VALUABLE LAW WORKS PUBLIHHED BY STEVENS AND HAYNES, BELL Y ARD, TE]\IPLE BAR, LONDON. *^* For full particulars of the following and other Works, see S. d H.'s Catalogue at end of this Volume. 1^0X0 ready, Second Edition, in ; A TREATISE ON THE LAW A LETTERS TATENT FOR INVENTION national Convention, Rules, Forms and Pi B.Sc. (Lond. ), Fellow of the Chemical Socie In %vo. Sixth Editim MAYNE'S TREATISE ON DAMA Mayne, of the Inner Temple, Barrister- Smith, Q.C. Second Edition. In roya THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC and Wife ; Parent and Child ; Guardian an By W. P. EvERSLEY, B.C.L., M.A., Ban Li 8vo, jn-ice 7 THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE SE at the request of the Council of Legal Edu Majesty's Counsel, /„ 8w, price \ SHORT PRACTICAL COMPANY! Author of " Summary of the Law of Comp Williams, Barristers-at-Law. Second Edition, in Two Volionu NEGLIGENCE IN LAW. Being i the Law of Negligence. Re-arranged an( Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, royal THE RELATIONSHIP OF LANDL FoA, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Lav Second Edition, royal i THE LAW RELATING TO SF Their Appointment, Duties, Powers, Rights Esq., M.A., Q.C. Second Edition. Wit Shipping Act, 1894, the Rules of Court mad for Preventing Collisions at Sea. By the Duncan, Esq., B.A,, of the Inner Temple In One Volitme, 8w THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMERC statutes, annotated by means of references to Robert Cecil, of the Inner Temple, Barristers-at-Law. In one Volunu, medium 8vo, price 38s. cloth, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO. With a hitherto Unpublished Treatise by Lord Hale; Lord Hale's De Jure Maris ; and the Third Edition of Hall's Essay on the RIGHTS OF THE CROWN IN THE SEASHORE. With Notes, and an Appendix relating to Fisheries. By Stuart A. Moore, F.S.A., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Seco7id English Edition. In royal 8vo, price 45s. cloth, STORY'S COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE. By W. E. Griosbt, LL.D. (Lond.), B.C.L. (Oxon.), Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, In One Vohime, royal Svo, price 32s. cloth, THE LAW RELATING TO THE SALE OF GOODS AND COM- MERCIAL AGENCY. By Robert Campbell, Barrister-at-Law. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW LIBRARY Joseph Hurst and Lord [ See Catalogue at end of this Volume. ] {A Catalogue of New Law Works may be obtained gratis upon application to S. d A/.] STEVENS AND HAYNES' LAW PUBLICATIONS. In 8vo, price I6s. doth. THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. By s. a. t. KowLAiT, M.A., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. In 8vo, 2}i'ice 12s. 6c?. doth, THE LAW SPECIALLY RELATING TO TRAMWAYS AJNU LlUHl KAILWAVS, and containing the Tramways Act, 1870, and the Board of Trade Kulcs and Regulations relating to Tramways, with Notes ; and the Light Railways Act, 1896, and the Board of Trade Rules and Regulations relating to Light Itailways, with Notes ; and a full Collection of Precedents. By Seward Bkice, M.A., LL.D., one of Her ilajesty's Counsel. In Svo, 600 2>P- , price 9s. net, doth, THE LAW OF TORTS Arranged on the Principles of the English Common Law, and the Imiian Case Law, By Ratanlal Rancuhoddas, B.A., LL.B., Pleader High Court. Seventh Edition, in Svo, price 21«. cloth, BALDWIN'S TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF BANK- RUPTCY and BILLS OF SALE. With an Appendix, containing the Bankruptcy Acts, 1883-1890 ; General Rules, Forms, Scale of Costs and Fees of 1886-1890 ; Rules under s. 122 of 1888; Deeds of Arrangement Acts, Rules and Forms, 1887-1890; Board of Trade and Court Orders ; Debtors Acts, 1869,1878, Rules and Forms, 1889- 1895; Bills of Sale Acts, 1878-1891, &c., &c. By Edward T. Baldwin, M.A., Barrister-at- Law. In 8vo, Twelfth Edition, price 2\s. cloth, SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY. Twelfth Edition. By AncaiBALD Brown, ot the Middle Temjile, Barrister-at- Law. Third Edition. In 8ro, price 21s. doth, WALKER'S COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW RELATING TO EXECUTORS AJSD AOiUliSlSJTuATuRS. WitU an Appendix oi statutes, &c. Third Edition. By E. J. Elgoud, B.C.L., M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Seventh Edition, in 8vo, price lis. cloth, A MANUAL OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF Judicature in the QUEEN'S BENCH and CHANCERS Divi- SIGNS ; intended for the Use of Students and the Profession. Seventh Edition. By John Indermauk, Solicitor. Third Edition, in Svo, jyrice 365. cloth, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERA- TURE and ART; including that ot the Drama, Music, Engraving, Sculpture, Painting, Photography, and ornamental and useful Designs : together with INTER- NATIONAL and FOREIGN COPYRIGHT, with the Statutes relating thereto, and references to the English and American decisions. Third Edition. Considerably enlarged. By W. A. Copinger, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, One Volume, Svo, price 28s. cloth, A SELECTION OF PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACTS IN THE COMMON LAW AND CHANCERY DI VISIONS. With Notes Explanatory of the Different Causes of Action and Grounds of Defence ; and an I ntroductory Treatise on the Present Rules and Principles of Pleading, as illustrated by the various decisions down to the present time. Second Edition. ByM. W. Mattinson and S. C. Macaskie, of Gray's Inn, Barristers-at-Law. Third Edition. In One Voluine, royal Svo, price 38s. cloth, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND COMPANIES, a Treatise on the Doctrine of ULTRA VIRES : Being an Investigation of the Principles which limit the Capacities, Powers, and Liabilities of Corporations, and more especially of Joint Stock Companies. By Seward Brice, M.A., LL.D., of the Inner Temple, one of Her Majesty's Counsel. Eighth Edition, in Svo, 'price 20s. doth, HARRIS' PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW. intended as a lucid Exposition of the Subject for the Use of Students and the Profossion. Eighth Edition. By C. L. Attenborough, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. [ See Catalogue at end of this Volume. ] THE LAW NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES. THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES. SIX LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE REQUEST OF THE COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION. WILLIAM WILLIS, ONE OF HER MAJESTY S COUNSEL. LONDON: STEVENS & HAYNES, 13, BELL YAED, TEMPLE BAE. 1896. BRADBURY, AUNEW, & CO. LD., PKINTliR< LONDON AND TONBRIDGE. ^ a/jCU500. The plaintiffs were money dealers in London, and they sued upon the title of Victor St. Paul & Co., money-changers, of Paris. It appeared that some bank-notes had been stolen, and one of them was the note in respect of which the action was brought. The payment of the stolen notes was immediately stopped, and notice of the stealing of these notes, with a list of them, had been given to nearly all the money-changers in Paris, and among other people to Victor St. Paul & Co. It was proved to be the practice of that house to file all notices of stolen notes served upon them. On a certain day a man comes in and asks Mr. Victor St. Paul to change a Bank of England note for him. There behind him was the list of stolen bank-notes. A glance at it would have protected the true owner at whose instance the Bank of England had stopped payment of the note. Mr. Victor St. Paul stated at the trial that he did not look at the file and had no recollection of the notice. Mr. Victor St. Paul at once cashed the note, giving for every sovereign 24 francs 95 cents., being the course of exchange on the WHAT IS A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. 21 day in question. He sent the note to Raphael in England, who demanded payment at the Bank of England. Payment was refused, and in the action the Bank of England pleaded that Victor St. Paul was not a bond fide holder for value, and that he was not a holder without notice of the theft. It is curious to remark Avhat happened at the trial. Chief Justice Jervis put certain questions to the jury, which they answered. They found that Victor St. Paul & Co. did give value for the note, that they had notice of the robbery, that the}'^ had no knowledge of the loss at the time the}^ took the note, but they had the means of know- ledge if they had properly used it, and that they took the note bond fide. Upon these findings the learned judge said: "That will be a verdict for the plaintiff.'' Then, apparentl}'', some of the jurymen, not liking the notion that a careless holder should recover, endeavoured to assist the Bank of England in obtain- ing a new trial by making affidavits saying that if they had known that the plaintiff was to have the verdict they would not have given the answers they did. On the motion for a new trial the Court allowed, against the current of decisions, the affidavits to be read. The counsel moving stated that the affidavits shewed that six of the jury did not concur in the verdict as entered. The Chief Justice : " What do the jury- men say ■? " On one of the affidavits being read the Chief Justice Jervis said in his severest manner, " A man who could make out such an affidavit as that is utterly unfit to be a juryman." The Court refused to grant a rule, being of opinion that the Chief Justice upon the findings, had rightly directed the verdict to be entered for the plaintiff. Now, what did that case settle ? That a man who takes a note or bill of exchange honestly and truly for value, although he had the means at his command of determining wliether the note or bill was one that he ought to take, but for the moment forgot to use those means, is entitled to assert himself to be the true 22 LECTURE I. owner, and to assert his right in the instrument against every other person. Read that case diligentl}'. It put an end to a whole series of cases in which judges had been saying that if a man takes a bill of exchange carelessly and not in such a way as a prudent man would have taken it, he could not recover although he took it honestly and for value. Since the decision in that case, that doctrine has been completely destroyed. You Avill find the cases to which I refer in the Eeport of Raphael v. The Bank of Eiujland. You need not read them except for the instruction to be derived from examining the errors of great minds. The carelessness of the person who claims the instru- ment must be considered in coming to the conclu- sion of his bona fides; but when once you come to the conclusion, having regard to all the circumstances, that he took the instrument bond fide and for value, he is entitled to the instrument and to all the rights under it notwithstanding his carelessness, notwith- standing he made no inquiry, notwithstanding he was informed of facts which would have led a reasonable mind to make further inquiry. Now, let me, before I conclude this evening's address, just call your attention to the question of consideration. Now, you often hear a . great deal that is inexact in respect to consideration. You will find in the books the expression " full con- sideration," sometimes " adequate consideration." I tell you that if the tribunal that has to try the question whether the claimant is a ho7id fide holder for value of a negotiable instrument comes to the conclusion that he took it honestly and for value, however small that value, he is entitled to the property in the instrument. But let me not be misunderstood. There is no criterion so useful for the purpose of deter- mining the bona fides of the person who takes a nego- tiable instrument as the price he pays for it. Watch my words, " if the tribunal comes to the conclusion that he took it bond fide, and for value," tlien although WHAT IS A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. 23 the value may be inadequate, he is entitled to the property in the instrument ; but before the tribunal comes to that conclusion it will seriously consider the consideration that was given ; it will give due weight to the inadequacy of the price that was paid. Some- times the inadequacy of the price may leave no doubt that the bill was not taken in good faith; sometimes the adequacy of the consideration will be alone suffi- cient to establish ho)ia fides. Hence, of course, Chief Justice Jervis, as any sensible man would do, the moment he found that Victor St. Paul in Paris gave exactly the full amount in French money for the ^500 note, had no doubt whatever that at the time when Victor St. Paul parted with his money he believed that he was getting a good and valid instrument ; or in other words, he believed the man was acting honestly in getting the note changed. If he did, if that was his state of mind, then he was entitled to recover. In former days it did not take Baron Martin, with his practical skill, long to dispose of some of these cases ; and now I see they take, in equity, five days to try. Let me tell j^ou what I once witnessed before him, and thereby became impressed with the importance of the consideration given, in considering whether a man took an instrument honCi fide. A case was called on in a court crowded with barristers, who had heard that an interesting and intricate fi'aud in connection with a bill of exchange was to be unfolded. The case was opened, and the counsel for the plaintiff stated that evidence of fraud on the part of the person who transferred the instrument to his client would cast upon him the burthen of showing that his client took the instrument hand fide and for value ; that he should content himself with proving the signature of the defendant — the only matter, at present, on which he had to supply proof; and that after evidence of the fraud had been offered by the defendant, lie should show that his client discounted the bill at a very moderate rate, he having given for the bill of £200 the sum of £197. 24 LECTURE I. Mr. Baron Martin at once said : "If that be so, why trouble yourself about burthen of proof. Let us see your man / " The plaintiti' was accordingly put into the box. He produced his cheque for £197, payable to the order of the man who transferred the bill. The cheque shewed that it had been paid by his bankers, and in his pass-book he was debited by them with the amount. He stated he had parted with all the money the cheque represented, that he had no notice of any misconduct, and had no suspicion that the man who transferred the bill to him was acting dishonestly. He was cross-examined by defendant's counsel, without anything arising to cast a doubt upon the evidence given in chief. Baron Martin then said to the counsel for defen- dant : " I suppose you are not going to call the man who committed the fraud on your client, to give an account different from that the plaintiff has given." " No, my lord ; how can I, with any advantage ? I could only produce him as a disgraced man," said the counsel for defendant. *' Quite right," said the judge. " I don't see how you can. Have you any evidence at all to show that what the plaintiff has said is untrue ? " " None," was the reply. " Then, if you like, you can address the jury upon the question whether they believe the account which the plaintiff has given of the transaction." Before the defendant's counsel could say whether he would address the jury or not, they intimated, through their foreman, that they believed the plaintift"s story. Baron Martin thereupon said : " I will ask the jury whether they believe the plaintiff took the bill honesti}^ or whether he gave £197 for the instrument with a suspicion of there being any dishonesty, which if brought home to him would make the instrument in his hands a bit of waste paper?" The jury said they believed that the plaintiff took the bill honestl}-. With that Baron Martin said: "Gentlemen, you may now find your verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount of the bill, without troubling yourselves WHAT IS A NEGOTIABLE INSTKUMENT. 25 whether there was any fraud committed on the defendant or not." The crowd of barristers soon dis- persed, all of them leaving the court admiring the practical sagacity and business energy of the great judge. Now let me offer to you some few suggestions which may be useful to you in dealing with the question of bona fides. If ever 3'ou should be in a case such as that I have just described, always ask 3^ourselves first of all, What is the value of the instrument that the claimant saj's he took bond fide ? and secondl}', What is the consideration tbat he gave for it ? The dispro- portion between the value of the bill and the amount given may supply cogent evidence of dishonest}'-. If, of course, the instrument is worth nothing — and there are plenty of men, unfortunately, who put their names on bills of exchange who do not, by the ink they put there, add the slightest value to the instrument — the smallness of the consideration will not help you. If a bill for sSlOO at three months is a good commercial bill, readily discountable in the City for three or four per cent, per annum, and the claimant gave ^50 for it, knowing the character and value of the bill, the jury will have very little difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the man who took the bill must have known perfectly well that the man with whom he was dealing was not acting honourably or had not come by the bill honestly. There is another thing with respect to bona fides which I must mention. It is not necessary to shew that the man who took the negotiable instrument knew the exact wrong that was being committed. The great principle of negotiability is guarded by the practical rule that no man shall be deemed a bond fide owner of a negotiable instrument in respect of which he had a suspicion at the time he took it that there was some- thing wrong on the part of the person with whom he was dealing. Now, you will find the definition of bona fides and the doctrine that inadequacy of consideration ma}'' 26 LECTUKE 1. be evidence of dishonesty well stated in a judgment of Lord Blackburn in the case of Jones v. Gordon, 2 Apjoeal Cases, 676. He tells you there that in criminal cases the general evidence that is given to shew that the receiver of goods which were stolen knew that they were stolen is, that he has given a great undervalue for them, and that in like manner if it is shewn that a considerable undervalue was given for bills, it is an important element in considering whether the man who gave that undervalue was acting Z^ona^i^e. Then he goes on to tell you, in that simple but forcible language which made him the great instructor of those who had the privilege to hear him, that if he has given an undervalue, but done it honestly in a blundering, stupid way, yet he is entitled to claim the instrument as his own. Therefore the extent of the consideration is most important in determining the question of bona fides. It is not necessary that it should be full ; it is necessary that there should be some; and the Courts will not inquire into the nature and extent of the con- sideration. But the amount of the consideration may be of the most vital importance in determining whether the man has taken the instrument bona fide and for value. If he has not given consideration, if it is a gift, he cannot claim it as against the true owner who has been defrauded. If he has given a sovereign for the bill he is entitled to it, if he has taken it honestly — if, considering all the circumstances, and the fact that he paid only the sovereign, you still come to the conclusion that he took it honestly. Where a person advances money on account of a negotiable instrument, and seeks to retain it only for the money actually advanced, if the tribunal is assured of the actual advance of the mone}^ it is difficult, in the absence of direct and cogent evidence of bad faith, to come to any other conclusion than that the person making the advance took the instrument bond jide. If the consideration for the transfer of a bill of exchange be a past consideration, as for a debt already existing, WHAT IS A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. 27 the inquiry into the hojia fides of the transferee may involve great care. If the debt is owing to a banker who may frequently have customers whose accounts are overdrawn and whose customers bring cheques for large amounts in reduction of an overdrawn account, in the absence of other evidence of bad faith, there is no reason why the transaction should not be readily accepted as an honest one. If, however, a bill of exchange is taken for a private debt or for a debt owing to a man who dabbles in discounting paper, as the creditor is not worse oli' by taking the bill for a past debt, he is parting with nothing, and may have the chance of getting a debt paid which perhaps would not be otherwise paid, the following inquiries suggest themselves. What is the amount of the debt ? is it large or small ? how long has it been owing ? has the transferor made any recent appreciable reduction of it? has the transferor to the knowledge of the transferee had the opportunity of obtaining suddenly a bill of exchange for services rendered or any business trans- action ? did the transferee make any inquiries as to how the transferor came by the bill ? The importance of these inquiries is seen when I tell you that in a case within my own experience, where the debt due to the transferee was =1^250, that it had been outstanding twelve months, that the transferor had been pressed for payment and had written more than once to say that it was quite out of his power then to pay the debt, that the transferee on having the bill offered in satis- faction of the debt made no enquiries as to how the debtor came by it, the jury, doubtless thinking that the transferee abstained from asking questions lest he should be deprived of the chance of getting his debt paid by reason of tlie answers which might be given, found that although the plaintiff took the bill for value, he did not take it bo)tu fide. If the transferee should say he did make inquiries, always ask what they were, because the answers may be just as useful in shewing the want of bona fides as the absence of inquiry itself. Now, in my opinion the next thing which it is most 28 LECTURE I. important for you to consider and bear in mind is this, that it does not matter at all who the person is with whom you deal, if you take the instrument bond fide and for value. Therefore, if he is an agent, what does it matter ? If yo\x take negotiable instruments from a man whom you know to be an agent, believing he has authority to deal with them in the way he is doing, although he is acting most fraudulently in the dis- position of the bills, you are entitled to them. I am in this connexion again led to remind you of the cases of ShcJJield v. Tlie London Joint Stock Bank and Simmons v. The London Joint Stock Bank, as they are reported in the House of Lords. In the case of Sheffield v. TJie London Joint Stock Bank, the Law Lords said : " We come to the conclusion that the bank officials, when they took the instruments, knew that the person from whom they took them was not the owner and had only a limited interest therein." They, therefore, held that Lord Sheffield was entitled to redeem his securities on paying the sum of money he had authorized to be raised on them. In Sim- mons v. London Joint Stock Bank the House of Lords arrived at the conclusion that the bank officials, although they knew they were dealing with an agent, yet honestly believed that the agent had authority to pledge the securities in the manner and to the extent arranged. They held that the bank had a perfectly good title to the securities. The decisions of the House of Lords in Sheffield v. The London Joint Stock Bank and Simmons v. The same Bank are not, as is sometimes supposed, in actual conflict, but perfectly consistent with each other. Once affect a holder for value of negotiable securities with notice that the person from whom he took them was not the owner of them, but had only a limited interest therein, then such holder, however honestly he may have acted in taking the securities, will acquire no other interest in them than that which the person with whom he dealt could lawfully transfer. But if the holder for value . deal with an agent, honestly believing that the agent WHAT IS A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. 29 has full and ample authority to deal with the negotiable instruments in the way he is doing, whether by sale or pledge, then such holder is entitled to retain the instruments either as owner or pledgee, and to assert the complete or partial ownership of them, notwithstanding the fraud on the true owner which the agent may have committed. You must unfortunately read the two cases to which I have referred — two cases which will give you the trouble of reading a hundred pages of discussion of fact. The princijDles of law applied in those cases have been recognised as principles of law for well nigh fifty years. My first lecture, you will see, has been concerned with the ascertainment of the meaning of a negotiable instrument, which it is essential for everybody to know in business — ay, perhaps more important in business than to the lawyer, because the lawyer may only seldom be called upon to advise. Still, never forget, it is the privilege of a lawj^er not to measure his studies by the necessities of professional employment, but to open his mind to the mastery, if possible, of the law in all its various departments. Men of business, it is important that you should know the meaning of negotiabilit}^ in order to take care of the instruments themselves — in order to see that you do not suffer either by failure to give notice of dishonour, or by failure to take the signature of the transferor, because you can only sue persons on bills of exchange who put their names on them. It is important that you should know all about these instruments, their value, and nature; and to the lawyer it may be equally important to have listened to my address on this first great question of the meaning of negotiability, although I know I shall only have recalled to his recollection the results of previous study. Now with these observations I thank you for your attendance and your patient and encouraging hearing, and next time, if you will come and see me, I will tell you what instruments are compi'ised under the head of " Negotiable Securities." LECTURE 11. I SUPPOSE that almost every lecturer is subject to misapprehension. It has been said that on the last occasion upon which I had tlie honour and privilege to speak to you I told you that a negotiable instrument was one which could only be acquired by a bond fide purchaser for value. I can only say that I did not intend to say anything of the kind, and as I told you that a Bank of England note was a negotiable instrument, and as most of you, I hope, have received a present of such an instrument from the true owner, you do not need to be told that the true owner of a negotiable instru- ment has all the powers of the owner of any other property. But the incident and attribute of the pro- perty that we are considering is, that although the true owner may dispose of it by gift inter vivos, by donatio mortis causa, or by will, or in any other way the law permits, yet he ma}' lose it by some jierson taking it, either from a finder or a thief, bond fide and for value, and thereby becoming the owner. As there may be some present to-night who were not present at the last lecture, I will state shortly its results. I stated that a negotiable instrument, was one the proj)erty in which is'^acquired by a, person V!ho_jB^s it- %und fide and for value, the instrument a^j-iW' that state that the true owner, if he wished topart with the property in it, could pass it by ' — ^iTcIeliji'.ery. I told j^ou also that it did not matter whether, in a case of a negotiable instrument, a person purchased the instrument or advanced money uj^on it; that in the former case he became the owner, and in INSTEUMENTS WHICH ARE NEGOTIABLE. 31 the latter case could detain the instrument until his advance was repaid. In Si)inno)is v. Tiie Lo)ulou Joint Stock Bank an objection was taken that a person who advanced money upon a negotiable instrument did not acquire a title to the extent of the advance. Lord Herschell, with his native vigour, reasoned to the conclusion that he did, notwithstanding that no authority was given to him for the proposition. I would like to call your attention to the case of Wookey V. Pole, 4 Barnewall & Alderson, p. 1, which establishes the proposition that a person who advances money upon a negotiable instrument obtains a perfectly good title to the extent of his advance. You will there see the difference at Common Law between a pledge of personal chattels b}^ an agent authorized to sell them and the pledge of an agent authorized to sell negotiable securi- ties. In the former case the pledgee acquired no right to retain the goods : in the latter he acquired a right to retain the negotiable securities to the extent of the advance. It therefore makes no difference whether the person who takes the instrument ho)ut fide takes it acquiring the whole b}^ purchase or b}^ making an advance upon it. The next thing I dealt with was, What is the mean- ing of bona fides when one speaks of a hand fide holder? I am afraid that here also I have been misunderstood, because some persons who listened to me last week have said that, with respect to a negotiable instru- ment, the question is whether the person who took the instrument ought not to have suspected that the man who was parting with the instrument had no title or was acting dishonestly. I told you (and I hope that you will correct me if I am wrong, and I should like to spend an evening in which to put right the mistakes that I commit) that it is not the question in the case of negotiable instruments whether the man who takes them ought to have suspected dishonesty or whether he acted rationally, or acted as other reason- able men would. The sole question, in my opinion, is the state of his mind. Did he take it honestly 32 LECTURE II. although he took it stupidly and in a hlundering and irrational manner? If you answer the question that he took it IxDtd fide, then he is entitled to claim and to retain the property, notwithstanding his blundering, and notwithstanding his stupidity. But if, on the other hand, upon looking at the whole of the circum- stances, you should come to the conclusion (as I told you), that he suspected that there .was something wrong, then he cannot claim the property as having been taken by him bond fide and for value. Another thing which I guarded you against was this. I said that it would be a great mistake if the doctrine of constructive notice, or that there were facts which ought to lead a man to make enquiry, was aj)plied to negotiable instruments, which pass with marvellous rapidity, and under circumstances of necessity in this great city. But I told you that if it was a case of conflicting equities where the legal estate had been conveyed by the authority of the true owner, then, of course, it appeared to me that as equity has always taken care to guard the beneficial interest, it might be that in such case a question would arise whether there was not really constructive notice wdth regard to the authority of the person with whom he was dealing, or whether upon the facts disclosed he ought not to have made further enquiry. Having said so much I am going to pass on now to perhaps the most important matter that can engage the attention of lawyers. What is now about to engage our attention is the list of negotiable securities. I have discussed with you what a negotiable security is. I want to-night to give you the list of them, and in so doing I must at once draw your attention to the im- portant distinction between instruments and contracts which, made in England, have their nature, incidents and effects defined and regulated b}' English law, and contracts and instruments which are created in foreign countries. Unless, gentlemen, you realize the distinc- tion between those two you will not act with safety in your business transactions nor be competent to advise INSTRUMENTS WHICH ARE NEGOTIABLE, 33 persons who may desire your guidance in matters relating to negotiable securities. First of all will you take this from me, and I believe it to be correct, that with respect to instruments that are made in this country and to which the law of England is applicable-, instruments created here by either individuals or companies, the element of negotiability cannot be added to them either by stipulation or by usage. That is the first thing that you have to learn — that the element of negotiability cannot be added to such instruments hy any usage whatever. The question, whether an English instrument is negotiable, is a question of law to be determined by the judge, and if he is satisfied that it is a negotiable instrument he is to hear no evidence to the contrar3^ If it is not in his opinion a negotiable instrument, he is to refuse to hear all evidence of usage to shew that it is, however long that usage may have been continued. In short, the list of negotiable secu- rities coming into existence under English law is closed, until the Legislature itself annexes the incident of negotiability to some fresh instruments. This doctrine is established by two or three cases to which I desire to call your attention. The first is Grant v. Vaughan in the 3rd Burrows, page 1516, in which Lord Mansfield distinctly lays it down that the question, whether an instrument is a negotiable instrument or security, is a question of law to be determined by the judge. Hence, if you look at Edie v. The East India Company which you will find reported in 2 Burrows, page 1216, you will find there that Lord Mansfield laid it down that it having been once judicially decided that an instrument was negotiable, he was wrong in allowing evidence of usage to show that it was not, and on his attention being called to the earlier de- cision on a motion for a new trial he declared that he was mistaken at the trial in allowing evidence of the usage, and that there ought to be a new trial. That is to say in Grant v. Vaitglian he held clearly N.S. D 84 LECTURE II. and distinctl}', apparently for the first time, that a cheque payable to " Bearer " was a negotiable instru- ment, and that the man who took it honestly and for value either from a thief or a finder could sue the person who drew it. In Edie v. The East India Company there was an indorsement to an individual without saying "or order." I shall discuss indorse- ment when I come to treat of bills of exchange. But let me assume this amount of knowledge at present — that a bill of exchange may be indorsed to A. B. Evidence was admitted to show that according to the usage of merchants, such an indorsement was a restric- tive indorsement and that A. B. could not pass the property in the bill of exchange by an indorsement of it. Lord Mansfield admitted the evidence, but found that he had made a mistake in so doing because by a decision previously given it had been laid down that such an indorsement was not restrictive. He directed that a new trial should be had and laid down the doctrine that the law having determined the nature of the instrument, no evidence of usage was admissible to shew that the instrument possessed a nature or quality different from that which the law ascribed to it. Now comes a case which I trust you will read. Do not take its supposed effect from a text-b.ook. Read the case for 3'ourselves. I too often find men carrying about with them scraps from text-books, and think they are sufficiently furnished for an examination or their profession. They are greatly mistaken ; they may and should read text-books, but above all let them read and study the reports of decided cases. It was my custom, when I attended classes, to take a list of the cases given to me by the lecturers to the admirable library of the society of which I was a member, and there to read and study for myself the cases to which my attention had been called. Now there is one case on which the distinction I am presenting clearly rests. The case is Crouch v. The Credit Fonder Company of England, reported in the Law Reports, 8 Queen's INSTRUMENTS WHICH ARE NEGOTIABLE. 35 Bench, page 374. I ask you to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest it. In it you have the considered judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench delivered by that most remarkable man. Lord Blackburn. From the facts stated in the case it appeared that the Credit Foncier Company had under its seal issued certain instruments which were called debentures, by which they promised to pay to the bearer £100 with interest. There was a covenant, however, to pay the debenture according to certain drawings. The defendants sold ten debentures for ^6100 each to a person named Macken, Macken never parted with these debentures, but his house was broken into and the ten debentures were stolen therefrom. Crouch took one of them from the thief hondfide and for value. The company at the instance of Macken refused to pay this debenture to the plaintiff. It was tacitly admitted at the trial that similar documents were in practice treated as negotiable. A verdict was found for the plaintiff, leave being re- served to move to enter the verdict for the defendants. A rule nisi was obtained pursuant to the leave, and after argument the Court held that the rule to enter a verdict for the defendants should be made absolute. Mr. Justice Blackburn most carefully examined the whole of the facts in order to see whether in any aspect of them the instrument could be held to be negotiable. He decided first, that being under seal it could not be a promissor}'^ note, and therefore was not a negotiable instrument under the head of promissory notes. He found further that it contained promises outside the promise to pay money which in itself prevented it from being a negotiable securit}^ or a negotiable instru- ment. He stated the general rule of the law of England to be that an owner of property does not hold it on a precarious title liable to be divested if a thief or finder could find a bond fide purchaser, and that it is not within the competency of private persons either by contract or usage to attach such an incident to any property. Such an incident may be annexed by statute D 2 36 LECTURE II. or by the law merchant, but in no other way can it be added to an English instrument made in England. A stipulation between obligor and obligee that the obligor maj^pay to any one who holds the instrument is perfectly good, and such a payment would be good as against the obligee, but such a stipulation falls far short of negotiability. He therefore held that a debenture of a public company existing under English law is not a negotiable instrument, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, notwithstanding the usage of the English market, by which such an instrument was treated as negotiable. You will have no difficulty, I think, if you will study these cases, in coming to a conclusion as to what are negotiable instruments with respect to instruments created and arising on English territory. The cases of Gorgier v. Mieville, and Goodwin v. Roharts, to which your attention will be called later on, are perfectly consistent with Crouch v. Credit Fonder Co., because in the former cases the instru- ments were decided to be instruments arising under foreign and not English law. Mr. Justice Blackburn would, in my view, have certainly acquiesced in the decision in Goodwin v. Roharts. I do not think the observations of Cockburn, C.J., in Goodwin v. Roharts when that case was before the Exchequer Chamber, have affected in any degree the binding effect of Crouch V. The Credit Foncier Company. There is one case to which I must call your atten- tion — the case of Rumhall v. The Metropolitan Bank, which is in the Law Eeports, 2 Queen's Bench Divi- sion, page 194 — in which it was held that scrip cer- tificates of the Anglo-Egyptian Banking Company, an English company, which entitled the bearer to be registered as the holder of shares after making certain payments, were by the usage of the English market negotiable. This case seems to be in direct opposition to Crouch V. 2Vie Credit Foncier Company, and if not directly overruled, has been so adversely commented INSTRUMENTS WHICH ARE NEGOTIABLE. 37 upon as to entitle me to say that at this day I do not think that Rumhall v. The Metropolitan Bank would receive acceptance in the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords. Assuming Crouch v. The Credit Fonder Company to be a binding authority, let me tell you now, as far as I can, what are the instruments which are nego- tiable by the law of England. I am speaking now of English instruments. First of all, then, bills of exchange, promissory notes, Bank of England notes, the notes of country bankers, cheques — but all with this condition, that they are in such a state that the true owner, if he so desired, could pass the property in them by delivery. If they are not in a state by which the true owner can pass the pro- perty in them by a simple act of delivery, with intention to convey the property, the documents are not negotiable instruments. Do not forget that I gave you a case in point on the last occasion, Whistler v. Forster, in the 14th Common Bench, New Series, which shewed the importance of this very doctrine, and the loss which a man may incur in consequence of not having the instrument endorsed to him by the person from whom he takes it. The next is Exchequer Bills. If you want to see the form of exchequer bills you can find it in the case of Wookey v. Pole, in 4 Barnewall & Alderson, page 1, or in the case of Brandao v. Barnett, which can be found in the 12th Clarke & Finnelly, page 787. You must look at the form of it. It begins by saying : " This bill entitles or order to one thousand pounds and interest after the rate of two pence half- penny per diem payable out of the first aids or supplies to be granted in the next session of parliament. If the blank is not filled up this bill will be paid to bearer." Take the exchequer bill without any name in it and it passes like a bill of exchange or a promissory note, or a cheque, payable to bearer, and any person who takes the exchequer bill for value, and honestly, will acquire 38 LECTURE II. a perfectly good title, no matter what the title, or what the conduct, or what the authority, of the person with whom he is dealing. The moment, however, that the name is inserted in the exchequer bill, you take it from anyone other than the person whose name has been inserted at your peril, and if the person with whom, you are dealing is not the true owner of the exchequer bill, but a man acting dishonestly, you will acquire no- title, and you will lose your money, however honestly you may have acted. Therefore it is most important that a person in the City who is going to advance money on an exchequer bill should be aware that the- moment that a name is inserted therein it ceases to be- negotiable until the person whose name has beent inserted indorses it, and that without his indorsement a person who takes an exchequer bill runs the risk of the transferor being the owner, or of his acting; honestly. In Brandao v. Barnett it was held (and see the importance of it), that if the exchequer bills of A^ be deposited by B. with a bank, the bank, not knowing, that A. was the owner but believing that B. was the owner, the blanks in the exchequer bills not having, been filled up, the bankers would acquire a lien upon, the exchequer bills so deposited, and have a right to. retain them as a security for any money due to them, from him. They are deemed to be bond fide holders, for value to the extent of their lien. In the case of Brandao v. Barnett the Court held that the circum- stances of the deposit were such as to prevent the existence of a lien. If the exchequer bills are filled. up with the name of the true owner, whatever the: circumstances of the deposit, no lien otherwise than by the act of the true owner can exist. It is important, for you to bear in mind these statements with respect to exchequer bills. I come next to dividend warrants. Have you read Partridge v. The Bank of England 1 I dare say that, you all have. It is found in the 9th Queen's Bench, the old Queen's Bench Reports, those venerable volumes. INSTRUMENTS WHICH ARE NI::G0TIABLE. 39 that contain some of the earliest reporting woi'k of Lord Blackburn before he became a reporter under the style of Ellis & Blackburn. I hope you will become acquainted with the decisions reported in those volumes also, in which are to be found some cases admirably reported by the present Master of the Rolls. No better training can be given to you than to read and re-read some of these cases, first remark- ing how the English lawyers, more closely than the lawyers of any other country, can select the material facts, which are alone necessar}^ for the determina- tion of the question in dispute ; and then, secondly, noticing the closeness of the reasoning in the deci- sions, which, even in present, and certainly in past times, excites my admiration. Therefore, if you have not done so, read the case of Partridge v. The Bank of England. The dividend warrant in that case was made payable to Mr. Partridge only. It was in the following form : " To the Cashiers of the Bank of England. Pay to Joseph Ashby Partridge the sum of thirty-seven pounds ten shillings." A person named Wakefield received the dividend warrant under a power of attorney, and at the time he received the warrant he wrote on the face of it an acknowledgment of his having received of the Bank of England the above-mentioned sum. Evidence was given at the trial that after that acknowledgment the cashiers at the Bank, according to long-established custom, would pay the money to anybody who presented the warrant. Wakefield passed the warrant to his bankers, who took it bond fide and for value, and the bankers passed it to the Bank of England. See the error that was made ! Lord Denman and his colleagues in the Queen's Bench, on proof that for sixty years the dividend warrant so made out and receipted, had been treated by the custom of merchants and bankers as a negotiable instrument, decided in favour of the Bank of England that the instrument, although not in its nature and form a negotiable one, had become so by 40 LECTUEE 11. the proof of usage. But look at the argument before the Judges in the Exchequer Chamber ! How calmly and carefully every point is examined. Tkey said : " It is of no use your bringing before us sixty years of usage. By the law of our country, an instrument made out in the way the instrument is in this case is not a negotiable instrument, and cannot be made so b}^ the usage of merchants for sixty or any number of years," and they decided that the plaintiff was entitled to have the money as against the Bank of England. But of course a dividend warrant made out to Mr. Partridge, or order, would be a negotiable instrument, and I think, by virtue of the provisions of the 8th section, clause 4, of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, the instrument as drawn in the case of Partridge v. The Bank of England would now be deemed negotiable. The negotiability of which I have been speaking is the creation of the common law, not of any statute. I can only find one case, and I shall be glad if you can help me to any other, in which it is said negotiability has been added bj^ Act of Parliament as an incident to any document or instrument made on our own soil, and arising under our own law, and that is, the case of the bonds of the old East India Compan3% But I must confess that I want you to look at. the Act of Parliament for j^ourselves. I question whether the words of the Act of Parliament, if taken strictly, really made them negotiable, or whether they did more than make them transferable. I told you on the last occasion that it is not because an instrument is transferable, so that the transferee can sue upon it in his own name, that it is negotiable. This principle must be added to the transferabilit}', viz., that the instrument is one which a person taking honci fide and for value shall have a good title to, even although the person from whom he took it had none. If you look at Glyn v. Baker, in the 13th East, p. 509, and afterwards at the 51st George 3rd, chapter 64, sec- tion 4, you will find the section that is supposed to INSTRUMENTS WHICH ARE NEGOTIABLE. 41 make the East India Bonds negotiable. Look at the section, and judge for yourselves whether it does so or not. The doctrine which I have been, in a familiar way, trying to present to you, is, that if the instrument is one whose nature, incidents and effects are defined and regulated by English law, unless coming within the classes I have mentioned, it cannot be made negotiable by any usage, and only the legislature can make it so, since the Courts of law no longer affect to create or make law. To sum up : if a question arises as to the negotiability of an instrument created under our own law, jou must call the attention of the Court to some statute, the express will of the legis- lature, making it so, or to some decision of our judges to which the legislature has given force and effect by enforcing their decision, and so impliedly making the principle involved in their decision the will of the legislature itself. So far, then, with respect to the negotiability of English instruments. I hope that I have not gone too rapidly for you, or spoken too hurriedly. I want you to realise this first part of my address, namely, what instruments are negotiable that are English instruments arising under English law, and I believe that I have enumerated the whole of them to you : viz. exchequer bills, bills of exchange, promissory notes. Bank notes, cheques. East India bonds and dividend warrants. Now comes a very important part of our law with regard to foreign instruments, made by persons abroad, obligations arising under the law of foreign countries. The most important of these instru- ments relate to the public debts of foreign and colonial governments. I have told you that in certain events the law of England makes these negotiable by adopting the usage of our own markets. First of all you must learn this, that negotiability by usage applies to transactions taking place here, if you follow me. I have spoken to you of instruments arising 42 LECTURE II. under our law made in England. I am now going to speak to you of instruments not made here, but dealt in here. It is only so far as they are dealt in here that I am discussing the negotiability of the documents or instruments. "Will you take this from me, that an instrument, however negotiable abroad, is not negotiable here, by the mere fact of its being negotiable abroad, and can only become negotiable here by the usage of our own markets. Even although the instrument might not be negotiable where it was made, yet if there was nothing on the face of it inconsistent with the right thereto passing to bearer by delivery, I think that our Courts would still apply the usage of our own market, if satisfied that, by a fairly continuous usage, the instrument passed by delivery, and that the person who took it honestly and for value acquired a title to the instru- ment itself. Do let me impress upon you that this is a most important part of our law, not to be trifled with or passed over Hghtly. I wish that our men of business in the City would turn some of their attention to this part of our law : When do foreign instruments become negotiable here by usage ? It may be (I do not say that it is) that foreign in- struments may by usage become negotiable here, although, perhaps, nou negotiable abroad, if transfer- able by delivery abroad ; and I will call your attention, step by step, to the way in which foreign instruments have been brought within the law relating to negotiable securities. The first case that I know of in which a foreign instrument was treated as negotiable in this country is that of Gorgier v. Mieville, reported in the 3rd Barnewall & Cresswell, page 45. I look at the pages of that report with delight. The great decision upon which all the doctrine of the negotiability of foreign securities rests, a doctrine which has been discussed at such great length in so many pages during the last few years that even I weary in the examination — the INSTRUMENTS WHICH ARE NEGOTIABLE. 43 arguments of counsel and the judgment of the Court are given in two pages ! In that case the King of Prussia had by a bond declared himself and his succes- sors bound to every person who should for the time being be the holder of the bond for the payment of the principal and interest. The plaintiff was the holder of the bond, and had deposited it with Agassiz & Co., who wrongfully pledged it with the defendants. Evidence was given that by the usage of the English market — -not the usage of the Prussian market : nothing of the sort — that by the usage of the English market the property in an instrument such as I have described passed by delivery to every person who received it, and that the person who took it bond fide and for value acquired a title to it, just as if it were an exchequer bill. Did the judges hesitate to give effect to such usage ? They could not have allowed such usage at all in the cases that I have been telling you about — English instruments. In such cases they were bound by English law and could not depart from it. But, dealing with a foreign instrument, they decided to adopt the usage of the merchants of their own country, and held not merely that the King of Prussia could discharge himself by paying the amount to bearer, but that the bond of the King of Prussia was, by the usage of the markets of England, a negotiable instrument, and consequently that any person who took it horid fide for value would acquire the property therein. The jury having found the defendants took the instrument bond fide and for an advance of money, the Court declared the defendants were entitled to the instrument to the extent of their advance. On that case has been built up all our law relating to the negotiability of foreign instruments- dealt in on the English market. The case does not. state how long the usage had lasted. It is clear the Court did not call for immemorial usage, as Kings of Prussia only came into existence in 1699, and the Court did not rely upon the plaintiff having any know- 44 LECTURE II. ledge of such usage or of his acquiescing therein. Now, gentlemen, that case was recognized for nearly fifty years, and I have no doubt its doctrine was applied extensively in the English market and in the case of bonds of other countries. Its doctrine was not ques- tioned until the case of Goodwin v. Roharts came up for consideration. The case of Goodwin v. Roharts is reported in L. E. 10 Exch. p. 76, where the decision of the Court of Exchequer will be found. In the same volume, p. 337, the decision of the Court of Appeal is reported ; and the argument and the decision in the House of Lords will be found in Appeal Cases, vol. i. p. 476. The plaintiif Goodwin had purchased ^6200 of Russian scrip, forming part of a loan raised by the Russian Government. The scrip was issued under the authority of the Russian Government. Messrs. Roth- schild & Sons, of London, were employed to negotiate the loan. The form of the instrument was as follows : — Scrip for £100 stock, No. . Received the sum of £20, being the first instalment of 20 per cent, upon £100 stock, and on payment of the remain- ing instalments at the periods specified, the bearer will be entitled to receive a definitive bond for £100, after receipt thereof, from the Imperial Government." Bonds were executed in Russia, and afterwards delivered to Messrs. Rothschild, who issued them in England and France to the bearers of the scrip. The bond declared, " The bearer of this bond is entitled to £100 sterling with interest at 5 per cent., which will be i:)aid on presentation of the coupons hereunto attached." The plaintifi" purchased his scrip through Clayton, his broker, and left the scrip with Clayton to be exchanged for bonds, or disposed of as he might direct. Clayton borrowed £800 for himself, and deposited as a security for the loan the scrip of the Russian loan belonging to the plaintiff. ' In the special case presented to the Court for its opinion, it was admitted that the scrip of loans to INSTRUMENTS WHICH ARE NEGOTIABLE. 45 foreign governments had been generally dealt in by bankers, money-dealers, and members of the English Stock Exchange, and through them by the public, for over fifty years, and tbe usage had been during all that time to buy and sell such scrip and advance loans of mone}^ upon the security of it before the bonds were issued, and to pass the scrip upon such dealing by mere delivery as negotiable instruments. The question for the Court was, whether the defendants were entitled as against the plaintiff to the said scrip and to the proceeds thereof. The Court of Exchequer held that the defendants were so entitled ; their decision was affirmed by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, and finally affirmed b}^ the House of Lords. The House of Lords held there was no distinction to be made between the bonds themselves and the scrip that would entitle the person to the bonds, and the Law Lords recognized the authority of Gorgier v. Mieville, and gave effect to the principle of that case. The argument of Mr. Benjamin, who appeared for the appellant, but unsuccessfull}^, is worthy of a careful examination at your hands, because all the decisions relative to the matter are therein reviewed, and the objections to the defendants' claim most skilfully and powerfully urged. It is important to see how readily the Courts in these cases gave effect to the usage of the English market. The case of Gorgier v. Mieville was a recognition of the usage of merchants in making the bonds of a foreign government negotiable. In Goodwin v. Roharts the Courts proceeded a step further, and recognized the usage of merchants in making negotiable the scrip for foreign bonds ; not the bonds themselves, but the scrip which promises that on certain payments being made a bond should be given. In reading the case of Goodwin v. Boharts, you must remember that the House of Lords placed the right of the defendants to the scrip on two grounds : first, on the ground that the scrip was a negotiable instrument, and had been taken by Robarts honestly 46 LECTURE II. and for value, and secondly on the ground that Good- win was estopped by the form of the instrument from claiming it as against the defendant, because he was in the position of a person who had made a representa- tion on the face of his scrip that it would pass with a good title to anyone on his taking it in good faith and for value, and who had put it in the power of his agent to hand over the scrip with this representation to those who were induced to alter their position on the faith of the representation so made. Do not confound these two grounds together — they are entirely distinct, and the right on the ground of estoppel is in no way connected with the right arising out of the negotiability of the instrument. I may say for myself, that I never could follow the reasoning by which the peers based the claim of Robarts on the doctrine of estoppel, and I may mention that Lord Bramwell in a subsequent case dissented from the doctrine of Goodwin v. Robarts, so far as it rested on the doctrine of estoppel. Lord Bramwell (then Mr. Baron Bramwell) was one of the judges in the Court of Exchequer who gave judgment for the defendants, on the ground that they were entitled to judgment as being ho7id fide holders for value of a negotiable instrument. You thus see that the doctrine of negotiability by usage was first applied to the bonds of foreign govern- ments and then to the scrip for the bonds of foreign governments. I have now to call your attention to a still further advance in the application of this doctrine. I believe to-day, that the bonds of foreign companies, if negotiable by usage on the English market, would be regarded as such by our Courts. With respect to the bonds of foreign or colonial governments there is no contract upon which j^ou can sue. You have a claim upon the governments but no cause of action. You cannot sue the Empexor of Russia here, and, so far as I know, not in his own empire. All you get by the purchase of Russian INSTRUMENTS WHICH ARE NEGOTIABLE. 47 bonds is a piece of paper ; nevertheless it is valuable paper ; it is worth what it will fetch upon the market where men deal in Russian bonds. Thus the first steps ever taken in respect to making foreign instru- ments negotiable by usage were in cases in which apparently no contract subsisted between the parties by and to whom the bonds were delivered. To-day the doctrine has been applied to the bonds of foreign companies, which can contract and can incur responsibility, and whose engagements can be en- forced against them by the law of the country under which they are put forth. You will find that it is decided that they may become negotiable here by usage. Remember always that in the case of foreign instruments which are negotiable by usage on the English market, the usage only applies to the acquisi- tion of the property in the paper which evidences the transaction, and not in any way to the enforcement of the engagement itself. This will be seen on comparing Goodwin v. Robarts with Crouch v. The Credit Foncier Company. In the former the ques- tion was who was entitled to the instruments : in the latter a person was attempting to sue upon a contract to which he was not originally a party. I have tried to go through all the cases and to find out what foreign instniments have been decided to be negotiable. In addition to those I have men- tioned, in Gorgier v. Mieville and in Goodwin v. Robarts, you have Unified Egyptian bonds ; Egyptian preference Government bonds ; and New South Wales bonds. These last three kinds of foreign instruments were held to be negotiable in The London d' County Banking Company v. The London dc River Plate Bank, reported in Law Reports, 21 Queen's Bench Division, page 535. In that same case, reported in the Law Reports, Queen's Bench Division, vol. 20, page 232, it was decided that certificates of shares in the Pennsylvania Railway Company were not negotiable. And here I think is the distinction : if the foreign 48 LECTUEE II. instrument which you claim to be negotiable here by usage shows on the face of it that a transferee is not to become the owner by mere delivery, but that something further is required in order to give him the property as in the case of the Pennsylvania Railway certificates of shares, which must be transferred in the books of the Company personally or by attorney, such instrument is not a negotiable security even by usage. It is important that men engaged in the City should know that Pennsylvania Railway certificates of shares are not negotiable instruments. They had been dealing in them and had regarded them as negotiable up to the time of the decision in 1887, but it has been decided that they are not, and such decision should be known. In the 15th Appeal Cases, page 268, in the case of Cady v. London Chartered Bank oj Australia, it was held that certificates for shares in the New York Central Railway Company were not negotiable by usage. You will see this clearly stated in the judgment of Lord Herschell, page 285. It has been decided in Easton v. The London Joint Stock Bank, 34 Chancery Division, that Baltimore and Potomac Railway bonds are negotiable. If you look at the case you will find this peculiarity, that they, like the exchequer bills that I spoke of, pass by delivery until a name is inserted in the bond, and when a name is inserted they can only be trans- ferred b}^ entry in the books of the company. There- fore, as long as the Baltimore and Potomac Railway bonds have no name inserted in them they are negotiable securities. It was also decided that bonds of the Delaware and Hudson Railway Company were negotiable securities. In Bentinck v. Tlie London Joint Stock Bank, Law Reports, 1893, 2 Chancery, p. 120, it was held that the bonds of the New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio Railway Company had become negotiable b}^ usage. I think that, as far as I remember, those are the whole of the foreign securities which have been decided to be negotiable. With respect to INSTRUMENTS WHICH ARE NEGOTIABLE. 49 foreign instruments, I think it must be taken that they cannot become negotiable by usage here, if it is neces- sar}" to do some act out of the kingdom in order to pass the title to them, or, in other words, if delivery is not of itself sufficient. I should like to go a little further and tell you what instruments arising under English law are not nego- tiable. I have told you that certificates of shares, and scrip for certificates of shares in English companies — and I am going to make a statement now which ma}^ not be quite correct — that share warrants in English com- panies are not negotiable ; but I think that if a foreign country should adopt share warrants, warrants that entitle the bearer to the shares specified in them, and they should be dealt in here, and b}' usage of our market they should be regarded as negotiable and pass irrevocably by delivery to a person who takes them hondfide and for value, as the validity of the transaction is to be determined by our own law, I believe that such warrants would be deemed b}' our Courts to be negoti- able securities, unless the word securities is to be confined to instruments which provide for the pay- ment of money. Lord Justice Bowen intimates that in his opinion share warrants arising under English law are not negotiable. On page 296 of liaw Rep. Ch. 1891, vol. i., he says : " It is difficult to see how shares, share warrants, or certificates of shares in a company, which are not securities for money, can be entitled to the description of negotiable securities." I want you to read the statute of the 30th & 31st Victoria, chapter 131, sections 27 to 36, and those sections will give you all the provisions relating to the creation of share warrants. I have enquired and I have been told that they are not often resorted to in the case of companies existing under English law and carrying on business here. Section 27 provides that a company limited by shares, if authorized so to do b}' its regulations, may with respect to any share when it is fully paid up issue a warrant, stating that the bearer of the warrant is N.S. E 50 LECTURE II. entitled to the share or shares. By section 28 it is prescribed that a share warrant shall entitle the bearer of such warrant to the shares specified in it, and that such shares may be transferred by the delivery of the share warrant. There are no words which say that anybody who takes a share warrant bond fide and for value shall become entitled to it. I think that it is sufficient to put this construction upon the sections, that they provide that the lawful bearer of the share warrant shall be entitled to the shares. But you must look at the case of Little v. The Joint Stock Banking Company, reported in the same volume as Simmons' Case and argued together with it. Little claimed seventy-five shares of ^10 each in the Bio Tinto Compan}^ Limited. That was an English company, and as regards those shares, share war- rants had been issued under the Companies Act, 1867, section 27. The Joint Stock Bank by their counsel claimed those shares as being negotiable. As the Court of Appeal was ready to decide against the Bank, assuming the share warrants to be negotiable, the question of their negotiability was allowed to pass without much discussion. Lord Justice Bowen, as above stated, intimating that in his opinion they were not negotiable. I think it must be taken at present that share warrants in English companies are not negotiable and cannot be made so by usage. So far, then, to-night. I have one or two observa- tions to make to you upon a matter which I must mention before I sit down. I will sum up this evening's lecture at the introduction of the next lecture. I have made every endeavour to give you to the best of my ability a list of all the instruments that at present have been decided to be negotiable. With respect to those arising under our own law I have relied upon Mr. Justice Blackburn's judgment in Crouch v. The Credit Fonder. Take that awa}^ and then I have no justification for the distinction which I have drawn ; but if you follow that decision you have clear and direct guidance with respect to INSTRUMENTS WHICH ARE NEGOTIABLE. 51 instruments arising under English Law. If you adopt the view that share warrants under the Act of 1867, chapter 131, are negotiable instruments, then you must add them to the list, and may you soon in your pro- fession be called upon to discuss the question whether they are, and aid the Court to a just determina- tion. I have given you a list of foreign securities, and I cannot impress upon you sufficiently the necessity of separating the instruments which arise under our own law, and those which are created in foreign countries by foreign Governments and foreign companies. Then, let me say that in using the phrase ** negotiable instruments," I should like to use that phrase as included under the wider term of negotiable property so that negotiable property should include negotiable chattels and negotiable instruments. I have only found the words " negotiable property " used once by a Judge. I wish to tell you that there are negotiable chattels as well as negotiable instruments. No interest in land can be negotiable. The Chancery- Judges have not yet established negotiable interests in land, and therefore you may get rid of land. And I also tell you that there are no negotiable chattels except of a particular kind, to wit, the current coin of the realm and the pieces of paper on which the negotiable instru- ments are written. By legislation a title to chattels under certain cu'cumstances may be acquired when dealing with persons who have no property therein or authority to deal with them, but chattels have not yet been made negotiable. Do not speak of chattels dealt with under the Acts of the Legislature as having " some of the elements of negotiabilit3^" If you have two material objects you can say that they have two or more elements in common, but where you speak of intellectual conceptions, you cannot safely do so. Keep them distinct and use distinct names. If they are alike you use the same word ; if not, have a distinct word. Never use the words "elements of negotiability " in E 2 52 LECTURE II. respect of personal chattels. True, we have by legisla- tion now given rights to persons who purchase chattels or advance money on them far beyond what existed even when I came to the Bar. A mercantile agent entrusted with goods may by sale and disposition of them defraud the true owner, and give a good title- to the man who buys. If you buy seventeen volumes- of Meeson and Welsby, and pay for them, the pro- perty in the books vests in you ; but if you leave them in the shop, and the shopkeeper sells them to someone else bondjide and for value, by the provisions of recent legislation you lose your property in the books. We- also know, too, that if you agree to sell a man goods, who is to pay for them by instalments and you put him in possession of the goods before he has paid the instalments, and he sells them, the man who purchases; them bond fide will have a good title, although it was stipulated that the property in the goods should not pass until all the instalments had been paid. But there is no statute and no rule of common law which says that personal chattels under all circumstances, at all times and in all places, shall pass to the person who buys them bond fide and for value. You must enquire into the nature and extent of the authority that has been conferred by Acts of Parliament in respect of the disposition of chattels, and particularly study the Factors Act of the year 1889. But the negotiability of the instruments with which I am dealing is limited to no time, no place, no person. Wherever or from whomsoever a man takes them, if he takes them bona fide and for value, he will acquire a jaerfectly good title ; and although Dr. Johnson was allowed to write by permission in Goldsmith's Deserted Village — "Trade's proud empire hastes to swift decay," we are still extending our commerce year by year, and the principles of law to which I have called your atten- tion to-night have materially assisted in such develop- ment and expansion. I thank you for your kind and patient hearing. INSTRUMENTS WHICH ARE NEGOTIABLE. 53 (DO) CS o ■W pa ■I— I o o :W OH ^ PI S s ^- rt' Ph'-^ "u ^ o ^ cc aj^§ O a b pa ■^^ (3 o 3d c^ . o --J o 'm CD S pj-l § fee h ri M ^ o ^ Ph ^ t:3 _53 t3 ^ o J o a; o s .« ^ (U P^pa ►■> >-■ S o -1^ >" o _S &3 ^ PI CO 5 2 c> ^« o O o s 2 i o .-- 5 a t- i fa J pa (D c^ a ■pa 0:1 S t^ r/l pa fl ^ -- c . 02 Pi « s . ^ Ph.S 0-1 s -^pa CO ^ , g gii'2 s bC spirt's ® a 5 -sis: ^ ^ ^ "C '^ ^ a p^aa2 '^t-fe"'?; -^•J^S"-^ s P I s oj+^c/j -e' — I a j; •- r*-^ y:;C-it.Sac35'X3*-^ ■5 gB S I ^ ^ I ^ S ^ ^^ ►5a-, S '^ 05 fee .22 &x)2 X a o w ^ c3 Is simp 5 pq Ph pa O W W P CK a ^ ■^•^ Ph ■" to 2 a' •s == =; 5 -0; ^^<3' .B Ph ^ So « . i> ,— . ^^ a, 03 ^H ?cs^ a a ^ vs !> a ct t- o O) 0) Ph O LECTURE III. On the last occasion when I had the honour of speaking to you, I endeavoured to present to you a full list of all the negotiahle instru- ments which have been declared to be such by the decisions of our Courts, and I particularly called your attention to one decision, and perhaps the most important of all, viz., the case of Crouch v. The Credit Fonder Company, which, if the judgment of Lord Blackburn stands, leads you to this conclusion — that no usage on the Stock Exchange or elsewhere can make an instrument that is created in this country and defined and regulated by English law negotiable ; and that whether an instrument created under English law is negotiable or not, is a question of law to be determined by the Judge before whom the question arises. If that decision be correct, then I showed you that with respect to instruments arising under English law the principal and perhaps the only instruments that could be deemed to be negotiable were when ilaej were in a certain condition, bills of exchange, promissory notes, bank notes, cheques, exchequer bills, East India bonds and dividend warrants. I then called your attention to the case of foreign instruments, thus dividing the subject of negotiable instruments into two classes : one, instruments arising under our own law, and made here in England ; and the other, instruments created abroad and arising under foreign law; and I endeavoured to show you by the decisions to which I called your attention that if foreign instruments become negotiable here by usage. BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 55 that is if the propert}- indicated hy them passes by simple delivery, and if persons taking them bond fide and. for value acquire a good title, then the Courts of this country would declare them to be negotiable in any proceeding here, and would upon the evidence of such usage annex the incident of negotiability to nearly all instruments created by foreign or colonial Governments who are borrowing and creating a debt, and to the bonds and engagements of foreign companies. I called 3^our attention to the decision in the House of Lords in Simmons' case, which applied the doctrine of negotiability by usage not merely to the bonds of a foreign Government, in which case there is perhaps no contract subsisting at all upon which the person who holds the bond can sue, but to the case of bonds of foreign com- panies who might be sued by the holder of the bonds in the countr}^ in which those bonds were given. I also endeavoured to shew by a reference to two cases to which I called your attention that if the instruments on the face of them indicate that something is to be done in the foreign country in order that the property in them should pass, that then, in that case, whatever may be the usage of English bankers and brokers, such instruments are not negotiable. Then I called your attention to the statement of law that instruments which are negotiable abroad are not thereby negotiable here, and that you would require evidence of usage in this country to give negotiability to such instruments. Then I passed on to tell you that with respect to personal chattels, they are not negoti- able with but two exceptions, and that those exceptions were the chattels which constitute the current coin of the realm and the paper that evidences the negotiable instruments. The law of this country apparently is clear that, with the exception of a few instances, no person who takes a j)ersonal chattel can acquire a better title than the person who transferred it could confer, and that the person who is the owner of a personal chattel, as I am of my books in my chambers, 56 LECTURE III. remains the owner of that chattel as I remain the owner of my books ; and if, to-night, any person were to break into my chambers and steal my books, except by sale in market overt, he could not confer any title to them. Mr. Justice Willes in a judgment in Fuentes v. Montes, reported in Law Reports, 3 Common Pleas, discusses the whole question under what circumstances a man can at Common Law acquire a better title to chattels than the person with whom he deals is capable of conferring. He gives three instances: (1) sale in market overt; (2) the case of a man who has acquired the property in goods, under a contract obtained b}^ fraud, and who has resold such goods to a bond Jide purchaser for value before the defrauded vendor has rescinded the contract; and thirdly, the case of a holder of a bill of lading parting with the instrument for value to a hand fide purchaser, whilst the goods were in transitu, and that such a dispo- sition would deprive the vendor of his right of stoppage in transitu, in case of the insolvency of the vendee. Then I called your attention to one or two instances of instruments said to be negotiable which are not. You will find in one or two arguments of counsel, and in an occasional judgment, it is stated, without any qualification, that a bill of lading is a negotiable instrument. It is not, and if you will look into the case of Gurney v. Bchrend, reported in 3 Ellis & Blackburn, 622, you will find it distinct!}^ laid down that a bill of lading is not a negotiable instru- ment. More than that, in a recent important judg- ment in the House of Lords, Setvell v. Burdick, L. R. 10 App. Cases, 74, there is this difference indicated between a bill of exchange and a bill of lading, viz., that the effect of what passes and arises in dealing with a bill of lading, depends upon the intention of the parties ; and upon the existence of a transaction fitted to pass the property apart from the delivery of the bill of lading, and consequently that a transfer of a bill of lading will pass the entire property, or a portion only of that property according to the BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 57 intention of the parties. Then, of course, in the case of a bill of lading, if a man simply indorses it to his factor or agent, no property passes ; but if I have a bill of exchange, of which I am the true owner for value, I can, without any consideration, pass the property in it at once to any person I choose. More- over, until the 18 & 19 Vict. c. Ill, no one could sue upon the contract contained in the bill of lading unless he was originally a party to such contract. I want you, however, to bear in mind, that the current coin of the realm, such as sovereigns, half- crowns, and shillings, all pass to the person who takes them bond fide for value, irrespective altogether of the title of the person who transfers them ; and you thus have an instance of chattels, the property in which may be derived not from the true owner, or anything that he has done, but from the conduct of the person who receives them. I have to impress upon 3^ou that the true view of negotiability is this : that a person can claim the property in negotiable instruments or the current coin of the realm by what he has done — not by what anybody else has done ; and that having taken sovereigns or Bank of England notes for value, and honestly, he is entitled to retain them, no matter who the party is who deals with him, or what the circumstances of the transaction. Now, if you want to see the law relating to the transfer of the current coins of the realm and bank notes, I refer you to the case of Miller v. Race, 1 Sm. L. C. 491, 9th ed., which I hope you will aU read. Do not let it be said that the reason why property in money passes to the bond fide holder for value is because you cannot follow or trace it. Nothing of the kind. You can follow money ; and if you can trace it and identify it, you can sue for its value and recover it from any person who cannot justify its detention. On the other hand, if you mark all the current coins and bank notes in your possession, so that you could speak with certainty to every one, you may yet without any fault or act of your own, lose the bo LECTURE III. whole, although ,you know in whose possession they are. Suppose a hurglar steals them all and they have come into the possession of a tradesman who has taken them bond fide and for value, you cannot demand them from him, notwithstanding your power of shewing they once were yours, and that you had never parted with them. The tradesman has become the owner of them by the principle of law to which I have so con- stantly referred you. So far, therefore, understand me, I do not know of any personal chattels which are negotiable other than the current coins of the realm and the paper on which negotiable instruments are written. I am quite aware of cases in which, perhaps, a better title may be had than the person transferring could give, and of course I am not insensible to the cases in equity where a purchaser of the legal estate, without notice, may get a better title, or to the case of the assignment of a chose in action, where a creditor has dealt twice with the debt due to him, the second assignee, who should give notice of the assignment to the debtor (the first not having done so), would acquire the right to the debt. I am not insensible to those cases, and I hope you will put down a list of them, and all learn, as you ought to do, if you are to be competent for your work, when, and under what circumstances,- a person can acquire a title Avliich the man with whom he was dealing could not himself lawfully confer. Having said thus much, let me tell you that with respect to the bonds of foreign Governments, the scrip for bonds of foreign Governments, the bonds of foreign companies, the scrip for bonds of foreign companies, I have told you nearly all the law relating to them. I have to tell you that with respect to them there is no drawer, no acceptor, no indorser, no iiotice of dishonour needful, and none of those duties to be discharged which exist in respect of bills of exchange. The main thing in connexion with foreign instruments is to know whether they are negotiable, whether the property in them has been lawfully passed, and, if not, BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 59 ■whether the clamiant has taken them bond fide and for value. I now advance to consider those negotiable instruments which do involve a great deal of learning in order to their proper use and enjo3'ment, namely bills of exchange, promissory notes, and cheques. Now, before proceeding to discuss them, if there should be any here to-night who are engaged in the Cit}^, [ should like to address to them, with your permission, a word or two of advice. You who are law^-ers have had quite enough law already in these lectures to occupy your spare hours for some time to come. To those persons here who are unaccustomed to the consideration of legal decisions, the}' perhaps may be glad to listen to a few general observations that do not come under the head of law. The observations wliich I now offer are such as were addressed to myself in my early j^ears. Now I should like to impress on you young men in the City (whether acting for a jnaster or on your own account), the importance of endeavouring to procure in every transaction in business or trade the promise that a bill of exchange shall be given. To secure such promise, you see frequentl}?^ on the invoices in the City the proviso, " Cash at the end of the month, less 2| per cent., or a three months' bill." There is nothing more important in trade than having such an agreement as that. Without such agreement you cannot call upon your customer to give you his acceptance. You can have such an agreement by express arrangement with the buyer, or it may arise from previous dealings. If having promised to accept he does not do so, you can sue him at once for breach of his agreement, and obtain in the action the full price of the goods less the discount. The bill of exchange, if you can get it, is a thing that is readily convertible in the mone}' market of London. If j^ou cannot get cash, get as man}' of your transactions as you can back again in your cash box in the form of biUs of exchange. You may find yourself pressed for money through failure of €0 LECTURE III. people to keep their engagements, or an opportunity may offer of making a good purchase for cash. It is no use a man taking his book debts to discount houses or bankers for an advance — they will not look at them ; but if you have bills you can walk into a bill-broker's ■office (as it has been my business to do), and offer good trade bills with names well known in the various towns in the kingdom, and in a moment you can turn them into mone}'. I have known a man relieved from most pressing engagements because he could go and get a ■considerable sum of money by discounting bills of exchange which he had taken in respect of trade transactions. Another thing to remember is this — that if once peo^jle have put their hands to bills as accej)tors they will do their utmost to meet them, because of the fatal consequence of their dishonour; whereas a debt that is merely in the books of the creditor may be long delayed ; and the creditor does not care to sue a man who, though slow in paj'ment, is yet faithful. These bills of exchange are not things to be trifled with. The moment you put your hand to a bill of exchange it goes away — it circulates every- where. Let me give a further piece of advice. Pray mind, you young men, to keep a proper list of the bills which your master accepts, and do .not allow him to accept a bill until it has been put into the " Bills payable " book, so that there may be no mistake as to his obligations. I cannot stay to tell you to- night of the troubles which I myself have known through forgetfulness so to do. Another thing is, take care to keep your bills in proper order and nice condition. Do not take to a bill-broker a parcel of bills which may never have been in anybod}' else's hands but which are in such a state that they look as if they had been hawked about for discount to other houses. Keep your bills in proper order, that they really look like good trade bills that you are presenting to the bill discounter. There is another thing I should wish you to remember. Do not, j^ou young men, be BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 61 parties to creating' bills of exchange behind which tliere is no value, or creating what is called accommo- dation paper. This is sometimes done, to the discredit of men engaged in business. If you are an honest man and of sound position, and the man who desires to assist you to raise money is honest too, go and tell your banker how you stand and what you desire to do, and unless I am mistaken he will do all he can to render 3'ou assistance ; but bankers do not like to deal with a man who has presented to them apparently honest trade bills, and all the while they are unconnected with any trade transaction. Honesty is the best policy. Now, having uttered these few words, that are not quite in the line of my lectures, let me, with your permission, just call your attention to one or two cases which show the risks you run in creating bills of exchange. For this purpose I must ask you to read the case of Ingluim v. Primrose, which is reported in 7 Common Bench, New Series, page 82. This is a case which shows how careful you should be when dealing with bills. If ever you have put your name to a bill of exchange as acceptor, and still more, if it has got a drawer's name to it, and you do not wish to make any use of it, do not tear it in pieces, mind that you burn it or com- pletely cancel or deface it. In the case of Ingham v. Primrose the defendant, being desirous of raising some money, had accepted a bill, drawn by one Charles Murgatroyd and given it to him for the purpose of getting it discounted. Murgatroyd tried to get the bill discounted, but in vain, and returned the bill to the defendant, who said : " I will tear it up ; it is of no use. We cannot do the bill; " and he tore the paper in half and threw it away in the street. Charles Murgatroyd picked the bill up and afterwards pasted the two pieces together and passed the bill away to a man named King, from whom the plaintiff took it. At the trial it was found as a fact that the defendant 62 LECTURE in. when he tore the bill in half and threw it away intended to cancel it. The jury having found that King took the bill hondjide and for value, the Court held that Primrose, the acceptor, was liable. I am bound to tell you that the present Master of the Rolls, in the case of Baxendale v. BenneAt, which is reported in Law- Reports, 3 Queen's Bench Division, page 525, has cast some doubt on the propriet}"^ of that decision. The case which called for the observations of Lord Esher did not require perhaps tbe consideration of the case of Ingham v. Primrose, because in Ingham v. Primrose the defendant had accepted the bill with a drawer's name upon it. He knew that Charles Mur- gatroyd picked up the torn pieces, and the defendant left them in Murgatroyd's hands. But there is the case of Baxendale v. Bennett, which you will look at in conjunction with Ingham v. Primrose. In the case of Ingham v. Primrose it may be said that the instrument had ceased to exist, and was never after issued as such by the acceptor, and therefore there was no instrument which could be passed to a bond fide holder for value. The Court, however, repelled the objection and thought that the acceptor was liable because the cancellation was not sufficiently complete. In the case of Baxendale v. Bennett the defendant had written his name as acceptor across a bill stamp. There was no drawer's name upon it. It was stolen from his desk, and a drawer's name was put upon it without the authority of the acceptor. Such drawing need not necessarily have been a forgery because, as Lord Justice Bramwell pointed out, the man who stole the paper might have said to the person who took it : "I have the authority of the acceptor to put any name I like, and you can put your own name as drawer ; " and the person who took it may have put his name as a drawer quite honestly. It was held in that case that the bond fide holder for value could not recover, because the defendant had never accepted a bill of exchange — he had never authorised anyone to BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 63 put his name to the instrument as drawer, and without a drawer's name, authorised expressly or impliedly, there cannot be a bill of exchange. The grounds on which Baxcndale v. Bennett was decided do not, in my opinion, involve the reversal of Ingham v. Primrose. Baxcndale v. Bennett, however, shews that a man may give full value for an instrument that appears to be in order and every signature to which is genuine and has been honestly placed there, and yet the bond fide holder have no remed}^ against the supposed acceptor. Now I have called your attention to the consequence of not getting the instrument properly endorsed, as was shown in the case of Whistler v. Foi'ste?', which I have mentioned to you two or three times. The plaintiff there took the cheque bond fide and for value, but did not notice that the payee had not endorsed it. He got no title by mercantile law and usage, and before he could get the endorsement he had notice that the payee had committed a fraud in procuring the cheque. Held, that he could not have a better title to the cheque than the person who passed it to him, and as such person had obtained it b}' fraud the person who gave value for the bill had no title either. Now let me call the attention of men of business to another case, which shows the importance of using the utmost care in dealing with bills. In the case of Garrard y. Lewis, which is reported in lOQ. B.D., p. 30, a person accepted a bill, which, by some over- sight, did not contain words in the body of the bill which expressed the amount for which the bill was drawn, a place having been left in the body of the bill for such words. The amount expressed by figures in the margin was i;l4 Os. 6d. The drawer of the bill wrote in the body of the bill in words one hundred and sixty- four pounds and sixpence, and altered the marginal figures from £14 Os. Qd. to ^0164 Os. &d. A person took the bill so altered bond fide and for value : Held, that he had a perfectly good title — that the marginal figures are not an essential part of the bill ; 64 LECTURE III. that the words are the essential part of the bill n determining the amount ; and that the alteration of the figures was not a material alteration so as to avoid the instrument. In that case the acceptor had to pay the £164 Os. 6d., although he only intended to pa}^ ;G14 Os. 6d. I have just given you those three or four instances, and now let me give you another, because I think you will learn more about bills of exchange in this way, as I shall shew j^ou directly, than from the longest and most accurate definition that ever was prepared. A tradesman was to have the acceptance of A. B. for goods sold and delivered to him, and C. D. was to be surety for their payment. A bill was drawn upon A. B. only. A. B. accepted it, and then it was said, "Well, now, Mr. Surety, you had better accept," and so he did. Held, no acceptance. Why ? Because a man cannot accept a bill unless it is addressed to him. To be an acceptor he must be a drawee. Here the only drawee was A. B., and A. B. was the only person who could accept. The bill should have been drawn on C. D. as well as A. B. There being no debt between CD. and the tradesman, and C. D. not being liable on the bill as an accejitor, the tradesman would have no claim against CD., unless the instrument itself to which he put his name as acceptor would satisfy the j)rovisions of the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds (see Jackson V. Hudso7i, 2 Campbell, 447). If you are going to have an acceptor see that he is a drawee. I just call your attention to these few things really to awaken in you a great interest in this department of our law, whether you practise the profession of the law or whether j^ou are engaged in commercial houses. To my mind, men should stud}^ this portion of our law until they are practically masters of its rules, principles, and decisions ; and to men of business and bankers it is of the utmost importance that they should know these things in order that they may prove them- selves exact in everything they do, and especially if BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 55 they are servants, because there is not a more delightful work than that of a servant guarding by his care and competency the interests of the master whom he serves. I come now to bills of exchange themselves, and I am bound to tell 3'ou that the law relating to them has been codified by an Act of Parliament called the 45th and 46th Victoria, cap. 61. It contains 100 sections. This Act will, I think, be a dead letter to you if you begin to read it through without some such preparation as that which I am endeavouring to give you. It is indeed a valley of dry bones, and an in- forming spirit is needful that they may live. It is not easy for the experienced lawyer to master all its contents ; and although I have read it through several times, and have had some expei'ience in the application of its provisions, if you were to examine me as to some portions of it you might not think me so well acquainted with the law of bills of exchange as I may appear to you to be. Now do not let us begin with a definition of a bill. Definition may be all very well in examinations ; yet I have known men in attempting to give definitions omit a word here and a word there that evidently told me that the individual giving the definition was a respectable person carrying a burden the nature of which he did not quite appreciate or understand. Now let us look at the enormous definition of a bill of exchange given in the Act of 1882. Just imagine keeping this in your mind, " A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person to another, signed b}' the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to or to the order of a specified person, or to bearer." I trust that before we have finished this course of Lectures I shall by practical instances set up the whole of this definition in your minds piece by piece, and cause it to remain there without the effort of N.s. F 66 LECTURE III. memory : that you may have it as a living thing in your minds and not as mere words repeated b}' rote. I think, I hope so at least, that I shall render you more service, by putting before you specimens of the instruments themselves which have given rise to discussions in our courts, than by examining in a scholastic manner the various parts of the definition 1 have just read to you. On the next occasion I hope to put in your hands a set of papers which will enable me to speak more freely and easily to you on the subject of drawer, drawee, payee, acceptor, indorsee, and other matters. But to-night I want, if j-ou will allow me, to get into your minds portions of the defi- nition of a bill of exchange by shewing you some of the transactions, that are valid at common law, which cannot be carried out by a bill of exchange, and some transactions that can be carried out by bills of ex- change, which cannot be carried out by the ordinary rules of the common law or equity, and some incidents to bills of exchange which do not attach to contracts at common law. Some j^eople to w^iom I have talked have looked upon a bill of exchange as some- thing mysterious ; and I remember (when I was attending the lectures of Mr. Broom), a fellow- student saying to me, " Well, I have never seen a bill of exchange myself, and although I have taken down a number of phrases from this good lecturer, the whole thing is still to me a mystery." Now, I think we shall do well to look first at a bill of exchange in the way I am putting it to you. First of all, take this. There are great privileges incident to bills of exchange, as you will see directl}^ : there are therefore necessary limitations, and there are many transactions that can be carried through at comnn)n law that cannot be comprised in, or covered by, a bill of exchange. Now, first of all, I must shew you under what head of contracts a bill of exchange is found, and 1 only hope that everybody will be able to follow me. I ma}' BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 67 be right or wrong about it, but if ever I am asked what a contract is, I always say it is " an agreement to which the supreme power has annexed an obligation." In the language of Austin and of Maine it is an agreement plus an obligation. I never use the word " agreement " as synonymous witli " contract." Then you see I have to look and ascertain, first of all, whether there is an agreement of parties. If there be, then the next thing to ascertain is : Are all the conditions there which must be present in order that the agreement may have a binding force or effect ? This question I answer by liaving ascertained by examination of statutes and the decisions of judges to what agreements the supreme power has decided to give a binding force or annex an obligation. Thus the study of the law of contracts involves the same kind of investigation as that of the man of science who arranges flowers or animals in different classes. Now, by the law of England, you may take it that, apart from judgments and contracts of Record, contracts are divided into two great classes — con- tracts under seal and simple contracts. A bill of exchange comes under the head of simple contracts, and if an instrument is under seal it is not a bill of exchange at all, unless the drawing of a bill of exchange under seal is authorised by statute. Lord Blackburn has said there is no case in the books where a bill of exchange made under seal has been sued on. You know, in order that there may be an agreement obligatory under the head of " Simple Contracts," you must find in the transaction somewhere or other a request, a considera- tion, and a promise, all combining with the intention of entering into a binding engagement. Now the bill of exchange is an excellent illustration of this rule, because it introduces you at once to the request made by the drawer, the promise made by the acceptor, and the consideration which must always be present for a bill. F 2 68 LECTURE III. Now I want to call attention to a peculiarity with respect to the consideration for a bill of exchange. If there be a consideration for it, it does not matter from whom it moves. In a simple contract the only person who can sue upon it is the person from whom the consideration moves. Take the case of Tweedle v. Atkinson, which is reported in 1 Best & Smith, p. 393. The plaintiff there was engaged to a young lady, and her father promised him verbally that he would give him a marriage portion. The mai'riage took place without the promise being j)erformed. Subsequently the father of the plaintiff and the father of the young lady met, and the latter said to the former : "I will give ;6200 to your son if you will also give him £100." The father of the young man said he was content to do so, and the j)roposal was accepted. The son cannot sue either his own father or his father-in- law for the payment of either of the sums. Although his advancement was the object of the contract, he was not a party to the transaction. The considera- tion did not move from him. The consideration was not marriage ; the consideration was the promise to give £200 if the other would give ^6100. Although all that passed between the parents was by word of mouth, there is no question of the Statute of Frauds. The marriage was not the consideration, and the only person who could sue is the one father suing the other for the non-fulfilment of the promise. But now, then, let one father put down the cash and hand it to the son. Let the other father give a promissory note for £200 to his son-in-law. Then the son-in-law can sue on the promissory note if dishonoured, although the consideration for the note did not move from him. He has got the promissory note with a consideration for it ; and in the case of a promissory note or bill of exchange it does not matter from whom the considera- tion moves if there be an actual consideration for the note or bill. Observe another thing with respect to the con- BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 69 sideration for a bill of exchange. There is always a presumption that a bill of exchange or promissory note has been given for a consideration. It is not a con- clusive presumption. Evidence may be given to shew that there was in fact no consideration for the bill. There is no such presumption in the case of other contracts coming under the head of simple contracts. As between acceptor and drawer, indorser and indorsee, the presumption is that a consideration has been given. Now take the next point of importance to work out this definition. A promissory note or a bill of exchange to exist must relate to debt and debt only ; so also it must be debt in the strictest sense of the word ; not debt and some other obligation and promise, but debt and debt onh'. I do not know whether 3'ou ever read any good pleadings — I do not often see any now, — but if 3'ou look to the mone}'^ counts in Bullen and Leake, you will find that when suing for money payable under the money counts you could always recover as a debt the value of anything you had supplied, although no price was fixed by the bargain, the law implying in such case that a reasonable price is to be paid. That was still regarded as a transaction in debt, and for which an action of debt would lie, " Please pay the reasonable price due for the goods 1 sold you," will not do for a bill of exchange ; it must be a fixed or certain sum for which you draw. If you drew an instrument thus : " Please pay me the balance you owe me in respect of cottages erected," it would not be a bill of exchange. In all these cases, claims would arise at common law, but not one could be the subject of a bill of exchange. Again, in order that the instrument should be a bill of exchange, the request must not be conditional. Suppose you were to draw upon me for the money due and owing in respect of the proceeds of goods I sold for you, that would not be good as a bill of exchange. Suppose you requested me to paj'^ a sum of money on the anival of a certain ship, upon the sale of a certain cargo, or the delivery of certain bills 70 LECTURE III. of lading, even if accei^ted, the instrument would not be a bill of exchange. The request must be pure and simple, and free from all condition. Every one of the transactions I have just named might give rise to a claim at common law, yet cannot be made the subject- matter of a bill of exchange. If the instrument is drawn conditionally on the happening of a certain event, it is none the less invalid as a bill of exchange, even although the event happened before the time men- tioned on the instrument for the performance of the obligation had expired. Again, let me take another illustration. Bills of exchange and promissory notes have this advantage over transactions at common law, that they fix the time for payment beyond all dispute. You need not trouble yourself to consider whether tlie day mentioned on the bill was the day originally agreed on for pay- ment by the original contract, or whether there was any consideration for the promise to pay on a fixed day. If your debtor has given you a bill of exchange, such bill constitutes conditional payment. You cannot sue him for the original debt while the bill is running, and when the day comes he must pay it, whether the time of the bill was fixed by the original contract or not. Now I will give this illustration to 30U young gentle- men. Suppose 3'ou went into a tailor's shop, and he said: " You owe me £15 for clothes.^' " Yes, sir, I am sorry I do ; well, I will pay you on the first of next month, because then I get my allowance." You could not be sued upon that promise. There is no considera- tion for it. I do not mean to say that a judge would not amend if the creditor did happen to declare upon such promise, but such promise has no force or effect what- ever. If you want to see an instance of this in the old days, look at Ho2)hins v. Logan, which is rei^orted in 5 Meeson and ^Yelsby, page 241, where the declaration alleged that the plaintiff and defendant had stated an account whereb}' certain sums of money were due and BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 71 owing to the plaintiff, and the defendant promised to pay the said moneys on a certain day to come ; that the said day had passed before bringing the action, and the defendant had not paid the money. The Court hehl that the declaration disclosed no cause of action, because it did not allege any consideration for the promise ; the promise which arises upon an account stated is to pa}' on request, and a promise to pay on a fixed day would not be binding without some fresh consideration ; and as in those da^'s there was no amendment, the proceedings were of no avail, although the defendant owed every penny of the money claimed. The moi'al is, get a bill of exchange for your debt whenever you can. There is another thing -which I wall just point out. At common law, if for a consideration you promise to pay on a particular day, on that day you must tender the money to the creditor. It is not so with a bill of exchange, because if a bill of exchange is not pay- able on demand, you have always three days of grace for the payment ; hence, if the bill is drawn on the 1st March, and is payable in three months, then it would be payable on the 4th June. If you keep these things in your minds you wdll soon come with pleasure and delight to the definition in the Act of Parliament, and see it all for 3'ourselves, and be able to speak of it in your own y^SLj. Of course, you know that in Courts of law you are seldom asked for a definition of a bill of exchange. You produce the instrument ; objection is taken to it, and you must answer the objection that is presented. Another thing in respect of which a bill of exchange differs from a simple contract debt is this : a bill of exchange gives rise to a claim for interest unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. On a bill of exchange, I may say at once, that if the instrument contains nothing to the contrary, interest is payable, and usually at five per cent., from the day of its maturity, whereas interest is not payable upon debts at common law apart 72 LECTURE III. from agreement, express or implied. You may now, liowever, recover interest on debts as damages if they come within the terms of the Act of 8 & 4 Will. IV., c. 42, sec. 27. Now I want to tell 3'ou of transactions which a hill of exchange can carry out which are canied out at common law, hut are carried out by bills of exchange with additional powers and facilities. A creditor may in writing request his debtor to pay the debt he owes to a third person, and the creditor may give such request to the third person. Such an instrument is an authority to pay. If the debtor pays, he has discharged his debt, and the receipt of the money by the third person may discharge a debt due to him from the person giving the authority or constitute the person giving the authority the creditor of the person receiving it. A bill of exchange may carry out such authorit}' by being drawn in favour of a third person. Such third person is called the payee, and answers to the person at common law to whom the authority to receive is given. But there is this difference between an order to pay at common law and a bill of exchange. The man who receives an authority at common law cannot sue the debtor for the amount due, the relation of debtor and creditor does not subsist between them, nor can he sue as being assignee of the debt ; but, as I have told you that so long as there is a consideration for the bill anyone may sue although the consideration does not move from him, the payee of a bill of exchange can demand the sum due on the bill from the acceptor and sue him if he does not pay. The man who has a mere common law authority cannot sue the debtor if he does not pay : all he can do is to go back to his own debtor and say, " I am very sorr}' to tell you that your creditor has not paid ; you must now pay me." Look at the decision in Percival v. Dunn, which is reported in 29 Chancery Division, page 128, a decision of Vice-Chancellor Bacon. He held in that case, that a document drawn in the BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 73 following words, " Please pay Percival tlie amount of his account £42 14s. 6d. for goods supplied," was not an instrument upon which any action would lie at the suit of Percival ; it was a simple request to pay, and no action would lie. It did not amount to an assignment, and therefore no action upon the instrument delivered by the creditor to Percival could be maintained. Now I want particularly, in the few minutes that remain at my disposal to-night, to call your attention to the most important part of the transactions that are carried out by bills of exchange, viz., the assignment of debt. Bills of exchange have rendered debt a marketable commodity capable of being assigned in the easiest and simplest manner. Now from what I have to tell you presently you will see that the things I have mentioned hitherto all arise on the face of the instru- ment. You find the acceptance on the face as a rule — it need not be there, but you generally find it there. You will find the name of the drawee there ; you will find the name of tlie drawer there, and the name of the payee there, the amount, the dates, the time ; all will appear on the face of the instrument ; and when we go quietly through the form of a bill of exchange I shall ask you to make yourselves familiar with all that is on the face of it before ever you turn your attention to what will be on the back of it. The back of the bill itself ordinarily relates to the assignment of the debt mentioned on the face, and except, of course, the drawing in favour of the payee, which may be regarded as an exception, I still like to say that the back of the bill contains all that relates to the assignment of the debt, and on the back of the instrument will be found the transactions containing the names and signatures by which the debt is assigned. Now, you can do a very great deal at common law and equity of what is done by bills of ex- change in the matter of the assignment of debt. Of course, neither common law nor equity can 74 LECTURE III. supply ready means of giving increased value to instruments b}' the addition of names. You know a bill of exchange becomes exceedingly valuable by every name that is added to it, and it is by the simple addition of a name by way of indorsement that credit is increased and that a bill of exchange with several names on the back becomes so valuable. It is thus that bills of exchange are so readily accepted as real marketable commodities, and can be used with great facility for carrying out mercantile transactions. Now you will learn still, if you open your books, that a chose in action, or a debt, is not assignable at common law. Well, that is only so in words, because an assignee of a debt could alwaj^s sue at common law in the name of the assignor, and an assignment of the debt itself impliedly confers an authority on the assignee to use the assignor's name in all legal pro- ceedings for the purpose of recovering the debt, subject to indemnifying him against the cost of the proceedings. Still further, the law courts have by their decisions taken care to enable the assignee to carry on the action for his own benefit. Take an instance. I had a case in which the assignor, after having assigned the debt, released the debt, and to an action brought in the assignor's name the debtor pleaded the release. This seemed to offer a great obstacle to the success of the action. The same judges that had said that a chose in action was not assignable had taken every care that in practice it should. What I had to do was to go to a judge at Chambers and ask him to strike out the plea on the ground that the release was fraudulent between the plaintiff, the assignor, and the defendant, telling him I was acting for a client who was the assignee and real owner of the debt and was truly the plaintiff. He struck the plea of release out accordingly, and judg- ment was entered for tlie plaintiff for Avant of a plea. Suppose, for instance, the assignor of a debt, after the assignment, became bankrupt, and the assignee commenced an action against the debtor in the name BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 75 of the assignor, the debtor might plead the bankruptcy of the creditor, which would show prima facie that the debt was not in the plaintiff but in his trustee in bankruptcy. The plaintiff would reply that the debt had been assigned bond fide and for value prior to the bankruptcy. This would be an answer to the plea, because the trustee in bankruptcy takes only what the bankrupt is both legally and beneficially entitled to, and this replication shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the bankruptcy, had no beneficial interest in the debt, and the debt had consequently not passed to the trustee but remained in the plaintiff. If the replication was true in fact, judgment would be given for the plaintiff, of which judgment the assignee of the debt could alone avail himself. It is from these arrangements, many and complicated, you learn that even at law a chose in action can be assigned. The Chancery judges, on the other hand, openly decided that a chose in action could be assigned, and allowed the assignee to sue for the debt in his own name, making both the assignor and the debtor parties to the proceedings. The Chancery judges thus conferred great benefits on the community. Therefore, you see that some of the powers in respect to the assignment of debt incident to a bill of exchange were in existence under the common law and the law of the Court of Chancerv, and which powers still exist. Then I want to show you, that although these powers in respect of an assignment of debt still exist, what advantages the assignee of a debt obtains by means of the indorsement of a bill of exchange. The indorsee need not give any notice to any parties to the bill that he has taken the bill in order to obtain the full advantage of it. He does not know or care whether the acceptor knows of the in- dorsement to him or not ; he does not ask, and need not ask, the acceptor whether he owes the money ; he gives him no notice of any kind. He does not regard the acceptor in the slightest ; and even if there may 76 LECTURE III. have been fraud or failure of consideration in any of the dealings of the previous parties to the bill, if he is a bond fide holder for value, he will be entitled to sue all antecedent parties. Look at the advantages of bills of exchange in the matter of the assignment of debt, and how they contrast with transactions of assignment of debt at common law and in equit3\ A person in equity can assign a debt to anyone for value by any words that indicate that the one shall part with and the other become the owner of the debt ; but to be safe, the assignee must give notice to the debtor of the assignment, for if he should not, and the creditor should make an assignment for value of the same debt to a second assignee without notice of the previous assign- ment, such second assignee, giving notice to the debtor before the first assignee does so, would become the owner of the debt as against the first assignee. Now, nothing of that sort can arise with respect to a bill of exchange, and the indorsee of a bill of ex- change is not under any obligation to give the slightest notice of any kind to the persons whose names appear on the bill that he has become indorsee of the bill. There is another advantage which attaches to the indorsee of a bill of exchange, who becomes such before the bill matures, viz., that if he is the bond fide holder for value he does not take the instru- ment subject to any equity of any kind subsisting between any of the previous parties to the bill ; whereas, you know that if a man is the assignee of a chose in action he always has to take the chance of the position of the person who has given him the security or assigned to him the debt. You will find the doctrine established and illustrated in a magnificent judgment of Lord St. Leonards, then Lord Chancellor, in the case of Mangles v. Dixon, a decision which you will find in 3 House of Lords, p. 702. You will there find an accurate and admirably expressed statement of the equitable doctrines with respect to the assignment of a chose in action, and the extent to which an assignee BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 77 of a chose in action is affected by the equities existing between the assignor of the debt and the debtor. It is pleasant to read the satirical references of the Lord Chancellor to common law lawyers labouring to apply a half apprehended equity. It is worth noticing that in 1852 there was little waste of judicial power. In the case of Mangles v. Dixon, the Lord Chancellor, sitting bj"" himself, in the House of Lords, reversed the decision of Lord Cottenham delivered when Chan- cellor, and reinstated the decision of Vice -Chancellor Knight Bruce which Lord Cottenham had reversed. But although the rule in equity is that the assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to the equities sub- sisting between the assignor and his debtor, 3'et the Chancery judges have gone a step further in facilitating the assignment of debt b}' allowing a debtor to agree by the instrument that creates the debt that the per- son who takes the instrument by assignment from the ci'editor shall take it unaffected by any equities between himself and his creditor. If you follow me, this is coming very near to the power which is attained by the indorsement of a bill of exchange, but there is this further thing which has never yet been reached b}"^ the rules of equity as to assignment of debt, that the indorsee of a bill of exchange for value is entitled to the amount upon the bill as against all precedent parties to the instrument, even although there has been fraud or deceit in the inception or transfer of the bill or no real transaction to which the instrument relates. My time is up. I will proceed on the next occa- sion to call your attention shortly to the various parties that appear upon the face of specimen papers which will be laid before you. BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 79 00 rH ^ M CCi ;3 H T— ( a>5 w S CO 5 0) o < *^ 5^ 1— 1 o y< t-3 o g o r:i CO r o >. o r_ • • 1^ o si -tJ CK Cfi o ^ in o o < O -+J -TS u rd ,-(j c3 'Tl a; -M ;3 0) -~v C^ ^ CD f-H i) o; 13 crt 3 O a> fcfi X 3 n ^ o ■Ji ;; ■^ y, ^ t-H "■^ o IfJ o ^-) CH of XJ} »o W (=5 J -a C3 ..4^ «+-! c3 ^' m (D (-4 > ^ ^ ■ o '8 tUO * " M '^ o ^ S5 fl ■ ■ o Ph « o iH -S c Cft < N.S. X r.ILLS OF EXCHAXGE. 83 \ i *^ ' o ri OJ CO 1-1 -5 00 •—1 w *~ e O S ^ a o ^- <4-i » o y< o G a o 1— 1 NOSNiaO'g uogio CO :^88.^g }gT?quio'][ d o "A *00 ^ Ut3A"% eg '.Ciapjijg; '\yi aiq'eXijd Tpa:jdaooY o -+J c3 ^ ;h 1

.>J -d M (D -t-3 m i=l o W) o Q H . g tT g H d O i 5 o O) :=! x; _^ n ■ ■ o t:? '^ <^ 1 o ^ ^ 1^ o O h^ ■ • H (^ . o 'Tq M lO o f2 H ^ i-H 1 ^ 1-5 G 2 BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 85 MS ^ C5 O 00 ;5 « a ad -•J o 1^ O O u^noq ctf (i) CD -u i> ■ c» -t-3 i=; :=! o o s PlH , 1 03 (D ;h •T-I I ^1 o y-. 03 n ^ «3 : ) >". » ^ o o Pd of C/J »o W (<5 < o ^ H o O BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 87 O 7^ Oi 00 55 O « O 54-1 o ^ pf H CO 1— ( S rXi ^ ■+^ ip-t ^ r^ ^ < 0) h— ( t— 1 pq >: !h o o o o o l-l 1-5 KOSxMiaoy; saKVf' CD UOIHIO'T ^ o :;98.^g HpjBqino^ ^ -TJ o3 03 •03 :v nB.%[ .'Scp.iTJe: (D 0) o 03 pa|tl900Y u ^ O) -IJ ■^ ^ k CO r/T -1-3 a> fl 13 ■oc o O ^ C . a Ph o cS o CD l-t Q O 1 o P4 O 1— 1 w o s o o H BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 89 OS o 00 rH 5zi vT 1? o V a» oQ rO o O « 9. < « Q 2 ^ o O rj CO r5 55 le O ;> Q Z Sh O .—1 o NOsanH(J<^f 'pa-jclgooy to ONiA^i g^ 'pe-^daooy d c 0) o o ^ H H BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 1)1 o CO 1—1 ^ 00 rH o O t4-. < S^ o % "^ r-l H a> o a u c aaN'u^ Sa'IHVHQ o p9id80oy ^ P-. © HJ o3 n3 ^ ^ cu 03 • .> s puK^g '618 g^ aiqt •.{^d o aaHVT[;;^X' 'H o 'jj pa^dajajY c3 PL, (S -f3 e8 ^ ^ 0) -4^ # ti- es m A ■+3 a o g t^' 0) ^ >• 0) te o o ^ H o 12 o 1-3 rH o Cft 1 o '^ > H BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 95 o CD 00 o Q >5 Q > C4=! . a^ ^ r^ -+=> ^ f^ ^ $H Iz ^ 03 Ph o -t-3 a '^ ^ a; ,+-3 , U-: 03 a; 02 ^ o ^-3 o S o o $H 2 o 3 o "IS ^ K> H oT ■-a ^H >-( ^ o Q-i if 3 BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 97 LECTUEE IV. On the last occasion when I spoke to j'^ou, I told 3'ou that in my view it was better for you to tiy and ascertain what transactions at common law could not be the subject of bills of exchange or pro- missory notes, and what transactions could be carried out by bills of exchange or promissory notes, which could not be effected either by the principles of common law or the Courts of Equity ; and that if you carefully studied those transactions you Avould soon have in your minds a true definition of a " bill of exchange " or " promissory note," without com- mitting to memory the definition you find in the Act of Parliament of 1882, which professes to codify the law relating to bills of exchange. I also called your attention to the most important incident to a bill of exchange, namel}'^ : how it secured the assignment of debt in a safe and simple manner. I also, at the close of my last address, very hurriedly called your attention to two cases, the names of which I am afraid I did not give you, but which I want you to have, because it is worth while seeing how far the Judges of the Court of Equity have gone in endeavouring to do in the matter of the assignment of debt some portion of that which is effected by a bill of exchange. You remember I told you that in equity, a chose in action or a debt could be assigned like any other propert}^ and that the person to whom it was assigned could sue for the recovery of the debt in his own name. I told you also, that the assignee of the debt took it subject to all the equities N.S. H 98 LECTURE IV. subsisting between the assignor and the debtor, but that the Courts of Equity had gone thus far : that they had laid it down that a person might agree to contract himself out of the right to assert as against the assignee of a creditor, equities which would be available against the creditor. Whether a debtor has done so depends upon the true construction of the words he has used. In one case the Court may say the debtor has done so ; in another, that he has not. Notwithstanding, therefore, the rule just mentioned, the assignee of the debt, except in a very clear case, can never be sure he is free from the equities attaching to the debt. From all such doubt and risk the transferee of a bill of exchange is altogether and absolutely free, if endorsed to him before maturity. The law of the Courts of Equity upon this point, and the different constructions put by judges on the words employed by the debtor, may be well studied in the decision of Lord Justice Rolt in the case of In re Blakely Ordnance Company, at p. 154, and the decision of Lord Cairns in the case of In re The Natal Invest- ment Co., at p. 355 of the third volume of Law E,ep., Chancery Appeals. I call 3'our attention to those judgments in order to show you how Judges may differ as to the true meaning of the contract into which the debtor has entered, and may differ as to whether or not the party entering into the obligation has agreed that he will not avail himself as against an assignee, of an}^ equities he may be able to assert against the person wdth whom he is contracting. These two cases will show you how difficult it is to tell whether the debtor or obligor has entered into such an engagement. In the one case, Lord Justice Eolt held, that the debtor had so contracted ; in the other, Lord Cairns decided that he had not, overruling a decision of the Master of the PtoUs, who had arrived at the conclusion that the debtor had so contracted. With respect, however, to bills of exchange or promissory notes, a person in BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 99 trade or business incurs no such difficulty or risk. If he takes the instrument honesth", and for value and ■without notice, he is unaffected by anything transpir- ing between the previous parties to the instrument ; neither is he troubled with equities, nor with any con- tract into wdiicli tlie prior parties or any of them may have entered. I also forgot to tell you, when stating in respect of bills of exchange, that at every stage the pre- sumption is that it has always been dealt with or parted with for consideration, that it is always open to a part}^ to establish that there really was no con- sideration for the acceptance or indorsement of the bill, and then, of course, if the claim is between imme- diate parties, no action will lie ; and if the acceptor could sustain the same allegation between all the sub- sequent parties to the instrument, he will have an answer to any action brought upon the instrument, and no liability will exist in respect of it. When I first of all attended a lecture on bills of exchange and promissory notes, I had the advantage of having been familiar with their use whilst I was engaged in business in the Cit}'^ ; but a young man present on that occasion said to me : " I do not understand a word that has been said because I have never seen such an instrument, and I scarcely know to what the lecturer is referring. I hear the words * drawer,' * drawee,' * acceptor ' ; I have never heard them before, and I really have carried away this morning no clear and definite views of the instrument to which the lecturer has been calling our attention." Remembering the difficulty m}' fellow-stu- dent then experienced, I have taken the trouble to have certain lithographic forms* prepared, which you will find upon the tables. These I desire you to take and keep. Now, if the Lord Chief Justice of England will allow me to give him a set of the forms, and to say how cheered * The forms placed before the gentlemen attending the lecture are found printed on the pages preceding this lecture. H 2 100 LECTURE IV. we all are by his presence to-night, I will proceed at once to call your attention to No. 1 of the specimen instru- ments. No. 1 is a perfect bill of exchange. I do not mean to say that there may not be other names added, but it is in its present state a bill of exchange. It contains, as you will see, on the right-hand corner, the name of a particular person. Understand me, it is not requisite that this form should be observed ; but as I have practised at the Bar now thirty years, and have never seen any different form, you need not trouble yourselves much with some of tliose strange instruments which, fifty, sixty, or eighty years ago, troubled the Courts, and were drawn by persons who had but little intelligence. The schoolmaster has been abroad. As I was saying, you will find in the right- hand bottom corner, the name of " William Smith." He is the drawer of this instrument, and always keep that word to describe his part in the transaction. Now, if you notice, he requests that somebody will, three months after date, pay to his order the sum of £100. He, William Smith, therefore, is the drawer of the instrument. It is addressed to "James Robinson, 52, Old Change, London." His name is in the left-hand corner of the bill. He is the drawee. Keep that word as the word which, signifies the person to whom the instrument is addressed, viz., the drawee. Use it then for that purjjose and for no other. As I have said, "William Smith" is the drawer. Then I can tell 3'ou, upon the authority of Mr. Justice Patteson in the case of Davis v. Clarke, reported in 13 L. J. Q. B., p. 305, that an instrument like No. 1 (properly stamped, of course) constitutes a perfect bill of exchange, although you must have already noticed that there is no acceptance upon this instrument. Just notice that, please — there is no acceptor to this instrument No. 1, but only drawer and drawee. No doubt you remember that, in early times, an instrument such as this, a bill of exchange, was used for the purpose of providing money in distant BILLS OF EXCHANGE. lOl places to discharge obligations arising there, and the bill of exchange, therefore, was generally drawn and circulated before ever it was accepted. Let me illustrate what I mean. One man comes to another in London, and says, " I want to pay a debt in Florence ; does any- body there owe you any money ? " " Yes," is the reply. " How much ? "" " £200." " That is the sum I want ; then will you draw upon your debtor in Florence for the £200, payable to the order of my creditor, and give the instrument to me?" "I will." " How much do you want for it?" — So much. The money is paid, the bill is drawn as requested and handed over, and the debtor sends it to his creditor in Florence, who pro- cures the acceptance of the bill and, at maturity, the money. The instrument before acceptance was a perfect bill of exchange, and was dealt with as such. On the other hand, bear in mind that you cannot have a bill of exchange without a drawer, and for that you find an excellent authority in the case of Peto v. Reynolds, which is reported in 9 Exchequer Eeports, p. 410. There you will find Baron Parke saying, except in one case of Eegina v. Hawkes, 2 Moody's Crown Cases, p. 60, there is no case in the books which establishes that there can be a bill of exchange without the ex- istence of two parties, the drawer and the drawee. Now let us proceed. This bill. No. 1, as you notice, is an "inland" bill of exchange. It is drawn by one man in London upon another man in London. I have not had time to ascertain whether it be so now, but it is quite certain from an exami- nation of the works of Pothier, that a bill of exchange in his time, in France, was not valid if it was drawn by one person upon another person living and residing in the same town. I think Ai'ticle 111, Code de Commerce, shows that the law of France on the subject is still the same as in the time of Pothier. The instrument, in order to be valid as a bill of exchange, must have been drawn by a person in one town upon some person residing in another town. That is not the law of our country, and a bill drawn 102 LECTURE IV. by one person residing in London upon another person residing in London, or a bill drawn by one person re- siding in Manchester upon another person residing in Manchester is a perfectly good instrument; no objec- tion to it as a bill of exchange can be taken on the ground of the drawer and drawee residing in the same place. Another thing I should tell you is this. It is not necessary to the validity of a bill of exchange that there should be the place of business or residence either of the drawer or of the acceptor, or any place at all ; nor even that it should be stated where the instrument is payable. Next, it is not necessary that there should be a date to the instrument. It is a per- fectly good bill of exchange without any date. The date can be proved, and the date may be filled in ; and if a holder for value honestl}^ fills it in, making a mistake as to the date, it is none the less a good instrument ; and if it has been filled in with a date before it comes to a person who is a hand fide holder for value, no possible objection can be taken to it on the ground that the date has been improperly filled in. Now let me pass on. The next thing you get is the jBIOO in figures. I have told you before that a bill of exchange must be for a precise amount of money. It must fix the relation of debtor and creditor. It must be £100, or some other definite amount — iilOO, or whatever the amount is, and nothing else — not £100, and an obligation to pledge goods ; not £100, or the delivery of certain goods in lieu of the £100. It must be a precise sum of money that is the subject of the drawing. It may, however, be payable by instal- ments. You may have the £100, in the body of it payable by instalments, and you may have, if you like, a proviso that on the non-payment of any one instal- ment the whole shall become due and payable. But now I must tell you that the figures on a bill are controlled by the words of the bill. If you notice, in the bill as I have drawn it, there is " £100 " in figures and "One Hundred Pounds" in words. I BILLS Oy EXCHANGE. 103 will here give you the names of two cases, both of which are worthy of your study. The first is the case of Sanderson v. Piper, reported in 5 Bingham's New Cases, p. 431. In that case the figures were " s6250 " and the words in the body of the instrument " Two Hundred Pounds." Held, that the bill was only good for ;£200, and not for iJ250. Then, in the case of Garrard V. Lewis, reported in 10 Queen's Bench Division, p. 30, the late Lord Bowen, then Lord Justice Bowen, sitting as a judge of first instance, decided that until the words are filled in, in the body of the instrument, the instrument in question is not a bill. His Lord- ship does Jiot say that if there are no figures in the margin it is not a bill — quite the contrary ; nor do I understand him to say, that if in the body of the instrument instead of "One Hundred Pounds" being in words the ".£100" is in figures, that that Avould not be a good bill. There are two or three cases that I could give you in Vvhich, as far as I can judge, there were no figures at all in the margin of the instrument, the amount was not given in words, but the amount was put in figures in the body of the instru- ment, and it was held to be, and must be held to be, a good bill of exchange. But in the case of Garrard v. Lewis, Lord Bowen adopted this view, that the words so far controlled the figures that the figures themselves are not a material part of the instrument, and that the fact of their having been altered does not constitute a material alteration of the instrument so as to avoid the bill. Now, the next thing I want to call attention to is this. I have drawn this bill. No. 1, in this form : — " Three months after date pay to my order." That is a perfectly good, common form. It may sometimes be, " Pay to nie or my order." Now I want to tell you the importance of those few words. If you look at writers such as Pothier, he tells you that you cannot have a bill of exchange unless there are three parties to the instrument — drawer, drawee, and a payee, as distinct from the drawer. Let me illustrate it 104 LECTURE IV. in this way : When, for instance, a person wanted to send money to a distant town, he said to the person whose bill he was getting, "Draw it upon your cor- respondent in favour of the person whose debt I want to discharge ; " so that a bill of exchange drawn in London upon a person in Florence, payable to a person in Florence, on being paid by the acceptor would discharge the debt which he owed to the drawer, and, the bill being made payable to the creditor, would, as soon as that money reached his hands discharge the debt due to him from the person who procured and forwarded the bill. You would have in that case drawer, drawee, payee. According to the law of France when Pothier wrote, although the French law now is in conformity with the English in this respect, there must be these three parties to the instrument in order that it might be a bill of exchange. Our law has not required the existence of three persons. By our law the drawer may be himself the payee. You see the importance of this difference to the trade of this country. When a man is in business, and he sells a parcel of goods amounting in the whole, say, to £175, he may have no person in his mind to whom he wants to pass the bill on the day he draws it, but he desires to have a bill of exchange in his possession, ready for use whenever necessary. He therefore draws the bill payable to his order. See the wisdom with which our Judges have built up our law following all the needs of commerce itself. They have held that such an instru- ment is a valid bill of exchange. So that now you may have an instrument, "Pay to me or my order." A trader does not want to use the bill to-da}^ nay, he may wait until perhaps he gets i;20,000 or £30,000 worth of such bills, good trade bills, and then he takes them to a bill broker or to his bankers for discount. He gets the money value of the bills, meets his engage- ments, and carries on, let us hope, a successful business. I would refer you in this connection to the ^ BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 105 fluJM. case of iJSg Stoltz, wliich is reported in 6 Modern Reports, p. 29. The decision in that case that those simple words " me or my order " made " a good bill of exchange " was a most important decision for the trade and business of this country. Now, of course, you may have a bill drawn tlius : " Pay to bearer." I had not time to have a lithographed form for every j)Ossible instrument; but j'ou can write the words " or bearer" over the words '* or order," in No. 1. Now if you notice I have put upon the form No. 1, " Three months after date." That is three months from the 1st February, You might have " Three months after sight," and that means three months from the time when the bill is presented for acceptance. It is legall}^ seen at sight whenever it is presented for acceptance, and if it is not accepted it is dishonoured, upon which proceedings can at once be taken against the person from whom the bill was received. You can write " sight," over *' date." Now you can also have the bill drawn payable " on demand," and a bill of exchange of course would be payable on demand where the words are "on demand," or if there is no time mentioned at all it would be pa3'able on demand ; or, if it is payable " at sight" or payable " on presentation," the bill of exchange would then be payable on demand. I hurry forward because most of the things I am now mentioning you will find in the provisions of the Act of 1882 ; but I am anxious to talk to you in a plain, simple way, so that having heard me you may be able to avail yourselves of its provisions in any emergency. Now there is another thing I must mention. No. 1 is an " inland " bill of exchange. An inland bill of exchange has been defined long since. An inland bill of exchange is one that either is or purports to be drawn within the British Isles and payable therein, or one which is actually drawn within the British Isles upon a person resident therein, even although it may be payable out of the United Kingdom. This is the definition of an "inland" bill of exchange, and every 106 LECTURE IV. other instrument outside this definition is a *' foreign " bill of exchange. Now let me tell you that you can have two persons or more as drawers, drawees, and acceptors, and they need not be partners. You may have three or four if you like, but you cannot have them successively or alternatively ; it must be addressed to them jointly as if they were one person. Then I need scarcely tell you that anyone accepting will be liable as acceptor although the other drawees do not accept. Keep these simple views in your mind and j^ou will have very little difficulty in dealing with such an instrument. You may, of course, have two or more persons drawing, but they must constitute as it were one drawer, or 3'ou may have two or three persons, as persons to whom the bill is addressed, but you cannot have them successively or alternatively — it must be addressed to one or more persons con- stituting, as it were, one drawee of the instrument. There is another thing which it is important for you young men to remember, because I have seen mistakes made by reason of forgetting it. This bill No. 1 is drawn without any acceptance thereon. It has a drawee, but as 3'et it has not been accepted. I shall hereafter, have to discuss with you the passing of a promissory note or bill of exchange by indorsement or delivery. Suppose, then, the first specimen bill, No. 1, has been passed away through five or six hands and at length it is taken to Mr. Robinson at Old Change and he refuses to accept ; who can sue Mr. Robinson for not accepting ? Only the person who can say that Mr. Robinson has agreed with him to accept the bill. Therefore remember that if you take a bill without acceptance you, the holder of it, can sue the drawer and all intermediate indorsers ; and of course if j^ou have several good names on the bill it may be almost as good as a Bank of England note. Still you have no action against the drawee if he does not accept, BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 107 and if by chance you have taken the bill because it is drawn upon a resj^onsible person from a drawer who is a man without means, you may find yourself ultimately in the possession of a piece of paper of little or no value. As a general rule the only person who can sue the drawee for non-acceptance is the drawer, and in specimen No. 1 he is William Smith ; but then William Smith cannot sue for non-acceptance unless Mr. Robinson has agreed to accept. William Smith may still, however, resort to the consideration for the bill, viz., goods sold and delivered or money lent, but he cannot sue Robinson for not accepting this bill unless there has been a promise to do so. I hurry over these matters because I have to comprise all I have to sa}' on negotiable securities in only a few lectures. Now the next specimen is No. 2. Here you will find that the bill has been accepted, and you see "Accepted ; payable at Barcla}', Bevan & Co., Lombard Street, London : James Robinson," written across the face of the instrument. Now that is the ordinary form in which a bill is accepted. Let me tell you that prior to the 1st & 2nd George IV. cap. 78, a bill of exchange might be accepted by word of mouth. I need not stay to trouble you with cases which show the disadvantages of such a state of the law. Since the 1st & 2nd George IV. cap. 78, the acceptance of an inland bill of exchange must be in writing on the instrument or on some one part of the instru- ment if it is drawn in two, three, or four bills con- stituting a set. The law continued unaltered with respect to foreign bills of exchange down to the 19th & 20th Vict. cap. 97, but from that time forward the acceptance of a "foreign" bill of exchange must be in writing either on the bill itself, or on one of the fom' bills which, as a rule, make the set in the case of a " foreign" bill of exchange. Every accept- ance, therefore, now of a bill of exchange must be in writing. There was a great discussion many years ago 108 LECTURE IV. as to what was the effect of an acceptance payable at a particular place, such as that j^ou read on No. 2 : — "Accepted; pa3'able at Barclay, Bevan & Co., Lom- bard Street, London ; James Eobinson." Was that a general acceptance or a qualified acceptance ? That is to say, in order to charge the acceptor with the non-payment of this instrument were you bound to present it for payment at Barclay, Bevan & Co. ? The question was set at rest by that very same Act, 1st & 2nd Geo. IV. cap. 78, which enacted that an acceptance like the one you see on the second form should not be deemed a qualified acceptance at all, but a general acceptance, with respect to place. I shall have to shew j'-ou that you can have a qualified acceptance with respect to everj^thing almost, except as to the way in which the bill shall be paid. You cannot have a qualified acceptance to pay the bill in goods, or in services ; but with these exceptions you can have the bill accepted conditionally in all manner of ways. The Act of Parliament above mentioned provides that no acceptance shall be deemed to be a qualified acceptance as to place, unless the acceptor shall in his acceptance express that he accepts the bill payable at a banker's house or other place " only and not other- wise or elsewhere." If you find these words as part of the acceptance, then you cannot charge the acceptor unless you have presented the bill for payment at Barclay, Bevan & Co., or any other place at which the acceptor may have made the bill payable. You need not present it at once or auy fixed day. Presentation at any time within six years will be sufficient to charge the acceptor. Mind you, I am not speaking of charging the drawer, indorser, or payee, but with respect to charging the acceptor. At any time you can present the bill at the place mentioned on the instrument, and you will have a j)erfectly good cause of action against the acceptor if the bill is not honoured ; but you will have no cause of action against him until you do so present it. Now let me say again that it is not necessary BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 109 to have such a formal acceptance as appears on No. 2. "Accepted, James Kobinson," would be perfectly good. On a certam day, in a moment of forget- fulness which comes even to the most brilliant intellects when they are on the bench, some judges, quite for- getting previous decisions, decided that James Robin- son did not accept a bill if he merel}' put " Accepted ; James Bobinson." To correct the mistake, an Act of Parliament was passed, the 41 Vict. cap. 13. By this Act it is enacted that the word " accepted " and a name shall be a perfectly good acceptance. But long- before this Act it had been decided that if you had a name across a bill answering to the name of the drawee, without the word " accepted," that would be a perfectly good acceptance ; and so now, under the Act of 1882, you can have four forms: "James Bobinson ; " " Accepted ; James Bobinson ; " " Ac- cepted ; payable at Barclay, Bevan & Co., bankers, Lombard Street ; " and then, lastly, the fourth, " Ac- cepted ; payable at Barclay, Bevan & Co. only, not elsewhere and not otherwise." Keep these distinctions in your minds and you will be able to deal with the various instruments as the}" come before you. Now just let me ask you for a moment to take in your hands specimen No. 3 — you find there is no drawer's name : William Smith's name is not there, as on No. 1 and No. 2 — and assume, if j'ou please, that all the rest is on the instrument, addressed to " James Bobinson, Old Change, London "; "Accepted ; payable at Barclay, Bevan & Co., Lombard Street, London ; James Robinson." Now I should like you to take the view which I generally adopt for myself, viz., that the specimen No. 3 is not an instrument of any kind. You find that in No. 3 you have no name of a drawer, and as I have told you, it cannot, there- fore, be a bill of exchange. For a bill of exchange, you must have a drawer. I do not like to speak of it, when I wish to avoid all error, even as an acceptance in blank or an inchoate bill, althougli both these terms 110 LECTURE IV. are applied to such a document. In the state in which you see it, it is not worth more than the paper on which the words are written. When a drawer's name is lawfully placed upon it, it will become a bill of exchange, and the words across the face of it will become an acceptance. The calling such a document as this by the right name may be of practical import- ance in other cases than those in which an action may be brought upon such a document. Thus, some few years ago an action was brought against a railway company for the loss of goods, and a claim was made for the loss of nine sovereigns. The com- pany said they were not responsible for their loss, because the parcel contained gold and securities to the value of £20. A railway company, as you all know, is not responsible for gold and other securities above the value of £10, unless notice of the contents of the parcel has been given to them. The parcel contained nine sovereigns, and an instrument exactly like specimen No. 3. No notice of the contents had been given. The instrument had been given by the person who wrote the words across the face of it for goods sold and delivered to him, with an authority, of course, to the vendor to fill up the bill with his name as drawer. When the instrument was received by the railway company there was no drawer's name upon it. The Court held that the parcel contained gold and securities only to the extent of £9, because the instru- ment was not a security at all, and was in its then state nothing more than a piece of paper, and of no pecuniar}' value at all ; and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the loss of the nine sovereigns. Slocssigcr v. SoutJt Eastern Hallway Company, 3 Ellis and Blackburn, p. 549. I desire to call your attention to other cases, which show what an essential part of a bill the drawing is. There have been three ver}' important cases on this matter. Let me just give j'ou one. Ex parte Haywood, re Haywood, L. R. 6 Chan. Ap. 546. The question arose BILLf? OF EXCHANGE. Ill on a petition in bankruptcy. A creditor says : " I have a bill of exchange accepted by the person against whom the petition is presented ; he has not met the bill. He has committed an act of bankruptcy. I want him adjudicated a bankrupt." "Oh," says an intelligent young junior, just called, full of learning, " Sir, an order of adjudication cannot properly be made. This bill of exchange, it is true, bears date the 17th March ; true, the assignment for the benefit of creditors was on the 4th of April, upon which reliance is placed as an act of bankruptcy ; the act of bankruptcy is subsequent to the date of this bill. It is drawn, sir, I admit ; it is a perfect instrument ; but I propose to show you that although the acceptor's name was put on the instrument on the 17th of March the drawer's name was not put there until the 24th of May." " Oh," says the Registrar, *' what has that to do with it ? He has committed an act of bankruptcy, and he accepted the bill prior thereto. I shall make him a bankrupt." Lord Justice James and Lord Justice Mellish, when the case is brought before them, say : " Oh, no ; there never was a bill of exchange at all until the 24th of May, when the drawer's name was put to it." " Oh, but it became a bill of exchange at the date of the bill, because the drawing relates back to the date of the acceptance," says the counsel for the petitioning creditor. Keply : " No, there is no relation backwards ; the drawing cannot relate back to the date of the acceptance. That instrument never had any existence as a bill until the 24th of May, when it was drawn, nor was the person against whom the petition is presented an acceptor until then. The act of bankruptcy was committed on the 4th of April, at a time when the petitioning creditor was not a creditor at all. And as the petitioning creditor's debt must be subsisting at the time of the act of bankruptcy, the adjudication must be annulled." You know how men smiJe when you talk in Court of ele- mentary principles, forgetting that almost every case in Court is determined by the application of some 112 LECTURE IV. elementary principle, which, if stated at the beginning of the argument, none would dispute. In the case of Baxendale v. Bennett, reported in Law Eeports, 3 Queen's Bench Div., p. 525, you will see the importance of ascertaining when and how the instru- ment came to have a drawer's name upon it. In that case the defendant put his name as acceptor across the face of a piece of paper with a bill stamp upon it for the purpose of raising money. A drawer's name was not upon it. He put the piece of paper in his desk, and one day left his desk open. Somebody took the paper out, and filled it up with a drawer's name. It got into the hands of a bond fide holder for value. Held, the bond fide holder could not recover; that this paper never had any existence as a bill of ex- change by the authority of the person who had put his name across it as if he would become an acceptor. Kead that case, study it, and you v/ill be in possession of all the learning bearing on this question. Now take another case in the same volume of Reports, the case of Hogarth v. Latham, p. 643 ; and there you will see that a man who puts words across an instru- ment that is stamped, purporting to accept, and parts with it without the amount being filled up and without a drawer's name to the instrument, may find, if he has authorised such person to become drawer or to permit anyone else to become the drawer, that he has clothed the person to whom he has surrendered the document with authority to fill it up to the largest amount of money the stamp will cover. But if a person, however honestly, takes a piece of paper on which an acceptor's name appears but no drawer's name, then, according to the authorities as I read them, he runs the risk of the person who gives him the instrument not having authority to allow a drawer's name to be put to the instrument. If it turns out that authority to put a drawer's name has been given, then no question arises ; but if not, then the instrument has not become a bill of exchange, and the pers^on who has put his name BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 113 across it as acceptor cannot be made liable as acceptor. If, when you take what is called a blank acceptance from any person other than the so-called acceptor, you see that there is no drawer's name there, and you are going to put your name as drawer or ask somebody else to become the drawer, then it will be at your risk whether what is being done is done with the sanction of the person who has put these words, "Accep- ted payable," across the piece of paper. Read, there- fore, the last two cases that I have given you, and those of you who are engaged in business will see at once the importance of never taking without enquiry an instrument on which there is not a drawer's name. Of course, 3'ou cannot tell when it is already filled up whether any wrong has been done ; but if 3'ou find there is no drawer's name filled in, then you run the risk of whatever is done in the way of drawing the bill, not havmg been done with the authority of the person who has put his name across the instrument. Now the acceptance I have told you may be qualified or conditional; the drawing never can be. It seems by the law of France there cannot even be a conditional acceptance. Supposing you draw for £100 pa3'able out of the proceeds of certain goods to be sold, that is not a bill of exchange. Suppose you draw for ^OlOO payable on realization of a cargo, that is also not a bill of exchange. Suppose you draw for iGlOO payable on the arrival of a vessel, that is not a good bill. Suppose j-ou draw for ^£100, but tell the drawee he may pay himself out of a particular fund, that is a good bill. Suppose you draw for iSlOO, and tell the drawee to charge it to a certain account, the instrument is still a biU of ex- change. Suppose you draw for £100, stating the reason for drawing it, namely, " pm'suant to a memorandum," that is still a good bill. Those are good bills, but if you have either an uncertain amount of money, or you have a certain amount with an obligation to do something more than to pay the money, or you have a contin- genc}'^ of the kind I have expressed annexed to the draw- N.S. I 114 LECTURE IV. ing, there is no bill. Remember, also, you cannot have a contingency as to the time for the payment of the money — " Pay three months after Caius shall return from Rome " would not be a good bill. If it were three months after the happening of an event, although uncer- tain as to time, but one that is sure to happen, it would nevertheless be a good bill. Therefore, if it were " three months after the death of A. B;," it would be a perfectly good bill. Just keep those things in your minds. On the other hand do not forget this, that you can have a quali- fied acceptance. A man can say : " Yes, I accept, payable when I have realized a cargo ; " or " I accept payable on the giving up certain bills of lading to me ; " or, " I accept payable on being put in funds at a particular bank by a certain day." An acceptor may qualify his acceptance almost in any way he likes, and if such an acceptance is taken it is a perfectly good acceptance. I will speak in a moment of the obligation of the person who takes a qualified acceptance to give notice to the previous parties to the instrument that he has done so, but it is a perfectly good acceptance, if it is taken. Now, you can have a bill drawn for ^6100, and the drawee may accept for £50. Understand that. He can change the place and time. He can accept (apart from the question of stamp duty), at three months although the bill is drawn at two months. Therefore never forget that whilst an acceptance may be under all conditions almost, and under all circumstances, qualified in ever}' way except as to the method of paying, there can be no qualification as to the drawing ; there must be an unconditional request. You will meditate upon this distinction. No condition can enter into the drawing of a bill of exchange, but the acceptance may be conditional in the various ways which I have men- tioned to you. Having told you this, I must now say to you that a man who holds a bill as indorsee, and who is going to take a qualified acceptance, will take it at his own risk. " To be sure, what business have vou to take a KILLS OF EXCHANGE. 115 qualified acceptance ? " the drawer may say to him. The holder takes it at his own risk, and he will therehy discharge all the parties previous to himself if the acceptance is not taken with their authoritj^, express or implied ; but if he informs them of his having taken the qualified acceptance, and they do not express their dissent to the holder within a reasonable time, they will be deemed to have assented thereto. Therefore at once you must inform the prior parties to the bill, if 3^ou take a conditional acceptance, of what you have done, and if they do not dissent, the acceptance will be binding, and they will still continue liable upon the bill. Of course, a qualified acceptance offered by the drawee may be refused, and the holder who can only get a qualified acceptance may treat the bill as dishonoured by non-accei)tance, and at once render all previous parties liable. Now I desire to call your attention to a bill drawn in favour of a payee. Take specimen No. 4. " Three months after date pay to James Johnson or order." This is the convenient way, if you want to discharge an obligation to Mr. Johnson, of drawing the bill. There is one thing I ought to tell you here — that I think the Act of 1882 has changed the law with respect to a point arising in connection with a bill drawn in favour of a payee. Suppose a bill had been drawn thirty or forty years ago, " Three months after date pay James Johnson," that would have been held to be an instrument not transferable, because it is not said to be to the order of James Johnson ; but now under the Act of 1882, where a bill is made payable to a particular individual, without saying to his order, and there are no words restricting the transfer of the instrument, then the instrument is as transferable as if it had been drawn payable to the man and his order. Therefore you may take it from me, that if the specimen No. 4 had been drawn, " Three months after date pay to James Johnson," alone, that would, since 1882, have been an instru- I 2 116 LECTURE IV. ment capable of transfer ; and James Johnson (by a method which we shall discuss, I hope, at our next lecture, when I come to speak to you about the passing of property in bills of exchange and promissory notes) could pass it as readil}' and freely as the payee could in the specimen No. 4. You know that I have told you that at one time it was thought a bill of exchange must have a payee, but that is no longer necessary, at all events by the law of England, and a bill of exchange may be drawn to the order of the drawer. Then I have framed the next instrument, No. 5, as it appears payable to bearer, because it will be of service when I come to deal with the passing of property in a bill of exchange. There, as you will see, it is drawn payable to " James Johnson or bearer." I wish now to call your attention to specimen No. 6, because I want you to understand that no person can be an acceptor of a bill unless the bill has been ad- dressed to him. See the importance of this in the case I am about to mention. Look, then, at specimen No. 6. Many of you, I dare say, at once will see the point, as you are more familiar with the cases than I am. Form No. 6 has been taken from the case of Jackson v. Hudson, reported in 2 Campbell, p. 447. You see the acceptance reads thus: "Accepted J. Irving ; accepted Jos. Hudson, payable at Mr. Hudson's, 132, Oxford Street." You will notice upon this instrument, therefore, the names of two persons as acceptors. There is no objection in that form, because if the bill is addressed to two people in their separate names, not in the name of a partnership, their names must be put the one after the other. The objection taken before Lord EUenborough was, that Mr. Hudson could not be sued as the acceptor, because he was not a drawee, not a person to whom the bill was addressed. Lord EUenborough held that the objection was fatal, and ever since his day, it has been held that no person, no matter what words he uses, can be the acceptor of BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 117 a bill unless lie is a person to whom the bill has been,rv^ ^/^»« f'^'^* addressed. >( It is addressed onlj' to Irving, and not . (^ ■ to Hudson. What was the position of Hudson ? He ' ^Kj. ^\ l. was surety. Mr. Jackson would not sell his goods to / ^y^ i^ Mr. Irving without having Hudson's undertaking to * JiJ^^'^*^! pay if Irving did not. Instead of drawing the bill on 'L^- "v^^ Hudson as well as Irving, which would have been J^ perfectly in order, it is addressed only to " Irving," the parties, I have no doubt, thinking that if Hudson put his name as acceptor it imposed upon him the responsibility of acceptor. After this decision it is certain that the only action that would lie against Hudson would be an action upon a promise to indem- nify Mr. Jackson against Mr. Irving's failing to pay for the goods that he purchased. That, as you know, would be an action of assumpsit sounding in damages, and you would have to show that the instrument signed by Hudson complied with the provisions of the 4tli section of the Statute of Frauds, which I'equires such promise to be in writing. I do not say this instrument might not satisfy the statute. But do not let your clients or anybody for whom you are acting get into a position of doubt. Keep them in a straight, clear path ; and if you know the law beforehand, you always will. Having said thus much on Form No. 6, let me now pass to specimen No. 7. This is a very interesting case. I wonder (if I did not tell you) how long it would take you to find out the objection that was taken to this instrument. From it you will see that Mr. Sustanance draws the instrument and puts his name to it as drawer. Now see what he has written. Look at the left-hand corner, where you would expect to find the drawee's name. You do not find the name of any drawee ; you only find, " Payable at No. 1, Wilmot Street, Bethnal Green, London." Then you will see across the face of the bill, " Accepted ; Charles Milner." In an action brought against Charles Milner, as acceptor of the bill, to recover the sum for which it 118 LECTURE IV. was drawn, an objection was taken that Charles Mihier was not an acceptor because his name did not appear upon the instrument as a drawee. The Court held that before acceptance there was no drawee's name, but that as soon as Charles Milner put his name as acceptor, the words in the left-hand corner of the bill became definite and certain, and the acceptor acknowledged by his acceptance that he was the person to whom the bill was addressed. I am glad to tel] you that it is the law of France and one or two other countries that instruments like the one you are now considering are perfectl}^ good as acceptances. The case is reported under the name of Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunton's Keports, p. 739. The principle of it was stated in a subsequent case to be that a bill of exchange made payable at a particular place or house is meant to be addressed to the person who resides at that place, and if a man puts his name to it the presumption is, until the contrary appears, that he is the person residing there, and the person to whom it is addressed. Now, if I may trespass upon your time for a moment or two longer than usual to-night, let me give you another illustration. I want to draw your attention to specimen No. 8. This specimen bill is a very im- portant one. If you look at it you will see that John Havt is the drawer, and you will also see in the left- hand corner that John Hart is the drawee. John Hart has drawn upon himself. It has been placed now beyond all dispute that where a man draws upon himself the instrument is a perfectly good one, but it will be (at the election of the holder) either a pro- missory note or a bill of exchange. Treat John Hart as the drawer of a bill of exchange, and the holder may have to give him notice of dishonour in order to charge him. Treat him as a maker of a promissory note, and the holder will be free from all such obligation. So that if he says you have not given him notice of dishonour of the instrument so as to BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 119 charge liim as drawer you may say: "You drew upon yourself, and I, therefore, am entitled to consider the instrument either as a bill of exchange or as a promissory note ; I treat it as a promissory note, and you, the maker, require no notice, and your obligation continues for six years from the time the instrument matured." But there is another and far more important matter to consider. Look and see how the instrument is accepted. It is : " Accepted, H. J. Clarke, payable at 319, Strand." Mr. Clarke was sued as acceptor. He took the objection that he was not the person upon whom the bill was drawn, and consequently could not become an acceptor and sued as an acceptor. It was assumed that John Hart and H. J. Clarke were diiferent persons. This instrument is taken from the case of Davis v. Clarke, which is reported in 13 Law Journal, Queen's Bench, and in 6 Queen's Bench, p. 16. The Court decided that no action would lie against Clarke ; he was not the acceptor of the instrument because it was not addressed to him, and it made no difference that Mr. John Hart, the person upon whom it was drawn, was one and the same person with the Mr. John Hart who drew it. Mr. Clarke, therefore, under that instrument could neither be made responsible as acceptor nor as the maker of a promissory note, and no obligation rested upon Mr. Clarke under the instrument. Now let me pass on and deal with the next specimen, No. 9, and with its examination my address shall finish. This form is taken from the case of Fielder v. Marshall, reported in 9 Common Bench, New Series, p. 606. I should like you to try your judgment upon this instrument before I tell you about the question that arose and the decision at which the Court arrived. You see it is drawn b}^ Ann Langstaffe, in favour of Mrs. Emma Fielder. Now in the corner what is there written? — "To Mrs. Emma Fielder, Trafalgar Square, Chelsen." Is that person the drawee? Then the acceptance is : " Accepted ; payable at 50, King 120 LECTURE IV. William Street, City, Samuel Marshall." Samuel Marshall is sued, as the acceptor of the bill, by Emma Fielder, as the payee of the bill. The objection was taken that Samuel Marshall had never accepted any such bill, because he was not on the face of the instru- ment the drawee, or, in other words, the bill had never been addressed to him. Looking at the specimen, it is clear that Marshall is not the drawee, and could not become acceptor by anything he chose to write on the face of the instrument. The objection seems a good one. Then it was suggested for the plaintiff that if Marshall could not be sued as an acceptor, he could be sued as the maker of a promissory note. To this, answer was made that he might be so, if there were no drawee on the face of the bill ; but that there was such a drawee, namely, Mrs. Emma Fielder, whose name you see in the left-hand corner of the instrument. The Court, however, came to the conclusion that Mrs. Fielder was not a drawee ; that her address in the corner was not a direction of the bill to her, but a mere repetition of that which was contained in the body of the instrument, namel}', that pay- ment is to be made to her or her order. The Court said it was a case in which there was a direction to no one, and if the defendant could not be made liable as an acceptor he must be regarded as the maker of a promissory note. The plaintiff, therefore, recovered the full amount of the instrument. I am obliged to you for the attention you have paid to me to-night. I trust that by the practical illustrations I have given you, the nature of a bill of exchange is rising clear in your minds otherwise than by a mere effort to recall the different definitions which others have prepared for you. No. 10. William Smith, pay Thomas Daft (or Order), James Kichardson. Thomas Daft. William Hartley. Mark Phillips, pay James Saunders, George French. James Saunders, pay William Eobertson, (Acceptor) James Eobinson. pay Jonathan George, William Eobertson. / / / BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 123 OS 00 o r-t ^ K CO O K— 1 tH ^ Oi 1 a i o ^ J ■^ -^ ^ ^ t—l •\ ,.^ t-^ o O t— 1 Q ^ o ^ r-^ ^ o t> '^ ?- 'S r3 o pq o o crt c5 "^ as ^^ I g JIT o ^-1 _2 O g o ^ CD o S ^ S ^ o *-» LECTUKE V. On the last occasion I called your attention to important matters appearing on the face of the bill of exchange, and I told j^ou that on this, the next occasion, I should call your attention to important matters appearing on the back of the bill of exchange. But I am bound to tell you that an acceptance may be as well on the back as on the face of the bill, and that which people call an endorsement may be on the face of the instrument. Still, I myself have never seen a bill of exchange in which the acceptance was not on the face of it ; I have never seen an indorsement which was not on the back as I now invite you to regard it. Now, before speaking of the transfer and assignment of the debt, which is established by the drawing and acceptance on the face of the instrument, let me for one moment call your attention to the nature of the consideration which must subsist, in order that either the drawer or the indorsee may be said to be a holder for value. Now the " consideration," we are told, is generally something of some value in the eye of the law ; it may be anything that brings profit or advantage or benefit to the promisor, or it ma}^ be some detriment or loss which the promisee, at the request of the promisor, incurs, or some responsibility which he undertakes ; and you gentlemen practising the law, must make 3'ourselves familiar with the cases which establish what is, and would be in the contemplation of a judge, a consideration for any promise. But I may say 126 LECTURE V. to persons who are in business, and who have to deal every day with these instruments, that a bill of ex- change or promissory note or cheque, whether given on account of an antecedent debt or in pursuance of a promise made at the time the debt arose, is an instru- ment given for " consideration " or for value. Now it is important to keep this statement in your minds, because at one time it was supposed that the title of a creditor to a bill of exchange or promissory note, given on account of an antecedent debt, rested upon an implied agreement on his part to suspend his remedies in respect of the debt. If the bill or note were payable at a subsequent date, however short, the creditor would, on this principle, be a holder for value of the bill of exchange or promissory note. It was con- tended, and in one case was so decided, that where the security given on account of a past debt was a bill of exchange or a promissory note or cheque payable on demand, the person who took it was not a holder for value. It was said that in such case there was no con- sideration, because the creditor could immediately de- mand payment of the sum due on the instrument, and did not suspend, nor agree to suspend, his remedies in respect of the antecedent debt. The case to which I have just referred is Crofts v. Beale, which is reported in 11 Common Bench, p. 172. The defendant was there sought to be made liable, on a jjromissory note payable on demand, for ,£400. At the trial it was proved that John Beale was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of iiljOOO, and that, being pressed for payment, he and the defendant gave the plaintiff their joint and several note for 5^400, upon which the action was brought. The jury found there was no agreement to forbear proceedings in respect of the debt of £1,000, or any part thereof, and the Court held that under the circumstances there was no consideration for the promissory note, and the defendant was relieved from all liability. To-day, for reasons to be given, the action would be an undefended one. The same Court, BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 127 however, in the case of Belshaw v. Bush (11 Common Bench, p. 191), decided that a bill of exchange given on account of a debt is a conditional payment of the debt, and that until the condition is defeated the bill of exchange operates as an absolute pa)anent of the debt. This principle was applied subsequently in a \Qvy important case to bills of exchange and promissory notes payable on demand, and cheques, involving thereby the reversal of the case of Crofts v. Beale, the particulars of which I have just given j'ou. The case which I sub- mit to you overruled Crofts v. Beale is the case of Currie v. Misa, reported in Law Reports, 10 Exchequer, p. 153. I particularly call your attention to the judg- ment of Mr. Justice Lush, delivering the opinion of the majority of the judges in the Court of Appeal. The other judges who concurred with Justice Lush were Justices Quain, Archibald, and Keating. In the case of Currie v. Misa a cheque, pay- able therefore immediately, was drawn by the defen- dant Misa on his bankers in favour of Mr. Lizardi or bearer. Lizardi paid the cheque to Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co. on account of a debt which Lizardi owed them. The cheque was not taken for collec- tion. I wish you to note the difference between an instrument taken for collection and an instru- ment which bankers take on account of a debt due to them. In the latter case, if they take the instrument without suspicion, they are clearly bond fide holders for value for the full amount. If of course they take a cheque to collect, they may have a lien upon that cheque ; and not only has the banker a lien on the cheque given to him by his customer for collec- tion, but he is deemed, under the provisions of the Act of 1882, section 27, subsection 3, to be a bond fide holder for value to the extent of his lien ; and therefore it appears that as to ever}' instrument in the possession of a banker upon which he has a lien, if it is a negotia- ble instrument, he acquires a perfectly good title to it to the extent of his Hen against all persons who may claim 128 LECTURE V. the bill from him. Either because Lizardi had been guilty of fraud, or there was an entire failure of con- sideration between himself and the defendant, it was assumed in argument that Lizardi could not maintain any action on the cheque against the defendant. The question then came to be whether the plaintiffs could maintain an action against the defendant by reason of their being bond fide holders for value. It was admitted they were bond fide holders, but a great contention arose as to whether they were holders for value, or whether, in other words, they gave consideration to Lizardi for the cheque. Mr. Justice Lush said that he would not stay to con- sider whether there was a consideration by way of for- bearance for the cheque, although he and his brethren thought there was ; and you will see his reference to the authorities and his reasoning in support of that view on pp. 162, 163. Mr. Justice Lush and the majority of the judges decided in favour of the plaintiff on a broader ground than that of whether there was legally any con- sideration by way of forbearance for the cheque. They held that an existing debt forms of itself a sufficient con- sideration for a negotiable security payable on demand, so as to constitute the creditor to whom it is given a holder for value. It is scarcely possible to overrate the importance of this judgment to the commercial com- munity. The decision is impaired by the dissenting judgment of the late Lord Coleridge. It is, however, the judgment of four eminent practical lawyers. When the case was before the House of Lords, see 1 App. Cas. p. 554, the Law Lords do not seem to have adopted the simple principle of Mr. Justice Lush, but to have discussed the question whether there was a consideration for the cheque as between Lizardi and Misa. The House of Lords, differing from the assump- tion of the judges in the Exchequer Chamber, held that there was, and that Lizardi could have sued Misa on the cheque. In that view of the case it became unim- portant to consider whether Glyn, Mills & Co. gave BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 129 Lizardi consideration for the cheque, although the Law Lords thought they had by the delivery up of a document which Lizardi had drawn upon Misa. The question, therefore, whether an antecedent debt formed of itself a sufficient consideration for a ne- gotiable security payable on demand remained, even after the decision of the Exchequer Chamber in Currie V, Misa, still an open question. It was at length set at rest by section 27, sub-sec. b of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, by which, in conformity with Mr. Justice Lush's decision, it is enacted that an antecedent debt or liability is deemed a valuable consideration for a bill, whether the bill is payable on demand or at a future time. You will read the section for yourself, because in this part of my course my lectures are only an introduction I hope to your complete mastery and study of this Act of 1882, mj' object being simply to facilitate your study of all its various clauses. The pro- vision I have stated relating to a bill of exchange applies to a promissory note and to a cheque. It is therefore clear law now, that a person who takes bond Jide and for a past debt a negotiable instrument payable on demand acquires a title to it independent of the question of forbearance. So much for the question of consideration ; but j'ou must keep it in mind, because if a man draws a bill upon an acceptor, and there is no consideration for the drawing, and the name is lent for the accommodation of the drawer, no action will lie by the drawer against the ac- ceptor ; and if the drawer should pass it to another person without value, such person cannot sue the acceptor. But remember, if you are jileading to an action on a bill against the acceptor, you must allege failure of consideration between the acceptor and drawer, and failure of consideration between the drawer and the holder ; and remember this, too, that in con- sequence of the presumption tbat every dealing with a bill is for value, the burthen of proving these N.S. K 130 LECTURE V. allegations and each of them, rests upon the defendant who pleads them. Let me now pass to the transfer of a bill ; and here I may say that I find a phrase that I do not much like in the Act of 1882, sect. 31(1). It says : " A bill is nego- tiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder of the bill." I prefer these simple words : "A bill may be transferred " — that is all you want to learn — " from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder of the bill." In the expression "negotiated when it is transferred" the framers of the Act are not using the word " negoti- ated " there in the sense in which I use the word *' negotiable " ; all that they mean by the expression is, you may transfer a bill of exchange from one person to another so as to constitute the transferee the holder of the bill. So you may. Now, just let us see for a moment how it is done ; and if you will take into your hands the * lithographed form No. 10, which I have had pre- pared for you, I will make such observations as the various indorsements seem to call for. Those of you who kept the specimen bills Nos. 1 to 9 of last week will please refer to No. 2. You will find there that William Smith is the drawer of the bill. . How, then, can William Smith transfer the property in that bill ? As it is payable to his order he can only do it by putting his name on the back of the instrument and delivering it with the intention of passing the property therein. I should like to add these last words to the definition of sect. 31 of the Act of 1882 : — The Legislature there says, "A bill payable to bearer is negotiated by delivery." " A bill payable to order is negotiated b}^ the endorsement of the holder completed by delivery." The delivery in each case must be with the intention of passing the property * The two forms used at this lecture will be found on the pages prior to this lecture. BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 131 therein. Therefore, if AVilHam Smith indorses his name upon the bill and says to his clerk, " Take this into the next room and make a copy of it," the pro- perty in the instrument has not passed to the clerk, although it has been delivered into his hands. There has not been a deliver}^ within the meaning of this section or within the principles of our law: "de- livery " in the section means delivery with the in- tention of passing the property in the bill. If the clerk should, however, without authority pass the bill to a bond fide holder for value, William Smith would be liable to him as an indorser. Marston v. Allen, 8 Meeson and Welsby, p. 494. Let me assume now that you are looking at the form No. 10, and regarding it as if it were the back of No. 2. The first thing you see on it is the signature of " William Smith " simply. Then he must also have delivered it, as, so far as he is concerned, the property will not pass by his act unless he not only writes his name but delivers the instrument. Now let me tell you, in dealing with matters arising out of bills of exchange, you must know and discuss the principles of almost every department of law. You must learn, therefore, the law of principal and agent. I cannot dis- cuss the law of principal and agent in my six lectures, but I may say that delivery to an agent will be delivery to the principal. It is important also to remember that you are now dealing not so much with contract as with conveyance and transfer in this part of our study. There is no contract made between the person to whom William Smith delivered the bill and the acceptor, b}'^ reason merely of the delivery. The indorsee may, how- ever, by the law merchant sue the acceptor upon the contract he has entered into with the drawer, although the indorsee was not a party originally to that contract. There may be two or three contracts between William Smith and James Robinson, and a contract, of course, by his accepting. There might have been a contract before his accepting by his having promised to accept, K 2 132 LECTURE V. but in dealing with indorsement we are dealing with a case of transfer and conve3^ance. Now remem- ber this elementary principle, that as to a contract you must have the consent of two or more parties to make it. A conve3'ance is operative without the consent at all of the person in whose favour it is made. Do not forget that. It is a principle that is applicable in many departments of our law. Let me show you its applicability to bills of exchange by referring you to the case of Lysaght v. Bryant, which you will find reported in 9 Common Bench, p. 46. That was a case in which Lysaght and another were in partnership. They had in their possession a bill drawn by the defendant upon a man named Matthews. Lysaght and his partner were indebted to the father of Lysaght in a large sum of money. They were in difficulties. They wished to reduce the debt which they owed to Lj'saght senior, and evidence was given (and the jury found it to be true) that one day Lysaght and his partner agreed that the bill which they had received from the defendant should be transferred to the father of Lysaght in reduction of his debt. They accordingly endorsed the bill to Lysaght the father, and the son of the plaintiff, with the consent of his partner, put it into the cash-box, and held it for the use of Lysaght the father, who sued as plaintiff. What did the Court hold ? That although the plaintiff knew nothing about the transaction at the time it took place, yet, being a case of conveyance and transfer, the property in the bill passed to L3'saght the father immediately that transaction took place, and that until he disclaimed the propert}^, he continued the owner of the bill. You must study the word " delivery " and the meaning of the word " possession." The Court held that, upon the facts found by the jury, there had been an indorsement and delivery by the firm to the son as the father's agent, and that the possession of the son was the possession of the father. The transaction was the same as if the father had BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 133 been present at the time of the indorsement, and received the bill. When " Mr. William Smith " has put his name on the back of the bill in the way you see, and delivered it with the intention of passing the property therein, the bill now can be transferred by simple delivery. Ee- member, these are things that you are to have present to your mind at a glance. I am talking about things that must be in your minds ready for use at any moment — not to be ascertained by looking into a Bills of Exchange Act. Now the moment " Wilham Smith " has put the bill into that state, it can now be trans- ferred by delivery. Therefore the person to whom " William Smith " gives it can pass it by delivery at once, without any writing on the back of the bill, and his transferee will have a perfectly good title. It may go, perhaps, through three hands by simple delivery, and at length it gets into the hands of Mr. James Richardson. Now let me tell j'ou — it is im- portant that you should remember this — that no person can be sued on a bill of exchange who does not put his name to it. If, of course, a man has given you a bill of exchange, promising to put his name to it and intending to do so, if he does not on request put his name to it, you can take proceedings to compel him to do so, but not unless he intended to do it, and it was so understood. If he does not put his name, you simply have a title to the bill but no claim thereon against the transferor. Therefore, if you want any person's responsibility on the bill, you must get him to put his name on the back of the bill ; but if he does not you cannot sue him on the bill. He is not, how- ever, free from all resiDonsibility and obligation ; far from it. A man who transfers a bill to another for value, although he does not put his name on the instrument, warrants his transferee that there is no defect in the instrument ; that the bill is what it purports to be ; that he himself has a perfect right to transfer it, and he himself is not aware of anything 134 LECTURE V. which would render it valueless. If you want authority on this point, you will find it, apart from the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, sect. 58, in the case of Gurney v. Womersley , which is reported in 4 Ellis & Blackburn, p. 133. Womersley was a broker in the City. Overend, Grurney & Co. took a bill from the defendant to be dis- counted by them, but it did not have Womersley's name upon it. As a rule, bill brokers who offer bills for discount do not put their names on the bills they offer. It turned out that the acceptance was a forgery, and that the supposed drawer and first indorser were fic- titious persons. The bill, in short, was worthless. The Court held that Gurneys could get back the money which they paid as upon a failure of consideration, and sue, as in former days we used to do, for money had and received, as money which the defendant was bound to return. Now," when you hear, as I have often heard people say in a hasty way: " Oh, you cannot sue him, his name is not on the bill," please remember there are obliga- tions which exist outside the bill, and although his name be not upon the bill, the person who transfers it to you does incur obligations, and obligations to the extent I have mentioned. Now look again at the specimen. I will assume that this bill has come through two or three hands if you like, and at last it has reached the hands of Mr. James Richardson. What does Mr. James Richardson do when he parts with the bill ? He writes over his name, " Pay Thomas Daft." It does not matter whether there is "or order" or not; there is no difference between "Thomas Daft" and "Thomas Daft or order." Richardson writes, " Pay Thomas Daft, James Richardson." " William Smith's " indorsement is what is called a " blank " indorsement. Now 3'ou have " James Richardson's " indorsement, and his is a special indorsement, and an indorsement to pay " Thomas Daft." When it is in that form, Thomas Daft cannot part with the property in this instrument according to BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 135 mercantile law by mere delivery, although there have been intermediate dealings with the bill by delivery, and although William Smith made it a bill transferable by delivery. Now again, by Richardson's indorsement, it has become a specially indorsed bill, and Thomas Daft must put his name to it in order to transfer the property therein, just as William Smith was obliged to put his name on the back because the bill was drawn to his order. Now I put the following indorse- ments before you because some people have asked me : " Do you mean you can have two or three blank indorse- ments ? " Certainly, one after the other, and here they come. Thomas Daft desu-es to pass the property in the bill, and he does so by indorsement and delivery. Thomas Daft indorses in blank ; "William Hartley," to whom Daft delivered it, indorses in blank ; and "Mark Phillips," to whom Hartle}^ delivered it, in- dorses it in blank. There you see three blank indorse- ments one after the other. That of Thomas Daft was necessary in order to transfer the property in the bill. William Hartley and Mark Phillips could each of them have transferred the property in the bill without indorse- ment, but their names were put on the bill in order to make them liable on it. When the bill has been indorsed in blank it is not essential, in order to trans- fer the property, that the transferor should put his name on the bill, but it is necessary he should do so if you desire to make him a party to the bill and that he should incur to you the obligations of indorser of the instrument. You can thus have several indorsers in blank ; I have put them on the form because I have seen as many as these in my time. Now the bill comes into the hands of Mr. George French, who says, " Pay James Saunders," and therefore you have again the bill which has been indorsed in blank two or three times befoi'e, an instrument again specially indorsed ; and, if you are going to deal with " James Saunders," you must have "James Saunders's" signature in order to a valid transfer of the bill. 136 LECTURE V. I may tell you practical lawyers, who may have to do with bills of exchange in Court, that if ever you should be suing, say, in the name of " George French," and you are suing, perhaps, " William Smith," the drawer, and you have a difficulty in proving all these various endorsements and transfers which are upon this bill, you may strike out the inter- vening endorsements, and allege it to be a transfer by William Smith to George French. Of course, if you strike out the intervening names of the parties to the instrument you lose, if I remember rightly, your remedy against them ; but, subject to that, you can at once, if you are in a difficulty in Court (and I hope you will be in some cases soon, to show your skill in getting out of apparent difficulties), say: "Very well, my lord, I will strike out all these indorsements. I will take the first indorsement that is in blank, ' William Smith ; ' that will do for me." Then prove his signature, and that you are the holder for value, and your case is complete. Now, the next matter I desire to place before you is this. Never forget that a man may be a party to a bill of exchange in two or three capacities. An ac- ceptor may become first of all an indorsee ; then in his turn he may become an indorser. So inay a man who has drawn the bill, after five or six dealings with the instrument, become an indorsee, and again may become indorser ; and so, with every one of the in- dorsers in the same way, each one ma}'^ become indorsee and again an indorser. But onl}^ mind you, with this consequence : that if the acceptor becomes an indorsee, he cannot charge any ante- cedent party to the bill, who would have a remedy over against him upon the bill as acceptor. I hope you follow me. I tell you the acceptor may become indorsee, and may become indorser, exactly as if his name had never been on the instru- ment, but only with this condition : that the acceptor who becomes an indorsee — (and very naturally you BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 137 can see the reason, viz. to prevent circuit}^ of action) — can never maintain an action against any of the prior parties to the bill if those prior parties could maintain an action against him upon the in- strument. If they could not, then he is entitled still to sue. The same with the drawer, the same witli the indorser ; and therefore I have, on purpose to show you this, given you the name of James Robinson as an indorser, and I have put against his name the word, in brackets, " acceptor." You will find, therefore, that the acceptor may still become an indorsee, and may also become an indorser, of course, subject to the rules which I have just mentioned as to his right over against the prior parties to the instrument. Now I want to call your attention to a matter which is sometimes overlooked. A man may write the name of an indorsee on a bill of exchange, and yet not be liable himself upon the instrument. Now, you will notice that James Robinson has specially indorsed the bill: "Pay William Robert- son ; James Robinson." Assume that William Robertson indorses the bill in blank : it is now in order again for the j^ropert}' passing by delivery ; but you also see over the name " William Robertson," the direction " Pay Jonathan George." That direc- tion, "Pay Jonathan George," may not have been written by William Robertson at all. That may have been written by a man to whom the bill has been transferred after it has been passed two or three times by delivery to different people, not one of whom has put his name to the bill. Then a person who does not want to put his name to the bill may desire to state on tlie face of the bill to whom the property in it shall go, and he does so by writing "Pay Jonathan George " over the simple blank indorsement of " William Robertson." Do I make myself under- stood ? William Robertson has put his name simply. It is then transferable by delivery ; it can pass by delivery. Suppose William Robertson gave it to 138 LECTURE V. James Gladstone, and James Gladstone, without putting his name on it, gave it to Richard Cobden, and Richard Cobden desires to pass the property in the bill to Jonathan George, he may do so by writing "Jonathan George" over the signature of William Robertson, and handing it to Jonathan George. Richard Cobden has thus, without rendering himself liable on the instrument, turned the indorsement of " William Robertson " into a special indorsement, and Jonathan George in his turn must indorse the instru- ment in order to pass the property therein. Now, if you will just keep these things in your minds, you will not have much trouble in dealing with the indorsements that appear on the back of the bill, and which are the means, together with delivery, by which the property in the bill is, and can be, trans- ferred. You must clearly distinguish between an " indorsement in blank," and a " special indorsement." You must remember that you can have an indorsement in blank followed by a special indorsement ; then you know the conditions under which in each case the property may be passed. Then you may have an in- dorsement in blank again, followed by another special indorsement ; and then ultimately you may have a person turning a blank indorsement, not his own, into a special indorsement by putting over the blank indorse- ment the name of his transferee, although he himself has not put his name to the bill and cannot be sued ujion it. There are one or two things more that I want to say to you in reference to the transfer of bills of exchange. Under the Act of 1882 it is established beyond all doubt that if a bill is indorsed condition- ally, the acceptor may disregard the condition, and payment by him to the indorsee is valid although the condition has not been performed. So that now if 3^ou were to have a conditional indorsement thus : "Pay A. B. or order on his handing over to me cer- tain bills of lading, Thomas Johnson," the acceptor BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 139 may pay the value to the lawful holder of the bill, although there is this condition upon it, and the accep- tor need not trouble himself whether the condition has been fulfilled. What the responsibilit}' is between the j)erson who takes the instrument conditionally and the person who transfers it, at present we need not stay to discuss. There would be no doubt whatever that he would be bound by that condition and have to answer for any improper dealing with the instru- ment contrary to the express agreement between the parties. Now there is another thing I wart to tell you. You cannot have a partial indorsement. You can have a partial acceptance. You cannot sa}', "Pay A. B. £'50 of the within £100." That is no indorsement at all ; whether conditional or not, the indorsement must be for the entire amount of the bill. If nothing is said on the bill, the indorsement will be presumed to be for the entire bill. Further, let me tell you that if the instrument has been indorsed or made payable to the order of twx) or more persons severally, they must all put their names to the instrument in order to transfer it unless one is apj^ointed to act for the others, or the persons named stand in the relation of partners. Then you can have what are called " restrictive indorsements," and such indorsements put an end, apparently, to the transferability of the bill in the ordinar}- sense of that word. Here are one or two illustrations. " Pay D. or order for collec- tion ; " "Pay D. only." Those are what are called "restrictive indorsements," and there is by them no transfer of the ownership in the bill. D. has, how- ever, a right to receive payment of the bill and to sue any person his indorser could have sued. The next thing I want to speak to you about is an overdue bill of exchange. Of course you know what I mean by " overdue." Assuming a bill was drawn on the 1st January at three months, it would be payable on the 4th April, and if not paid on that day, the 140 LECTURE V. instrument would be said to be overdue and " dis- honoured." If, then, it comes into your hands after such dishonour, it woukl be said to come into your hands "disgraced." A bill of exchange payable on de- mand may be disgraced by mere lapse of time. By the Act of 1882, a bill payable on demand is overdue when it appears on the face of it to have been in circulation for an unreasonable time. What is an unreasonable length of time is a question of fact. It is otherwise with a promissory note. If a promissory note, payable on demand, has been negotiated, it is not to be deemed overdue for the purpose of aifecting the holder with defects of title, of which he had no notice, by reason that a reasonable time for presenting it for payment has elapsed since its issue. If the instrument is dis- graced, you cannot have a better title than the man had, who transferred it to you. Then just let us see in what position does the transferee of a bill of exchange stand who takes it overdue and disgraced ? First of all I may say this (and I believe really it will cover all the cases), that the person takes the instrument subject to all the equities (mark the word) arising out of the original transaction. If there has been fraud or duress, of course it is clear that you take it subject to the defence which those matters afford, and you can have no better title than the person who transferred it to 3'ou ; but, further than that, you take it subject to the equities arising out of the original transaction. These words, " the equities arising out of the original transac- tion," must be carefully considered. A., the holder of a disgraced bill of exchange, indorses it to B. If A. sued the acceptor, the accej^tor would have a set-oif equal to the amount of the bill. Would B. be affected by that set-off in an action against A. ? No ; the set- off does not arise out of the original transaction. B. would not be affected by the set-off even if he knew of it at the time he took the bill, and took it for the purpose of defeating the acceptor's set-off. You will BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 141 best understand the words " equities arising out of the transaction," by stud3dng a case which I trust 3^ou will endeavour to keep in your mind. Read the case of Holmes v. Kicld, reported in the 3rd Hurlstone & Norman, p. 891. This case which I am going to give you was not a case of fraud, duress, or illegality of any kind, and yet the person who took the bill in that case when it was disgraced, was met for the larger portion of the bill with an absolutely good defence. Now,,just follow me. In the case of Holmes v. Kicld, Kidd, the acceptor, wanted some money, and he went to a man and asked him if he would lend him ^9300. "Yes," said the man, " I will lend you £300 ; give me your acceptance for the ^£300 at three months, and lodge with me goods, so that, if you do not pay the bill, I may sell the goods and pay myself out of the proceeds." Kidd agreed to these terms. The bill was accepted, the goods were deposited, and the money lent ; the bill was dis- honoured. The goods were sold by the drawer, and i£272 was realised and received by him. Then the drawer, acting dishonourabl}^ passed the bill to the plaintiff in the action. To the declaration in the action the defendant pleaded thus : When I accepted this bill, I accepted it upon a condition that the right to sue me on the bill by the drawer should be defeasible by his exercising a power of selling the goods which I gave him as a security for the instru- ment, and the promise that he would deduct from the amount of the bill the amount realised by the sale of the goods. The drawer, on my not meeting the bill, sold the goods, and realised £272 thereby, and then indorsed the bill to the plaintiff. This defence does not involve a question of notice at all ; it has nothing to do with notice. The plaintiff took the bill after it was dishonoured. Held, by the Court of Exchequer Chamber to be a perfectly good defence to the extent of £272, and upon this short ground, that it was not a question of notice on the part 142 LECTURE V. of the plaintiff, or want of good faith on the part of the plaintiff, but that as he was the transferee of the bill after it was dishonoured, he took it subject to all the equities arising out of the original transac- tion. You. see, this is not a case of set-off which exists outside the transaction of the bill altogether, and is merely personal to the holder ; but this is a case in which, when the very bill was con- ceived and created, the right under it was to be defeasible upon the realization of the goods ; and so the Court held in that case, that the person who took it, although it ma}'^ have been taken bond fide, as he took it disgraced, had no title to the instrument, except to the extent of £28. Now there is one other matter which I think I can deal with perhaps satisfactorily to-night in the time which is now remaining to me, and that is as to the question upon whom the burden of proof rests, as to consideration and bona fides, where there has been fraud, illegality of consideration, or duress in respect of the bill, or the bill has been stolen, or there has been an improper dealing with it. You understand of course what " duress " means. It is making a man put his name to a bill by a threat of force, as if the drawer should say, for example, " If you do not put your name to this bill as acceptor before' you leave this room, I will do you some bodily harm." You understand of course what "illegality of considera- tion " means. I cannot stay to discuss with you to- night the many rules at common law and the various statutes which make certain considerations illegal ; you yourselves must study " illegality of considera- tion " as part of the general law. As to a case of fraud, you know generally that it exists wherever a person represents some fact as existing which does not exist, the person making the representation knowing it to be untrue, or not caring whether it is true or false. Now do not think that those are the only cases which give rise to the question of the burden of BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 143 proof. Any imj)roper dealing with the bill by the person who transfers it will raise the question of the burrlen of proof; and the case I always keep in my mind on this point is the case of Hall V. Featherstone, which is reported in 3 Hurlstone & Norman, p. 284. That is the case of one man saying to another : " I am pressed for money. Can you help me?" The answer is: "I will easil}' get some money for you by discounting your accept- ance. How much would you like?" "£65." " Very well ; give me jowv acceptance : I will put my name to it as drawer, and then I will go and get it discounted and send or bring you the money." It fre- quently happens that a gentleman of this description, as soon as he gets the bill, parts with it immediately l^erhaps for some debt of his own, or for some few sovereigns given to him to live upon for the next few days, or to indulge whatever tastes or habits may be most pleasant to himself. In Hall v. Feaihcrstouc, the acceptor was left entirely in the lurch. Read that case, and although in it there was no fraud in pi'ocur- ing the acceptance, no duress, no illegality of con- sideration, yet the man who transferred the bill to the holder dealt with the bill in a manner that was dishonest and improper. The Court held, that such a state of things called for proof on the part of the holder of the bill, the extent of which I will mention directly. Now what is the burthen of proof which under such circumstances is east upon the claimant who alleges he is a bond fi(h holder for value ? As to that the Court of Appeal have decided, in a case in which I was engaged (but not reported), that as soon as ever a defendant in an action upon a bill establishes fraud, duress, illegality of consideration, or improper dealing with the instrument, the man who seeks to recover upon the bill must establish to the satisfaction of the Court or jury not only that he is a holder for value, but that he is an honest holder for value. The 144 LECTURE V. great question in dispute was, and had been for many 3'ears, wliether all that he was called upon to do was to show consideration, leaving the defendant to estab- lish that the plaintiff took it dishonestly. But, say the Courts now (and I think the words of the Act of 1882 are sufficiently strong to support their de- cision), "You, the plaintiff, must, now that evidence of fraud has been given, if 3'ou want to recover upon the bill, not only show that you gave value for it, but you must satisfy the tribunal that you took the bill honestl}^" I need scarcely say there is a difference, and a very great difference, between the de- fendant showing that the plaintiff' took it dishonestly and the plaintiff showing that he took it honestly. The burden of proof of both honesty and value rests upon the plaintiff. I tell you that the moment the defendant has given evidence from which the jury may properly infer that the bill was obtained by fraud, or by duress, or that there was illegality of consideration, or any improper dealing with the bill, the defendant is no longer called uj^on to sustain the further allegations contained in his plea, that the plaintiff' took it without value and with notice. The burden is at once shifted, and the plaintiff must show that he took it for value, and that he took it honestly. See the dift'erence. The plaintiff will have to be put in the box. If he is not called, or his absence accounted for, although he may give evidence of the consideration for the bill by a person who was present at the transaction, the jury will not find that he took the instrument honestl3\ It very often happens at the close of the cross-examina- tion of the plaintiff', the inadequacy of the consideration and other circumstances disclosed therein, establish the fact that he took it dishonestly. Mark you, do not forget that word " consideration." The consideration given very often is conclusive, as I have told you, upon the question of bona fides. If I found that the plaintiff gave half the value for good commercial bills that could be discounted at 5 ^ex cent, per annum in the City BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 145 — bills that had been accepted in the name of the firm b}' a partner for gambling transactions in fraud of the part- nership — I should soon come to the conclusion that the plaintiff did not take them honestly, because he could not have believed that the man was x^arting with bills that he came by honestly, and which were his property, at half their value. Therefore, always work your cases like this : If the plaintiff has given a small considera- tion, show the extreme value of the instrument and what the transferor could have got if it had been discounted properly. Hence, with respect to a Bank of England note, if a man gave three pounds for a £5 Bank of England note there is not one of you, unless there were some very extraordinary circumstances, who would hesitate for a moment to find that the man who took the note for three pounds, for which an honest man anywhere could get ^5, must have suspected that the person part- ing with the note, or some person for whom he was acting, had come by the note dishonestly. This is an illustration I have heard used by great judges in order to explain to a jury how the inadequacy of con- sideration should affect their minds in dealing with the question of bona fides. As a rule, honest people want full or fair value for the property they are parting with. So much for this part of the case. If there has been improper dealing with the bill, fraud, or duress, then the person who sues must show that he is a holder for value, and that he took the bill honestly. If, of course, he did take the bill honestly, although carelessly, negligently, although he took it in a way that perhaps no twelve rational men would have taken the instrument, although he took it for inade- quate consideration, yet if you come to the conclusion that he did take it honci fide and for value, he is perfectly entitled to recover upon the bill. Now, I am sure you will remember that in de- livering these six lectm'es how much I have to N.S. L 14G LECTURE V. compress, and with what haste I am obliged to advance. Therefore, if you will bear with me I think I can just deal to-night with one more matter, and that is pre- sentment of a bill of exchange for acceptance. Now, if you will look at specimen No. 1 of the bills, I told you that was a perfect bill of exchange because there are drawer and drawee, although no acceptor. The drawer of such a bill may j)art with the property in it before it is accepted. Now, what you have to learn is, when the holder of a bill of exchange is bound to present the instrument for acceptance. He must do so when the bill is payable after sight, in order to fix the maturity of the instrument. He must do so if the bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented for acceptance. He must also present the bill for acceptance where it is drawn, payable elsewhere than at the residence or place of business of the drawee. It must be presented for acceptance before it can be presented for payment. If the holder of a bill drawn payable elsewhere than at the residence or place of business of the drawee has not time, using reason- able care, to present the bill for acceptance before ]3resenting it for payment on the day it falls due, the delay in presenting the bill for acceptance is excused. When a bill payable after sight is transferred, the holder must either present it for acceptance or part with it within a reasonable time. If you will look at specimen No. 1, you will see it is addressed to James Robinson, at 52, Old Change, London. There is nothing to show that the bill is drawn payable else- where than the place of business or residence of Mr. Robinson ; it need not be presented for acceptance. If it is drawn as appears on the second page of the forms inserted prior to this lecture, and marked No. 11, it must be presented for acceptance. The address of the drawee is at 52, Old Change, and the bill is drawn paj^able at Barclay, Bevan & Co., Lombard Street. The bill in that case must be presented for acceptance. BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 147 The holder of bill No. 1 may present the bill for acceptance prior to the day of payment if he chooses, but is not obliged to do so. If the drawee refuses to accept the bill, the holder must give notice of such refusal to all prior parties on the bill except the drawee, and may sue them upon the bill as being dishonoured by non-acceptance, no presentment for payment being necessary. Apart from a contract, neither the holder of the bill nor any other party to the bill has an action against the drawee for not accepting. The presentment for acceptance must be made, by or on behalf of the holder, to the drawee at a reason- able hour on a business da}-, and before the bill is overdue. If there are two or more drawees who are not partners, presentment for acceptance must be made to all, unless one has authority to act for all, and then the presentment may be made to him onlj'. It is not necessary in all cases to take the instrument to the residence of the drawee, or his place of business ; it may be presented for acceptance through the post, when the post office ma}- be used pursuant to agreement or usage. Where the drawee is dead, then the bill may be presented to his personal representa- tives ; if bankrupt, then to his trustee. Where, how- ever, the drawee is dead or bankrupt, presentment for acceptance is excused, and the bill may be regarded as dishonoured by non-acceptance. It is also excused if, after using all reasonable care, presentment cannot be eifected. I told you the other day that there may be a qualified or conditional acceptance of a bill of exchange. The holder of the bill may take such conditional acceptance if he likes. He may, however, refuse to do so ; and if lie cannot get an unqualified acceptance he may treat the bill as dishonoured by non-acceptance. I will proceed in my next lecture to discuss present- ment of a bill of exchange lor payment, and the rules L 2 148 LECTURE V. relating to notice of dishonour, and deal shortly with promissory notes and cheques. As the next lecture will be the last, perhaps you will grant me a longer allowance than an hour, in order to present in six lectures an outline — I am afraid a bare and imperfect outhne — of this important department of om' law. PROMISSORY NOTES. 149 »o t-t Oi o 00 tH OB 1-1 o m Pi r^ « rO O Q <» ^-5 O •iS .^ (X) H Co •-3 P^ o H M CD O ^ o P^ o ■^ ^ O o m 02 'a o O 6 &H ^3 ^ m t— 1 m O a> M o o a 13 m o r^ s ■ ■ C -l-s o -fj ^ s ^ ■ m .2P < o iH o ^ crt pqO / PROanSSORY NOTES. 151 W3 a 00 :3 tH QQ {H •*o^ © pq CO ^ P^ ^ <» ■+3 p »o ^ ^ 10 ^ §^ H CQ P^ ^ i=! P^ ^ ^ pq p 7^ P^ >^ h^ CO ay money cannot be a, 35 English instruments not, by usage or stipulation, 35, 55 but only by the Law Merchant, or Statute, 35, 40 foreign instruments may be, by English Courts adopting usage of our markets, 41 but not if instrument shows on its face that it will not pass by mere delivery, 42 instruments, abroad, not necessarily negotiable here, 42 securities, steps by which foreign instruments have been brought within the law relating to, 42 personal chattels, not, 51, 55 except coins of the realm, 51, 55, 57 paper on which negotiable instrument is written, 51, 55 bill of lading, not, 56 NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES, list of, 53 English Instruments — bills of exchange lif in such a state that the true owner cheque > could pass the property in them by mere promissory notes y delivery, 37 Bank of England notes, 37 dividend warrants, if payable to named person or order ; now perhaps without words "or order," sec. 8 (4) Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 40 form of, 39 East India bonds, perhaps : see Taylor v. Kyincr, 3 B. & Al. 40 Exchequer bills, form of, 37 if blank not filled up, 37 if blank , filled up, and instrument indorsed by person whose name is inserted, 38 Foreign Instruments — Baltimore & Potomac Railway bonds, 48 unless name inserted, 48 if name inserted, they can only be transferred by entry in books of the company, 48 Cedulas, bonds of Buenos Ayres Land Mortgage Bank, 53 Delaware & Hudson Railway bonds, 48 Egyptian Government Preference, 47 Egyptian Unified, 47 New South Wales, 47 New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio Railway bonds, 48 Prussian bonds, 43 Russian scrip, 44 form of, 44 N.S. P 202 INDEX. PARKE, B., dictum of, in Pdo v. Reijiiolds, 101 statement by, as to what is sufficient notice of dishonour, 16S PEARSON, J., decision of, in Easton v. London Joint Stock Bank, 5 PENNSYLVANIAN RAILROAD, certificate of shares not negotiable, 7 PERILS, to which law of negotiable securities lately exposed, 4 PERSONAL CHATTELS, not negotiable, 55 except coins of the realm, 51, 55, 57 paper on which negotiable instrument wi-itten, 51, 55 better title to, cannot be acquired than that of transferor, 55 except as regards goods bought in market overt, 56 goods bought from one who obtained them under a contract induced by fraud, but iinrescinded, 56 goods mentioned in a bill of lading which is trans- ferred to a person who takes bond fide and for value, 56 POTHIER, according to, bill of exchange cannot be drawn upon resident of same town as drawer, 101 bill of exchange must have three parties, drawer, drawee, payee, 104 PRIVATE PERSONS, cannot contract to attach to property liability to have owner's title divested, if thief or finder can find bond fide purchaser, 35 such incident can be attached only by Law Merchant, or statute, 35 PROMISSORY NOTE, instrument under seal not a, 35 ordinary form of, 149 maker of in position of acceptor of bill of exchange, 167 no need to present for payment to maker, 167 unless promise to pay qualified by place, 167 first indorser of, if not payable to maker's order, in position of drawer of bill of exchange, 167 has practically same responsibilities and privileges as indorser of bill of exchange, 167 instrument payable to maker's own order not a promissory note till indorsed by maker, 167 form of such note, 151 may be made payable to bearer, 167 Bank of England note, instance of, 167 instrument to be a perfect, must be delivered, 167 irregular instruments, 168 INDEX. 203 PROMISSORY :R0TE— continued. may be indorsed and dealt with as if it were a bill of exchange, 168 dishonour of, notice of, must be given to first indorser if he is not maker, 168 to charge indorser of, presentment necessary, 168 payable on demand, must be presented within reasonable time after indorsement, 168 or indorser will be discharged, 168 not presented within reasonable time, holder for value affected only by defects of which he had notice, and not by all equities arising out of note, 168 payable on demand, when disgraced, 140 RAPHAEL V. TUCK, what case settled, 21 destroyed doctrine that a man who took a bill of exchange care- lessly and not in such a way as a prudent man would have taken it could not recover, although he took it honestly and for value, 22 observations of Jervis, G.J., on affidavit by juryman in, 21 REASONS for undertaking task of delivering lectures, 1 ROLLS, MASTER OF, cases admirably reported by present, in old Queen's Bench Reports, •39 ROLT, L.J., decision of, in Re JBlalxIy Ordnance Co., 98 ST. LEONARDS, LORD, magnificent judgment of, in Mangles v. Dixon, 77 satirical references of, to common law lawj'ers, labouring to apply a half apprehended ecpiity, 77 STATUTES, 51 Geo. 3, c. 64. ..40 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78. ..107, 108 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42. ..71 16 & 17 Vict. c. 59.. .175 19 & 20 Vict. c. 25... 180, 181 97. ..107 21 & 22 Vict. c. 79. ..180, 181 30 & 31 Vict. c. 131... 49, 50, 51 39 & 40 Vict. c. 81. ..181, 182, 185 41 Vict. c. 13... 109 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61. ..11, 40, 65, 97, 105, 115, 129, 130, 138, 153, 158, 180, 183 TIME, reasonable, difficulty of determining, 154 regard must be had to all the circumstances, 154 no fixed rule for determining, 154 See Bill of Exchanoe, presentment for acceptance, presentment for payment, notice of dishonour. 204 INDEX. TORTS, importance of not placing under law relating to, obligations arising out of contract, 172 WILLES, J., discussion by, in Fucntcs v. Montis, of question under what cir- cumstances a man can acquire a better title to chattels than the man has with whom he deals, 56 THE END. BRADBURY, AGNEW, & CO. LD., PRINTERS, I.OSDON AKD TONBRIDliE. A GAT Telegraphic Address: "POLYGRAPHY, LONDON." A L O G U E LAW WORKS PUBLISHED AND SOLD BY Stevens & Haynes, fab ^Hbibljers, gooksellers & €^*j|orters, i3, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR, LONDON. BOOKS BOUND IN THE BEST BINDINGS. Works in all Classes of Literature supplied to Order. FOREIGN BOOKS IMPORTED. LIBRARIES VALUED FOR PROBATE, PARTNERSHIP, AND OTHER PURPOSES. LIBRARIES OR SMALL COLLECTIONS OF BOOKS PURGHASED„ A large Stock of Reports of the various Courts of England, Ireland, and Scotland, always on hand. Catalogues and Estimates Furnished, and Orders Promptly Executed. Note. — To avoid confusin g our fir 7n with any of a similar name, we beg to notify that ive have no connexion tvhatever zvith any other house of business, and we respectfully request that Corre- spondents zvill take special care to direct all communications to the above names and address. STEl'ENS &' HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. NDEX OF SUBJECTS. ABSTRACT DRAWING— Scott 32 ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS— Walker and Elgood 18 ADMINISTRATORS— Walker 6 ADMIRALTY LAW— Kay 17 Smith 23 AFFILIATION— Martin 7 ARBITRATION— Slater 7 BANKRUPTCY— Baldwin I5 Hazlitt 29 Indermaur (Question & Answer) 28 Ringwood I5> 29 BAR EXAMINATION JOURNAL 39 BIBLIOGRAPHY 40 BILLS OF EXCHANGE— Willis 14 BILLS OF LADING— Campbell 9 Kay 17 BILLS OF SALE— Baldwin '5 Indermaur 28 Ringwood '5 BUILDING CONTRACTS— Hudson 12 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT— Copinger 42 CARRIERS— See RAILWAY LAW. SHIPMASTERS, CHANCERY DIVISION, Practice of— Brown's Edition of Snell ... 22 Indermaur 25 Williams 7 And see EQUITY. CHARITABLE TRUSTS— Bourchier-Chilcott 47 Cooke 10 Whiteford 33 CHURCH AND CLERGY— Brice 33 CIVIL LAW— i-^^ ROMAN LAW. CLUB LAW— Wertheimcr 32 CODES— Argles ..... 32 COLLISIONS AT SEA— Kay . . 17 COLONIAL LAW— Cape Colony 38 Forsyth . • 14 Tarring 41 COMMERCIAL AGENCY— Campbell , . . 9 PAGE COMMERCIAL LAW— Hurst and Cecil II COMMON LAW— Indermaur ....,..• 24 COMPANIES LAW— Brice 16 Buckley I? Reilly's Reports 29 Smith 39 COMPENSATION— Browne 19 Lloyd 13 COMPULSORY PURCHASE— Browne 19 CONSTABLES— .S-f^ POLICE GUIDE. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HISTORY— Forsyth 14 Taswell-Langmead 21 Thomas 28 CONSULAR JURISDICTION— Tarring 42 CONVEYANCING— Copinger, Title Deeds .... 45 Deane, Principles of 23 COPYRIGHT— Copinger 45 CORPORATIONS— Brice . . . , 16 Browne I9 COSTS, Crown Office- Short 41 COVENANTS FOR TITLE— Copinger 45 CREW OF A SHIP— Kay 17 CRIMINAL LAW— Copinger 42 Harris 27 CROWN LAW— Forsyth 14 Hall 30 Kelyng 35 Taswell-Langmead . , , . . 21 Thomas 28 CROWN OFFICE RULES— Short 10 CROWN PRACTICE— Corner lO Short and Mellor 10 CUSTOM AND USAGE— Browne I9 Mayne 38 DAMAGES— Mayne 3^ DICTIONARIES— Brown , , 26 STEVENS 6- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. INDEX OF SUBJECTS-^^«^^««^^. DIGESTS - PAGE Law Magazine Quarterly Digest . 37 DISCOVERY— Peile 7 DIVORCE— Harrison 23 DOMESTIC RELATIONS— Eversley 9 DOMICIL— i-^e PRIVATE INTER- NATIONAL LAW. DUTCH LAW 38 ECCLESIASTICAL LAW— Brice 33 Smith 23 EDUCATION ACTS— See MAGISTERIAL LAW. ELECTION LAW and PETITIONS— Hardcastle 33 O'Malley and Hardcastle ... 33 Seager 47 EQUITY— Blyth 22 Choyce Cases 35 Pemberton 32 Snell 22 Story 43 Williams 7 EVIDENCE— Phipson 20 EXAMINATION OF STUDENTS— Bar Examination Journal ... 39 Indermaur 24 and 25 Intermediate LL.B 21 EXECUTORS— Walker and Elgood 6 EXTRADITION— Clarke 45 See MAGISTERIAL LAW. FACTORIES— See MAGISTERIAL LAW. FISHERIES— Sec MAGISTERIAL LAW. FIXTURES— Brown 33 FOREIGN LAW— Argles 32 Dutch Law 38 Foote 36 Pavitt 32 FORESHORE— Moore 30 FORGERY— ^-^e MAGISTERIAL LAW. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES— May 29 GAIUS INSTITUTES— Harris 20 GAME LAWS— See MAGISTERIAL LAW. GUARDIAN AND WARD— Eversley 9 HACKNEY CARRIAGES— See MAGISTERIAL LAW. HINDU LAW— Coghlan 28 Cunningham 38 and 42 Mayne 38 HISTORY— Taswell-Langmead 21 HUSBAND AND WIFE— Eversley 9 INFANTS— Eversley 9 Simpson 43 INJUNCTIONS— Joyce 44 INSTITUTE OF THE LAW— Brown's Law Dictionary ... 26 INSURANCE— Porter 6 INTERNATIONAL LAW— Clarke . 45 Cobbett 43 Foote 36 INTERROGATORIES— Peile 7 INTOXICATING LIQUORS— See MAGISTERIAL LAW. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES— See COMPANIES. JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS— Pemberton 18 JUDICATURE ACTS— Cunningham and Mattinson . . 7 Indermaur 25 Kelke 6 JURISPRUDENCE— Forsyth 14 Salmond 13 JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES— Campbell 47 Harris 20 LANDLORD AND TENANT— Foa II LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDA- TION ACT— Lloyd 13 LATIN MAXIMS 28 LAW DICTIONARY— Brown 26 LAW MAGAZINE and REVIEW . 37 LEADING CASES— Common Law 25 Constitutional Law . Equity and Conveyancing , Hindu Law International Law . . . , LEADING STATUTES— Thomas 28 25 28 STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. INDEX OF '^X^B^^QTX '^-continued. PAGE LEASES— Copinger 45 LEGACY AND SUCCESSION— Hanson 10 LEGITIMACY AND MARRIAGE— See PRIVATE INTERNA- TIONAL LAW. LICENSES— ^f^ MAGISTERIAL LAW. LIFE ASSURANCE— Buckley 17 Reilly 29 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - Banning 42 LUNACY— Renton 10 Williams 7 MAGISTERIAL LAW— Greenwood and Martin .... 46 MAINE'S (Sir H.), WORKS OF— Evans' Theories and Criticisms . 20 MAINTENANCE AND DESERTION. Martin 7 MARRIAGE and LEGITIMACY— Foote 36 MARRIED WOMEN'S PRO- PERTY ACTS— Brown's Edition of Griffith . . 40 MASTER AND SERVANT - Eversley g MERCANTILE LAW— Campbell g Duncan 33 Hurst and vCeci! 11 Slater 7 See SHIPMASTERS. MERCHANDISE MARKS - Daniel 42 MINES— Harris 47 MONEY LENDERS— Bellot and Willis 1 1 MORTMAIN— See CHARITABLE TRUSTS. NATIONALITY— ^-^i; PRIVATE IN- TERNATIONAL LAW. NEGLIGENCE— Beven 8 Campbell 40 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS— Willis 14 NEWSPAPER LIBEL— Elliott 14 OBLIGATIONS— Brown's SaviQ;ny .... .20 PARENT AND^CIilLD-- Eversley 9 PAGE PARLIAMENT— Taswell-Langmead 21 Thomas 28 PARTITION— Walker 43 PASSENGERS— See MAGISTERIAL LAW. ,, RAILWAY LAW. PASSENGERS AT SEA— Kay 17 PATENTS— Daniel 42 Frost 12 PAWNBROKERS— See MAGISTERIAL LAW. PETITIONS IN CHANCERY AND LUNACY— Williams 7 PILOTS— Kay 17 POLICE GUIDE— Greenwood and Martin .... 46 POLLUTION OF RIVERS— Higgins . . 30 PRACTICE BOOKS— Bankruptcy 15 Companies Law .... 29 and 39 Compensation 13 Compulsory Purchase .... 19 Conveyancing 45 Damages 31 Ecclesiastical Law 33 Election Petitions 33 Equity 7) 22 and 32 Injunctions 44 Magisterial . . • 46 Pleading, Precedents of . . . 7 Railways and Commission ... 19 Rating 19 Supreme Court of Judicature . . 25 PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING— Cunningham and Mattinson . , 7 Mattinson and Macaskie ... 7 PRIMOGENITURE— Lloyd 13 PRINCIPAL AND SURETY— Rowlatt 18 PRINCIPLES— Brice (Corporations) ..... 16 Browne (Rating) 19 Deane (Conveyancing) .... 23 Harris (Criminal Law) .... 27 Houston (Mercantile) .... 32 Indermaur (Common Law) . . 24 Joyce (Injunctions) 44 Ringwood (Bankruptcy) . . 15 Snell (Equity) 22 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW— Foole ...,,.,.. 36 STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. INDEX OF '$>\}^^^Q,'\'$>~conti,mcd. PAGE j PROBATE— Hanson lo j Harrison 23 PUBLIC WORSHIP— Brice 33 QUARTER SESSIONS— Smith (F. J.) 6 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, Practice of— Indermaur 25 QUESTIONS FOR STUDENTS— Aldred 21 Bar Examination Journal ... 39 Indermaur 25 Waite 22 RAILWAYS— Browne 19 Godefroi and Shortt 47 RATING— Browne I9 REAL PROPERTY— Deane 23 Edwards 16 Tarring 26 RECORDS— Inner Temple 11 REGISTRATION— Elliott (Newspaper) .... 14 Seager (Parliamentary) .... 47 REPORTS— Bellewe 34 Brooke 35 Choyce Cases 35 Cooke . • • 35 Cunningham 34 Election Petitions 33 Finlason 32 Gibbs, Seymour Will Case . . 10 Kelyng, John 35 Kelynge, William 35 Reilly 29 Shower (Cases in Parliament) . 34 ROMAN DUTCH LAW— Van Leeuwen 38 ROMAN LAW— Brown's Analysis of Savigny . . 20 Campbell 47 Harris 20 Salkowski 14 Whitfield 14 SALVAGE— Jones 47 Kay 17 SAVINGS BANKS— Forbes , . . . f8 SCINTILLAE JURIS— Darling (C. ].) 18 SEA SHORE— PACE Hall 30 Moore 30 SHIPMASTERS AND SEAMEN— Kay 17 SOCIETIES— See CORPORATIONS. STAGE CARRIAGES— See MAGISTERIAL LAW. STAMP DUTIES— Copinger 45 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS— Banning 42 STATUTES— Hardcastle, by Craies .... 9 Marcy 26 Thomas 28 STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU— Campbell 9 Houston « 32 Kay ,17 STUDENTS' BOOKS . 20—28, 39, 47 SUCCESSION DUTIES— Hanson 10 SUCCESSION LAWS- Lloyd 13 SUPREME COURT OF JUDICA- TURE, Practice of— Indermaur 25 TELEGRAPHS— See MAGISTERIAL LAW. TITLE DEEDS— Copinger 45 TORTS— Ratanlal (Indian) 26 Ringwood 13 TRADE MARKS— Daniel . . 42 TRAMWAYS AND LIGHT RAIL- WAYS— Brice 19 TREASON- Kelyng '35 Taswell-Langmead ..... 21 TRIALS— Bartlett, A. (Murder) . , 32 Queen v. Gurney 32 ULTRA VIRES— Brice 16 USAGES AND CUSTOMS— Browne I9 VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES— May 29 WATER COURSES— Higgins >o WILLS, CONSTRUCTION OF— Gibbs, Report of Wallace v. Attorney-General lo WORKING CLASSES, Housing of Lloyd . , 13 6 STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. Third Edition, in 8vo, price 215., cloth, THE LAWS OF INSURANCE: #irf, ILiff, ^fcltcnt, antj (Siuarantef. EMBODYING CASES IN THE ENGLISH, SCOTCH, IRISH, AMERICAN, AND CANADIAN COURTS. By JAMES BIGGS PORTER, OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-ATLAW. ASSISTED BY W. FEILDEN CRAIES, M.A., and THOMAS S. LITTLE, OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTERS-AT-LAW. " We find little change in the scope of the book, but the cases decided since 1887, some of them are of considerable importance, together with the new Statute Law relating to the subject, have all been properly placed, and make the third edition as valuable as its predecessor. We do not hesitate to recommend this book to the continued favourable attention of the Legal profession." — Laiu Journal. This work, which in the present edition has been brought down to the latest date, was originally published by Mr. Porter in 1884, with the view of supplying a concise treatise on the Laws of In- surances within the compass of a moderate sized volume, and we have no hesitation in saying how excellently the author has attained that object, while overlooking or omitting nothing of importance. The book is one of great value." — Irish Law Times. " The issue of a third edition calls for little more than a record of the fact, for the previous editions of the book established its reputation as a lucid and exhaustive examination of the subject dealt with. It is_ still, so far as we know, the only book which embraces the whole Law of Insurance (excepting marine) and the present edition is as clear and concise as ever." — Manchester Guardian. " The third edition of Porter's most excellent and concise treatise on the laws relating to Insurance is now before us, and those with any knowledge of, or experience in, insurance affairs of any class or description, will know that, with the name of the author quoted, the contents will be at once inclusive, clear, concise and reliable .Should certainly be on the shelves of every insurance office^ and in the possession of every broker, as well as a necessary addition to a lawyer's library." — Liverpool yoiinial of Commerce. In Royal i2nio, price 20J., cloth, QUARTER SESSIONS PRACTICE, A VADE ME CUM OF GENERAL PRACTLCE LN APPELLATE AND CIVIL CASES AT QUARTER SESSIONS. By FREDERICK JAMES SMITH, OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW, AND RECORDER OF MARGATE. Third Edition. In one volume, 8vo, price 2i.r., cloth, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW RELATING TO I EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, with an Appendix of j Statutes, Annotated by means of References to the Text. By W. Gregory • Walker, B.A., Barrister-at-Law, and Edgar J. Elgood, B.C.L., M.A., j Barrister-at-Law. Third Edition by E. J. Elgood, B.C.L., M. A. Mr. Walker is fortunate in his choice of a sub- "We higldy approve of Mr. Walker's arrange ment The Notes are full, and as far as we have been able to ascertain, carefully and accurately cornpiled We can commend it as bearing on its face evidence of skilful and careful labour, and we anticipate that it will be found a verj' acceptable substitute for the ponderous tomes of the much esteemed and valued Williams." — Law Times. ject, and the power of treating it succinctly ; for the ponderous tomes of Williams, however satisfac- tory as an authority, are necessarily inconvenient for reference as well as expensive On the whole we are inclined to think the book a good and useful one." — Lazi' loiemal. In royal i2mo, price 4^., cloth, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF PRACTICE UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACTS AND RULES, and the cases decided IN THE CHANCERY AND COMMON LAW DIVISIONS FROM NOVEMBER 1875 TO AUGUST 1S80. Bv W. H. HASTINGS KELKE, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. STEVENS &= HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 7 Second Edition, in 8vo, price 95., cloth, THE LAW OF MAINTENANCE AND DESERTION, AND THE ORDERS OF THE JUSTICES THEREON. Second Edition, including the LAW OF AFFILIATION and BASTARDY. With an Appendix of Statutes and Forms, including the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women's) Act of, 1895. % Temple Chevallier Martin, Chief Clerk of the Lambeth Police Court, Editor of the "Magisterial and Police Guide," &c., and George Temple Martin, M.A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, price (>s. 6d., cloth, THE LAW OF ARBITRATION AND AWARDS; With Appendix containing the STATUTES RELATING TO ARBITRA- TION, and a collection of Forms and Index. Third Edition. By Joshua Slater, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, price 6s., cloth. THE PRINCIPLES OF MERCANTILE LAW. By JosHtfA Slater, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. In Svo, price 125., cloth, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY in the SUPREME COURT of JUSTICE. With an Appendix of Forms, Orders, &c., and an Addenda giving the Alterations under the New Rules of Practice. By Clarence J. Peile, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. In one volume, Svo, price iSj., cloth, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO PETITIONS IN CHANCERY AND LUNACY, Including THE SETTLED ESTATES ACT, LANDS CLAUSES ACT, TRUSTEE ACT, WINDING-UP PETITIONS, PETITIONS RELATING TO SOLICITORS, INFANTS, Etc., Etc. With an Appendix of Forms AND Precedents. By Sydney E. Williams, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, in Svo, price 28.?., cloth, A SELECTION OF PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACTS IN THE COMMON LAW DIVISIONS. With Notes explanatory of the difterent Causes of Action and Grounds of Defence ; and an Introductory Treatise on the Present Rules and Principles of Pleading as illustrated by the various Decisions down to the Present Time. By J. CUNNINGHAM and M. W. MATTINSON. SECOND EDITION. By MILES WALKER MATTINSON, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law, and STUART CUNNINGHAM MACASKIE, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. REVIEWS. ' ' The notes are very pertinent and satisfactory : the introductory chapters on the present system of pleadi ng are excellent, and the precedents will be found verj' useful." — Irish Laiu Times. "A work which, in the compass of a single portable volume, contains a brief Treatise on the Principles and Rules of Pleading, and a carefully annotated body of Forms which have to a great extent gone through the entirely separate sifting processes of Chambers Court, and Judges' Chambers, cannot fail to be a most useful companion in the Practitioner's daily routine.'" — Lazv Magazine and Rei'iciv. STEVEN'S (Sr= H.4YNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. Second Edition, in two volumes, royal 8vo, price 70^'., cloth. NEGLIGENCE IN LAW^ Being the Second Edition of "Principles of the Law of Negligence," Re-arranged and Re-written. By THOMAS BEVEN, CF THE INNKK TKIMl'I.E, BARRISTER-AT-LAW ; AUTHOR OF " THE LAW OV EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY FOR THE NKGLIGENCE OF SERVANTS CAUSING INJURY TO FELLOW SERVANTS." REVIEWS. " These volumes, says Mr. Beven in the preface, maybe regarded as a second edition of his ' Principles of the Law of Negligence,' in so far as the subjects treated of in both books are the same ; and the materials collected in the one have been used without reserve in the other. As to anything beyond this, he continues, the present is a new work. The arrangement is altogether different from that previously adopted. Nearly a half of the contents of these volumes is absolutely new, and of the remainder there is very little which has not been materially modified, if not in substance, yet in expression. "Upon its first appearance, the 'Principles of the Law of Negligence' was at once recognized as a work of the highest importance, and the ability and industry which Mr. Beven had brought to bear upon his task laid the profession under no ordinary obligation. The service which he then rendered has been greatly increased by the production of this second edition, and the book deserves a place in the first rank among authoritative expositions of the law. "The chief characteristic of Mr. Beven s method is thoroughness. He is not himself in a hurry, and it is certainly useless for his readers to be so. The law is to be found in his pages, and, when found, it is clearly enunciated ; but it is always deduced from a full and discriminating e.\amination of multitudinous cases — English and American — and readers must be content to survey, leisurely and cautiously, with Mr. Beven, the whole field of judicial exposition, and to follow his own careful and elaborate criticism, if they would gain the full benefit of the results at which he arrives. The book is not meant to be taken up for a hasty reference, and often the lawyer may find it more convenient to resort to a treatise more concise. On the other hand, it will be an invaluable companion in the consideration of any matter which requires research, and the style and arrangement are such that, whether the book is used for purposes of business or of general study, it cannot fail to prove deeply interesting. . . . "The above account is but a sketch of Mr. B'^ven's great work. It is impossible within the present limitr, to give an adequate idea of the variety of topics which are included, of the learning and patience with which they are discussed. Negligence may only be an aspect of the law ; but the treatment here accorded to it throws into prominence a host of questions of the utmost importance, both practically and theoretically. By his contribution to the due understanding of these Mr. Beven has placed the profes- sion under a lasting obligation, an obligation which no reader of his work will fail to realize." — Solicitors' yournal. "The book upon which this is founded, and which is in a measure a former edition of the present volumes, has made Mr. Beven an authority on the subject of the law of negligence. He has, in writing tncse volumes, made full use of his former labours ; but he claims that in reality the present work is a new one, and his claim is justified. . . . Just occasionally a well-written and ably-conceived law book is published, and such a one is this of Mr. Beven's. We think that to compare it with other books on the subject would be impossible ; it stands easily the best book on the subject. In clear exposition of law, for good classification of subject-matter, for accuracy of detail, and for every arrangement to facili- tate reference it cannot be beaten. We may congratulate Mr. Beven upon the accomplishment of his laborious task ; he has given to the profession a valuable work, and one which will enhance his reputation as a writer on the Law of Negligence." — Laiv Journal, August 3, 1895. " He has treated the well-known subject of Negligence in a scientific way, and has not been content with merely collecting, in more or less relevant positions, a number of cases which anyone could find for himself In any Digest of Law Reports, but has endeavoured to reduce from the chaos of decided cases a systematic study of the subject, with clear enunciations of the principles he finds governing the various decisions. In the arrangement of the book the author has been very happy in his method, a by no means easy task in the treatment of a subject in which each branch of it in reality overlaps another. ... A good index and dear type increase the value of a book which will without doubt receive the hearty commendation of the profession as a successful completion of the author's ambitious task." — Law Times. " In respect of the style of treatment of the subject, the book must be highly commended. It will be of service to every lawyer who wishes rather to get an intelligent understanding of the Law of Negligence, than merely to find correct and reliable legal propositions for practical use, and that whether he be a student or a practitioner. To the student the work is valuable for the searching and well-sustained discussion of the cases ; and to the practitioner there are presented all the cases that bear on most points for which he may be in search of authority. One of the chief merits of the work is, that all the available authority on each point is collected and so arranged that it can be easily iowwA."— Juridical Review. ' Contains evidence of much serious work, and ought to receive a fair trial at the hands of the profes- sion." — La^v Quarterly Reziciv. STEVENS 6- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 9 Second Edition, in royal 8vo, price 38^-., cloth, THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS, INCLUDING HUSBAND AND WIFE: PARENT AND CHILD: GUARDIAN AND WARD : INFANTS : AND MASTER AND SERVANT. By WILLIAM PINDER EVERSLEY, B.C.L., M.A., OF TKE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. "We are glad to see a second edition of IVIr. Eversley's useful work. There is a convenience in having the various subjects of which it treats collected in one volume, while at the same time each is handled with such fulness as to give the reader all the information he could expect in a separate volume. Mr. Eversley states the law with the most painstaking thoroughness, and has made an exhaustive survey of all the relevant statutes and cases. . . Great care has been taken to make the present edition complete and accurate, and a very full index adds to its utility." — Solicitors' yonnial. "Important statutes and cases have come into operation since the first edition, and this has induced Mr. Eversley to give the contracts of married women separate treatment. Careful revision to date now makes this treatise comprehensive and thoroughly reliable." — Law Times. "This is an important and almost a leading treatise on domestic law. The former edition was received with merited favour. Its value has become well known, and now, after an interval of eleven years, the learned author has brought out a second edition." — La%v Journal. " It is only necessary to refer to Mr. Eversley's learned and scholarlike work on ' The Domestic Rela- tions,' a book which, though technically belonging to the forbidding ranks of ' Law Books,' is yet full of human interest, and written, moreover, in the English language." — Edinburgh Review. Second Edition, in one volume, royal Svo, price 32^., cloth, THE LAW RELATING TO THE SALE OF GOODS AND COMMERCIAL AGENCY. SECOND EDLTION. By ROBERT CAMPBELL, M.A., OF Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-la\v ; advocate of the scotch bar, AUTHOR of the " LAW OF NEGLIGENCE," ETC. "An accurate, careful, and exhaustive handbook on the subject with which it deals. The excellent index deserves a special word of commendation." — Laiu Quarterly Review. " We can, therefore, repeat what we said when reviewing the first edition — that the book is a contribu- tion of value to the subject treated of, and that the writer deals with his subject carefully and fully." — Law yournal. Second Edition, in one volume, Svo, price 285., cloth, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF STATUTE LAW. with appendices containing words and expressions used in statutes which have been judicially or statutably construed, and the popular and short titles of certain statutes. By henry HARDCASTLE, Barrister-at-Law. SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED, by W. F. CRAIES, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. " The result of Mr. Craies' industry is a sound and good piece of work, the new light thrown on the subject since 1879 having been blended with the old in a thoroughly workmanlike manner. Though less a student's manual than a practitioner's text book, it is the sort of volume an intelligent perusal of which would educate a student better than the reading of much substantial law." — Saturday Review. 10 STEVENS or- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. Fourth Edition, in 8vo, price 30J., cloth, HANSON'S DEATH DUTIES; bemgthe Fourth Edition of the Acts relating to Estate Duty Finance, Probate, Legacy, and Succession Duties. Comprising the 36 Geo. III. c. 52 ; 45 Geo. III. c. 28 ; 55 Geo. III. c. 184; and 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51; the Customs and Inland Revenue Acts, 43 Vict. c. 14; and 44 Vict. c. 12; also the New Estate Duty Finance Acts, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 30, and 59 & 60 Vict. c. 28 ; with an Introduction, Copious Notes, and References to all the Decided Cases in England, Scot- lancl, and Ireland. An Appendix and a full Index. By Alfred Hanson, of the Middle Temple, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, Comptroller of Legacy and Suc- cession Duties. Fourth Edition by Lewis T. Dibdin, M.A., D.C.L., and F. H. L. Errington, M. A., Barristers-at-Law. reputation with the Profession, and all interested in a somewhat difficult subject." — Law Times. Of all the various treatises on the subject to " It is remarkable how surely a really good legal treatise finds favour with the Profession. The late Mr. Hanson's edition of the Acts relating to " Es- tate, Probate, Legacy and Succession Duties," is one of these The passing of the Finance Acts of 1894 and 1896 has caused the introduction of new matter. We recognise a decided improve- ment in the work, which we think will enhance its which the recent Acts have given birth, the one under review strikes us as the fullest and best, and we heartily recommend it to all seeking instruction on these difficult statutes."— />•«/[ La^u Times. In one Volume, royal 8vo, price 505. net, THE LAW AI^D PRACTICE IN LUNACY: with the Lunacy Acts, 1890-91 (Consolidated and Annotated) ; the Rules or Lunacy Commissioners ; the Idiots Act, 1886 ; the Vacating of Seats Act, 1886 ; the Rules in Lunacy ; the Lancashire County (Asylums and other powers) Act, 1891 ; the Inebriates Act, 1879 and 1888 (Consolidated and Annotated) ; the Criminal Lunacy Acts, 1800-1884 ; and a Collection of Forms, Precedents, &c. By A, Wood Renton, Barrist er-at-Law. In 8vo, price 30?., cloth, THE PRACTICE ON THE CROWN SIDE Of the Sueen's BeDch Division of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice (Founded on Corner's Crown Office Practice), including Appeals from Inferior Courts; with Appendices of Rules and Forms. By F. H. SHORT, Chief Clerk of the Crown Office, and FRANCIS HAMILTON MELLOR, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. In 8vo, price I2J'., cloth, THE CROWN OFFICE RULES AND FORMS, 1886. The Supreme Court of Judicature Acts and Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, relating to the Practice on the Crown side of the Queen's Bench Division ; including Appeals from Inferior Courts, Tables of Court Fees, Scales of Costs ; together with Notes, Cases, and a Full Index. By F. H. SHORT, Chief Clerk of the Crown Office. In royal 8vo, 1877, price lO-f., cloth, THE CASE OF LORD HENRY SEYMOUR'S WILL (WALLACE V. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL). Reported by FREDERICK WAYMOUTH GIBBS, C.B., Barrister-at-Law, I.ATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. In 8vo, 1867, price i6s., cloth, CHARITABLE TRUSTS ACTS, 1853, 1855, 1860; THE CHARITY COMMISSIONERS' JURISDICTION ACT, 1862; THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHARITIES ACTS: Together with a Collection of Statutes relating to or affecting Charities, including the Mortmain Acts, Notes of Cases from 1853 to the present time, Forms of Decla- rations of Trust, Conditions of Sale, and Conveyance of Charity Land, and a very copioust Index. Second Edition. By HUGH COOKE and R, G. HARWOOD, of the Charity Commission. STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 11 Just Published, Demy 8vo, 152 pp. Price Ts. 6d, THE LAW RELATING UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAINS WITH MONEY-LENDERS. INCLUDING the History of Usury to the Repeal of the Usury Laws, with Appendices, and containing a Digest of Cases, Annotated ; relating to Unconscionable Bargains, Statutes, and Forms for the use of Practitioners. By Hugh H. L. Bellot, M.A., B.C.L., and R. James "Willis, Barristers-at-Law. INNER TEMPLE RECORDS. A Calendar of the. Edited by F. A. Inderwick, Q.C. Vol. I., 21 Hen. VII. (1505)— 45 Eliz. 11603). Imperial 8vo. Roxburghe binding. 1896. 20^. net. In one Volume, 8vo, price 20^., cloth, THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMERCIAL LAW; WITH AN APPENDIX OF STATUTES, ANNOTATED BY MEANS OF REFERENCES TO THE TEXT. By JOSEPH HURST and LORD ROBERT CECIL, OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTERS-AT-LAW. "Their compendium, we believe, will be found a really useful volume, one for the lawyer and the business man to keep at his elbow, and which, if not giving them all that they require, will place in their hands the key to the richer and more elaborate treasures of the Law which lie in larger and more ejihaus- tive works." — Law Times. "The object of the authors of this work, they tell us in their preface, is to state, within a moderate compass, the principles of commercial law. Very considerable pains have obviously been expended on the task; and the book is in many respects a very serviceable one." — Law Journal. .Second Edition, in royal 8vo, price 25.?., cloth, THE RELATIONSHIP OF LANDLORD AND TENANT. Bv EDGAR FOA, OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. "Will be found of much value to practitioners, and when a second edition has given the author the opportunity of reconsidering and carefully revising his stetements in detail, we think it will take its place as a very good treatise on the modern law of landlord and tenant." — Solicitors' Journal. " Mr. Foa is a bold man to undertake the exposition of a branch of law so full of difficulties and encum- bered by so many decisions as the Law of Landlord and Tenant. But his boldness is justified by the excellent arrangement and by the lucid statements which characterise his book."'— ZaTO^; HAYAES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 13 Third Edition. In 8vo, price lo.f. 6i/., cloth, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF TORTS. By RICHARD RINGVVOOD, M.A., OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW ; AUTHOR OF " PRINCIFLES OF BANKRUPTCY," &C., AND LECTURER ON COMMON LAW TO THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY. "We have always had a great liking for this work, and are very pleased to see by the appearance of a new Edition that it is appreciated by students. We consider that for the ordinary student who wants to take up a separate work on Torts, this is the best book he can read, for it is clear and e.vplanatory, and has good illustrative cases, and it is all contained in a very modest compass. . . . This Edition appears to have been thoroughly revised, and is, we think, in many respects improved." — Law Students' Journal. " The work is one we well recommend to law students, and the able way in which it is written reflects much credit upon the author." — Lam Times. "Mr. Ringwood's book is a plain and straightforward introduction to this branch of the law." — Lam Journal. ^^* Prescribed as a text-hook by the Incorporated Laiv Society of Ireland. Sixth Edition, in 8vo, price 21 j., cloth, THE LAW OF COMPENSATION FOR LANDS, HOUSES, &c. UNDER THE LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACTS, THE RAILWAYS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACTS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT, 1873; THE HOUSING OF THE WORKING CLASSES ACT, 1890; THE METROPOLIS LOCAL MANAGEMENT ACT AND OTHER ACTS, WITH A FULL COLLECTION OF FORMS AND PRECEDENTS. By eyre LLOYD, OK THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. SIXTH EDITION. By W. J. BROOKS, OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. " In providing the le^al profession with a book ivhich contains the decisions oj the Courts oj Law and Equity upon the various statutes relati7ig to the Law of Compensation, Mr. Eyre Lloyd has long since left all competitors in the distance, and his book may no^v be considered the standard work upon the sub- ject. The plan of Mr. Lloyds book is generally kno2vu, and its hccidity is apprreciated ; the present quite fulfils all the promises of the preceding editiofis, and contaitis in addition to other matter a complete set of forms under the Artizans and Labourers Act, 1875, and specimens of Bills of Costs, whichwill be found a noz'el feature, extremely useful to legal p>-actitione7-s." — Justice of the Peace. In 8vo, price 7^., cloth, THE SUCCESSION LAWS OF CHRISTIAN COUNTRIES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF PRIMOGENI PURE AS IT EXISTS IN ENGLAND. By eyre LLOYD, B.A., Barrister-at-Law. In crown 8vo, price 6i-. , cloth, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL HISTORY. By JOHN W. SALMOND, M.A., LL.B. (Lond.), a DARRISTER of the SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND. In crown 8vo, price ds., cloth. THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE. By JOHN W. SALMOND, M.A., LL.B., bakristf.r-at-la\v ; authou of "essays in jurisprudence and i.f.gai. hisiokv " 14 STEVENS 6- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR, In 8vo, price ']s. 6d., cloth, THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES. CONTAINED IN A COURSE OF SIX LECTURES. Delivered by WILLIAM WILLIS, Esq., Q.C, AT THE REQUEST OF THE COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION. In one large vol., 8vo, price 32^., cloth, INSTITUTES AND HISTORY OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW, WITH CATENA OF TEXTS. By Dr. CARL SALKOWSKI, Professor of Laws, Konigsberg Translated and Edited by E. E. Whitfield, M.A. (Oxon.). In 8vo, price 45. 6d., cloth, THE NEWSPAPER LIBEL AND REGISTRATION ACT, 1881. WITH A STATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIBEL' AS AFFECTING PROPRIETORS, PUBLISHERS, and EDITORS OF NEWSPAPERS. By G. ELLIOTT, Barrister-at-Law, of the Inner Temple. In one volume, royal 8vo, CASES AND OPINIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE. COLLECTED AND DIGESTED FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SOURCES. IVITH NOTES. By WILLIAM FORSYTH, M.A., M.P., Q.C, STANDING COUNSEL TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN COUNCIL OF INDIA, Author of '•■ Hortensius," " History of Trial by Jury," " Life of Cicero," etc., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 15 Seventh Edition, in 8vo, price \os. 6d., cloth, THE PRINCIPLES OF BANKRUPTCY. WITH AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING THE CONSOLIDATED RULES OF 1886, 1890 & 1891, SCALE OF COSTS, AND THE BILLS OF SALE ACTS, 1878, 1882, 1890 k 1891, AND THE RULES THEREUNDER; THE DEEDS OF ARRANGEMENT ACT, 1887, AND THE RULES THEREUNDER. Bv RICHARD RINGWOOD, M.A., OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-I.AW ; LATE SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DuBLIN. " We welcome a new edition of this excellent student's book. We have written favourably of it in reviewing previous editions, and every good word we have written we would now reiterate and perhaps even more so. . . . In conclusion, we congratulate Mr. Ringwood on this edition, and have no hesitation in saying that it is a capital student's book." — Lazv Students' Jourtial. " This edition is a considerable improvement on the first, a^d although chiefly written for the use of Students, the work will be found useful to the practitioner." — Lmv Times. Seventh Edition, in 8vo, price 215., cloth, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY AND BILLS OF SALE. WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING THE BANKRUPTCY ACTS, 1883— 1890; GENERAL RULES, FORMS, SCALE OF COSTS AND FEES ; RULES UNDER S. 122 of 1888; DEEDS OF ARRANGEMENT ACTS, 1887— 1890; RULES AND FORMS; BOARD OF TRADE AND COURT ORDERS ; DEBTORS ACTS, 1869, 1878 ; RULES and FORMS; BILLS OF SALE ACTS, 1878— 1891, Etc., Etc. By EDWARD T. BALDWIN, M.A., OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. "The seven editions simply record the constant progress of case growth and statute law. It is a remarkably useful compendium." — La-w Times, July 20, 1895. " As a well-arranged and complete collection of cafie law this book should be found of great use." — Law Joumal, July 20, 1895. " Carefully brought down to date." — Solicitors" Joiirnal, November 9, 1895. " We have always considered the work an admirable one, and the present edition is quite up to the previous high standard of excellence. We know of no better book on bankruptcy for the practitioner's library." — Lazv Students' yournal, August, 1895. " Practitioners may, we feel sure, safely rely on its accuracy. A distinct acquisition for reference purposes to the shelf of any practitioner." — Law Notes. ](3 STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. Thiid Edition, in one vol., price 20.?., cloth, A COMPEWDIUM OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND. FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS AND THE PROFESS/ON. THIRD EDITION WITH ADDENDA, GIVING THE LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897, WITH REFERENCES TO THE TEXT. By WILLIAM DOUGLAS EDWARDS, LL.B., OF Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-law. 'Mr. Edwards' IreatibC on the Law of Real Property is marked by excellency of arrangement and conciseness of statement We are glad to see, by the appearance of successive editions, that the merits of the book are appreciated." — Solicitors' Joii>-iial. " So excellent is the arrangement that we know of no belter compendium upon the subject of which it treats."— Zaw Times. "We welcome the third edition of Mr. Edwards' book. It has by this time secured a first place amongst students' books on Real Property, both by its admirable arrangement of topics and by the clearness of its statements. The present edition intorporates the Statutes and Cases for 1896." — Cambridge Revieiv. "An established place in legal literature is occupied by Mr. W. D. Edwards' ' Compendium of the Law of Property in Land,' the third edition of which has just been published." — The Globe. " We consider it one of the best works published on Real Property Law." — Law Students' Jourttal. "Another excellent compendium which has entered a second edition is Mr. Edwards' 'Compendium of the Law of Property in Land.' No work on English law is written more perspicuously." — Law Times. " The author has the merit of being a sound lawyer, a merit perhaps not always possessed by the authors of legal te.xt-books for students." — La7u Quarterly Review. "Altogether it is a work for which we are indebted to the author, and is worthy of the improved notions of law which the study of jurisprudence is bringing to the front." — Solicitors' lournal. Third Edition, royal 8vo, price sSj'., cloth, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AMD COMPANIES. A TREATISE ON THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES: BEING All Investigation of the Principles which Limit the Capacities, Powers, and Liabilities of CORPORATIONS, AND .MORE ESPECIAU.y OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. By SEWARD BRICE, M.A., LL.D., London, OF THE INNEK TEMPLE, ONE OF HER MAJESTY'S COUNSEL. THIRD EDITION. REVISED THROUGHOUT AND ENLARGED, AND CONTAINING THE UNITED STATES AND COLONIAL DECISIONS. REVIEWS. ' . . . On the whole, ive consider Mr. Brice's exhattstive work a. valuable addition to the literature oj the pro/eision." — Saturday Review. " It is the Law of Corporations that Mr. Brice treats of (and treats of more fully, and at the same time more scientifically, than any work with which we are .acquainted), not the law of principal and agent ; and Mr. Brice does not do his book justice by giving it so vague a title." — Law Journal. "On this doctrine, first introduced in the Common Law Courts in East Anglian Railway Co. v. Eastern Counties Raihuay Co., Brice on Ultra Vires may be read with advantage." — Judgment of Lord Justice Hramwell, in the Case o/Evershedv. L. &' N. II'. Ry. Co. (L. R., 3 Q. B. Div. 141.). STEVENS &> //A YATES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 17 Seventh Edition, in royal 8vo, price 365., cloth, BUCKLEY ON THE COMPANIES ACTS. THE LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE COMPANIES ACTS, 1862 to 1893; and THE LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANIES ACTS, 1870 to 1872 ; inxluding THE COMPANIES (MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION) ACT; THE COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) ACT, and the DIRECTORS' LIABILITY ACT. "^ 'AEuattsc oit the gl.ito of Joint ,§to<:k (JTompanus. CONTAINING THE STATUTES, WITH THE RULES, ORDERS, AND FORMS, TO REGULATE PROCEEDINGS. SEVENTH EDITION BY THE AUTHOR, and A. C. CLAUSON, Esq., M.A., OF LINCOLN'S INN, BARRISTER-AT-LA\V. Second Edition, with Supplement, in royal 8vo, price ^6s., cloth. THE LAW RELATING TO SHIPMASTERS AND SEAMEN. THEIR APPOINTMENT, DUTIES, POWERS, RIGHTS, LIABILITIES, AND REMEDIES. By THE LATE JOSEPH KAY, Esq., M.A., Q.C. Second Edition. WITH A SUPPLEMENT Cotnprisi7ig THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894, The Rules of Court made thereiuider, and the {^proposed) Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. By THE Hon. J. W. MANSFIELD, M.A., and G. W. DUNCAN, Esq., B.A., OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTERS-AT-LAW. REVIEWS OF THE SECOND EDITION: " It will, however, be a valuable book of refer- ence for any lawyer desiring to look up a point connected with the rights and duties of a ship- master or a seaman — the list of cases cited covers nearly seventy pages — while any shipmaster, ship- agent or consul who masters this edition will be well posted up We hope this new Edition will be quickly appreciated, for the Editors have carried out an arduous task carefully and well." — Law yournal, April, 1894. " It has had practical and expert knowledge brought to bear upon it, while the case law is brought down to a very late date. Considerable improvement has been made in the index." — Laiu Times, April, 1894. In royal 8vo, price 10s. 6nporary Review. " The book is well known as an admirable introduction to the study of constitutional law for students at law Mr. Carmichael appears to have done the work of editing, made necessary by the death of Mr. Taswell-Langmead, with care and judgment." — Law Joiiriial. " The work before us it would be hardly possible to praise too highly. In style, arrangement, clearness, and size, it would be difficult to find anything better on the real history of England, the history of its constitutional growth as a complete story, than this volume." — Boston (U.S.) Literary World. "As it now stands, we should find it haid to name a better text-book on English Constitutional History." — Solicitors' Jo-iinial. " Mr. Taswell-Langmead's compendium of the rise and development of the English Constitution has evidently supplied a want The present Edition is greatly improved. . . . We have no hesitation in saying that it is a thoroughly good and useful work." — Spectator. " It is a safe, careful, praiseworthy digest and manual of all constitutional history and law." — Globe. "The volume on English Constitutional History, by Mr. Taswell-Langmead, is exactly what such a history should be." — Standard. " Mr. Taswell-Langmead has thoroughly grasped the bearings of his subject. It is, however, in dealing with that chief subject of constitutional history — parliamentary government — that the work exhibits its great superiority over its rivals." — Academy. Second Edition, in 8vo, price 6j-., cloth, HANDBOOK TO THE INTERMEDIATE AND FINAL LL.B. OF LONDON UNIVERSITY ; (PASS AND HONOURS), Including A COMPLETE SUMMARY OF "AUSTIN'S JURISPRUDENCE," AND THE EXAMINATION PAPERS of LATE YEARS in ALL BRANCHES. By a B.A., LL.B. (Lond.). In crown 8vo, price 35. ; or Interleaved for Notes, price 45., CONTRACT LAW. QUESTIONS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. With Notes to rHE AN.SWERS. Founded Oil ^^ Anson," ^'' Chiity," and ^^ Pollock." By PiULiP Fo.siER Alukeij, D.C.L., Hertford CoUesje and Gray's Inn. 22 WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. Twelfth Edition, in 8vo, price 21^-., cloth, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY. INTENDED FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION. By EDMUND H. T. S N E L L, OF THK MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. TWELFTH EDITION. By ARCHIBALD BROWN, M.A. Edin. & Oxon., & B.C.L. Oxon., OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW ; AUTHOR OF "a NEW LAW DICTIONARY," "an analysis of SAVIGNY on OBLIGATIONS," AND THE " LAW OF FIXTURES." REVIEWS. "The Twelfth Edition of this work will be welcomed. . . . The book is now a standard work on the ' Principles of Equity,' and we suppose that very few aspirants for the Bar and the Rolls present them- selves for examination without reading the book more than once. . . . There is no book on Equity which can come near ' Snell.' "— Laiv Notes. " ' Snell ' remains, as it has been for a generation, the indisputable introduction to the study of Equity." — Oxford Magazine. " The fact that ' Snell's Principles of Equity ' has reached the Twelfth Edition is in itself sufficient to show the warm approval of the profession. It is a wonderful compendium of Equity Principles, so arranged as to lead the reader steadily on from simpler to more abstruse questions ; and is most useful, not only to the student, but also to the barrister in his every day work." — /?7Vi Law Times. "The student who has mastered 'Snell' will know as much about Equity as most practitioners, and more than some. . . . This edition appears to have been brought well up to date. It is, moreover, furnished with an excellent index. This is fortunate, as ' Snell holds the field as a treatise on Equity." ■ — Law Journal. " This is the Eighth Edition of this student's text-book which the present editor ha.s brought out. . . . the book is a good introduction to Equitj', and is additionally useful by having a full index." — Solicitors' yournal. "Whether to the beginner in the study of the principles of Equity, or to the practising lawyer in the hurry of work, it can be unhesitatingly recommended as a standard and invaluable tx&atisc."— Cam bridge Review. " This is now unquestionably the standard book on Equity for students." — Satii7-day Review. In 8vo, price 2s., sewed, QUESTIONS ON EQUITY. FOR STUDENTS PREPARING FOR EXAMINATION. FOUNDED ON THE NINTH EDITION OF SNELL'S "PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY." By W. T. WAITE, BARKISTER-AT-LAVV, HOLT SCHOLAR OF THE HONOURABLE SOCIETY OF GRAV's INN. " We kno7v of no better introductioti to the Principles of Equity.''^ — i Canada Law Journal. j Sixth Edition, in 8vo, price ds., cloth, I AN ANALYSIS OF SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF | EQUITY. Founded ON the Twelfth Edition. With Notes thereon. By E. E. Blyth, LL.D., Solicitor. ! " Mr. Blyth's book will undoubtedly be very useful to readers of Snell." — La^v Times. \ " This is an admirable analysis of a good treatise ; read with Snell, this little book will be found very | profitable to the student." — Laiv Jonnial. \ WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. 23 Second Edition, in one volume, 8vo, price i8j-., cloth, PRINCIPLES OF CONVEYANCING. AN ELEMENTARY WORK FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. By henry C. DEANE, OF Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-law, sometime lecturer to the incorporated law society OF the united kingdom. '■''We hope to see this book, like SnelTs Equity, a standard class-book in all Laiv Schools where English lazv is taught." — Canada Law Journal. " We like the work, it is well written and is an " In the parts which have been re-written, Mr. excellent student's book, and being only just pub- Deane has preserved the same pleasant style marked lished, it has the great advantage of having in it all by simplicity and lucidity which distinguished his the recent important enactments relating to convey- first edition. After ' Williams on Real Property,' ancing. It possesses also an excellent index." — j there is no book which we should so strongly Law Students' Joiimal. recommend to the student entering upon Real Pro- " Will be found of great use to students entering ! petty Law as Mr. Deane's ' Principles of Convey- upon the difficulties of Real Property Law. It has i ancing,' and the high character which the first an unusually exhaustive index covering some fifty I edition attained has been fully kept up in this pages." — Lazv Times. \ second." — Lam Journal. Fourth Edition, in 8vo, price loj-. , cloth, A SUMMARY OF TPIE LAW & PRACTICE IN ADMIRALTY. FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. By EUSTACE SMITH, of the inner temple; author of "a summary of comfanv law." "The book is well arranged, and forms a good introduction to the subject." — Soticitors' JouKnal. " It is, however, in our opinion, a well and carefully written little work, and should be in the hands of every student who is taking up Admii'alty Law at the Final." — Law Students' Journal. ■' Mr. Smith has a happy knack of compressing a large amount of useful matter in a small compass. The present work will doubtless be received with satisfaction equal to that with which his previous ' Summary' has been met." — Oxford and Cambridge Undergraduates' Journal. Fourth Edition, in 8vo, price 8j., cloth, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS. FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. By EUSTACE SMITH, the inner temple; author of "a summary of company law " and "a summary of the law and practice in admiralty." " His object has been, as he tells us in his preface, to give the student and general reader a fair outline of the scope and extent of ecclesiastical law, of the principles on which it is founded, of the Courts by which it is enforced, and the procedure by which these Courts are regulated. We think the book well fulfils its object. Its value is much enhanced by a profuse citation of authorities for the propositions contained in it." — Bar Examination Jourjial. Fourth Edition, in 8vo, price "js. 6^'.,. cloth, AN EPITOME OF THE LAWS OF PROBATE AND DIVORCE. FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS FOR HONOURS EXAMLNATION. By J. CARTER HARRISON, Solicitor. "The work is considerably enlarged, and we think improved, and will be found cf great assistance to students." — Laiv Students' Journal. 24 WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. Eighth Edition. In one volume, 8vo, price 20^., cloth, PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMON LAW. INTENDED FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION. EIGHTH EDITION. By JOHN INDERMAUR. Solicitor, AUTHOR OF "A MANUAL OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT," " EPITOMES OF LEADING CASES," AND OTHER WORKS. •'The student will find in Mr, Indermaur's book a safe and clear guide to the Prin- ciples of Common Law." — Law yournal, 1892. "The present edition of this elementary treatise has been in general edited with praise- worthy care. The provisions of the statutes affecting the subjects discussed, which have been passed since the publication of the last edition, are clearly summarised, and the effect of the leading cases is generally very well given. In the difficult task of selecting and distinguishing principle from detail, Mr. Indermaur has been very successful ; the leading principles are clearly brought out, and very judiciously illustrated."— .Si^/ZczVor^' yournal, "The work is acknowledged to be one of the best written and most useful elementary works for Law Students that has been published." — Law Times, " The praise which we were enabled to bestow upon Mr. Indermaur's very useful com- pilation on its first appearance has been justified by a demand for a second edition." — Law Magazine, " We were able, four years ago, to praise the first edition of Mr. Indermaur's book as likely to be of use to students in acquiring the elements of the law of torts and contracts. The second edition maintains the character of the book." — Laiv Jotimal. "Mr. Indermaur renders even law light reading. He not only possesses the faculty of judicious selection, but of lucid exposition and felicitous illustration. And while his works are all thus characterised, his ' Principles of the Common Law ' especially displays those features, That it has already reached a second edition, testifies that our estimate of the work on its first appearance was not unduly favourable, highly as we then signified approval ; nor needs it that we should add anything to that estimate in reference to the general scope and execution of the work. It only remains to say, that the present edition evinces that every care has been taken to insure thorough accuracy, while including all the modifications in the law that have taken place since the original publication ; and that the references to the Irish decisions which have been now introduced are calculated to render the work of greater utility to practitioners and students, both English and Irish." — Irish Law Times. " This zvork, the author tells us in his Preface, is 'written mainly tuith a view to the examinations of the Incorporated Law Society ; but we think it is likely to attain a wider usefulness. It seems, so far as we can judge from the parts we have examined, to be a careful and clear outline of the p7-inciples of the cotnvion law. It is very readable ; a>ui not only students, but many practitioners and the fiublic, might benefit by a perusal 0/ its pages." —SiOiACiTO'Rs' Journal. WORKS FOR LAW STUDEN7'S. "25 Seventh Edition, in 8vo, price 14-r., cloth, A MANUAL OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH AND CHANCERY DIVISIONS, Seventh Edition. Intended for the use of Students and the Profession. By John Indermaur, Solicitor. "Mr. Indermaur has brought out a sixth edition of his excellent 'Manual of Practice' at a very opportune time, for he has been able to incorporate the effect of the new Rules of Court which came into force last November, the Trustee Act, 1893, and Rules, and the Supreme Court Fund Rules, 1893, as well as that of other Acts of earlier date. A very complete revision of the work has, of course, been necessary, and Mr. Indermaur, assisted by Mr. Thwaites, has effected this with his usual thoroughness and careful attention to details. The book is well known and valued by students, but practitioners also find it handy in many cases where reference to the bulkier ' White Book ' is unnecessary."— i^«w Times, February, 1894. "This well-known students' book may very well be consulted by practitioners, as it contains a considerable amount of reliable information on the practice of the Court. It is written so as to include the new Rules, and a supplemental note deals with the alterations made in Rule XI. by the Judges in January last. The praise which we gave to previous editions is quite due to the present issue." — Law Journal, February, 1894. Eighth Edition, in 8vo, price ds., cloth, AN EPITOME OF LEADING COMMON LAW CASES; WITH SOME SHORT NOTES THEREON. Chiefly intended as a Guide to " Smith's Leading Cases." By John Indermaur, Solicitor (Clifford's Inn Prizeman, Michaelmas Term, 1872). " We have received the third edition of the ' Epitome of Leading Common Law Cases,' by Mr. Inder- maur, Solicitor. The first edition of this work was published in February, 1873, the second in April. 1S74; and now we have a third edition dated September, 1875. No better proof of the value of this book can be furnished than the fact that in less than three years it has reached a third edition." — Laiv Journal. Eighth Edition, in 8vo, price ds., cloth, AN EPITOME OF LEADING CONVEYANCING AND EQUITY CASES; WITH SOME SHORT NOTES THEREON, FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. By John Indermaur, Solicitor, Author of "An Epitome of Leading Common Law Cases." "We have received the second edition of Mr. Indermaur's very useful Epitome of Leading Convey- ancing and Equity Cases. The work is very well done." — Laiu Titttes. "The Epitome well deserves the continued patronage of the class— Students— lor whom it is especially intended. Mr. Indermaur will soon be known as the ' Students' Friend.' " — Can ada Law Journ al. Sixth Edition, 8vo, price 6s., cloth, THE ARTICLED CLERK'S GUIDE TO AND SELF-PREPARATION FOR THE FINAL EXAMINATION. Containing a Complete Course of Study, with Books to Read, List of Statutes, Ca.ses, Test Questions, &c., and intended for the use of those Articled Clerks who read by themselves. By John Indermaur, Solicitor. "In this edition Mr. Indermaur extends his counsels to the whole period from the Intermediate examination to the Final. His advice is practical and sensible : and if the course of study he recommends is intelligently followed, the articled clerk will have laid in a store of legal knowledge more than sufficient to carry him through the Final Examination." — Solicitors' Journal. Now ready, Fifth Edition, in 8vo, price ioj., cloth, THE ARTICLED CLERK'S GUIDE TO AND SELF- PREPARATION FOR THE INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION, As it now exists on Stephen's Commentaries. Containing a complete course of Study, with Statutes, Questions, and Advice. Also a complete Selected Digest of the whole of the Questions and Answers set at the Examinations on those parts of " Stephen " now examined on, embracing a period of fourteen and a half years (58 Examinations), inclusive of the Examination in April, 1S94, &c. &c., and intended for the use of all Articled Clerks who have not yet passed the Inter- mediate Examination. By John Indermaur, Author of " Principles of Com- mon Law," and other works. In 8vo, 1875, price 6j-., cloth, THE STUDENTS' GUIDE TO THE JUDICATURE ACTS, AND THE RULES THEREUNDER: Being a book of Questions and Answers intended for the use of Law Students. By John Indermaur, Solicitor. 26 WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. In Demy 8vo, cloth gilt, pp. 600, price ^s. net, THE LAW OF TORTS. ARRANGED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW, AND OF THE INDIAN CASE LAW. By RATANLAL RANCHHODDAS, B.A., LL.B., PLEADER, HIGH COURT. The Right Hon. Lord Llerschell, Ex-Lord High Chancellor ot England : — " Wherever I have tested it, the statements of law appear accurate and clear." Thi Right Hon. Lord Russell of L\illoiven, Lord Chief Justice of England : — " It seems to me to be carefully done and to be well arranged. " The Right Hon. Lord Davey, of Her Majesty's Privy Council : — " I have pleasure in saying that it appears to me to be well arranged and carefully done, and I have no doubt that it will prove useful both to the student and to the practitioner." The Hon. Mr. ytistice Parsons, of the Bombay High Court : — " I am sure the book will prove most useful to all who wish to acquire a knowledge of this subject, and from the great pains you have evidently bestowed upon it, it seems quite entitled to rank as the text-book of the subject in India." The Hon. Mr. Justice P.C. Chatterjec, of the Panjab Chief Court : — "It is a work 01 considerable originality and merit. I believe the general accuracy of your book is beyond question." Fifth Edition, in crown 8vo, price \2s. 6d., cloth, AN EPITOME OF CONVEYANCING STATUTES. Extending from 13 Edw. I. to the End of 55 & 56 Victoria. Fifth Edition, with Short Notes. By George Nichols Marcy, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, in 8vo, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, AND INSTITUTE OF THE WHOLE LAW; Embracing French and Latin Terms and References to the Authorities, Cases, and Statutes. Second Edition, revised throughout, and considerably enlarged. By Archibald Brown, M.A. Edin. and Oxon., and B.C.L., Oxon., Barrister-at-Law ; Author of the "Law of Fixtures,'" etc. In royal 8vo, price 5^., cloth, ANALYTICAL TABLES of THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY; Drawn up chiefly from STEPHEN'S BLACKSTONE, with Notes. By C. J. TARRING, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. ■'Great care and considerable skill have been shown in the compilation of these tables, which will be found of much service to students of the Law of Real Property." — Law Times. WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. Eighth Edition, in 8vo, price 20s., cloth, PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW. INTENDED AS A LUCID EXPOSITION OF THE SUBJECT FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION. By SEYMOUR F. HARRIS, B.C.L., M.A. (Oxon.), AUTHOR OF "a CONCISE DIGEST OF THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN." EIGHTH EDITION. By C. L. ATTENBOROUGH, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. REVIEWS. " Messrs. Stevens & Haj^nes have just issued the Seventh Edition of their well known text-book, ' Harris's Principles of the Criminal Law.' For the present edition Mr. Charles L. Attenborough, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law, is responsible. He has brought the work up to date, and ensured for it a further career of usefulness as the leading student's te.\t-book upon the Criminal Law." — Laiv Times. "This work is pretty well known as one designed for the student who is preparing for examination, and for the help of young practitioners. Among articled clerks it has long enjoyed a popularity which is not likely to be interfered with. . . . We have been carefully through the new edition and can cordially commend it." — Laiu Stiidetifs yonriial. "The book must be good, and must meet a demand, and Harris's Criminal Law remains as it has always been, an excellent work for obtaining that kind of theoretical knowledge of the criminal law which is so useful at the University Examinations of Oxford and Cambridge." — La7v Notes. " The characteristic of the present Edition is the restoration to the book of the character of ' a concise e.xposition ' proclaimed by the title-page. Mr. Attenborough has carefully pruned away the excrescences which had arisen in successive editions, and has improved the work both as regards terseness and clearness of exposition. In both respects it is now an excellent student's book. The text is very well broken up into headings and paragraphs, with short marginal notes — the importance of which, for the convenience of the student, is too often overlooked." — Solicitors' yournal. " The favourable opinion we expressed 0/ the first edition of this ivork appears to have been fitstified by the reception it has met luith. Looking through this nezu Edition, zve see no reason to modify the praise we bestoiued on the foriner Edition. The recent cases have been added and the provisions of the Summary furisdiction Act are noticed in the chapter relating to Sumviary Convictions . The book is one of the best manuals of Criminal Law for the studejit.''' — Solicitors' Journal. " There is no lack of Works on Criminal Law, but there was i-oom for such a useful handbook of Principles as Mr. Seymour Harris has supplied. Accustomed, by his previous labours, to the task of analysing the law, Mr. Harris has brought to bear upon his present work qualifications well adapted to secure the sticcessful accomplishment of the object which he had set before him. That object is not an avibitious one, for it does not pretend to soar above utility to the youtig practitioner and the student. For both these classes, and for the yet wider class who may require a book of reference on the subject, Mr. Harris has produced a clear and convenient Epitome of the Law.^' — Law Magazine and Review. "This work piirports to contain 'a concise exposition of the nature of crime, the various offences punish- able by the English law, the law of criminal procedure, and the law of summarj' convictions,' with tables of offences, punishments, and statutes. The work is divided into four books. Book I. treats of crime, its divisions and essentials ; of persons capable of committing crimes ; and of principals and accessories. Book II. deals with offences of a public nature ; offences against private persons ; and offences against the property of individuals. Each crime is discussed in its turn, with as much brevity as could well be used consistently with a proper explanation of the legal characteristics of the several offences. Book III. explains criminal procedure, including the jurisdiction of Courts, and the various steps in the apprehension and trial of criminals from arrest to punishment. This part of the work is extremely well done, the description of the trial being excellent, and thoroughly calculated to impress the mind of the uninitiated. Book IV. contains a short sketch of ' summary convictions before magistrates out of quarter sessions.' The table of offences at the end of the volume is most useful, and there is a very full index. Altogether we must congratulate Mr. Harris on his adventure." — Laiv Joitmal. ! 28 WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. Second Edition, in crown 8vo, price 5^. 6(/., cloth, THE STUDENTS' GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY; Being a Complete Digest of the Law of Bankruptcy in tlie shape of Questions and Answers, and comprising all Questions asked at the Solicitors' Final Examinations in Bankruptcy since the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, and all important Decisions since that Act. By John Indermaur, Solicitor, Author of " Principles of Common Law," &c. &c. In i2mo, price 5^. dd., cloth, A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF SALE, FOR THE USE OF LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS, AND THE PUBLIC. Embracing the Acts of 1878 and 1882. Part I.— Of Bills of Sale generally. Part II.— Of the Execution, Attestation, and Registration of Bills of Sale and satisfaction thereof. Part III. — Of the Effects of Bills of Sale as against Creditors. Part IV. — Of Seizing under, and Enforcing Bills of Sale. Appendix, Forms, Acts, &c. By John Indermaur, Solicitor. " The object of the book is thoroughly practical. Those who want to be told exactly what to do and where to go when they are registering a bill of sale will find the necessary information in this little book." — Law younuxl. Second Edition, in 8vo, price 4J. , cloth, A COLLECTION OF LATIN MAXIMS & PHRASES. LITERALLY TRANSLATED. INTENDED FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS FOR ALL LEGAL EXAMINATIONS. Second Edition, by J. N. COTTERELL, Solicitor. " The book seems admirably adapted as a book of reference for students who come across a Latin maxim in their reading."- — La%u Journal. In one volume, 8vo, price 95. , cloth, LEADING STATUTES SUMMARISED, FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. By ERNEST C. THOMAS, • BACON SCHOLAK OF THE HON. SOCIETY OF GRAV'S INN, LATE SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD: AUTHOR OF " LEADING CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BRIEFLY STATED." Second Edition, in 8vo, enlarged, price 6j'., cloth, LEADING CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Briefly Stated, with Introduction and Notes. By ERNEST C. THOMAS, BACON SCHOLAR OF THE HON. SOCIETY OF GRAV's INN, LATE SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD "Mr. E. C. Thomas has put together in a slim octavo a digest of the principal cases illustrating Con- stitutional Law, that is to say, all questions as to the rights or authority of the Crown or persons under it, as regards not merely the constitution and structure given to the governing body, but also the mode in which the sovereign power is to be exercised. In an introductory essay Mr. Thomas gives a very clear and intelligent survey of the general functions of the E.xecutive, and the principles by which they are regulated ; and then follows a summary of leading cases." — Saturday Revieui. " Mr. Thomas gives a sensible introduction and a brief epitome of the familiar leading cases." — Law Times. In 8vo, price %$., cloth, AN EPITOME OF HINDU LAW CASES. With Short Notes thereon. And Introductory Chapters on Sources of Law, Marriage, Adoption, Partition, and Succession. By William M. P. Coghi.an, Bombay Civil Service, late Judge and Sessions Judge of Tanna. STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 29 Second Edition, in crown 8vo, price \is. 6d., cloth, THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, With Notes of all the Cases decided under the Act ; The consolidated RULES and FORMS, 1886; The Debtors Act, 1869, so far as applicable to bankruptcy matters, with rules and forms thereunder ; the Bills of Sale Acts, 1878 and 1882 ; Board of Trade Circulars and Forms, and List of Official Receivers ; Scale of Costs, Fees, and Percentages, 1886 ; Orders of the Bankruptcy Judge of the High Court ; and a Copious Index. Bv WILLIAM HAZLITT, Esq., and RICHARD RINGWOOD, M.A., SENIOR REGISTRAR IN BANKRUHTCV, OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, ESQ., BARR1STER-AT-LA\V. Second Edition, by R. RINGWOOD, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. "This is a verj- handy edition of the Act and Rules The cross references and marginal references to corresponding provisions of the Act of 1869 are exceedingly useful There is a very full index, and the book is admirably printed." — Solicitors' Jonmal. Part I., price "js. 6^/., sewed, LORD WESTBURY'S DECISIONS IN THE EUROPEAN ARBITRATION. of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Reported by Francis S. Reillv, Parts I., II., and III., price 25^., sewed, LORD CAIRNS'S DECISIONS IN THE ALBERT ARBITRATION. Reported by Francls S. Reilly, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, in royal Svo, price 305., cloth, A TREATISE ON THE STATUTES OF ELIZABETH AGAINST FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES. The Bills of Sale Acts 1878 and 1882 and the LAW OF VOLUNTARY DISPOSITIONS OF PROPERTY. Bv THE LATE H. W. MAY, B.A. (Ch. Ch. Oxford). Second Edition, thoroughly revised and enlarged, by S. Worthington Worthington, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law ; Editor of the " Married Women's Property Acts," 5th edition, by the late J. R. Griffith. "Mr. Worthington's work appears to have been conscientious and exhaustive." — Saturday Review. " Examining Mr. Ma5''s book, we find it con- structed with an intelligence and precision which render it entirely worthy of being accepted as a guide in this confessedly difficult subject. The subject is an involved one, but with clean and clear handling it is here presented as clearly as it could be. . . . On the whole, he has produced a very useful book of an exceptionally scientific character." — Solicit07-s' Journal. " The subject and the work are both verj' good. The former is well chosen, new, and interesting ; the latter has the quality which always distin- guishes original research from borrowed labours." — American Law Revieiv. "We are happy to welcome his (Mr. May's) work as an addition to the, we regret to say, brief cata- logue of law books conscientiously executed. We can corroborate his own description of his labours, ' that no pains have been spared to make the book as concise and practical as possible, without doing so at the expense of perspicuitj', or by the omission of any important points. ' "—Zaiw Times. " In conclusion, we can heartily recommend this book to our readers, not only to those who are in large practice, and who merely want a classified list of cases, but to those who have both the desire and the leisure to enter upon a systematic study of our law." — Solicitors' Journal. "As Mr. Worthington points out, since Mr. Maj' wrote, the ' Bills of Sale Acts' of 1878 and 1882 have been passed ; the ' Married Women's Property Act, 1882 '(making settlements by married wornen void as against creditors in cases in which similar settlements by a man would be void), and the ' Bankruptcy Act, 1883.' These Acts and the deci- sions upon them have been handled by Mr. Worth- ington in a manner which shows that he is master of his subject, and not a slavish copyist of sections and head-notes, which is a vicious propensity of many modern compilers of text-books. His Table of Cases (with reference to all the reports), is admirable, and his Index most exhaustive." — Law Times. "The results of the authorities appear to be given well and tersely, and the treatise will, we think, be found a convenient and trustworthy book of reference." — Law Journal. 30 STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. In one volume, medium 8vo, price 38^., cloth ; or in half-roxburgh, 42^., A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO. With a Hitherto Unpublished Treatise by Lord Hale, Lord Hale's " De Jure Maris," and the Third Edition of Hall's Essay on the RIGHTS OF THE CROWN IN THE SEA-SHORE. With Notes, and an Appendix relating to Fisheries. By STUART A. MOORE, F.S.A., OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. "This work is nominally a third edition of the late Mr. Hall's essay on the rights of the Crown in the Sea-shore, but in reality is an absolutely new production, for out of some 900 odd pages Hall's essay takes up but 227. Mr. Moore has written a book of great importance, which should mark an epoch in the history of the rights of the Crown and the subject in the litus maris, or foreshore of the kingdom. Hall's treatise (with Loveland's notes) is set out with fresh notes by the present editor, who is anything but kindly disposed towards his author, for his notes are nothing but a series of exposures of what he deems to be Hall's errors and misrepre- sentations. Mr. Moore admits his book to be a brief for the opposite side of the contention sup- ported by Hall, and a more vigorous and argu- mentative treatise we have scarcely ever seen. Its arguments are clearly and broadly disclosed, and supported by a wealth of facts and cases which show the research of the learned author to have been most full and elaborate. . . . There is no doubt that this is an important work, which must have a considerable influence on that branch of the law with which it deals. That law is contained in ancient and most inaccessible records ; these have now been brought to light, and it may well be that important results to the subject may flow therefrom. The Profession, not to say the general public, owe the learned author a deep debt of gratitude for providing ready to hand such a wealth of materials for founding and building up arguments. Mr. Stuart Moore has written a work which must, unless his contentions are utterly un- founded, at once become the standard text-book on the law of the Sea-shore." — Law Times, Dec. ist. "Mr. Stuart Moore in his valuable work on the Foreshore." — The Times. " Mr. Stuart Moore's work on the title of the Crown to the land around the coast of England lying between the high and low water mark is something more than an ordinary law book. It is a history, and a very interesting one, of such land and the rights exercised over it from the earliest times to the present day ;'and a careful study of the facts contained in the book and of the argu- ments brought forward can scarcely fail to convince the reader of the inaccuracy of the theory, now so constantly put forward by the Crown, that without the existence of special evidence to the contraFy, the land which adjoins riparian property, and which is covered at high tide, belongs to the Crown and not to the owner of the adjoining manor. The list which Mr. Moore gives of places where the question of foreshore has been already raised, and of those as to which evidence on the subject exists amongst the public records, is valu- able, though by no means exhaustive ; and the book should certainly find a place in the library of the lord of every riparian manor." — Morning Post. In one volume, 8vo, price I2J-., cloth, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO THE POLLUTION AND OBSTRUCTION OF WATER COURSES ; Together with a Brief Summary of the Various Sources of Rivers Pollution. By CLEMENT HIGGINS, M.A., F.C.S., OF THE INNER TERH'LE, BARRISTER- AT-LAW. "As a compendium of the law upon a special and rather intricate subject, this treatise cannot but prove of great practical value, and more especially to those who have to advise upon the institution of proceedings under the Rivers Pollu- tion Prevention Act, 1876, or to adjudicate upon those proceedings when brought." — Irish Laiv Times. "We can recommend Mr. Higgms' Manual as the best guide we possess." — Pubiic Health. '■■ County Court Judges, Sanitary Authorities, and Riparian Ov/ners will find in Mr. Higgins' Treatise a valuable aid in obtaining a clear notion of the Law on the Subject. Mr. Higgins has accomplished a work for which he will readily be recognised as having special fitness on account of his practical acquaintance both with the scientific and the legal aspects of his subject." — Law Maga- zine and Review. "The volume is very carefully arranged through- out, and will prove of great utility both to miners and to owners of land on the banks of rivers." — The Mining Journal. "Mr. Higgins writes tersely and clearly, while his facts are so well arranged that it is a pleasure to refer to his book for information ; and altogether the work is one which will be found very useful by all interested in the subject to which it relates." — Engineer. "A compact and convenient manual of the law on the subject to which it relates." — Solicitors' yoiirnal. STEVENS ^^ HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 31 In 8vo, Sixth Edition, price 285., cloth. MAYNE'S TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES. SIXTH EDITION. REVISED AND PARTLY REWRITTEN. BY JOHN D. M A Y N E, OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER- AT-LAW ; AND His Honor Judge LUMLEY SMITH, Q.C. " ' Mayne on Damages ' has now become ahnost a classic, and it is one of the books which we cannot afford to have not up to date. We are therefore pleased to have a new Edition, and one so well written as that before us. With the authors we regret the increasino' size of the volume, but bulk in such a case is better than incompleteness. Every lawyer in practice should have this book, full as it is of practical learning on all branches of the Common Law. The work is unique, and this Edition, like its predecessors, is indispensable." — Law Journal April, 1894. " Few books have been better kept up to the current law than this treatise. The earlier part of the book was remodelled in the last edition, and in the present edition the chapter on Penalties and Liquidated Damages has been rewritten, no doubt in consequence of, or with regard to, the elaborate and exhaustive judgment of the late Master of the Rolls in Wallis v. S^nith (31 W. R. 214 ; L. R. 21 Ch. D. 243). The treatment of the subject by the authors is admirably clear and concise. Upon the point involved in Wallis v. Smith they say : ' The result is that an agreement with various covenants of different importance is not to be governed by any inflexible rule peculiar to itself, but is to be dealt with as coming under the general rule, that the intention of the parties themselves is to be considered. If they have said that in the case of any breach a fixed sum is to be paid, then they will be kept to their agreement, unless it would lead to such an absurdity or injustice that it must be assumed that they did not mean what they said.' This is a very fair summary of the judgments in Wallis v. Smith, especially of that of Lord justice Cotton ; and it supplies the nearest approach wliich can be given at present to a rule for practical guidance. We can heartily commend this as a carefully edited edition of a thoroughly good book." — Solicitors Journal. " During the tivcnty-two years ivhich have elapsed since the publication of this well-knozvn work, its reputation has been steadily growing, and it has long since become the recoonised authority on the inip07-tant stibject of which it treats." — Law Magazine and Review. what the facts proved in their judgment required. And, according to the better opinion, they may give damages 'for example's sake,* and mulct a rich man more heavily than a poor one. In actions for injuries to property, however, 'vindictive' or 'exemplary' damages cannot, except in very rare cases, be awarded, but must be limited, as in con- tract, to the actual harm sustained. _" It is needless to comment upon the arrangement of the subjects in this edition, in which no alteration has been made. The editors modestly express a hope that all the English as well as the principal Irish decisions up to the date have been included, and we believe from our own examination that the hope IS well founded. We may regret that, warned by the growing bulk of the book, the editors have not included any fresh American cases, but we feel that the omission was unavoidable. We should add that the whole work has been thoroughly revised "— Solicitors' Journal, " This text-book is so well known, not only as the highest authority on the subject treated of but as one of the best text-books ever written, that it would be idle for us to speak of it in the words of commendation that it deserves. It is a work that no practisino lawyer can do without.'' — Canada L.\w Journal. "This edition of what has become a standard work has the advantage of appearing under the supervision of the original author as well as of Mr. Lumley Smith, the editor of the second edition. The result is most satisfactory. Mr. Lumley Smith's edition was ably and conscientiously pre- pared, and we are glad to find that the reader still enjoys the benefit of his accuracy and learning. At the same time the book has doubtless been improved by the reappearance of its author as co- editor. The earlier part, indeed, has been to a considerable extent entirely rewritten. " Mr. Mayne's remarks on damages in actions of tort are brief. We agree with him that in such actions the courts are governed by far looser prin- ciples than in contracts ; indeed, sometimes it is impossible to say they are governed by any prin- ciples at all. In actions for injuries to the person or reputation, for example, a judge cannot do more than give a general direction to the jury to give 32 STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. In crown Svo, price 45. 6(/., cloth, ABSTRACT DRAWING. Containing Instructions on the Drawing of Abstracts of Title, and an Illustrative Appendix. By C. E. Scott, Solicitor. "This little book is intended for the assistance of those who have the framing of abstracts of_ title entrusted to their care. It contains a number of useful rules, and an illustrative appendix." -Law Times. " A handy book for all articled clerks." — Ln7u Students' Journal. " Solicitors who have articled clerks would save themselves much trouble if they furnished their clerks with a copy of this little book before putting them on to draft an abstract of a heap of title deeds." —Law Notes. ''• The book ought to be perused by all law students and articled clerks." — Red Tape. Second Edition, in crown Svo, price 7^., cloth, THE LAW RELATING TO CLUBS. By the late JOHN WERTHEIMER, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, by A. W. CHASTER, Barrister-at-Law. "A convenient handbook, drawn up with great "This is a very neat little book on an interesting judgment and perspicuity." — Morning Post. subject. The law is accurately and well expressed." " Both useful and interesting to those interested — Law Journal. in club management." — Law Times. " This is a very handy and complete little work. " Mr. Wertheimer's history of the cases is com- This excellent little treatise should lie on the table plete and well arranged." — Saturday Review. of every club." — Pump Court. In 8vo, price 2s., sewed, TABLE of the FOREiaN MERCANTILE LAWS and CODES in Force in the Principal States of EUROPE and AMERICA. By Charles Lyon-Caen, Professeur agrege a la Faculte de Droit de Paris ; Professeur a I'Ecole libre des Sciences politiques. Translated by Napoleon Argles, Solicitor, Paris. In Svo, price is., sewed, A GUIDE TO THE FRENCH LAWS OF 1889, ON NATION- ALITY and military SERVICE, as affecting British Subjects. By A. Pavitt, Solicitor, Paris. In one volume, demy Svo, price los. 6d., cloth, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU, RETENTION, and DELIVERY. By John Houston, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. In Svo, price loj. , cloth, THE TRIAL OF ADELAIDE BARTLETT FOR MURDER ; Complete and Revised Report. Edited by Edward Beal, B.A., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. With a Preface by Edward Clarke, Q.C., M.P. In Svo, price lOj-. 6d., cloth, A REPORT OF THE CASE OF THE QUEEN v. GURNEY AND OTHERS, In the Court of Queen's Bench before the Lord Chief Justice Cockburn. With Intro- duction, containing History of the Case, and Examination of the Cases at Law and Equity applicable to it. By W. F. Finlason, Barrister-at-Law, In royal Svo, price JOs. 6d., cloth. THE PRACTICE OF EQUITY BY WAY OF REVIVOR AND SUPPLEMENT. With Forms of Orders and Appendix of Bills. By Loftus Leigh Pemberton, of the Chancery Registrar's Office. STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 33 In 8vo, price I2j". 6(/. , cloth, THE ANNUAL DIGEST OF MERCANTILE CASES FOR THE YEARS 1885 AND 1886. Being a Digest of the Decisions of the English, Scotch and Irish Courts ON Matters relating to Commerce. By JAMES A. DUNCAN, M.A., LL.B., Trin. Coll., Camb., AND OF THE INNER TEIMTLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. In 8vo, 1S7S, price 6^., cloth, THE LAW RELATING TO CHARITIES, especially with reference to the validity and construction of CHARITABLE BEQUESTS AND CONVEYANCES. By FERDINAND M. VVHITEFORD, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Vols. I., XL, III., IV., and V., Part I., price 5/. 7j. REPORTS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE JUDGES FOR THE TRIAL OF ELECTION PETITIONS IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND. PURSUANT TO THE PARLL4MENTARY ELECTIONS ACT, 1868. By EDWARD LOUGHLIN O'MALLEY and HENRY HARDCASTLE. *^* Vol. IV. Part III. and all after are Edited by]. S. Sandars and A. P. P. Keep, Barristers-at-Laiv. In 8vo, price \2.s., cloth, THE LAW OF FIXTURES, in the principal relation of Landlord and Tenant, and in all other or general relations. Fourth Edition. By Archibald Brown, M.A. Edin. and Oxon., and B. C.L. Oxon., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. In one volume, Svo, price 28^-., cloth, THE LAW RELATING TO PUBLIC WORSHIP ; With special reference to Matters of Ritual and Ornamentation, and the Means of Securing the Due Observance thereof, and containing in extenso, with Notes and References, The Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874 ; The Church Discipline Act; the various Acts of Uniformity; the Liturgies of 1549, 1552, and 1559, compared with the Present Rubric ; the Canons ; the Articles ; and the Injunc- tions, Advertisements, and other Original Documents of Legal Authority. By Sevvard Brice, LL. D. , of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law, 34 STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. (Stebtns anb gjagnes' jSmcs of |[l«}jrint0 of th« ®mlg H^epovttra. SIR BARTHOLOMEW SHOWER'S PARLIAMENTARY CASES. In 8vo, 1876, price 4/. 4^., best calf binding, SHOWER'S CASES IN PARLIAMENT RESOLVED AND ADJUDGED UPON PETITIONS b' WRITS OF ERROR. FOURTH EDITION. CONTAINING ADDITIONAL CASES NOT HITHERTO REPORTED. REVISED AND EDITED BY RICHARD LOVELAND LOVELAND, OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LA\V ; EDITOR OF " KELYNG'S CROWN CASES," AND "hall's essay on THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN IN THE SEASHORE." " Messrs. Stevens & Haynes, the successful publishers of the Reprints of Bellewe, Cooke, Cunningham, Brookes's New Cases, Choyce Cases in Chancery, William Kelynge and Kelyng's Crown Cases, determined to issue a new or fourth Edition of Shower's Cases in Parliament. " The volume, although beautifully printed on old-fashioned Paper, in old-fashioned type, instead of being in the quarto is in the more convenient octavo form, and contains several additional cases not to be found in any of the previous editions of the work. " These are all cases of importance, worthy of being ushered into the light of the world by enterprising publishers. "Shower's Cases are models for reporters, even in our day. The statements of the case, the argunientsofcounsel,andthe opinions of the Judges, are all clearly and ably given. "This new edition with an old face of these valuable reports, under the able editorship of R. L. Loveland, Esq., should, in the language of the advertisement, 'be welcomed by the profession, as well as enable the custodians of public libraries to complete or add to their series of English Law Reports.'" — Canada Law Journal. BELLEWE'S CASES, T. RICHARD II. In 8vo, 1869, price 3/. 3^., bound in calf antique, LES ANS DU ROY RICHARD LE SECOND. Collect' ensembl' hors les abridgments de Statham, Fitzherbert et Brooke. Per Richard Bellewe, de Lincolns Inne. 1585. Reprinted from the Original Edition. " No public library in the world, where English 1 highly creditable to the spirit and enterprise of law finds a place, should be without a copy of this j private publishers. The work is an important link edition of Bellewe." — Canada Law Journal. 1 in our legal history ; there are no year books of the reign of Richard II., and Bellewe supplied the only " We have here a_/Jir-«V«//« edition of Bellewe, substitute by carefully extracting and collecting all and it is really the most beautiful and admirable 1 the cases he could find, and he did it in the most reprint that has appeared at any time. It is a 1 convenient form — that of alphabetical arrangement perfect gem of antique printing, and forms a most } in the order of subjects, so that the work is a digest interesting monument of our early legal history. It belongs to the same class of works as the Year Book of Edward I. and other similar works which have been printed in our own time under the auspices of the Master of the Rolls ; but is far superior to any of them, and is in this respect as well as a book of law reports. It is in fact a collection of cases of the reign of Richard II., arranged according to their subjects in alphabetical order. It is therefore one of the most intelligible and interesting legal memorials of the Middle Ages." — Law Times. CUNNINGHAM'S REPORTS. In 8vo, 1 87 1, price 3/. 3^., calf antique, Cunningham's (T.) Reports in K. B., 7 to 10 Geo. II.; to which is prefixed a Proposal for rendering the Laws of England clear and certain, humbly offered to the Consideration of both Houses of Parliament. Third edition, with numerous Corrections. By Thomas Townsend Bucknill, Barrister-at-Law. "The instructive chapter which precedes the cases, entitled ' A proposal for rendering the Laws of England clear and certain,' gives the volume a degree of peculiar interest, independent of the value of many of the reported cases. That chapter begins with words which ought, for the information of every people, to be printed in letters of gold. They are as follows : ' Nothing conduces more to the peace and prosperity of every nation than good laws and the due execution of them." The history of the civil law is then rapidly traced. Next a history is given of English Reporters, beginning with the reporters of the Year Books from i Edw. III. to 12 Hen. VIII. — being near 200 years — and afterwards to the time of the author," — Canada Law Journal. STEVENS ^ HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 35 (Stcbtns ani SJagnes' (Series of ileprints of the (Karlg gleporters. CHOYCE CASES IN CHANCERY. In 8vo, 1870, price 2/. zs,, calf antique, THE PKAOTIOE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY. With the Nature of the several Offices belonging to that Court. And the Reports of many Cases wherein Relief hath been there had, and where denyed. "This volume, in paper, type, and binding (like 'Bellewe's Cases') is a fac-simile of the antique edition. All who buy the one should buy the other." — Canada Laiu fournal. In 8vo, 1872, price 3/. 35. , calf antique, SIR G. COOKE'S COMMON PLEAS REPORTS IN THE REIGNS OF QUEEN ANNE, AND KINGS GEORGE I. and II. The Third Edition, with Additional Cases and References contained in the Notes taken from L. C. J. Eyre's MSS. by Mr. Justice Nares, edited by Thomas TowNSEND BucKNiLL, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. an old volume of Reports may be produced by these modern publishers, whose good taste is only equalled by their enterprise." — Canada Lazv Journal. " Law books never can die or remain long dead so long as Stevens and Haynes are willing to con- tinue them or revive them when dead. It is cer- tainly surprising to see with what facial accuracy BROOKE'S NEW CASES WITH MARCH'S TRANSLATION. In 8vo, 1873, price 4/. a,s., calf antique, Brooke's (Sir Robert) New Cases in the time of Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Queen Mary, collected out of Brooke's Abridgement, and arranged under years, with a table, together with March's (John) Translation HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. Second Edition, in 8vo, price 2.bs., cloth, A CONCISE TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, BASED ON THE DECISIONS IN THE ENGLISH COURTS. By JOHN ALDERSON FOOTE, OF Lincoln's inn, bakrister-at-law ; chancellor's legal medallist and senior whevvell scholar OF international law, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY, 1873 ; SENIOR STUDENT IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ROMAN LAW, INNS OF COURT EXAMINATION, HILARY TERM, 1874. " This work seems to us likely to prove of considerable use to all English lawyers who have to deal with questions of private international law. Since the publication of Mr. Westlake's valuable treatise, twenty years ago, the judicial decisions of English courts bearing upon different parts of this subject have greatly increased in number, and it is full time that these decisions should be examined, and that the conclusions to be deduced from them should be systematically set forth in a treatise. Bloieover, Mr. Foote has done this well." — Solicitors Journal. " Mr. Foote has done his work very well, and the book will be useful to all who have to deal with the class of cases in which English law alone is not sufficient to settle the question." — Saturday Review, March 8, 1879. "The author's object has been to reduce into order the mass of materials already accumulated in the shape of explanation and actual decision on the interesting matter of which he treats ; and to construct a framework of private international law, not from the dicta of jurists so much as from judicial decisions in English Courts which have superseded them. And it is here, in compiling and arranging in a concise form this valuable material, that Mr. Foote's wide range of knowledge and legal acumen bear such good fruit. As a guide and assistant to the student of international law, the whole treatise will be invaluable : while a table of cases and a general index will enable him to find what he wants without trouble." — Standard. " The recent decisions on points of international law (and there have been a large numbersince Westlake's publication) have been well stated. So far as we have observed, no case of any impoi"tance has been omitted, and the leading cases have been fully analysed. The author does not hesitate to criticise the grounds of a decision when these appear to him to conflict with the proper rule of law. Most of his criticisms seem to us very just On the whole, we can recommend Mr. Foote's treatise as a useful addition to our text-books, and we expect it will rapidly find its way into the hands of practising lawyers." — Tlie Journal o/ymisprudence and Scottish Law Magazine. " Mr. Foote has evidently borne closely in mind the needs of Students of Jurisprudence as well as those of the Practitioners. For both, the fact that his work is almost entirely one of Case-law will commend it as one useful alike in Chambers and in Court." — La7ij Magazine and Review. "Mr. Foote's book will be useful to the student One of the best points of Mr. Foote's book is the ' Continuous Summary,' which occupies about thirty pages, and is divided into four parts — Persons, Property, Acts, and Procedure. Mr. Foote remarks that these summaries are not in any way intended as an attempt at codification. However that may be, they are a digest which reflects high credit on the author's assiduity and capacity. They are ' meant merely to guide the student ; ' but they will do much more than guide him. They will enable him to get such a grasp of the subject as will render the reading cf the text easy and fruitful." — La%v Journal. "This book is well adapted to be used both as a text-book for students and a book of reference for practising barristers." — Bar Examination Journal. "This is a book which supplies the want which has long been felt for a really good modern treatise on Private International Law adapted to the every-day requirements of the English Practitioner. The whole volume, although designed for the use of the practitioner, is so moderate in size — an octavo of 500 pages only — and the arrangement and development of the subject so well conceived and executed, that it will amply repay perusal by those whose immediate object may be not the actual decisions of a knotty point but the satisfactory disposal of an examination paper." — Oxford and Cambridge Undergraduates' Journal. "Since the publication, some twenty years ago, of Mr. Westlake's Treatise, Mr. Foote's book is, in our opinion, the best work on private international law which has appeared in the English language The work is executed with much ability, and will doubtless be found of great value by all persons who have to consider questions on private international law." — Athenmum. STEVENS or^ HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 37 THE EatB JHaga^ine ant) 3^ebieto, AND QUARTERLY DIGEST OF ALL REPORTED CASES. Price riVE SHILLINGS each Number. No. CCXVIII. (Vol. I, No. I. of the New Quarterly Series.) November, i No. CCXIX. (Vol. I, 4th Series No, II.) February, 1876. A^.B. — These two Numbers are out ofpi-int. No. CCXX. (Vol. I, 4th Series No. III.) For May, 1876. No. CCXXI. (Vol. I, 4th Series No. IV.) For August, 1876. Nos. CCXXII. to CCXLIX. (Vol. 2, 4th Series, to Vol. 8, 4th Series, Nos. V. to XXXII.) November, 1S76, to August, 18S3. Nos. CCL. to CCLIII. (Vol. % 4th Series, Nos. XXXIII. to XXXVI.), November, 1883, to August, 1884. Nos. CCLIV. to CCLVII. (Vol. 9, 4th Series, Nos. XXXVII. to XL.), November, 1S84, to August, 1885. Nos. CCLVIII. to CCLXI. (Vol. X., 4th Series, Nos. XLI. to XLIV,), November, 1885, to August, 1886, Nos. CCLXII. to CCLXV. (Vol. XL, 4th Series, Nos. XLV. to XLVIIL), November, 1886, to August, 1887. Nos. CCLXVI. to CCLXIX. (Vol. XIL, 4th Series, Nos. XLIX. to LIL), November, 18S7, to August, 1888. Nos. CCLXX. to CCLXXIII. (Vol. XIII. , 4th Series, Nos. LIII. to LVL), November, 18S8, to August, 1889. Nos. CCLXXIV. to CCLXXVII. (Vol. XIV., 4th Series, Ncs. LVII. loLX.), November, 1889, to August, 1890. Nos. CCLXXVIII. to CCLXXXI. (Vol. XV., 4th Series, Nos. LXI. to LXIV.), November,. 1890, to August, 1891. Nos. CCLXXXII. to CCLXXXV. (Vol. XVL, 4th Series, Nos. LXV. to LXVIIL), November, 1891, to August, 1892. Nos. CCLXXXVI. to CCLXXXIX. (Vol. XVIL, 4th Series, Nos. LXIX. to LXXIL), November, 1892, to August, 1893. Nos. CCXC. to CCXCIII. (Vol. XVIIL, 4th Series, Nos. LXXIII. to LXXVL), November, 1893, to August, 1894. Nos. CCXCIV. to CCXCVII. (Vol. XIX., 4th Series, Nos. LXXVII. to LXXX.), November, 1894, to August, 1895. Nos. CCXCVIII. to CCCV.(Vols. XX. & XXL, 4th Series, Nos. LXXXI. toLXXXVIIL), November, 1895, to August, 1897. 38 STEVENS s. 6d., cloth, A COMPLETE TREATISE UPON THE NEW LAW OF PATENTS, DESIGNS, & TRADE MARKS, CONSISTING OF THE PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883, WITH THE RULES AND FORMS, FULLY ANNOTATED WITH CASES, &c. And a Statement of the Principles of the Law upon those subjects, with a Time Table and Copious Index. By EDWARD MORTON DANIEL, OF Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-law, associate of the institute of patent agents. In 8vo, price 8s., cloth. The TRADE MARKS REGISTRATION ACT, 1875, And the Rules thereunder ; THE MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT, 1862, with an Introduction containing a SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS, together with practical Notes and Instructions, and a copious Index. By Edward Morton Daniel, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, in one volume, 8vo, price l6s., cloth, A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE STATUTE LAW OF THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS. With an Appendix of Statutes, Copious References to English, Irish, and American Cases, and to the French Code, and a Copious Index. By henry THOMAS BANNING, M.A., OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. "The work is decidedly valuable." — Laiu Ti'jnes. " Mr. Banning has adhered to the plan of printing the Acts in an appendix, and making his book a running treatise on the case-law thereon. The cases have evidently been investigated with care and digested with clearness and intellectuality." — Z.aw Journal. In 8vo, price u., sewed, AN ESSAY ON THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. Evibracing 7nore particularly an Enunciation and Analysis of the Principles of Law as applicable to Criminals of the Highest Degree of Guilt. By WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, ESQ., BARRISTER-AT-LAW. Sixth Edition, in 8vo, price 3IJ. 6d., cloth, THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, No. IX., of 1872. TOGETHER WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATORY NOTES, TABLE OF CONTENTS, APPENDIX, AND INDEX. By H. S. CUNNINGHAM and H. H. SHEPHERD, BARRISTERS- AT-L AW. STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 43 Second Edition, in 8vo, price 15^., cloth, LEADING CASES and OPINIONS on INTERNATIONAL LAW COLLECTED AND DIGESTED FROM ENGLISH AND FOREIGN REPORTS, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, and other Sources. With NOTES and EXCURSUS, Containing the Views of the Text-Writers on the Topics referred to, together with Supplementary Cases, Treaties, and Statutes ; and Embodying an Account of some of the more important International Trans- actions and Controversies. By PITT COBBETT, M.A., D.C.L., OF GRAV'S INN, BARRISTER-AT-LAW, PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, N.S.VV. "The book is well arranged, the materials well "The notes are concisely written and trust- selected, and the comments to the point. Much »'0"hy^ .... The reader will learn from them a ... , . . . r , „ , great deal on the subject, and the book as a will be tound m small space in this book. —i.a-,v | whole seems a convenient introduction to fuller and Journal. I more systematic works." — Oxford Magazine. Second Edition, in royal 8vo. iioo pages, price 45.C., cloth, STORY'S COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE. Second English Edition, from the Twelfth Americati Edition. By W. E. GRIGSBY, LL.D. (Lond.), D.C.L. (Oxon.), AND OF THE IN.VER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. " It is high testimony to the reputation of Story, and to the editorship of Dr. Grigsby, that another edition should have been called for. . . . The work has been rendered more perfect by additional indices." — Laiu Titnes. Second Edition, in 8vo, price %s., cloth, THE PARTITION ACTS, 1868 & 1876. A Manual of the Law of Partition and of Sale, in Lieu of Partition. With the Decided Cases, and an Appendi.x containing Judgments and Orders. By W. Gregory Walker, B.A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. "This is a very good manual — practical, clearly written, and complete. The subject lends itself well to the mode of treatment adopted by Mr. Walker, and in his notes to the various sections he has carefully brought together the cases, and dis- cussed the diflficulties arising upon the language of the different provisions." — Solicitors' Journal. Second Edition, in 8vo, price 225., cloth, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO INFANTS. By ARCHIBALD H. SIMPSON, M.A., OF Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-law, and fellow of Christ's college, Cambridge. SECOND EDITION. By E. J. Elgood, B.C.L., M.A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. " Mr. Simpson's book comprises the whole of the ] yet in comparatively little space. The result is law relating to infants, both as regards their per- j due mainly to the businesslike condensation of his sons and their property, and we have not observed any very important omissions. The author has evidently expended much trouble and care upon his work, and has brought together, in a concise and convenient form, the law upon the subject down to the present time." — Solicitors' Journal. "Its law is unimpeachable. We have detected no errors, and whilst the work might have been done more scientifically, it is, beyond all question, a compendium of sound legal principles." — Laitj Times. ' Mr. Simpson has arranged the whole of the Law style. Fulness, however, has by no means been sacrificed to brevity, and, so far as we have been able to test it, the work omits no point of any im- portance, from the earliest cases to the last. In the essential qualities of clearness, completeness, and orderly arrangement it leaves nothing to be desired. " Lawyers in doubt on any point of law or prac- tice will find the information they require, if it can be found at all, in Mr. Simpson's book, and a writer of whom this can be said may congratulate himself on having achieved a considerable success." relating to Infants with much fulness of detail, and I — Law Magazine, February, 1S76. 44 STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. In one volume, joyal 8vo, 1877, price 305., cloth, THE DOCTRINES & PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS. By WILLIAM JOYCE, OF LINCOLN S INN, B ARRISTER - AT - L AW. "Mr. Joyce, whose learned and exhaustive work on 'The Law and Practice of Injunctions' has gained such a deservedly high reputation in the Profession, now brings out a valuable companion volume on the ' Doctrines and Principles ' of this important branch of the Law. In the present work the Law is enunciated in its abstract rather than its concrete form, as few cases as possible being cited ; while at the same time no statement of a principle is made unsupported by a decision, and for the most part the very language of the Courts has been adhered to. Written as it is by so acknowledged a master of his subject, and with the conscientious carefulness that might be expected from him, this work cannot fail to prove of the greatest assistance alike to the Student — who wants to grasp principles freed from their superincum- bent details — and to the practitioner, who wants to refresh his memory on points of doctrine amidst the oppressive details of professional work." — Law Magazine and Review. BY THE SAME AUTHOR. In two volumes, royal 8vo, 1872, price ^os., cloth, THE LAW & PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS. EMBRACING ALL THE SUBJECTS IN WHICH COURTS OF EQUITY AND COMMON LAW HAVE JURISDICTION. By WILLIAM JOYCE, OF Lincoln's inn, barristek-at-law. REVIEWS. "A work which aims at being so absolutely complete, as that of Mr. Joyce upon a subject which is of almost perpetual recurrence in the Courts, cannot fail to be a welcome offering to the profession, and doubtless, it will be well received and largely used, for it is as absolutely complete as it aims at being This work is, therefore eminently a work for the practitioner, being full of practical utility in every page, and every sentence, of it We have to congratulate the pro- fession on this new acquisition to a digest of the law, and the author on his production of a woik of permanent utility and fame." — Law Magazine and Review. " Mr. Joyce has produced, not a treatise, but a complete and compendious exposition of the Law and Practice of Injunctions both in equity and common law. "Part III. is devoted to the practice of the Courts. Contains an amount 0/ valuable and technical matter n07vhere else collected. " From these remarks it will be sufficiently per- ceived what elaborate'and painstaking industry, as well as legal knowledge and ability has been necessary in the compilation of Mr. Joyce's work. No labour has been spared to save the practitioner labour, and no research has been omitted which could tend towards the elucidation and exemplifi- cation of the generiil principles of the Law and Practice of Injunctions." — Law Journal. " He does not attempt to go an inch beyond that for which he has express written authority ; he al- lows the cases to speak, and does not speak for them. "The work is something more than a treatise on the Law of Injunctions. It gives us the general law on almost every subject to which the process of injunction is applicable. Not only English, but American decisions are cited, the aggregate number being 3,500, and the statutes cited i6o, whilst the inde.x is, we think, the most elaborate we have ever seen — occupying nearly 200 pages. The work is probably entirely exhaustive." — Law Times. " This work, considered either as to its matter or manner of execution, is no ordinary work. It is a complete and exhaustive treatise both as to the law and the practice of granting injunctions. It must supersede all other works on the subject. The terse statement of the practice will be found of incalculable value. We know of no book as suitable to supply a knowledge of the law of injunctions to our common law friends as Mr. Joyce's exhaustive work. It is alike indispensable to members of the Common Law and Equity Bars. Mr. Joyce's great work would be a casket without a key unless accompanied by a good index. His index is very full and well arranged. We feel that this work is destined to take its place as a standard text-book, and the text-book on the particular subject of which it treats. The author deserves great credit for the very great labour bestowed upon it. The publishers, as usual, have acquitted themselves in a manner deserving of the high reputation they bear." — Canada Law Jouinnl. STEVENS &- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 45 Third Edition, in 8vo, price 20J-., cloth, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION, WITH THE CONVENTIONS UPON THE SUBJECT EXISTING BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FOREIGN NATIONS, AND THE CASES DECIDED THEREON. : Bv Sir EDWARD CLARKE, OF lin'coln's inn, s.-g., q.c, w.p. '■ Mr. Clarke's accurate and sensible book is the wants to learn the principles and practice of the best authority to which the English reader can ; law of extradition will be greatly helped by Mr. turn upon the subject of Extradition." — Saturday Clarke. Lawyers who have extradition business Review. _ . . I will find this volume an excellent book of reference. "The opinion we expressed of the merits of this Magistrates who have to administer the extradition work when it first appeared has been fully justified law will be greatly assisted by a careful perusal of by the reputation it has gained. It is seldom we 'Clarke upon Extradition.' This may be called a come across a book possessing so much interest to warm commendation, but those v.'ho have read the the general readerand at the same time furnishing so book will not say it is unmerited." — Laiu Journal. useful a guide to the lawyer." — Solicitors Journal. The Times of September 7, 1874, in a long "The appearance of a second edition of this article upon "Extradition Treaties," makes con- treatise does not surprise us. It is a useful book, siderable use of this work and writes of it as " Mr. well arranged and well written. A student who Clarke's -icsefttl Work on Extraditioji." In 8vo, price 2.s. 6d., cloth, TABLES OF STAMP DUTIES FROM 18 1 5 TO 1878. By WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, OF THE .-MIDDLE TEMPLE, ESQUIRE, BARRISTER-.\T-L.\W 1 AUTHOR OF " THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART," " INDEX TO PRECEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING," " TITLE DEEDS," &C. " We think this little book ought to find its way into a good many chambers and offices." — Soli- citors' Journal. ■' This book, or at least one containing the same amount of valuable and well-arranged information, large number of old title-deeds." — Law Times. " His Tableso/ Stamp Duties, from 1815 to 1878, have already been tested in Chambers, and being now published, will materially lighten the labours of the profession in a tedious department, yet one re- should find a place in every Solicitor's office. It is j quiring great care." — Laiv Magazine and Review of especial value when examining the abstract of a ! In one volume, 8vo, price 14J., cloth, TITLE DEEDS: THEIR CUSTODY. INSPECTION. AND PRODUCTION. AT LAW IN EQUITY, AND IN MATTERS OF CONVEYANCING, Including Covenants for the Production of Deeds and Attested Copies ; with an Appendix of Precedents, the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, &c. &c. &c. By Walter Arthur Copinger, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law ; Author of " The L,aw of Copyright" and "Index to Precedents in Conveyancing.'' " The literary execution of the work is good here. Mr. Copinger has supplied a much-felt want, enough to invite quotation, but the volume is not by the compilation of this volume. We have not large, and we content ourselves with recommending ^ space to go into the details of the book ; it appears it to the profession." — Law Times. 1 well arranged, clearly written, and fully elaborated. " .\ really good treatise on this subject must be With these few remarks we recommend his volume essential to the lawyer : and this is what we have ' to our readers." — Law Joiir?ial. Third Edition, in 8vo, considerably enlarged, price 365., cloth, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT In Works of Literature and Art ; including that of the Drama, Music, Engraving, Sculpture, Painting, Photography, and Ornamental and Useful Designs ; together with International and Foreign Copyright, vi'ith the Statutes relating thereto, and References to the English and American Decisions. By Walter Arth'JR Copinger, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. "Mr. Copinger's "oook is very comprehensive, merits which will, doubtless, lead to the placing of dealing with every branch of his subject, and even this edition on the shelves of the members of the extending to copyright in foreign countries. So far as we have examined, we have found all the recent authorities noted up with scrupulous care, and there is an unusually good index. The?e are profession v/hose business is concerned with copy- right ; and deservedly, for the hook is one of con- siderable value." — Solicitors' jfourital. 46 STEVENS 6- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. Third Edition, in One large Volume, 8vo, price 32^-., cloth, A MAGISTERIAL AUD POLICE GUIDE: BEING THE LAW RELATING TO THE PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION, and DUTIES of MAGISTRATES AND POLICE AUTHORITIES, IN THE METROPOLIS AND IN THE COUNTRY. With an Introduction showing the General Procedure before Magistrates both in Indictable and Summary Matters. By henry C. greenwood, STIPENDIARY MAGISTRATE FOR THE DISTRICT OF THE STAFFORDSHIRE POTTERIES ; AND TEMPLE CHEVALIER MARTIN, CHIEF CLERK TO THE MAGISTRATES AT LAMBETH POLICE COURT, LONDON ; AUTHOR OF "the LAW OF MAINTENANCE AND DESERTION," " THE NEW FORMULIST." ETC Third Edition. Including the Session 52 & 53 Vict., and the Cases Decided in the Superior Courts to the End of the Year 1889, revised and enlarged. By temple CHEVALIER MARTIN. "A second edition has appeared of Messrs. Greenwood and Martin's valuable and comprehensive magisterial and police Guide, a book which Justices of the peace should take care to include in their 'Lixhr^xi^s." —Saturday Review. " Hence it is that we rarely light upon a work which commands our confidence, not merely by its research, but also by its grasp of the subject of which it treats. The volume before us is one of the happy few of this latter class, and it is on this account that the public favour will certainly wait upon it. We are moreover convinced that no effort has been spared by its authors to render it a thoroughly efficient and trustworthy guide." — Law Joiirnal. "Magistrates will find a valuable handbook in Messrs. Greenwood and Martin's ' Magisterial and Police Guide,' of which a fresh Edition has just been published." — The Times. •' A very valuable introduction, treating of proceedings before Magistrates.and largely of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, is in itself a treatise which will repay perusal. We expressed our high opinion of the Guide when it first appeared, and the favourable impression then produced is increased by our examination of this Second Edition." — Law Times. " For the form of the work we have nothing but commendation. We may say we have here our ideal law book. It maybe said to omit nothing which it ought to contain." — Law Times. " This handsome volume aims at presenting a comprehensive magisterial handbook for the whole of England. The mode of arrangement seems to us excellent, and is well carried out." — Solicitors Journal. " The Magisterial and Police Guide, by Mr. Henry Greenwood and Mr. Temple Martin, is a model work in its conciseness, and, so far as we have been able to test it, in completeness and accuracy. // oitglu to be in the hands of all who, as magistrates or otherwise, have authority in matters 0/ police." — Daily News. " This work is eniinently practical, and supplies a real want. It plainly and concisely states the laiv on all points upon which Magistrates are called upon to adjudicate, syste- matically arranged, so as to be easy of refe7-etice. Lt ought to find a place on every Justict's table and we caiinot but think that its useftilness will speedily ensure for it as large a sale as its merits deserve." — Midland Cotcntics Herald. " The exceedingly arduous task of collecting together all the enactments on the subject has been ably and efficiently performed, and tlie arrangement is so methodical and precise that one is able to lay a finger on a Section of an Act almost in a moment. It is wonderful what a mass of information is comprised in so comparatively small a space. We have much pleasure in recommending the volume not only to our professional, but also to our general readers ; nothing can be more useful to the pubhc than an acquaintance with the outlines of magisterial jurisdiction and procedure." — Sheffield Post. STEVENS a^ HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 47 In 8vo, price \2s. dd. cloth, THE LAW RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITIES, WITH THE CHARITABLE TRUSTS ACTS, 1853-1894, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1894. • By THOMAS BOURCHIER-CHILCOTT, OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER- AT'LAW. In one thick volume, 8vo, price 32J., cloth, THE LAW OF RAILWAY COMPANIES. Comprising the Companies Clauses, the Lands Clauses, the Railways Clauses Consoli- dation Acts, the Railway Companies Act, 1867, and the Regulation of Railways Act, 1868 ; with Notes of Cases on all the Sections, brought down to the end of the year 1868 ; together with an Appendix giving all the other material Acts relating to Railways, and the Standing Orders of the Houses of Lords and Commons ; and a copious Index. By Henry Godefroi, of Lincoln's Inn, and John Shortt," of the Middle Temple, Barristers-at-Law. In a handy volume, crown 8vo, 1870, price \Qs. 6d., cloth, THE LAW OF SALVAGE, As administered in the High Court of Admiralty and the County Courts ; with the Principal Authorities, English and American, brought down to the present time ; and an Appendix, containing Statutes, Forms, Table of Fees, etc. By Edwyn Jones, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. In crown 8vo, price 45. , cloth, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PARLIAMENTARY REGISTRATION. WITH AN APPENDIX OF STATUTES AND FULL INDEX. By J. R. SEAGER, Registration Agent. Second Edition, in One Vol., 8vo, price \2s., cloth, A COMPENDIUM OF ROMAN LAW, Founded on the Institutes of Justinian ; together with Examination Questions Set in the University and Bar Examinations (with Solutions), and Definitions of Leading Terms in the Words of the Principal Authorities. Second Edition. By Gordon Campbell, of the Inner Temple, M.A., late Scholar of Exeter College, Oxford; M.A., LL. D., Trinity College, Cambridge; Author of "An Analysis of Austin's Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy of Positive Law. " I In 8vo, price 7^. 6d., cloth, I TITLES TO MINES IN THE UNITED STATES, I WITH THE STATUTES AND REFERENCES TO THE DECISIONS OF THE COURTS RELATING THERETO. By W. a. HARRIS, B.A. Oxon., OF Lincoln's inn. barrister- at-law ; and of the American bar. INDEX To the Names of Authors and Editors of Works enumerated in this Catalogue. Aldred (P. F.), page 21. Argles (N.), 32. AsHWORTH (P. A.), 21. Attenborough (C. L.), 27. Baldwin (E. T.), 15. Banning (H. T.), 42 Beal (E.), 32. Bellewe (R.), 34. Bellot & Willis, ii. . Seven (T.), 8. Blyth (E. E.), 22. Boukchier-Chilcott (T.), 47. Brice (Seward), 16, 19, 33. Brooke (Sir R.), 35- Brooks (W. J.), 13. Brown (Archibald), 20, 22, 26, 33, 40. Browne (J. H. Balfour), 19. Buckley (H. B.), 17. Bucknill(T. T.), 34, 35- Campbell (Gordon), 47. Campbell (Robert), 9, 40. Cecil (Lord R.), n- Chastkr(A.W.),32. ChittyQ.J. C.),38. Clarke (Sir Edward), 45. Clauson (A. C), 17. CoBBETT (Pitt), 43. COGHLAN (W. M.), 28. Cooke (Sir G.), 35. Cooke (Hugh), id. CopiNGER (W. A.), 42, 45. Corner (R. J-). lo- cotterell (j. n.), 28. Craif.s (W. F.), 6, 9. Cunningham (H. S.), 38, 42. Cunningham (John), 7. Cunningham (T.), 34. Daniel (E. M,), 42. Darling (C. J.), 18. Deane (H. C), 23. De Bruyn (D. p.), 38. De Wal (J.), 38. Dibdin (L. T.), 10. Duncan (G. W.), 17. Duncan (J. A.), 33- Edwards (W. D.), 16, 39. Elgood (E. J.), 6, iS, 43. Elliott (G.), i4- Errington (F. H. L.), 10. Evans (M. O.), 20. Eversley (\V. p.), 9. FiNLASON (W. F.), 32. FOA (E.), II. Foote (J. Alderson), 36. Forbes (U. A.), 18. Forsyth (W.), 14- Frost (R.), 12. GiBBs(F. W.), 10. godefroi (h.), 47- Greenwood (H. C), 46. Griffiths (J. R. ), 40. Grigsby (W. E.), 43- Grotius (PIugo), 38. Hall (R. G.), 30. Hanson (A.), 10. Hardcastle (H.), 9, ^j. Harris (Seymour F.), 20, 27. Harris (W. A.), 47- Harrison (J. C), 23. Harwood (R. G.), 10. Hazlitt (W.), 29. Higgins (C), 30. Houston (J.), 32, Hudson (A. A.), 12. Hurst (J.), 11. Indermaur (John), 24, 25, 28. InDERWICK, II. Jones (E.), 47. Joyce (W. ), 44. Kay (Joseph), 17. Kelke (W. H.), 6. KoTZE (J. G.), 38. Kelyng (Sir j.), 35. Kelynge (W.), 35. Lloyd (Eyre), 13. Lorenz (C. A.), 38. Loveland (R. L.), 34, 35. Lyon-Caen (Charles), 32. Maasdorp (A. F. S.), 38.' McNaughton (D. N.j, 19. Macaskie (S. C), 7. Mansfield (Hon. j. W. ), 17. March (John), 35.' Marcy (G. N.), 26. Martin (Temple C), 7, 46. Mattinson (M. W.), 7. May (H. W.), 29. Mayne (John D.), 31, 38. Mellor (F. H.), 10. Moore (S. A.), 30. Norton-Kyshe, 40. O'Malley (E. L.), 33. Pavitt (A.), 32. Peile (C. J.), 7. Pemberton (L. L.), i8, 32. Phipson (S. L.), 20. Porter (J. B.), 6. Ratanlal, 26. Reilly (F. S.), 29. Renton (A.W.), 10. Ringwood (R.), 13, 15, 29 Kowlatt (S. a. T.), 18. Salkowski (C), 14. Salmond (J. W. ), 13. Savigny (F. C. Von), 20. ScoTr (C. E.), 32; Seager (|. R.), 47. Shepherd (H. FL), 42. Short (F. H.), 10, 41. Shortt (John), 47. Shower (Sir B. ), 34. Simpson (A. H.), 43. Slater (J.), 7. Smith (Eustace), 23, 39. Smith (F. J.), 6. Smith (Lumley), 31. Snell (E. H. T.), 22. Story, 43. Tarring (C. J.), 26, 41, 42 Taswell-Langmead, 21. Thomas (Ernest C), 28. Tyssen (A. D.), 39. Van der Keesel (D. G.), 38. Van Leeuwen, 38 Van Zyl, 38. Waite (W. T.), 22. Walker (W. G.), 6, 18, 43. Wertheimer (J.), 32. Whiteford (F. M.), ;^;i Whitfield (E. E.), 14. Williams (S. E.), 7. Willis (W.), 14. Worthington (S. W. ), 29. I'.RADHURV, AGNEW, & CO. LD.., PRINTERS, LONDON AND TONHRIUriE. A Catalogue cf New Law Works may be obtained gratis upon application to S.dH.} STEVENS. AND HAYNES* LAW PUBLICATIONS. 7?i 8vo, price 1 2s. 6d, cloth, THE LAW KELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITIES under the Charitable Trusts Act, 1853-1894, and Local Government Act, 1894. By Thomas Bouhchier-Chilcott, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Fourth Edition, in One Volume, Svo, price 30s. cloth, HANSON'S DEATH DUTIES : Being the Fourth Edition of THE PROBATE, LEGACY, AND SUCCESSION DUTIES ACTS; Comprising 36 Geo. 3, c. 62 ; 45 Geo. 3, c. 28 ; 65 Geo. 3, c. 184 ; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 61 ; the Customs and Inland Revenue Acts, 43 Vict. c. 14 ; 44 Vict. c. 12 ; and the New Estate Duty Finance Acts, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 30, and 59 &' 60 Vict. c. 28 ; with an t Introduction and copious Notes, incorporating the Cases to 1896, etc. By Lewis T. DiBDiN, M.A,, D.C.L., and F. H. L. Ekrington, M.A., Barristers-at-Law. Third Edition, in Svo, price 10s. 6d. cloth, [ OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF TORTS. By Richard Ring- WOOD, M.A., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, in Svo, price 28s. cloth, HARDCASTLE'S TREATISE ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF STATUTE LAW. With Appendices. Second Edition. By W. F. Craies, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, in Svo, price 16s. cloth, A TREATISE ON THE STATUTE LAW OF THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS. With an Appendix of Statutes, References to Cases, and French Code. By H. T. Banning, M.A., I5arrister-at-Law. lliird Edition, in Svo, price 20s. cloth, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND. For the use of Students and the Profession. 2'Airr? ^i^ioji, with Addenda, giving the Land Transfer Act, 1897, witli references to the Text. By William Douglas Edwards, LL. B. , of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Third Edition, crown Svo, price Qs. 6d. cloth. THE LAW OF ARBITRATION AND AWARDS. With Appendix contivining the STATUTES RELATING TO ARBITIJATION, and a collection of Forms and Index. Third Edition. By Joshua Slatku, of Gray's Inn, [ Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, in Svo, price 26s. cloth, A CONCISE TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNA- TIONAL JURISPRUDENCE. Based on the decisions in the English Courts. By JouN Aldehson Foote, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. In Svo, price 30s. cloth, THE PRACTICE ON THE CROWN SIDE OF THE QUEENS BENCH DIVISION of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice (founded on Corner's Crown Office Practice), including Appeals from Inferior Courts. With Appen- dices of Rules and Forms. By F. Hugh Short, Chief Clerk of the Crown Office, and F&AKCIS H. Mellok, M.A., Barristerat-Law. Seventh Edition, Svo, price 10s. 6d. cloth, RINGWOOD'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF BANK- RUPTCY ; Embodying the Bankruptcy Acts, 1883 and 1890 ; part of the Debtors Act, 1869 ; the Bankruptcy Appeals (County Courts) Act, 1884. With an Appendix contain- ing Schedules to the Bankruptcy Act, 1883; the Bankruptcy Rules, 1886 and 1890, ^c, &c. Seventh Edition. By R. Rinowood, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Third Edition, in Svo, price 32s. cloth, A MAGISTERIAL AND POLICE GUIDE: Being the statute Law relating to the Procedure, Jurisdiction, and Duties of Magistrates and Police Authorities in the Metropolis and in the Country. With an Introduction, showing the General Procedure before Magistrates both in Indictable and Summary Matters. By Hknry C. Greenwood, Stipendiary Magistrate, and Temple Chevallier Martin, Chief Clerk to the Magistrates at Lambeth Police Court, London. Third Edition, in- cluding the Session 52 k 53 Vict., and the Cases decided in the Superior Courts to the End of the Year 1889, by Temple Chevallier Martin. [ SeeSUB|il[9|QL|e d^^nd of this Volume. ] 1/: STEVENS AND HAYN UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY S.dH.] L Seventh Edition, in royal 8vo, price '^^^^^^^^^K^- *HE LAW AND PRACTICE UNDErrTfflnimiPANIES ACTS, 1862 TO 1893; and THE LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANIES ACTS, 1870x0 1872. Containing the Statutes, with the Rules, Orders, and Forms to regulate Pro- ceedings, and full Notes of the Decisions, &c.,&c. By H. Burton Buckley, M.A., of Lincoln's Inn, Esq., one of Her Majesty's Counsel, and A. C. Clauson, of Lincoln's Inn, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, Second Edition, in Svo, price 9s. cloth, THE LAW OF MAINTENANCE AND DESERTION, and the Orders of Justices thereon. Second Edition, including the LAW ON AFFILIATION and BASTARDY. With an Appendix of Statutes and Forms, including the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act of Session, 1895. By Temple Chevallier Martin, Editor of the "Magisterial and Police Guide," &c., and George Temple Martin, M.A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Sixth Edition, in %vo, price 21s. cloth, THE LAW OF COMPENSATION FOR LANDS, HOUSES, Ac, under the Lands Clauses, Railways Clauses Consolidation Acts, Public Health Act, 1 875, Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890, and other Acts, with a full Collection of Forms and Precedents. By Eyre Lloyd, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Sixth Edition. By W. J. Brooks, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, in cro^vn 8 w, price 1 2s. Qd. cloth, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, ^y s. l. Phipson, m.a.. of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Fifth Edition, in crown 8ro, price 12s. Qd, cloth, AN EPITOME OF CONVEYANCINCx STATUTES. Extend- ing from 13 Edw. I. to the end of 55 & 56 Victoriae. Fifth Edition, with Short Notes. By George Nichols Marcy, of Lincoln's Inn, Ban"ister-at-Law. Second Edition, in Two Volumes, royal 8vo, price 50s. cloth, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BUILDING AND ENGINEERING CONTRACTS, and of the Duties and Liabilities of Engineers, Architects, Surveyors and Valuers, with an Appendix of Precedents, annotated by means of reference to the Text and to Contracts in use, and an Appendix of Unreported Cases on Building and Engineering Contracts. By Alfred A. Hudson, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Fifth Edition, in croivn 8vo, price 15s. cloth, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: From the Teutonic Conquest to the Present Time. Designed as a Text-book for Students and others. By T. P. Taswell-Langmead, B.C.L., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Fifth Edition, with Notes. By Philip A. Ashworth, Barrister-at-Law, translator of Gneist's "History of the English Constitution." Second Edition, in 8vo, price 22s. cloth, A TREATISE ON THE LAW & PRACTICE RELATING TO INFANTS. By Archibald H. Simpson, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, by E. J. Elgood, B.C.L., M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, in royal 8vo, price 30s. cloth, A TREATISE ON THE STATUTES OF ELIZABETH against FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES : the Bills of Sale Acts, 1878 and 1882; and the LAW of VOLUNTARY DISPOSITIONS of PROPERTY. By the late H. W. May, B.A. Second Edition, by S. W. Worthington, Barrister-at-I^w. Second Edition, in 8vo, price 15s. cloth, LEADING CASES AND OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW ; Collected and Digested from English and Foreign Reports, Official Documents, Parliamentary Papers, and other Sources. With Notes and Excursus. By Pitt COBBETT, M.A., D.C.L., Barrister-at-Law, Professor of Law, Sydney University. Third Edition, in 8vo, price 21s. cloth, THE LAWS OF INSURANCE : fire, life, accident, and GUARANTEE. Embodying Cases in the English, Scotch, Irish, American and Canadian Courts. By J. B. Porter and W. F. Craies, Barristers-at-Law. Eiglvth Edition. In 8vo, price 20s. cloth, PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMON LAW. intended for the Use of Students and the Profession. By John Indermaur, Solicitor. [ See Catalogue at end of this Volume. ]