferson, Writings, by Ford, vol. vi, p. 217. *Ibid., vol. vi. p. 218. *Ibui., vol. vi, p. 219. 327] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 41 The questions submitted by Washington involved hi.s two ablest Cabinet members in a notable controversy, which resulted in the formulation and adoption of our American policy of non-intervention in the political affairs of another nation. Jefferson's ver>' able argument was marked some- what by his democratic tendencies. He held that all acts by public agents under the authority of the nation, were acts of the nation, and could not be annulled or affected by any change in the form of government, or of the persoas administering it. The treaties in question, therefore, were treaties between the L'nited States and France and not be- tween the United States and Louis Capet; and in spite of the fact that both nations had since changed their form of government, both had remained in existence and their treat- ies had not been annulled thereby.^ Jefferson drew an analogy between contracts between nations and contracts between individuals, maintaining that non-performance was not immoral if performance was impossible, and that, if perfonnance should become sclf-dcstru-cthe to the party, the law of self-preservation overruled the law of obligation to others. He conceded that no nation had a right either to suspend or to annul its obligations merely because they were either useless or disagreeable; but in case they were dangerous, it was, he affirmed, a matter of the degree of the danger; and by a close chain of reasoning, he held that the degree of danger in this case did not justify annulment.'' Jefferson concluded that the treaties were still binding, without regard to changes in government ; that the clause of guarantee only suggested danger, and that only remotely; that extreme danger, and neither uselessness nor disagree- ableness, was the test of the right of annulment or suspen- sion; that the question of receiving a minister did not ccm- ^ Jefferson, Writings, by Ford, vol. vi, p. 217. 'Ibid., voL vi, p. 220. 42 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [328 cem tlie treaty c>bligation; that the United States held at all times the right of suspension or annulment where the question of self -preservation was in\'olvecl; and finally, that allowing the treaties to remain in operation did not amount to a breach of neutralit>', while their abrogation would amount to such a breach, giving France just cause for war/ While Jefferson's treatment of the case was scientfic and liberal, Hamilton took what he thought to be a more expedient view. He was imaginative enough, however, to anticipate a situation. In answering question HI (whether the minister should be accorded an absolute or qualified re- ception, and if with qualifications, what kind), Hamilton "held that the United States should previously declare to the French minister before his reception that the American government, ;desiring to maintain cordial relations andi friendly intercourse with France, would accept his creden- tials and receive him as minister; yet, on account of the relations originally contracted between the two countries and the present state of affairs in France, the United States reserved the question of the temporary and provisional sus- pension of the treaties to future decision : and that the French minister should be apprised of the reservation. " Hamilton relied upon a brief recital of the facts of the situation in France to strengthen his contention. The treat- ies were between the United States and the king of France, his heirs and successors. A new constitution accepted by the king had not changed the status of things. The seizure of the king and the declared suspension of the royal govern- ment was effected by a body unauthorized to destroy any other constituted authority. No convincing evidence had been produced against the king. Not mentioning other ir- regularities, the king had been put to death, bringing up ^Jefferson, Writings, by Ford. vol. vi, p. 231. * Hamilton, Works, by Lodge, vol. iv, p. 370. 329] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 43 the question whether or not it was an act of national justice. That the new gox-emment was irregular and had not established itself was evidenced by the fact that all Europe regarded it as an act demanding armed interven- tion to restore the royalty to power. The question, then, was concerning the future goverment of France — would the royal authority be restored or would a republic be estal>- lished? Hamilton's contention was that the facts and circumstances proved that the revolution was not a free, regular and deliberate act of the French nation.^ Arguing that the treaties ought to be renounced in the interests of peace, Hamilton declared that the existence of an option and its non-use were equivalent to adandoning neutrality for an alliance, hence giving the enemies of France just reason to regard the United States as an enemy; and if under the treaties we were not bound to go to war, it was due to casualty or inability: the former relieving us only in case of an offensive war, and the plea of inability being the weakest means of maintaining neutrality. The latitude other governments were taking in giving sanction to Fraich treaties ; the embarrassments ensuing in regard to the clause of guarantee, should the French cause fail; the refusal of European nations to treat with the new govern- ment, and their armed intervention in behalf of royalty; and the prudence of requiring the reservation of the question imtil the circiunstances of the case furnished light for a right and safe decision; were arguments conclusive of the right of the United States to sever her alliance ^^^th P'rance. In answer to tlie fourth question it was advanced that ap- plying the principle of the first one taking up arms as con- ducting a defensi\-e war, the facts revealed France as en- gaged in a war of oflFense only, while the alliance wa- clearly a defensive one." 'Hamilton, JVorks, by Lodge, vol. iv, p. 373. *Ibid.. vol. iv, p. 397. 44 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [330 While arguing from diftereait points of view, and as- suming a given state of facts in certain cases, Jefferson and Hamilton in this Cabinet controversy made possible the policy of the United States before the actual circumstances arose to test the policy. It must be remembered that the questions were submitted by Washington before Morris informed the President of Genet's plans hi America. In trying to appraise the value of the opposing arguments, one is compelled tO' conclude that Jefferson was more academic and more liberal, with a greater appreciation of the duties of the United States under the treaties, and yet with a due regard for American rights and interests as well. Hamil- ton was governed purely by practical considerations. With him, the circumstances were the determining factor. Justi- fying renunciation on the grounds of danger to the United States, he entertained the same opinion of the French govern- ment as the enemies of France held, and he thought the American view should be identical with the EuropearL They differed, naturally, in interpreting the authorities on the question of alliances. Jefferson believed that to re- nounce the alliance would be just cause for a declaration of war by France; Hamilton belie\'ed just as firmly that maintaining the alliance would lead to war with the enemies of France, and if war came, it would be better to fight for non-intervention and neutrality as permanent national foreign policies rather than to fight for the purpose of maintaining a questionable alliance. Jefferson regarded the French government as regular and the treaties as binding because, every nation having a right to change its form of government, the alliance existed between the nations and not between the govemmeivts. He accorded the revolu- tionary government both a de jure and de facto character. Hamilton, however, while admit^'ng the right of a nation to change its government at will, denied that an alliance need ^3l] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE FOLIC V 45 be continued by a change in government. If the revolu- tion be consummated and the government established and recognized, with strength to secure the performance of the alliance, the treaty would hold. But he took into account the probable circumstances. Without detemiining the de jure status of the French government (for wliich reason- able doubt was entertained). Hamilton refused to accord to the new French government a de facto character until it had established itself. With all' Europe in arms, refus- ing to recognize the go\'ernmeni as de facto, and interven- ing to restore the monarchy, the United States could not be guilty of a breach of neutrality by continuing an alliance with a government not as yet able to maintain itself, but would be guilty of an act of inten^ention by being the ally of a government the rise of which many goverimients re- garded as in itself a ground for intervention. By insist- ing upon a reserv'ation of the question of suspension and annulment until the circumstances of the case could be ex- amined, and by declaring for the renunciation of the treat- ies, which in itself was a denial of the de facto character of the French go\ernment, Hamilton attempted to commit the United States to the extreme policy of abandoning treaty re- lations with a government which proved itself able to offer effective resistance to nearly all the states of Europe, on the grounds of non-recognition and intervention by enemy states opjx)sed to the liberal form of government adopted by the French nation. To have followed Hamilton's course would have constituted a disparagement of revolution, both as a right and as basis of governmental succession, would have led to a test of governmental eflficacy common to the old world but antagonistic to our principles, and would have led to an unwarranted discrimination between the French state and the French government. It would also have meant the unnecessary suspension or annulment of treaties at a ^6 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [332 time most likely to provoke war. Jefferson's view was the one adopted. With tlie likelihood of being called upon to perform dangerous obligations a matter of doubt, Jefferson declared that one ground alone would justify renunciation — the preservation of the life of the state. In defense of this, all alliances would be put aside. Some of the obligations might be useless or disagreeable, but they could be dealt with through diplomatic channels when the question should arise, and did not justify suspension. He recognized the right of revolution (through which means our government was founded), and recognized no distinction between a state and a government by reason of the government's liberal or revo- lutionary character, or the character of opposition entertained by intervening enemy states. His test was purely a de facto one. His dealings with the French government as Secretary of State with respect to the alliance and the war fully justified the wisdom of his course and definitely es- tablished his connection with the origin and adoption of the policies of non-intervention and neutrality. By the abrogation of the treaty of alliance with France by act of Congress, July 27, 1798, the policy of foreign alliances was definitely abandoned, but the policy of non-intervention antedates the abrogation, as stated by Jefferson and adopted by Washington as a fK>licy in 1793. The arrival of Genet at Charleston, April 8, 1793, marked the beginning of many annoying acts on his part. He at once began fitting out and commissioning privateers before he had delivered his credentials or before he had even been recognized as minister to the United States. On May 23, he wrote to Secretary of State Jefferson, suggesting that the United States anticipate the stipulated payment of their debt to France by furnishing provisions and military stores.*- The Secretar)' of the Treasury was of the opinion that there ^ Am. State Papers, For. Rel., vol. i, p. 142. 333] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 47 was no need for assigning any reason for non-compliance, since by the terms of its contract, the United States was not bound to make the payments/ The Secretary of State, howe\'er, thought that a reason should be assigned." On June II, Jefferson politely refused the proposal of the French minister.^ Great Britain at once protested against the making of the United States a base of operations against that coimtry. The British ship Grange was seized by a French cruiser within the capes of the Delaware. It was the opinion of Attorney General Randolph that the vessel had been seized in neutral waters and that restitution should follow.* Hamilton favored restitution on the ground that the jurisdiction of the United States excluded the exercise of authority by France within American territory, except by express consent or by treaty stipulation.^ On June 5, Jefferson wrote Genet : After fully weighing again, all the principles and circumstances of the case, the result appears still to be, that it is the right of every nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty from being exer- cised by any other within its limits, and the duty of a neutral nation to prohibit such as would injure one of the warring powers ; that the granting of military commissions within the United States by any other authority than their own, is an in- fringement on their sovereignty, and particularly so when granted to their own citizens, to lead them to commit acts con- trary to the duties they owe their own country ; that the de- parture of vessels, thus illegally equipped, will be but an ac- knowledgment of respect, analogous to the breach of it, while. ^Hamilton, H''orks, by Lodge, vol. iv. p. 420. 'Jefferson, Writiitgs, by Ford, vol. vi, p. jSy. ^Ibid., vol. vi, pp. 294-295. * Opinions of the Attorneys-Gciwrcil vol. i, n>. .33-38. ^Hamilton, Works, by Lodge, vol. iv, p. 409. 48 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVESTIOS [334 it is necessary on their part, as an evidence of their faithful neutrality/ Genet replied: The United States, friends of the French, their allies and guar- antees of their possessions in America, have permitted them to enter armed and remain in their ports, to bring there their prizes, to repair in them, to equip in them, whilst they have expressly refused this privilege to their enemies." In a note of June 22, 1793, he attempted to defend the pro- priety of a military expedition within the United States against Great Britain. While actually engaged in aiding France in America, he was jealous that the United States- should be a faithful ally. He urged that the American government prevent the fitting out of armed vessels hostile to France in American ports, and further demanded that the British privateer Jayie be ordered away from American ports.^ And finally he demanded that the American govern- ment protect American rights and maintain the security of the American f^ag against British aggression.* On August 23, 1793. Jefferson asked for the recall of Genet.^ On September 18. Cknet made a vigorous reply, complaining of ill-treatment and humiliation, attacking Washington for slighting him and Hamilton for abusing him, complaining of the incompetency of the courts, and finally appealing to the people as against the government.' On December 25, he disavowed any activities on his part to re- cruit an armed force within the United States, but he did' "^ Am. State Papers, For. ReL. vol. i, p. 150. ^Ibid., vol. i, p. 151. Ibid., vol. i, pp. 154, 163. * Ibid., vol. i, p. 164, Ibid., vol. i, p. 172. * Ibid., vol. i, pp. 172-174. 335] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 49 admit the granting of military commissions to American, citizens in South Carolina for that purpose/ On January 20, 1794. ^^'ashington in a message to Congress stated that the conduct of Genet had been unequivocally disapproved, and his recall would be expedited without delay." Jefferson, in writing to James Madison, referred to Genet's appoint- ment as "calamitcus." and referred to him personally as " hot-headed, all imagination, no judgment, passionate and disrespectful."^ In compliance with a reciprocal request, Washington recalled Morris as minister to France, at the same time expressing his highest regard for Mr. Morris in spite of the recall.* The recall of Genet ended a severe test of the .\merican policy of neutrality favored both by Jefferson and Hamilton and adopted by 'Washington. In a communication of May 3, 1793, Genet stated that his government had charged him " to propose to your government, to establish, in a true family compact, that is. in a national compact, the liberal and fraternal basis, on w^hich she wished to see raised the commercial and political system of two people, all whose interests are confounded." " The proposal was a definite invitation to strengthen the former alliance and if accepted would have led to intervention in the European w-ar. The practical renunciation of the French alliance and the re- fusal of the United States to form either a " family " or " national compact " established more finnly the American policy of non-intervention^^ The neutral policy of the United States is closely related to the policy of non-intervention. Both develop simultan- 1 Am. State Papers. For. Rel., vol. i, p. 311. ^ Ibid., vol. i. p. 314. 'Jefferson, Writings, by Ford, vol. vi. pp. 33&-339. * Washington. IVritings, by Ford, vol. xii, pp. 433-434. ^ Am. State Papers. For. Rel., vol. i, p. 147. ^O THE UNITED STATES A.\'D L\TERyENTION [336 eously, and the observance of one required the observance of the other. The treaties of 1778 concluded with France almost led the United States into the European conflict in the wars following the French Revolution ; which intervention was prevented only by the strictest adherence to the policy of neutrality. But there was a further responsibility. The maintenance of neutrality, together with the duty of the United States as the champion of neutral rights, made the policy of non-intervention difficult to uphold. At-> tention will be given the questions of neutrality and neutral rights only as they are germane to the principle of non- interv^ention. The relation between the two policies of neutrality and non-intervention is clear. Physical separa- tion from Europe; a new state in a new continent wnth a form of government entirely different from those of Europe at the time; the apparent advantages of a policy of separation from European alliances maintaining the troublesome principle of the balance of power; were in- fluences which contributed to the adoption and the main- tenance of both policies. The rights and duties of neutrals had not been clearly defined. The attitude of the United States toward the European conflict was to be an epoch-making decision. The French treaties, already discussed, complicated this problem. It was decided at the meeting of the Cabinet, April 19. 1793. that a proclamation of neutrality should issue. The pro- clamation was issued in April 22 : Whereas it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one part, and France on the other; and the duty and interest of the United States require, that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent Powers : I have therefore thought it fit by these presents to declare 337] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY the disposition of the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid towards those powers respectively; and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever, which may in any manner contravene such disposition. And I do hereby also make known, that whatsoever of the citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations, by com- mitting, aiding or abetting hostilities against any of the said Powers, or by carrying to any of them those articles which are deemed contraband by the modern usage of nations, will not receive the protection of the United States, against such pun- ishment or forfeiture; and further, that I have given instruc- tions to those officers, to whom it belongs, to cause prosecu- tions to be instituted against all persons who shall, with the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the law of nations, with respect to the powers at war, or any of them.^ In spite of the efforts of the United States to maintain a strict neutrality, the relation of this country to the wars growing out of the French Revolution continued to be perilous. With the renewal of the war between England and France in 1803, the Republican party, under the leader- ship of President Jefferson, was forced to grapple with the problem' anew. Whatever sympathy Jefferson niay have had for France did not in any way alter the consistent policy of a " fair neutrality " which he advocated while Secretary of State and rigidly adhered to as President. Whatever clamor had existed for the formation of a French alliance in 1793 had absolutely disappeared by 1803. There was no time, however, when the great majority of citizens did not uphold the government in its policies of non-inter- vention and neutrality. While engaged in preventing violations of American neutrality, the United States government was equally con- ^ Am. State Papers, For. Rel., vol. i, p. 140. 52 THE UNITED STATES AXD INTERVENTION [338 cerned with the protection of commercial and neutral rights. The French decrees and the British orders in council threatened the very existence of neutral commerce as well as the sanctity of neutral rights. The question as to how far belligerents could prey upon neutral commerce was fully as important as the question of neutrality. John Jay con- cluded a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation with Great Britain on November 19, 1794. The object of this treaty was to settle the question of neutral rights as far as the United States and Great Britain were concerned. By article XVII, enemy goods could be taken from neutral vessels.^ By article XXIII, asylum- was granted to ships of war." By article XXIV, privateering was forbidden to any holding commissions from any state at war with either country-." The negotiation of the Jay treaty with the most effective enemy of France made clear the position of the United States as a neutral power, and rendered the hope of American intervention in the war on the side of France an impossibility. The displeasure of France was expressed by additional decress against neutral commerce, and by complaints of- fically made against the United States. On IMarch 9. 1796, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs coirtmunicated to Mr. Monroe the complaints of the French Republic against the United States. The first general complaint was as re- regards the inexecution of treaties. The first example was " tlie submission to our tribunals of the cognizance of prizes brought into our ports " by French privateers, in spite of the treaty clause co\'ering the subject.* Mr. Monroe an- swered that " those rights which are secured by treaties fomi 'Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc.. vol. i, p. 601. *Ibid., vol. i, p. 603. *Ibid., vol. i, p. 604. * Am. Slate Papers, For. ReL, vol. i. p. 658. 339] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 53 the only preference in a neutral port which a neutral nation can give to either of the parties at war; and if these are transcended, the nation so acting makes itself a party to the war, and, in consequence, merits to be considered and treated as such." ^ To the com.plaint that English ships of war had been admitted to American ports in contravention of Article XVII of the commercial treaty of 1778, it was maintained that the enemies' warships were not barred by the treaty except when accompanied by prizes." As regards the judicial proceedings against the captain of the Cassiiis, it was stated that while the treaty (article nineteen) stipu- lated that " the commandants of vessels, public and private, shall not be detained in any manner whatever," yet the treaty contained no stipulation as to the right to arm, and not to have proceeded judicially would have amounted to a col- lusive breach of neutrality.^ M. de la Croix complained of the outrage committed by a British frigate and aided by a British consul against the French minister, on the ground that the punishment inflicted by the United States was not comrruensurate with the indignity imposed.* The revoca- tion of the consul's exequatur and the expulsion of the British vessel from American waters, combined wath a formal protest to England, was all the United States could do, since there was no effective fleet."' In support of the last general complaint that by the Jay treaty the United States had " knowingl}'. and evidently sacrificed their con- nections with the republic and the most essential and least contested prerogative of neutrality," I\I. de la Croix alleged that the United States had departed from the principles of the armed neutrality and to the prejudice of France had 1 Am. State Papers, For. Rcl., vol. i, p. 660. ^ Ibid., vol. i, p. 660. ^Ibid., vol. i, pp. 660-661. *Ibid., vol. i, p. 659. ''Ibid., \'oli, -p. 66j. 54 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [340 abandoned tlie limits of contraband; and had even extended contraband to include provisions/ Monroe answered that Great Britain had never acceded to the principles of the armed neutrality, and that the United States had agreed upon the most liberal list of contraband which Great Britain would recognize." Other complaints were presented by M. Adet. the French minister, to Mr. Pickering, Secretary^ of State. He pro- tested that the United States had questioned whether or not it should execute the treaties, " or receive the agents of the rebel and proscribed princes.'' It was replied that the con- duct of the United States as proved by the facts, was ex- emplary; and on account of the rapid succession of revolu- tionary events, the American government had the right to deliberate." To the charge that the President had issued " an insidious proclamation of neutrality." the Secretary of State answered that the object of the proclamation was to preserve the United States in a state of peace, to be observed by an impartial neutrality.* M. Adet was also reminded that the French ministers had declaned that the French government did not desire the United States to enter the war. Protests were made against Hamilton's instructions to the collectors of the customs, the neutrality laws, the treatment of French privateers, the Jay treaty, and favorit- ism' on the part of the United States to England. The blockade of the French colonies, Mr. Pickering stated, was an active one and binding on all neutrals alike.^ He also contended that the United States had aided France in various ways, citing as examples the aid given M. Genet, "^ Am. State Papers. For. Rel, vol. i, p. 659. ^Ibid., vol. i, p. 661. 'Moore, J. B., Digest of International Lazv, vol. v, p. 5QS. *Ibid.. p. 595. ^Ibid., vol. V, pp. 596-597. 341 ] ORIGIX A\'D ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 55 the meeting of the debt to France and the aid given relative to the insurrection in Santo Domingo.^ In spite of the efforts to reply satisfactorily to the com- plaints of the French government, new decrees were issued, directed against neutral commerce. On August 22. 1796, Mr. Pickering informed Mr, Monroe of his recall. Mr. C. C Pinckney of South Carolina was named as his suc- cessor." M. de la Croix infofmed Mr. Monroe that the Directory would " no longer recognize nor receive a minister plenipotentiary from the United States until after a re- paration of the grievances demanded of the American government, and which the French republic has a right to expect/' ^ Pinckney was directed to leave France. He was even denied the privileges of a resident alien. A new decree was issued by the French Directory, the substantial effect of which was to declare a " general and summary con- fiscation of American vessels."* In February of the next year, Mr. Pickering filed formal complaints against the French government for alleged interference with American commerce. The suspended diplomatic relations made the situation more serious. The President of the Directory, Barras, said in an unfortunate speech: France . . . strong in the esteem of her allies, will not abase herself by calculating the consequences of the condescension of the American government to suggestions of her former tyrants. . . . They will weigh, in their wisdom, the magnani- mous benevolence of the French people with the crafty caresses of certain perfidious persons who meditate bringing them back to their former slavery.-^ * Moore, op. cit., vol. v, p. 597. * Am. State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i. p. 741. *Ibid., vol. i, p. 746. * Moore, J. B., Digest of International Laze, vol. v, p. 599. ^Ani. State Papers. Foreign Relations, vol. ii, p. 12. 56 T?1E UMTED STATES AND INTERVENTION [342 In a message to a special session of Congress, ]May 16, 1797, President John Adams reviewed the relations of the United States with France/ Adams complained of the in- sults to Pinckney, but he was more enraged at the speech of Barras, which he thought more serious because it was danger- ous to American independence, for, while it was studiously marked with indignities to the American government, it also suggested the separation of the people of the United States from its government." He suggested that such in- sults should be decisively repelled so as to convince France and the world that the United States were " not a degraded people, humiliated under a colonial spirit of fear and sense of inferiority, fitted to be the miserable instruments of foreign influence, and regardless of national honor, charac- ter, and interest." * This wound in the American breast Adams faithfully tried to heal. On May 31, 1797, Pick- ney, John Marshall and Francis Dana were nominated as ministers to France. Elbridge Gerry finally replaced Dana. They were given plenary power to settle all differences with France. They were given protection by Talleyrand, but a formal reception was at first refused. Three gentlemen known as X, Y. and Z suggested that as a doticciur for the members of the Directory who had been offended by the President's message, a sum of money would be required, and that a loan to the government would also be necessary. Pinckney reminded them that he had been treated with great disrespect, but said that he would treat for a reconciliation on honorable terms jointly with his colleagues. Finally, after some negotiations, the American envoys offered to send one of their number forthwith to America to interv^iew the government on the matter of a ^Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i, p. 2^. ^Ibid., vol. i, p. 235. *Ibid., vol. i, p. 235. 343] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY loan, if proceedings in regard to captured American ships would be suspended. Later the envoys informed the in- termediaries that in spite of the course of the Directory, they must guard the interest and honor ofx\merica; and further, they would no longer hear propositions from per- sons having no authority to act. A new decree was issued Januar}- 17, 1798. On January 28, a formal review of the questions betw^een the two countries was submitted to Talleyrand. In March an audience was granted. The mat- ter of a loan, the Jay treaty, and other complaints were men- tioned. The ministers disclaimed all authority to agree to a loan. Talleyrand informed them that he would be dis- posed to treat with the one whose opinions were most im- partial (meaning Gerry). They replied that negotiations could only be considered jointly, whereupon Pinckney and Marshall left France. Gerry remained, only to be recalled. The treatment accorded the American representatives aroused much hostility in the United States. President Adams said in a message to Congress: '' I will never send another minister to France without assurance that he will be received, respected and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation." Measures were taken to prepare for war. It was the opinion of the Attorney-General of the United States that actual maritime warfare not only existed between France and the United States, but a maritime war authorized by both nations. The indignation of the United States caused Talleyrand to alter his course. He suggested through the French legation at The Hague, that any minister sent to France by the United States would receive the treatment demanded by President Adams in his message of June 21, 1798. Our participation in the war against France was thus narrowly averted. Ellsworth. Davie and Murray were sent as ministers in response to the above overture, with full powers to nego- 38 THE UNITED STATES AXD INTERVENTION [344 tiate, but with specific instructions. They claimed that the treaties of 1778 had been abrogated by a solemn public act only after France had in many ways violated the treaty of amity and commerce. The French plenipotentiaries claimed that they could not consider the treaties as annulled ; there had been no state of war as far as France was con- cerned. They regarded an abrogation as provocation to war, and in that case would refuse to treat further unless negotations were preceded by a treaty of peace. To have insisted on American claims would have led to war. Their consideration was postponed to avert such a condition. The French would not agree to deal separately as regards the question of claims and treaties. A treaty was signed Sep- tember 30, 1800. By article II it was agreed that since no concurrence could be reached in respect to the treaties of alliance, amity and commerce of 1778, and the convention of 1788, nor upon the alleged indemnities of both nations, negotiations would continue at a more convenient time. The convention and treaties in the meantime were to have no operation. Provision was made for the commercial rela- tions between the two countries.^ This article was expunged on demand of the Senate. It was agreed that the convention should be in force for eight years from the time of the ex- change of ratifications. This brought to an end the long struggle between France and the United States over tlie treaties of 1778, which were the main factors in bringing up the question of intervention. The conflict over them resulted in the adoption and maintenance of the policy of non-intervention. Non-interv^ention in its relation to the government as a practical policy has already been discussed in detail. The formation of the French alliance, and the trouble caused by it during the wars growing out of the French revolution, *Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., vol. i. p. 497. 345 togi ..^j diia tne pro- tect-^. X yjL ucLiirai rights, illustrate the practical workings of the polic}'. But the theory of non-intervention existed as a political principle and as a part of the political philos- ophy of American statesmen, both during and following the Revolutionary period, quite apart from any question of alliances, neutrality, or neutral rights. The fact that these unforeseen questions played a definite part in the mainten- ance of the policy and sorely tested it, and our consistent adherence to it in spite of all complications, demonstrate most clearly that the policy was one of conscious purpose, designed to be maintained, if possible, in all emergencies; it was not a matter of casual development. The purpose was already fixed in the minds of the statesmen. The ap- plication of the purpose had to await the matter of state action, which always limits the operation of a theory. The reasons for entertaining such a theory are obvious. The matter of geographical isolation was the most ap- parent. Edmund Burke made much of the physical separa- tion of England and the Colonies in his plea for concilation. This reason, while very clear as a prima facie matter, has a few practical applications to the American situation. Physical separation from the mother cotmtry prevented the colonists from securing equal rights with English citizens. It also gave England every advantage to stifle the Colonies commercially, and to control the seas as far as colonial trade was concerned. The disadvantages of physical separation under political union demonstrated clearly the manifold ad- vantages of both physical and political separation. The idea was given more practical significance in the Revolution- ary war, when the Americans saw how difficult it was for a power of Europe to conduct a successful war in America because the base of operations was so far removed from the territorv' of the European l>elligerent. (jQ THF.UMTIW STATES AMD INTERVENTION [346 The second reason for the adoption of the principle of non-intervention was found in the American form of government, and in the conception of the right of revolu- tion. Wars to preserve the balance of power had largely originated in the design to save or to enhance the position' of reigning monarchies. The establishment of a repub- lican government with no royal house would elim^inate such dynastic wars as liad been the curse of Europe. Current political theories and their diversities were well represented in the waitings of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. All three writers espoused the conception of the social contract, but their applications of it were very different. Hobbes in- ferred from' it that men had consented to the establishment of an all-powerful sovereign. The state existed to main- tain order and the rights of property; but their maintenance was in the discretion of the sovereign, who made the laws but was not himself bound by them. Any state was better than no state, since the condition of war which existed pre- vious to the establishment of society was more terrible than the tyranny of the worst prince. The sovereign power, when once relinquished and conferred, could not be alien- ated. This theory was more applicable to the English system than to any other. Locke drew different conclu- sions. There were certain inalienable rights which could not be surrendered by the individual. The state was estab- jished to maintain life, liberty and propert}^ through the institution of a known law and a common judge. The purpose of the state was secured through the establish- ment of a government, the duty of which was a protect life, liberty and property. Whenever government failed to secure these purposes, it might be overthrown and a new one set up in its pla.ce. This was very acceptable philosophy to the Americans. Rousseau held that the individuals con- ferred all their rights and powers on an organized society 347] ORIGIX AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 6l which was the sovereign power, and gave expression to its sovereignty through the general will. Government, being only an administrative agent, C':>uld be changed at will by the sovereign power. Instead of adopting one of the extremes, American states- men took the middle ground as advocated by Locke. To admit that the sovereign only coidd maintain rights, that the sovereign was not bound by law, and that sovereignty once conferred, could not be alienated, would be to favor ro^^ulty and the consequences of dvtiastic quarrels. On the other hand, to conclude that the governmient could be chang^ at will without qualification was not satisfactory. Ameri- cans were satisfied to reason that certain rights could not be conferred; and if the government formed to secure these rights could not guarantee them, it could be overthrown. The right of revolution, then, was justified onh" on the grounds that a government failed to secure the natural rights of man. The Declaration of Independence is practi- cally a statement of these principles. It was declared that when any form of government did not secure these ends, it was the right of the people to abolish it. But while the right was recogniized, stress was laid upon the seriousness of the step. " Prudence, indeed, will dictate that govern- ments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the form^ to which they are accustomed." ^ The Declaration then goes into detail, enumerating the failures of the Britisii government to secure these rights, thereby justifying poli- tical separation from England. It is well to point out the wisdom of the American course. To have adopted the view of Hobbes would have led either to colonial sub- * Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i. p. 3. 62 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [348 mission or to the establishment of an independent monarchy with all its dangers; while, to have followed the principles of Rousseau would have meant the carrying of the right of revolution to the straining point. Its effect was seen in France, when the effort was made to carry liberty to all oppressed peoples. The adoption of either of these ex- tremes might have resulted in the virtual abandonment of the policy of non-intervention. The Congressional view was strictly in favor of the non- intervention principle. The management of foreign affairs after the adoption of the Constitution was practically trans- ferred from Congress to the President. Congress would favor no policy which would suggest direct interference in European affairs. Such an attitude had been manifested by the Congress under the Article of Confederation in the matter of the armed neutrality. On ]May 21, 1783, in con- nection with the Dana mission to Russia and the desirability of a commercial treaty with that country, it was on motion of Mr. Hamilton, seconded by Air. Madison, resolved : " That though Congress approve the principles of the armed neutrality, founded on the liberal basis of the maintenance of the rights of neutral nations and of the privileges of commerce, yet they are unwilling, at this juncture, to be- come a party to a confederacy which may hereafter too far complicate the interests of the United States with the politics of Europe, and therefore if such a progress is not yet made in this business as may make it dishonorable to recede, it is their desire that no further measures may be taken at present towards the admission of the United States into that Confederacy." ^ Congress had approved on Octo- ber 5, 1780. the principles of the armed neutrality;^ and 'Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, vol. vi, p. 438. ^ Ibid., vol. vi, p. 438. 349] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 63 the board of admiralty was instructed to prepare rules for the commanders of American ships conformable to those contained in the Russian declaration, while American minis- ters were authorized, if invited to do so, to accede to the principles. But on June 12, 1783, the Congress declared that the primary object of the resolution of October 5, 1780, and of the commission and instructions to Mr. Dana in re- gard to the accession of the United States to the neutral confederacy, could no longer operate, and that, as the true interests of the States required that they be as little as pos- sible entangled in the politics and controversies of European nations, it was inexpedient to renew such powers to the American ministers abroad. And it was accordingly re- solved : That the ministers plenipotentiary of these United States for negotiating a peace be, and they are hereby, instructed, in case they should comprise in the definitive treaty any stipulations amounting to a recognition of the rights of neutral nations, to avoid accompanying them by any engagements which shall oblige the contracting parties to support those stipulations by arms.^ The most independent of American diplomatists was John Adams. From the first he was the spokesman and defender of the principle of non-interventioiL On November 10, 1782, he disclosed in no mistakable terms to Mr. Oswald's secretary-, his views on this question. He observed that there was something in the minds of the English and French which impelled them' to war frequently, but if anything was done as regards peace which the Americans thought hard or unjust, ''both the English and French would be continually blowing it up. and inflaming the American minds with it, in order to make them join one side or the other in a future ^ Wharton, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 483. 64 THE UNITED STATES AXD INTERVENTION [350 war." ^ He was of the opinion that Oswald had good reason to think that America would be glad to join France in such a war. and he took pains to undeceive him on this point.^ He summarized his view^ in the following words: For my own part, 1 thought America had been long enough involved in the wars of Europe. She had been a football be- tween contending nations from the beginning, and it was easy to foresee that both France and England would endeavor to involve us in their future wars. I thought it our interest and duty to avoid them as much as possible and to be completely independent, and to have nothing to do but in commerce with either of them ; that my thoughts had been from the beginning to arrange all our European connections to this end, and that they would be continued to be so em.ployed." A few days later he told Oswald that he was afraid the United States would be made the tools of the European powers and of their manoeuvering to get the United States into their real or imaginary balances of power,"* It should be the rule of the United States not to interfere, and of the powers of Europe not to desire or even permit such inter- ference. Later, President Adams, in referring to certain French indignities, stated that France and the world should be decisively convinced that the United States would not be made " the miserable instruments of foreign in- fluence."^ He recognized that the American form of government exposed the United States openly to the " in- sidious intrigues and pestilent influence " of foreign nations, 1 Wharton, op. cif., vol. v, p. 879. *3 John Adams' Works, p. 307. 'Wharton, Diplomatic Correspoiideuce of the American Rezolution, vol. V, p. 880. * Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law. vol. vi. p. 11. * Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i. p. 233. 351 ] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY > 65 which could only be averted by an " inflexible neutral- ity."^ The views of President Washington are best set forth dn his Farewell Address of September 17, 1796. He warned the American people against favoritism towards or hatred of any particular nation. Favoritism could easily lead to an imaginary cunmion interest where no interest really existed ; and would easily lead to concessions to the favored nations w^hich would be regarded as grounds for resentment by the others. He further pointed out how the favoritism of a small nation for a larger would result in the ultimate sub- mission of the former to tlie rule of the latter, and how foreign influence was one of the most baneful foes of re- publican government. He stated his position in the follow- ing memorable words: The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign rela- tions is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote rela- tion. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise to us to implicate our- selves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected : when '9 John Adams' Works, p. 277. 66 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [352 belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisi- tions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provoca- tion; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the advantages of such a peculiar situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? ^ A review of the more important factors involved in the origin and adoption of the American policy of non-interven- tion reveals that the formation of the alliance wnth France was the most important diplomatic event of the Revolution related directly to the origin and growth of the policy. The Revolutionary statesmen desired first of all to win tlieir independence from Great Britain. Recognition and regular diplomatic intercourse with foreign nations was sought, as is done by every new state. The alliance was a matter of expediency on both sides. The Colonies desired aid from France and wished to negotiate a treaty as well. France desired the pennanent separation from England of her American colonies. In order to secure their immediate •needs, the American commissioners must, b}" a defensive alliance, agree to reciprocate in a similar emergency. The post-Revolutionar}' period was the great testing time. The French revolution and the wars growing out of it constantly threatened the position of the United States as a neutral coimtry. The Europeati struggle and the arrival of Genet caused Washington to detemiine upon a policy of non-in- tervention and neutrality. The question of the absolute or qualified reception of the French minister and of the abroga- tion or suspension of treaties was referred to the Cabinet. All agreed upon a proclamation of neutrality. Jefterson 'Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i, p. 222. 353] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 67 believed that to renounce the alliance would be just cause for declaration of war by France; Hamilton believed just as firmly that maintaining the alliance would lead to war with the enemies of France. Hamilton favored a qualified reception; Jefferson held that any reception at all was a re- cognition of the legitimacy of the French government. Genet was received and the alliance was not annulled. Washington was more inclined to Jefferson's than to Hamilton's view. The urgency with which Hamilton argued his case demonstrated his desire for a more com- plete separation from the European war. Both worked for a policy of non-intervention; the question was one of procedure. That the United States would have been in a better position without the alliance is obvious. The point is whether or not Hamilton would have defeated the very end for which he was striving by his own plan of procedure. The activities of Genet only intensified American adher- ence to the policy which was the outgrowth of the famous cabinet meeting. His conduct was repudiated, and his proposals for an alliance were rejected. Hand in hand with the policy of non-intervention, we. find the maintenance of lfeuffaJity''ancf the protection of neutral rights. The consistent effort of the government to maintain these princi- ples constantly threatened the existence of the non-inten^en- tion policy. The abrogation of the French alliance did not solve the treaty question. After many negotiations which in a few cases nearly led to war, the matter was practically settled by the treaty of Septemder 30, 1800. The theory of non-intervention was an important matter in the practical evolution of the policy. Physical separation from England and a different form of government were the chief reasons for the existence of the policy as a fundamental principle of American statesmen. The writings of Adams, Wash- ington. Jefferson and Hamilton prove this fact. The views 58 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [354 of Congress proxe the same. Some foreign policies develop casually without conscious direction. Others are the re- sult of the discerning and guiding will of statesmen. The policy of non-intervention, while lacking" an orderly plan of development, enjoyed the conscious and deliberate attention and direction of our ablest leaders. Its origin and adoption, then, is attributed to a conscious purpose, and not to cir- cumstance or accident. CHAPTER II The Extension of tke Policy of Xon-intervention Non-intervention in the politics of Europe having been delinitely accepted by American statesmen as a cardinal rule of .American foreign policy, based not only on physical conditions but also and in the main on a deep-seated belief in a distinct American destiny, political and social, the de- velopment of the principle only awaited the happening of events which should require its further application. Of im- mediate concern to the United States was the question of European colonial possessions in America. Not only the transfer of colonies from one European nation to another, but also the efforts of European governments to acquire new domains, by settlement or by conquest, would result in making territory adjacent to the United States a battle ground among European powers. The possibility of the expansion of the United States might be affected by each new treaty of peace made in Europe. Even the security of the country might be threatened. From the very outset the United States was obliged to exert itself in order to secure commercial and territorial rights essential to the growth of a young nation. The first such struggle was that with Spain over the navigation of the Mississippi River. The vital importance of the Missis- sippi to the West wa-s obvious. The restrictive control which Spain exercised over the lower part of the river was felt to be unendurable. A right of deposit at New Orleans was gained by the treaty of October 27, 1795. The next step was the acquisition of the territory of Louisiana. The 355] 69 70 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [355 cession of that territory by Spaiii to France had changed the entire aspect of our foreign relations. It was necessary for the United States not only to protect commercial rights already gained, but also to consider the territorial question. New Orleans would be the destination of hostile expeditions in case of war between Great Britain and France. Jef- ferson thought that French control of the Mississippi was to be resisted, even to the extent of forming an alliance with Great Britain. The situation was unexpectedly relie\'ed by the cession of Louisiana, by France to the United States on April 30, 1803. The territorial question, of so much con- cern to the United States, was being disposed of satisfac- torily. A vast area was forever excluded from the sphere of contests between European powers, and the territorial integrity of the United States was further secured. The next step in excluding European territorial control was the acquisition of the Floridas. West Florida was claimed as a part of the Louisiana cession, while the hold of Spain on East Florida was feeble and imcertain. Both provinces, as well as other territory-, were ceded by Spain on February 22, 18 19. The free navigation of the Mississippi, the ces- sion of Louisiana, and the cession of the Floridas, were three \ntal factors in the exclusion of European territorial and colonial influence. This cleared the way for the L'nited States per se. It remained for subsequent events to re- quire the extension of this policy beyond the limits of the United States to other American states for the mutual pro- tection of all. The significance of the Louisiana cession was expressed by the commissioners as follows : We cease to have a motive of urgency, at least, for inclin- ing to one Power, to avert the unjust pressure of another. We separate ourselves in a great measure from the European world and its concerns, especially its wars and intrigues. We make, in fine, a great stride to real and substantial independence, the 357] ^^^ EXTE^'SIO^' of the policy yi good effect whereof will, we trust, be felt essentially and ex- tensively in all our foreign and domestic relations. Without exciting the apprehension of any power, we take a more im- posing attitude with respect to all. The bond of our Union will be strengthened, and its movements become more har- monious by the increased purity of interest which it will com- municate to the several parts which compose it.^ While the United States was engaged in securing ter- ritorial gains, and thus making European colonial aggran- dizement impossible as regards territory- contiguous to the United States, other events were happening which required a definite American policy as regards recognition and a further development of the policy of non-intervention. These events centered in the revolt of the Spanish colonies in America and their struggle for independence. The ces- sion of Louisiana by Spain to France had roused the coimtry to the dangers that might ensue from the passing of the Spanish colonies into other European hands ; and the United States was 'now confronted with additional questions as to the recognition of the independence of those colonies, and as to the attitude to be taken towards intervention by European powers to suppress that independence. At the close of the American revolution, Spain's actual occupation of territory in the Am'ericas was at its height. She owned, with the exception of Brazil, the entire country enclosed by the Atlantic coastline from the St. Marv''s River in Florida to Cape Horn, and then northward along the Pacific coast to the archipelago of the Northwest coast. Most important to the United States at this time were the Floridas and Louisiana. Next came the Kingdom of New Spain, including Mexico. Texas, New Mexico and California. The Spanish colonies in South America were ^ Am. State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii, p. 559. 72 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [358 remote from the United States, both in a pliysical sense and in interest. The Spanish West Indies, however, were near enough to present a serious problem. The decline of Spain in Europe and the supervening chaos in her internal ad- ministration resulted in the disintegration of her vast American colonial empire. During the American revolu- tion. France hesitated to join the United States because of her financial weakness. Spain's financial condition was still weaker. Later, the results of the French revolution to Spain were disastrous. Her misfortunes culminated when, in 1808, Napoleon placed his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. This was promptly followed by revolts in Spain's South American colonies. The loyal adherents of the legiti- mate Spanish monarchy were inclined to assist the new regime, while others yet desired independence for its own sake. The liberal ideas advocated by Montesquieu, Rous- seau and Voltaire found their way into Spanish America. The American and French revolutions seemed to give to those ideas practical effect. Subsequent history has shown how susceptible were the Spanish Americans to revolution- ary propaganda. ]Vloreover, the success of the American constitutional system exerted a profound influence. On January 10, 181 1, President Madison communicated to Congress a letter, which had come into his hands, from the Chevalier de Onis to the loyalist Captain General of the Province of Caracas. De Onis had been sent to the United States as a diplomatic representative by the Central Junta, which, on the setting up of the Napoleonic government in Spain, was. formed in the name of Ferdinand VTI to main- tain the independence of the nation, but the United States, in view of the conditions in Spain and the uncertainty as to government there, declined to receive him in his repre- sentative character. De Onis, in his letter, complained to the Captain General of the facility with which American 259] T^HE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 73 vessels were admitted into the Spanish colonies, thus causing the people of the United States, as he said, " to believe that Spain's weakness did not permit her even to talk to them on equal terms, much less to take measures which might in- jure them." ^ It was from this source, he declared, that they gained the opinion that Joseph Bonaparte would rule in Spain and her colonies; "and hence the incitement to their scandalous conduct in promoting, by every means in their power, the machinations of Joseph to make himself master of our colonies, as if upon that depended our hap- piness." ^ De Onis's letter served ro apprise Congress of the hopeless condition of Spain, and to attract attention to the question of the fate of the Spanish colonies. In the negotiations regarding the free navigation of the Missis- sippi, the fear was expressed by Spain that the principles of independence would spread among the Spanish colonists by communication with the Americans.^ President Madison, on the other hand, in referri'ng later to West Florida, de- clared that the United States *' could not see without serious inquietude any part of a neighboring territory in which they have difTerent respects so deep and so just a concern pass from the hands of Spain to those of any other foreign pcnver." * In his message to Congress, November 5. 181 1, President Madison dealt with the situation developing in the provinces south of the United States.^ " An enlarged philanthropy and an enlightened forecast concur in imposing on the national councils an obligation to take a deep interest in their destinies, to cherish reciprocal sentiments of good ^ Am. State Papers, For. Rel., vol. viii, p. 404- * Ibid., voJ. iii, p. 404. 'Ibid., vol. 3, p. 261. * Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i. p. 488. ''Ibid., vol. i, p. 494. 74 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [360 will, to regard the progress of events, and not to be unpre- pared for whatever order of things may be nltinuately es- tablished." ^ On December ro, 181 1, a committee made a report to Congress relative to the Spanish- American colon- ies. The report took the form of a resolution on the sub- ject of the decision of the colonies to " form federal govern- ments upon the elective and representative plan, and to de- clare themselves free and independent" ' The United States beheld with friendly interest the establishment of inde- pendence by the Spanish provinces, as inhabitants of the same hemisphere, and they were promased that when they had attained the condition of nations, the House and Senate ■would unite with the President in entering into diplomatic and commercial relations with them as soa^e reign and inde- pendent states.^ This was a promise of recognition, only on condition that a sovereign status should be attained. American sympathy with the revolutionists in Spanish America did not determine the attitude of the government. Neutrality and the refusal of premature recognition of in- dependence were consistently adhered to; but the recogni- tion of their belligerency and the admission of their visits to United States ports were no doubt helpful to them. Joel R. Poinsett and Alexander Scott were sent to Buenos Aires and to Venezuela in order to promjote commerce with the United States and to secure liberal and stable commercial regulations. They were to give certain information to the government. Rodney, Bland and Graham were sent at a later time to report on conditions in South America. In order the more eflfectively to maintain a policy of neutral- ity. President Madison issued a proclamation warning all 1 Richardson, op. cit., vol. i, p. 494. 2 Am. State Papers, For. Rei, vol. iii, p. 538. *Ibid., vol. iii, p. 538. 361] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 75 citizens to have no part in hostile expeditions against the colonies of Spain.^ On December 2, 18 17. President Mo'nroe in his first annual message to Congress, declared the policy of the United States to be one of impartial neutrality. He also clearly indicated the policy of the United States, should the question of recognition arise. They (the United States) have [he declared] regarded the contest, not in the light of an ordinary insurrection or re- bellion, but as a civil war between parties nearly equal, having, as to neutral powers, equal rights. Our ports have been open to both ; and every article, the fruit of our soil, or the industry of our citizens, which either was permitted to take, has been equally free to the other. Should the colonies establish their independence, it is proper now to state that this government neither seeks nor would accept from them any advantage in commerce or otherwise which will not be equally open to all other nations. The colonies will, in that event, become inde- pendent states, free from any obligation to or connection with us, which it may not then be their interest to form on the basis of a fair neutrality. - The United Provinces of South America, after declaring their independence, desired to be regarded by the United States as free, sovereign and independent.^' Don Manuel Hermenegildo de Aguirre was conmiissioned as minister near the United States. On January 6. 18 18, Seiior Doti Aguirre suggested to the Secretary of State, after a pre- vious interview, that the independence of the United Pn>- vinces be acknowledged by a formal act in the nature of a treaty.* The recognition question will be followed here * Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i, pp. 561-2. "Am. State Papers, For. Rel., vol. iv, p. 130. ^Ibid., vol. iv, p. i8r. *Ihid.. vol. iv, p. 182. 76 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [362 only as it opened the way to extend the principle of non- intervention to independent American states. On March 8, 1822, President Monroe recommended to Q>ngress the recognition of the revolted colonies/ He justified such, action on the grounds that Spain had done nothing to quell the rebellions. " When the result of such a contest is mani- festly settled." he said, " the new governments have a claim to recognition by other powers, which ought not to be re- sisted." ^ On March 9, 1822, Joaquin de Anduaga pro- tested vigorously to the Secretary of State against President Monroe's proposed recognition, "declaring that it (the United States ) call in no way now, or at any time, lessen or invali- date in the least the right of Spain to the said provinces, or to employ whatever means may be in her power to reunite them to the rest of her dominions." ^ To this protest Secretar}' of State Adams made a significant reply. He re- minded the Spanish Mi'nister that in the recognition of the independence of nations, the principles of right and of fact were involved, the former depending exclusively upon the determination of the nation itself, and the latter resulting^ from the successful execution of that determination.* The United States had taken no part in the revolutions, and where war existed had been neutral. But the civil war be- tween Spain and the new states was at an end. They had maintained and established their independence against all who had opposed it. The recognition, then, was merely the acknowledgment of existing facts, with the intention to enter into proper commercial and political relations. The United States had already defined its policy as regards the transfer of Spanish colonies from one sovereignty to an- ^ Am. State Papers, For. Rel, vol. iv, p. 818. *Ihid., vol. iv, p. 819. *Ihid., vol. iv, p. 846. * Ibid., vol. iv, p. 846. 363] ^-^^ £AT£.V5/0A' OF THE POLICY yy Other. The question of their independence was another thing. They were ultimately recognized on the grounds that they had successfully established and maintained their independence — an application of the non-intervening de facto principle of recognition. But another and vital question soon arose. What would be the attitude of the European governments toward the 'new American States, and what policy would the Uniteint, and Adams desired that both Houses of Con- gress pass resolutions to the same effect. But the course would not commit the United States to absolute war, be- cause of the cooperation of England with the United States and because the restoration of Spanish rule in South Amer- dca would not be of any advantage to the allied govern- ments.^ ^ Adams, op. cit., vol. vi, pp. 200-201. 'Jbid., vol. vi, p. 201. ^Ibid., vol. vi, p. 202. * Ibid., vol. vi, p. 202. ''Ibid., vol. vi, p. 203. 379] ^^^ EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 93 On November 26, Adams reviewed with the Cabinet the results of the former meetings. The President's message had been presented, expressing general alarm at the situa- tion, censuring European powers for the invasion of Spain, and recognizing Greece as an independent state. Adams suggested a substitute. In case of any issue with the Holy Alliance, it should be on grounds exclusively American ; that we should disclaim all interference in European affairs and make the American cause alone supreme; that an an- swer should be made to the British and Russian communica- tions in the same paper, at the same time stating the attitude of the United States toward the designs of the Holy Alliance upon South America.^ The only remaining ques- tion was whether there would be any advantage in a policy of opposition to the Holy Alliance. Wirt doubted that the country would support the government in a war for the independence of South America." Calhoun favored action, but feared that the contrast between republican and monar- chial principles might be too offensive. An important ques- tion was raised by President Monroe. What if England should resist the Allies, should they attack South America, without the aid of the United States? Adams thought England would be victorious, and the probability of Eng- lish occupation should hasten American action. The pro- posals of Canning, however, did not contemplate war, and hence there was little danger of it.* On November 27, President Monroe advised the omission of all paragraphs objected to in the paper. Adams acquiesced, with the ex- ception of the paragraph containing the declaration of principles of the government. This paragraph referred to Liberty, Independence and Peace as the fundamental prin- 1 Adams, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 205. ^ Ibid., vol. vi, p. 205. *Ibid., vol. vi, p. 209. 94 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [380 ciples of our govenimient. The object of their exposition was " to compress into one sentence the foundation upon which the mind and heart at once could repose for our justi- fication of the stand we are taking against the Holy Alliance." ^ He argued strenuously with the President to retain the paragraph, but Monroe thought it better omitted because of the circimistances.' He reserved final decision, howevei" On December 2. 1823, President Monroe delivered his seventh annual message to Congress. This message con- tained a definite statement of the policy of non-interven- tion in its extended form, as worked out in the Cabinet meet- ings immediately preceding the delivery of the message. He first spoke of the arrangement to settle, by amicable negotiation, the disputes between the United States and Russia (yn the Northwest coast of North America. He took advantage of this opportunity to declare " that the American continents, by a free and inde|)endent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." ^' In other words, any further coloniza- tion by European nations in the Americas was not to be acquiesced in by the United States. A paragraph was de- voted to conditions in Greece, but recognition was not ac- corded.* After reviewing the intervention in Spain and Portugal, the message expressed the interest of the United! States in the countries of Europe, but distinctly stated that American policy was averse to engaging in any of the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves. ^ Adams, op. cit.. vol. vi, p. 211. ^Ibid., vol. vi, p. 212. •Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. ii, p. 209. * Ibid., vol. ii, p. 217. 381] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 95 Only the invasion or the menacing of our rights could se- cure our participation in a European struggle. But with regard to any movements in the Western hemisphere the policy was reversed. The political systems of the two Continents were different, based upon a difference in govern- ment, and what rights had been thus far gained would be scrupulously defended. The time had come to declare that any extension of the European political system to any part of the Western hemisphere would be resisted by the United States. The status quo would be observed as regards ex- isting European dependencies, and there need be no fear of intervention. But where governments had declared and maintained their independence, and it had been acknowledged by the United States, any intervention to oppress or in any way control them would meet the opposition of the United States.^ A policy of neutrality had been adopted and fol- lowed, both in relation to these governments and Spain. Only the security of the United States could cause a change in this policy. The forcible intervention in the internal affairs of Spain raised the question as to what extent such intervention could be carried, on the same principle. This raised the question of legitimacy. The policy of the United States was not to intervene in any of the internal concerns of the powers, and in all cases to recognize the de facto government as the legitimate government and the one with which the United States would deal. This settled the ques- tion of recognition of governments and also stated the pro- position that the United States would not intervene in other states for rights of succession or for the purp^ose of determining the legitimacy of governments. But in the American continents, where circumstances were absolutely different, any extension of their political system would en- danger the peace of the United States, and the new states ^ Richardson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 218. ^6 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [382 would not adopt it voluntarily. Since Spain could not sub- due them, the United States had adopted the policy of leaving them to themselves, which policy was commended to the rest of the world/ The conditions of peace with Europe were, then : (a) non-intervention in European affairs as regards the United States, and (b) non-intervention in American affairs, as regards the powers of Europe. European responsibility was characterized by President Monroe to be of two kinds, non-intervention in the affairs of the independent states of America, and non-colonization in any American territory. The latter was stated in the seventh paragraph of President Monroe's message of De- cember 2. 1823, and has come to be known as the prin- ciple of non-colonization. This declaration was occasioned larg-ely by Russian claims to the Northwest, the circum- stances of which have already been related. At a Cabinet meeting on June 28, 1823, Adams had stated that the Rus- sian claim could not be admitted as no settlement had beeit made upon the territory in dispute, except in California, and hence no territorial right could accrue.- The Emperor's ukase of 182 1 claimed territorial rights to the fifty-first degree of north latitude, and prohibited foreign navigation and fishing within one hundred Italian miles of the Coast- On July 17, Adams told Baron Tuyll that the United States " should contest the right of Russia to any territorial es- tablishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establish- ments."^ Adams addressed a communication to Rush, July 22, 1823, relating to the right of colonization. He 1 Richardson, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 219. 'Adams, C. F,, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, vol. \i, p. 157. ^ Ibid., vol. vi, p. 163. 383] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 9- denied the claim that the occupation of an island gave a right to the adjoining mainland/ He could not conceive of any European nation planting a colony on the northwest coast of America. The ultimate settlement of the country, including an absolute territorial right, was both natural and expected, and had been a subject of Congressional deliberations." He considered, then the following principles as the settled principles of colonization : the American con- tinents were no longer subjects of colonization; American independent nations possessed rights incident to that con- dition; the Pacific Ocean was open to the navigation of all nations alike; the rights of interior navigation of their rivers would belong to each of the American nations within its own territories; the United States would not admit the colonial principle of exclusion as applying to any part of the Northwest coast of i\merica, or regard any part of it as belonging to any European nation.^ An incident of much significance was the Panama Con- gress. The governments of Colombia, Mexico and Central America had invited the United States to participate. The motive of American participation, was " neither to contract alliances nor to engage in any undertaking or project im- parting hostility to any other nation." * President John Quiiicy Adams declared in a special message to Congress, December 26, 1825, that ~" an agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting that each will guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its border may be found advis- able."^ In his message of March 15, 1826, he stated that ^Am. State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. v, p. 446. ^Ibid., vol. V, p. 447. *Ibid., vol. V, p. 447. * Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. ii, p. 417. ^Ibid., vol. ii, p. 417. (jS THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [384 most of the new republics had assented to the principle of non-colonization, and that they were considering means of asserting that principle as well as of repelling interference in the affairs of American states.^ The American dele- gates to the Congress did 'not arrive in time to attend the sessions, and the adjourned session did not meet as planned. Doubts as to the aims of Bolivar threw a shadow over the Congress. On April 18, 1826, an important resolution passed the House of Representatives by a lean majority. It was resolved that the United States should be represented at the Panama Congress only in a diplomatic character. No alliance, offensive or defensive, nor any negotiations for sucli an engagement, should be undertaken with all or with any of the South American republics. No joint de- claration should be made regarding interference of European powers with their independence or form of government, nor any compact formed for preventing colonization upon the continent of America. The United States should be left free to act when the crises might arise, as her friend- ship and interests might at the time demand.^ The Panama Congress failed in its immediate purpose, but it clarified the issue raised by Monroe and Adams. The republics to the South recognized the principle of non-intervention and its corollary, the principle of non-colonization. The United States, however, always true to its policy of non-interven- tion, held itself free from any alliance with the Americaii states, in order to maintain a consistent policy, and in order to be better able to deal with any crisis unhampered by prior engagements. In discussing the factors leading to and resulting in the extension of the policy of non-intervention, one is impressed by the fact that the extension of the policy was made as the ' Richardson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 334. ^Cofig. Debates, 1825-1826, vol. ii, pt. 2, pp. 2369, 2457. 385] T^^^ EXTENSION OF THE POLICY gg demands arose. The adoption of the policy in the earlier days of the Republic was largely the result of a given set of circumstances requiring definite action upon a policy as regards Europe. The early conception of non-intervention concerned relations exclusively American-European. The first form which the extension of the policy took was resistance to the territorial and commercial aims of the European powers. The independence of the Spanish pro- vinces in South America raised quite anoth*_r question. Before any further extension of the policy of non-interven- tion could take place, the United States must settle its own policy as regards the independence of the South American republics. They were ultimately recognized because they had successfully established and maintained their indepen- dence, the de facta government being recognized as the legitimate government. Neutrality was impartially ob- served, and there was no premature recognition. The United States declined to inquire either into the form of government or into the means by which the government had been established. This was later elaborated by Monroe by declaring de facto governments as legitimate as far as the United States was concerned, in contrast with the Euro- pean intervention in Spain to put down revolution and to determine the form of government. The United States, while avoiding intervention, en- deavored to avoid occasion for it and to restore tranquil- lity to the western world by attempting in a conciliatory manner to induce Spain to make peace with Mexico and with the Central and South American governments. On January 20, 1826, Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, addressed a lengthy communication to the Duke de Infantado, Spanish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which he reviewed the history of the Colonial struggle, the attitude of the United States, the lOO T^tiE- UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [386 depleted condition of Spain, and pleaded for peace between the mother country and the colonies/ From the first, it will be remembered that the United States maintained a strict neutrality as between Spain and the colonies. Thio policy was commended to Russia. Both Great Britain and the United States had taken the ground that they would not interfere with any reconciliation between Spain and her colonies, but both had indicated that they would oppose any interference by a third power to induce the colonies to sub- mit. The efforts of Minister Everett to persuade Spain to recognize their independence were based solely on the fact that their independence was actually achieved, that Spain could not possibly subdue; them, and that the continua- tion of the struggle must be altogether fruitless. As he pointed out, the United States did not depart from its neutral position, even so far as to express an opinion upon the merits of the quarrel ; still less did it entertain a thought of active intervention in favor of either party.' But the advantages of peace and commerce were urged upon Spain as adequate compensation for the recognition of the new states. On different occasions the United States has opposed foreign intervention in Mexico. Henrv- Clay, as Secretary of State, in instructions to Joel R. Poinsett, Minister to Mexico, on March 25, 1825. declared that the purpose of Poinsett's mission was " to lay, for the first time, the foundations of an intercourse of amit\', commerce, naviga- tion, and neighborhood," helpful to both States.^ Poin- sett was furnished with full powers to negotiate concerning commerce and navigation.* But he was also instructed to ^Am. State papers. For. Rcl., vol. vi, pp. 1006-1044. 2 Tbid., vol. vi, pp. 1006, 1008, 1009, loio. *Ibid., vol. vi, p. 578. *Ibid., vol. vi, p. 579. 387] ^^£ EXTENSION OF THE POLICY lOi bring to the notice of the Mexican government the non-colon- ization principle stated by President Monroe in his message of December 2, 1823, as well as the principle that any at- tempt by the European Powers to extend their political system to this hemisphere would be dangerous to our peace and safety, and to " urge upon the government of Mexico the utility and expediency of asserting the same principL-s on all proper occasions." In 1825 the Mexican Secretary of State, ]\Ir. Alaman, brought to the notice of Mr. Poinsett and also to that of Mr. Ward, the British charge d'affaires, a report from a Mexican agent in Jamaica in regard to the movements of the French fleet in tht West Indies. In this report an apprehension was expressed that the French in- tended to occupy Cuba with a view to eventual military opera- tions against Mexico. Mr. Poinsett assured Mr. Alaman that the United States would not view with indifference the occupation of Cuba by France, especially if it was done with hostile intentions towards Mexico, but hinted that the im- prudent conduct of some of the Mexican commanders might have induced Spain to cede the island to the French rather than have it wrested from her as Santa Anna had proposed. It was agreed, however, that Mr. Alaman should address lidentic notes to Mr. Poinsett and Mr. Ward. These notes, as received, stated that the persons to whom they were ad- dressed had declared not only that their governments never would consent to the interposition of a third power between Spain and her former colonies, but also that the conduct of France constituted such an interposition, and then asked that the matter be brought by them to the notice of their govern- ments in order that the latter might demand of France such explanations as the case required. Mr. Poinsett objected to these statements on the ground that the friendly disposition of the United States towards the Spanish-American countries did not confer upon Mexico the privilege of de- 102 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [388 fnmiding the interference of the United States as a right The notes were altered so as to meet this objection, and were then answered both by Mr. Poinsett and by Mr. Ward in the sense of the assurance which Mr, Poinsett had pre- viously given to Mr. Alaman as to the attitude of the United States.^ Mr. Clay subsequently complained that, when questions of commerce were involved, Mexico treated the United States as a European rather than as an American nation, but that, when Mexican independence was menaced by Europe, the government appealed to fraternal s>-mpathies which were supposed to spring from the United States, as a member of the American family. This comment related to the proposed insertion by Mexico in a commercial treaty with the United States of an exception in favor of nations that were formerly Spanish possessions. Mr. Clay ob- served that the United States had asked only equality and reciprocity, and could consent to no other basis of negotia- tion.^ The proposed interventions by European nations in Mexico during the years 1858-60 were firmly and consis- tently opposed by the United States. A repwDrt reached the United States in 1858 that Spain was preparing to send a military and naval force to Mexico in order to obtain political ascendancy there by taking advantage of Mexico's mifortunate internal condition. The American minister at Madrid. Mr. Dodge, was instructed incidentally to re- mind the Spanish minister of foreign affairs of the interest of the United States in the subject. With respect to the causes of war between Spain and Mexico, Mr. Dodge was advised that the United States had no concern. It did not undertake to judge those causes, or claim to interpose in ^Am. Stafe Papers, For. Rel., vol. v, pp. 908-910. *Ibid., vol. vi, pp. 582-583. 389] ^^^ EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 103 any hostilities that might take place ; its " policy of observa- tion and interference " was " limited to the permanent sub- jugaticyn of any portion of the territory of Mexico, or of any other American state to any European power what- ever." ^ Mr. Tassara, Spanish minister to the United States, informed the government that the naval force had been ordered to Mexican waters only for the protection of the persons and property of Spanish subjects resident In Mexico and to compel justice from Mexico for injuries which had been committed. This explanation was satis- factory, but the American policy was again stated to tlie Spanish government. Later, the naval forces of the United States in Mexican waters were increased to protect American rights and interests. The Spanish fleet had been ordered to Vera Cruz to attack the city in case the Juarez govern- ment did not comply with certain demands. The Amer- ican fleet was directed not to resist the Spanish fleet if war measures were adopted. Secretary of State Cass declared to the Spanish minister that the United States was utterly opposed to the holding of Mexico by any foreign power, as well as to any forcible interference with a view to control of Mexico's political destiny, and that any measures taken for such objects the United States would resist '* by all the means in their power.'' The American minister at Madrid was directed to suggest to the Spanish government that it would be desirable to avert the impending struggle, if possible, by peaceable means. ^ Great Britain also made plans to intervene in Mexico. On the strength of a statement by the British consul at Vera Cruz that the British government had determined to enforce the payment by the Liberal Govemrrtent. then at 'Moore, J. B,, Digest of International Law, vol. vi. pp. 477, 478 ' Ibid^ vol. vi. pp. 478, 48r>48i lO^. THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [390 Vera Cruz, of certain British claims against Mexico, Secre- tary of State Cass on May 12, 1859, instructed Mr. Dallas, then American manister at London, in case the consul's annoimcement should prove to be true, to say that while the United States did not undertake to sit in judgment on the difficulties between Great Britain and Mexico or on the measures adopted to bring about a settlement of them, yet the relations of the United States and Mexico were for political as well as for geographical and commercial reasons, of vital interest to the United States, that the Liberal party was thought b}' the President to be the best means of consolidating power in Mexico, and that an attack on Vera Cruz would probably result in great injury to the general interest.^ The British government therefore was asked to leconsider its decision to use force. In July i860. Lord Lyons, then British minister at Washington, invited the United States tO' join France and Great Britain in an effort to induce the Miramon and Juarez governments to end their struggles for power, by calling a national assembly. It was declared that the general policy of the United States was " opposed to any interference, especially the joint interference, of other powers in the domestic affairs of an independent nation." ^ The Juarez government had been recognized by the United States, and joint intervention, the President thought, would do no practical good. Even when all designs to intervene by force in order to influence the Mexican government by any means except friendly were disavowed, the President refused to consider a departure from our established policy. The French government made a similar representation to the United States, disclaiming the intent to use force, but reserving the right to use such measures as were expedient 1 Moore, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 479. 'Ibid., vol. vi, pp. 479-480. 391 ] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 105 df the rights of French citizens in Mexico were violated.^ Mr. Cass replied that the permanent occupation of any part of the territory of Mexico by a foreign power, any forcible attempt to inter\^ene in its internal affairs or to control it politically would greatly offend the United States. Mr. Cass reviewed the situation in a note to Mr. McLane, minister to Mexico, September 20, i860. The govern- ments of England, France, and Spain had disavowed all designs to do anything against the policy of the United States.' The United States would not oppose any effort to bring the contending parties together, if the plan be honestly carried out, but the non-intervention policy of the country prevented any direct participation in the arrange- ment. Mr. McLane feared that the European powers would use this as a means of securing political control." Mr. Cass did not share this view, but made it clear that any such attempt would meet the armed opposition of the United States. Resistance to threatened European intervention in Mexico was not the only difficulty experienced by the United States with the southern republic during President Buchanan's administration. The question of American in- tervention was equally vexing to the government at Wash- ington, and led to strong representations by the President to Congress in several annual messages. Incessant civil strife and a hopeless state of anarchy had, he declared, rendered the adequate protection of American citizens im- possible; American claims and remonstrances against griev- ances had passed unnoticed; and confiscatory decrees had been promulgated. These conditions led to the with- drawal of the American legation from Mexico, and to the 1 Moore, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 4S0. *Ibid., vol. vi, p. 481. 'Ibid., vol. vi, p. 482. I06 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [392 suggestion by the President of the estabHshment of a temj>- orary protectorate over the northern portion of the Mexican States of Chihuahua and Sonora. The President regarded it as his duty to protect Mexican territory- against hostile interference by other powers/ A special agent, dispatched to Mexico with discretionary powers, accorded recognition to the Juarez government, but outrages against American citizens continued." Intervention was again suggested as the only eflfective remedial measure, in concert with the " constitutional " govermnent of Mexico. Such a course was justified by the President in the following terms : It may be said that these measures will, at least, indirectly, be consistent with our wise and settled policy not to interfere in the domestic concerns of foreign nations. But does not the present constitute an exception? An adjoining republic is in a state of anarchy and confusion from which she has proved wholly unable to extricate herself. She is entirely destitute of the power to maintain peace upon her own borders or to pre- vent the incursions of bandits into our territory. In her fate and in her fortune, in her power to establish and maintain a settled government, we have a far deeper interest socially, com- mercially and politically, than any other nation. She is now a wreck upon the ocean, drifting about as she is impelled by different factions. As a good neighbor, shall we not extend to her a helping hand to save her? If we do not, it would not be surprising should some other nation undertake the task, and thus force us to interfere at last, under circumstances of in- creased difficulty, for the maintenance of our established policy.* In his last annual message. President Buchanan again reviewed relations with Mexico, contending that the risk 'Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. v, pp. 512-514. *Ibid., vol. V, p. 564. 'Ibid., vol. V, p. 568. 393] ^^^ EXTENSION OF THE POUCV 107 attending the removal of the cause for European interven- tion was preferable to the risk attending the continuance of the danger/ Congress, however, refused to accept his proposal. Injured American citizens awaited the slow pro^- cess of treaty negotiation to secure a redress of grievances. Definite plans by Eiu^opean powers for reprisals against Mexico were already under way. In a joint note of November 30, i86i, the Spanish, French and British governments declared their intention to intervene in Mexico in order to secure a redress of grievances and to insure the protection of foreign residents. The>' agreed that no Mexican territory would be taken, nor would they interfere coerclvely with the form of the Mexican govermnent. The aggrieved governments invited the United States to join them, but they refused to allow their purpose to be de- feated by delay." The United States, while referring to its attempts to aid Mexico in meeting foreign claims, re- fused to take part in the intervention, for the following reasons : First, the United States, so far as is practicable, prefers to adhere to a traditional policy recommended to them by the father of their country, and confirmed by a happy experience, which forbids them from making alliances with foreign nations ; second, Mexico being a neighbor of the United States in this continent, and possessing a system of government similar to our own in many of its important features, the United States habitually cherish a decided good will towards that republic, and a lively interest in its security, prosperity, and welfare." The forces of the allied governments seized Vera Cruz m 1861 ; but the British and Spanish forces were with- ^ Richardson, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 645-646. '5.? Br. and For. State Papers, p. 394- '5^ Br. and For. State Papers, pp. 396-397- Io8 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [394 drawn in April, 1862. Both those governments were dis- satisfied with the course of France. Moreover. Mr. Seward, as Secretary of State of the United States, in a series of notes protested against any poHcy of permanent intervention in Mexican affairs, and insisted that recogni- tion by the United States of the government of Maximilian, which France had set up, must await the choice and act of the Mexican people.^ He also peremptorily remonstrated against an Austrian proposal to aid the French, and the project was definitely abandoned by the Austrian govern- ment.^ The protestations of the French government that •it did not aim at the acquisition of territory or at the setting up of a form of government different from that which the Mexicans desired, and that the satisfaction of existing " griefs " and the establishment of a responsible govern- ment were all that it desired, were accepted,* but only sa long as was necessary. The formal acceptance by the Archduke Maximilian of the imperial crown on x\pril 10, 1864, led the House of Representatives unanimously to re- solve : The Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to have the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators to the deplorable events now transpiring in the republic of Mexico, and they think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical government in America under the auspices of any European power.* No sooner was the burden of the Civil War lifted, than ^H. Ex. Doc. 100, Z7 Cong. 2 Sess., p. 217; Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, vol. ii, pp. 783, 799. 'Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, pp. 505, 506. • Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, pp. 354-355, 377, 404. * Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 496. 395] -^^^ EXTEXSION OF THE POLICY 109 Seward complained of continued foreign military rule against the will of the Mexican people/ He demanded the withdrawal of French troops, and the observance by France of the principle of non-intervention as regards Mexico.' He virtually threatened war, unless France shoidd comply, and an agreement for the gradual withdrawal of the French forces was reached.^ The United States, in hi- sisting upon the removal of a cause of intervention, reaf- firmed its own continued adhesion to the non-intervention principle.* Mexico City was evacuated by the French in Februaiy 1867, and the government of Maximilian was left to the only test consistent with American policy — the will of the Mexican people. Next to Mexico, Venezuela has caused the United States the most concern in the maintenance of the principle of non- intervention. In a controversy between the Venezuelan and Spanish governments, the former requested the inter- position of the United States. Secretary of State Cass, in a note to General Paez, the Venezuelan Minister at Washington, November 5, i860, replied that the established policy of the United States forbade interference " with the relations of foreign nations to each other/' and that it was " both improper and impossible " for the United States to decide upon the course of conduct towards Venezuela which Spain might think " her honor and her interests" required her to take. But the minister of the United States at Madrid was instructed to tender his " good offices " to the governments of Spain and Venezuela if a favorable opportunity should arise.^ ^ Moore, op. cit., vol. vi, pp. 499-500. *H. Ex. Doc. 73, 39 Cong, i Sess., pt. 2. p. 348. ^Diplomatic Correspondence. 1866. vol. i, p. 37^- *Ibid., 1866, vol. i, p. 378. 5 Ibid., vol. vi, p. 530. jlO THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [396 On two different occasions the United States refused to be a party to joint action against Venezuela to secure a more strict observance of the engagements of that country. In June 1871, Baron Gerolt, German Minister at Washing- ton, confidentially sounded the Secretary of State, Hamil- ton Fish, as to how the United States would receive a pro- posal, which the German government had already addres- sed to Great Britain, Spain, Italy and Denmark, the pur- pose of which was to inaugurate a joint and concerted, movement to urge upon Venezuela the maintenance of a more stable government and the stricter observance of her engagements.^ Mr. Fish could not discover that Germany was among the creditors of Venezuela, nor did he know of any grievances of Germany against Venezuela, and he was consequently surprised at the inquiry. Baron Gerolt was reminded of the combined movement against Mexico and its consequences. The United States, said Mr. Fish, if Germany or any other power had just cause of war against Venezuela, could not c^ject to a resort to that measure; but the United States could not look with indifference on any combination of European powers against an American state. If what was desired was a united remonstrance against anarchy or a chronic revolutionary condition, or appeal to honesty in the observance of engagements, the United States, while declining to take part in joint represen- tation, would itself make an independent but similar re- monstrance and appeal. In conformity with these views, Mr. Fish instructed General Schenck, then x\merican minis- ter in London, on June 2, 1871. to inquire of the British government as to its intentions, and to urge that the matter be settled by pacific means.^ Fifteen years later, the American minister at Caracas, ^ Moore, op. cit., vol vi, p. 531. 2 Jbid., voL vi, p. 532. 397] ^^-E EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 1 1 1 after a conversation with the British minister at the capital, suggested a " joint representation " and " joint cooperation " by the two governments for the purpose of securing a set- tlement of British and American claims. Mr. Bayard, as Secretary of State, replied that the policy of the United States was " distinctly opposed to joint action with other powers in the presentation of claims, even when they may arise from an act equally invading the common rights of American citizens and the subjects of another state resid- ing in the country to whose government complaint is made."^ A coincident and even identical representation might be made regarding matters of common interest to the powers, but a joint presentation was a different matter. A truly joint demand might involve a joint enforcement, which would be inconsistent with American policy. An American minister might, said Mr. Bayard, act " in con- cert " with his colleagues to secure the benefits of co-opera- tive action, but the United States was not disposed to risk the embarrassments which united action might entail." Perhaps the most serious instance in which the United States felt called upon to assert and maintain the principle of non-intervention was the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. It was essentially a case of protecting, if not guaranteeing, the territorial integrity of an American state against the claims of a pcnver of Europe holding a colony contiguous to the American state. Repeated efforts by the United States to secure an amicable settlement between Great Britain and Venezuela had failed. The question engaged the attention of Presidents Harrison and Cleveland in their annual messages, and of Congress in the form of a joint resolution.' 1 Moore, op. cit., vol. vi, pp. 532, 533. 2 Ibid., vol. vi, p. 533. ^ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. ix, pp. 181, 441, 526; Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 535. 112 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [398 On July 20, 1895, ^I^- Olney. as Secretarv' of State, addressed instructions to Mr. Bayard, then American ambassador to Great Britain, covering the American view of the subject.^ These instructions dealt with the history of the boundary question; the efforts of Venezuela to secure an arbitral settlement and Great Britain's refusal to agree; the efforts of the United States to secure an amicable solution; and the future policy of the United States with regard to the threatened aggressions of Great Britain, The main question, Mr. Olney contended, was whether or not any right or duty devolved upon the United States to interfere to protect Venezuelan territorial inte- grity. The general principle of intervention was not in- voked to justify American action, but reliance was placed on the peculiarly and distinctively American character of the question. History, geography and similarity in forms of government were cited as reasons for American interest in Latin-American states. This interest was further justi- fied on grounds of power, for " Today the United States," w^rote Mr. Olney, " is practically sovereign on this conti- nent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it con- fines its interposition." In the view of the government of the United States, the dispute involved the acquisition and ex- tension of political control. Great Britain was regarded as a state of Europe in respect to its American possessions, for any other construction would allow the indefinite ex- tension of European-owned territory in America. Un- restricted arbitration was demanded as the only means of reaching a just settlement, in place of the British proposal for restricted arbitration. Lord Salisbury, on November 26, 1895, emphatically con- tested the validity of the contentions advanced by Mr. ^Foreign Relations. 1895. vol. i, pp. 545-562. 399] ^^^ EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 113 Olney/ While admitting the justification of the American policy at the time of its adoption and of the adhesion of Great Britain to it, he denied its application to the Venezuelan controversy. The dispute was, he maintained, only the determination of the frontier of a British posses- sion owned by Great Britain before Venezuela became an independent state. As the United States did not control the conduct of South American states, it was pointed out that no right existed to protect them from the consequences of their misconduct towards other nations. The demand for unrestricted arbitration was rejected. The parties whose claims were at issue were alone regarded as com- petent to settle the dispute. The Monroe declaration was denied a place in the code of international law, and the claim of American interest in anything concerning a Latin- American state merely because of geographical situation, was definitely rejected. President Cleveland, in a special message to Congress, December 17, 1895, declared that the Monroe declaration applied to every stage of our national life, as did the balance of power to the old, and that its maintenance was essential to the peace and safety of the United States.^ He asked for authority to appoint a commission to determine the correct boundary line between Venezuela and British Guiana, and took the ground that, when the line had been so determined, any attempt by Great Britain to appropriate territory beyond that line should be resisted as a wilful aggression on the rights of the United States. Congress promptly complied with the President's request, and a] commission was duly appointed, with Justice David J. Brewer as president. The commission, however, found ' Foreign Relations, 1895, vol. i, pp. 563-567- 'Foreign Relations, 1895, vol. i, pp. 542-543- 114 ^^^ UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [400 itself helpless to proceed without evidence from British as well as from Venezuelan sources. To meet this difficulty, Justice Brewer wrote a letter to Mr. Olney, requesting that both interested parties place at the disposal of the com- mission such docimientary, historical, unpublished or other evidence as either possessed or controlled ; ^ and he further suggested that an agent or attorney representing the con- flicting interests w'ould be welcome to aid in the submission of proofs. Justice Brewer observed that it would not be of advantage to any party " that the machinery devised by the government of the United States to secure the desired information should fail in its purpose." His letter was communicated to the British foreign office" and Lord Salisbury made a favorable response; but the commission never made a report. On the other hand, a treaty of arbi- tration, signed at Washington, February 2, 1897, between Great Britain and Venezuela, ended the controversy be- tween Great Britain and the United States.^ The arbitral tribunal consisted of Chief Justice Fuller, Mr. Justice Brew^er, Lord Herschell, and Sir Richard Collins, with F. de Martens as president. It rendered its award at Paris on October 3, 1899.* In the final settlement of the contested boundarv' line, possession was accepted as the determining factor.^ Pre- scription is one of the recognized sources of title to territory, but no precise period of time has been fixed by interna- tional law on the expiration of which the principle must be held to operate. In the present instance, the treaty of 1 Foreign Relations, 1895, vol. i, p. 576. *Ibid., 1895, vol. i, p. 576. ^Ibid., 1896, p. Ixxi. *Ibid., 1899, P- xxxii. s Ibid., 1896, p. 254. 40l] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY II5 arbitration provides that adverse holding for a period of fifty years was to be regarded as conferring title. Exclu- sive political control as well as actual settlement of a dis- trict was construed as constituting title by prescription. International law was to govern wherever the rule fixed by the treaty was inapplicable. Under the award Great Britain continued to hold a large part of the disputed ter- ritory in the interior, while Venezuela retained control of the mouths of the Orinoco, including Barima Point and the Caribbean Httoral for some distance eastward. Presi- dent Cleveland reported to Congress that the award was satisfactory to both parties, and that the dispute was de- finitely ended. By the incorporatioin of the principle of prescription in the terms of the treaty of arbitration, a large portion of the Venezuelan claims was relinquished. The active interest of the United States ceased upon the agree- ment of the parties to enter into a treaty of arbitration. Another Venezuelan controversy causing the United States concern was the armed intervention of Germany, Great Britain and Italy in 1902-1903, for the collection of claims. Germany complained of the non-performance of engagements in connection with the building of a railway and of the non-satisfaction of claims arising out of damages suffered by German merchants and land-owners during the Venezuelan Civil Wars of 1898-1900.^ A six-months' term was fixed during which no claims would be entertained by the Venezuelan government; and a decree was issued es- tablishing a purely Venezuelan commission to determine the claims, which were required to be presented within three months.^ Responsibility for claims before a certain date was disavowed ; diplomatic protests were to be ignored ; only appeals to the Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice '^Foreign Relations, 1901, p. 193. ^Jbid., 1901, p. 193. Il6 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [402 were to be allowed ; and payment was to be made in bonds of a newly emitted revolution debt. After repeated re- fusals of offers to arbitrate. Germany decided once more to demand a settlement, and in case of refusal to use coercion. Assurances were given to the United States that Germany desired only to secure justice for her injured citizens, and that under no circumstances was the acquisition or perman- ent occupation of any territory considered.^ President Roosevelt, in his message to Congress of Deceinber 3, 1901, declared that the United States did not " guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power." ^ The govern- ment was satisfied with the assurance of the German government that no territory would be taken, and would await the actual appearance of ulterior designs before taking any kind of action. The measures suggested by the German government were the blockade of the har- bors of La Guayra and PortO' Cabello, and in case this coercive measure failed, the temporary occupation of the Venezuelan ports and the levying of duties.' On July 29, 1902, the British government warned the Venezuelan government that unless the claimants of British nationality should be paid what was justly due them, the British govern- ment would take steps to compel pajonent.* After the German demand of December 7, 1902, Eng- land, Germany and Italy agreed upon certain reprisals against Venezuela. Some war vessels were seized, Porto Cabello was bombarded and a Venezuelan port was shelled. Venezuela was forced to yield, and the United States was 1 Foreign Relations, 1901, p. 194. *Ibid., 1901, p. 195. ^Ibid., 1901, p. 194. ■•Hart, Monroe Doctrine, p. 230. 403] ^^^£ EXTENSION OF THE POLICY II7 requested to convey to the blockading governments a pro- posal of arbitration.^ Full authority was conferred on the American minister at Caracas to act. Arbitration was accepted by Germany and Great Britain with important re- servations, and President Roosevelt was invited to act as arbitrator. The Hague Tribunal was ultimately agreed upon as the arbitrator of the question of preferential payment alone, as the claims with the exception of the British and German reservations were referred to mixed coinmissions." The question of preferential payment was decided in favor of the blockading governments on February' 22, 1904.^ The policy of the United States in this instance was guided by the assurance that the acquisition of territory neither was contemplated nor would under any circum- stances be considered. November 11, 1902, Mr. Hay told Sir Michael Herbert, the British ambassador at Washing- ton, that while the United States government regretted the use of force against Central and South American coun- tries, yet no objection could be made against steps taken to secure the redress of injuries suffered by the subjects of the European powers concerned, where the question of ter- ritory w^as not included.* The Argentine minister of foreign relations. Dr. Drago, communicated certain views to the United States government. In this communication he took the ground that proceedings for the execution of a judgment against a state could not be instituted; that a sovereign state had the right to determine the time and mode of payment; that ability to pay often must await in- crease in wealth; that the collection of loans by military means implied territorial occupation to make them effective ; ^Foreign Relations, 1903, pp. 420, 453. *Ibid., 1903, pp. 425-426; 439-440; 477-478. * Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 591. * Ibid., vol. vi, p. 592. Il8 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [404 and that the South American nations, while not exempt from the ohUgations of states under internatio'nal law, should insist on the principle that the public debt of a country could not occasion anned intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power.^ In reply, Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, referred to President Roosevelt's message of De- cember 3, 1901, in which he declared no guarantee against punishment could be given to any state misconducting it- self." The question of territory was excepted by Mr. Hay. The Argentine government was informed that the United States strongly favored the reference of all claims by one state against another growing out of individual wrongs or national obligations to an impartial tribunal. This was broader than the Drago proposal, which referred to public debts alone. The United States, however, did not agree to protect any country where the collection of claims only was contemplated, and armed intervention by three Euro- pean powers in an American state actually took place, with the knowledge and without the objection of the governmient of the United States. Our relations with Brazil afford one instance of non-in- tervention and one instance of intervention on the part of the United States. Just as Mexico had called upon the United States for aid against probable French invasion, and Venezuela against Spain, so Brazil called upon the United States for aid against Portugal. The charge d'affaires of Brazil in the year 1825 suggested the forma- tion by the United States of an alliance with Brazil to main- tain the latter's independence, should Portugal receive the aid of any foreign power, and also the conclusion of an alliance to expel the Portugese from any part of Brazil '^Foreign Relations, 1903. pp. 1-5. ^Ibid., 1903, p. 5. 405] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 119 which might fall into their hands/ Mr. Clay replied that the prospects of a speedy peace between Brazil and Portugal seemed to remove the necessity of an alliance, but intimated that, if the independence of xA.merican States should again be threatened by the European allies, the President would take appropriate action. But he also indicated that an alliance with Brazil against Portugal would be a violation of the policy of the United States, for '' whilst the war is con- fined to the parent country and its former colony, the United States remain neutral, extending their friendship and doing equal justice to both parties." - Another case in which the question of American inter- vention arose was the Brazilian naval revolt during the years 1893- 1894. The revolt of the naval vessels under Admiral Mello was followed by an attack on Rio de Janeiro, resulting in the declaration of martial law, the suspension of all trade and commerce, the death of many non-combat- ants, and the destruction of property. The msurgents pro- fessed to set up a provisional government, and asked for its recognition by the United States and other foreign powers. The Brazilian government, on the other hand, issued a decree placing the revolting squadron outside the protection of the national flag.^ Mr. Thompson, the Amer- ican minister of Brazil, was instructed to take steps to in- sure the protection of American interests.* The diplomatic representatives of several foreign governments observed the practice of non-intervention in Brazil internal affairs, but they strongly insisted that the insurgent admiral be deprived of all pretext for hostile action. The allied naval com- manders informed Admiral Mello that they would oppose ^ Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 437. *Ibid., vol. vi, p. 437. * Foreign Relations. 1803. pp. 59-60. *Ibid., 1893, P- 47- I20 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [406 by force, if necessary, all attacks upon the city (Rio de Janeiro), and further insisted that insurgent interference with commerce should be limited to the lines of fire of the batteries of the land fortifications.^ Definite instructions were sent by Secretary of State Gresham to Mr. Thompson, a summary of which follows : 1. That, an actual condition of hostilities existing, the right of the insurgents to carry on orderly military operations was admitted. 2. That the denial of this right by a foreign power would have constituted an act of intervention, incompatible with neutral duty. 3. That, in view of the creation of fortified and armed strategic positions within the limits of the city, the foreign naval forces would not be justified in forcibly preventing its bombardment. 4. That, while " an announced and effective blockade," en- forcement of which would have necessarily involved the right to extend operations to the high seas, would be recognized, the insurgents would not be permitted, after they had allowed foreign commerce to enter the port, to seek to accomplish the objects of a blockade either by seizing particular vessels or by firing upon them when they were engaged in discharging or receiving cargo.^ Admiral Benham, commander of the American naval force, informed the insurgents and the city that American vessels would be forcibly protected.^ The Detroit was ordered to fire back if merchant vessels were fired upon. An insurgent vessel fired upon, but missed, an American vessel, and the Detroit returned the fire. This was fol- 1 Foreign Relations, 1893, pp. 56, 95-96. * Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol ii, p. 1 1 14. ^Foreign Relations, 1893, PP- 116-117. 407] ^^^ EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 121 lowed by an exchange of shots, together with a threat by the commander of the Detroit that the insurgent vessel would be sunk in case of further hostilities. Admiral Benham stated that he had not interfered with the military or naval operations of either side, but had limited action to the pro- tection of American citizens and commerce. American vessels in the line of fire during legitirruate hostilities were operating at their peril, he declared, while merchant vessels were entitled to freedom of movement elsewhere. The search of neutral vessels, or the seizure of cargoes amount- ing to contraband of war in case of war between two in- dependent governments was denied to the insurgents, on the grounds that forcible seizure by those not enjoying a status of belligerency would constitute an act of piracy. Mr, Gresham held that Mr. Thompson had acted within his instructions.^ Mr. Gresham's approval of Admiral Benham's course seemingly sanctions several misconceptions which should not pass unnoticed. Admiral Benham's communication to Admiral da Gama was clearly a denial of the right of the insurgent party to prevent the supply of contraband to the city and to the federal government. The protection of commerce, and the prevention of fire upon the seizure of in- nocent neutral ships were w^ithin the rights of Admiral Benham. But his denial of the right to prevent the supply of contraband was a direct intervention in the conflict be- tween the insurgents and the Brazilian federal govern- ment, and operated to the disadvantage of the fonner. This was a course which he had no right to take, either under his instructions or under international law. Mr. Gresham's instructions to Mr. Thompson recognized the existence of a state of hostilities and the right of the in- surgents to carry on military operations. They therefore 1 Foreign Relations, 1893, p. 117. 122 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [408 had the right to prevent the delivery of arms and munitions of war to the federal forces, as orderly military operations include the crippling of the enemy by all fair means. The duties of neutral governments and of individuals with re- spect to contraband were evidently confused in this case. Contraband trade is prohibited to individuals, but the duty to enforce this prohibition does not rest on neutral govern- ments. A private citizen supplying war materials to either party to an armed conflict is guilty of an unneutral act. But he commits it at his own risk; and if his government should assume to protect him in it, it would make itself a party to his unneutrality. The Department of State inquired as to the attempted blockade of the port by the insurgents, and intirnated that the test of the blockade would be its effectiveness. This substantially recognized the possibility of a legal blockade, which, if it was established, would gain for the insurgents the rights of belligerents. The denial of the right to pre- vent the supply of contraband constituted a very effective limitation of the power of the insurgents to make their blockade effective, and had the effectiveness of the blockade depended wholly on this, Admiral Benham's position would have made impossible the very thing which the Department of State admitted the insurgents had a legal right to do. The action of the American naval force had, indeed, broken the attempted blockade. Until insurgents are recognized as belligerents, the titular government continues to be prima facie responsible for the proper treatment of foreigners within its jurisdic- tion. Other governments have no right to assume the re- sponsibilities of the titular government in this respect, in the absence of any necessity for self defence, to which acts of interference are expressly limited. The recognition of belligerency, or the withhoMing of belligerent rights should 409] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 123 not be confused with the duty of neutral governments in relation to parties in a civil conflict where one is a titular governiment and another is a contesting insurgent. Recog- nition of the insurgents as belligerents was denied by Mr. Gresham, on the ground that it would be an act of unfriendliness towards the titular government and would g-ive moral support to the rebellion, since evidence was lacking of the stability and effectiveness of the insurgent resistance to the titular government.'- This denial, how- ever, did not give the United States the right to resist the movements of the insurgent forces, nor did it justify Admiral Benham's denouncement of the prevention of the supply of contraband as an act of piracy. Admission by neutrals of the right of insurgents to commit hostile acts •against a titular government carries with it the duty of non-intervention, and is in no way connected with the according or withholding of belligerent rights. The relations of the United States with the Argentine Republic furnish two illustrations of the application of the policy of non-intervention, and one example of inter- vention when American interests require it. The first of these was an attempt of South American countries to se- cure the intervention of the United States in their internal .affairs, within a few years following the publication of the Monroe message. An inquiry having been made by the Argentine Republic as to the scope of the Monroe de- claration, Mr. Clay, who was then Secretary of State, re- plied that it was leveled at apprehended European inter- ference in the affairs of American republics, and that, while It would doubtless receive the sanction of Congress, it was purely a voluntary executive declaration, and did not pledge the United States to any obligation the performance of ^Foreign Relations. 1893, P- 63. 124 ^^^ UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [410 which might be demanded by foreign governments.^ Should the question again arise, Congress alone could de- tennine whether or not the country would engage in war. The war between the Argentine Republic and the Emperor of Brazil was a purely American war, which presented no analogy whatsoever to the situation described by President Monroe. Even if Brazil had remained under Portuguese dominion, the war with Argentina would not have come within the purview of Mr. Monroe's declaration. On January 26, 1832, Mr. Livingston, as Secretary of State, gave Mr. Baylies, charge d'affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, instructions relative to American complaints against that government. It was stated that one Lewis Vemet, who had formed an establishment at Soledad, one of the Falkland Islands, had captured three American vessels, — the Breakwater, tlie Harriet, and the Superior — pretending that they had violated some un- known laws of the republic of Buenos Aires, for the pro- tection of fisheries.^ Two of the vessels were appropriated by Vemet without any trial, and were fitted out to make further aggressions on the property of American citizens engaged in lawful commerce in the seas around those is- lands. These acts were, said Mr. Livingston, regarded as *' lawless and piratical." ^ Mr. Baylies was instructed to secure recognition of American fishery rights, and if Vemet's acts were avowed, to justify the recapture of the vessels taken, and to demand their restitution, if not taken on the grounds of the irregularity of proceedings; but if the acts should be disavowed, orders should be given to the squadron to break up the settlement and bring Vemet to Buenos Aires for trial.* On February 14, 1832, Mr. ' Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 434. *Ibid., vol. i, p. 876. ^Ibid., vol. i, p. 877. *Ibid., vol. i, p. 883. 41 1 ] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 125 Livingston again sent instructions making further charges against Vernet's conduct. The colony was one composed of deserters from American ships and renegades from all nations, governed only by the will of Vernet. It was a necessary act of self-defence to break up this settlement, whether the government of Buenos Aires had or had not a title to the jurisdiction of the islands; and in any event, the right of fishery could not be interfered with/ In answer to the protest of the American consul against the seizure of American vessels, the Argentine minister of foreign af- fairs had justified the acts of Vernet as legal. ^ The opera- tions of Vernet were forcibly suppressed by the American warship Lexington, under the command of Captain Dun- caru In reply to the demands of Mr. Baylies, the govern- ment of Buenos Aires not only refused indemnity for Vernet's acts but demanded reparation for the acts of Captain Duncan. After this. Mr. Baylies demanded his passports.^ At bottom, this controversy involved the question of the validity of the claim of Buenos Aires to title to the Falk- land Islands. On this ground Mr. Webster, as Secretary of State, on December 4, 1841, declined to pursue the discus- sion of the complaints made against the course of Captain Duncan until the question of jurisdiction over the islands, as between Great Britain and Buenos Aires, should be set- tled.* Mr. Bayard, as Secretary of State, on March 18. 1886, took similar ground.*^ As the British reoccupation of the islands in 1833 was based on a claim of title asserted and maintained before the declaration of President Monroe, ^ Moore, op. dt., vol i, p. 884. ^Br. and Fr. State Papers, vol. xx, pp. 3i^3i7- 'Ibid., vol. XX, pp. 369, 437. * Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law. vol. i, p. 888. ^Ibid., vol. i, p. 889. 126 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [412 that declaration, which Buenos Aires had invoked, was held by the United States to be inapplicable to the case.^ But the United States also maintained that, even if Gneat Britain had violated tlie Monroe principle, this would not give another government the right to demand from the United States redress for injuries alleged to have resulted from its failure to act. The United States further con- tended that there was ample justification for putting an end to Vemet's operations, even if the claim of Buenos Aires to sovereignty over the islands were admitted. From this re- view, it appears that the United States maintained, in the Falkland Islands affair, the following positions: (i) that, where a dispute as to title antedated the Monroe message, the United States did not regard itself as being called upon to interfere; (2) that the Monroe declaration did not, in the opinion of the United States, operate retroactively; (3) that another government could not as of right demand that (the United States enforce the Monroe declaration, or de- mand redress for injuries sustained as the result of inaction by the United States; (4) that the United States had, as an independent nation, the right to abate a nuisance in- volving lawless aggressions upon the persons and property of its citizens, without regard to the question of territorial jurisdiction. In reply to a suggestion, in 1898, that the United States should join Germany and Great Britain in representations to the Argentine government in relation to its alleged re- fusal to proceed with the arbitration of the boundary dis- pute with Chile, the Department of State observed that the fact that the queen of Great Britain had already been chosen; as arbitrator would probably stand in the way of joint re- presentations by Great Britain and Germany; but the De- partment added that it did not wish to appear as opposing 1 Moore, op. cit., vol. i, p. 890. 413] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 127 any suggestion of arbitration, when " made benevolently and not in the form of intervention, joint or otherwise, in- consistent with the independence of the nation to which it was addressed." ^ A tender of good offices had already been made by the United States to Argentina and Chile. The relations of the United States with Cliile reveal two cases where the principle of non-intervention was at first disregarded, but later applied. The first was the contro- versy over asylum and safe-conduct during the civil war following the dispute between President Balmaceda and the Chilean congress. Many persons sought refuge at the various legations. Even prior to the resignation of Balma- ceda, Mr. Patrick Egan, then American minister at Santiago, was threatened with police inspection for harbor- ing Congressionalists. During the year 1891, when many persons were seeking asylimi, the Chilean government, claiming that the privilege of asylum was being abused, be- gan to police the American legation. Mr. Egan protested vigorously, and declared that he would permit his refugees to leave the legation only under proper safe-conduct to neutral territory.^ He repeatedly demanded safe-conduct for the people at his legation, but without result.^ The State Department instructed him to report the facts of the situation, to learn the practices of other states and to pre- vent the abuse of the privilege of asylum.* Mr. Egan argued with Seiior Matta that his house was an integral part of the territory of the United States, and that, without the will and permission of that government, Chile could not consider as subject to her judicial action persons clearly beyond her jurisdiction. He also contended that the grant ' Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 435. ^Foreign Relations, 1891, p. 166. 3 Ibid., pp. 166, 177, 184, 185. *Ibid., pp. 167, 177. 178, 179- 128 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [414 of safe-conduct to liarbored refugees was ordinary Chilean practice. Sefior Matta would admit the extraterritoriality of the minister's domicil, and the attendant right of asylum, but the granting of safe-conduct, he held, was only a matter of courtesy/ This unwarranted extension of extraterritorial privi- leges, resulting in the defeat of justice and the crippling of the administration of extradition, was reasserted by Mr. Egan in 1893, during a new uprising of the Balmaceda party. The leaders of the movement, Colonel Fuentes and Sefior Blanlot-Halley, were received by Mr. Egan at the American legation, and safe-conduct was requested for them." Mr. Gresham, who was then Secretary of State, after learning that the men were wanted for " murder and robbery," and that a regular trial would be afforded them, notified Mr. Egan that he had no authority to protect Chileans against police officers who were boimd to arrest them for violation of the laws of their country, and in- structed him to cease harboring them if they were demanded by the Chilean governmjent on a criminal charge.^ On April 18. 1893, •'^'*- Gresham instructed that the criminals be ordered to leave the legation.* Mr. Cleveland in his annual message, December 4, 1893, completely disavowed the act of Mr. Egan as unauthorized by the government, not sanctioned by international precedent, and provocative of strife and sedition, adding that " under no circumstances; can the representatives of this government be permitted, under the ill-defined fiction of extraterritoriality, to inter- rupt the administration of criminal justice in the countries to which they are accredited." ® ^ Foreign Relations, p. 195. 2 Ibid., 1893, pp. 217, 218. ^Ibid., pp. 219, 220. *Ibid., p. 221. 5 Ibid., 1893, p. iv. 415] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 129 The attempted interventicm by Mr. Blaine, as Secretary of State, in the Chile-Peruvian war in 1881, and the subse- quent reversion to the poHcy of non-intervention by his suc- cessor, Mr. Frelinghuysen, exemplify in a striking way how deeply intrenched the policy of non-intervention had become. The dispute between Chile and Peru related to territorial rights over the seaboard of Atacama, which led to the Chile-Bolivian conflict of 1879, and to the subsequent entry of Peru into the conflict. This comparatively insig- nificant region became famous in 1841 because of the dis- covery of vast guano deposits. While Chilean jurisdic- tion had been generally recognized, Bolivian claims of jurisdiction extending southward to the Salado river formed a serious complication. Chile's strong denial of the Bolivian claims threatened war, but Spanish aggressions on the west coast of South America stayed the immediate drift towards hostilities. The treaties of 1866 and 1874 between Chile and Bolivia were aimed at an amicable set- tlement. The secret compact between Peru and Bolivia, made in 1873. further complicated the situation. Diplo- matic relations between Chile and Bolivia were broken off on February 10, 1879. and hostilities commenced four days later. On April 5, 1879, Chile declared war against Peru. Secretary of State Evarts refused in 1879 to join with Germany and Great Britain in mediation between Chile and Peru, on the ground that single or collective mediation would at the time carry the impression of dictation or coercion in disparagement of belligerent rights.^ No ob- jection was made to efforts to restore peace wherever the good offices of the United States might be usefully proffered ; but it was intimated that no premature efforts nor any effort in combination with other neutral powers would be made. In the same year Mr. Pettis, American Minister ' Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 34. 130 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [416 to Bolivia, visited Lima and Santiago in order personally to acquaint each of the three governments w^ith the attitude of the others concerning peace/ The Department of State criticised his action as rash and unauthorized. The Chilean press had represented that Mr. Pettis had indicated a pur- pose on the part of the government of the United States to end the war by inten^-ention or arbitration on terms pro- posed by itself, but these statements were dismissed by the Department of State as the false utterances of a hostile press. Secretary of State Blaine, on June 15, 1881, instructed Mr. Hurlbut, American Minister to Peru, in the event that the Chilean authorities were willing to allow the establish- ment of the provisional government set up by Senor Calderon, to encourage the Peruvians to accept any reason- able conditions to make this result possible, and to im- press upon the Chileans the desirability of a liberal policy.^ The United States believed that Peru should make peace, even if loss of territory were demanded; and the weight of American influence with Chile would be used to make the cession of territory a subject of negotiation, and not a condition precedent to negotiations. The objects of the provisional Peruvian government, thought Mr. Blaine, were to establish a constitutional government and to open nego- tiations for peace without the imposition of preliminary conditions on either side. Chilean rights as a result of success in war were recognized, and it was admitted that cession of territory by Peru might necessarily follow as a price of peace. Mr. Hurlbut was expressly warned that the time for friendly intervention had not arrived. The course of Mr, Hurlbut, giving the impression that the United States would interfere actively in the South 'Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 35. ^Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 914, 417] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 131 American conflict, led Mr. Blaine to reprimand him for acting beyond the scope of his instructions. Especially did Mr. Blaine disavow the statement that the United States would regard with disfavor any amiexation by Chile of Peruvian territory by right of conquest.^ Mr. Hurlbut was expected, complained Mr. Blaine, not so much to protest against possible annexation as to induce in a friendly man- ner the Chilean authorities to allow the Peruvian author- ities to attempt the satisfaction of Chilean rights and in- terests without enforced annexation as a condition pre- cedent to negotiation. He also disapproved of the im- pression given as to the American attitude tOAvard die Calderon government ; of the suggestion that the Argentine government send a minister to Peru; and of Hurlbut'si efforts to secure a naval station from Peru for the United States. It was added that the government of the United States did not understand the suppression of the Calderon government by Chile and the arrest of President Calderon. These circumstances, it was thought, justified the sending of a special mission to deal with the situation. On Novem- ber 30, 1 88 1, Mr. William Henry Trescot was commis- sioned as special envoy to Chile, Peru and Bolivia, to deal with the difficulties existing between the three republics." The Third Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Walker Blaine, was directed to accompany him. All matters relating to the dispute were to be referred to him instead of to the American ministers. The Calderon government had been recognized under the discretionary authority given to Mr. Christiancy, and that government had been authorized to make a treaty of peace without the cession of territory.' The Chilean authorities forbade the exercise of govern- ^ Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 949. ^Ibid., p. 142. 'Ibid., pp. 144, 14s, 146. 132 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [418 mental fuiictions by the Calderon government in territory held by Chile/ Later Calderon was arrested and his govern- mient extinguished. Mr. Blaine instructed that if this was done in resentment of the continued recognition of the Calderon government by the United States, Chile should be informed that it was regarded as sufficient cause to break ofif diplomatic relations.^ Should Chile persist in destroy- ing Peruvian nationality and absorbing an independent state, the United States would appeal to the other American republics in order to determine what steps would be taken to prevent the consummation of the Chilean designs.^ The objects of the United States were declared to be the pre- vention of further bloodshed and the recognition by Chile of the respect due to the United States in its attempts at friendly interposition, which sprang from its disinterested purpose, legitimate influence and established position. In case of continued Chilean opposition to the friendly inter- position of other powers, Mr. Trescot was instructed strongly to represent to that government " the disappoint- ment and dissatisfaction felt by the United States at such a deplorable policy." There was no' intent to interfere with Chile's rights as military conqueror, nor was there any desire to prejudice her plans for future security. How- ever. Mr. Blaine declared : We cannot regard with unconcern the destruction of Peru- vian nationality. If our good offices are rejected, and this policy of the absorption of an independent state be persisted in, this government will consider itself discharged from any further obligation to be influenced in its action by the position which Chile has assumed, and will hold itself free to appeal to the ^Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 146. 'Ibid., p. 146. 'Ibid., 1881, p. 148. 419] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 1 33 Other republics of this continent to join it in an effort to avert consequences which cannot be confined to Chile and Peru, but which threaten with extremest danger the political institutions, the peaceful progress, and the liberal civilization of all America. Secretary of State Frelinghuysen reversed the policy of Mr. Blaine and revoked the instructions to Mr. Tnescot threatening intervention. The President, Air. Frelinghuy- sen said, held that he had no right to dictate terms of peace to independent republics, as a policy of dictation, even to prevent war, would cause taxation for the benefit of foreign nations to maintain an army and navy.^ Mr. Trescot was informed that the policy expressed in Washington's fare- well address would control the conduct of the United States with the South American republics. He was directed not to visit the Atlantic republics of South America after leav- ing Chile. The President would hereafter reserve to him- self the question of entering into consultations to promote peace with certain friendly nationalities without extending* it to others, for " if such partial confidence would create jealousy and ill-will, peace, the object sought by such con- sultation, would not be promoted." Mr. Frelinghuysen also indefinitely postponed a conference of the American nations on international arbitration, for which invitations had. at the instance of Mr. Blaine, been issued. American representatives in South America were, how- ever, directed to aid the powers at war in a friendly way Jo agree on a treaty of peace, and the minister to Chile was instructed to make certain suggestions to the Chilean government in relation to terms." Meanwhile, the terms of peace which Chile had demanded and which the Calderon government had refused, were accepted by the Iglesias ^Foreign Relations, 1882, p. 57. ^Foreign Relations, 1883, p. 709. 134 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [420 government. They were more severe than the terms sug- gested by the United States ; but in spite of this fact, as well as of the fact that they were accepted on the part of Peru by a government other than that which the United States had recognized, the United States would not obstruct the way to peace. The United States made representa- tions, however, in regard to the disposition of the guano deposits, because of the interests of American creditors.^ On November 15, 1883, Mr. Frelinghuysen, writing to Mr. Phelps, again disclaimed any desire to interfere with Peru's right to settle its affairs in its cm-^n way." With the Peru- vian people, the United States maintained relations of friendship and sympathy. With the administration at the time assuming control of the government, the United States had little concern, and American action would be con- ditioned by the action of the Peruvian assembly in its own choice of governments and its own ratifications of terms of peace. A treaty of peace was signed between Chile and Peru on October 20. 1883, and a truce was signed between Chile and Bolivia on April 4 of the following year. Peru ceded to Chile the rich nitrate province of Tarapaca, and agreed to the occupation by Chile of the provinces of Tacna and Arica for a period of ten years, after the expiration of which a plebiscite was to be held, to determine whether Peruvian or Chilean nationality would prevail. The country favored by the plebiscite was to pay to the other ten million dollars in Chilean silver. The plebiscite has not taken place, and the failure to hold it has continued to be a subject of controversy between these countries till the pres- ent time. Peru emerged from the war financially crippled, both in public revenues and in private resources. Bolivia 1 Foreign Relations, 1883, p. 711. *Ibid., 1883, p. 729. 421 ] THE EXTENSION OF THE POLICY 135 lost all her seacoast and became an exclusively interior state. Chile gained primacy among the republics of the west coast of South America. Had the intervention of Mr. Blaine been successful, the failure of which he at- tributed to President Arthur's refusal to give it his con- tinued support, although previously pledged, the termina- tion of the war would have been radically different. A policy of determined intervention in a conflict between three South American republics was displaced by a policy of careful reserve and abundant caution, even in the clearest cases of friendly representation. In discussing the extension of the policy of non-inter- vention, as originally applied to Europe, to the entire system of American States, I have attempted, by an ex- amination of actual cases, to point out the direction which the development of the policy has taken. In the light of what has thus been disclosed, it appears that the policy has been understood to preclude the United States from inter- vening in the internal politics of American states, and to preclude European states from intervening in the western hemisphere either to gain territory, or to change the political system or control the destiny of American nations. The practice of a policy is more significant than its enuncia- tion. We have seen that in several instances American States have requested the intervention of the United States in their controversies with other powers, and that the United States has consistently held that its intervention could not be demanded as of right. It also became settled that the United States would forcibly resist territorial ag- gression, the imposition of foreign political systems, or the extension of political control by non-American governments in the western hemisphere, as illustrated in the case of the French intervention in Mexico and the Venezuela boundary dispute. The right of the United States to intervene to 136 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [422 protect the rights and safety of its citizens stands apart from the principle of non-intervention as a general right, to be exercised in Latin-America as well as elsewhere. On certain occasions, when the United States seemed to de- part from its policy of non-intervention, its action was later reversed or the act of the intervening official was disavowed. The Chile-Peruvian war and the Egan asylum case were exaanples. Again and again the United States had re- fused to take part in joint representations to Latin-Ameri- can states. The zealous desire to protect American rights has sometimes led to excessive claims, such as that of Admiral Benham regarding contraband in the Brazilian naval revolt. But the mere enunciation of a position does -not suffice to establish it. This was so even with Presi- dent Monroe's famous declaration of 1823; and it must be so with recent proposals, such as that of President Wilson, to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the world. The effect of such proposals must await the test of history. The cases examined abundantly establish the principle of non-in- tervention as a definite policy. PART II DEPARTURES FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION BY THE UNITED STATES CHAPTER III Intervention in Cuba The most striking departure from the x\merican policy of non-intervention in relation to x\merican states and ter- ritory was the Cuban intervention. The importance of Cuba to the interests of the United States has been realized from the beginning. The desire to secure the island as a part of the United States, in case it should pass from Spanish control, was shown in the attitude of American statesmen in early timies. Jefiferson advocated the acquisi- tion of Cuba by peaceful means. ^ The Jefferson Cabinet on October 22, 1808, unanimously agreed that while the United States would be content that the island should con- tinue under Spanish rule, French or British rule would be frowned upon" In 1822 a rumor prevailed that Great Britain was secretly negotiating with Spain for the cession of the island.^ This Canning denied. War between France and Spain led John Ouincy Adams, as Secretary of State, to declare that the ultimate annexation of Cuba was essential to the preservation of the Union, although at the time inopportune.* The United States, he said, was un- alterably opposed to French or British encroachments. Mr. Randall was commissioned special agent to Cuba to report on political conditions and to observe the objects and move- ^Ford, Jefferson's Writings, vol. x, pp. 159, 257-258, 278. ^Ibid., vol. i, p. 334- ' Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, voL vi, pp. 379-380. *44 Br. and Fr. Slate Papers, p. 138. 425I 139 I40 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [426 meiits of foreign agents there.^ Henry Clay, as Secretary of State, directed the American ministers to Spain, France and Great Britain to inform the governments of those countries of the unwillingness of the United States to ac- quiesce in the transfer of Cuba to any other power.^ Mexico and Colormbia, seeking to aid Cuban independence, planned expeditions for that purpose. Colombia complied with Clay's request to suspend operations until the Con- gress of Panama could be consulted, but Mexico refused unreserved acceptance of the suggestion.^ Opposition to apprehended European intervention in Cuba was the central theme of our early Cuban relations. In refusing, in 1825, a proposal of Canning that the United States join France and Great Britain in disclaiming any in- tention to occupy Cuba, Clay gave as a reason that Spain, thinking her colonies safe, might prolong the colonial wars in America, and that American policy was opposed to such action."* The French government rejected a similar pro- posal from Great Britain. The supposed danger that Spain might cede or lose Cuba to some European power caused Secretary of State Van Buren in 1829 to argue for continued Spanish control. Cuban subjection to a state of South America, he thought, would lead to European control, and the emancipation of slaves in Cuba would prejudice the interests of the slave-holders of the South.^ Confidential reports to the Department of State from what was supposed to be a trustworthy source indicated the existence on the part of the British ministry and certain abolition societies of * Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 384. 2 Ibid., vol. vi, p. 447; Am. State Papers, For. Rel, vol. v, pp. 855-856; // Gallatin's Writings, p. 346. 3 44 Br. and For. State Papers, p. 44; ^6 ibid., p. 1152. * Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 457. ^26 Br. and For. State Papers, pp. 1149-1151. 427] INTERVENTION IN CUBA 141 a purpose to effect a union between the Creoles and negroes of the island, and to set up a negro military republic under British protection/ Daniel Webster, who was then Secre- tary of State, thought that this would be a death-blow to slavery in the United States, and would constitute a serious menace to American commerce. '* It is quite obvious," he stated, in a letter to Mr. Campbell, the American consul at Havana, " that any attempt on the part of England to em- ploy a force in Cuba for any purpose would bring on a] war, involving possibly all Europe as well as the United States." ' In 1852 the ministers of France and Great Britain, at Washington, invited the United States to join their govern- mient in the conclusion of a tripartite convention, the sub- stance of which was contained in the following article : The high contracting parties hereby, severally and collec- tively, disclaim, now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba, and they respectively bind themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individuals whatsoever. The high contracting parties declare severally and collec- tively, that they will not obtain or maintain for themselves, any exclusive control over the said island, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over the same.^ This proposal was declined. The response of the United States was made by Edward Everett, as Secretary of State, in identic notes addressed to the British and French ministers at Washington on December i, 1852. In these notes, which attracted wide attention, the Cuban question was comprehensively reviewed; and the conclusion was 1 44 Br. and For. State Papers, p. 174. ^44 ibid., p. 176. ^S. Ex. Doc. 13, 32 Cong. 2 Sess., p. 15. 142 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [428 reached that the United States, although it entertained no designs on the island, could not be expected and could not properly be asked to agree not to acquire it under any future conditions/ Only five years before Mr. Everett's note was v^^ritten, President Polk had made a serious effort to bring about the annexation of Cuba to the United States. Among the reasons by which he supported his action was the fear that Great Britain would eventually seize the island, and thus have the coastwide trade of the United States at her mercy. He authorized the offer of a maximum of a hundred million dollars for the cession." The Spanish government would not listen to the proposal, the minister of the United States at Madrid reporting that " sooner than see the island transferred to any pozver, they would prefer seeing it sink in the ocean." ^ In the celebrated " Ostend Manifesto " of 1854, the an- nexation of Cuba by the United States was openly and strongly advocated. This document was signed by James Buchanan, John Y. Mason and Pierre Soule, ministers re- spectively to Great Britain, France and Spain, who had been instructed to meet at some convenient point in Europe to confer and report upon the Cuban question. They strongly recommended the purchase of the island, and, in case Spain should persist in refusing to sell, intimated that the United States would be justified in acting upon the principle of self-preservation, especially if conditions should develop, as regards the slave population, that would en- danger the peace and tranquility of the states of the United States in which slavery existed. Should such conditions 15". Ex. Doc. 13, 32 Cong. 2 Sess., pp. 17, 22-23; Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 460. *if. Ex. Doc. 121, 32 Cong. 1 Sess., p. 49. ^Ihid., p. 59. 429] INTERVENTION IN CUBA 1 43 supervene, and Spain still remain obdurate to offers of purchase, the question would, in the opinion of the signers of the " manifesto," then arise as to whether further action was not imperative; and in this relation they significantly declared : Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power ; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home. The Ostend Manifesto became a political issue, in con- nection with the contest over slavery; but condemnation of dt was not confined to the members of any one political party. There were leading Democrats who requdiated its recommendations. Naturally, the Republican platform of 1856 denounced it, declaring " that the highwayman's plea that might makes right embodied in the Ostend circular .... would bring shame and dishonor upon any govern- ment or people that gave it their sanction." ^ The Demo- cratic Secretary of State, William M. Marcy, in a letter to Soule, remarked that doubtless " it was not extended by yourself and your colleagues to offer to Spain the alterna- tive of cession or seizure." ^ Marcy, while expressing the opinion that the acquisition of Cuba would be advantage- ous as " a precautionary measure of security," stated that he did not regard existing conditions as imperiling the ex- istence of the government. " But," he added, " should the contingency suggested in your report ever arise there is no reason to doubt that the case will be promptly met by the deliberate judgment and decisive action of the Ameri- can people." ^ ^ Stanwood, History of the Presidency, p. 272. 'H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33 Cong. 2 Sess., p. 135. 'Ibid., p. 136. I^ THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [430 During the years 1 868-1 878, the civil strife, commonly known as the " Ten Years' War," kept the Cuban question before the American people, and gave rise to many per- plexing problems. President Grant, in his annual message to Congress, December 6, 1869, said that the United States would refrain from enforcing its views upon unwilling nations and from exercising an interested part without in- vitation in the quarrels of other states, whether between nation and nation or between government and subjects/ The Cuban struggle, he declared, had not reached a state of actual war, nor had the insurgents demonstrated their capacity for recognition as belligerents. Spain had accepted a tender of the good offices of the United States only on terms unfair to Cuba, and the offer was withdrawn. Later, in a special message to Congress, the President reviewed the progress of the disorderly system of warfare prevailing in the is- land, the chief results of which were devastation and wanton destruction. The law of nations was violated by both parties. No responsible de facto government existed on the island, nor had Spain quelled the revolt or protected the rights and interests of foreign nations and their citi- zens. Similar complaints, together with discussions of the question of declaring neutrality and according to the in- surgents belligerent rights, may be found in the annual message of 1870, as well as in subsequent communications to Congress. Vigorous protests were made to Spain against her conduct in numerous matters." The termina- tion of the conflict, together with the abolition of slavery and the granting of autonomy to the islands, was urged.* The president regarded ". . . . independence, and emanci- * Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. vii, p. 31. * Ibid., vol. vii, pp. 64, 97, 147. ^Foreign Relations, 1871, p. 733; 1872, p. 580; 1873, vol. ii, pp. 1032- 1033 ; 1874, p. 859. 43 1 ] INTERVENTION IN CUBA 1 45 pation, of course, as the oaily certain and evien necessary, solution of the question of Cuba. And, in his mind, all incidental questions are quite subordinate to those, the larger interests of the United States in this respect." ^ September 26, 1872, a circular was issued by Sehor Jil Colunje, Colombian secretary of interior and foreign rela- tions, to the American governments relative to the situation in Cuba. The length of the contest, the hopelessness of peace, the devastation and ruin of the island and the utter disregard for law and order rendered the situation so serious that the American nations, so the circular declared, could not longer remain unconcerned." Cuban rights should be respected. Cuba as an independent nation would mean the disappearance of slavery. Colombia also pro- posed that the governments of Spanish America and the United States act jointly to obtain from Spain the recogni- tion of Cuban independence. In case the expenses of the war caused Spain to hesitate, the mediating govenmients nuight agree to a pro rata reimbursement, requiring none in return, although the resources of Cuba were ample. In case mediation was accepted, it was proposed that confis- cation of property and capital punishment for political of- fenses be discontinued. In replying to this circular, Mr. Fish, speaking as Secretary of State, intimated that the United States would not enter upon the course suggested by Colombia, unless the answers of the Spanish American states to the circular and the conditions prevailing in Cuba, furnished reasonable grounds to believe that American in- tervention would be successful.^ On another occasion Mr. Fish also intimated that, instead of taking it for granted that the United States would act upon the proposals con- ^ Foreign Relations, 1874, p. 862. * Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 70. ^Ibid., vol. vi, pp. 70-71. 146 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [432 tained in the circular, it would have been advisable to con- sult the government beforehand as to whether it was will- ing to assume the role of arbiter.^ On November 5, 1875, Mr. Fish sent to Caleb Gushing, fthen American minister at Madrid, a paper, known as in- struction No. 266, referring to the confiscation of estates belonging to American citizens, the trial of Americans in contravention of treaty obligations, the case of the Virginius, and finally, the general relations of the United States and Spain as affected by the situation in Cuba.^ The hope that an adjustment would be reached, based upon emancipation and self-government, had, he said, been un- realized, and all efforts by Spain forcibly to end the strife had failed. All suggestions of reform and offers of media- tion made by the United States had been rejected. Re- conciliation was agreed to only on terms making recon- ciliation impossible." The Spanish government had in- sisted that no state of war existed entitling the insurgents to belligerent rights, but demanded all the privileges of war for itself. During seven years of tremendous strain on the part of the United States to fulfill the most exacting de- mands any government could make under any doctrine or claim of international obligation upon another, Spain had failed to justify any hopes for pacification, Mr. Fish de- clared that the United States was therefore entitled to be relieved of the strain, which could only be done by the ter- mination of the struggle. Any further reticence, it was observed, would be inconsistent with the interests of both governments : and in case the war was not terminated, Mr. Fish stated that the time was at hand for "other governments to intervene, solely with the view of bring- ' Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 70. *H. Ex. Doc. 90, 44 Cong, i Sess., p. 7. 'Ibid., p. 8. 433] INTERVENTION IN CUBA I47 ing to an end a disastrous and destructive conflict and of restoring peace in the islaaid of Cuba." ^ In its purpose to bring the war to a close, the United States desired to obtain the moral support of the European powers. Instruction No. 266 was sent to General Schenck to be read to Lord Derby in order to gain the influence of Great Britain in the settlement of the Cuban question.' It was likewise sent to the American ministers at Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna and Rome, with directious to impart the substance of it to the ministers of foreign affairs, and to suggest that Spain be urged either to termin- ate or to abandon the contest.^ General Schenck was authorized to explain to Lord Derby that interv^ention was not contemplated as an immediate result, but only as a con- tingent necessity in case the contest was prolonged and ex- isting claims were not adjusted.* In his annual message to Congress, December 7, 1875, President Grant reviewed the existing situation in Cuba, saying that " other nations will be compelled to assume the responsibility which de- volves upon them, and to seriously consider the only re- maining measures possible, mediation and intervention." ^ The President, while mentioning these as the only alterna- tives for ending the strife, did not recommend any measure of intervention, holding himself ready to do all he could to reach a peaceful solution.* The United States had already had many opportunities for interference, if such had 1 H. Ex. Doc. 90, 44 Cong, i Sess., p. 11. ^S. Report No. 885, 55 Cong. 2 Sess.. pp. 152-153; •5"- Doc. 213, 54 Cong. I Sess. '//. Ex. Doc. 90, 44 Cong, i Sess., pp. 13-14; -S". Report No. SS5, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 130, 140-141, mS, 152-153, i5+ i/i- i74- * H. Ex. Doc. 90, 44 Cong, i Sess., p. 13. ^Foreign Relations, 1875, vol. i, pp. x-xi. « Ibid., 1875, vol. i, p. xi. 148 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [434 beeii its purpose. But proposals from the go^vernment of Spain and the immediate reform of the internal administration of the island checked any plans for interven- tion until the practical result of the proposals and measures could be ascertained. The French government, while professing to be desirous of aiding in the matter, intimated that it would have to wait, because of the internal conditions of Spain ; but ex- pressed a willingness to cooperate with the United States in terminating the war when the time should seem to be favorable. '^ The German government was disposed to act only in concert with the other powers, but later manifested a disinclination to do anything on accoimt of assurances re- ceived from Spain." Great Britain refused to be involved if Spain stood off and declined interference.* Lord Derby doubted if Spain would give up the island under any circumstances except by force. Portugal would not make any representation to the Spanish government."* Russia agreed to advise Spain regarding the termination of the contest, but in fact referred more directly to the desire to avert a conflict between the United States and Spain.^ Italy agreed to the American proposal.^ The foregoing correspondence practically brings to a close the efforts during the administrations of President Grant to effect a settlement of the Cuban question. On more than one occasion, and especially in the case of the Virgimus. a rupture had seemed to be imminent. The resources of diplomacy were severely taxed; and it was ^S. Report No. 883, 55 Cong. 2 Sess., pp. 143-147. ^Ibid., p. 151 ; Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. lOi. *S. Report No. 883, 55 Cong. 2 Sess., p. 163. *Ibid., pp. 154, 171-172. ^Ibid.. pp. 173, 176-179. *Ibid., p. 169. 435] INTERVENTION IN CUBA 149 only by the pursuit of a consistent policy, directed to the maintenance of peace, that intervention was avoided. During the year 1876, public interest in the United States came to be more and more absorbed in domestic problems. The celebration of the centenary of American inde[)€n- dence, the presidential campaign, and disturbed political conditions in some of the southern states, followed by the contest over the results of the presidential election, all united to cause a withdrawal of public attention from foreign affairs. Moreover, the continued operation of the Mixed Commission under the agreement of February 12, 1871, by which the settlement of claims growing out of the Cuban insurrection was gradually effected, exerted a tranquilizing influence on relations with Spain. The insurrection con- tinued to drag on, but less notice was taken of it than be- fore. President Hayes, in his first annual message of De- cember 3, 1877, adverted to the strife in Cuba as being still in progress, but he adhered to the policy of non-inter- vention.^ In the following year the struggle was formally brought to an end by the so-called peace of Zanjon. The insurrection that broke out in Cuba in February, 1895 spread rapidly, and was characterized by active fight- ing. The revolt quickly assumed formidable proportions. The Spanish authorities, in spite of their command of con- siderable military forces, offered little effective resistance to the insurgents. Mr. Olney. in his communication to Spain, did not suggest intervention, but sought to impress upon the government the importance of ameliorating con- ditions in the island and bringing to an end the destruction and devastation that were in progress." Spain, on the other hand, sought to minimize the causes of complaint, and to emphasize alleged violations of neutrality in the United ^Foreign Relations, 1877, p. xii. ^Foreign Relations, 1897, p. 542. I^O THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [436 States. In a comprehensive report to the President, Mr. Olney reviewed the relative positions of the contending parties, commenting upon the inabihty of Spain either to make her rule effective or to afford redress for injuries, as w^ell as upon the gradual impoverishment of the island.^ President Cleveland, in his message to Congress of De- cember 7, 1896. adopted a conciliatory attitude.-' He dis- cussed the different solutions suggested, and advised against intervention on the ground that the United States had a character to maintain, with right and not might as its rule of conduct. Conscious, however, of the dangers that lurked in the futile continuance cf the struggle, he sounded a note of warning, saying: When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the in- surrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its right- ful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its reestablish- ment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruc- tion of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge. The change of administration in the United States in 1897 was not attended with any radical change of attitude on the part of the Government towards the Cuban question, but there was a growing popular feeling against the enforce- ment of the policy of reconcentration instituted by General Weyler. This sentiment was reflected in a protest addres- sed by Mr. Sherman, the new Secretary of State, to the Spanish minister at Washington, on Jime 28. 1897, in 1 Foreign Relations, 1896, pp. xxxi-xxxvii. "^Ibid., 1896, pp. xxxi-xxxv. 437] INTERVENTION IN CUBA I 5 i which it was declared that -the President conceived that he had a right to demand that a war, conducted almost within sight of the United States and grievously affecting the in- terests of its citizens, should " at least be conducted ac- cording to the militar}' codes of civilization." The Spanish government, in its reply, maintained that great progress had been made in subduing the insurrection, and, while denying the right of the United States to interfere in the matter, again complained of the support and encouragement which the insurgents received from American sources. President McKinley, in his annual message of December 6, 1897, reviewed the Cuban problem at much length. His attitude towards Spain was altogether friendly, but he stated that the existing conditions were such as to cause the gravest apprehension. The offer of the friendly offices of the United States, made by his predecessor in April 1896. had, he said, altogether failed, the answer of Spain in sub- stance being that the pacification of the island must begin with the submission of the rebels to the mother countr^^ He described the " cruel policy of concentration " initiated in 1896 as a measure of " exterm'ination." and adverted to the demand which he had made after his inauguration as President for the release or speedy trial of all American citizens who were under arrest in Cuba. This demand had resulted in the release of upwards of twenty prisoners who were citizens of the United States. The new Minister to Spain, General Woodford, had, said President McKinley, been instructed to assure Spain of the sincere wish of the United States to lend its aid toward the ending of the struggle by a solutioii which should l^e just and honorable alike to Spain and to the Cuban people. Between the de- parture of General Woodford from the United States and his arrival in Spain, Sehor Canovas, the head of the Spanish cabinet, had fallen by the hands of an assassin and a new 1^2 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [438 administration had been installed under the leadership of Senor Sagasta. It had fallen to the latter to answer General Woodford's representations, and the answer was, said President McKinley, in the direction of a better under- standing. Sefior Sagasta had stated that Spain had de- cided to put into effect the political reforms which he had previously advocated for the purpose of giving Cuba autonomy while guarding Spanish sovereignty. After thus rehearsing the negotiations, President McKinley stated that of the untried measures there remained only "recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; recogni- tion of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to* end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not," declared President AIcKinley, " of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. Thait, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggres- sion." President McKinley then discussed the question of the recognition of belligerency and reached the conclu- srion that it was unwise and inadmissible. He also op- posed intervention, especially in view of the hopeful change that had apparently taken place in the conduct of the Spanish government. Decrees looking to the application of the foreshadowed reforms had, he said, already been promulgated, although their full text had not been received. Moreover, under the appropriation made by Congress on April 4, 1897, effective relief had been given to distressed American citizens in Cuba and the new Spanish govern- ment had reversed the military policy which had so greatly shocked the sentiment of humanity, having recalled the commander under whose orders it was initiated, and had set on foot measures to relieve the horrors of starvation. No American citizen, so far as the government knew, was then in arrest or confinement in Cuba. The near future 439] INTERVENTION IN CUBA 153 would, said President McKinley, demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace was likely to be attained; and if it should later appear to be the duty of the United States to intei'vene by force, it should be " with- out fault on our part, and only because the necessity of such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world." The pursuit of the peaceful policy which President Mc- Kinley had sought to preserve was soon interrupted by cer- tain extraordinary incidents which produced a crisis, and at last brought the United States to the point of forcible intervention. The first of these was the surreptitious publication of a letter which the Spanish minister at Wash- ington had addressed to a personal correspondent in Havana. This letter, besides describing the negotiaticrtis then pending between the United States and Spain for a commercial arrangement in regard to Cuba, as a mere diplomatic expedient intended to gain time, contained an analysis of the political situation in the United States, in which opprobious epithets were applied to the President, who was represented as being a shifty politician, anxious to keep on good terms with those who advocated as well as with those who opposed intervention in Cuba. The fact that this letter was private detracted nothing from the pain- ful effects produced by its publication. Its author mani- fested his appreciation of the circumstances by cabling his resignation to Madrid before a demand for his recall could be presented. The excitement caused by this incident had by no means died away when, on February 15, 1898, the sinking of the U. S. S. Maine, as the result of an explosion, ocurred in the harbor of Havana, with the loss of two of her officers and two hundred and sixty-four of the crew. The sinking of the ship was separately investigated by American and Spanish naval commissions, which rendered 1^4 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [440 Opposite reports as to the cause of the explosion. While public feeling in the United States was deeply stirred by this incident, the impression that Spain was unable to re- store Older in Cuba was greatly strengthened by a notable speech made in the Senate by Senator Proctor of Vermont, who had lately visited the island. Hence, while nego- tiations to reach a peaceful solution were not wholly aban- doned, there was little reason on either side to believe or to hope that they would prove to be successful. General Woodford, at Madrid, continued earnestly to labor for a practicable basis of settlement The Spanish Government offered to submit the affairs of the Maine to arbitration, to revoke all orders of concentration and ac- cept assistance from the United States in feeding and ex- tending succor to persons in need, and to confide the pre- parations for the pacification of the island to an insular parliament. But, as this parliament was not to meet until the 4th of May, the Spanish government intimated that it would not find it inconvenient to accept at once a suspen- sion of hostilities if the insurgents should request it from the Spanish commander-in-chief, wnth whom it would rest to determine the duration and conditions of the suspension. On this basis the Spanish government sought to secure de- lay in the transmission by the President to Congress of a message which he had prepared on the Cuban situation. Great impatience had already l>een manifested in Congress and elsewhere at the delays that had taken place in the sub- mission of the President's message. It was at length sent in on April 11, 1898. In this message, President McKinley, after reviewing historically the relations of the United States with Spain in regard to Cuba, discussed the various expedients which had been suggested as a means of solving the problem with which he was confronted. Discussing, first, the ques- 441 ] INTERVENTION IN CUBA I -5 tioii 01 recognizing the indepaidence of the insurgent government in Cuba, he invoked as a precedent the message of President Jackson to Congress of Decembef 21, 1836, on the question of recognizing the independence of Texas, and reached the conclusion that the recognition of the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic would be un- justified on grounds of law and would also be inexpedient. There remained for consideration, said President McKinley. the alternative fonns of inter\'ention to end the Nvar, either by imposing a rational compromise between the con- testants, or by becoming the active ally of the one party or the other. The latter alternative he rejected. Of the former, he stated that the grounds for such intervention might be summarized as follows : First : In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door. Second : We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to aftord them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no gov- ernment there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection. Third: The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devas- tation of the island. Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance: The pres- ent condition of aflFairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business rela- tions ; when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant 156 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [442 danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined; where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by war ships of a foreign nation, the expedi- tions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent alto- gether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising — all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace. On a view of all the facts and considerations, Presi- dent McKinley requested from Congress authority to take measures to bring about the final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, \vith power to make such use of the military and naval forces of the United States as might be necessary for those purposes. He declared that, having exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs that had so long existed, he was prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon him by the constitution and the law. In conclusion, however, he stated that since his mes- sage was prepared, he had received official information that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directed General Blanco, in order to facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which had not yet been communicated to the United States. President McKinley commended this communication to the consideration of Congress in the solemn deliberations 011 which it was about to enter. On April 19, 1898, Congress passed the following joint resolution for intervention : Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the Island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the 443] INTERVENTION IN CUBA 1 57 United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civiHzation, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty-five of its offi- cers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Con- gress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was invited : Therefore, Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent. Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several states, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect. Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any dis- position. or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its people.' This resolution, with the approval of the President, be- came a law on April 20. On the same day. Mr. Sherman, as Secretary of State, telegraphed the text of the resolution to General Woodford, at Madrid, with instructions to pre- sent it to the Spanish government and formally to demand that Spain at once relinquish her authority and government 1 Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 763. 1^8 7"//£ UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [444 in the island of Cuba and withdraw her land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.^ Any desire on the part of the United States to exercise jurisdiction, control or sovereignty over the island was disclaimed. Unless a satisfactory response to these demands should be received by Saturday noon, April 23, it was stated that the President would without further notice execute the provisions of the joint resolution in order to end the conflict in Cuba. Senor Polo de Bernabe, who had succeeded Sehor Dupuy de Lome as Spanish Minister at Washington, asked for his pass- ports 051 April 20. On April 21, the Spanish minister of state in a note to General Woodford, declared that the joint resolution, since it denied the legitimate interests of Spain in Cuba aiid threatened armed intervention, was equivalent to an evident declaration of war, and that consequently diplomatic relations between the countries were broken. On April 22, President McKinley proclaimed a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including ports between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and of the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast; and on April 23rd he called for volun- teers tc execute the purpose of the joint resolution. In a special message to Congress on April 25th, he recommended a formal declaration of the existence of a state of war be- tween the United States and Spain. This recommendation was immediately accepted and on the same day an act was passed b}' Congress and was approved by the President, declaring the existence of the state of war from and in- cluding April 21. It is beyond my purpose to follow the military events of the Spanish-American war; nor is it pertinent here to dis- cuss the terms of the treaty of peace, the eventual grant of independence to the island, or the interventions that have since taken place under the treaties between the United ^ Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 762-763. 445] INTERVENTION IN CUBA 1 59 States and Cuba. President McKinley, in his annual mes- sage of December 5, 1898. declaned that, after the pacifica- tion of the island, aid and protection should be given to the Cubans in forming a government of their own, and that military occupation by the United States would continue only until complete tranquility and a stable government had been established. The independence of Cuba was estab- lished and its political relations to the United States were determined by the treaty of March 22, 1903, which em- bodied the so-called Piatt amendment to the act of Congress of March 21, 1901, making appropriations for the support of the United States Army. This amendment was, by its terms, declared to be intended to fulfill the purpose de- clared in the joint resolution of April 20, 1898, to leave the government and control of Cuba to its people, after the ex- pulsion of the Spanish authorities. To this end the Presi- dent was authorized to leave the government and control of the island to its people so soon as a government should have been established under a constitution which should define the future relations of the United States with Cuba, in conformity with the conditions which the amendment prescribed. These conditions were, in substance, ( i ) that the Cuban government should never enter into any engage- ment with any foreign power which would impair or tend to impair the independence of the island, nor permit any such power to obtain a lodgment in or control over any part of the island; (2) that the Cuban government should not assume or contract any public debt for which the ordin- ary revenues of the island, after defraying current expenses, were inadequate; (3) that the United States might in- tervene for the preservation of Cuban hidependence. the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for the dis- charge of the obligations which the I/nited States had as- l6o THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [446 Slimed on the part of Cuba under the treaty of peace with Spain; (4) that all acts of the United States in Cuba dur- ing its military occupancy should be treated as valid, and that all lawful rights acquired thereunder should be main- tained and protected ; ( 5 ) that the government of Cuba should execute plans for the sanitation of the cities of the island in order to prevent the recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases, and to assure protection to the people and commerce of Cuba as well as to the commerce of the southern ports of the United States and their inhabitants; (6) that the Isle of Pines should be omitted from the pro- posed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title to the island to be left to future adjustment by treaty; (7) that, in order to enable the United States to maintain the inde- pendence of Cuba, and protect its people as well as to pro- vide for its own defense, the government of Cuba should sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States; (8) that by way of further assurance, the government of Cuba should embody the foregoing conditions in a permanent treaty with the United States. These conditions were incorporated into an ordinance appended to the Cuban constitution. They were also em- bodied in a permanent treaty between the United States and Cuba, signed at Havana on May 22, 1903, the ratifications of which were exchanged at Washington on July i. 1904. By a treaty concluded July 2, 1903, Cuba leased to the United States certain areas of land and water at Guan- tanamo and Bahia Honda for naval or coaling stations. President Roosevelt, in his annual message to Con- gress of December 3, 1901, announced that before the ses- sion of Congress closed, the putting of the independent government of Cuba on a firm footing would be an ac- 447] INTERVENTION IN CUBA l6r compHshed fact. The first president of the Republic of Cuba was inaugurated on May 20, 1902. Thus, iii the most striking instance of intervention to be found in its history, the United States. fulfilHng the pledee which it had given to the world, kept faith with the object of its solici- tude by relinquishing to the people of Cuba the govern- ment and control of the island, subject only to such con- ditions as were essential to the maintenance of its indepen- dence and the exercise of orderly self-rule. CHAPTER IV Intervention in the Revolution at Panama^ 1903 With the express exception of the case of Cuba, the outstanding instance of American interventicyn is that of the United States in the revolution at Panama in 1903, re- sulting in the establishment of the republic of Panama. This interv'ention, and the controversy with Colombia which followed, has a distinct relation to the treaty of 1846 between the United States and the republic of New Granada, article 35 of which provides that " the United States guarantee, positively and efficaciously, to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the be- fore-mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists ; and, in conseques-ice, the United States also guarantee, in the saime manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory."^ President Polk, in a message to the Senate^ February 10, 1847, transmitting the treaty of 1846 to that body, ob- served that the conditions inducing him to lay the document before the Senate were: (i) that the treaty did not pro- pose to guarantee a territory to a foreign nation in which the United States should have no common interest with that nation; (2) that the guarantee was confined to the single province of the Isthmus of Panama, and did not ex- tend to the New Granadan territories generally; (3) that ' Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., vol. i, p. 312. 162 [448 449] INTERVENTION AT PANAMA 1 63 it would constitute no alliance for any political object, but for a purely commercial one. which would command the in- terest of all maritime nations; and (4) that in entering into the mutual guarantees proposed in Article 35 of the treaty,, neither of the parties had entertained any narrow or ex- clusive views, but were moved " to secure to all nations the free and equal right of passage over the Isthmus." ^ More- over, he contended that such a guarantee was necessary to secure for the world this passage, independent of wars and re\-olutions which might arise among different nations, and was indispensable to effect its cc^istruction, either by sovereign states or by private enterprise. The treaty of 1846, therefore, embraces a guarantee of the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, with a view to maintaining a free and open transit, and a guarantee of New Granadan rights of sovereignty and property over the territory. The guarantee of neutrality and sovereignty has in several instances been defined and interpreted by the United States under circumstances which seemed to justify it. We have taken the position that the United States could tender to New Granada, unsought,' such advice as was necessary, in her relation with other powers, to protect the Isthmus under the treaty. The Peruvian government in- quired as to the measures which the United States might take in case the neutrality of the Isthmus should be threatened, and suggested that New Granada might make the Isthmus a seat of hostile preparations against Peru,, and thus make of the guarantee of neutrality in effect a defensive alliance between New Granada a":Kl the United States.* Mr Everett, as Secretary of State, replied that the action taken would be controlled by the magnitude of 'Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. iv, pp. 512-513. * Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. iii, p. 24. 3 Ibid., vol. iii, p. 25. l64 7"H£ UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [450 American interests, and in the event of a conflict between Peru and New Granada, the good offices of the United States would be offered to prevent it. It was the opinion of Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, that the United States was under no duty to explain to Colombia the means which it might take to effect thei guarantee of Colombian sovereignty.^ The action of both governments, he observed, should be regulated by the treaty and the law of nations, should the emergency arise. Mr. Fish, as Secretary of State, declared that " a principal ob- ject " of New Granada in signing the treaty of 1846 was to maintain her sovereignty over the Isthmus against any attack from abroad.- Secretary of State Evarts expressed the view that the American guarantee of neutrality did not extend to the duty of restraining the transportation of munitions of war to belligerents in a war during which the United States was neutral.^ He directed Mr. Dichman, American minister to Colombia, that the neutrality of the Isthmus, as guaranteed by the United States, should in no sense be confused with the rules which Colombia should be called upon to enforce within her territorial jurisdic- tion as a sovereign state, as towards all belligerent states. The construction of the American guarantee was reserved for a situation which might require it. In a convention between the republics of Colombia and Costa Rica, it was agreed to refer certain boundary dif- ferences which affected the territorial limits of the State of Panama to the King of the Belgians, and in case of his declination, successively to the King of Spain and the President of the Argentine Republic* Mr. Blaine, Secre- 1 Richardson, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 26-27. 'Foreign Relations, 1871. pp. 247, 248. ' Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. iii, p. 27. * Ibid., vol. iii, pp. 29-32. 45l] INTERVENTION AT PANAMA 165 tary of State, declared that the United States would not be bound by any arbitration where its rights or interests were concerned, and where it had not been consulted as to the sub- ject or method of the arbitration, or as to the choice of the arbitrator. This position w^as substantially reaffirmed by Secretaries of State Frelinghuysen and Bayard. By a supplementary convention between Colombia and Costa Rica, concluded January 20, 1886, it was stipulated that the judgment of the arbitration should be confined to ter- ritorial limits as set forth in the supplementary convention, and it was further provided that the judgment should not affect the rights which any third party, not having partici- pated in the convention, might claim to the " ownership " of the territory in question. This formal assurance was accepted by the United States, with the understanding that the term " ownership " was used in no restrictive sense, but included all jx>ssessory or usufructuary rights, easements, or privileges which the United States or its citizens may possess in the territory under dispute, both as regards the relation of the United States to the contracting parties, and its relation and that of its citizens to any third govern- ment not a party to the arbitration. The guarantee of a free and open transit, in its relation to domestic disturbances which have taken place on the Isthmus, is equal in importance to the guarantee of neutral- ity and sovereignty. The Isthmus became in due course an imiportant highway of commerce and transportation. In the celebrated Panama riot of 1856, resulting in the loss of life and the destruction of property, the government of New Granada, by a convention concluded at Washington. September 10, 1857, agreed to adjust all claims of Ameri- can citizens against that government preseiited before a certain date, and especially such claims as were caused by the riot of 1856.^ By this convention. New Granada rec- 1 Moore, op. (it., vol. iii, pp. 34-35- l66 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [452 ognized her " obligation to preserve peace and good order along the transit route." The Department of State, in 1866, with respect to a rumor that the state of Panama would attempt to secure her independence, announced that the United States had made a uniform practice of absten- tion from any connection with questions of internal revolu- tion in the state of Panama or any other Colombian state, • and would continue to be neutral in such domestic distur- bances/ However, in the event of interference with the transit trade due to foreign or domestic invasions in the state of Panama, measures of protection would be taken. Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, significantly observed that the United States had, under the treaty of 1846, undertaken to protect the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama." In ad- dition, he said : " This engagement, however, has never been acknowledged to embrace the duty of protecting the road across it from the violence of local factions; but it is re- garded as the undoubted duty of the Colombian government to protect it against attacks from local insurgents." Dur- ing the insurrection of 1884- 188 5, and at other times, the United States had employed its armed forces to protect American citizens and their property along the transit route. In most instances, these steps were taken with the assent of the Colombian goverament. In regard to these measures, Mr. Bayard, Secretary- of State, declared that the United States had always recognized the sovereignty of Colombia and had never acknowledged, but had expressly disclaimed, the duty of protecting the line of transit against domestic disturbance. Due to interference with the line of railway by the Liberals, American forces were landed at Panama, November 4, 1901. A degree of American inter- vention continued during the period of revolution, which was ^ Moore, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 38. 2 Ibid., vol. iii, p. 38. 453] INTERVENTION AT PANAMA 167 brought to a close when peace was conchided on November 21, 1902, between the Colombian government and the re- volutionary forces in the cabin of Rear-Admiral Casey's flagship. The incident which led to our intervention to establish the republic of Panama was the revolution of 1903. On November 3, 1903, the commanders of the Boston, Nash- ville and Dixie were instructed as follows : Maintain a free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Pre- vent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either gov- ernment or insurgent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama. Government force reported approaching Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing if, in your judgment, the landing would precipitate a conflict.^ The revolution followed the next day, and the independence of the republic was declared a day later. Mr. Hay, Secre- tary of State, instructed the representative of the United States at Panama to enter into relations with the new govern- ment when he was satisfied that " a de facto government, republican in form, and without substantial opposition from its own people " had been established." He was also dir- ected to look to tliat government tor the protection of American citizens and their property, and for the interests of the United States as regards Isthmian transit. On November 13, Mr. Bunau-Varilla was received by Presi- dent Roosevelt as minister of Panama to the United States.^ The Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty was concluded between the United States and Panama on November 18, 1903. Under its provisions, the United States agreed to guarantee and maintain the independence of the republic of Panama.* ' Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 267. *Ibid., 1903, p. 22,3- *Ibid., 1903, pp. 245, 246. * Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., vol. ii, pp. 1349, ct scq. l68 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [454 On her part, Panama relinquished to the United States the control of sanitation and the maintenance of public order within the cities of Colon and Panama. The United States was given the right to employ measures to protect the canal, and no alterations in government, laws or treaties affecting the rights of the United States could be made without her consent. Panama granted to the United States in perpetuity a zone ten miles wide for purposes of a canal, American control of which was to be virtually sovereign. President Roosevelt discussed the provisions of the Hay- Bunau-Varilla treaty in his annual message of December 7, 1903.^ He cited declarations of policy of earlier statesmen in regard to the canal question, gave a list of revolutions and other outbreaks which had occurred on the Isthmus since the treaty of 1846. and pointed out that American interests under the treaty would be best served by entering into re- lations with the republic of Panama. He also condemned Colombia for her " contemptuous refusal " to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty, which the Colombian Congress de- clined to approve on the ground that it infringed national sovereignty and was not in accord with the national con- stitution and laws. Colombia immediately protested, invoking article 35 of the treaty of 1846, and the two governments entered upon a controversy which is still unsettled. The question was whether the conduct of the United States in extending re- cognition at so early a stage of the revolution constituted an act of intervention. General Reyes was sent on a special mission to the United States to present the Colomi- bian case. A capital complaint which he made was that the United States had inter\'ened in a conflict between Colombia and a rebellious province, and had aided in the dismemberment of a portion of Colombia's territory. He ^Foreign Relations, 1903, p. xxxii. 455] INTERVENTION AT PANAMA 169 denied that the principle of secession was recognized by the internal law of Colombia, and described what he re- garded as the proper conditions of recognition in the fol- lowing terms : If the people of Panama, animated by the noble sentiments which induced men of action to seek quicker and more rapid progress, had proclaimed their independence and, without for- eign aid, been victorious in battle waged against the armies of the mother country, had organized a government, drawn up laws, and proved to the world that it could govern itself by itself and be responsible to other nations for its conduct, with- out doubt it would have become entitled to recognition by all the powers.^ He held, however, that none of these things had oc- curred, and observed that the conduct of the United States was difficult to comprehend in the light of prior American practice. His three main points of complaint included the aid rendered by the United States to the Panama insurrec- tion, the premature recognition of the republic of Panama, and the alleged violation of the terms of the treaty of 1846 between the United States and New Granada. Mr. Hay, as Secretary of State, replied that eighteen governments had recognized the revolution as an " avowed object .... to secure the construction of the interoceanic canal." " It w^as inspired, he said, by the desire of the people to safe- guard their own interests and at the same time to secure the canal to its providential uses. Any recognition was due to the conviction that interests of utmost importance to the civilized world would be endangered. As to the American guarantee of the neutrality of the Isthmus, and of the sovereignty and property of Colombia over it. such a step ^Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 292. 'Ibid., 1903, pp. 302-303. 170 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [456 had been taken in the interests of an interoceanic communi- cation and of an uninterrupted tratisit from sea to sea. Responsibility was laid upon Colombia, and a vigorous ex- change of notes followed. In a special nuessage to Congress, Januarys 4, 1904, Presi- dent Roosevelt set forth, in clear and explicit terms, definite reasons for the policy of his administration in dealing with the situation in Panama.^ At the outset, he quoted the position enunciated by Secretary of State Cass in 1858, which was in effect that sovereignty has its duties as well as rights, and that the administration of the states in Central America should not be allowed to close the doors of in- tercourse to the world. Under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, he said, the United States, in engaging to control and police the canal, and to keep it open for the vessels of all nations on equal terms, " assumed the position of guarantor of the canal and of its peaceful use by all the world." At the time of the submission to Colombia of the Hay-Herrani treaty, three things, Mr. Roosevelt observed, were settled. One was that the canal should be built, and that the time of allowing impediments to delay its- construction was past. A second was that the United States would deal in a fair and generous way with the people through whose land the canal might be built. The Hay-Herran treaty, it was de- clared, fulfilled these conditions, in that it acknowledged, confirmed and preserved Colombian sovereignty over the strip. No nation could undertake to build a canal with a less degree of control than was provided for in the Hay- Herran treaty, and a refusal to grant it was a refusal to enter into any practicable treaty, with the result that Colombia would hold up the world's traffic across the Isth- mus. Finally, Congress had settled that the canal \\2lS to be built. ^Foreign Relations, 1903. pp. 260-278. 457] INTERVENTION AT PANAMA iji With the refusal of the Colombian legislature to ratify the treaty, three possibilities, said President Roosevelt, were open to the United States. One possibility, that Colombia might eventually see the unwisdom of her course, failed, in spite of warnings from the United States as to the con- sequences which would ensue. A second was the utilization of the Nicaragua route. A third was that the people of the Istlunus might, in their desire to see the canal built, de- clare their independence, and make its construction possible. This course was taken. President Roosevelt defended the conduct of the Unitei States in the following terms : " We, in effect, policed the Isthmus in the interests of its inhabitants and of our own national needs, and for the good of the entire civilized world." He then gave the following defense of the act of recognition : Their recognition by this government was based upon a state of facts in no way dependent for its justifications upon our action in ordinary cases. I have not denied, nor do I wisii to deny, either the validity or the propriety of the general rule that a new state should not be recognized as independent till it has shown its ability to maintain its independence. This rule is derived from the principle of non-intervention, and as a corollary of that principle has generally been observed by the United States. But, like the principle from which it is de- duced, the rule is subject to exceptions ; and there are in my opinion clear and imperative reasons why a departure from it was justified and even required in the present instance. The reasons for depanure in this instance, observed President Roosevelt, embraced our treaty rights, our national interests and safety, and the interests of collective civiliza- tion. As to treaty rights, he held that the American guarantee of New Granadan sovereignty over the Isthmus was not a guarantee against domestic insurrection; and 172 THE UNITED STATES AND INTERVENTION [458, where the intervention had taken place under article 35 of the treaty of 1846, it was only with the larger end in view of free Isthmian transit. Colombia, he claimed, did not reciprocate with the grant of reasonable concessions which the United States had a right to expect. National in- terests and safety, he thought, would be endangered by further delay in constructing the long-contemplated inter- oceanic canal. The third justification for the rapid recogni- tion of Panama was found in the mandate which the United States had received from civilization to build the canal. A striking analogy was made by President Roosevelt be- tween American action in Panama, and the intervention in Cuba. The Cuban case was even more extreme, he said, as "we intervened even by force on general grounds of national interests and duty." He referred to prophecies made at the time of the Cuban intervention, that the United States would retain Cuba permanently and subordinate it to American interests, but he pointed out that the action of the United States had been otherwise. " The people of Cuba," he said, " have been immeasurably benefited by our inter- ference in their behalf, and our own gain has been great. So will it be in Panama. The people of the Isthmus, and as I firmly believe of the adjacent parts of Central and South America, will be greatly benefited by the building of the canal and the guarantee of peace and order along its. line; and hand in hand with the benefit to them will go >the benefit to us and to mankind." Our early recognition of the republic of Panama was clearly an act of intervention, and a distinct departure, as indicated by President Roosevelt, from the principles of non-intervention and the de facto recognition of states. As such, its justification must rest upon the merits of the case, which are clearly set forth, including the reasons there- for, in the President's message of January 4, 1904. He 459] INTERVENTION AT PANAMA 173 openly avowed the recognition of Panama as an extraordin- ary procedure, justified by sufficient reasons to require a departure from tlie rule requiring a demonstration of governmental competency before according recognition. While the principle of non-intervention and the de facto principle of recognition were recognized as general rules of American policy which had ordinarily been observed, yet he regarded both as subject to exceptions, and the Panama situation as one constituting such an exception. In the second capital instance of departure from ordinary Ameri- can policy, as in the case of the Cuban intervention, we have been satisfied with such a degree of interference as- will protect our interests, and preserve to the world, un- impaired, the use of the waterway which we, as the " man- datory- of civilization," have constructed. It appears, there- fore, that the United States would not be satisfied with any less degree of control over any zone and country where our interests are so great. 92% UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. ^^ «Wl 51986 O Si: iawiRi FEB 1 . ,^., REC'D LD-UPi •.^.: SEP 2^_ 3AN 1 9 Form L9-Series 444 MAR 4 19« QL JAN23 19^ ^ lll'l'iiiii?r'/ili.n!^,^.'^^°'°^'^'- LIBRARY FACILITY AA 001 333 541