$B 1M bMM 
 
EXCHANGE 
 
 H /s-2- 
 

 Prolegomena to a Study of the Ethical 
 
 Ideal of Plutarch and of the Greeks 
 
 of the First Century A. D. 
 
 Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Require- 
 ments for the Degree of ^Ph. D., at the 
 University of Michigan. 
 
 By 
 
 GEORGE DEPUE HADZSITS, 
 
 1906 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI 
 CINCINNATI, OHIO. 
 

Prolegomena to a Study of the Ethical 
 
 Ideal of Plutarch and of 
 
 the Greeks of the 
 
 First Century A. D. 
 
 .4 l^hesis Presented in Partial fulfillment of the Require- 
 ments for the Degree of Ph. D., at the 
 University of Michigan 
 
 By 
 
 GEORGE DEPUE HADZSITS. 
 
 1906 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI PKBSS 
 CINCINNATI, OHIO. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Bibliography 5-6 
 
 Ivexica and Indices 7-10 
 
 Historical Introduction 11-14 
 
 The Problem and the Method of Research 15-18 
 
 Discussion 19-58 
 
 List of Words 59 
 
 Conclusions .. . 60-66 
 
 239403 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Arnold, W. T. 
 
 Bergk, Theo. 
 Benn, A. W. 
 
 Bernays, J. 
 Christ, W. 
 Croiset, A. et M. 
 Droysen, J. G. 
 Eichhoff, A. 
 
 Fried! aender, L. 
 Finlay, Geo. 
 Frazer, J. G. 
 Gardthausen, V. 
 Gregorovius, Ferd. 
 Greard, Octave. 
 Gomperz, Th. 
 Holm, A. 
 Hertzberg, G. PV. 
 Hath, Edwin. 
 Heinze, H. 
 Holden, H. A. 
 Hoffding, H. 
 Karst, J. 
 Kostlin, K. 
 Kennedy, H. A. A. 
 Marquardt, J. und / 
 Mommsen, Th. I 
 
 The Roman System of Provincial Ad- 
 ministration. 
 
 Grieehische Litteraturgeschichte. 
 
 7^he Philosophy of (Greece, considered in 
 relation to the character and history of 
 i/s people. 
 
 Hh. M. Jg. 7, *. 92. 
 
 Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur. 
 
 Histoire de la Litterature Grecque. 
 
 Geschichte des Hellenismus. 
 
 Ueber die religiose sittlichc Weltansicht des 
 Plutarchus. 
 
 Sittengesch ichte . 
 
 Greece under the Romans. 
 
 Edition of Pausanias. 
 
 Augustus u. seine Zeit. 
 
 The Rmperor Hadrian. 
 
 De la Morale de Plutarque. 
 
 Griechische Denker. 
 
 The History of Greece. 
 
 Gesch ichte Griechenlands . 
 
 Essays on Biblical Greek. 
 
 Plutarchische Untersuchungen . 
 
 Plutarchus Lives. 
 
 Ethik. 
 
 Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters. 
 
 Geschichte der Ethik. 
 
 Sources of New Testament Greek. 
 
 Handbuch der Romischen Altertilmer, 
 Vols. 4 and 6. 
 
Merivale, Chas. 
 
 The History of the Romans under the 
 
 Mommsen, Th. 
 Miiller, Iwan. 
 Miiller, F. Max. 
 MahafiFy, J. P. 
 
 Martha, C. 
 Niese, B. 
 
 Norden, Ed. 
 Oakesmitli, Jno. 
 Paulsen, Fr. 
 Roberts, W. Rhys. 
 Schmidt, L. 
 Shuckburg-h, E. S. 
 Sickinger, A. 
 
 Trench, R. C. 
 
 Thumb, A. 
 
 Volkmann, R. 
 
 Wundt, W. 
 Windelband, W. 
 Weissenberg-er, B. 
 
 Wenley, R. M. 
 
 Wedgwood, J. 
 Wundt, Wm. 
 Whitney, W. D. 
 Wunderer, C. 
 2iegler, Th. 
 teller, Edw. 
 
 77fc Provinces of the Roman Kmpire. 
 Handbuch, Vol. 3. 
 
 Lectures on the Science of Language. 
 I ^roblems in Greek History. The (.wreck 
 
 World under Roman Sway. 
 Etudes Morales sur L? Antiqvite. 
 Gcsehichte der Griechischen u. Makedon- 
 
 ischen Staaten seit der Schlacht hei 
 
 Chaeronea. 
 
 Die Antike Knnstprosa. 
 The Religion of Plutarch. 
 System der Kthik. 
 The Ancient Boeotians. 
 Die Kthik der alt en Griechen. 
 Augustus. 
 l)e Linguae Lalinae apud Plutarchum ct 
 
 Reliquiis ct Vestigiis. 
 Plutarch: His Life, His Parallel Lires 
 
 cnic His Morals. 
 
 Synonyms of the Nezv Testament. 
 Handbuch der Neugrtechischen Volks- 
 
 sprache. Die Griechischc Sprache iiu 
 
 Zeit alter des Hellenismus. 
 Lehen, Schriftcn u. Philosophic dcs 
 
 Plutarch. 
 
 Ethics (Engl. Translation). 
 .1 History of Ancient Philosophy. 
 Die Sprache Puttarchs u. die Pseudoplut- 
 
 arch ischcn Schriftcn . 
 Plutarch and his Age; in " The \e-c 
 
 World", June, iyoo. 
 The Moral Ideal. 
 T ~olkerpsychologie. 
 
 Language and the Study of Language. 
 (.'itate u. geflilgelte Worte bei Polybius. 
 Geschichte der Kthik. 
 Die Philosophic der Griecheu. 
 
LEXICA AND INDICES. 
 
 (NoTE: We have taken all of our words through all of 
 the following: indices and lexica; supplementing- this with 
 wide reading, we have gathered the passages in which the 
 terms are found. The discussion deals with each term sepa- 
 rately, giving an historical treatment of the significance, 
 meaning and development of each term. This work, it need 
 hardly be added, does not lay claim to finality.) 
 
 Index Homericus Aug. Gehring. Teubner, 1891. Appen- 
 dix Hymnorum Vocabula Continens, 1895. 
 
 Lexicon Homericum H. Ebeling. Teubner, 1885. 
 
 Poetac Minores GraeciTh. Gaisford. Teubner, 1823. In- 
 dices for Hesiod, Theognis, Archilochus, Solon, Simon- 
 ides, Mimnermus, Tyrtaeus, Theocritus, Bion, Moschus. 
 
 Hesiod^. A. Paley. London, Geo Bell, 1861. 
 
 Greek Lyric Poets G. S. Parnell. London, Longmans, 
 Green & Co., 1891. 
 
 Greek Melic Poets B.. W. Smyth. Macmillan & Co., 1900. 
 
 Bacchylides F. G. Keyon. Oxford, 1897. 
 
 Fr. W. Blass. Teubner, 1898. 
 
 Lexicon Pindaricum I. Rumpel. Teubner, 1883. 
 
 Tragicae Dictionis Index spectans ad Tragicorum Graecorum 
 Fragmenta A. Nauck. Lipsiae, 1892. 
 
 Lexicon Aeschyleum J. Dindorf. Lipsiae, 1876. 
 Lexicon Sophodeum Fr. Ellendt. Berlin, 1872. 
 
 Euripidis Opera Omnia A. et J. M. Duncan. Glasguae, 1821. 
 Vol. 9. Index Verborum . . Omnium. Chr. D. Beck. 
 
Concordance to the Comedies and Fragments of Aristophanes 
 H. Dunbar. Oxford, 1883. 
 
 Menandri et Philemonis Reliquiae Aug. Meineke. Berlin, 
 1823. 
 
 Herodotus J. C. F. Baehr. Lipsiae, 1861. 
 
 Lexicon to Herodotus (Schweighaeuser.) H. Carey. Ox- 
 ford, 1843. 
 
 Thucydides Fr. Goeller. London, 1835. 
 K. W. Kriiger. Berlin, 1846. 
 
 Lexicon Xenophonteum F. G. Sturzius. Lipsiae, 1801-4. 
 
 Indices Graecitatis quos in singulos oratores Atticos confecit 
 J. J. Reiskius. Oxford, 1828. Indices for Antiphon, 
 Aeschines, Andocides, Deinarchus, Demades, Isaeus, 
 Lysias, Lycurgus. 
 
 Index Demosthenicus S. Preuss. Teubner, 1892. 
 
 Index Andocideus, Lycurgeus, Dinarcheus L. L. Forman. 
 Oxford, 1897. 
 
 Index Lysiacus D. E. Holmes. Bonn, 1895. 
 
 Isaei Orationes XI cum fragmentis G. F. Schoemann. 
 Gryphiswaldiae, 1831. 
 
 Hyperdis Orationes \ji cum fragmentis Fr. Blass. Teubner, 
 1894. 
 
 Index Graecitatis Platonicae T. Mitchell. Oxford, 1832. 
 Index Aristotelicus H. Bonitz. Berlin, 1870. 
 Lexicon Theocriteum I. Rumpel. Teubner, 1879. 
 Apollonii Argonautica R. Merkel. Teubner, 1854. 
 Polybius Lexicon, Ed., Schweighaeuser. Lipsiae, 1789-1795. 
 Lexicon Polybianum J. A. Ernesti. 1789-1795. 
 BabriusW. G. Rutherford. Macmillan & Co., 1883. 
 
Diony sins of Halicarnassus: Epistola ad Pompeium, Indicium 
 de Thucydide, Libellum de Us quae Thucydidi propria 
 sunt C. G. Kriig-er. Halis Saxonum, 1823. 
 De Structura Orationis J. Upton. London, 1747. 
 xat^v K/aitris G. Holwell. London, 1778. 
 
 i roiiv d^^attov pyropow vTro/Aviy/xarwr/xot. 
 
 The Three Literary Letters W . Rhys. Roberts. Cam- 
 bridge, 1901. 
 
 Index Graecitatis in Plutarchi Opera D. Wyttenbach, Lip- 
 siae, 1835. 
 
 Rpicteteae Philosophiae Monumenta I. Schweighaeuser. 
 Lipsiae, 1779, 
 
 Appian I. Schweig-haeuser. Lipsiae, 1785. 
 Luciani Opera I. P. Reitzius. Amsterdam, 1743-46. 
 
 Dio Cassius F. G. Sturzius. Lipsiae, 1824. 
 
 Y. P. Boissevain. Berlin, 1898-1901. 
 
 Herodian Th. G. Irmisch. Lipsiae, 1805. 
 Philostrati Opera C. L. Kayser. Teubner, 1870. 
 AthenaetisG. Kaibel. Teubner, 1887-90. 
 Sextus Empiricus Im. Bekker. Berlin, 1842. 
 
 Timaei Sophistae Lexicon Vocum Platonicarum D. Ruhn- 
 kenius. Lipsiae, 1828. 
 
 Der Atticismus: Diony sius von Halikarnass bis auf den 
 ziveiten Philoslrattis W. Schmid. Stuttgart, 1887-97. 
 
 Rhetores Graecil^. Spengel. Teubner, 1854-85. 
 
 Epigrammata Graeca ex Lapidibus Conlecta G. Kaibel. 
 Berlin, 1878. 
 
 Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhetoricae I. Chr. Th. 
 Ernesti. Lipsiae, 1795. 
 
 Greek Lexicon of the Roman & Byzantine Periods. 146 B. 
 C.-1100 A. D. K. A. Sophocles. Boston, 1870. 
 
 Lexicon^. G. Liddell and R. Scott. New York, 1889. 
 
 9 
 
Synonyms of the New Testament R. C. Trench. New York, 
 1854. 
 
 Lexicon of the New Testament Greek H. Cremer (Trans. W. 
 Urwick). Edinburgh, 1878. 
 
 Greek- English Lexicon of the New Testament J. H. Thayer. 
 New York, 1897. 
 
 English-Greek Lexicon C. D. Yonge. New York, 1893. 
 
 Modern Greek and English Lexicon P. D. Sakellarios, Jno. 
 Pervanoglu. (Athens, 1894). 
 
 A Modern Greek and English {and English- Greek} Lexicon 
 N. Contopoulos. London, 1880. (Athens, 1889). 
 
 A Modern Greek Lexicon R. A. Rhousopoulos. Leipzig, 
 1900. 
 
 A.Qr)aravpi<TT<av cv TOIS EXXr;vtKOis Aei*cois St. A. 
 
 Koumanoudes. Athens, 1883. 
 Sylogge Inscriptionum Boeoticarum C. Keil. Lipsiae, 1847. 
 
 English and Modern Greek Lexicon A. A. Jannaris. Lon- 
 don, 1895. 
 
 10 
 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 It is not our purpose to give a detailed account of the 
 historical conditions in Greece in the first century of our era, 
 but rather, to sketch those condilions briefly, with a view 
 merely to establishing the necessary environment for our 
 subsequent study of certain ethical ideas that gained favor 
 in that century. The interrelation of these is obvious, and 
 just as the moral ideal was larg-ely shaped by that environ- 
 ment within which it grew, so it reacted upon its own envir- 
 onment and was, in part, responsible for the trend of events. 
 
 In general, the century was one of peace for Greece, 
 greater than she had enjoyed since the days of the Mace- 
 donian, but it was hardly a condition that encouraged great 
 effort; it was, rather, the peace of exhaustion, with but 
 a minimum of stimulus derived from her great western con- 
 queror. 
 
 Politically, economically, socially, the status of Greece in 
 the first century A. D., was that of a conquered province, 
 enfeebled, smitten with the consciousness of defeat, in the 
 main quite fairly treated by Rome and often flattered, 
 through all maintaining a great measure of self-esteem and 
 pride. 
 
 Despite a technical freedom, Greece's political position 
 was insignificant; while the Greek cities felt that they were 
 governing 1 themselves 1 , since the management of police, build- 
 ing 1 , public worship, g'ames, instruction, taxation and lesser 
 legal administration were left to their own direction, yet the 
 power of the Roman emperor and of his gwernor was ever 
 present to interfere; there were no other channels of public 
 activity into which men might direct their energies except 
 those of municipal administration, and, in that ag*e, such 
 were narrow enough limits for ambition, and even within 
 these freedom was conditional. Yet Rome, a generous 
 
 1. Tac. Ann. xii. 58; Plin. E)p. x. 56; L/iv. xlv. 18, 29; Paus. viii. 
 30. 9. 
 
 11 
 
master in this instance, treated the cities of Greece with a 
 consideration which was extended to no other conquered 
 lands; and in the free cities she interfered as little as pos- 
 sible with the affairs of government. Even of Domitian 2 it 
 was said "Provinciarum praesidibus coercendis tantum curae 
 adhibuit, ut neque modestiores umquam neque iustiores 
 exstiterint ". At one time the Phil-Hellene Nero 3 had even 
 gone to the extreme of declaring 1 Greece subject to no gover- 
 nor and free from tribute. Hadrian also went to great 
 lengths and the settled calm of Greece affords a striking con- 
 trast to the restlessness of the tribes on the Euphrates? on 
 the Danube, and in Great Britain. Among other reasons for 
 such conduct on the part of Rome, there existed the fact of 
 "far greater similarity between the Greek and Roman spirit 
 of municipal government than affinity with either the 
 Eastern spirit of monarchical rule or the Northern spirit of 
 personal freedom". Notwithstanding such favors, the calm 
 that existed in Greece was not the calm of freedom and of 
 self-government, but the calm of submission, of indifference, 
 of exhaustion ! 
 
 Greece was utterly incapable of benefiting from the 
 idea of Pan-Hellenism 4 imposed from without, and the num- 
 erous beneficial acts of Hadrian, in the way of roads, 
 aqueducts, temples, baths, when Athens was, perhaps, 
 externally more splendid than ever before, did not improve 
 her economic condition, neither increasing the resources of 
 the land nor appreciably improving the condition of the in- 
 dustrial classes. In some cases, communities lacked the 
 means to keep even the existing public works in repair. The 
 land was only moderately fertile, agriculture was of limited 
 extent, vine-culture was unimportant 5 , and that of the olive, 
 little less so; the marble quarries did not benefit the general 
 population, nor were there any manufactures of significance. 
 
 2. Suet. Doni. 8; true of other emperors, Tac. Ann. iii. 10, Suet. 
 Claud. 14, 15. 
 
 3. Vespasian annulled these acts, Paus. Ach. vii. 17.2. 
 
 4. Keil. Syll. Iiiser. B. 31, Plut. Arist. 19, C. I. G. 5852, Dion Cass. 
 Ixix. 10, Waddington iii. i. 807, Paus. i.18.9. 
 
 5. Iviv. xxxi. 24. Strabo & Paus., passim. L/ampridius, in Alex, 
 p. 122. 
 
 12 
 
The financial administration of the Romans produced disas- 
 trous consequences both on the material prosperity of the 
 country and on the moral constitution of society; the govern- 
 ment of Rome was so lax, that mismanagement and robbery 
 often went unpunished 6 . While Asia Minor and Syria 
 recovered their commercial prosperity, Greece lagged behind; 
 Corinth and Patrae were the chief centers of real activity in 
 Greece, but they flourished only because they were Roman 
 colonies and were impoitant to Rome. Athen^s svipremacy 
 was completely gone. Under the rule of the Flavian 7 
 emperors, the Roman system of financial administration and 
 of taxation was directly responsible for reducing Greece to 
 her lowest state of poverty and depopulation. The tenden- 
 cies of society were toward the accumulation 8 of property in 
 the hands of a few; "latifundia" had destroyed the 
 yeomanry; the gulf between the few rich noble families and 
 the great body of poor was widened. There was a general 
 accumulation of debts throughout the country 9 . The 
 depopulation 10 of the county, dating from the destruction 
 of Thebes, of Corinth and Megara, was appalling, and even 
 the masculine type had declined 11 . On every hand there 
 were signs of the economic distress, decay, exhaustion 12 , 
 which Rome could not have sta3 r ed, had she so willed. 
 
 While thus in politics there was no opportunity or at 
 least but slight encouragement for the exercise of talent, 
 while economic conditions offered no inducements to ambi- 
 tion, socially, the position of Greece was very unimportant 
 in the world. In art, philosophy and literature, in which 
 she expressed her truer, better self, Greece was still mistress 
 of the world. It was because of her primacy in these, that 
 she returned the scorn of the Roman people with a disdain, 
 equally unjustifiable. Despite the supremacy of Greece in 
 such matters, the Romans failed to appreciate the Greeks 
 
 6. Cic. In. Verr. i.2, Tac. Ann. i.76, Suet. Claud. 25. 
 
 7. Paus. Ach. vii, 17. 2. Suet. Vesp. 8. 
 
 8. Tac. Ann. xv. 20. Strabo. x. 2.25. 
 
 9. Plut. "De vitando aere alieno". 
 
 30. Strabo. ix. 1.15., ix. 2.25, viiiandx. passim, Plut. DeDef. Or. c. 8. 
 
 11. Dio. Orat. 21. 501. R. 
 
 12. Suet. Tib. 32, Juv. S. viii. 87, Cic. ad fam. 4.5.4. Philo. ii. 302. 12. 
 
 13 
 
as a people, who were included in a general sentence of con- 
 demnation of the whole East and who were misunderstood, 
 by reason of the baser types that appeared in large numbers 
 from the East, in Rome. The Greeks of Hellas had no social 
 standing in Rome. There was, to be sure, great decline in 
 vigor, and moral energy was seriously threatened, if not, 
 perhaps, undermined; there was a decline of families, and 
 the Greek world had all the petty weaknesses and vices that 
 naturally exist in a secluded 13 , overripe and decaying 
 society. Yet Juvenal was not acquainted with the best in the 
 Greek nature, and Tacitus' stricture was one-sided 14 . 
 
 The Greek world was by no means hopelessly lost, even 
 after the political and economic death and social decline. In 
 the arts, in literature, in philosophy, Greece lived again and 
 gave evidence of a fine nature and culture, in which old 
 traditions were fondly blended with new ideals. It is a well- 
 known fact that "the defeated Hellenism still 
 
 created the conceptions by means of which the new religion 
 shaped itself into a dogma" 15 . The Greek's attitude toward 
 God powerfully affected his relation toward his fellow-man; 
 it is his ethical ideal in the first century of our era that con- 
 stitutes the subject of the following prolegomena. 
 
 13. Lrtician, Cataplus i. 351. 
 
 4. Tac. Hist. iii. 47, Ann. ii. 55., Plin. EJp. x. 49, Dion Cass. liv. 7. 
 15. Windelband. 
 
 14 
 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 AND OF METHODS. 
 
 We have made the ethical vocabulary of Plutarch 1 the 
 basis of our study of this problem of the ethical ideal of the 
 Greek of the first century A. D. Reading the "Moralia" of 
 Plutarch, one very soon becomes conscious of the presence of 
 a large number of ethical terms that do not belong to the 
 classical vocabulary. These words are so numerous and their 
 character so varied that it at once becomes apparent that 
 they must be of considerable significance. Upon closer in- 
 vestigation 2 , it appears that some of these ethical terms 
 occur for the first time in literature, in Polybius and in the 
 Septuagint, while others seem to appear, first, in the first 
 century B. C., and others till not later in Plutarch and his 
 contemporaries; as these terms are also found in the N. T., 
 in inscriptions 3 , in ecclesiastical literature for a long period 
 of several hundred years, and, further, have a place in the 
 modern Greek vocabulary, it is clear that they are not merely 
 ephemeral terms, begotten of either local or sporadic or 
 short-lived needs, but are the product of a deep-seated, vital 
 disturbance in the ethical consciousness; the thought interest 
 and activity behind the words was strong and imperative, 
 and, as we shall see, the ethical movement, of much impor- 
 
 1. Plutarch represents the spirit of his age better than any of his 
 contemporaries, reflecting not only the personal equation, but also "die 
 Resultate der ethischen Reflexion ernes ganjren Zeitalters" (Schmidt, 
 p. 40). It is all the more possible to study the religious, political, philo- 
 sophical, ethical problems of the age through the works of the sage of' 
 Chaeronea, as his outlook was broad and his interpretation, mild. 
 
 2. We have, by means of lexica and indices and wide readings de- 
 termined, with considerable accuracy, the time and place limits within 
 which these terms were employed. 
 
 3. Our inscriptional evidence has not yet been organized, nor is it 
 directly applied in the later discussions; its value is very great, how- 
 ever, and the popular, oral currency, the colloquial character of many 
 of these ethical terms is demonstrated. 
 
 15 
 
tance. A study of these terms should, then, throw some 
 light upon the problem of the status of morals in Greece, in 
 the Plutarchean age. 
 
 With Plutarch occupying 1 the central point in this study 
 of ethical ideas, some of which existed even before his day, 
 and all of which lived long after his time 4 , we find that 
 every one of the terms considered is an expression of an 
 ethical movement that was operating in Greek life and thus 
 exerting a pressure upon the old vocabulary. While it may. 
 perhaps, be impossible to say, precisely, how far the ethical 
 ideas were assimilated and how far they became a part of 
 the common intelligence, at any rate, it becomes very evident 
 that these words are expressions of virtues that were admired 
 and cultivated and of vices that were condemned by the 
 Greek people of the first century, and represent the working 
 of positive forces in the development of the race 5 . 
 
 The discussion that follows takes into account the fol- 
 lowing terms: /catyoAoyia, evpeo-iAoyiu, raTretvos, Tcwreivo^poo-vny, 
 jU,Tpt07ra0ia, avt&KaKui, ayaOoTroua, Kotvux^eAta, /u^yaAax^eAia, /u,yaAopyta, 
 
 4. We have, of course, in the case of every word, carefully con- 
 sidered every passage in which that terra was found, noting-, in some 
 cases, a growth in the meaning of the word. 
 
 5. The new ethical vocabulary is only a part of a larger body of 
 new terms that the Greek language, in becoming a world-instrument, 
 created, when demands were made upon it, to express the conceptions 
 that came with a wider experience; this process had been notably in 
 effect since the days of the Roman conquest and Polybius shows many 
 signs of it. A complete study of this new vocabulary, in its entirety, 
 though important, does not fall within our province. 
 
 6. This list of words is but a small, though significant portion of 
 the entire new ethical vocabulary, which may receive some illustration 
 from the following terms: vrraKorj, cwcevo'So^oi/, 
 
 a7ripaya0ta, 
 
 , aAAorptoTrpayia, 7rpO7ra0ia ? Trapa^wpTyriKos^ SucnyKOOs, 6\iy6<f>p(0v , 
 
 a/Ae'0v<TTOs, /AyaAop/o?7/x,oorw)7, <iA.ei8>ya)v, yA.MrxpoA.oyta, erot/utoAoyos, Kara. 
 AaAta, Karu^pt'curo-o/zcu, apyoAoyta, Trpoo-eTTi^Te'w, Trpoo-eTrco-^jaatvca^ crvve- 
 
 16 
 
It is our belief that a philological-psychological study 
 of the mental state of the Greeks of the first century, 
 furnishes valuable clues, tending to elucidate the obscure 
 problems of Greek ethics and religion of that period. An 
 insight into the inner life of thought and feeling of the 
 Greek people may enable us to apprehend the true nature of 
 a very complex age, by no means as yet thoroughly under- 
 stood. 
 
 Anticipating the statement of our conclusions, it may 
 perhaps be apposite to state, here, that one might seriously 
 doubt the validity of the generalization that the Greek 
 society of this era was "a fossil society, feeding upon its 
 own traditions and petrified beyond the hope of ren^ovation 
 or healthy growth" 7 . Nor is it absolutely true that "the 
 ideal of the Conscience belonged to the great foe of Greece" 8 . 
 Rather, that very ideal was growing and developing within 
 the limits of Greek experience, and as shown by the language, 
 
 ^s ? 8iaypt.aiv(a, 
 
 KarevAoyeto, KTa7reivoa>. The constant reference to private, affairs and vir- 
 tues is noteworthy; the interests of the individual constitute the starting- 
 point for the development of this system of ethics. There is abundant 
 evidence of interest in petty concerns; the very large number of new 
 double compound terms evinces, if not a desire for exact expression or 
 of restoring" to words the force they have lost, a fondness for pompous 
 and picturesque effects, a tendency toward elaboration and an attention 
 to detail, just as characteristic of decadent literature as of the arts. 
 Another group deserving attention is that of "strengthened" terms: 
 these words, while showing that tendency toward exaggeration charac- 
 teristic of language in its decline, are a mockery of an age that we 
 know was characterized by feeble feelings, lesser impulses, minor am- 
 bitions, of which the numerous late diminutives are a truer expression . 
 This large body of words gives a picture of a society, "hastening to ex- 
 plain everything in its decline", but at the same time aspiring to lofty 
 virtues. 
 
 We are at first surprised that Plutarch seems to have borrowed so 
 little from the Latin ethical vocabulary, but, as is well known, his 
 "Demosthenes" begins with an apology for his slight knowledge of 
 Latin. Apart from public life, Latin was never so widely learned in 
 Greece as Greek was in the Roman world, all the time from the Scipios 
 to Marcus Aurelius. (Cic. Arch. 23. Senec. Consol. ad Helv. 6.8. Juv. 
 15.110. Quint, i. 1.12. Suet. Claud. 42. Plut. i.564$.) 
 
 7. Mahaffy. c.12. "The Greek World Under Roman Sway." 
 
 8. Wedgwood, p. 129. 
 
 17 
 
that infallible formula of a people, the Greek temperament 
 was undergoing a subtle transformation, knowledge of which 
 ought to correct the only too often preferred charges of 
 44 stagnancy" and a " contemptible decadence", made against 
 the Greek of the first century. While it is true that Plutarch 
 "rehabilitates the ancient sanctions of morality and of 
 religion" 9 , at the same time, unconsciously, perhaps, he be- 
 comes the high priest of a new moral aspiration. 
 
 9. Wenley. "Plutarch and His Age", p. 267. 
 
 18 
 
DISCUSSION. 
 
 The keen versatility and vivacity of the Greek mind 
 naturally took delight in new language formations; this 
 neologistic tendency was as ancient as Homer 1 , and was ver} r 
 marked throughout the entire history of the people, as we 
 see, for example, in Aeschylus, Aristophanes, the rhetori- 
 cians 2 , Thucydides 3 , Demosthenes, Polybius and Plutarch. 
 The mental activity of the race, thus, in time, produced a 
 vocabulary of extraordinary variety, to which free fancy 
 contributed, as much as need. 
 
 When Polybius 4 uses the term KcuvoAoyia, (not occurring 
 in Greek literature before his time), we are left in doubt 
 whether he has coined a new term or is employing (as was 
 possible for one who was writing in the "common dialect" 
 and employing a less pure vocabulary), a word, current be- 
 fore his day but which had not yet crept into formal litera- 
 ture; this problem is of less consequence to us however, than 
 the problems suggested by the use of the word in Polybius 
 and in later writers. Polybius attributes Ktui/oAoyia to Greek 
 ambassadors, whose "strange phraseology" vexed the Roman 
 senate; the latter fact is significant, as the more conserva- 
 tive 5 Romans would no t y unnaturally, be vexed at Athenian 
 volubility. 
 
 1. Eustathius, 1801, 27, calls Homer a KaivoAoyos Sc rts TTOO/TIJS. 
 
 2. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, (De lyys. p. 458) speaking of Greek 
 literary styles, of the use of figures, of hyperboles, of K<uvoA.oyta says 
 8r;Aoi Sc TOVTO To/oytas re 6 Acovrtvos. cf. also Soph. Tr. 873. 
 
 3. Thucydides, 3.38, bears witness to the Athenian fondness for 
 new phrases and novelty in language. 
 
 4. 38. 1. 1. 
 
 5. Hor. A. P. 45 seq. The Horatian dictum is not irreconcilable 
 with Plautine, L<ucretian and Ciceronian usage. 
 
 19 
 
In Strabo 6 we find a similar admission that man (i. e. a 
 Greek) in general, and children, in particular, were fond of 
 the strange and the new 7 ; a recommendation of myths fol- 
 lows, as being Kau/oAoyta TI'S, on the ground that the element of 
 novelty is an incentive to learning- and provokes the desire 
 to learn. The apologetic use of the new term suggests that 
 it does not belong to the pure Greek vocabulary and thus, 
 perhaps, throws light on the problem, raised, above, in 
 Polybius. 
 
 The word, KaivoAoyt'a, which we find, first, in Polybius, 
 also occurs in Plutarch 8 and in Herodianus 9 . For the student 
 of the new ethical vocabulary of Plutarch, the changed at- 
 titude of the great moralist toward neologizing, in general, 
 is most important; his derision of the practice of the Greek 
 Stoics who go to extreme lengths and are excessively given 
 to KaivoAoyta, for its own sake, is evidence of his own conserva- 
 tism and is positive proof that the numerous ethical terms 
 that will be our particular study, were neither coined nor 
 employed by him without a serious motive. We can rest 
 assured, in all our subsequent work, that words were, with 
 him, vital. 
 
 That the term evpeo-iAoyia stands for a certain activity, 
 contemporary with the life of the word itself, cannot be 
 doubted. The term means loquacity, skill in finding words, 
 command of words, quibbling, sophistical use of words, 
 multiplying or inventing words, and is used of an idle use of 
 words, as opposed to efficient labor or sincere search for truth. 
 The idea is one, closely associately with Kau/oAoyi'a, discussed 
 above, and a similar impulse must have created them both. 
 
 A consideration of the Greek attitude toward evpeo-iAoyia 
 and the mental processes involved, is of prime importance, 
 
 6. i. 2.8. 
 
 7. In the same passage, Strabo employs another new term, 
 
 8. ii. 1068 D. Plutarch's conservatism is a matter of much impor- 
 tance in this connection. 
 
 9. Epim. p. 3. 
 
 20 
 
is, in fact, a necessary preliminary, for the student of the 
 new ethical vocabulary of Plutarch, as it gives a preliminary 
 knowledge of the ethical standard of the people who coined 
 the new vocabulary, and assists us to a proper interpretation 
 of the terms themselves. 
 
 The character and the extent of the activity defined by 
 cvpeo-t\oyia, are the two points of particular importance, for 
 which the passages, in which the term occurs, furnish 
 evidence. 
 
 Polybius' 1 use of the word indicates that to his mind it 
 meant idle argument, mere loquacity. Philo 2 associates it 
 with yAio-x/ooAoyia (itself a new term), uses it of quibbling of 
 the Stoics, of research and of defence turned to bad account, 
 and of idle prosecution, so that evpeo-iAoyia, not necessarily bad 
 in itself, becomes so by implication. Diodorus 3 says Alex- 
 ander Ka06\ov 8t r<ris rats evp?7<nA.yus Kara<ro<iofievTvs rrjv 8uva/uv riys 
 
 TreTrpw/xei^ys e/2Aa<r<^. Diodorus does not always, however, 
 use the term with reproach. Cornutus 4 opposes Herakles to 
 6 evpeo-iAo'yo? and it is obvious that the latter was a factor in 
 the writer's own experience. Strabo 5 says ot y/oa/A/>umKoi ^vOnpia 
 
 Trapa/JaAAovres ev/oe<riA.oyov<ri /xaAAov rj Avovcri ra ^rov/xeva 
 
 Arrian 6 is opposed to unprincipled, clever evpco-t'Aoyoi. Euse- 
 bius 7 and Clemens 8 Alexandrinus view the activity with dis- 
 favor and discourage the spread of the evil. Sextus 
 Kmpiricus 9 accuses the Dogmatists of evpeo-eAoyia. Diogenes 
 Laertius 10 , with this term, characterizes the philosophers 
 Menedemus, Arcesilaus and Stilpo, not necessarily with any 
 evil association. Athenaeus 1 1 quotes (not, perhaps, exactly) 
 Polybius, and expresses little regard for the quality. In the 
 Oracula Sibyllina 12 , 01 evpeo-i'Aoyoi are included in a category 
 
 1. Polybius. 18. 29.3. 
 
 2. Philo. i. 698.46; ii. 492.16; i. 628.50; i. 314.29; ii. 49.24. 
 
 3. Diod. 17. 116.4. i. 37.9. 
 
 4. Cornut. 191. 
 
 5. Strabo. 13. i. 69, 17. i. 34. 
 
 6. Arr. Epict. 2.20. 35. 
 
 7. Bus. ii. 89. B. 
 
 8. Clem. Al. ii. 561. A. 
 
 9. Sext. Emp. i. 63. 
 
 10. Diog-. L,. ii. 134; iv. 37; ii. 113. 
 
 11. Ath. 193 D. 
 
 12. Or. Sib. i. 178. 
 
 21 
 
of the worst criminals. Suidas 13 defines the term with the 
 help of <Avapos and croi/xoAdyos. Finally, Plutarch 14 , earlier 
 than the last and later than the first authors, quoted, 
 occupies, too, a mean position in his understanding- and 
 application of the word and in the consequent feeling: he 
 entertained toward such to whom the word applied; in other 
 words, he accuses the Stoics of evpeo-iAoyta, associates cvpe<rtA.oyta 
 with TrcuSia and opposes it to work worthy of the greatest zeal, 
 but he also employs it, once, without any evil signification 
 whatever, of a party of his guests who have engaged in 
 clever argument and word play. 
 
 It is clear, therefore, that cvpeo-iAoyta is an expression of a 
 tendency, not, perhaps, new 15 in Greek life, but sufficiently 
 strong from the time of Polybius on, to result in the coinage 
 of the new term under consideration. It has been shown 
 that the habit had a bad aspect which seemed to prevail over 
 the less harmful, in consequence of which, the cfyeo-tAdyos, in 
 life, was rather the quibbler and the sophist than the 
 eloquent, earnest searcher for truth. By the time of Plutarch, 
 the meaning of the word was crystallized; its signification 
 in the "Moralia" is suggested in the literature before his 
 day, as it is confirmed in the later literature. 
 
 As in the case of KtuvoAoyta, so Plutarch's attitude toward 
 the activity expressed by evpeo-iAoyta, also, is clearly defined, 
 and his serious employment of the more strictly ethical 
 terms receives illumination therefrom. 
 
 Before considering the significance of Tcwravexfyxxrvn/, it 
 seems desirable to trace out, however incompletely, the his- 
 torical development of the meaning of rawavos, in Greek lit- 
 
 13. Suid. Fr. Gr. 68. 
 
 14. Plut. ii. 625 C.; ii. 656 A-B; ii. 28 A; ii. 31. E; ii. 1033 B; ii. 1070 
 F; ii. 1072 F; ii. 414 A. 
 
 15. The idea that the word expresses, existed at least as early as the 
 time of Pindar (0.9.120. evp^teTny?) . If events of the early democracy 
 could and did create this specific notion, we are not surprised to find a 
 recurrence of that process of thought in the Graeco-Roman period, suc- 
 ceeding upon the wisdom of the Alexandrian age. 
 
 22 
 
erature and life. With this in view, we have made a study 
 of TaTretvo? in Aeschylus 1 , Euripides, Demosthenes, Aristotle 
 (Eth. & Pol.), and Plutarch (Moralia). A knowledge of the 
 reception accorded "humility" 2 at an earlier time is of great 
 importance for the student of Plutarchean ethics. 
 
 We find, first, in the early period, evidences of a bold 
 spirit to which humility was alien; second, at a later time, 
 evidence of a negative and halting- recognition of humility, 
 at a time when we would expect suffering to bring out the 
 trait, if it were in the national character; third, evidence of 
 a greater leniency, in the century of Athens' supreme con- 
 flict, coupled, however, in the same age, with a philosphical 
 system that grew out of an atmosphere in which hutnility^ 
 could hardly thrive and be recognized as a virtue; and fourth, 
 lastly, an attitude in which new tendencies, more generous 
 and more cosmopolitan, appear, but in which the old stan- 
 dards, though withdrawing into the background, do not 
 vanish ! 
 
 In Aeschylus 3 , TOTTCM/OS is used of a lowering in rank, at 
 one time, of Prometheus, whom Oceanus counsels, urging 
 submission to a resistless power, (the course is not dishonor- 
 able, but, nevertheless, for Prometheus an unendurable hum- 
 iliation), at another, of Zeus; this time the condition is 
 one to which his archenemy would reduce him (with the 
 commentary of SovAeuetv). The state, characterized by raTrcivos, 
 provokes scorn and contempt. Without any suggestion of 
 evil or wickedness, the state is quite intolerable, merely 
 because it is low; humility is slavery and no free-born Greek 
 admires it. 
 
 In Euripides, we find a deeper interpretation and a wider 
 application of the term; it signifies, first, as before, humili- 
 ation; but also, second, submissive humility; and, third, 
 wickedness and depravity. Certain passages 4 reflect the old 
 inherent tendency in the Greek character to respect strength, 
 
 1. TtxTmvos does not seem to occur in Homer nor in Sophocles. 
 
 2. We reserve, for the future, the study of such words and phrases as 
 
 , jSaios, TaTreu/axris, TcwretvoTT/s, oyuxpov </>ovtv, 
 
 3. Aes. Pr. 320, 908, 926. 
 
 4. Eur. Fr. xxii. 2; Hi. 2; xxx. 4. 
 
 23 
 
success and wealth, with little charity for their opposites. 
 In the second place 5 ,wravo? is predicated of Andromache, of 
 Orestes, of Herakles, and we find a new suggestion, not 
 openly expressed but clearly implied, of leniency toward sub- 
 mission and humility; but the circumstances are of the most 
 trying- nature and these alone render humility excusable. 
 Submission or humility does not necessarily entail loss of 
 honor or self-respect. It does not, regardless of causes, 
 awaken a strong revulsion of feeling. In the third place 6 , 
 the word is used of Odysseus, of Orestes and of Pylades, of 
 Agamemnon, and of Helen and falls from hostile lips; it 
 signifies baseness, cowardice, disgrace, and is a term of 
 strong condemnation. The treatment of the word shows a 
 development of the idea, a growth and quickening of the 
 moral consciousness. 
 
 The three distinct senses of the word that we have 
 observed, are still more clearly marked in Demosthenes; the 
 tendencies we have noticed before are more sharply defined. 
 Demosthenes uses the word first 7 , of Philip, of the Athenian 
 army, of Thebes with the old implications of weakness, of 
 humiliation, insignificance, lack of pride, and always with 
 an association of scorn and contempt. The term is, however, 
 also used in a milder sense 8 ; it is used of Athens, in her final 
 struggles, in her helplessness, with deep reproach to be sure 
 and with a suggestion of loss of prestige and earlier reputa- 
 tion and of pride, but still with no loss of honor. That it 
 was possible to associate and even identify the idea with 
 /xcVpios is an indication of a movement toward greater leniency, 
 on the part of the Athenian public, the common people to 
 whom Demosthenes 'made his pleas, and in whom humility 
 inspired pity. In the third place 9 , that other sense of posi- 
 tive evil has become thoroughly established. 
 
 In Aristotle, we see the earlier meaning more clearly. 
 The tone of Demosthenes is mild, that of Aristotle reminds 
 us of the past; the former is decidedly a man of his age; the 
 
 5. Eur, Andr. 165. 971. Her. F. 1406. (cf. Xen. Cyr. 5.1.5.) 
 
 6. Eur. Hec. 245. Orest. 1411. Iph. A. 339. Troad. 1018. Fr. ii. 1. 
 
 7. Dem. i. 9; 4.23; 9.21; 16.24; 19.325; 61.25. 
 
 8. Dem. 8.67; 1074; 13.25; 21. 183-6; 45.4; 7.45. 
 
 9. Dem. 18. 108; 18. 178. 
 
 24 
 
latter has inherited more of the earlier temper; the former 
 speaks the note of the struggling democracy, the latter, the 
 eulogy of the once proud state. We have, here, indications 
 of the old pride, of scorn for weakness, together with a care- 
 ful effort to attain moderation in all matters; hence the 
 TaTravot were certain to meet with censure in Aristotle, as 
 the word meant, to him, a failure to attain that mean, 
 whether the word had a social, moral or political application. 
 This is an aristocratic society the exercise of whose virtues 
 requires wealth and leisure and noble birth. The raTreivo? 10 
 is humble, cannot be liberal, is easily a flatterer, and is 
 servile; for him Aristotle can have no words except of con- 
 demnation. This probably represents the essentially Greek 
 attitude and o raTreivos incurs the strong displeasure of the 
 Greek, less because he may be base or wicked than because 
 he is low. Sox^/ooo-vn/ is the mean opposed to 3/3/ois, and not 
 Ta7reti/oTiys ! Here, most clearly, we see the slight recognition 
 of humility, the absence of mercy toward the lowly, the 
 assertion of an old confidence within conscious, artistic 
 limits. 
 
 We find the three significations we have noticed before, 
 still more clearly defined in Plutarch. He could say : 
 
 ;(0pov 8e . . TO TifJLwpLav irapaXiirctv Kaipov irapaa-Xovros eTrieiKc's tori 
 (90 F), evye'veia KaXov /u,ei/, aAAa Trpoydvwv aya66v (5 D), and <yw yap 
 fjiaXurr av ftov\OL(j.vjv 7raort KOLvrj xpijcri/ioi/ ctvat rrjv aywyijv (8 K). This 
 
 is evidence of a greater equalization of classes, of a break- 
 ing down of old distinctions. Thus we find, in the matter 
 of Tcwretvo's, first, a recognition, to be sure, of the old feeling 
 which does not disappear, but second, at the same time, a 
 greater forgiveness, extended to the humble and the lowly 
 who cannot be accused of evil, and, third, finally, a certain 
 indulgence, even in the case of evil that TCW-CU/OS may suggest. 
 The Greek of this late period has not entirely lost the dis- 
 tinctive traits of his ancestors; humility 11 , submission, sub- 
 
 10. Arist. H88. 1124 b 22; H88. 1125 a 2; n. e. y. 3. 1231 b 12; n. e. y. 6. 
 1233bl3; n. e. n. 11. 1244 a 6; ap 7. 1251bl5, 25; TT. y. 13. 1284 a 41; TT. 8. 11. 
 1295 b 18; TT. e. 11. 1313 b 41; -. e. 11. 1315 b 6'; *-. B. 2. 1337 b 14. 
 
 11. Plut. ii. 91 C; ii. Ill F; ii. 266 D; ii/276 D; ii. 584 E; ii. 762 E; 
 ii. 805 D; ii. 807 E; ii. 822 D; ii. 1046 C; ii. 1060 A. 
 
 25 
 
ordination, without, in any sense, being connected with 
 evil, still were likely to provoke his scorn and even his 
 indignation. At the same time, in spite of this apparent 
 pride, events of several hundred years have greatly modified 
 his character, and, with it, his attitude in this matter. The 
 former note is a protest, an old strain that will assert itself; 
 but, with this, there appears 12 a more generous inclination 
 toward the humble and the lowly, whether thus through the 
 accident of birth, through sorrow, or through sin. 
 
 But the pagan Greek position could never, probably, be 
 that which we find in the Scriptures 13 , where this word is 
 used of the noblest and the most necessary of all the virtues. 
 There it conveys a sense of honor unknown to the Greek, but 
 suited to the Hebraic and to the Christian world 14 . Such a 
 conception was foreign to the Greek nature; if suggestions 
 of such a feeling appear, at times, as in Plato 15 , and, later, 
 more frequently, in Plutarch, it means that, within Greek 
 limitations, an evolution was taking place in philanthropy, 
 which) though more merciful than ever before, nevertheless 
 still remained pagan 1 6 . 
 
 The word Ta?mi/o<pa>v, while occurring in the Septuagint, 
 does not recur, again, until Plutarch's time, and becomes 
 common, only later, in the Patristic literature. 
 
 The feeling, of which it is an expression, is a funda- 
 mental one which would effect all thought, feeling and con- 
 duct. In the Septuagint on the one hand, and in the New 
 Testament and in a large body of Patristic literature on the 
 other, the virtue of ra7ruvo<j>poorvvr} is accepted without reserva- 
 tion; it is constantly encouraged and recommended with 
 other virtues; nor is it merely an ideal that provokes exhor- 
 tation, but often, by implication, and frequently, expressly, 
 is acknowledged a fact in Greek life. "Humility" then, was 
 
 12. Plut. 11. 357 A; ii. 599 B; ii. 806 A; ii. 822 D; ii. 1069 C. 
 
 13. N. T. Math. 11.29; Luc. 14.11; Peter i. 5.5; LXX. Pr. 1619. 
 
 14. See discussion of Tairivo<t>po(rvvr). 
 
 15. Plato. L,egrg. iv. 716 A (cf. Origin, i. 1312 C.) 
 
 16. Plutarch favored slavery and was an aristocrat. 
 
 26 
 
a factor in the evolution of Greek character 1 , as early as the 
 time of the Septuagint 2 ' 8 and as late as the fourth century 
 after Christ, and was operating in Greek communities in 
 Asia Minor and Alexandria in the East, and in Rome, in the 
 West. 
 
 While it is impossible to determine to what extent such 
 suggestions were immediately operative, the fact remains 
 that the suggestion was there, and, certainly, later, bore 
 fruit. Ignatius 4 , writing to the Ephesians, exhorts them to 
 be Ta7rvo</ooves; he contrasts that frame of mind with 
 Htya\oppr)n.o<Tvvr] and unites it with irpaonys. Barnabas 5 feels it 
 to be a man's duty to obey the Lord's commands, not to exalt 
 one's self but to be Tcwretvo'^/owv. in the Doctrina Orientalis 6 , 
 the Lord is praised for his great Tcwravo^/xxrvn/. Peter 7 urges 
 all men to be compassionate and humble-minded. Paul 8 
 urges the Ephesians and the Philippians to follow his 
 example of serving the Lord with all humility, meekness 
 and long-suffering. In Basilius 9 we find the dictum that he 
 is great in the sight of the Lord who has yielded 
 to his neighbor. Tertullian 10 preaches great 
 with endurance of hunger, thirst and imprisonment. Ori- 
 gen 11 , blames Celsus for his misconception of rairetvo^poarvvrj 
 and even finds encouragement of the virtue in Plato. His 
 own defence of the quality is unequivocal. Hippolytus 12 
 cites the case of Nabouchodonosor, who regained his king- 
 
 1. TaTreii/OTT/s, the earlier term, has not the significance of noble 
 humility we find associated with TaTrewx^pocrwi/. In a moral sense, it 
 implies baseness, as, in Plat. Pol. 309 A., joined with apaOia in Arist. 
 Rhet. ii. 6. 1384, synonymous with /x,tK/3O/o;;(ia, an d in Dem. 151.9 united 
 with 
 
 2. LXX. Ps. 131. 2. 
 
 3. LXX. Prov. 29.23. 
 
 4. Ignat. X. 64 (653 A.) 
 
 5. Barn. 777 B. 
 
 6. Doctr. Or. 656 A. 
 
 7. N. T. Petr. 1.3.8. 
 
 8. N. T. Act. 20.19; Ep. Eph. 4.2. (Also, Ep. Phil, 2.3.) 
 
 9. Basil, iv. 813 A. 
 
 10. Tertull. ii. 970 A. 
 
 11. Origen. i. 1312 D; vii. 217 B; i. 1312 C. 
 
 12. Hippol. 681 A; 856 B. 
 
 27 
 
dom through rairetvoifrpovwi), and quotes the Evangelist John 
 as authority for the Lord's regret vo^poo-vVi/. Hennas 13 promises 
 God's pity to those who repent and become humble. 
 Clemens 14 Romanus exhorts all to live in concord and sanc- 
 tity, to avoid pride and arrogance, and to be examples to 
 others of raTrctvo^poo-vv^, which servants of the Lord practice. 
 
 Between the two temporal extremes, considered above, 
 we find the term employed in Plutarch, in Arrian and in 
 Josephus, and the distinctly different feeling entertained 
 toward the quality is very significant. While there is no 
 question of the unreserved welcome, extended the virtue in 
 these two extreme periods, and, too, no question of its actual 
 practice, we find a different ethical standard, a tentative 
 reserve, expressed in the middle period. 
 
 Neither in Plutarch, nor in Josephus, nor in Arrian has 
 the word the same connotation of meaning we have found in 
 the passages quoted above, and, in consequence, we find a 
 different attitude toward the Tairuv6<f>pove?. Plutarch 15 with 
 all his generosity, feels a reserve toward this virtue, which 
 to his mind implies, at least, a loss of noble spirit and thus ap- 
 proaches dangerously near baseness. Josephus 16 relates how 
 the Roman Galba, accused, by the soldiers, of Ta7rcivo^po<rw>y, 
 was treacherously put to death. Such " weak-mindedness", 
 approaching "meanness" or "cowardice", was associated by 
 Arrian 17 with the vice of KoXaKeia. 
 
 Thus, while in the first century A. D., Greek Ethics did 
 not, as yet, welcome the idea of humility, still the idea was 
 a present force that was at work in the Greek consciousness 
 and, in time, produced great psychic changes. Although 
 the idea did not receive complete acceptance in Plutarch's 
 day, yet it was not ostracized, and the Greek mind gradually 
 became accustomed to it, more so, even in the first century 
 A. D., than the above study would seem to indicate. The 
 
 13. Herm. Sim. 7; Vis. 3.10. 
 
 14. Clem. R. i.2; i.19; i.30; i.44 (cf. also Or. Sib. 8.481) i.48 (cf. also 
 C1.A1. L532B). 
 
 15. Plut. ii. 336 E; ii. 475 E. 
 
 16. Jos. B. J. 4.9.2. 
 
 17. Arr. Epict. i.9.10; 3.24.56. 
 
 28 
 
presence of other virtues, such as dh/e&KaKta, ptrpiarrdOcui and 
 dyatfoTToua, closely related to "humility", demonstrates this! 
 Still it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Greek 
 temper was still essentially proud 1 * . 
 
 As the prejudice, however, against *' humility" broke 
 down, there was wide room for sympathy, equality and kind- 
 ness. At the same time that dyafloTrotta, dvc&KaKta and ficrpioira. 
 0ea flourish, (forces that would help to break down that 
 prejudice and to create the necessary environment for 
 "humility") real strength, including audacity, courage 
 and /xcyaXoepyta, gradually vanishes, and an epoch of weakness 
 is ushered in, also fostering a constantly growing humility 19 ', 
 for these virtues inevitably acted and reacted upon one 
 another 20 . 
 
 The previous study of nanim and of Ta7ruvo<ppoarvvrj has 
 led us to believe that the Greek character of Plutarch's day 
 was, still, proud and essentially pagan; that is, despite a 
 certain great philanthropy, humility was not yet welcomed, 
 without reserve. It was, nevertheless, an existing force that 
 could not be overlooked, whose influence is further traceable 
 in other virtues, as that of ^rptoTraOeia. 
 
 While /AerpioTratfaa, in its form at least, truthfully reflects 
 the spirit of the past 1 , expressing that artistic proportion 2 
 that was consciously sought in the sphere of the feelings as 
 in everything else, yet that very artistic and hence exclusive 
 spirit, of which we have a reminiscence in the form of this 
 word, yielded to other, humanizing influences, of which 
 
 18. See also discussion of raTreivos. 
 
 19. We are not surprised, therefore, to find other ideas, besides the 
 one of "thinking-", viz. of "saying" and of "doing", united, in time, 
 with the adjective Tcwravo-, and forming 1 new compounds. 
 
 20. See discussion of 
 
 1. Plutarch constantly betrays the old Greek search for modera- 
 tion; this essentially Greek strain still survives in his century. 
 Ivrexyov 8e TO rr)V fifxnyv fv aTrcuri TC/IVCIV eft/xcAe's TC. Plut. ii. 7 B. 
 
 2. Of which /zcTpio7T77<j and o-ox^pocrwT/, the ruling principle of 
 Greek life, are further expressions. 
 
 29 
 
was one. Under such influences, 
 acquired a meaning- in Plutarch, it never could have possessed 
 in Aristotle. 
 
 We find the term employed from the time of Aristeas to 
 that of Sextus Empiricus, and its significance is not the 
 same throug-hout. There are certainly no aesthetic implica- 
 tions involved in the word, as applied to the Romans or to 
 the Hebrews; the control of the feelings, in these instances, 
 was referable, rather, to another sense, that of duty and of 
 honor. The weakness, involved in Plutarch's fterpioTrafleia, 
 (Plutarch was not conscious of that weakness however) is 
 felt, also, in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in St. Paul, in 
 Philo, but no trace of it appears in Appian or in Sextus 
 Empiricus. 
 
 In Sextus Empiricus 3 we find the position of the Skeptic 
 defined, whose reAos, in life, is aTrdOtui in matters of opinion, 
 and /leTpiorrafleia in matters of necessity. As far as the Skeptic 
 felt that the arapagia of aTrdOeia and that fTToxn could secure him 
 the greatest happiness, his life would be a practice of his 
 ideal, and, to that extent, at least, ntrpio7rdOia was a factor in 
 Greek life for several hundred years. Appian 4 represents 
 Pyrrhus of Epirus as possessing ficTpioTra&ia, for sparing- the 
 conquered Romans and giving them peace. The Numantini 
 prayed Scipio for indulg-ence and /AerpioTratfaa. There is none 
 of the suggestion of weakness, here, that we shall find in 
 Philo; as predicated of the Romans, united with o-o></>poW/jia, 
 
 associated with ev<re/3a, identified with /xeyaAo^poo-wiy, /merptoTr- 
 dOtui means that heroic forbearance which had exalted the 
 Roman race. 5 
 
 Plutarch 6 attributes this virtue to Camillus, Metellus, 
 Aristeides, Socrates and Stilpo; his recognition of the con- 
 temporary practice of the virtue is coupled with an exhorta- 
 tion for its wider employment. His association of perpunrdOeui 
 with TrpaoTrp is, perhaps, significant. The terminology of 
 
 3. Sext. Bmp. 8.18; 176.21; 176.23; 577.13; 9.20. 
 
 4. App. i.366.63; i.408.32; i.420.18; i.62.70; i.218.90; i.366.52. 
 
 5. Verg. Aen. 6.851-3. 
 
 6. Plut. ii. 102D; ii. 1119C; H.458C; H.489C; ii.551 C. 
 
 30 
 
Aristotle 7 is, in this connection, very important; we find the 
 
 following" scale: VTrep/foAi^opyiXanys; /u-eo-OTi/s^TrpaoTT^; cAAeu/us 
 
 dopyr/tna. Aristotle says that Trpaorrjs is really not the word to 
 express the mean, as its suggests weakness and inclines to 
 the defect of dopyryo-ta, or utter absence of anger or entire lack 
 of spirit. Plutarch makes no such apology for wpaonys, nor 
 for /Xrpio7rd0a \ While Plutarch's /ncTpioTrdfleia must have 
 seemed to Aristotle as little, or perhaps even less a perfect 
 virtue than his own TrpaoTr^, for Plutarch, the word and the 
 virtue carried no similar reproach. The weakness of /^crpio- 
 TraOaa did not strike him. It is plain that the ethical stan- 
 dard has shifted. There is a wide gap between Aristotelian 
 and Plutarchean ethics. In Plutarch, the feeling for a 
 "mean", for a control of the passions looking to an observa- 
 tion of the "mean", for the sake of the "mean", is not so 
 strong as a control prompted by unselfish, altruistic motives. 
 With such a different standard, the limits within which 
 /ATpio7rd0eia could exercise itself, were, also, certain to change. 
 
 Josephus 8 , like Appian, credits Romans with the posses- 
 sion of fieTpio7rd0eia and it is mentioned with /x-cyaXo^poo-vny. 
 
 Paul's 9 high priest is able to /*Tpio7ra0eTv, m cat 
 
 avros TTcpiKen-at, foOcvcuiv . Philo 10 includes /nerpioTrafleta, attributed 
 to Aaron, Abraham and Joseph, among the virtues making 
 for a noble character, in spite of the fact that he represents 
 Moses, the perfect man, as turning his back upon /xeTpiorra&ia 
 and cultivating airdOua instead; /xeTptoimflaa, to the Hebraic 
 mind, seemed rather a concession to human frailty. Diony- 
 sius of Halicarnassus 11 opposes /xeTpuwrdtfeia an ^ a number of 
 allied virtues, which do not go to make up a very strong 
 character, opposes these to the qualities of <po's and x a ^ 7r< fe, 
 found in the nature of the Volsci. Aristeas 12 mentions 
 , as part of the equipment of a philosopher. 
 
 In Diogenes I/aertius 13 we find: <>? & rov <ro<ov M clvai /A/ 
 
 7. Arist. Eth. N. 4.5.1 seq; Eth. N. 2.7.10; ^.a.23.1191b25. Cf. also 
 discussion of dve&KaKia. 
 
 8. Jos. A. J. 12.3.2. 
 
 9. N. T. Ep. Hebr. 5.2. 
 
 10. Philo. i.113.44; ii.37.26; ii.45.38; ii.315.41; ii.439.2: i.113.31; i.113.2. 
 
 11. Dion. H. 8. 61. 
 
 12. Aristeas. 29. 
 
 13. Diog. L. 5.31. 
 
 31 
 
rj 8e. If Aristotle is quoted exactly, the word 
 is an old one, of the Peripatetic school. If an old word, it is 
 singular that we do not find it in Aristotle 14 , aye, even 
 frequently. 
 
 While the idea of /AerpwHra&ia was, doubtless, rooted in the 
 Greek consciousness long before Plutarch's day, just as it 
 existed there, long afterwards, the word changed in mean- 
 ing from the time of Aristeas to that of Sextus Empiricus. 
 Most important for us is the fact that -weakness is clearly 
 and commonly conceived as an element in //.erpioTrafleta, in the first 
 century A. D. The word becomes a witness both for old 
 forces and for new, a concession to the old idea of aesthetic 
 repose and a confession of the new moral standard, testimony 
 of an age that was externally influenced by the past but which 
 -was vitally afected by the present. The original aristocratic 
 nature of /ierpioTratfeia, was approaching the standard of the 
 contemporary TaTretvo^poo-vvT/, which at once influenced the 
 evolution and encouraged the practice of the former virtue. 
 
 With the Plutarchean conception of /AerpioTrafleia, the 
 Greek mind was ready to entertain other virtues, as 
 
 ayaOoTTOiia and 
 
 While '* humility", because involving a sacrifice of pride, 
 received only a reserved welcome from Plutarch, it doubtless 
 affected the development of ntTpioird$ia,- which, in the first 
 century A. D., possessed a large degree of feebleness. 
 Plutarch's naive ignorance of this fact made his own recep- 
 tion of this virtue the more possible. But no prejudice 
 existed against the inherent weakness of av&KaKta, which was 
 accepted without hesitation by Plutarch. This paradox is 
 not entirely inexplicable; the relation of dvei/ca/a to fterpioTra- 
 0a is suggested by Plutarch, in the De Fraterno Amore, 
 thus: peTpLan-aOeias tKyovov dveucaKiav * ; to the older virtue, natur- 
 ally, there clung associations of the past, but no similar 
 
 14. Aristotle was familiar with ^erpioTrys, but /Aerpto- compounds 
 are, in the main, of late origin. 
 1. Plut. ii. 489 C. 
 
 32 
 
or 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 mystery attached to the later word. Plutarch's failure to 
 recognize the changed character of utTpurrrdOtia. was as natural, 
 as was his willingness to adopt dve&Ka/cia ( a comparatively 
 new sentiment), although it brought in its train implications 
 that meant a break with the past and its traditions. 
 
 The life of the word was very long; we find the term, 
 first, in the Septuagint, then in the literature of the first 
 century A. D. and shortly before, and, finally, as late as Por- 
 phyrogenitus. A study of the literature in which the word 
 occurs reveals the character and vitality of the virtue. 
 
 Of the pagan attitude toward dveiKaKi'a we can form some 
 idea from the testimony of several writers, flourishing imme- 
 diately before and soon after Plutarch, and we get, too? sug- 
 gestions of the practice of the virtue. Cicero's 2 meditation 
 upon dveta for a whole year was hardly without results, any 
 more than Paul's 3 exhortations to Timothy that SovXov Sk Kvptov 
 
 ... Set ... eiircu Trpos TravTas . . . dve^iKaKOv. The virtue was well 
 
 known to Epictetus 4 , who preaches of its valuable results, 
 
 irpaoTr)* and aopyrjo-La. Lucian's 5 approval Of dve&Ka/cux i s not 
 
 altogether certain, but Herodianus 6 tones down a rather 
 harsh picture of Severus, by attributing dve&Kaiaa and Kaprtpta 
 to him. The term occurs in Pollux 7 . Diogenes Laertius 8 , 
 with admiration, describing Socrates' endurance of ridicule, 
 says KOLL Travra ravra </>e/oetv dveiKaKa>s. Themistius 9 defines the 
 
 dveiKaKia of Sthenelus, by Opposing to him rbv & ov o-reyovra 
 
 vppw; no comment follows. 
 
 Thus after Cicero, we find in Greek literature, outside of 
 Plutarch, a decided appreciation of the virtue of dve&KaKia and 
 signs that the virtue was cultivated. Its scope is not so 
 clearly defined as in Plutarch, though it implies, at least, an 
 
 2. Cic. Alt. 5.11. 
 
 3. N. T. Tim. ii. 2.24. 
 
 4. Epict. Ench. 10. Arr. Epict. 3.20.9. 
 
 5. L,ucian: Judic. Voc. 9; Asin. 2; De. Par. S3. 
 
 6. Hdn. 3.8. 
 
 7. Poll. 5.138. 
 
 8. Diog-. L,. 221. 
 
 9. Themist. 271 B. 
 
 33 
 
endurance of abuse, a considerable humility and control of 
 anger 10 . 
 
 The extent of Plutarch's 4 * forbearance'' was remarkable, 
 overcoming Tipo/xa, leading- to acts of charity toward the 
 feeble and even toward a foe, bringing about extreme mild- 
 ness toward erring servants, and inducing the cultivation of 
 dopyijo-t'a, <tAav0aMna, and freedom from harsh words and 
 deeds 11 . Plutarch speaks from personal experience, of the 
 value of dve&KaKia whose present or existing force he recog- 
 nizes, while exhorting still others to practice the virtue. 
 Plutarch, as he had done in the case of /xeT/oioTra&ia, constantly 
 associates OLV&KO.KUL with irpavrv)^ in spite of his consciousness 
 of its meekness, he takes refuge in the association of <Wu 
 KaKta with dvfy>ei'a and with /aeyaA.oi/a>xi, on the hypothesis that 
 weakness may be strength. Plutarch's broad interpretation 
 of dve&KaKi'a may, perhaps, have been far in advance of the 
 average conception of the virtue, but even this implies an 
 actual exercise of dve&KaKia in the pagan world, though its 
 scope may generally have been more limited. 
 
 From the Septuagint 12 with its approval of dvei*aKui and 
 imtiKaa toPorphyrogenitus 13 who bears witness to the inclu- 
 sion of this virtue in the body of Christian ideals, we have, 
 in Ecclesiastic Greek, an important line of evidence touching 
 the feeling entertained toward avcgiKaKia by a large community 
 of Greek speaking people, distributed over the entire pagan 
 world. In Justin Martyr 14 , dve&Kcuoa is not only strongly 
 approved, but partially defined by reference to exhortations of 
 Christ 1 5 and by association with dopy^o-ia and viro^ovr). Clemen- 
 tin 1 6 refers to an incident of self-control in Peter's life and the 
 
 10. While we find such older terms as cyx/m-reia, jca/orepta, aopyrjo-ta, 
 
 etc -> in the passages, cited above, yet dve&KaKia, as under- 
 stood in the first century A. D. and afterwards, was a virtue that hardly 
 fitted into the older pagan world, and the dveiKaKux of Epictetus could 
 hardly have corresponded to the virtue of the Homeric Greek, which 
 Themistius calls dveiKaKia. 
 
 11. Plut. ii. 90 K, 464 C, 489 C, i. 220 E, i. 290 F, ii. 459 C. 
 
 12. L,XX. Sap. 2.19. 
 
 13. Porph. Cer. i.62. 16; 574.7. 
 
 14. Just. M. Apol. i.16. 
 
 15. N. T. Matth. 5. 39.40; I<uc. 6.29. 
 
 16. Clementin. 448 A. 
 
 34 
 
high approval of that conduct, described by means of 
 
 and dvc&KaKW?. Basilius 17 counts dve&KaKi'a as part of e&re'/Jeia to 
 
 be exercised toward all. Macarius' 18 advice to bear misfor- 
 tune with dve&KaKia and ftaxpo&vfua was to his mind no more 
 impossible, than was the extraordinary conduct of Constan- 
 tine which Eusebius 19 calls <#>tAav0/o<i>7rias vTrep/JoAi/. 
 
 The evidence drawn from this source, covering- a wide 
 period of time and extending over a great reach of territory, 
 demonstrates the unreserved practice of &vciKa,KM on the part 
 of those to whom Judaism and Christianity appealed. The 
 practice of this virtue involved a degree of patience, of 
 humility, of weakness and meekness, submission to misfor- 
 tune, of philanthropy, with complete suppression of pride, 
 which only piety and religious zeal could have inspired. 20 
 
 In the matter of ''forbearance", then, Plutarch occupied 
 a middle ground, between the position taken by most pagan 
 Greeks of the first and second centuries A. D., on the one 
 hand, and that of the Christians of the same period and 
 later. If Plutarch was not ready to make concessions that 
 seemed necessary and noble to Christians, he was, neverthe- 
 less, ahead of his age in generosity. The essential weakness 
 of /xerpioTrdfleia reappears in its offspring virtue of dveiKa/a'a; but 
 in the case of the latter virtue, Plutarch is more aware 
 of that lack of strength than in the case of the former. 
 Progressus in dve&KaKi'a was, significantly enough, accom- 
 panied by a development of do/oy^o-ca, which, a "defect" in 
 Aristotle, is highly praised by Plutarch, though an amiable 
 weakness. If able to embrace the virtue of dve&KaKia, as in- 
 terpreted by Plutarch, the old Greek pride was .broken, his 
 character was tempered and humbled; it meant a new toler- 
 ance, which was sure to destroy the old idea of rt/xwpta and to 
 be of the utmost consequence to slaves. The inherent possi- 
 bilities of the Plutarchean dve&Ka/aa appear, however, in their 
 
 17. Basil, iv. 460.B. 
 
 18. Macar. 233 D. 
 
 19. Bus. ii. 989 C. 
 
 20. We find in the passages (14-19) such older words as 
 
 dopyiycrta, VTTO/XOVT/, irpa.6rr)<: all of which, whatever their his 
 tory, eventually helped to make dvei/ca/a'a possible. 
 
 35 
 
bloom, only later, in the ecclesiastical literature. The pos- 
 sible effects of ave&KdKia were far-reaching. The record of 
 the actual effects of di/ei/caKia in Plutarch's day indicates the 
 great circle of its activity, the numerous directions in which 
 it was affecting Greek Ethics and Greek Life. 
 
 While the weakness of /u,ei7>io7ra0a was veiled, no similar 
 doubt existed about di/ci/<aKia. The presence of both these 
 virtues was essential to the development of ayaOoTroda. The 
 passive character of <Wuca/oa is supplemented by the more 
 positive or active nature of ayaOoTroda. The ultimate effect of 
 the three virtues would, necessarily, be first, the suppression 
 of the pride that rendered TaTruvo<j>po<Tvvr) in Plutarch's day, still 
 foreign; second, the gradual naturalization of "humility". 
 
 The concept of which the word ayaOorroda is an expres-. 
 sion 1 , existed in the Greek mind as far back as the time of 
 the Septuagint; it does not appear with any frequency, how- 
 ever, until the first century A. D.; we find the word 
 employed, in Plutarch, in the N. T., and, commonly, in 
 Patristic Literature. 
 
 In the Septuagint 2 , dyafloTroua j s predicated, primarily, of 
 God, but also of man and, with certain qualifications, of 
 woman besides. It is a divine quality, existing, potentially, 
 in man, and also actually exhibited in acts of generosity and 
 in filial piety. 
 
 Plutarch 3 says Osiris has been called o dyafloTroto?. In the 
 New Testament 4 , we find the term frequently, and Christ is 
 
 1. There were, to be sure, numerous words in the earlier language, 
 signifying benefaction, kindness, good-will, as eve/oyeo-ia, ewota, </>i'A.ai/0- 
 powria, a><eA.i/x,os, Trpoa-qvrjs, dya0oe/oyt'a, <iAaya#O5, etc. But the great 
 majority of ayaOo- compounds are late, and this, of itself, is, perhaps, 
 a sign of a certain moral agitation. Besides, it is the character of 
 dyaOoiroua that is of chief importance to this discussion. 
 
 2. L,XX. Num. 10.32, Tobit. 12,13. Sophon. i.12. Mace, i.11.33, 
 Sir. 42.14. 
 
 3. Plut. ii. 368 B. 
 
 4. N. T. Marc. 3.4; I^uc. 6.33; Petr. i.2.15; i.4.19; i.3.6; i.3.17; Act. 
 14.17; Petr. i.2.20; Joann. 3.11. Epist. 
 
 36 
 
represented as the chief inspiration of the dya&wroiot, who 
 approach the Christ-like, by the exercise of this virtue. 
 Practically no limits are set for the practice of the virtue, 
 dyafloTToud, whose benefits should be universal ! In Artem- 
 idorus 5 , Ptolemaeus 6 and Hermes 7 , the word is used only in 
 an astronomical sense of the stars and of the planets. 
 Sextus Empiricus 8 gives clear expression to the religious tone 
 
 of ayaOoTroua, in the following: dya0ov iStov <TTI TO ayaOoTroieiv . 
 ra.ya.6ov of ye o 0eos. LOLOV apa ccrrt Oeov TO dyafloTrotcu'. 
 
 In the Ecclesiastical literature we receive confirmation 
 of the suggestions that have appeared elsewhere. Clemens 
 Romanus 9 , in an epistle to the Corinthians, establishes the 
 divine origin of ayaOowoda and its cosmopolitan character; the 
 degree of piet} r it involves is almost more than human. 
 Athenagoras' 10 language could hardly be called equivocal: o 
 8e 0eos TcA-twos dya0os wv d'ioYa>s dya&wroios eo*Tiv. Hermas 11 throws 
 
 further light on the position of the aya0o7roids in life, whose 
 
 virtues include WMTTIS, a\.yOeia, VTTO/AOV^, TO X^P 015 VTrrjptTtlv and 
 
 <f>i\oevia. The "Testamenta Patriarch arum" 12 and Diog- 
 netus 13 simply re-affirm the position of Clemens Romanus, 
 while Clenlens Alexandrinus 1 4 defines the ayaOoTroda of the 
 perfect man, who submerges his own interests in the greater 
 benefits of all others. Clemens Alexandrinus, Paulus Alex- 
 andrinus 15 and Eusebius 16 use the term, also, in an astrono- 
 mical sense, of the stars. lamblichus' 17 statement is another 
 predication of this virtue, of the gods. 
 
 5. Artem. 4.59. 
 
 6. Ptol. Tetrab. 38, 19.48; Bibl. i.19. 
 
 7. Hermes Tr. latrotn. 388.10. 
 
 8. Sext. Emp. M. ii. 70. 
 
 9. Clem. R. 2.10; i.2; i.344. 
 
 10. Athenag. 952A. 
 
 11. Hermas, Mand. 8; Vis. 3.9. 
 
 12. Patriarch. 1337 C. 
 
 13. Diognet. 1176 A. 
 
 14. Clem. Al. i. 1348 A. 692 C, (ii. 460A. 
 
 15. Paul. Al. iv. init. 
 
 16. Eus. P. E. 275 D. 
 
 17. Iambi. 52.18. 
 
 37 
 
The governing motive of dyaOotroua is not far to seek; its 
 religious character is very pronounced ! The unrestricted 
 limits within which we find the activity, implied in a'ya007roua, 
 exercised, is, also, most important, as it clearly indicates the 
 breadth of the sympathy of the age that first brought the idea 
 prominently forward in literature, which means, in life. 
 The sacrifice, necessary for dveiKcuaa, grows apace with the 
 development of aya&wroud; but that sacrifice was a possibility 
 through the religious impulse back of it. 
 
 While the evidence drawn from Plutarch himself is 
 slight, that obtained from other sources renders clearer to 
 our minds the possible and the probable status of dyaOo-n-oua. 
 for Plutarch and his age. These side lights establish the 
 same impression that our previous study of Ta7ravo<fy>ocrw77, 
 per pioira&eia and dve&KaKta has created. The four virtues are so 
 closely involved that it is almost impossible to dissociate 
 them; contemporaneous, in fact, they must have acted upon 
 one another, withal that each had its own special functions. 
 It is not impossible to conceive of aya&wroua 18 a s the crown of 
 them all, pledge and product of their sincerity. 
 
 KoLvaxf>\ia l and 
 
 and /^yaXax^eXifc are clearly closely related. We 
 find both of the words, for the first time, in literature of the 
 first century A. D. or shortly before. Each activity was, 
 plainly, a possibility in the atmosphere, created by the earlier 
 
 feelings implied by ra.ireivo<t>po<rvvrj, ^rpLoirdOeua^ dvt&icaKia and 
 
 dyaOoTToda. The mood following upon the cultivation of such 
 virtues was hardly averse to Koivox^eXta and /AcyaXo><eXia. How 
 far that mood expressed itself in action is a problem that a 
 study of KOM/ox^eXta and of /xeyaXw^eXia will in part, as least, 
 clarify. 
 
 18. It is, perhaps, singular that dyaOoiroda is of late origin, when 
 we find dyaOotpyi'a in Herodotus, KOLKOTTOLOS in Pindar, and KaKovpyia 
 in Homer. 
 
 1. Koivox^eXi'a is the form recognized by the " Btymologicum Mag- 
 num ", 462.21, although jw<D<e'Xeta appears in Diodorus. 
 
 38 
 
Plutarch's 2 definition of the "perfect" man is signi- 
 ficant, viz., one who has combined political power with the 
 calm life of the philosopher, having thus gained the two 
 greatest blessings, the peace of the philosopher's retirement 
 and TOV . . . Koivox^cAov? PLOV of those engaged in political 
 affairs. There is no suggestion in the essay that Plutarch 
 had in mind the life only of a narrow TroAiTct'a and there can 
 be little doubt but that his vision was much broader. There 
 can be no question about the meaning of Philo's 3 phrase: 
 
 Kotvox^eAeis yap at TOV Trpwrov ^ye/xovos Stopeai. The same broad 
 
 interpretation applies (1) to his statement of a dogma which 
 he calls *eiw^eXAnuTOK, on Tras <fy//,iovpyos 17801% o-o^>xs to-riv ayovos, 
 and (2) to his characterization of Joseph's upright states- 
 manship and judgment as /cou/axM-eT?. Perhaps one could 
 hardly speak dogmatically of the true meaning of Koiv<o</>A>/s, 
 as applied by Plutarch to Antigonus, successor of Alexander. 
 Diodorus Siculus 4 clearly limits the possible Koivw<e'Aeia of 
 great monuments, to the inhabitants of Egypt. Marcus 
 Aurelius 5 counts among his other virtues of mildness, of 
 perseverance, of freedom from vain conceit, of love of toil, 
 also, willingness to pay heed to those who were able to 
 produce TI Koivox^eAe's; for him, this is of world- wide import. 
 Galen 6 speaks of medical services of "common utility" to a 
 Cretan city. Clemens Romanus 7 attributes to the Lord Z-QTUV 
 TO Kowo^eAes iraa-iv, which is in proportion to his "humility". 
 At first blush we would incline to a belief in a growth of 
 ivide philanthropy, previously fostered by such sentiments as 
 
 Ta.Trewo<j>poarvvr), /JLerpiOTrdOtia, aveiKaKta and aya&wroad, and expressed 
 
 by Kotvox^fiAta. Whether the wide philanthropy of Koivu><eAia 
 was largely a fancy or real fact of extended application is 
 partially determined by the passages in which this word 
 occurs. The idea, strong enough to seek embodiment in a 
 new term, was actually vital enough to serve as a factor in 
 life, well known to Galen and to Marcus Aurelius and 
 
 2. Plut. i. 258 E; ii. 8 A. 
 
 3. Philo. i.389.28; ii.52.19; ii.404; ii.376, 
 
 4. Diod. LSI. 
 
 5. Anton, i.16. 
 
 6. Galen. 14.296. 
 
 7. Clem. R. i.48. 
 
 39 
 
clearly implied by Philo, Diodorus and Plutarch ! The word 
 expresses not merely a passive sense of equality, a widening- 
 humanity, but also an active interest in affairs. 
 
 While such sentiments are, necessarily, always, to some 
 extent ideal, yet the consideration and contemplation and 
 welcoming" of that ideal, in time, at least in part, establishes 
 that ideal more and more a dynamic working 1 force in actual 
 life. The operative power of such a Sweats ma y or may not 
 be able to create its own perfect erreXc^eta, but the fact of the 
 8wa/us none would deny. 
 
 The fact of weakness, pre-supposed by the other virtues 
 of /AeiyxoTrafleia and dve&AcaKia, would operate against the com- 
 plete success of Koivax^eXia and we find little to justify the 
 belief in a vigorous activity looking toward a universal 
 amelioration. 8 
 
 While still, then, to a degree, ideal (perhaps the Greek 
 temperament could never realize such an ideal) Koiva><eXwi 
 was, nevertheless, not an impossibility to the imagination of 
 the first century A. D.! The Macedonian conquest had 
 broken down the barriers between Greek and barbarian; the 
 Stoic philosophy had proclaimed the equality of all men; 
 the Roman conquest 8 had still further reduced the Greek 
 people. Under these circumstances, the cosmopolitan and 
 religious character of Koiv<i><eXx (as of dyatforroud) is a matter 
 of little surprise. The broad political values of Plutarch 
 and the religious of Philo are both of universal application 
 to all mankind 9 ! 
 
 8. See "Historical Introduction." 
 
 9. Koivox^cXT/s was formed, perhaps, after analogy of the older 
 
 While KOIVCOVMI and cvepycr^s are earlier terms, Koivo-rroiea), 
 -TTpayt'a and -iraOrjs are of comparatively late origin. 
 
 MeyaXox^eX^s. What has been said of Kotvox^cX^s is largely true of 
 this word, also, and little need be added. 
 
 MeyaXox^cXta was at least a possibility (as has been said of KOIVW- 
 <eXta), though the passages in which this word occurs give but a nega- 
 tive result. 
 
 The passages, Plut. ii. 553 D; Cleomed. i.15; Clem. A. i.352B., do 
 not demonstrate the actuality of the virtue that /u-eyaXox^eXifc implies; 
 they do not prove that the virtue was really practiced. But it is difficult 
 to conceive of an utter neglect of what /neyoXox^eXta stands for, when 
 men were applying the term to God, to Nature, and to heroes of the 
 past, with admiration. 
 
 40 
 
McyaXocpyta. 
 
 MeyaAoepyia, though found in Polybius, occurs with com- 
 parative frequency only in the time of Plutarch and after. 
 Throughout the analysis that follows, we shall find a strik- 
 ing- avoidance of assigning the quality of ^eyaXoepyia to con- 
 temporary actors or events, and a consistent attribution of it 
 to men and deeds, remote in time and place, to Nature and 
 to God. 
 
 Polybius 1 informs us that Antiochus and Aemilius Paulus 
 were rivals in "magnificence". Philo 2 with admiration, 
 looks back to the time of Moses for his examples of /*eyaAo- 
 vpyta. Josephus 3 applies the term to a place of uncommon 
 splendor, in Phoenicia. Plutarch 4 predicates the quality of 
 Alexander the Great, of Demetrius, of the Athens of Per- 
 icles' day, of Cato Major and of the Roman consul Caninius 
 Rebilus, always with approval. Plutarch's testimony to 
 the confusion of (fyumys and fieyaAov/oyia in his own time, is 
 witness to a perverted moral judgment and proof of the 
 absence rather than of the presence of the second of the two 
 qualities. Lucian 5 attributes TO ptyaXovpyov to Alexander, to- 
 gether with TO /xijSei/ /AIK/OOV invoLv. Appian 6 , too, turns to the 
 past and finds /w.eyaAoepyia in the character of Ptolemy Phila- 
 delphus, of Mithridates, of Hannibal, of Scipio, of Pompey 
 the Great, and their is no question of his admiration for the 
 
 The potentiality, at least, was there in Plutarch's day and this was 
 so strong- as the coinag-e of the term indicates and as the unreserved 
 admiration of the virtue shows that it is quite within the bounds of 
 possibility and of probability that the potentiality of which we have 
 evidence, was an actuality, at least a striving 1 to perform great services. 
 /x,eyaA.o- compounds are numerous in the earlier literature, e. g-. 
 -8oos, -Swpos, -KtVSvfOS, -voia, 7r/oay/xwv, -7rpe7nJ9, o-tfevi/s, 
 /u-eyaAajyopos, /icyaAijvtop, /neyaAavxi'a; comparatively late are 
 /w.eya,Ao-epyi'a, -7ra$ex ? -Troiew, /xeyaAwo-vny. But there are a number of 
 significant late p,i/cpo- compounds! 
 
 1. Polyb. 31.3.1. 
 
 2. Philo. ii. 142; i. 405.26; ii. 21.46; ii. 105.16. 
 
 3. Jos. Ant. 15.9.6. 
 
 4. Plut. Caes. 58, (i. 735A), i. 191D; i. 344B; i. 705A; i. 897 D; ii. 
 183B; ii. 456F. 
 
 5. Luc. Alex. 4; Calumn. 17. 
 
 6. App. i. 14.7; i. 816.42; ii. 6.86; ii. 155.19; ii. 235.22; ii. 270.16. 
 
 41 
 
quality of /xeyaAocpyux. Philostratus 7 uses the term to describe 
 a natural situation, and in reflecting- upon the deeds of 
 Xerxes, of Darius and of Agamemnon. Eusebius' 8 complaint 
 that men, wondering- at the marvels of architecture, forget 
 the architect, as those, marvelling at God's work, neglect his 
 worship, is not far removed from Nectar's 9 religious enthu- 
 siasm and ascription of /teyaAoepyui to God, who thereby 
 reveals the greatness of his goodness. 
 
 While the idea of the activity, expressed by the word, 
 was present to the mind of the Greeks who coined and 
 employed the term, there is no evidence from the literature 
 in which the word occurs, that the activity itself was 
 present 10 for the same period. On the contrary, there is 
 constant reference either to the great figures of the past 
 history of the pagan world or to the supernatural, with full 
 admiration for the virtues of /w-eyaAoepyia. Just as far as the 
 Greek world coined and employed this word with reference to 
 great events abroad and far away, the term becomes a strange 
 satire on the Greek's own insignificance in certain of the 
 great activities of the world. The word and its usage be- 
 tray the essential weakness of the people that proceeded no 
 farther than a neologism, however strong their ambition to 
 imitate might have been or however great their passive 
 indifference and indecision might have been. The wide cur- 
 rency of the term is important, as it shows the extent of the 
 mental state that thus expressed itself, whether incipient 
 energy, that, however, never attained to effective action, or 
 whether a mere passive regard for the accomplishments of 
 others was responsible for the coinage of the term. 
 
 In either event, in time, a sense of weakness was bound 
 to prevail, sooner or later, among the people whose own 
 /AeyaA-oepyio. was of a phantom nature! Such a sense of feeble- 
 ness inevitably bred melancholy. 
 
 Though there was a spark of the old pride 11 in him still, 
 
 7. Philostr. 2. 221.3 and 9. 
 
 8. Bus. ii. 1380 B. 
 
 9. Nectar 1825 A. (cf. also Simoc. 5.2). 
 
 10. Kvo8oia and KevooTrovSi'a (treated later) were existing- evils. 
 
 11. Cf. Ta.TTwo<f>po<rvvr), treated earlier. 
 
 42 
 
nevertheless the Greek's generally weak character 1 2 accounts 
 for the passive nature of /*eyaA.oepyi'a, an expression not of real 
 "magnificence", but rather of pseudo-greatness in many 
 repects 13 . The growing consciousness of the latter fact 
 reacted, doubtless, upon the resignation essential to the full 
 development of those other virtues, Ta7reivo<poow77, 
 and 
 
 Out of the list of ver}' many K^O- compounds, we have 
 chosen KevoSo&a and xcvoo-TrovSta as particularly significant. 
 The importance of these ideas to the morality of the age 
 under consideration is obvious 1 . 
 
 The term Ko>o8oia is found in the Septuagint and in 
 Aristeas and in Polybius, but appears much more frequently 
 in and after the first century A. D.! There is no ambiguity 
 about the meaning of the word, no question about the exist- 
 ence of "frivolity" and "conceit", no doubt about the feeling 
 entertained toward these. 
 
 From the testimony of the Septuagint 2 that idols have 
 come into the world through the Kevo8o&a of men (frivolous- 
 mindedness), to that of Aristeas 3 that the tastes of the 
 Kcvo8ooi are inferior, we pass to Polybius 4 who not only con- 
 
 12. As shown by our study of /xerpiOTra^cta, aveiKa/aa, dya0O7roua; 
 we do not mean moral weakness. 
 
 13. EJven in the direction of KOivox^eAta, which might have been 
 fully realized, if /xcyaAoepyia had been genuine. 
 
 14. The /xyaA.o- compounds in the older literature, whether of mind, 
 of soul, courage, labor, speech, reputation or generosity, are numerous: 
 /AyaAo-0v/u.os, -yva>/M,a>v, -o8oos, -0800/305, -ovota, -77*01/77/309, -Trpay/uxoi/, 
 -TrpeVeia, -O-XTJ/AODV, -<pove'a>, .^u;(ta, //.eyc-ATp/opta, /txeyaAr/vopca. /u,eya. 
 Aoepyta represents no new concept, but a return in thought (cf. also 
 /xeyaA.o7roie'a>) to the past, glowing with great deeds. 
 
 1. Kevo</>eov, /cevoAoyc'w, KCVOTT/S (and also /xtKpoAoyia) are terms 
 found in the older literature, as well as a number of other KCVO- com- 
 pounds, less important. The idea of Ktvo8oia is not an altogether new 
 one, but the frequent use of the word in later literature gives it great 
 significance. 
 
 2. LrXX. Sap. 14.14. 
 
 3. Aristeas 2. 
 
 4. Polyb. 3.81.9; 27.6.12; 10.33.6; 39.1.1. 
 
 43 
 
demns Hasdrubal, the Carthaginians, Polyaratus for 
 which he associated with other evils as dXa^oveta and 
 but also, through Hannibal, complains that ^poirei-aa, 
 
 0V/AOS aAoyos, Ki/o8oi'a and TV<J>O<S incline to eiu/JovAi), eve'Spa and 
 
 Diodorus Siculus 5 tells the tale of the death of Calanus, 
 an Indian philosopher, contemporary of Alexander, whose 
 spectacular death some condemned as an exhibition of /<evo8oia, 
 "vanity". Paul 6 writes to the Philippians and to the Gala- 
 tians against "vain-glory", exhorting "lowliness of mind"; 
 his sermon was, of course, inspired by fear that the evils 
 existed. The previous impressions are confirmed by the 
 evidence of Plutarch 7 who regretfully complains of the 
 anger of the covetous man, the glutton, the jealous man, the 
 K/o8oos, whose examples he laments, as well as that of the 
 flatterer who is not ashamed to call "ambition", "fruitless 
 vanity". Philo 8 dramatically represents Kevo8ota as a wild 
 beast, lying in wait to destroy those who engage in it, and it 
 is the %*oKoVos who is the KCVO&>OS. Further, Kcvo8o&a is 
 included in a category of other social evils, presumably con- 
 temporaneous. o KcvoSo^os was a fact in the life of Marcus 
 Aurelius 9 , who scorns such a one and his "little glory", 
 8oapuH/. According to Arrian 10 and Epictetus, the law takes 
 cognizance of the *evo8oos who is set down with the aAao>v. 
 Lmcian 11 humorously represents Hermes as begging Zeus to 
 
 lay aside dA.aoveia, a/xatfta, Kcvo8ota, TV<OS, /LtaraiOTrovia, /uuKpoAoyta, 
 
 ri and many other faults. Porphyrius 12 attributes the 
 ia of the men of his own day, source of great misfor- 
 tunes, to the enmity of demons. We find the term as late as 
 Heliodorus 13 , applied to the Egyptians. 
 
 The Ecclesiastical literature tells much the same tale 
 
 5. Diod. Sic. 17.107.5. 
 
 6. N. T. Ep. Phil. 2.3; Ep. Gal. 5.26. 
 
 7. Plut. ii.57D; H.457B. 
 
 8. Philo. i.613.11; i.401.19; ii.47.16; ii.376.44. 
 
 9. M. Anton. 5.1. 
 
 10. Arr. Bpict. 3.24.43. 
 
 11. Lftic. D. Mort. 10.8. 
 
 12. Porph. Abst. ii.40. 
 
 13. Heliod. 9.19. 
 
 44 
 
regarding this word Kcvo&>&a. Polycarp 14 had said to the 
 Roman proconsul, with scorn, t KevoSo&Is. Clemens Romanus 1 5 
 in a letter to the Corinthians promises them salvation, if 
 they cast off injustice, strife, malice, slander, pride, "vain- 
 glory". Ignatius 16 betrays his aversion to KcvoSo&a, by prais- 
 ing those who have in place of it, love of the Lord. In the 
 language of the Tatian 17 the same feeling exists. Kuse- 
 bius 18 ridicules a certain Lacydas for his *voSo&a, while, fin- 
 ally, in ChrySOStomUS 19 we read: o yap TeraTreivayieVos KCU 
 <rvvTeT/oi/A/Aei/os ov Kvo8o?7<rei, ov/c opyteirat, ov ^Oovrjarci TO> TrX^crtov, OVK 
 
 aAAo rt S&rat Traces, which, open to but one interpretation, 
 brings the same conviction that the previous testimonies 
 have created. 
 
 We have, thus, abundant evidence of the long-continued, 
 wide-spread evil of KevoSo&a, which, signifying, now, "friv- 
 olity", now, "conceit", meaning frivolous-mindedness, 
 vanity, vain-glory is combated as an existing evil ! not only 
 in the Plutarchean age (when the Kevo8oos was a well-known 
 type of the day), but before and after that time as well, an 
 evil deep-rooted in the character of the Greek of the first 
 century A. D.I 
 
 Such a mental state implies a loss of greater or more 
 serious interests. It is a state of mind that belongs to men 
 of lesser intellectual stature; it is significantly enough but 
 once applied to a Roman, and then, hypothetically. 
 
 With its signification of "frivolity", its effect on politics 
 is obvious; meaning also "conceit", its influence in the realm 
 of ethics upon the new ethical standard would be equally 
 deleterious. It was an excess, doubtless, of Kevo8ota that pro- 
 voked the opposition to it that we have noted; that very 
 excess carried with it the possibility of a cure and might in 
 time inspire the opposite virtue of real modesty which the 
 Christian Fathers exhorted. 
 
 As long, however, as *evoooia flourished, there was little 
 
 14. Polyc. 10. 
 
 15. Clem. R. i.35. 
 
 16. Ignat. 697 A.B. 
 
 17. Tatian. 832 B. 
 
 18. Eus. (Numen. apud) iii.!209A. 
 
 19. Joan. Chrys. vii. 43 A. 
 
 45 
 
hope for raTreivo^poo-uny, and the evil of KcvoSo&a, "conceit", 
 without doubt, was one of the forces that interfered with the 
 development of raTravo^pocrwr/ 2 . The weakness of "friv- 
 olity" (K/o8o|ia) co-operated with that of /xerpioTrafleia and of 
 dve&Ka/a'a, and helps to explain the negative element in ayaOowoda 
 and the negative nature of /AtyaAoepyia, while the "vanity" of 
 *evo8ox would prevent the state of equality essential for a 
 Utopian Kou>o></>eA.ta. 
 
 Vanity, pride? conceit 21 were, as every one knows, essen- 
 tial qualities of the pagan world. But the Greek world had 
 not, before this, reached the point where it could pronounce 
 that judgment upon itself, which we read in the word 
 KevoSota itself, and hear proclaimed in literature from Polybius 
 to Heliodorus. The study of Kevo8ox admirably shows the 
 position of the Greek of the first century A. D., who is still 
 Greek, to the extent that he is "vain", KevoSoos, but un-Greek, 
 in that he condemns that pride and holds it sinful or 
 "frivolous". 
 
 Here we find (as in /AeyoAoepyia) the possible genesis of a 
 melancholy, which manifests itself more pronouncedly in 
 
 II eptavToA.oy t'a . 
 
 Let us subordinate TrepiairroA.oyi'ct to KvoSoi'a, to which it is very 
 closely related. 
 
 The word TrepiavToAoyi'a appears for the first time in Plutarch. The 
 quality of "boastfullness" that it refers to, is one that existed long 
 before Plutarch and one for which there were many other expressions. 
 t'a, /xeyaAvyyopi a, KOJOLTTO^O), /co/x,7rea> ? vj/^AoAoyeo/Aai, <re/x,i/oyoyeu>, 
 ), crrw/xvXt'a, OTo/A<aoyxos, av\e<a, cwraAea), dAaoi/evo/>UH; this is a 
 partial list of the earlier terms denoting- "boasting-". In view of these 
 many terms, the appearance of 7repiavToA.oyi'a is all the more remark- 
 able.) The coinage of this new term and, no less, the continuance, in 
 use, of the group of older terms, evince the persistence of certain 
 
 20. Cf. previous study of 
 
 21. We need but to recall ^avvoriys, /ouxratoT^s, ayAatd, 
 
 avflaSta, oy/<os, //,cyaAo<po<rwi;, TV^OS a d 8oKr;(n(ro<jf)ta. The following- 
 from Aristotle (Eth. N. 2.7.7) expresses clearly the old artistic standard 
 of judgment and the consequent grounds of objection: irtpl 8e rifj.r)v K>U 
 /ACOTOTIJS per /ncyaA.oi/'vxi'a, virepftoXrj & xavvor^s rt? 
 
 46 
 
features of Greek character, certain qualities that were a heritage of the 
 past (cf. also TaTruvo<f>poa"uvrj discussion) and which were not easily 
 surrendered ! (The vitality of the term is of much significance and is 
 such as to dispel any suspicion that, because the cases of occurrence 
 of the term are rather infrequent the quality was of little consequence 
 in life.) 
 
 Plutarch's (Plut. ii. 29B; ii. 41C; ii. 539C) condemnation of 
 TrepiavToAoyta is expressed in no uncertain terms; together with p,eyaA- 
 it is contrasted with arv<j>ia and /AeTpwmys; it is characterized as 
 e's and avfXf.v6f.pov and the moralist adds: pyo> 8'ov TroAAot rrjv arfitav 
 OLVTOV oVaTrc^evyaaiv. Sextus Bmpiricus (Sext. EJmp. 77-. Y. i- 62.) mocks 
 the dogmatists whom he criticizes as rerv^xofiei/wv KCU TrepiavToAo yowTwv. 
 lamblichus (Iambi. 91.8; Myst. 90.9) stigmatizes TrepiavToAoyux, calling it 
 TO aTrarrjXov. Porphyrius, (Porphyr. Aneb. 32.12) claiming that TO 
 TreptavToAoyetv was common to gods, demons and other superior beings, 
 and was token of the god's presence, is contradicted by lamblichus, 
 who grants them truth, instead of "boasting". Origen's (Origen. i. 
 752B) words are significant: eviSetv & rri KCU TO> TOV 'Irjo-ov r)Qa Travra^ov 
 7Tfpuo~Tafjivov TT/v TrepiavToAoytav /cat Sta TOVTO AeyovTOs: "Kav eyto CITTW 
 Trept /w,avTOi, y fjMpTvpui fwv ovK Icmv oA^T/s." Eustathius (Eust. 100. 
 37; 897.2) describing Nestor, says, without disapproval, TOIOVTOS ovv 6 
 Ne'oTwp wv TroXXaxov TrcpiavToXoyei, while, in another passage, interpreting 
 Homer, his language is as follows: IO-TCOV 8c KCU on *c TOV ivTavOa Kvpto. 
 
 XCKTOV/M6VOV KO/XTTCIV TO KO/XTTCI^CIV TTttp^/CTttl, O TTttptt TOt? V<TTtpOV, <TT<*)fJiV\t<lV 
 
 SryXoT /cat o-TO/u,^ao-/xov TrepiavToXoyiKOv. 
 
 The word is an expression of one side of the Greek's nature, the 
 other side of which is represented by such terms as Ta.Trwo<J>pocrvvi] and 
 ttve&KaKta. But just as far as KevoSo^ta interrupted the progress of 
 Tairwo<f>po<rvvr) and dveifiKaKta, so, too, the presence of TrcpiavToAoyta 
 militated against "humility" and "forbearance", and along with these, 
 against the "quality of mercy'', included in Kou/<o<eA.ia. At the same 
 time, these virtues act against ircpiavroXoyta. and seek to overcome it; 
 the real vanity and inanity of the boasting strain for which TrepuivTo- 
 Xoyia stands is evidenced by the presence of KevoorirovSia and of 
 /waTcuorrovta J 
 
 IleptavToAoyax, like /cevoSo&'a, is a companion term to /uteyoAoepyta, 
 and was justified as far as the latter term was an index of real accom- 
 plishment, but become a hollow pretence, when we recognize the 
 unreality of /xeyaAoepyta. 
 
 In a moral atmosphere, however, of which TaTretvo^poo-wiy, /xcTptoir- 
 a0eia and ayaOoTroua are products, the quality of TrepiavToAoyta was natur- 
 ally condemned, and that condemnation and distrust, such as we find in 
 Plutarch, led, perhaps, somewhat to its suppression, though that very 
 moral greatness \vouldbe the chief ground fora justifiable TrepunrroAoyta ! 
 
 47 
 
[The suggestions derived from the passages in which TTCI&JVIOS 
 occurs, are not insignificant. 
 
 Ilei&yvios (It is not our object, here, to determine, completely, the 
 nature and the limits of "obedience" in Greek ethics. For this idea 
 there were many expressions in the older language, as 
 TuQapxia-, evTreifleia, VTraKOvw, aKpoaats, Trcwn^aAtvos, 
 os, ev>jnos, CVT/KOOS. IleiflT/vios may have been formed after analogy 
 of Trcto-t^aXivos or TrtiOapx"*-', what motive was behind the creation of 
 this new term it were difficult to determine. ) is another member of the 
 new vocabulary of the first century A. D. and reveals considerable 
 regarding the problem of "obedience". 
 
 When Plutarch (Pint. ii. 592 B; ii. 90 B; ii. 442 C; ii. 102 F; ii. 369 
 C; ii. 1029 E; i. 58 D; i. 176 A; i. 596 C; i. 878 F.) refers to Roman or 
 to Spartan life, "obedience" is explicitly represented as due to the 
 authority of law and of administration; these instances are, perhaps, 
 cited as usual in Plutarch's Laves for emulation. Within the limits 
 of Greek conduct, reason and divine power are in control and exact 
 "obedience". Philo (Philo. i. 184.5.) also imagines reason as mistress 
 of the soul, while to the mind of Clemens Alexandrinus (Cl. Al. i. 1012 B; 
 ii. 460 A. ) the supreme power is vested in God, whose example is fol- 
 lowed in worldly affairs and to whom "obedience" is due. (We also find 
 the term in M. Anton, (i. 17), who rejoiced in a wife, 7rei#r/nos and 
 <iAo<TTopyos, in Pollux (i. 219) who uses it in its strictly literal sense, 
 in Soranus (p. 220), who employs it in a medical way). 
 
 The ideal subservience to reason, to Fate, to Daemons, to God, allow- 
 ing much scope for individualism, does not deny the possibility of will- 
 ing surrender; at the same time that 7repiavToA.oyta and Kvo&oia found a 
 place in men's consciousness, raTrttvo^pocrvvrj (under certain conditions) 
 was exercised and brotherly love was encouraged ! The complex char- 
 acter of this virtue meant a Greek appreciation of "obedience" that did 
 not enslave but which allowed freedom at the moment of surrender. 
 
 The complexity of such "obedience" is closely identified with the 
 combined religious and rational tone of later Greek ethics. Conduct 
 had at once an intellectual justification and sought a divine sanction ! 
 Freedom was not surrendered, nor was authority denied !] 
 
 Out of the mental state implied by K/o8o&a, 
 could and did result, and we find it, first, shortly before the 
 first century B. C. The suspicion that the word itself is a 
 symbol of a "zealous pursuit of frivolities" and of the "friv- 
 olity of zeal", in the life of the Greeks of the first century 
 A. D., is confirmed by a study of the passages in which the 
 term occurs; neither element of the word is new; but that 
 
 48 
 
rf should be so *"/ as to form a single concept denotes a 
 fixity of the idea, and signifies more than mere occasional 
 expressions of the futility of zeal and of labor; the single 
 word is concrete evidence of the fact that the idea was 
 abroad, while the wide and free use of the word would seem 
 to indicate the actual importance of the feeling which the 
 word defines; the literature betrays the regret felt because 
 of the fact of KvooTrov8ia, a fact that pressed heavily upon the 
 moral consciousness of the age. 
 
 The word is variousl} r applied to certain minor endeav- 
 ors, to trivial events and to the whole of human conduct. 
 Cicero 1 refers to problems of idle curiosity touching events 
 in Brundisium in the year 49 B. C., as xevoo-TrovSa 2 . Dionysius 
 of Halicarnassus 3 characterizes the laughable conduct of 
 Lucius Junius Brutus (contemporary of Appius Claudius), 
 as Kci/oo-TTovSta. To Josephus 4 the idea was not unknown and 
 it was referred to the times of Herod. Plutarch's 5 condem- 
 nation of Kcvoo-TrovSta grows out of the bitterness of his own 
 experience; while it is unthinkable that God is /wKpo? and 
 KevooTrovSo?, men are so and zealously fritter awa} r their energy 
 upon profitless things; o Kevdo-TrovSos is opposed (and defined 
 by the antithesis) to 6 ^tAoVoi/os. The same moral earnest- 
 ness appears in Marcus Aurelius 6 , and his sweeping denun- 
 ciation includes almost all of men's activities, under the head 
 of Kcvoo-Trov&a! Hernias' 7 scorn for the Kcvoo-rrovSos whom he 
 knows from life, is paralleled by that of Artemidorus 8 , whose 
 discrimination leads him into condemnation. Hipparchus 9 
 defines the "zealous frivolity" of a dilettant mathematician, 
 
 1. Cic. Att. 9.1. 
 
 2. It is not remarkable that Cicero knew this comparatively new 
 term (cf. aJso dvc^iKaKta); Cicero knew his Greek! His knowledge of 
 the term is not at all proof of its age, but rather of its wide currency, 
 perhaps wider than its comparatively infrequent appearance in litera- 
 ture would suggest. 
 
 3. Dion. H. 6.70. 
 
 4. Jos. Ant. 16.4.3. 
 
 5. Plut. ii. 560 B; ii. 1061 C; ii. 234 D; 1069 C. 
 
 6. M. Anton. 4.32; 7.3. 
 
 7. Herni. Sim. 9.5. 
 
 8. Artemid. 4.11; 4.82. 
 
 9. Hipparch. 1016 B. 
 
 49 
 
by contrasting- the seriousness of a <^tXoA.iy^ with his 
 Trov&'a. The pious enthusiasm of Clemens 10 of Alexandria 
 carries him into extravagant denials of the value of life apart 
 from religion, and leads him to praise life in the desert <*TOS 
 
 7ra<n;s Kvoor7TOv8ias, aTreipaya&'as, /ouKpOTrpeTreuxs. Clemens Alexan- 
 drinus could have sympathized with Plutarch and with 
 Marcus Aurelius. Although Diogenes Laertius 11 looks back 
 to the time of Plato 12 , his reproach does not belong dis- 
 tinctly to that earlier age any more than his general reflec- 
 tion; oorct (rwretVa eis TO d/?e/}atov KOU KevotrrrouSov a/xa Kai TruiSapuoSes 
 rwv dv0p<o7T<oi/, which possesses a universal value. His associa- 
 tion of xevoo-TrovSt'a with TV<OS is also suggestive. Finally, 
 Stobaeus 13 employs the word, expressing a thought he 
 attributes to Socrates 14 . 
 
 After the passing of the conditions that created the 
 social ethics of Plato, the aesthetic ethics of Aristotle, the 
 individual ethics of Zeno and of Epicurus, a condition 
 inevitably arose, in which /ccvoorTrovSta was prominent! We 
 wonder that we do not find the word earlier in literature. 
 The growth of a futile or frivolous zeal ended in an ultimate 
 belief in the futility of all zeal! Kevoo-Trov&a, the result of 
 KevoSo&a, is the very antithesis of a genuine ftcyaAocpyta, though 
 a natural concomitant of a mythical /^eyaAoepyia. Melancholy 
 was a natural result of the regret, (that we have found 
 evidence of) at the prevalence of Kevoo-Trov&a. We find a more 
 distinctly marked pessimism in connection with Kevoo-TrouSiu 
 than we have before. 
 
 We find, to be sure, sporadic strains of melancholy in 
 the earlier literature; but 0177 Trep <vAA<ov yevoj, roi-q & KIU dvSpcov. 
 
 and opoi yap 17/u.as ovSev oVras aXXo TrXrjv aStuA' otrotTrep wp,cv rf Kov<f>r)v 
 
 , and other similar lines do not represent the prevailing 
 
 10. Clem. Al. i. 532 B; i. 216 B. 
 
 11. Diog. L. 6.26; 9.68. 
 
 12. Diogenes L/aertius is probably no more quoting- exactly, here, 
 than before, in the case of p; Tpio7ra0tta. (Cf. previous treatment of 
 that word. ) 
 
 13. Stob. 534.23. 
 
 14. 5<uKpar^s \eye vofiifcew act TOV? #covs yeAav optovras rrjv TWV 
 a/$pa)7ra>i/ KcvocTTrovStav. It is little likely, we think, that Socrates knew 
 this word which we find, first, in Hipparchus and in Cicero. 
 
 50 
 
spirit of the earlier age, nor is melancholy characteristic, 
 in general, of the Greek nature, which, active, boastful, 
 talkative, fickle, not above lying, beaut3 7 -loving, speculative 
 and brave, was not pessimistic. We find no Lucretius, no 
 Rubaiyat in Greek literature ! The consciousness of the folly 
 and futility and emptiness of human endeavor does, however, 
 assert itself more strongly after the great conquests, and the 
 presence of this word, under consideration, is no less a sign 
 of that feeling than was the rise of a School of Skeptics 
 much earlier. But the Greek was not incurably pessimistic 
 
 and even TIJS 8c Ka/ctas di/aTreTrA^o-Ttu Trai/ra Trpay/xara KCU iras 6 /3ios 
 
 Ta/oaTTO/acvo? Kai /xvySev ^a>v /xcpos KaOapbv prfi avf.TriXffirrov , a>s OVTOI 
 Aeyowi, (i.e. the Stoics) atcr^tcrrov OTI Spa/txaTwv airdvTwv Kai are/o- 
 
 Trco-raTov 1 5 represents onty one side of Stoicism, and even such 
 strong condemnations provoked, in time, only a feeling of 
 equality and of wider sympathy, but not of despair. Thes ad- 
 ness of Kevoo-Trov&a is, however, indisputable. 
 
 KevooTTouSox, involving TV<OS, the opposite of 4>iA.o7rovos and 
 of 4>iAaA.i}0T75, is, like KcvoSo&'a, twin-sister of /u,i*/oo/oyta, and 
 becomes a true expression of a petty age that worshiped 
 ^eyaAoepyia as a distant ideal ! Pride, feebleness and sadness 
 were conspicuous among the qualities of the Greek of 
 Plutarch's centur ! 
 
 We find /xaraio., compounded with nouns of action 1 occa- 
 sionally before the first century A. D., but such cases are 
 sporadic in comparison with the numerous later occurrences. 
 
 MaratoTrovta is applied to a wide range of activities, being 
 even predicated, though negatively, of God and of Nature. 
 MaratoTTovta is by no means a new idea in Greek life, within 
 which, from Homer's time on, much TTOI/OS or O-TTOV^ must have 
 seemed /xdVaios. The later interpretation of what constituted 
 /xaraioTTovta is also quite a universal one, and Polybius and 
 Livy, Strabo and Pheidias, Plutarch and Plato, Lmcian and 
 Homer might easily have been in agreement, touching the 
 
 15. Plut. ii. 1066 A. (cf. too ii. 478 A. seq). 
 
 1. We have taken into consideration, /Lumuorrovia, -TrovTj/Aa, -Trpayta, 
 -epyta. 
 
 51 
 
folly of what is termed t^raioirovia. But as in the case of 
 Kvo(T7rov8ia, the later close association of /uarcuo- with a con- 
 siderable number of other ideas is significant; the words 
 thus formed w^ere not fashioned for a day, and suggest the 
 growth of a feeling of /WXTCUOTT/S! 
 
 Polybius 2 records his own keen disapproval of /w.aTcuo7rovia, 
 as well as that of the Romans. The scholiasts 3 of Aristophanes 
 and of Sophocles used the term /AaratoTroveo) to define less well- 
 known words from their authors; Qopvfteiv and Kov<f>a \.a\tiv, also 
 employed to illuminate the same text, at the same time also 
 explain the commentator's attitude toward an existing 
 /AaToioTrona. Strabo 4 finds an example of ^wnuorw^, in the 
 case of an Egyptian temple of barbaric KOTOO-KCWJ, which, to 
 his mind, possessed little of grace. Philo 5 denies that the 
 quality of /xaraioTrovux can be predicated either of Nature or of 
 God. His conception of /AaraioTrovia is graphically stated: 
 
 vyirtttiv TraiSwv . . . . o t 7roAA.ouas Trap' aiytaXots dflv/oorrcs if/d/JLfjLov yecuAo^ovs 
 8iavrTa<n KCH eTrafl' ixfraipovvrts rai^epal 7raA.iv cpctVovcri. Plutarch 6 
 
 expresses his own conviction, in applying the term /xaTatoTrovta 
 to useless indulgence in grief. The satirist Lucian 7 includes 
 
 /xaTcuoTTcwa among dAuoveta, d/Aa$i'a, pts, KcvoSo^ia, /xiK/ooA.oyta and 
 
 other no less censurable evils, unworthy of the gods. 
 lamblichus 8 represents Pythagoras as characterizing the 
 ordinary duties of life that interfere with philosophy, as 
 /xaraioTrwr^itt. To Clemens Romanus 9 ? /AaraioTrovt'a consisted in 
 idle inquiry regarding the future of the soul. Justin's 10 
 hypothetical statement of the /xaTatoTrovta of God is, of course, 
 an expression of his own condemnation of that quality in 
 life. Olympiodorus' 11 opinion of /xaraioo-TrovSia is shown by his 
 association and identification of it with TO avv-n-apKra T&V om/owv 
 
 <^avrap/u.ara and T^V TOW TroXXuiv Aoywv axatpov <t>\vapiav, Kpiphan- 
 
 2. Polyb. 9.2.2; 25.5.11. 
 
 3. Schol. Ar. Plutus. 575; Soph. O. T. 887. 
 
 4. Strabo. 806. 
 
 5. Philo. 2.500; 2.98.52. 
 
 6. Plut. ii. 119 D. 
 
 7. L,uc. Dial. Mort. 10.8. 
 
 8. Iambi. Vita Pyth. 24. 
 
 9. Clementina, i. 60 B; i. 27. B. 
 
 10. Just. Frag-. 1585 A. 
 
 11. Olymp. A. 41 C. 
 
 52 
 
ius' 1 * condemnation of /u-aTcuocpyia { s not less unequivocal. 
 Philostorgius 18 , also, draws from his own experience for an 
 illustration of /txaraioo-TrovSta, which is used of idle, trivial oc- 
 cupation 14 . 
 
 We have, thus, a record of a -wide-felt disapproval of a 
 wide-spread iMraunrovial In the light of the evidence furnished 
 by Ko/oo-Trou&a, the development is strongly suggested of an 
 atmosphere of idleness and of inactivity, or one of labor and 
 zeal that were trivial and therefore condemned. The words 
 of Plutarch 1 ' 5 are, perhaps, significant in this connection: 
 KCU /xdAi? av vvv o\rj ['EAAas] 7rapa<r;(oc, T/oio-^tAtov? OTrAiras, txrovs 17 
 MeyapeW fua TroAts ee7r/u,i^ev i? IIAaTaiea? .... ircpt TO HTWOV OTTOV 
 /A0' -fffjipa<; eVrv^etv eorrtv dv0pd>7ra> vcpovn. Evidence of the Same 
 
 weariness appear in the language of Strabo 16 who writes of 
 Athens that her navy was "almost extinct, that little re- 
 mained of her Long Walls, and of the lower cit_y no more 
 than a small part of the maritime quarter". Thebes was 
 hardly deserving of the name of village, and the same was 
 true of all the Boeotian towns except Tanagra and Thespiae. 
 Dion 17 gives a more picturesque description of Thebes when 
 he says that "only a single statue stood erect among the 
 ruins of the ancient market-place". Pausanias 18 in the 
 second century, is our best witness of "shrunken or ruined 
 cities, deserted villages, roofless temples, shrines without 
 images and pedestals without statues, faint vestiges of places 
 
 12. Epiph. i. 417 A. 
 
 13. Philostorg-. H. E. 11.1. 
 
 14. MaTuiooTTrov&a is found in Suicer, with this comment: 
 ovupntv SiaAAaTToucm/ at TOJV av0pa>7ra>i/ /txaTaiooTrovSiai. Eu.stathius (543) 
 uses ^aratoTrpayta of the idle, lazy, useless exertion of Homeric heroes. 
 Of the numerous fjM.ra.io- compounds, some are, of course, earlier, some 
 later, in origin; /xaraioAoyco), like ^wpoAoyia, /xi/cpoAoyta, <J>\vapia and 
 AuAf'o) and KCvoAoyta belong-s to the older literature. We have chosen 
 and treated /xaratOTrovta, because of its close relation with Kei/oorrov&a. 
 MaTaiore^vta is also interesting and is defined by Quintilian (2.20.3) as 
 "supervacua artis imitatio, quae nihil sane neque boni neque mali 
 habeat, seel vanum laborem". 
 
 15. Plut. ii. 414 A. 
 
 16. Strabo. ix. 1 and 2. 
 
 17. Dion. Chr. vii. Or. p. 136. Dind. 
 
 18. Frazer: Pausanias. p. xiv. Intr. (with ref's) vol. i. 
 
 53 
 
that once had a name and played a part in history". It is 
 well-known that through imperial favor Greece enjoyed, for 
 two centuries, a high degree of tranquillity and of repose; 
 this but encouraged her own settled calm, her state of leth- 
 argy and of exhaustion. When men are strong- and are 
 vitally engaged in their own occupations, which are all- 
 absorbing, then /aaratoTrovta and Ko/oo-TrouSux are foreign to their 
 lives; the temper of this age, however, of Plutarch's age 
 was not far removed from "/xaratOTrys /xaT<uori;T<>v, ewrev 6 
 7S, /Maraiorr/s /x,aTcuoT7;T<Dv, TO. travra 
 
 This is a term we do not find in literature before Diony- 
 sius of Halicarnassus. Dionysius of Halicarnassus 1 , who 
 calls the Roman character fuvoirovrjpa and aivQaSr), represents 
 Horatius reviling his sister with the epithets favSoTrapOtvc and 
 /u,wra8A.<e. The Greek's knowledge of the evil of /xt<ra8cA<^>ta 
 is evidenced no less than his belief that the evil was a 
 universal one in time and place. Plutarch's 2 sweeping 
 denunciation of ^lo-aScA^wi grew out of the bitterness of his 
 conviction that <iAa8cA<ia was as rare in his day as /xtcraSeAxjka 
 had been in the time of the ancients; in his own day, if we 
 can believe his words, it was a common social evil which he 
 deeply deplored. Philo 3 recognizes the presence of the 
 ^wraSeX^o? and of the /uouvfyxoTros, whose evil influences he 
 seeks to overcome. The exhortations of the ecclesiastics 4 
 not to honor /uou8eA.<ia before <iAa8eA<ta, to oppose <iA.ovetKia, to 
 avoid envy and /xto-aSeX^ta, to seek goodness, love and peace 
 are clear enough condemnation of a social evil whose effects 
 they knew from experience and dreaded accordingly. 
 
 From Dionysius of Halicarnassus, then, throug-h at least 
 the fourth century A. D., we find testimony to the existence 
 of this evil, which meets with a bitter condemnation 5 . 
 
 1. Dion. H. i. 464.9. 
 
 2. Plut. ii. 478 C., ii. 482 C. 
 
 3. Philo. i. 671.47. 
 
 4. Patriarch. 1145 B; Athan. i. 305 B; Basil, ii. 820 B. 
 
 5. We cannot believe that the idea of /xio-aScA^ta is an entirely new 
 one, born at this late period of Greek ethics; /nio-avfywoTros is a partial 
 
 54 
 
Plutarch's extreme, pessimistic view must be taken "cum 
 grano salis"; his argument for the very great prevalence 6 of 
 in his own day and a corresponding- rarity of 
 is invalid, as the same argument could be adduced 
 to prove the contrary. And, in fact, the essay "De Fraterno 
 Amore" is more evidence, perhaps, to the contrary of 
 Plutarch's statement than his argument is proof for the 
 affirmative. There can be no doubting the fact, however, 
 that the evil, whether wide-spread or no, affected the mind 
 of the age with a certain horror, if Plutarch be a true repre- 
 sentative. The appearance of the term, if it was coined at 
 this time, is evidence, probably, not so much of the preva- 
 lence of the evil which is deprecated, as of a deeper moral 
 consciousness and an acuter sense of sin ! 
 
 With a growing "humility" and "forbearance", both 
 earlier in time than /ou<ra8eA.<ta, such an attitude is easily com- 
 prehensible. Further, the weakness, suggested by pcrpioiraOcia 
 and dve&Ka/aa, would break down the hostility necessary for a 
 prolonged /ouo-aSeA^'a. The religious character of Ko/<o<eAia, 
 the generosity of dya&wroud would also contribute to the 
 charity that opposed /xio-aScX^a 7 . Under such circumstances, 
 the evil of /uo-aSeA^i'a could hardly thrive, while the feeling 
 against it would naturally be very strong. 
 
 Though the term KOcr^oTroXirr^ seems to be quite late in Greek liter- 
 ature, the conception of world-citizenship had presented itself, long- be- 
 fore the first century A. D., to the mind of the Stoics and of the Cynics 
 (Diog. L. 6.63. L,ucian i. 548). The idea was present to the imagination 
 of the first century and, as Philo (Philo. i.1.18; i.657.6; ii. 106,2. Moses 
 
 expression of the same feeling and is as old as Demosthenes and Plato. 
 It is a matter or some surprise that the word /xra8eA.<ia, was not cre- 
 ated earlier, as was its opposite <iAa8eA<ia. There are many late JUMTO-, 
 fjiura- compounds. The feeling entertained toward /u(ra8e\<ta in the 
 first century A. D. is, however, of more importance than the problem of 
 the exact time, of the creation of this term! 
 
 6. The moralist's expression is, rather, merely one of protest than 
 an accurate index of the extent of the evil; cf., for another exaggera- 
 tion, Plut. ii. 1066 A. 
 
 7. Perhaps, such late terms, as <f>i\a\\r]\ia, d8eA.^>OTi^, <iAcvcre'/?ei, 
 
 and <f>iXo<rvvy6'r)<i are significant, in this connection. 
 
 55 
 
is Philo's example of such lofty citizenship.) understood the character 
 the KOcrftoTToAtrry? was a citizen of the universe, subject to the law of the 
 whole KOCT/U-OS or to the regulations of Nature. Further, the soul that was 
 KOO-/XOTTO\ITIS, was also 0eo<iA7ys and consecrated itself to the service of 
 God, not enrolled in any one city, but through divine interest, possess- 
 ing" the whole world. In the social fabric of the first century, the con- 
 cept was quite as natural to Greek as to Hebrew. For both, the idea 
 had a religious as well as a political significance, and JSpictetus (EJpict. 
 2.10.3.), though using the different phrase TroAtTiys KOOT/MOV, further illus- 
 trates the moral obligations of world-citizenship (The few passages 
 cited, in which this word occurs, do not militate against the belief in a 
 wide currency of this term, -a belief resting upon the frequent repetition 
 of the word in inscriptions; the same is true of ^eyaAxix^eAi/s.). 
 
 While the fact of the ico<r/AoiroAirip, of the man who ignored the 
 barriers of race and of religion, of the citizen of the world who recog- 
 nized a universal divinity and a universal philanthropy is plainly 
 established, his religious character is as much emphasized as his ethical 
 or his political. 
 
 The way was doubtless, in part at least, prepared for such a char- 
 acter by the humanizing influences of such virtues as TaTravo<f>po<Tvvr) 
 /xef/otOTraflcia, dve&KaKia, dya#O7roiia, and Kotvox^cXux; the hostility enter- 
 tained toward fjuo-ao\<f>ia, likewise was favorable toward a universal 
 friendship; the leveling tendency of these habits of thought broke 
 down narrow, local prejudices and made for the cosmopolitanism, 
 represented by 6 K 
 
 While ^oTTottd, with a moral suggestion, was not unknown 
 to Aristotle 1 & 2 , while to rhetoricians after Callistratus 
 ^Ooiroua was well-known as a rhetorical term, in the first 
 centur} 7 A. D. the word acquired a deep ethical significance 
 of genuine value ! The positive moral signification that the 
 word then carries points, perhaps, to a deeper interest in the 
 moral activity that the term defines ! 
 
 Plutarch's well-known moral purpose, both in the 44 Mor- 
 alia" and in the ' 'Lives" 3 , lends special interest to his frequent 
 use 4 of the term yOoTroda. His discriminating use of 
 
 1. Arist. irX. i. 955a 32. This case in Aristotle seems to be unique. 
 
 2. Another passage, Rh. iii. 7., illustrates a step in the formation 
 of the term, eav TO. ovofjua.ro. ot/caa Aey?; rfj !ci, irouqcrti TO rjOos. 
 
 3. Plut. Pericl. 2. 
 
 4. Plut. i. 71 B; i. 961 D; ii. 814 A; ii. 660 B; ii. 799 B; i. 153 B; i 
 112 B; ii. 1U53 D; ii. 450 F; 1.53 A. 
 
 56 
 
i.e., in associating- it with peace, bravery and justice in the 
 case of the Romans, and with <<j>povifav and with noble 
 pleasures in the case of the earlier Greeks suggest elements 
 of his own moral ideal. Plutarch allows a wide range of 
 rjOoTToiia, applying it to Spartans, to Sicilian Greeks and to his 
 own times, socially and politically. There is no question of 
 his own concern for philanthropy and fora "formation of 
 character" which shall be secure! Philo 5 , in the interests 
 of an actual JjOorroda, declares the possibility of its realization 
 through religion and through philosophy. In the absence of 
 an exacter definition of the ?0<>s, we can only conclude 
 the presence of a desire for a noble "character formation". 
 Strabo 6 , in a dissertation on the humanizing results of 
 Roman conquest, counts ^Wood among- the signs of civiliza- 
 tion. 'HfloTroua mig-ht, of course, according to the significa- 
 tion of the ?0os, have a bad sense, as when referring- to the 
 
 ayo>y^v TWV irapa rot? KtvatSots 8iaA.eKra>v *at rfjs rjfloTrouas, in Ionia. 
 
 The stricter moral sense, with an exhortation to practice, 
 recurs in Clemens 7 of Alexandria: TrpaK-riKo? & wv 6 TratSaywyos, 
 
 irporepov fiev as 8ta0<riv rjOoirouas Trpovrptyaro^ 77807 8 KOI eis rrjv T<OV 
 
 Scovrwv eV/oyeuxv TrapaKoAct. Sextus Empiricus 8 controverts the 
 belief of the Pythagoreans in an harmonious organization 
 of the universe and the consequent value to be attached to 
 
 *H0o7r<Hi 9 is also used in a different sense, of "delineation 
 of character", by sophists and by rhetoricians from Calli- 
 stratus to Longinus, by Callistratus 10 , of the r^y with 
 which the Argo was built, by Dionysius 11 of Halicarnassus 
 of Lysias and of Isocrates to whom he grants the most con- 
 spicuous dpeTTJ in composition, ^OTTOIOX; this receives a defini- 
 
 tion in the following: r)^07rom KCU Karao-Keva^ei TO, TrpooxoTra raJ Aoyw 
 Trto-ra Kai xprjarTa^ 7rpooup(7is re avrot? dcrreaxf VTTOTI^CI? . . KOI 
 
 5. Philo. i. 355.10; i. 302.41; i. 364.26; ii. 214.48. 
 
 6. Strabo. 648 C (14.1.41); 127 C. (2.5.26). 
 
 7. Clem. Al. i. 249 C. 
 
 8. Sext. Emp. M. 6.30; 6.36. 
 
 9. Similarly, ^oypa^os, rjOoXoyta. 
 
 10. Callistr. Stat. 10. 
 
 11. Dion. H. de Lys. c. 8. c. 19. Isocr. c. 11. (for dv^oirotrrro? L/ys. 
 c. 13). 
 
 57 
 
Adyovs 7riiKets cbroSiSovs KOU rats rv^ais aKoXovBa (frpovovvras euraycov; 
 Hermogenes 1 2 defined yOoiroua as ftiprjcns yOovs VTTOKCI/ACI/OV 7rpo<rw7rov, 
 
 and classified it with other technical rhetorical terms, as 
 irpoo-wroiroua and etSwAoTroua; Longinus 13 includes it among 
 
 7rpo8idp0awns, e7ri8to/o0uxns, dTroo-twTn/tris, irapaAet^ts, ctpwvaa. In other 
 
 words, yOoTroda is purely a technical term of rhetoric, with no 
 further moral signification; as a rhetorical term it was widely 
 known and we also find it in Aphthonius 14 , Nikolaiis, Phoe- 
 bammon, Zonaeus; Eustathius 15 , commenting- on Homer, 
 
 Says: ^ TOV 'ArpetSov \j/v\r] KCU <f>rj<riv rf ^OTroiiyTiKws. 
 
 While neither the Greek, the Hebraic, the Roman nor 
 the Christian ideal has been exactly defined, above, the word 
 is a symbol of an effort to attain a realization of those 
 ideals! Widely 16 used, the word reveals a genuine desire to 
 promote "character-formation", to upbuild nobility of 
 character. 
 
 It were natural to conclude that yQoiroda. meant, for the 
 Greek of the first century A. D., a realization, in "character- 
 formation", of elements that appealed to the age. 'Hftwrood 
 represents a conscious union of various ethical forces, repre- 
 sented by T(nrewo<f>po(rvvr)^ /AerpioTra&ia, ave&KUKi'a, dya&wroua, KOIVCO- 
 <cA,ta, /u,yaA.<D<eAi'a, /xeyaAoepyta, Tra&yvios, <iAa8eA<ia, KOtr/xoTroAiT^s, 
 
 which, all, separately, factors in the ideal character of the 
 age, became united in the perfect 
 
 12. Hermog. Prog. 44. 
 
 13. I^ongin. Frag. 8.14; (for dvrytfoTroiVos, 34.3). 
 
 14. Cf. Rhetores Graeci, L>. Spengel. 
 
 15. Bust. 1955.54 and 49. 
 
 16. avrjOoiroirjTos occurs in Cic. ad Alt. 10.10.5, meaning "immoral". 
 
 58 
 
LIST OF WORDS. 
 
 PAGK 
 
 KcuvoAoyta . . . . . 19 
 
 Evpeo-iAoyta ..... 20 
 
 TaTravo? ..... 22 
 
 .... 26 
 
 .... 29 
 
 .... 32 
 
 .... 36 
 
 ia and MeyaAox^eAi/s . . 38 
 
 MeyaAoepyi'a ..... 41 
 
 Kevo8oux . . . . . 43 
 
 IlepiuvToAoyia .... 46 
 
 UuOrjVLOS ..... 48 
 
 KevocrrrovSta, ..... 48 
 
 MttTatOTrona . . . . . 51 
 
 Mta-aSeX^ta ..... 54 
 
 Kocr/xoTToXtrr/? . . . . 55 
 
 'H007TOI&X 56 
 
 59 
 
CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 In the previous discussion it has been shown that all of 
 these words are expressions, concrete symbols of real facts in 
 the Greek life of the first century A. D. The ethical move- 
 ments that these words evidence were genuine factors in the 
 life of the age that Plutarch represents. There w)(ere 
 certain virtues in process of development, that were encour- 
 aged, some of them more fully realized, others less so; 
 there were certain vices whose existence was deplored and 
 condemned. 
 
 The words themselves are partial evidence of the ethical 
 situation, inasmuch as we can be certain that they were 
 vital, (compare Chapter on "Method", also KawoXoyta and 
 cvpeo-iAoyia) ; their acceptance in the language, their long 
 history shows them to be precipitates of genuine thinking 
 and feeling of serious import. The extent of that ethical 
 vocabulary, (which goes back in its beginning at least to the 
 time of Pol3 T bius, and which developed in the time of 
 Plutarch and includes both new ideas and old ones reinforced 
 or altered), is further evidence of the width and depth of 
 the moral agitation of the first century A. D. The ideas 
 and conduct these words portray were determinative, and 
 quite full testimony of such conduct is received from the lit- 
 erature before and after Plutarch's time representing actual 
 conditions in life, as well as ideals 1 . 
 
 The moral ideal of Plutarch is our immediate concern, 
 but while we can establish certain data of his ethical stan- 
 dard, some of these data appear to be true for the whole 
 century as well, as we find the same attitude observed in 
 further literary and other sources of the same time as that 
 of the great representative Boeotian; this attitude, develop- 
 
 1. It is thought that a complete study of the history of the entire 
 ethical vocabulary found in Plutarch must make quite clear the nature 
 of the moral ideal of the Greeks of the first century A. D., which is by 
 no means as yet fully understood. 
 
 60 
 
ing before, finally became established in the first century A. 
 D. and continued long after, not only in time but also in 
 place 2 . 
 
 That moral agitation, which was undoubted^ sincere 
 and deep rooted, is, in part at least, defined by the study we 
 have made of a portion of the ethical terminolog} 7 , which is 
 no less a positive record of moral progress than the marbles 
 of a fallen temple are witness of an ancient glory 3 . 
 Plutarch's ethical ideal included the virtues of 
 
 and combated the evils of Kei/o8oia, TreptavroXoyta, 
 
 ta, /xaraioTrovta; the ethical movement had a definite 
 relation to the past but was also firmly established in the new 
 conditions of the later age. Taireivo<t>po<Tvvri he received with 
 great reserve, owing to an inherited strain of Greek pride; 
 fjLTpio7rd6ua was strongly exhorted; while in a way recalling 
 the past, and even applied to Socrates, it was essentially a 
 new virtue that implied much weakness; dvefrjcaicto is distinctly 
 a new product that brought in its train opposition to Ti/xwpia, 
 kindness toward slaves, toward the feeble, and toward a foe, 
 that encouraged do/oyi/o-ia and <iAav0/oa>7ri'a; ayaOairoua had a clear 
 religious implication and Kou/o><eAia, quite a new term, was in 
 time predicated of God as well as of man; Plutarch cherished 
 this idea as he did that of /xeyaXox^eXi}?; curiously enough we 
 find the latter term applied to God, nature, and heroes of the 
 past, rather than to men of the present, which is also true 
 fteyaXocpyta. Plutarch sincerely regretted the /u<ra8eA<x that 
 existed in his own day, and was deeply affected by the evils 
 of Ko/o8oia, which he associated with covetousness, jealousy 
 and flattery; no less bitterly^ did he condemn the TreptavroAoyux 
 of his own day, while the prevalent Kwbfrww&a was actually 
 responsible for a large degree of melancholy; pnraunrwCa was 
 another fault of the age that disturbed the moralist; many 
 of these faults were inherent in the Greek nature, but the 
 practical philosophy of Plutarch contemplated their reform; 
 
 2. The "discussion" gives this information with such exactness as 
 may be attained in this matter. 
 
 3. It should be borne in mind that this study is merely a "prolego- 
 mena" and that more evidence will be published at a later time. 
 
the idea of iruQrjvtos seems to have been complex, as the whole 
 system of ethics was, which referred its laws now to man, 
 now to God, now to human institutions, now to divine power. 
 The ideal of character formation, ^0<wroua, included, besides 
 the above, peace, bravery, justice, o-to^poo-w^ and noble 
 pleasures. The entire group of words and concepts repre- 
 sents a deep moral earnestness, a positive long-ing- for virtue 
 and hatred of sin. 
 
 The ideas that we have, in large measure, been consider- 
 ing-, separately, were also very closely inter-related. While 
 suggestions have already been made of this correlation, it 
 may be well, in conclusion, to pass all of the ideas in review, 
 together. 
 
 As has already been established, the moral ideal was not 
 merely a vision hovering before the mind of the age, but cer- 
 tain virtues, crystallizing, had penetrated the very heart of 
 the Greek life and found a home there. The general ten- 
 dency was toward a generous interpretation of life and of 
 its obligations. A gradual appreciation of humility, (raTm. 
 vo<j>po<rvvr)) the foundation-stone of this ethical structure, 
 induced a mode of thought and a habit of feeling, favorable 
 to a broad philanthrop} r , which, in private affairs, fostered 
 an ideal of brotherly love (^iXaScA^ta), and, in public matters, 
 cherished the hope of world-citizenship (KOOTAOTTOAITT;?), when, 
 reversing- the old process, the individual soug-ht the state. 
 A new interpretation of control of the passions (/ACTpiorrafleta) 
 was a resultant psychological necessity, and a noble forbear- 
 ance (dve&Ka/aa) became a pS3 T chological possibility; the 
 feebleness of these qualities undermined the aristocratic 
 sense of pride, once an essential quality of Greek ethics. 
 Advancing hand in hand, these democratic virtues proceeded 
 to put into action (ayaOovoua^ /xeyaXax^cX^s) their ideals but 
 lacked the strength to initiate the universal amelioration 
 (Kotv<D<e\ta) which should have been the logical issue of such 
 effort. With a great capacity for sacrifice, this nature was 
 smitten with a sad feebleness that made its inherited strain 
 of pride a mockery and its. chief ambition, a failure. 
 
 While sympathy was cosmopolitan and ethics received 
 her law from religion, (cf. TT^VIOS, KOtvox^eXta, aya007roua, dvet- 
 
 there were, however, other forces present which checked 
 
 62 
 
and complicated the onward movement of thought. Obedi- 
 ence O0ijvios) did not yield unquestioningly to the dictates 
 of humility, but reserved for herself a large measure of free- 
 dom, b}' which the natural tendency and the final results of 
 the ideas, previously considered, were necessarily held in 
 abeyance. Frivolity and conceit (KcvoSo&a) were native 
 elements, not easily eradicated from the Greek character, 
 though bitterly condemned by the age; humility won only a 
 partial triumph over this foe. The representative voice of 
 the age, to be sure, raised a protest against anger (opy*?), but 
 Plutarch, himself, was, as yet, still unable to extend an 
 unreserved welcome to humility (ruTreivos). While there may 
 have been a gain in generosity, that sentiment was still con- 
 fined within serious limitations. 
 
 The evident earnestness of the moral movement had also 
 to contend against a deep-seated languor, frivolous zeal, idle 
 indifference (Kevoo-TrovSta, /naraioTrovta) . Though the Greek con- 
 science was disturbed by these and regret was profound, the 
 disease was not readily cured; and the Greek's boastfulness 
 (TTcptavToAoyia), his ostentation and his egoism were a hollow 
 pretence that left him in his weakness, melancholy and 
 resigned. 
 
 In the midst of these contradictions, in the strife, on the 
 one hand, between a noble generosity and an effort to be 
 great through being good, and, on the other, a pride that 
 was self-centered rather than altruistic, in the conflict 
 between sincerity and pretence, we see an unceasing yearning 
 for the Golden Fleece of a Moral Ideal ! There is no doubt- 
 ing the fact that there was a wide-spread belief in virtuous 
 ideals and encouragement of virtuous acts ! The condemna- 
 tion the age passed upon its own weaknesses, the regret it 
 felt at its own failures bespeak the earnestness to attain the 
 goal of noble living. Aware of the presence of evil in his 
 own nature which a conscientious introspection had revealed 
 to him, the Greek's conscience was deeply stirred and he was 
 impelled to purify his own heart. Incapable, perhaps, of 
 inaugurating a universal reform, though not abandoning the 
 the hope of it, the purity of the individual was his immedi- 
 ate aim ! Thus, though the period was one of contradictions 
 and of compromises, though paradoxes blocked progress, 
 
 63 
 
public opinion seems to have taken a definite trend in a cer- 
 tain direction. With whatever longing the Greek may have 
 reverted to the great days of long ago, (/xeyaAoepyox, fteyaXw^eA.^?) 
 and whatever self-esteem (ye/oiauroAoyi'a) he may have jealously 
 cherished because of his past, the present need was inculcat- 
 ing new lessons of moral reform and the national "Geist" was 
 being transformed. The Greek was no longer the Greek of 
 old, with an aesthetic consecration to beauty but a new type 
 of Greek, with a deep conviction of duty 4 . 
 
 What the results to Greek ethics would have beeen, in 
 the first century, had Greece been left alone to work out her 
 own salvation without the intervention of Roman dominance, 
 is a matter of fascinating, though idle speculation, (Polyb. 
 xl. 5.12). Certain it is, however, that the Roman was quite 
 unconscious of those hidden forces that were silently sway- 
 ing the Greek multitude and making for noble character 
 (^florroud), in spite of the external decadence ! (cf. hist, 
 introd.) That there was no great resultant organized social 
 reform is a sad commentar} 1 - on the weaknesses of an age, 
 incapable of putting into complete effect, its own highest 
 ideals. (Plin. Ep. x. 93. 94.) Historians of Greece, reflect- 
 ing upon the political, economic, and social decline of the 
 country, have failed to appreciate fully, the substratum of 
 genuine worth in the Greek character, at this period ! 
 Although the moral ideal may not have gained universal 
 validity, it had, nevertheless, strongly impressed itself upon 
 the mind of the age, and a correct understanding of the 
 period must recognize this fact as well as weigh the external 
 events of history. In the gloaming of Greek political and 
 economic life, when there was little of energetic activity 
 (Kvo8ota, Ko/oo-TTovSia, /iaraioTTona) and as little energetic think- 
 ing, there was, nevertheless, a deep undercurrent of reflec- 
 
 4. The original contact with Rome may, perhaps, have stimulated 
 the evolution of this sense; at any rate a moral atmosphere was develop- 
 ing 1 not merely about Plutarch but throughout the Greek world; the 
 political, economic, and social decline that was accompanied with great 
 disasters was, perhaps, also ultimately responsible for this reaction. 
 Principles of human conduct, seemingly fundamental, were undergoing 
 slow and subtle alterations, the cumulative affect of which meant in 
 time a complete transformation. 
 
 64 
 
tion, that dwelt upon the broad sympathy of dya&wroud and 
 the cosmopolitan philanthropy of Koivox^cXux, the majesty of a 
 past ntya\opyia and the possibility of a present /xeyaXox^eXta 
 that resented the pretensions of the Romans, with scorn, 
 (TrepiavroAoyia, KevoSo|ia), that went in imagination far beyond 
 the limitations of municipal administration, granted by 
 Roman authority 5 , to ideas of universal citizenship (KOO-/XOTTO- 
 
 A-iriys), that deemed raTreivo^/ixxrvn/, /ACT/oi07ra0ia, dveiKaKia worthy 
 
 of sincere consideration and which ended in resignation and 
 
 sadness (/xeyaAoe/oyta, KCvoo-TrovSta, /u<ra8eA<ta) . The results of 
 
 Roman administration upon Greek character were both good 
 and bad, but albeit this external influence was great, the 
 internal evolution, whether because of it or in spite of it, 
 was advancing toward lofty ideals of righteousness 6 . 
 Roman love of conquest was, in Greek ethics, represented by 
 a sense of sacrifice (Ave&icaicta, /xeTy>io7ra0eia) f Roman habit of 
 self-indulgence was here balanced by a recognition of 
 altruism (Kocvw^eAta), Roman pride was here met by a Greek 
 ideal of humility (raTruvo^poa-vvrj) ! 
 
 It is not strange that the ethics of this period were 
 eclectic in character; we find the artistic and the humanistic, 
 the national and the cosmopolitan, the social and the indi- 
 vidualistic, the objective and the subjective all contributing 
 to this system of ethics; man hardly knew which claim was 
 paramount and whether salvation was attainable through 
 holiness or through wisdom, or through both ! The ethical 
 ideal was subject to theological, rational, natural, individual 
 
 5. A quasi-political renaissance, though the conquest of Greece 
 was never more complete. 
 
 6. While the Greek's own great deeds were a thing of the past, 
 while sorrow, the greatest leveler of all, colored his entire attitude 
 toward life, despair did not yet seize upon him, for he felt that 
 (/AeyaAox^eA^s, /uteyaAoepyta, Kotvax^eAiys, dya&wroua) fc Nature and God, 
 at least, were great and good and that in Reason, he possessed the 
 Ariadne thread to lead him out of the labyrinth to his own ideals of 
 the Conscience ! The elements in his nature alien to his moral ideal, 
 though they possessed all the force of inherited traits and of tradition, 
 were opposed by a profound devotion to duty, by a sense of goodness, 
 purity and holiness. A sense of sin conspired with a love of God to 
 establish a moral ideal that had a religious sanction (ave^i/cowa'a, 
 
 ijs, /xeyaA.a><e\7) and a rational basis ( xevoo-rrovSta, TTCI&JVIOS) \ 
 
 65 
 
and universal impulses, in the midst of which there existed, 
 with divided authority, a hierarchy of faith and a sover- 
 eignty of reason, a necessary moment in Greek Being, 
 (cf. ayaOoTToua^ KoivoM^eAiys, Kevo<r7rov8tu ) prior to a greater evolu- 
 tion. New ideas were born into the world, meeting- with 
 deep appreciation, but there was a sad lack of Titanic 
 emotions capable of welding, with gigantic force, the various 
 elements into an organic synthesis (^0o7roua). The age 
 produced no inspired prophet with power to command; there 
 was only a Chaeronean high-priest, to aspire ! 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 Page 7. For Keyon, read Kenyon. 
 
 " 8. Add Demosthenes to list of orators; for D. E. 
 Holmes, read D. H. Holmes; for Hyperdis, read 
 Hyperidis. 
 
 <4 9. For Y. P. Boissevain, read V. P. 
 
 " 10. Read Aftprav/wcrnov, instead of 4 ' Atfr/o-avpio-Twv " ; 
 
 Sylloge, instead of "Sylogge"; A. N. Janflaris, 
 instead of "A. A. Jan^aris". 
 
 44 12. Note 4. For "Inser", read Inscr. 
 
 " 14. For Note 4, read 14. 
 
 44 15. (line 12). For "till not", read not till. 
 
 44 16. Note 6. (line 6). Note following- corrections: 
 
 20. Read associated instead of 44 associately". 
 
 21. (line 16). Read Ka0oAov Se TOVS rais 
 
 25. Note 10. (line 2). Read 1251 b. 15, 25. 
 
 26. (line 26). Read affect, instead of "effect"; Note 
 
 13, read Matth., instead of Math. 
 
 29. Note 2. Read /X-CT/OIOTT;?, instead of ju-erpiOTnys. 
 
 30. (line $7). Read /xeyaXo^pocrwry, instead of 
 
 46. (line 26). Read boastfulness; (line 28), 
 
 instead of o-e/xvoyoyetu. 
 
 47. (line 10). Read e7ra X 0es; (line 18), 8, instead of &, 
 
 (line 19), read irepd'o-ra/AeVou, instead of Trepticrra/xevov; 
 
 (line 38), read becomes, instead of "become". 
 
 50. (line 30). Read Er&oA' instead of S<uA'. 
 
 51. (line 17). Read "The sadness"; Note 1. Read 
 
 .Trovry/Aa, instead of -Trov^a. 
 
 52. (line 31). Read <#>avTao-/xara, instead Of 
 

 
 
 THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 STAMPED BELOW 
 
 AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS 
 
 WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN 
 THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY 
 WILL INCREASE TO SO CENTS ON THE FOURTH 
 DAY AND TO $1.OO ON THE SEVENTH DAY 
 OVERDUE. 
 
 'NTERLIBRARY 
 
 AUG 1 2 
 
 . OF CAUF 
 
 - \)U 1- 
 
 INTERLiBRAR 
 
 ? 9 
 
 UNI. 
 
 SEP 1 T 'M 
 
 LOAN 
 
 1987 
 
 : CftUF.. BERK 
 

 . 
 
 >