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Prolegomena to a Study of the Ethical

Ideal of Plutarch and of the Greeks

of the First Century A. D.

Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Require-
ments for the Degree of ^Ph. D., at the
University of Michigan.

GEORGE DEPUE HADZSITS,

1906

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
CINCINNATI, OHIO.

Prolegomena to a Study of the Ethical

Ideal of Plutarch and of

the Greeks of the

First Century A. D.

.4 l^hesis Presented in Partial fulfillment of the Require-
ments for the Degree of Ph. D., at the
University of Michigan

GEORGE DEPUE HADZSITS.

1906

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI PKBSS
CINCINNATI, OHIO.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

Bibliography 5-6

Ivexica and Indices 7-10

Historical Introduction 11-14

The Problem and the Method of Research 15-18

Discussion 19-58

List of Words 59

Conclusions .. . 60-66

239403

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Arnold, W. T.

Bergk, Theo.
Benn, A. W.

Bernays, J.
Christ, W.
Croiset, A. et M.
Droysen, J. G.
Eichhoff, A.

Fried! aender, L.
Finlay, Geo.
Frazer, J. G.
Gardthausen, V.
Gregorovius, Ferd.
Greard, Octave.
Gomperz, Th.
Holm, A.
Hertzberg, G. PV.
Hath, Edwin.
Heinze, H.
Holden, H. A.
Hoffding, H.
Karst, J.
Kostlin, K.
Kennedy, H. A. A.
Marquardt, J. und /
Mommsen, Th. I

The Roman System of Provincial Ad-
ministration.

Grieehische Litteraturgeschichte.

7^he Philosophy of (Greece, considered in
relation to the character and history of
i/s people.

Hh. M. Jg. 7, *. 92.

Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur.

Histoire de la Litterature Grecque.

Geschichte des Hellenismus.

Ueber die religiose sittlichc Weltansicht des
Plutarchus.

Sittengesch ichte .

Greece under the Romans.

Edition of Pausanias.

Augustus u. seine Zeit.

The Rmperor Hadrian.

De la Morale de Plutarque.

Griechische Denker.

The History of Greece.

Gesch ichte Griechenlands .

Essays on Biblical Greek.

Plutarchische Untersuchungen .

Plutarchus Lives.

Ethik.

Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters.

Geschichte der Ethik.

Sources of New Testament Greek.

Handbuch der Romischen Altertilmer,
Vols. 4 and 6.

Merivale, Chas.

The History of the Romans under the

Mommsen, Th.
Miiller, Iwan.
Miiller, F. Max.
MahafiFy, J. P.

Martha, C.
Niese, B.

Norden, Ed.
Oakesmitli, Jno.
Paulsen, Fr.
Roberts, W. Rhys.
Schmidt, L.
Shuckburg-h, E. S.
Sickinger, A.

Trench, R. C.

Thumb, A.

Volkmann, R.

Wundt, W.
Windelband, W.
Weissenberg-er, B.

Wenley, R. M.

Wedgwood, J.
Wundt, Wm.
Whitney, W. D.
Wunderer, C.
2iegler, Th.
teller, Edw.

77fc Provinces of the Roman Kmpire.
Handbuch, Vol. 3.

Lectures on the Science of Language.
I ^roblems in Greek History. The (.wreck

World under Roman Sway.
Etudes Morales sur L? Antiqvite.
Gcsehichte der Griechischen u. Makedon-

ischen Staaten seit der Schlacht hei

Chaeronea.

Die Antike Knnstprosa.
The Religion of Plutarch.
System der Kthik.
The Ancient Boeotians.
Die Kthik der alt en Griechen.
Augustus.
l)e Linguae Lalinae apud Plutarchum ct

Reliquiis ct Vestigiis.
Plutarch: His Life, His Parallel Lires

cnic His Morals.

Synonyms of the Nezv Testament.
Handbuch der Neugrtechischen Volks-

sprache. Die Griechischc Sprache iiu

Zeit alter des Hellenismus.
Lehen, Schriftcn u. Philosophic dcs

Plutarch.

Ethics (Engl. Translation).
.1 History of Ancient Philosophy.
Die Sprache Puttarchs u. die Pseudoplut-

arch ischcn Schriftcn .
Plutarch and his Age; in " The \e-c

World", June, iyoo.
The Moral Ideal.
T ~olkerpsychologie.

Language and the Study of Language.
(.'itate u. geflilgelte Worte bei Polybius.
Geschichte der Kthik.
Die Philosophic der Griecheu.

LEXICA AND INDICES.

(NoTE: We have taken all of our words through all of
the following: indices and lexica; supplementing- this with
wide reading, we have gathered the passages in which the
terms are found. The discussion deals with each term sepa-
rately, giving an historical treatment of the significance,
meaning and development of each term. This work, it need
hardly be added, does not lay claim to finality.)

Index Homericus Aug. Gehring. Teubner, 1891. Appen-
dix Hymnorum Vocabula Continens, 1895.

Lexicon Homericum H. Ebeling. Teubner, 1885.

Poetac Minores GraeciTh. Gaisford. Teubner, 1823. In-
dices for Hesiod, Theognis, Archilochus, Solon, Simon-
ides, Mimnermus, Tyrtaeus, Theocritus, Bion, Moschus.

Hesiod^. A. Paley. London, Geo Bell, 1861.

Greek Lyric Poets G. S. Parnell. London, Longmans,
Green & Co., 1891.

Greek Melic Poets B.. W. Smyth. Macmillan & Co., 1900.

Bacchylides F. G. Keyon. Oxford, 1897.

Fr. W. Blass. Teubner, 1898.

Lexicon Pindaricum I. Rumpel. Teubner, 1883.

Tragicae Dictionis Index spectans ad Tragicorum Graecorum
Fragmenta A. Nauck. Lipsiae, 1892.

Lexicon Aeschyleum J. Dindorf. Lipsiae, 1876.
Lexicon Sophodeum Fr. Ellendt. Berlin, 1872.

Euripidis Opera Omnia A. et J. M. Duncan. Glasguae, 1821.
Vol. 9. Index Verborum . . Omnium. Chr. D. Beck.

Concordance to the Comedies and Fragments of Aristophanes
H. Dunbar. Oxford, 1883.

Menandri et Philemonis Reliquiae Aug. Meineke. Berlin,
1823.

Herodotus J. C. F. Baehr. Lipsiae, 1861.

Lexicon to Herodotus (Schweighaeuser.) H. Carey. Ox-
ford, 1843.

Thucydides Fr. Goeller. London, 1835.
K. W. Kriiger. Berlin, 1846.

Lexicon Xenophonteum F. G. Sturzius. Lipsiae, 1801-4.

Indices Graecitatis quos in singulos oratores Atticos confecit
J. J. Reiskius. Oxford, 1828. Indices for Antiphon,
Aeschines, Andocides, Deinarchus, Demades, Isaeus,
Lysias, Lycurgus.

Index Demosthenicus S. Preuss. Teubner, 1892.

Index Andocideus, Lycurgeus, Dinarcheus L. L. Forman.
Oxford, 1897.

Index Lysiacus D. E. Holmes. Bonn, 1895.

Isaei Orationes XI cum fragmentis G. F. Schoemann.
Gryphiswaldiae, 1831.

Hyperdis Orationes \ji cum fragmentis Fr. Blass. Teubner,
1894.

Index Graecitatis Platonicae T. Mitchell. Oxford, 1832.
Index Aristotelicus H. Bonitz. Berlin, 1870.
Lexicon Theocriteum I. Rumpel. Teubner, 1879.
Apollonii Argonautica R. Merkel. Teubner, 1854.
Polybius Lexicon, Ed., Schweighaeuser. Lipsiae, 1789-1795.
Lexicon Polybianum J. A. Ernesti. 1789-1795.
BabriusW. G. Rutherford. Macmillan & Co., 1883.

Diony sins of Halicarnassus: Epistola ad Pompeium, Indicium
de Thucydide, Libellum de Us quae Thucydidi propria
sunt C. G. Kriig-er. Halis Saxonum, 1823.
De Structura Orationis J. Upton. London, 1747.
xat^v K/aitris G. Holwell. London, 1778.

i roiiv d^^attov pyropow vTro/Aviy/xarwr/xot.

The Three Literary Letters W . Rhys. Roberts. Cam-
bridge, 1901.

Index Graecitatis in Plutarchi Opera D. Wyttenbach, Lip-
siae, 1835.

Rpicteteae Philosophiae Monumenta I. Schweighaeuser.
Lipsiae, 1779,

Appian I. Schweig-haeuser. Lipsiae, 1785.
Luciani Opera I. P. Reitzius. Amsterdam, 1743-46.

Dio Cassius F. G. Sturzius. Lipsiae, 1824.

Y. P. Boissevain. Berlin, 1898-1901.

Herodian Th. G. Irmisch. Lipsiae, 1805.
Philostrati Opera C. L. Kayser. Teubner, 1870.
AthenaetisG. Kaibel. Teubner, 1887-90.
Sextus Empiricus Im. Bekker. Berlin, 1842.

Timaei Sophistae Lexicon Vocum Platonicarum D. Ruhn-
kenius. Lipsiae, 1828.

Der Atticismus: Diony sius von Halikarnass bis auf den
ziveiten Philoslrattis W. Schmid. Stuttgart, 1887-97.

Rhetores Graecil^. Spengel. Teubner, 1854-85.

Epigrammata Graeca ex Lapidibus Conlecta G. Kaibel.
Berlin, 1878.

Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhetoricae I. Chr. Th.
Ernesti. Lipsiae, 1795.

Greek Lexicon of the Roman & Byzantine Periods. 146 B.
C.-1100 A. D. K. A. Sophocles. Boston, 1870.

Lexicon^. G. Liddell and R. Scott. New York, 1889.

Synonyms of the New Testament R. C. Trench. New York,
1854.

Lexicon of the New Testament Greek H. Cremer (Trans. W.
Urwick). Edinburgh, 1878.

Greek- English Lexicon of the New Testament J. H. Thayer.
New York, 1897.

English-Greek Lexicon C. D. Yonge. New York, 1893.

Modern Greek and English Lexicon P. D. Sakellarios, Jno.
Pervanoglu. (Athens, 1894).

A Modern Greek and English {and English- Greek} Lexicon
N. Contopoulos. London, 1880. (Athens, 1889).

A Modern Greek Lexicon R. A. Rhousopoulos. Leipzig,
1900.

A.Qr)aravpi<TT<av cv TOIS EXXr;vtKOis Aei*cois St. A.

Koumanoudes. Athens, 1883.
Sylogge Inscriptionum Boeoticarum C. Keil. Lipsiae, 1847.

English and Modern Greek Lexicon A. A. Jannaris. Lon-
don, 1895.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

It is not our purpose to give a detailed account of the
historical conditions in Greece in the first century of our era,
but rather, to sketch those condilions briefly, with a view
merely to establishing the necessary environment for our
subsequent study of certain ethical ideas that gained favor
in that century. The interrelation of these is obvious, and
just as the moral ideal was larg-ely shaped by that environ-
ment within which it grew, so it reacted upon its own envir-
onment and was, in part, responsible for the trend of events.

In general, the century was one of peace for Greece,
greater than she had enjoyed since the days of the Mace-
donian, but it was hardly a condition that encouraged great
effort; it was, rather, the peace of exhaustion, with but
a minimum of stimulus derived from her great western con-
queror.

Politically, economically, socially, the status of Greece in
the first century A. D., was that of a conquered province,
enfeebled, smitten with the consciousness of defeat, in the
main quite fairly treated by Rome and often flattered,
through all maintaining a great measure of self-esteem and
pride.

Despite a technical freedom, Greece's political position
was insignificant; while the Greek cities felt that they were
governing 1 themselves 1 , since the management of police, build-
ing 1 , public worship, g'ames, instruction, taxation and lesser
legal administration were left to their own direction, yet the
power of the Roman emperor and of his gwernor was ever
present to interfere; there were no other channels of public
activity into which men might direct their energies except
those of municipal administration, and, in that ag*e, such
were narrow enough limits for ambition, and even within
these freedom was conditional. Yet Rome, a generous

1. Tac. Ann. xii. 58; Plin. E)p. x. 56; L/iv. xlv. 18, 29; Paus. viii.
30. 9.

master in this instance, treated the cities of Greece with a
consideration which was extended to no other conquered
lands; and in the free cities she interfered as little as pos-
sible with the affairs of government. Even of Domitian 2 it
was said "Provinciarum praesidibus coercendis tantum curae
adhibuit, ut neque modestiores umquam neque iustiores
exstiterint ". At one time the Phil-Hellene Nero 3 had even
gone to the extreme of declaring 1 Greece subject to no gover-
nor and free from tribute. Hadrian also went to great
lengths and the settled calm of Greece affords a striking con-
trast to the restlessness of the tribes on the Euphrates? on
the Danube, and in Great Britain. Among other reasons for
such conduct on the part of Rome, there existed the fact of
"far greater similarity between the Greek and Roman spirit
of municipal government than affinity with either the
Eastern spirit of monarchical rule or the Northern spirit of
personal freedom". Notwithstanding such favors, the calm
that existed in Greece was not the calm of freedom and of
self-government, but the calm of submission, of indifference,
of exhaustion !

Greece was utterly incapable of benefiting from the
idea of Pan-Hellenism 4 imposed from without, and the num-
erous beneficial acts of Hadrian, in the way of roads,
aqueducts, temples, baths, when Athens was, perhaps,
externally more splendid than ever before, did not improve
her economic condition, neither increasing the resources of
the land nor appreciably improving the condition of the in-
dustrial classes. In some cases, communities lacked the
means to keep even the existing public works in repair. The
land was only moderately fertile, agriculture was of limited
extent, vine-culture was unimportant 5 , and that of the olive,
little less so; the marble quarries did not benefit the general
population, nor were there any manufactures of significance.

2. Suet. Doni. 8; true of other emperors, Tac. Ann. iii. 10, Suet.
Claud. 14, 15.

3. Vespasian annulled these acts, Paus. Ach. vii. 17.2.

4. Keil. Syll. Iiiser. B. 31, Plut. Arist. 19, C. I. G. 5852, Dion Cass.
Ixix. 10, Waddington iii. i. 807, Paus. i.18.9.

5. Iviv. xxxi. 24. Strabo & Paus., passim. L/ampridius, in Alex,
p. 122.

The financial administration of the Romans produced disas-
trous consequences both on the material prosperity of the
country and on the moral constitution of society; the govern-
ment of Rome was so lax, that mismanagement and robbery
often went unpunished 6 . While Asia Minor and Syria
recovered their commercial prosperity, Greece lagged behind;
Corinth and Patrae were the chief centers of real activity in
Greece, but they flourished only because they were Roman
colonies and were impoitant to Rome. Athen^s svipremacy
was completely gone. Under the rule of the Flavian 7
emperors, the Roman system of financial administration and
of taxation was directly responsible for reducing Greece to
her lowest state of poverty and depopulation. The tenden-
cies of society were toward the accumulation 8 of property in
the hands of a few; "latifundia" had destroyed the
yeomanry; the gulf between the few rich noble families and
the great body of poor was widened. There was a general
accumulation of debts throughout the country 9 . The
depopulation 10 of the county, dating from the destruction
of Thebes, of Corinth and Megara, was appalling, and even
the masculine type had declined 11 . On every hand there
were signs of the economic distress, decay, exhaustion 12 ,
which Rome could not have sta3 r ed, had she so willed.

While thus in politics there was no opportunity or at
least but slight encouragement for the exercise of talent,
while economic conditions offered no inducements to ambi-
tion, socially, the position of Greece was very unimportant
in the world. In art, philosophy and literature, in which
she expressed her truer, better self, Greece was still mistress
of the world. It was because of her primacy in these, that
she returned the scorn of the Roman people with a disdain,
equally unjustifiable. Despite the supremacy of Greece in
such matters, the Romans failed to appreciate the Greeks

6. Cic. In. Verr. i.2, Tac. Ann. i.76, Suet. Claud. 25.

7. Paus. Ach. vii, 17. 2. Suet. Vesp. 8.

8. Tac. Ann. xv. 20. Strabo. x. 2.25.

9. Plut. "De vitando aere alieno".

30. Strabo. ix. 1.15., ix. 2.25, viiiandx. passim, Plut. DeDef. Or. c. 8.

11. Dio. Orat. 21. 501. R.

12. Suet. Tib. 32, Juv. S. viii. 87, Cic. ad fam. 4.5.4. Philo. ii. 302. 12.

as a people, who were included in a general sentence of con-
demnation of the whole East and who were misunderstood,
by reason of the baser types that appeared in large numbers
from the East, in Rome. The Greeks of Hellas had no social
standing in Rome. There was, to be sure, great decline in
vigor, and moral energy was seriously threatened, if not,
perhaps, undermined; there was a decline of families, and
the Greek world had all the petty weaknesses and vices that
naturally exist in a secluded 13 , overripe and decaying
society. Yet Juvenal was not acquainted with the best in the
Greek nature, and Tacitus' stricture was one-sided 14 .

The Greek world was by no means hopelessly lost, even
after the political and economic death and social decline. In
the arts, in literature, in philosophy, Greece lived again and
gave evidence of a fine nature and culture, in which old
traditions were fondly blended with new ideals. It is a well-
known fact that "the defeated Hellenism still

created the conceptions by means of which the new religion
shaped itself into a dogma" 15 . The Greek's attitude toward
God powerfully affected his relation toward his fellow-man;
it is his ethical ideal in the first century of our era that con-
stitutes the subject of the following prolegomena.

13. Lrtician, Cataplus i. 351.

4. Tac. Hist. iii. 47, Ann. ii. 55., Plin. EJp. x. 49, Dion Cass. liv. 7.
15. Windelband.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
AND OF METHODS.

We have made the ethical vocabulary of Plutarch 1 the
basis of our study of this problem of the ethical ideal of the
Greek of the first century A. D. Reading the "Moralia" of
Plutarch, one very soon becomes conscious of the presence of
a large number of ethical terms that do not belong to the
classical vocabulary. These words are so numerous and their
character so varied that it at once becomes apparent that
they must be of considerable significance. Upon closer in-
vestigation 2 , it appears that some of these ethical terms
occur for the first time in literature, in Polybius and in the
Septuagint, while others seem to appear, first, in the first
century B. C., and others till not later in Plutarch and his
contemporaries; as these terms are also found in the N. T.,
in inscriptions 3 , in ecclesiastical literature for a long period
of several hundred years, and, further, have a place in the
modern Greek vocabulary, it is clear that they are not merely
ephemeral terms, begotten of either local or sporadic or
short-lived needs, but are the product of a deep-seated, vital
disturbance in the ethical consciousness; the thought interest
and activity behind the words was strong and imperative,
and, as we shall see, the ethical movement, of much impor-

1. Plutarch represents the spirit of his age better than any of his
contemporaries, reflecting not only the personal equation, but also "die
Resultate der ethischen Reflexion ernes ganjren Zeitalters" (Schmidt,
p. 40). It is all the more possible to study the religious, political, philo-
sophical, ethical problems of the age through the works of the sage of'
Chaeronea, as his outlook was broad and his interpretation, mild.

2. We have, by means of lexica and indices and wide readings de-
termined, with considerable accuracy, the time and place limits within
which these terms were employed.

3. Our inscriptional evidence has not yet been organized, nor is it
directly applied in the later discussions; its value is very great, how-
ever, and the popular, oral currency, the colloquial character of many
of these ethical terms is demonstrated.

tance. A study of these terms should, then, throw some
light upon the problem of the status of morals in Greece, in
the Plutarchean age.

With Plutarch occupying 1 the central point in this study
of ethical ideas, some of which existed even before his day,
and all of which lived long after his time 4 , we find that
every one of the terms considered is an expression of an
ethical movement that was operating in Greek life and thus
exerting a pressure upon the old vocabulary. While it may.
perhaps, be impossible to say, precisely, how far the ethical
ideas were assimilated and how far they became a part of
the common intelligence, at any rate, it becomes very evident
that these words are expressions of virtues that were admired
and cultivated and of vices that were condemned by the
Greek people of the first century, and represent the working
of positive forces in the development of the race 5 .

The discussion that follows takes into account the fol-
lowing terms: /catyoAoyia, evpeo-iAoyiu, raTretvos, Tcwreivo^poo-vny,
jU,Tpt07ra0ia, avt&KaKui, ayaOoTroua, Kotvux^eAta, /u^yaAax^eAia, /u,yaAopyta,

4. We have, of course, in the case of every word, carefully con-
sidered every passage in which that terra was found, noting-, in some
cases, a growth in the meaning of the word.

5. The new ethical vocabulary is only a part of a larger body of
new terms that the Greek language, in becoming a world-instrument,
created, when demands were made upon it, to express the conceptions
that came with a wider experience; this process had been notably in
effect since the days of the Roman conquest and Polybius shows many
signs of it. A complete study of this new vocabulary, in its entirety,
though important, does not fall within our province.

6. This list of words is but a small, though significant portion of
the entire new ethical vocabulary, which may receive some illustration
from the following terms: vrraKorj, cwcevo'So^oi/,

a7ripaya0ta,

, aAAorptoTrpayia, 7rpO7ra0ia ? Trapa^wpTyriKos^ SucnyKOOs, 6\iy6<f>p(0v ,

a/Ae'0v<TTOs, /AyaAop/o?7/x,oorw)7, <iA.ei8>ya)v, yA.MrxpoA.oyta, erot/utoAoyos, Kara.
AaAta, Karu^pt'curo-o/zcu, apyoAoyta, Trpoo-eTTi^Te'w, Trpoo-eTrco-^jaatvca^ crvve-

It is our belief that a philological-psychological study
of the mental state of the Greeks of the first century,
furnishes valuable clues, tending to elucidate the obscure
problems of Greek ethics and religion of that period. An
insight into the inner life of thought and feeling of the
Greek people may enable us to apprehend the true nature of
a very complex age, by no means as yet thoroughly under-
stood.

Anticipating the statement of our conclusions, it may
perhaps be apposite to state, here, that one might seriously
doubt the validity of the generalization that the Greek
society of this era was "a fossil society, feeding upon its
own traditions and petrified beyond the hope of ren^ovation
or healthy growth" 7 . Nor is it absolutely true that "the
ideal of the Conscience belonged to the great foe of Greece" 8 .
Rather, that very ideal was growing and developing within
the limits of Greek experience, and as shown by the language,

^s ? 8iaypt.aiv(a,

KarevAoyeto, KTa7reivoa>. The constant reference to private, affairs and vir-
tues is noteworthy; the interests of the individual constitute the starting-
point for the development of this system of ethics. There is abundant
evidence of interest in petty concerns; the very large number of new
double compound terms evinces, if not a desire for exact expression or
of restoring" to words the force they have lost, a fondness for pompous
and picturesque effects, a tendency toward elaboration and an attention
to detail, just as characteristic of decadent literature as of the arts.
Another group deserving attention is that of "strengthened" terms:
these words, while showing that tendency toward exaggeration charac-
teristic of language in its decline, are a mockery of an age that we
know was characterized by feeble feelings, lesser impulses, minor am-
bitions, of which the numerous late diminutives are a truer expression .
This large body of words gives a picture of a society, "hastening to ex-
plain everything in its decline", but at the same time aspiring to lofty
virtues.

We are at first surprised that Plutarch seems to have borrowed so
little from the Latin ethical vocabulary, but, as is well known, his
"Demosthenes" begins with an apology for his slight knowledge of
Latin. Apart from public life, Latin was never so widely learned in
Greece as Greek was in the Roman world, all the time from the Scipios
to Marcus Aurelius. (Cic. Arch. 23. Senec. Consol. ad Helv. 6.8. Juv.
15.110. Quint, i. 1.12. Suet. Claud. 42. Plut. i.564$.)

7. Mahaffy. c.12. "The Greek World Under Roman Sway."

8. Wedgwood, p. 129.

that infallible formula of a people, the Greek temperament
was undergoing a subtle transformation, knowledge of which
ought to correct the only too often preferred charges of
44 stagnancy" and a " contemptible decadence", made against
the Greek of the first century. While it is true that Plutarch
"rehabilitates the ancient sanctions of morality and of
religion" 9 , at the same time, unconsciously, perhaps, he be-
comes the high priest of a new moral aspiration.

9. Wenley. "Plutarch and His Age", p. 267.

DISCUSSION.

The keen versatility and vivacity of the Greek mind
naturally took delight in new language formations; this
neologistic tendency was as ancient as Homer 1 , and was ver} r
marked throughout the entire history of the people, as we
see, for example, in Aeschylus, Aristophanes, the rhetori-
cians 2 , Thucydides 3 , Demosthenes, Polybius and Plutarch.
The mental activity of the race, thus, in time, produced a
vocabulary of extraordinary variety, to which free fancy
contributed, as much as need.

When Polybius 4 uses the term KcuvoAoyia, (not occurring
in Greek literature before his time), we are left in doubt
whether he has coined a new term or is employing (as was
possible for one who was writing in the "common dialect"
and employing a less pure vocabulary), a word, current be-
fore his day but which had not yet crept into formal litera-
ture; this problem is of less consequence to us however, than
the problems suggested by the use of the word in Polybius
and in later writers. Polybius attributes Ktui/oAoyia to Greek
ambassadors, whose "strange phraseology" vexed the Roman
senate; the latter fact is significant, as the more conserva-
tive 5 Romans would no t y unnaturally, be vexed at Athenian
volubility.

1. Eustathius, 1801, 27, calls Homer a KaivoAoyos Sc rts TTOO/TIJS.

2. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, (De lyys. p. 458) speaking of Greek
literary styles, of the use of figures, of hyperboles, of K<uvoA.oyta says
8r;Aoi Sc TOVTO To/oytas re 6 Acovrtvos. cf. also Soph. Tr. 873.

3. Thucydides, 3.38, bears witness to the Athenian fondness for
new phrases and novelty in language.

4. 38. 1. 1.

5. Hor. A. P. 45 seq. The Horatian dictum is not irreconcilable
with Plautine, L<ucretian and Ciceronian usage.

In Strabo 6 we find a similar admission that man (i. e. a
Greek) in general, and children, in particular, were fond of
the strange and the new 7 ; a recommendation of myths fol-
lows, as being Kau/oAoyta TI'S, on the ground that the element of
novelty is an incentive to learning- and provokes the desire
to learn. The apologetic use of the new term suggests that
it does not belong to the pure Greek vocabulary and thus,
perhaps, throws light on the problem, raised, above, in
Polybius.

The word, KaivoAoyt'a, which we find, first, in Polybius,
also occurs in Plutarch 8 and in Herodianus 9 . For the student
of the new ethical vocabulary of Plutarch, the changed at-
titude of the great moralist toward neologizing, in general,
is most important; his derision of the practice of the Greek
Stoics who go to extreme lengths and are excessively given
to KaivoAoyta, for its own sake, is evidence of his own conserva-
tism and is positive proof that the numerous ethical terms
that will be our particular study, were neither coined nor
employed by him without a serious motive. We can rest
assured, in all our subsequent work, that words were, with
him, vital.

That the term evpeo-iAoyia stands for a certain activity,
contemporary with the life of the word itself, cannot be
doubted. The term means loquacity, skill in finding words,
command of words, quibbling, sophistical use of words,
multiplying or inventing words, and is used of an idle use of
words, as opposed to efficient labor or sincere search for truth.
The idea is one, closely associately with Kau/oAoyi'a, discussed
above, and a similar impulse must have created them both.

A consideration of the Greek attitude toward evpeo-iAoyia
and the mental processes involved, is of prime importance,

6. i. 2.8.

7. In the same passage, Strabo employs another new term,

8. ii. 1068 D. Plutarch's conservatism is a matter of much impor-
tance in this connection.

9. Epim. p. 3.

is, in fact, a necessary preliminary, for the student of the
new ethical vocabulary of Plutarch, as it gives a preliminary
knowledge of the ethical standard of the people who coined
the new vocabulary, and assists us to a proper interpretation
of the terms themselves.

The character and the extent of the activity defined by
cvpeo-t\oyia, are the two points of particular importance, for
which the passages, in which the term occurs, furnish
evidence.

Polybius' 1 use of the word indicates that to his mind it
meant idle argument, mere loquacity. Philo 2 associates it
with yAio-x/ooAoyia (itself a new term), uses it of quibbling of
the Stoics, of research and of defence turned to bad account,
and of idle prosecution, so that evpeo-iAoyia, not necessarily bad
in itself, becomes so by implication. Diodorus 3 says Alex-
ander Ka06\ov 8t r<ris rats evp?7<nA.yus Kara<ro<iofievTvs rrjv 8uva/uv riys

TreTrpw/xei^ys e/2Aa<r<^. Diodorus does not always, however,
use the term with reproach. Cornutus 4 opposes Herakles to
6 evpeo-iAo'yo? and it is obvious that the latter was a factor in
the writer's own experience. Strabo 5 says ot y/oa/A/>umKoi ^vOnpia

Trapa/JaAAovres ev/oe<riA.oyov<ri /xaAAov rj Avovcri ra ^rov/xeva

Arrian 6 is opposed to unprincipled, clever evpco-t'Aoyoi. Euse-
bius 7 and Clemens 8 Alexandrinus view the activity with dis-
favor and discourage the spread of the evil. Sextus
Kmpiricus 9 accuses the Dogmatists of evpeo-eAoyia. Diogenes
Laertius 10 , with this term, characterizes the philosophers
Menedemus, Arcesilaus and Stilpo, not necessarily with any
evil association. Athenaeus 1 1 quotes (not, perhaps, exactly)
Polybius, and expresses little regard for the quality. In the
Oracula Sibyllina 12 , 01 evpeo-i'Aoyoi are included in a category

1. Polybius. 18. 29.3.

2. Philo. i. 698.46; ii. 492.16; i. 628.50; i. 314.29; ii. 49.24.

3. Diod. 17. 116.4. i. 37.9.

4. Cornut. 191.

5. Strabo. 13. i. 69, 17. i. 34.

6. Arr. Epict. 2.20. 35.

7. Bus. ii. 89. B.

8. Clem. Al. ii. 561. A.

9. Sext. Emp. i. 63.

10. Diog-. L,. ii. 134; iv. 37; ii. 113.

11. Ath. 193 D.

12. Or. Sib. i. 178.

of the worst criminals. Suidas 13 defines the term with the
help of <Avapos and croi/xoAdyos. Finally, Plutarch 14 , earlier
than the last and later than the first authors, quoted,
occupies, too, a mean position in his understanding- and
application of the word and in the consequent feeling: he
entertained toward such to whom the word applied; in other
words, he accuses the Stoics of evpeo-iAoyta, associates cvpe<rtA.oyta
with TrcuSia and opposes it to work worthy of the greatest zeal,
but he also employs it, once, without any evil signification
whatever, of a party of his guests who have engaged in
clever argument and word play.

It is clear, therefore, that cvpeo-iAoyta is an expression of a
tendency, not, perhaps, new 15 in Greek life, but sufficiently
strong from the time of Polybius on, to result in the coinage
of the new term under consideration. It has been shown
that the habit had a bad aspect which seemed to prevail over
the less harmful, in consequence of which, the cfyeo-tAdyos, in
life, was rather the quibbler and the sophist than the
eloquent, earnest searcher for truth. By the time of Plutarch,
the meaning of the word was crystallized; its signification
in the "Moralia" is suggested in the literature before his
day, as it is confirmed in the later literature.

As in the case of KtuvoAoyta, so Plutarch's attitude toward
the activity expressed by evpeo-iAoyta, also, is clearly defined,
and his serious employment of the more strictly ethical
terms receives illumination therefrom.

Before considering the significance of Tcwravexfyxxrvn/, it
seems desirable to trace out, however incompletely, the his-
torical development of the meaning of rawavos, in Greek lit-

13. Suid. Fr. Gr. 68.

14. Plut. ii. 625 C.; ii. 656 A-B; ii. 28 A; ii. 31. E; ii. 1033 B; ii. 1070
F; ii. 1072 F; ii. 414 A.

15. The idea that the word expresses, existed at least as early as the
time of Pindar (0.9.120. evp^teTny?) . If events of the early democracy
could and did create this specific notion, we are not surprised to find a
recurrence of that process of thought in the Graeco-Roman period, suc-
ceeding upon the wisdom of the Alexandrian age.

erature and life. With this in view, we have made a study
of TaTretvo? in Aeschylus 1 , Euripides, Demosthenes, Aristotle
(Eth. & Pol.), and Plutarch (Moralia). A knowledge of the
reception accorded "humility" 2 at an earlier time is of great
importance for the student of Plutarchean ethics.

We find, first, in the early period, evidences of a bold
spirit to which humility was alien; second, at a later time,
evidence of a negative and halting- recognition of humility,
at a time when we would expect suffering to bring out the
trait, if it were in the national character; third, evidence of
a greater leniency, in the century of Athens' supreme con-
flict, coupled, however, in the same age, with a philosphical
system that grew out of an atmosphere in which hutnility^
could hardly thrive and be recognized as a virtue; and fourth,
lastly, an attitude in which new tendencies, more generous
and more cosmopolitan, appear, but in which the old stan-
dards, though withdrawing into the background, do not
vanish !

In Aeschylus 3 , TOTTCM/OS is used of a lowering in rank, at
one time, of Prometheus, whom Oceanus counsels, urging
submission to a resistless power, (the course is not dishonor-
able, but, nevertheless, for Prometheus an unendurable hum-
iliation), at another, of Zeus; this time the condition is
one to which his archenemy would reduce him (with the
commentary of SovAeuetv). The state, characterized by raTrcivos,
provokes scorn and contempt. Without any suggestion of
evil or wickedness, the state is quite intolerable, merely
because it is low; humility is slavery and no free-born Greek
admires it.

In Euripides, we find a deeper interpretation and a wider
application of the term; it signifies, first, as before, humili-
ation; but also, second, submissive humility; and, third,
wickedness and depravity. Certain passages 4 reflect the old
inherent tendency in the Greek character to respect strength,

1. TtxTmvos does not seem to occur in Homer nor in Sophocles.

2. We reserve, for the future, the study of such words and phrases as

, jSaios, TaTreu/axris, TcwretvoTT/s, oyuxpov </>ovtv,

3. Aes. Pr. 320, 908, 926.

4. Eur. Fr. xxii. 2; Hi. 2; xxx. 4.

success and wealth, with little charity for their opposites.
In the second place 5 ,wravo? is predicated of Andromache, of
Orestes, of Herakles, and we find a new suggestion, not
openly expressed but clearly implied, of leniency toward sub-
mission and humility; but the circumstances are of the most
trying- nature and these alone render humility excusable.
Submission or humility does not necessarily entail loss of
honor or self-respect. It does not, regardless of causes,
awaken a strong revulsion of feeling. In the third place 6 ,
the word is used of Odysseus, of Orestes and of Pylades, of
Agamemnon, and of Helen and falls from hostile lips; it
signifies baseness, cowardice, disgrace, and is a term of
strong condemnation. The treatment of the word shows a
development of the idea, a growth and quickening of the
moral consciousness.

The three distinct senses of the word that we have
observed, are still more clearly marked in Demosthenes; the
tendencies we have noticed before are more sharply defined.
Demosthenes uses the word first 7 , of Philip, of the Athenian
army, of Thebes with the old implications of weakness, of
humiliation, insignificance, lack of pride, and always with
an association of scorn and contempt. The term is, however,
also used in a milder sense 8 ; it is used of Athens, in her final
struggles, in her helplessness, with deep reproach to be sure
and with a suggestion of loss of prestige and earlier reputa-
tion and of pride, but still with no loss of honor. That it
was possible to associate and even identify the idea with
/xcVpios is an indication of a movement toward greater leniency,
on the part of the Athenian public, the common people to
whom Demosthenes 'made his pleas, and in whom humility
inspired pity. In the third place 9 , that other sense of posi-
tive evil has become thoroughly established.

In Aristotle, we see the earlier meaning more clearly.
The tone of Demosthenes is mild, that of Aristotle reminds
us of the past; the former is decidedly a man of his age; the

5. Eur, Andr. 165. 971. Her. F. 1406. (cf. Xen. Cyr. 5.1.5.)

6. Eur. Hec. 245. Orest. 1411. Iph. A. 339. Troad. 1018. Fr. ii. 1.

7. Dem. i. 9; 4.23; 9.21; 16.24; 19.325; 61.25.

8. Dem. 8.67; 1074; 13.25; 21. 183-6; 45.4; 7.45.

9. Dem. 18. 108; 18. 178.

latter has inherited more of the earlier temper; the former
speaks the note of the struggling democracy, the latter, the
eulogy of the once proud state. We have, here, indications
of the old pride, of scorn for weakness, together with a care-
ful effort to attain moderation in all matters; hence the
TaTravot were certain to meet with censure in Aristotle, as
the word meant, to him, a failure to attain that mean,
whether the word had a social, moral or political application.
This is an aristocratic society the exercise of whose virtues
requires wealth and leisure and noble birth. The raTreivo? 10
is humble, cannot be liberal, is easily a flatterer, and is
servile; for him Aristotle can have no words except of con-
demnation. This probably represents the essentially Greek
attitude and o raTreivos incurs the strong displeasure of the
Greek, less because he may be base or wicked than because
he is low. Sox^/ooo-vn/ is the mean opposed to 3/3/ois, and not
Ta7reti/oTiys ! Here, most clearly, we see the slight recognition
of humility, the absence of mercy toward the lowly, the
assertion of an old confidence within conscious, artistic
limits.

We find the three significations we have noticed before,
still more clearly defined in Plutarch. He could say :

;(0pov 8e . . TO TifJLwpLav irapaXiirctv Kaipov irapaa-Xovros eTrieiKc's tori
(90 F), evye'veia KaXov /u,ei/, aAAa Trpoydvwv aya66v (5 D), and <yw yap
fjiaXurr av ftov\OL(j.vjv 7raort KOLvrj xpijcri/ioi/ ctvat rrjv aywyijv (8 K). This

is evidence of a greater equalization of classes, of a break-
ing down of old distinctions. Thus we find, in the matter
of Tcwretvo's, first, a recognition, to be sure, of the old feeling
which does not disappear, but second, at the same time, a
greater forgiveness, extended to the humble and the lowly
who cannot be accused of evil, and, third, finally, a certain
indulgence, even in the case of evil that TCW-CU/OS may suggest.
The Greek of this late period has not entirely lost the dis-
tinctive traits of his ancestors; humility 11 , submission, sub-

10. Arist. H88. 1124 b 22; H88. 1125 a 2; n. e. y. 3. 1231 b 12; n. e. y. 6.
1233bl3; n. e. n. 11. 1244 a 6; ap 7. 1251bl5, 25; TT. y. 13. 1284 a 41; TT. 8. 11.
1295 b 18; TT. e. 11. 1313 b 41; -. e. 11. 1315 b 6'; *-. B. 2. 1337 b 14.

11. Plut. ii. 91 C; ii. Ill F; ii. 266 D; ii/276 D; ii. 584 E; ii. 762 E;
ii. 805 D; ii. 807 E; ii. 822 D; ii. 1046 C; ii. 1060 A.

ordination, without, in any sense, being connected with
evil, still were likely to provoke his scorn and even his
indignation. At the same time, in spite of this apparent
pride, events of several hundred years have greatly modified
his character, and, with it, his attitude in this matter. The
former note is a protest, an old strain that will assert itself;
but, with this, there appears 12 a more generous inclination
toward the humble and the lowly, whether thus through the
accident of birth, through sorrow, or through sin.

But the pagan Greek position could never, probably, be
that which we find in the Scriptures 13 , where this word is
used of the noblest and the most necessary of all the virtues.
There it conveys a sense of honor unknown to the Greek, but
suited to the Hebraic and to the Christian world 14 . Such a
conception was foreign to the Greek nature; if suggestions
of such a feeling appear, at times, as in Plato 15 , and, later,
more frequently, in Plutarch, it means that, within Greek
limitations, an evolution was taking place in philanthropy,
which) though more merciful than ever before, nevertheless
still remained pagan 1 6 .

The word Ta?mi/o<pa>v, while occurring in the Septuagint,
does not recur, again, until Plutarch's time, and becomes
common, only later, in the Patristic literature.

The feeling, of which it is an expression, is a funda-
mental one which would effect all thought, feeling and con-
duct. In the Septuagint on the one hand, and in the New
Testament and in a large body of Patristic literature on the
other, the virtue of ra7ruvo<j>poorvvr} is accepted without reserva-
tion; it is constantly encouraged and recommended with
other virtues; nor is it merely an ideal that provokes exhor-
tation, but often, by implication, and frequently, expressly,
is acknowledged a fact in Greek life. "Humility" then, was

12. Plut. 11. 357 A; ii. 599 B; ii. 806 A; ii. 822 D; ii. 1069 C.

13. N. T. Math. 11.29; Luc. 14.11; Peter i. 5.5; LXX. Pr. 1619.

14. See discussion of Tairivo<t>po(rvvr).

15. Plato. L,egrg. iv. 716 A (cf. Origin, i. 1312 C.)

16. Plutarch favored slavery and was an aristocrat.

a factor in the evolution of Greek character 1 , as early as the
time of the Septuagint 2 ' 8 and as late as the fourth century
after Christ, and was operating in Greek communities in
Asia Minor and Alexandria in the East, and in Rome, in the
West.

While it is impossible to determine to what extent such
suggestions were immediately operative, the fact remains
that the suggestion was there, and, certainly, later, bore
fruit. Ignatius 4 , writing to the Ephesians, exhorts them to
be Ta7rvo</ooves; he contrasts that frame of mind with
Htya\oppr)n.o<Tvvr] and unites it with irpaonys. Barnabas 5 feels it
to be a man's duty to obey the Lord's commands, not to exalt
one's self but to be Tcwretvo'^/owv. in the Doctrina Orientalis 6 ,
the Lord is praised for his great Tcwravo^/xxrvn/. Peter 7 urges
all men to be compassionate and humble-minded. Paul 8
urges the Ephesians and the Philippians to follow his
example of serving the Lord with all humility, meekness
and long-suffering. In Basilius 9 we find the dictum that he
is great in the sight of the Lord who has yielded
to his neighbor. Tertullian 10 preaches great
with endurance of hunger, thirst and imprisonment. Ori-
gen 11 , blames Celsus for his misconception of rairetvo^poarvvrj
and even finds encouragement of the virtue in Plato. His
own defence of the quality is unequivocal. Hippolytus 12
cites the case of Nabouchodonosor, who regained his king-

1. TaTreii/OTT/s, the earlier term, has not the significance of noble
humility we find associated with TaTrewx^pocrwi/. In a moral sense, it
implies baseness, as, in Plat. Pol. 309 A., joined with apaOia in Arist.
Rhet. ii. 6. 1384, synonymous with /x,tK/3O/o;;(ia, an d in Dem. 151.9 united
with

2. LXX. Ps. 131. 2.

3. LXX. Prov. 29.23.

4. Ignat. X. 64 (653 A.)

5. Barn. 777 B.

6. Doctr. Or. 656 A.

7. N. T. Petr. 1.3.8.

8. N. T. Act. 20.19; Ep. Eph. 4.2. (Also, Ep. Phil, 2.3.)

9. Basil, iv. 813 A.

10. Tertull. ii. 970 A.

11. Origen. i. 1312 D; vii. 217 B; i. 1312 C.

12. Hippol. 681 A; 856 B.

dom through rairetvoifrpovwi), and quotes the Evangelist John
as authority for the Lord's regret vo^poo-vVi/. Hennas 13 promises
God's pity to those who repent and become humble.
Clemens 14 Romanus exhorts all to live in concord and sanc-
tity, to avoid pride and arrogance, and to be examples to
others of raTrctvo^poo-vv^, which servants of the Lord practice.

Between the two temporal extremes, considered above,
we find the term employed in Plutarch, in Arrian and in
Josephus, and the distinctly different feeling entertained
toward the quality is very significant. While there is no
question of the unreserved welcome, extended the virtue in
these two extreme periods, and, too, no question of its actual
practice, we find a different ethical standard, a tentative
reserve, expressed in the middle period.

Neither in Plutarch, nor in Josephus, nor in Arrian has
the word the same connotation of meaning we have found in
the passages quoted above, and, in consequence, we find a
different attitude toward the Tairuv6<f>pove?. Plutarch 15 with
all his generosity, feels a reserve toward this virtue, which
to his mind implies, at least, a loss of noble spirit and thus ap-
proaches dangerously near baseness. Josephus 16 relates how
the Roman Galba, accused, by the soldiers, of Ta7rcivo^po<rw>y,
was treacherously put to death. Such " weak-mindedness",
approaching "meanness" or "cowardice", was associated by
Arrian 17 with the vice of KoXaKeia.

Thus, while in the first century A. D., Greek Ethics did
not, as yet, welcome the idea of humility, still the idea was
a present force that was at work in the Greek consciousness
and, in time, produced great psychic changes. Although
the idea did not receive complete acceptance in Plutarch's
day, yet it was not ostracized, and the Greek mind gradually
became accustomed to it, more so, even in the first century
A. D., than the above study would seem to indicate. The

13. Herm. Sim. 7; Vis. 3.10.

14. Clem. R. i.2; i.19; i.30; i.44 (cf. also Or. Sib. 8.481) i.48 (cf. also
C1.A1. L532B).

15. Plut. ii. 336 E; ii. 475 E.

16. Jos. B. J. 4.9.2.

17. Arr. Epict. i.9.10; 3.24.56.

presence of other virtues, such as dh/e&KaKta, ptrpiarrdOcui and
dyatfoTToua, closely related to "humility", demonstrates this!
Still it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Greek
temper was still essentially proud 1 * .

As the prejudice, however, against *' humility" broke
down, there was wide room for sympathy, equality and kind-
ness. At the same time that dyafloTrotta, dvc&KaKta and ficrpioira.
0ea flourish, (forces that would help to break down that
prejudice and to create the necessary environment for
"humility") real strength, including audacity, courage
and /xcyaXoepyta, gradually vanishes, and an epoch of weakness
is ushered in, also fostering a constantly growing humility 19 ',
for these virtues inevitably acted and reacted upon one
another 20 .

The previous study of nanim and of Ta7ruvo<ppoarvvrj has
led us to believe that the Greek character of Plutarch's day
was, still, proud and essentially pagan; that is, despite a
certain great philanthropy, humility was not yet welcomed,
without reserve. It was, nevertheless, an existing force that
could not be overlooked, whose influence is further traceable
in other virtues, as that of ^rptoTraOeia.

While /AerpioTratfaa, in its form at least, truthfully reflects
the spirit of the past 1 , expressing that artistic proportion 2
that was consciously sought in the sphere of the feelings as
in everything else, yet that very artistic and hence exclusive
spirit, of which we have a reminiscence in the form of this
word, yielded to other, humanizing influences, of which

18. See also discussion of raTreivos.

19. We are not surprised, therefore, to find other ideas, besides the
one of "thinking-", viz. of "saying" and of "doing", united, in time,
with the adjective Tcwravo-, and forming 1 new compounds.

20. See discussion of

1. Plutarch constantly betrays the old Greek search for modera-
tion; this essentially Greek strain still survives in his century.
Ivrexyov 8e TO rr)V fifxnyv fv aTrcuri TC/IVCIV eft/xcAe's TC. Plut. ii. 7 B.

2. Of which /zcTpio7T77<j and o-ox^pocrwT/, the ruling principle of
Greek life, are further expressions.

was one. Under such influences,
acquired a meaning- in Plutarch, it never could have possessed
in Aristotle.

We find the term employed from the time of Aristeas to
that of Sextus Empiricus, and its significance is not the
same throug-hout. There are certainly no aesthetic implica-
tions involved in the word, as applied to the Romans or to
the Hebrews; the control of the feelings, in these instances,
was referable, rather, to another sense, that of duty and of
honor. The weakness, involved in Plutarch's fterpioTrafleia,
(Plutarch was not conscious of that weakness however) is
felt, also, in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in St. Paul, in
Philo, but no trace of it appears in Appian or in Sextus
Empiricus.

In Sextus Empiricus 3 we find the position of the Skeptic
defined, whose reAos, in life, is aTrdOtui in matters of opinion,
and /leTpiorrafleia in matters of necessity. As far as the Skeptic
felt that the arapagia of aTrdOeia and that fTToxn could secure him
the greatest happiness, his life would be a practice of his
ideal, and, to that extent, at least, ntrpio7rdOia was a factor in
Greek life for several hundred years. Appian 4 represents
Pyrrhus of Epirus as possessing ficTpioTra&ia, for sparing- the
conquered Romans and giving them peace. The Numantini
prayed Scipio for indulg-ence and /AerpioTratfaa. There is none
of the suggestion of weakness, here, that we shall find in
Philo; as predicated of the Romans, united with o-o></>poW/jia,

associated with ev<re/3a, identified with /xeyaAo^poo-wiy, /merptoTr-
dOtui means that heroic forbearance which had exalted the
Roman race. 5

Plutarch 6 attributes this virtue to Camillus, Metellus,
Aristeides, Socrates and Stilpo; his recognition of the con-
temporary practice of the virtue is coupled with an exhorta-
tion for its wider employment. His association of perpunrdOeui
with TrpaoTrp is, perhaps, significant. The terminology of

3. Sext. Bmp. 8.18; 176.21; 176.23; 577.13; 9.20.

4. App. i.366.63; i.408.32; i.420.18; i.62.70; i.218.90; i.366.52.

5. Verg. Aen. 6.851-3.

6. Plut. ii. 102D; ii. 1119C; H.458C; H.489C; ii.551 C.

Aristotle 7 is, in this connection, very important; we find the

following" scale: VTrep/foAi^opyiXanys; /u-eo-OTi/s^TrpaoTT^; cAAeu/us

dopyr/tna. Aristotle says that Trpaorrjs is really not the word to
express the mean, as its suggests weakness and inclines to
the defect of dopyryo-ta, or utter absence of anger or entire lack
of spirit. Plutarch makes no such apology for wpaonys, nor
for /Xrpio7rd0a \ While Plutarch's /ncTpioTrdfleia must have
seemed to Aristotle as little, or perhaps even less a perfect
virtue than his own TrpaoTr^, for Plutarch, the word and the
virtue carried no similar reproach. The weakness of /^crpio-
TraOaa did not strike him. It is plain that the ethical stan-
dard has shifted. There is a wide gap between Aristotelian
and Plutarchean ethics. In Plutarch, the feeling for a
"mean", for a control of the passions looking to an observa-
tion of the "mean", for the sake of the "mean", is not so
strong as a control prompted by unselfish, altruistic motives.
With such a different standard, the limits within which
/ATpio7rd0eia could exercise itself, were, also, certain to change.

Josephus 8 , like Appian, credits Romans with the posses-
sion of fieTpio7rd0eia and it is mentioned with /x-cyaXo^poo-vny.

Paul's 9 high priest is able to /*Tpio7ra0eTv, m cat

avros TTcpiKen-at, foOcvcuiv . Philo 10 includes /nerpioTrafleta, attributed
to Aaron, Abraham and Joseph, among the virtues making
for a noble character, in spite of the fact that he represents
Moses, the perfect man, as turning his back upon /xeTpiorra&ia
and cultivating airdOua instead; /xeTptoimflaa, to the Hebraic
mind, seemed rather a concession to human frailty. Diony-
sius of Halicarnassus 11 opposes /xeTpuwrdtfeia an ^ a number of
allied virtues, which do not go to make up a very strong
character, opposes these to the qualities of <po's and x a ^ 7r< fe,
found in the nature of the Volsci. Aristeas 12 mentions
, as part of the equipment of a philosopher.

In Diogenes I/aertius 13 we find: <>? & rov <ro<ov M clvai /A/

7. Arist. Eth. N. 4.5.1 seq; Eth. N. 2.7.10; ^.a.23.1191b25. Cf. also
discussion of dve&KaKia.

8. Jos. A. J. 12.3.2.

9. N. T. Ep. Hebr. 5.2.

10. Philo. i.113.44; ii.37.26; ii.45.38; ii.315.41; ii.439.2: i.113.31; i.113.2.

11. Dion. H. 8. 61.

12. Aristeas. 29.

13. Diog. L. 5.31.

rj 8e. If Aristotle is quoted exactly, the word
is an old one, of the Peripatetic school. If an old word, it is
singular that we do not find it in Aristotle 14 , aye, even
frequently.

While the idea of /AerpwHra&ia was, doubtless, rooted in the
Greek consciousness long before Plutarch's day, just as it
existed there, long afterwards, the word changed in mean-
ing from the time of Aristeas to that of Sextus Empiricus.
Most important for us is the fact that -weakness is clearly
and commonly conceived as an element in //.erpioTrafleta, in the first
century A. D. The word becomes a witness both for old
forces and for new, a concession to the old idea of aesthetic
repose and a confession of the new moral standard, testimony
of an age that was externally influenced by the past but which
-was vitally afected by the present. The original aristocratic
nature of /ierpioTratfeia, was approaching the standard of the
contemporary TaTretvo^poo-vvT/, which at once influenced the
evolution and encouraged the practice of the former virtue.

With the Plutarchean conception of /AerpioTrafleia, the
Greek mind was ready to entertain other virtues, as

ayaOoTTOiia and

While '* humility", because involving a sacrifice of pride,
received only a reserved welcome from Plutarch, it doubtless
affected the development of ntTpioird$ia,- which, in the first
century A. D., possessed a large degree of feebleness.
Plutarch's naive ignorance of this fact made his own recep-
tion of this virtue the more possible. But no prejudice
existed against the inherent weakness of av&KaKta, which was
accepted without hesitation by Plutarch. This paradox is
not entirely inexplicable; the relation of dvei/ca/a to fterpioTra-
0a is suggested by Plutarch, in the De Fraterno Amore,
thus: peTpLan-aOeias tKyovov dveucaKiav * ; to the older virtue, natur-
ally, there clung associations of the past, but no similar

14. Aristotle was familiar with ^erpioTrys, but /Aerpto- compounds
are, in the main, of late origin.
1. Plut. ii. 489 C.

or
UNIVERSITY

mystery attached to the later word. Plutarch's failure to
recognize the changed character of utTpurrrdOtia. was as natural,
as was his willingness to adopt dve&Ka/cia ( a comparatively
new sentiment), although it brought in its train implications
that meant a break with the past and its traditions.

The life of the word was very long; we find the term,
first, in the Septuagint, then in the literature of the first
century A. D. and shortly before, and, finally, as late as Por-
phyrogenitus. A study of the literature in which the word
occurs reveals the character and vitality of the virtue.

Of the pagan attitude toward dveiKaKi'a we can form some
idea from the testimony of several writers, flourishing imme-
diately before and soon after Plutarch, and we get, too? sug-
gestions of the practice of the virtue. Cicero's 2 meditation
upon dveta for a whole year was hardly without results, any
more than Paul's 3 exhortations to Timothy that SovXov Sk Kvptov

... Set ... eiircu Trpos TravTas . . . dve^iKaKOv. The virtue was well

known to Epictetus 4 , who preaches of its valuable results,

irpaoTr)* and aopyrjo-La. Lucian's 5 approval Of dve&Ka/cux i s not

altogether certain, but Herodianus 6 tones down a rather
harsh picture of Severus, by attributing dve&Kaiaa and Kaprtpta
to him. The term occurs in Pollux 7 . Diogenes Laertius 8 ,
with admiration, describing Socrates' endurance of ridicule,
says KOLL Travra ravra </>e/oetv dveiKaKa>s. Themistius 9 defines the

dveiKaKia of Sthenelus, by Opposing to him rbv & ov o-reyovra

vppw; no comment follows.

Thus after Cicero, we find in Greek literature, outside of
Plutarch, a decided appreciation of the virtue of dve&KaKia and
signs that the virtue was cultivated. Its scope is not so
clearly defined as in Plutarch, though it implies, at least, an

2. Cic. Alt. 5.11.

3. N. T. Tim. ii. 2.24.

4. Epict. Ench. 10. Arr. Epict. 3.20.9.

5. L,ucian: Judic. Voc. 9; Asin. 2; De. Par. S3.

6. Hdn. 3.8.

7. Poll. 5.138.

8. Diog-. L,. 221.

9. Themist. 271 B.

endurance of abuse, a considerable humility and control of
anger 10 .

The extent of Plutarch's 4 * forbearance'' was remarkable,
overcoming Tipo/xa, leading- to acts of charity toward the
feeble and even toward a foe, bringing about extreme mild-
ness toward erring servants, and inducing the cultivation of
dopyijo-t'a, <tAav0aMna, and freedom from harsh words and
deeds 11 . Plutarch speaks from personal experience, of the
value of dve&KaKia whose present or existing force he recog-
nizes, while exhorting still others to practice the virtue.
Plutarch, as he had done in the case of /xeT/oioTra&ia, constantly
associates OLV&KO.KUL with irpavrv)^ in spite of his consciousness
of its meekness, he takes refuge in the association of <Wu
KaKta with dvfy>ei'a and with /aeyaA.oi/a>xi, on the hypothesis that
weakness may be strength. Plutarch's broad interpretation
of dve&KaKi'a may, perhaps, have been far in advance of the
average conception of the virtue, but even this implies an
actual exercise of dve&KaKia in the pagan world, though its
scope may generally have been more limited.

From the Septuagint 12 with its approval of dvei*aKui and
imtiKaa toPorphyrogenitus 13 who bears witness to the inclu-
sion of this virtue in the body of Christian ideals, we have,
in Ecclesiastic Greek, an important line of evidence touching
the feeling entertained toward avcgiKaKia by a large community
of Greek speaking people, distributed over the entire pagan
world. In Justin Martyr 14 , dve&Kcuoa is not only strongly
approved, but partially defined by reference to exhortations of
Christ 1 5 and by association with dopy^o-ia and viro^ovr). Clemen-
tin 1 6 refers to an incident of self-control in Peter's life and the

10. While we find such older terms as cyx/m-reia, jca/orepta, aopyrjo-ta,

etc -> in the passages, cited above, yet dve&KaKia, as under-
stood in the first century A. D. and afterwards, was a virtue that hardly
fitted into the older pagan world, and the dveiKaKux of Epictetus could
hardly have corresponded to the virtue of the Homeric Greek, which
Themistius calls dveiKaKia.

11. Plut. ii. 90 K, 464 C, 489 C, i. 220 E, i. 290 F, ii. 459 C.

12. L,XX. Sap. 2.19.

13. Porph. Cer. i.62. 16; 574.7.

14. Just. M. Apol. i.16.

15. N. T. Matth. 5. 39.40; I<uc. 6.29.

16. Clementin. 448 A.

high approval of that conduct, described by means of

and dvc&KaKW?. Basilius 17 counts dve&KaKi'a as part of e&re'/Jeia to

be exercised toward all. Macarius' 18 advice to bear misfor-
tune with dve&KaKia and ftaxpo&vfua was to his mind no more
impossible, than was the extraordinary conduct of Constan-
tine which Eusebius 19 calls <#>tAav0/o<i>7rias vTrep/JoAi/.

The evidence drawn from this source, covering- a wide
period of time and extending over a great reach of territory,
demonstrates the unreserved practice of &vciKa,KM on the part
of those to whom Judaism and Christianity appealed. The
practice of this virtue involved a degree of patience, of
humility, of weakness and meekness, submission to misfor-
tune, of philanthropy, with complete suppression of pride,
which only piety and religious zeal could have inspired. 20

In the matter of ''forbearance", then, Plutarch occupied
a middle ground, between the position taken by most pagan
Greeks of the first and second centuries A. D., on the one
hand, and that of the Christians of the same period and
later. If Plutarch was not ready to make concessions that
seemed necessary and noble to Christians, he was, neverthe-
less, ahead of his age in generosity. The essential weakness
of /xerpioTrdfleia reappears in its offspring virtue of dveiKa/a'a; but
in the case of the latter virtue, Plutarch is more aware
of that lack of strength than in the case of the former.
Progressus in dve&KaKi'a was, significantly enough, accom-
panied by a development of do/oy^o-ca, which, a "defect" in
Aristotle, is highly praised by Plutarch, though an amiable
weakness. If able to embrace the virtue of dve&KaKia, as in-
terpreted by Plutarch, the old Greek pride was .broken, his
character was tempered and humbled; it meant a new toler-
ance, which was sure to destroy the old idea of rt/xwpta and to
be of the utmost consequence to slaves. The inherent possi-
bilities of the Plutarchean dve&Ka/aa appear, however, in their

17. Basil, iv. 460.B.

18. Macar. 233 D.

19. Bus. ii. 989 C.

20. We find in the passages (14-19) such older words as

dopyiycrta, VTTO/XOVT/, irpa.6rr)<: all of which, whatever their his
tory, eventually helped to make dvei/ca/a'a possible.

bloom, only later, in the ecclesiastical literature. The pos-
sible effects of ave&KdKia were far-reaching. The record of
the actual effects of di/ei/caKia in Plutarch's day indicates the
great circle of its activity, the numerous directions in which
it was affecting Greek Ethics and Greek Life.

While the weakness of /u,ei7>io7ra0a was veiled, no similar
doubt existed about di/ci/<aKia. The presence of both these
virtues was essential to the development of ayaOoTroda. The
passive character of <Wuca/oa is supplemented by the more
positive or active nature of ayaOoTroda. The ultimate effect of
the three virtues would, necessarily, be first, the suppression
of the pride that rendered TaTruvo<j>po<Tvvr) in Plutarch's day, still
foreign; second, the gradual naturalization of "humility".

The concept of which the word ayaOorroda is an expres-.
sion 1 , existed in the Greek mind as far back as the time of
the Septuagint; it does not appear with any frequency, how-
ever, until the first century A. D.; we find the word
employed, in Plutarch, in the N. T., and, commonly, in
Patristic Literature.

In the Septuagint 2 , dyafloTroua j s predicated, primarily, of
God, but also of man and, with certain qualifications, of
woman besides. It is a divine quality, existing, potentially,
in man, and also actually exhibited in acts of generosity and
in filial piety.

Plutarch 3 says Osiris has been called o dyafloTroto?. In the
New Testament 4 , we find the term frequently, and Christ is

1. There were, to be sure, numerous words in the earlier language,
signifying benefaction, kindness, good-will, as eve/oyeo-ia, ewota, </>i'A.ai/0-
powria, a><eA.i/x,os, Trpoa-qvrjs, dya0oe/oyt'a, <iAaya#O5, etc. But the great
majority of ayaOo- compounds are late, and this, of itself, is, perhaps,
a sign of a certain moral agitation. Besides, it is the character of
dyaOoiroua that is of chief importance to this discussion.

2. L,XX. Num. 10.32, Tobit. 12,13. Sophon. i.12. Mace, i.11.33,
Sir. 42.14.

3. Plut. ii. 368 B.

4. N. T. Marc. 3.4; I^uc. 6.33; Petr. i.2.15; i.4.19; i.3.6; i.3.17; Act.
14.17; Petr. i.2.20; Joann. 3.11. Epist.

represented as the chief inspiration of the dya&wroiot, who
approach the Christ-like, by the exercise of this virtue.
Practically no limits are set for the practice of the virtue,
dyafloTToud, whose benefits should be universal ! In Artem-
idorus 5 , Ptolemaeus 6 and Hermes 7 , the word is used only in
an astronomical sense of the stars and of the planets.
Sextus Empiricus 8 gives clear expression to the religious tone

of ayaOoTroua, in the following: dya0ov iStov <TTI TO ayaOoTroieiv .
ra.ya.6ov of ye o 0eos. LOLOV apa ccrrt Oeov TO dyafloTrotcu'.

In the Ecclesiastical literature we receive confirmation
of the suggestions that have appeared elsewhere. Clemens
Romanus 9 , in an epistle to the Corinthians, establishes the
divine origin of ayaOowoda and its cosmopolitan character; the
degree of piet} r it involves is almost more than human.
Athenagoras' 10 language could hardly be called equivocal: o
8e 0eos TcA-twos dya0os wv d'ioYa>s dya&wroios eo*Tiv. Hermas 11 throws

further light on the position of the aya0o7roids in life, whose

virtues include WMTTIS, a\.yOeia, VTTO/AOV^, TO X^P 015 VTrrjptTtlv and

<f>i\oevia. The "Testamenta Patriarch arum" 12 and Diog-
netus 13 simply re-affirm the position of Clemens Romanus,
while Clenlens Alexandrinus 1 4 defines the ayaOoTroda of the
perfect man, who submerges his own interests in the greater
benefits of all others. Clemens Alexandrinus, Paulus Alex-
andrinus 15 and Eusebius 16 use the term, also, in an astrono-
mical sense, of the stars. lamblichus' 17 statement is another
predication of this virtue, of the gods.

5. Artem. 4.59.

6. Ptol. Tetrab. 38, 19.48; Bibl. i.19.

7. Hermes Tr. latrotn. 388.10.

8. Sext. Emp. M. ii. 70.

9. Clem. R. 2.10; i.2; i.344.

10. Athenag. 952A.

11. Hermas, Mand. 8; Vis. 3.9.

12. Patriarch. 1337 C.

13. Diognet. 1176 A.

14. Clem. Al. i. 1348 A. 692 C, (ii. 460A.

15. Paul. Al. iv. init.

16. Eus. P. E. 275 D.

17. Iambi. 52.18.

The governing motive of dyaOotroua is not far to seek; its
religious character is very pronounced ! The unrestricted
limits within which we find the activity, implied in a'ya007roua,
exercised, is, also, most important, as it clearly indicates the
breadth of the sympathy of the age that first brought the idea
prominently forward in literature, which means, in life.
The sacrifice, necessary for dveiKcuaa, grows apace with the
development of aya&wroud; but that sacrifice was a possibility
through the religious impulse back of it.

While the evidence drawn from Plutarch himself is
slight, that obtained from other sources renders clearer to
our minds the possible and the probable status of dyaOo-n-oua.
for Plutarch and his age. These side lights establish the
same impression that our previous study of Ta7ravo<fy>ocrw77,
per pioira&eia and dve&KaKta has created. The four virtues are so
closely involved that it is almost impossible to dissociate
them; contemporaneous, in fact, they must have acted upon
one another, withal that each had its own special functions.
It is not impossible to conceive of aya&wroua 18 a s the crown of
them all, pledge and product of their sincerity.

KoLvaxf>\ia l and

and /^yaXax^eXifc are clearly closely related. We
find both of the words, for the first time, in literature of the
first century A. D. or shortly before. Each activity was,
plainly, a possibility in the atmosphere, created by the earlier

feelings implied by ra.ireivo<t>po<rvvrj, ^rpLoirdOeua^ dvt&icaKia and

dyaOoTToda. The mood following upon the cultivation of such
virtues was hardly averse to Koivox^eXta and /AcyaXo><eXia. How
far that mood expressed itself in action is a problem that a
study of KOM/ox^eXta and of /xeyaXw^eXia will in part, as least,
clarify.

18. It is, perhaps, singular that dyaOoiroda is of late origin, when
we find dyaOotpyi'a in Herodotus, KOLKOTTOLOS in Pindar, and KaKovpyia
in Homer.

1. Koivox^eXi'a is the form recognized by the " Btymologicum Mag-
num ", 462.21, although jw<D<e'Xeta appears in Diodorus.

Plutarch's 2 definition of the "perfect" man is signi-
ficant, viz., one who has combined political power with the
calm life of the philosopher, having thus gained the two
greatest blessings, the peace of the philosopher's retirement
and TOV . . . Koivox^cAov? PLOV of those engaged in political
affairs. There is no suggestion in the essay that Plutarch
had in mind the life only of a narrow TroAiTct'a and there can
be little doubt but that his vision was much broader. There
can be no question about the meaning of Philo's 3 phrase:

Kotvox^eAeis yap at TOV Trpwrov ^ye/xovos Stopeai. The same broad

interpretation applies (1) to his statement of a dogma which
he calls *eiw^eXAnuTOK, on Tras <fy//,iovpyos 17801% o-o^>xs to-riv ayovos,
and (2) to his characterization of Joseph's upright states-
manship and judgment as /cou/axM-eT?. Perhaps one could
hardly speak dogmatically of the true meaning of Koiv<o</>A>/s,
as applied by Plutarch to Antigonus, successor of Alexander.
Diodorus Siculus 4 clearly limits the possible Koivw<e'Aeia of
great monuments, to the inhabitants of Egypt. Marcus
Aurelius 5 counts among his other virtues of mildness, of
perseverance, of freedom from vain conceit, of love of toil,
also, willingness to pay heed to those who were able to
produce TI Koivox^eAe's; for him, this is of world- wide import.
Galen 6 speaks of medical services of "common utility" to a
Cretan city. Clemens Romanus 7 attributes to the Lord Z-QTUV
TO Kowo^eAes iraa-iv, which is in proportion to his "humility".
At first blush we would incline to a belief in a growth of
ivide philanthropy, previously fostered by such sentiments as

Ta.Trewo<j>poarvvr), /JLerpiOTrdOtia, aveiKaKta and aya&wroad, and expressed

by Kotvox^fiAta. Whether the wide philanthropy of Koivu><eAia
was largely a fancy or real fact of extended application is
partially determined by the passages in which this word
occurs. The idea, strong enough to seek embodiment in a
new term, was actually vital enough to serve as a factor in
life, well known to Galen and to Marcus Aurelius and

2. Plut. i. 258 E; ii. 8 A.

3. Philo. i.389.28; ii.52.19; ii.404; ii.376,

4. Diod. LSI.

5. Anton, i.16.

6. Galen. 14.296.

7. Clem. R. i.48.

clearly implied by Philo, Diodorus and Plutarch ! The word
expresses not merely a passive sense of equality, a widening-
humanity, but also an active interest in affairs.

While such sentiments are, necessarily, always, to some
extent ideal, yet the consideration and contemplation and
welcoming" of that ideal, in time, at least in part, establishes
that ideal more and more a dynamic working 1 force in actual
life. The operative power of such a Sweats ma y or may not
be able to create its own perfect erreXc^eta, but the fact of the
8wa/us none would deny.

The fact of weakness, pre-supposed by the other virtues
of /AeiyxoTrafleia and dve&AcaKia, would operate against the com-
plete success of Koivax^eXia and we find little to justify the
belief in a vigorous activity looking toward a universal
amelioration. 8

While still, then, to a degree, ideal (perhaps the Greek
temperament could never realize such an ideal) Koiva><eXwi
was, nevertheless, not an impossibility to the imagination of
the first century A. D.! The Macedonian conquest had
broken down the barriers between Greek and barbarian; the
Stoic philosophy had proclaimed the equality of all men;
the Roman conquest 8 had still further reduced the Greek
people. Under these circumstances, the cosmopolitan and
religious character of Koiv<i><eXx (as of dyatforroud) is a matter
of little surprise. The broad political values of Plutarch
and the religious of Philo are both of universal application
to all mankind 9 !

8. See "Historical Introduction."

9. Koivox^cXT/s was formed, perhaps, after analogy of the older

While KOIVCOVMI and cvepycr^s are earlier terms, Koivo-rroiea),
-TTpayt'a and -iraOrjs are of comparatively late origin.

MeyaXox^eX^s. What has been said of Kotvox^cX^s is largely true of
this word, also, and little need be added.

MeyaXox^cXta was at least a possibility (as has been said of KOIVW-
<eXta), though the passages in which this word occurs give but a nega-
tive result.

The passages, Plut. ii. 553 D; Cleomed. i.15; Clem. A. i.352B., do
not demonstrate the actuality of the virtue that /u-eyaXox^eXifc implies;
they do not prove that the virtue was really practiced. But it is difficult
to conceive of an utter neglect of what /neyoXox^eXta stands for, when
men were applying the term to God, to Nature, and to heroes of the
past, with admiration.

McyaXocpyta.

MeyaAoepyia, though found in Polybius, occurs with com-
parative frequency only in the time of Plutarch and after.
Throughout the analysis that follows, we shall find a strik-
ing- avoidance of assigning the quality of ^eyaXoepyia to con-
temporary actors or events, and a consistent attribution of it
to men and deeds, remote in time and place, to Nature and
to God.

Polybius 1 informs us that Antiochus and Aemilius Paulus
were rivals in "magnificence". Philo 2 with admiration,
looks back to the time of Moses for his examples of /*eyaAo-
vpyta. Josephus 3 applies the term to a place of uncommon
splendor, in Phoenicia. Plutarch 4 predicates the quality of
Alexander the Great, of Demetrius, of the Athens of Per-
icles' day, of Cato Major and of the Roman consul Caninius
Rebilus, always with approval. Plutarch's testimony to
the confusion of (fyumys and fieyaAov/oyia in his own time, is
witness to a perverted moral judgment and proof of the
absence rather than of the presence of the second of the two
qualities. Lucian 5 attributes TO ptyaXovpyov to Alexander, to-
gether with TO /xijSei/ /AIK/OOV invoLv. Appian 6 , too, turns to the
past and finds /w.eyaAoepyia in the character of Ptolemy Phila-
delphus, of Mithridates, of Hannibal, of Scipio, of Pompey
the Great, and their is no question of his admiration for the

The potentiality, at least, was there in Plutarch's day and this was
so strong- as the coinag-e of the term indicates and as the unreserved
admiration of the virtue shows that it is quite within the bounds of
possibility and of probability that the potentiality of which we have
evidence, was an actuality, at least a striving 1 to perform great services.
/x,eyaA.o- compounds are numerous in the earlier literature, e. g-.
-8oos, -Swpos, -KtVSvfOS, -voia, 7r/oay/xwv, -7rpe7nJ9, o-tfevi/s,
/u-eyaAajyopos, /icyaAijvtop, /neyaAavxi'a; comparatively late are
/w.eya,Ao-epyi'a, -7ra$ex ? -Troiew, /xeyaAwo-vny. But there are a number of
significant late p,i/cpo- compounds!

1. Polyb. 31.3.1.

2. Philo. ii. 142; i. 405.26; ii. 21.46; ii. 105.16.

3. Jos. Ant. 15.9.6.

4. Plut. Caes. 58, (i. 735A), i. 191D; i. 344B; i. 705A; i. 897 D; ii.
183B; ii. 456F.

5. Luc. Alex. 4; Calumn. 17.

6. App. i. 14.7; i. 816.42; ii. 6.86; ii. 155.19; ii. 235.22; ii. 270.16.

quality of /xeyaAocpyux. Philostratus 7 uses the term to describe
a natural situation, and in reflecting- upon the deeds of
Xerxes, of Darius and of Agamemnon. Eusebius' 8 complaint
that men, wondering- at the marvels of architecture, forget
the architect, as those, marvelling at God's work, neglect his
worship, is not far removed from Nectar's 9 religious enthu-
siasm and ascription of /teyaAoepyui to God, who thereby
reveals the greatness of his goodness.

While the idea of the activity, expressed by the word,
was present to the mind of the Greeks who coined and
employed the term, there is no evidence from the literature
in which the word occurs, that the activity itself was
present 10 for the same period. On the contrary, there is
constant reference either to the great figures of the past
history of the pagan world or to the supernatural, with full
admiration for the virtues of /w-eyaAoepyia. Just as far as the
Greek world coined and employed this word with reference to
great events abroad and far away, the term becomes a strange
satire on the Greek's own insignificance in certain of the
great activities of the world. The word and its usage be-
tray the essential weakness of the people that proceeded no
farther than a neologism, however strong their ambition to
imitate might have been or however great their passive
indifference and indecision might have been. The wide cur-
rency of the term is important, as it shows the extent of the
mental state that thus expressed itself, whether incipient
energy, that, however, never attained to effective action, or
whether a mere passive regard for the accomplishments of
others was responsible for the coinage of the term.

In either event, in time, a sense of weakness was bound
to prevail, sooner or later, among the people whose own
/AeyaA-oepyio. was of a phantom nature! Such a sense of feeble-
ness inevitably bred melancholy.

Though there was a spark of the old pride 11 in him still,

7. Philostr. 2. 221.3 and 9.

8. Bus. ii. 1380 B.

9. Nectar 1825 A. (cf. also Simoc. 5.2).

10. Kvo8oia and KevooTrovSi'a (treated later) were existing- evils.

11. Cf. Ta.TTwo<f>po<rvvr), treated earlier.

nevertheless the Greek's generally weak character 1 2 accounts
for the passive nature of /*eyaA.oepyi'a, an expression not of real
"magnificence", but rather of pseudo-greatness in many
repects 13 . The growing consciousness of the latter fact
reacted, doubtless, upon the resignation essential to the full
development of those other virtues, Ta7reivo<poow77,
and

Out of the list of ver}' many K^O- compounds, we have
chosen KevoSo&a and xcvoo-TrovSta as particularly significant.
The importance of these ideas to the morality of the age
under consideration is obvious 1 .

The term Ko>o8oia is found in the Septuagint and in
Aristeas and in Polybius, but appears much more frequently
in and after the first century A. D.! There is no ambiguity
about the meaning of the word, no question about the exist-
ence of "frivolity" and "conceit", no doubt about the feeling
entertained toward these.

From the testimony of the Septuagint 2 that idols have
come into the world through the Kevo8o&a of men (frivolous-
mindedness), to that of Aristeas 3 that the tastes of the
Kcvo8ooi are inferior, we pass to Polybius 4 who not only con-

12. As shown by our study of /xerpiOTra^cta, aveiKa/aa, dya0O7roua;
we do not mean moral weakness.

13. EJven in the direction of KOivox^eAta, which might have been
fully realized, if /xcyaAoepyia had been genuine.

14. The /xyaA.o- compounds in the older literature, whether of mind,
of soul, courage, labor, speech, reputation or generosity, are numerous:
/AyaAo-0v/u.os, -yva>/M,a>v, -o8oos, -0800/305, -ovota, -77*01/77/309, -Trpay/uxoi/,
-TrpeVeia, -O-XTJ/AODV, -<pove'a>, .^u;(ta, //.eyc-ATp/opta, /txeyaAr/vopca. /u,eya.
Aoepyta represents no new concept, but a return in thought (cf. also
/xeyaA.o7roie'a>) to the past, glowing with great deeds.

1. Kevo</>eov, /cevoAoyc'w, KCVOTT/S (and also /xtKpoAoyia) are terms
found in the older literature, as well as a number of other KCVO- com-
pounds, less important. The idea of Ktvo8oia is not an altogether new
one, but the frequent use of the word in later literature gives it great
significance.

2. LrXX. Sap. 14.14.

3. Aristeas 2.

4. Polyb. 3.81.9; 27.6.12; 10.33.6; 39.1.1.

demns Hasdrubal, the Carthaginians, Polyaratus for
which he associated with other evils as dXa^oveta and
but also, through Hannibal, complains that ^poirei-aa,

0V/AOS aAoyos, Ki/o8oi'a and TV<J>O<S incline to eiu/JovAi), eve'Spa and

Diodorus Siculus 5 tells the tale of the death of Calanus,
an Indian philosopher, contemporary of Alexander, whose
spectacular death some condemned as an exhibition of /<evo8oia,
"vanity". Paul 6 writes to the Philippians and to the Gala-
tians against "vain-glory", exhorting "lowliness of mind";
his sermon was, of course, inspired by fear that the evils
existed. The previous impressions are confirmed by the
evidence of Plutarch 7 who regretfully complains of the
anger of the covetous man, the glutton, the jealous man, the
K/o8oos, whose examples he laments, as well as that of the
flatterer who is not ashamed to call "ambition", "fruitless
vanity". Philo 8 dramatically represents Kevo8ota as a wild
beast, lying in wait to destroy those who engage in it, and it
is the %*oKoVos who is the KCVO&>OS. Further, Kcvo8o&a is
included in a category of other social evils, presumably con-
temporaneous. o KcvoSo^os was a fact in the life of Marcus
Aurelius 9 , who scorns such a one and his "little glory",
8oapuH/. According to Arrian 10 and Epictetus, the law takes
cognizance of the *evo8oos who is set down with the aAao>v.
Lmcian 11 humorously represents Hermes as begging Zeus to

lay aside dA.aoveia, a/xatfta, Kcvo8ota, TV<OS, /LtaraiOTrovia, /uuKpoAoyta,

ri and many other faults. Porphyrius 12 attributes the
ia of the men of his own day, source of great misfor-
tunes, to the enmity of demons. We find the term as late as
Heliodorus 13 , applied to the Egyptians.

The Ecclesiastical literature tells much the same tale

5. Diod. Sic. 17.107.5.

6. N. T. Ep. Phil. 2.3; Ep. Gal. 5.26.

7. Plut. ii.57D; H.457B.

8. Philo. i.613.11; i.401.19; ii.47.16; ii.376.44.

9. M. Anton. 5.1.

10. Arr. Bpict. 3.24.43.

11. Lftic. D. Mort. 10.8.

12. Porph. Abst. ii.40.

13. Heliod. 9.19.

regarding this word Kcvo&>&a. Polycarp 14 had said to the
Roman proconsul, with scorn, t KevoSo&Is. Clemens Romanus 1 5
in a letter to the Corinthians promises them salvation, if
they cast off injustice, strife, malice, slander, pride, "vain-
glory". Ignatius 16 betrays his aversion to KcvoSo&a, by prais-
ing those who have in place of it, love of the Lord. In the
language of the Tatian 17 the same feeling exists. Kuse-
bius 18 ridicules a certain Lacydas for his *voSo&a, while, fin-
ally, in ChrySOStomUS 19 we read: o yap TeraTreivayieVos KCU
<rvvTeT/oi/A/Aei/os ov Kvo8o?7<rei, ov/c opyteirat, ov ^Oovrjarci TO> TrX^crtov, OVK

aAAo rt S&rat Traces, which, open to but one interpretation,
brings the same conviction that the previous testimonies
have created.

We have, thus, abundant evidence of the long-continued,
wide-spread evil of KevoSo&a, which, signifying, now, "friv-
olity", now, "conceit", meaning frivolous-mindedness,
vanity, vain-glory is combated as an existing evil ! not only
in the Plutarchean age (when the Kevo8oos was a well-known
type of the day), but before and after that time as well, an
evil deep-rooted in the character of the Greek of the first
century A. D.I

Such a mental state implies a loss of greater or more
serious interests. It is a state of mind that belongs to men
of lesser intellectual stature; it is significantly enough but
once applied to a Roman, and then, hypothetically.

With its signification of "frivolity", its effect on politics
is obvious; meaning also "conceit", its influence in the realm
of ethics upon the new ethical standard would be equally
deleterious. It was an excess, doubtless, of Kevo8ota that pro-
voked the opposition to it that we have noted; that very
excess carried with it the possibility of a cure and might in
time inspire the opposite virtue of real modesty which the
Christian Fathers exhorted.

As long, however, as *evoooia flourished, there was little

14. Polyc. 10.

15. Clem. R. i.35.

16. Ignat. 697 A.B.

17. Tatian. 832 B.

18. Eus. (Numen. apud) iii.!209A.

19. Joan. Chrys. vii. 43 A.

hope for raTreivo^poo-uny, and the evil of KcvoSo&a, "conceit",
without doubt, was one of the forces that interfered with the
development of raTravo^pocrwr/ 2 . The weakness of "friv-
olity" (K/o8o|ia) co-operated with that of /xerpioTrafleia and of
dve&Ka/a'a, and helps to explain the negative element in ayaOowoda
and the negative nature of /AtyaAoepyia, while the "vanity" of
*evo8ox would prevent the state of equality essential for a
Utopian Kou>o></>eA.ta.

Vanity, pride? conceit 21 were, as every one knows, essen-
tial qualities of the pagan world. But the Greek world had
not, before this, reached the point where it could pronounce
that judgment upon itself, which we read in the word
KevoSota itself, and hear proclaimed in literature from Polybius
to Heliodorus. The study of Kevo8ox admirably shows the
position of the Greek of the first century A. D., who is still
Greek, to the extent that he is "vain", KevoSoos, but un-Greek,
in that he condemns that pride and holds it sinful or
"frivolous".

Here we find (as in /AeyoAoepyia) the possible genesis of a
melancholy, which manifests itself more pronouncedly in

II eptavToA.oy t'a .

Let us subordinate TrepiairroA.oyi'ct to KvoSoi'a, to which it is very
closely related.

The word TrepiavToAoyi'a appears for the first time in Plutarch. The
quality of "boastfullness" that it refers to, is one that existed long
before Plutarch and one for which there were many other expressions.
t'a, /xeyaAvyyopi a, KOJOLTTO^O), /co/x,7rea> ? vj/^AoAoyeo/Aai, <re/x,i/oyoyeu>,
), crrw/xvXt'a, OTo/A<aoyxos, av\e<a, cwraAea), dAaoi/evo/>UH; this is a
partial list of the earlier terms denoting- "boasting-". In view of these
many terms, the appearance of 7repiavToA.oyi'a is all the more remark-
able.) The coinage of this new term and, no less, the continuance, in
use, of the group of older terms, evince the persistence of certain

20. Cf. previous study of

21. We need but to recall ^avvoriys, /ouxratoT^s, ayAatd,

avflaSta, oy/<os, //,cyaAo<po<rwi;, TV^OS a d 8oKr;(n(ro<jf)ta. The following-
from Aristotle (Eth. N. 2.7.7) expresses clearly the old artistic standard
of judgment and the consequent grounds of objection: irtpl 8e rifj.r)v K>U
/ACOTOTIJS per /ncyaA.oi/'vxi'a, virepftoXrj & xavvor^s rt?

features of Greek character, certain qualities that were a heritage of the
past (cf. also TaTruvo<f>poa"uvrj discussion) and which were not easily
surrendered ! (The vitality of the term is of much significance and is
such as to dispel any suspicion that, because the cases of occurrence
of the term are rather infrequent the quality was of little consequence
in life.)

Plutarch's (Plut. ii. 29B; ii. 41C; ii. 539C) condemnation of
TrepiavToAoyta is expressed in no uncertain terms; together with p,eyaA-
it is contrasted with arv<j>ia and /AeTpwmys; it is characterized as
e's and avfXf.v6f.pov and the moralist adds: pyo> 8'ov TroAAot rrjv arfitav
OLVTOV oVaTrc^evyaaiv. Sextus Bmpiricus (Sext. EJmp. 77-. Y. i- 62.) mocks
the dogmatists whom he criticizes as rerv^xofiei/wv KCU TrepiavToAo yowTwv.
lamblichus (Iambi. 91.8; Myst. 90.9) stigmatizes TrepiavToAoyux, calling it
TO aTrarrjXov. Porphyrius, (Porphyr. Aneb. 32.12) claiming that TO
TreptavToAoyetv was common to gods, demons and other superior beings,
and was token of the god's presence, is contradicted by lamblichus,
who grants them truth, instead of "boasting". Origen's (Origen. i.
752B) words are significant: eviSetv & rri KCU TO> TOV 'Irjo-ov r)Qa Travra^ov
7Tfpuo~Tafjivov TT/v TrepiavToAoytav /cat Sta TOVTO AeyovTOs: "Kav eyto CITTW
Trept /w,avTOi, y fjMpTvpui fwv ovK Icmv oA^T/s." Eustathius (Eust. 100.
37; 897.2) describing Nestor, says, without disapproval, TOIOVTOS ovv 6
Ne'oTwp wv TroXXaxov TrcpiavToXoyei, while, in another passage, interpreting
Homer, his language is as follows: IO-TCOV 8c KCU on *c TOV ivTavOa Kvpto.

XCKTOV/M6VOV KO/XTTCIV TO KO/XTTCI^CIV TTttp^/CTttl, O TTttptt TOt? V<TTtpOV, <TT<*)fJiV\t<lV

SryXoT /cat o-TO/u,^ao-/xov TrepiavToXoyiKOv.

The word is an expression of one side of the Greek's nature, the
other side of which is represented by such terms as Ta.Trwo<J>pocrvvi] and
ttve&KaKta. But just as far as KevoSo^ta interrupted the progress of
Tairwo<f>po<rvvr) and dveifiKaKta, so, too, the presence of TrcpiavToAoyta
militated against "humility" and "forbearance", and along with these,
against the "quality of mercy'', included in Kou/<o<eA.ia. At the same
time, these virtues act against ircpiavroXoyta. and seek to overcome it;
the real vanity and inanity of the boasting strain for which TrepuivTo-
Xoyia stands is evidenced by the presence of KevoorirovSia and of
/waTcuorrovta J

IleptavToAoyax, like /cevoSo&'a, is a companion term to /uteyoAoepyta,
and was justified as far as the latter term was an index of real accom-
plishment, but become a hollow pretence, when we recognize the
unreality of /xeyaAoepyta.

In a moral atmosphere, however, of which TaTretvo^poo-wiy, /xcTptoir-
a0eia and ayaOoTroua are products, the quality of TrepiavToAoyta was natur-
ally condemned, and that condemnation and distrust, such as we find in
Plutarch, led, perhaps, somewhat to its suppression, though that very
moral greatness \vouldbe the chief ground fora justifiable TrepunrroAoyta !

[The suggestions derived from the passages in which TTCI&JVIOS
occurs, are not insignificant.

Ilei&yvios (It is not our object, here, to determine, completely, the
nature and the limits of "obedience" in Greek ethics. For this idea
there were many expressions in the older language, as
TuQapxia-, evTreifleia, VTraKOvw, aKpoaats, Trcwn^aAtvos,
os, ev>jnos, CVT/KOOS. IleiflT/vios may have been formed after analogy
of Trcto-t^aXivos or TrtiOapx"*-', what motive was behind the creation of
this new term it were difficult to determine. ) is another member of the
new vocabulary of the first century A. D. and reveals considerable
regarding the problem of "obedience".

When Plutarch (Pint. ii. 592 B; ii. 90 B; ii. 442 C; ii. 102 F; ii. 369
C; ii. 1029 E; i. 58 D; i. 176 A; i. 596 C; i. 878 F.) refers to Roman or
to Spartan life, "obedience" is explicitly represented as due to the
authority of law and of administration; these instances are, perhaps,
cited as usual in Plutarch's Laves for emulation. Within the limits
of Greek conduct, reason and divine power are in control and exact
"obedience". Philo (Philo. i. 184.5.) also imagines reason as mistress
of the soul, while to the mind of Clemens Alexandrinus (Cl. Al. i. 1012 B;
ii. 460 A. ) the supreme power is vested in God, whose example is fol-
lowed in worldly affairs and to whom "obedience" is due. (We also find
the term in M. Anton, (i. 17), who rejoiced in a wife, 7rei#r/nos and
<iAo<TTopyos, in Pollux (i. 219) who uses it in its strictly literal sense,
in Soranus (p. 220), who employs it in a medical way).

The ideal subservience to reason, to Fate, to Daemons, to God, allow-
ing much scope for individualism, does not deny the possibility of will-
ing surrender; at the same time that 7repiavToA.oyta and Kvo&oia found a
place in men's consciousness, raTrttvo^pocrvvrj (under certain conditions)
was exercised and brotherly love was encouraged ! The complex char-
acter of this virtue meant a Greek appreciation of "obedience" that did
not enslave but which allowed freedom at the moment of surrender.

The complexity of such "obedience" is closely identified with the
combined religious and rational tone of later Greek ethics. Conduct
had at once an intellectual justification and sought a divine sanction !
Freedom was not surrendered, nor was authority denied !]

Out of the mental state implied by K/o8o&a,
could and did result, and we find it, first, shortly before the
first century B. C. The suspicion that the word itself is a
symbol of a "zealous pursuit of frivolities" and of the "friv-
olity of zeal", in the life of the Greeks of the first century
A. D., is confirmed by a study of the passages in which the
term occurs; neither element of the word is new; but that

rf should be so *"/ as to form a single concept denotes a
fixity of the idea, and signifies more than mere occasional
expressions of the futility of zeal and of labor; the single
word is concrete evidence of the fact that the idea was
abroad, while the wide and free use of the word would seem
to indicate the actual importance of the feeling which the
word defines; the literature betrays the regret felt because
of the fact of KvooTrov8ia, a fact that pressed heavily upon the
moral consciousness of the age.

The word is variousl} r applied to certain minor endeav-
ors, to trivial events and to the whole of human conduct.
Cicero 1 refers to problems of idle curiosity touching events
in Brundisium in the year 49 B. C., as xevoo-TrovSa 2 . Dionysius
of Halicarnassus 3 characterizes the laughable conduct of
Lucius Junius Brutus (contemporary of Appius Claudius),
as Kci/oo-TTovSta. To Josephus 4 the idea was not unknown and
it was referred to the times of Herod. Plutarch's 5 condem-
nation of Kcvoo-TrovSta grows out of the bitterness of his own
experience; while it is unthinkable that God is /wKpo? and
KevooTrovSo?, men are so and zealously fritter awa} r their energy
upon profitless things; o Kevdo-TrovSos is opposed (and defined
by the antithesis) to 6 ^tAoVoi/os. The same moral earnest-
ness appears in Marcus Aurelius 6 , and his sweeping denun-
ciation includes almost all of men's activities, under the head
of Kcvoo-Trov&a! Hernias' 7 scorn for the Kcvoo-rrovSos whom he
knows from life, is paralleled by that of Artemidorus 8 , whose
discrimination leads him into condemnation. Hipparchus 9
defines the "zealous frivolity" of a dilettant mathematician,

1. Cic. Att. 9.1.

2. It is not remarkable that Cicero knew this comparatively new
term (cf. aJso dvc^iKaKta); Cicero knew his Greek! His knowledge of
the term is not at all proof of its age, but rather of its wide currency,
perhaps wider than its comparatively infrequent appearance in litera-
ture would suggest.

3. Dion. H. 6.70.

4. Jos. Ant. 16.4.3.

5. Plut. ii. 560 B; ii. 1061 C; ii. 234 D; 1069 C.

6. M. Anton. 4.32; 7.3.

7. Herni. Sim. 9.5.

8. Artemid. 4.11; 4.82.

9. Hipparch. 1016 B.

by contrasting- the seriousness of a <^tXoA.iy^ with his
Trov&'a. The pious enthusiasm of Clemens 10 of Alexandria
carries him into extravagant denials of the value of life apart
from religion, and leads him to praise life in the desert <*TOS

7ra<n;s Kvoor7TOv8ias, aTreipaya&'as, /ouKpOTrpeTreuxs. Clemens Alexan-
drinus could have sympathized with Plutarch and with
Marcus Aurelius. Although Diogenes Laertius 11 looks back
to the time of Plato 12 , his reproach does not belong dis-
tinctly to that earlier age any more than his general reflec-
tion; oorct (rwretVa eis TO d/?e/}atov KOU KevotrrrouSov a/xa Kai TruiSapuoSes
rwv dv0p<o7T<oi/, which possesses a universal value. His associa-
tion of xevoo-TrovSt'a with TV<OS is also suggestive. Finally,
Stobaeus 13 employs the word, expressing a thought he
attributes to Socrates 14 .

After the passing of the conditions that created the
social ethics of Plato, the aesthetic ethics of Aristotle, the
individual ethics of Zeno and of Epicurus, a condition
inevitably arose, in which /ccvoorTrovSta was prominent! We
wonder that we do not find the word earlier in literature.
The growth of a futile or frivolous zeal ended in an ultimate
belief in the futility of all zeal! Kevoo-Trov&a, the result of
KevoSo&a, is the very antithesis of a genuine ftcyaAocpyta, though
a natural concomitant of a mythical /^eyaAoepyia. Melancholy
was a natural result of the regret, (that we have found
evidence of) at the prevalence of Kevoo-Trov&a. We find a more
distinctly marked pessimism in connection with Kevoo-TrouSiu
than we have before.

We find, to be sure, sporadic strains of melancholy in
the earlier literature; but 0177 Trep <vAA<ov yevoj, roi-q & KIU dvSpcov.

and opoi yap 17/u.as ovSev oVras aXXo TrXrjv aStuA' otrotTrep wp,cv rf Kov<f>r)v

, and other similar lines do not represent the prevailing

10. Clem. Al. i. 532 B; i. 216 B.

11. Diog. L. 6.26; 9.68.

12. Diogenes L/aertius is probably no more quoting- exactly, here,
than before, in the case of p; Tpio7ra0tta. (Cf. previous treatment of
that word. )

13. Stob. 534.23.

14. 5<uKpar^s \eye vofiifcew act TOV? #covs yeAav optovras rrjv TWV
a/$pa)7ra>i/ KcvocTTrovStav. It is little likely, we think, that Socrates knew
this word which we find, first, in Hipparchus and in Cicero.

spirit of the earlier age, nor is melancholy characteristic,
in general, of the Greek nature, which, active, boastful,
talkative, fickle, not above lying, beaut3 7 -loving, speculative
and brave, was not pessimistic. We find no Lucretius, no
Rubaiyat in Greek literature ! The consciousness of the folly
and futility and emptiness of human endeavor does, however,
assert itself more strongly after the great conquests, and the
presence of this word, under consideration, is no less a sign
of that feeling than was the rise of a School of Skeptics
much earlier. But the Greek was not incurably pessimistic

and even TIJS 8c Ka/ctas di/aTreTrA^o-Ttu Trai/ra Trpay/xara KCU iras 6 /3ios

Ta/oaTTO/acvo? Kai /xvySev ^a>v /xcpos KaOapbv prfi avf.TriXffirrov , a>s OVTOI
Aeyowi, (i.e. the Stoics) atcr^tcrrov OTI Spa/txaTwv airdvTwv Kai are/o-

Trco-raTov 1 5 represents onty one side of Stoicism, and even such
strong condemnations provoked, in time, only a feeling of
equality and of wider sympathy, but not of despair. Thes ad-
ness of Kevoo-Trov&a is, however, indisputable.

KevooTTouSox, involving TV<OS, the opposite of 4>iA.o7rovos and
of 4>iAaA.i}0T75, is, like KcvoSo&'a, twin-sister of /u,i*/oo/oyta, and
becomes a true expression of a petty age that worshiped
^eyaAoepyia as a distant ideal ! Pride, feebleness and sadness
were conspicuous among the qualities of the Greek of
Plutarch's centur !

We find /xaraio., compounded with nouns of action 1 occa-
sionally before the first century A. D., but such cases are
sporadic in comparison with the numerous later occurrences.

MaratoTrovta is applied to a wide range of activities, being
even predicated, though negatively, of God and of Nature.
MaratoTTovta is by no means a new idea in Greek life, within
which, from Homer's time on, much TTOI/OS or O-TTOV^ must have
seemed /xdVaios. The later interpretation of what constituted
/xaraioTTovta is also quite a universal one, and Polybius and
Livy, Strabo and Pheidias, Plutarch and Plato, Lmcian and
Homer might easily have been in agreement, touching the

15. Plut. ii. 1066 A. (cf. too ii. 478 A. seq).

1. We have taken into consideration, /Lumuorrovia, -TrovTj/Aa, -Trpayta,
-epyta.

folly of what is termed t^raioirovia. But as in the case of
Kvo(T7rov8ia, the later close association of /uarcuo- with a con-
siderable number of other ideas is significant; the words
thus formed w^ere not fashioned for a day, and suggest the
growth of a feeling of /WXTCUOTT/S!

Polybius 2 records his own keen disapproval of /w.aTcuo7rovia,
as well as that of the Romans. The scholiasts 3 of Aristophanes
and of Sophocles used the term /AaratoTroveo) to define less well-
known words from their authors; Qopvfteiv and Kov<f>a \.a\tiv, also
employed to illuminate the same text, at the same time also
explain the commentator's attitude toward an existing
/AaToioTrona. Strabo 4 finds an example of ^wnuorw^, in the
case of an Egyptian temple of barbaric KOTOO-KCWJ, which, to
his mind, possessed little of grace. Philo 5 denies that the
quality of /xaraioTrovux can be predicated either of Nature or of
God. His conception of /AaraioTrovia is graphically stated:

vyirtttiv TraiSwv . . . . o t 7roAA.ouas Trap' aiytaXots dflv/oorrcs if/d/JLfjLov yecuAo^ovs
8iavrTa<n KCH eTrafl' ixfraipovvrts rai^epal 7raA.iv cpctVovcri. Plutarch 6

expresses his own conviction, in applying the term /xaTatoTrovta
to useless indulgence in grief. The satirist Lucian 7 includes

/xaTcuoTTcwa among dAuoveta, d/Aa$i'a, pts, KcvoSo^ia, /xiK/ooA.oyta and

other no less censurable evils, unworthy of the gods.
lamblichus 8 represents Pythagoras as characterizing the
ordinary duties of life that interfere with philosophy, as
/xaraioTrwr^itt. To Clemens Romanus 9 ? /AaraioTrovt'a consisted in
idle inquiry regarding the future of the soul. Justin's 10
hypothetical statement of the /xaTatoTrovta of God is, of course,
an expression of his own condemnation of that quality in
life. Olympiodorus' 11 opinion of /xaraioo-TrovSia is shown by his
association and identification of it with TO avv-n-apKra T&V om/owv

<^avrap/u.ara and T^V TOW TroXXuiv Aoywv axatpov <t>\vapiav, Kpiphan-

2. Polyb. 9.2.2; 25.5.11.

3. Schol. Ar. Plutus. 575; Soph. O. T. 887.

4. Strabo. 806.

5. Philo. 2.500; 2.98.52.

6. Plut. ii. 119 D.

7. L,uc. Dial. Mort. 10.8.

8. Iambi. Vita Pyth. 24.

9. Clementina, i. 60 B; i. 27. B.

10. Just. Frag-. 1585 A.

11. Olymp. A. 41 C.

ius' 1 * condemnation of /u-aTcuocpyia { s not less unequivocal.
Philostorgius 18 , also, draws from his own experience for an
illustration of /txaraioo-TrovSta, which is used of idle, trivial oc-
cupation 14 .

We have, thus, a record of a -wide-felt disapproval of a
wide-spread iMraunrovial In the light of the evidence furnished
by Ko/oo-Trou&a, the development is strongly suggested of an
atmosphere of idleness and of inactivity, or one of labor and
zeal that were trivial and therefore condemned. The words
of Plutarch 1 ' 5 are, perhaps, significant in this connection:
KCU /xdAi? av vvv o\rj ['EAAas] 7rapa<r;(oc, T/oio-^tAtov? OTrAiras, txrovs 17
MeyapeW fua TroAts ee7r/u,i^ev i? IIAaTaiea? .... ircpt TO HTWOV OTTOV
/A0' -fffjipa<; eVrv^etv eorrtv dv0pd>7ra> vcpovn. Evidence of the Same

weariness appear in the language of Strabo 16 who writes of
Athens that her navy was "almost extinct, that little re-
mained of her Long Walls, and of the lower cit_y no more
than a small part of the maritime quarter". Thebes was
hardly deserving of the name of village, and the same was
true of all the Boeotian towns except Tanagra and Thespiae.
Dion 17 gives a more picturesque description of Thebes when
he says that "only a single statue stood erect among the
ruins of the ancient market-place". Pausanias 18 in the
second century, is our best witness of "shrunken or ruined
cities, deserted villages, roofless temples, shrines without
images and pedestals without statues, faint vestiges of places

12. Epiph. i. 417 A.

13. Philostorg-. H. E. 11.1.

14. MaTuiooTTrov&a is found in Suicer, with this comment:
ovupntv SiaAAaTToucm/ at TOJV av0pa>7ra>i/ /txaTaiooTrovSiai. Eu.stathius (543)
uses ^aratoTrpayta of the idle, lazy, useless exertion of Homeric heroes.
Of the numerous fjM.ra.io- compounds, some are, of course, earlier, some
later, in origin; /xaraioAoyco), like ^wpoAoyia, /xi/cpoAoyta, <J>\vapia and
AuAf'o) and KCvoAoyta belong-s to the older literature. We have chosen
and treated /xaratOTrovta, because of its close relation with Kei/oorrov&a.
MaTaiore^vta is also interesting and is defined by Quintilian (2.20.3) as
"supervacua artis imitatio, quae nihil sane neque boni neque mali
habeat, seel vanum laborem".

15. Plut. ii. 414 A.

16. Strabo. ix. 1 and 2.

17. Dion. Chr. vii. Or. p. 136. Dind.

18. Frazer: Pausanias. p. xiv. Intr. (with ref's) vol. i.

that once had a name and played a part in history". It is
well-known that through imperial favor Greece enjoyed, for
two centuries, a high degree of tranquillity and of repose;
this but encouraged her own settled calm, her state of leth-
argy and of exhaustion. When men are strong- and are
vitally engaged in their own occupations, which are all-
absorbing, then /aaratoTrovta and Ko/oo-TrouSux are foreign to their
lives; the temper of this age, however, of Plutarch's age
was not far removed from "/xaratOTrys /xaT<uori;T<>v, ewrev 6
7S, /Maraiorr/s /x,aTcuoT7;T<Dv, TO. travra

This is a term we do not find in literature before Diony-
sius of Halicarnassus. Dionysius of Halicarnassus 1 , who
calls the Roman character fuvoirovrjpa and aivQaSr), represents
Horatius reviling his sister with the epithets favSoTrapOtvc and
/u,wra8A.<e. The Greek's knowledge of the evil of /xt<ra8cA<^>ta
is evidenced no less than his belief that the evil was a
universal one in time and place. Plutarch's 2 sweeping
denunciation of ^lo-aScA^wi grew out of the bitterness of his
conviction that <iAa8cA<ia was as rare in his day as /xtcraSeAxjka
had been in the time of the ancients; in his own day, if we
can believe his words, it was a common social evil which he
deeply deplored. Philo 3 recognizes the presence of the
^wraSeX^o? and of the /uouvfyxoTros, whose evil influences he
seeks to overcome. The exhortations of the ecclesiastics 4
not to honor /uou8eA.<ia before <iAa8eA<ta, to oppose <iA.ovetKia, to
avoid envy and /xto-aSeX^ta, to seek goodness, love and peace
are clear enough condemnation of a social evil whose effects
they knew from experience and dreaded accordingly.

From Dionysius of Halicarnassus, then, throug-h at least
the fourth century A. D., we find testimony to the existence
of this evil, which meets with a bitter condemnation 5 .

1. Dion. H. i. 464.9.

2. Plut. ii. 478 C., ii. 482 C.

3. Philo. i. 671.47.

4. Patriarch. 1145 B; Athan. i. 305 B; Basil, ii. 820 B.

5. We cannot believe that the idea of /xio-aScA^ta is an entirely new
one, born at this late period of Greek ethics; /nio-avfywoTros is a partial

Plutarch's extreme, pessimistic view must be taken "cum
grano salis"; his argument for the very great prevalence 6 of
in his own day and a corresponding- rarity of
is invalid, as the same argument could be adduced
to prove the contrary. And, in fact, the essay "De Fraterno
Amore" is more evidence, perhaps, to the contrary of
Plutarch's statement than his argument is proof for the
affirmative. There can be no doubting the fact, however,
that the evil, whether wide-spread or no, affected the mind
of the age with a certain horror, if Plutarch be a true repre-
sentative. The appearance of the term, if it was coined at
this time, is evidence, probably, not so much of the preva-
lence of the evil which is deprecated, as of a deeper moral
consciousness and an acuter sense of sin !

With a growing "humility" and "forbearance", both
earlier in time than /ou<ra8eA.<ta, such an attitude is easily com-
prehensible. Further, the weakness, suggested by pcrpioiraOcia
and dve&Ka/aa, would break down the hostility necessary for a
prolonged /ouo-aSeA^'a. The religious character of Ko/<o<eAia,
the generosity of dya&wroud would also contribute to the
charity that opposed /xio-aScX^a 7 . Under such circumstances,
the evil of /uo-aSeA^i'a could hardly thrive, while the feeling
against it would naturally be very strong.

Though the term KOcr^oTroXirr^ seems to be quite late in Greek liter-
ature, the conception of world-citizenship had presented itself, long- be-
fore the first century A. D., to the mind of the Stoics and of the Cynics
(Diog. L. 6.63. L,ucian i. 548). The idea was present to the imagination
of the first century and, as Philo (Philo. i.1.18; i.657.6; ii. 106,2. Moses

expression of the same feeling and is as old as Demosthenes and Plato.
It is a matter or some surprise that the word /xra8eA.<ia, was not cre-
ated earlier, as was its opposite <iAa8eA<ia. There are many late JUMTO-,
fjiura- compounds. The feeling entertained toward /u(ra8e\<ta in the
first century A. D. is, however, of more importance than the problem of
the exact time, of the creation of this term!

6. The moralist's expression is, rather, merely one of protest than
an accurate index of the extent of the evil; cf., for another exaggera-
tion, Plut. ii. 1066 A.

7. Perhaps, such late terms, as <f>i\a\\r]\ia, d8eA.^>OTi^, <iAcvcre'/?ei,

and <f>iXo<rvvy6'r)<i are significant, in this connection.

is Philo's example of such lofty citizenship.) understood the character
the KOcrftoTToAtrry? was a citizen of the universe, subject to the law of the
whole KOCT/U-OS or to the regulations of Nature. Further, the soul that was
KOO-/XOTTO\ITIS, was also 0eo<iA7ys and consecrated itself to the service of
God, not enrolled in any one city, but through divine interest, possess-
ing" the whole world. In the social fabric of the first century, the con-
cept was quite as natural to Greek as to Hebrew. For both, the idea
had a religious as well as a political significance, and JSpictetus (EJpict.
2.10.3.), though using the different phrase TroAtTiys KOOT/MOV, further illus-
trates the moral obligations of world-citizenship (The few passages
cited, in which this word occurs, do not militate against the belief in a
wide currency of this term, -a belief resting upon the frequent repetition
of the word in inscriptions; the same is true of ^eyaAxix^eAi/s.).

While the fact of the ico<r/AoiroAirip, of the man who ignored the
barriers of race and of religion, of the citizen of the world who recog-
nized a universal divinity and a universal philanthropy is plainly
established, his religious character is as much emphasized as his ethical
or his political.

The way was doubtless, in part at least, prepared for such a char-
acter by the humanizing influences of such virtues as TaTravo<f>po<Tvvr)
/xef/otOTraflcia, dve&KaKia, dya#O7roiia, and Kotvox^cXux; the hostility enter-
tained toward fjuo-ao\<f>ia, likewise was favorable toward a universal
friendship; the leveling tendency of these habits of thought broke
down narrow, local prejudices and made for the cosmopolitanism,
represented by 6 K

While ^oTTottd, with a moral suggestion, was not unknown
to Aristotle 1 & 2 , while to rhetoricians after Callistratus
^Ooiroua was well-known as a rhetorical term, in the first
centur} 7 A. D. the word acquired a deep ethical significance
of genuine value ! The positive moral signification that the
word then carries points, perhaps, to a deeper interest in the
moral activity that the term defines !

Plutarch's well-known moral purpose, both in the 44 Mor-
alia" and in the ' 'Lives" 3 , lends special interest to his frequent
use 4 of the term yOoTroda. His discriminating use of

1. Arist. irX. i. 955a 32. This case in Aristotle seems to be unique.

2. Another passage, Rh. iii. 7., illustrates a step in the formation
of the term, eav TO. ovofjua.ro. ot/caa Aey?; rfj !ci, irouqcrti TO rjOos.

3. Plut. Pericl. 2.

4. Plut. i. 71 B; i. 961 D; ii. 814 A; ii. 660 B; ii. 799 B; i. 153 B; i
112 B; ii. 1U53 D; ii. 450 F; 1.53 A.

i.e., in associating- it with peace, bravery and justice in the
case of the Romans, and with <<j>povifav and with noble
pleasures in the case of the earlier Greeks suggest elements
of his own moral ideal. Plutarch allows a wide range of
rjOoTToiia, applying it to Spartans, to Sicilian Greeks and to his
own times, socially and politically. There is no question of
his own concern for philanthropy and fora "formation of
character" which shall be secure! Philo 5 , in the interests
of an actual JjOorroda, declares the possibility of its realization
through religion and through philosophy. In the absence of
an exacter definition of the ?0<>s, we can only conclude
the presence of a desire for a noble "character formation".
Strabo 6 , in a dissertation on the humanizing results of
Roman conquest, counts ^Wood among- the signs of civiliza-
tion. 'HfloTroua mig-ht, of course, according to the significa-
tion of the ?0os, have a bad sense, as when referring- to the

ayo>y^v TWV irapa rot? KtvatSots 8iaA.eKra>v *at rfjs rjfloTrouas, in Ionia.

The stricter moral sense, with an exhortation to practice,
recurs in Clemens 7 of Alexandria: TrpaK-riKo? & wv 6 TratSaywyos,

irporepov fiev as 8ta0<riv rjOoirouas Trpovrptyaro^ 77807 8 KOI eis rrjv T<OV

Scovrwv eV/oyeuxv TrapaKoAct. Sextus Empiricus 8 controverts the
belief of the Pythagoreans in an harmonious organization
of the universe and the consequent value to be attached to

*H0o7r<Hi 9 is also used in a different sense, of "delineation
of character", by sophists and by rhetoricians from Calli-
stratus to Longinus, by Callistratus 10 , of the r^y with
which the Argo was built, by Dionysius 11 of Halicarnassus
of Lysias and of Isocrates to whom he grants the most con-
spicuous dpeTTJ in composition, ^OTTOIOX; this receives a defini-

tion in the following: r)^07rom KCU Karao-Keva^ei TO, TrpooxoTra raJ Aoyw
Trto-ra Kai xprjarTa^ 7rpooup(7is re avrot? dcrreaxf VTTOTI^CI? . . KOI

5. Philo. i. 355.10; i. 302.41; i. 364.26; ii. 214.48.

6. Strabo. 648 C (14.1.41); 127 C. (2.5.26).

7. Clem. Al. i. 249 C.

8. Sext. Emp. M. 6.30; 6.36.

9. Similarly, ^oypa^os, rjOoXoyta.

10. Callistr. Stat. 10.

11. Dion. H. de Lys. c. 8. c. 19. Isocr. c. 11. (for dv^oirotrrro? L/ys.
c. 13).

Adyovs 7riiKets cbroSiSovs KOU rats rv^ais aKoXovBa (frpovovvras euraycov;
Hermogenes 1 2 defined yOoiroua as ftiprjcns yOovs VTTOKCI/ACI/OV 7rpo<rw7rov,

and classified it with other technical rhetorical terms, as
irpoo-wroiroua and etSwAoTroua; Longinus 13 includes it among

7rpo8idp0awns, e7ri8to/o0uxns, dTroo-twTn/tris, irapaAet^ts, ctpwvaa. In other

words, yOoTroda is purely a technical term of rhetoric, with no
further moral signification; as a rhetorical term it was widely
known and we also find it in Aphthonius 14 , Nikolaiis, Phoe-
bammon, Zonaeus; Eustathius 15 , commenting- on Homer,

Says: ^ TOV 'ArpetSov \j/v\r] KCU <f>rj<riv rf ^OTroiiyTiKws.

While neither the Greek, the Hebraic, the Roman nor
the Christian ideal has been exactly defined, above, the word
is a symbol of an effort to attain a realization of those
ideals! Widely 16 used, the word reveals a genuine desire to
promote "character-formation", to upbuild nobility of
character.

It were natural to conclude that yQoiroda. meant, for the
Greek of the first century A. D., a realization, in "character-
formation", of elements that appealed to the age. 'Hftwrood
represents a conscious union of various ethical forces, repre-
sented by T(nrewo<f>po(rvvr)^ /AerpioTra&ia, ave&KUKi'a, dya&wroua, KOIVCO-
<cA,ta, /u,yaA.<D<eAi'a, /xeyaAoepyta, Tra&yvios, <iAa8eA<ia, KOtr/xoTroAiT^s,

which, all, separately, factors in the ideal character of the
age, became united in the perfect

12. Hermog. Prog. 44.

13. I^ongin. Frag. 8.14; (for dvrytfoTroiVos, 34.3).

14. Cf. Rhetores Graeci, L>. Spengel.

15. Bust. 1955.54 and 49.

16. avrjOoiroirjTos occurs in Cic. ad Alt. 10.10.5, meaning "immoral".

LIST OF WORDS.

PAGK

KcuvoAoyta . . . . . 19

Evpeo-iAoyta ..... 20

TaTravo? ..... 22

.... 26

.... 29

.... 32

.... 36

ia and MeyaAox^eAi/s . . 38

MeyaAoepyi'a ..... 41

Kevo8oux . . . . . 43

IlepiuvToAoyia .... 46

UuOrjVLOS ..... 48

KevocrrrovSta, ..... 48

MttTatOTrona . . . . . 51

Mta-aSeX^ta ..... 54

Kocr/xoTToXtrr/? . . . . 55

'H007TOI&X 56

CONCLUSIONS.

In the previous discussion it has been shown that all of
these words are expressions, concrete symbols of real facts in
the Greek life of the first century A. D. The ethical move-
ments that these words evidence were genuine factors in the
life of the age that Plutarch represents. There w)(ere
certain virtues in process of development, that were encour-
aged, some of them more fully realized, others less so;
there were certain vices whose existence was deplored and
condemned.

The words themselves are partial evidence of the ethical
situation, inasmuch as we can be certain that they were
vital, (compare Chapter on "Method", also KawoXoyta and
cvpeo-iAoyia) ; their acceptance in the language, their long
history shows them to be precipitates of genuine thinking
and feeling of serious import. The extent of that ethical
vocabulary, (which goes back in its beginning at least to the
time of Pol3 T bius, and which developed in the time of
Plutarch and includes both new ideas and old ones reinforced
or altered), is further evidence of the width and depth of
the moral agitation of the first century A. D. The ideas
and conduct these words portray were determinative, and
quite full testimony of such conduct is received from the lit-
erature before and after Plutarch's time representing actual
conditions in life, as well as ideals 1 .

The moral ideal of Plutarch is our immediate concern,
but while we can establish certain data of his ethical stan-
dard, some of these data appear to be true for the whole
century as well, as we find the same attitude observed in
further literary and other sources of the same time as that
of the great representative Boeotian; this attitude, develop-

1. It is thought that a complete study of the history of the entire
ethical vocabulary found in Plutarch must make quite clear the nature
of the moral ideal of the Greeks of the first century A. D., which is by
no means as yet fully understood.

ing before, finally became established in the first century A.
D. and continued long after, not only in time but also in
place 2 .

That moral agitation, which was undoubted^ sincere
and deep rooted, is, in part at least, defined by the study we
have made of a portion of the ethical terminolog} 7 , which is
no less a positive record of moral progress than the marbles
of a fallen temple are witness of an ancient glory 3 .
Plutarch's ethical ideal included the virtues of

and combated the evils of Kei/o8oia, TreptavroXoyta,

ta, /xaraioTrovta; the ethical movement had a definite
relation to the past but was also firmly established in the new
conditions of the later age. Taireivo<t>po<Tvvri he received with
great reserve, owing to an inherited strain of Greek pride;
fjLTpio7rd6ua was strongly exhorted; while in a way recalling
the past, and even applied to Socrates, it was essentially a
new virtue that implied much weakness; dvefrjcaicto is distinctly
a new product that brought in its train opposition to Ti/xwpia,
kindness toward slaves, toward the feeble, and toward a foe,
that encouraged do/oyi/o-ia and <iAav0/oa>7ri'a; ayaOairoua had a clear
religious implication and Kou/o><eAia, quite a new term, was in
time predicated of God as well as of man; Plutarch cherished
this idea as he did that of /xeyaXox^eXi}?; curiously enough we
find the latter term applied to God, nature, and heroes of the
past, rather than to men of the present, which is also true
fteyaXocpyta. Plutarch sincerely regretted the /u<ra8eA<x that
existed in his own day, and was deeply affected by the evils
of Ko/o8oia, which he associated with covetousness, jealousy
and flattery; no less bitterly^ did he condemn the TreptavroAoyux
of his own day, while the prevalent Kwbfrww&a was actually
responsible for a large degree of melancholy; pnraunrwCa was
another fault of the age that disturbed the moralist; many
of these faults were inherent in the Greek nature, but the
practical philosophy of Plutarch contemplated their reform;

2. The "discussion" gives this information with such exactness as
may be attained in this matter.

3. It should be borne in mind that this study is merely a "prolego-
mena" and that more evidence will be published at a later time.

the idea of iruQrjvtos seems to have been complex, as the whole
system of ethics was, which referred its laws now to man,
now to God, now to human institutions, now to divine power.
The ideal of character formation, ^0<wroua, included, besides
the above, peace, bravery, justice, o-to^poo-w^ and noble
pleasures. The entire group of words and concepts repre-
sents a deep moral earnestness, a positive long-ing- for virtue
and hatred of sin.

The ideas that we have, in large measure, been consider-
ing-, separately, were also very closely inter-related. While
suggestions have already been made of this correlation, it
may be well, in conclusion, to pass all of the ideas in review,
together.

As has already been established, the moral ideal was not
merely a vision hovering before the mind of the age, but cer-
tain virtues, crystallizing, had penetrated the very heart of
the Greek life and found a home there. The general ten-
dency was toward a generous interpretation of life and of
its obligations. A gradual appreciation of humility, (raTm.
vo<j>po<rvvr)) the foundation-stone of this ethical structure,
induced a mode of thought and a habit of feeling, favorable
to a broad philanthrop} r , which, in private affairs, fostered
an ideal of brotherly love (^iXaScA^ta), and, in public matters,
cherished the hope of world-citizenship (KOOTAOTTOAITT;?), when,
reversing- the old process, the individual soug-ht the state.
A new interpretation of control of the passions (/ACTpiorrafleta)
was a resultant psychological necessity, and a noble forbear-
ance (dve&Ka/aa) became a pS3 T chological possibility; the
feebleness of these qualities undermined the aristocratic
sense of pride, once an essential quality of Greek ethics.
Advancing hand in hand, these democratic virtues proceeded
to put into action (ayaOovoua^ /xeyaXax^cX^s) their ideals but
lacked the strength to initiate the universal amelioration
(Kotv<D<e\ta) which should have been the logical issue of such
effort. With a great capacity for sacrifice, this nature was
smitten with a sad feebleness that made its inherited strain
of pride a mockery and its. chief ambition, a failure.

While sympathy was cosmopolitan and ethics received
her law from religion, (cf. TT^VIOS, KOtvox^eXta, aya007roua, dvet-

there were, however, other forces present which checked

and complicated the onward movement of thought. Obedi-
ence O0ijvios) did not yield unquestioningly to the dictates
of humility, but reserved for herself a large measure of free-
dom, b}' which the natural tendency and the final results of
the ideas, previously considered, were necessarily held in
abeyance. Frivolity and conceit (KcvoSo&a) were native
elements, not easily eradicated from the Greek character,
though bitterly condemned by the age; humility won only a
partial triumph over this foe. The representative voice of
the age, to be sure, raised a protest against anger (opy*?), but
Plutarch, himself, was, as yet, still unable to extend an
unreserved welcome to humility (ruTreivos). While there may
have been a gain in generosity, that sentiment was still con-
fined within serious limitations.

The evident earnestness of the moral movement had also
to contend against a deep-seated languor, frivolous zeal, idle
indifference (Kevoo-TrovSta, /naraioTrovta) . Though the Greek con-
science was disturbed by these and regret was profound, the
disease was not readily cured; and the Greek's boastfulness
(TTcptavToAoyia), his ostentation and his egoism were a hollow
pretence that left him in his weakness, melancholy and
resigned.

In the midst of these contradictions, in the strife, on the
one hand, between a noble generosity and an effort to be
great through being good, and, on the other, a pride that
was self-centered rather than altruistic, in the conflict
between sincerity and pretence, we see an unceasing yearning
for the Golden Fleece of a Moral Ideal ! There is no doubt-
ing the fact that there was a wide-spread belief in virtuous
ideals and encouragement of virtuous acts ! The condemna-
tion the age passed upon its own weaknesses, the regret it
felt at its own failures bespeak the earnestness to attain the
goal of noble living. Aware of the presence of evil in his
own nature which a conscientious introspection had revealed
to him, the Greek's conscience was deeply stirred and he was
impelled to purify his own heart. Incapable, perhaps, of
inaugurating a universal reform, though not abandoning the
the hope of it, the purity of the individual was his immedi-
ate aim ! Thus, though the period was one of contradictions
and of compromises, though paradoxes blocked progress,

public opinion seems to have taken a definite trend in a cer-
tain direction. With whatever longing the Greek may have
reverted to the great days of long ago, (/xeyaAoepyox, fteyaXw^eA.^?)
and whatever self-esteem (ye/oiauroAoyi'a) he may have jealously
cherished because of his past, the present need was inculcat-
ing new lessons of moral reform and the national "Geist" was
being transformed. The Greek was no longer the Greek of
old, with an aesthetic consecration to beauty but a new type
of Greek, with a deep conviction of duty 4 .

What the results to Greek ethics would have beeen, in
the first century, had Greece been left alone to work out her
own salvation without the intervention of Roman dominance,
is a matter of fascinating, though idle speculation, (Polyb.
xl. 5.12). Certain it is, however, that the Roman was quite
unconscious of those hidden forces that were silently sway-
ing the Greek multitude and making for noble character
(^florroud), in spite of the external decadence ! (cf. hist,
introd.) That there was no great resultant organized social
reform is a sad commentar} 1 - on the weaknesses of an age,
incapable of putting into complete effect, its own highest
ideals. (Plin. Ep. x. 93. 94.) Historians of Greece, reflect-
ing upon the political, economic, and social decline of the
country, have failed to appreciate fully, the substratum of
genuine worth in the Greek character, at this period !
Although the moral ideal may not have gained universal
validity, it had, nevertheless, strongly impressed itself upon
the mind of the age, and a correct understanding of the
period must recognize this fact as well as weigh the external
events of history. In the gloaming of Greek political and
economic life, when there was little of energetic activity
(Kvo8ota, Ko/oo-TTovSia, /iaraioTTona) and as little energetic think-
ing, there was, nevertheless, a deep undercurrent of reflec-

4. The original contact with Rome may, perhaps, have stimulated
the evolution of this sense; at any rate a moral atmosphere was develop-
ing 1 not merely about Plutarch but throughout the Greek world; the
political, economic, and social decline that was accompanied with great
disasters was, perhaps, also ultimately responsible for this reaction.
Principles of human conduct, seemingly fundamental, were undergoing
slow and subtle alterations, the cumulative affect of which meant in
time a complete transformation.

tion, that dwelt upon the broad sympathy of dya&wroud and
the cosmopolitan philanthropy of Koivox^cXux, the majesty of a
past ntya\opyia and the possibility of a present /xeyaXox^eXta
that resented the pretensions of the Romans, with scorn,
(TrepiavroAoyia, KevoSo|ia), that went in imagination far beyond
the limitations of municipal administration, granted by
Roman authority 5 , to ideas of universal citizenship (KOO-/XOTTO-

A-iriys), that deemed raTreivo^/ixxrvn/, /ACT/oi07ra0ia, dveiKaKia worthy

of sincere consideration and which ended in resignation and

sadness (/xeyaAoe/oyta, KCvoo-TrovSta, /u<ra8eA<ta) . The results of

Roman administration upon Greek character were both good
and bad, but albeit this external influence was great, the
internal evolution, whether because of it or in spite of it,
was advancing toward lofty ideals of righteousness 6 .
Roman love of conquest was, in Greek ethics, represented by
a sense of sacrifice (Ave&icaicta, /xeTy>io7ra0eia) f Roman habit of
self-indulgence was here balanced by a recognition of
altruism (Kocvw^eAta), Roman pride was here met by a Greek
ideal of humility (raTruvo^poa-vvrj) !

It is not strange that the ethics of this period were
eclectic in character; we find the artistic and the humanistic,
the national and the cosmopolitan, the social and the indi-
vidualistic, the objective and the subjective all contributing
to this system of ethics; man hardly knew which claim was
paramount and whether salvation was attainable through
holiness or through wisdom, or through both ! The ethical
ideal was subject to theological, rational, natural, individual

5. A quasi-political renaissance, though the conquest of Greece
was never more complete.

6. While the Greek's own great deeds were a thing of the past,
while sorrow, the greatest leveler of all, colored his entire attitude
toward life, despair did not yet seize upon him, for he felt that
(/AeyaAox^eA^s, /uteyaAoepyta, Kotvax^eAiys, dya&wroua) fc Nature and God,
at least, were great and good and that in Reason, he possessed the
Ariadne thread to lead him out of the labyrinth to his own ideals of
the Conscience ! The elements in his nature alien to his moral ideal,
though they possessed all the force of inherited traits and of tradition,
were opposed by a profound devotion to duty, by a sense of goodness,
purity and holiness. A sense of sin conspired with a love of God to
establish a moral ideal that had a religious sanction (ave^i/cowa'a,

ijs, /xeyaA.a><e\7) and a rational basis ( xevoo-rrovSta, TTCI&JVIOS) \

and universal impulses, in the midst of which there existed,
with divided authority, a hierarchy of faith and a sover-
eignty of reason, a necessary moment in Greek Being,
(cf. ayaOoTToua^ KoivoM^eAiys, Kevo<r7rov8tu ) prior to a greater evolu-
tion. New ideas were born into the world, meeting- with
deep appreciation, but there was a sad lack of Titanic
emotions capable of welding, with gigantic force, the various
elements into an organic synthesis (^0o7roua). The age
produced no inspired prophet with power to command; there
was only a Chaeronean high-priest, to aspire !

ERRATA.

Page 7. For Keyon, read Kenyon.

" 8. Add Demosthenes to list of orators; for D. E.
Holmes, read D. H. Holmes; for Hyperdis, read
Hyperidis.

<4 9. For Y. P. Boissevain, read V. P.

" 10. Read Aftprav/wcrnov, instead of 4 ' Atfr/o-avpio-Twv " ;

Sylloge, instead of "Sylogge"; A. N. Janflaris,
instead of "A. A. Jan^aris".

44 12. Note 4. For "Inser", read Inscr.

" 14. For Note 4, read 14.

44 15. (line 12). For "till not", read not till.

44 16. Note 6. (line 6). Note following- corrections:

20. Read associated instead of 44 associately".

21. (line 16). Read Ka0oAov Se TOVS rais

25. Note 10. (line 2). Read 1251 b. 15, 25.

26. (line 26). Read affect, instead of "effect"; Note

13, read Matth., instead of Math.

29. Note 2. Read /X-CT/OIOTT;?, instead of ju-erpiOTnys.

30. (line $7). Read /xeyaXo^pocrwry, instead of

46. (line 26). Read boastfulness; (line 28),

instead of o-e/xvoyoyetu.

47. (line 10). Read e7ra X 0es; (line 18), 8, instead of &,

(line 19), read irepd'o-ra/AeVou, instead of Trepticrra/xevov;

(line 38), read becomes, instead of "become".

50. (line 30). Read Er&oA' instead of S<uA'.

51. (line 17). Read "The sadness"; Note 1. Read

.Trovry/Aa, instead of -Trov^a.

52. (line 31). Read <#>avTao-/xara, instead Of

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