.A. -n n ry 
 
 REESE LIBRARY 
 
 JNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 APR 12 
 
 . / f 
 
 5*ti frl CA/ss 
 
 1 If u u 'J 
 
REFORMED LOGIC 
 
HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY 
 
REFORMED LOGIC 
 
 A SYSTEM BASED ON 
 
 BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY 
 
 WITH AN ENTIRELY NEW METHOD OF 
 
 DIALECTIC 
 
 " 
 
 D. B. McLACHLAN 
 
 ' SPIRITS are active, indivisible substances ; IDEAS [objects] are inert, 
 fleeting, dependent things, which subsist not by themselves, but are 
 supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances . . . The cause of 
 Ideas is an incorporeal active SUBSTANCE or Spirit.' 
 
 Berkeley. 
 
 Bonbon 
 SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO 
 
 PATERNOSTER SQUARE 
 1892 
 
 [All rights reserved'] 
 
1 Looking to the chaotic state of logic text-books at the 
 present time, one would be inclined to say that there does 
 not exist anywhere a recognised, currently-received body of 
 speculation to which the title Logic can be unambiguously 
 assigned, and that we must therefore resign the hope of 
 attaining by any empirical consideration of the received 
 doctrine, a precise determination of the nature and limits 
 of logical theory: Encyc , Brit ^ Art< LoGIC . 
 
rV" 
 
 UXUTEE 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 THE object of the following treatise is to give an 
 intelligible account of the principal facts of Mind, 
 with a method for the right expression and criticism 
 of Reasoning. It is based on principles not before 
 applied to such a purpose. The current systems of 
 Metaphysic are obscure and difficult simply because 
 they start from false premises, not because the nature 
 and operations of Mind cannot, if properly under- 
 stood, be made as comprehensible to beginners as 
 other branches of knowledge. The rules of Dialectic 
 are quite within the capacity of any intelligent 
 schoolboy, and should be an essential part of early 
 education, like Arithmetic. 
 
 Let not the student be repelled at finding a philo- 
 sophy reputed to be one of the most difficult taken 
 as the basis of this work. It is Berkeleyism con- 
 siderably modified. Also it is to be borne in mind 
 
vi Preface 
 
 that a philosophy is not to be judged by its primd 
 facie probability, but by its power of explaining 
 many facts in a coherent and lucid way. A theory 
 that does this should not be rejected for a seeming 
 paradox at the outset. 
 
 Most of the theoretical and all the dialectical parts 
 of this work can be adapted to Realistic thinking, by 
 treating the judgments of the two Berkeleyan cate- 
 gories as intuitions instead of inferences. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PREFACE v 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I Division of Philosophies into Ideal and Substantial Sub- 
 stantial subdivided into Mental and Material Berkeley's 
 philosophy a Mental Substantial! sm i 
 
 II Ontological principles essential to logical theory Mind 
 consists of (at least) Self and a Plastic Substance 
 Functions of each Perception of Inorganic things 
 discussed Berkeley's view on this point rejected Body 
 to be considered an apparatus of Perception ... 4 
 
 III Current Metaphysic is Ideal and therefore incoherent 
 Substantial alone has a connecting principle Importance 
 of Categories in Substantialism Its doctrine of Reason 
 totally different from the Academic .... 8 
 
 INTELLECT 
 
 iv Origin of Intellect Its use Difference between Senti- 
 mental and Intellectual consciousness Intellect not the 
 governing intelligence of Man Moral education the most 
 important n 
 
 v Truth, its various meanings Veracity Correct Ideation 
 Correct Inference No absolute standard of Truth Nisi 
 utite est, quod novimus, stulta est Sapentia Schopen- 
 hauer on the function of Intellect . . . -14 
 
viii Contents 
 
 SECT. PAGE 
 
 VI Standard of Truth relating to Bodily welfare different from 
 that relating to Mental welfare Realism the theory of 
 Perception under the former standard Its main dogmas 
 Cause why it is superseded Superstition of One Truth 
 Realism and Substantialism both true and yet contra- 
 dictory 1 8 
 
 PERCEPTION 
 
 VII Denned, according to Substantial principles Noumenon 
 Subject Object Sentiment not excited by Objects, but 
 Objects accompany Sentiments Subject not passive in 
 Perception ATTENTION Kant's opinion on the incon- 
 ceivability of Noumena refuted Difficulty of overcoming 
 Realis-tic prejudices Science of little use in Philosophy . 23 
 
 IDEAS 
 
 vin How produced Hume's notion untenable No innate 
 Ideas but Sentiment is innate Division of Ideas into 
 Particular, General, and Imaginary . . . -27 
 ix MEMORY OBLIVION RECOLLECTION Images, how pre- 
 served and how lost Good Memory not necessarily 
 advantageous Recovery of the apparently Forgotten 
 Sudden extinction of Ideas 'Decay of the mind' in 
 old age Memory inexplicable on any theory but the 
 Substantial John Stuart Mill's confession Memory the 
 
 chief fact of Mental Science 28 
 
 x Sentiments may be remembered Feelings and Emotions 
 No detailed analysis of Sentiments possible or neces- 
 sarySpinoza's list Can sentiments be noumenally ex- 
 cited without objects ? 34 
 
 xi Analysis of Comparison It is the principle of General- 
 isation and Imagination 36 
 
 GENERALISATION 
 
 xn Purpose of Generalisation Objects classified must be 
 similar and have similar utilities Inferiority of general 
 
Contents ix 
 
 SECT. PAGE 
 
 ideas acquired by definition Names not essential to 
 general thought Generalisation resembles composite 
 photography Classification on mere objective resem- 
 blance neat but superficial Conceptualism . . 38 
 
 xin MATTER the most general notion derived from Objects 
 Belief in Real Matter a form of Mysticism A 
 material basis for phenomena unnecessary . . 43 
 
 xiv NOMINALISM Berkeley's Nominalism, and objections 
 
 thereto Concrete Thought expressed in general terms 46 
 
 xv Generalisation the bane of European philosophy / 
 Plato's theories on General Ideas Aristotle's 'Essence' 
 Classification a means, not the end of Reason The 
 explanatory Unity a unity of service Evolution a 
 concrete Platonism 58 
 
 IMAGINATION 
 
 xvi How distinguished from Recollection and Reverie 
 Imagination by Simple Combination By Transfusion 
 Artistic Imagination Rational Imagination 
 Wrong views of Metaphysicians .... 63 
 
 DIALECTIC 
 
 xvii Recapitulation of the genealogy of Reason It is the 
 art of conceiving the Future and Unknown Dialectic 
 the science of Reason Division of theorems into 
 Arguments and Fallacies Method of Dialectic . 68 
 
 xvin The RATIONAL PARALLEL Rational Conclusions are 
 never certain Essential parts of an Argument Rules 
 of Parallel False conclusions cannot be destroyed 
 but may be stigmatised In what circumstances we 
 may reason concerning a known fact ... 74 
 
 xix Hypothetical Arguments Current errors with respect 
 
 to these Dilemma 80 
 
 xx .DEBATE is extra-dialectic How a valid argument may 
 
 be criticised 87 
 
Contents 
 
 CATEGORIES 
 
 SECT. 
 
 XXI 
 
 Natural Realistic Scientific Philosophical Cate- 
 gories of Pythagoreans of Aristotle of Kant, etc. . 92 
 
 XXII Category of Inherence It is a metaphysical analysis 
 of objects Examples of Judgment and Argument 
 Use of Standards for Mediate Comparison . . 97 
 
 XXI II \ Category of Association defined Position Examples 
 of Judgment and Argument Movement Number 
 Flat Space 103 
 
 XXIV Perspection or Depth in groups Perspective degrada- 
 tion Redintegration, real and ideal This groupment 
 as a fixed Precedent Standard of Depth Sky Per- 
 spection 108 
 
 XXV Concretion of Cubic ideas from flat objects Backs of 
 things Resistance Dr. Johnson on Idealism Dan- 
 ger of trifling with Idealists, illustrated from the 
 Dabistan Geographical Concretion Its superiority 
 to mere Recollection Sphericity of the Earth, what 
 it means 118 
 
 XXVI Material Sequence defined, with examples TIME the 
 interval between objects in Sequence Eternity 
 Scientific confusion of Sequence with Causation . 126 
 
 xxvii CAUSATION Its peculiarities How distinguished from 
 Sequence Effects are never causes Cause consists 
 of Motive, Plan, and Power Generation not causa- 
 tion Atoms not causes Sub-categories of Causation 
 ' Conservation ' of Energy discussed Note on 
 DREAMS . . .130 
 
 REDACTION OF COLLOQUIAL ARGUMENTS 
 
 XXVIII Language not naturally an instrument of Argument 
 How to adapt it to this purpose Negative words 
 Partitive words Redaction does not extend to the 
 correction of faulty observation Syllogistic Conver- 
 sion not necessary on the Substantial method . 
 
Contents 
 
 XI 
 
 FALLACIES 
 
 SECT. PAGE 
 
 XXIX Of Equivocation Of Imperfect Observation . . 157 
 
 xxx Of Parallel Arrangement Suppressed Precedent 
 Inferring a negative from Contrast False Analogy 
 
 Doubtful Precedent Of Accident Of Division 
 
 Of Composition Dialectical Tautology Cross 
 Reasoning Fallacy of No Case Of Inversion 
 Suppressed Conclusion Of No Application Of 
 Irrelevant Conclusion 161 
 
 ACADEMICAL DIALECTIC. 
 
 xxxi Various notions of Reason entertained by Syllogists 
 
 One only true, Analogy 175 
 
 xxxn ' Immediate Inference ' is not Argument, but explicit- 
 ness and emphasis in language . . . 1 76 
 
 XXXIII Arithmetic, what it is The Real and the Symbolic 
 Reasoning enters only into the Real The Sym- 
 bolic a kind of expression 177 
 
 xxxiv Geometrical Demonstration not a form of Reasoning 
 The so-called ' deductive reasoning ' of Geometry 
 a graduated series of lessons in perception . . 182 
 
 XXXV Induction not a special kind of reasoning, but a de- 
 duction with suppressed precedent Other meanings 
 of the word 185 
 
 xxxvi Aristotle's Dictum explained and refuted . . .187 
 xxxvn Mediate Comparison not Argument . . . .189 
 
 xxxvnl SYLLOGISM analysed It is not Argument Doctrine 
 of the Predicate Moods of the Syllogism discussed 
 
 All moods reducible to One 
 
 191 
 
 STUDIES IN DIALECTIC 
 
 XXXIX Additional examples to illustrate the Dialectic of 
 
 Substantialism ....... 205 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 I RELATION OF BERKELEY S PHILOSOPHY 
 TO OTHER SYSTEMS 
 
 PHILOSOPHIES are either Ideal or Substantial. The 
 ideal are those which resolve all things, actual and 
 possible, into thought or consciousness. They seek 
 to find in consciousness the reason and meaning of 
 itself, or, if this be impossible, to account for each 
 item in consciousness by defining its relation to some 
 other item, or to some general mass of consciousness. 
 This type of philosophy includes German transcen- 
 dentalism and idealism, and some species of Buddhist 
 and Persian metaphysic. European idealists are 
 seldom consistent, for at the basis of their philoso- 
 phies (or at the apex) they place GOD, who is not an 
 item of human consciousness, actual or potential, and 
 who therefore occupies, whether it be admitted or 
 not, the relation of substance to human thought. 
 
Introduction 
 
 Substantial philosophies affirm that thought in- 
 variably inheres in some sort of Substance, for whose 
 service it exists. It is incapable of independent being, 
 and cannot be understood abstracted from its sub- 
 stance. It is intermittent, called up when wanted, 
 and is liable to variation and aberration. 
 
 Substantialists differ however as to what the sub- 
 stance of human intelligence is. Some hold that 
 it is the human body. Consciousness exists, they 
 argue, for the use of the body and varies with its con- 
 dition. This class of philosophers may be subdivided 
 into Materialists and Metaphysicians (including logi- 
 cians). 
 
 Materialists believe that consciousness is a product 
 of the physical body has therefore no existence before 
 the body is formed or after it is dissolved. It is really 
 as physical as the teeth or hair. 
 
 In metaphysic the intelligence is supposed to have 
 a principle of existence apart from the body, and does 
 not, or need not, share the fate of the body. The 
 body is nevertheless regarded as the substance or 
 superior fact during the union of the two. This is 
 an eminently inconsistent philosophy, for if conscious- 
 ness has an existence apart from body it must be in 
 some other substance, and if so its relations to that 
 substance are more important than its relations to the 
 body, and should be the first object of inquiry. 
 Metaphysic is in its development an idealism, since 
 
Berkeley's Philosophy 
 
 the connection admitted between body and thought 
 is too slight to afford a sufficient explanation of 
 intelligence, and no other substantial relation is 
 known. 
 
 The notion that an invisible immaterial sub- 
 stance may underlie consciousness has occurred to 
 some philosophers, among others to the illustrious 
 BERKELEY. His theory of Vision, which has never 
 been refuted or even weakened, is founded on this 
 hypothesis. 
 
 Berkeleyan substantialism combines the charac- 
 teristic features of the other theories, and affords an 
 easy solution of many difficult problems in philo- 
 sophy. It has in common with idealism whence it 
 is sometimes, but erroneously, called by that name 
 that it regards all material bodies and things as facts 
 or items of consciousness. It agrees with materialism 
 that a substance is essential to consciousness, and that 
 the consciousness of man serves the needs of his body, 
 though that is not the highest use to which it can be 
 put. It confirms the metaphysical view that intelli- 
 gence is not, in its abstract or essential character, 
 dependent on the body, and may therefore survive 
 the body. 
 
 This is the theory on which the following logic is 
 based : I shall refer to it briefly as Substantialism. 
 
 B 2 
 
Introduction 
 
 II ONTOLOGICAL NOTIONS 
 
 SUBSTANTIALISM has two main divisions Ontology, 
 which treats of the mental substance in itself, and 
 Logic or Metaphysic, which deals with its conscious- 
 ness. The present essay is specially concerned with 
 logic, but certain ontological premises must be as- 
 sumed to render the logic intelligible. This follows 
 from the subordinate relation of consciousness to 
 substance. 
 
 The substantial mind consists of two principal 
 parts a SELF and a PLASMA the Atman and 
 Akasa of Sanscrit philosophers. 
 
 Self is the seat of Energy and Consciousness. The 
 plasma is inert and unconscious ; it protects the Self 
 and receives, communicates, and retains impressions 
 of experience, both the external and the internal 1 . 
 
 1 The mental substance is the fifth essence of the initiate Greeks and 
 of Alchemists. They also called it chaos sis\d.frst matter. ' Man was 
 made of that very matter and chaos whereof all the world was made, 
 and all the creatures in it : which is a most high mystery to understand, 
 and must, nay is altogether necessary to be known of him that expecteth 
 good from this art, being the ground of the wisdom thereof. Foolish 
 men, nay they that the world holds for great doctors, say and tell it for 
 truth, that God made man of a piece of mud, or clay, or dust of the 
 earth, which is false ; it was no such matter, but a Quintessential Matter 
 which is called earth, but is no earth.' :De Manna Benedicto. 
 
Ontological Notions 
 
 The Self would be conscious though isolated from 
 other minds, at least from those of its own grade of 
 being. It would feel the fluctuations of its energy. 
 But the experience called ' external ' depends on the 
 mutual action of minds. It is the form into which 
 their consciousness is thrown when they come in con- 
 tact. It lasts no longer than the contact, and so has 
 only a casual existence. 
 
 The constitution of the mind is not given by Ber- 
 keley, and on other points also we must supplement 
 and correct his philosophy. He was wrong as regards 
 the mental cause of the perception of the Inorganic 
 or Dead. 
 
 Since external experience implies that another 
 mind is operating upon ours, what mind is operat- 
 ing when we perceive an object that is apparently 
 mindless? Berkeley replies that it is the supreme 
 mind that is then acting upon us. 
 
 Many objections can be urged against this view. 
 I will mention only one, which seems to me conclusive. 
 By every clti^on of judgment we possess, the living or 
 organised is better more important and significant 
 than the lifeless and elemental ; so if Berkeley's 
 reasoning be valid the phenomena excited by finite 
 and created beings are superior to those excited by 
 their Creator. The movements of a living man are 
 referred to a human mind a putrescent carcase is a 
 vision immediately induced by the Deity. 
 
Introduction 
 
 The beauty of the starry sky is irrelevant to the 
 question. Apart from the finite life and thought that 
 may be associated with the stars, they have no more 
 philosophical importance than a spadeful of sand. 
 
 A more reasonable account of the inorganic is 
 found in several ancient philosophies. Gnostics and 
 Neo-Platonists referred the elemental to a cosmic 
 mind (Demiurges) intermediate between human 
 beings and the Supreme. The demiurgic mind 
 is inconceivably greater and more powerful than the 
 human, but is not necessarily better in quality. It is 
 the origin of all natural forces, and its organic pro- 
 cesses are what we term c physical laws.' This is the 
 explanation of inorganic consciousness which I feel 
 disposed to adopt, but to discuss it fully would carry 
 us too far from the subject of this work. 
 
 The next point relates to the body. What is its 
 function in substantialism ? The brain, says Ber- 
 keley, is an idea in the mind, and he ridicules the 
 notion that one idea should generate all other ideas. 
 This is an argument against materialism. No doubt 
 he would have admitted, though he does not say so, 
 that the body-idea facilitates, or at least must pre- 
 cede, the experience of other ideas. He would not 
 have denied that it is an instrumental idea. 
 
 Since his time an important discovery has been 
 made with reference to the constitution of the body. 
 I allude to the Cell theory. It is no longer possible 
 
Ontological Notions 
 
 to regard the body either as a self-moving machine 
 (if this is not a contradiction in terms), or as a lump 
 of ' dead matter ' animated by the mind. It is a 
 society of minute animals 1 , each having a certain 
 degree of independent energy and liberty of move- 
 ment. They are organised and governed by the 
 human or animal mind with which they are asso- 
 ciated. In short, the relation of the cell to the man is 
 analogous to, if not quite the same as, the relation of 
 the man to the cosmic being. 
 
 This discovery complicates the problem of 'external' 
 consciousness, without however affecting the principles 
 on which a substantialist would endeavour to solve 
 it. Instead of conceiving human minds as coming 
 into immediate contact in perception, we have to con- 
 ceive the cellular systems of each as forming a medium 
 between the two. We do not perceive the other mind 
 immediately or intuitively ; what we perceive intui- 
 tively is certain affections in our own organism, which 
 we must first refer to the other body, and then to the 
 mind behind that body. Our knowledge of other 
 human beings is thus altogether inferential. 
 
 The cellular medium explains why we are not 
 generally aware of the substantial constitution of 
 other minds; it is veiled by the intervening organisms. 
 
 1 See Strieker's Manual of Histology; Bioplasm, and other works, by 
 Dr Lionel S. Beale, M.B., F.R.S. ; and an article on the New Psychology, 
 by A. Fouille, in the Revue des Deux Mondes for October I5th, 1891. 
 
Introduction 
 
 The relation of body to mind, the reason of em- 
 bodiment, and so forth, are questions of prime im- 
 portance in ontology, but in logic we are concerned 
 only with the object in consciousness, without refer- 
 ence to the apparatus of perception. The instrument 
 of intellectual perception may in its proper character 
 be ignored. 
 
 Ill DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUBSTANTIAL AND 
 METAPHYSICAL LOGIC 
 
 ALL the current academic metaphysic is ideal. 
 Materialists, when they attempt to explain thought, 
 fail to attach it properly to the body, or to account 
 for that large and important division of mental 
 activity which has no bearing, direct or indirect, on 
 bodily welfare. They drop their materialism at an 
 early stage of their enquiry and continue on the 
 metaphysical method. 
 
 Hence in none of the current systems is there any 
 true principle of arrangement in the treatment of 
 logical phenomena. Unless we know the use of a 
 thing we cannot describe it, let alone explain it. We 
 know not the relative importance of its parts, and we 
 arrange them according to superficial resemblances, 
 
Substantial and Metaphysical Logic 9 
 
 or on some arbitrary principle which conceals instead 
 of revealing their meaning. 
 
 Substantial philosophy alone possesses a principle 
 of coherence. The facts of consciousness are deter- 
 mined by anterior facts of substance, and there can 
 be only one true mode in which to present them 
 they must follow and reflect the substantial order. 
 They will thus appear as a consecutive and coherent 
 system of ideas, no one of which could be otherwise 
 placed without damage to the whole. This is perhaps 
 the most important respect in which substantial logic 
 differs from others. 
 
 The doctrine of Categories has to receive full de- 
 velopment in order to elucidate the genesis of the 
 ' material world.' Except to a substantialist the cate- 
 gories have no particular value, and so they are barely 
 mentioned in the academic systems. 
 
 The theory of Reasoning or Dialectic (logic in 
 the narrower sense) given in the following chapters, 
 will be found totally different from the academic. 
 It does not merely state in other words or 
 metaphors the doctrines laid down in works of the 
 Aristotelian type, it declares that the theory of 
 reasoning taught in these works is altogether false. 
 Our argumentation is not conducted in syllogisms, 
 either tacit or explicit. This has been suspected by 
 several critics of logic, but no attempt has been 
 made to substitute a more correct theory and method. 
 
io Introduction 
 
 Of course logicians do not always reason wrongly, 
 and true arguments may be stated in the syllogistic 
 form. What I mean is that logicians nowhere tell us 
 in what right reasoning essentially consists, and for 
 want of a distinct notion on the subject they all of 
 them occasionally admit as valid, arguments that are 
 not so. 
 
 The main dogma of substantialism should be kept 
 in view in reading the following pages. It is mind 
 alone that is conceived as having solidity and energy : 
 material things are temporary forms of our conscious- 
 ness ; they have length and breadth but no depth, 
 and they are without energy, even passive resistance. 
 If an object cannot be removed at pleasure, what 
 resists us is the other mind causing that object, not 
 the object itself. 
 
 As far as possible I have utilised the existing logical 
 terminology. But substantialism has notions which 
 require special technical words, and I have not hesi- 
 tated to invent such when necessary. On the other 
 hand, I have rejected the latinisms of current logic, 
 which have never been assimilated by modern lan- 
 guages. The English language is good enough for 
 all the purposes of logic. 
 
INTELLECT 
 
 IV ITS ORIGIN AND FUNCTION 
 
 THE mind has at physical birth one uniform quality 
 of plasma and consciousness. By education and ex- 
 perience a portion of the plasma is gradually changed, 
 and the consciousness excited by this portion is what 
 we call INTELLECT. The word may also stand for 
 the plasma so differentiated. 
 
 The consciousness pertaining to the plasma left in 
 its primitive state is SENTIMENT, which generally 
 corresponds to what is termed the moral nature of 
 man. 
 
 Intellect is a temporary condition arising out of the 
 need to preserve the Self from hostile and inharmoni- 
 ous surroundings. The adaptation is artificial, and 
 may therefore be well-done, or ill-done, or over-done. 
 
12 Intellect 
 
 It is over-done when too much of the plasma and 
 mental energy is devoted to intellectual purposes 
 when the individual has, to use a common expression, 
 more head than heart. In this case the end is sacri- 
 ficed to the means. 
 
 I conceive the intellect as a hardening of the plasma 
 in its superficies, the formation of a sort of rind cap- 
 able of receiving finer, sharper, and more enduring 
 impressions than the plasma of sentiment; and, being 
 harder, it is better able than the latter to resist en- 
 feebling influences. Its duty is to challenge and 
 inspect vibrations before permitting them to pass 
 inwards to the region of sentiment. Yet the intellec- 
 tual consciousness is itself a degree of sentiment, and 
 in intellects not sufficiently trained it may be impos- 
 sible to distinguish thoughts that are purely intel- 
 lectual, from thoughts that are also to some extent 
 sentimental. Upon minds of this sort the best-pre- 
 pared arguments have no hold ; they must be mixed 
 with oratory and poetry to receive any attention. 
 It need not be said that a mind which responds only 
 to 'persuasive' language is feeble of intellect. It 
 lives in the present only, and is incapable of far-reach- 
 ing designs. It is to the intellect we owe the power 
 of conceiving the past and future, and of laying plans 
 for the future. 
 
 A mind properly intellectualised is, of its kind, 
 strong and self-controlled. With the intellect defec- 
 
Its Origin and Function 13 
 
 tive the man exhibits passion, undue excitement and 
 demonstrativeness. He responds to the least stimulus, 
 like an exposed nerve ; his energy is wasted in ex- 
 plosions. Sentiment is the inmost nerve of man 
 intellect its protecting sheath. The most carefully 
 trained intellect is liable at times to be carried by 
 assault or stratagem ; then follows a feeling of empti- 
 ness occasioned by loss of energy. On the other 
 hand an appearance of self-command may be really 
 due to apathy, the mind is of a low type and callous 
 to influences that usually affect its species. If it is 
 bad to be explosive, it is perhaps worse to be incap- 
 able of exploding. 
 
 Intellect is not the supreme or ruling intelligence of 
 man. It initiates nothing. It is a light to direct our 
 steps, but we do not walk where the light happens to 
 fall we make it fall where we desire to walk. Hence 
 the diversity of occupation and intellectual accom- 
 plishments in men. Each acquires the sort of intellect 
 he thinks will be sentimentally most serviceable to 
 him ; and on matters concerning which he has not 
 learnt to reason he consults other men. We are not 
 born rational beings ; we are in no sense rational on 
 all subjects ; we are rational only on those few which 
 we have mastered. 
 
 Men pretend to act from reason only, and perhaps 
 they do on matters to which they are indifferent. 
 But in general their rationality consists in rinding 
 
14 Intellect 
 
 pretexts for what on sentimental grounds they have 
 already resolved to do, and in finding ways and means 
 to carry out their resolves. Sentiment is the moving 
 spring of conduct : intellect is the executive faculty. 
 Those historical philosophers are mistaken who sup- 
 pose the progress of mankind results from intellectual 
 discoveries and inventions. These are effects, not 
 causes, of progress effects of sentimental disagree- 
 ment with previous conditions. 
 
 Intellect is little more than an extension inwards of 
 our senses. It is an epitome and rearrangement of 
 their observations, and is as instrumental as they. 
 We are not necessarily improved by a development 
 of the intellect forced upon us from without. Edu- 
 cation is sometimes a dagger put into the hands of 
 an assassin. The best education is largely sentimental 
 (moral), for that is not confined to preserving the 
 mind we have it gives us another and a better mind, 
 and so indirectly improves the intellect. 
 
 v TRUTH 
 
 THIS word has several meanings which it may be 
 well to notice. 
 
 As veracity it means an agreement between our 
 thoughts and our language. It supposes that we take 
 
Truth 15 
 
 reasonable pains to learn the conventional laws upon 
 which language is founded, and then endeavour as far 
 as possible to bring our speech in conformity with 
 these laws. Since language is an art (like music) it 
 may be acquired well or ill, so that a mistake in the 
 use of a phrase or term is not regarded as untruth. 
 There must be deliberate abuse of language to con- 
 stitute a lie. 
 
 Agreement between an idea of memory and the 
 actual experience correct recollection is another 
 meaning of truth. 
 
 Also truth may signify agreement between an in- 
 ferential thought and the fact to which it refers, 
 although the fact has not yet been observed. In 
 this sense truth must be construed liberally. We 
 never foresee a future fact exactly as it will take 
 place. Our anticipations are vague and our prepara- 
 tions for them general, but that on the whole is 
 enough for our purposes. At least it is all that 
 reason affords us. If we are absolutely certain of a 
 future fact and can figure it in the mind precisely as 
 it will take place, that means that it has already 
 occurred so often that we are virtually using our 
 memory, not our reason. 
 
 An inference may be considered true if it is the 
 best we can draw from the information at our com- 
 mand, though in point of fact it may prove to be very 
 incorrect. 
 
1 6 Intellect 
 
 There is no mass of speculative Truth which 
 everybody ought to possess on pain of being con- 
 sidered foolish or miscreant. This notion, formerly 
 so prevalent, betrays gross ignorance of the nature 
 and function of intellect. It makes intellectual specu- 
 lation an end in itself. Our ideas must be such as 
 serve the uses of our sentimental or inner soul, and 
 since the sentiments (tastes) of men vary widely, so 
 N ought also their intellectual ideas. Though change 
 of sentiment modifies ideas, change of ideas does not 
 modify sentiment. There is therefore no sort of good 
 in uniformity of belief in itself. It is creditable to 
 modern times that men have shaken off the pro- 
 crustean beliefs of the Middle Ages, and are free to 
 adapt their intellects to their real sentimental needs. 
 The numerous sections into which speculative thought 
 is now broken up, and the frequent changes of theory, 
 are signs of healthy and active sentiment. 
 
 In matters of social policy, where large bodies of 
 men have to carry out a single design, uniformity 
 must be attained by persuasion or compromise. But 
 such matters relate only to physical well-being, into 
 which philosophical truth can hardly be said to 
 enter. 
 
 This relative and, in the widest sense, utilitarian 
 
 view of intellectual truth applies both to quantity and 
 
 quality of ideas. We should not learn what we do not 
 
 / sentimentally require. That is waste of power. Use- 
 
Truth 1 7 
 
 less knowledge is folly, said both Plato and Aristotle. 
 To mistake knowledge to be the pursuit of man is to 
 confuse the means with the end, says the author of 
 the Bhagavad Gita. 
 
 The quality of our ideas must not be good beyond 
 our necessities. If they are, we shall suffer by acting 
 on them. They will land us in circumstances for 
 which our nature is not fully prepared. 
 
 If there were an abstract or standard truth, it 
 would be good for every species of being, and no 
 doubt the thoughts of a man are nearer to it than the 
 thoughts of a horse. Therefore a horse ought to be 
 improved by receiving a human intellect. But if we 
 could insinuate into a horse's mind the knowledge 
 possessed by an educated man, we should spoil what 
 may have been a good horse and produce a monstrous 
 and horrible man. So is it with ourselves. If we could 
 receive knowledge far in advance of our requirements 
 or out of relation to them, it would drive us mad or be 
 itself madness. Our constitution and necessities deter- 
 mine what we can know and what we ought to know. 
 Not all possible knowledge is good, and what is good for 
 some may be useless or bad for others. Schopenhauer 
 says well l : ' The faculty of Knowing .... has only 
 arisen for the purpose of self-preservation, and therefore \ 
 stands in a precise relation, admitting of countless gra- 
 dations, to the requirements of each animal species.' 
 
 1 Will in Nature, ' Physiology of Plants.' 
 C 
 
1 8 Intellect 
 
 VI REALISM 
 
 IF our interests were single and uniform, one con- 
 sistent scheme of intellectual knowledge would suffice. 
 We need never be in fundamental contradiction with 
 ourselves. Every advance in knowledge would illus- 
 trate and confirm what we had already learned. 
 
 But we are not of this simple constitution. We are 
 first and essentially minds, we are next and tempo- 
 rarily embodied minds, and in each of these cha- 
 racters we have distinct and, to a great extent, con- 
 flicting interests. Hence we have to acquire different 
 species of knowledge and admit different standards of 
 truth. The ideas that serve the interests of the em- 
 bodied man are false to the same man considered 
 apart from his embodiment, and contrariwise false, 
 in the sense of being useless and perhaps misleading. 
 
 Hence the existence of Common-sense for the em- 
 bodied interests, and Philosophy for the purely mental 
 interests. Science is common knowledge carried to 
 its utmost perfection, but not partaking in the least 
 of the philosophical character. 
 
 Realism is the notion of perception that is acquired 
 with our common knowledge. It is seldom explicitly 
 
Realism 19 
 
 defined or defended, for in order to this a comparison 
 with philosophic theories would have to be made, and 
 the defects of realism would be apparent. The realistic 
 view is so named by philosophers to distinguish it 
 from their own views. 
 
 For corporeal purposes it is useful to believe, and it 
 is therefore relatively true, that there is a real space 
 which would exist although all objects were removed 
 from it. Objects are real solid things stored in space 
 like casks in a cellar. They have fixed dimensions 
 notwithstanding that they appear to contract and 
 dilate as we leave or approach them. It is quite 
 'natural' they should appear smaller at a distance. 
 Distant perception is conceivable, therefore it is pos- 
 sible, and since calculations based on this assumption 
 are verified by experience, it must and does take 
 place. Time also is as real as space, and would exist 
 by itself though space and its contents were annihi- 
 lated. It is a sort of stream. 
 
 All these propositions are true for certain necessary 
 purposes. We begin to form such ideas from the 
 moment we are born, and during the years of infancy 
 we are doing nothing else intellectually but working 
 out the notions of space, time, magnitude, distance. 
 Most of our school education is of the same kind. 
 By the time we reach maturity realism has become 
 so rooted in our intellect that as regards the majority 
 of men no sceptical considerations are strong enough 
 
 C 2, 
 
20 Intellect 
 
 to unsettle them. For why ? They enable the natural 
 man to provide sufficiently well for his bodily needs 
 and other needs depending therefrom, and he has 
 therefore no motive for doubting his realism or for 
 acquiring any other sort of ideas. He is quite right to 
 abide by those which have answered his purposes. 
 
 It is not from without but from within that doubts 
 arise as to realistic truth. They arise when the mind 
 has acquired power over and above what is needed 
 for bodily uses, and begins to think on its own account. 
 Sentiments are felt which do not depend on or refer 
 to bodily life, and a new intellect has to be formed to 
 explain and protect these sentiments. This new in- 
 tellect is Philosophy. It is the science and practical 
 conduct of mind considered as abstracted from body. 
 
 Much of the obscurity of philosophy is traceable 
 to the superstition of a fixed standard of truth 
 which must be recognised universally. We are re- 
 luctant to accept philosophical hints and inferences 
 because they conflict with truths that have been 
 physically verified. Or which is more common we 
 take up a few philosophical propositions and tack on 
 to them all the science we know, believing they make 
 a homogeneous whole, because truth must be self- 
 consistent. 
 
 Time and labour would be spared if we could be 
 told at the right moment that truth is expedience 1 , 
 
 1 This does not apply to truth in the sense of veracity. 
 
Realism 21 
 
 and that there is no need to harmonise philosophy 
 and science. We are each of us two men in one, and 
 each of these men must be allowed to think for him- 
 self. There is no reason why they should quarrel ; 
 there is no reason why they should even argue. The 
 science in our mind should not be ousted to make 
 room for the philosophy ; let them exist together and 
 work alternately. When the mariner is at sea he 
 must mind his ship and study the weather ; when he 
 is on shore he may neglect both. So when we are 
 navigating the body we have to think in categories 
 proper to its safety ; as philosophers we dismiss the 
 realistic categories and think in other forms, but we 
 need not then call the realism false or foolish. In its 
 proper place it is right and true 1 . 
 
 Between realism and substantialism there is there- 
 fore no necessary conflict or competition. They are 
 each indispensable. It is absurd to carry realism into 
 philosophy, and no less absurd to carry substantialism 
 
 1 Greek philosophers never understood the dual standard of Truth, 
 and insisted that philosophy was the best preparation for every sort of 
 employment. The people, though generally unwise in political matters, 
 had sense enough not to entrust the care of their temporal interests to 
 philosophers, and so the universal utility of philosophy had few oppor- 
 tunities of being tested. A Macedonian king committed the custody of 
 Corinth and its citadel to a philosopher, Persaeus, who was promptly 
 expelled by Aratus a mere soldier. Persaeus frequented the schools 
 again, and on the well-worn theme that ' none but a wise man is fit to 
 be a general ' being brought up for discussion, he said, ' It is true, and 
 the gods know it, that this maxim of Zeno once pleased me more than 
 all the rest ; but I have changed my opinion since I was taught better 
 by the young Sicyonian.' Plutarch's Life of Aratus. 
 
22 Intellect 
 
 into common affairs, or to reproach a substantialist 
 because he acts and speaks occasionally like other 
 people. It is probable however that in a community 
 largely composed of substantialists the realism of 
 common action would be less stringent than is now 
 found necessary. 
 
STIVER 
 
 PERCEPTION 
 
 VII 
 
 PERCEPTION has already been partially defined. So- 
 called * external objects ' are forms excited in our 
 consciousness by pressure of other minds. The great 
 permanent ' world ' is due to the action of a cosmic 
 mind with which we are intimately associated through- 
 out our physical life. 
 
 Objects have a totally different sort of existence 
 from minds, for whereas the latter are at least re- 
 lative to objects self-existent, the former have no 
 existence except during the act of perception. If 
 minds could be all moved asunder from each other 
 the whole objective world would disappear, yet the 
 universe would be as full as before, for sensation 
 occupies no room. 
 
24 Perception 
 
 The appearances we interpret as distance are due 
 to variations in the pressure or stimulus producing 
 the object. 
 
 It will be convenient to call the more active mind 
 Noumenon, the perceiving mind Siibject. The mind 
 that is subject on one occasion may be noumenon 
 at another, and conversely. The true antithesis to 
 subject is not object, but noumenon. Object has no 
 antithesis, unless it be nonentity. 
 
 It is specially to be noticed that an object is not 
 the cause of a sentiment. The knife we see or handle 
 is not the cause of the pain it may inflict if driven 
 into our flesh. Pains and pleasures signify that the 
 noumenal action is powerful enough not only to 
 excite objects in the intellect, but to penetrate in- 
 wards and excite sentiments also. It is the noumenon 
 that causes both object and sentiment, as far as the 
 energy exerted is concerned, but the variation of 
 plasma in the subject is also essential to the distinc-' 
 tion of object and sentiment. 
 
 The subject is not quite passive in perception. 
 No consciousness takes place unless the subject is 
 charged with energy. Further, since consciousness 
 is confined to the Self and not inherent in the plasma, 
 we perceive only such vibrations as reach the Self. 
 If the Self is absorbed in one part of the mind, 
 vibrations may take place in other parts without 
 being noticed. The more energy we concentrate at 
 
Perception 2.5 
 
 the point or surface of contact (Attention), or other- 
 wise bring to bear on the plasmic vibration, the more 
 vivid is the object. 
 
 The fixing or circumscribing of attention so as to 
 break up our experience into distinct things or 
 objects is an acquired art, whence we may infer that 
 the intellectual experience of infancy is a vague 
 whitish surface, not clearly distinguished by colour or 
 movement. 
 
 Kant and other philosophers admit that objects 
 are caused by noumena, but insist that we can never 
 know or conceive what a noumenon is. 
 
 Why not ? Each of us knows himself to be the 
 noumenon of many phenomena ; he has no doubt 
 that many other phenomena are caused by minds 
 like himself, and it is easy to extend this principle to 
 all phenomena whatever. They are all caused by 
 minds more or less like human minds. This is a 
 useful conclusion, although we are not able to imagine 
 very accurately the mind of an insect or of a being of 
 cosmic dimensions. It is not necessary we should, 
 but the most general inference of this sort is better 
 than none at all, and better than the notion that 
 phenomena are self-existent and self-moving. 
 
 Although simple and intelligible when stated in 
 the abstract, perception is difficult to work out in' 
 detail. Objections start up on every side, and it 
 requires the utmost patience to reduce them to what 
 
26 Perception 
 
 they are inferences from the realism we are supposed 
 to have discarded. It is only when we try to dis- 
 lodge realism wholly and consistently that we find 
 how fast its hold upon our intellect is. Critics who 
 profess to treat Berkeley's substantialism seriously 
 and sympathetically, constantly bring up against it 
 arguments of the most naively realistic kind. They 
 have no adequate conception how enormous is the 
 revolution in thought involved in substituting sub- 
 stantialism for realism. It is a complete dissolution 
 of the natural thought and belief ; it means the con- 
 struction of a new heaven and a new earth with laws 
 to which we have been hitherto unaccustomed. The 
 old science is of little or no use to us as substan- 
 tialists. 
 
 Philosophy is not an advance or correction of 
 science. In so far as the latter claims to be abso- 
 lutely or philosophically true, substantialism abolishes 
 it in dispensing with the notions of real matter and real 
 space. Hence it is quite irrelevant to point out that 
 substantialism is inconsistent with (say) the doctrine 
 of physical evolution. This theory, though so new, 
 is now often referred to as axiomatically true, whereas 
 it is an inference, the evidence for which, even to 
 many realists, is far from conclusive. Whether it be 
 considered true or not in science, physical evolution 
 is quite untrue in philosophy. 
 
IDEAS 
 
 VIII HOW PRODUCED 
 
 AN imprint or mould of the object is generally 
 left in the plasma of the subject. The imprint is 
 deep, clear and lasting in proportion to the strength 
 of the exciting cause and the degree of energy 
 assigned to the perception. When the noumenon 
 withdraws the object does not at once disappear, for 
 if the energy of attention remain the mould left by 
 the noumenon serves to excite a consciousness similar 
 to the object, and this is what we call an IDEA. 
 
 What Hume says as to an object differing from an 
 idea in nothing but vividness is evidently incorrect. 
 Objects are generally, but not always, more vivid 
 than ideas, and when an object is present we have an 
 indefeasible conviction of being acted on by some- 
 thing not ourselves, which conviction is not present 
 
28 Ideas 
 
 in recollection. We may not be able to give a satis- 
 factory reason for the conviction if we are arguing 
 idealistically we certainly shall not but the fact that 
 it is there serves to mark off objects as a class of 
 consciousness distinct from ideas, irrespective of their 
 vividness. If an object were once seen clearly and so 
 remembered, and were afterwards seen indistinctly 
 through a mist, the latter consciousness would 
 (according to Hume) be the idea and the former the 
 object. Such an application of words would be an 
 abuse of language. 
 
 There are of course no innate ideas of objects. 
 There is innate consciousness the sentimental. 
 
 Ideas are of three kinds Particular Ideas, General 
 Ideas, Imaginary Ideas corresponding to the so- 
 called faculties of Memory, Generalisation or Classifi- 
 cation, and Imagination. 
 
 IX MEMORY OF OBJECTS 
 
 WHEN the energy of attention is exhausted or 
 withdrawn the idea also disappears, but it may be 
 revived by bringing the energised Self in contact with 
 the imprint again, and this operation can be repeated 
 indefinitely. The power of exciting ideas of past 
 
Memory of Objects 29 
 
 experience is Memory; any particular exercise of 
 memory is Recollection. 
 
 The imprint of an object is not absolutely per- 
 manent and is probably never quite true. It begins 
 to lose sharpness at once, but if the object be 
 frequently observed and much remembered, it will 
 retain its general character for years. The exercise 
 of memory, instead of wearing out the imprint as 
 would be the case with a material negative or en- 
 graved plate, keeps the channels open 1 . Persons of 
 little experience remember well, for their energy of 
 attention is not distributed over many different ideas ; 
 it travels continuously round a small circuit. One 
 hears ignorant persons recounting events that hap- 
 pened years ago, with as much detail and with almost 
 as much sentiment as if they had taken place the 
 day before. A ' good memory ' is no proof that the 
 quality of mind or thought is good. All experience 
 is not worth remembering. One of the most difficult 
 things in moral culture is to get rid of the imprints of 
 ideas that are out of harmony with our improved 
 sentiment. 
 
 Although the imprints in our mind may close up and 
 leave scarce a cicatrice, the part that has been once 
 disturbed is never the same as the virgin plasm. It 
 remains a little more tender. It may not reopen to 
 ordinary stimuli, but an extra agitation of the plasm 
 
 1 As if the image had the form of a stencil. 
 
30 Ideas 
 
 will rip up the closed furrows, and give us back scenes 
 in our life that had long ceased to be recollected. A 
 great agitation in all parts of the mind may revive 
 what appears to be the whole of our past experience 
 in a simultaneous recollection. So I explain the extra- 
 ordinary lucidity that sometimes occurs in fevers and 
 in moments of extreme terror. 
 
 It is also conceivable that the egoistic energy may 
 be so strong as to destroy outright the moulds of 
 thought, as a flood sweeps away the banks of a 
 river. ' We sometimes find a disease quite strip the 
 mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a fever in a 
 few days calcine all those images to dust and con- 
 fusion which seemed to be as lasting as if graved in 
 marble ' 1 . 
 
 What is called ' decay of the mind ' in old age is 
 merely the loss of the plasmic images. Since intellect 
 would not have been formed in the first instance if it 
 had not been wanted, it is to be expected that it will 
 fade out of the mind when it is no longer wanted. So 
 far as the realistic intellect is concerned, we return to 
 ' second childhood ' and the uniform sensibility we 
 had at birth. 
 
 No philosophy but the substantial explains me- 
 mory. Idealists and metaphysicians, who recognise 
 only consciousness, are utterly unable to account for 
 
 1 Locke, Essay on the Understanding, ii. x. 5. 
 
Memory of Objects 31 
 
 the revival of a shadowy sort of objects in the absence 
 of their original causes. Here is the melancholy con- 
 fession of John Stuart Mill on the subject : 
 
 1 If we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, 
 we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it 
 a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and 
 future : and we are reduced to the alternative of 
 believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something dif- 
 ferent from any series of feelings, or possibilities of 
 them, or of accepting the paradox that something 
 which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be 
 aware of itself as a series. 
 
 ' The truth is that we are here face to face with 
 that final inexplicability at which, as Sir W. Hamilton 
 observes, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate 
 facts ; and in general one mode of stating it only 
 appears more incomprehensible than another, because 
 the whole of human language is accommodated to 
 the one, and is so incongruous with the other, that it 
 cannot be expressed in any terms which do not deny 
 its truth. The real stumbling-block is perhaps not in 
 any theory of the fact, but in the fact itself. The true 
 incomprehensibility perhaps is, that something which 
 has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a 
 manner, present: that a series of feelings, the in- 
 finitely greater part of which is past or future, can be 
 gathered up as it were into a single present concep- 
 tion, accompanied by a belief of reality. I think, by 
 far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inex- 
 plicable fact, without any theory of how it takes 
 
32 Ideas 
 
 place ; and when we are obliged to speak of it in 
 terms which assume a theory, to use them with a 
 reservation as to their meaning 1 .' 
 
 Memory an ultimate fact ! It is the first that 
 stares us in the face on beginning to philosophise, and 
 it haunts us through all our subsequent speculations. 
 It is the 'dweller on the threshold' of philosophy, 
 which unless we overcome will overcome us, and 
 frustrate our magic. 
 
 The passage quoted does not show Mill's usual 
 candour and consistency. His philosophy has broken 
 down on an essential point, and he is reluctant to 
 admit it. He tries to throw the blame on other 
 things, and recommends that those who think with 
 him should maintain a discreet silence on the sub- 
 ject of memory, or if obliged to speak of it do so 
 in ambiguous language. That is hardly honest, and 
 is bad philosophical practice. What we know or 
 think we know we may leave alone it will not run 
 away ; it is what we are conscious of not knowing 
 that should receive our persistent attention. 
 
 Materialism presents at first sight the data out of 
 which to construct a theory of memory, for it recog- 
 nises the dependent character of consciousness and 
 takes body to be its substance. Does the body show 
 any marks or traces of thought that may serve to 
 
 1 Exam, of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 212-3. 
 
Memory of Objects 33 
 
 revive ideas in the absence of objects? None have 
 yet been discovered. Nerves are used in objective 
 observation, but they do not appear to be essential 
 either to recollection in general or to any of the more 
 elaborate forms of internal thought. The brain is 
 used only when giving expression to thought. 
 
 Memory is noticed by everyone, even the least 
 metaphysical. Persons who are incapable of under- 
 standing the difference between object and subject or 
 general and particular, are yet perfectly well aware 
 of the difference between remembering and forgetting. 
 The phrases relating to this distinction are the com- 
 monest in every language. Memory is conspicuous 
 notorious palpable. It is the pivot on which the 
 whole mental system revolves. It cannot be gainsaid 
 or ignored. There is no profit in boycotting it in the 
 manner recommended by Mill it must be faced 
 and explained. ' How do you account for memory?' 
 should be the first question addressed to one who 
 pretends to have a science of mind. If he has no 
 plausible answer to give, his system is not worth dis- 
 cussion. A philosophy without a theory of memory 
 is like an astronomy without gravitation. 
 
 D 
 
34 Ideas 
 
 X MEMORY OF SENTIMENTS 
 
 SENTIMENTS are remembered and recollected like 
 objects. For instance, a boy is punished for doing 
 wrong and has pain ; he does wrong again and is 
 haunted with the fear of being punished again, which 
 is the recollected and anticipated pain. We have 
 thus two species of sentiment corresponding exactly 
 to object and idea. The word 'feeling' is appro- 
 priate to the first, 'emotion' to the second. 'Passion' 
 is a strong degree of either. 
 
 Objects that are associated with feelings are better 
 remembered than those that merely affect the in- 
 tellect, for there is a double memory at work one 
 in the core and one on the surface of our mind. 
 
 Sentiments are not susceptible of the same degree 
 of analysis as objects. The inner matrix is more 
 fluid and does not keep details. Apart from the 
 objects associated with feelings, there is not much 
 opportunity or need for classifying them. We are 
 happy, wretched, or indifferent that sums up the 
 sentimental experience. 
 
 No two moral philosophers give the same list of 
 sentiments. Some are satisfied with two pain and 
 
Memory of Sentiments 35 
 
 pleasure. Spinoza gives a list of forty-seven * sen- 
 timents, which includes luxury and drunkenness. It is 
 evident that luxury is a general term which covers 
 many different forms of feeling, and if the feeling of 
 intoxication by alcohol is worth mentioning, so also 
 must be the intoxications by opium and tobacco ; 
 and if these are included we must admit the feeling of 
 nausea, which brings us to the sentiments associated 
 with all diseased conditions of body or mind. Such 
 distinctions are superfluous, for if the sentiment is 
 purely personal and not associated with an external 
 object, it is not of any general interest ; if associated 
 with an object and common to many persons it is 
 best defined by reference to the object as the pleasure 
 of smelling a rose. 
 
 We have sometimes feelings of elation and depres- 
 sion for which we cannot find an internal reason nor yet 
 an objective sign. Many of the so-called religious 
 experiences are of this sort. So also are the sudden 
 sympathies and aversions we feel towards certain 
 people and places. Here there is an object, but we 
 
 1 I append Spinoza's list, and print in italics the sentiments that 
 appear to me to be emotions as distinguished from feelings. Desire 
 Pleasure Pain Wonder Contempt Love Hate Inclina- 
 tion Aversion Devotion Derision Hope Fear Confidence De- 
 spair Joy Grief Pity Approval Indignation Overesteem Dis- 
 paragement Envy Mercy (or good will) Self-contentment Humility 
 Repentance Pride Dejection Honour Shame Regret Emula- 
 tion Thankfulness Benevolence Anger Revenge Cruelty Dar- 
 ing Cowardice Consternation Civility (or deference) Ambition 
 Luxury Drunkenness Avarice Lust. Pollock's Spinoza, ch. vii. 
 
 D 2, 
 
3 6 Ideas 
 
 cannot find anything in the object that can be taken 
 as specially significant of the feeling. We are said 
 not to be able to ' analyse ' our feeling, that is, assign 
 it an object as cause. 
 
 These abnormal feelings may be explained by sup- 
 posing that some external influences succeed in 
 reaching our sentiment without exciting our in- 
 tellect. Considering that intellect is artificial and 
 may be very imperfect, and also that its efficiency 
 depends to some extent on its being less sensitive 
 than the original mental nature, it is reasonable to 
 conclude that subtle emanations from our surroundings 
 may occasionally affect us without exciting the in- 
 tellectual consciousness. Panic, inspiration, mes- 
 merism, and other ' occult' influences are probably 
 due to this cause. If we further assume that sen- 
 timents so excited may then, by association, excite 
 appropriate ideas in the intellect of the recipient, we 
 have a likely explanation of what is called ' thought- 
 transference.' Since ideas excite emotions, it is 
 reasonable to suppose that feelings may excite ideas, 
 or even the illusion that objects are being perceived. 
 
 XI COMPARISON 
 
 MOST ideas, except the particular (which are copies 
 
Comparison 37 
 
 of single objects), are associated with a consciousness 
 of resemblance and difference which arises in the 
 following manner. 
 
 When new experience simply revives the imprint 
 of a former experience we call it the same object or 
 objects, though it is not numerically the same, being 
 different at least in time. If a totally new imprint is 
 made in the mind the experience is quite novel or 
 strange^ but we do not call it different. 
 
 Experience is usually neither quite the same as 
 before nor quite strange, which means that the pre- 
 sent noumenon has partially revived an old imprint 
 and made a partially new one. 
 
 In this case we have a quadruple consciousness. 
 There is first the present object ; next the recollection 
 of the object originally associated with the same im- 
 print ; thirdly, a consciousness of resemblance between 
 the new and the old (the present object and the 
 recollected idea) in so far as the imprints coincide, 
 and (fourthly) a sense of difference in so far as they 
 disagree. The limitation of resemblance gives rise to 
 the sense of difference a negative consciousness and 
 the shock of difference emphasises the resemblance* 
 This is Comparison, the common basis of Generalisa- 
 tion and Imagination. 
 
GENERALISATION 
 
 XII NATURE AND FUNCTION 
 
 GENERAL IDEAS are formed by the coincident im- 
 print of several objects in some respects different, 
 but which have all a resemblance as objects, and 
 are besides the signs of the same sentimental effect. 
 If the effects are different the confusion of the 
 objects occasions practical error, as when we mistake 
 one man for another whom he closely resembles. 
 Though the sentimental utilities should be the same, 
 the object cannot be reduced to a common idea if 
 they are quite dissimilar : for example, a sand-glass 
 and a watch have similar uses, but they cannot be 
 generalized. The value of generalisation to a thinker 
 is that it economises memory and recollection by 
 making one common or average idea do duty for 
 
Nature and Function 39 
 
 many particular ideas. Let us follow the process in 
 detail. 
 
 The first perception of an object leaves an imprint 
 in the substance of the intellect. A second percep- 
 tion partially resembling the first revives the first to 
 the extent at least of the resemblance. Supposing 
 this is done by a hundred similar objects it is plain 
 that the resembling properties will have been ex- 
 perienced a hundred times, whereas the distinguishing 
 attributes may have been felt a few times only, in 
 some cases only once. Unless we have special 
 reasons for observing the differences and so deepen- 
 ing the impressions of them, they will fade from our 
 memory at a rate corresponding to the paucity of 
 experiences. The most general idea will last longest 
 because there the impression has been very deep. 
 Our idea of Man or Animal will on this principle, as 
 it is found to do in fact, outlast our memory of many 
 concrete men and animals. 
 
 The objects that contribute to form a general idea 
 or Class are commonly said to 'belong to,' or to 
 * inhere in,' or to be ' brought under' the idea or class. 
 All these metaphors are wrong and occasion mis- 
 takes. Generalisation is nothing but condensed or 
 epitomised recollection ; it is practised by ourselves for 
 our own convenience, and does not imply any essential 
 or extra-personal relation between the objects. We 
 are free to classify things in any order we find useful. 
 
40 Generalisation 
 
 A farmer's classification of some animals into cattle, 
 game, fowls, birds, and vermin, is perfectly legitimate, 
 for each species is based on a different utility for 
 him. 
 
 We should distinguish general ideas which we our- 
 selves have drawn from our primary experience, from 
 the ideas suggested by verbal definitions of general 
 ideas formed by other minds. Supposing the objects 
 in question to be quite unknown to us, the definitional 
 idea is more like a particular or imaginary idea than 
 a general idea. It is a single thin rigid idea, utterly 
 unlike the flexible suggestive thought evolved from a 
 large mass of personal experience. Definitional 
 general ideas are as unsatisfactory as described 
 objects, but we are sometimes compelled to use both 
 when personal experience is totally wanting. 
 
 It is a common error to suppose that general ideas 
 cannot exist in the intellect without words by which 
 to name them. Words and other modes of marking 
 ideas are useful in all departments of thought, but not 
 more necessary in general thought than in any other. 
 An active intellect makes thousands of observations 
 and scores of general ideas which it may have no 
 means or wish to express in language. 
 
 Generalisation is very like the operation called 
 composite photography. A number of persons are 
 posed in the same attitude and partially photographed 
 on the same plate. The result is an average or mean 
 
Nature and Function 41 
 
 likeness of the whole group, but not an exact portrait 
 of any individual. So general ideas are ' means ' or 
 ' averages ' of many resembling but slightly differing 
 objects. 
 
 There are other things in the photographic art 
 remarkably similar to intellectual thinking. The 
 gelatine film behaves very like the mental plasma : 
 only one other physical object (so far as I am aware) 
 is a better image of the plasm. 
 
 In theory the object or phenomenon has no im- 
 portance. Even when it has the quality we call 
 ' beauty/ that is not a property of the bare object, 
 for it is not seen by every person or animal with good 
 eyesight ; it is a sentimental effect associated with 
 the object. Hence we might, if it were possible, 
 ignore all objects except those which have value to us 
 as signs of sentimental effects. 
 
 But in practice we cannot do this. Objects are 
 thrust upon our notice which we cannot avoid, and 
 which have no sentimental interest for us. These 
 objects are necessarily classified according to their 
 phenomenal appearance only, and such ideas lack an 
 essential characteristic of true general ideas. But 
 we cannot prevent their formation in the mind, 
 for generalisation is merely a kind of abbre- 
 viated memory, and, objects being once perceived, 
 their recollection is to a great extent beyond our 
 control. 
 
42 Generalisation 
 
 Artificial and adventitious utilities produce the 
 same kind of one-sided generalisation. If society 
 pays a man in fame or money to observe and describe 
 certain things, his classification of them will be purely 
 phenomenal. He will classify dogs with wolves and 
 nightshade with potato, and will lump together the 
 whole population of a country in one class, although 
 it consists of the most divers elements fools and 
 philosophers, rogues and righteous, saints and sinners, 
 patricians and plebeians. These are differences much 
 more important than sameness of nationality, colour, 
 race, or language. 
 
 This practice, no doubt, gives symmetrical classi- 
 fications. The greater classes are subdivided into 
 subordinate classes, and these again into lower classes 
 in a many-stepped series. Gradation occurs also in 
 true generalisation, but not to the same extent. 
 
 If we confine our observation to things that are 
 much like each other, the average idea will not be 
 greatly different from a particular idea : this is called 
 lowness in generality. If we run together quadrupeds, 
 bipeds and fishes, we shall have a much higher 
 general idea : the average will be very unlike any 
 concrete animal. The higher we generalise the 
 smaller becomes the content of the idea, but the 
 wider its extension, that is, the realm of objects from 
 which it has been drawn, or which it is considered to 
 represent. The usual practice is to generalise by fine 
 
Matter 43 
 
 gradations. Get the general idea of sheep, then of 
 cow, then of horse ; then average the averages. The 
 result is much the same if we run all the objects 
 together and average them in one operation, but the 
 slower process gives the neater results. The grada- 
 tions of generality are distinguished by names such as 
 (beginning from below) variety, species, genus, class, 
 family, kingdom. 
 
 * Conceptualism ' is the metaphysical doctrine now 
 prevalent with respect to general ideas. They are 
 regarded not as objects nor as essences, but as forms 
 of consciousness depending more or less on our own 
 mental activity. This is true enough so far as it 
 goes, but without a substantial plasm to hold the 
 * concept ' its formation and endurance are quite in- 
 explicable. 
 
 XIII MATTER 
 
 MATTER is the name given to the most general idea 
 we can form of objects. It is supposed to cover 
 all of them. In other words, the content or * essence ' 
 of the idea is the attribute or attributes common to 
 all objects without exception. It is the universal 
 
44 Generalisation 
 
 objective minimum the least objective experience 
 consistent with the experience being objective. Some 
 have attempted to define this general idea more 
 precisely by identifying it with some abstract pro- 
 perty such as extension, resistance, etc. An object 
 may be material without offering any resistance to 
 human energy, as a beam of light. A material object 
 may also be without extension, as a sound or smell. 
 The only quality left to matter is bare objectivity, 
 namely, that it is a form of consciousness excited in 
 a mind by some other mind, not occurring sponta- 
 neously. This seems to me the only true connotation 
 of matter. 
 
 Matter is not the antithesis of mind ; it is a mere 
 affection of mind. The two are not in any proper 
 sense co-ordinate or equipollent. They are to each 
 other somewhat in the relation of a mirror to an 
 image reflected from it. Mind is to each of us a 
 concrete primary experience the feeling of personal 
 power and identity. Matter is a general idea arising 
 from the comparison of objects in consciousness. No 
 two things could well be more diverse. 
 
 Since general ideas are products of our own 
 mental energy, and matter the most general of all, it 
 is the farthest removed from the concrete objective 
 condition, and so it is literally true that we never 
 objectively perceive matter though we constantly 
 perceive material objects. It is as impossible to see, 
 
Matter 45 
 
 touch, or taste matter as it is to ride the general idea 
 Equus or dine off the general idea nourishment. In 
 denying the objectivity of matter we do not deny 
 the objective reality of things : we merely decline to 
 confound a general idea with the objects that have 
 contributed to form it. We decline to be mystics, in 
 the sense defined by J. S. Mill l . The belief in the 
 external existence of matter is a form of mysticism ; 
 the Hindus call it maya, meaning illusion. 
 
 Some metaphysicians argue that since phenomena 
 appear only in conjunction, we are compelled by the 
 constitution of our nature to think of them conjoined 
 in and by something, and this imaginary foundation 
 and cement is another meaning of the word ' matter.' 
 
 For myself I feel no such compulsion. When 
 things are complex I recollect the several properties 
 as cohering together, and when I abstract one or some 
 for special consideration, I sometimes think of the 
 others as forming a ' substance ' in which the ab- 
 stracted properties inhere. But I cannot discover any 
 inherence or coherence except the mutual, and the 
 notion of an invisible material setting which holds all 
 the parts of a thing together seems to me superfluous 
 and unwarranted. If it existed it would not be, as 
 logicians argue, something superior and antithetical 
 
 1 ' Mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence 
 to the subjective creations of our own faculties, to ideas or feelings of the 
 mind.' Logic, chapter on 'Fallacies.' 
 
46 Generalisation 
 
 to phenomena ; it would be simply an inferred or 
 latent phenomenon like the luminiferous ether of 
 science. The material substance is evidently a grop- 
 ing of the mind after the noumenal (mental) substance 
 which causes the appearance of objects. 
 
 XIV NOMINALISM 
 
 NOMINALISTS deny the existence of general ideas as 
 distinct from particular ideas. Most of them affirm 
 that we employ general or common words to signify 
 the common properties of similar things, but that we 
 are incapable of thinking of these common properties 
 apart from the other properties that accompany them. 
 
 Why we should wish to use signs of things we 
 cannot think about, or how a word can be a 'sign' 
 when we are incapable of attaching a definite mean- 
 ing to it, are points not satisfactorily cleared up by 
 nominalists. 
 
 Considering how well Berkeley's principle, com- 
 bined with the plasmic theory, accounts for general- 
 isation, and how inevitable it is that there should be 
 general ideas distinguishable from particular ideas by 
 superior brilliancy and endurance, it is surprising 
 
Nominalism 47 
 
 to find in Berkeley one of the most convinced and 
 eloquent of nominalists. His views on the subject 
 have so much weight with philosophers that I must 
 examine them at length. 
 
 ' It is agreed on all hands/ he writes in the Intro- 
 duction to his Principles, ' that the qualities or modes 
 of things do never really exist each of them apart by 
 itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, 
 as it were, and blended together, several in the same 
 object. But, we are told, the mind being able to con- 
 sider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other 
 qualities with which it is united, does by that means 
 frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is 
 perceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and 
 moved : this mixed or compound idea the mind 
 resolving into its simple constituent parts, and viewing 
 each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the 
 abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not 
 that it is possible for colour or motion to exist 
 without extension ; but only that the mind can frame 
 to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of 
 extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and 
 extension.' 
 
 Abstract ideas do not form a fourth class of ideas 
 but are fractions of particular, general, or imaginary 
 ideas, and may (as Berkeley, reporting the meta- 
 physical doctrine, says) be single or partial properties 
 mentally detached from the collective properties form- 
 ing an object. In this case they are abstracted pro- 
 
4 8 Generalisation 
 
 parties, not ideas. Since general ideas are less 
 complete than the particular ideas from which they 
 were drawn, they are abstract ideas in so far as they 
 are partial ideas ; but all abstract ideas are not 
 general ideas. Berkeley's nominalism is based on 
 the supposed impossibility of forming any sort of 
 partial idea, and he now proceeds to reproduce the 
 metaphysical account of the general abstract idea. 
 
 * And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of 
 qualities or modes, so does it, by the same precision 
 or mental separation, attain abstract ideas [general 
 ideas] of the more compounded beings which include 
 several co-existent qualities. For example, the mind 
 having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble 
 each other in certain common agreements of shape 
 and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or 
 compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and any 
 other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, 
 retaining only what is common to all, and so makes 
 an abstract [general] idea wherein all the particulars 
 equally partake abstracting entirely from and cut- 
 ting off those circumstances and differences which 
 might determine it to any particular existence. And 
 after this manner it is said we come by the abstract 
 [general] idea of man, or, if you please, humanity or 
 human nature ; wherein it is true there is included 
 colour, because there is no man but has some colour, 
 but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any 
 particular colour, because there is no one particular 
 colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is 
 
Nominalism 49 
 
 included stature, but then it is neither tall stature, 
 nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something 
 abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. 
 Moreover, there being a great variety of other 
 creatures that partake of some parts, but not all, of 
 the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out 
 those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining 
 those only which are common to all the living 
 creatures, frames the idea of animal, which abstracts 
 not only from all particular men, but also all birds, 
 beasts, fishes and insects. The constituent parts of 
 the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and 
 spontaneous motion. By body is meant body without 
 any particular shape or figure, there being no one 
 shape or figure common to all animals, without cover- 
 ing either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet 
 naked : hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the 
 distinguishing properties of particular animals, and 
 for that reason left out of the abstract [general] idea. 
 Upon the same account the spontaneous motion 
 must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping ; it 
 is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is 
 not easy to conceive.' 
 
 This is a fair paraphrase of the accounts given by 
 metaphysicians of the manner of forming general ideas. 
 It is also in itself a perfectly correct account of the 
 process, considered simply as a manifestation of con- 
 sciousness or a succession of states of consciousness, 
 that is, apart from the substantial plasmic operation of 
 which it is merely the symptom. Berkeley however 
 
 E 
 
50 Generalisation 
 
 denies that it is a true statement of what takes place 
 in the mind of consciousness. 
 
 ' Whether others have this wonderful faculty of 
 abstracting their ideas, they best can tell ; for myself, 
 I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining or repre- 
 senting to myself, the ideas of those particular things 
 I have perceived, and of variously compounding and 
 dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, 
 or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a 
 horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose 
 each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest 
 of the body. But then, whatever hand or eye I 
 imagine, it must have some particular shape or colour. 
 Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must 
 be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, 
 or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. 
 I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the ab- 
 stract idea above described. And it is equally 
 impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion 
 distinct from the body moving, and which is neither 
 swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the 
 like may be said of all other abstract general ideas 
 whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to 
 abstract in one sense, as when I consider some 
 particular parts or qualities separated from others, 
 and which, though they are united in some object, 
 yet it is possible they may really exist without them. 
 But I deny that I can abstract from one another, 
 or conceive separately, those qualities which it is 
 impossible should exist so separated ; or that I can 
 form a general notion, by abstracting from particulars 
 
Nominalism 5 1 
 
 in the manner aforesaid which last are the two 
 proper acceptations of abstraction. And there is 
 ground to think most men will acknowledge them- 
 selves to be in my case. The generality of men 
 which are simple and illiterate never pretend to 
 abstract notions [general ideas]. It is said they are 
 difficult and not to be attained without pains and 
 study ; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if 
 such there be, they are confined only to the learned.' 
 
 It is quite true that 'the simple and illiterate never 
 pretend to abstract notions,' for the sufficient reason 
 that they do not know the names of their mental opera- 
 tions, even if they are capable of discriminating them. 
 For the same reason they do not pretend to talk 
 prose or to be realists. 
 
 The practice of every profession and craft, even the 
 humblest, involves abstraction and generalisation. 
 The objective properties associated with a given utility 
 have to be abstracted from those which are indifferent, 
 and this is what enables men of experience in any 
 Ifranch of industry or art to form a speedy judgment on 
 matters touching their special affairs. It is in part what 
 distinguishes the 'professional' from the 'amateur.' 
 
 Berkeley's disclaimer of any power in himself to 
 form general ideas is no doubt sincere, and he is 
 justified in reasoning from himself to others. But the 
 point at issue is, whether Berkeley in this instance 
 correctly analysed his own mental processes. The 
 
 E 2 
 
52 Generalisation 
 
 fact that he was correct in some points of great 
 importance does not preclude us from surmising that 
 he may have been wrong in others of less importance. 
 In comparison with his discovery of the substantiality 
 of mind, his oversight on the subject of abstraction is 
 a bagatelle. 
 
 He explains the existence of general words on the 
 theory that they are names of particular ideas which 
 we use to represent all similar ideas. 
 
 1 ... an idea which, considered in itself, is par- 
 ticular, becomes general by being made to represent 
 or stand for all other particular ideas of the same 
 sort. To make this plain by an example, suppose a 
 geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting 
 a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a 
 black line of one inch in length : this, which in itself 
 is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its 
 signification general, since, as it is there used, it 
 represents all particular lines whatsoever ; so that 
 what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all 
 lines, or, in other words, of a line in general. And, 
 as that particular line becomes general by being made 
 a sign, so the name " line," which taken absolutely is 
 particular, by being a sign is made general. And as 
 the former owes its generality not to its being the 
 sign of an abstract or general line, but of all par- 
 ticular right lines that may possibly exist, so the 
 latter must be thought to derive its generality from 
 the same cause, namely, the various particular lines 
 which it indifferently denotes.' 
 
Nominalism 53 
 
 These extracts will suffice to show what was 
 Berkeley's doctrine on the subject of general ideas. 
 
 With respect to the analogy supposed to exist 
 between the generality of a name and the generality 
 of a general idea, it has to be observed that a name 
 owes its generality solely to its being the sign of a 
 general idea. It is an imputed or conventional 
 generality, in its proper character a general name is 
 concrete and individual. Also it does not resemble 
 the thing it signifies (the general idea), nor the 
 concrete things from which that has been derived. 
 
 The generality of a general idea, on the other hand, 
 depends altogether on its resemblance to many par- 
 ticular things. It is independent of convention. 
 Hence there is no real analogy between the two 
 generalities. 
 
 Considering that Berkeley professes himself unable 
 to imagine abstract properties, it is surprising how 
 easily and naturally he writes about geometrical lines 
 which are abstract properties. Probably he means 
 concrete strokes. 
 
 What sort of representation can subsist between 
 one concrete stroke and every other concrete stroke ? 
 If it is straight it will not correctly represent a curve ; 
 if it is curved it will not represent a straight stroke. 
 A stroke an inch long cannot stand for a stroke a 
 hundred miles long ; a black stroke does not properly 
 represent a red stroke. So it is incorrect to say that 
 
54 Generalisation 
 
 'what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all 
 strokes, or, in other words, of a stroke in general.' 
 A particular object can stand only for itself, and if 
 general words stand for many things it is not by 
 direct representation, but because they first suggest 
 general ideas, which are the true substitutes of many 
 particular things. 
 
 A reference to geometrical objects, themselves so 
 abstract, is a doubtful mode of showing how well one 
 concrete thing can represent others. Had Berkeley 
 taken a more complex object as his general repre- 
 sentative he would have seen the weakness of his 
 argument. Suppose a biologist has to discourse on 
 a province of animal life comprising many species, 
 and takes an individual of one species as a repre- 
 sentative of the whole. His sample is perhaps a 
 hare, but he has to treat of birds and fishes. What 
 is to prevent his hearers from concluding that birds 
 are furred animals and fishes quadrupeds? Are 
 they to be expected to see in the hare only the pro- 
 perties common to . all the animals reviewed ? If 
 so they have the power denied them by nominalists 
 of forming a pure general idea, and the hare is 
 superfluous. The common properties could have been 
 defined and imagined without a concrete specimen, 
 with irrelevant attributes, being brought into the 
 discourse. 
 
 All nominalists insist that if we think long on a 
 
Nominalism 55 
 
 general idea it becomes particular, and from this they 
 argue that it is not, and never has been, a general 
 idea \ 
 
 The experiments of this sort proposed by logicians 
 are misleading, because we are without the ordinary 
 motives for thinking generally. In practical thought 
 we have some sufficient reason for attending to a 
 fraction of consciousness and excluding the rest, and' 
 the irrelevant qualities are distinctly less charged with 
 attention than the principal quality. 
 
 The power of abstracting thought is a matter of 
 education. It is that ruling of the spirit which is 
 more difficult than the capture of a city. We have 
 to master the restless energic Self and fix it down 
 on a particular plasmic figure, or a mere point or 
 edge of one, preventing the energy from spreading to 
 adjacent images. That is irksome and fatiguing, but 
 it is only a high degree of the faculty everyone 
 possesses of distinguishing particular objects from 
 each other. Some minds are so flaccid that you 
 cannot hold them to one subject, even the most 
 particular and obvious, for five minutes at a time. 
 Training enables us to bring into the focus of atten- 
 tion just what we wish to observe or think about, and 
 
 1 With equal plausibility it might be argued that we have no par- 
 ticular ideas, because it is difficult if not impossible to observe and 
 remember all the details of any object. Our most particular ideas are 
 slightly abstract, and in the process of forgetting they become more and 
 more abstract, until they disappear altogether. 
 
56 Generalisation. 
 
 leave the rest in the background, however closely it 
 may be connected with the matter that immediately 
 interests us. But for this power much of our energy 
 would be expended to no purpose. Abstraction is 
 simply attention of a minute and concentrated kind 
 a bringing of our energy of observation or recollec- 
 tion to a fine point. 
 
 When abstraction need not be prolonged when 
 we are free to pass rapidly from one general or 
 abstract idea to another there is no difficulty in 
 partial thinking. We skim over the plasmic im- 
 prints, lightly brushing the surface of each where it 
 is most prominent and therefore most general, but 
 not pausing to recollect particulars. It is this rapid 
 delicate touch we oftenest use in actual thought ; but 
 when for purposes of experiment we come down 
 heavily on an imprint, then the Self overflows 
 to adjacent channels and particular memories are 
 stirred up, in spite of every effort to limit our atten- 
 tion. 
 
 So common and easy is rapid general thought that 
 it is constantly used as a substitute for concrete 
 thought, when a sketchy treatment of things is all 
 that is wanted. 
 
 'A bird has alighted on the fence.' The speaker 
 saw a particular concrete bird, and might have tried 
 to describe it in the concrete. But the attributes that 
 rendered it concrete are supposed not to be of present 
 
Nominalism 57 
 
 importance, and the hearer is consequently invited to 
 think only of bird in general. Would a nominalist 
 affirm that in such a case the words are meaningless 
 unless the idea is concreted unless the general sketch 
 is filled out in detail ? 
 
 Take another example. 'The man sat by the 
 window overlooking the river that flowed towards 
 the city.' 
 
 Here all the nouns are general, but the picture is 
 individual and concrete. It is also quite intelligible, 
 as a sketch. We can think of a man without assign- 
 ing to him any particular type of face, or colour of 
 hair, or stature, or age, or clothing. Our idea is the 
 general idea man used as a sketch of a particular 
 man. He is in a house because he is looking through 
 a window, but we do not stay to imagine the house 
 as cottage, inn, or mansion. We call up the general 
 idea house, which is definite enough for our pur- 
 pose, and we cannot doubt for a moment that we 
 have such a general idea. The river may be wide 
 or narrow, straight or crooked, navigable or not, but 
 we think only of the general idea river, which is 
 water flowing between banks. And surely we can 
 imagine a general city without giving it any de- 
 finite size, or form, or nationality, or number of 
 inhabitants ! 
 
 These considerations clearly demonstrate that 
 we have general ideas, which are not merely concrete 
 
 . 
 
58 Generalisation 
 
 ideas used as examples, and if we can employ them 
 in the manner just indicated, where a light superficial 
 recollection is all that is necessary, we can equally 
 well use them in their more legitimate character, 
 as signs of certain general utilities. 
 
 XV ERRORS WITH RESPECT TO GENERALISATION 
 
 GENERALISATION has been the bane of European 
 philosophy. It has monopolised well-nigh the whole 
 metaphysical attention. It has been considered the 
 radical fact of mind from which all others have 
 grown, whereas it is no more than a method for 
 abbreviating recollection. It neither reveals to us 
 new things, nor reduces the multiplicity of things 
 actually existing. 
 
 Plato insisted on the importance of general thought 
 as against the fluctional idealism of Heraclitus, but he 
 was wholly mistaken as to the nature of general ideas. 
 He thought they were external objects also types and 
 causes of primary objects. But patterns are not 
 causes, and general ideas are quite obviously sug- 
 gested by things, not things derived from general 
 ideas. The notion that the general idea is either the 
 
Errors with respect to Generalisation 59 
 
 cause, or an image and revelation of the cause, of 
 things is an error of perennial recurrence. In some 
 form or other it is always with us. 
 
 Plato also taught that general ideas are recollections 
 of knowledge acquired in the condition prior to em- 
 bodiment, which the objective experience of this life 
 serves to revive. These several doctrines are some- 
 what inconsistent with each other. The last is inter- 
 esting but lacks confirmation. 
 
 Aristotle admitted the superiority of general over 
 particular ideas, and thought that the former corre- 
 sponded to some specially important part of objects 
 called the ' essence.' 
 
 This is nearer the truth. The essence of an object 
 is that part of it, which being present, a given senti- 
 mental result follows, or may be expected to follow, 
 or may be made to follow. A certain experience of 
 things is necessary before we can know what is the 
 objective minimum consistent with some sentimental 
 utility. If things are classified with due regard to 
 their utilities, the essence will be the same as the 
 general idea. It is however not true that the essence 
 or any other part of the object causes the sentimental 
 effect (vn). 
 
 A common form of the generalistic superstition 
 is to suppose that a thing is explained or sufficiently 
 accounted for by classifying it. 
 
 In all philosophies of Greek derivation the Asiatic 
 
60 Generalisation 
 
 seem to be free from this defect reason is con- 
 sidered to be 'the bringing of a thing under a 
 class-notion,' and when this is done we are sup- 
 posed to know the thing completely. An elaborate 
 and utterly false dialectic has been erected on this 
 foundation. 
 
 No doubt our first attempt at explaining a thing is 
 to refer it to a general idea to classify it. This 
 usually suggests something to add to the bare pheno- 
 menon by way of explanation or hypothesis. But 
 only if we have a prior knowledge of the general idea, 
 derived from things better known than the present 
 phenomenon. The general idea is simply a short 
 formula of that prior knowledge. Suppose we 
 thoroughly know a body of similar things #, b, c, 
 and also reduce them to the general image X ; then 
 on seeing d and noticing that it is like <z, , c y we 
 briefly think, ' Oh, it is X,' which excuses us from 
 studying it further. We at once transfer to d our 
 whole knowledge of a, b, c, and in this ideal transfer 
 the explanation consists not in the classification. 
 The transfer is often tacit if explicit it is an 
 * argument.' 
 
 If there has been no better known a, b, c, it is 
 evident that the mere generalisation of new facts 
 d, e, /, will not add anything to our knowledge of 
 them. In deduction we should only return to them 
 the knowledge just extracted from them. We should 
 
Errors with respect to Generalisation 61 
 
 be explaining things by themselves reasoning in a 
 circle 1 . 
 
 The unity which explains is not the general idea. 
 It is a unity of function or service, and may include 
 things utterly heterogeneous, and therefore incapable 
 of being reduced to a common idea. The pen in my 
 hand consists of wood and metal ; if I generalise them 
 into Matter the nearest class that includes both I do 
 not thereby explain the pen. But it is explained by 
 the unity of service : the wood and metal contribute 
 to form one instrument for writing. 
 
 The best results of modern science are discoveries 
 of utilities (inventions) ; discoveries of the relations of 
 sequence among objects, which enable us to predict 
 their arrival years in advance ; of coexistences on the 
 great cosmic scale (geographical and stellar explora- 
 tion) ; of co-inherence of properties in individual 
 objects (chemistry). Yet science is still too general- 
 istic. It runs too much to classification and no- 
 menclature, which is nothing but memoria technica. 
 
 1 Mill's nominalistic tendencies led him to the same conclusion : 
 ' Our general ideas contain nothing but what has been put into them, 
 either by our passive experience, or by our active habits of thought ; 
 and the metaphysicians in all ages, who have attempted to construct the 
 laws of the universe by reasoning from our supposed necessities of 
 thought, have always proceeded, and only could proceed, by labori- 
 ously finding in their own minds what they themselves had formerly put 
 there, and evolving from their ideas of things what they had first in- 
 volved in those ideas.' Logic, Bk. V. c. 3. 3. 
 
62 Generalisation 
 
 Modern biology presents a curious return of Platonism. 
 The general idea is not indeed put forward as the 
 cause of individuals, but a particular concrete animal 
 is found who closely resembles the general idea, and 
 it is imagined that an animal like him was the original 
 cause of all animals of his species. When it happens 
 as it occasionally must in a thorough-going system 
 of phenomenal classification that the average or 
 general idea falls between two species, no individual 
 can be found to represent it with the desired exact- 
 ness. In this case it is supposed by evolutionists 
 that the intermediate animal has existed but is now 
 extinct. These are the ' missing links ' so badly 
 wanted to complete the evolutionary scheme. 
 
IMAGINATION 
 
 XVI 
 
 THIS faculty or habit consists essentially in combin- 
 ing ideas (particular or general), or objects and ideas, 
 so as to form systems different from those occurring 
 in actual experience. The whole has never been 
 perceived, though all its elements have been per- 
 ceived. 
 
 Any association of ideas may be called imaginary 
 if it occurs in an order different from the order of 
 experience. But the term Imagination is properly 
 confined to novel combinations deliberately and con- 
 sciously formed to serve some utility. It is thus 
 distinguished from Reverie, in which no choice or 
 control enters into the recollection. 
 
 We control our ideal associations by means of 
 comparison, which is therefore what distinguishes 
 imagination from reverie. For instance, if I see a 
 
64 Imagination 
 
 vase from which the handle has been broken off, I can 
 imagine the handle restored, but to do this I must be 
 able to compare the broken vase with a similar whole 
 vase, or with the general idea ' whole vase.' The 
 combination I form is novel, for I have never seen 
 this particular vase in a whole state ; if I had I should 
 not be imagining it but recollecting it. 
 
 There are two principal distinctions to be noticed 
 in imagination ; one relates to the mode of forming 
 the imaginary idea, the other to its use. 
 
 In the above case we form the whole by mechanical 
 extension or addition. The process is as simple as 
 nailing one piece of wood to another. But suppose 
 the broken vase is of porcelain and the whole one of 
 bronze, the restoration can still be made, but it is no 
 mechanical junction of two previous ideas. It is a 
 fusion of the material supplied by one idea with a 
 form supplied by another. On the same principle a 
 vase may be wholly designed from hints supplied by 
 a score or more of vases, differing in material, in size, 
 colour, decoration, and so forth. In these cases the 
 new idea may be said to be totally different throughout 
 its length from any other and from any object. Yet 
 it is a combination of previous ideas. We do not 
 create any absolutely new idea. This may be called 
 imagination by transfusion. The elements may be 
 so well mixed that it is impossible to trace each back 
 to its origin. 
 
Imagination 65 
 
 Transfusion may be further complicated by re- 
 compounding ideas already compound. This occurs, 
 as we shall see, in forming the ' external world ' of 
 materialists and realists. 
 
 The two uses to which imaginary ideas are put 
 are the Artistic and the Rational. 
 
 We have seen (x) that emotions may be excited 
 by objects or ideas. Hence, agreeable emotions may 
 be excited by suggesting the objects associated with 
 the original agreeable feelings ; and novel emotions 
 may be excited by novel combinations of the ideas of 
 experienced objects that have been signs of feelings. 
 From this possibility has arisen that extensive pro- 
 vince of activity called ART, which consists in imagin- 
 ing novel combinations of things capable of exciting 
 novel and pleasurable emotions (not feelings), and in 
 finding means of suggesting such ideas to others. 
 Some of these combinations are so subtle, and the 
 emotions they excite so exquisite, that we value the 
 artistic work at a great price, and rank the man who 
 imagined it among the benefactors of his species. 
 
 REASON, or the Rational Imagination, does not 
 appeal directly to the emotions. It serves the uses 
 of life by enabling us to imagine what we have not 
 yet experienced but may have to experience, and the 
 quality aimed at is accuracy of intellectual ideation, 
 not emotional pleasure. It is found by experience 
 that an intellect well furnished with ideas may learn 
 
 F 
 
66 Imagination 
 
 to combine them into pictures or preconceptions of 
 the future, and the indirect utility of this accomplish- 
 ment is very great. If it does not, like art, give 
 immediate sentimental pleasure, it often enables us 
 so to control events that we are brought into condi- 
 tions affording more lasting satisfaction than many 
 expensive works of art. Reason, then, is the imagin- 
 ative faculty applied to the purpose of acquiring ideas 
 of experience that has not yet taken place, and it is 
 good in proportion to the similarity of the idea to the 
 anticipated or unknown experience. 
 
 Although imagination is more important than 
 generalisation, it has received little attention from 
 metaphysicians. Their treatment of it is not uniform, 
 but it generally exhibits two fundamental defects. They 
 consider it an independent or ultimate faculty, that is, 
 one incapable of resolution into anything more simple. 
 We have seen that it is an application of comparison, 
 and comparison depends on the coincidence of par- 
 ticular ideas. 
 
 Then they regard imagination only in its artistic 
 uses, not perceiving that it is also the basis of reason. 
 Reason they treat as generalisation a vice that per- 
 vades all their systems. They put reason and art in 
 essential opposition, whereas the difference between 
 them is only specific a difference of use. 
 
 Some metaphysicians confound imagination with 
 n;ere recollection. 'It is/ says one of them, 'the 
 
Imagination 67 
 
 faculty representative of the phenomena both of the 
 external and internal worlds.' But there is a great 
 difference between the representation of what we have 
 experienced actually, and the representation of a future 
 and perhaps impossible event : the latter only is imagi- 
 native. ' There is no train of ideas/ says another, ' to 
 which the term imagination may not be applied.' If a 
 man at the end of the day calls to mind all the events 
 of the day in a train of ideas, that is recollection, and 
 would be very inappropriately termed imagination. 
 According to a third, imagination has for its object the 
 concrete as opposed to abstractions and generalities. 
 This also is inexact. A traveller may describe in 
 general the qualities of a foreign country or tribe of 
 men, and we shall imagine that generality without a 
 concrete picture. The power of imagining generalities 
 and abstractions necessarily follows from the power of^ 
 forming them in the first instance. 
 
 F 2 
 
DIALECTIC 
 
 XVII ITS SCOPE 
 
 THE derivation of Reason as given in the preceding 
 sections may be summed up thus : the meeting of 
 Minds gives Perception or primary experience ; At- 
 tention selects therefrom objects of special interest to 
 the observer ; Memory retains impressions of these in 
 the mental plasma, by which ideas of them are recol- 
 lected though the originating mind be not present ; 
 community with divergence of imprint gives rise to 
 Comparison ; from this are derived Imagination and 
 Generalisation ; from imagination emerge Reason 
 and Art. 
 
 Generalisation is thus only a collateral relation of 
 reason, not its immediate parent nor in the direct 
 line of descent. It is not essential to reason, but 
 may enter as a subsidiary process into an argument. 
 If the things we argue about are numerous it will be 
 
Its Scope 69 
 
 more correct to generalise them and then argue from 
 the general idea, than to argue from one concrete 
 object to another. But innumerable inferences are 
 drawn from one particular thing to another, and these 
 involve no generalisation. 
 
 Reason is chiefly the art of predicting by means of 
 the intellect what will occur to us in the future. Its 
 use is to enable us to prepare for future events in so 
 far as our resources permit. We never predict quite 
 accurately, but general preconceptions are better than 
 none at all. The same process by which we precon- 
 ceive the future can be applied to the conception of 
 what is actually taking place but not within our ken 
 as at the antipodes and can be applied also to 
 events that took place in the past and will never be 
 experienced by us. It might be objected that as 
 regards the past we can have no motive in imagining 
 it, seeing we can never experience it. But a con- 
 ception of the past is often a necessary condition 
 of our conceiving the future, and is artistically in- 
 teresting. It awakens pleasing emotions to be able 
 to picture to ourselves, even imperfectly, states of the 
 world and of society that have long been obsolete. 
 
 An investigation of the manner in which reason 
 supplies us with ideas of the unknown, involves the 
 consideration and arrangement of so many details 
 that it may be regarded as a small science in itself 
 DIALECTIC. 
 
70 Dialectic 
 
 A dialectician (logician in the narrower sense) is 
 neither a grammarian nor an encyclopedia of the best 
 information on every subject. His office consists in 
 deciding whether certain theorems are arguments 
 or not. An ARGUMENT is an act or product of 
 rational imagination. Theorems which purport to 
 be arguments, but are not, are FALLACIES. 
 
 A fallacy is not merely a bad argument it is no 
 argument at all. Quite apart from fallacy there is a 
 goodness and badness in arguments, but with this dis- 
 crimination the dialectician (as such) has nothing to 
 do. Only persons experienced in the matter are com- 
 petent to decide between good and bad arguments. 
 Hence when the quality of an argument is in question 
 the dialectician takes no part in the debate : he is 
 neither combatant nor umpire. He is at most an 
 impartial president whose chief duty is to see that 
 people do not debate about mere words and foregone 
 conclusions. Granting that a theorem has the quali- 
 ties of an argument, the dialectician is not competent 
 to say that it is improper or too trivial to be dis- 
 cussed. He is not a judge of what people ought to 
 be interested in. 
 
 From his better knowledge of what constitutes 
 rational prediction, a dialectician may offer his services 
 to disentangle and render explicit involved and partial 
 arguments. Many people reason well who are yet 
 unable to express themselves coherently. A dialecti- 
 
7/s Scope 71 
 
 cian should be able to reconstruct an argument from 
 the slightest hint, as a naturalist imagines an animal 
 from a single bone. In ordinary reasoning the argu- 
 ments are seldom fully expressed, and the reasoners 
 themselves are not always quite conscious of the 
 premises from which they argue. All such suppressed 
 and overlooked assumptions should be brought to 
 light by dialectic, the aim of which is to render 
 reason as self-conscious as possible. 
 
 Though a dialectician need not be an expert in any 
 department of knowledge, he must know the facts on 
 which an argument is built, otherwise he may be de- 
 ceived by equivocal language. Reverting to the in- 
 stance of the vase the dialectician must have seen 
 both the whole vase and the broken vase, but he need 
 not have any opinion as to whether the proposed 
 handle is the most suitable, or not. That must be 
 left to those who are familiar with vases and who are 
 interested in the restoration of the one in question. 
 
 The definition here given of the scope and office of 
 dialectic may appear to some too modest. But 
 in reality there is a great deal involved in it. Philo- 
 sophers have been discussing Reason for twenty cen- 
 turies or more, and have not produced a satisfactory 
 definition of it. Consequently they cannot decide 
 with any confidence whether a theorem is an argu- 
 ment or a fallacy. The cleverest of them give their 
 sanction to theorems that are demonstrably fallacies. 
 
Dialectic 
 
 They are evidently judging more by ear than by rule. 
 All this causes confusion of mind and waste of 
 energy. 
 
 Dialectic takes its general idea of reason from the 
 higher analysis of logic, and brings the general idea 
 to bear on concrete arguments. A dialectician makes 
 a collection of theorems for study just as a botanist 
 makes a collection of plants. He sorts them out into 
 convenient classes, separates the valid or useful from 
 the erroneous and misleading, studies the relation of 
 language to argument and the influence for good or 
 ill that words have upon rational thought. 
 
 From the example of the vase cited above it will 
 be seen that in every act of reason two principal 
 things are requisite. There must be something wholly 
 known (or comparatively well known) and something 
 less well known, and the reasoning or argument con- 
 sists in ideally completing the latter on the model of 
 the former. If we would predict the coming of a 
 future season of the year we must have a picture 
 in the mind of all the seasons in the order in which 
 they occur. If we would go straight to a place on the 
 surface of the earth we must have a plan of the way 
 in our imagination. If we would predict the effect of 
 a drug on an animal body we must have previously 
 noticed the effect it has produced and so on. 
 Neither the mind nor intellect supplies spontaneously 
 any of these models ; they are all formed out of 
 
7/s Scope 73 
 
 actual experience remembered and recollected. 
 When they have been refined into extremely 
 general ideas they are apt to be taken for innate 
 tendencies of the intellect, as Kant erroneously 
 thought. They are not so ; all we know of the intel- 
 lect is consistent with the belief that it begins with 
 pure plasm without a trace of idea, and is absolutely 
 indifferent to the imprints it may receive. Doctrines 
 of innate ideas innate forms of thought or categories 
 innate ' principles ' of various kinds are devices 
 of metaphysicians to cover the weakness of their 
 theories. 
 
 The two main parts of an argument divide natur- 
 ally into four subdivisions. There is the thing argued 
 about (corresponding to the broken vase) ; there is 
 the ideal extension or restoration ; in the model we 
 reason from there are the parts corresponding to each 
 of these. I propose to take terms for these four 
 parts from one of the most important, formal and 
 correct modes of reasoning the application of a pre- 
 cedent or statute to a case in Law. 
 
74 Dialectic 
 
 XVIII THE RATIONAL PARALLEL 
 
 EVERY argument, whatever be the matter of it, 
 consists in bringing a Case under a Precedent^ and 
 applying to the case ideally the better knowledge 
 possessed of the precedent. The Conclusion (also called 
 Inference or Deduction) is the result of this appli- 
 cation, and is always an addition to our stock of ideas. 
 
 A conclusion has never the same reality as actual 
 experience. It is not ' true ' in that sense, though it 
 may be 'morally' true, that is, we are ready to act 
 upon it without hesitation to stake our life or fortune 
 on it. As regards actual or experienced fact there 
 can be no argument, since it is useless to ' predict ' 
 what we already know. 
 
 Academical logicians have a doctrine the reverse of 
 this. They assert that their syllogisms yield conclu- 
 sions that are always as certain as the premises. 
 Grant their premises and you are obliged to accept 
 their conclusions. This is so, because a regular syl- 
 logistic conclusion is simply a restating in other 
 words of the information, or part of the information, 
 already contained in the premises. If the syllogism 
 has any use at all, it is merely as an aid to recollec- 
 
The Rational Parallel 75 
 
 tion ; no new idea is generated by it. It is needless 
 to insist on a fact so notorious as that ordinary 
 rational conclusions those that form the staple of 
 our daily thought are not by any means so certain 
 as the data from which they are drawn. For example, 
 the sky is red and lowering this evening, and we con- 
 clude therefrom that the weather will be bad to- 
 morrow. There is no doubt about the present aspect 
 of the sky, but much doubt about the inference. 
 
 The form of an act of reasoning or argumentation 
 may be rendered plainer by a diagram. 
 
 S A represents the precedent. S is the Subject 
 or body of the precedent ; A (the Applicate] is one 
 property, or a part, or a relation of S abstracted from 
 the rest to illustrate a case. C is the case ; / is the 
 conclusion (or inference). / results from imagining C 
 to be associated with a property or relation similar to 
 A. The sum of our /'s constitutes what we know of 
 the world and man before we were born, of what is 
 taking place in other parts of the world or universe, 
 of what may take place in the future, and of the con- 
 cealed and inaccessible parts of present objects. This 
 is true not only of the results of our own reasoning 
 but of what we have learned as verified knowledge 
 
76 Dialectic 
 
 from others, for the interpretation of language is, in 
 the last analysis, a rational conclusion. 
 
 All the parts of an argument exist in the mind, but 
 they are not always expressed in language. When 
 treated dialectically the implicit members are ex- 
 pressed, and the terms arranged so as to show as 
 clearly as possible the nature of the argument. The 
 following are the points most necessary to be ob- 
 served in constructing or analysing an argument. 
 
 (i) C must resemble S, for that is the basis of the 
 argument. If C is not felt to be like S, or (as some- 
 times happens) is explicitly declared to be unlike S, 
 there can be no conclusion. The precedent is not 
 applicable to the case. A may, or may not, be 
 associated with S ; that is to say, a verbal negation 
 may appear in the statement of the relation of S to 
 A, but there must be no negation with respect to the 
 relation of C to S. 
 
 The resemblance of C to S may, however, vary in 
 degree from the faintest analogy to community of 
 species. The difference between them may far out- 
 weigh their resemblance. There may even be no 
 material likeness, but only a similarity of function, or 
 position, or of any the most trivial attribute. Only it 
 is to be observed that the kind and degree of resem- 
 blance between S and C determine the kind and 
 degree of resemblance between A and /. We must 
 not infer specifically unless the case is specifically 
 
The Rational Parallel 77 
 
 like the precedent. In all other instances we can 
 only infer proportionally or by transfusion. 
 
 (2) None of the antecedents must be a verbal or 
 identical proposition, that is, a proposition which 
 merely substitutes one name or nominal phrase for 
 another ; nor must the case be merely the precedent 
 expressed in other words, or the precedent a para- 
 phrase of the case. In any of these circumstances 
 one of the elements of the argument is wanting ; we 
 have two names for one thing or two propositions 
 giving the same information. 
 
 (3) The precedent may (as has been already re- 
 marked) be a general idea, or may be an individual 
 idea or object. If S A has occurred frequently it is 
 certain to be generalised, and so may form a maxim, 
 a law, a rule, an induction, &c. But one well-observed 
 precedent is enough to suggest a conclusion, if there 
 has been no experience to the contrary. There is 
 therefore no dialectical difference between arguing 
 from a general idea (class notion) to an individual or 
 subordinate idea, and arguing from one individual to 
 another. Comparison and inference occur in both. 
 
 (4) After separating A from S care should be 
 taken that it is A and not S that is used to generate /. 
 Examples are plentiful of theorems in which S and 
 A change parts, which invalidates the conclusion. 
 Other errors in stating theorems intended to be 
 
78 Dialectic 
 
 arguments will be noticed under the head of 
 ' Fallacies.' 
 
 The following is an argument comformable to the 
 above rules. 
 
 Tyrants 
 
 Caesar was a tyrant 
 
 deserve death 
 
 no doubt he deserved death 
 
 This square mode of stating the argument is 
 adapted from the general type, and brings out the 
 mutual relations of the compared parts better than 
 the three-lined arrangement. The word ' therefore/ 
 which usually introduces a logical conclusion, is am- 
 biguous. It may mean that the antecedents are the 
 causes of the fact mentioned in the conclusion, or 
 merely that the antecedents are the reasons why we 
 believe the conclusion. The former is the scientific 
 * therefore,' the latter is the purely dialectical. I shall 
 generally omit the illative word, and print conclusions 
 in italics, besides entering them invariably in the 
 fourth compartment of the parallel when this arrange- 
 ment is adopted. 
 
 An idea once generated in the intellect is not to 
 be erased at pleasure. It can be obliterated only by 
 the process of forgetting. If after we have formed a 
 dialectical conclusion we meet with evidence that 
 contradicts it, the only result of that evidence is to 
 affix a mark of falsity to the conclusion, so that as 
 
The Rational Parallel 79 
 
 often as it is recollected the stigma is recollected 
 too, and neutralises the effect of the idea. A negative 
 or destructive argument is thus, plasmically speaking, 
 a positive addition to the idea it seeks to efface. For 
 the time being it renders the idea more conspicuous, 
 as the word CANCELLED stamped in large letters 
 across a document makes it more evident than it was 
 before ; but no doubt the stigmatising of an idea 
 hastens the process of oblivion, for we thenceforth 
 bestow less attention upon it. Stigmatic arguments are 
 not another species, but merely the ordinary construc- 
 tive arguments used for a particular purpose. 
 
 Suppose we have inferred from the general resem- 
 blance of the earth to the moon that the latter is 
 inhabited, we stigmatise this belief by such an argu- 
 ment as 
 
 Without air 
 
 animals cannot live 
 
 There is no air in the moon 
 
 there can be no life in the moon 
 
 There is an exception to the rule that argument is 
 superfluous when the speaker has already verified the 
 conclusion. It is when he is addressing a person who 
 has not had the same experience as himself and 
 who doubts his word. The speaker may then resort 
 to arguments drawn from antecedents recognised by 
 the hearer, if any such are applicable to the subject. 
 But a fact may be truly reported though neither the 
 witness nor a sceptical hearer can find dialectical 
 
80 Dialectic 
 
 antecedents to prove it, for there may be no relation 
 between the fact in question and any prior knowledge 
 they possess, or they may not be able to find the 
 relation. 
 
 This brings us again to that view of the intellect 
 which represents it as artificial and limited by ex- 
 perience. Man is rational only on matters familiar to 
 him ; in utterly novel circumstances he is irrational, 
 and must fall back for guidance on his general mental 
 sentiment, or the advice of persons more experienced 
 than himself. 
 
 XIX HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENTS 
 
 IT is allowable to imagine ourselves placed in circum- 
 stances not yet realised, or in possession of informa- 
 tion not yet acquired, and to anticipate or rehearse 
 the reasoning we should employ under the supposed 
 conditions. Such arguments take in language a con- 
 ditional or hypothetical phraseology. 
 
 The case may be entirely fictitious, but I cannot 
 find a valid instance of a whole precedent being 
 fictitious. Its dubiety turns on our knowledge or 
 ignorance of the applicate. Has a subject such or 
 such an attribute ? Then it may be applied to illus- 
 
Hypothetical Arguments 81 
 
 trate a certain case. ' If it is true that Damon and 
 Pythias are inseparable, then Pythias must be in town, 
 for I have just seen Damon.' 
 
 It is more often the case that is dubious. ' If 
 Caius is a European he is white, for all Europeans are 
 white/ * If Damon is in town Pythias is in town, for 
 they are inseparable.' ' If I were you / should defer 
 the voyage to the summer season, as I have always found 
 winter travelling disagreeable.' But the word 'if 
 does not always mark a hypothetical thought. In the 
 proposition, * if children are neglected they will grow 
 up ignorant,' we have a dogmatic or assertorial judg- 
 ment ' neglected children grow up ignorant.' (Bain.) 
 
 The precedent may be suppressed in hypothetical 
 as in dogmatic argument. * If the crops are good, 
 corn will be cheap ' implies the unspoken precedent, 
 * good crops have been invariably followed by cheap 
 corn.' ' If logic is useless it deserves to be neglected,' 
 carries the mind to the more general thesis, * all 
 useless studies deserve to be neglected.' * If Great 
 Britain should be invaded the volunteers will be called 
 out,' rests on the precedent judgment, ' it is the 
 duty of the volunteer army to repel invaders.' 
 
 Arguments in which both applicate and case are 
 hypothetical are so very dubious that they cannot be 
 considered of any practical use. '//"opium is poisonous, 
 and if this substance is opium, you will be poisoned 
 by taking this substance.' 
 
 G 
 
82 Dialectic 
 
 The Aristotelian hypothetical is almost invariably 
 a fallacy, sometimes on more than one account. It 
 usually consists of first, a conditional or doubtful 
 statement ; next, a solution of the doubt by means of 
 positive information ; finally and by way of inference 
 the first statement is given without the doubt. Here is 
 an example from Jevons: ' If the barometer is falling, 
 bad weather is coming ; but the barometer is falling ; 
 therefore bad weather is coming.' 
 
 Where did the information that the barometer is 
 falling come from? If we knew it before uttering 
 the first proposition, we were affecting an ignorance 
 that did not exist. The second proposition takes 
 away all occasion for argument ; it is an amendment 
 of the first proposition, and what we get from the 
 theorem as a whole is a case, followed by a prediction 
 for which there is no precedent justification. We are 
 arguing in a circle. 
 
 ' If Aristotle is right, slavery is a proper form of 
 society ; but slavery is not a proper form of society ; 
 therefore Aristotle is not right.' If we knew for 
 certain (as the second proposition indicates) that 
 slavery is not a proper form of society, what is the 
 use or meaning of treating the question as hypo- 
 thetical (as is done in the first) ? If we acquired the 
 information after uttering the first proposition, there 
 was no occasion to go on with the argument; we 
 should have said simply, 'Slavery is not a proper 
 
Hypothetical Arguments 83 
 
 form of society, though Aristotle said it was.' It is 
 needless, except for verbal completeness, to say ' he 
 was not right ' we have logically said so. 
 
 When two or more alternative data are presented, 
 of which only one is valid or relevant to a proposed 
 argument, but we know not at first which the valid 
 datum is, we have the dilemma (trilemma, tetralemma, 
 &c.) of logicians. In such conditions we have a 
 double process to go through ; we must first settle by 
 observation or by an auxiliary argument which of 
 the alternative data to select, and then work out the 
 principal argument in the regular dogmatic form. 
 
 Suppose we have to determine dialectically the 
 specific gravity of a piece of metal, but do not 
 know whether it is gold or gun-metal. It is evident 
 we must first somehow make up our mind as to its 
 identity, and then proceed on the usual method of 
 argumentation. The 'making up our mind' is probably 
 itself an argument, and might be of this character 
 ' A piece of yellow metal stamped with what appears 
 to be a hall-mark, is more likely to be gold than gun- 
 metal ; this piece of metal has traces of such a stamp ; 
 so I conclude it is gold' Then we proceed to the prin- 
 cipal question 'The specific gravity of gold is 19-26; 
 I have concluded that this object is gold ; I conclude 
 further that it has a specific gravity of 19-26.' 
 
 We may work out all the alternative conclusions 
 first and fix on a datum afterwards, as in deciding 
 
 G a 
 
Dialectic 
 
 how we shall invest our money. * If I put my 
 money in Consols I shall have a small return with 
 good security ; if I buy Patagonian bonds I may 
 have a large interest for a time, but the security 
 is bad.' The next thing to settle is whether in our 
 experience or on accepted principles small profit with 
 good security is, or is not, to be preferred to large 
 profit and bad security : having decided in favour 
 of the former alternative, we now choose our invest- 
 ment dogmatically ' A good security with small 
 profit is to be preferred ; Consols are of this character; 
 they are a siiitable investment for me! 
 
 We may be unable to decide for any of the alterna- 
 tive data, but we work out all the possible arguments 
 as hypotheses, and so are prepared in a degree for all 
 the possible events. A person is seen approaching our 
 residence, but we cannot discern whether it is A. B., 
 who is a bore, or C. D. } who is an entertaining com- 
 panion. We argue rapidly * If it is A.B. / shall 
 have a bad half -hour > for he always wearies me ; if it 
 is C. D. / shall have an agreeable distraction^ for he is 
 very amusing.' 
 
 According to the syllogists, the dilemmatic pre- 
 mises are a statement of alternative data and the 
 choice of one of them, and the inference is the re- 
 jection of the remainder : or the rejection may be 
 given as matter of fact and the selection as conclu- 
 sion. In neither case have we argument. 
 
Hypothetical Arguments 85 
 
 From the moment we select a datum the remaining 
 data are of no import to us, and they need not be 
 mentioned. The selection of one datum is logically 
 identical with the rejection of the rest, and this is there- 
 fore not a conclusion from that. ' Do you take tea 
 or coffee ? ' ' Tea, please.' * Then I conclude you do 
 not take coffee.' A person who would ' conclude ' in 
 this fashion would be justly deemed irrational. The 
 choice of the tea is a fact, and the rejection of the 
 coffee is the same fact otherwise expressed, so that 
 the rejection cannot be a rational conclusion. ' My 
 doctor sends me off every winter to Nice, Algiers, or 
 Egypt ; but I never go to Algiers or Egypt.' There 
 is no occasion to say, * therefore you go to Nice ' ; 
 that has been already announced as a matter of fact 
 and is not susceptible of inference. For the sake 
 of verbal emphasis we might remark, ' So it is to Nice 
 you go ', but this is not logically requisite. 
 
 Whately's examples of this kind of theorem are 
 exactly of the model just given. ( Either the earth 
 is eternal, or the work of chance, or the work of an 
 intelligent Being ; it is not eternal, nor the work of 
 chance, therefore it is the work of an intelligent 
 Being.' This is put forward in all gravity as a spe- 
 cimen of reasoning. It is plain that if we know the 
 premises as matters of fact, we also know the pro- 
 posed conclusion as a matter of fact. There is no 
 occasion to reason about it. 
 
86 Dialectic 
 
 The Aristotelian hypothetical can be reduced to 
 arithmetical subtraction. Suppose we put five balls 
 into a bag and afterwards take out three without seeing 
 the remainder : is the judgment that two balls remain 
 in the bag a logical inference? No it is matter of 
 fact. Since we last perceived the objects they have 
 undergone diminution, but that does not confer on 
 what is left of them the imaginary character proper to 
 a rational conclusion. What remains is as much fact 
 recollected but not imaginary fact as before the 
 subtraction. 
 
 Whately's next example is 'It is either spring, 
 summer, autumn, or winter ; but it is neither spring 
 nor summer ; therefore it is either autumn or winter.' 
 This is aggravated fallacy. Not only is it mere sub- 
 traction, but the remainder v& perceived not recol- 
 lected, as in the preceding case. The actual season of 
 the year is a known fact, and is not rendered more 
 certain by an inference drawn from the absence of 
 some other season. Arguments have no validity as 
 against matters of fact, and add nothing to their 
 authority. Fact is above, and independent of, argu- 
 ment. The example just cited may be paralleled 
 thus 'The cards in my hand are either spades, 
 hearts, clubs, or diamonds ; but they are neither 
 spades nor hearts ; therefore they are either clubs or 
 diamonds '. I see that they are either clubs or dia- 
 monds : the perceptual judgment renders the rational 
 
Debate 87 
 
 imaginary judgment superfluous. Reason is in- 
 tended to supplement experience not to supersede it. 
 
 XX DEBATE 
 
 THE purpose of debate is to determine the good- 
 ness or badness of an argument by general logical 
 criticism and knowledge of the matter. This is not 
 dialectic, but takes place after the dialectician has 
 declared that a given theorem is valid argument. If 
 then its conclusion is repugnant to us we may seek 
 to stigmatise it or remove a stigma as the case may 
 be by going behind the argument to the composition 
 of the judgments that enter into it. 
 
 Let us take the case of Caesar being proved to be 
 a tyrant in a society that punishes tyranny with 
 death. There are two ways in which he may be 
 saved or his punishment mitigated. 
 
 We are not bound to take the first precedent that 
 is offered from which to generate a conclusion. We 
 grant that Caesar resembles the general notion 
 'tyrant,' but we ask if he does not resemble in an 
 equal or greater degree some other person or class 
 in regard to whom capital punishment is no just 
 treatment. Does he resemble a 'successful and 
 
88 Dialectic 
 
 patriotic general ' a ' benevolent monarch ' a * wise 
 legislator ' a ' virtuous man ' ? All these resem- 
 blances are compatible with his being a tyrant in 
 some senses of the word. Let us not condemn Caesar 
 for what may be a merely technical offence the 
 usurpation of authority if in other respects he is an 
 admirable man. So an opportunity must be given 
 to Caesar or his advocate to suggest other prece- 
 dents, yielding a different conclusion, by which to 
 complete our imperfect knowledge of the case. So- 
 crates, when he was brought under the class ' per- 
 verters of youth ' which also yielded the conclusion 
 ' death' suggested as an amendment that he should 
 be classed under ' national benefactors,' with the con- 
 clusion ' maintenance for life at the public expense.' 
 
 It is not enough that we can say of a case that it 
 * is ' this or that, and so proceed to draw the con- 
 clusion bound up in that classification. 'Is' in the 
 case means likeness to the precedent, and one ' is ' is 
 good only when no better can be found. 
 
 If after having weighed the alternative precedents 
 it appears clear that Caesar resembles tyrants more 
 than any other class of persons, the prospect looks 
 bad for him. But there is still a chance of escaping 
 the worst penalty. It turns on the meaning of the 
 word ' all,' which in logic generally introduces a 
 proposition to which no exception has been found 
 the misnamed and misleading * universal.' 
 
Debate 89 
 
 Logicians do not hesitate to say that in this con- 
 nection it means * all possible, known or unknown, 
 past or future individuals of the class.' They suppose, 
 or talk as if they supposed, that at some fixed 
 date in our life we enter into possession of our 
 general ideas, and that no subsequent experience can 
 modify them. Hence the moment it is admitted that 
 Caesar is a tyrant, he is supposed to come under 
 the rule of a stereotyped general idea with inflexible 
 consequences. 
 
 This is not quite so. ' All ' does not mean ' all 
 possible ' but ' all known up to the present time, ex- 
 clusive of the case under discussion! Our general or 
 average ideas are the plasmic product of the in- 
 dividuals we have actually known not a unit more. 
 And as that idea is liable to be modified by every 
 new individual examined, it is possible that on- 
 examining Caesar we may find reason to change our 
 general idea, to the extent at least of dividing it into 
 two species, the tyrants who deserve death and the 
 tyrants who deserve some milder punishment, and 
 that we shall resolve to bring Caesar under the latter 
 species. Thus if the idea threatens to hang Caesar, on 
 the other hand Caesar may burst the idea, and his case 
 establish itself as a new precedent. That is how 
 general ideas multiply by a sort of fission. 
 
 In the proposition ' tyrants deserve death ' as first 
 proposed, we are dealing with the old general idea, 
 
9 Dialectic 
 
 and as regards all individuals except those from 
 which it was drawn the proposition is little more 
 than a hypothesis. The idea is itself on trial. Until 
 Caesar is examined we do not fully know how the 
 general tyrant is in future to be defined. Our ex- 
 amination of Caesar is a part of our education on the 
 subject of tyrants. In judging we learn, and the 
 general idea which remains after Caesar is examined 
 is that by which he is to be judged. 
 
 If our idea of tyrant remains unshaken after the 
 trial of Caesar, and if he is found to resemble that 
 class more than any other, then -and not till then- 
 are we compelled to pass on him the judgment asso- 
 ciated with the definition of tyrant. 
 
 An argument based on a particular or solitary pre- 
 cedent is criticised on the same principles. We seek 
 to prove either that the case is not sufficiently like the 
 precedent to justify the application, or that the appli- 
 cate is not a property of the precedent. If we make 
 good either of these propositions, we prevent the sug- 
 gested conclusion from being fastened on the case. 
 
 The syllogistic dialecticians do not admit alterna- 
 tive precedents or reconstruction of general ideas : 
 their terms and figures are not adapted to express 
 such notions. Hence they cannot evade a conclusion 
 whose premises are correctly given. They have an 
 axiom to the effect that a judgment must be abso- 
 lutely true or absolutely false a door must be open 
 
Debate 91 
 
 or shut, it cannot be ajar ; every colour is white or 
 black, it cannot be green or grey, and so on. Now 
 in practical reasoning we may and constantly do admit 
 premises and reject the conclusions they dialectically 
 involve. We look at the question 'from another 
 point of view.' This means that while admitting 
 there is some ground for bringing a case under a 
 certain precedent, we contend that on the whole it is 
 preferable to bring it under another precedent with 
 a different conclusion. The proposed handle may fit 
 the vase somehow, but we think another sort of 
 handle will suit it better. Or rather than accept an 
 objectionable conclusion we will divide our idea. This 
 is degree in truth. And that is the elastic method on 
 which we reason in actual affairs. Logicians give a 
 false account of reason, and so their systems are 
 neglected and their authority is never recognised in 
 real debates. 
 
CATEGORIES 
 
 XXI CATEGORIES OF SUBSTANTIALISM, 
 AND OTHERS 
 
 A CATEGORY is primarily a class of Judgments. 
 Since arguments are composed of judgments, a 
 category is also a class of arguments ; that is to 
 say, the argument follows the classification of the 
 judgment. This is not the practice of syllogists, 
 who have categories for judgments only, the argu- 
 ments being classified according to verbal expression. 
 
 I distinguish six categories two Natural and four 
 Artificial. The judgments of a natural category 
 concern experience presented in a synthesis whose 
 composition is due to the noumenal mind ; the cate- 
 gories corresponding to this definition are 
 Inherence 
 Association. 
 
 An artificial category is so called because the syn- 
 thesis is formed by the subjective mind. 
 
 The first category of this kind is 
 Perspection 
 which is an artificial arrangement of objects according 
 
Categories of Substantialism 93 
 
 to a figurative interpretation of certain appearances 
 they present. 
 
 The second artificial category I will call 
 
 Concretion 
 
 as it is an ideal cohesion of experiences never wholly 
 perceived at once. These two categories are those 
 chiefly responsible for the realistic mode of thought. 
 
 The third artificial category is that which is called 
 in science causation, but it is only 
 
 Sequence, 
 
 that is, a series of phenomena sufficiently coherent 
 to afford a basis for inference, but not necessarily or 
 energically connected. Hume and others have con- 
 clusively proved that such phenomena are not causally 
 related. 
 
 Finally there is 
 
 Causation 
 
 in the proper sense of the word, that is, the relation 
 between energic mind and its effects. This is the 
 category of human affairs generally, and of all the 
 Cosmic that we explain by analogy with the Human. 
 It is the only exhaustive explanation of phenomena, 
 and so is the category which philosophy would sub- 
 stitute for the rest. When we can truly resolve things 
 into effects analogous to human actions, we have 
 reached the highest standpoint from which they can 
 be viewed. Realistic anthropomorphism is the first 
 
94 Categories 
 
 and rudest explanation of things: idealistic anthropo- 
 morphism is the last and most refined. 
 
 The artificial categories are all formed on analogies 
 supplied by the natural, since the intellect is incapable 
 of imagining anything absolutely original. 
 
 Each category may include judgments of other 
 categories in a subordinate relation. Inherence and 
 concretion enter to some extent as auxiliaries into 
 all the others. A group category may be treated as 
 an individual object for certain purposes, and an 
 individual as a group of properties. In the one case 
 a fictitious unity is created, in the other a real unity 
 is imaginatively dissolved. But in general the cate- 
 gories are sufficiently distinct and may be considered 
 as mutually exclusive. They will be separately ana- 
 lysed and exemplified. 
 
 The term category is used in common logic to 
 signify the final classes into which judgments can be 
 arranged. To this minor use only is the category 
 applied. It does not either denote a classification of 
 arguments or a distinct province of ideas whose origin 
 and validity should be a matter of investigation. In 
 Greek and modern logic arguments are distinguished 
 solely by their verbal expression never by the char- 
 acter of the judgment that enters into them. Treated 
 in this superficial and haphazard way, the categories 
 necessarily play a quite insignificant part in philosophy. 
 The oldest known set of categories is that quoted 
 
Various Categories 95 
 
 by Aristotle in his Metaphysic as being held by a 
 sect of Pythagoreans. It consists of the following 
 series of contraries 
 
 Bound. Infinity. 
 
 Odd. Even. 
 
 Unity. Plurality. 
 
 Right. Left. 
 
 Male. Female. 
 
 Rest. Motion. 
 
 Straight. Crooked. 
 
 Light. Darkness. 
 
 Good. Bad. 
 
 Square. Oblong. 
 
 Aristotle's own categories are the following : 
 
 (1) Essence or Substance, as man, horse : 
 
 (2) Quantity, as two cubits long : 
 
 (3) Quality, as white, erudite : 
 
 (4) Relation, as double, half, greater : 
 
 (5) Place, as in the Agora : 
 
 (6) Time, as yesterday : 
 
 (7) Posture, as standing, sitting : 
 
 (8) Having (Condition ?), as to be shod, armed : 
 
 (9) Action, as he is cutting, burning : 
 (10) Passion, as he is being cut. 
 
 This list can be reduced to one half the number. 
 Quantity, Quality, Posture, Condition are kinds of 
 Attribute or Property of the Substance. Place and 
 Time are valid. Action and Passion are both referable 
 to causation. Non-causal sequence or consecution 
 (as day following night) one of the commonest 
 judgments is not mentioned. 
 
 The Stoics reduced Aristotle's ten categories to 
 
96 Categories 
 
 four Substratum or Substance, the Essential Quality, 
 Manner of being, and Relation. 
 
 Kanada, a Hindu philosopher, has six categories 
 Substance, Quality, Action, Genus, Individuality, and 
 Concretion or Co-inherence. 
 
 Plotinus was acquainted with the Aristotelian and 
 Stoic lists and offers as his own : (i) Fundamental 
 forms of the Ideal Being, Rest, Motion, Identity, 
 Difference ; (2) Categories of the Sensible Substance, 
 Relation, Quality, Quantity, Motion. 
 
 Descartes recognised but two final categories, the 
 Absolute and the Relative. 
 
 Kant has an elaborate scheme of categories, which 
 he considered to be, not merely classes of judgments, 
 but innate power of the mind by which we are moved 
 to form the judgments. They are the following : 
 
 I. Of Quantity. Unity, Plurality, Totality. 
 II. Of Quality. Reality, Negation, Limitation. 
 
 III. Of Relation. Of Inherence and Subsistence 
 
 (substantia et accidens). 
 
 Of Causality and Dependence 
 (cause and effect). 
 
 Of Community (reciprocity be- 
 tween the active and the 
 passive). 
 
 IV. Of Modality. Possibility, Impossibility, Exist- 
 
 ence, Non-existence, Neces- 
 sity, Contingency. 
 
Inherence 97 
 
 Sir William Hamilton's categories were Being, 
 Being by itself, and Being by accident. 
 
 Categories have also been proposed by Spinoza, 
 Locke, Wolff, Leibnitz, Herbart, Mill, and others. No 
 two of them are alike. They are not formed on any 
 definite principle, but are individual opinions as to the 
 most convenient way to classify judgments 1 . 
 
 XXII INHERENCE 
 
 AN object being given by perception we develop 
 our knowledge of it, first by narrowing our focus of 
 attention so as to perceive parts and single attributes 
 of the object ; next by widening our attention so as 
 to include several objects in one view. The first 
 process is Analysis or Abstraction ; it informs us 
 what attributes co-inhere to constitute the object. 
 The second is Synthesis or Grouping, by which we 
 learn the relations of one thing to others. These 
 operations comprise all we know about a thing, for it 
 can have no attributes which are not either internal 
 or external. 
 
 1 Ueberweg's Logic, Fleming's Vocabulary, and Dickenson's Diet, of 
 
 Philosophy. 
 
 H 
 
9 8 Categories 
 
 Practical analysis means cutting a thing to pieces 
 or dissolving it, and this has a certain value because 
 it multiplies objects. But it does not increase our 
 knowledge of the first thing. On the contrary, by 
 destroying a thing we render a knowledge of it im- 
 possible. The analysis which gives knowledge is 
 Metaphysical Abstraction an attention concentrated 
 on the parts of a thing without destroying their con- 
 nection with the other inherent parts. The meta- 
 physical elements may be quite different from the 
 mechanically divisible parts. They are generally a 
 species of things which could not exist alone, such 
 as red, blue, straight, curved, square, round, acid, 
 sweet, insipid, fragrant, sharp, hot, heavy, dull, loud, 
 bright, and a multitude of properties of that abstract 
 kind. 
 
 For many of these at least for the description of 
 them a comparison of two or more things is essential. 
 A sound is heard to be loud by comparison with 
 another which is low or soft ; a knife is known to be 
 blunt by experience of another more sharp, or the 
 same knife in a sharper condition. But comparison 
 does not alter the essential character of abstract 
 attention it serves merely as an incitement to it. 
 Difference between qualities otherwise alike whets 
 our attention to a finer discrimination. 
 
 The properties recognised by each sense are easily 
 distinguished in the bulk from those of another sense. 
 
Inherence 99 
 
 Colour is distinct from Figure in a more marked 
 degree than red from blue or square from circular. 
 Fine degrees of Sound maybe difficult to discriminate, 
 but not the difference between a sound and a smell 
 or a taste. 
 
 Still broader contrasts give rise to an artificial but 
 sometimes useful kind of attribution the negative. 
 When we do not know much concerning the positive 
 characteristics of a thing, it is something to know 
 that it has not this or that property. What Thought 
 is, positively, few people know, but they are able to 
 say (with a little prompting) that it is un-extended, 
 im-material, im-ponderable, and so forth. This com- 
 parison re-acts on the thing better known, and so we 
 call visual objects c extended ' from their dissimilarity 
 to thoughts. But for that there would have been no 
 occasion to notice the abstract extension of visual 
 objects. The term * visual object ' would have tacitly 
 included extension. There must be great and general 
 ignorance of a thing to excuse the negative attribu- 
 tion : it is not allowable to speak of plants as non- 
 metals, or sheep as non-horses, but a large class of 
 animals is called in-vertebrate. In this case the 
 negative property serves to bar a possible inference 
 that all animals are vertebrate, since those we know 
 best are so. 
 
 The judgment in this category is a consciousness 
 of the attributes making up a thing, or so much of it 
 
 H 2, 
 
ioo Categories 
 
 as interests us. ' Cleopatra's Needle is an obelisk 
 of granite, about sixty-eight feet high, and is carved 
 with hieroglyphics.' If we go on to say that it 
 stands on the Thames Embankment, we shift into 
 the category of association. The relation of an 
 object to its place is different from that of one in- 
 herent attribute of the object to another, or to the 
 whole. 
 
 The properties of a general idea are defined in this 
 category. The synthesis is natural or noumenal, the 
 artificiality of the idea consisting merely in the 
 omission of some of the concrete properties. ' Garden 
 rhubarb [in general] has broadly cordate leaves, 
 strongly veined beneath ; the footstalks are long, 
 thick, and fleshy, with a channel above ; its growth 
 is exceedingly rapid.' These are properties inherent 
 in a unity not of our making. The botanist changes 
 into the category of sequence when he says, ' the 
 stalks are used for tarts and made into jam.' 
 
 In a complicated object or general idea some of 
 the judgments we treat as inherent may be inferences 
 in other categories used subordinately. ' The ancient 
 Persians had remarkably thin and weak skulls. They 
 were good horsemen and archers, courageous and 
 spirited in battle. They wore a tunic and trousers 
 of leather . . . They were quick and lively, keen- 
 witted, capable of repartee, ingenious, and for 
 Orientals far-sighted. They had fancy and imagina- 
 
Inherence 101 
 
 tion, a relish for poetry and art, and they were not 
 without a certain power of political combination.' 
 Some of these properties might have been perceived 
 objectively, but not the possession of fancy and 
 imagination, which could only be known by inference 
 in causation here used to complete a coherent unity. 
 T e historian employs causation as a principal cate- 
 gory when he tells us that ' their bards did not 
 touch the chords which rouse what is noblest and 
 highest in our nature.' The thought implied in 
 touching chords the notion of will directing action 
 is a different judgment from the perception of an 
 inherent permanent attribute. 
 
 The argument in this category consists in ideally 
 completing an imperfect object by comparison with 
 a similar object, or the idea of a similar object. 
 Suppose we have studied thoroughly one or more 
 rhubarb plants, and then see a plant with broadly 
 cordate leaves, footstalks long, thick, and fleshy, and 
 having a channel above. In the time at our disposal 
 we cannot ascertain if its growth is exceedingly rapid, 
 but we are justified in inferring that it is, and that 
 the plant we are examining is in all other respects 
 rhubarb. If the Egyptian obelisks we have seen 
 were sculptured with hieroglyphics throughout their 
 length, and we see an obelisk part of which is under- 
 ground, it is a rational inference that that part also 
 is sculptured. 
 
102, Categories 
 
 We have proved that certain samples of aluminium 
 have a specific gravity of 2-6, and then see a metal 
 of specific gravity unknown which has all the other 
 properties of aluminium : we may confidently infer 
 that this metal also would, if tested, show a specific 
 gravity of 2-6. 
 
 For purposes of reason it may be necessary to 
 compare things that cannot be brought physically 
 together. When this happens we generally compare 
 them in idea, or the idea of one with the other as 
 object. When great accuracy is required and the idea 
 which is always rather vague cannot be relied on, 
 we have recourse to mediate comparison. Standards 
 are employed. These are manageable or portable 
 objects with which principal things are separately 
 compared by way of effecting indirectly a comparison 
 between them. Standards can only mediate com- 
 parisons between abstract properties, for if they con- 
 tained all the concrete properties of the compared 
 objects they would, by supposition, be as unmanage- 
 able as the latter. We have standards for length in 
 rules, scales, tapes, chains ; the balance is a standard 
 for weight. There are also scales for pitch of sound, 
 varieties of colour, degree of light, heat, atmospheric 
 pressure, and probably some others for special pur- 
 poses. 
 
 Indirect comparison is not in itself inference ; or 
 if inference it is subordinate and preparatory to some 
 
Association 103 
 
 more important conclusion. A coin is weighed and 
 concluded to be light, but this is only a datum in 
 determining the more important question whether it 
 is a forged coin or not. 
 
 XXIII ASSOCIATION 
 
 IN this category we widen the attention so as to 
 include several objects in one act of perception. 
 
 The first result of this diffusion of attention is 
 to lessen the brilliancy of objects. Our attention is a 
 light which is intensified when narrowed and concen- 
 trated enfeebled when dispersed over several objects. 
 The observation of a group amounts practically to 
 observing the objects in rapid succession. At a 
 given moment we perceive only one thing well, or 
 it may be only a small part of a thing, but we have 
 a dull sense of other things adjacent, which we have 
 just seen and may immediately see again in any order 
 we please. That is 'all that is meant by perception of 
 a group. 
 
 To distinguish this category properly from the next 
 we must consider the group of objects as divested of 
 depth or distance outwards. It is to be regarded as 
 
io4 Categories 
 
 a flat surface standing a few feet from us, the objects 
 in it having absolutely the dimensions they appear to 
 have. This is in fact their real magnitude, for the 
 supposed real magnitude is a matter of theory, and 
 means the perceptual magnitude taken under certain 
 conditions of observation. The real magnitude is 
 constantly changing, so for practical convenience in 
 determining size, etc., we refer all objects to one con- 
 dition of observation that in which they can be 
 touched as well as seen. 
 
 In metaphysic we are not obliged to recognise this 
 convention. If an object a mile off appears to be an 
 inch high, it is an inch high as really as if it were in 
 a photograph or picture and materially represented of 
 that height. The mystery of the change of size in 
 objects is not explained or reasoned away by any 
 device for overcoming some of its practical incon- 
 veniences. It depends on the degree of energy with 
 which minds affect each other. 
 
 A group has properties which an object has not ; 
 or, if this be not strictly the case, we may say that the 
 properties we look for in a group are not those we dis- 
 tinguish in a single object. The special properties of 
 a group are positions. It is unnecessary to say ' rela- 
 tive ' positions, for position cannot be otherwise than 
 relative. Position cannot be defined by reference to 
 anything more simple. What is meant is intuitively 
 known to everybody. But let us take a concrete ex- 
 
Association 105 
 
 ample a man with a horse and cart standing on a 
 bridge. Each object in this group has a position 
 towards the other objects. The bridge is over the 
 river and under the cart ; the cart is upon the bridge 
 and behind the horse ; the man is in the cart ; the 
 horse is before and outside of the cart, it is near one 
 end of the bridge, far from the other, and between the 
 two extremities. These are the principal positions in 
 a natural group or association, by which is meant the 
 objects we can see (or are supposed to see) simul- 
 taneously, and whose mutual positions we are con- 
 sidering. 
 
 The use of observing positions is the same as that 
 which moves us to all rational study, namely, its value 
 in prediction. We can reason from one object to 
 another in a group just as we reason from one pro- 
 perty to another in an object. 
 
 Suppose our perception of a landscape is inter- 
 rupted for a moment, and when we next endeavour to 
 perceive it we find we only perceive a portion of it, 
 the rest being ' hidden ' by an intervening object. 
 As far as we are concerned the hidden part has been 
 annihilated. We only remember what was there. But 
 this recollection is also a preconception of what we 
 may be able to cause to appear again, either by re- 
 moving the obstructing object, by waiting till it has 
 been removed, or by walking round and standing be- 
 tween it and the landscape. 
 
ic6 Categories 
 
 If this be too close to mere recollection, we have 
 pure reasoning when from the general appearance of 
 a group we imagine generally some concealed part of 
 it not before seen. A procession of people dressed in 
 mourning is usually accompanied by a hearse : from 
 perceiving the people only on a certain occasion we 
 predict the hearse. The sound of a steam-whistle 
 enables us to imagine a train in a certain locality, 
 though fog or other obstruction may prevent our 
 seeing it. The scent of flowers prepares us for finding 
 them somewhere near us. From smoke we predict 
 the nearness of a chimney. The trail of an animal 
 is a clue to his position. 
 
 The judgment in this category is therefore a con- 
 sciousness of position, such as those mentioned above. 
 The argument is a completion of one association by 
 comparison with another the expectation of simi- 
 larity in groups. 
 
 Movement. All judgments as to change of position 
 in objects come under this category. It takes at least 
 two things arranged in a group to produce the per- 
 ception of movement. If there were but one thing in 
 our field of observation we could not say whether it 
 moved or not, for there would be nothing which it 
 would pass, or leave, or approach. It would appear 
 to stand still. There is, however, more in movement 
 than depends on mere perception. 
 
 All movement is due to energy either in the ob- 
 
Association 107 
 
 server or in the other mind acting upon his. Energy 
 is not a generalisation of moving things, nor a pro- 
 perty, nor a relation, though all these may be signs 
 of energy. The most abstract idea of movement is 
 Motion. It may be denned as a series of positions. 
 
 Number. If we treat a group as a large loose 
 object we shall perceive in it certain properties not 
 strictly positional. Number is one of these. 
 
 A group of three coins has not the same practical 
 value as a group of six or sixty, and we are thus 
 obliged to notice the difference and distinguish degrees 
 of this property by names hence Arithmetic. 
 
 Flat Space or space of two dimensions is another 
 property of a group. Grouped objects have frequently 
 intervals between them. Such intervals are negations 
 of perception interruptions or discontinuities of ex- 
 perience. But by abstraction we can reduce the 
 objects bounding an interval to a geometrical line, 
 and so give a sort of positive existence to the in- 
 terval. Thus we talk of a hole or of darkness as 
 if they were true objects, and measure them by 
 standards of length. 
 
 If we abstract the boundary lines from a space we 
 get the idea ' intervalness,' which is the right name 
 for two-dimensioned space. This abstract idea is 
 nearly the same as abstract size. Space is interval 
 without bounds size is object without contents. 
 Space and size are equally nothing intrinsically or in 
 
ic8 Categories 
 
 their own right, but they have been reached by dif- 
 ferent modes of refining away the positive qualities 
 associated with them, and this difference of origin 
 is slightly suggested by their names. Spaces have a 
 use in perception similar to rests in music they re- 
 lieve the attention and give contrast and vigour to the 
 next positive object 
 
 XXIV PERSPECTION 
 
 THIS is the first of the artificial categories. It is an 
 ideal treatment of an associated group to facilitate a 
 certain kind of reasoning. 
 
 Reason let me repeat is the imaginary extension 
 of gxperieage bycomparison with more complete ex- 
 perience of a similar kind. By reasomrtg^-m inherence 
 we complete single objects ; by inference in associa- 
 tion we complete groups. These two categories 
 demonstrate that a natural group consists of fragments 
 of objects, and fragments of other natural groups 
 which are possible but not yet developed. A hill is 
 partly concealed by a house, the house partly con- 
 cealed by a tree, the tree by a stone fence, the fence 
 by a growth of ivy. A river disappears at a curve and 
 is lost to view ; we know from experience of other 
 
Perspection 109 
 
 rivers that under certain conditions we might perceive 
 the river further on as a feature in several more land- 
 scapes. As we gaze at an association of objects these 
 possible completions occur to us not fully or definitely 
 but sufficiently to convince us that the group might be 
 developed into many other groups, and into a multi- 
 tude of objects of forms different from those we 
 actually perceive. By our hypothesis the observer 
 has always been stationary, the objects have moved to 
 and fro but not from near to far. Their real dimen- 
 sions have remained unaltered, and nothing has 
 occurred to suggest that they ever appear of other 
 dimensions. In short we are gazing on a piece of 
 stage-scenery. 
 
 But there is another element in perception. We 
 and all other real (mental) beings are part of the cosmic 
 force. We are co-creators of what we perceive limited 
 gods, not machine-men as the scientific people would 
 have us believe. But for our power of affecting each 
 other and our readiness to receive impressions from 
 other minds, there would be no perception no material 
 objects. We (that is, all sentient beings) could, by 
 unanimous resolution, annul the material creation 
 blot out the universe of objective things in a moment. 
 United to and implied in this general power is the 
 particular power of modifying our world without 
 destroying it. We can redistribute the active and 
 passive forces so as to produce other perceptual 
 
no Categories 
 
 effects than those present at a given moment. And 
 we habitually do this to some extent. Within a 
 limited scope our world is plastic as dough, and we 
 knead it to any form we please. For example, we 
 exert energy to change our place, and immediately 
 the group before us breaks up and undergoes meta- 
 morphosis. Some objects disappear altogether, and 
 entirely new objects present themselves. Some be- 
 come smaller, others larger ; some fractional forms fill 
 out to completion, some integers undergo curtailment, 
 others separate into several distinct objects. In a 
 few minutes the first group has dissolved into a 
 second, which may merge into a third, and so on 
 indefinitely. 
 
 In contemplating these phenomena we discern a 
 third form of completeness and incompleteness, dis- 
 tinct from those that enter into inherence and asso- 
 ciation. Hence a new type of reasoning another 
 category : the Perspective. 
 
 It will be convenient to suppose that the modifica- 
 tions to which it refers are solely due to the observing 
 mind, as the most conspicuous and comprehensive 
 really are, but some of the minor perspective changes 
 are due to the noumenon of the object. 
 
 We have first to get a criterion of perspective per- 
 fection. What this shall be is to some extent a matter 
 of convention. The standard I shall adopt is, that an 
 object of a nature to be perceptible to all the senses 
 
Perspection ni 
 
 would be most perfect if within reach of touch. If it 
 can be heard it is then heard at its loudest this is 
 correct enough for our purpose, if it can be seen it 
 is then seen at its largest and brightest. This is Per- 
 spective Completeness at the Tactual Range. It 
 means the closest contact of noumenon and subject, 
 compatible with clear definition in perception. 
 
 Now let us exert energy and disarrange a group. 
 Those things that were or might have been tangible 
 in the former position, are no longer so, but they may 
 still be seen, heard, or even smelt. The bright colours 
 have however somewhat faded, the size has shrunk, 
 some of the details are lost. Here is a lapse from 
 perspective completeness. It is indicated, not as in 
 the first two categories by mechanical cutting away of 
 mass and circumstance, but by deterioration all over 
 the object. We seem to be thrown out of focus in 
 relation to it, and the perspective degradation may 
 increase until the object has dwindled to a speck and 
 finally disappears altogether. 
 
 The judgment in this category consists in observing 
 the kind and degree of degradation to which things 
 are liable in perspection. In addition to change in 
 size, brightness, detail and loudness, which have been 
 already mentioned, occultation as in the second 
 category can be used as an indirect datum. An 
 object which eclipses another is invariably more 
 perfect perspectively than the object eclipsed. The 
 
Categories 
 
 motion of objects has also to be taken into account. 
 As objects degrade their movements slacken, and 
 recover power as the objects are restored. 
 
 By attending to all these indications and checking 
 each by the rest, we have the elements of a fairly 
 accurate inference as to comparative perspective 
 condition. We have constant practice in this sort 
 of thought with frequent opportunities of verifying 
 our conclusions ; penalties are annexed to failure and 
 rewards to success. It is no wonder then that in 
 the course of years we become expert in judging of 
 perspective condition, so that when confronted with 
 a natural group we can estimate almost instantly the 
 degree in which each object falls short of perspective 
 integrity. 
 
 The result of this practice is that on perceiving a 
 natural group of many objects, we graduate them 
 according to the perspective deterioration which each 
 exhibits, and for greater precision we figure the per- 
 spective difference as an interval between the objects 
 an imaginary interval modelled on the true interval 
 of association. The object on a distant horizon is 
 visually as near as the ground we can touch by 
 stooping, but in this imaginary group the former is 
 placed at the far end of the line and the latter at 
 the near end, and between them are ranged the other 
 objects each at a point corresponding to what we 
 suppose to be its perspective distance. That is how 
 
Perspection 113 
 
 a landscape acquires depth. Space outwards is an 
 ideal imitation of real lateral interval. It is the mea- 
 sure and expression of perspective defacement. 
 
 From what has been said it follows that the near 
 objects will be relatively large, clear, and lively in 
 motion, while the far will be small, dull, and slow, 
 but this rule is liable to many exceptions which can 
 only be learnt by experience. 
 
 On the analogy of the other forms of inference 
 which consist in completing imperfect things by 
 reference to others more perfect the essence of an 
 argument in perspection is the power to imagine an 
 object which is perspectively defective, brought up 
 to the tactual range and displaying all the qualities 
 it would possess in that position. This is done by 
 comparing it with the idea of the same or a similar 
 object experienced at the tactual range ; and is done 
 for an ulterior purpose, like all other intellectual 
 operations. A great part of our material happiness 
 consists in the exercise of the short senses (taste, 
 touch and smell), and the chief use of perspective 
 reasoning is to enable us to judge of the energy 
 required to bring a distant object near for close 
 perception. We have therefore to observe our energic 
 fluctuations in conjunction with perspective change, 
 if we would extract the utmost practical benefit from 
 this category. The perspective inferences are none 
 the less useful after we discover that they are not 
 
ii4 Categories 
 
 intuitions, and that the completeness we imaginatively 
 assign to distant objects has no existence until we 
 exert the corresponding energy. 
 
 A landscape being rendered perspective we can 
 determine the perspective state of any new object 
 that may enter it, by reference to the objects adjoin- 
 ing it, and this though the object be of a species 
 quite unknown to us and which therefore, by itself, 
 would afford no clue to its perspective distance. 
 
 The imaginary interval we place between objects 
 of different perspective effacement, can be expressed 
 in terms of exact lateral measurement. This is done 
 by developing and measuring the associative groups 
 represented in the perspective group. Supposing we 
 wish to get an exact definition of the perspective 
 condition of a mountain relative to a certain station, 
 we can, from that station, develop all the natural 
 groups up to the mountain (walk over the ground) 
 and measure the lateral intervals and masses dis- 
 closed. The total measurements will be a definition 
 of the mountain's perspective distance in terms of 
 true associative distance. That is what we mean 
 by saying a mountain is ten miles off. It is not 
 really ten miles off it is not an inch off. But to 
 render it tactual ly perfect we should have to expend 
 an amount of energy equal to 17,600 times the energ 
 required to move from one associative object to 
 another a yard apart from it laterally. If we prac- 
 
Perspection 115 
 
 tise the mileage scale in conjunction with the per- 
 spective indications, we may acquire the art of 
 expressing in miles, though not measured, the dis- 
 tance of objects estimated from purely perspective 
 data, but few can do this with any near approach to 
 exactness 1 . 
 
 The 'realistic three-dimensioned space is a com- 
 bination of the true interval of association and the 
 false interval of perspection. This generates an idea 
 resembling the capacity or vacancy in a room or 
 vessel, and thus it is supposed that objects occupy 
 a sort of universal room without walls, floor, or ceiling. 
 It is however the enclosing objects which make a 
 room, .and when they are abstracted there remains 
 nothing. The universal room is therefore nothing 
 a myth. It is a useful working theory for common 
 purposes, but in philosophy it is superfluous and 
 obstructive. 
 
 1 When the perspective object is accurately measured by instrument 
 at a known distance from the eye, and the tactual size of the object is 
 also known, the associative distance can be calculated by simple pro- 
 portion. Multiply the measuring distance by the tactual size and divide 
 the product by the perspective size the quotient is the distance. The 
 perspective size of objects is greatly exaggerated in realism. Most 
 people think they see a man at his full stature for a distance of fifty 
 yards or so. At that distance the tallest man does not measure half an 
 inch in height. At twenty feet a six-foot man measures 3-6 inches at 
 ten feet 7-2 inches. The people assembled in a room forty feet long 
 range in real perspective height from seven inches to two inches. 
 When a man is nearer than ten feet we do not perceive him in one 
 operation we observe him in parts which we put together in the mind. 
 
 I 2 
 
n6 Categories 
 
 In the definitions of geometry no difference is made 
 between the depth of a landscape and the ' third 
 dimension ' of any small cubic object. They are 
 both called 'third dimension' or 'cubic dimension.' 
 Yet they are inferences of different categories, and 
 neither is real. The former, as we have just seen, 
 is the imagined redintegration of objects perspectively 
 shrunk and defaced. The latter is the imaginary 
 completion of a thing having many surfaces or facets, 
 only one of which can be shown at a time. 
 
 Sky Perspection. The effect produced on our mind 
 by the observation of celestial objects, reveals at once 
 the artificiality of cubic space. Clouds in their form 
 and movements are somewhat like earthly things 
 vapour or mountains, and so we conceive them par- 
 tially graduated in distance and floating in a concavity. 
 But whether they are a mile off, or twenty miles off, 
 few of us can tell. 
 
 When we contemplate the sun, moon and stars, our 
 realism is completely at fault. These we cannot 
 modify at will, and they move too slowly and present 
 too uniform an aspect to cause the perspective effect. 
 Since we have never seen them at the tactual range 
 we know not to what degree they are perspectively 
 incomplete ; hence they appear without relative dis- 
 tance distance being simply a metaphor of perspec- 
 tive effacement. If 'cubic space' is real, let the realists 
 tell us why we do not see it in the sky why we do 
 
Perspection 117 
 
 not arrange the stars behind each other according 
 to their calculated distances. This question is un- 
 answerable realistically, but idealistically it presents 
 no difficulty. The sky is not spaced, because the 
 conditions are wanting under which the illusion of 
 terrestrial space is formed in the intellect. 
 
 By close instrumental attention to the moon and 
 planets a slight parallax is observable, and on the 
 analogy of terrestrial parallax astronomers are able 
 to calculate what they call the distance of these bodies. 
 Perhaps their calculations are right, but the magni- 
 tudes are not conceivable as associative distance, 
 being so much greater than we have any experience 
 of. We take them to mean that the heavenly bodies 
 are extremely degraded, perspectively speaking. Their 
 noumena are in contact with our minds, for this is 
 essential to perception, but if astronomical calculations 
 are correct the contact is infinitely slight, compared 
 with what it would be, supposing to speak realisti- 
 cally we could go to the stars or they could be 
 brought to us. 
 
 Berkeley's Theory of Vision and Dialogues are 
 occupied with the analysis of perspection. The argu- 
 ments he uses to show that distance outwards is not 
 real are in the main those given in this section. 
 
ITS Categories 
 
 XXV CONCRETION 
 
 I F we take a cricket-ball in the hand and turn 
 it round we shall perceive a series of discs. Only 
 one of these can be seen at a time, but if we perceive 
 and remember the whole series we shall be able to 
 infer all from the perception of one in a similar object. 
 The same occurs with other cubical or solid objects. 
 This is a form of ideal construction different from 
 any we have yet considered. It differs from in- 
 herence in that the object which we conceptually 
 put together is never objectively perceived as a whole. 
 It is an imaginary whole constructed in the intellect 
 out of fragmentary experience. It differs from asso- 
 ciation on the same grounds ; the latter can be all 
 perceived at once in forming the judgment. It differs 
 from perspection in that the imperfection of experi- 
 ence is due to curtailment, not to general deteriora- 
 tion. What we actually see may be perspectively 
 perfect. It differs also from the next category in 
 that the series of perceptions can occur in various 
 orders of succession. 
 
 The ' backs ' of Things. We talk of the back of 
 a thing, but nobody has ever seen a back. Things 
 
Concretion 119 
 
 have no backs in the popular sense of the word. 
 When we turn round a back to perceive it, it is then 
 a front. Everything is a flat upright surface, and 
 its appearance of solidity can be imitated on a surface 
 known to be flat, and with nearly the same illusive 
 completeness as in the original object. In turning 
 things round we merely change the surface ; we are 
 exercising our power to alter primary consciousness. 
 
 When two persons perceive the ' same ' object from 
 contrary directions, the sameness means that the two 
 objects proceed from the same cause, or can be 
 reduced to the same general idea. But the objects 
 are numerically distinct. By a similar turn of speech 
 we say that A and a are the same letter , but they are 
 evidently distinct and dissimilar objects. If we hold 
 a thing before a mirror and see what is termed its 
 back, we produce a new object resembling the first 
 in some respects but without its resistance. 
 
 Resistance is a negative term signifying the limit 
 of our power to alter primary experience. Where our 
 power ceases resistance is said to begin, and we meet 
 with resistance when we apply a power inadequate to 
 the desired effect. 
 
 Dr. Johnson's solitary experiment in idealistic 
 philosophy has been often related. He struck a 
 post, and because it did not disappear he thought 
 he had disproved Berkeley's statement that material 
 objects exist only in the perceiving mind. The 
 
1 20 Categories 
 
 experiment merely showed that all means are not 
 adequate to change all primary experience. Had he 
 shut his eyes, or turned a corner, or occupied his 
 attention with other matters, the post would have 
 vanished. He chose improper means and therefore 
 met with 'resistance.' No idealist believes we can 
 change our primary experience by any capricious 
 and frivolous means 1 . 
 
 1 Probably Dr Johnson meant to be humorous in his way. The 
 principles of Idealism are apt to excite mirth in the unphilosophical, 
 but the laugh is not always on the side of the scoffer. A member of the 
 Persian philosophical sect called Samradians once said to. his steward : 
 ' The world and its inhabitants have no actual existence ; they have 
 merely an ideal being.' The servant on hearing this took the first 
 favourable opportunity to conceal his master's horse, and when he was 
 about to ride brought him an ass with the horse's saddle. When the 
 Samradian asked, ' Where is the horse ? ' the servant replied, ' Thou 
 hast been thinking of an idea ; there was no horse in being.' The 
 master answered, ' It is true ' ; he then mounted the ass, and after riding 
 for some time he suddenly dismounted and taking the saddle off the 
 ass's back placed it on the servant's, drawing the girths tightly ; and 
 having forced the bridle into his mouth, he mounted him and flogged 
 him along vigorously. The servant in piteous accents exclaimed, ' What 
 is the meaning of this treatment ? ' to which the Samradian replied, 
 ' There is no such thing as a whip ; it is merely ideal ; thou art only 
 thinking of some illusion.' After which the steward repented and re- 
 stored the horse. 
 
 Another Samradian or perhaps the same individual having married 
 the daughter of a rich man, she, on finding out her husband's creed, 
 proposed to have some amusement at his expense. One day the Sam- 
 radian brought in a bottle of pure wine, which during his absence she 
 emptied of its contents and filled with water. When the time for taking 
 wine arrived she poured out water instead of wine, into a gold cup 
 which was her own property. The Samradian having observed, ' Thou 
 hast given me water instead of wine,' she answered, ' It is only ideal ; 
 
Concretion 121 
 
 Geographical Concretion. The knowledge of large 
 geographical areas is an artificial construction without 
 objective reality. 
 
 Our experience is, literally and exactly, a series or 
 sequence a flux or stream. It is composed of objects 
 or of groups, according to the width of our attention. 
 If we travel over a large tract of country the ex- 
 perience is a train of objects or views, which follow 
 each other continuously but for interruptions in atten- 
 tion. If we were bound to think of things in the 
 order in which they were experienced, we should have 
 to imagine our topographical consciousness as a long 
 ribbon of views, like the pictures of a panorama. 
 Supposing we travelled hither and thither over one 
 county, it would appear to us as a straight strip of 
 land which might be several hundred miles long. If 
 we again traversed the ground, but in another order, 
 we should have another strip resembling the first, 
 but also differing from it, and it would be necessary 
 to keep the two from being confused in our mind. 
 If several persons traversed the same ground but in 
 divers directions, they would each retain a different 
 
 there was no wine in existence.' The husband then said, ' Thou .hast 
 spoken well ; hand me the cup that I may go to a neighbour's house 
 and bring it back full of wine.' He thereupon took out the gold cup, 
 which he sold, and instead of it brought back an earthen vessel full of 
 wine. The wife on seeing this said, ' What hast thou done with the 
 golden cup ? ' He replied, ' Thou art surely thinking of some ideal 
 golden cup ' on which the woman greatly regretted her witticism. 
 Dabistiin, v. i. p. 199-200. 
 
122 Categories 
 
 recollection of it, and it would be extremely hard 
 for any two of them to agree as to the order in 
 succession of any portion of the ground traversed. 
 
 Our experience of the natural group suggests a 
 mode of treating our geographical experience which 
 overcomes many of these inconveniences. We find 
 that we can traverse (either bodily or by the eye) 
 a single landscape in a thousand directions, and 
 retain a memory of it without any reference to these 
 directions. What we remember is the mutual posi- 
 tions of the objects, not the order in which they were 
 observed. As this greatly facilitates the memory of 
 one group, we apply the same principle of synthesis 
 to the succession of groups composing our geo- 
 graphical experience. We dismiss from our minds 
 the order of observation, and construct instead an 
 imaginary group of associated objects or places 
 having mutual positions. It is imaginary, for no one 
 has ever seen as a co-existent synthesis the objects of 
 a county, not to speak of a country or continent. 
 Substituting for memory of succession, a memory of 
 position, there grows up in our mind a large co- 
 existent image of a country on the model of a single 
 group, which affords all the advantages as regards 
 economy of energy which we enjoy by virtue of 
 comprehending a natural group in one act of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 Take an instance of this economy. Suppose a man 
 
Concretion 1 23 
 
 travelled from London to Oxford, then to Exeter, 
 then to Portsmouth, then to Brighton, and afterwards 
 desired to return to London. If he, acting on a 
 mistaken conception of truth and disdaining in- 
 struction from others, persisted in remembering the 
 objects perceived on his journey as what they no 
 doubt literally were a continuous series, he would be 
 unable to imagine any way of returning to London 
 except by reversing the order of his journey. If on 
 the other hand he carried in his mind an image of the 
 ground in question, with the mutual position of the 
 places, it would enable him to foresee that London 
 was to be reached by journeying northward from 
 Brighton, in far less time and at far less cost than by 
 returning the way he came. Thus does conceptual 
 position, when it is correctly imagined, prove its 
 superiority to the order of experience. And we say 
 that the ideal picture is truer than the crude memory, 
 not that it is really so if natural order is a test of 
 truth, but because it is the least onerous, which is our 
 practical standard of truth. The only object of 
 knowledge being the wise management of energy, 
 that sort of knowledge must be considered truest that 
 enables us to have the feelings we desire at the least 
 cost. In one sense truth means the quickest and 
 easiest way of passing from one state of consciousness 
 to another preconceived state. 
 
 It may be objected to the above example as a valid 
 
 O- 
 
 A **-:*- 
 
J 24 Categories 
 
 deduction from an imaginary synthesis, that the 
 relation of London to Brighton is now a certainty, 
 whereas an inference can be no more than a prob- 
 ability. The reply is, that if a man has already 
 traversed the route in question, it is to him an actual 
 experience and his idea of it is ever afterwards a 
 memory, not an inference. But until it is actually 
 perceived it must be imaginary, and therefore slightly 
 problematical. Although a man is convinced that 
 others are not deceiving him in saying a place is to 
 be reached in a certain way, he cannot be absolutely 
 sure that he fully understands the directions given, 
 in other words, that his image of the route cor- 
 responds to their perception of it. There probably 
 never is exact similarity between one man's primary 
 experience and another man's idea of it. It may even 
 be doubted whether there is ever exact similarity 
 between a man's own primary experience and his 
 subsequent idea of it. 
 
 The geographical synthesis is founded on actual 
 exploration supplemented by inference. The mutual 
 position of some important places are determined and 
 serve as precedents for a multitude of minor posi- 
 tional deductions. A is twenty miles north of London, 
 B is ten miles south of London, hence A is thirty 
 miles north of B. The mileage is determined by 
 imagining the synthesis developed into natural groups 
 and measured laterally. Other scales are the time 
 
Concretion 1 25 
 
 spent in travelling between the places, or the money 
 it costs, or the distance delineated on a map. 
 
 Though the geographical concretion may be 
 modelled on the association, we cannot treat it 
 perspectively, for the places being purely ideal (except 
 the one we are at), the ideal image is not liable to 
 deterioration by weakened perception. It may suffer 
 degradation by forgetfulness, but that has nothing to 
 do with perspection. 
 
 Sphericity of the Earth. The geographical syn- 
 thesis is not always formed on the pattern of a natural 
 association. That is the first and most obvious shape 
 to give it, and for thousands of years it appears to 
 have answered the topographical needs of mankind. 
 But as exploration extended it was found that the 
 associative theory did not in some cases afford true 
 preconception. If we travel far enough in any fixed 
 direction we shall return to the point from which we 
 started. This could not have been predicted from a 
 synthesis formed on the model of a landscape. Such 
 a return however takes place in the objects de- 
 nominated spheres, and so the spherical instead of the 
 flat form has been conceptually given to the geo- 
 graphical concretion. That is all that is meant by 
 saying that the world is round. There is no world, 
 as the mystical realist projecting outwards his mental 
 synthesis imagines. There is only a scheme of 
 spherical positions in the intellect, which facilitates 
 
J26 Categories 
 
 the recollection of places and enables us to foresee 
 the shortest and easiest way of reaching i. e. ex- 
 periencing places. The concretion is true inasmuch 
 as the prediction is found to coincide with real ex- 
 perience. But that by no means implies that the 
 places exist except when perceived in minds. 
 
 XXVI SEQUENCE 
 
 SEQUENCE is a series most resembling a procession 
 of objects in a natural group (second category). It 
 differs therefrom in that the objects cannot be seen 
 together. It differs from concretion in that the order 
 in which the objects appear cannot be altered, or if 
 they are human and alterable we cease to treat them 
 as a sequence. They no longer have the predictive 
 value which moves us to form artificial groups of 
 objects. 
 
 Satisfactory examples of reasoning in sequence are 
 less numerous than might be supposed. It is a poor 
 category for argument. Series either occur with per- 
 fect regularity, like the seasons of the year, phases of 
 the moon, &c., and then they rapidly become mere 
 recollections and lose the problematical character 
 essential to a true inference, or the connection be- 
 
Sequence 127 
 
 tween the objects is too casual for argumentative 
 purposes. Darwin's theory of the formation of coral 
 atolls is a fine argument in sequence, but the appli- 
 cation of this theory to reefs not examined by him 
 is hardly uncertain enough to be an argument. It 
 is the first sequential inference that is valid the rest 
 are foregone conclusions. 
 
 Geology supplies some good sequences. It has been 
 noticed, for instance, that the sea leaves ripple-marks 
 on sandy beaches, and stones with similar marks have 
 been found at a distance from the sea ; it is a valid 
 sequential inference that the marks in the latter case 
 have also been formed by the action of the waves. 
 Here the difference in locality between the two com- 
 pared series the modern complete and the ancient 
 incomplete supplies that slight element of doubt 
 essential to an argument. 
 
 So as regards the mode of making ancient flint 
 tools : it has been found that tools exactly similar to 
 the ancient can now be made with the simplest possible 
 means, and it is a true argument to infer that the 
 ancient implements were made by these means. The 
 conclusion is highly probable without being infallibly 
 certain, and that is what a dialectical conclusion ought 
 to be. 
 
 We may admit that some of the astronomical 
 sequences are forms of reasoning, for they were such 
 to their first discoverers, and to minds not thoroughly 
 
Categories 
 
 conversant with them they are still in the nature of 
 predictions that might fail of accomplishment. Poli- 
 tical, financial, and sporting forecasts are sequential 
 arguments, and we may also include speculations on 
 the future states of all growing organisms and 
 developing institutions. 
 
 Time. The intervals between the objects of a 
 sequence are imagined after the model of lateral 
 intervals in association. This is Time. Like space 
 it is mere blanks in experience, though treated by 
 realists as external and self-subsisting. It can be 
 measured by reference to objects on whose sequential 
 recurrence we have the most reliance, such as the 
 phases of the moon, the positions of the sun in the 
 ecliptic, the movements of the hands of a clock or 
 the chiming of its bells. Abstract or unbounded 
 time is called 'eternity'; like abstract space it is a 
 refined form of nothing. Time and space are usually 
 coupled together as if co-ordinate, but eternity is the 
 co-ordinate of space. Time is divided sequence and 
 would correspond to materially divided space, that is, 
 space with objects in it at regular intervals. 
 
 Matter, space, and time are the three pillars of the 
 realistic world. We have now seen what they are 
 made of. Matter is a general idea compiled by our- 
 selves from phenomenal consciousness. It is no 
 substance only an average. Space has even less 
 reality. It is first the interval between two objects in 
 
Sequence 129 
 
 association ; then this interval is used metaphorically 
 as an expression and measure of perspective deca- 
 dence. Time is an application of the same associative 
 interval to express the blanks between objects in 
 sequence. Space and time are thus pure nullities 
 negatives with positive names. These three notions 
 being exploded as entities, there remain as a residuum 
 of true fact and the starting-point of philosophy 
 minds ) their energies^ and their consciousness. This is 
 a very ancient triad. 
 
 Science constantly confounds sequence and causa- 
 tion. We are told that the moon causes eclipses 
 of the sun, that heat causes objects to expand, that 
 a seal causes an imprint. This is a metaphor from 
 human causation, and the expression is now so rooted 
 in language that it would hardly be possible to in- 
 troduce a more correct phraseology. Yet it is as 
 incorrect as to say that one o'clock causes two o'clock, 
 or that daylight causes darkness. The confusion has 
 arisen from the fact that both sequence and causa- 
 tion deal with fixed inconvertible series, but only in 
 the latter is there real power exerted to produce the 
 effect. Material things and their apparent effects are 
 due to a cause lying behind both. 
 
 K 
 
130 Categories 
 
 XXVII CAUSATION 
 
 CAUSATION differs from all other categories in that 
 one of its elements is mental. It is a series beginning 
 in the mind in this relation denominated cause and 
 developing into objective phenomena called effects or 
 an effect. The series being known by judgment we 
 can infer similar causes from perception of similar 
 effects. The commonest causation is the use and 
 interpretation of language. Because we utter words 
 from a certain motive we infer that all who utter the 
 same words do so from the same motive. That is 
 the reason of the intelligibility of words. 
 
 This category is peculiar from the extremely narrow 
 range of the experience which supplies the judgments. 
 We never perceive any mind but one our own and 
 this has to supply all the judgments by which we 
 reason concerning other minds. There is therefore 
 no category in which correct reasoning is so difficult 
 and so rare. No amount of experience entirely over- 
 comes this defect, for if we are ignorant we cannot 
 understand the wise, and if we are wise we cannot 
 conceive the motives of the ignorant and vicious. 
 
Causation 131 
 
 Only those persons who are mentally very like each 
 other are mutually comprehensible. 
 
 This category has a further peculiarity. In all the 
 rest the inference relates to objective experience, and 
 this being due to interaction of minds we are justified 
 in saying that until it is perceived it has no existence. 
 But in causation we are inferring something with 
 reference to a mind, and this exists though we never 
 can perceive it. We know that minds exist without 
 perception because we know that our own exists 
 though no one perceives us though we are in total 
 darkness and silence and cannot ourselves perceive 
 our bodies. As already stated, Existence has not 
 the same meaning when applied to objects and to 
 minds, objects being merely temporary conditions 
 of minds. The non-existence of inferred but unper- 
 ceived objects does not follow from any defect in 
 the faculty of inference, but depends on the essential 
 character of objects. They are created by mutual 
 contact of minds and cannot exist without that con- 
 dition, however clearly they may be inferred and 
 however correctly their appearance may be pre- 
 dicted. 
 
 Causation is confounded with sequence because 
 both are series. Let me illustrate the difference 
 between them by an example. I turn the stop-cock 
 of a pipe, and water flows from the open end of the 
 pipe. In popular and even scientific language it 
 
132 Categories 
 
 would be said that I caused the water to flow. But 
 this is incorrect. All I caused was the turning of the 
 tap ; that alone was wholly due to my energy and 
 intelligence. There followed as a sequence the out- 
 flow of water, but that was due partly to cosmic force 
 and partly to the previous human causation (not mine) 
 implied in making and laying down the pipe so as to 
 utilise the cosmic force. I merely removed an obstacle 
 that prevented the further development of the force in 
 a particular direction. My relation to the outflow was 
 sequence, not causation. 
 
 In observation sequence registers fixed or probable 
 series of objects without regard to their causes. It is 
 sufficient if they occur regularly enough to justify 
 prediction. Causation, on the other hand, pays no 
 regard to physical connection of any sort, but seeks 
 out the being or beings who supplied the energy 
 producing an effect or series of effects. The specula- 
 tions in causation pass quite beyond the domain of 
 objectivity, over into the realm of true creation. 
 
 When we read that ' the succession of events is an 
 endless chain of effects which are in their turn causes 
 of new effects,' what is meant is sequence, and for 
 ' cause J and * effect ' the terms ' antecedent ' and * con- 
 sequent ' should have been employed. Sequences 
 may be 'chains' and may be long, but if so their 
 links have been forged by independent causes acting 
 across the chain ; as when a line of soldiers fire in 
 
Causation 133 
 
 succession at regular intervals, or as in the case of 
 the moon's quarters. In these instances the objects, 
 although forming a series, has each a cause of its 
 own. 
 
 Certainly a causation is a series, for the cause 
 precedes the effect. But an effect is never the cause 
 of a succeeding effect. When this appears to be the 
 case the explanation is that the energy was not 
 exhausted in producing the immediate simple effect, 
 but has produced a complicated effect in which a series 
 may be discovered. An objective effect, being a mere 
 flash of consciousness a shadow on a window-blind 
 is incapable of causing anything. 
 
 Analysis of Cause. Cause is mind in action. It 
 consists of at least energy and a sentimental motive 
 energy exerted to gratify sentiment. If the mind is 
 intellectualised there will probably be an ideal element 
 in the cause in this connection called plan or design 
 for the better direction of the energy. Normal human 
 causation consists of an effort of mind directed to- 
 wards the objective realisation of a plan, for the 
 gratification of a sentiment. This is the same as 
 
 WILL. 
 
 All three elements of cause may be furnished by 
 the same individual or any two of them or only 
 one. For instance, the man who wants a house 
 supplies the motive, the architect provides the design, 
 the builder finds the energy. 
 
J34 Categories 
 
 One plan may use up an indefinite number of 
 separate stores of energy. Even in an individual 
 the realisation of a plan exhausts the powers of 
 millions of organic cells. A military campaign 
 illustrates the relation of plan to power. The de- 
 sign may have been formed by one man, and then 
 communicated wholly or partially to a hundred 
 thousand, and the energies of these may be devoted 
 to its realisation. The soldier fights with his own 
 energy, but he is directed by his commander's idea, or 
 so much of it as has been confided to him. The 
 design may stretch from the commander to the soldier, 
 but not the energy. In order that the commander 
 should be termed the ' cause ' of his private's activity, 
 it would be necessary to eliminate the notion of ex- 
 erted energy from causation, and reduce it to bare 
 communication of design, which would be absurd. 
 
 The stretching of one design over many relays of 
 energy has no doubt helped to confirm the notion 
 that causation is a long chain of alternate causes 
 and effects. The truth is that energy can act only 
 at short range, and has to be incessantly renewed. 
 The world is in a constant state of creation and 
 dissolution, say the Kabbalists. It is absurd to 
 speak of anything that existed a thousand or even 
 a hundred years ago as the cause of anything existing 
 to-day. The design may intellectually survive, but 
 the energy is long since dissipated. We have never 
 
Causation 135 
 
 more than about a day's supply of energy in store 
 at once. 
 
 If sentiment, power, and design are supplied by 
 different individuals, no single one of them can be 
 called the cause of the effect. The relation of each 
 to the result is sequence. When we have traced an 
 effect to the mind or minds that supplied the three or 
 the two necessary elements supposing the design is 
 sometimes omitted and the act what we call instinctive 
 we have obtained a complete explanation of the 
 effect. Our curiosity is then absolutely satisfied. We 
 have reached a true beginning. 
 
 It is the want of this thorough explanation that 
 renders material science so disappointing. We are 
 put off with a mere physical antecedent, which itself 
 needs explanation as much as its consequent. It 
 does not make the antecedent more significant to 
 place it far back in time, for time by itself is not a 
 cause it is merely a name given to intervals of 
 experience. A thing is never truly explained until 
 we see that its production either caused pleasure to 
 something else, or was expected to cause pleasure. 
 Behind everything must be Sentiment. 
 
 One generation of beings is not the cause of the 
 following generation, else the former would have 
 perished in begetting the latter. More particularly, 
 a man is not the effect of his parents or remoter 
 ancestors, though they stood to him in an antecedent re- 
 
136 Categories 
 
 lation. The seed of his body was taken from theirs, but 
 his energy is his own, drawn direct from the universal 
 source. If he resembles them corporeally it is because 
 he previously resembled them mentally, not because 
 the cells of his body have hereditary tendencies to 
 take particular forms. Hence the Darwinian genealogy 
 of men and animals supposing it were correct does 
 not explain them. It is a phenomenal schematism 
 based on or implying an erroneous assumption that 
 generation is causation. 
 
 Atomism the theory of Democritus is founded 
 on another false view of causation. The physical 
 parts of a thing are conceived to be the causes of the 
 thing, and so the least conceivable particles of matter ' 
 are considered the first causes and true explanation 
 of all things. This notion appears to be useful in 
 chemistry, but it cannot be accepted as philosophy. 
 If our senses were sharpened to perceive atoms these 
 would simply be small phenomena, and it would still 
 be necessary to inquire what motive and power pro- 
 duced them. It has been suggested that atoms may 
 be inherently sentient and dynamic : if so they are 
 minute animals or cells, and we are still without an 
 explanation of their occurrence in organised masses. 
 It is inconceivable that they should spontaneously 
 enter into intricate combinations, whose evident 
 purpose has only an indirect and partial bearing on 
 their welfare. 
 
Causation 137 
 
 Though advocated by men of undoubted ability, 
 Atomism and Evolution are nothing more than forms 
 of the ordinary realistic belief, that things are caused 
 by their physical antecedents. The two theories are 
 supposed to be complementary, but in reality they are 
 contradictory. If an animal body is caused by its 
 parents it cannot be caused by its own atoms, and 
 vice versa. 
 
 Varieties of Causation. Abstract causation the 
 category consists of a cause and an effect. The 
 former, as we have seen, is complicated, the latter 
 may comprise several objects. Ignoring the com- 
 plications involved in the use of an organism which 
 comes between the mind and the final effect we 
 distinguish four or five varieties of causation. 
 
 The cause C produces from its own energy the 
 series of effects e 1 4 , like the rebounding of a missile 
 from the surface of ground or water. This may be 
 called ' ricochet.' 
 
 Effects, each having an independent cause, some- 
 times form a series like a ladder: 
 
 e 1 e* <? e* e 5 
 
 I I I I I 
 C C C C C 
 
 This is the species illustrated by a successive dis- 
 
138 Categories 
 
 charge of musketry. The causation of science con- 
 sists of the effects in this species considered apart 
 from the causes. 
 
 In the 'gamut' the effects are in sequence, but they 
 have all the same physical antecedent. 
 
 e 1 e z * e< e> 
 
 I I I I I 
 
 The successive acts of the same man or animal are 
 of this kind. 
 
 In each of these species the effects are in series and 
 may be treated as a sequence, but the cause or causes 
 lie outside the sequence. Far from mere regularity 
 of succession being a proof of causation between the 
 objects, it may very easily be itself a part of the 
 causal design. 
 
 In the ' capstan ' several partial causes contribute to 
 produce one effect, as when a gang of men manipulate 
 one engine. 
 
 O 
 
 \/ 
 
 C. p ___ r* 
 "**- & - \^ 
 
 A 
 
 The c star ' or * fountain ' is the converse of the last. 
 
Causation 139 
 
 A single cause produces several simultaneous partial 
 
 C ' 
 
 \/ 
 e C e 
 
 /\ 
 
 effects, as when we strike our open hand smartly on 
 the surface of water. 
 
 These sub-categories enable us, if we so wish, to 
 define an energic series somewhat more precisely than 
 by calling it a causation in the most abstract sense. 
 Possibly also the figures delineated represent the 
 primitive forms which energy takes when emerging 
 into the phenomenal. The ' star ' is a most character- 
 istic form. The dendritic shape so frequently met 
 with in objects is a star springing from a ray of a pre- 
 ceding star. Perhaps each vegetable bud has an in- 
 dependent cause ; if not they are ' ricochets ' from the 
 general plant life. In the combinations of these ele- 
 mentary effects we have a likely explanation of plant 
 and crystal formation. 
 
 1 Conservation' of Energy. Energy is annihilated 
 in the using. It emanates from a great universal 
 centre, and at a short distance from that centre is 
 completely and irrecoverably dissipated. The appar- 
 ent fixity of things is purely formal like the fixity 
 
14 Categories 
 
 of a water-fall, which renews its substance every few 
 seconds. That is the meaning of saying that the 
 world is in a constant state of formation and disso- 
 lution. 
 
 Physical theorists represent energy under the figure 
 of substance, but they suppose it is fixed in quantity 
 though constantly undergoing change of form the 
 scientific view, here as elsewhere, being just the oppo- 
 site of the philosophical. 
 
 Observe say the conservationists the case of a 
 man raising a heavy stone from the earth. He fa- 
 tigues himself but he does not destroy energy ; he 
 acquires command over the energy-in-position of the 
 stone, and in using it to crack a cocoa-nut or drive a 
 post he receives back his own energy undiminished in 
 quantity. 
 
 That seems reasonable at first sight. A quantity of 
 energy is taken from the man and put into the stone ; 
 it is taken from the stone and put into the driven 
 post. To be sure, if the man undrives the post he 
 does not thereby disfatigue himself, as the theory 
 would lead us to expect he fatigues himself the 
 more. 
 
 The same 'law,' we are told, holds good in building 
 a dam across a stream and utilising the force of water 
 to drive a mill. The energy apparently lost in the 
 construction is recovered in the superior ease with 
 which we grind our corn or saw our timber. There 
 
Causation 141 
 
 is a confusion in the terminology here : to save 
 energy that would otherwise be lost is not iden- 
 tical with recovering energy that has once been 
 used. 
 
 We make a gun, load it, and discharge a bullet 
 against a target. What has become of the force 
 expended? It has been transformed into heat, say 
 the conservationists. And when the target and 
 flattened bullet have cooled down? The energy 
 has gone to raise the general temperature of the 
 universe ! 
 
 That is a conclusion hard to believe and impossible 
 to verify. But granting that the individual explo- 
 sions of a gun may be the ' conservation ' of some 
 antecedent power how do we recover the initial 
 expense of the instrument? And if not recoverable, 
 where at least and in what form does it exist? 
 Prior to the explosions that are represented by 
 heated targets and the like, energy was spent in 
 inventing and making the gun, making the am- 
 munition, loading and aiming the piece. All these 
 were essential to the effect and what has become 
 of them? Have they also gone to warm the uni- 
 verse ? 
 
 Instead of raising a stone to a height, let us carry 
 it along horizontally till we feel the same degree 
 of fatigue. If energy in the using is merely trans- 
 formed but not lost, we should now be in possession 
 
142 Categories 
 
 of some power equivalent to the energy expended. 
 But we are not we have nothing to show for our 
 trouble. 
 
 If we construct a water-mill and fix it high and dry 
 in the middle of a plain, instead of under a fall of 
 water, we get no return for the energy expended. 
 By such a law as the conservation of energy, and 
 with the usefulness of a properly placed mill as the 
 measure of compensation, we should receive an equi- 
 valent return no matter where the mill is placed. 
 What has place to do with the action of a universal 
 law? 
 
 Instead of raising the stone or carrying it horizon- 
 tally, let us find it near the edge of a precipice and 
 roll it over. There is no proportion between the push 
 that launched the stone, and the force it exhibits on 
 reaching the foot of the precipice. How is the equi- 
 valence of energy maintained in this case? It will be 
 replied that the force now at work is gravitation. If 
 so, it was gravitation that brought down the first stone 
 on the post not any energy transferred from us to 
 the stone. The raising of the stone put us in a posi- 
 tion to use the force of gravity, just as climbing the 
 precipice put us in a position to roll the stone over 
 the edge of it. 
 
 Such considerations as these make this ' law ' in- 
 credible to me. But when I pass from the expla- 
 nation to the concrete facts, I have no difficulty in 
 
Causation 143 
 
 understanding them. It is the law that is obscure 
 not the facts. 
 
 There exists nothing but living minds of different 
 degrees of energy. We men are small beings asso- 
 ciated with a cosmical creature whose force is im- 
 measurably greater than ours, and we have intelligence 
 enough to utilise part of this force to supplement our 
 own. That is the meaning of mechanism. Some 
 efforts to control the cosmic forces are profitable, but 
 there is no transmutation of our energy into the 
 result, nor any necessary equivalence between the 
 labour and the result. We may stumble upon an 
 available cosmic force almost by accident we may 
 waste a life-time over a mechanical problem and fail 
 to solve it. 
 
 The utilisation of cosmic force by man is best ex- 
 plained by comparing it with animal slavery. Trap 
 a wild elephant and train him to draw and carry 
 you have constructed an engine. There are of course 
 important differences between the two kinds of in- 
 strument, due to the enormous disproportion between 
 the magnitude and power of the respective entities. 
 In the case of the animal the whole life comes under 
 our control : in the case of the cosmos we can utilise 
 only a minute fraction of it, and that rather by 
 putting ourselves in its way than by making it obey 
 us. The animal we have to feed : the cosmic being 
 does not draw upon us for its nourishment. We 
 
1 44 Categories 
 
 can direct the animal through his sensibility : the 
 cosmic sensibility appears to be beyond our power 
 of irritation. 
 
 Apart from these differences the general laws of the 
 one kind of tool are those of the other also. We have 
 not transferred power to the raised stone, or the coiled 
 spring, or the loaded gun, or the embanked river 
 any more than to the tamed and harnessed horse. 
 There is no fixed ratio between the fatigue of catch- 
 ing and training an animal, and the energy saved by 
 making him work for us. The animal's work is not 
 our own energy given back to us neither is the 
 machine's. A plough is useless without cattle to 
 draw it so is a turbine without water to drive it. 
 When coal is burned to * generate ' electricity, that is 
 the cosmic equivalent of exhausting or killing one 
 animal to overpower or to feed another : the energy 
 of combustion is utterly destroyed not transformed 
 into the electricity. 
 
 The question can be more accurately stated and 
 brought to a plain issue if we use the terms and forms 
 of dialectic. 
 
 A theory is an argument when it is not a fallacy 
 and an argument, we have seen, consists of two parts. 
 There is the matter of fact requiring explanation, and 
 the antecedent knowledge which is used to illustrate 
 it. Of these the precedent is the more important, 
 
Causation 145 
 
 and it is no valid objection to a criticism that the 
 person who offers it knows less about the case than 
 the theorist. The critic may be in possession of a 
 better precedent, which the theorist has failed to 
 notice, perhaps from a too exclusive attention to 
 the case. 
 
 In the question before us the case is Mechanical 
 or Inorganic Energy. It is not an object, but an 
 inference from the knowledge of our personal mental 
 energy. This latter is the only energy we really 
 perceive. But we find in objects, or associated with 
 the perception of them, a power capable of assisting 
 or of opposing our efforts hence we conclude it is 
 something of the same nature as our own power. We 
 cannot well avoid that inference, and there is no 
 apparent reason why we should try to avoid it. 
 
 So far science and philosophy are at one, but here 
 they part company. Philosophy consistently endows 
 Nature with sentiency also, for we never to our cer- 
 tain knowledge meet with energy without sentiency, 
 and we have no right to transfer one attribute without 
 the other. 
 
 Although science is indebted to the assimilation of 
 organic and inorganic Nature explained by Man 
 for the first notion of external energy, no sooner is the 
 notion formed than the argument is discarded, and 
 external energy is declared to be entirely destitute of 
 an organic and mental character. How then is it 
 
 L 
 
1 46 Categories 
 
 to be further explained? To what shall it now be 
 likened ? 
 
 In the materialistic scheme all things are supposed 
 to be resolved into matter and force. Matter is con- 
 ceived as a self-existent substance, indestructible, &c. 
 It is better known than force, for material things can 
 be directly perceived whereas force is imaginary all 
 the time. Under these circumstances it is natural 
 though illogical to treat force as a species of matter. 
 With only two things left in the universe, the better 
 known of the two will be used to explain the less 
 known, if an explanation is considered indispensable. 
 Force is accordingly brought as a * case ' under matter 
 as a * precedent,' and is concluded to be indestructible 
 because matter is believed to be indestructible ; and 
 when energy appears to be wasted the inference is 
 that it has simply withdrawn from view, like an object 
 that has ceased to be perceived and may be perceived 
 again. That seems to be the evolution of the scientific 
 notion of inorganic energy. 
 
 This theorem is fallacious in two respects. There 
 is no such matter as science imagines. Matter is a 
 general idea formed by the study of material objects, 
 which are states of consciousness excited by noumenal 
 contact It is the average object a mere affection or 
 formation of the observing mind. We are the makers 
 of matter. Such an idea cannot be said to be in- 
 destructible : in a sense it is destroyed in an individual 
 
Causation 
 
 when it is forgotten or inactive ; it would certainly 
 be destroyed if all minds ceased to form it. Thus 
 the precedent in the scientific theory of force is itself 
 false. 
 
 Then energy is not in the least like matter either 
 the matter of science or that of philosophy. The 
 energy we really know is a unique experience not 
 a general idea, nor anything analogous to a pheno- 
 menal object ; so that even if the proposed pre- 
 cedent were true in itself, it is not applicable to 
 the case. To complete our knowledge of external 
 energy we must go back to that comparison which 
 first suggested to us that there is external energy, 
 namely, the comparison of living man with living 
 nature. 
 
 If this is not a correct account of the derivation of 
 the notion that cosmic energy is indestructible, let 
 conservationists tell us what is the parallel on which 
 they are arguing. Here is a blank theorem for 
 completion 
 
 is indestructible 
 
 Cosmic energy is a 
 sort of x 
 
 it must therefore be considered 
 indestructible 
 
 Matter, as we have seen, is not x. Human energy is 
 not x. Our individual power so far as experience 
 informs us is destroyed in the using. A day's work 
 exhausts us, and we have to pass into the condition 
 
 L 2 
 
148 Categories 
 
 called sleep to be refilled. It is sleep, not food, that 
 refreshes the mind. Food restores the bodily tool we 
 have been working with puts a fresh edge on the 
 chisel, but it does not recuperate the power that 
 wields the tool. 
 What then is*? 
 
 NOTE ON DREAMS 
 
 IF dreams could be studied with our waking conscious- 
 ness they would throw much light on our mental nature. 
 Being a poor dreamer myself I am not competent to 
 discuss this phase of psychology as it deserves. I think 
 however the bulk of our dreams can be reduced to two 
 principles. There is first the simple lowering of the 
 mental energy, which weakens the attention and dissolves 
 the artificial categories, thus making ordinary reason im- 
 possible. There is just enough energy left to revive a 
 few scattered ideas, which blend together without control 
 or regard to precedent. Hence the singular combinations 
 they sometimes form. 
 
 In the waking state the objective and intellectual ex- 
 perience are generally more vivid and engrossing than the 
 sentimental at least in masculine persons. (I deliberately 
 avoid the phrase * masculine mind,' because there is mani- 
 festly no sex in mind.) In dreams the converse of this is 
 the case. The objects we appear to see are dull and 
 indistinct, being ideas mistaken for objects, whilst the 
 
Dreams 149 
 
 feelings are evidently genuine and sometimes of great in- 
 tensity. This may be explained on the occult principle 
 alluded to in section x. 
 
 What I understand by occult influence is this. In or- 
 dinary experience the object is first perceived, then a 
 sentiment may be excited either by the same noumenon 
 or by recollection. In the occult procedure this order is 
 reversed. The sentiment is first secretly reached through 
 the chinks of our intellectual armour, and the intellect is 
 not excited at all or only by association. During sleep, 
 when the Self is nearly exhausted of power, it is likely 
 we are more exposed than usual to such influences. They 
 invade our mind and excite our sentiment without awaking 
 the intellect. Whatever ideas accompany the sentiments 
 are generally inadequate to explain them, the stock of 
 available ideas being now reduced. 
 
 The conversations we hold in dreams, and the apparent 
 communication of knowledge that takes place, are referred 
 by Du Prel to a division of the ego into two or more 
 individuals who talk together. This notion appears to 
 me forced and unthinkable. Under what image is the 
 ego figured that it should be capable of division ? In the 
 waking state we sometimes ask ourselves questions, and 
 on consideration find answers to them. We cannot recall 
 a name, a word, or date, though we know it is somewhere 
 in our memory, and we pause and search till we succeed in 
 exciting the latent image. When this takes place in a 
 dream the information is assumed to come from another 
 individual by an easy dramatisation. 
 
 A disturbance in the body during sleep may constitute 
 like all bodily suffering a drain upon our mental energy, 
 which will be felt as a sentiment and may excite ideas by 
 
150 Dreams 
 
 sympathy. No doubt many dreams are caused in this 
 manner. 
 
 Since our waking consciousness is highly artificial and 
 imaginary, we may infer that whilst dreaming we are nearer 
 to the natural, primitive state of the mind, but in a weak- 
 ened condition. 
 
REDACTION OF COLLOQUIAL 
 ARGUMENTS 
 
 XXVIII 
 
 A CLEVER man has said that the use of language is 
 to conceal thought. Its primary use is certainly not 
 to reveal thought, but to enable one person to produce 
 an effect on the mind of another or of others, either 
 for their or his own advantage. In the course of 
 using speech as an instrument of command, entreaty, 
 persuasion, menace, or fustigation, it may happen that 
 the movements of the speaker's mind are revealed to 
 some extent, but this is a mere incident, not the main 
 purpose of the speech. 
 
 Grammar is the system of rules which govern the 
 use of language in its primary and ordinary capacity. 
 
 It follows from this that language is in no sense a 
 revelation of the reasoning processes, nor do the rules 
 
152 Redaction of Colloquial Arguments 
 
 of grammar coincide with the laws of intellect. It is 
 just as reasonable to expect to find the metaphysic 
 of thought revealed in any of the industrial and fine 
 arts, as to look for it in the structure of speech. 
 Aristotle drew his logic from the composition of the 
 Greek sentence he might as well have sought for 
 logic in the constitution of the Greek buskin. * 
 
 Even when men begin to reason aloud and seek to 
 render their logical movements as evident as possible, 
 they are so hampered by the ordinary habits and rules 
 of speech that their meaning is often difficult or 
 impossible of comprehension. Whence arises the 
 necessity, if we would reason aloud to any purpose, 
 of redacting or translating language from the ver- 
 nacular into a dialect more indicative of the logical 
 
 o 
 
 processes that take place when we reason. 
 
 This redaction consists mainly in distinguishing 
 clearly the four parts composing an argument, namely, 
 the Subject of the Precedent; the Case which is 
 brought under it for judgment ; the Applicate or 
 part of the precedent bearing on the case ; the 
 'Conclusion, which is the ideal judgment concerning 
 
 1 Though evidently suggested by language, the form which the syl- 
 . logistic logic finally assumed is so unlike anything grammatical, that it 
 is easily convertible into symbols having no resemblance to language. 
 It has been put into literal symbols with algebraic values, and into 
 geometrical diagrams. A logical machine has even been invented by 
 Professor Jevons, ' worked by keys like a pianoforte,' which returns 
 ' infallible answers ' of the Aristotelian sort to every kind of question. 
 That is sufficiently unlike both reason and language. 
 
Redaction of Colloquial Arguments 153 
 
 the case. When these four parts are expressed and 
 clearly understood we have a perfect argument, so far 
 as argumentation depends on language. But probably 
 we have spoiled the language from the grammatical 
 and rhetorical point of view. We may have had to 
 supply much that would be redundant and unsightly 
 in ordinary conversation or writing, and to take away 
 much that is appropriate to colloquial discourse. We 
 are diverting language to a use for which it was not 
 designed, and we need not be surprised if the result 
 is ungraceful. This cannot be helped since there 
 exists no other means than language by which to 
 express our concrete reasoning. 
 
 I have already shown practically how an argument 
 can be arranged so as to indicate the logical relations 
 subsisting between its parts. A Greek cross is drawn, 
 and in the four angles thus made the four parts of the 
 argument are written, or the principal words of each. 
 Begin with the conclusion, for that is generally the 
 most explicitly given ; then find or supply the part of 
 the precedent that agrees or logically rhymes with it ; 
 next place the subject in the first compartment, and 
 the case under it. These relative positions should 
 not be varied. When this has been practiced for a 
 while it enables one to dismember the most intricate 
 argument with ease and exactness. 
 
 The redaction or re-writing of the language can be 
 abbreviated by regarding the horizontal line as equi- 
 
 / ..- > I 
 
154 Redaction of Colloquial Arguments 
 
 valent to a declaration of resemblance between case 
 and precedent-subject, and (by application) between 
 the illustrative abstraction and conclusion. If there 
 is an argument at all there must be this resemblance, 
 and the right-hand parts must have one of the six 
 categorical relations to the left-hand parts. The 
 contents of the angles may be cut down to a word or 
 two, as 
 
 I. 
 
 Tyrants death 
 
 Caesar death 
 
 If the category be further indicated by a numeral 
 over the upright line, we have the essential parts of 
 the argument in a very compact form. The cross 
 and categorical numeral may be regarded as a 
 sufficient substitute for grammatical syntax and 
 punctuation. 
 
 The negative word that generally occurs in stig- 
 matic arguments requires special attention. It should 
 always be put in the second angle, and when it may 
 read so as to negative the subject it should be 
 hyphened to the predicate, thus giving it the value 
 of non, un, im, or other negative prefix. To say 
 colloquially that * all Russians are not angels ' 
 leaves room to believe that some Russians are 
 angels, the f not' applying to 'all' instead of to 
 ' angels.' By linking * not ' to ' angels ' we get a 
 
Redaction of Colloquial Arguments 155 
 
 term equivalent to non-angelic, which expresses the 
 meaning intended that no Russians are angels. 
 
 Caution should be observed with partitive words 
 like c some,' ' many/ * a few,' &c. There is little danger 
 of ambiguity when they occur in the case, for that 
 means that we bring only a portion of a group of 
 things to judgment, which we are manifestly entitled 
 to do. The conclusion however applies only to the 
 portion in question, not to the rest of the group. 
 ' Honest men deserve respect ; some Negroes are 
 honest men ; these particular Negroes deserve respect? 
 
 In the precedent, partitive words imply that only 
 some of the subject have the applicate. If that 
 portion is a dialectical ' all ' that is, if there has been 
 no exception in the course of our experience we may, 
 though that experience has been limited, venture to 
 treat the applicate as universal and ground a con- 
 clusion upon it. If the subject is really partitive 
 if we know for certain that some subjects have the 
 applicate and others have it not the conclusion must 
 follow the greater probability. If the number and 
 character of the observed cases is known we can 
 express the probability arithmetically ; it is the 
 number of occurrences of a given character divided 
 by the total number. 
 
 Redaction must not be used to correct original 
 errors of observation ; its purpose is to render explicit 
 in language what is implicit in thought, not what 
 
156 Redaction of Colloquial Arguments 
 
 might have been thought supposing the thinker had 
 been more intelligent or industrious than he was. 
 
 ' Conversion ' is a process admitted or required in 
 the artificial methods of syllogistic dialectic. It 
 consists mainly in transposing the subject and pre- 
 dicate of a proposition, as ' some Europeans are 
 Mohammedans ' c some Mohammedans are Euro- 
 peans/ This operation never takes place in real 
 argument, or is merely the emendation of a propo- 
 sition at first awkwardly expressed. Conversion can 
 take place only when the predicate is a class, hence 
 the categorical propositions cannot be converted. 
 
FALLACIES 
 
 XXIX OF EQUIVOCATION AND MAL-OBSERVATION 
 
 FALLACIES are counterfeit or sham arguments. They 
 may fail to be arguments (i) because their ante- 
 cedents are false ; (2) because the antecedents though 
 true are not arranged dialectically, and do not suggest 
 the right conclusion ; (3) because the language is 
 equivocal. 
 
 To take the last first. So many things are called 
 by the same name, and so many different names 
 may be applied to the same thing, that if we attempt 
 to argue from words alone, without any personal 
 knowledge of the things or judgments that are in 
 question, we shall certainly make mistakes. The 
 only security against this sort of fallacy is much 
 experience, and the self-denial necessary to relinquish 
 argument and the criticism of arguments, when we 
 have no sufficient knowledge of the data. 
 
158 Fallacies 
 
 The degree of imperfection in observation which 
 should be considered to render the theorem fallacious, 
 is no easy matter to determine. One class of logi- 
 cians (the Formal) get over the difficulty by declaring 
 that dialectic is not concerned with concrete know- 
 ledge at all, x but only with its general properties 
 (as conceived by Aristotle), and they have set up 
 as a standard of logical truth the capability of being 
 imagined. A centaur is to them as true a fact as 
 a horse, and they would accept as valid such a 
 theorem as this : ' All centaurs object to be shod 
 with iron ; Gryneus is a centaur ; therefore we may 
 conclude that he would resist being shod with iron.' 
 No amount of conceivability or formal coherence can 
 make this other than nonsense. 
 
 J. S. Mill and his followers go to the opposite 
 extreme. They study all the sciences and endeavour 
 to master their methods of reasoning which is well ; 
 but they do so with the prepossession that there 
 exists some absolute standard of knowledge to fail in 
 attaining which involves fallacy. They thus condemn 
 as false all theorems based on superseded notions 
 of nature and man. Only modern thinkers can 
 argue rationally the ancients were all and habitu- 
 
 1 One fault of observation is noticed by formal logicians ; it is that 
 of assigning an improper cause, Non causa pro caiisd or Post hoc ergo 
 propter hoc. It is evident that defects in every other category have an 
 equal right to be noticed. 
 
Of Equivocation and Mai- Observation 159 
 
 ally victims of fallacy, and of the moderns only 
 the few are rational who have mastered the latest 
 theories on every subject. This is the principle 
 of Mill's doctrine on the fallacies of observation ; 
 we can see that he regarded all beliefs as falla- 
 cious which he had himself outgrown or did not 
 feel a need of. ' Truth ' was simply the facts and 
 judgments that happened to suit Mill's mental con- 
 stitution. 
 
 From the Substantial point of view this is an 
 untenable position. 
 
 No degree of observation is intrinsically defective 
 if it serve the purpose of intellect, which is to protect 
 the mind. There is no intellectual truth as a thing 
 in itself. The thoughts of a sparrow or a child are 
 as perfect as those of a man, if they afford the neces- 
 sary defence to the individual's sentiment. As we 
 change our inner mental character, new intellectual 
 ideas have to be acquired and the old are discarded, 
 perhaps completely forgotten. They appear now to 
 be ignorances and fallacies mal-observation and bad 
 reasoning. The new seem to be so much truer 
 perhaps infallibly true. All that is illusion. We 
 make another advance, and the thoughts that a week 
 before were as stable as rocks are now cast aside 
 as absurd. Perhaps the belief in the certainty of 
 present judgments is a condition of our making the 
 best use of them ; if so they should not be shaken 
 
1 60 Fallacies 
 
 until we are ready to enter on the next stage of 
 knowledge. 
 
 It is quite true that one man may know more 
 than another, but the ground on which the more 
 intellectual is generally considered to be superior to 
 the latter is not the right one. He is not better for 
 his intellectual acquirements, but he is better if his 
 mind, being of a finer sort, required a superior intel- 
 lect to defend it. At bottom, then, the general cause 
 of mal-observation there are particular causes which 
 interfere with the general rule is inferiority of senti- 
 mental character. We do not see what we do not 
 need to see, and we see imperfectly what is not 
 essential to our well-being. That we should be 
 ignorant or reason badly about what does not concern 
 us is not in itself a defect. 
 
 It is inconsistent with these views on the function 
 of intellect to admit that any sort of non-observation 
 or mal-observation can be always and for all alike 
 fallacious. If there are things which we habitually 
 ignore, the presumption is that they do not concern 
 us that the knowledge they would confer is not 
 essential to our welfare and would be intellectual 
 lumber. 
 
 I should therefore abstain from condemning as 
 fallacies theorems drawn in good faith from facts 
 believed to be true, and which serve as motives of 
 conduct. They are sophisms only when the reasoners 
 
Of Parallel Arrangement 161 
 
 have not taken ordinary pains to verify their data, or, 
 knowing the antecedents to be false, ^retend to believe 
 them for some immoral purpose. 
 
 XXX OF PARALLEL ARRANGEMENT 
 
 THERE is no fault of perversion, mutilation, or en- 
 tanglement in the statement of an argument that we 
 do not meet with in actual reasoning. Even in the 
 writings of educated and honest thinkers it is rare to 
 meet with an argument the parts of which are clearly 
 distinguished by the author himself, and expressed 
 so as to show the precise degree of force they ought 
 to carry. Reasoning is still only a semi-conscious 
 process directed by rule-of-thumb. We make certain 
 statements and find they have a power of moving 
 others, so we continue to make them. But whether 
 the result is due to the rationality of the discourse or 
 merely to the docility of the hearers, we do not know, 
 and so long as the desired result follows we do not 
 care to inquire. 
 
 For this state of things logicians are to a great 
 extent responsible. They are uncritical imitators 
 of the Greek philosophers, whose notions on dialectic 
 
 M 
 
1 62 Fallacies 
 
 were quite wrong. The Greeks and their medieval 
 and modern followers have squandered attention on a 
 mental process which is not reason, mistaking it for 
 reason, so that practically there has never been a 
 science of dialectic. However much reasoners may 
 have wished to present their thoughts coherently, 
 they have not been provided with a method or nota- 
 tion adapted to the purpose. With an instinctive 
 sense of the futility of the Syllogism, they have ig- 
 nored it completely. I cannot call to mind a single 
 controversial work that has been presented in syllo- 
 gistic form, nor do even trained logicians use it 
 overtly in argument. 1 Yet if it were what it professes 
 to be, it would be as natural and convenient to ex- 
 press our arguments in syllogism as it is to put down 
 on paper a sum in arithmetic. We are, as regards 
 
 1 Whately complains of the disinclination shown by logicians to put 
 their rules into practice. ' Whenever they have to treat of anything that 
 is beyond the mere elements of Logic, they totally lay aside all reference 
 to the principles they have been occupied in establishing and explaining, 
 and have recourse to a loose, vague, and popular kind of language; 
 such as would be best suited indeed -to an exoterical discourse but seems 
 strangely incongruous in a professed logical treatise. . . . Surely it 
 affords but too much plausibility to the cavils of those who scoff at 
 Logic altogether, that the very writers who profess to teach it should 
 never themselves make any application of, or reference to, its principles, 
 when, and when only, such application and reference are to be expected.' 
 Logic, Book III. Introd. The fact here admitted proves that even 
 logicians do not find their method of any practical use. But what is the 
 meaning of the emphatic ' when only ' ? Why should a logical method 
 be unsuitable for every sort of subject except those matters of logic that 
 are beyond the mere elements ? 
 
Of Parallel Arrangement 163 
 
 the expression of reasoning, in the position of nume- 
 rical thinkers before the invention of figures and the 
 elaboration of arithmetical rules. We have to do all 
 our arguments ' in our head,' and so we do them badly. 
 We can seldom be sure of the correctness of our own 
 reasonings, and we are constantly being misled by 
 sophistry. Nothing indeed will enable us to reason 
 well or to detect false reasoning on a subject of which 
 we are entirely ignorant, but a large measure of pro- 
 tection would be afforded by the adoption of a uniform 
 system of presenting arguments, by which all the 
 assumptions they involve are rendered explicit. 
 
 One of the commonest omissions in argumentation 
 is to take the precedent for granted. This is allow- 
 able when it is a fact universally known or believed. 
 * If you let the glass fall it will be broken,' the 
 omitted precedent " is the known consequences of 
 letting brittle things fall to the ground. ' Caius is a 
 liar, therefore he is a coward ' presupposes that every 
 liar is a coward. 
 
 This liberty of suppression is sometimes used 
 sophistically. The tacit precedent is not universally 
 known or accepted, but if it is questioned the sophist 
 is ready with an exclamation of surprise or contempt 
 at our supposed ignorance. Persons who are afraid 
 of appearing singular in their beliefs are liable to be 
 deceived by this trick. 
 
 ' It frequently happens,' says Whately, ' in the case 
 
 M 2 
 
1 64 Fallacies 
 
 of a fallacy [of omitted precedent] that the hearers 
 are left to the alternative of supplying either a 
 premiss which is not true, or else one which does not 
 prove the conclusion : e.g. if a man expatiates on the 
 distress of the country, and thence argues that the 
 government is tyrannical, we must suppose him to 
 assume either that " every distressed country is under 
 a tyranny," which is a manifest falsehood, or merely 
 that " every country under a tyranny is distressed," 
 which, however true, proves nothing, the Middle 
 Term being undistributed. . . . Which are we to 
 suppose the speaker meant us to understand ? 
 Surely just whichever each of his hearers might 
 happen to prefer : some might assent to the false 
 premiss ; others allow the unsound syllogism ; to the 
 sophist himself it is indifferent, as long as they can 
 be brought to admit the conclusion.' 
 
 We sometimes attempt to reason from Contrast 
 instead of resemblance, with a confused notion that 
 things which differ in some respects must differ also in 
 others. ' Who spareth the rod hateth the child ; the 
 parent who loveth his child must therefore spare not 
 the rod.' The fallacy of this becomes apparent when 
 we complete the theorem in the parallel form. 
 
 VI. 
 
 The hating parent 
 
 The loving parent differs from 
 the hating parent 
 
 spares the rod 
 
 [No Conclusion] 
 
Of Parallel Arrangement 165 
 
 The following has often been presented as a valid 
 argument 'What is universally believed must be 
 true ; the belief in God's existence is not universal ; 
 it is therefore not true/ 
 
 I. 
 
 What is universally believed is true 
 
 The existence of God is not 
 universally believed 
 
 N. C. 
 
 To establish the conclusion aimed at, it would be 
 necessary to lay down as precedent 'What is not 
 universally believed is not true.' 
 
 These theorems from contrast are on a par with 
 the following 
 
 I. 
 
 Cows 
 
 Sheep are not cows 
 
 are four-footed 
 
 sheep are not four-footed 
 
 This is the fallacy called in the quaint language of 
 the syllogists ' Illicit Process of the Major Term.' 
 
 In False Analogy the resemblance is so slight that 
 the application is untrustworthy, or a conclusion is 
 drawn in excess of the resemblance. If from the 
 habit of calling a deep bay or salt-water loch an 
 ' arm ' of the sea from its analogy to a human arm, 
 we conclude that the sea has elbows and wrists, we 
 commit this fallacy. The earth is like an orange, but 
 we must not think that it is pulpy inside. 
 
1 66 Fallacies 
 
 Akin to this is the fallacy of False Generality or 
 Donbtfid Precedent. It consists in carelessly or per- 
 versely using bad antecedents when better are avail- 
 able. This applies to such current prejudices as that 
 all Frenchmen are frivolous, all Germans mystical, 
 all Jews dishonest, all Carthaginians faithless, all 
 rich people purseproud, all nobles haughty, and so on. 
 Even if all the Carthaginians we personally knew had 
 proved faithless, our general knowledge of mankind 
 should keep us from inferring that a whole nation 
 should be faithless. The most we should conclude is 
 that some Carthaginians are faithless, but we are free 
 to exercise caution in future dealings with members 
 of that race. All these generalities are grounded 
 on this prior argument : ' when a known portion of a 
 class exhibits certain qualities, we are justified in in- 
 ferring that the whole class possess these qualities '- 
 which is only occasionally true. 
 
 The fallacy si Accident occurs when the precedent 
 is so defined as not to exclude exceptions, and the 
 case happens to be one of the exceptions. ' What gives 
 pain should be abstained from ; surgical operations 
 give pain ; they should therefore be abstained from.' 
 The painful things that should be universally ab- 
 stained from are those which give needless or useless 
 pain, not the sort that give less pain than they 
 remove. Falstaff committed this fallacy when he 
 supposed that the King would be a boon companion 
 
Of Parallel Arrangement 167 
 
 like the Prince. So did the colonists who introduced 
 rabbits and water-cress into Australia, on the suppo- 
 sition that they would there have the same function 
 or value as in Great Britain. In consequence of the 
 Accidental change the rabbits have developed into a 
 pest, and the water-cress obstructs navigation. 
 
 If the applicate is a property of the subject only 
 when the latter is taken collectively, it will not yield 
 a true conclusion when the parts or individuals of the 
 subject are taken separately. All the angles of a 
 triangle are equal to two right angles, but it does not 
 follow that one of them though it resembles the 
 triangle to some extent is equal to two right angles. 
 In this instance we should render the meaning clear 
 by saying ' collectively equal,' when no argument 
 follows and no mistake is made. This is called the 
 fallacy of Division. 
 
 The fallacy of Composition is the converse of this. 
 What is true of several singulars may not be true 
 of all of them taken together. Because each of the 
 witnesses in a law case is liable to error, it does not 
 follow that the concurrent testimony of many is not 
 to be credited. (Jevons.)- 
 
 Circular or Tautological theorems (Petitio Principii 
 Begging the Question) are a breach of rule 3, section 
 XVIII. This fallacy often consists in proposing as a 
 precedent the case, or information drawn from the 
 
1 68 Fallacies 
 
 case and stated in other words. ' To allow every 
 man an unbounded freedom of speech must always 
 be. on the whole, advantageous to the State ; for it is 
 highly conducive to the interests of the Community 
 that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly 
 unlimited of expressing his sentiments.' (Whately.) 
 
 It is conducive 
 
 that each individual should enjoy 
 
 It is advantageous to allow 
 
 There may be tautology in a single word the 
 'question-begging epithet.' We undertake to prove 
 something, but get no further than the use of meta- 
 phors implying the point in dispute. For example, 
 some scientific writers are anxious to promote the 
 belief that animal life is a combination of natural 
 forces that there is no individual life distinct from 
 cosmic life, but all their proof consists in calling a 
 man or beast a ' machine,' and calling machines 
 ' creatures.' This might be mistaken for the Sub- 
 stantialist doctrine on the same subject, but the two 
 are radically different. Substantialism asserts that 
 man and nature have similar lives materialism 
 teaches that they have only one life in common, and 
 that the coarse, mindless life of the cosmos as con- 
 ceived realistically. 
 
 Conclusions may be used as precedents before verifi- 
 cation, but it is not lawful to assume a hypothetical 
 precedent on the understanding that it is to be 
 
Of Parallel Arrangement 169 
 
 proved in the course of the argument, and then use 
 the conclusion so obtained to prove its own precedent. 
 This is also dialectical tautology, but the circle 
 includes two or more theorems. When naturalists 
 tell us that in the struggle for life the fittest only 
 survive, and when asked how we know which are 
 the fittest they reply that the fittest are known by 
 the fact of their surviving, we have a tautological 
 argument. 
 
 Animals that survive 
 
 are the fittest 
 
 Fittest animals 
 
 survive 
 
 A particular animal 
 has survived 
 
 hence it is the 
 fittest of its 
 species 
 
 This animal is 
 the fittest of 
 its species. 
 
 which is the 
 reason it has 
 survived 
 
 Survival under competitive conditions is first as- 
 sumed, and from it is deduced the superiority of the 
 existing type of animal ; then this inferential su- 
 periority is offered to justify the previously imagined 
 competitive survival. The two hypotheses waltz 
 round each other without making any rational ad- 
 vance. 
 
 When a book is quoted to prove its own au- 
 thenticity we have this fallacy ; or when the precedent 
 is as unknown as the conclusion, ' Paradise was in 
 Armenia, therefore Gihon is an Asiatic river.' 
 
 The academical syllogism as defined not always 
 as presented contains two fallacies, one of which is 
 tautology. 'ALL Europeans are white; Caius is a 
 European; therefore he is white.' If, as logicians 
 
J 70 Fallacies 
 
 say, the 'all' is absolute and includes Caius even 
 before he is mentioned, then it is clear that the 
 theorem amounts to saying, ' All Europeans are white, 
 and one of them is Caius.' 'Both the twins are 
 fair-haired ; Caius is one of the twins ; therefore he 
 is fair-haired ' : the pretended conclusion is merely 
 a naming of a part of the precedent. The first 
 of these theorems may be interpreted so as to 
 give a valid conclusion. We are informed that 
 an unknown person called Caius is a European ; 
 we are not told, and we do not know, what is 
 the colour of his skin ; but because all the Euro- 
 peans we have known have been white, we infer 
 pending actual knowledge that Caius is white. 
 Logicians interpret the syllogism otherwise, for they 
 have a notion that reason should give infallible 
 certainty. 
 
 After the precedent has been divided into subject 
 and applicate, the former is sometimes used as ap- 
 plicate and so generates a wrong conclusion. This 
 may be called Cross Reasoning or Diagonal Reasoning 
 the fallacy termed by logicians * Undistributed 
 Middle.' 
 
 Manx cats 
 
 This cat has no tail 
 
 have no tails 
 
 it must be a Manx cat 
 
 De Morgan has this example ' His imbecility of 
 character might have been inferred from his prone- 
 
Of Parallel Arrangement 171 
 
 ness to favourites ; for all weak princes have this 
 failing.' 
 
 All weak princes 
 
 are prone 
 
 He was prone he imist have been weak 
 
 Statements are sometimes put forward as reason- 
 ing which contain no case, either expressed or under- 
 stood. This will seem hardly credible seeing that 
 the illustration of a case is the purpose of argumenta- 
 tion. Not only does it occur, but a certain form of 
 it is regarded by some logicians as valid reasoning. 
 It is the 'particular' syllogism of the Third Figure. 
 
 Socrates was poor j 
 Socrates was wise. 
 
 From these premises no conclusion can be extracted, 
 unless it be the verbal summary ' Socrates was both 
 poor and wise.' But logicians draw from it the 
 dialectic conclusion 
 
 Therefore some men have been poor and wise, 
 
 or 
 Therefore one man has been poor and wise. 
 
 Both these conclusions are inadmissible. It is be- 
 cause they are empirically true that we are apt to 
 think their truth depends on the antecedent informa- 
 tion. If we wish to extend the qualities of Socrates 
 to 'some men' we must make them a case with 
 ' Socrates is poor and wise ' for a precedent, but I fail 
 
172 Fallacies 
 
 to see how it is to be done. If we add to the 
 premises, * One man was Socrates, therefore one man 
 was poor and wise,' we have a tautological fallacy. 
 
 J. S. Mill notices a fallacy which amounts to an 
 Inversion of the Parallel : the conclusion is known or 
 believed and the truth of the antecedents is inferred 
 backwards. 
 
 * People continually think and express themselves 
 as if they believed that the premises cannot be false 
 if the conclusion is true. The truth, or supposed 
 truth, of the inferences which follow from a doctrine, 
 often enables it to find acceptance in spite of gross 
 absurdities in it. How many philosophical systems 
 which had scarcely any intrinsic recommendation 
 have been received by thoughtful men because they 
 were supposed to lend additional support to religion, 
 morality, some favourite view of politics, or some 
 other cherished persuasion ; not merely because their 
 wishes were thereby enlisted on its side, but because 
 its leading to what they deemed sound conclusions 
 appeared to them a strong presumption in favour of 
 its truth, though the presumption, when viewed in its 
 true light, amounted only to the absence of that 
 particular evidence of falsehood which would have 
 resulted from its leading by correct inference to some- 
 thing already known to be false.' * 
 
 The conclusion of an argument may sometimes 
 be left unexpressed. If the antecedents are strong and 
 
 1 Logic, ( Fallacies,' c. 6. 
 
Of Parallel Arrangement 173 
 
 the conclusion obvious it weakens the argument to 
 state the conclusion in full, besides reflecting on the 
 capacity of the reader or hearer to draw the con- 
 clusion for himself. Hence we find at the end of 
 controversial and indignant writings such expressions 
 as ' Comment is superfluous ' ' We leave the reader 
 to draw his own conclusions,' or simply a point of 
 exclamation is appended. 
 
 Sophistical insinuations are suggested in this 
 manner. A train of ideas is laid that generates a 
 conclusion which the speaker is afraid or ashamed to 
 put into words. 
 
 The second fault of the syllogism as defined may 
 be called the fallacy of No Application. It consists in 
 arranging propositions so as to end in a classification, 
 but no applicate is detached and no rational con- 
 clusion is drawn. ' Jones is a Welshman ; all Welsh- 
 men are Britons ; therefore Jones is a Briton.' If in 
 actual thinking it were ever desired to establish by 
 argument that Jones is a Briton, it would be with the 
 object of applying to him some quality connoted by 
 Briton, but the presence of which in Jones is a matter 
 of doubt. This would be a conclusion but not the 
 mere classification. 
 
 Irrelevant Conclusion the fallacy called by Aris- 
 totelians Ignoratio elenchi is an attempt to substi- 
 tute a better argument for the one proposed, but which 
 proves something which has not been denied, or stig- 
 
1 74 Fallacies 
 
 matises something that has not been asserted. It 
 frequently arises from honest ignorance of the question 
 at issue, as in the objections usually made to the 
 Berkeleyan Substantialism. It can also be used as a 
 weapon of sophistry, by confusing the matter in dispute 
 or diverting attention to side issues. It is irrelevant 
 to the truth of a conclusion to point out that he who 
 now supports it formerly opposed it, or that his 
 conduct is inconsistent with a belief in it. Appeals to 
 passion to reverence for authority to popular belief 
 are instances of this fallacy. 
 
 The best protection against Fallacy next to a 
 thorough knowledge of the matter is a clear notion 
 of the properties of a valid argument ; it is useful 
 however to be able to distinguish and name the 
 faulty theorems one constantly meets in controversial 
 speeches and writings. 
 
ACADEMICAL DIALECTIC 
 
 XXXI ANALOGY 
 
 LOGICIANS of Greek inspiration apply the term 
 reasoning or argument to at least eight different 
 intellectual operations, some of them important indeed 
 but only one of them argument. This is Analogy 
 which receives but little notice from logicians because 
 it does not give certain conclusions. The operations 
 mistaken for argument are : 
 
 Immediate Inference 
 Arithmetical Calculation 
 Geometrical Demonstration 
 Induction 
 Aristotle's Dictum- 
 Mediate Comparison 
 Syllogism. 
 
176 Academical Dialectic 
 
 XXXII IMMEDIATE INFERENCE 
 
 SOME logicians maintain that it is possible to draw 
 a kind of conclusions from one judgment alone. 
 These pretended conclusions are of two species. 
 
 The first is a restatement in different words of the 
 whole or part of the single idea, and it is preceded by 
 ' therefore ' to give it the appearance of an argument. 
 All men suffer, therefore some men suffer.' ' John 
 is a man, therefore he is a living creature.' ' This weighs 
 that down, therefore it is heavier.' These are all ob- 
 vious tautologisms. It is not an inference to deny 
 the opposite of what we have asserted, as ' The weather 
 is warm, therefore it is not cold.' The conditional 
 and dilemmatic examples of logicians abound in such 
 ' inferences.' We cannot entirely avoid these locu- 
 tions, as they give point and clearness to speech, but 
 they are not argument, even when introduced by 
 ' therefore/ 
 
 The other species of spurious conclusions arises out 
 of what is technically called Conversion. This is a 
 process permitted in Syllogistic in order to render 
 propositions more explicit. The subject may change 
 places with the predicate, a ' some ' may be inserted 
 an 'all' suppressed, or a 'not' may be made to 
 
Arithmetical Calculation 177 
 
 qualify one word instead of another. In all this there 
 must be no change in the meaning of the proposition, 
 and therefore there can be no inference. If the second 
 proposition means something more or different from 
 the first, another premise is unconsciously taken for 
 granted, or the supposed interpretation amounts to 
 interpolation. The reasoner may have inadvertently 
 or sophistically added something to the original datum. 
 Here is an example of inference by conversion 'All 
 cabbages are plants,' therefore some plants are cab- 
 bages.' If it is not understood from the terms of the 
 first proposition that plants are limited to such as are 
 cabbages, the * some ' of the converted proposition is 
 an interpolation supplied from the reasoner's know- 
 ledge of the matter. In this case the ' quantification ' 
 of plants is not a valid inference from the original 
 information. 
 
 XXXIII ARITHMETICAL CALCULATION 
 
 ARITHMETIC is first a manipulation of symbols called 
 { figures.' There are ten of these, and they are capable 
 of many species of combination, and an indefinite 
 number of individual operations under each species. 
 
 N 
 
178 Academical Dialectic 
 
 Certain rules govern each sort of operation, and when 
 the rules are properly understood and recollected the 
 operations can be performed with absolute certainty. 
 Although the figures have names relating to number, 
 and the problems given for exercise make mention of 
 acres, pounds, tons, miles, and all sorts of concrete 
 objects, the symbolic calculations of books have no 
 necessary relation to real things, numbers, or quan- 
 tities. They are a purely conventional treatment of 
 arbitrary marks that may mean anything or nothing. 
 That is the arithmetic of the ' schools.' There is no 
 trace of reasoning or argument in it it is mere rule 
 and recollection. 
 
 There is however real Number and there is real 
 Quantity. Number is that quality in which a group 
 of three things (for instance) is seen to differ from a 
 group of four or seven, even when the things are 
 otherwise quite similar. We begin by distinguishing 
 ten primary degrees of this difference, and then con- 
 sider other degrees as multiples or parts of these 
 primary degrees. 
 
 Quantity is degree in size, and is a property quite 
 different from number. But, for convenience, we 
 assume that quantities are all units or fractions of 
 certain standard quantities, and we are thus enabled 
 to use the same terms for both number and quantity. 
 
 The names which written language provides for the 
 numerical degrees and their combinations are incon- 
 
Arithmetical Calculation 179 
 
 venient to use, and so a set of symbols was devised 
 exclusively for numerical designation. These are the 
 figures of arithmetic. They are the technical vocabulary 
 of number, and of quantity considered as number. 
 
 Number and quantity admit of but two kinds of 
 variation increase and diminution. These variations 
 can be denoted so correctly by figures, that any com- 
 bination we first make in figures according to rule 
 can be reproduced in real objects, provided the ob- 
 jects are in other respects possible. The result of 
 this perfection of technical nomenclature is that our 
 study of number and quantity has been transferred 
 from real objects to figures. It has become symbolic 
 and indirect, and most of us never go beyond the 
 symbols ; that is, what we call arithmetic is an affair 
 of figures, not of true quantities and numbers. We 
 talk of miles, tons, and pounds sterling, but we do 
 not think of miles, tons, and pounds sterling we 
 think of figures. A thousand shillings is to us, when 
 arithmetically stated, ' IQOOS.' just as it is here repre- 
 sented on paper; we do not think of silver coins, 
 and we could not if we tried imagine a thousand 
 things of any sort. There is in reality an enormous 
 difference between ' ooou.' and * icooj.,' but to the 
 arithmetician the only objective difference is one of 
 arrangement in figures. 
 
 From these considerations it follows that there are 
 two sciences of number. There is the true science 
 
 N 2 
 
180 Academical Dialectic 
 
 which deals with quantities really seen in objects and 
 imagined in the mind, and an artificial science dealing 
 with figures which have only a historical connection 
 with real quantity. Of the latter, unfortunately, our 
 arithmetical education chiefly consists. We are never 
 taught to distinguish number and size in things by the 
 ' eye/ that is, by reason. The symbolism that was 
 originally intended to assist real arithmetical thought 
 has ended by supplanting it. An ignorant shepherd, 
 bricklayer, or carpenter, who is accustomed to make 
 a rapid estimate of the number of things in a mass, or 
 the area of planking in a log, has a better training in 
 real arithmetical science than some mathematicians. 
 If we are obliged to practise genuine arithmetical 
 thought in engineering, astronomy, and other profes- 
 sions, our scholastic symbolism gets realised to some 
 extent, and is a great assistance in arithmetical 
 estimation. But without this it has no more reference 
 to number and quantity than a musical education, 
 based entirely on the printed or written notation, has 
 to the appreciation of musical sounds. A book arith- 
 metician is in the position of a person thoroughly 
 acquainted with theoretical music, and who can even 
 compose music according to rule^ but who is unable to 
 distinguish a high note from a low one or harmony 
 from discord in actual sound. 
 
 It will thus be seen that it is only in the real arith- 
 metic that reasoning can enter. The judgment in 
 
Arithmetical Calculation 18 r 
 
 free arithmetical observation is the counting of actual 
 groups and the measurement of actual surfaces, and 
 the argument consists in estimating the number of 
 individuals in other groups, and the size of other sur- 
 faces, without counting or measurement. But this 
 exercise never enters into symbolic arithmetic. All 
 the apparent conclusions of book arithmetic are tauto- 
 logical ; they consist in repeating in one combination 
 of symbols the whole or part of what has been already 
 given in another combination. It is an exercise in 
 expression nothing more. 
 
 Arithmetical ratio has a resemblance to the rational 
 parallel. 3 : 5 : : 9 : 15 might be arranged thus 
 
 5 
 
 This is not argument, for two reasons, (i) The ap- 
 parent conclusion is not an effort of rational imagina- 
 tion ; it is a figure that can be obtained with infallible 
 certainty by treating the other figures according to a 
 rule, which has only to be recollected and applied. 
 (2) The relation between the left-hand figures and the 
 right-hand figures is not a categorical judgment ; it is 
 a form of resemblance, and so it cannot yield a valid 
 conclusion. 
 
1 8 2 Academical Dialectic 
 
 XXXIV GEOMETRICAL DEMONSTRATION 
 
 THIS exercise is regarded by logicians as one of the 
 purest forms of argument. It is nothing more than 
 an aid to a certain kind of perception. 
 
 Take, for instance, the fifth proposition of the first 
 book of Euclid 6 The angles at the base of an isosceles 
 triangle are equal, and if the equal sides be produced 
 the angles on the other side shall also be equal.' The 
 proposition is accompanied by a diagram of an 
 isosceles triangle with the equal sides already pro- 
 duced, so that the conditional phrasing of the propo- 
 sition does not mean that the production of the sides, 
 and what results therefrom, are future or possible 
 events which neither Euclid nor anybody else has 
 yet experienced, and the probability of which is an 
 argumentative conclusion. 
 
 What the proposition means is this : an isosceles 
 triangle of which the equal sides have been produced, 
 has equal angles on the same side of the base both 
 within and without the triangle. It is an affirmation 
 of what is, not of what we must believe to be for 
 reasons to be given. 
 
 The truth of the proposition is seen at once from 
 simple inspection of the diagram. It is an associa- 
 tion of properties related in a certain manner. It 
 
Geometrical Demonstration 183 
 
 has many relations which the geometer does not 
 mention in this proposition, but those which he men- 
 tions are seen to be correctly described as soon as 
 we direct attention to them. If we have any doubt 
 on the subject we remove it by measuring the angles. 
 
 Euclid however does not appeal to the powers of 
 inspection we can exercise in this case, and he ignores 
 our facilities for measurement. He appeals to simpler 
 and easier kinds of perception expressed in his axioms, 
 which he began by assuming we were capable of 
 exercising without demonstration. They constitute 
 what he considers the minimum power of relational 
 perception, which if a man have not he cannot be 
 taught geometry. Euclid also in this proposition 
 refers to the result of a prior demonstration, the 
 relation in which he supposes we have seized. By 
 means of these antecedents he prompts our perceptive 
 faculty up to the point of seeing the relations ex- 
 pressed in this proposition. If we saw them without 
 the prompting, the latter is superfluous ; if the rela- 
 tions do not stand the test of measurement, the 
 prompting goes for nothing. 
 
 All Euclid's demonstrations are of this sort. They 
 are pointings-out of what can be seen by inspection 
 and sufficient attention. He is not bringing a case 
 under a precedent he is describing relations in 
 things, that may serve as precedents in concrete or 
 applied geometry. The service he performs is that 
 
184 Academical Dialectic 
 
 of a connoisseur who points out the beauties of a 
 picture or landscape to a careless or uninterested 
 spectator. Relations are sometimes difficult to see 
 much more difficult than colours or masses and there 
 is a legitimate sphere of usefulness for people who 
 point out what others are apt to overlook. There is 
 no prediction in this. We are not asked to conceive 
 anything that is not before us. Geometrical demon- 
 stration thus assists perception, but does not imply 
 reasoning. Euclid does not argue he prompts. 
 
 Those who maintain that Euclid is syllogistic do 
 so on the ground that the axioms are generalisa- 
 tions, and that as often as one is cited there occurs 
 the subsumption of an object under a class-notion. 
 That would not be argument ; but let us suppose it 
 means bringing a case under a precedent. Then if 
 the axioms be precedents and the demonstration an 
 application of them to new cases, the theorem is 
 a fallacy a useless argument written to prove a 
 foregone certainty, for the conclusion can be and 
 generally is perfectly known without reference to the 
 demonstration. 
 
 It appears to me more true to regard the axioms 
 as the simplest relations, which everybody may be 
 supposed capable of perceiving, and that geometrical 
 demonstration consists in showing that other relations 
 not so apparent are really varieties or combinations 
 of the simpler relations. By using in concert with 
 
Induction 185 
 
 the axioms the relations already demonstrated, we 
 are enabled to grasp relations that would not have 
 been at all obvious on first beginning the geometrical 
 praxis. Euclid's geometry is thus a series of gradu- 
 ated lessons in a special sort of observation, not a 
 system of deductive arguments. 
 
 The educational theory that geometry is exception- 
 ally good training for the reason apart from its prac- 
 tical utility in mechanics is thus evidently a mistake. 
 Abstract geometry may induce habits of minute 
 observation and exact definition, but reason nowhere 
 enters into the study. As a rational gymnastic there 
 is nothing better than the game of chess. 
 
 XXXV INDUCTION 
 
 THOSE who contend that there is a kind of argu- 
 ment called Inductive different from the Deductive, 
 illustrate their view by some such example as the 
 following : ' This, that, and the other magnet ' [that 
 is, all the magnets we know] * attract iron ; therefore all 
 possible magnets attract iron.' They say there is an 
 irresistible compulsion in the mind to draw such a 
 conclusion from information of the kind exemplified, 
 
1 86 Academical Dialectic 
 
 and they contrast that type of thought with a deduc- 
 tive argument like' All magnets attract iron ; this 
 object is a magnet ; therefore it attracts iron.' They 
 figure the former as a progress upwards, the latter as 
 a regress downwards. 
 
 That is Induction as understood by J. S. Mill and 
 Sir William Hamilton ; on this point these philoso- 
 phers happen to agree. 
 
 The first of those arguments is a deduction with 
 the precedent omitted. Expressed in full it amounts 
 to this ' Any relation observed several times to 
 subsist between two classes of objects, and concerning 
 which no exception has ever been observed, may be 
 taken as universal ; there is such a relation between 
 known magnets and known iron ; therefore it may be 
 regarded as universal/ The precedent is not a mental 
 compulsion, but a result of experience. Induction as 
 above defined is therefore only a species of deductive 
 conclusions. 
 
 Most logicians take the word Induction in its ety- 
 mological sense, as meaning systematic observation 
 carried on with a view to obtaining a general idea of 
 some class of objects ; or of establishing a categorical 
 relation between one object or class and another, 
 by eliminating all the alternative correlatives. In 
 neither operation would Induction be argument. 
 
 In science a ' perfect induction ' is one in which all 
 existing objects of a class, or all objects related in a 
 
Aristotles Dictum 187 
 
 certain manner, have been perceived, so that there is 
 no other object concerning which a conclusion can be 
 drawn. In such cases, says Mill, there is no induc- 
 tion only a summary of experience. He evidently 
 regarded the conclusion with respect to unknown 
 cases as the essence of induction, whereas in the 
 scientific sense the induction is the positive content of 
 the idea, or the abstract relation the unknown cases 
 are ignored, or there may be none. In scientific 
 writings induction sometimes means the method of 
 observation rather than the result the method of 
 correcting inferences by perception, wherever possible. 
 
 xxxvi ARISTOTLE'S DICTUM 
 
 THIS is usually put into English thus 'Whatever 
 is affirmed or denied of a class, may be affirmed or 
 denied of any part of that class,' and such an affirma- 
 tion or denial is supposed to be an act of reason. 
 Archbishop Whately expounds the Dictum in ana- 
 lysing the following theorem Whatever exhibits 
 marks of design had an intelligent author; the 
 world exhibits marks of design ; therefore the world 
 had an intelligent author. 
 
i88 Academical Dialectic 
 
 ' In the first of these premises/ he says, ' we find it 
 assumed universally of the class of " things which 
 exhibit marks of design," that they had an intelligent 
 author ; and in the other premise, " the world " is 
 referred to that class as comprehended in it : now it 
 is evident that whatever is said of the whole of a 
 class, may be said of anything comprehended in that 
 class : so that we are thus authorised to say of the 
 world, that " it had an intelligent author." Again, 
 if we examine a syllogism with a negative conclusion, 
 as, e. g. " nothing which exhibits marks of design 
 could have been produced by chance ; the world 
 exhibits, &c. ; therefore the world could not have 
 been produced by chance : " the process of Reasoning 
 will be found to be the same; since it is evident, 
 that whatever is denied universally of any class may 
 be denied of anything that is comprehended in that 
 class. On further examination it will be found, that 
 all valid arguments whatever may be easily reduced 
 to such a form as that of the foregoing syllogisms ; 
 and that consequently the principle on which they 
 are constructed is the UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE of 
 Reasoning.' I 
 
 The examples given by Whately are perfectly valid ; 
 the first is a constructive argument in the Sixth 
 Category, the second a stigmatic in the Fifth. I have 
 in several places admitted that the arguments adduced 
 
 1 Logic, Book I. 3. 
 
Mediate Comparison 189 
 
 by syllogists are sometimes correct, the fault com- 
 plained of being in the mode in which such correct 
 arguments are interpreted. They are interpreted 
 wrongly, and then other theorems are found or made 
 agreeing with the interpretation^ and the admitted 
 soundness of the first theorems is used to procure 
 acceptance for the second. Things brought under 
 the same definition ought to be essentially alike, 
 but they are not so when the utmost latitude is taken 
 to ' assume ' that predicates have properties which 
 they obviously have not. 
 
 The objections we make to the Dictum as above 
 interpreted are (i) that in reasoning the precedent 
 (major premise) need not be a class ; (2) if it is a class, 
 it consists of all known things of_a_skrrilar kind, not 
 of all possible things of a similar kind. When inter- 
 preted in the latter sense the Dictum becomes dia- 
 lectically tautological, as has been often observed. 
 
 XXXVII MEDIATE COMPARISON 
 
 A FEW pages further on Whately gives a totally 
 different account of reasoning, without being aware 
 of his inconsistency. 
 
190 Academical Dialectic 
 
 ' Every syllogism has three, and only three terms : 
 viz. the middle term and the two terms (or extremes, 
 as they are commonly called) of the Conclusion or 
 Question. Of these, first, the subject of the conclu- 
 sion is called the minor term ; second, its predicate, 
 the major term ; and third, the middle term, (called 
 by the older logicians " Argumentum ") is that with 
 which each of them is separately compared, in order 
 to judge of their agreement or disagreement with 
 each other. If therefore there were two middle terms, 
 the extremes or terms of conclusion not being both 
 compared to the same, could not be conclusively 
 compared to each other.' x 
 
 Here reasoning is made to consist in comparing 
 two things by reference to a third which both re- 
 semble. There is not a word about classification, 
 which is declared just before in loud capitals to be 
 the universal principle of reasoning ! 
 On this definition we remark 
 
 (i) Comparison by mediation is untrustworthy, 
 unless the qualities compared be rigidly defined or 
 restricted, as in geometry and the use of standards 
 (xxil). In geometry the only two qualities recog- 
 nised are figure and magnitude. The axiom of 
 mediate comparison means that things having the same 
 magnitude as a third thing are to be considered equal, 
 though they may have different outlines. But the 
 1 Logic, Book II. c. 3. 2. 
 
Syllogism 191 
 
 axiom is liable to be untrue in things of three or 
 more qualities. Add colour. Then a white sphere 
 may resemble a white cube on the one side, and a 
 black sphere on the other, but the white cube does 
 not at all resemble the black sphere. This axiom 
 is therefore inadmissible or at least extremely risky 
 in logic, which treats of things having many qualities. 
 
 (2) Comparison, however correctly performed, is 
 never the end, but only a means, of reasoning. 
 
 XXXVIII SYLLOGISM 
 
 WE have already had two distinct definitions of 
 syllogism. According to the first it is the applica- 
 tion of class-attributes to individuals known to belong 
 to the class ; according to the second it is the com- 
 parison of two things or terms by reference to a third 
 which both resemble. When we arrive at the chapters 
 in logic books devoted to the exposition of the 
 syllogism in detail, we find that the theorems there 
 discussed do not conform to either of those defini- 
 tions. The only sort of syllogism that can be * con- 
 verted ' is one consisting of two classifications, and a 
 conclusion which predicates a classification, as thus 
 
192 Academical Dialectic 
 
 All Englishmen are Europeans j 
 John Smith is an Englishman; 
 therefore John Smith is a European. 
 
 Observe the difference between this theorem and that 
 adduced in illustration of the Dictum (xxxvi). In 
 the latter the first premise is a categorical judgment 
 and so therefore is the conclusion ; in the theorem 
 just given the first premise is a classification, and the 
 conclusion is necessarily a classification. 
 
 We first remark that such an * argument ' is never 
 met with in real spontaneous thinking it occurs only 
 in logic books. It is manufactured exclusively for 
 Peripatetic consumption. The reason it is not to be 
 found is simple the conclusion it yields is a classi- 
 fication, and that is not enough for valid argument. 
 In reasoning we may introduce a classification as the 
 minor premise that is, the proposition which brings 
 the case under the precedent but the applicate is 
 never a general or class idea. It is one or more 
 properties abstracted from the subject (whether the 
 latter be a single object or general idea), and applied 
 to the case. Merely to classify a case and so leave it 
 would answer no rational purpose. 
 
 Logicians urge in recommendation of this syllogism 
 that it gives a certain conclusion. The premises being 
 correct, the conclusion is infallibly true. 
 
 No doubt it is, for in contemplating a thing we can 
 mentally enter it into all the classes to which it 
 
Syllogism 1 93 
 
 appears to belong, whatever be their generality. 
 Knowing the class European and the individual John 
 Smith, we see at once that the latter is contained 
 in the former, and we can do this without putting 
 him first in the minor class English. It is like 
 saying, 'The pavilion is in the garden, John Smith 
 is in the pavilion, therefore he is in the garden.' Of 
 course he is ! The minor premise of a double classi- 
 fication is superfluous. The fact that such conclu- 
 sions are certain, shows how nugatory they are. We 
 are not certain of anything till it has been experi- 
 enced. In legitimate reasoning the conclusion is 
 never more than probable. The certainty of these 
 double classifications shows that we are stating what 
 we already know not imagining an ideal addition to 
 our positive knowledge. 
 
 Doctrine of the Predicate. So long as logicians 
 are permitted to fabricate their own examples, all is 
 plain sailing with the syllogism. But they are some- 
 times obliged to deal with genuine arguments. In 
 this case what they do is to assume that for logical 
 purposes every predicate of the precedent that is, 
 the applicate is a general or class term. Even 
 when an argument is good they spoil it with a bad 
 theory. 
 
 Sir William Hamilton states that up to his time 
 logicians recognised but one type of proposition that 
 
 called by him the proposition ' in extension,' which 
 
 O 
 
194 Academical Dialectic 
 
 means the classifying of the subject. He announced 
 that he intended to introduce a proposition ' in com- 
 prehension,' meaning a judgment in the category of 
 inherence as for instance, ' man is responsible.' He 
 further said that he recognised a third type of pro- 
 position, that concerning ' cause and effect.' 
 
 But in the course of working out these logical 
 novelties he seems to have discovered that they were 
 irreconcilable with conversion, and so he dropped 
 them. The judgment in comprehension, he then 
 declared, was to all intents and purposes the same 
 as one in extension, and as to causation why, a 
 cause is a class, and an effect is an individual belong- 
 ing to that class ! * 
 
 Let us see what is the result of treating applicates 
 as general ideas. Take an example in each of the 
 categories. 
 
 ' The paper is white.' This means that the paper 
 
 1 Lectures, iii. pp. 287 and 356. The impossibility of reconciling 
 their definitions and rules to real thinking and argument is the despair 
 of logicians. Most of them take to symbols, which are more accommo- 
 dating than real experience, having just such properties as their makers 
 choose to put in them. Sir William Hamilton had the courage to 
 declare that a logician might use arguments of a concrete or real form, 
 but that it is not necessary they should agree with real fact. ' The 
 logician has a right to suppose any material impossibility, any material 
 falsity ; he takes no account of what is objectively impossible or false, 
 he has a right to assume what premises he please, provided that they do 
 not involve a contradiction in terms.' Id. 322. That means in plain 
 English that a logician may misrepresent matters of fact, if he cannot 
 otherwise establish his theory ! 
 
Syllogism 195 
 
 has the property or attribute of whiteness. In logic 
 it is interpreted to mean that paper is an individual 
 of the class white. This is wrong, for there is no 
 such class. No sane person would form a class out 
 of salt, snow, milk, china, silver, the moon, and 
 other white things ; for though they have a common 
 property it is not the sign of a common human 
 utility. 
 
 The confusing a single property with a class is not 
 always owing to exigencies of syllogism. It per- 
 vades the writings of most Western metaphysicians, 
 and may be accounted for in this manner. 
 
 General ideas and abstract properties or ideas have 
 in common that they are partial recognitions of what 
 we perceive (xiv). The partition in each is however 
 made in a different way, and for a different purpose. 
 In generalisation the selection is done almost me- 
 chanically. We see many things that have some 
 common relation, function, or utility for us, and we 
 remember only so much of them as appears to be 
 necessary for the recognition of that relation or 
 utility just so much of the Intellectual experience 
 as has always accompanied the Sentimental experi- 
 ence. The process is very like that of putting a 
 piece of wood or ivory in a turning-lathe, and whit- 
 tling off all that we do not want. A general idea is 
 the useful core of a multitude of superposed observa- 
 tions, each of which had something irrelevant 
 
 O 2 
 
196 Academical Dialectic 
 
 something which it is better to forget. We whittle 
 this off and remember only the core. 
 
 Abstraction, on the other hand, is a conscious and 
 deliberate operation from beginning to end. It con- 
 sists in distinguishing one by one the properties of 
 a thing, and even treating each property as if it had 
 an independent existence. For this exercise it is not 
 necessary to observe many things : we can analyse 
 one alone, though an acquaintance with other cognate 
 objects is sometimes necessary to call our attention 
 to single properties. We need the shock of difference 
 to be able to distinguish well a fine abstraction the 
 difference between shades of colours, for example. 
 Abstraction is thus a minute attention to individuals, 
 and need not for a moment be confounded with 
 generalisation. 
 
 Another cause of the confusion in question can be 
 traced to the use of the verb * is ' to represent both 
 the relation of a thing to the general idea it has 
 contributed to form, and the relation of a single 
 property to the thing in which it inheres. We say 
 ' The man is a British subject ' classifying him ; we 
 say also ' The man is cold ' mentioning one of his 
 attributes. There is no class of cold men, and the 
 two relations have nothing in common. A class does 
 not inhere in a man as cold inheres in him. There 
 is no object corresponding to class it is a conceptual 
 creation. 
 
Syllogism 197 
 
 The ambiguity of ' is ' favours the syllogistic doc- 
 trine of predication, and there is a rule to the effect 
 that in syllogising propositions, all verbs are to be 
 converted into ' is' (or its conjugates) with a participle 
 or noun, so that if they were not before statements 
 of classification they now become such. ' He walks ' 
 is clearly no classification ; but ' he is walking' is assimi- 
 lated by false analogy to such a classification as 
 ' he is human,' and so is treated as a classification 
 by those who reason according to the Letter. 
 
 The substantive verb has no positive and uniform 
 meaning. As an auxiliary it is a mere sign of tense, 
 and in other positions it is an indefinite mark of 
 relationship, the precise meaning of which must be 
 determined by the subject and the context. It may 
 sometimes be dispensed with in classification, as 
 'Victoria Regina' ' Phillips, Dentist/ 
 
 In the second category we have such propositions 
 as ' the book lies on the table.' In syllogistic this 
 is first altered to ' the book is lying on the table,' 
 and it is feigned that ' lying on the table ' is a class 
 or general idea, and * book ' an individual of that 
 class. To interpret * the groom stands by the horse ' 
 a class has to be created, composed of the persons 
 who happen to be standing by horses. 
 
 ' The mountain is ten miles off ' is a judgment in 
 perspection. Syllogistically we are asked to believe 
 that a class of things exists having the common pro- 
 
198 Academical Dialectic 
 
 perty of being ten miles off, and that the mountain is 
 entered in that class. The absurdity of this doctrine 
 is self-evident. 
 
 In the remaining categories the reduction to 'is' 
 has, if possible, a worse effect. In changing ( Canada 
 lies west of Ireland ' into ' Canada is a country lying 
 west of Ireland,' we lose the relation in concretion, 
 and express instead a verbal definition. Instead of 
 affirming a position we explain a name. In such a 
 proposition as ' the town of A lies 100 miles due north 
 of B,' it is plain the predicate cannot be a class, for 
 only one place has the quality expressed. 
 
 In the fifth category we have such a proposition 
 as ' water freezes when the temperature falls to zero 
 Centigrade.' This is turned into a substantive sen- 
 tence by saying ' water is that liquid which freezes,' 
 &c., which is a verbal or identical proposition. 
 
 ' Cecrops founded Athens ' is a judgment in causa- 
 tion. In turning it into ' Cecrops was (or is) the 
 founder of Athens,' we emphasise the man's name, 
 but the relation signified by ' founded ' is slurred over 
 or lost sight of. Boole converts ' Caesar conquered 
 the Gauls ' into ' Caesar is he who conquered the 
 Gauls,' l and this he interpreted as classification. We 
 need not be surprised that he should suppose a class 
 could be formed by one individual, for he elsewhere 
 tells us that Nothing is a class. 2 
 
 1 Laws of Thought, p. 35. 2 Ibid. p. 47. 
 
Syllogism 199 
 
 Classification is not judgment of any sort it is 
 a variety of recollection. Logicians imagine it is the 
 only judgment, and so far as they can they degrade 
 true judgments to that spurious form. 
 
 Moods of the Syllogism. Having persuaded them- 
 selves that classification is the beginning, middle, and 
 end of reasoning, logicians next proceed to divide 
 the matter of their science. 
 
 Modern logicians who have some acquaintance with 
 real thinking as exemplified in works of physical 
 science, can, if acting according to their natural intelli- 
 gence, lay down correct rules for dividing a subject. 
 These are simple and obvious : divide according to 
 fundamental resemblance let each division correspond 
 to some definite human utility let the more impor- 
 tant properties take precedence of the less important, 
 and so forth : the merest common sense. 
 
 But in the division of their own subject they follow 
 Aristotle, and so lose their way. 
 
 It is plain that an act of reasoning is a mental 
 thing in the first place, and only when uttered, and 
 thus in a secondary sense, is it a material object. 
 The classification of arguments should therefore follow 
 mental characteristics. Logicians make it follow the 
 material characteristics of the terms in which the 
 arguments are uttered. Their moods of the syllo- 
 gism are mere varieties of expression, not varieties 
 of reason. 
 
2co Academical Dialectic 
 
 The number of these moods is accidental, depend- 
 ing on flexibility of language and ingenuity in in- 
 venting varieties of syntax. Mere transposition of 
 premises constitutes a difference of mood. Logicians 
 however pretend to base their numeration on a more 
 general necessity. They calculate from the distinctive 
 parts of the three propositions forming a syllogism, 
 varied by negation, &c., that there ought to be sixty-four 
 moods. Experience proves that in spite of their free 
 and easy method of multiplying syllogistic varieties 
 they cannot produce anything like that number. One 
 logician has thirty-six moods, another thirty-two, a 
 third eleven ; the more orthodox fix the number at 
 nineteen. But they all admit that every argument 
 can be reduced to one of four fundamental types the 
 moods of the First Figure. Why then have more 
 classes than these four ? Because, says Whately, it 
 would be ' occasionally tedious ' to reduce every argu- 
 ment to the first figure. 
 
 If the n, 19, 32, or 36 classes were natural argu- 
 ments taken down untouched from men's lips, and it 
 was found to be useless and troublesome to reduce them 
 to four artificial forms, the plea might be admitted. 
 But the so-called valid syllogisms are themselves 
 artificial, and just as tedious to make as the moods 
 of the first figure. Not only so, but an elaborate 
 system of mnemonic rules is provided for reducing 
 the valid moods to the fundamental moods, thus 
 
Syllogism 201 
 
 admitting that the former are only intermediate halt- 
 ing places between the natural speech and the funda- 
 mental moods. It is expected that the intermediates 
 should be reduced to the first figure. 
 
 Is there anything analogous to this sort of division 
 in any science or branch of practical thought ? Would 
 logicians themselves sanction such a classification in 
 a natural science ? If a zoologist, for example, were 
 to determine beforehand how many classes of animals 
 there ought to be, would they not say he was acting 
 improperly? If, after discovering that he had five 
 times as many classes as he could find animals to 
 put into them, he still retained his classification and 
 required his pupils to write out the names or symbols 
 of all the useless classes would not logicians be apt 
 to call him a pedant? Yet in a modern work on 
 logic such a task is prescribed for students : 
 
 'Write out the sixty-four moods of the syllogism, 
 and strike out the fifty -three invalid one si 
 
 We might have excused the existence of a merely 
 verbal classification in logic, if it were accompanied 
 by and subordinated to a classification of theorems 
 considered as mental facts. But in syllogistic the 
 verbal is the dominant classification, and we have seen 
 from the procedure of Sir William Hamilton in drop- 
 ping his categorical judgments that when the two 
 principles of division conflict, it is the mental which 
 
202 
 
 Academical Dialectic 
 
 has to give way. The Letter is allowed to kill the 
 Spirit. 
 
 All the Moods reducible to One. Syllogists appear 
 not to know their own schematism very well. They 
 say there are four ultimate moods, which it is im- 
 possible to reduce to any lower number. But since 
 each of the four is, mentally, a double classification, 
 it must be possible to reflect this common property in 
 the mode of expression. The difference between them 
 can only be verbal. Let us adopt another than the 
 ordinary symbolism. 
 
 Cut a card into three triangular pieces of unequal 
 size, and call them by the letters A, B, C, beginning 
 with the largest. These are the terms of the syllogism. 
 
 Celarent. 
 
 Darii. 
 
 Ferio. 
 
 The first mood Barbara is formed by placing the 
 cards on top of each other, so that B is within the 
 
Syllogism 203 
 
 margin of A, and C within the margin of B. This is 
 the syllogism, ' All B is A, all C is B, therefore all C 
 is A/ 
 
 Next let B and C be as above, but let A be wholly 
 apart from both. This is Celarent : * No B is A, all 
 C is B, therefore no C is A.' 
 
 In Darii the whole of B is in A, but only a part of 
 C coincides with B. The syllogism is : c All B is A, 
 some C is B, therefore some C is A.' 
 
 In Ferio A is again wholly separated from the 
 others, and C is only partially in B. Argument : ' No 
 B is A, some C is B, therefore some C is not A.' 
 
 It is to be remembered that all the other figures 
 and moods are reducible to the above figure of four 
 moods, so that the reduction applicable to the latter 
 is equally applicable to the former. 
 
 To reduce Darii to Barbara all that is necessary is 
 to ignore the dotted part of C. That is suggested by 
 the use of the word ' some/ which has a correlative 
 ' all ' or * others.' But the correlative quantity does 
 not enter into the syllogism, and we know nothing 
 about it. It may not even exist. We are therefore 
 at liberty to substitute for * some C ' the name D, and 
 consider it an integer instead of a fraction. Then we 
 have the Barbara syllogism: ' All B is A, all D ( = 
 some C) is B, therefore all D is A.' The phrase ' all 
 of some ' is quite allowable : ' I met some firemen, all 
 of whom wore brass helmets.' 
 
204 Academical Dialectic 
 
 Ferio in the same manner is reduced to Celarent. 
 The dotted part of C is cut away, and the part really 
 significant in the syllogism is called E. Then ' No B 
 is A, all E is B, no E is A.' 
 
 Finally Celarent can be reduced to Barbara. B 
 cannot indeed be enclosed in A, but we assume the 
 existence of a whole having all the characters which 
 A has not, or having none of the characters which A 
 has. This is the whole F = Not-A. Then Celarent 
 becomes Barbara thus : ' All B is F, all C is B, there- 
 fore all C is F.' 
 
 This demonstrates that there is only one funda- 
 mental operation where syllogists suppose there are 
 at least four. The difference is wholly a matter of 
 language, and disappears on changing the names of 
 the terms and ignoring irrelevant suggestions. But 
 the syllogism, I repeat, does not represent the act of 
 reasoning, and its moods and figures are fit only to 
 be a game for children. 
 
STUDIES IN DIALECTIC 
 
 XXXIX 
 
 THE theorems given for practice in logic books are 
 useful dialectic material, but they do not fully illus- 
 trate all the categories. Logicians have no definite 
 categories, and in selecting examples they are uncon- 
 sciously biassed in favour of those that can be most 
 easily interpreted to signify classification. The really 
 generalistic examples are rare ; the most are judg- 
 ments of inherence, admitted in virtue of the assump- 
 tion that inherent properties can when it is needful 
 to preserve the traditional notion of predication be 
 considered class-ideas. Theorems in perspection and 
 concretion we do not expect to find in logic books, 
 for these, in so far as they are distinct from asso- 
 ciation, are categories peculiar to the Berkeleyan 
 philosophy. 
 
206 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 Whately has the following example in association 
 ' Lias lies above red sandstone ; red sandstone lies 
 above coal ; therefore lias lies above coal/ No doubt 
 Whately would, in syllogising this, have changed the 
 propositions to ' Red sandstone is lying/ &c., and 
 have assumed that c lying above coal ' is a class to 
 which red sandstone belongs. 
 
 Here are examples of arguments in inherence 
 
 A hot skin, quick pulse, intense thirst have in- 
 variably in my experience coexisted with fever ; the 
 person now examined exhibits these symptoms, so I 
 infer that he has a fever. 
 
 Great width of skull between the ears is invariably 
 found united with a destructive temperament ; this 
 animal's skull is very wide between the ears ; hence it 
 may be concluded that he has a destructive tempera- 
 ment. 
 
 Cloven feet belong universally i.e. as far as our 
 experience goes to horned animals ; we may con- 
 clude that this fossil animal, since it appears to have 
 had cloven feet, was horned. 
 
 I. 
 
 Cloven feet 
 
 Fossil animal appears to 
 have had cloven feet 
 
 inhere with horns 
 
 it is probable he 
 had horns 
 
Studies in Dialectic 207 
 
 When an architect, contemplating the fragments 
 of a building, restores it in imagination after the 
 analogy of similar buildings, we have an argument in 
 inherence. Such speculations are generally too long 
 and complex for analysis, but an instructive ex- 
 ample occurs in Canon Rawlinson's Seventh Oriental 
 Monarchy, which I will venture to quote, marking 
 the phrases that introduce or express the rational 
 idea. Observe the difference of style between this, 
 which is real practical reasoning, and the trivial 
 certainties of Syllogistic. 
 
 ' What remains of this massive erection [the Takht- 
 i-Khosru, or palace of Chosroes Anushirwan, at 
 Ctesiphon] is a mere fragment, which, to judge from 
 the other extant Sassanian ruins, cannot have formed 
 so much as one fourth part of the original edifice. 
 Nothing has come down to our day but a single 
 vaulted hall on the grandest scale, together with the 
 mere outer wall of what no doubt constituted the 
 main facade of the building. The apartments, which, 
 according to all analogy, must have existed at the two 
 sides, and in the rear, of the great hall, some of which 
 should have been vaulted, have wholly perished. 
 Imagination may supply them from the Firuzabad, or 
 the Mashita palace ; but not a trace, even of their 
 foundations, is extant ; and the details consequently 
 are uncertain, though the general plan can scarcely 
 be doubted. At each side of the great hall were 
 probably two lateral ones, communicating with each 
 other, and capable of being entered either from the 
 
208 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 hall or from the outer air. Beyond the great hall 
 was probably a domed chamber equalling it in width, 
 and opening upon a court, round which were a 
 number of moderate-sized apartments. The entire 
 building was no doubt an oblong square, of which the 
 shorter sides seem to have measured 370 feet. It 
 had at least three, and may not improbably have 
 had a larger number of entrances, since it belongs to 
 tranquil times and a secure locality.' 
 
 The most notable argument in the category of 
 concretion is undoubtedly the inference as to the 
 sphericity of the earth. Next is the sub-inference 
 by Columbus that China could be reached by sailing 
 westward from Portugal. If the syllogistic opinion 
 were valid that a conclusion must be absolutely 
 true or absolutely false the expedition of Columbus 
 was based on a fallacy. Most people think it was 
 eminently rational. 
 
 No one has seen the north or the south poles, and 
 the conviction that they could be realised, if certain 
 difficulties of transport were overcome, is a sub 
 inference of the same character. 
 
 Here is a common type of inference in perspection 
 III. 
 
 That church 
 
 A man appears on 
 the roof of the ch. 
 
 is loo yards off 
 
 he is 100 ys, off 
 
Studies in Dialectic 209 
 
 And this 
 
 III. 
 That distant house is 60 ft. high 
 
 It appears to be scaffolded 
 to a third of its height 
 
 the scaffold is about 
 20 feet high 
 
 In these cases we have not seen the man or the 
 scaffolding before, and have not measured the latter 
 or the distance to the former : the conclusions are 
 imaginary judgments fairly drawn from known pre- 
 mises. 
 
 The deciphering of hieroglyphics, cuneiform in- 
 scriptions, and remains of other dead and forgotten 
 languages, is argument in causation. Examples 
 cannot conveniently be quoted even in a condensed 
 form, but this kind of reasoning is most interesting 
 dialectically from the slightness of the analogies that 
 are nevertheless found to give valid conclusions. 
 
 This is considered argument by Whately 
 I. 
 
 Louis 
 
 The governor of France 
 is Louis 
 
 is a good king 
 
 therefore the g. of F. is 
 a good king 
 
 The supposed case is a verbal proposition, serving to 
 rename the subject of precedent. There is no reason- 
 ing. If we already know that Louis is a good king 
 and is also the governor of France (the given matters 
 
 p 
 
2i o Studies in Dialectic 
 
 of fact), there is no rational imagination involved in 
 rearranging these data as in the proposed con- 
 clusion. 
 
 ' He who calls you a man speaks truly ; he who 
 calls you a fool calls you a man ; therefore he who 
 calls you a fool speaks truly.' A fallacy of cross 
 reasoning, and the predicate is a class. 
 
 All fools 
 
 You are a man 
 
 are men 
 
 N. C. 
 
 1 Nothing is heavier than platina; feathers are 
 heavier than nothing ; therefore feathers are heavier 
 than platina. 5 A trivial equivoque. 
 
 The following is more subtle. ' Theft is a crime ; 
 theft was encouraged by the laws of Sparta ; therefore 
 the laws of Sparta encouraged crime.' At most the 
 laws of Sparta encouraged one crime ; but there is 
 a fallacy of equivocation. Taking things surrepti- 
 tiously from the person in whose possession they may 
 be, is not a crime is not theft in a society so com- 
 munistic as the Spartan. There it was encouraged as 
 an exercise in adroitness. This example shows the 
 necessity of knowing the matter of the argument. 
 
 * Warm countries alone produce wine ; Spain is a 
 warm country ; therefore Spain produces wine.' 
 
Studies in Dialectic 
 
 V. 
 
 Wine 
 
 Spain is a warm c. 
 
 is p. in w. countries 
 
 N.C. 
 
 ' Meat and drink are necessaries of life ; the re- 
 venues of Vitellius were spent in meat and drink ; 
 therefore the revenues of Vitellius were spent on the 
 necessaries of life.' Fallacy of composition : meat 
 and drink in moderate quantities are necessaries of 
 one life, but not food of every kind and in excessive 
 quantities. 
 
 * He who is most hungry eats most ; he who eats 
 least is most hungry ; therefore he who eats least 
 eats most.' A fallacy of accident : he who eats least 
 does not at the same time eat most. 
 
 ' Whatever body is in motion must move either in 
 the place where it is, or in the place where it is not ; 
 neither of these is possible ; therefore there is no such 
 thing as motion.' It is an abuse of reason to 
 attempt to disprove matters of fact. The conclusion 
 of an argument being always problematical, it can 
 have no force against actual experience. We ex- 
 perience motion, therefore it cannot be disproved. 
 
 ' A wise lawgiver must either recognise the rewards 
 and punishments of a future state, or he must be able 
 
 P 2 
 
212 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 to appeal to an extraordinary Providence, dispensing 
 them regularly in this life; Moses did not do the 
 former, therefore he must have done the latter' 
 (Warburton, from Whately). The reasoner omitted 
 to establish that Moses was a wise lawgiver, so that 
 the precedent does not apply to his case, except by 
 courtesy. 
 
 ' That man is independent of the caprices of fortune 
 who places his chief happiness in moral and in- 
 tellectual excellence ; a true philosopher is inde- 
 pendent of the caprices of fortune ; therefore a true 
 philosopher is one who places his chief happiness in 
 moral and intellectual excellence.' An instance of 
 cross reasoning. 
 
 I. 
 
 He who places 
 
 Philosopher is independent 
 
 is independent 
 
 N.C. 
 
 ( For those who are bent on cultivating their minds 
 by diligent study, the incitement of academical 
 honours is unnecessary ; and for the idle it is in- 
 effectual, for such are indifferent to mental improve- 
 ment ; therefore the incitement of academical honours 
 is either unnecessary or ineffectual.' 
 
 A fallacy of doubtful precedent : because two kinds of 
 students are not benefited by the hope of honours 
 
Studies in Dialectic 213 
 
 it is prematurely concluded that no others exist who 
 may be so benefited. 
 
 ' He who bears arms at the command of the magis- 
 trate does what is lawful for a Christian ; the Swiss in 
 the French service, and the British in the American 
 service, bore arms at the command of the magistrate ; 
 therefore they did what is lawful for a Christian.' 
 
 The conclusion is valid so far as the information 
 given enables us to judge. If we know from other 
 sources that the Swiss and British who are referred 
 to, committed atrocities at the command of the magis- 
 trate, the conclusion is a fallacy of accident. In 
 general it is lawful to obey a magistrate, but there 
 may be particular cases when it is not. 
 
 ' Anyone who is candid will refrain from condemn- 
 ing a book without reading it ; some reviewers do not 
 refrain from this ; therefore some reviewers are not 
 candid.' This is cross reasoning and invalid. It is 
 one thing to say that the uncandid do not refrain, and 
 another that all who do not refrain are uncandid. 
 The conclusion is taken from the latter proposition, 
 which is not asserted. 
 
 ' Everyone desires happiness ; virtue is happiness ; 
 therefore everyone desires virtue.' 
 
214 
 
 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 I. 
 
 Whoever desires an effect desires the cause of that effect 
 
 Everyone desires the hap- 
 piness which is caused 
 by virtue 
 
 everyone desires virtue 
 
 The case is manifestly untrue. 
 
 ' He who has a confirmed habit of any kind of 
 action exercises no self-denial in the practice of that 
 action ; a good man has a confirmed habit of virtue ; 
 therefore he who exercises self-denial in the practice 
 of virtue is not a good man.' (Arist. Eth. Bk. II., 
 from Whately.) 
 
 VI. I. 
 
 He who has a 
 
 habit, &c. 
 
 exercises no self- 
 denial 
 
 He who exercisesno 
 self-denial in the 
 practice of virtue 
 
 is good 
 
 A good man has 
 this habit with 
 respect to virtue 
 
 He exercises no 
 self-denial with 
 respect to virtue 
 
 He who does exer- 
 cise, &c. 
 
 N. C. 
 
 The conclusion drawn is fallacious, the second theorem 
 being based on contrast. 
 
 ( According to theologians, a man must possess 
 faith to be acceptable to the Deity ; now he who 
 believes all the fables of heathen mythology must 
 possess faith ; therefore such a one must, according to 
 theologians, be acceptable to the Deity.' 
 
 'Faith' is ambiguous, meaning in the precedent, 
 
Studies in Dialectic 215 
 
 spiritual aspiration, and in the case ignorant 
 credulity. 
 
 * No evil should be allowed that good may come of 
 it ; all punishment is an evil ; therefore no punish- 
 ment should be allowed that good may come of it.' 
 ( Evil ' is ambiguous, meaning wrong-doing in the 
 precedent and pain in the case ; the conclusion is 
 therefore fallacious. 
 
 ( The principles of justice are variable ; the ap- 
 pointments of nature are invariable ; therefore the 
 principles of justice are no appointments of nature.' 
 (Arist. Eth. Bk. V., from Whately.) The terms ' prin- 
 ciples of justice ' and ' nature ' require to be defined. 
 It might be said that justice is one principle, every- 
 where and always the same, and that only its embodi- 
 ments in law and custom are variable. 
 
 ' What happens every day is not improbable ; some 
 things, against which the chances are many thousands 
 to one, happen every day ; therefore some things 
 against which the chances are many thousands to 
 one, are not improbable.' A fallacy of division : that 
 improbable things in general happen every day does 
 not render the occurrence of any one a probable 
 event. 
 
216 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 6 Protection from punishment is plainly due to the 
 innocent ; therefore, as you maintain that this person 
 ought not to be punished, it appears that you are 
 convinced of his innocence.' A fallacy of cross rea- 
 soning. 
 
 I. 
 
 Innocent persons 
 
 This person deserves protection 
 
 deserve protection 
 
 N.C. 
 
 ' He who cannot possibly act otherwise than he 
 does, has neither merit nor demerit in his action ; a 
 liberal and benevolent man cannot possibly act other- 
 wise than he does in relieving the poor ; therefore 
 such a man has neither merit nor demerit in his 
 action.' To f have merit in an action ' is scarcely 
 intelligible. A man's merit is in his character, and 
 his actions are effects and signs of character. 
 
 'All the fish that the net inclosed were an indis- 
 criminate mixture of various kinds ; those that were 
 set aside and saved as valuable were fish that the net 
 inclosed ; therefore those that were set aside and 
 saved as valuable were an indiscriminate mixture 
 of various kinds.' 
 
 An instance of the fallacy of division : what is true 
 of the whole contents of the net is not necessarily true 
 of a portion of the contents. 
 
Studies in Dialectic 217 
 
 * A desire to gain by another's loss is a violation of 
 the tenth commandment ; all gaming, therefore, since 
 it implies a desire to profit at the expense of another, 
 involves a breach of the tenth commandment.' A 
 valid argument in inherence. 
 
 All desire to gain by, c. 
 
 Gaming involves this kind of desire 
 
 violates 
 
 it violates 
 
 * He that destroys a man who usurps despotic 
 power in a free country, deserves well of his country- 
 men ; Brutus destroyed Caesar, who usurped despotic 
 power in Rome ; therefore he deserved well of the 
 Romans.' If Rome was * a free country ' the conclu- 
 sion is valid. 
 
 * No fish suckles its young ; the whale suckles its 
 young ; the whale is therefore no fish.' 
 
 I. 
 
 What suckles 
 
 Whale suckles 
 
 is no-fish 
 
 it is no-fish 
 
 ' This explosion must have been occasioned by 
 gunpowder, for nothing else would have possessed 
 sufficient force.' 
 
2l8 
 
 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 V. 
 
 Explosions of a certain 
 destructiveness 
 
 This explosion has that 
 destructiveness 
 
 can only be occasioned by 
 gunpowder 
 
 it must have been occasioned 
 by gtmpowder 
 
 ' Every man should be moderate, for excess will 
 cause disease.' 
 
 V. 
 To avoid disease moderation is requisite 
 
 Every man should avoid 
 disease 
 
 every man should be 
 moderate 
 
 ' Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain 
 mercy.' 
 
 I. 
 
 To obtain mercy 
 
 Those who show mercy 
 obtain mercy 
 
 is blessed 
 
 they must be considered 
 blessed 
 
 ' Some speculative men are unworthy of trust ; for 
 they are unwise, and no unwise man can be trusted.' 
 
 Unwise men 
 
 are not to be trusted 
 
 Some speculative men 
 
 they are not to be trusted 
 
 are unwise 
 
Studies in Dialectic 
 
 219 
 
 ' No idle person can be a successful writer of his- 
 tory ; therefore Hume, Macaulay, Hallam and Grote 
 must have been industrious.' 
 
 I. 
 
 Successful historians are not idle persons 
 
 Hume and the rest were 
 successful historians 
 
 they cannot have been 
 idle persons 
 
 ' Lithium is an element ; for it is an alkali-producing 
 substance, which is a metal, which is an element.' 
 Fallacy of no-application. 
 
 Every alk. prod, 
 subst. 
 
 is a metal 
 
 Every metal 
 
 is an element 
 
 L. is alk. p. subst. 
 
 it is a metal 
 
 L. is a metal 
 
 it is an element 
 
 ' Rational beings are accountable for their actions ; 
 brutes not being rational, are therefore exempt from 
 responsibility.' 
 
 I. 
 Rational beings are accountable 
 
 Brutes not rational 
 
 N. C. 
 
 ' Whatever tends to withdraw the mind from pur- 
 suits of a low nature deserves to be promoted ; classi- 
 cal learning does this, since it gives us a taste for 
 
Studies in Dialectic 
 
 intellectual enjoyments ; therefore it deserves to be 
 promoted.' 
 
 V. I. 
 
 Whatever gives tends Whatever tends I deserves 
 
 Learning gives it tends Learning tends it deserves 
 
 1 Bacon was a great lawyer and statesman ; and as 
 he was also a philosopher, we may infer that any 
 philosopher may be a great lawyer and statesman.'- 
 The theorem infers the general inherence of philo- 
 sophy with eminence in law and politics, from the 
 single instance of Bacon : it is evidently a fallacy of 
 doubtful precedent. 
 
 ' Snowdon is the highest mountain in England and 
 Wales. Snowdon is not so high as Ben Nevis. There- 
 fore the highest mountain in England and Wales is 
 not so high as Ben Nevis.' 
 
 This means : ' the highest mountain in England and 
 Wales is called Snowdon, and it is not so high as Ben 
 Nevis.' The apparent conclusion merely repeats 
 a part of the information given already. There is no 
 case. The following is a theorem of the same 
 kind 
 
 ' Lithium is the lightest metal known. Lithium is 
 the metal indicated by one bright line in the spectrum. 
 
Studies in Dialectic 221 
 
 Therefore the lightest metal known is the metal in- 
 dicated by a spectrum of one bright line/ 
 
 ' If ye were Abraham's children, ye would do the 
 works of Abraham/ 
 
 VI. 
 
 Abraham's children 
 
 If ye were his children 
 
 do his works 
 
 ye would do his works 
 
 * Since all metals are elements, the most rare of all 
 the metals must be the most rare of all the elements/ 
 There is a suppressed precedent to the effect that 
 the most rare individual of a species must be the 
 most rare of its genus, which may or may not be 
 true. 
 
 * All vice is odious ; but avarice is a vice ; for it 
 makes men slaves ; therefore avarice is odious/ 
 
 V. I. 
 
 Whatever enslaves is a vice I All vice is odious 
 
 Avarice enslaves 
 
 it is a vice I Avarice is a vice it is odious 
 
 ' Bucephalus is a horse ; a, horse is a quadruped ; a 
 
222 
 
 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 quadruped is an animal ; an animal is a substance ; 
 therefore Bucephalus is a substance.' 
 
 All horses 
 
 are quads. 
 
 Quads. 
 
 animals 
 
 Animal 
 
 substance 
 
 Bu. is a h. 
 
 he is q. 
 
 B. is quad. 
 
 he is an. 
 
 Bu. is an. 
 
 he is subst. 
 
 This is what logicians call a Sorites. There may 
 be a chain of valid arguments, in which the conclusion 
 of one is precedent or case of the next ; but the 
 propositions just quoted do not make an argument, 
 being merely a string of classifications. If we know 
 what Bucephalus and substance mean, we know by 
 perception that Bucephalus is a substance. 
 
 ' Every being is then happy when it acquires the 
 proper perfection of its nature ; and consequently all 
 vital beings are capable of receiving felicity that are 
 capable of arriving at the perfection of their nature.' 
 
 I. 
 
 Every being that acquires 
 
 All vital beings capable 
 of acquiring 
 
 is happy 
 
 must be capable of receiv- 
 ing felicity 
 
 This is perilously near tautology ; it can be saved 
 only by assuming that ' every being capable of happi- 
 ness ' is a more extensive class than c all vital 
 beings capable of arriving at the perfection of their 
 nature.' 
 
Studies in Dialectic 223 
 
 ' The soul's debility is not owing to her lapse into 
 matter ; for as this lapse is voluntary, the soul must 
 have sinned prior to her descent.' 
 
 VI. 
 
 Voluntary lapse 
 
 Soul's lapse is v. 
 
 proves prior sin 
 
 her debility must have been 
 
 antecedent to lapse 
 
 Cogito ergo sum. 
 
 I. 
 Whatever thinks I is 
 
 I think I I must believe that I am 
 
 That we exist is the most certain fact we know : it 
 cannot be strengthened by any argumentation. If 
 we can doubt that we are> we can with better reason 
 doubt that we think. 
 
 Here is Hamilton's example of a disjunctive syllo- 
 gism, which he considered a valid argument 'The 
 hope of immortality is either a rational expectation 
 or an illusion ; but the hope of immortality is a 
 rational expectation ; therefore the hope of immor- 
 tality is not an illusion.' It is a flagrant tautologism. 
 
 * If man be not a morally responsible being, he 
 must want either the power of recognising moral good 
 
224 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 (as an intelligent agent), or the power of willing it 
 (as a free agent) ; but man wants neither of these 
 powers ; therefore man is a morally responsible 
 being.' 
 
 Adopted by Hamilton from Krug and given as valid. 
 It is first a fallacy of contrast, and if amended in this 
 respect it would still be a fallacy of tautology. 
 
 I. 
 
 If m. lacked certain pp. 
 
 He does not lack these pp. 
 
 he would be irresp. 
 
 N. C. 
 
 ' If Aeschines joined in the public rejoicings, he is 
 inconsistent ; if he did not, he is unpatriotic ; but he 
 either joined, or not, therefore he is either inconsistent 
 or unpatriotic.' An excellent specimen of logicians' 
 logic : on a par with this If it is fine weather, I go ; 
 if it rains, I stay ; it must either rain or be fine, there- 
 fore I must either go or stay. 
 
 * If the world were eternal, the most useful arts, 
 such as painting, &c. would be of unknown antiquity : 
 and on the same supposition there would be records 
 long prior to the Mosaic ; and likewise the sea and 
 land in all parts of the globe might be expected to 
 maintain the same relative situations now as formerly: 
 
Studies in Dialectic 225 
 
 but none of these is the fact : therefore the world is 
 not eternal.' 
 
 If some things were different 
 from what they are 
 
 They are not different 
 
 the w. would be eternal 
 
 N.C. 
 
 1 If the world existed from eternity, there would be 
 records prior to the Mosaic ; and if it were produced 
 by chance, it would not bear marks of design : there 
 are no records prior to the Mosaic, and the world 
 does bear marks of design : therefore it neither existed 
 from eternity, nor is it the work of chance.' 
 
 Two theorems are here mixed together, both fallacies 
 of contrast 
 
 Existence of records 
 
 would prove the w. etern. 
 
 Records do not exist 
 
 Non-existence of marks 
 
 the w. is non-eternal 
 
 The marks exist 
 
 wd. pr. w. made by chance 
 w. was not made by chance 
 
 ' If this man were wise, he would not speak irreve- 
 rently of Scripture in jest ; and if he were good he 
 would not do so in earnest ; but he does it, either in 
 jest or earnest ; therefore he is either not wise or not 
 good.' 
 
 Q 
 
226 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 As it stands this is quite circular, but it might be 
 rendered valid by generalisation : 
 
 VI. 
 
 To speak irrev. of Scr. in 
 jest or earnest 
 
 This man does it 
 
 indicates that a man is not 
 wise or not good 
 
 we must infer that he is not 
 iv. or not g. 
 
 ' If virtue were a habit worth acquiring, it must 
 ensure either power, or wealth, or honour, or plea- 
 sure ; but virtue ensures none of these ; therefore 
 virtue is not a habit worth attaining.' Fallacy of 
 contrast 
 
 I. 
 
 What ensures 
 
 is worth 
 
 V. does not ensure N. C. 
 
 'If men are not likely to be influenced in the 
 performance of a known duty by taking an oath to 
 perform it, the oaths commonly administered are 
 superfluous ; if they are likely to be so influenced, 
 everyone should be made to take an oath to behave 
 rightly throughout his life ; but one or other must 
 be the case ; therefore either the oaths commonly 
 administered are superfluous, or everyone should be 
 made to take an oath to behave rightly throughout 
 his life.' This will be more intelligible if contracted 
 
Studies in Dialectic 227 
 
 thus : If oaths fail to influence they are superfluous ; 
 if they influence they should be obligatory ; but they 
 either influence or do not ; therefore they are either 
 superfluous or should be obligatory. There is no 
 argument ; the alternative conclusions merely repeat 
 the alternative precedents. 
 
 ' If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary ; but virtue 
 is voluntary ; therefore so is vice.' (Arist. Eth. Bk. III. 
 quoted by Whately.) This is a circular way of saying 
 that we believe it to be a fact that vice is voluntary. 
 The argumentative form is probably supposed to give 
 the assertion greater weight than it would have if 
 expressed as a perceptual judgment. 
 
 This is valid argument, according to Hamilton 
 4 If man were suited to live out of society, he would 
 either be a god or a beast ; but man is neither 
 a god nor a beast ; therefore he is not suited to 
 live out of society.' It has faults of contrast and 
 tautology. 
 
 I. 
 
 Only gods and beasts 
 
 are suited 
 
 Man is neither g. nor b. N. C. 
 
 If iron is impure, it is brittle ; but this iron is 
 Q 2 
 
228 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 impure ; therefore it is brittle.' A valid dogmatic 
 argument. 
 
 I. 
 
 Impure iron 
 
 This iron is imp. 
 
 is brittle 
 
 it must be br. 
 
 ' If the weather is fine, we shall go into the country ; 
 now the weather is fine, therefore we shall go into the 
 country.' We never get beyond the simple judgment 
 that our going into the country is associated with fine 
 weather. 
 
 The following is valid : ' As often as the weather 
 is fine, my brother has a habit of going into the 
 country ; if the weather be fine to-morrow I infer 
 that he will go into the country.' Here a particular 
 hypothetical case is illustrated by reference to a 
 general habit. 
 
 ' As often as the weather is fine my brother goes 
 into the country ; if it be not fine to-morrow I con- 
 clude that he will not go into the country.' A fallacy 
 of contrast : we are not informed in the antecedents 
 what the brother does on wet days. 
 
Studies in Dialectic 229 
 
 ' If there are sharpers in the company we ought not 
 to gamble ; but there are no sharpers in the company ; 
 therefore we ought to gamble.' 
 
 I. 
 
 Presence of sh. 
 
 Absence of sh. 
 
 forbids to gamble 
 
 N. C. 
 
 1 Logic as it was cultivated by the schoolmen 
 proved a fruitless study ; therefore logic as it is 
 cultivated at the present day must be a fruitless 
 study likewise.' We must take the conclusion as 
 valid, until we know in what respects modern logic 
 is superior to scholastic logic. 
 
 * Few treatises of science convey important truths, 
 without any admixture of error, in a perspicuous and 
 interesting form : therefore though a treatise would 
 deserve much attention which should possess such 
 excellence, it is plain that few treatises of science do 
 deserve much attention.' 
 
 This means no more than that treatises of a certain 
 excellence would deserve attention, and that there are 
 few of them. There is no argument. 
 
 * Some objects of great beauty answer no other 
 purpose but to gratify the sight : many flowers have 
 
2 3 
 
 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 great beauty ; and many of them accordingly answer 
 no other purpose than to gratify the sight.' 
 
 I. 
 
 Some obj. which answer 
 
 Many flowers are beaut. 
 
 are beautiful 
 
 N. C. 
 
 ' None but Whites are civilised ; the ancient Ger- 
 mans were Whites ; therefore they were civilised.' 
 
 All civilised nations 
 
 Anc. Ger. were Wh. 
 
 are Whites 
 
 N. C. 
 
 ( Wilkes was a favourite with the populace ; he who 
 is a favourite with the populace must understand how 
 to manage them ; he who understands how to manage 
 them must be well acquainted with their character ; 
 he who is well acquainted with their character must 
 hold them in contempt ; therefore Wilkes must have 
 held the populace in contempt.' 
 
 Favourites 
 
 must kn. how to 
 manage 
 
 He who kn. how 
 to manage 
 
 must be ac- 
 quainted 
 
 W. was a fav. 
 He who is acq. 
 
 he knew how to man. 
 must despise 
 
 W. knew 
 
 he was acq. 
 
 W. was acq. 
 
 he must have desp. 
 
 Something has existed from eternity. For since 
 
Studies in Dialectic 231 
 
 something now is, it is manifest that something always 
 was. Otherwise the things that now are must have 
 risen out of nothing, absolutely and without cause. 
 Which is a plain contradiction in terms. For to say 
 a thing is produced, and yet that there is no cause at 
 all of that production, is to say that something is 
 effected when it is effected by nothing, that is, at the 
 same time when it is not effected at all. Whatever 
 exists has a cause of its existence, either in the 
 necessity of its own nature, and then it must have 
 been of itself eternal : or in the will of some other 
 being, and then that other being must, at least in the 
 order of nature and causality, have existed before it.' 
 
 In this theorem we have a case ' Something is ' ; 
 and a conclusion ' Something has existed from 
 eternity.' The reasoner seeks a credible or conceiv- 
 able precedent by which to connect that conclusion 
 with the case. 
 
 We are offered a choice of two theorems. The 
 first is untenable, for we have never had the experience 
 that is given as precedent ; it is also tautological, as 
 the ' something ' of the case is the ' whatever ' of the 
 precedent. 
 
 V. 
 
 Whatever exists in the neces- 
 sity of its own nature 
 
 ' Something ' exists in the ne- 
 cessity of its own nature 
 
 has existed from eternity 
 
 it has existed from eter- 
 nity 
 
 It is not inconceivable that something should be 
 
232 Studies in Dialectic 
 
 self-existent, but we know nothing as to its being 
 eternal. We are not familiar enough with self-existent 
 things and eternal things to warrant us in asserting 
 dogmatically that where the first quality is, there also 
 must be the second. 
 
 The next theorem is that everything must be 
 caused, and that causation involves a regressum ad 
 infmitum. On this principle there must have been 
 things for an eternity backwards. According to the 
 theory of causation given in section XXVII, a true 
 beginning is reached when we discover the motive, 
 design and power that produced an effect. It is not 
 necessary to ask next what caused that motive, design 
 and power. The infinite regress is applicable only to 
 material sequence, in which there is no proper be- 
 ginning or end. The author of the above argument 
 seems to be trying to combine the notion of causation 
 by will with that of infinite regress. But his language 
 is too obscure to make it certain what he means 
 exactly. 
 
 The three following theorems in a diluted form 
 occur in an otherwise excellent work on the politics 
 and social life of the ancient Greeks. 
 
 * The Athenians who opposed the union of Greece 
 and Macedonia were old men, and the result was 
 mischievous ; other similar instances are found in 
 history; therefore the government of old men is 
 
Studies in Dialectic 233 
 
 always mischievous/ A fallacy of false generality. 
 Everybody knows that some old men have been wise 
 governors. Cicero, from his experience, drew the 
 opposite conclusion that the only safe rulers were old 
 men. 
 
 ' All old political leaders are mischievous ; Glad- 
 stone is old ; therefore he is to be considered po- 
 litically mischievous/ Even were the precedent not 
 false the argument is superfluous, for the effect of 
 Gladstone's politics is now matter of fact or history. 
 
 ' Gladstone is politically mischievous ; he advocates 
 Home Rule for Ireland ; therefore Irish Home Rule 
 must be mischievous/ A fallacy of division : a 
 political leader might on the whole be mischievous, 
 but his measures need not on that account be each 
 and every one mischievous. 
 
 If dialectic were taught generally and on a rational 
 method, a responsible author would avoid bad reason- 
 ing of this sort as carefully as he avoids bad grammar, 
 vulgar imagery, or faulty arithmetic. 
 
 END 
 
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