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A REPLY 
 
 TO THE 
 
 MISREPRESENTATIONS AND ASPERSIONS 
 
 ON 
 
 THE MILITARY REPUTATION 
 
 OF THE LATE 
 
 LIEUT.-GEN. R. B. LONG, 
 
 CONTAINED IN A WORK ENTITLED 
 
 " Further Strictures on those Parts of Col. Napier's History of the Peninsular 
 
 War which relate to the Military Opinions and Conduct of General 
 
 Lord Viscount Beresford, G.C.B. &c. &c. &c." 
 
 ACCOMPANIED BY 
 
 EXTRACTS FROM THE MS. JOURNAL AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 
 
 OF THAT OFFICER, AND CORROBORATED BY THE FURTHER 
 
 TESTIMONY OF LIVING WITNESSES. 
 
 By CHARLES EDWARD LONG, Esq. 
 
 Pudet hac opprobria nobis 
 Et diet potuisse, et non potuisse refelli. 
 
 LONDON: 
 JAMES RIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY 
 
 MDCCCXXXII. 
 

 HENRY 
 
 Mouse mrxrHEMSB 
 
 LONDON *. 
 
 C. ItOWORTH AND SONS, BELT. YARD, 
 TEMPLE BAR. 
 

 PREFACE 
 
 Nothing but the duty of vindicating the repu- 
 tation of a deceased relative, would have induced 
 the Compiler of these pages to put forth a 
 printed Reply to the work which has recently 
 appeared, entitled "-Further Strictures on Col. 
 Napier's Third Volume of the Peninsular War, 
 &c. &c." It is an undertaking at once foreign 
 to his habits and painful to his feelings. But, 
 as the Author of the Strictures has thought 
 proper to shelter his Commander-in-chief (Lord 
 Beresford) from the charges brought against 
 him by Colonel Napier, by dragging forth un- 
 necessarily, and in somewhat offensive lan- 
 guage, the deeds, or as he would insinuate, the 
 misdeeds of another, and by heaping counter- 
 vailing charges on the conduct of a brother 
 officer who is not living to refute them; no 
 
IV . PREFACE. 
 
 alternative is left to those by whom the memory 
 of that officer is revered, but to meet such 
 charges plainly and promptly with the nearest 
 evidence at hand — the written and recorded 
 statements of the party accused, whose own 
 unvarnished narrative, corroborated, as it is, in 
 nearly every important particular, by the testi- 
 mony of living witnesses, may afford the best 
 reply to the injurious aspersions of his anony- 
 mous accuser. 
 
R E P L Y, &c. 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 26, third line from the bottom, for " of the General,'* read " of General." 
 
 35, ninth line from the top, for " squadrons A. that," read " squadrons 
 
 that." 
 
 45, twelfth line from the top, /or " army," read " arm." 
 
 55, fifth line from the bottom, for " August," read " March." 
 
 61, twelfth line from the top, /or- " columns," read " column.." 
 
 63, fourth line from the bottom, for " squadron," read " squadrons." 
 
 64, fourth line from the bottom, for " at this distance," reud " at the distance." 
 
 80, twelfth line from the bottom, dele " them." 
 
 91, for " Than their slight habits," read " Than thin slight habits." 
 
 96, seventh line from the bottom, for " to the command," read " the 
 
 command." 
 137, thirteenth line from the top, for " near to the source," reud " near the 
 
 source." 
 141, ninth line from the bottom, for " every," read " very." 
 
 racter of the work by a comparative estimate of 
 the different accounts submitted to their pe- 
 rusal. All that the author can pretend to do 
 is, to lay before his readers such statements as 
 shall be deemed sufficient to vindicate the re- 
 putation of his deceased relative from the un- 
 just and unprovoked reproaches attempted to 
 
 B 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 alternative is left to those by whom the memory 
 of that officer is revered, but to meet such 
 charges plainly and promptly with the nearest 
 evidence at hand — the written and recorded 
 statements of the party accused, whose own 
 unvarnished narrative, corroborated, as it is, in 
 
R E P L Y, &c. 
 
 It is not the intention, neither is it within the 
 capacity of the author of this reply, to enter 
 upon a military critique of the work in ques- 
 tion, but simply to point out a few of the various 
 discrepancies that exist in the " Further Stric- 
 tures on Colonel Napier's History of the Pe- 
 ninsular War," as compared with the journal 
 and correspondence of the late Lieutenant- 
 General Long, and the living evidence that has 
 been obtained, so far as it affects the opera- 
 tions with which that officer was immediately 
 connected. It must be left to the public, and 
 to the military reader more particularly, to form 
 their own conclusions as to the general cha- 
 racter of the work by a comparative estimate of 
 the different accounts submitted to their pe- 
 rusal. All that the author can pretend to do 
 is, to lay before his readers such statements as 
 shall be deemed sufficient to vindicate the re- 
 putation of his deceased relative from the un- 
 just and unprovoked reproaches attempted to 
 
be cast upon it ; to involve no one in the con- 
 troversy excepting those by whom that rela- 
 tive has been assailed, and to found his defence, 
 not on vague assertions sent forth with all the 
 ostentation of authority, and yet coupled with 
 all the irresponsibility of concealment, but on 
 statements backed by living evidence, which 
 is alike within the reach of all. For the mul- 
 tiplicity of details, and the continued repeti- 
 tion of facts, a desire to strengthen the defence 
 by corroborative testimony is the only apology 
 that can be offered. 
 
 That differences unfortunately existed be- 
 tween Marshal Beresford and General Long- 
 is well known to many officers now living. 
 The lapse of more than twenty years, and 
 the decease of the latter officer, had nearly 
 buried the remembrance of those differences 
 in oblivion. However unmerited might have 
 been the treatment of General Long, the re- 
 volution of time had nearly obliterated from 
 the minds of his surviving relatives all traces 
 of that treatment, and the recollections had 
 passed away as the events by which they 
 had been occasioned receded from observa- 
 tion, or were overshadowed by others of a 
 deeper and more durable interest. It remained 
 for the author of the Strictures to renew those 
 recollections, and in seeking out a victim to 
 
( 3 ) 
 
 appease his antagonist, and account for the 
 errors of his chief, he has thus chosen to stab, 
 with all the bitterness of long rankling hostility, 
 the reputation of an officer now, unfortunately, 
 not living to refute his charges, and whose cha- 
 racter is thus left to the chance-medley aid of 
 a few private letters, the evidence of some one 
 or two brother officers, and (but which it is 
 hoped may be confidently relied on) the im- 
 partial judgment of the readers of this publi- 
 cation. Neither the letters of General Long, 
 nor his private journal, were ever intended 
 to meet the public eye ; they were written 
 solely for the gratification of his relatives, and 
 one or two professional friends ; and most 
 certainly, but for the censures of the writer 
 of the Strictures, would never have been sub- 
 mitted to the press. An answer to an anony- 
 mous publication might, under other circum- 
 stances, be deemed an unnecessary, perhaps, 
 an inconsiderate, undertaking. But, carrying 
 with it, as that publication confessedly does 
 (in its tone at least), the mark and impress 
 of a higher hand, it cannot be regarded as the 
 mere effusion of some obscure and casual critic 
 of Colonel Napier's History, but as the delibe- 
 rate narrative of an authorised advocate of Lord 
 Beresford's cause, connected with his proceed- 
 ings, and possibly countenanced by his appro- 
 b 2 
 
( * ) 
 
 bation. In the prosecution of this task, it has 
 been the author's chief aim, to abstain from all 
 personal allusions, and, in that respect, *to 
 avoid the example of the writer of the Stric- 
 tures. He, at least, has not confined himself 
 to the barren refutation of distinct charges, 
 nor limited his animadversions to the historian, 
 whose work he has professed to criticise ; but, 
 to quote his own words, he " dashes about his 
 inconsiderate censures, without any regard for 
 those whose honour or character he may- 
 wound ; and, though a soldier himself, appears 
 to have no sympathy in the common sentiments 
 of all military men, that a soldier's honour is 
 dearer than his life." 
 
 However reluctantly the author may have 
 been forced into this painful controversy, and 
 unexpectedly dragged to the bar of public 
 opinion, he is still aware that that opinion is 
 alone to be governed, as he. would wish it to 
 be governed, by the strength of the evidence 
 adduced. 
 
 It is by the strict standard of truth that the 
 value of this reply is to be estimated, and by 
 that let it be tried. It might have been thought, 
 perhaps, that there was no one who would 
 come forward to undertake the irksome office 
 of a posthumous defence. The writer may 
 have triumphed in the conscious superioritv, 
 
( 5 ) 
 
 that the weapons of the living are at hand, 
 and have cherished the delusive expectation 
 that, as those who are in their graves speak 
 not, there is no arm to right them. He has 
 yet to learn, that there is still enough of honest 
 indignation among the surviving relatives of an 
 injured man, to rouse them to a just sense of 
 their duty to defend him, and still enough of 
 evidence within their grasp, to confound, if 
 not to silence, his accusers. 
 
 Almost immediately on his second arrival in 
 the Peninsula, in March 1811, General Long 
 was appointed to the command of the cavalry 
 in the Alemtejo, under the orders of Marshal 
 Sir William Beresford, whom he joined at 
 Thomar on the 16th of that month, having 
 previously been present, though not in any 
 command, at the affair of the 13th, at Casal 
 Nova, with Lord Wellington. 
 
 In proceeding to lay before the reader the 
 documentary evidence on which the author is 
 prepared to found his answer to the misrepre- 
 sentations of the writer of the " Further Stric- 
 tures," it is necessary to preface its introduc- 
 tion by a brief notice of the charges which 
 have been adduced against General Long, and 
 which charges, in fact, form the ground work, if 
 not the whole, of the defence of Lord Beresford 
 against the censures of Colonel Napier, by 
 
( 6 ) 
 
 whom General Long is not, as respects the affair 
 of Campo Mayor, even nominally alluded to as 
 the officer in command. There are other occa- 
 sions in which General Long's conduct is called 
 in question ; indeed, wherever his name appears 
 in the work it is invariably coupled either with 
 censure or insinuation. If failures are to be 
 accounted for, the cause of them is attributed 
 to him; if praise might be bestowed, it is studi- 
 ously and systematically withheld. 
 
 The writer first states, in opening the case 
 of Campo Mayor, that " General Long, who 
 then commanded the Allied cavalry, was di- 
 rected to proceed to turn the enemy and to 
 threaten his line of retreat," p. 38, which, he adds, 
 was " done with a view of trying whether the 
 French commander intended to abandon the 
 place, or to remain under the protection of its 
 guns and defend it," the enemy having, as he 
 says, been previously observed to be " filing- 
 out of it, and forming on the glacis." " Ge- 
 neral Long," he continues, " was ordered only 
 to make such a circuit as would be just suffi- 
 cient to keep his troops clear of the guns of the 
 works. He had not gone far before the Mar- 
 shal, perceiving that he was taking far too 
 wide a range, sent Lieutenant-Colonel Har- 
 dinge with orders for him to circle nearer the 
 town, in obedience to the instructions that had 
 
( 7 ) 
 
 been given him. General Long still continued 
 to widen his circuit ; and a second time Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Hardinge was sent after him to 
 express the Marshal's displeasure, and with 
 directions for him to approach the enemy. 
 The General alleged some foolish reasons for 
 thus obstinately persisting in his most extraor- 
 dinary detour, and, in the mean time, the 
 enemy perceiving the movement that was 
 made, began to retire to Badajos." — p. 38-9. 
 
 In Marshal Beresford's dispatch, it will be 
 seen that Brigadier-General Long was ordered 
 " to endeavour to turn the enemy's right, keep- 
 ing out of the reach of the place." The letter 
 of General Long, dated April 22, notices this 
 complaint of the extended circuit as coupled 
 with his orders, by giving a reason for not nar- 
 rowing the detour, and denying that he ex- 
 ceeded his directions; and the answer of Major- 
 General Sir Charles Dalbiac to the second 
 question submitted to him, as far as relates to 
 that portion of the cavalry he was with, corro- 
 borates the fact, that if Brigadier-General 
 Long did disobey his orders it was in not " keep- 
 ing out of reach of the place," and by only 
 occasionally, if at all, moving beyond cannon 
 range in following his directions to " turn 
 the town," and " threaten the line of retreat." 
 With respect to the concluding passage in these 
 
( 3 ) 
 
 extracts, and the " foolish reason" alleged to 
 have been returned by Brigadier-General Long 
 to the second message from the Marshal, urging 
 an immediate approximation to the enemy, an 
 application was, on reading this passage, almost 
 immediately made to Sir Henry Hardinge, to 
 know what was (for in the flippant generali- 
 zation of his terms the author had omitted to 
 note it down) the answer of General Long to 
 this " second message, expressive of the Mar- 
 shal's displeasure." The reply of Sir Henry 
 Hardinge was as follows : 
 
 " I was directed by Lord Beresford to ex- 
 press his dissatisfaction at the wide circuit he" 
 viz. General Long, " was taking, and to repeat 
 his Lordship's injunctions that General Long- 
 should take a shorter line, in order to place 
 the cavalry on or near the road leading from 
 Campo Mayor to Badajos. General Long, in 
 making this movement, had his right flank 
 towards the town, and his left towards the 
 undulating but open country by which the 
 place is surrounded. The General, in explana- 
 tion, urged the propriety of securing his left 
 flank against any enemy's cavalry force which 
 he was of opinion might be concealed under 
 cover of the undulating ground on the left. 
 
 "I expressed to the General at the time the 
 different view I took of the necessity of the 
 
( 9 ) 
 
 caution he was using, and, as General Long's 
 subsequent explanations to Lord Beresford 
 were to the same effect, the impression re- 
 mained, that the General, on this occasion, had 
 erred in judgment, as to the best and most 
 prompt mode of carrying Lord Beresford's 
 orders into execution." 
 
 That this reason for the detour differs very 
 materially from that given in General Long's 
 letter, dated Los Santos, April 22, is unques- 
 tionable. But on comparing this passage with 
 the letter to General Le Marchant, it will be 
 seen that General Long, in speaking of " an 
 impassable ravine," apparently alludes to an 
 earlier part of his operations; for he subse- 
 quently mentions the arrival of an aide-de-camp 
 with orders for him to " proceed round the 
 town, so as to turn it, but to keep at two or 
 three gun shots from the works," and then 
 confirms so much of the statement of Sir Henry 
 Hardinge as relates to the " propriety of se- 
 curing his left flank," in consequence of "the 
 enemy's demonstrations on his left." If, how- 
 ever, no other reason was assigned for such 
 detour than that stated from recollection by Sir 
 Henry Hardinge, the evidence of that officer 
 is singularly unavailable in support of the 
 charge of the author of the Strictures, inasmuch 
 as it equally involves him with General Long 
 
( io ) 
 
 in the same " error in judgment;" for, in page 
 48, that writer observes that " the heights al- 
 luded to 1 ' viz. in a passage in Napier, "were 
 really only on the enemy's left flank as he re- 
 tired ; but on this plain there are great inequa- 
 lities of ground, behind which any number of troops 
 might be concealed."' If, therefore, General Long- 
 was, in the opinion of Sir Henry Hardinge, 
 using unnecessary caution in " securing his 
 left flank against any enemy s cavalry force that 
 might be concealed under cover of the undulating 
 ground on the left" he was confessedly not so 
 in the opinion of the author of the Strictures ; 
 and if he did allege " some foolish reasons for 
 thus obstinately persisting in his most extra- 
 ordinary detour," those reasons were obviously 
 not the reasons stated by Sir Henry Hardinge, 
 the bearer of the message. 
 
 This deduction, being abundantly evident to 
 the merest tyro in reasoning, the author may 
 here be permitted to observe, with reference to 
 the difference of opinion that seems to exist re- 
 specting the direction taken by General Long 
 to arrive at the enemy, that a movement which 
 must have had the effect of placing that officer 
 and his cavalry on the road between Campo 
 Mayor and the enemy, and not on the road 
 between Badajos and the enemy, would ap- 
 pear to be an extraordinary way of obeying his 
 
( 11 ) 
 
 injunctions to " turn the enemy" and " threaten 
 his line of retreat" — p. 38. Even supposing 
 that by such a narrowing of his circuit he could 
 have obeyed the remainder of his orders to 
 " keep his troops" all the while " clear of the 
 guns of the works." 
 
 To proceed, "That officer," viz. Brigadier- 
 General Long, " had been expressly ordered 
 not to charge the enemy's infantry under any 
 pretence whatever, while they were in co- 
 lumn and prepared, but to exert every means 
 to harass and delay its progress till the in- 
 fantry of the Allies could come up." — p 39. 
 " When the marshal," he continues, " first got 
 sight of the Allied cavalry, they were already 
 in contact with the enemy, and the first thing 
 he could discern was a charge made by the 
 Portuguese cavalry against a column of French 
 infantry. As might be expected, the assailants 
 were beaten off." 
 
 How far the author can be borne out in the 
 assertion that Brigadier-General Long charged 
 the column of French infantry with the Portu- 
 guese cavalry, the reader will best determine 
 from the letter of General Long, dated March 
 28, and the private memorandum, as also from 
 the notes of Lieut.-Colonel Doyle, and the answer 
 of Major-General Sir C. Dalbiac to the fourth 
 question submitted to him, both which officers 
 
( 12 ) 
 
 were present. The Portuguese never charged 
 the infantry at all. The Hussars, who had not 
 stirred from the enemy's column, advanced, 
 whereupon the Portuguese troops fled. 
 
 " At this time,'' the writer goes on to say, 
 p. 39, viz. after the Marshal had discerned (it 
 being " the first thing he could discern") this 
 "charge made by the Portuguese cavalry against 
 the column of French infantry" (which never 
 took place) and their " expected" discomfiture 
 (which would seem to have taken place without 
 the assistance of any charge whatever,) " the 
 Marshal came up with the heavy brigade of ca- 
 valry, commanded by Colonel De Grey, at a short 
 distance in rear of the others, and directed them 
 to take post on a small height until" (until!) 
 " he could examine what was going on in front." 
 So that having " first" got sight of the allied 
 cavalry when they were effecting their ideal 
 charge on the column of infantry, the Marshal 
 afterwards " came up with the heavy brigade," 
 gave it its directions, (viz. to halt) and then, 
 and not till then, proceeded to " examine what 
 was going on in front," he having been pre- 
 viously in profound ignorance, or, what was 
 worse than ignorance, in positive error as to 
 " what" had been " going on in front." This 
 examination having, it appears, taken place, 
 " Colonel De Grey was then ordered up, the 
 
( 13 ) 
 
 nearest guns were directed to advance with all 
 possible speed. Two guns from the German 
 infantry brigade arrived, and a few rounds were 
 fired into the enemy's column ; but the horses 
 were exhausted and could not be made to keep 
 pace with the French troops, who steadily 
 pressed on at a very quick step, notwithstand- 
 ing the cavalry of the Allies were threatening 
 to charge them at every instant." — p. 40. 
 
 The nearest guns were directed to advance 
 with all speed. Two had arrived, and were 
 already, be it observed, between the heavy 
 brigade and the enemy at the time when the 
 former were " ordered up" from the " small 
 height'' across the Badajos road. The natural 
 question that must immediately suggest itself to 
 the general reader is : Why, if two guns could 
 come up, did not all six ? It would appear from 
 the statement of Colonel Doyle, that the bring- 
 ing them up was deemed no very impracticable 
 undertaking by the officer commanding them. 
 But the " horses were exhausted," — exhausted 
 in the pursuit of infantry to a distance of two 
 miles from Campo Mayor ! ! The mere stop- 
 ing to fire might, one would suppose, have en- 
 abled these " exhausted" animals to recover 
 their wind, and to keep pace at least with the 
 march of a column of infantry, having several 
 miles of open country before it, and which " the 
 
( 14 ) 
 
 cavalry of the Allies were threatening to charge 
 at every instant" ! 
 
 The next in the series of disasters narrated 
 by this faithful historian, is coupled with 
 an accusation, as respects Brigadier-General 
 Long, at once as astounding as it is ridiculous. 
 " The Marshal," he writes, p. 40, " now heard 
 from General Long, whose report was con- 
 firmed by Baron Trip, that the 13th Light 
 Dragoons* had, in the strangest manner, been 
 taken prisoners bodily. Indeed the account 
 which these officers delivered of the capture of 
 the 13th was even more extraordinary than Co- 
 lonel Napier's description of their engagement. 
 " The Marshal finding it difficult to credit the 
 account, expressed his astonishment that in a 
 plain such as they were upon, no one man 
 should have broken away. Still the assertion 
 that such was the fact could not be contra- 
 dicted." 
 
 The extreme absurdity of such a charge, viz, 
 that the general officer commanding on the 
 
 * With respect to Baron Trip, it is stated (p. 38,) that 
 " some light horse were sent down to reconnoitre." With these, 
 who were Portuguese skirmishers, Baron Trip, as the author 
 is confidently informed, was stationed, and consequently could 
 not have seen the charge of the 13th. Whether he was the 
 author, or one of the authors of the report circulated, as is 
 affirmed by the writer of the Strictures, it is not necessary 
 to inquire. 
 
15 
 
 spot, who directed the charge of his troops, 
 and witnessed the discomfiture of the enemy 
 should himself have reported to his chief that 
 they had been, subsequently to their success, 
 actually captured en masse, but how or where 
 no man knew, would hardly seem to require 
 the aid of direct evidence in refutation. The 
 reader is however requested to observe in the 
 letter of General Long to E. L., dated May 29, 
 how, in a conversation with Sir William Lum- 
 ley, he had first become acquainted with the 
 fact that such a report had indeed been made 
 direct to Marshal Beresforcl ; and he is further 
 required to notice the authorized communica- 
 tion from Sir W. Lumley, and the answer of 
 Sir C. Dalbiac to the fifth question submitted to 
 him. 
 
 But it " could not," says the writer, " be 
 contradicted." Whether such a report required 
 a direct contradiction, or whether credulity her- 
 self should not have been shamed into scepti- 
 cism, and have only been startled (if startled 
 at all) by the shapeless incongruity, at the mere 
 instant of its apparition, it is not pretended 
 to inquire. But it ivas contradicted, viz. by Co- 
 lonel Doyle, (who had followed in the charge for 
 some distance,) as he himself states, when he was 
 sent by General Long to order up the heavy 
 dragoons; and this fact sufficiently proves that 
 
( 16 ) 
 
 Marshal Beresibrd never could have " heard " 
 this strange report " from General Long," (even 
 putting the evidence of that officer's letter aside,) 
 inasmuch as General Long was not aware by 
 whose order the heavy dragoons had been 
 halted, and subsequently removed to the right 
 of the Badajos road, until Colonel Doyle had 
 returned with his report from head quarters, 
 and that the message to which that report was 
 in answer, was preceded by the rumour at head- 
 quarters of the " bodily capture'' of the 13th. 
 But the whole thing is most unaccountably 
 strange and mysterious ; for, from the answer 
 of Major-general Sir C. Dalbiac to the sixth 
 question, it is clear that he, at least, as one of 
 the heavy brigade, had witnessed, if not the 
 charge of the 13th, the evidence of the success 
 of that charge, and this about the time head- 
 quarters passed the heavy brigade, and " pro- 
 ceeded to examine what was going on in front !" 
 In the sequel, p. 40, " the Marshal seeing that 
 it was impossible to bring up his infantry, and 
 that the cavalry had been brought into action 
 in direct opposition to his orders,'' &c. " com- 
 manded the cavalry to desist from all further 
 pursuit." — p. 41. With respect to the impossi- 
 bility of bringing up any infantry, the reader 
 will notice what is stated by Colonel Doyle 
 with reference to General Stewart's division, 
 
( 17 ) 
 
 and also what is mentioned by General Long, 
 in his letter dated Dec. 3, in regard to Colonel 
 Colborne, an officer in General Stewart's 
 division, and the identical Colonel Colborne 
 (now Sir John Colborne) of whom the writer 
 of the Strictures observes, that "neither Colonel 
 Colborne nor any infantry were near the scene 
 of action." — p. 42. He will also further notice 
 the answers of Colonel Gabriel (General 
 Stewart's aide-de-camp) to the questions sub- 
 mitted to him regarding the proximity of the 
 infantry. With respect to the cavalry being 
 brought into action in direct opposition to his 
 (the Marshal's) " orders," it is sufficient to 
 refer to the Marshal's dispatch, where he states 
 that the "opportunity" was "favourable," and 
 of the effect, that the enemy "were entirely 
 routed." 
 
 The author of the Strictures, in conclusion, 
 gives a resume of the affair as follows : — " With 
 regard to the 13th," p. 41, he observes, "the 
 fact was this: — General Long coming from his 
 circuit, at less than a league from Campo 
 Mayor, descended from the heights upon the 
 left flank of the enemy." The construction of 
 this passage is somewhat obscure, but it is 
 presumed that the writer means to signify that 
 General Long " descended from the heights 
 upon the left flank of the enemy at less than 
 
 c 
 
( 18 ) 
 
 a league from Campo Mayor." The distance 
 given is somewhat indefinite. It was in reality 
 about two miles, consequently, considerably 
 less than a league from Campo Mayor, and 
 although General Long's movement is pro- 
 nounced to have been " erroneous," p. 46, it is 
 satisfactory to ascertain that it brought him 
 precisely upon the left flank of the enemy so 
 as to " threaten his retreat." 
 
 "The Marshal," p. 41, continues our inform- 
 ant, " some time after the halt, was the first to 
 perceive a column of troops advancing towards 
 them from the direction of Badajos. On look- 
 ing through the glass he discovered it to be the 
 13th returning." The obvious question that 
 occurs to the unprofessional inquirer is — Why, 
 when the Marshal saw (and indeed was the 
 "first" to see) that they were safe, and that their 
 " bodily " engulphment was a chimerical delu- 
 sion, did he not bring up his guns (the horses 
 having sufficiently recovered from their exhaus- 
 tion by the time that had elapsed between the 
 halt and the first perception of the victorious 
 captives), and try to retrieve the " mischief and 
 folly," p. 47, of the day, by some small effort of 
 hostility against the enemy's column (now con- 
 fessedly surrounded by all the allied cavalry 
 with a couple of guns, and the whole army 
 with the other guns in the rear), or at least se- 
 curing their already captured artillery? 
 
( 19 ) 
 
 The gradation of events is not very rigidly 
 adhered to by the author of the Strictures, 
 and it is necessary to follow his criticisms in the 
 order they occur. " General Long," pp. 44, 45, 
 he observes, " instead of charging the hussars in 
 front, as he should have done, if he thought fit 
 to make any attack at all, so as to drive them 
 upon their infantry, charged them in flank, and 
 separated them from the latter, which was 
 thus left quite clear on every front of its 
 square." 
 
 It is not for the author to speak in the tone 
 of a tactician of the military merit or demerit 
 of such a movement. It must be left to the 
 criticism of the military reader. He may, 
 however, be allowed to submit whether a 
 charge of the 1 3th, which should have been 
 sufficiently successful to have carried them 
 through the enemy's cavalry (as appears to have 
 been the case in the attack made by that regi- 
 ment), would not have placed them between 
 two bodies of the enemy in a state of disorgan- 
 ization, and in face of the then unbroken infan- 
 try, and consequently that it would have been 
 indeed an instance of " folly," not unlikely to 
 have been attended with its merited proportion 
 of " mischief." One fact is certain, amply au- 
 thenticated by the writer himself in his reprint 
 of Sir B. D'Urban's brief notice of the affair, 
 c 2 
 
( 20 ) 
 
 and fully corroborated by the dispatch of Mar- 
 shal Beresford, viz. the success of the charge, 
 " made," says the Marshal, " with the most 
 
 determined courage," the enemy being " en- 
 tirely routed, and pursued into the town of 
 Badajos, two leagues distant; in which flight 
 the greater part of them were sabred, as were 
 the conductors and the artillery-men of six- 
 teen pieces of cannon, which were taken on 
 the road, but afterwards abandoned.*" In a no 
 less laudatory style, is the concise and correct 
 statement of Major General Sir B. DTrban. 
 Not a word here about the " erroneous move- 
 ment."" "An occasion,*' says Sir Benjamin, 
 " was found for attacking his cavalry, notwith- 
 standing that it moved very near to, and ap- 
 puied itself upon his infantry."' — p. 8, Appendix. 
 ''The attack was admirably executed, and the 
 success complete. The enemy's cavalry was 
 routed, driven off the field, and pursued to the 
 bridge-head of Badajos. It suffered severely, 
 particularly the 26th Dragoons, who lost their 
 Colonel and eight officers, and were almost 
 entirely destroyed. The allied cavalry in pur- 
 suit of the French overtook the detachment 
 of artillery, which had been employed in the 
 siege of Gampo Mayor, fell upon them and cut 
 them to pieces." And this is what the writer 
 has the temerity to quote in corroboration of 
 
( 21 ) 
 
 his censures upon the officer who directed 
 this " admirably executed " attack, in which 
 Marshal Beresford states, that that officer 
 " manoeuvred with great ability," and that 
 " the loss of the enemy was very consider- 
 able, not less than five or six hundred men in 
 killed, wounded, and prisoners !" But " their 
 infantry," says the writer, in consequence of 
 this charge in flank, "was thus left quite clear 
 on every front of its square." This assertion, 
 like that in pages 39 and 40, that none of the 
 " enemy's cavalry were to be seen," is equally 
 devoid of foundation. The hussars which 
 headed and closed the column had never stirred 
 from the infantry. " The Marshal," says the 
 writer, reverting to the first scene of his drama, 
 p. 46, " sent General Long to manoeuvre under 
 his own eye, and he remained himself at the 
 head of the infantry, ready to put it in motion 
 as soon as he should discern what were the in- 
 tentions of the enemy." That General Long 
 " manoeuvred with great ability," we have in 
 evidence from Marshal Beresford himself; and 
 when the intentions of the enemy " to abandon 
 the place," and not " to remain under the pro- 
 tection of its guns and defend it," were made 
 manifest, where, it may be asked, was the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, that he was not at hand to 
 "discern" those "intentions," and " read v to 
 
( 22 ) 
 
 put" his infantry "in motion" to counteract 
 them ? 
 
 " When," writes the author, the Marshal 
 " perceived that General Long still continued 
 his erroneous movement," p. 46, (although 
 manoeuvring " with great ability,") " even after 
 the enemy were in motion," (one of the two 
 objects which the Marshal was desirous of ascer- 
 taining and of being " ready" to take advantage 
 of,) " Beresford set off at full gallop after 
 him (who had then been lost sight of,) and 
 though he had not reached the cavalry when 
 the charge was made by the 13th," (going at 
 " full gallop,") " though indeed he did not see 
 it, though he did not arrive early enough to 
 stop the attack made by the Portuguese bri- 
 gade," (which, as we have seen, was an effort 
 of vigour on their part that was rendered su- 
 perfluous by their flight,) " yet he came up 
 immediately after, and in time to prevent the 
 occurrence of still greater mischief and folly." 
 
 The main and primary question is this — was 
 the allied cavalry to attack that of the enemy, 
 if an opportunity offered of striking a blow ? 
 That such was the understanding of Brigadier 
 General Long, the officer in command of that 
 cavalry, is obvious from his letters ; that such 
 was the impression of M. General Sir C. Dal- 
 biac, then in command of one of the regiments 
 
( 23 ) 
 
 of that cavalry, is evident from his first answer; 
 that such was the conviction of Colonel Doyle, 
 an officer on the staff of the army, is clear, from 
 his observations; that such was the idea of 
 Major General Sir B. D'Urban is indisputable, 
 from his account of the affair ; that such was 
 the supposition of Marshal Beresford's staff is 
 palpable, from the suggestions of one of his 
 aide-de-camps, as stated in the letter of General 
 Long to General Le Marchant ; and that such was 
 the conception of the Marshal himself is mani- 
 fest from his dispatch— the " opportunity" was 
 " favourable." Was General Long accountable 
 for the indiscreet but gallant pursuit of the 
 13th to the bridge-head of Badajos ? The Mar- 
 shal himself says that he was not. On the 
 contrary, he affirms, that that officer " made 
 the greatest exertions to moderate the ex- 
 cessive ardour of the cavalry, and regulate 
 their movements." It is submitted to the 
 military reader, whether, if Marshal Beres- 
 ford had intended to interfere with, rather 
 than to support, the operations of his cavalry, 
 he ought not to have been in advance, and on 
 the spot, to have witnessed the charge of the 
 13th (which it is evident that neither he nor 
 any of his staff did witness), and to have taken 
 measures to have supported the successful 
 efforts of his cavalry, for he could then have 
 
( 24 ) 
 
 seen that there was no wholesale and " bodily 
 capture" of that regiment. If, on the other 
 hand, he was not in advance, and knew not 
 of their success, " though he had not reached 
 the cavalry when the charge was made by the 
 13th; though, indeed, he did not see it ; though 
 he did not arrive early enough to stop the attack 
 made by the Portuguese brigade;'' though, it 
 may be added, the " determined courage" of 
 the one had ended in captivity, and the pre- 
 sumptuous gallantry of the other had evapo- 
 rated in flight ; though the " entire routing" 
 of the enemy had but enabled them to absorb 
 within the vortex of their fugitive squadrons 
 the victors whose " success was complete," 
 and by whom they were " pursued to the 
 bridge-head of Badajos;" though all these 
 miracles had been wrought, and the dirge of 
 defeat had so simultaneously (if the Hibernicism 
 may be permitted) succeeded to the shout 
 of victory, ought (it is submitted) the indi- 
 vidual, by whom the energies of an army were 
 to be directed, thus to have paralysed (before 
 the rumour of the capture had reached him), 
 by an immediate interference, and by the 
 withering of his presence, those proceedings 
 which he had delegated to others, prepared 
 to partake in the gale of their triumph, 
 and yet condemn the head that had directed, 
 
( 25 ) 
 
 and the arm that had executed, " admirably 
 executed," that attack, which was destined to 
 crown with titular distinction one, who, at the 
 same time, indignantly spurned the hand by 
 which the wreath that was proffered had 
 been woven ? But the Marshal '*.. considered " 
 (that is, after the first interference of halting 
 the heavy brigade) " one regiment as lost." 
 It is again submitted, whether, if such had 
 really been the case, it was not an urgent 
 and additional reason for attempting to neu- 
 tralize the triumph of his enemy, by every 
 effort to effect a decisive blow against the re- 
 treating column of infantry, and more espe- 
 cially when he saw them, as he says, " in much 
 confusion," and had artillery at hand to pro- 
 duce much more ? In conclusion : whether 
 Marshal Beresford's arrival on the spot with 
 his heavy cavalry, (which he had previously 
 halted at the moment when its support was 
 most critically required,) and a couple of guns, 
 was, as the author is pleased to observe, "in time 
 to prevent the occurrence of still greater mis- 
 chief and folly;" and whether the Marshal 
 (the 13th having been, "from the report of 
 Baron Trip," " given up as lost,") acted with 
 judicious generalship in "hovering round" the 
 enemy's infantry, " at the distance of a hundred 
 yards," (p. 49,) in ordering a general halt, and 
 finally (after having been " the first to per- 
 
( 2C ) 
 
 ceive " the safety of the 13th,) in leaving that 
 enemy (now confessedly hemmed in on all 
 sides,) to retire unmolested to Badajos, and 
 their captured battering train to be re-captured 
 and carried off at their earliest convenience, is 
 no part of the province of the author of these 
 pages to determine. 
 
 The winding up of this most extraordinary 
 detail of facts and reckless advancement of 
 opinions by the writer of the Strictures, where 
 he says, p. 50, " I have reason to believe that the 
 whole of the Marshal's censure on their teme- 
 rity" (viz. the pursuit of the 13th,) "was con- 
 fined to the formal reception and the brief 
 sentence of admonition, which he addressed to 
 Colonel Head," is in harmonious keeping with 
 the general accuracy of his narrative. Mar- 
 shal Beresford, it is well known, wrote to Lord 
 Wellington, and caused that reprimand, which 
 will be found in the order of the papers printed. 
 Of its severity and of its justice the public 
 will judge ; and they will in like manner recon- 
 cile, if it be possible, the " facts " collected by 
 the author of the Strictures, for his case of Campo 
 Mayor, with Marshal Beresford's dispatch, 
 the papers of General Long, the evidence of 
 the officers who were present, and the brief 
 narrative of the General Sir B. D' Urban. They 
 will then determine whether the writer of the 
 Strictures has confined himself to the legiti- 
 
( 27 ) 
 
 mate line of defence, or whether his is not an 
 endeavour to enhance the military judgment 
 of an officer now living, by a most unjust and 
 ungenerous attack upon the military character 
 of an officer deceased. 
 
 Dispatch from Marshal Beresford to his Excel- 
 lency Lord Wellington, dated Campo Mayor, 
 March 26, 1811. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 I had communicated to your Excel- 
 lency my arrival at Arronches with all my 
 forces, except the division of Brigadier General 
 Cole, to which, in consequence of the con- 
 tinued marches it had made, it was judged ne- 
 cessary to give a day's rest at Portalegre. 
 
 On the 24th, I caused the troops to move 
 from Arronches for Quinta de Reguengo, a 
 little more than half-way to this place, and the 
 division of General Cole for Arronches, and 
 having joined yesterday at ten in the morning, 
 I put the whole in motion for this town. I 
 could not know the intention of the enemy 
 with respect to this place; but in case he 
 should endeavour to maintain it, I proposed to 
 post myself between him and Badajos, and thus 
 cut him off from the latter. 
 
 We discovered the enemy's advanced ca- 
 
( 28 ) 
 
 valry on the heights of Lopo de Malto, about a 
 league distant; but perceiving that we were 
 manoeuvring on their flank, they retreated, 
 and some skirmishing took place at the foot of 
 the walls of the town with the advanced ca- 
 valry. When I reached the heights of the 
 place, I discovered the enemy's force on the 
 outside of the town. (I did not, however, 
 know whether or not he was master of the 
 place.) There were four regiments of cavalry, 
 the regiment of infantry, No. 100, of three 
 battalions, with some horse artillery. 
 
 I ordered Brigadier General Long with the 
 cavalry to endeavour to turn the enemy s right, 
 keeping out of the reach of the place. My object 
 was to detain the force of the enemy till some 
 infantry could arrive. The Brigadier made a 
 wider circuit than was intended, so that he 
 more effectually flanked the enemy, and obliged 
 him to retreat hastily, and indeed with extra- 
 ordinary rapidity. The cavalry advanced upon 
 his right flank, and Brigadier General Long, 
 seeing a favorable opportunity, ordered Colonel 
 Head, with two squadrons of the 13th Light 
 Dragoons, to charge the cavalry of the enemy, 
 which obliged the infantry to fall back to sup- 
 port it. This charge, followed by Colonel 
 Otway, with two squadrons of the 7th Portu- 
 guese, and supported by General Long, with 
 
( 29 ) 
 
 the remainder of that regiment, the 1st Portu- 
 guese, and the brigade of Colonel de Greyj 
 was made with thr most determined courage, 
 
 and the French wear entirely routed, and pur 
 
 sued into the town of Badajos, two leagues 
 distant; in which flight the greater part of 
 them were sabred, as were the conductors and 
 
 artillerymen of lb" pieces of cannon, which were 
 taken on the road, but afterwards abandoned. 
 
 This success, though it occasioned a great 
 loss to the enemy, was in some manner unfor- 
 tunate; because, not knowing what had been 
 done by the cavalry that had made the charge, 
 and continuing to pursue the infantry with the 
 remaining cavalry and two pieces of artillery, 
 for the space of a League, to support the de- 
 tached body which had advanced, and not 
 having received any notice from it, nor know- 
 ing what new force the enemy might send from 
 Badajos, prudence obliged me to halt with my 
 cavalry till the infantry could come up. The 
 enemy's infantry, amounting to about 1,200 
 men, though in much confusion, continued to 
 march in column without halting, notwith- 
 standing we were not more than one hundred 
 and sixty yards distant from them; yet not 
 knowing any thing of tin; 13th Regiment of 
 Dragoons and 7th Portuguese, I could not ha- 
 zard the loss which would have necessarily 
 
( 30 ) 
 
 taken place, even though successful, had I or- 
 dered a charge of the heavy brigade under the 
 command of Colonel de Grey. The attention, 
 firmness, and order of this brigade, composed 
 of the 3d Dragoon Guards and 4th Dragoons, 
 merit my warmest approbation. General Long 
 manoeuvred ivith great ability, and made the 
 neatest exertions to moderate the excessive 
 ardour of the cavalry and regulate their move- 
 ments. The valour of all was exemplary, par- 
 ticularly of Colonels Head and Otway, and 
 their squadrons ; and the only thing to be re- 
 marked is, that which is customary with our 
 troops, on their first encounter with the enemy, 
 too great an impetuosity. 
 
 The loss of the enemy was very considerable ; 
 not less than 5 or 600 men in killed, wounded, 
 and prisoners. We likewise took a great num- 
 ber of horses and mules ; in fact the enemy 
 abandoned everything ; but we had only means 
 to bring away what is mentioned in the en- 
 closed list. Some carriages, &c. were de- 
 stroyed. We also suffered some loss, a return 
 of which I have the honour to transmit to you. 
 It was not my intention yesterday to have pro- 
 ceeded to this city, and I was only induced to 
 do so from the prospects of capturing or de- 
 stroying the force which the enemy incau- 
 tiously left there, and which would infallibly 
 
( 31 ) 
 
 have taken place if our cavalry had not com- 
 pelled the enemy to make a retreat so rapid 
 that the infantry could not come up with it. 
 
 After the long marches and fatigues neces- 
 sarily consequent on them, I have sent the 
 troops into cantonments here and at Elvas for 
 rest and refreshment, and to make the neces- 
 sary preparations for the ulterior operations 
 recommended by your Excellency. Of the 
 corn and provisions in the place at the time of 
 its surrender to the enemy, the latter had not 
 time to carry anything away, and they will 
 prove a very opportune assistance to us. The 
 enemy left behind 8,000 rations of biscuit, not 
 expecting so sudden a visit. I have the honour 
 to be, &c. 
 
 (Signed) W. C. Beresford, Marshal. 
 
 Private Memorandum of the Affair of Cavalry 
 between Campo Mayor and Badqjos, on the 
 25th of March, 1811. 
 
 Brigadier-General Long having received or- 
 ders from Marshal Beresford to turn the town 
 of Campo Mayor on the 25th instant, and to at- 
 tack the enemy, should circumstances appear to 
 favour it, proceeded with eight squadrons of 
 heavy dragoons (3d Dragoon Guards and 4th 
 
( 32 ) 
 
 Dragoons) under Colonel de Grey, two and a 
 half squadrons 13th Light Dragoons under 
 Colonel Head, and five small squadrons of Por- 
 tuguese under Colonel Otway. The enemy, 
 observing the movement, evacuated the town, 
 nor could General Long close with them till he 
 had nearly gained their flank and rear, and to 
 which he was obliged to advance at a trot near 
 five miles.* He then discovered their force, 
 apparently eight squadrons of cavalry and 
 about two battalions of infantry. The latter 
 were retreating in column at one quarter dis- 
 tance, with two troops of hussars at their head 
 and two also closing their rear, the rest of the 
 cavalry manoeuvring so as to cover the retreat 
 of the infantry, if possible, and, at the same 
 time, to secure themselves the benefit of their 
 co-operation. General Latour Maubourg com- 
 manded them in person. 
 
 As they were inarching each by a flank, Ge- 
 neral Long by his left, and the enemy by their 
 right, his first determination was to dispose of 
 the covering force of cavalry, which, as he ap- 
 proached, took up a position en potence, and 
 
 * An officer who was present considers the ground gone 
 over, from the point where the order was given to turn the 
 town, to the point where they came upon the enemy, to have 
 been about four miles. 
 
'■zee page 33 . 
 
 Ttrst Position,. 
 
 
 i 
 i 1 
 
 ■; 
 
 ?ute 
 
 i 
 
 A 3 Squadrons French/ Dragoons. 
 B 3 D? Of 
 
 C Column of French. In/kntrv 
 
 Head. So Rear closed by Troops 
 
 of Hussars. 
 
 N?l Z Squadrons Portuguese under Col, Otway to coved 
 GenJ-Lortqs LeJl Flank gcturro theFnemys Right 
 
 2 8 Squadrons Portuguese, to dispose or" Corps A. 
 
 3 2 Squadrons 13^1 'Dragoons, disengaged from the. 
 
 Rear, to dispose of Corps B . 
 
 4 8 Squadrons Heavy Dragoons, to siepporl. 
 
 Sea? nd, Pos ilwrv. 
 
 Fkj.2. 
 
 2 Fr-eneP Squadron* 
 - raZh'itta 
 
 3 Portuqite.te w 
 
 Squadrons Jr 
 
 FreneJv Column. eontinuirig 
 
 its Retreat C 
 
 J] IJ] 
 
 
 
 | Heavy Brigade 
 I Halted 
 
 .1 
 
 2 
 
 B^e E 
 
 N\ 
 
 **: 
 
 i 
 
 Portuguese g ■ 
 I 1 B 
 
 Route ****&£'*-" 
 
 Last Position. 
 Fia.3. 
 
 .v- 
 
 British _ ]? 
 
 - French, - 
 
 || || B.oad to B; 
 
 British arui 
 Portuguese 
 
 
 British coloured. Red 
 Portiuruese Green 
 
 Pro?/ oh Blue 
 
( 33 ) 
 
 formed their infantry into an oblong square, 
 viz. fig. I. Not knowing what their object 
 might be, General Long was inclined to believe 
 the corps A. destined by a rapid flank move- 
 ment to turn his left, while the corps B. and 
 the hussars attached to the infantry, attacked 
 to the front. He therefore kept two squadrons 
 in line, on the left of his column, under Colonel 
 Otway, and directed Colonel Head to disen- 
 gage from the rear of the column, to march in 
 parallel line with him, and when he should have 
 gained the flank of the corps B. to attack them 
 while he disposed of the corps A. They pro- 
 ceeded accordingly, but as soon as the enemy B. 
 saw the light dragoons advancing in column, left 
 in front, and presenting a flank, or else antici- 
 pating the proposed movement, they changed 
 position to the left, throwing forward their 
 right, and immediately advanced to the charge. 
 The 13th formed to their front, and advanced 
 with equal determination. General Long en- 
 deavoured with the Portuguese to gain the 
 flank of the corps A., but before this could be 
 accomplished, the charge of the 13th Dragoons 
 had broken the corps B., which in its flight car- 
 ried away every thing behind it. General Long 
 formed the Portuguese to the front, and fol- 
 lowed to support the 13th as far as the spot 
 where his route intercepted the road by which 
 
( 34 ) 
 
 the enemy retired ; but finding it impossible 
 to rally the 13th, he detached Colonel Otway 
 with his two squadrons to follow them in line, 
 and to support them to his utmost. These, 
 however, dispersed in pursuit, so that every 
 thing, except the three squadrons which he 
 kept with him, were en debandade. He then 
 intended to adopt some new arrangement for 
 the disposal of the enemy's force, which was 
 cut off in his rear, and to support his van in 
 front. Upon turning back, however, he dis- 
 covered that the heavy brigade had been with- 
 drawn from the situation he had directed them 
 to keep, and halted two miles off, on a slope 
 of ground across a valley, and on the other 
 side of the route, Fig. 2. Had they closed 
 towards General Long on their left, all would 
 have been well, but going away to the right 
 was abandoning him, and putting a valley and 
 an impassable ditch or rivulet between them ; 
 and General Long's attention being engaged 
 in front, he did not observe this movement 
 until it was over. He sent an order for their 
 advance, which had scarcely been dispatched, 
 when the enemy's column came up from their 
 rear, upon his right flank, and he afterwards 
 observed two squadrons rallying on a rising 
 ground, about 200 yards on the left flank. 
 The line was formed to the right to meet the 
 
( 35 ) 
 
 column, but when the enemy was observed 
 again in the rear, he was obliged to change 
 his position by the right, to get clear of them, 
 and throw back his left flank. The moment 
 the column saw this movement they began to 
 fire, and the hussar skirmishers to advance, 
 the Portuguese got frightened without any 
 reason, and scampered off. The two squa- 
 drons, A. that had rallied, were French Dra- 
 goons, absolutely passed and left behind by 
 the cavalry in pursuit, and who were thus at 
 liberty to turn again upon them. General 
 Long rallied the Portuguese as soon as he 
 could, and led them back rapidly to the flank 
 of the French column, to threaten and delay 
 its march, and watch the movements until the 
 heavy dragoons arrived. These had at length 
 been put in motion, but were making a long 
 detour upon an outward and concentric circle, 
 and the enemy had gained considerably before 
 they came up on their reverse flank in two 
 lines, apparently manoeuvring for the purpose, 
 and with the intention of attacking. 
 
 Figure 3 became the last position. 
 
 E. column of French, continuing its retreat 
 in same order. 
 
 A. 13th Dragoons and two squadrons Por- 
 tuguese, returning from pursuit of the enemy. 
 
 d 2 
 
( 36 ) 
 
 B. three squadrons Portuguese rallied and 
 brought back on the enemy's flank. 
 
 C. Heavy brigade in two lines, the leading 
 regiment advancing in direct echellon from the 
 right, under Marshal Beresford. 
 
 D. two guns brought up, and at liberty to 
 fire into the French column as near as they 
 pleased. 
 
 At this moment a general halt was ordered, 
 and the enemy permitted to retire through an 
 open country without molestation, retaking, on 
 their march, all the artillery (15 pieces) which 
 the dragoons had captured, and some of which 
 they were actually bringing back, also carrying 
 away with them the greater part of the pri- 
 soners taken from us, who were with the 
 column. 
 
 Of the enemy's cavalry, nearly 600 were 
 killed, wounded, and taken ; 16 guns (only 
 one brought off) and several ammunition wag- 
 gons taken. All the men attached to the train 
 of artillery were killed. Out of 16 officers of 
 one of their regiments of cavalry, only 6 re- 
 mained for duty. All done by two squadrons 
 of the 13th and two squadrons of Portuguese. 
 
 General Latour Maubourg escaped, but his 
 friend, Count Chamorin, colonel of the 26th 
 dragoons, fell by the sword of one of the 13th 
 
( 37 ) 
 
 dragoons, whose comrade he had just before 
 shot through the head. 
 
 Had the heavy dragoons taken the intended 
 share in the action, the whole French corps 
 must have been destroyed or taken. 
 
 The loss of the allied cavalry on this occa- 
 sion was — 1 cornet, 23 rank and file, and 20 
 horses killed ; 2 lieutenants, 1 staff, 1 quarter- 
 master, 1 serjeant, 55 rank and file, 35 horses 
 wounded. 
 
 1 serjeant, 76 rank and file, and 108 horses* 
 missing ; some of the missing were made pri- 
 soners on the bridge of Badajos. 
 
 * The disproportionate loss of horses was occasioned by 
 the Portuguese, who abandoned their own in order to secure 
 those of the French, and made a return of the loss but not 
 of the gain. Such at least is the statement of an officer who 
 was present. 
 
( 38 ) 
 
 39, Mount Street, 
 June 11, 1832. 
 
 My dear Doyle, 
 
 I believe I told you that it was the 
 intention of the late General Longs relations 
 to publish a reply to the attacks made upon 
 his military reputation (especially in the case 
 of Campo Mayor, where you were present), in 
 the work that has recently appeared, entitled 
 " Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's 3rd 
 vol. &c. &c." 
 
 I now send you General Long's MS. ac- 
 count of that affair, in which I observe that 
 your name is mentioned. If you can furnish 
 any observations, bearing either upon the ac- 
 curacy or inaccuracy of that account, you will 
 greatly oblige me by making them, and allow- 
 ing me, at the same time, to avail myself of 
 the assistance that they may afford. 
 
 Yours, very sincerely, 
 
 C. E. Long. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Doyle, 
 Sfc. 8fc. 
 
( 39 ) 
 
 George Street, 
 1 kh June, 1832. 
 
 My dear Long, 
 
 With reference to your note of the 
 11 th instant, I now return to you the late 
 General Long's MS. account of the cavalry 
 affair at Campo Mayor, with a few remarks 
 bearing upon those parts which came under 
 my personal observation. I think it right to 
 apprize you, that my acquaintance with your 
 late uncle was very slight. He found me at- 
 tached as an officer of the Quartermaster 
 General's Department to the cavalry of Marshal 
 Beresford's corps, on his joining that force, 
 and as I was relieved from that duty very 
 shortly after the above mentioned affair by 
 Captain Heathcote, and ordered to join head- 
 quarters in the north of Portugal, my inter- 
 course with him ceased. I can of course have 
 no objection to your making use of the facts I 
 have stated, if you think they will assist your 
 object. 
 
 I am, my dear Long, 
 
 very truly yours, 
 
 C. J. Doyle, 
 
 C. E. Long, Esq. 
 
( 40 ) 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Brig. Gen. Long, to 
 C. B. L. with Journal of Operations, dated 
 St. Vicente, near Elvas, March 28, 1811. 
 
 My last to you was written, I think, on 
 the 21st or 22nd instant, from Portalegre, and 
 it announced the probability of approaching 
 operations against the force besieging Campo 
 Mayor, and afterwards perhaps against Bada- 
 jos. Our united force assembled at Ar- 
 ronches on the 24th instant, and marched, 
 with the exception of one division, to a bivouac 
 on the left bank of the Caya river, our right 
 close to the ford which is passed in going from 
 St. Olaya to Campo Mayor. The enemy was 
 reconnoitred early the next morning, and the 
 report made them very strong in cavalry, so 
 much so as to induce Marshal Beresforcl, after 
 having planned the march of my division in 
 two separate columns, to unite them again in 
 one. Having left our bivouac about 10 o'clock 
 a. m. on the morning of the 25th, a march of 
 about three miles brought us out of the wooded 
 into the open country, and we came in contact 
 with the enemy's picquets. 
 
 The arrangements for our further progress 
 were here made, and I was directed to move 
 circling round a considerable height, over 
 
( 41 ) 
 
 which the infantry marched, but from whom I 
 was separated by a deep ravine. The heavy 
 dragoons were again separated from me, and 
 marched in column on my right flank. I 
 trotted away with the light gentry, and having 
 driven the enemy's picquets from the positions 
 they occupied, I at length passed over a con- 
 siderable plain which brought me to a small 
 ridge, from whence I looked down on the town 
 of Campo Mayor, distant about 1,200 yards. 
 Here I first saw their cavalry (a part of them 
 at least), drawn up in line of battle under the 
 protection of the works. I immediately formed 
 my line and waited further orders, not knowing 
 what were the Marshal's intentions. During 
 this time they began to move and manoeuvre, 
 and I did the same, to counteract any project 
 they might have in contemplation. I had ex- 
 pressly asked the Marshal in the morning, if 
 it was his wish that I should attack them, if 
 practicable, wherever I might meet with them. 
 His answer was, that they were very strong, 
 that I must not commit myself; but, that if a 
 favourable opportunity of striking a blow 
 should occur, to avail myself of it.* I soon 
 
 * The orders I understood Brigadier General Lon«- to 
 have received were, to circle round the town of Campo 
 Mayor, out of cannon range, and to make a dash at the 
 enemy's cavalry, if a favourable opportunity offered. Briga- 
 
( 42 ) 
 
 after had orders to lead the column of light 
 cavalry (five troops of the 13th light dragoons, 
 and five weak squadrons of Portuguese) so as 
 to turn and gain the rear of the town. This I 
 did, and the enemy, alarmed at the movement, 
 soon began to retire, and formed in the valley 
 behind the town, on the road to Badajos, their 
 order of march en retraite. As soon as I ob- 
 served this, I determined to gain their flank 
 and rear, and then to act as circumstances 
 might prompt me. The heavy cavalry now 
 joined me, and as the route upon which I was 
 marching intersected, at about one mile and a 
 half, the road upon which the enemy was re- 
 tiring, the further I advanced the more of 
 course we closed. At length I found myself, 
 for the first time, in sight of their whole force, 
 consisting of eight squadrons of cavalry, 10th 
 hussars, some chasseurs, and, I believe, the 
 26th dragoons, and two battalions of infantry, 
 in close column. The column of infantry had 
 
 dier General Long did at first make rather a wider detour 
 than perhaps was absolutely requisite ; that is, however, 
 matter of opinion, but I incline to it, as the light cavalry had 
 to bring up their left shoulders frequently, before the enemy 
 was observed formed in the low ground behind the town on 
 the road to Badajos. The French force consisted of about 
 8 squadrons of cavalry, and 1,200 infantry in one column, 
 viz. cavalry, 26ieme dragons ; 2ieme hussards ; lOieme ditto; 
 about 100 Juramentados or Spaniards, in the service of King 
 Joseph, and lOOieme of the line, 2 battalions. 
 
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( 43 ) 
 
 a squadron of hussars at its head, and another 
 in its rear, and in this way they were retiring 
 in perfect order. Six squadrons in two divi- 
 sions en potetice covered their retreat. Con- 
 sidering myself quite strong enough to show 
 my adversaries the way to Campo Mayor, I 
 determined at least to attempt it. The heavy 
 brigade had joined me, and the force now 
 under my immediate command consisted of 
 
 8 squadrons 3d dragoon guards, and 4th dragoons, 
 
 2 J ditto, 13th light dragoons, 
 
 5 very small squadrons of Portuguese. 
 
 in all, perhaps, about 1,200 swords. At this 
 time the enemy's position was thus ( vide en- 
 graving)* 
 
 To oppose which, I made the disposition as 
 above (vide engraving of sketch), and my orders 
 and instructions were, in the first instance, to get 
 rid of the covering force of the cavalry A and C, 
 and then to dispose of the rest, who, deprived of 
 their support, would no doubt fall an easy con- 
 quest. I marched the light division f by the 
 
 * The rough sketch gives a tolerable idea of the general 
 disposition. The heavy dragoons were in reserve, a fact, 
 of which it is well to bear in mind, Colonel Head was ap- 
 prized. 
 
 t The light cavalry were in column of ranks by threes, 
 left in front, and advancing at a brisk trot. Brigadier Ge- 
 neral Long disengaged the 13th dragoons from the rear of 
 the column, and ordered them to bring up their left shoulders. 
 
( 44 ) 
 
 left in column of ranks by threes, and when I 
 had approached sufficiently near, I directed the 
 13th dragoons to disengage from their right 
 from the rear of the column, and having gained 
 the flank of the enemy's corps C, to charge 
 them, whilst my movement with the remain- 
 ing five squadrons of Portuguese was directed 
 against the corps A, to cover at the same time 
 the left flank of the 13th dragoons and to en- 
 deavour to cut them off completely from their 
 point of retreat ; the heavy dragoons to sup- 
 port this movement in the situation you see 
 described. Two detached squadrons covered 
 my left flank, and interposed between the 
 enemy and the point of his retreat. 
 
 It is necessary to observe, that I led the 
 light division over a ridge of heights and broken 
 ground,* which overlooked the valley in which 
 the enemy were formed, and through which 
 ran a nasty boggy and almost impassable kind 
 of ditch. My intention was, that the heavy 
 cavalry should continue to move straight on, 
 their left towards the heights I occupied, their 
 right as low down as the ground permitted. 
 
 The heavy brigade, in two lines, were advancing in a steady 
 slow trot, over some soft ground, rather to the right and in 
 the rear of the 13th dragoons. 
 
 * The ground could scarcely be termed broken, it was 
 undulating. 
 
( 45 ) 
 
 Every thing being thus situated and arranged, 
 I directed the attack to be made. The moment 
 the enemy C* saw the two columns moving 
 on parallel lines to outflank and attack them, 
 they changed their position to the left on their 
 left squadron. The 13th formed immediately 
 to their front, and both proceeded with deter- 
 mined gallantry to the charge, the 13th re- 
 ceiving a partial fire from the infantry as they 
 passed. As the movement of the 13th dra- 
 goons was made with the rapidity character- 
 istic of the army, and as the pace of the Por- 
 tuguese ponies could not be very extended, 
 consistent with the preservation of that order 
 
 * Part of the enemy's cavalry posted near the point C. of 
 the sketch, but rather more off the road, changed to the left 
 and formed line. Colonel Head observing that instantly 
 after the formation, they advanced to charge the 13th dra- 
 goons, formed the latter rapidly to their front, and receiving, 
 as he passed to the charge, a fire from the enemy's infantry, 
 broke completely through the line of the French cavalry. 
 At that moment, the officer commanding the grenadier troop, 
 or co?)ipagnie d' elite of the 26ieme dragons, finding they covered 
 more ground than their assailants, wheeled inwards, upon the 
 rear of the 13th dragoons. But the impetuosity of Colonel 
 Head's charge had so completely broken and appalled the 
 other squadrons, that the cool steady conduct of that young 
 officer and his elite was of no avail, and they were hurried 
 away, mixed up in the mass of fugitives, the whole flying 
 on the road leading towards Badajos. It is not impossible 
 that this circumstance may have occasioned the silly report 
 of the 13th having been bodily taken. The officer command- 
 ing the compagnie d 'elite was taken prisoner. 
 
( 46 ) 
 
 which, with ill-formed troops, is with difficulty 
 maintained at any pace, I found, at the mo- 
 ment of the attack of the 13th, that the head 
 of the three squadrons I. led was only just in 
 a line with the attacking corps, which, having 
 completely broken the enemy's ranks, the whole 
 of the corps A. and C. dispersed and fled in 
 confusion towards Badajos. I followed as ra- 
 pidly as I could to support this attack,* still 
 supposing the heavy brigade in my rear, occu- 
 pying the attention of the remaining part of 
 the enemy's force, but, to my utter astonish- 
 ment, when, at the point where I first met the 
 Badajos road, I halted, and looked round to 
 see what was next to be done, I found they 
 had quitted altogether the line of direction I 
 had pointed out, and at the suggestion of one 
 of Marshal Beresford's aides-de-camp,! had 
 marched by their right to the other side of the 
 valley and road, and were halted a mile 
 and half off, on the opposite and elevated 
 ground, quite abandoning me to myself, and 
 completely oversetting all my plans. In 
 
 * I am not aware where Brigadier General Long was at 
 the moment when the 1 3th dragoons charged, or if the ground 
 admitted of his seeing the full effect of the attack. I believe 
 he was on their left flank, with some Portuguese cavalry. 
 
 t The movement of the heavy brigade is correctly de- 
 scribed, but at whose suggestion they were so moved I know 
 not. 
 
( 47 ) 
 
 consequence of this unfortunate occurrence, 
 the enemy's infantry column had kept on re- 
 treating uninterruptedly, and the whole of the 
 13th Dragoons having dispersed in pursuit of 
 the flying and beaten cavalry,* and every effort 
 of mine to stop them proving useless, I felt 
 myself obliged to detach two squadrons of the 
 Portuguese to support and rally them, under 
 the orders of Colonel Otway,t formerly of the 
 18th Dragoons. They, however, instead of 
 obeying my orders, broke also away in pursuit 
 and continued unsupported till they reached 
 the bridge of Badajos. The rapidity with 
 which this ill-judged pursuit was made abso- 
 lutely left as many of the enemy behind as 
 they were driving before, so that soon after 
 I had halted, I found two squadrons of them 
 rallying on the road upon a small rise, within 
 200 yards of my left flank, and just at the same 
 moment came up the infantry columns, headed 
 
 * The 13th Dragoons did not disperse in pursuit, they 
 followed in mass, closed in upon the French cavalry, but cer- 
 tainly (as I afterwards learnt) arrived with them at the foot 
 of the bridge, and were fired at from the ramparts of Badajoz. 
 
 •j: I am unacquainted with the orders Colonel Otway re- 
 ceived from Brigadier-General Long. Shortly after the 
 charge of the 13th Dragoons, I remarked Portuguese cavalry 
 at some distance to the left at a gallop, these I afterwards learnt 
 were two squadrons under Colonel Otway. 
 
( 48 ) 
 
 and closed by two squadrons of hussars on my 
 right flank.* I felt the critical situation I was 
 in, and saw but one way of getting out of it, 
 that of making a rapid change of position, 
 throwing back my left flank. As soon as I 
 could get the Portuguese to understand me,f 
 
 * I am inclined to think Brigadier-General Long was de- 
 ceived by appearances; they certainly did not leave as many 
 of the enemy's caialry behind as they were driving before 
 them. It was the main body of their cavalry that had been 
 defeated, and that consisted principally of the dragoons, whose 
 brazen helmets, with crests of long horse hair, it was impos- 
 sible to mistake. In riding back from the spot where the bat- 
 tering train was captured, to seek Brigadier-General Long, 
 I saw very few French scattered about, and those wounded 
 or unhorsed. 
 
 It is more than probable the two squadrons which the 
 Brigadier-General states he saw rallying on his left flank, were 
 skirmishers, who had been called in, and a portion of the 
 hussars detached from those at the head of the column of 
 infantry. The turn of the road will account for their position, 
 and the rise of ground which intervened, concealed them from 
 the Brigadier- General until they rose the crest of the hill 
 from out of the low road. The French infantry had also 
 moved from the point D. to about C, and the Brigadier- 
 General himself must at that time have been near A.; at all 
 events I have a distinct recollection that they were all hussars. 
 
 f I remember coming up at this moment to Brigadier- 
 General Long, who had with him some troops of Portuguese 
 cavalry, and explaining to the commanding officer (a Portu- 
 guese) what the Brigadier-General required. 
 
( 49 ) 
 
 I put their ranks by threes to the right, and was 
 in the act of conducting them to the point I in- 
 tended,* when some of the enemy's infantry 
 and flankers firing, and a troop of their cavalry 
 advancing and shouting, my Portuguese friends 
 got alarmed, broke away and fled in disorder. 
 The French hussars, encouraged by the spec- 
 tacle, pursued and got among them. After 
 great difficulty I rallied them, with the assist- 
 ance of Captain Doyle, of the Quarter-Master- 
 General's department, and led them back, post- 
 ing myself on the enemy's left flank, within 
 200 yards, and continuing to march parallel 
 with them, with the view of preventing them 
 from acting against the corps of the 13th and 
 Portuguese, that were at this time still between 
 them and their point of retreat — Badajos. I 
 at that time sent Captain Doyle to order the 
 
 * Brigadier-General Long never made any attack on the 
 enemy's infantry, as the author of the Strictures asserts ; a 
 few shots were fired, and the French hussars advanced a short 
 distance and began shouting, when the Portuguese certainly 
 were alarmed and went about, which the enemy's hussars 
 observing, they made a demonstration of pursuing them, and 
 some few individuals rode out and fired their carbines or 
 pistols, but they did not venture to leave the infantry. After 
 a little difficulty the Portuguese were rallied and brought 
 back in good order, and the Brigadier-General continued to 
 manoeuvre them on the flank of the French infantry. 
 
 E 
 
( 50 ) 
 
 immediate advance of the heavy cavalry,* de- 
 termined, on its arrival, to lose not a moment in 
 accomplishing the defeat and surrender of this 
 column of infantry. 
 
 For the first time I learned from Captain Doyle 
 that Marshal Beresford himself was with the 
 brigade of heavy cavalry, and had himself 
 halted them in the situation I have described. 
 I had nothing further to say. Soon after I saw 
 them in motion at a very slow pace in two lines, 
 keeping to the right of the road on which the 
 enemy were retreating. At length they ap- 
 proached the right flank of the enemy's column, 
 indicating an apparent intention to attack, 
 bringing up at the same time twof pieces of 
 
 * Brigadier-General Long did send me to order up the heavy 
 brigade. On my way I passed the French infantry, then in 
 close column, and went on to where I saw Marshal Beresford 
 and his staff. On coming up I was asked (as well as I recol- 
 lect) where the 13th Dragoons were, to which I replied that 
 they had charged and broken the French cavalry, and were 
 pursuing them on the Badajos road. I then learnt it had been 
 reported that the 13th had all been cut to pieces or bodily 
 taken, and that it was by the Marshal's order the heavy dra- 
 goons were in the position in which Brigadier-General Long 
 then saw them. I of course returned and acquainted the 
 Brigadier-General of what I had been told. 
 
 f These two guns were brought up from Major Hartmann's 
 brigade of the King's German Legion Artillery. It was cur- 
 rently stated at the time, that Hartmann had been anxious to 
 bring up the entire brigade, and it is presumed that as two of 
 
( 51 ) 
 
 artillery, which no earthly obstacle prevented 
 firing into the French column at such a dis- 
 tance as they chose. I hung upon their left flank 
 with my valiant runaways. The country was 
 beautifully open and favourable for the move- 
 ments of both artillery and cavalry. The enemy 
 had still several miles to go to their point of 
 retreat, and between them were interposed the 
 four squadrons of British and Portuguese, who 
 had pursued their adversaries to the bridge of 
 Badajos, taking all the artillery they had with 
 them and had employed at the siege of Campo 
 Mayor, about twelve or fifteen pieces of cannon. 
 In such a state of things I did not conceive it pos- 
 sible for the enemy to exist ten minutes longer, 
 and I really am convinced that, had they been 
 summoned, an immediate surrender would have 
 taken place. After parading and escorting them 
 in this manner, for some distance, judge my 
 astonishment at seeing all the troops, artillery, 
 &c. halted, and the enemy permitted to retire 
 without molestation before us, taking with them 
 
 the guns were actually up, the rest might as readily have been 
 brought into action. The fire from these would in all pro- 
 bability have obliged the French infantry either to loosen their 
 formation and thus afford an opening for the heavy dragoons 
 to act against them with effect, or they must have been nearly 
 annihilated by the concentrated fire from six pieces at a dis- 
 tance of from 160 to 200 yards, or thereabout. 
 
 E 2 
 
( 52 ) 
 
 all the prisoners they had made from us, re- 
 taking all their guns,* and absolutely threaten- 
 ing the safety of the dragoons in advance, who 
 were then returning from their pursuit, which, 
 though displaying great gallantry, was a sad 
 proof of want of order and discipline both in 
 officers and men.t The heavy brigade, by some 
 
 * Brigadier-General Long here mistakes. The battering 
 train was not recaptured at the time by the French infantry, 
 the guns were left on the road, the traces had been cut and 
 the horses were taken away, it was said, by the Portuguese 
 cavalry, or some of the stragglers. 
 
 f Colonel Head, in making the attack he did, positively 
 only obeyed his orders. Mad he not charged, he must have 
 received the charge of the 26ieme Dragons, who were in motion 
 with that intention. He formed his line with rapidity and 
 precision, and charged with the greatest impetuosit}^, leading 
 his regiment in very brilliant style. He had every right to 
 suppose he was supported by the heavy brigade, for he was 
 told so, and shortly before the charge they were observed in 
 the rear advancing in a beautiful soldier-like and steady man- 
 ner, keeping their horses in wind by gently trotting over some 
 deep ground across which they were moving. How their di- 
 rection was changed matters not; Colonel Head was ignorant 
 of it. The pursuit was certainly carried on beyond the line 
 of prudence; on this point there can be but one opinion. 
 Colonel Head, however, could never seriously apprehend 
 danger for his retreat, when he had, as he imagined, that fine 
 heavy brigade advancing to his support, the whole army in 
 his rear, and an extensive plain (passable in every direction 
 for cavalry) to manoeuvre upon. 
 
 That the report of the destruction of the 13th Dragoons, 
 (generally attributed, with what justice I know not, to Baron 
 
( 53 ) 
 
 improper, though perhaps well-meant interfe- 
 rence, had left me to myself, and the subse- 
 quent retreat of my three squadrons, with the 
 loss sustained, obliged me to leave the others 
 almost to their fate; but the defeat of the 
 enemy's column would have ensured safety to 
 the whole, and would have wound up as bril- 
 liant a little field-day as fortune could have 
 delighted my heart with.* It was only neces- 
 sary to charge, and beat, and throw into con- 
 fusion the cavalry at their head and rear, (and 
 which if British dragoons could not do, they 
 have no business here,) and the object was 
 accomplished. But I am convinced, that had 
 a determination to annihilate them been shown, 
 and steps taken accordingly, they would have 
 surrendered at the first summons. 
 
 Such is my decided opinion, and I believe 
 (with the exception of Marshal Beresford) that 
 of every officer present on the occasion. The 
 
 Trip,) may have occasioned the change in the disposition of 
 the heavy brigade, is very possible ; but to whatever cause that 
 change was owing, no individual who witnessed the combat 
 can doubt that it disconcerted the entire plan. 
 
 * The affair, I apprehend, must ever be deemed brilliant, 
 although it did not realize all the results anticipated. The 
 fault was, first, not effectually supporting the attack of the light 
 cavalry; secondly, when the guns were eventually brought 
 up, not bringing into action the whole instead of a part of 
 Major Hartmann's brigade. 
 
( 54 ) 
 
 motives of his conduct were I dare say excel- 
 lent, but sure I am that Lord W. himself would 
 never have conferred such an honour on the 
 enemy and entailed such a disgrace on his own 
 troops, as to suffer two battalions of infantry 
 and four squadrons of cavalry to bid defiance 
 to and retreat in safety before eight squadrons 
 of British and three of Portuguese cavalry, two 
 pieces of artillery and a large column of infan- 
 try that were following the same route, and 
 were within a couple of miles of the scene of 
 action,* and this in a country so favourable to 
 the operations of cavalry, and after the whole 
 of the enemy's covering force of cavalry had 
 been charged, broken and pursued for nearly 
 nine miles. The thing speaks for itself, there- 
 fore I shall say no more. 
 
 * I recollect it was matter of conversation at the time, that 
 Major-General the Honourable Sir William Stewart offered 
 to bring up a portion of the infantry, if the men were allowed 
 to take off their packs. 
 
 The lOOieme French infantry regiment behaved with cool- 
 ness. Hartmann's guns killed a few men, but they kept firm 
 in their formation. It is, however, more than probable, under 
 the circumstances in which they were placed, had any force 
 of infantry shown itself, they would have availed themselves 
 of the fair excuse to surrender. As it was, it must have been 
 evident to them, that there was no serious intention of risking 
 the heavy cavalry in an attack upon their square. 
 
( 55 ) 
 
 39, Mount-street, May 27, 1832. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 You may possibly have seen a work, 
 recently published, entitled " Further Stric- 
 tures on Colonel Napier's Third Volume of the 
 History of the Peninsular War, &c." in which 
 the military reputation of my late uncle, Ge- 
 neral Long, is, as his relatives have no hesita- 
 tion in declaring, most unjustly and ungene- 
 rously assailed. Of their anxiety to refute the 
 aspersions contained in that work it is hardly 
 necessary for me to speak, still less when I am 
 writing to the personal friend and brother offi- 
 cer of General Long, and in the full knowledge 
 of the friendship that still subsists with other 
 members of his family. 
 
 I have lately been informed that you were in 
 command of the 4th Dragoons, one of the 
 regiments of the heavy brigade under the im- 
 mediate orders of General Long, during the 
 spring of 1811, commencing with the operations 
 at Campo Mayor on the 25th of August. It is 
 under these circumstances that I venture to 
 hope that you will not object to reply to a few 
 questions touching the different orders and ar- 
 rangements as connected with General Long's 
 
( 56 ) 
 
 operations, so far as the same came within your 
 own knowledge, or under your own observation 
 at the period in question. 
 
 Believe me, dear Sir, 
 
 Yours, very sincerely, 
 
 C. E. Long. 
 
 M. Gen. Sir C. Dalbiac, 
 
 &c. &c. 
 
 34, Cavendish-square, May 29, 1832. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 I have to acknowledge your note of 
 the 27th instant, and have to state that I was 
 in command of the 4th Dragoons at the cavalry 
 affairs of Campo Mayor and Los Santos in 
 1811, but not at the battle of Albuera. I do 
 not know that I can object to reply to any 
 questions which you may wish to put to me 
 " touching the different orders and arrange- 
 ments as connected with General Long's opera- 
 tions (at the cavalry affairs above-mentioned), 
 so far as the same came within my own know- 
 ledge, or under my own observation," but of 
 the propriety of my so doing, I shall be better 
 able to judge when those questions shall be 
 submitted. I conclude that they will be 
 limited to matters of fact, for having been un- 
 
( 57 ) 
 
 acquainted with the general instructions which 
 Brigadier-General Long received from time to 
 time from his superior in command, I can ven- 
 ture no opinion as to the correctness with 
 which those instructions were carried into ex- 
 ecution. Indeed it will naturally occur to you, 
 that the offer of any opinion thereupon, coming 
 from an inferior officer, would be presumptuous 
 and improper. 
 
 I remain, my dear Sir, 
 
 Yours, most sincerely, 
 
 J. C. Dalbiac 
 
 C. E. Long, Esq. &c. &c. 
 
 39, Mount-street, June 1, 1822. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 In answer to your letter of the 29th, 
 I can assure you that nothing would be further 
 from my wishes or intentions than to bring you 
 into a collision of opinions with other officers 
 who may have served at the period in question. 
 The duty of vindicating General Long's repu- 
 tation has devolved upon his surviving relatives. 
 It is one which they intend to perform to the 
 best of their ability, but without the slightest 
 desire to implicate others in the dispute. My 
 questions will be limited, as you will see, to 
 
( 58 ) 
 
 matters of fact, and in no way, I trust, so framed 
 as to appear to elicit an opinion from you either 
 as to the correctness or incorrectness of the 
 military performances of any party. 
 
 I enclose them to you, and shall hope to be 
 favoured with the answers as soon as you can 
 conveniently reply to them. 
 
 Believe me, dear Sir, 
 
 Yours, very sincerely, 
 
 C. E. Long. 
 
 M. Gen. Sir C. Dalbiac, &c. &c. 
 
 34, Cavendish-square, 16 June, 1832. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 I have been prevented by a variety 
 of circumstances from taking earlier notice of 
 your letter of the 1st of June. I now transmit 
 replies to the questions which accompanied 
 that letter; in which replies I have reason to 
 believe that nothing will be found essentially 
 different from the circumstances to which your 
 questions refer. 
 
 I remain, my dear Sir, 
 
 Yours, very sincerely, 
 
 J. C. Dalbiac. 
 
 C. E. Long, Esq. 
 
( 59 ) 
 
 Questions submitted to Major-General Sir Charles 
 Dalbiac, together with his A?tswers to the same. 
 
 I. 
 
 Q. When the allied cavalry under the com- 
 mand of Brigadier-General Long was ordered 
 to advance on the morning of the 25th March, 
 1811, was it your impression that no attack was 
 on any account to be made on the enemy's 
 cavalry ? 
 
 A. My impression was that the allied cavalry were 
 to attack that of the enemy, if a favourable opportunity 
 offered. I judged from the orders issued by Brigadier- 
 General Long, having been present when the General 
 informed the Hon. Colonel de Grey that the cavalry 
 were ordered to advance, with a view to intercept the 
 enemy between Campo Mayor and Badajos; that he 
 (the General) should direct the advance with the light 
 brigade, and that the heavy brigade was to support at 
 a proper distance, and be cautious to maintain its order. 
 The Hon. Colonel de Grey's instructions to the officer 
 commanding the od Dragoon Guards and to myself 
 corresponded with those which he had received from 
 General Long. 
 
 II. 
 
 Q. Was Brigadier-General Long ever, accord- 
 ing to the best of your recollection, out of 
 
( 60 ) 
 
 cannon range whilst making his detour round 
 the town of Campo Mayor ? 
 
 A. I think the advance of the cavalry in the first 
 instance was made in two columns, the heavy brigade 
 forming the right one, and before passing Campo Mayor 
 was never at a distance beyond cannon range from the 
 fortress, though there might have been moments when 
 it was partially hidden therefrom by inequalities of 
 ground. 
 
 III. 
 
 Q. How far was the spot where the British 
 cavalry first encountered the enemy's cavalry 
 from Campo Mayor, and what was the nature 
 of the attack directed by Brigadier-General 
 Long? 
 
 A. The knoll of a hill which intervened between the 
 heavy brigade and the position where the enemy had 
 formed when attacked, precluded me from witnessing 
 the actual encounter between the allied cavalry and 
 that of the enemy: but from what came under my 
 observation immediately afterwards, I should state the 
 distance to have been about two miles from Campo 
 Mayor on the Badajos road. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Q. Did Brigadier-General Long, to your 
 knowledge, charge the enemy's infantry with 
 
( 61 ) 
 
 the Portuguese cavalry, or did you ever under- 
 stand that he had done so? 
 
 A. The situation of the heavy brigade (as stated in 
 the preceding answer) precluded me from being an eye- 
 witness of the attack made by the light brigade. I 
 never understood that General Long had ordered any 
 part of the cavalry to attack the enemy's infantry, or 
 that an attack upon the infantry had ever been made ; 
 but the officers of the loth Dragoons stated that in 
 their advance to charge the enemy's cavalry, supported 
 by that of the Portuguese, some of the squadrons had 
 drawn down a partial fire from the columns of French 
 infantry. 
 
 V. 
 
 Q. Did you understand that Brigadier- Gene- 
 ral Long had himself informed Marshal Beres- 
 ford of the fact of the bodily capture of the 13th 
 Dragoons (as stated by the author of " Further 
 Strictures," p. 40), or did you understand that 
 any such report had been made by others? If 
 so, at what period did you hear that such report 
 had been made? 
 
 A. It was circulated through the heavy brigade, 
 very soon after it halted on the right of the Badajos 
 road, (and it was rumoured as the cause of the halt of 
 the troops,) that Baron Trip, upon being questioned by 
 head-quarters as to the fate of the 13th Dragoons, had 
 either made a report, or induced a belief, or admitted 
 
( 62 ) 
 
 the probability that the 13th Dragoons had all been 
 taken prisoners. Indeed, being myself at one time 
 very near to head-quarters, on the left of the heavy 
 brigade, I heard a conversation from some of the staff 
 to the effect that Baron Trip had so expressed himself. 
 I never understood that any such report or supposition 
 had emanated from General Long. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Q. Did you see the charge of the 13th Dra- 
 goons, and at what period, with reference to 
 that charge, did Marshal Beresford direct the 
 heavy brigade " to take post on a small height 
 (as stated in the " Further Strictures," p. 39), 
 " until he could examine what was going on in 
 front?" 
 
 A. The nature of the ground, as before observed, 
 prevented me from actually witnessing the charge of 
 the 13th Dragoons; but I had seen shortly before the 
 attack the light brigade (at about 500 yards in advance, 
 and from a direction more to the left than the heavy 
 brigade) to carry left shoulders forward over a small 
 ridge of heights, whence it immediately descended into 
 the bottom on the Badajos road, where the charge 
 against the enemy took place. Soon after which I ob- 
 served, at a point of the road more distant, the French 
 dragoons pursued by the 13th in the direction of Ba- 
 dajos. About this time head-quarters passed the heavy 
 brigade, which was then ordered to halt upon some 
 
( 63 ) 
 
 rising ground, whence were seen soon after some Por- 
 tuguese squadrons to ascend in considerable confusion, 
 and subsequently to rally upon the slope of the same 
 ridge of heights over which the light brigade had pre- 
 viously passed in order to attack the enemy. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Q. How soon after the heavy brigade was 
 ordered to take post on the said small height 
 was it " ordered up" (as expressed in p. 40 of 
 " Further Strictures") nearer to the enemy, and 
 how was it then placed, with reference to that 
 part of the light cavalry which remained with 
 General Long? 
 
 A. I should say the heavy brigade halted for some 
 minutes, (not a quarter of an hour,) after which it de- 
 scended from the rising ground in the direction of 
 Badajos, and then first got sight of the column of 
 French infantry attended by two squadrons of hussars. 
 The heavy brigade crossed the road to Badajos, and 
 formed line at about 250 yards short of the enemy, the 
 left of the brigade bearing upon two of Major Hart- 
 mann's guns, placed on the Badajos road, which had 
 just fired a few rounds, with no very considerable effect. 
 The Portuguese squadron (with which I presume Ge- 
 neral Long then was) were formed on the left of the 
 Badajos road, having descended a little the slope on 
 which they had previously rallied. 
 
( 64 ) 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Q. How far from Campo Mayor was it where 
 the heavy brigade came up with the enemy's 
 infantry, and how far did it continue to follow 
 his retreat ? 
 
 A. The heavy brigade came in sight of the column 
 of French infantry at about two miles from Campo 
 Mayor. It followed the enemy (at this distance and in 
 the position stated in preceding answer) for several 
 hundred yards, or somewhat less than a mile, when it 
 was finally halted. 
 
( 65 ) 
 
 The two following Questions were submitted to 
 Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel, Aid-de-Camp to 
 the late General Stewart. 
 
 1. How far were the infantry column (com- 
 manded by Major General the Hon. W. Stew- 
 art), and Major Hartmann's guns from the spot 
 where the heavy brigade and the two guns in 
 advance were halted, at the close of the affair 
 of Campo Mayor, March 25, 1811 ? 
 
 2. Was the enemy's column then in sight ? 
 
 To these questions Colonel Gabriel returned 
 the following answers. 
 
 1. The head of the infantry column was a 
 few hundred yards (about 4 or 500) in rear of 
 the heavy brigade. 
 
 2. The enemy's column was in sight. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from General Long to E. H. 
 dated Los Santos, April 22, 1811. 
 
 " Our debut at Campo Mayor, but for the 
 untimely interference of others, would have 
 been attended with perfect success and little 
 
( CG ) 
 
 loss. The official representation I have seen 
 of it in the Lisbon Gazette is very unfair. The 
 Marshal says, the movement I made to get 
 round the town was more circuitous than he 
 wished ; he should have added the reason, 
 namely, that ignorant of the ground, he was 
 not aware that a deep and impassable ravine 
 separated me from the enemy, and prevented 
 my getting over at any other spot but where I 
 did ; but even with this fact, I maintain that 
 my column was never more distant from the 
 town than he directed. Secondly, he says 
 that his object was to get between Badajos 
 and the enemy, and thus to cut them off com- 
 pletely : if this was really his intention, the 
 operations to accomplish it were most defec- 
 tive ; because the corps he sent to pass the 
 Caya river, between Elvas and Campo Mayor, 
 never arrived till the afternoon, whereas they 
 ought to have been at their post early in the 
 morning. Thirdly, he says, that he wished to 
 bring up his infantry, but that my movements 
 obliging the enemy to retreat precipitately, he 
 could not accomplish his object. To this, I 
 answer, that if such was his intention, he 
 should have let me remain halted before the 
 town till the infantry came up, instead of which, 
 I received his positive orders to move rapidly 
 round to the rear of the town, which move- 
 
( 67 ) 
 
 ment it was evident must, and would, dislodge 
 the enemy, and of course throw his infantry 
 further in the rear. Lastly, he says he wanted 
 to cut off the retreat of the enemy to Badajos. 
 To this, I answer, the business was done to his 
 hands by the cavalry, and they were completely 
 cut off ; their covering force was driven into 
 Badajos, all their artillery taken, and the rest 
 completely surrounded in such a manner as to 
 make their destruction inevitable. One of the 
 French officers who was with their column on 
 the above occasion, but since made prisoner, 
 told me, that not a r man of them thought it 
 possible to escape, and they were utterly as- 
 tonished at our forbearance. But mark the 
 result! To cover the deeds of the General, 
 the cavalry, though acting strictly up to his 
 orders, have been represented rather as causing 
 the escape of the very enemy they had gal- 
 lantly beaten, and absolutely cut off from their 
 point of retreat, and have been severely repri- 
 manded for doing too much!" 
 
 f 2 
 
( 68 ) 
 
 Extract of a Letter from General Long to E. L, 
 dated Villa Franca, May 29, 1811. 
 
 " I think I have deserved (from good-will at 
 least) more support, and, I should dare to say, 
 approbation, from Marshal Beresford than it 
 has been my good fortune to receive. His own 
 public letter convicts him of inconsistency, par- 
 ticularly where he attributes, to the impetuosity 
 of the cavalry, the defeat of his intentions to 
 surround and capture the enemy's force with 
 his infantry at Campo Mayor. In the first 
 place, Latour Maubourg himself reconnoitred 
 early in the morning, a league from the town 
 of Campo Mayor, our whole force advancing 
 upon him, upon which he immediately ordered 
 his corps to evacuate the town and retreat ; 
 and I see no reason for supposing, after this 
 precaution, that three battalions of infantry 
 and cavalry cannot march away as fast as a 
 heavy column of infantry can follow, the former 
 having the start of several miles. But, sup- 
 posing the contrary, why did the Marshal order 
 me to turn the town and flank the enemy with 
 the cavalry, if he wished them not to be hurried 
 away ? Such a movement, on my part, could 
 not fail to make them retreat, even had they 
 been disinclined so to do, and it certainly had 
 
( 69 ) 
 
 the effect of accelerating it, even supposing no 
 attack to have subsequently ensued. 
 
 Things come out by degrees, General Lumley 
 has just told me a fact I was never before ac- 
 quainted with, and which accounts for the Mar- 
 shal's feelings and conduct at the time. After 
 the charge of the 13th dragoons, an officer rode 
 up to the Marshal and assured him that the 
 whole of that regiment had been surrounded by 
 the enemy and carried off f * * * * * 
 
 The Marshal is wrong in describing the at- 
 tack. Colonel Otway never charged the enemy, 
 and was never directed so to do. He was 
 on my left flank, with two squadrons to sup- 
 port ; and after the charge of the 13th dragoons 
 and dispersion of the enemy, I detached him, 
 not to charge, but to support the pursuit of the 
 13th dragoons, and as a point for them to rally 
 upon, and I supported him with the rest of the 
 troops. Such being the facts, the Marshal's 
 account is neither fair nor correct. But, how- 
 ever, when such credit is assumed for driving 
 the enemy into Badajos with such loss, I leave 
 the world to determine who are entitled to the 
 
 f Sir William Lumley, on being applied to for a confirma- 
 tion of this statement, corroborates it to the extent that, " on 
 riding up to Marshal Beresford and a group of officers on 
 the field, he was informed that a staff officer had just reported 
 the 13th dragoons to have been all taken prisoners." 
 
( 70 ) 
 
 credit, those who accomplished the business, 
 or those who looked on, without supporting 
 them, and afterwards abused them for it." 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Gen. Long to C. B. L., 
 dated Cabeca de Vide, December 3, 1811. 
 
 " I have likewise since learned, that at Campo 
 Mayor, Marshal B. himself was the cause that 
 the infantry did not accomplish what it was 
 within their power to have done. Colonel Col- 
 borne told me that he was detached round the 
 town, and observing the enemy with the bag- 
 gage &c. quitting it, he sent back word to beg 
 he might be supported, and that he was in a 
 situation to cut them all off. The answer he 
 received, was a positive order to halt ; in con- 
 sequence of which, the opportunity was lost, 
 and could not be again recovered. Compare 
 this account and fact with the Marshal's dis- 
 patch." 
 
( 71 ) 
 
 General Order. 
 " Brigadier-General Long has it in command 
 from his Excellency Marshal Beresford, to sig- 
 nify to the officers of the light cavalry portion 
 of the division under his command, that his 
 Excellency the Commander of the Forces, Lord 
 Wellington, has expressed very great displeasure 
 at the report he has received of their conduct 
 in the affair of the 25th ultimo. His Excellency 
 never doubted the spirit and gallantry of any 
 part of his army, consequently required no 
 proof to fortify his opinion in these particulars; 
 but it is of the utmost importance, to the credit 
 and safety of corps in particular, as well as 
 of the army in general, that that discipline and 
 controul over troops, which can alone give 
 effect to their gallantry, should, under no cir- 
 cumstances, be ever lost sight of or abandoned; 
 and unless this command over the men can be 
 relied upon and maintained by officers in all 
 situations, whether of victory or defeat, the 
 distinguishing feature of regular troops is lost 
 and disappears, and the body so acting or con- 
 ducted resembles more an armed rabble than 
 an organised part of a regular army. 
 
 In communicating these painful remarks to 
 the regiments particularly engaged on the 25th 
 ultimo, Brigadier-General Long trusts that they 
 
( 72 ) 
 
 will nevertheless remain deeply impressed on 
 the mind of every officer to whom they are 
 addressed, that they be explained by them in 
 such a manner to the troops under their respec- 
 tive commands, as may secure him hereafter 
 from the painful duty he fulfils, in being the 
 channel of conveying to them an admonition so 
 unpleasant to their feelings, but, at the same 
 time, so necessary, perhaps, to their future cre- 
 dit and the safety of their regiments. " 
 
 Letter from Gen. Long to Gen. Le Marchant.* 
 
 Los Santos, near Zafra, Confines of Estremadura, 
 April 25, 1811. 
 
 " Your letter, my dear Le Marchant, of the 
 10th ultimo, is now before me, and this is the 
 first scrawl I have been able to write to you 
 since I arrived in Portugal ; not perhaps for 
 want of time to commit to paper a dozen lines 
 to say how do you do, but from my perfect ina- 
 bility to undertake such a letter to you as could 
 alone be acceptable. My mind and body indeed 
 
 * The author is indebted to the kindness of Mr. Le Mar- 
 chant for this letter to his father (the late Gen. Le Marchant), 
 and he has only to regret that a subsequent letter to the same 
 distinguished officer, giving a detailed account of the opera- 
 tions at Albuera, has, by some unfortunate accident, been 
 mislaid. 
 
( 73 ) 
 
 have been so occupied by the duties of my 
 situation, that the sight of pen, ink and paper, 
 could not be endured. An interval of rest re- 
 stores me to myself, and I dedicate a leisure 
 hour to acknowledge the receipt of your last, 
 and to give you a short summary of our pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 I landed at Lisbon on the 5th March, and pro- 
 ceeded early the next morning to Cartaxo to see 
 Lord W. His Lordship had that day advanced to 
 Santarem, in consequence of the enemy's retreat. 
 I proceeded thither and had an interview with 
 him the same evening. Not having a single horse 
 with me, or other article but what I had upon 
 my back, it was proposed that I should return 
 to Lisbon, borrow two horses from the Prince 
 Regent's stable, and join his Lordship again as 
 soon as possible. I did so, and overtook his 
 column again near Redinha, and remained with 
 him till they passed Miranda de Corvo. 
 
 In the mean time, however, letters had been 
 written to me which I never received, desiring 
 me to proceed to the Alemtejo, and take the 
 command of the cavalry south of the Tagus, 
 and it was at the same time intimated, that 
 operations upon an extensive scale were about 
 to be undertaken in that quarter, and Lord W. 
 told me himself that he proposed conducting 
 them in person. Finding, therefore, on the 15th 
 
( ™ ) 
 
 March, that the enemy declined all engagement, 
 and were decidedly retreating upon Celerico, 
 and that Marshal Beresford was to leave Lord 
 W. immediately for the Tagus, and that one 
 division of infantry (General Cole's), and two 
 regiments of cavalry (the 3d Dragoon Guards 
 and 4th Dragoons), were likewise ordered to the 
 Alemtejo, I also turned my horse's head and 
 proceeded back to Chamusca. General Beres- 
 ford overtook me at Thomar, and I continued 
 with him till we reached Portalegre, on the 20th 
 ultimo. The whole force at his disposal (about 
 20,000) was to have been assembled there on 
 the 22d March, and so they were, but the fatigue 
 sustained by General Cole's division, and their 
 want of shoes, obliged the Marshal to leave 
 them behind. The French were at this moment 
 on the point of taking Campo Mayor, and the 
 object was to surprise them at this work, and 
 our whole force was considered necessary for 
 the purpose. The consequence was, that the 
 Governor, unable to hold out longer, surrendered 
 the town on the very day the troops marched 
 from Portalegre. Well ! on the 24th March, 
 three divisions of infantry, and all the cavalry, 
 were assembled in a bivouac upon the Caya 
 river, about two leagues from Campo Mayor. 
 Whilst reconnoitring the position, Colonel 
 D'Urban had been discovered and pursued by 
 
( 75 ) 
 
 the enemy's patrole. The next morning an- 
 other reconnoissance was made with a squadron 
 of dragoons, and the enemy's picquets were 
 found placed upon a height that runs all the 
 way from Campo Mayor, and forms the boundary, 
 as it were, of the open country into which we 
 were about to debouche. On Colonel D'Urban's 
 return, an order of march was given out, and 
 we proceeded towards Campo Mayor. This 
 order of march was completely changed before 
 we had proceeded half a league. However, I had 
 a conversation on the morning with the Marshal. 
 He told me the enemy was exceedingly strong in 
 cavalry, and that I must hug the infantry for 
 support if necessary. I asked him peremptorily 
 if I should attack them wherever I met them; 
 his answer was, do not commit yourself against 
 a very superior force, but if the opportunity to 
 strike a blow occurs, avail yourself of it. 
 
 With these instructions, I proceeded to move, 
 and was soon ordered to the front (as usual) 
 with all the cavalry. On reaching the open 
 country I saw nothing but a cavalry picquet 
 observing our motions. 
 
 The cavalry was here divided. A deep and 
 impassable ravine running down a bottom, sepa- 
 rated the two heights upon which I moved with 
 the light portion of my division, and that over 
 which the infantry marched, supported by the 
 
( 76 ) 
 
 heavy brigade. I followed implicitly the instruc- 
 tions I received as far as the ground permitted, 
 and when I could find a passage across the ra- 
 vine, I filed my column over, drove the enemy's 
 picquets from the opposite heights back upon 
 Cainpo Mayor, towards which I proceeded across 
 a considerable plain, and halted about a mile 
 from the town. I here observed a part of their 
 cavalry formed under the works, but the undu- 
 lation of the ground prevented my getting a 
 complete view of their whole force. They be- 
 gan, however, to manoeuvre behind the heights, 
 &c. as if intending an attack, and I employed 
 myself in making what I thought the best dis- 
 position to counteract their intentions, waiting 
 the Marshal's further orders. At length an aide- 
 de-camp brought me an order to proceed round, 
 and to the rear of the town, so as to turn it, 
 but to keep at two or three gun-shots from 
 the works. Though the Marshal and I differ 
 upon this point, I do not believe I was ever 
 more than the prescribed distance from the 
 town, although the enemy's demonstrations on 
 my left obliged me to extend to cover that flank. 
 At length I got a full sight of my opponents, 
 and the heavy brigade having joined me, I pro- 
 ceeded in a direction that intersected their line 
 of march, or rather retreat, and as every step 
 I took brought me more and more upon their 
 
( 77 ) 
 
 flank, and towards their rear, it was not long 
 before we closed so much that I was enabled to 
 distinguish their whole force and position. I 
 should here mention that one of the Marshal's 
 aides-de-camp having joined me about this time, 
 whilst I was reconnoitring the position and 
 strength of my opponents, and rather urged my 
 attempting something against them, as likely to 
 give the Marshal, his master, considerable satis- 
 faction. Having fourteen squadrons under my 
 command, and the enemy having but eight, with 
 two battalions of infantry, I thought myself jus- 
 tified in considering the opportunity of attacking 
 them as one which might enable me to strike a 
 blow without committing myself, for the infantry 
 columns were following though at some distance, 
 and unless the attempt was made by the cavalry 
 upon this retreating force, there was nothing to 
 prevent their reaching Badajos without moles- 
 tation. I therefore determined to try my luck, 
 and began by directing, in the first instance, my 
 efforts against their covering force of cavalry, 
 aware that if they were properly disposed of, 
 the remainder would be at my mercy. 
 
 The enemy had placed two squadrons in co- 
 lumn of half squadrons at the head of their 
 column of infantry, and another in a similar 
 manner in the rear, and in this order they per- 
 severed in their retreat throughout the day. 
 
( 78 ) 
 
 The remainder of their cavalry were formed 
 en potence waiting, apparently, my attack. I 
 was on their left flank, marching by my left ; 
 they on my right, marching by their right. I 
 directed Colonel Head, with two squadrons and 
 a half of the 13th Dragoons, to attack three of 
 their squadrons, whist I proceeded with three 
 Portuguese against the remainder. I kept two 
 other squadrons of Portuguese on my left flank 
 parallel with the head of my column, to coun- 
 teract any manoeuvre of the enemy in that 
 direction. 
 
 The moment they saw Colonel Head disen- 
 gage from the rear to execute my orders, three 
 of their squadrons that had been en potence 
 made a change of position to the left to front 
 him, and immediately moved on to the attack. 
 This brought the French upon two parallel lines 
 of three squadrons each. Colonel Head formed 
 to his front and proceeded to the charge. I was 
 still in column of threes, left in front, and on his 
 left, and when I observed what was passing on 
 my right, I pushed on as quickly as I could to 
 gain the flank and rear of the enemy's line. 
 The rapid advance, however, of the 13th, the 
 deroute of the enemy, which threw both their 
 lines into disorder, and the wretched kind of 
 horse mounted by the Portuguese, frustrated 
 my intention of cutting off completely the ene- 
 
( 79 ) 
 
 my's retreat. The whole of the 13th pursued, 
 and became so broken and intermixed with the 
 enemy, that to cover them I was obliged to de- 
 tach the two squadrons on my left to their im- 
 mediate support, intending to move on likewise 
 with the remaining three squadrons of Portu- 
 guese. I also sent positive orders to them to 
 rally and form. Colonel Otway, with the two 
 supporting squadrons, disbanded also in pursuit 
 and away they all raced, without further support, 
 to the bridge of Badajos. On looking round to 
 make fresh arrangements and dispositions, I 
 discovered to my astonishment that the whole 
 of the heavy brigade, which I had stationed in 
 my rear in two lines, but outflanking to the 
 right, to support me and observe the column of 
 infantry, had been drawn across to the other side 
 of the valley, and were halted on the opposite 
 height about two miles from me. At this mo- 
 ment, too, I perceived two squadrons of the 
 enemy rallying upon my left flank, and the co- 
 lumn of infantry with two squadrons approach- 
 ing my right. I immediately attempted a 
 change of position with the Portuguese, but on 
 the first fire of the enemy's skirmishers, they 
 broke and ran off. I rallied them however, 
 returned to keep the enemy's column in check, 
 and sent off for the heavy dragoons, but the 
 Marshal was himself with them, and it took 
 
( so ) 
 
 some time before he could be persuaded to put 
 them in motion. He at length advanced on 
 the other flank of the enemy's column in two 
 lines, and brought up two guns. The country 
 perfectly open, and every where favourable to 
 the operations of cavalry. The artillery began 
 firing, and with some, but not the desired, effect 
 into the column, and all we had to do, was to 
 continue thus to pepper them till their order was 
 broken, and then to let loose a portion of the 
 cavalry, which surrounded them on every side. 
 At this critical moment for the enemy, and when 
 I momentarily looked for their surrender, judge 
 my surprize on seeing a general halt and cessa- 
 tion of attack ordered, and the enemy permitted 
 to walk off unmolested, thus absolutely inter- 
 posing themselves between us and that portion 
 of our cavalry that had pursued them to 
 Badajos, and were then on their return. To 
 this fatal determination, and to the previous 
 occurrence of the heavy brigade having sepa- 
 rated from me, all our loss is to be attributed, 
 and it is lucky that it was no worse. The enemy, 
 however, was completely routed (that part of 
 them at least that were attacked) and we 
 took sixteen pieces of artillery, two of which 
 only were brought away. Their loss, by their 
 own acknowledgment, amounted, in killed, 
 wounded, and prisoners, to 600 men and several 
 
( si ) 
 
 officers, among whom was the Colonel of the 
 26th Dragoons. 
 
 Well ! instead of thanks we got nothing hut 
 abuse ; and by the Marshal's official account it 
 should appear that we had marred a well- 
 digested plan of his to cut them all off himself 
 from Badajos. If such a plan ever was pro- 
 jected, the measures adopted to accomplish it 
 were the very reverse of what they ought to 
 have been; and had not the cavalry made the 
 attack they did, not a single Frenchman on that 
 day would have fallen into our hands; whereas 
 their loss was six times that of ours, and the 
 impression made upon them, such as to this 
 hour they have not forgotten, or are likely soon 
 to do." [continued page 100.] 
 
 In proceeding with the narrative of events, 
 and following the course of the work before us, 
 the next occasion on which General Long's 
 name occurs is at p. 77, respecting the capture 
 of a squadron of the 13th, near Villa Real. 
 " The Marshal," it is observed, " before sunset, 
 communicated to the principal officers the in- 
 tended attack of the enemy ; and having fixed 
 General Stewart's division in its position, he 
 marked out that which General Cole's was to 
 take up as it arrived. The squadron of the 13th 
 he had ordered to be withdrawn before dark, 
 and to be placed in the rear of General Stew- 
 
 g 
 
( 82 ) 
 
 art's division. From some mistake or other, 
 which occurred in giving or carrying M. Gene- 
 ral Long's orders, this movement was not exe- 
 cuted." There is an ambiguity about this latter 
 passage, as respects the position of the words 
 "giving" and " carrying," which might lead to an 
 inference that some blame was to be attached 
 to General Long. To prevent the possibility of 
 misconception upon this point, it is sufficient to 
 mention, that Lieutenant-Colonel Gabriel, in a 
 short interview with the author, which led to 
 the questions submitted to him, fully confirmed 
 the accuracy of General Long's account of the 
 transaction, as detailed to General Le Marchant. 
 It clearly appears that General Long had no 
 connection with the disaster in question, further 
 than in doing every thing that was possible to 
 remedy it, and that the construction of the pas- 
 sage should, if General Long's name is intended 
 to appear at all, be this, that " from some mis- 
 take or other, which occurred in giving or car- 
 rying the orders to General Long, this movement 
 was not executed," and the consequences were, 
 as the author has stated, the capture of this 
 squadron. The occurrence is treated more in 
 detail in General Long's journal, but it has been 
 deemed unnecessarily tautological to enter fur- 
 ther into it. 
 
 Not long after this misfortune, an opportunity 
 
( 83 ) 
 
 of, in some measure, counteracting its effects by 
 retaliation occurred. " The Marshal," p. 82, 
 says the narrator, " drove Latour Maubourg into 
 the Morena, and defeated and cut to pieces two 
 regiments of French cavalry, not at Usagre, as 
 misstated by the author," viz. Colonel Napier, 
 u but at Los Santos." Without desiring to de- 
 tract from the claims of Marshal Beresford to 
 his equitable share, as commander-in-chief, of 
 the merit in defeating and cutting to pieces these 
 two regiments of cavalry ; by the most ordinary 
 rules of justice, some slight notice, one should 
 think, ought to have been taken of the officer 
 in command of that cavalry, inasmuch, as though 
 the order to attempt the defeat emanated from 
 his superior officer, and the practical part of the 
 proceeding was carried into execution by the 
 regiments themselves, the mode of accomplish- 
 ing the object, and the movements regulating it, 
 were indisputably arranged by him. But this 
 is onlv in unison with the whole tenor of the 
 work. Where the Marshal was present, as at 
 Campo Mayor, and where not only his ineffective 
 co-operation, but his active interference, palpa- 
 bly neutralized the successes of his cavalry, the 
 fault is fixed upon the commander of that cavalry. 
 Where, as at Los Santos, that arm alone effected 
 its object, and the Marshal was present, the 
 
 g2 
 
( 84 ) 
 
 whole of the credit is assumed for him only, by 
 the impartial recorder of his exploits. 
 
 We now approach the ever-memorable day 
 of Albuera, (for not even on the prouder day of 
 Waterloo, were the glorious deeds of a gallant 
 army more nobly conspicuous,) and the final 
 criminatory charges against General Long, which 
 have been pleaded in bar of judgment on 
 the part of Lord Beresford, by the unknown 
 counsel chosen for conducting his defence. 
 " Lord Beresford," says the writer, p. 116, 
 " having left staff officers to put the troops in 
 the positions he had assigned them, went to 
 reconnoitre the country in the direction of Ta- 
 lavera, and refresh his memory with its features, 
 though his former visit had already made him 
 pretty well acquainted with it. He proceeded 
 on this object for about two leagues, till he 
 came within sight of the town, and was slowly 
 returning towards Albuera, when one of his 
 aides-de-camp came galloping towards him, with 
 the account that General Long had arrived there 
 in great confusion from Santa Martha, and that 
 the enemy's light cavalry were close upon him." 
 Whether General Long did so arrive from Santa 
 Martha, " in great confusion," as stated by the 
 writer, will best appear from the journal of that 
 officer, and the corroborating testimony of his 
 
( 35 ) 
 
 aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Pitt, contained 
 in his answer to the first question submitted to 
 him. " The Marshal's astonishment was ex- 
 treme," so at least writes the author of the 
 " Further Strictures," p. 117. Not so, however, 
 M. General Sir B. D'Urban, whose work that 
 author has (apparently with a view to the 
 more effectual confirmation of his own state- 
 ments) taken the trouble to re-print and publish 
 jointly with his own narrative. This " great 
 confusion" of the cavalry, and " extreme asto- 
 nishment" of the Marshal, are by that officer 
 frittered away in the lukewarm phraseology, and 
 summed up with the sententious brevity and 
 simplicity of the eight meagre words " rather 
 more briskly than had been looked for." Ap.p. 24. 
 " He," viz. the Marshal, continues our author, 
 (p. 117) " had very recently received dispatches 
 from General Long at Santa Martha, in which 
 not the slightest mention was made of an im- 
 mediate retreat." This may be very possible, 
 the necessity of an immediate retreat might 
 not have been stated, but General Long, in the 
 journal of his proceedings, distinctly declares that 
 he was " hourly reporting to head quarters the 
 advance and movements of the enemy," and 
 adds, that he had not received " a single instruc- 
 tion," although repeatedly applied for; and the 
 first of these facts is fully corroborated, as will 
 
( 86 ) 
 
 be seen, by the answer of Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Pitt to the second question submitted to him. 
 " He/' the Marshal, " then hastened back," 
 viz. to Albuera, (having been told, p. 116, that 
 " Gen. Long had arrived there") " and found the 
 cavalry still in considerable confusion." p. 117. 
 Still! That is, between the period of the aide-de- 
 camp's departure from Albuera, where General 
 Long and the cavalry then were, and Marshal 
 Beresford's arrival there, they had remained in 
 a state of confusion. " After," says our author, 
 " forming them, and placing them in their posi- 
 tion, he," the Marshal, " discovered that the 
 enemy's horse had already occupied the wood, 
 on the slope of the opposite heights beyond 
 Albuera, and through which the road from Santa 
 Martha slopes slantingly towards the bridge." 
 So that after Marshal Beresford had returned 
 to Albuera, and " formed" his cavalry, and 
 " placed them in their position," though in what 
 position, (whether on the right or left bank of 
 the stream,) does not distinctly appear, he then 
 discovered that the opposite heights were aban- 
 doned to the enemy. There must, indeed, have 
 been very " considerable confusion," " confusion 
 heaped upon confusion," to have endured thus 
 long, and the confusion could not have been 
 confined to the cavalry alone. The Marshal 
 must, according to the conductor of his cause, 
 
( 87 ) 
 
 have participated rather largely in this general 
 disorganization : thus, on a sudden, to have seen 
 that the heights, where the cavalry he had just 
 been forming ought, as is afterwards declared, 
 p. 119, to have kept the enemy " at bay," were 
 " already occupied" by that enemy, and not by 
 the cavalry he had so recently formed in their 
 position. So that the author would exhibit the 
 Marshal to us in such a state of absolute 
 bewilderment, as to have made the disastrous 
 discovery, that the cavalry he had been engaged 
 in "forming," were in point of fact not elsewhere. 
 To rescue the Marshal from so palpable an ab- 
 surdity, the more charitable, as indeed the more 
 rational supposition is, that the Marshal dis- 
 covered that no infantry were on the heights to 
 keep the enemy " at bay," as he had intended ; 
 for he had heard through his aide-de-camp, as we 
 have seen, that General Long had arrived at Al- 
 buera before he got there, and therefore he could 
 not have expected to find him contending for the 
 possession of the heights. We shall presently 
 see whether this surmise is the correct one. 
 
 "The only error," says our author, p. 119, 
 " that appears in Lord Beresford's plans, was 
 his omitting to place some infantry in occupa- 
 tion of the wood on the great height beyond 
 the Faria stream, through which the road from 
 Santa Martha passed. This I understand," he 
 
( 88 ) 
 
 observes, " had been intended." Had been in- 
 tended ! If " intended," why was it not done ? 
 and if not done, why is this " only error " (ac- 
 knowledged as such by the writer of the Stric- 
 tures, and by him applied solely to Marshal 
 Beresford) attributed in its effects to General 
 Long, the scape-goat of every blunder, when, 
 in fact, if " intended," it could only be so " in- 
 tended" by the Commander-in-Chief, the ne- 
 cessary originator of all intentions. " It could 
 not, indeed," continues the writer, " have been 
 maintained against the French infantry for any 
 length of time ; but had their cavalry been here 
 kept at bay, the Marshal might have compelled 
 them to show their force on the elevated plain 
 beyond the wood, and, as their infantry only 
 came up during the night, he might thus have 
 prevented their gaining possession of it for the 
 whole of that day." The reader is particularly 
 requested to attend to this profound pleading 
 in mitigation, and the dexterous attempt to 
 shift the error to other shoulders. Marshal 
 Beresford having neglected, or some other 
 officer to whom his intentions had been made 
 known having neglected, to " place some in- 
 fantry in occupation of the wood," as " had 
 been intended." General Long, having no con- 
 nection with the infantry, arriving there in 
 obedience to his orders to " fall back upon 
 
( 89 ) 
 
 Albuera," followed by an overwhelming force 
 of the enemy's cavalry/* against which he had 
 been peremptorily ordered not to commit his 
 own; and seeing (as is evident from the testi- 
 mony of Colonel Pitt, that he did see,) this 
 omission, this non-execution of intentions, should 
 have notwithstanding kept, or endeavoured to 
 keep, the enemy " at bay," as the expression 
 is, with his inferior cavalry, and thus, by dis- 
 obeying his positive injunctions, have enabled 
 the Marshal to escape from the consequences 
 caused by this " only error in his plans." 
 
 "But," continues the author, p. 119, "the 
 unaccountable manner in which General Long 
 abandoned this post, before Lord Beresford 
 ever knew of his having left Santa Martha, has 
 already been related; his fault ought to have 
 been repaired. It was not ; and whoever was 
 to blame for it, this was certainly an omission." 
 So then it would appear that there were two 
 omissions and one fault. 1st. The " only error 
 in Lord Beresford's plans," viz. " his omitting 
 to place some infantry in occupation of the 
 
 * " The French cavalry, so infinitely superior in numbers, 
 discipline, and composition to our own." — p. 172. Confirmed 
 by Sir B. D'Urban, in p. 22, App. — " The advantage which 
 
 the enemy possessed aided by a superior 
 
 cavalry, over an army of three different nations, inferior in the 
 latter arm/' 
 
( 90 ) 
 
 wood on the great height." 2clly. The " fault" 
 of General Long in having unaccountably " aban- 
 doned this post," which the Marshal had omitted 
 to occupy : and 3dly, the " omission" of some 
 officer, name unknown, in not having repaired 
 the "fault" of General Long, in not having 
 repaired the " only error" of Marshal Beresford. 
 In other words, the concentrated essence of 
 error was in General Long, by reason of his 
 having abandoned a post which the Marshal 
 " intended" to have defended, but which he, or 
 those to whom he had delegated that defence, 
 had already abandoned ! Whose, then, was the 
 fault ? and what was the proposed reparation 
 of that fault ? Was it ever even whispered that 
 General Long ought to have defended this 
 height against the enemy's superior cavalry, in 
 defiance of his orders and in contempt of the 
 consequences ? What steps did Marshal Beres- 
 ford take towards the reparation of this fault ? 
 Where did he find the cavalry, as stated in 
 p. 117 ? Where did he " form them ?" Where 
 did he " place them ?" literally, nowhere. The 
 written evidence of General Long, the living 
 testimony of Colonel Pitt, prove, beyond the 
 shadow of a shade of a doubt, that the orders 
 to General Long, to move his cavalry to the 
 left bank of, in fact across, the Albuera stream, 
 originated in the Commander-in-Chief, and were 
 
( 91 ) 
 
 communicated through the Adjutant-General to 
 General Long; nay, more, that the Commander- 
 in-Chief never " found" the cavalry until they 
 had crossed the river, never " formed" them at 
 all, and that they were in no confusion what- 
 ever!! The author does not insist upon these 
 as mere random unsupported assertions, 
 
 " Without more certain and more overt test 
 Than their slight habits, and poor likelihoods," 
 
 such as have been put forth by the anonymous 
 writer of the Strictures; but as facts, authenti- 
 cated by living evidence, and boldly challenging 
 the equally open contradiction of living wit- 
 nesses. But the testimony of Sir Benjamin 
 D'Urban has been hurried across the Atlantic to 
 assist in this vindication of Lord Beresford's 
 wrongs. The defendant has declined the dis- 
 tinct avowal of his defence ; the counsel in the 
 cause has cautiously shrunk from the notoriety of 
 an open court, and assumed the dark obscurity 
 of an inquisitorial disguise ; while the only living 
 witness subpoenaed on this trial is — Major Ge- 
 neral Sir Benjamin D'Urban. Let us see then 
 what assistance can be rendered, as regards the 
 points at issue, by the testimony of that officer. 
 It has already been seen of what avail it was, 
 in the instance of Campo Mayor. 
 
 " The assembly of the army then," writes Sir 
 
( 92 ) 
 
 Benjamin, " having been determined at Albuera, 
 on or before the noon of the 15th, the cavalry, 
 which had concentrated at Zafra and Los Santos, 
 had been directed to fall back gradually before 
 the enemy, by Santa Martha, upon Albuera, 
 taking care to observe the roads of Solana and 
 Torre de Almendral." — App. p. 24. 
 
 " About three o'clock, the cavalry, which had 
 been pushed back from Santa Martha rather 
 more briskly than had been looked for, by that 
 of the enemy, arrived, and upon the return of 
 Sir William Beresford to the right, from placing 
 the left of the line, and examining the country 
 immediately beyond it, he found that it had 
 already crossed the rivulet, and that the whole 
 of the opposite bank was in possession of the 
 enemy. Under the actual circumstances, this 
 mistake once made, it was too late to repair it." 
 
 Marshal Beresford, from this account, appears 
 to have done exactly what it is presumed that 
 he did do, though not exactly what the writer 
 of the " Strictures" would make him do. He 
 returned to Albuera on hearing that the cavalry 
 had " arrived," and found that they " had al- 
 ready crossed the rivulet,' 1 and that " the whole 
 of the opposite bank was in possession of the 
 enemy." It will be observed that no notice is 
 taken by General D'Urban of the " only error 
 in LordBeresford's plans," respecting the placing 
 
( 93 ) 
 
 of the infantry as "had been intended;" while 
 the " mistake" is enveloped in a sort of mys- 
 terious ambiguity that might attach to any- 
 body. We are indebted to the author of the 
 " Strictures" for explicitly assigning, in his 
 summing up, the whole blame to General Long. 
 " His fault," says the author, " ought to have 
 been repaired.''' " This mistake," says General 
 D'Urban, on the other hand, " once made, it was 
 too late to repair it!' 9 So far " the slight dis- 
 crepancies which exist between" the writer of the 
 " Strictures" and General D'Urban. But does 
 that writer derive any assistance in his facts from 
 the dispatch of Marshal Beresford himself? The 
 reader will judge. " The cavalry, which had, ac- 
 cording to orders, fallen back as the enemy 
 advanced, was joined at Santa Martha by Gen. 
 Blake." "I determined to take up a po- 
 sition at this place," viz. Albuera. " The army 
 was therefore assembled here on the 15th inst." 
 
 " Our cavalry had been forced on the 
 
 morning of the 15th to retire from Santa Martha, 
 and joined here. In the afternoon of that day 
 the enemy appeared in front of us." But Sir 
 B. D'Urban, in another passage, describes the 
 concentration of the army at Albuera, with even 
 more measured solemnity of statement. " The 
 allied army," he observes, p. 27, Appendix, " was 
 thus united upon the Albuera, having regulated 
 
( 94 ) 
 
 all its successive movements by the progressive 
 advance of the enemy, equally avoiding a late or 
 a premature assembly, and having combined the 
 removal of all the ordnance and siege stores with 
 a timely arrival at the proposed position ! !" 
 
 The author has now concluded the defence of 
 General Long from the direct charges advanced 
 against him by his anonymous accuser, and he 
 earnestly desires the attention of the reader to 
 the evidence by which it is supported. There 
 are, however, one or two points immediately 
 connected with the conflict at Albuera, which, 
 far from being irrelevant, it is incumbent on the 
 author, in justice to General Long's memory, 
 to notice, and more especially as, in one in- 
 stance, the high authority of Sir B. D'Urban is 
 apparently at variance with General Long's 
 version of the proceedings. In the first place, 
 the repulse of the Polish Lancers at the fords 
 near the bridge of Albuera, at the commence- 
 ment of the attack, was entirely effected by the 
 orders of General Long, and of this no notice is 
 taken either in the " Strictures" — in Sir B. 
 D'Urban's narrative —or in Marshal Beresford's 
 dispatch. It would also appear that General 
 Long had suggested the propriety of placing a 
 force near the spot where the Polish lancers so 
 fatally broke in upon the right flank of the 
 infantry, but which suggestion was not attended 
 
( 95 ) 
 
 to. But there is one very material point in the 
 day's proceedings which requires a more par- 
 ticular notice. At the conclusion of his Preface 
 General D'Urban writes as follows: — " The 
 masterly disposition of the 4th division and of 
 the cavalry, to which General Dumourier ad- 
 verts in his letter,* of which the results were so 
 beneficial, and which is praised even in the His- 
 tory of the War in the Peninsula (see p. 556), 
 emanated entirely from the Marshal, nor has 
 any one a claim to participate in it; and this I 
 securely affirm, because I placed those troops 
 upon their ground, by his direction, and received 
 from his own mouth the orders for their gui- 
 dance, which I then gave to their respective 
 generals." 
 
 Without at all questioning the applicability 
 of the splendid panegyric which the French 
 general, Dumourier, in a moment of patriotic 
 enthusiasm at the recital of a narrative which 
 detailed the fact that 5000 of his countrymen 
 had fallen by the hands of the enemy he was 
 eulogizing — without entering upon any classi- 
 cal critique as to whether the cavalry of Caesar 
 at Pharsalia, or of Marshal Beresford at Al- 
 buera, was the better disposed — the author 
 
 * A complimentary effusion of that officer, subjoined to 
 the Preface, in which he writes to Marshal Beresford, " Vous 
 avez fait plus que Cesar," &c. &c. 
 
( 9G ) 
 
 may be permitted to doubt first (not of course 
 the accuracy of General D'Urban's statement, 
 as far as it goes), but, whether General Long- 
 did not previously point out the position where 
 the cavalry was placed ; ultimately, of course, 
 in consequence of orders given by Marshal 
 Beresford to General D'Urban, and by him, as 
 he says, to the respective generals. And se- 
 condly, whether if such was not the case, and, 
 allowing with General Dumourier that as 
 the disposition of the cohorts of Caesar was the 
 cause of the one triumph, so that of the squa- 
 drons of Marshal Beresford was the cause of 
 the other, some small portion of merit was not 
 due to the officer who, in the beginning of the 
 day, had alone directed the movements of all 
 the cavalry and horse artillery, and whose dis- 
 position of the cavalry on the ground (admitting 
 that Marshal Beresford is to claim all the merit 
 of the disposition as respects the field of battle) 
 was adopted, and whose suggestions were acted 
 upon by the officer who had so suddenly as- 
 sumed to the command. There is no question, 
 it is believed among military men, respect- 
 ing the ability with which General Lumley 
 performed his part; but it is a question whether 
 the whole of the riches of the harvest should be 
 gathered by the labourer who had come late to 
 the reaping, and had not borne the heat or 
 
( 97 ) 
 
 burthen of the day. The least that could have 
 been done would have been to have mentioned 
 General Long's name, and had General Lum- 
 ley himself been, as he was at Usagre, the 
 recounter of the exploits of his cavalry, the de- 
 tails would, the author dares to assert, have 
 been far different. Let the reader peruse the 
 whole of Marshal Beresford's dispatch. Not 
 even the name of General Long once occurs, 
 although that officer was in command, in the 
 early portion of the day, of all the cavalry, and 
 for the remainder in command of all the British 
 and Portuguese. What were the consequences 
 of this reward of silence as affecting him when 
 it became the duty of his Majesty's Ministers 
 to submit to parliament whom they would de- 
 sire to honour with their distinguishing ap- 
 plause as the chief actors by whom this victory 
 had been achieved ? Did the House of Com- 
 mons preserve an expressive and ominous 
 silence? Were its praises parsimoniously con- 
 fined to Generals Cole, Stewart, Hamilton, 
 Lumley, and Alten (all most fully and amply 
 meriting them), as had been the case in Mar- 
 shal Beresford's dispatch? On the contrary. 
 The members of the parliament of Great Britain 
 did, as became them : they made no exceptions, 
 but unanimously resolved, — " That the Thanks 
 of this House be given to Major-General the 
 
 ii 
 
( 9"B ) 
 
 Honourable Galbraith Lowry Cole, the Ho- 
 nourable William Stewart, John Hamilton, the 
 Honourable William Lumley, Charles Baron 
 Alten, Brigadier-General Robert Ballard Long, 
 and the several other officers, for their distin- 
 guished exertions on the 3 6th of May last, in 
 the glorious battle of Albnera, and that Lieut.- 
 General Sir William Carr Beresford do signify 
 the same to the Hon. William Stewart, &c. &c. ,? 
 
 The Lieutenant-General did accordingly 
 transmit, as he was desired to do, this vote of 
 thanks to the several officers so named, and 
 Gen. Long, passed over in the roll of praises by 
 which the record of this victory had been wound 
 up, was destined to receive at the hands of the 
 person to whom his " distinguished services" 
 must have been, if they were distinguished, 
 more immediately known, that approbation 
 which he, in his justice, had withheld from all 
 notice in his dispatch, and which (from minis- 
 terial ignorance it must be presumed) had thus 
 crept into the councils of the Sovereign, to be 
 subsequently echoed by the consentient voices 
 of the Commons of England. 
 
 If there are any of his readers disposed to 
 cast censure upon the author of this Reply as 
 wanting in propriety, though not in right, to 
 retaliate while he defends,— to these be it an- 
 swered that he was not the first to come for- 
 
( 99 ) 
 
 ward in the character of a masked assailant, 
 and at the same time in all the apparent im- 
 portance of a confidential ally. Had any one 
 of General Long's friends put forward a work 
 of such a complexion; had " foolish answers," 
 " further mischief and folly," and posts " un- 
 accountably abandoned," as applied to a third 
 and a deceased party, been the basis of any 
 dissertation on their part, while attempting a 
 vindication of their relative against the censures 
 of an antagonist, well might they expect to 
 draw down the merited indignation of the 
 friends of that party thus exposed to this col- 
 lateral assault. But the writer has not only 
 travelled out of the record in raking up the 
 ashes of another, he has literally out-Heroded 
 Herod, and has, in some instances, gone beyond, 
 in others contradicted, Marshal Beresford's and 
 Sir B. D'Urban's recorded statements. 
 
 If the author is wrong in his impression, 
 that the writer of the Further Strictures has 
 been authorized to undertake Lord Beresford's 
 defence, and been partially, for it is as impos- 
 sible to believe as it would be insulting to 
 the veracity of that officer to assert, that he 
 has been wholly furnished with the implements 
 of his warfare, it rests with Lord Beresford 
 to denounce the obtrusive officiousness of the 
 writer, and to shake off the incubus that has 
 
 h 2 
 
( ioo ) 
 
 thus fastened itself upon his military reputation. 
 If, on the contrary, the literary labours of the 
 writer are the overstrained efforts of friend- 
 ship, and the result of a partially confidential 
 communion, it remains only to wonder at the 
 hardihood that could hazard such assertions, 
 or the reckless indiscretion that could risk a 
 vessel so freighted with the renown of his com- 
 mander, on the shoals and reefs which common 
 care might have detected, and a cautious in- 
 quiry have enabled him to shun. 
 
 Conclusion of Letter to Gen. Le Mar chant. 
 
 " After a considerable lapse of time in making 
 a bridge over the Guadiana, for which no pre- 
 parations appear to have been made, the army 
 began crossing that river on the 5th of April, 
 and on the following day and night the greater 
 part of the infantry, with the 13th dragoons, 
 were posted on the other side opposite to Jeru- 
 menha. About two o'clock on the morning 
 of the 6th of April the enemy advanced from 
 Olivenza with a battalion of infantry, three guns, 
 and 400 hussars. Their object, believing us not 
 to be in force, was to try to reach the bridge and 
 destroy it. On their march they fell in with an 
 
( loi )' 
 
 advanced picquet consisting of a squadron of 
 the 13th dragoons, commanded by Capt. Morris, 
 whom you must recollect at Wycombe. His 
 being posted there appears to have arisen from 
 some mistake between him and Major-General 
 Lumley. Having passed the river myself that 
 night only, and superintending the passage of 
 the cavalry, I was not aware of what was going 
 on in front. About three o'clock a. m. I retired 
 to the village of Villa Real, having conducted 
 the 13th Dragoons to their ground, to get my 
 horse fed and refreshed before day-break. — 
 Scarcely had fifteen minutes elapsed before I 
 was alarmed by the enemy's approach. I ran 
 out and found them pursuing some of the 13th 
 Dragoons up to the very place where I stood. I 
 alarmed a battalion of infantry that were sleep- 
 ing near the village, and hastened to the 13th 
 Dragoons to bring them up to the support of the 
 infantry, among whom I really expected to see 
 the enemy's cavalry enter before they could 
 form and get under arms. Alarmed, however, 
 at the fire of the infantry picquet, the pursuers 
 returned, and the rest of the enemy halted, and 
 then retired before there was sufficient light to 
 discover their force or movements. In the mean 
 time, however, they had completely surprised 
 Morris, and carried off about 50 men and 60 
 horses of the squadron under his command. I 
 
( 102 ) 
 
 shall offer no comment upon this unfortunate 
 event, because it would be unfair so to do, with- 
 out hearing what he may have to say in his jus- 
 tification. I had so far a narrow escape, that 
 General Stewart wished and proposed to me to 
 take up my quarters for the night in an isolated 
 house near Villa Real. I reconnoitred it, and 
 from the surrounding ground and the light of 
 the picquets which I observed in front, I thought 
 it too exposed, and went to the village. The 
 enemy surrounded the house, took some of the 
 infantry picquets stationed there, and carried off 
 two fine horses belonging to Captain Gabriel, 
 General Stewart's aide-de-camp. The army 
 remained in its position here, living only from 
 hand to mouth, the cavalry posted in a plain, 
 without a shrub or tree of any kind, where they 
 remained for three days and nights exposed to 
 very bad weather. 
 
 On the 9th of March the whole moved in two 
 columns, and in due form, upon Olivenza. The 
 enemy had retired a day or two before, leaving 
 only 100 old fellows to shut the gates, and fire 
 off a few three-pounders. The town was sum- 
 moned and refused to surrender. What was to 
 be done ? It could not be stormed, and we had 
 presumed on taking it without artillery ! Guns 
 were therefore sent for to Elvas, General Cole's 
 
( 103 ) 
 
 division of 6000 men left to besiege it, and the 
 remainder of the troops marched next day to 
 Albnera on the high road from Badajos to Seville. 
 Here and subsequently the army appears to 
 have been moved upon no premeditated plan, 
 but according to the suggestions arising out of 
 the intelligence hourly received. At length on 
 the 15th of March we moved to Santa Martha, 
 and on the following morning proceeded to this 
 place with the declared intention of taking up 
 a position at Zafra. We halted about two miles 
 off, in a valley, whilst the ground in front was 
 reconnoitring, and I received orders to feed the 
 cavalry, and even cook. The first I acceded to, 
 and we filled ourselves with green forage and 
 water previously, as we concluded, to our taking 
 up our ground. In about a couple of hours 
 information was brought that 600 of the enemy's 
 cavalry were advancing rapidly upon Los San- 
 tos. I was ordered forward. The fire of our 
 skirmishers soon announced their proximity, 
 and I trotted the column round the village till 
 I got upon the Seville road. The rising of the 
 ground prevented my seeing them, till I reached 
 the top of the rise, where there was a narrow 
 debouche into a triangular and open space, be- 
 yond which I observed the enemy posted in 
 column of squadrons. 
 
( 104 ) 
 
 The moment the head of the 13th dragoons 
 appeared they detached one squadron, of what 
 had constituted their advanced guard, to attack 
 us, and being only distant about 300 yards they 
 were almost upon the 13th before they could 
 form, the retreat of the troupe doree on the 
 enemy's advance having distracted the men's 
 attention, and created some little confusion. 
 However they closed, and the enemy was re- 
 pulsed and fled. The 13th rallied, recollecting 
 the jobation they had received for their zeal at 
 Campo Mayor. I immediately formed the Por- 
 tuguese (next in column) in a second line be- 
 hind them, to support a renewed attack by the 
 13th Dragoons, and detached the heavy brigade 
 to the right to gain the enemy's flank. They 
 made off immediately. We pursued, but in the 
 strictest order. The consequence was, that to 
 preserve the regularity we could not gain ground 
 upon them sufficiently to make a charge or cut 
 them off. We however followed at a gallop for 
 nearly ten miles, and our flankers cut down or 
 secured all they came up with, which, by the 
 time we pulled up, amounted to nearly three 
 officers (one captain killed) and 150 men and 
 horses. General Beresford desired me not to 
 let them escape. I observed that this could not 
 be prevented, unless the whole of the 13th Dra- 
 
( 105 ) 
 
 goons were let loose upon them. This could 
 not be permitted, consequently we could not 
 overtake them, having already a start of a 
 quarter of a mile, and going as hard as they could 
 lay their heels to the ground. We did not lose 
 a man, but twelve horses, chiefly old blacks, 
 died that night of fatigue. The enemy re- 
 treated the next day from the villages four leagues 
 in our front, and fell back upon Guadal Canal, 
 evacuating Llerena, which a small corps of 
 Spaniards took possession of. Lord Wellington 
 having reached Elvas, a communication, I sup- 
 pose, took place between him and Marshal 
 Beresford, in consequence of which the infantry 
 retired on the 18th to Santa Martha and Al- 
 mendralejo, the cavalry remaining distributed in 
 Villa Franca, this place, and Zafra. Ballasteros 
 with a small corps advanced towards Monasterio, 
 Count de Penne, with 1,500 Spaniards, occupies 
 Llerena, and General Blake, with 8000 men 
 from Cadiz, is expected to land at Ayamonte, 
 and then proceed to this frontier. Lord W. is 
 about to undertake the reduction of Badajos, 
 and this accomplished, it remains to be seen 
 what will next be done." 
 
( 10^ ) 
 
 Private Memorandum of the Affair of Los Santos, 
 16th April 
 
 " The army moved from Santa Martha at 3 
 o'clock, on the morning of the 16th of April, 
 to take up a position near Zafra. The actual 
 situation of the enemy was not at that time 
 precisely known, but they were supposed to 
 have parties in front and on both flanks. The 
 cavalry led the column, and just as they reached 
 Los Santos, received orders to halt and water 
 their horses, whilst the Quarter-Master-General 
 was reconnoitring a position for the army to 
 occupy. Two hours elapsed in this situation, 
 when some Spaniards brought intelligence that 
 600 of the enemy's cavalry were in sight, 
 advancing upon Los Santos, into which their 
 advanced guard pushed. Our cavalry was 
 directed to advance, which they did in column, 
 viz. 
 
 13th Light Dragoons — British. 
 
 Two guns. 
 
 Portuguese Brigade. 
 
 Heavy Brigade — British. 
 
 After passing the skirts of the village of Los 
 Santos, they moved along the high road to 
 Seville about 400 yards, when they debouched 
 through a narrow space into an open, rocky 
 ground, of a triangular shape, bounded on the 
 
( 107 ) 
 
 left and right by a wall, and towards the end 
 of which, was another debouche, just wide 
 enough to admit a squadron in front, and be- 
 yond which the enemy was formed, facing to 
 it, in column. The moment the head of the 
 British column appeared, the enemy detached 
 one squadron, together with the advanced 
 guard, to attack it; and they were on their 
 march about 300 yards distant, when Brigadier 
 General Long first saw them; he directed the 
 13th dragoons to form, and repel the attack, 
 which they scarcely could do before the enemy 
 was upon them. The latter were nevertheless 
 repulsed, and the 13th dragoons rejoined their 
 squadron in order of battle. The enemy's 
 squadron fled, and rallied behind their column. 
 Brigadier General Long directed the Portu- 
 guese to form up quickly in rear of the 13th 
 dragoons, and the heavy brigade to move, 
 between a wall, and a high mountain to the 
 right, to endeavour to gain the enemy's flank, 
 and favour the advance of the 13th dragoons 
 through a narrow opening, in front of which 
 the enemy was posted. The moment the enemy 
 perceived this movement, they retired rapidly. 
 The 13th dragoons were put in motion, detach- 
 ing one squadron as pursuers; the Portuguese 
 followed in support. The heavy brigade hung 
 on their flank, and the object then was to follow 
 
( 108 ) 
 
 them at such a pace as, preserving our own 
 order, should oblige them to halt, and form to 
 receive our attack, or else, by the rapidity of 
 their movement in avoiding it, to break into 
 disorder, and give greater scope to the effects 
 of our pursuers : the latter occurred — we press- 
 ed them so hard, that they broke completely, 
 and went off as hard as they could go. Another 
 squadron of the 13th dragoons and detach- 
 ments from the heavy went next in pursuit, 
 and as the enemy's troops were blown, or come 
 up with, they were sabred, or taken prisoners. 
 In this manner the pursuit continued on our 
 part for nearly 10 miles at a gallop; when the 
 exhausted state of our horses, many of which 
 dropped down, unable to move further, obliged 
 us to pull up, and call in the pursuers. The 
 result of this day's business has been, a loss on 
 the part of the enemy of 150 men and horses, 
 and 4 officers, one of the latter (a Captain) 
 killed ; the rest prisoners. The enemy's regi- 
 ments engaged were, the 2nd dragoons, and 
 10th hussars, the same that were beaten at 
 Campo Mayor, and by these two conflicts are 
 more than half destroyed. 
 
 Just as we had halted, a fresh regiment 
 came out of Usagre to cover the retreat of 
 their routed comrades, but they did not attempt 
 to advance, or molest us in our retreat back to 
 Los Santos." 
 
( 109 ) 
 
 Extract of a Letter to C. B. L. dated Villa Franca, 
 May 30th, containing part of the Journal of 
 Operations. 
 
 " Here we remained in peace and quietness 
 till the enemy having collected all his forces, 
 about the 10th of May, put them in motion on 
 the side of Llerena and Monasterio, to move 
 forward, and attempt the relief of Badajos. 
 The Spaniards on the outposts at these places 
 fell back before them, and a part joined me at 
 Villa Franca, on the 11th of May, the rest 
 retiring upon Los Santos, where a part of my 
 division (the 13th dragoons and the Portuguese) 
 were stationed. 
 
 Never in my life did I experience greater 
 anxiety of mind than during this period. My 
 force was left in dispersed situations, whilst 
 the enemy, whose advance and movements I 
 was hourly reporting to head quarters, were 
 concentrated in my front, and on my flanks. 
 Not a single instruction had I received, nor 
 could I obtain, though repeatedly applied for: 
 my route or point of retreat were not even 
 pointed out. I was only desired not to commit 
 the troops under my command against a supe- 
 rior force, but, at the same time, not to lose 
 ground without necessity; an undertaking not 
 very easy of accomplishment in such a country 
 
( no ) 
 
 as this, when their first indication must naturally 
 be so near to me, as to leave the result to chance 
 and the enemy's intentions, rather than to my 
 inclination. 
 
 On the 11th of May, Marshal Soult collected 
 his force at Fuente de Cantos, (on the Monas- 
 terio road), and the corps at Llerena, marched 
 upon Bienvenida and Calzadilla, occupying at 
 the same time Usagre. He pushed patroles to 
 Zafra and Los Santos, and also towards Ribera. 
 On the 12th of May, he made a feint attack 
 upon Los Santos, but was repulsed ; at the 
 same time it was evident, that that post could 
 not long be maintained. 
 
 On the 13th of May he advanced with greater 
 force upon Los Santos, and the officer com- 
 manding there retired. This circumstance, by 
 opening the road of Fuente del Maestre upon 
 my right flank, compelled me also to fall back, 
 which I did accordingly, four hours afterwards, 
 upon Almendralejo, where I halted 1^ hour, 
 and then proceeded by Azeuchal, to Santa 
 Martha. The enemy at the same time appear- 
 ed at Ribera, and carried off some bread des- 
 tined for my troops. 
 
 My whole force being now collected, my 
 apprehensions and my anxiety ceased. My 
 chief danger lay on the side of Solana, where 
 B. General Madden was stationed, and I ur- 
 
( 111 ) 
 
 gently requested him to give me the earliest 
 intimation of the enemy's approach in that 
 direction, and more particularly when he should 
 be obliged to abandon it, which he promised 
 to do. 
 
 On the 14th, the enemy advanced to Almen- 
 dralejo, and occupied likewise Azeuchal. I 
 remained at Santa Martha. 
 
 On the 15th May, they advanced to my ad- 
 vanced posts in front of Santa Martha, and 
 exchanged shots, and it was reported that a 
 considerable body had been seen to advance in 
 the direction of Solana. 
 
 Not having received any report from General 
 Madden, I dispatched a letter to him at 3 a. m. 
 on the morning of the 15th, but the orderlies 
 fell in with a patrole of the enemy, retired re 
 infectd, and left me still in doubt about General 
 Madden's position. Relying on his communi- 
 cating his movements to me, I remained under 
 arms at Santa Martha; and about 11 o'clock 
 dispatched another messenger to ascertain 
 whether or not Solana was really occupied by 
 the enemy, and to open the communication 
 with General Madden. Scarcely had this 
 messenger been sent off half an hour, when we 
 perceived a very strong column of the enemy's 
 cavalry (apparently about 3,000), followed by 
 infantry and artillery, coming over the hills 
 
( H2 ) 
 
 directly down upon Santa Martha. I made 
 every necessary disposition for retreat, and 
 called in the advanced posts. Their nearer 
 approach having fully established their strength, 
 I fell back at a walk to Albuera, detaching the 
 Portuguese brigade in advance, to cover the 
 passage of the bridge at that place. The enemy's 
 advance soon came up with our rear, and they 
 skirmished with us all the way to Albuera. 
 On the road, I received a dispatch ordering 
 me to retire upon Albuera, and near that vil- 
 lage I met the xldjutant-general, who desired 
 me to cross the river and take up a position on 
 the other side. This was done accordingly, 
 and the enemy occupied the ground on this 
 side in our front. At this time, I heard that 
 our infantry were also advancing upon Albuera, 
 the position selected for the inevitable conflict 
 that was approaching. None of these, how- 
 ever, made their appearance for several hours, 
 a circumstance that would have put the enemy 
 in possession of the field of battle without 
 much difficulty, had he been aware of it, and 
 advanced the same evening to the attack. His 
 neglect to do so was our salvation. 
 
 Having taken up the position, I proceeded 
 to reconnoitre the ground, and, to my utter 
 astonishment, found that the heights which 
 formed the key of the position w 7 ere not in- 
 
( 113 ) 
 
 tended to be occupied, but that the lines were 
 drawn up parallel to the Badajos road, con- 
 ceiving the enemy's attack would be directed 
 on our left, and not upon our right. A tyro 
 in military matters ought to have seen other- 
 wise ; and, trembling for the consequences, I 
 could not help pointing out to the Adjutant- 
 general the result of my observations, with the 
 probable consequences that would attend upon 
 the error we were falling into. Soon after, I 
 saw Marshal Beresford reconnoitring the ground 
 himself, and I hoped for better arrangements. 
 In the mean time, I distributed the cavalry 
 along this strong line of defence, and we re- 
 mained quiet during the night, my orders being 
 to maintain that ground till relieved by the 
 Spaniards. 
 
 The morning of the 16th May arrived, but no 
 Spaniards appeared. I again reconnoitred the 
 ground, became confirmed in all my preceding- 
 opinions, and, on my return, I met Colonel 
 D'Urban, who desired me to move off directly 
 the whole of the cavalry to the rear of the British 
 line, on the left of the position ; and he himself 
 marched off with the 4th dragoons, thus aban- 
 doning the defence of the bridge and fords which 
 I had placed them to protect. In the mean time, 
 I had assembled the rest of the cavalry in order 
 to fulfil my instructions, but so convinced was 
 
 i 
 
( 114 ) 
 
 I of the danger attendant on the movement, 
 that I delayed their departure as long as I 
 could. In half an hour afterwards we saw the 
 enemy in motion, pushing a strong corps of 
 cavalry towards the bridge, and crossing the 
 greater part of their force over the rivulet on 
 the right of our position, which evidently was 
 to become the point of attack. I placed the 
 3rd dragoon guards on the ground from whence 
 the 4th dragoons had been removed, to oppose 
 the passage of the river, and distributed the 
 rest on the right. The moment the enemy's 
 movements were reported to Head-quarters, 
 the 4th dragoons were ordered back, and fresh 
 dispositions appeared to be making with the 
 infantry. 
 
 In the mean time, the enemy's column on 
 our left, or rather centre, formed opposite the 
 bridge and ford, opened a cannonade which 
 we answered, and pushed a corps of lancers 
 across the rivulet. I directed the 3rd dragoon 
 guards to charge and beat them back, which 
 was done. The advance of the enemy upon 
 the heights on our right obliged me to make a 
 fresh disposition of the troops. Having placed 
 the artillery, therefore, on the most commanding 
 points, supported by detachments of cavalry, 
 and having left the 4th dragoons (a part of 
 them at least) to keep the enemy in check in 
 
( 115 ) 
 
 our front, I moved down with the rest to the 
 position which I had selected for covering the 
 infantry, and for meeting the enemy defini- 
 tively. 
 
 Whilst in the act of making these arrange- 
 ments, M. General Lumley rode up and as- 
 sumed the command. Having explained to 
 him the nature of the ground, and my ideas 
 and intentions, he adopted them, and the line 
 was formed behind a rugged ditch and rivulet 
 which strengthened our position, and there we 
 awaited the enemy's further operations. I felt 
 convinced they would not dare to cross that 
 ditch and attack us, but at the same time the 
 ground near the source of the ditch offered 
 great advantages for an attack upon the flank 
 of our infantry. I pointed it out as the spot 
 where their exertions would probably be made, 
 and suggested the propriety of placing a Bri- 
 tish regiment in column opposite the opening, 
 to counteract any such attempt on the part of 
 the enemy. This being declined, I obtained 
 permission to place a Spanish corps there, 
 which was done ; but they formed in two lines 
 instead of column, and at too great a distance 
 from the spot I pointed out to be of use. 
 
 Being now called to the right by the enemy's 
 attempts to turn our flank in that direction, 
 I remained there during the rest of the day. 
 
 i 2 
 
( no ) 
 
 The enemy having formed his infantry in 
 columns of attack, proceeded to gain the heights 
 in succession, covered by their immense force 
 of cavalry in the plain before us. 
 
 The fault we had committed now became 
 too evident. Our infantry were hurried on at 
 a trot to anticipate this movement, but arrived 
 too late, and instead of being the defenders of 
 the strongest ground, they had to become the 
 assailants of the enemy, to dispossess him of it. 
 Their gallantry overcame all difficulties. They 
 advanced to the charge under a heavy fire of 
 artillery and musquetry, but the more they 
 advanced, the more their flank became exposed 
 and unprotected; and as the infantry omitted 
 to secure their own flank by throwing back a 
 battalion, or forming a square en potence, the 
 enemy's cavalry took advantage of the omission, 
 charged and routed them on the spot I had 
 predicted, and they were pursued at the same 
 time by their infantry. The day appeared to 
 be lost, but a fresh division of infantry coming 
 up, renewed the attack, and recovered the 
 ground. They, too, having advanced with simi- 
 lar incaution, a fresh attempt was made by the 
 enemy's cavalry to serve them in the same way. 
 Two squadrons of the 4th dragoons were de- 
 tached to their assistance, and a charge made 
 
( 117 ) 
 
 by them with some loss, partially defeated the 
 enemy's intentions. 
 
 The greater part of the infantry being by this 
 time brought into action, the contest was con- 
 tinued with unequalled gallantry, till the ene- 
 my's infantry gave way in all directions, which 
 circumstance compelled their cavalry also to 
 retire. We followed them to support our in- 
 fantry, and thus the battle (as bloody a one as 
 ever was fought) terminated by their flight to 
 the woods whence they had advanced in the 
 morning. 
 
 Be it observed, that not a shot was fired on 
 the ground selected and originally taken up 
 by us for the field of battle, and that the whole 
 contest was carried on upon the strong ground 
 and heights which form the key to the position 
 of Albuera, and which we had neglected to 
 occupy. 
 
 Had the French cavalry advanced and beat 
 ours, the day was infallibly lost, and our army 
 would have been annihilated, for never would 
 retreat have been more difficult and arduous, 
 or have offered greater advantages to a trium- 
 phant, pursuing and active enemy. 
 
 Thank God ! it turned out otherwise, and 
 bravery triumphed. The enemy, however, bore 
 off some trophies of colours and guns, and from 
 
( 118 ) 
 
 this accident will claim the honour of the vic- 
 tory. 
 
 A violent rain fell during the action, and a 
 still severer one during the evening and fol- 
 lowing day. This made the situation of the 
 wounded most pitiable; not a house presented 
 itself for shelter, not a carriage or beast of 
 burden was to be found to transport them to 
 the rear. On the ground, therefore, they re- 
 mained some for 24, many for 48 hours, with 
 bleeding wounds, where they fell, exposed to 
 cold and drenching rain, and many of them 
 stripped to the skin. 
 
 We remained during the night on the field 
 of battle, our very bivouacs in the midst of 
 heaps of the slain and wounded. Fresh dispo- 
 sitions were made of the troops, and they were 
 placed for a second contest, in the event of the 
 enemy re-advancing, as they ought to have 
 been for the first onset. 
 
 We appeared to expect a second attack on 
 the following day, and the position of the troops 
 was strengthened and improved. On the 17th, 
 therefore, we remained tranquilly on our ground, 
 but evident symptoms appeared of the enemy's 
 intention to retire, by the gradual drawing off 
 of the troops formed in line before us. 
 
 On the morning of the 18th May, the fact 
 of their retiring being ascertained, the cavalry 
 
( 119 ) 
 
 moved forward to the position they had occu- 
 pied, where numbers of wounded, English and 
 French, were left on the ground, and in the 
 wood. We pushed back their rear guard of 
 cavalry, followed them into the plain, and there 
 discovered their whole force of cavalry drawn 
 up to protect the retreat of the infantry. On 
 the night of that day we bivouacked on the 
 open plain, about a league on the Albuera side 
 of the village of Corte de Peleas. 
 
 The next morning (19th May) we pushed 
 our advance about a league beyond Corte de 
 Peleas, and found the enemy, infantry and 
 cavalry, posted at Solana. We continued to 
 watch them. 
 
 On the morning of the 20th, they retired to 
 Azeuchal. We pushed on to Solana, where 
 we found several of their dead, and pushed our 
 advance within half a league of Azeuchal, which 
 it endeavoured to enter, but was repulsed. 
 
 On the 21st, we skirmished severely in front 
 of Azeuchal, to press their retreat, but they 
 were obstinate, and both parties maintained 
 their ground. 
 
 On the 22d May, Marshal Beresford directed 
 a division of infantry to advance from Albuera 
 and support the cavalry. The enemy, how- 
 ever, retired in the morning upon Villa Franca, 
 our advance followed them through Azeuchal 
 
( 120 ) 
 
 to a league beyond Almendralejo, the rest of the 
 cavalry marching upon Almendralejo, where it 
 was joined by the infantry, and the whole bi- 
 vouacked there for the night. 
 
 On the 23d May, we resumed our march 
 upon Villa Franca; the advance proceeding to 
 Ribera, which the enemy had that morning 
 evacuated, and, as reported, had fallen back 
 upon Llerena. The cavalry bivouacked in front 
 of Villa Franca, the advance at Ribera. The 
 infantry halted at Almendralejo. 
 
 On the 24th May, the whole of the cavalry 
 moved on to Usagre. Within half a league we 
 fell in with their advanced posts, and observed 
 about 400 formed in column on the heights, in 
 rear of the village. I immediately detached the 
 13th dragoons to turn their right, whilst the 
 Spanish advance, supported by the heavy dra- 
 goons, inarched through the town. 
 
 An almost impassable ravine, which obliged 
 the dragoons to break off by ranks, defeated 
 my intention, and gave the enemy sufficient 
 time to retire upon Villa Garcia. We took up 
 the ground they had relinquished, and made a 
 disposition to meet any attack on the side of 
 Bienvenida, in front of which village, about a 
 league distant, we observed a strong regiment 
 (lancers) drawn up in line. They soon after 
 withdrew and fell back upon Villa Garcia and 
 
( 121 ) 
 
 Llerena. At night the Spaniards remained in 
 front of Usagre, towards Villa Garcia, and the 
 British, Portuguese, and guns, retired behind 
 the defile and bivouacked. 
 
 Early in the morning of the 25th May, 
 reports were brought that strong columns of the 
 enemy's cavalry were advancing from Villa 
 Garcia. General Lumley ordered the whole 
 force to recross the village and defile, and occupy 
 the ground in front of them. I earnestly re- 
 monstrated against this disposition, which in 
 case of a reverse exposed us to annihilation, 
 and I obtained his consent to push over the 
 light cavalry only, and to leave the heavy bri- 
 gade and guns in reserve where they were 
 posted. Scarcely had the light division passed 
 the village, when the enemy's columns disen- 
 gaged, bearing down in all directions, and they 
 opened their guns upon us. A retreat was 
 ordered across the rivulet at various points, and 
 was fortunately accomplished without loss or 
 confusion, the enemy not pressing us hard. A 
 disposition was hastily taken up to defend the 
 passages on the river, and that through the 
 village. The enemy brought their guns toge- 
 ther in battery, which was answered with 
 effect. They now formed their plan of attack, 
 which was to threaten our left, and at the same 
 time push three regiments through the village 
 
( 122 ) 
 
 to make the first attack against the British ; this 
 attack to be supported by a second line, as the 
 troops could be brought in succession through 
 the village. 
 
 The three regiments were permitted to pass 
 through accordingly. Two of them formed in 
 column opposite the 3d Dragoon Guards, the 
 third deployed in line upon their right. At 
 this moment, General Lumley, not aware I be- 
 lieve of their operations, wished to carry the 
 3d Dragoon Guards more to their right, and 
 they were wheeled in column of half squadrons 
 for the purpose, moving behind the rise of 
 ground up which the enemy's columns were 
 advancing, and over a ditch and broken ground 
 which threw several of the horses down, and 
 deranged their regularity. I saw their situa- 
 tion with apprehension, and considered it so 
 critical, as to determine instantly to proceed 
 to the attack of the enemy with the 4th Dra- 
 goons, supported on the left by the 13th Dra- 
 goons. They advanced accordingly, but had 
 not marched 100 yards before I observed the 
 3d Dragoon Guards wheel into line, and Gene- 
 ral Lumley, being made acquainted with the 
 enemy's situation in his front, directed that 
 regiment also to attack . The charge of both was 
 therefore combined and simultaneous, though 
 without any previous concert or agreement upon 
 
( 123 ) 
 
 this head, and both were successful in the highest 
 degree. The enemy was completely routed, 
 and having the defile in his rear, which was 
 choked up with fresh troops, their escape was 
 impeded and their loss proportionate. This 
 amounted to 29 killed on the ground of attack, 
 not counting those killed by the artillery and 
 in the village ; to 78 prisoners exclusive of one 
 Colonel, one Major, two Lieutenants, and one 
 other officer killed, and upwards of 60 horses 
 sent to head quarters, many others having been 
 seized by the Spaniards and converted to their 
 own use. The enemy thus discomfited retired 
 to their former position. 
 
 In the evening, however, they brought up a 
 reinforcement of heavier guns and cannonaded 
 us. This obliged us to retire further from the 
 village, out of range of their shot. They only 
 killed however one of our men. 
 
 The troops took up a retired position during 
 the night leaving only the picquets in advance. 
 The men had been mounted nearly all day, 
 and neither man nor horse had had any thing 
 to eat or drink. The same during the night. 
 The environs presented no resources, and the 
 strength and proximity of the enemy kept us 
 in a state of incessant fatigue and vigilance, 
 exposed all day long to the most distressing 
 effects of a torrid sun, and parched up ground. 
 
( 124 ) 
 
 This state of things could not be continued 
 without destruction to the troops. General 
 Lumley therefore in the morning determined to 
 retreat, and before daybreak drew off the heavy 
 cavalry and guns to a position about a league 
 from Usagre, whence, in the afternoon they fell 
 back to Ribera. He requested me to remain 
 with the rest and bring them off during the 
 night. This I did at eleven o'clock, occupying 
 in the first place a bivouac about a league from 
 the town, and the next morning at day break, 
 marched off leisurely, and without molestation 
 to Ribera. I strongly believe the enemy was 
 not aware of this movement till the day dawned 
 on the morning of the 27th May. In the course 
 of this day the troops were sent to their different 
 cantonments, and occupied Ribera, Villa Franca 
 and Los Santos. General Ballasteros with a 
 few thousand men being stationed at Zafra. 
 
 This little affair has been brilliant, and from 
 being bloodless on our part, gratifying; but 
 what to me is also most gratifying are the ac- 
 knowledgments made by General Lumley both 
 in his letter to Marshal Beresford, and in his 
 orders, as a tribute of approbation for the part I 
 lent in seconding him upon the above occasion. 
 This is all the reward I seek for and desire, 
 and when it is deserved and bestowed, I am 
 perfectly and amply remunerated. 
 
( 125 ) 
 
 May 28th. Every thing remained in statu quo. 
 
 29th. ditto ditto. 
 
 The enemy reconnoitred our advanced posts, 
 but made no demonstrations of attack. Major 
 General Sir William Erskine arrived to assume 
 the command of the united cavalry. 
 
 During the whole of the preceding fortnight, 
 nothing could exceed the fatigue supported by 
 the troops, exposed to a scorching sun by day, 
 and heavy dews by night, without any covering 
 save the canopy of Heaven, often without food, 
 and as far as I am concerned, without a change 
 even of linen; our supplies also uncertain and 
 irregular, a necessary consequence of our posi- 
 tion in large plains close to the enemy's force." 
 
 Extract of a Letter to C. B. L., dated Bivouac, 
 near Vicente, June, 26, 1811. 
 
 " I hope you will ere this have been put 
 in possession of a very long detail I sent from 
 Villa Franca, containing the journal of our pro- 
 ceedings during the most interesting period of 
 our operations in Estremadura. I do not pre- 
 tend to perfect accuracy in my description of 
 what relates to others, but when I narrate what 
 I personally witnessed, you may rely, I hope, 
 
( 126 ) 
 
 not only on my veracity but impartiality. I 
 am of opinion that Marshal Beresford never 
 deserved at my hands, the zeal with which I 
 served him, and endeavoured to merit his good 
 opinion ; but unfortunately the business at 
 Campo Mayor, added to the collision which 
 arose out of the circumstance of a Portuguese 
 Brigade of despicable cavalry having been 
 placed under my command, produced, perhaps, 
 an alienation that he could not easily get over. 
 
 With regard to Lumley's appointment, it 
 certainly arose out of an act of my own. I had 
 written from Santa Martha to state the awk- 
 ward circumstances arising out of the union of 
 the Spanish brigadiers with the force under my 
 command, and I there received a notification 
 that General Lumley would be appointed to do 
 away the difficulty. He did not arrive however, 
 nor did he assume the command, till after I 
 had manoeuvred the cavalry for a considerable 
 time against the enemy on the 16th of May, 
 and was in the act of placing them in that 
 position in which they afterwards defied, under 
 General Lumley, the efforts of a superior enemy. 
 You have seen the reward I have received. 
 
 This is all 1 have to complain of, for certainly 
 I had no pretensions to a command of that 
 magnitude, still less to assume or exercise any 
 control over officers (Spanish) senior to myself. 
 
( 127 ) 
 
 I have just read the Marshal's account, and 
 he has written it with more prudence than was 
 shown in preparing for the contest. The whole 
 sum and substance is confined in the words — 
 " As the heights which the enemy had gained'' 
 (by our having neglected to occupy them, he 
 might have added,) " raked and entirely com- 
 manded our whole position, it became necessary 
 to make every effort to retake and maintain 
 them." Here is a just description of the po- 
 sition as it was taken up, and the cause of that 
 blood that was so profusely spilled in the at- 
 tempt to retrieve the error. The Marshal has 
 here stated the fact, and by his own confession 
 my observations, as to accuracy of narrative, 
 may be appreciated. I have never said half&s 
 much against him as I hear from others very 
 high in authority indeed, and therefore I am 
 convinced that the battle of Albuera will for 
 ever be to General Beresford the most unfortu- 
 nate day for his military reputation that he ever 
 encountered. You will doubtless have seen, 
 read, or heard of various other private accounts 
 of this memorable day, and I only beg that 
 you will abide in your opinion by that which 
 appears the most favourable, and at the same 
 time the most impartial." 
 
( 128 ) 
 
 Extract of a Letter to H. H. dated Bivouac, 
 near Vicente, Jane 26, 1811. 
 
 " I feel deeply the kind interest you take in 
 my behalf, and I am sorry that any circum- 
 stance should deprive me of the full enjoyment 
 I could not but derive from a fair acknowledg- 
 ment of services performed to the best of my 
 ability. But, I must confess, the Marshal, had 
 he had been studiously inclined to throw me 
 in the back ground, could not have adopted a 
 better course than the one he has pursued. His 
 last public dispatch, on the action of Albuera, 
 in which so much is said in favour of his friend, 
 and my successor in command, and not a soli- 
 tary word for me, winds up of the measure of 
 his injustice.* That very column which he 
 describes as menacing so formidably his front, 
 before he was prepared to resist it, was solely 
 repulsed, and kept afterwards in check by the 
 movements of the cavalry and artillery under 
 my immediate orders, and, without at all ques- 
 tioning the superiority of General Lumley's 
 abilities; still, arriving, as he did, in the hour of 
 action, ignorant of the ground, position, or 
 
 * It will be seen in the conclusion whether the full mea- 
 sure was yet meted out. 
 
( 129 ) 
 
 movements of the enemy or of his friends, I 
 may be permitted to say that the greater part 
 of what he did was at my suggestion, and car- 
 ried into effect with my most zealous co- opera- 
 tion. I completely rode down four horses 
 during the action, and the result of all this 
 labour, anxiety, and effort has been to receive 
 the reward of — silence. 
 
 You will see the details which I sent from 
 Villa Franca. With military men the action of 
 Albuera will be a severe blow to the Marshal's 
 reputation, and difficult will it be to wipe away 
 the fact of having exposed his army in a position 
 which he himself in his dispatch describes as 
 being " raked and commanded by heights," 
 which the enemy was permitted to gain without 
 resistance, but from which he could alone be 
 dislodged by torrents of blood, and the exercise 
 of more than human courage. Such an army 
 deserved a better fate than to be placed in such 
 a position. According to every rational calcu- 
 lation their defeat was certain, and had it taken 
 place you would have heard no more of the 
 " Army of the South." I refer you to the facts 
 which history will record, and which indepen- 
 dence and impartiality will dictate for my 
 excuse when thus speaking of others. Had I 
 been his enemy I should not have taken the 
 trouble I did to get him convinced, by personal 
 
 K 
 
( 130 ) 
 
 observation, of his error. I am too much a 
 friend to truth to suffer it to be perverted for 
 the greatness of any one. Let us each have 
 our due, and that is all we are entitled to. 
 
 We require much time to place our army 
 again on the same effective footing it was at the 
 opening of the campaign. The sword and sick- 
 ness have made dreadful havoc in our ranks, 
 and reduced us at least to one-third our num- 
 bers. At Albuera the respective and opposing 
 armies were not unequally matched. From 
 every account I have received from prisoners, 
 &c. they (the enemy) amounted to 24 or 
 25,000 men in all. Ours I estimate at 27,000. 
 The dispersion of our cavalry scarcely left us 
 more than 4 or 500 British at any point, and 
 these, with two regiments of Spaniards that 
 could not be depended upon, were all we had 
 to offer by way of resistance to their numerous 
 and overwhelming columns. The ground, how- 
 ever, favoured us, and the horse artillery did 
 its duty with brilliant effect. They lost a great 
 number of men and from 4 to 500 horses by 
 the operation of this arm alone. Two regi- 
 ments more of British cavalry would have gone 
 near to exterminate the French army, retreat- 
 ing, or rather flying away, in the manner it 
 did/' 
 
( 131 ) 
 
 39, Mount Street, June 29, 1 882. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 I wrote to you at Warrington, about 
 a week ago, respecting a reply which is in pre- 
 paration to the work entitled " Further Stric- 
 tures on Colonel Napier's 3d vol. &c. &c." in 
 which the reputation of my relative, the late 
 General Long, is assailed in no very measured 
 terms of reproach. 
 
 I then expressed my intention of sending 
 you some questions relative to the operations 
 just previous to and immediately connected 
 with the battle of Albuera, when you held the 
 situation of aide-de-camp to General Long. 
 
 As my questions relate to distinct matters 
 of fact, there can, I think, be no impropriety 
 on my part in putting them, nor on your part 
 in answering them. My object is to obtain 
 evidence as to facts, and then to make the best 
 use of it that I can, and for whatever opinions 
 I may advance, or conclusions I may draw from 
 those facts, I am, as I should desire to be, 
 wholly responsible. 
 
 T enclose you the questions, 
 and am, 
 
 very sincerely yours, 
 
 C. E. Long. 
 
 Lt. Col Pitt, $c. $c. 
 
 K 2 
 
( 132 ) 
 
 Royal Barracks, Dublin, 
 3d July, 1832. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 I am favoured with your note of the 
 29th ultimo, requesting me to answer some 
 queries relative to the operations immediately 
 previous to and during the battle of Albuera, 
 when I was holding the situation of Aide-de- 
 Camp to the late Lieutenant-General Long, and 
 in reply beg to assure you, that I feel no hesi- 
 tation in giving answers to such direct questions 
 of fact as yours appear to be, at the same time, 
 adhering most strictly to what I sincerely be- 
 lieve to be truth, to the best of my recollection, 
 without offering any opinion of my own in oppo- 
 sition to those of my superiors in command. 
 
 In complying thus far, I conceive that I am 
 only performing a duty I owe to the memory of 
 a distinguished officer, whose reputation com- 
 manded the esteem of all who knew him. 
 Believe me, 
 
 very sincerely yours, 
 
 Geo. D. Pitt, 
 Lt. Col. 80th Regt. 
 
( 133 ) 
 
 Questions submitted to Colonel Pitt, and his 
 Answers. 
 
 I. 
 
 Q. Did the cavalry, under the orders of B. 
 General Long, on the 15th May, 1811, arrive 
 at Albuera from Santa Martha in great con- 
 fusion, when pushed back from the latter place 
 by the advance of the enemy ? 
 
 A. When the force of the enemy was distinctly ob- 
 served descending from the heights towards the town of 
 Santa Martha, on the loth May, 1811, B. General 
 Long commenced his retreat upon Albuera, where we 
 arrived that afternoon without the least confusion, our 
 rear guard skirmishing and retreating gradually before 
 the advance of the enemy. 
 
 II. 
 
 Q. Was B. General Long, to your know- 
 ledge, continually reporting to Head-quarters 
 the advance and movements of the enemy, 
 previous to their approach upon Santa Martha? 
 
 A. Brigadier-Gen. Long did, to my knowledge, con- 
 tinually report to Head-quarters the advance and move- 
 ments of the enemy previous to and after their approach 
 upon Santa Martha. 
 
 III. 
 
 Q. Did the enemy's force appear to be more 
 numerous than that under B. General Long ? 
 A. The enemy's force, in cavalry alone, was greatly 
 
( '134 ) 
 
 superior to that under the command of General Long, 
 besides which, infantry and artillery were distinctly seen 
 moving upon Santa Martha before we commenced our 
 retreat. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Q. Did B. General Long, in your hearing, 
 express any surprise that infantry were not 
 posted at the height beyond the Faria stream, 
 through which the road from Santa Martha 
 passed ? 
 
 A. B. General Long did more than once express his 
 surprise at not finding the wooded height, above the 
 Faria stream, occupied by infantry at the time we passed 
 it, this he did in my hearing then and often after. 
 
 V. 
 
 Q. Did you understand that B. General 
 Long's orders were to attempt the defence of 
 that height with the cavalry, unsupported by 
 infantry ? and did you hear any Staff-officer 
 at any time remark that B. General Long 
 ought there to have kept the enemy at bay ? 
 
 A. The onlv orders I knew B. Gen. Lon<v to receive 
 were to retire upon Albuera : 1 never heard him or any 
 other person hint at the idea of attempting to defend 
 the height with cavalry ; neither did I hear any Staff- 
 officer or other person remark that General Long should 
 have kept the enemy at bay at that point. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Q. Did you, soon after your arrival with the 
 
( 135 ) 
 
 cavalry at Albuera, when pushed back from 
 Santa Martha, see Marshal Beresford ? 
 
 A. On the arrival of the cavalry at Albuera, when 
 pushed back from Santa Martha, the whole crossed 
 over the bridge : posts were placed along the left bank 
 of the river, the fords watched, and the main body re- 
 tired under the high ground. Some time after this was 
 done, Marshal Beresford rode past our bivouac, and 
 General Long accompanied him to the right of our posi- 
 tion ; this was the first time I saw the Marshal. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Q. Were the cavalry then in considerable 
 confusion ? and did Marshal Beresford on that 
 occasion form them and place them in their 
 position — if so, in what position ? 
 
 A. I did not observe that the cavalry were in any 
 confusion then or at any other period during the day, 
 neither did I see the Marshal conduct them to any 
 position. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Q. By whom, to your knowledge, was B. 
 General Long directed to cross to the left bank 
 of the Albuera ? 
 
 A. I heard Lieut.-Col. Rooke, Assistant Adjutant 
 General, order General Long to cross to the left bank of 
 the Albuera and take up posts, as stated in my answer 
 to Question VI. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Q. Was the cavalry after this ordered to 
 the rear of the line ? and was it by B. General 
 
( 136 ) 
 
 Long's orders that a portion of the cavalry 
 remained to protect the bridge and fords, and 
 did they effect that object? 
 
 A. On the morning of the l6th, the cavalry were 
 moved to the rear of the infantry line, with the exception 
 of some heavy dragoons, which I heard B. General 
 Long order to form opposite to a ford above the bridge, 
 and when the enemy attacked the town and bridge a 
 body of Polish lancers crossed the ford. I was present 
 with General Long at the time, and near the dragoons 
 when he gave them orders to charge, which I saw them 
 do effectually, by driving the lancers in and over the 
 river. 
 
 X. 
 
 Q. At what time did M. General the Hon. 
 W. Lumley arrive and assume the command 
 of the cavalry ? and did you hear B. General 
 Long explain the arrangements to that officer 
 with respect to the disposition of that arm on 
 the right of the line ? 
 
 A. Some time after the charge before mentioned, I 
 was in company with General Long, when M. General 
 the Hon. Sir W. Lumley rode up and assumed the 
 command of the allied cavalry. I heard him explain to 
 Sir William the arrangements he had made with respect 
 to the disposition of that arm on the right, also that he 
 was prepared to obey his orders and render every as- 
 sistance in his power. 
 
 XL 
 
 Q. What did you understand to be the 
 reason of M. General Lumley\s appointment ? 
 
( 137 ) 
 
 A. 1 understood then and since that General Long 
 was superseded in the command of the allied cavalry 
 in consequence of there having been Spanish brigadiers 
 senior to him, and, to prevent any jealousy or misunder- 
 standing, an officer of higher rank was appointed to 
 command the whole. 
 
 XII. 
 
 Q. Was B. General Long actively engaged 
 throughout the day ? 
 
 A. B. General Long was actively engaged through- 
 out the day. 
 
 XIII. 
 
 Q. Did B. General Long in your hearing 
 express great anxiety about the right flank 
 of the infantry, near to the source of a ditch 
 where the charge of the Polish lancers took 
 place ? and did he suggest the placing some 
 force near the spot to repel any attack that 
 might be made ? 
 
 A. B. General Long did in my hearing express 
 great anxiety about the right flank of the British in- 
 fantry, and his regret that a corps of Spanish cavalry 
 did not advance to the ground he observed he had 
 pointed out for them to occupy : this took place pre- 
 vious to the charge made by the Polish lancers upon 
 
 the British infantry. 
 
 Geo. D. Pitt, 
 
 Lieut. Colonel 80th Regt. and Aide- de-Camp 
 to the late Brig. Gen. Long. 
 Royal Barracks, 
 Dublin, July 3, 1832. 
 
( 138 ) 
 
 The author cannot conclude the execution of 
 the task he has undertaken, so far as it is con- 
 nected with the defence of General Long from 
 the accusations contained in the " Further 
 Strictures," without directing the attention of 
 the reader to one very material point, viz. that 
 the very nature of the defence is egoistical, and 
 as such, in some degree prejudicial to General 
 Long's cause. Confidential communications 
 contained in letters to relatives and private 
 friends form a considerable portion of that de- 
 fence, and the accused is thus, of necessity, 
 made as it were the trumpeter of his own ex- 
 ploits. Had the case been otherwise, had 
 General Long been alive to meet the accusa- 
 tions of his opponents, he might have given a 
 narrative of the transactions freed from the im- 
 purities of a careless epistolary style, and the 
 duty of conducting his defence would not have 
 been consigned to the unaided efforts of one so 
 little fitted for the task of a military critic. But 
 there is happily more than that barren and proof- 
 less assertion whose value must depend upon the 
 character of him who makes it. The evidence of 
 those officers whose testimony has been sought 
 for, (and who, it should be observed, were solely 
 applied to as witnesses, and not attempted to 
 be enlisted as partisans,) demands, as it de- 
 serves, something beyond the simple and sha- 
 
( 139 ) 
 
 dowy emptiness of anonymous contradiction, 
 and, like the cross-bow, its force is fortunately 
 not rendered less effective through the weakness 
 of the arm by which its arrows are propelled. 
 
 All bitterness and personal hostility, saving 
 only that which has been engendered by the 
 work in question, the author at once renounces; 
 and most willingly would he have been spared 
 the hateful task which has thus obliged him, 
 perhaps, to do violence to those kindred feel- 
 ings which must always be honoured, and 
 which he had never desired to wound. But the 
 public will judge on which side this aggression 
 originated. A solemn duty to the dead was to 
 be discharged, a defence of the defenceless, and 
 it has been done. 
 
 There is, however, still remaining one sup- 
 plementary portion of the history of this unfor- 
 tunate association with Marshal Beresford, 
 which, although irrelevant to the immediate 
 matter in dispute, is yet in strict accordance 
 with the general nature of the narrative. 
 
 On the occasion of the distribution of the 
 medals for the battles of Albuera and Vittoria, 
 General Long received the latter and not the 
 former. In consequence of this marked omis- 
 sion he addressed a communication, through 
 Sir Henry Torrens, to H. R. H. the Duke of 
 York, complaining of this exception and ten- 
 
( 140 ) 
 
 dering the return of the Vittoria medal, " for," 
 as he most justly observed, " if the exception 
 in this case,'' viz. Albuera, " was merited, I 
 could evidently have had no claim whatever to 
 any greater degree of consideration or favor for 
 my services at Vittoria," and, as the author 
 would ,add, if General Long did not deserve a 
 medal at Albuera, he deserved a court-martial. 
 The official answer returned from the Horse 
 Guards was, that the consideration of his case 
 " did not come within the rules and regulations 
 laid down for the grant of such distinctions," 
 and that upon his returning the Vittoria medal 
 " the notification of the distinction would be 
 cancelled in the Gazette." On the receipt of 
 this reply, General Long having examined the 
 rules (which will be found in the subjoined 
 note)* returned the following reply. 
 
 * l. 
 
 No general officer shall be considered entitled to receive 
 medals, unless he has been personally and particularly en- 
 gaged upon those occasions of great importance and peculiar 
 brilliancy, in commemoration of which the Prince Regent may 
 be graciously pleased to bestow such marks of distinction. 
 
 2. 
 
 No officer shall be considered as a candidate for the medal 
 or badge, except under the special selection and report of the 
 Commander of the Forces upon the spot, as having merited 
 the distinction by conspicuous services. 
 
( 141 ) 
 
 July 10, 1814. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I have to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 letter of the 2d instant, which was only left at 
 my lodgings late in the evening of the 4th 
 instant. I beg you will be pleased to acquaint 
 H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, that having 
 at length obtained the sight of a Gazette con- 
 taining the rules and regulations to which you 
 have referred, as regulating the distinctions to 
 be conferred upon officers, I perceive by the 
 2d & 3d articles that the act of recommen- 
 dation, which determines exclusively the pre- 
 tensions of officers, is vested in the discretion 
 and rests entirely at the option of the Com- 
 mander of the Forces for the time being, and 
 consequently that the ungracious exception of 
 which I have complained appears to admit of 
 no appeal. It becomes my duty, therefore, to 
 submit; but in so doing, I have at least the satis- 
 faction of being able to appreciate every accu- 
 rately the real circumstances of the case, and I 
 find in this discovery abundant cause for conso- 
 lation. I am content, therefore, that the injury 
 intended me should rest where I shall not fail to 
 
 3. 
 
 That the Commander of the Forces shall transmit to the 
 Commander in Chief returns signed by himself, specifying the 
 names and ranks of those officers whom he shall have 
 selected as peculiarly deserving. 
 
( 142 ) 
 
 place it. I accept with pleasure the distinction 
 conferred at the recommendation of His Grace 
 the Duke of Wellington, and I leave Lord Beres- 
 forcl to reconcile as he can to his own sense of 
 justice and consistency, the fact of having trans- 
 mitted to me a public vote of thanks with the 
 annexed and expressed assurance that it was 
 for my " distinguished conduct and exertions 
 in the memorable battle of Albuera/' and in 
 the very teeth of this assurance to feel himself 
 justified in excluding my name from the list of 
 officers who were actually recommended by 
 him for those marks of His Majesty's gracious 
 approbation, which are the allotted rewards of 
 " distinguished conduct and exertion" in the 
 field. 
 
 I, Sir, did not presume thus to describe any 
 services of mine, but His Royal Highness is now 
 in possession of* the high authority that did so 
 describe them to me. 
 
 It has become my further duty to state for His 
 Royal Highness's information, that for some time 
 previous to the battle of Albuera, I had held the 
 command of the whole of the British Cavalry 
 and Horse Artillery south of the Tagus, and 
 that from the absence of Major General Lumley 
 I continued to have that honor at the com- 
 mencement and in the early part of the action, 
 during which time I had the opportunity to 
 
( 143 ) 
 
 employ both arms efficaciously and successfully 
 in repelling the enemy's efforts at a very critical 
 moment, and (as appeared to my judgment) 
 at a very critical point. 
 
 I will not permit myself to enter further into 
 the details of that day's proceedings, however 
 pleased I should be at the opportunity of doing 
 so, nor will I attempt to draw any invidious 
 comparisons between those who were equally 
 zealous, inclined, and anxious to support on that 
 trying occasion the honor and interests of their 
 sovereign and country. I have only to lament, 
 so far as I am personally concerned, that pri- 
 vate feelings should ever be permitted to influ- 
 ence the conduct of any commander when 
 discharging officially the duties of a great 
 public trust. 
 
 I have the honor to be, 
 Your most obedient humble servant, 
 
 R. B. Long, 
 
 M. Gen. Torrens, M. Gen 1 ." 
 
 &c. &c. 
 
 It would be the height of arrogance and pre- 
 sumption to put the professional services of 
 General Long on a par with those of that able 
 and excellent officer and man, the late Lord 
 Collingwood. But there is in the Life of that 
 distinguished commander a case in the distri- 
 bution of medals so strikingly similar in the 
 injustice of its application, although not equally 
 
( 144 ) 
 
 analogous in the reparation of that injustice, 
 that an allusion to it cannot be deemed super- 
 fluous. 
 
 " In the capricious distribution of rewards 
 which followed on that day," viz. the " glorious 
 1st of June," " Captain Collingwoocl," says his 
 biographer, p. 24, " found with extreme mortifi- 
 cation and concern, that his services were pass- 
 ed over by Lord Howe without notice, though 
 the rear admiral with whom he sailed was men- 
 tioned with well merited praise." " This act of 
 injustice," he continues, " created much sur- 
 prize in the fleet, and particularly in Captain 
 Pakenham of the Invincible, who used to say, 
 1 If Colli ngwood has not deserved a medal, 
 neither have I ; for we were together the whole 
 day.' • 
 
 In 1797 " when Lord St. Vincent," it is 
 added, p. 46, " informed Captain Collingwood 
 that he was to receive one of the medals which 
 were distributed on this occasion," viz. the 
 battle of Cape St. Vincent, " he told the ad- 
 miral with great feeling and firmness, that he 
 could not consent to receive a medal, while 
 that for the 1st of June was withheld. " I 
 feel," he said, " that I was then improperly 
 passed over ; and to receive such a distinction 
 now would be to acknowledge the propriety of 
 that injustice." " That is precisely the answer 
 which I expected from you, Captain Colling- 
 
( 145 ) 
 
 wood,' was Lord St. Vincent's reply." The 
 two medals were subsequently transmitted by 
 Lord Spencer, and, as Lord Collingwood ob- 
 served, " the king ordered the medal of the 1st 
 June to be sent to me, with that for February 
 in spite of Lord Howe. ******" 
 
 To add further comment would be to mutilate 
 the resemblance. It needs none. 
 
lon don: 
 
 C. ROWORTH AND SONS, Bfii.L YARD, 
 TEMPLB-BAR. 
 

 SECOND LETTER 
 
 CHARLES EDWARD LONG, Esq., 
 
 ON THE 
 
 MS. JOURNAL AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 
 
 OF THE LATE 
 
 Lieut-Gen. R, B. LONG ; 
 
 BY 
 
 GENERAL 
 
 LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD, G.C.B 
 
 LONDON: 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 
 
 MDCCCXXXIV. 
 
LONDON : 
 
 Printed by William Clowes, 
 
 Duke-street, Lambeth. 
 
A SECOND LETTER 
 
 TO 
 
 C. E. LONG, Esq. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I regret being obliged by the tenor of 
 your late publication to enter again on the discussion 
 of those parts of General Long's military career and 
 correspondence which formed the subject of my pre- 
 vious letter to you. The further considerations 
 which I have to offer will be compressed into as 
 short a space as possible; and, without any profes- 
 sions of candour, any inquiry into the motives that 
 may have led you to continue the controversy, or any 
 observation on the prudence of such a measure, I 
 shall at once proceed to the refutation of those pas- 
 sages in your late Pamphlet which I conceive to be 
 erroneous, and to which I shall strictly confine my 
 attention. — However widely we may differ on many 
 points, I can assure you, sir, that such differences of 
 
 B 
 
opinion can never excite in me any angry feelings 
 towards yourself, neither shall they ever betray me 
 into any uncourteousness of expression; but, as this 
 is the last notice that I shall ever allow myself to 
 take of these matters, you will not be surprised at 
 my producing on the present occasion such evidence 
 as I have in my possession, with such remarks upon 
 it as I feel requisite to the proof and establishment of 
 my case. 
 
 I have no doubt, sir, with regard to the opinion 
 which the public will form of that correspondence, in 
 which your relative privately detailed to his friends 
 at home a long catalogue of grievances against his 
 superior officer, of which not a single hint was ever 
 heard among his comrades abroad. I have made, 
 you say*, " all but direct assertions that he was in the 
 " daily habit of forwarding to his family and friends 
 " deliberate misrepresentations of facts, for the express 
 " purpose of injuring the credit of his commander." — 
 The conclusion, sir, is your own ; and I will not dis- 
 turb it by any observations of mine. — I have nothing 
 to do with the motives from which the errors of 
 General Long's statements sprung. My only concern 
 is with the errors themselves, and to them my obser- 
 vations will be exclusively addressed. 
 
 You state f that I devoted " no less than three 
 " pages to a discussion respecting the word * differ- 
 " ences.' " — I was not conscious that any doubt existed, 
 
 * Letter to Lord Beresforcl, p. 7. f P- *2, 
 
or had been entertained, respecting the meaning of 
 the word; but, as you seemed to advance it as a 
 fact of which several officers were aware, that differ- 
 ences had occurred between myself and your late 
 relative, and that my feelings towards him had been 
 consequently warped, I thought it right to prove 
 that your information on that point was incorrect. 
 It appears, however, that I mistook your meaning. 
 And, as you now say that you " did not mean to 
 " allude to early differences antecedent to the affair of 
 " Campo Maior, or of any particular quarrel subse- 
 H quent," it is manifest that, whatever General Long 
 might find to object to in my conduct towards him on 
 military points, I could not have been influenced by 
 any feelings of personal prejudice, The short pre- 
 vious intercourse that subsisted between us from the 
 15th to the 25th of March was more likely to pre- 
 possess me in his favour, than against him. We were 
 evidently, at that time, mutually well disposed towards 
 each other. He says, in one of his letters : " From the 
 " three days' intercourse I have had with the Marshal, 
 " I am disposed to like him exceedingly. I find him 
 " unreserved, affable, open, sociable, and obliging, and 
 " the revolution he has effected here" (alluding to the 
 discipline of the Portuguese infantry) " bespeaks his 
 ability."— This extract has been published by yourself 
 from your late relative's letter of the 21st March, 1811; 
 and I do not comprehend why, or in what manner, 
 any difference of opinion that I might have had with 
 General Long on purely military matters should have 
 
 b2 
 
force to annul the good qualities which are ascribed 
 to me above ; and it most certainly could never have 
 undisciplined the Portuguese army. — You proceed 
 to acquit me of any hostile feelings towards General 
 Long during the time of his remaining under my 
 command, although you produce reasons to show why 
 your relative should not have been equally well 
 disposed towards myself. " The schoolmaster," you 
 say, " does not suffer from the e ffect of his own 
 " lecture or his own rod. The scholar does, and, 
 " perhaps, profits by them." — Your illustration, sir, is 
 most defective. The poor schoolboy has no one to 
 look to for redress. The officer, and more especially 
 the general officer, is not placed in so unfriended a 
 position. He knows that he has an effectual resource 
 under any species of military wrong to which he may 
 be subjected. And I am not acquainted with a 
 single officer who would have refrained from 
 appealing to it, if he had encountered any kind of 
 indignity, oppression, or injustice. But if, sir, your 
 simile fails in this case, in another particular it 
 applies more justly. The schoolboy gives vent in 
 private complaints to those angry feelings which 
 are engendered by the imaginary injuries of his peda- 
 gogue, and against which he cannot venture to offer 
 any public remonstrance. In this respect, I admit 
 that the figure you have employed is admirably 
 descriptive of the case. With regard to that conduct, 
 in defence of which you do not appear to have any 
 excuse to suggest, I continue to hold the same opinion 
 
that I expressed in my previous letter to you. The 
 only palliative that you have attempted to advance 
 is one drawn from the precedents afforded by the 
 practice of others : of itself a miserable plea and no 
 justification. — But, in this instance, the very pre- 
 cedents adduced afford no authority for the conduct of 
 General Long. — The circumstances bear no resem- 
 blance. In General Long's case, the party who con- 
 ceived himself aggrieved and was most interested 
 in giving a peculiar colouring to the transactions, 
 was the person who had recourse to private corre- 
 spondence as the means of gaining circulation for his 
 own views. In both the other cases which you have 
 cited, the parties could have had no personal interest 
 whatever to influence the accounts they delivered of 
 the events, and they had no other object in writing than 
 to describe what actually occurred, or what appeared 
 to them to be the truth. You have referred to Sir 
 Benj. D'Urban's tetter, dated 29th August, 1811. 
 He sent it to me with other papers, three or 
 four years since, from Demerara. It was originally 
 written in answ T er to a friend, who had communicated 
 to him the various reports concerning the battle of 
 Albuera, which, flowing from some hidden source, 
 had obtained circulation in London. The letter 
 touches upon points which must, then, have been 
 fresh in the mind of the Quartermaster-general of 
 the allied army. It contains an account of many of 
 the principal events of the time. The reader will 
 perceive that such a letter, written at such a moment, 
 
in refutation of error, and by a person who could 
 have had no reason either for concealing or mis- 
 representing the truth, is a document deserving the 
 highest possible degree of credit and consideration. 
 With regard to the statement of Lieut-General Sir 
 William Lumley, I cannot understand why that 
 officer, because he had " never up to the summer of 
 " 1832 entered upon those occurrences in writing 
 " even with his oldest friends," should therefore 
 refrain in 1833 from giving the information which 
 was required of him, and which he considered him- 
 self called upon by common justice to afford. The 
 public, sir, will fully comprehend and appreciate Sir 
 W. Lumley's reasons for remaining silent on the 
 affairs of the Peninsula in 1832, when applied to by 
 yourself in the cause of General Long, since it has 
 been shown that he had no intelligence to give which 
 could have answered your object, or which would 
 have proved of a welcome description. It is a work 
 of supererogation even to say thus much in reply to 
 your observations on the statements of two officers 
 so much esteemed and honoured wherever they 
 are known, as Sir Benj. D'Urban and Sir Wm. 
 Lumley. Be well assured, sir, that censure, 
 whether direct, or by insinuation, levelled against 
 such persons, cannot fail of proving pernicious to 
 the cause of the advocate who allows himself to 
 hazard it. 
 
 I have said in my letter, that " after my command 
 " had ceased, I never, to the best of my recollection, 
 
" came again in contact with General Long." You 
 doubt the accuracy of the account, and appeal to "a 
 "certain controversy respecting two Portuguese Aides 
 "de Camp." I have a perfect recollection of that 
 circumstance, and did not overlook it when making 
 the statement to which you object. But, I believe 
 that even on that occasion no direct communication 
 took place between General Long and myself. He 
 was not at the time under my command. The act of 
 which he complained was my ordering, I conclude 
 through the Adjutant General of the Army, the two 
 officers whom I considered to be employed contrary 
 to the rules of the service to join their regiments. It 
 was most satisfactorily proved that I was correct 
 hi my view of the subject, and in the course 
 which I consequently adopted ; for my orders were 
 confirmed by the Duke of Wellington, to whom 
 General Long appealed, and were immediately car- 
 ried into effect. The Commander in Chief, as is 
 usual on such occasions, forwarded to me General 
 Long's letter of appeal, and I wrote my reply, per- 
 fectly aware that it would also be submitted to the 
 inspection of General Long. But I do not think 
 that we were brought into personal contact with each 
 other, or that even any direct correspondence ever 
 passed between us. Such was the sum of this trans- 
 action. I regret, sir, that you did not publish the 
 whole of my letter on this occasion, as it would have 
 rendered the case more clear. 
 
 I do not feci mvself at all hurt at your being com- 
 
8 
 
 pellet! occasionally " to doubt the perfect accuracy of 
 " my recollections." The events happened a great 
 many years ago ; and, never imagining that I should 
 be so unfortunately called upon to engage in this 
 public discussion of them, I did not, at the time, adopt 
 the precautions, which I might have taken, and 
 which experience has shown to be so expedient, of 
 furnishing myself with memoranda to which reference 
 might afterwards be made to support or to refresh 
 my recollections of facts. But still my memory is, I 
 believe, pretty correct respecting them. It was for- 
 tunate for me, perhaps, that the various rumours then 
 propagated in England came to the knowledge of 
 myself and many others, and naturally led us to 
 reconsider the then recent events, to compare our. 
 views of them, and to discuss them so fully and so 
 frequently as served to impress them indelibly upon 
 our memories. To the several false reports concerning 
 those events which we were continually receiving, I 
 am most probably indebted for much of the vividness 
 with which many of the minor events are still remem- 
 bered ; though, as you will readily believe, sir, from 
 the nature of my position, the greater and more pro- 
 minent transactions of the time — at least such as can 
 be matter of doubt — are those of which I was not 
 only best informed and am likely to have the clearest 
 recollection, but with regard to which no other person 
 can be acquainted ; except the few officers immediately 
 about me, and who, from their military position, were 
 necessarily in my confidence. — In concluding the pre- 
 
9 
 
 fatory part of your letter you say, " I shall number these 
 " charges, (those advanced in the 'Strictures ) " sub- 
 " joining a short notice of your lordship's confirmation 
 " of them, or, through their abandonment, of your 
 " virtual contradiction of them." I only quote this 
 passage for the purpose of protesting against the in- 
 terpretation which you have put upon my silence. 
 There are, I believe, many statements made in your 
 " Reply" which I forbore noticing — as I shall, per- 
 haps, many more on the present occasion — on differ- 
 ent accounts, — sometimes because they did not appear 
 to be of the slightest consequence, and, at others, be- 
 cause I really did not happen to know anything about 
 them. Such, for instance, was the case with regard 
 to Col. Colborne's position at Campo Maior. When 
 writing my "Letter" to you, I was really ignorant 
 of the matter. I have since, however, received some 
 information upon it, and shall be able to gratify you 
 with such an explanation as will most satisfactorily 
 prove that I never intended my silence on that or any 
 other point to be considered as a virtual abandonment 
 of it. But, sir, as this is a principle which you lay 
 down, I necessarily conclude it to have been the prin- 
 ciple on which you have acted yourself; and that all 
 those parts of my letter to you are to be considered 
 as unanswerable which you have omitted to notice. 
 
 I shall not, sir, imitate the tone of irony in which 
 you have thought it expedient to address me. In 
 discussions of this kind, which relate to mere matters 
 of fact, any deviation from the plain straightforward 
 
10 
 
 style of writing must, whether adopted with that in- 
 tent or not, always have the effect of bewildering the 
 reader, and seems to betray a want of confidence in 
 the force and connection of our proofs. I now pro- 
 ceed to reconsider those charges of misconduct in 
 and from General Long, which you have made the 
 object of your attention. 
 
 The first point which you have touched upon, is 
 your relative's extraordinary detour at Campo Maior, 
 with regard to which, after quoting the words of the 
 " Further Strictures" you add, " the enemy, per- 
 " ceiving that the movement was made, began to 
 l< retire to Badajoz ; by which means your lordship's 
 " intentions of surprising and capturing the whole 
 " were frustrated." 
 
 The expectation of ''surprising" the enemy, which 
 you have here ascribed to me, is particularly unfor- 
 tunate. General Long informs us in the letters which 
 you have published, that the enemy had discovered 
 our approach on the preceding evening, and again 
 early that morning. He also tells us, that he had 
 seen them previously to the commencement of his 
 detour; that they reciprocally manoeuvred ; and that, 
 being in sight f them, he halted "to wait for 
 further orders." — You will, therefore, see, sir, that 
 the intentions which you have imputed to me 
 could never have engaged my mind; as I never 
 could by any possibility have designed to surprise an 
 enemy, whom I knew, by the usual reports and by 
 ocular demonstration, to be fully aware of my pre- 
 
11 
 
 sence. But to return to the fact. — You are " willing 
 " to srive to me the benefit of the detour to the fullest 
 " extent of Col. Doyle's evidence, of which evidence," 
 (you say) " I approve." This latter conclusion is 
 perfectly gratuitous, and not warranted by any ex- 
 pressions of my letter to you, not even by the passage 
 you have produced in proof of it. I certainly said, 
 as you have quoted, that " nothing can be more fair 
 " than the manner in which that officer's statements 
 " are made." But I added, which you have not quoted, 
 " It is manifest that he always speaks with perfect 
 " impartiality and to the best of his recollection" I 
 still entertain the same opinion of Col. Doyle's state- 
 ment. It was made, I am convinced, according to 
 the best of his recollection ; but that I did not think 
 that recollection always accurate, has been shown in 
 my previous letter to you, on more than one occasion. 
 I approve the spirit in which Col. Doyle's evidence 
 is given ; but I am very far from approving all the 
 details of the evidence itself. But, sir, I cannot com- 
 prehend why you should think lit to tie me down to 
 the evidence of this officer, unless it be with the view 
 of keeping out of the reader's sight the far stronger 
 weight of opposite authorities adduced by myself upon 
 the same subject, which is a most principal one, not 
 only in a military point of view, but as being the 
 primary cause of this most disagreeable discussion. 
 Besides the evidence of Col. Doyle on this detour, 
 we have that of Sir Henry Hardinge, and of General 
 
12 
 
 Long himself, with, — which is of more weight than 
 all, — the broad and plain fact of the Commander in 
 Chief having sent twice, at the time and on the spot, 
 to inform General Long that he was making too wide 
 a circuit, and acting in disobedience to his orders. 
 This, sir, is the plain state of the case, which it is 
 impossible for you to controvert, and which, when 
 Col. Doyle, an officer of some experience, gives due 
 attention to, he will immediately perceive that, whe- 
 ther your relative's detour w T as, or was not, too 
 extended, can no longer be "a matter of opinion," 
 In such a case, no one can have an opinion except the 
 Commander in Chief on the spot. His orders are 
 imperative; and, if every subordinate officer were to 
 be allowed to deviate from them at discretion, he 
 would, as in the present instance, be deprived of the 
 direction of his own troops. I certainly object to your 
 deciding the question of General Long's detour by the 
 evidence of Col. Doyle alone; though he most dis 
 tinctly shows how incorrect you were in saying no 
 detour was made, and proves, as every military man 
 will see, that it must have been pretty considerable, 
 when he says that " in the course of the live miles' trot 
 the troops had frequently to bring up their left shoulders 
 to meet the enemy." But, sir, your relative's own 
 description of this movement, even without the facts 
 and statements adduced in my former letter to you, 
 is quite sufficient to establish the extent of it. — This, 
 however, is really of very little importance. — General 
 
13 
 
 Long disobeyed my orders twice sent to him : he 
 withdrew the cavalry from my immediate direction 
 and controul : what his own views and intentions 
 were it was impossible for me to divine; but be so 
 entirely separated the cavalry from the infantry, that, 
 whatever my views and intentions might have been, 
 the execution of them was necessarily frustrated. You 
 have, sir, allowed yourself to be somewhat ironical 
 respecting the objects I had in contemplation. I am 
 not aware by what possible means they could have 
 become known to you, as the only intimation respect- 
 ing them that has fallen from myself, was with regard 
 to the case of the enemy's retaining possession of 
 Campo Mai or ; — a case which did not occur. 
 
 I now proceed to the Ravine, which General Long 
 conjured up, as his excuse for disobeying my instruc- 
 tions. 
 
 u It is," you say, " as obvious as words can make 
 " it, that this ravine was met with in approaching 
 " Campo Maior," and in proof of this position you 
 refer me to General Long's journal as given in the 
 41st page of your ' ; Reply" and his letter to General 
 Le Marchant, in the 75th page of the same pub- 
 lication. 
 
 I have, sir, consulted the 4 1st page of your "Reply," 
 and do not there find it intimated that your relative met 
 with any the least impediment in his progress towards 
 Campo Maior. His words are, " I was directed to 
 " move circling round a considerable height, over 
 
14 
 
 u which the infantry marched, but from which I was 
 " separated by a deep ravine ;" but he does not say 
 that he had this ravine to pass. He describes him- 
 self, on the contrary, "as trotting away with the light 
 " gentry," (cavalry), and, ''after driving the enemy's 
 " picquets from the positions they occupied, at length 
 " passing over a considerable plain, which brought 
 " him to a small ridge from whence he looked down 
 '? on the town of Campo Maior, &c." 
 
 From page 41 of your "Reply," I turn to page 75, 
 to which you have also referred me ; and there only, 
 or rather in the following page, I find that General 
 Long mentions and describes a ravine which separated 
 him from our infantry, and which he had to pass be- 
 fore he came in sight of Campo Maior ; but in cross- 
 ing which he does not appear to have encountered 
 any opposition. Thus, in his journal of the 28th of 
 March, written at most three days after the affair, he 
 omits mentioning an obstacle of which, just one month 
 after the affair occurred, he has a most clear and par- 
 ticular recollection, and which actually led to no result 
 whatever. 
 
 But how, sir, did it happen that you have neglected 
 to notice an intermediate letter of your relative- 
 intermediate both with regard to its date and its posi- 
 tion in your " Reply?" — In a letter from Los Santos, 
 of 22nd of April, 1811, only three days earlier than 
 that to General Le Marchant, General Long says, 
 " Our debut at Campo Maior, but for the untimely 
 
15 
 
 " interference of others, would have been attended 
 " with perfect success and little loss. The official 
 " representation I have seen of it in the Lisbon 
 " Gazette is very unfair. The Marshal says, the 
 " movement I made to get round the town was more 
 " circuitous than he wished ; he should have added 
 " the reason, namely , that, ignorant of the ground, 
 iC he ivas not aware that a deep and impassable ravine 
 " separated me from the enemy, and prevented my 
 '• getting over at any other spot but where I did ; 
 " but even with this fact, I maintain that my column 
 " was never more distant from the town than he 
 " directed!' 
 
 If you will turn to the official document, to which 
 your relative above alludes, and by which he would 
 make it appear that injustice had been done him, you 
 will perceive that he could have nothing to object to 
 in any observations of mine respecting his conduct on 
 our approaching Campo Maior, as in that part of the 
 official account of the affair I neither mention his 
 name, nor make any allusion to him whatever. It is 
 evident, sir, from my despatch that, while approaching 
 the town, we did not meet with any opposition from 
 the enemy, and that even the skirmishing did not 
 commence till we arrived under the walls. Such 
 was the fact. 
 
 Indeed, General Long and I are both agreed that 
 the enemy's force was first seen by us respectively on 
 our approaching the height, about a mile distant from 
 Campo Maior; — he says in one place "about 1200 
 
16 
 
 yards." We are both agreed upon the orders he 
 received, which were, he says, " to lead the column 
 " of light cavalry so as to turn and gain the rear of 
 " the town," or rather, according to the terms of my 
 despatch, " to turn the enemy's right, keeping out 
 " of the reach of the place." We are also both 
 agreed that these orders were given and received, 
 after he had arrived and halted in sight of Campo 
 Maior and of the enemy's main force. What then 
 could any movement he made, or any impediment he 
 met with in the execution of my orders after this, 
 have to do with a ravine which he had long before 
 passed, and left in the rear ? Or why should General 
 Long complain, or defend himself upon a point to 
 which there was not the slightest allusion made in 
 the official account of the affair to which he objects ? 
 My despatch does not mention any delay occasioned, 
 or any circuit made by General Long in our approach 
 to the town, nor say that he was directed to go round 
 it before he saw it, or knew any reason for such a 
 measure ; but it does state that, after he had halted 
 in sight of Campo Maior and the enemy, and after he 
 had received my orders to turn the right of the 
 enemy, who were then halted under our eyes, he 
 " made a greater circuit than was necessary." It 
 was this remark that he complained of in his private 
 letter, when he observes, " The Marshal says, the 
 u movement I made to get round the town was more 
 ** circuitous than he wished ; he should have added 
 "the reason, that, ignorant of the ground, he was 
 
17 
 
 c< not aware that a deep and impassable ravine sepa- 
 u rated me from the enemy, and prevented my getting 
 " over at any other spot than where I did." It is in 
 this passage, sir, " as obvious as words can make it," 
 that General Long pleaded the impediment of " an 
 " impassable ravine" as his excuse for not carrying 
 my orders into effect, and making a less circuit than 
 he did make. I do not dispute his saying that, in the 
 earlier part of the day, he had " a ravine on his right;" 
 but he does not describe that ravine as separating him 
 from the enemy, but from our own infantry. However, 
 with that ravine, or any other ravine, which your re- 
 lative met, or fancied, I have nothing to do ; the only 
 ravine with which I am concerned is the one which 
 General Long, in discussing the correctness and com- 
 plaining of the justice of my official account, alleged as 
 his excuse for not acting in compliance with my com- 
 mands. He most distinctly states, that he encoun- 
 tered this " impassable ravine" in the course of his 
 second movement, that is, after halting to receive my 
 final instructions, and whilst proceeding in the execu- 
 tion of them. He says, expressly, that he met with this 
 obstacle during his movement to get round the town, 
 which, according to his own account, he received orders 
 to do after his halt. I need not pursue this subject. 
 It is incontrovertible that your relative, as stated in 
 my former letter, describes himself as having been 
 prevented by an impassable ravine from fulfilling my 
 orders ; a fact, sir, which you could not for a moment 
 have doubted, had you not overlooked—- though you 
 
 c 
 
18 
 
 had published it — your relative's letter to E. H. of 
 the 22d of April. It is also equally incontrovertible 
 from the evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge, Sir W. 
 Lumley, and Col. Doyle, that no such ravine was in 
 his way. 
 
 But General Long also speaks of a " ditch, or 
 rivulet," and you reproach me for having given a 
 partial quotation from a passage of his journal, and 
 omitting all mention of this circumstance. I shall 
 now cite the whole passage. Having forgotten his 
 impassable ravine, he says, ;c It is necessary to ob- 
 " serve, that I led the Light Division over a ridge of 
 " heights and broken ground, which overlooked the 
 " valley in which the enemy were formed, and through 
 " which ran a nasty, boggy, and almost impassable 
 " ditch." In my former letter, sir, I quoted only the 
 first part of this passage, as confirmatory of my own 
 and Sir Henry Hardinge's statement, and to shew, 
 from your relative's own account, that, notwithstand- 
 ing the ravine which we have just discussed, he 
 encountered no real impediment to his movement. I 
 have no objection whatever to the existence of this 
 " nasty, boggy, and almost impassable ditch." I can- 
 not perceive how it affected General Long's operations, 
 who only looked down upon it from the heights on 
 which he was moving, and perceived it in the valley 
 below, where he describes the enemy as being. He 
 does not state, you say, that this was " an insuperable 
 " impediment to his movements :" to which I would 
 add, he does not even say it was any impediment. 
 
19 
 
 Indeed, if this " ditch" was an obstacle to any party, 
 it must have been to the enemy ; and Col. Macal- 
 lister, your own witness, says, " Having gone over 
 " the ground after the affair, I observed a portion 
 " of swampy ground with an ugly gully, or ditch, 
 " part of which appeared to have been passed." 
 Now General Long certainly did not pass over this 
 swampy ground ; and, since he describes it as 
 lying in the valley where the enemy were formed, 
 it would appear pretty clear, from Col. Macallister's 
 account, or rather from the conjoint accounts, that it 
 had been passed over by the enemy. I cannot com- 
 prehend, therefore, what advantage I deprived General 
 Long of by omitting the latter part of the above-cited 
 passage in my previous letter. I might, indeed, have 
 used it to my own advantage, — Before I quit this 
 subject, I would observe, that the evidence of Col. 
 Macallister, as far as it goes, confirms Sir William 
 Lumley's account of the ground ; an account which, 
 sir, I feel satisfied no one but yourself could ever feel 
 inclined to censure, and which must give the reader a 
 far clearer notion of the country over which your rela- 
 tion had to move his troops, than any the most elaborate 
 and minute description could have afforded. Ct I 
 used," says Sir William Lumley in his comment 
 on General Long's letter, " to take the Light Horse 
 f Volunteers over worse ground on Finchley Com- 
 " mon." In confirmation of this opinion, I shall here 
 insert a question on the point I lately put to Sir 
 Henry Hardin ge, and his answer. 
 
 c2 
 
20 
 
 QUESTION. 
 
 k ' When we proceeded in pursuit of General Long 
 " and the cavalry with him, going as we did at a 
 " quick pace, and in a direct line so far as we could 
 " judge, did we meet with any impediment of ground 
 " to check our pace, such as ravine, boggy ground, 
 " or an almost impassable ditch ; that is, before we 
 " came up with the cavalry ? 
 
 ANSWER. 
 
 " In answer to your question, I do not think that 
 " there was any impediment of ground to check cavalry, 
 " such as ravine or impassable ditch, from the place 
 " at which the cavalry left the high road to turn Campo 
 " Maior, until they again got into the Badajoz road. 
 u There was a part of the ground near the high road 
 " on the Badajoz side of Campo Maior, where the 
 " Heavy Brigade, having turned the town, regained 
 " the road, which was wet, and might be termed 
 " swampy, but by no means constituting an obstacle 
 " to cavalry." 
 
 In proceeding after General Long, Sir Henry 
 Hardinge and I took a shorter and a more direct 
 line than he had done, and we were consequently 
 never so far from the high road on which the 
 enemy were marching as he ; and yet it is proved 
 that we met with no obstacle, and that the ground 
 exactly corresponded with the description given of it 
 by Sir W. Lumley. Having thus, sir, got rid of 
 ravines, and every other impediment adduced by 
 General Long, as reasons for not complying with my 
 
21 
 
 orders, I leave the reader to form his own opinion of 
 the character of these various and incongruous ex- 
 cuses. I have shewn in my former letter to you, that 
 your relative, in writing to E. H. on the 22d of April, 
 introduces " an impassable ravine" as his excuse. To 
 Sir Henry Hardinge, on the spot, " he urged the pro- 
 " priety of securing his left flank against any enemy's 
 " cavalry force which he was of opinion might be con- 
 " cealed under cover of the undulating ground on the 
 " left." While in his letter of the 25th of April, to 
 General Le Marchant, he actually introduces the 
 enemy on that left flank, and says " the enemy's de- 
 " momtratiom on my left obliged me to extend to 
 " cover that flank." 
 
 Disagreeable as the task is, sir, to point out and 
 dwell upon such unaccountable contradictions in the 
 statements of a departed officer, I am driven to it by 
 a sense of justice to myself. General Long's corre- 
 spondence, if we may judge of that which is still un- 
 published by the portions which have been submitted 
 to the public, teems with aspersions on my military 
 character ; and in defence of myself it is necessary 
 for me to show how undeserving of credit that cor- 
 respondence is. If I should point out only one pal- 
 pable and obvious misstatement, with regard to a fact 
 of which he had a personal knowledge and ought to 
 have been able to give correct information, his autho- 
 rity as a good and competent witness is annihilated 
 for ever ; and his praise or censure of my conduct 
 become equally valueless. I do not impute — I do 
 
22 
 
 not inquire about General Long's motives for making 
 such misstatements — I leave that to the reader. I 
 content myself with producing instances to prove that 
 he made them, and I will here advert to a most ob- 
 vious one. General Long, speaking of this circuit, 
 says, in his letter to General Le Marchant, as cited 
 in your Reply, page 76, " Though the Marshal and 
 " I differ on this point, I do not believe that I was 
 " ever more than the prescribed distance from the 
 " town, although the enemy s demonstrations on my 
 " left obliged me to extend to cover that flank'' 
 
 I must here quote from my letter to you, page 20, 
 where the above assertion is discussed. I say, "His 
 " (General Long's) excuse for not following my 
 " directions at the time was of a very different nature. 
 " The General urged the propriety, Sir Henry Hard- 
 " inge informs you. of securing his left flank against 
 " any enemy's cavalry force, which he was of opinion 
 " might be concealed under cover of the undulating 
 " ground on the left." 
 
 " Great indeed was my surprise at the moment 
 " when this answer was reported to me. General 
 " Long had received precise instructions relative to 
 " a visible enemy on his right flank; and acting as 
 " he was under the immediate personal direction of 
 " his superior, he had no concern with any possible 
 " contingency of a concealed enemy on his left. The 
 " whole responsibility of the operation devolved 
 '< upon myself, and the only duty of Brigadier-Gen. 
 <4 Long was to carry my commands into exact and 
 
23 
 
 " inimetliate execution, or, at the utmost, to make a 
 " representation of bis fears, and allow me to decide 
 " whether they should be acted upon or not." 
 
 " Singular, sir, as such a reason for evading a 
 " fulfilment of my orders will appear to every military 
 " man, it had not even the shadow of fact for its found- 
 " ation. There were no troops of the enemy to the 
 " left : no reason existed for supposing any to be there. 
 " Sir Henry Hardinge told the General at the 
 " moment that there was no necessity for his pre- 
 " caution. Indeed, had his fears been well grounded, 
 " the precaution that he adopted in consequence of 
 " them would appear most strangely unmilitary. No 
 " other officer, I apprehend, acting under similar sus- 
 " picion of a concealed enemy, would have executed 
 " his movement en masse, instead of sending out 
 " patroles, or flanking parties. But, sir, is it not 
 " somewhat remarkable, that to Sir Henry Hardinge, 
 " who was present, General Long should only have 
 " spoken of the force ' which might be concealed 
 u under the cover of the undulating ground to the 
 << left ;' while to General Le Marchant, who was at a 
 " distance from the scene, he stated that 'the enemy s 
 " demonstrations on his left obliged him to extend to 
 " cover that flank?' But what was the real state 
 " of the case? The General has himself described the 
 " enemy as retreating in compact order along the road 
 " from Campo Maior to Badajoz. No other enemy 
 " was that day seen, and not even a single French 
 " soldier appeared upon General Long's left from the 
 " commencement of his departure till he came in con- 
 
24 
 
 M tact with their columns. I need add nothing further 
 " on this point." 
 
 The above passage, sir, is extracted from my pre- 
 vious letter to you. As you have not attempted to 
 answer it, I may fairly conclude, according to your 
 own maxim, that you have s( virtually admitted it." 
 But I will give substantial evidence to confirm it, 
 in Sir Henry Hardinge's reply to some questions 
 which I addressed to him on the subject : — 
 
 QUESTION. 
 
 " To obviate the possibility of any misunderstand- 
 " ing on such a point, I will call your attention to 
 u page 76 of Mr. Long's ' Reply,' where, in a letter 
 " to General Le Marchant, General Long states, 
 " * Though the Marshal and I differ on this point, I 
 " ' do not believe that I was more than the prescribed 
 " ' distance ' (two or three gun-shots, he says) ' from 
 " ' the town, although the enemy s demonstrations on 
 i( ' my left obliged me to extend to cover that flank. ' 
 
 " I ask you if there was any the slightest ground 
 " for such a belief by General Long ? or if the enemy 
 " ever appeared on, or near, his left ? 
 
 ANSWER. 
 
 " In answer to your Lordship's questions embraced 
 " in the extract from General Long's letter to General 
 " Le Marchant, in the publication of 1832, page 76, 
 " beginning with the words ' Though the Marshal 
 " and I differ on this point,' &c. &c, I have 
 " to state, that the order carried by me to Gene- 
 ei ral Long, was to turn the town by the shortest 
 '-'.line, keeping the cavalry out of the range of the 
 
9r, 
 
 " guns of the place, which object was pressed upon 
 " General Long's attention in both the messages I 
 " conveyed to him by your order. 
 
 " To the other question I have to state, that I did 
 " not see any enemy on Gen. Longs left flank during 
 " the day, and consequently no demonstration of an 
 " enemy which obliged him to extend to cover that 
 " flank, as stated in his letter to Gen. Le Marchant ; 
 " and that when I was sent a second time by you to 
 " urge him to take a shorter line, his explanation to 
 " me for extending to his left was, that an enemy might 
 " be concealed behind the undulating ground on his 
 " left, which opinion I resisted ; and reported to you, 
 " on rejoining you, that the movement was an unneces- 
 " sary loss of time, as the only enemy to be seen or 
 " apprehended was the force moving out of Campo 
 " Maior on the road to Badajoz." 
 
 I thus present to the consideration of yourself and 
 the public a broad fact, stated by Gen. Long in 
 one of his private letters, only one month after the 
 affair, which was distinctly pointed out to your 
 notice in my former letter to you ; which is now 
 proved by direct evidence to be without any the 
 least foundation, and which indeed is as strongly 
 contradicted by Gen. Long's description of his fur- 
 ther progress and coming up with the enemy, as it is 
 by the above statement of Sir Henry Harclinge. I 
 might, here, sir, leave your case as quite broken 
 down ; but from respect to the public, I shall, though 
 as summarily as possible, proceed with the consi- 
 
26 
 
 deration of it. You inform me* that, since the 
 publication of your " Reply" an opportunity has 
 been afforded you " of referring to a more detailed 
 " account of the operations than that given in Gen. 
 <l Long's Journal, in which the name of Col. Har- 
 " dinge appears as the bearer of the order to Gen. 
 " Long to turn the town. — I further find," you add, 
 " the name of Col. Hardinge used to designate the 
 " Aide-du-Camp, who appeared to flatter Gen. Long 
 " with a hope of meriting your Lordship's approbation 
 " by attempting something against the enemy." 
 
 These two extracts appear to be very cautiously 
 inserted. We are not informed from what source 
 they are derived ; it must, however, be presumed 
 that they are taken from the family archives, as it 
 can hardly be supposed that any one would or could 
 give a more full and particular account of the Gene- 
 ral's operations than himself. — But he this as it may, 
 it is actually impossible that Col. Hardinge, ivko 
 never was my Ahle-du-Camp, could have been the 
 officer who, at the moment so precisely marked in 
 the correspondence you have published, thus flattered 
 Gen. Long with the hope of meriting my approbation 
 by attacking the enemy. Sir Henry Hardinge was 
 at that time with me. It will be remembered that I 
 twice sent that officer to desire your relative to 
 change the direction of his movement. On his last 
 return the cavalry was either altogether or nearly 
 out of sight. Gen. Long was leading them, as he 
 has described, at a trot: he was, in fact, on his way 
 * Letter, p. 28. 
 
to re-discover an enemy which he had seen tit to 
 lose sight of, but which, when he was put in 
 motion, was halted before his eyes. But on this 
 point Sir Henry Hardinge shall speak for himself. 
 "I shall endeavour," he says, " to answer your 
 " question whether the passage in Mr. Long's pub- 
 lished letter to your lordship of 1833, at p. 28, 
 " be correct, in which he says, ' I further find the 
 " ' name of Col. Hardinge used to designate the Aide- 
 " < du-Camp who appears to have flattered Gen. 
 " ' Long with the prospect of meriting your Lord- 
 " < ship's approbation by attempting something against 
 " ' the enemy.' 
 
 " If I were to answer the question according to 
 " my first impression of what I believe to be correct, 
 " I should say, that the Aide-du-Camp holding that 
 " communication with Gen. Long must have been 
 " some other officer, and could not have been me. 
 "But when I am called upon, at this distance of 
 " time, twenty-three years after the event, to speak 
 " to a point on which my recollection is at variance 
 u with a written document, made by Gen. Long, 
 " shortly after the event, I am most anxious not 
 " to trust to my memory alone, in answering the 
 " question. I am, therefore, obliged to be more 
 "tedious than I could wish, and to show, by a 
 V reference to Gen. Long's letter, addressed to Gen. 
 " Le Marchant, dated 25th April, 1811, published in 
 " 1832, that there is so decided a mistake as to the 
 " time and circumstances under which your Aide-du- 
 
2r< 
 
 1 Camp is stated to have joined him, that it is inipos- 
 ' sible for me to reconcile his account with my 
 1 recollection of the facts, if I am supposed to be the 
 ' Aide-du-Camp in question." 
 
 " At page 76, I find Gen. Long says — ' I had 
 1 ' proceeded in a direction that intersected the line of 
 ' ' inarch, or rather of retreat ; and as every step I 
 
 * ' took brought me more and more upon their flank, 
 1 ' and towards their rear, it was not long before we 
 ' 4 closed so much, that I was enabled to distinguish 
 ' ' their whole force and position. I should here 
 ' * mention, that one of the Marshal's Aides-du-Camp 
 ' ' having joined me about this time, whilst I was 
 ' ■ reconnoitring the position and strength of my 
 ' ' opponents, rather urged my attempting some- 
 ' ( thing against them, as likely to give the Marshal, 
 ' ' his master, considerable satisfaction.' 
 
 " The passage I have quoted represents the allied 
 ' cavalry as having closed so much on the enemy, 
 ' when the Aide-du-Camp joined Gen. Long, a* to 
 1 enable him to distinguish the enemy s whole force 
 ' and position. 
 
 " At no period, whilst I was with Gen. Long, 
 ' having delivered your second order, was there any 
 
 • enemy to be seen, either on his left flank, or in his 
 ' immediate front ; the enemy on the outside of the 
 ' town on the Badajoz road being then too distant 
 ' to distinguish their force or position. — And the 
 1 message from your Lordship, urging Gen. Long to 
 ' take a shorter line, would have been unnecessary 
 
29 
 
 " and inapplicable to the state of things described by 
 " Gen. Long about the time the Aide-du-Camp is 
 " stated to have joined him." 
 
 " Further, Gen. Long being personally acquainted 
 " with me, knew that I was the deputy Quarter- 
 " master-general of the Portuguese army, and not 
 u your Aide-du-Camp ; and as Gen. Long's account 
 " to Gen. Le Marchant, at p. 76, confirms mine 
 u given at p. 8, that you and he differed as to the 
 " mode in which he had moved the cavalry round 
 " the town, I am confident that my letter to Mr. 
 " Long, at p. 8, was the substance of the conver- 
 " sation which passed between me and Gen. Long, 
 " when I delivered your second message, urging 
 " upon him the propriety of taking a shorter line to 
 " intercept the enemy's retreat." 
 
 Thus, sir, it appears that Gen. Long describes a 
 positive fact as having taken place — a fact which 
 appeared to afford veiy little opening for mistake or 
 misconstruction, and with regard to which he was 
 deceived in every particular when writing an account 
 of it only thirty-four days after the event. A person, 
 s ; r, whose memory was so little tenacious that it 
 deceived him on such very material points as the 
 import of his orders, — the mode in which they were 
 to be executed, — the individuals he saw, — and the 
 subject of the communication he held with them, — 
 cannot be admitted, on any point whatever, as a 
 witness of the slightest authority. 
 
 Before I proceed any further, I will pause a 
 
80 
 
 moment, to show that two short sentences in my 
 despatch, on the affair of Campo Maior, to which 
 you attach great value in your defence of the late 
 Gen. Long's conduct, are wholly unavailable to your 
 purpose. You would endeavour to make it appear 
 that there is a discrepancy between the opinions 
 which I then expressed and those that I at present 
 entertain. It is with regret that I find myself com- 
 pelled to deprive you of such valuable auxiliaries. 
 The sentences of my despatch, to which you have 
 alluded, are the following : First—" Brigadier Gen. 
 "Long, seeing a favourable opportunity, ordered Col. 
 " Head to charge ;" and secondly, " Gen. Long manceu- 
 " verecl with great ability, and made the greatest 
 " exertions to moderate the excessive ardour of the 
 " cavalry, and regulate their movements." — On these 
 expressions of commendation from my despatch, you 
 have rung the changes with unwearied perseverance 
 and great triumph. But, I think, a very few words 
 will be sufficient to annihilate all the advantage to 
 your late relative's cause, which you have so indus- 
 triously, and, I must add, with so much ingenuity 
 derived from them. — I was not present at, I was not 
 the personal witness of, the transactions which are 
 here commended. — An official report on such occa- 
 sions must necessarily give information upon many 
 details which have not fallen under the immediate 
 observation of the Commander-in-chief, and are 
 reported to him by others, and especially by those 
 officers who commanded where he was not. Such 
 
31 
 
 was precisely my case in the present instance. I 
 saw nothing, either of Gen. Long, his corps, or their 
 movements, during any part of the transactions that 
 are commended in my despatch. From the time of 
 his leaving me I did not see him again till long 
 after the charge of the 13th Light Dragoons ; and, 
 after again catching sight of them on my advance, 
 the first thing I saw was the affair of the Portuguese 
 cavalry, and that at a very considerahle distance. 
 
 All that part of my despatch, sir, which expressed 
 approbation of your late relative's conduct in the 
 affair of Campo Maior, was founded on information 
 reported to me by that officer himself. That such is 
 indisputably the fact, you will perceive from the 
 evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge, stating the time 
 and manner in which I was left by Gen. Long, and 
 from every evidence relating to the period when I 
 rejoined his corps. Had I, sir, under these circum- 
 stances, written unfavourably of your relative, what 
 weight or value would you have attached to my 
 account ? I merely acted, as is usual on such 
 occasions, and reported the information that was 
 given me. I was not, I repeat, present at the 
 evolutions against, or the attacks upon, the enemy 
 near Campo Maior ; and my report of them was 
 made, if not in the exact words, certainly according 
 to the tenor of the account delivered me by Gen. 
 Long himself. — But, sir, from the manner in which 
 I gave such information, one thing is most manifest : 
 it is clear that my mind had imbibed no prejudice 
 
32 
 
 against General Long from any thing which occurred 
 during that day. It does not appear to me that I 
 have really censured him in my despatch. You say 
 that I highly eulogized him ; and, as my official re- 
 port was written after the affair, and on reflection, 
 his only ground for supposing that I had imbibed 
 any personal prejudice against him from his conduct 
 on that occasion is removed, and both he and you 
 are left without any assignable cause for the un- 
 favourable feelings towards him which you have 
 thought fit to ascribe to me, except such as naturally 
 and gradually arose in the course of service. 
 
 I now turn, sir, to the reported capture of the 13th 
 Light Dragoons. 
 
 You state that you did not intend to convey, by 
 your extract from General Long's letter of 29th May, 
 1811, that "he then first became acquainted with 
 " the report that such an idea (as that of the capture) 
 " had existed in the minds of some persons, but that 
 " he then first heard Baron Trip had stated it as a 
 "fact direct!" The distinction is curious; but you 
 have a right to give an explanation of your own 
 words, and I have no doubt but such was the sense 
 in which you designed them to be received. But it 
 was not, sir, so much your showing on this point, as 
 that of General hong, upon which I was commenting. 
 And I do not believe that any person could read the 
 isolated passage from his letter, which is given in 
 your "Reply," without inferring from it that your re- 
 lative had then, three months after the affair, heard of 
 
33 
 
 the report for the first time. I will here repeat that 
 extract. 
 
 " Things come out by degrees : General Lumley 
 " has told me a fact I was never before acquainted 
 " with, and which accounts for the Marshal's feel- 
 *■ ings and conduct at the time. After the charge 
 " of the 13th Dragoons, an officer rode up to the 
 " Marshal, and assured him that the whole of that 
 " regiment had been surrounded by the enemy and 
 " carried off." 
 
 General Long does not here drop the slightest in- 
 timation of his ever having had the idea of such an 
 occurrence suggested to him before by a single indi- 
 vidual, nor is the name of Baron Tripp alluded to. 
 But you can show in evidence, you say, that he was 
 previously aware of it. I want not the evidence. 
 Supposing that it could have been a matter of doubt, 
 your assurance on the subject would have been suffi- 
 cient ; but, sir, I have, myself, in my former letter 
 to you, distinctly proved that he knew it. — Indeed it 
 had been proved in your former publication, for Col. 
 Doyle says* that on coming to where I was, towards 
 the end of the affair, he then learnt " it had been re- 
 " ported that the 13th had been all cut to pieces or 
 " bodily taken," and adds, that he " of course re- 
 " turned and acquainted the Brigadier General of 
 11 what he had been told." But the fact which I pro- 
 pose to show, and which I hope to do most distinctly, 
 is, that General Long was not only aware of the 
 
 * C. E. Long's " Reply," p. 50, note. 
 D 
 
B4 
 
 report at the time, but that he, himself, was the per- 
 son who communicated it to me. I certainly quoted 
 the evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge, with the under- 
 standing that General Long was in the group at head- 
 quarters. After the halt, nearly every one of the 
 general staff assembled there, or came momentarily, 
 either from curiosity or for information ; and my 
 memory assures me that your relative was among the 
 number. Sir Henry Hardinge intimates that he was 
 there, in stating that Col. Head, on regaining head- 
 quarters and hearing the report, " expressed himself 
 " warmly, directing his remarks against General Long 
 " and Baron Tripp." — If this passage does not actually 
 declare the presence of General Long, it at least 
 proves that Col. Head had heard and believed him 
 to have given the information ; I admit, as I before 
 admitted, that Baron Tripp was in this group, and 
 that he assisted in spreading the report. You have 
 brought forward the evidence of Col. Leighton, Major 
 Doherty, and others, to show that this report did not 
 originate with your relative. The officers whose 
 statements you have produced are, most undoubtedly, 
 gentlemen of the highest honour and credit ; but to 
 what does their testimony amount ? — It is all of a mere 
 negative description— They either say that they did 
 " not hear of the report coming from General Long," 
 or that " they did not understand it to come from 
 General Long." Such evidence can be of no avail 
 against the positive evidence by which it is opposed. 
 The Count de Villa Real proves that I saw and 
 
35 
 
 spoke to General Long, who then actually reported 
 to me the capture of the 13th Light Dragoons. 1 
 thus, sir, received the intelligence from the officer 
 who was in command of the corps, who was on the 
 spot, who saw what passed, who was the best chan- 
 nel of information on the subject, and who was, cer- 
 tainly, the only channel which I was likely to apply 
 to. That we met at the time indicated could scarcely 
 be doubted, even without the evidence of the Count 
 de Villa Real. It is proved, beyond dispute, that I 
 made but a momentary stop with the heavy brigade, 
 and then passed on to the front. From this place to 
 General Long and to the enemy was not more than 
 500 yards. — Where then, or to whom, did I go ? 
 There was but one corps of three squadrons remain- 
 ing; and with that corps your relative was. To them, 
 therefore, I necessarily went. It is impossible to 
 suppose any other course of proceeding, and that I 
 pursued that course is confirmed by the statement of 
 the Count de Villa Real, which is itself confirmed by 
 the circumstances of the time. Yet, sir, there does 
 not appear a single expression in the passages you 
 have hitherto produced from your family archives, in 
 which General Long makes any allusion to these 
 events; on the contrary, he. clearly intends it to be 
 understood that we never met, still less spoke to each 
 other, during the whole course of the affair, and he 
 sends me to a distance with the Heavy Brigade which 
 it is proved I was not with, and to a spot where it is 
 equally proved that corps never was. All this, it must 
 
 d2 
 
36 
 
 be admitted, is singularly strange. But I shall at once 
 wind up my review of this point with the conclusive 
 statement of Lieut. -Col. Owen. This officer was 
 then a captain of one of the three squadrons of Por- 
 tuguese cavalry which remained with General Long 
 after the disappearance of the 13th Dragoons. His 
 letter, after describing the affair, proceeds in these 
 words : " Soon after the halt, a staff-officer rode up to 
 " me with an order to go to the Marshal. As he had 
 " known me long before, he kindly said to me, on my 
 " way, ' Be careful how you answer the questions 
 " ' going to be asked you ; for it is reported that the 
 " ' 13th are all prisoners, and the cavalry move- 
 " ' ments are all paralyzed.' When I reached the 
 " Marshal he said, ' Where do you come from, Capt. 
 " ' Owen ? Are you hurt V — I was covered with dust, 
 " my overalls torn, and my cap lost. — I answered, 
 u ' I come from the melee, sir ; my horse was thrown.' 
 " The Marshal said, ' Have you seen any thing of the 
 " '13th Dragoons?' ' Yes, sir, they passed me in 
 " ' pursuit of, and are beating the enemy.' — The Mar- 
 " shal replied, 'Why, General hong tells me they are 
 " ' all taken prisoners' — I answered, ' That I was not 
 " ' of that opinion ; that I knew the ground well, and 
 " ' did not believe that the regiment could have been 
 " ' taken.' The Marshal then said to General Long, 
 " ' Do you hear, sir, what this officer says?' The 
 " General made some observation, with which I can- 
 " not charge my memory, when the Marshal some- 
 " what angrily turned quick round to him, f Damn it, 
 
37 
 
 " * sir, why did you not do something ? — why did 
 " ' you not support them, or send to bring them 
 " 'hack?'" 
 
 I give the words us I find them plainly recorded 
 by Col. Owen. No one, I think, after reading the 
 above, will doubt whether General Long was, or was 
 not, the person who reported to me the capture of 
 the 13th Light Dragoons. 
 
 Allusion is made, in Col. Doyle's evidence, to the 
 support of the 13th by the Heavy Brigade; and in 
 the 46th page of your letter to me you observe, " I 
 " am of opinion that both your Lordship and the 
 " Count appeared to have laboured under an utter 
 " misapprehension of my relative's meaning. He 
 " may have said (I do not state that he even said 
 " that) that the regiments, if not supported, might 
 " be taken prisoners or cut to pieces. I merely offer 
 " this in solution of the mystery." This, in very 
 truth, does appear to me a most strange comment on 
 a very plain matter of fact. It is a curious guess, 
 and a still more curious mode of disproving testimony 
 which you would not, I fancy, be inclined even to 
 attempt in Westminster Hall. — But, sir, if you had 
 had recourse to the assistance of any military friend, he 
 might have informed you that the support ought to 
 have been given by your relative, when the charge 
 was made, or when the pursuit began, and that 
 when my conversation with him took place, it was 
 altogether too late to render such support, as the 
 
38 
 
 J 3th Dragoons were out of sight, and their position 
 and circumstances perfectly unknown to me. I have 
 also, in my former letter, proved, from his own corre- 
 spondence, as given in your own publication, that 
 General Long never intended the Heavy Brigade to 
 support the 13th Dragoons. 
 
 The last point that I shall take notice of on this 
 subject is part of the evidence of Lieut.-Col. Mac- 
 alister. He, as is the case with the other respectable 
 officers whom you have adduced, only speaks nega- 
 tively. He says, " It is the first time that I ever 
 " heard General Long's name coupled with the report 
 " to which you allude." 
 
 I implicitly believe the above ; and he adds, " I 
 " remember to have heard him frequently express 
 " himself in the most unqualified terms of indignation 
 " against the author of what he termed a wicked and 
 " scandalous report." 
 
 Even supposing that General Long had not been 
 the officer who originally informed me of the capture 
 of the 1 3th Dragoons, knowing, as he did, from Col. 
 Doyle, that such a report had been made and was 
 prevalent, it is very extraordinary that he did not 
 hasten to me, as every military man knows it was his 
 bounden duty to have done, and inform me of what 
 he considered the real state of the case ; — and be it 
 remembered, I was then not more than 300 yards 
 from him. But how very extraordinary does it also 
 appear, that after having ascertained, as he states, that 
 
39 
 
 Baron Tripp was the originator and propagator of 
 the account, and regarding it in the odious light 
 described by Col. Macalister, he should never 
 have required any explanation from that officer, nor 
 ever have made any representation or complaint 
 against him on the subject. The Baron still appears, 
 after the date of this discovery, to have remained with 
 your relative in the same state of social intercourse ; 
 and he probably went to his grave without ever 
 receiving any mark of his General's displeasure, 
 though named in his private letters as the author of 
 a report, against which, in conversation, he had been 
 frequently heard to express the most " unqualified 
 indignation" and to describe as " wicked and scan- 
 dalous." 
 
 I now proceed to consider the position, object, and 
 movements of the Heavy Brigade during this affair of 
 the cavalry. The representation of Brigadier- Gen. 
 Long is positive, direct and circumstantial on this 
 point, and is given with a marked design and appli- 
 cation. 
 
 In his letter to General Le Marchant, he writes, 
 " On looking round to make proper arrangements and 
 " dispositions, I discovered to my astonishment that 
 " the whole of the Heavy Brigade, which I had sta- 
 " tioned in my rear in two lines, but outflanking to 
 " the right to support me, and observe the column of 
 " infantry, had been drawn across to the other side 
 " of the valley, and were halted on the opposite 
 ct height about two miles from me." Now, sir, what 
 
JO 
 
 character must we attach to General Long's corre- 
 spondence, if it be shown again, as it already has 
 been in my former letter, that no such movements 
 as those which he has above described ever occurred ; 
 and that, consequently, no plan of his could have 
 been marred by them ? I quite agree with you 
 that there may be vagueness in your relative's, or in 
 any one's, account of distances on such an occasion ; 
 and, if the above extract referred to distances only, I 
 should be most willing to make every reasonable 
 allowance for any mistake that he might have incurred. 
 But in the present case there was an express object 
 for describing the Heavy Brigade as removed to the 
 station assigned them by General Long. He wished 
 to prove that his plans were frustrated by their being 
 taken so far off; and it cannot be expected that that 
 allowance for error in the computation of distances, 
 which might be available, under ordinary circum- 
 stances, to another, should be granted to him ; when 
 that error constitutes the very grounds on which he 
 endeavours to justify himself, and to cast reproach 
 upon his commander. But, sir, it is distinctly proved 
 by Sir C. D'Albiac, that the Heavy Brigade never 
 deviated from its direct line, in proceeding, as it was 
 ordered, to take post near, and on the right of, the 
 enemy's column. He says, in answer to your 7th 
 question, " I should say the Heavy Brigade halted 
 " for some minutes (not a quarter of an hour), after 
 6< which it descended from the rising ground in Ike 
 " direction o/Badajoz." And again, " The Heavy 
 
41 
 
 " Brigade crossed the road to Badajoz, and formed 
 " line about 250 yards short of the enemy; the left 
 " of the brigade bearing on two of Major Hartman's 
 (i guns placed on the Badajoz road." You say, " it 
 " ivas first halted, and then moved in a direction 
 " away from General Long." But this is the very 
 reverse of your relative's own story. He says, it was 
 first moved in a direction away from him, and then 
 halted two miles off. You have not advanced any 
 authority to support the above assertion ; unless the 
 note of Col. Doyle, which is attached to this part of 
 your letter to me, is meant as such, and which could 
 be of no avail against the clear and direct evidence 
 of Sir Charles D'Albiac, as published in your former 
 pamphlet. But what does Col. Doyle say? — His 
 note is given in explanation of his own previous note 
 and of my remarks upon it. His words are, " In page 
 " 27, Lord Beresford says, 'Col. Doyle, in his note, 
 (l ' appears to confirm this statement,' viz., ' that Lord 
 " ' Beresford not only sent the Heavy Brigade two 
 " ' miles across the plain, but accompanied it in per- 
 " ' son.' ,! u I " (says Col. Doyle) " mention no dis- 
 " tance in my note, which refers solely to the move- 
 " ment of the Heavy Brigade from the left to right 
 " of the Badajoz road, instead of direct to the front ; 
 " neither do I here mention anything regarding 
 " Marshal Beresford '& person" 
 
 The explanation which Col. Doyle here offers of 
 the note published in your " Reply" confirms the 
 opinion respecting it that I suggested in my former 
 
42 
 
 letter to you. lie states, that " his observations 
 " merely related to the movement of the Heavy Bri- 
 " gade from the left to the right of the road, instead 
 " of direct to the front." This brigade was on the 
 left of the road. General Long's small remaining 
 force was on the same side and in front of it, the 
 enemy were on the road ; and consequently, to place 
 itself to the right of the enemy as ordered, the Heavy 
 Brigade must necessarily have crossed the road, as 
 Col. Doyle has stated ; but, so far was it from making 
 any circuit in effecting this operation, that, Sir C. 
 D'Albiac informs you, it went to its point in a direct 
 line. He tells you that, on receiving the order to 
 advance, "the brigade descended from the rising 
 vf ground, where it had been halted, in the direction 
 " of Badajoz." Thus it appears, sir, that the Heavy 
 Brigade, so far from proceeding in a different direc- 
 tion to the enemy, was marching on the very same 
 point with them, and did not cross the road till it 
 came within two hundred and fifty yards of them. 
 This distance was most certainly not increased after 
 crossing that road ; where (as Sir C. D'Albiac has 
 said) " the Heavy Brigade formed in line near the 
 " enemy." Thus, sir, the account in your relative's 
 letter is found to be fallacious, in every particular. 
 I will here give what General Long has stated, as 
 published in your " Reply" * — " Upon turning back, 
 " however, lie (General Long) discovered that the 
 l< Heavy Brigade had been withdrawn from the situ- 
 
 * C. E. Long's Reply, p. 34. 
 
13 
 
 " atiun he had directed them to keep, and halted two 
 " miles off, on a slope of ground across a valley on 
 " the other side of the route, Fig. 2, and moreover 
 " putting a valley and impassable ditch between 
 ? them." In this Figure 2, your relative has abso- 
 lutely indicated the line of march which this brigade 
 took on returning from its distant position, thus — 
 
 
 Route of the Heavy Bng a e 
 
 vu^ 
 
 It is quite impossible to mistake General Long's 
 meaning in the above extract and accompanying plan ; 
 and they are too particular and circumstantial to 
 allow the admission of any plea of " vagueness of 
 distance" as an excuse for the gross errors they con- 
 tain. But I will cite another passage from your 
 relative's correspondence on the same point. " Col. 
 " Otway," he states,* "with the two supporting 
 " squadrons, disbanded also in pursuit, and away they 
 " all raced, without further support, to the bridge of 
 " Badajoz. On looking round to make fresh 
 u arrangements and dispositions, I discovered, to my 
 " astonishment, that the whole of the Heavy Brigade, 
 " which I had stationed in my rear in tw r o lines, but 
 " outflanking to the right, to support me and observe 
 " the column of infantry, had been drawn across to 
 
 * Letter to General Le March ant. — C. E. Long's Reply, p. 79, 
 
il 
 
 " the other side of the valley, and were halted on the 
 " opposite height about two miles from me." Now, 
 sir, I believe that every one of the facts which Gen. 
 Long has here stated has been proved incorrect. It 
 has been shown that the halt of this brigade was 
 only for a few minutes ; that it took place at the spot 
 and time I passed it ; that it was on the left of the 
 road ; that, therefore, it neither did, nor could, have 
 moved across a valley on the other side of this road ; 
 that, on being again put in motion, the corps pursued 
 the enemy in the direction of Badajoz, so as to place 
 itself on their right flank, and cross the road at only 
 250 yards in their rear ; and that it continued in this 
 position till the general halt. It is, moreover, proved 
 that I came up with the brigade at about 500 yards 
 in rear of the enemy ; that my stay with it was only 
 momentary ; that, having halted it, I passed on to 
 the front ; that I saw and spoke with General Long 
 immediately after; and that I did not rejoin the 
 Heavy Brigade from the time of my passing it in the 
 first instance, till it came within about 250 yards of 
 the enemy. 
 
 Sir C. D'Albiac and the Count de Villa Real 
 establish the above facts beyond dispute ; and Col. 
 Doyle, who is no longer (indeed I never thought he 
 was) a witness in favour of General Long's most ex- 
 traordinary statement, tells us that he " never, in his 
 former note, referred to distance," and, by his present 
 explanation, as given by yourself, confirms the testi- 
 mony of Sir Charles D'Albiac : while, with regard to 
 
45 
 
 my being with this cavalry beyond the impassable 
 ditch, he states, that on being sent by General Long 
 to order up the Heavy Brigade, " he found Marshal 
 " Beresford and his staff 1 with two of Major Hartman's 
 i( guns contiguous to the Badajoz road, and not above 
 " 300 yards from the enemy ;" and concludes this 
 note with saying, " Be this as it may," (the distances,) 
 " I was only sent once during the day to Marshal 
 " Beresford, and this was only at the close of the 
 " affair." All these several accounts agree with my 
 recollections of the occurrences of the day, and with 
 what every military man would consider as the na- 
 tural course of events. I left our column of infantry 
 on the point where we first halted on coming in view 
 of Campo Maior. After I had lost sight of the cavalry 
 under Brigadier-General Long, I went in pursuit of 
 them, and from the height I was going on, caught sight 
 of them again at a distance of about half a mile from 
 me. On descending towards them, I first came up with 
 the Heavy Brigade, which was in the rear, and halted 
 it, on account of my perceiving that a great confusion 
 existed among our light cavalry near the enemy, and 
 that very few of them Avere to be seen. I then passed 
 on to the front, to learn how matters stood ; and hav- 
 ing received General Long's report, I sent back in- 
 structions for the Heavy Brigade to advance, and for 
 two of the nearest guns to be sent forward. Till these 
 arrived I remained with or near the remaining Portu- 
 guese and the enemy, from which I was not seen at any 
 moment after, at a distance of more than 300 yards. 
 
■16 
 
 The evidence of Col. Doyle lias left, sir, another 
 vacuum to be filled up. He was most clearly not the 
 officer whom General Long says he sent to me, when 
 I was two miles off, and who is described as desiring 
 me to bring up the Heavy Brigade, which it does not 
 appear I was with till it came within 250 yards oi 
 the enemy, and from a position which it is quite cer- 
 tain that corps was never near. There is thus, sir, 
 a oreat deal more than an inaccurate estimate of dis- 
 tances to be accounted for ; and to a most strange 
 vagueness of vision, or of conception, must that man 
 be subject, who could suppose that a person whom he 
 had just seen and spoken with, and who was not more 
 than a distance of 300 yards from him, was two miles 
 off! However, I leave the point to the judgment of 
 the reader. 
 
 In the 55th, 56th, and 57th pages of your last 
 publication, you have argued at some length to prove 
 that that passage of my letter to you, in which I say 
 " it does not appear that Col. de Grey, who com- 
 " manded the Heavy Brigade, had any orders what- 
 " ever respecting the 13th Light Dragoons," is 
 inconsistent with that part of my official account of 
 the affair which describes the charge (that of the 13th 
 Light Dragoons) as " followed by Col. Otway with 
 " two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese, and supported 
 " by General Long with the remnant of that regi- 
 " ment and the brigade of Col. de Grey." I repeat, 
 sir, that I w T as not on the spot when these events oc- 
 curred ; and any military man will inform you that, 
 
47 
 
 on such occasions, the General in Chief states what 
 is reported to him by the officer actually in command. 
 In the present instance, that officer was Brigadier- 
 General Long*. In commenting on the passage, you 
 observe, that, in 1811, when writing my despatch, 
 I " really thought that the Heavy Brigade did actu- 
 " ally support somebody or something." I then 
 believed and reported what was reported to me. It 
 was not possible for me to state, on my own authority, 
 that which I did not witness. And I never doubted 
 the truth of that report, sir, till I read, in your own 
 publication, General Long's explicit contradiction of 
 the account he had supplied me with for that part 
 of my despatch, in which I was obliged to trust to 
 his intelligence. It was in your own " Reply" that 
 I found the evidence which proved that Col. de 
 Grey, who commanded the Heavy Brigade, had no 
 orders whatever respecting the 13th Dragoons; and, 
 consequently, that the account of the support, which 
 General Long had caused ine to insert in the de- 
 spatch, was as imaginary as many of the details of 
 his correspondence have been shown to be. The 
 quotation you adduce from Sir C. D'Albiac's first 
 answer, as given in your former pamphlet, is quite 
 inapplicable to the subject. " His impression," he 
 says, " was that the allied cavalry were to attack 
 " that of the enemy, if a favourable opportunity 
 " offered." This evidence is general as to the 
 cavalry, and can have no allusion to any detail, or 
 particular events. Besides, it was given in answer 
 
48 
 
 to a question that referred to a time antecedent even 
 to the first movement of the cavalry from the first 
 halt before Campo Maior. I shall here cite the 
 question to which the above answer applies, that the 
 reader may perceive what a very extraordinary mode 
 you have of making use of your evidence. Your 
 question to Sir C. D'Albiac was, "When the allied 
 " cavalry, under the command of Brigadier-General 
 " Long, was ordered to advance on the morning of 
 " the 25th of March, 1811, was it your impression 
 " that no attack was on any account to be made on 
 "the enemy's cavalry?" It is quite manifest, sir, 
 that no answer to the above question can fairly be 
 brought to bear upon the charge of the 13th Light 
 Dragoons, which happened at an after period of the 
 day. The orders to the cavalry, as supposed by Sir 
 C. D'Albiac, relate only to what might occur during 
 a general movement on the advance. But you have 
 furnished us with your relative's own account of the 
 directions which he gave on coming up with, and on 
 proceeding to the attack of the enemy. He informs 
 us, in one place,* that he " commanded the Heavy 
 " Brigade to support him, and observe the column 
 " of infantry ;" and in another placef, that he 
 followed "to support the attack of the 13th; still 
 " supposing the Heavy Brigade in his rear occu- 
 " pying the attention of the remaining part of the 
 " enemy's force." Such, sir, is your relative's own 
 account, and it seems extraordinary that you should 
 * C. E. Long's Reply, p. 79. t Idem. p. 46. 
 
49 
 
 question its accuracy; though any other person might 
 say it was contradictory. To conclude this point, I 
 will merely observe that, though I might, as you say, 
 " suppose the Heavy Brigade supported somebody or 
 " something," I could not possibly suppose that, after 
 the charge, it supported the 13th Light Dragoons ; 
 for, on reaching the field, I found the Heavy Brigade 
 500 yards in rear of the enemy, and the 13th Light 
 Dragoons not anywhere within sight. 
 
 With regard to what you designate " the order of 
 "reprimand," it is only necessary for me to say that 
 the account which appeared in my dispatch was taken 
 from your relative's after-report of the events that had 
 taken place. I have had occasion more than once to 
 mention, what every military man is perfectly aware 
 of, that, for facts of which I was not an eye-wit- 
 ness, my intelligence could only be derived from the 
 officer in command on the spot. I have never said, 
 sir, that Colonel Head was altogether blameless ; but I 
 have said, and I repeat, that the statements of Colonel 
 Doyle, Sir Henry Watson, and Colonel Otway, prove 
 the account given in your relative's correspondence, 
 as published by yourself, respecting the 13th Light 
 Dragoons and the Portuguese under Otway after 
 the charge, to have been altogether without founda- 
 tion ; and, as that account exactly corresponds with 
 my official report of the affair, it very clearly indicates 
 the source from which the information contained in 
 my report was derived. „ 
 
 E 
 
50 
 
 You next speak of the state of the artillery horses. 
 Upon this point you adduce the evidence of Colonel 
 Doyle, who says, " it was currently stated that the 
 " officer commanding the Artillery (Major Hartman) 
 " had been anxious to bring up the entire brigade," 
 and of Major, now Sir Julius, Hartman, who con- 
 firms this account. To the last-mentioned officer, 
 (since Colonel Doyle only speaks of what was ru- 
 moured, without pretending to have any personal 
 knowledge of the subject,) the authority on your 
 side of the question is confined, and it can hardly be 
 regarded as sufficient to stand against the opposing 
 testimony of Sir Henry Hardinge, the Count de 
 Villa Real, and Sir Benjamin D'Urban. An ex- 
 tract from a work of Sir Julius Hartman has been 
 cited by Colonel Napier, as evidence upon certain 
 events at the village of Albuera, during the battle to 
 which it has given the name ; and no one who has 
 read the exposure of the strange misstatements em- 
 bodied in that extract, will thenceforward feel in- 
 clined to attach much value to the accuracy of its 
 author. On the present subject, his account is given 
 from memory. I can only say, that his recollections 
 are diametrically opposed to mine. At the time the 
 two guns in question arrived and commenced firing, 
 I was with my staff on the right flank of and near 
 to the enemy's column ; and it was not till they had 
 fired a few shots, and every one around me was com- 
 plaining of the little effect produced — I did not see 
 
51 
 
 any — that I proceeded to the guns. After being some 
 short time with them, I urged the officer who com- 
 manded them to take up a position nearer the enemy ; 
 but he replied that his horses were so fatigued, as to 
 render it impossible for him to continue the pursuit 
 any longer. Sir Henry Hardinge, Sir B. D' Urban, 
 and the Count de Villa Real, my Aid-de-Camp, 
 were all with me ; and it was on receiving this an- 
 swer that I commanded the whole to halt. But, Sir, 
 this is one of those cases in which argument is use- 
 less. The facts speak for themselves. What other 
 probable, or imaginable, motive could there have been 
 for my order at this moment ? I had sent up for these 
 two guns, which, could they have continued to act, 
 would have proved quite sufficient for the object, per- 
 fectly conscious that, if I withheld my cavalry from 
 going upon the enemy, he could not possibly do me 
 any injury. With what imaginable view, then, should 
 I have prevented these guns from injuring him, if they 
 could have continued so to do ? The case speaks for 
 itself. As to Sir Julius Hartman's proposal of bring- 
 ing forward the whole brigade of Artillery, I should 
 like to know to whom and when it was made. He 
 does not say that it was made to me, though that may 
 appear to be his meaning ; neither does he intimate 
 at what moment it was made. If it was when he re- 
 ceived the order for the advance of the two guns, it 
 could not have been to me, as I was then two miles in 
 front of him : if it was when the guns were desired 
 
 E 2 
 
52 
 
 to halt, this would appear, under the circumstances, 
 an extraordinary time for addressing such a proposal 
 to a Commander in Chief. I have not the slightest 
 recollection of ever receiving any such suggestion ; 
 and to say the least of it, I could not but have re- 
 garded such a proposal from Major Hartman very 
 strange and unmilitary, when, having sent for two of 
 this brigade, I must have been perfectly aware that 
 at the spot they came from there were still four others 
 remaining. Sir Julius Hartman says, " the Artil- 
 " lery were immediately in the rear of the advanced 
 " guard," that is, of the advance of the infantry. We 
 have more than enough evidence to show that that 
 advanced guard was about two miles in the rear. — 
 You observe upon this, " Sir Henry Hardinge's 
 " informant was most egregiously in error." Sir 
 Henry Hardinge, sir, was his own informant ; he 
 was an eye-witness present with me on the occa- 
 sion. 
 
 I will now proceed to the case of Lieut.-Colonel Col- 
 borne, respecting which, with an evident, but, I trust, 
 a very short-lived triumph, you say,* " As this offer 
 of Sir John Colborne," (to cut off the enemy's bag- 
 gage), "given in p. 70 of my Reply, has unfortu- 
 " nately escaped your Lordship's notice, I am tempted 
 " to relieve it from its obscurity by the evidence of 
 " Colonel Macalister of the 13th, who was attached 
 " to that Officer on the occasion in question. His 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 63. 
 
53 
 
 " reply respecting the baggage before the attack, 
 " and the guns after the attack, is as follows : — 
 
 " ' I always understood,' says Colonel Macalister, 
 " ' that Sir John Colborne had made an offer to cut 
 " ' off the baggage. With respect to the guns I am 
 " * positive, as I volunteered the service myself, and 
 " < I understood from Sir John that the Marshal 
 " ' would not allow it, saying that too much had 
 " ' been done, or words to that effect." — It is true, sir, 
 that I did not take any notice of this passage in 
 my former letter. One reason of this omission was ? 
 that the absurdity of the account, as far as I was con- 
 cerned, appeared to be evinced by a single line of it. 
 Colonel Macalister has stated " that Sir John Col- 
 " borne sent back word to beg he might be sup- 
 " ported." It is clear, as was proved in my letter to 
 you, that at the time indicated I had left the infan- 
 try to follow the cavalry, and, therefore, could not 
 by any possibility have returned Sir John Colborne 
 an answer from the rear, where I was not. But, I 
 confess, my principal reason for omitting to mention 
 it was my not retaining the slightest recollection of 
 the circumstances ; and it was not till after my pre- 
 vious letter to you was written that I sent Sir John 
 Colborne the passage from General Long's Letter to 
 C. B. L. of the 3rd Dec. 1811, in which the state- 
 ment concerning him is made, and requested him to 
 inform me how far it was correct. I shall lay his 
 account of the transaction before you. It will not 
 be found to confirm the statements either of General 
 
54 
 
 Long or Colonel Macalister. This latter officer, by- 
 the-by, talks of having " volunteered his services to 
 " cut off the enemy's guns," which he never could 
 have seen, as they never were within sight of 
 Colonel Colborne, but were, as is on all hands 
 acknowledged, a great distance in front of the enemy 
 — about a league — and were never seen by any one 
 except those who advanced with the 13th. This is 
 passing strange ! — But we will proceed to Sir John 
 Colhorne's Letter. 
 
 " York, U. Canada, May 25, 1833. 
 
 " I have been for so long a time and so fully 
 " occupied in the situation which I at present hold, 
 " that I have paid but little attention to military 
 " publications. 
 
 " I am anxious, however, to inform you, in answer 
 " to your note of the 3rd March, that I met General 
 " Long frequently at Villa Vicosa after the affair at 
 " Campo Maior, and my Brigade Major was after- 
 " wards attached to his brigade of cavalry.. I may, 
 " therefore, have conversed with him on the move- 
 " ments of which we were all at that period interested 
 " in giving our own version. I will state to you the 
 " impression which I now have of the extent of my 
 " conversation with him, or with any yeraon, on the 
 " occurrences that were brought under my notice 
 " connected with the affair of Campo Maior. 
 
 " At Arronches I was very unexpectedly appointed 
 *< to command the advanced guard of your corps 
 
55 
 
 " d'armee from the bivouac, between Arronches and 
 " Campo Maior, on the morning of the march on that 
 " place. When we arrived at the commencement 
 " of the hill, where the arrangements were made 
 " for ascending the position near Campo Maior, I 
 " found the whole of my advanced guard disposed of 
 " and placed under the immediate command of Sir 
 " W Lumley, with the exception of a squadron or 
 " troop of cavalry and, the 66th regiment. Sir W. 
 " Stewart, perceiving that I had received no orders 
 " to advance, rode up to me and desired me to ascend 
 " the hill with the cavalry and the 66th regiment to 
 " the right of the town. I immediately hastened up 
 " the hill with Major Boycein command of the squa- 
 " dron, and ordered the 66th to follow. I had pa- 
 " trolled up this hill a few hours before daylight, 
 " and alarmed a picket of the enemy, and was, 
 " therefore, persuaded that the town was evacuated. 
 " On reaching the summit of the hill southward of 
 " Campo Maior, accompanied by the squadron of 
 " cavalry, I observed a column of French infantry, 
 " protected by cavalry, marching rapidly towards 
 " Badajoz, abandoning from time to time two or 
 " three horses or mules, apparently loaded with 
 " baggage. The head of the column was a very 
 " short distance from Campo Maior. I moved 
 " through some inclosures to the southward, and 
 " ordered the 66th regiment to follow the cavalry 
 " under my command, as rapidly as possible. While 
 
56 
 
 " we were greatly excited, and the commanding 
 " officer of the 66th receiving my instructions, an 
 " Aid-de-Camp from the General commanding the 
 " brigade came from the northward of the town, 
 " and delivered me a message that I was separating 
 " too far from him. I hastily said, * Tell the General 
 " ' I can see better than he can from this ground ;' 
 " and proceeded through a small ravine or valley, at 
 " a gallop, till we found ourselves on the flank of the 
 " enemy's column, and, perhaps, at about six or seven 
 " hundred yards from it. I think we must have been 
 " in this situation not more than a quarter of an hour 
 " after we had separated from Sir W. Stewart. 
 
 "We halted when the French column formed 
 " square, and their cavalry trotted towards Col. 
 " Head's squadrons to receive their charge. After 
 " this charge the two bodies of cavalry were so mixed 
 " that we could scarcely judge of the result, till the 
 " infantry opened a fire on the 13th Dragoons, on 
 " their passing through their opponents. 
 
 " The French retired, pursued by our cavalry, 
 " and, from the ground we occupied, the Portuguese 
 " Skirmishers and the Heavy Brigade appeared to 
 " be advancing in the form of a crescent. I inen- 
 " tion all these details to explain to you that what- 
 " ever conversation I may have had with General 
 " Long, it must have referred to my detached corps, 
 " and to the accidental position in which we were 
 " placed. I never communicated with any officer of 
 
57 
 
 ' c your staff, nor with any General during the affair, 
 " nor received any message except that which I have 
 " related above." 
 
 I omit, for the sake of brevity, some further details 
 in this letter, all of which, however, are corroborative 
 of the foregoing account, as will be clear from its 
 conclusion. " I advert to these circumstances, that 
 " Sir W. Lumley and Major Boyce may confirm 
 " my statements, and that they may show how far 
 " it is probable that I made the remarks attributed to 
 " me. In fact, I am positive that I have now com- 
 " municated to you the substance of all my conver- 
 " nation with General hong, or with any other 
 " officer relative to the affair of Campo Maior." 
 
 The reader will here perceive that I had nothing 
 whatever to do with the movements of Sir John 
 Colborne, but that they were divisional or brigade 
 arrangements. I do not believe they were ever re- 
 ported to me, probably because they had no particu- 
 lar result. 
 
 You have, sir, as you say, though under the im- 
 pression of a different result, enabled me " to relieve 
 " this matter from its obscurity." The whole story, 
 as related in your relation's correspondence, turns 
 out to have been no more than a mere creature of his 
 imagination, fostered, it is true, by yourself, and re- 
 ceiving some degree of sanction from the vague and 
 imperfect recollections of Col., then Capt., Macalister. 
 It is curious to observe that, notwithstanding the very 
 prominent part this latter officer ascribes to himself in 
 
58 
 
 the transactions in question, Sir John Colborne does 
 not appear to recollect that any such person was 
 near him. His name is never mentioned. No one 
 circumstance of his evidence is alluded to; and 
 what he states respecting the cutting off the baggage, 
 the capturing the guns, and the directions which he 
 attributes to me, is positively contradicted by Sir 
 John Colborne ; unless, indeed, the two or three 
 horses or mules, which were from time to time aban- 
 doned by the enemy, constituted the baggage which 
 Col. Macalister proposed to cut off, but which, accord- 
 ing to Sir John Colborne, had been cast off. Is it not 
 intolerable, sir, that I should be called upon, after 
 such a lapse of years, to defend myself against im- 
 putations, produced upon the authority of a private 
 and hidden correspondence, and these confused and 
 imperfect recollections of regimental or subaltern 
 officers? — Is such conduct fair and just? — It is, sir, 
 an extraordinary thing that I should be able to rebut 
 such attacks at all. If Sir John Colborne had not 
 survived to declare the truth, what defence could I 
 have put up? I could have done no more than 
 simply state that I had no remembrance of the cir- 
 cumstance ; and what would that have availed me ? — 
 It would only have afforded matter for sarcasm and 
 ironical observations. Yet, how clear and simple 
 does this military operation appear, when truly de- 
 scribed by the officer who commanded. You also 
 conceive, sir, that glorious results Avould have ensued 
 if General Stewart's proposal had been acted upon. 
 
59 
 
 and Sir John Colborne's wishes had been attended to. 
 The foregoing letter has spoiled this combination. — 
 But with regard to the proposal of General Stewart : 
 I am surprised that an officer of Col. Doyle's ex- 
 perience and judgment should have noticed it, or 
 assisted in propagating a rumour of this description. 
 It is not, indeed, said to whom this proposal of Gen. 
 Stewart's was communicated ; but it is, of course, to 
 be inferred that he made it to myself. Now it has 
 been distinctly shown in my former letter to you, 
 and also, I believe, in the " Strictures" that during 
 my course after General Long and the cavalry, the 
 Count de Villa Real brought me information of the 
 enemy having evacuated Campo Maior, and that, 
 on receiving the intelligence, I sent back to order 
 our infantry to advance. I thus never saw Sir W. 
 Stewart from the time he and the infantry were 
 ordered to advance, until they rejoined us after the 
 final halt. He could not, therefore, have made the 
 proposal in question to me. This sets the rumour 
 at rest, as far as I am concerned with it. — But, in- 
 deed, the instructions which were sent back to Sir 
 W. Stewart* were of such a nature, that, as hecom- 
 
 * The Count de Villa Real relates that, having been desired 
 by me to ascertain whether the town was evacuated, he spoke to 
 some persons on the ramparts, from whom he learned that the 
 French, after having sent on before them the artillery toBadajoz, 
 had left the town. "I returned," he says, " towards Marshal 
 " Beresford immediately, and met him at some distance from the 
 l [ infantry, going towards the cavalry. He sent immediately to 
 " the infantry to advance as quickly as possible, but so that it 
 " might not be exhausted on coming up with the enemy." 
 
60 
 
 manded the leading* division, he would have been 
 fully authorized in acting during the absence of the 
 Commander in Chief, as he is said to have pro- 
 posed, if he had really considered such a measure as 
 expedient. So much for the validity of all these 
 rumours, against which I have to defend myself. 
 
 You have said a great deal, sir, about a discre- 
 tionary order which General Long in his private 
 correspondence has thought fit to represent himself 
 as having received from me. He writes to General 
 Le Marchant*, " However, I had a conversation in 
 " the morning with the Marshal. He told me the 
 " enemy was exceedingly strong in cavalry, and that 
 " I must hug the infantry for support, if necessary. 
 " I asked him peremptorily, if I should attack them 
 " wherever I met them. His answer was, ' Do not 
 " ' commit yourself against a superior force ; but, if 
 " ' the opportunity to strike occurs, avail yourself of 
 " ' it.' " On a former occasion, not wishing to meet 
 this extraordinary statement of General Long by a 
 mere unsupported contradiction of my own, I showed 
 you how inconsistent it was with what he had 
 written in other places, and what he is known to 
 have done. — But the whole account involves a mass 
 of contradictions and inconsistencies. The latter half 
 forgets the beginning — He informs us that " I first 
 " cautioned him not to expose himself, telling him 
 " that the enemy was exceedingly strong in cavalry." 
 Here, by-the-by, I must have told him more than I 
 
 * C. E. Long's Reply, p. 75. 
 
61 
 
 knew, and more than proved to be the case. Next, 
 sir, this inferior officer "peremptorily" demands from 
 his superior, decided orders : — and for what? Why, it 
 would appear that he was preparing for some ser- 
 vice which was to be effected at a distance, and not 
 immediately in the view and under the control of 
 the Commander in Chief. He asks if he should 
 attack the enemy " wherever he met them ;" and my 
 answer, as he has reported it, is precisely such as 
 would be given on the understanding that he was 
 about to execute some duty where I should not be 
 present. No officer, I apprehend, ever heard of 
 such a question under similar circumstances. He 
 goes on to say, " With these instructions I proceeded 
 " to move, and was ordered to the front (as usual) 
 " with all the cavalry. The " as usual" here, might 
 have been very well left out ; as this was positively 
 the first time, since your relative joined, that we had 
 come near the enemy. He then moved on, having 
 the light portion of his division supported by the 
 Heavy Brigade. " I followed," he says, " implicitly 
 " the instructions I received as far as the ground 
 " permitted." It is thus, then, clear that he had par- 
 ticular and precise instructions, in pursuance of 
 which he proceeds to file his column across the 
 ravine, drives the enemy's pickets back on Campo 
 Maior, advances across a plain, and halts about a 
 mile from the town. He now perceives the enemy's 
 cavalry, and informs us that they began to manoeuvre 
 behind the heights, as if intending an attack upon 
 
62 
 
 him ; and that lie employed himself in making, what 
 he considered, the best dispositions to counteract 
 their intentions, " waiting the Marshal's further 
 " orders." — Here then, again, he distinctly proves 
 that he did not consider himself acting under such 
 general and discretionary orders as he had before 
 represented himself as receiving, and with respect to 
 which I can say no more than that, if the conversa- 
 tion General Long has reported ever took place, it 
 has totally escaped my recollection. But, I think, 
 every military man will allow that a conversation of 
 the nature described could scarcely have arisen under 
 the circumstances of the time, and that it was wholly 
 inapplicable to the occasion, which required that the 
 several arms should act in unity and conjunction, a 
 combination which could only be effected under one 
 command. — But what General Long has stated is 
 not only inconsistent with our then position, but is 
 altogether inconsistent with itself. I caution him, 
 because the enemy is exceedingly strong in cavalry, 
 to hug the infantry ; and he consequently abandons 
 the infantry entirely, and sets out after the exceed- 
 ingly strong cavalry of the enemy supported by their 
 infantry. He has precise orders for his approach to 
 Campo Maior ; and, on coming in sight of it, he 
 halts his corps to wait my further instructions. He 
 receives his new orders, is put in motion, is twice 
 informed that he is not fulfilling my intentions, and 
 peremptorily desired to conform to them ; but he 
 pays no regard to these repeated commands, and 
 
63 
 
 then endeavours to shelter himself under the pretence 
 of some previous order, which, if it ever existed, had 
 been superseded and annulled by the recent and 
 direct instructions applied to the occasion itself as it 
 occurred. 
 
 On this case you further observe* : " Either General 
 " Long was intrusted with the direction of the 
 " cavalry operations, or he was not. If he was, 
 " your Lordship should, I submit, have allowed him 
 " to carry his intentions into effect. If he was not, 
 " your Lordship should have been at hand, to have 
 " directed him, as you say, immediately and per- 
 " sonally" If this is the reasoning of a civilian, it 
 may be smiled at and excused ; but, if it has been 
 directed by any military critic, it is not very credit- 
 able to its author. General Long was the officer in 
 command of the cavalry ; but, sir, they were not his 
 intentions, but mine, that he had to carry into effect, 
 and after the manner that I directed. In the first 
 instance, he might have mistaken his orders ; but he 
 w T as informed twice, of the mistake which he had 
 made ; and, persisting in disobeying my instructions, 
 he withdrew the cavalry from me. I had moment- 
 arily other points to attend to, before I could go 
 after him. His letter has informed you of the pace 
 he proceeded at, and, considering the distance to 
 which he had removed himself from me by the time 
 Sir Henry Hardinge returned from his second 
 message, it is manifest, your relative had precluded 
 * C. E. Long's Letter, p. 65. 
 
64 
 
 the possibility of my being, as you say, " at hand to 
 " direct him." It has been seen that, though I went 
 after him at a quick pace, so far was I from being 
 able to be " at hand," that the 13th Dragoons had 
 made their charge, and were out of sight before my 
 arrival. So much for your well-advised paragraph. 
 I consider your evidence to show, that the Portu- 
 guese cavalry did not charge the French infantry 
 by orders of General Long, as perfectly satisfactory, 
 and acknowledge myself in error with regard to that 
 fact. Looking down on the parties, at the distance 
 of half a mile to the rear, I might easily have been 
 deceived as to whether the affair I witnessed was 
 between our cavalry and that of the enemy, or 
 between our cavalry and his infantry — the whole 
 being close together. My attention, in the distance, 
 was first attracted by the fire of the enemy's 
 infantry, and seeing our cavalry flying from it 
 immediately afterwards, I concluded that they had 
 charged and were repulsed. It appears that I was 
 in error ■ but I do not perceive what General Long 
 can possibly gain by my mistake. It is almost more 
 incomprehensible that he should have exposed his 
 light cavalry to the fire of the enemy, without in- 
 tending to make any attack. But this point I will 
 not discuss: my only object in reverting to this 
 movement, is to acknowledge that I was deceived 
 with regard to the nature of it. 
 
 ALBUERA. 
 
 You have, sir, filled several pages to prove, if I 
 
65 
 
 clearly understand the drift of them, that General 
 Long had not sufficient instructions to direct him on 
 the approach of the enemy to the battle of Albuera, 
 and that he was not informed in time of the point of 
 his retreat. 
 
 I shall merely observe in reply, that I never 
 received the slightest hint of such a circumstance 
 until, some twenty years after the events, you 
 thought fit so to state, on the authority of your 
 late relative's private correspondence. You demand ,* 
 * Are we to understand that General Long did not 
 '* repeatedly apply for orders?" This, sir, has never 
 been denied. On the contrary, he was considered 
 as making those applications far too frequently and 
 most unnecessarily. The Quarter-master-general's 
 letter of the 14th of May, from Valverde, will pretty 
 distinctly point out the feeling entertained at head- 
 quarters respecting General Long's correspondence. 
 The second paragraph shows, that your relative was 
 thought to entertain opinions which were neither 
 founded on the instructions he had received, nor 
 fitting the nature of his position. The third shows, 
 that he was considered as too timid of incurring 
 any responsibility. From such responsibility, how- 
 ever, it appears that I had no objection to relieve him, 
 and consequently issued to him such precise and 
 detailed instructions, as I had never previously 
 thought it necessary to deliver to any officer in a 
 similar position, and such as I am certain never 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 82. 
 F 
 
66 
 
 ought to have been required. I should be glad to 
 be informed, if any other general officer of cavalry, 
 situated as General Long was, would not have con- 
 sidered such orders as your relative applied for and 
 received as derogatory to his military skill and intelli- 
 gence ?. Every document you have published proves 
 him to have had the most ample notice that he 
 was to retire on Santa Martha, three leagues from 
 Albuera. And on the 14th, he writes from the 
 former place*, " as far as my private opinion goes, I 
 " have no reason to expect that I shall be forced 
 " from this position to-day, nor perhaps to-morroic." 
 The above was stated after receiving a report from 
 the Alcalde of Los Santos, three or four leagues in 
 advance of Santa Martha. Now, sir, General Long 
 in this passage, does not express the slightest doubt 
 respecting the point of his retreat, which he most 
 assuredly would have done had he been in ignorance 
 respecting it. Nay, you relate that, in the letter 
 from which the above extract is made, he expresses 
 his " readiness to dispute every inch of ground 
 " between Santa Martha and Valverde," by which 
 he distinctly proved that he was, at least, aware of his 
 line of retreat; as Albuera is on the Valverde road, 
 and two leagues nearer Santa Martha. You have 
 publishedf a letter from Sir B. D'Urban of the 
 12th, which General Long would receive early on 
 the 13th, informing him, that head-quarters would 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 79. 
 t C. E. Long's Letter, p. 7S. 
 
67 
 
 be transferred on the latter day to Yalverde or 
 Albuera, the road to the former running through 
 the latter. If your relative had been previously in 
 the dark respecting his line of retreat, this alone, in 
 the absence of any command to the contrary, would 
 have been sufficient for his instruction ; and when he 
 wrote on the 14th — the day after the above-mentioned 
 letter was received — that he would dispute every inch 
 of the ground to Valverde, it was evident that he 
 understood it in that sense. We have only General 
 Long's own evidence, detailed in his secret corre- 
 spondence, that the order of the Quarter-master- 
 general, directing him to march immediately to 
 Albuera, and which was sent at half-past seven in 
 the morning of the loth, did not reach him till he 
 had commenced his retreat from Santa Martha. If 
 this was the case, it is obvious, from the very move- 
 ment he was making, that he was quite aware of the 
 line he was to retire on, a fact which in your present 
 publication has been proved to demonstration. Lieut. 
 Heathcote. then an officer in the Quarter-master- 
 general's department, relates, that*, " on the morning 
 :< of the loth, General Long's division of Cavalry, to 
 " which I was attached, was posted about a mile 
 ■' in rear of Santa Martha on the road towards 
 " Albuera/' And, after describing this position 
 of the cavalry, Mr. Heathcote goes on to say. 
 " General Long, having left General de Grey in 
 M charge of his division, joined Count de Penne 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 105. 
 
 f2 
 
68 
 
 ' f near the church of Santa Martha situated on 
 " an eminence commanding an extensive prospect, 
 " where, we remained several hours." It is thus 
 manifest, not only from the documents that you 
 have published, hut from the very conduct of your 
 relative, that he was perfectly aware of the line on 
 which he was to retire. He acted as if he had a 
 perfect knowledge of it. No doubt on the subject 
 was apparent ; nor did any mistake occur ; and we 
 find him, early on the morning of the 15th, before, 
 according to his account, he had received the 
 Quarter-master- general's instructions for such a 
 measure, posting his troops on the road to Albuera 
 from Santa Martha, several hours before ordering 
 the retreat, or the appearance of any enemy. Whe- 
 ther General Long was really left in ignorance on 
 this subject, the reader may decide. 
 
 I now proceed to consider the manner in which 
 this retreat was conducted. You have adduced the 
 evidence of many most honourable officers to support 
 your representation of this matter. But their testi- 
 monies are strangely at variance with each other*. 
 
 * I cannot forbear introducing- here, as a note, the obser- 
 vations of a general officer on this part of your letter to me. 
 " The Retreat from Santa Martha to Albuera. 
 
 "Although fifty-two pages of .Mr. Long's letter are devoted to 
 " discussion relative to the retreat from Santa Martha to Albuera, 
 " the points in controversy may be brought into a very small 
 " compass. 
 
 " The following questions appear to me to comprise the whole 
 of them. 
 
 " 1st. Did General Long occasion the British Cavalry to 
 " retreat from Santa Martha, before the French advanced guard 
 
69 
 
 At this I am not greatly surprised. Such discre- 
 pancies to a certain extent may easily be accounted 
 
 " only ; and with more precipitation than there was occasion 
 lor? 
 
 " 2nd. Was the retreat, or the end of it, on crossing the Albnera, 
 " hurried, and more precipitate than was necessary ? 
 
 " 3rd. Was the representation of the proceeding's, (which 
 " General Long's account of them to his private correspondents 
 " seems intended to convey,) namely that 'the enemy's nearer 
 "* approach to (Santa Martha) having fully established their 
 '• ' strength, I fell back at a walk to Albuera' — and that * the 
 " ' enemy's advance soon came up with our rear, and skirmished 
 " ' with us all the way to Albuera,' a correct and true statement 
 " of the facts, or was it not ? 
 
 " To form answers to these questions, I will call for no testi- 
 M mony, nor use any materials but the written evidence which 
 " Mr. Long himself has laid before the public. I must, however, 
 " first say, that it is with grief and pain that I submit myself to 
 " point out the contradictory and erroneous statements which the 
 " documents alluded to contain ! — with still more pain that I feel 
 " compelled to show how very indiscreet and ill judging an ad- 
 <k vocate has started up to vindicate the military fame of General 
 " Long !! 
 
 " Question 1st. The evidence of Mr. Ralph Heathcote, who 
 M was an officer of the Quarter-master-general's department, and 
 '* who (as he says) ' hardly quitted General Long's person, (p. 104, 
 " Long's Letter,) during the whole of the 15th of May, (which 
 M was the day of the retreat,) states, (p. 105,) when the enemy's 
 " ' advance-guard appeared, driving in the Spanish outposts, 
 " * General Long sent off orders to General de Grey to commence 
 " ' his retreat towards Albuera.' 
 
 " The evidence of Col. Light shows (p. 108) 4 that the Spanish 
 " Cavalry covered the British rear, and that they were so little 
 " pressed upon, that they were enabled to retreat 'in good order' 
 " and had not one man killed. 
 
 " It further appears from the evidence of Mr. Heathcote, 
 " (p. 105,) that General Long remained in person with his staff, 
 " &c. a ' considerable time' at the church of Santa Martha after 
 " he had ordered the retreat of his division, (and that it was by 
 '■ so remaining that he became able 'distinctly' to sec 'a strong 
 
70 
 
 for by the different views which they took of the 
 state of things at the time, and by the many years 
 
 " 4 force of cavalry as well as infantry was advancing in several 
 44 ' columns,') and * until the enemy's skirmishers were on the 
 " ' point of entering and passing the village' !!! 
 
 " After the perusal of this evidence, does a soldier exist who 
 " will doubt, that the British cavalry, by General Long's orders, 
 44 did retreat before the French advance-guard only ? Or who 
 ■* will not deem that the commencement of the retreat was more 
 44 precipitate than there was occasion for? 
 
 44 It appears clearly that even the skirmishers of the French 
 14 advance-guard did not commence pushing into the village of 
 44 Santa Martha until a considerable time after the British had 
 " received orders to retreat on Albuera, and that General Long 
 44 was not able to overtake his corps, on their route, until they 
 44 had retired about eleven miles, and were within ' one or two 
 44 miles of Albuera (p. 105) !!! 
 
 44 As to question 2nd, General Sir Loftus Otway could not 
 44 have mistaken the pace at which his Brigade was obliged to 
 44 move, in order to keep up ! We have, moreover, the testimony 
 44 of Col. Wildman, thai, at one period of the retreat, the 4th 
 44 Dragoons (p. 101) trotted two miles in retreat: and that they 
 44 were hurried over the bridge of Albuera, and that there was 
 44 confusion amongst the Portuguese in passing the wood. 
 
 " Is not all this then quite enough to have fully justified every 
 44 word of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's letter? And was not the 
 44 whole of the ground on the right bank of the Albuera stream 
 44 given up to the enemy 4 without the slightest dispute,' so far as 
 44 General Long was at all concerned? And was not the hurried 
 44 manner in which the 4th regiment passed the bridge, and the 
 44 confusion amongst the Portuguese in passing the wood, sufficient 
 44 to account for the impression on the mind of Marshal Beresford 
 44 that the retreat was made with unnecessary hurry and confusion ? 
 
 " As to question 3rd, I think it must appear to every person 
 44 who peruses General Long's account to his friends, that the 
 4 « account was meant to convey the idea cf a skilful retreat, at a 
 44 slow pace, in the face of the enemy ! Let us quote what he 
 " says — 'The enemy's nearer approach (to Santa Martha) having 
 4 - 4 fully established their strength, I fell back at a walk to Albuera 3 
 
71 
 
 which have elapsed since the events occurred, but most 
 of all the incompetency of those officers from their 
 
 ** — that ' the enemy's advance soon came up with our rear, and 
 " • skirmished with us all the way to Albuera.' 
 
 44 It is truly painful to dissect this account ! and to contrast it 
 11 with that which is detailed as the fact by one of Mr. Long's 
 44 own witnesses, Mr. Heathcote, who was the assistant Quarter- 
 " master-general attached to the cavalry division !! 
 
 4< Mr. Heathcote writes, 'on the appearance of the French 
 
 advance-guard, General Long sent orders for his corps to 
 
 • commence their retreat towards Albuera.' And from what 
 
 44 follows, it appears that, at the time of sending this order, he 
 
 "* was not assured of what force was approaching him. He 
 
 '.' (in person), with his staff, waited ' a considerable time' (after 
 
 44 the order for the retreat of his corps was sent) at the church of 
 
 •* Santa Martha ; and it was then only, and after the lapse of 
 
 ' 4 a considerable time,' that he could 'distinctly' see that ' a strong 
 
 * force of cavalry, as well as infantry, was advancing in several 
 
 44 ' columns.' It was also after the lapse of this ' considerable 
 
 " time,' that 'the enemy's skirmishers were on the point of 
 
 44 ' entering and passing the village below.' 
 
 " General Long then rode off leisurely ; and at six miles to the 
 44 rear of Santa Martha, he found the Spanish cavalry formed, and 
 44 he discovered his own corps four or five miles farther to the 
 44 rear, on to the wood of Albuera. 
 
 44 (How will Mr. Long reconcile this with ' the enemy's advance 
 ; * soon came up with our rear, and skirmished with us all the 
 44 4 way to Albuera' ? !!!) 
 
 44 On passing the Spaniards, it seems that the General deemed 
 41 it prudent to ' mend his pace,' and he trotted to overtake his 
 44 corps ; but while so trotting, ' hearing the French attack the 
 ct 4 Spaniards in his rear, he hastened on as fast as possible.' He 
 44 did not, however, succeed in overtaking General de Grey, until 
 44 he had retired through the wood of Albuera, and was within 
 44 one or two miles of that place ; and was ' retiring by alternate 
 44 4 regiments towards the bridge of Albuera.' 
 
 44 The 4th dragoons were then hurried over the bridge, and 
 44 the Portuguese (p. 102) were in confusion in the wood of 
 44 Albuera ; although Col. Light declares, that « the Spanish 
 
n 
 
 respective positions to judge justly of what they even 
 saw. But do not the very circumstances that thus 
 
 " * cavalry covered the retreat of the British/ and he 'knows no 
 " ■ reason why the retreat should have been disorderly or con- 
 " ' fused, for there was no confusion with the Spaniards, who 
 "' were between General Long's corps (p. 108) and the enemy/ 
 
 " These accounts relative to the retreat, being placed in juxta- 
 " position with that written by General Long, no comment seems 
 " requisite !! 
 
 " Mr. Long may be able to reconcile them ! — I cannot ! 
 
 " I have said that it is with pain that I must point out the con- 
 44 tradictions of Mr. Longs witnesses. I must justify the expres- 
 " sion ; but I will go as little into the subject as possible. Col. 
 " Leighton says (p. 99), ' skirmishing did take place with the 
 " ' enemy's advance and our rear guard.' 
 
 " Col. Light (p. 108), that the Spaniards were between the 
 " French and General Long's corps !! 
 
 ' c Major Spedding has no recollection (p. 100) of the retreat 
 " being i hurried.'' 
 
 " Col. Wildman (p. 101) says the 4th Dragoons ' trotted' at one 
 " time for "two miles; 9 that they again ' trotted 1 through the wood, 
 k< and that they were subsequently * hurried'' over the bridge at 
 " Albuera ! 
 
 " Col. Maralister says, c General Long (p. 104) certainly was 
 " not at the head of the column during the whole of the retreat, 
 " ' as I repeatedly saw him, and never left my own station.' 
 
 " Ralph Heathcote, Esq., says (p. 106-7), that General Long 
 " never overtook the column until they were eleven miles to the 
 " rear of Santa Martha ; that the General then directed him to 
 " ' proceed on to General de Grey, while he remained with the 
 " ' 13th or Portuguese ;' but it will appear that the General 
 44 altered his mind about remaining with this part (namely the 
 " rear) of his column, as he overtook Mr. Heathcote again before 
 fc < he '■joined the. Heavy Brigade* which was retiring on the bridge 
 " of Albuera, on the other side the wood !! 
 
 " However there is no use in pursuing this subject. 
 
 " Mr. Long's criticisms about taking up and occupying the 
 " position of Albuera are unworthy of any notice. 
 
 " I must, however, remark on one other piece of information 
 
account for the variations, also tend to prove of how 
 little value such evidence must be ? Col. Leighton 
 prefaces his account by saying that, ' to the best of 
 " i his recollection, the enemy did appear in force 
 " ' near Santa Martha on the 15th of May, before 
 " ' the retreat;' and states that ' the cavalry cannot be 
 " ' said to have/led before the enemy, not did any 
 " * thing like it take place during the retreat. The 
 "'pace was not rapid' 
 
 " given by one of Mr. Long's evidences (Mr. Heathcote) as well 
 " elucidating General Long's character (p. 105) ! 
 
 "'While posting our piquets for the night (says Mr. H.), 
 " ' General Long repeatedly expressed his surprise at the manner 
 " ' in which the army was drawn up, &c. &c. 5 ' He was so much 
 " ' annoyed at the disposition of the respective corps on the 
 44 ' ground they occupied,' (on the morning of the 16th,) ' that he 
 " ' ordered me, on the spot, to make a sketch of the position of 
 " ' Albuera.' 
 
 " We have thus exhibited to us the General in the evening 
 44 condemning 'repeatedly,' to a subaltern officer, the manner in 
 " which his chief had drawn up the army !! And in the morning, 
 " (instead of bestowing all his watchfulness and care upon the 
 44 course of the Albuera stream, which separated the opposing 
 44 armies,) we have him finding fault with, and ' annoyed* at the 
 " ' disposition of the respective corps on the ground they occupied,' 
 " and employing one of his staff, at that critical moment, to make 
 " a sketch of the position of Albuera!! 
 
 " Mr. Long's ignorance of military matters has led him to 
 ** endeavour to attach some blame to Marshal Beresford, about 
 £i the unprepared state of the cavalry ; and its having received 
 44 orders to go and forage immediately antecedent to the com- 
 44 mencement of the action. But every officer of experience will 
 44 perfectly well know that this is a sort of detail into which a 
 44 commander in chief would never enter, and that any such order 
 44 would necessarily emanate from the chief of that particular 
 44 corps ! Therefore, if any blame was to be imputed, it must lie 
 44 on the proper shoulders !" 
 
74 
 
 Besides this account of Colonel Leighton, you bring 
 forward the statements of eleven other officers, exclu- 
 sive of Mr. Heathcote, to substantiate your represen- 
 tation of this movement, and to contradict that which 
 has been given by myself, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, 
 Sir Henry Hardinge, and others ; but you appear, 
 sir, to have forgotten altogether that the latter were 
 produced in contradiction to the previous statements 
 of General Long, which you had dragged from their 
 darkness into light, and published in your " Reply" 
 Your relative had asserted in his correspondence*, 
 •■" not a single instruction had I received, nor could I 
 " obtain, though repeatedly applied for ; my route or 
 " point of retreat were not even pointed out." 
 
 This extract, be it remembered, is from a letter 
 written after the battle ; and the evidence, which you 
 have yourself produced, proves that it is unfounded. 
 Again, he saysf, " I remained under arms at Santa 
 " Martha, and about eleven o'clock dispatched another 
 " messenger, to ascertain whether or not Solana was 
 " really occupied by the enemy, and open the com- 
 " munication with General Madden. Scarcely had 
 " this messenger been sent off half an hour when we 
 " perceived a very strong column of the enemy's 
 " cavalry (apparently about 3000), followed by in- 
 " fantry and artillery, coming over the hills directly 
 " down upon Santa Martha." Such is General Long's 
 account of the first hostile force which he saw ap- 
 proaching him ; and which is directly contradicted 
 
 * C. E. Long's Reply, page 109. t Idem, page 111. 
 
75 
 
 by the very full and particular description of the 
 enemy's advance, which has been given by Ralph 
 Heathcote, Esq., and printed in the 105th page of 
 your letter to me. " The nearer approach having 
 " fully established their strength, I fell back," says 
 General Long, " at a walk to Albuera, detaching 
 " the Portuguese Brigade in advance to cover the 
 " passage of the bridge at that place" It has been 
 proved by the officer commanding this brigade, and 
 by every one of your own witnesses who mention the 
 Portuguese cavalry, that no such order could have 
 been given, as it continued the whole retreat in rear 
 of the British. Mr. R. Heathcote states*, " it was 
 " to take up a position, covering the bridge over the 
 " little brook that crosses the road between Santa 
 " Martha and Albuera, about six English miles from 
 " either place." — These are most strange and un- 
 accountable contradictions ! 
 
 Many of the officers, whom you have produced as 
 witnesses, speak only to the " best of their recol- 
 lection," or " from the impression now remaining on 
 their memories ;" though some positively confirm 
 General Long's statement of the enemy having " ap- 
 " peared in great force at Santa Martha before our 
 " cavalry retreated." I shall be able, however, to 
 prove most distinctly that such was not the case ; and 
 that it was not possible for any of those officers to 
 have seen what their memories now betray them into 
 the belief of. Indeed, the evidence of Mr. Heathcote 
 would be quite sufficient and decisive for that object, 
 
 * C, E, Long's Letter, page 106 
 
76 
 
 With regard to General Long's assertion, that " he 
 f fell back at a walk to Albuera," it is contradicted by 
 every officer who has written on the subject. The 
 word, sir, is a military one, and is, therefore, not to 
 be explained away, or taken in any other than its 
 simple meaning. Your relative might have said 
 " leisurely," which is also a military term, and need 
 not have implied, as his present expression does, 
 that the retreat was altogether made in a walk. As 
 to whether it was more or less quick, or whether it 
 was, or was not, hurried, each individual may have a 
 different opinion, according to his view of the circum- 
 stances of the case ; but it appears from more than 
 one of your own witnesses, that there was consider- 
 able trotting. Not having been personally present 
 at any part of this retreat, I can have no other know- 
 ledge of it than such as is derived from the report of 
 others ; and, perhaps, the Commander in Chief is the 
 person who was most likely at the time to have 
 received the best information on such a matter. But 
 I shall at once bring forward my authorities on these 
 points. They are no less than the two officers com- 
 manding the two brigades of cavalry : Major Osten, 
 Brigade-Major to the Heavy Brigade ; the Quarter- 
 Master- General of the Army ; Sir Henry Hardinge, 
 the Deputy Quarter-Master- General ; Count de Villa 
 Real ; Col. Napier, Ralph Heathcote, Esq., your 
 own witness, and whose evidence I shall cite from 
 your own publication ; and lastly, I shall add the 
 corroborative testimony of Captain Lapene, an officer 
 
77 
 
 on the staff of the 5th French corps, and then and 
 there present. 
 
 I will give precedency to your own witness. Ralph 
 Heathcote, Esq., says*, " On the morning of the 15th 
 " of May, 1811, General Long's division of cavalry, 
 " to which I was then attached as Deputy- Assistant- 
 " Quarter-Master-General, was posted about a mile in 
 " rear of Santa Martha, on the road towards Albuera." 
 
 Thus then to begin : the cavalry was placed a mile 
 from Santa Martha, on the line of its retreat, and 
 General Long, at this early hour, leaving Col. de Grey 
 in charge of his division, placed as stated, joins 
 Count de Penne Villa-mur near the church of Santa 
 Martha, which is situated on an eminence, and com- 
 mands an extensive prospect. " From this height," 
 continues R. Heathcote, Esq., " when the enemy's 
 " advanced guard was seen driving in the Spanish 
 " outposts, Gen. Long sent off orders to Colonel de 
 " Grey to commence his retreat towards Albuera." 
 It thus then appears that the cavalry, being already 
 a mile from Santa Martha, had orders to commence 
 their retreat, as soon as from this height the enemy 
 was seen driving in our outposts : and yet several 
 officers, relying on the impressions of their memory, 
 have stated, more or less decidedly, that they saw the 
 enemy in force before the commencement of the re- 
 treat. But Mr. Heathcote marks the fact, if possible, 
 still more distinctly. He informs us that " General 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, page 104 — 107. 
 
« Long and the officers of his staff remained for a 
 " considerable time longer, till they had distinctly 
 « seen that a strong force of cavalry as well as in- 
 " fantry was advancing in several columns, and till 
 " the enemy's skirmishers were on the point of enter- 
 " ing and passing the village below." Thus then it 
 is proved that, after dispatching orders from this 
 height for the retreat of this division, General Long 
 remained there " a considerable time," and it was 
 only after this considerable time that, from this height, 
 which commanded an extensive view, the enemy's 
 masses or columns were seen, and none but the very 
 advanced skirmishers of the French advanced guard 
 had approached near the village. Now, during all 
 this considerable time that the General had been 
 stationary, our cavalry had been retreating ; and they 
 <;ould not have been less than two or three miles off 
 when the enemy's skirmishes only had arrived at 
 Santa Martha. And yet, sir, some of your witnesses, 
 though they were not at any time nearer than a mile 
 of the place, and though it would appear, from the 
 remainder of Mr. Heathcote's evidence, that our ca- 
 valry must have been three miles to the rear of it, 
 when only the advanced skirmishers of the French 
 were seen, have asserted that the enemy appeared in 
 great force before Santa Martha previously to the 
 commencement of the retreat. It is, sir, manifest 
 that no officer, a mile to the rear of Santa Martha, 
 could have seen the enemy in great, or considerable, 
 or even any force, before our troops began to retire. 
 
Mr. Heathcote's description of* the advance of an 
 army is military, and according to general practice ; 
 and I will corroborate his account by the testimony 
 of other officers who, from their position and expe- 
 rience, were more likely than any of your own wit- 
 nesses, who were then all young men and never, 
 with one exception, above the rank of Captain, to 
 have paid attention to the circumstance. Mr. Heath- 
 cote has informed us that Colonel de Grey was at 
 this very point of time in the command of this divi- 
 sion of cavalry. Let us then hear his account of 
 the case. I will now, sir, lay his letter before you 
 more fully than in my last address : it is dated April 
 17th. The year is not mentioned ; but it was written 
 very shortly before his death. 
 
 " My Lord, 
 
 " Relative to the retreat of the cavalry, on 
 '? the 15th May, 1811, from the plain, I forgot to 
 " mention to you yesterday, that we never saw a 
 " French soldier, either horse or foot, previous to 
 " General Long commencing a retreat. We were 
 " drawn up in two lines upon the plain, equal to any 
 " advance the enemy might have brought against us 
 " in the first instance. 
 
 " General Long all at once (most unaccountably 
 " to me) ordered us to withdraw, and during that 
 " retreat, perpetually sent to me either to hasten the 
 " pace, or again to go slower, but he still continued 
 ' it, and never rested until he ordered us across the 
 " bridge at Albuera." 
 
so 
 
 This will be corroborated, first, by Major Osten of 
 the 16th Lancers and then Brigade-Major to the 
 Heavy Brigade ; and, secondly, by Captain Lapene, 
 who was on the staff of the 5th French corps, and 
 who distinctly proves that the French never got sight 
 of the British near Santa Martha, nor were aware of 
 their presence until they came within a league of 
 Albuera. Major Osten, to whom I forwarded a copy 
 of Colonel de Grey's note to me, answers — 
 
 " Hatch, Beauchamp near Taunton, 
 " Sept. 20, 1833. 
 
 " Your Lordship's letter, dated August 6th, reached 
 " me only yesterday, a considerable delay having 
 " occurred in its being sent to Hanover instead of 
 " Wiesbaden, where I have been staying. This will 
 " at once account and plead my excuse for this late 
 " acknowledgment. 
 
 " With respect to the copy it incloses of the late 
 " Lord Walsingham's letter, I perfectly recollect and 
 " can bear witness to all the circumstances therein 
 " mentioned ; and I remember that considerable hurry 
 " and confusion took place on the retreat of the 
 " cavalry from Santa Martha to Albuera the 15th 
 " May, 1811, (although no enemy was in sight, and 
 " not a shot was fired,) in consequence of many orders 
 " of a contradictory nature issued by General Long. 
 "In fact, orders and counter-orders followed each 
 " other in such quick succession, that it was diffi- 
 " cult, almost^ impossible, to carry them into ex- 
 " edition." 
 
81 
 
 Both the above letters tally perfectly with Mr. 
 Heathcote's account as to the appearance of the 
 enemy near Santa Martha. I will now produce 
 Captain Lapene's statement on this point, and it will 
 be seen whose story it confirms. 
 
 " On the night of the 15th Marshal Soult was six 
 " leagues from Badajoz at Santa Martha. The 
 " French army had all arrived there. The half of 
 " General Werle's brigade only had remained two 
 " leagues in the rear at Villalba. 
 
 " Soult, uncertain for a part of the day if Beres- 
 " ford had taken up a position, was rather inclined 
 " to believe that the enemy would avoid a decisive 
 " battle and repass the Guadiana. His views, with 
 " regard to the real intentions of the allies, were soon 
 " decided by Gen. Briche, commanding the Light 
 " Cavalry of our advance guard. He had encoun- 
 " tered the enemy posted at two leagues from Santa 
 " Martha, on the road to Badajoz, and had made 
 " them fall back before him. Informed of this dis- 
 " covery, &c." It is thus manifest that the French 
 were ignorant of the presence of any British till they 
 came within a league of Albuera ; and that they were 
 then made acquainted with the circumstance by the 
 information of their advanced guard. And yet we 
 find it affirmed that the British did not retire from 
 Santa Martha till the enemy appeared in great force 
 before it ! 
 
 The reader must judge on which side the weight 
 of authority lies, and whether those superior officers, 
 
 G 
 
82 
 
 whose business it was to look to the general move- 
 ments, who received the orders and who had to execute 
 them, were likely to be the best judges of the matter 
 in dispute ; or the regimental officers whom you have 
 cited, who had their own, though more restricted, 
 duties to attend to, and who could scarcely have been 
 so well informed of what was in progress, or so aware 
 of the general scope of a movement, as to be able to 
 form a correct opinion even of what they saw. 
 
 The hurried and confused manner in which the 
 retreat was conducted is distinctly proved by Colonel 
 de Grey and by Major Osten who received General 
 Long's orders, and had to put them into execution. 
 Your own evidence, sir, clearly speaks to the same 
 effect. Lieutenant-Colonel Wildman says that they 
 " retired about half the way, and were halted for a 
 " short time*; that they were then ordered to the 
 " rear in a trot for about two miles ; and that after- 
 " wards they were again desired to trot." This may 
 certainly have been done without confusion ; but it 
 certainly has the appearance of hurry, and corrobo- 
 rates Col. de Grey's account. When they differ, it 
 must be remembered that Lieut.-Colonel Wildman 
 was at that time only a subaltern in the 4th Dra- 
 goons ; and that Col. de Grey, as the officer in com- 
 
 * This may serve to mark the time of the respective commands 
 of Colonel de Grey and General Long*: the former commanding 
 during the first period, the latter during the after period, when 
 the hurry and confusion is said to have commenced, according to 
 every witness who admits that there was any hurry or confusion 
 at all. 
 
S3 
 
 mand of the brigade, must have seen and known 
 more of what was actually going on than he, and 
 must, therefore, be received as the most perfect wit- 
 ness on the subject. No one has pretended, nor can 
 pretend, to deny the nature and the frequency of 
 the orders with which General Long harassed Col. 
 de Grey during the retreat, and which sufficiently 
 evince the state of confusion your relative himself 
 was in. The Brigade Major, who, next to the officer 
 immediately in command, was the individual most 
 likely to be well informed upon this point, most fully 
 corroborates Colonel de Grey's statement. Lieut.-Col. 
 Wildman most distinctly says, that " after passing 
 " the wood, the heavy brigade were formed in line, 
 " and halted facing the wood, when the light cavalry 
 " went to the rear, the 3d Dragoons then retired, 
 " and the 4th followed soon after, retreating in line, 
 " covered by the skirmishers, to the bridge, over 
 " which the regiment was hurried, but by whose 
 " orders, or for what reason, I never knew, as I was 
 " with the skirmishers, but had seen no enemy to 
 " skirmish with." Col. Wildman had previously 
 '' stated " that there was some confusion in the Portu- 
 '• guese cavalry in passing the wood," which confirms 
 the impression received from the statement of Sir 
 Loftus Otway. I will also assert as a military 
 man, that nothing can show more plainly the confu- 
 sion that actually existed than the foregoing para- 
 graph from Lieut.-Col. Wildman. To halt a corps 
 of cavalry with its face to a wood, from which it 
 
 g2 
 
84 
 
 could not be a musket-shot distant, and with the ob- 
 stacle of a river in its rear, while the enemy is sup- 
 posed to be near at hand and even pressing it, is cer- 
 tainly a most extraordinary proceeding ; nor can I 
 wonder, under such circumstances, that Lieut. Col. 
 Rook should have desired the commander to pass to 
 the left bank of the stream. The place chosen for the 
 halt was, besides, in a bottom. I know of no other 
 officer who would have required an order to place his 
 corps in a position, where the obstacle would be be- 
 tween himself and the enemy from which he was re- 
 tiring. It is you, sir, who have supplied me with 
 this evidence, which proves not only hurry and con- 
 fusion on the part of your relative, but something 
 more. Besides these ample evidences of the state of 
 affairs, we have skirmishers sent out, where there 
 was no enemy to skirmish with ; and, after all, with- 
 out an enemy in view, the rear regiment is hurried 
 over the bridge. 
 
 You next produce the evidence of Major Norcliffe, 
 who answers for his own brigade, by wdiich, I pre- 
 sume, he means the brigade in one of the regiments 
 of which he was then a subaltern. He retired, he in- 
 forms us, "in admirable order, and took up his 
 " ground on the field of Albuera without hurry, 
 " confusion, or disorder of any kind." Lieut. Nor- 
 cliffe, sir, Avas not only in the same brigade but in 
 the same regiment, the 4th Dragoons, with Lieut. 
 Wildman. I need only observe that the memory of 
 one of these officers must have sadly failed him. But 
 
85 
 
 I would here revert to the evidence of Colonel, now 
 Major-General Sir L. Otway. He says, " the 
 " march from Santa Martha to Albuera was hurried 
 u and harassing, the rear of the column being obliged 
 " to gallop." Col. de Grey's account of the contra- 
 dictory orders that he received now to go faster and 
 again slower would, as every military man knows, cause 
 the rear of the column, even where the horses were of 
 equal power, which was not the case in the present in- 
 stance, to proceed at the pace above described. Gen. 
 Otway states that " he went up to Gen. Long and 
 " reported this fact to him." There can, therefore* 
 be no doubt upon that point. This was done on the 
 spot, at the time, and by an officer commanding a 
 brigade. On this representation being made, Gen 
 Long was induced to trot rather slower. This again 
 is confirmatory of Col. de Grey and Major Osten's 
 statements.SirBenj. d'Urban's account of the man- 
 ner in which this retreat was effected will be found, 
 as well as the others above alluded to, in my former 
 letter to you. They all speak positively to the fact, 
 that the cavalry retired from Santa Martha in a hur- 
 ried and unmilitary manner ; and there is not, sir, 
 a single individual of your own witnesses who cor- 
 roborates your relative's assertion, that " he fell back, 
 at a walk, to Albuera." 
 
 The last evidence which I shall offer in confirma- 
 tion of this point is derived from a source to which, I 
 think, you will not object. Col. Napier* says, " In 
 
 * History of Peninsular War, vol. iii., p. 531. 
 
86 
 
 " this posture of affairs, about 3 o'clock in the even- 
 " ing of the 15th, while Beresford was at some 
 " distance on the left, the whole mass of the allied 
 " cavalry, closely pursued by the French light horse- 
 " men, came in from Santa Martha in a hurried 
 " manner, and passing the Albuera, abandoned the 
 " wooded heights in front to the enemy * &c." I do 
 not, sir, know how it can be denied, in the face of 
 this great mass of evidence, that the allied cavalry 
 under the immediate orders of your relative retired 
 unmilitarily, and that they retired in this hurried 
 manner when (as appears more particularly from La- 
 pene*) there was no enemy in pursuit of, nor was 
 there any near them, except Briche's brigade of light 
 cavalry. 
 
 In discussing the third extract from General 
 Long's correspondence, on which I offered some ob- 
 servations in my former letter, you enter into a 
 minute inquiry respecting the time when the cavalry 
 and infantry arrived at Albuera on the 15th of May. 
 No one can be more willing than I am to make every 
 allowance for mistakes in the calculation of time and 
 distances, and more particularly under circumstances 
 of strong excitement and absorbing interest. I 
 would not, therefore, engage in any discussion upon 
 such matters, unless, as is the case in the statement 
 of your relative, I observed some extreme exaggera- 
 
 *This author states the same fact several times in his History 
 ot these events, and says, indeed, that no other cavalry arrived till 
 the next morning-. 
 
87 
 
 tion. General Long relates that, having left Santa 
 Martha about noon and reached Albuera about 
 2 o'clock (Col. Napier says about 3 o'clock), " none of 
 " the infantry made their appearance for several 
 " hours after his arrival." Before this period, I had 
 no personal knowledge of what occurred ; for the 
 rest, I can speak upon my own authority. Previous 
 to the arrival of my troops, I had been over and 
 made my observations on the ground of Albuera, and 
 left officers to place them as they arrived. I then 
 went a considerable distance to the left down the 
 stream, but certainly could not have been absent 
 more than two hours ; and, though on my going to 
 the left I was not even informed that your relative 
 had left Santa Martha, I found on my return that he 
 had been some time at Albuera. Some infantry had 
 then arrived. If General Long, therefore, had come 
 up immediately on my leaving it, and the infantry 
 only just before my return, it must be quite evident 
 that the account of his having arrived " several hours' 
 before them is wholly incorrect. I only refer to this 
 point for the sake of noticing a passage which you 
 have quoted from " Recollections of the Peninsula" 
 and in which it is said, " on the 14th Ave broke up and 
 " marched upon Valverde, halted for the night and 
 " moved forwards, at mid-day on the 15th, to Albu- 
 " era, which place we reached about five in the 
 " evening!' — You have, sir, given the last sentence 
 in italics ; why did you not print in a similar charac- 
 ter " and moved forwards at mid-day ? " —Now, Sir 
 
88 
 
 W. Stewart's division was bivouacked considerably 
 in front of Valverde towards Albuera. He was, 
 when I passed him, ready to march. The total dis- 
 tance between the two places is two leagues. The 
 route, which is generally speaking a gradual descent, 
 was as good as troops could have to march over ; and 
 yet they are described, by your authority, as having 
 been Jive hours marching six miles over such a 
 route*. 
 
 The author you have cited styles his book "Recol- 
 lections/ 1 and never, I dare say, dreamt of being ad- 
 duced as an authority for hours and minutes ; but, if 
 the troops marched at mid-day, as I believe was the 
 case, they would scarcely have reached the point where 
 they halted after half-past two or three at the 
 latest. I will not, at this distance of time and from 
 recollection, take upon myself to say at what hour 
 of the day the several movements began or ended ; 
 but I most distinctly affirm, that I could not have 
 been absent more than two hours from the ground 
 at Albuera ; that, on my leaving it for the left, I 
 was not even aware of General Long's retreat from 
 Santa Martha ; and that, on my return, I found his 
 cavalry, and the infantry of Sir W. Stewart and 
 Baron Alten had arrived in my absence. How r long 
 each of these corps had arrived on the ground I can 
 only know from what was reported to me at the time ; 
 
 * The distance from Valverde to Albuera would be between 
 7 and 8 miles, but Sir W. Stewart was considerably in advance 
 of Valverde, and halted short of Albuera. 
 
89 
 
 and, without disputing which came up first, I cannot 
 helieve there was an hour's difference between the 
 arrival of the several corps. 
 
 You state it as your opinion, which you support 
 by a quotation from Lord Londonderry, " that Soult 
 " was beforehand with me." I confess myself un- 
 able to divine from what single circumstance such 
 an opinion is derived. It is not supported by — it is 
 contradicted — by the facts of the time. Were any 
 of the troops that I calculated upon absent when 
 Soult made his attack ? I had more objects to attend 
 to and combine on this occasion than he had ; and I 
 was fortunate enough to secure them all, and to be 
 prepared to meet him. You say, sir, that General 
 Madden's brigade was away. It was so; but I 
 could no more have prevented its absence, as you 
 are well aware, than I could have hindered General 
 Long's unexpected arrival at Albuera, or his dis- 
 obeying my orders at Campo Maior. The brigade 
 of Brigadier-General Kemmis was likewise not 
 present, but it was on service and employed elsewhere 
 for military objects which could not be dispensed 
 with ; and, if this diminution of the number of my 
 army is to be made a ground of charge, you should 
 also object to Soult' s having left a small garrison at 
 Villa Alba, and coming to the ground without that 
 force. 
 
 This battle of Albuera has, indeed, been canvassed 
 and sifted to the very bottom ; and I cannot imagine 
 
90 
 
 any effort that has not been attempted, to destroy 
 whatever credit the commander of the Allied army 
 might derive from the victory which he was so fortu- 
 nate as to have achieved. With what success it is 
 not for me to decide. 
 
 I shall not, sir, stop to notice Mr. Heathcote's 
 statement of the opinion entertained by General Long 
 respecting the disposition of our force at Albuera. 
 That point has been most fully discussed by the 
 author of " Further Strictures" and his observations 
 are si ill unanswered. I shall merely further observe 
 that the account of the ground on the right, which I 
 did not deem it necessary to occupy, as given in the 
 ^Strictures ," is most fully corroborated by Lord Lon- 
 donderry and by Col. Jones in their respective histo- 
 ries of those transactions. 
 
 I now turn to your relative's assertion that " no 
 " Spaniards had appeared at daybreak ; " and to 
 your attempted explanation of this extraordinary 
 mistake. You say that, from their having taken, upon 
 their arrival, an erroneous position in the dark, the 
 " Spaniards did not pass near the spot where General 
 " Long was stationed." You also accuse me of 
 having separated the sentence of General Long's 
 correspondence which I gave from the context, with 
 the view of fixing a mis-statement on your relative. 
 I will now publish the passage as it stands in your 
 letter, and leave the reader to discover what difference 
 could possibly have been made by my omission ; or, 
 
91 
 
 if there be any, whether my view is not more strongly 
 confirmed by the whole passage, than by the brief 
 extract previously cited. 
 
 " In the mean time," says General Long, " I dis- 
 " tributed the cavalry along this strong line of de- 
 " fence, and we remained quiet during the night, my 
 " orders being to maintain that ground till relieved 
 " by the Spaniards." 
 
 " The morning of the 16th May arrived, but no 
 " Spaniards appeared." 
 
 Can any one suppose that your relative does not here 
 distinctly state, that those Spaniards had not arrived 
 at the break of day, who, in fact, according to my 
 former showing, had arrived during the night, and 
 who, at daybreak, were tediously manoeuvring in the 
 sight of the whole army ? But, sir, so far is your mode 
 of accounting for this misrepresentation from being 
 correct, that the exact reverse is true. It was from the 
 error committed by the Spaniards in taking up their 
 position that they passed near the spot where Briga- 
 dier General Long was stationed, as, instead of 
 forming on the right of, and in alignment with the 
 2nd British division, which was placed under and to 
 the rear of the hill, they passed in the dark to the 
 front of it, and formed in line with the support of the 
 advance posts near the village and bridge, thereby 
 slanting close to the rear of General Long ; while, 
 again, on retiring in the morning to take up the po- 
 sition that had been marked out for them, they 
 had to press immediately under his view up the 
 slope from the river. On this I say no more. There 
 
92 
 
 can, I think, be no doubt but your relative's state- 
 ment and your explanation of it are equally inac- 
 curate. 
 
 " If the enemy," you demand,* " did not make 
 " some attempt near the village in the early part of 
 " the morning, what is the meaning of the passage in 
 " the ' Further Strictures,' p. 138 : ' some guns were 
 " ' immediately brought to bear upon them and with 
 "'considerable effect?'" — Your question, sir, is 
 answered by the passage from which your extract is 
 taken. That passage, which relates to the first move- 
 ment of the enemy in his grand attack, states that I 
 was present and perceived the movement. It cannot 
 therefore, as you seem to represent, refer to any at- 
 tack previous to the general one ; and most certainly 
 not to that mentioned by your relative, which I never 
 heard of till your former publication, and which Ge- 
 neral Long describes himself as having discomfited. 
 No other account that I have seen speaks of 
 any such early attack. If you turn to Col. Napier's 
 History,')' you will see what I have stated fully con- 
 firmed. But, sir, you seem to have misunderstood 
 Gen. Long, who, I think, agrees with all the other 
 accounts respecting the attack of the enemy, and 
 states it to have been at the beginning of this opera- 
 tion that he directed the 3d Dragoon Guards to beat 
 back a corps of Lancers which attempted to pass the 
 river. It was this I alluded to in saying, " I was not 
 
 * P. 117, C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford. 
 t Vol. iii., p. 534. 
 
93 
 
 c< fortunate enough to have had it reported to me at 
 ". the time," which I not only now repeat, but add, 
 that every authority describes this corps of cavalry as 
 having passed the brook, then wheeled to their left, 
 and joined Latour Maubourg on our right. Such is 
 the account given by Colonel Napier and Sir Benja- 
 min d' Urban, neither of whom make any mention 
 of their having been charged by our cavalry, nor of 
 their having been beat back. All are agreed, on 
 the contrary, that they continued their route on our 
 side of the rivulet, and then joined their main body. 
 The statements made in your ensuing pages* re- 
 late to one of the marvellous facts advanced by Col. 
 Napier in his " Justification" It is affirmed, on 
 the authority of an officer, that the cavalry, just 
 before the advance of the enemy, were sent to the 
 rear to cut forage. This circumstance has been fully 
 discussed in my " Refutation of Col. Napier" I 
 shall not again enlarge upon the subject, but refer 
 you and the reader to that publication, merely ob- 
 serving, that the author of this report has never in- 
 timated by whom these orders were issued, or how 
 they reached the cavalry ; and it has been proved 
 that they did not emanate from me. The orders 
 which I actually gave respecting the cavalry have 
 been distinctly ascertained by the evidence of the 
 officer who bore them, and also of the officer by whom 
 they were received. The former was Sir Benjamin 
 
 * Pp. 118, 119, 120, of Mr. Long's Letter. 
 
94 
 
 d' Urban, the Quarter-Master-General of the army ; 
 the latter was Brigadier- General Long, then in com- 
 mand of the cavalry. 
 
 On the 30th May, fourteen days after the action, your 
 relative appears to have been entirely unacquainted 
 with these foraging parties ; to have been equally 
 ignorant of the enemy having passed the rivulet 
 above our right, as stated by Capt. Gregory ; and to 
 have been no less uninformed of his having made 
 any report to me on the subject. He, on the con- 
 trary, most decidedly contradicts it ; for, after 
 describing the real advance of the enemy, he says — 
 " The moment the enemy's movements were reported to 
 " head quarters, the \th Dragoons were ordered back, 
 " and fresh dispositions appeared to be making with 
 " the infantry." These measures General Long de- 
 scribes as having been taken after, and as soon as 
 the enemy was seen moving down on the right bank 
 of the river towards the bridge ; and he immediately 
 adds, "In the meantime" (that is, whilst fresh 
 dispositions were making with the infantry) " the 
 " enemy's columns on our left, or rather centre, 
 " formed opposite the bridge and ford, opened a can- 
 " nonade which we answered, and pushed a corps of 
 " Lancers across the rivulet." The corps of Lancers 
 here mentioned is that which General Long says 
 he ordered the 3d Dragoon Guards to attack, a mea- 
 sure of which I expressed my ignorance. In every 
 other respect, his statement agrees with all the ac- 
 counts which have been published, except that of 
 
95 
 
 Captain Gregory, which it most decidedly contradicts. 
 It will be seen that the cannonade, which Gen. Long 
 says we answered, corresponds with the guns men- 
 tioned both by the author of the " Strictures," and by 
 Col. Napier, as having been at that very time brought 
 to bear with considerable effect against the enemy. 
 
 I have thus, sir, gone through the main points 
 toucheU upon in your pamphlet, though it really ap- 
 pears to me that they were fully answered already 
 in my former letter to you. I have said that, as this 
 is the last notice which I will ever take of any com- 
 ments or attacks on my military conduct or reputa- 
 tion, I would avail myself of this opportunity for lay- 
 ing such documents before the public, as tended to the 
 full elucidation of the facts under discussion between 
 us : — and, as you have referred to Los Santos — a sub- 
 ject which I was not anxious to touch upon, I shall 
 here submit to you a letter from Sir Benjamin d' Urban 
 relating to that affair, which will not only clear up 
 many points respecting it, but may serve to show that 
 my forbearance towards Gen. Long was great and 
 continued, and deserved a better return than it has 
 encountered from himself and his friends. 
 
 This letter of the Quarter-Master- General of the 
 army was written, as the date will show, from British 
 Guiana, of which he was then governor, and before 
 he had read your observations on the " Further 
 Strictures" It affords therefore a refutation by anti- 
 cipation of your letter, and a full confirmation of the 
 
90 
 
 contents of the " Further Strictures" which he had 
 
 read. 
 
 "British Guiana, 26 Jan., 1833. 
 
 " I have received your letter of the 3rd Dec. last, 
 " and I will most readily go through the 'Strictures' 
 " and the other works, with all care and attention, 
 " and send you such observations as may suggest 
 " themselves upon the whole. But I have not yet 
 " seen that which you mention of General Long's 
 " nephew, nor can I find, upon inquiry, that any one 
 " here has yet received it. 
 
 " I cannot comprehend what there is in my 
 " pamphlet which can bear the inference of my 
 " approving anything that the General did. My 
 " desire, when that narrative was written, was to 
 " bear lightly upon him, and not to bring into notice 
 " anything to his prejudice that could be avoided. 
 " The same feeling, I know, had actuated you during 
 " the operations I was relating, and especially on his 
 " supercession in the command of the cavalry, which 
 " was ostensibly attributed to the difficulty of recon- 
 " ciling the 'jarring pretensions of the Spanish 
 iS ' Brigadiers ' (the rank which he then held) and 
 ts the consequent necessity of our having a Major- 
 " General to command the whole. This was, indeed, 
 " one reason ; but it was, perhaps, the slightest of 
 " all. The main reasons were, that he was appa- 
 " rently incapable of the charge in which he had 
 " been placed, and that the period was too critical, 
 
97 
 
 81 to risk the advantages of our small cavalry being 
 " thrown away. The general circumstances that led 
 " to this conclusion were shortly as follows ; and, 
 " although I never made any remarks reflecting upon 
 " him or any other person in my journal, yet all that 
 " happened in regard to any officer does not the less 
 " forcibly strike me in running my eye over their 
 <{ names ; even if it were not otherwise in my recol- 
 " lection. 
 
 " General Long's incapacity for cavalry command 
 " above adverted to had, as I think, early shown 
 *' itself. The affair of Campo Maior was the first in- 
 u stance that I am aware of. His share in that affair 
 * appears very correctly described in the ' Farther 
 u Strictures ,' concluding by the wild and improbable 
 " (and fortunately unfounded) report of the Light 
 <( Cavalry having been cut off and lost 
 
 " Then follows the scene at the entrance of Los 
 " Santos, which can never be forgotten by any one 
 " who saw it ; and you must well remember that a 
 " small brigade of French hussars were there caught, 
 " in presence of all our cavalry, heavy and light, and 
 " that much precious time was lost by General 
 " Long's indecision, until you, yourself, were at 
 " length obliged to ride up to him, and urge him to 
 ie charge ; that he still galloped about calling for his 
 " guns ; and that in the end they were charged by 
 " the 13th Light Dragoons (the regiment then in 
 " front of the column, upon somewhat narrow 
 " ground) by your own personal order to the com- 
 
 H 
 
9b 
 
 * mantling officer. — Nay (if my memory serves me) 
 " so strong was the impression on your mind at the 
 " time of the vacillation which had before prevailed, 
 " and of the crisis to which it had led, that you said 
 " to Boyce, < Charge them, or they'll charge you.' 
 " The ensuing charge and pursuit there is no need 
 " to dwell upon, they had nothing to do with the 
 " question before us. 
 
 " Then followed a series of reports from the out- 
 " posts, concluding, as I think, with the memorable 
 " one from Santa Martha. These reports I have not ; 
 " the last time I saw them, as well as I remember, 
 " was among the papers of your English military 
 " secretary's office at the Pateo de Saldanha, but I 
 " cannot be mistaken in their tenor, which (if I do 
 " not greatly err) was full of difficulties, complaints, 
 "alarms, and despondency. The spirit of these 
 " papers, combined with the recollections of Campo 
 " Maior and Los Santos, induced me to propose that 
 " you should take advantage of the report, in which 
 " General Long had set forth the inconveniences 
 " arising from the collision of ranks, and replace 
 " him in the command of the cavalry by General 
 l < Lumley ; for the vital object of having it under 
 " some officer on whom dependence in emergencies 
 iC might reasonably be placed. You yielded reluc- 
 " tantly to this advice, which it was painful to you, 
 " on the General's account, to follow, as I am sure 
 '' it was to me to offer : and he was then, I believe, 
 " apprised, ' that, on account of the difficulties arising 
 " from the ill-defined ranks' which he had reported, 
 
99 
 
 " he should be speedily relieved by a Major-General. 
 " Immediately afterwards occurred the movement 
 " from Santa Martha. Among the other arrange- 
 " ments for assembling upon Albuera on the 15th 
 44 May, General Long was directed to march upon 
 44 that place (by the enclosed order) ;* but that 
 44 march could never have been intended to have 
 44 been so hurried before an enemy's advance, even 
 44 supposing that any enemy had been near him, 
 44 which he had not reported ; whereas, you know 
 44 the cavalry came back so rapidly, that it scarcely 
 44 even skirmished, if it did so at all; but crossed the 
 4< Albuera, without drawing bridle, and without 
 44 leaving even a piquet on the other bank, which the 
 44 French videttes immediately took possession of; and 
 44 the whole of that ground was left to the enemy. 
 
 44 The' morning after this adventure, (which was 
 44 the battle-day of Albuera,) General Lumley, who 
 4 ' had been already called to the cavalry from his 
 44 brigade of infantry, arrived ; and when he did so, 
 44 I recollect your reluctance, even then, to displace 
 44 General Long, which occasioned me to express 
 44 myself in these words, or words to the same effect. 
 44 4 If you do not, sir, the cavaLy will be worse than 
 44 4 useless, and perhaps thrown away.' So strongly 
 il had the series of proceedings, to which I have 
 4 * shortly adverted, impressed me with that appre- 
 " hension ; nor do I now think that it was un- 
 
 * This order was that before spoken of, and which was sent to 
 General Long* at half past 7 a.m., of the 15th May. 
 
 h2 
 
100 
 
 " grounded. You then placed General Lumley in 
 " the command of the cavalry. That lie conducted 
 " it admirably is unquestionable ; and I cannot re- 
 " gret the measure. 
 
 " I well remember that Hardinge and myself had 
 " for some time before come to the conclusion, that 
 " there was imminent danger to the cavalry whilst it 
 " remained under General Long's management. 
 
 " The above is, I believe, the substance of all that 
 " mainly relates to the subject, and I have no doubt 
 " that the whole will be in the recollection of Har- 
 " dinge, as clearly as it is in mine. 
 
 " (Signed) Benjamin D'Urban." 
 
 I sent the above letter to Sir Henry Hardinge for 
 perusal, and I am authorized by him to give the state- 
 ments it contains his full confirmation. 
 
 I repeat, sir, that I had no wish to rip up this 
 affair of Los Santos in all its details ; but I should 
 be now wanting to myself, and still more to those who 
 have stated the foregoing circumstances,' if I did not 
 add the corroboration of the Count de Villa Real. 
 This statement was given before the letter of Sir Ben- 
 jamin D'Urban was written ; and each officer was 
 totally ignorant of what the other had related. 
 
 He heads his account 
 
 " Los Santos. 
 
 " I was with Marshal Beresford on the 16th April, 
 " 1811, at Los Santos. The army had completed 
 " its day's march, and halted at a very short distance 
 
101 
 
 w from Los Santos, while the Quarter-Master-Ge- 
 « neral was marking the ground it was to occupy. 
 " Head-quarters were established at Zafra, where 
 " they were arrived, when a Spanish officer came 
 " in great haste to report to Marshal Beresford, 
 " that a column of French cavalry was advancing 
 " upon Los Santos. This information came totally 
 " unexpected. 
 
 " The Marshal got immediately on his horse, and 
 " in a few minutes reached the ground upon which 
 " the cavalry were halted. It was still dismounted. 
 " The Marshal ordered General Long to mount imme- 
 " diately, and to keep under the high ground in order 
 " not to be perceived by the enemy. 
 
 " While divine: the orders above-mentioned, it was 
 " reported that the French were moving on, and had 
 " already entered Los Santos, where it appeared we 
 " had no outposts. At this moment a party of the 
 "" French showed itself on our side of the village; 
 " but, on perceiving our cavalry, they retired imme- 
 " diately. The Marshal having seen them, then de- 
 " sired General Long to make the dispositions he 
 ci thought proper to advance quickly. General Long 
 " said that the Portuguese cavalry having their left 
 « in front, he thought he must bring their right to the 
 " front, and asked whether he was to move right or 
 (l left in front, adding something about the time it 
 " would take. The Marshal replied briskly not to 
 " lose time in whatever he did, lest the opportunity 
 " of acting might escape him. 
 
102 
 
 " I consider that our cavalry was not above two 
 " hundred yards from Los Santos. 
 
 " The Marshal, after giving orders to General 
 " Long to advance, rode on towards the village with 
 " the officers of his staff. He entered it, and stopped 
 '• in the street waiting for the cavalry, which I was 
 " desired to go and hurry on. General Long said 
 " he w r as manoeuvring ; and would advance the 
 " moment he got the cavalry in order. 
 
 " Upon my delivering General Long's answer, 
 " Marshal Beresford, not seeing the cavalry come 
 " up yet, sent me back again to General Long im- 
 " patiently to order him to come on Avithout any 
 " further delay, as the French would be off before he 
 " arrived. 
 
 " The 13th Light Dragoons being in motion, the 
 " Marshal proceeded farther on ; and, on getting out 
 " of the village, we saw the French cavalry halting 
 "in column fronting us, at about two hundred yards 
 *' beyond it, among some stony ground and low 
 " walls, which only left a narrow open space before 
 " them. As soon as the 13th Light Dragoons got 
 " sight of the enemy, they formed in front of them 
 " rather obliquely. The French, on their side, when 
 " they saw that the 13th had formed, detached their 
 " leading squadron to charge them. The first squa- 
 " dron of the 13th did not wait to receive the charge; 
 " but advancing instantly in a gallant style, they met 
 " the French squadron, drove it back to its column, 
 " and reformed in the greatest order. At this mo- 
 
103 
 
 " ment two Spanish guns were brought up, but did 
 " not fire. 
 
 " The Marshal was very anxious that the cavalry 
 " should act, and pressed Gen. Long to be quick, and 
 " to attack the enemy ; but, though he remained 
 " a while in presence, there was no charge from our 
 " cavalry, except that already mentioned of the squa- 
 " dron of the 13th. The French, however, seeing 
 " our cavalry advancing, opened from the rear, and 
 " went off. Upon this the Marshal ordered one 
 " of the squadrons of the 13th to disperse, and to 
 " pursue: he rode himself with the remainder of the 
 tC regiment in support of the pursuing squadron. 
 '• Being myself with the advance, I saw the soldiers 
 " of the 13th getting in the rear of the French co- 
 " lumn, cutting down and taking prisoners many of 
 " the French soldiers in their ranks. The French 
 " finally broke, and galloped off in confusion." 
 
 I might, by a simple relation of this affair, per- 
 haps make its several events more clear to the 
 reader, and show the bearings of the foregoing testi- 
 monies upon them. But I leave them to tell their 
 own tale, without any comment or observation on my 
 part. 
 
 I finally, sir, proceed to the consideration of a sub- 
 ject to which you personally appear to attach some 
 importance, my not having recommended Gen. Long 
 for the Albuera Medal. Upon this head you say*, 
 
 *C. E. Long's Letter, p. 123. 
 
104 
 
 " I am now, my Lord, arrived at that portion of your 
 " Lordship's Pamphlet and of my own reply, with 
 " which I am, individually speaking, more imme- 
 " diately concerned." Again* — " I am now put upon 
 " my own defence" — and again* — " Your Lordship 
 " has been so obliging as to advance an accusation 
 " against me, of having made a most important alter- 
 " ation in the sense of Sir Henry Torrens's answer 
 " to Gen. Long, by substituting the word consider a- 
 " tion for circumstances, thereby, as you say, casting 
 " the onus of my relative's having been refused the 
 <£ medal entirely upon your Lordship." 
 
 I open my observations on this subject with the 
 foregoing extracts, that I may, at once, put all per- 
 sonality out of the question. I cannot even now 
 perceive any thing in what I previously advanced 
 upon this head, which intimated the slightest charge 
 against yourself. Most assuredly, sir, no such accu- 
 sation was intended; and I had mentioned with 
 commendation, the very fair and candid manner in 
 which you have laid your evidences before the public. 
 But, the words of my letter to which you object do 
 not, I think, justify the construction you have put 
 upon them. They are as follows : " It is to be 
 " observed that your account of Sir Henry Torrens's 
 " answer contains a most material mistake with 
 " regard to the terms of the communication." This 
 is the only passage to which you could possibly 
 
 * C. E. Long's Letter, p. 131. 
 
105 
 
 object ; and it merely states that a mistake had been 
 made. Having thus exculpated myself, at least 
 from all intention of personality, you will allow me 
 to doubt whether you have disproved the mistake I 
 have pointed out by " an indignant denial of its 
 " existence." You add,* ff I own I was somewhat 
 " surprised at your lordship's statement, in as much 
 " as a mere walk to the Horse Guards would have put 
 " you at once in full possession of the real facts of 
 " the case." It is a trite observation that persons 
 seldom practise what they preach. Such, sir, must 
 have been the case with yourself on the present 
 occasion. It is evident that you have not taken this 
 (l mere walk to the Horse Guards." I, on the contrary, 
 had anticipated your recommendation, and can assure 
 you, from having personally inspected and compared 
 them, that the communication from Sir Henry 
 Torrens inserted in my published Letter to yourself 
 is a true and exact transcript of that at the Horse 
 Guards. You say, " the copy in your possession is 
 " different ;" of this I entertain no doubt. It is 
 clear, therefore, that the mistake which I pointed out 
 exists ; but I cannot understand upon what authority 
 you assert yours to be the original, though I do not 
 pretend to say it may not be such. The priority of 
 its claims must depend on whether the copy of the 
 Horse Guards was taken from your Letter, or yours 
 from it. This is not, however, of the slightest con- 
 sequence, for I shall, in proceeding to consider your 
 * C. E. Long's Letter, p. 131. 
 
106 
 
 further observations on the subject of this medal, 
 show, that the rules, regulations, and practice of the 
 army, with regard to such honorary distinctions, are 
 conformable with the copy of Sir Henry Torrens's 
 Letter which I gave, and with my explanation of it. 
 
 Reverting to the comparison which you drew 
 between the cases of Lord Collingwood and your 
 relative, you say, in " nothing but the particular case 
 " as regarding the medal, could I, or did I attempt 
 " to compare the individuals in question." I am not 
 aware of having ever stated that you did; but, as you 
 did not consider it expedient to pursue the comparison 
 even on the point of the medal to its end, and state 
 the result in either case, I thought it just to myself 
 to take up the parallel where you left it, and, follow- 
 ing out the conduct and the feelings of both the 
 officers alluded to, show that the course they pursued, 
 the feelings that influenced them, and the effects pro- 
 duced on them, were in every respect diametrically 
 opposite. 
 
 You undertake to prove that I was mistaken in 
 stating that I acted according to precedent in not 
 recommending General Long for the Albuera medal; 
 and, after citing the first of the three rules which 
 you had before quoted from the Official Regulations 
 for the granting of the medal (viz. " no General Officer 
 " shall be considered entitled to receive medals unless 
 " he has been personally and particularly engaged 
 " upon occasions of great public importance,") you 
 proceed to say that, " with the aid of a multitudinous 
 
107 
 
 " assemblage of synonymes, I bad extracted an 
 " answer from Sir Henry Hardinge to the effect, 
 " that he was not aware of any particular service 
 " rendered by General Long during the action." 
 The question, sir, which I addressed to Sir Henry 
 Hardinge was a very simple and direct one. The 
 answer which he gave to that question was equally 
 laconic and direct. You object to the vagueness of 
 the word "particular." This I am not surprised at; 
 as the sense in which the word is generally under- 
 stood can by no means be made to apply favourably 
 to the case of your relative. But, sir, the word is 
 neither mine, nor Sir Henry Hardinge's. It is taken 
 from the Official Regulations which you have quoted, 
 and describes the circumstances under which an 
 officer would be entitled to the distinction of the 
 medal ; and, notwithstanding your criticism on our 
 military terms, I must think that, according to the 
 above rule, an officer is required to have been 
 personally and particularly engaged. My inquiry 
 of Sir Henry Hardinge, whether he knew of General 
 Long's having rendered any such particular service, 
 and his reply, knowing as he did the object of the 
 question, and the full military sense of the word, 
 " that he was not aware of any such particular 
 " service," will, I apprehend, be considered by every 
 reader as most appropriate to the subject in discussion 
 between us ; and many, I doubt not, will think they 
 ought to have been received as conclusive. You 
 proceed to quote some terms of general commend a- 
 
108 
 
 tion from my despatch, with a view, I suppose, of 
 proving that your relative really did effect some 
 " particular service." But it appears to me that 
 your quotations prove too much. When, for instance, 
 you cite, " the Marshal feels that every officer, and 
 " every soldier, deserve particular mention," or " the 
 " conduct of all was noble," expressions which, in 
 their general application to the whole army, were 
 strictly true, — a person of so nice and discriminating 
 a talent as yourself must perceive, that it never could 
 have been my intention to assert that there might 
 not be some few individuals among the 20,000 men 
 which were at Albuera, who were not deserving 
 of such commendation. Many, indeed, were never 
 in the action ; and, sir, though all might deserve 
 particular mention, the whole army would not, 
 consequently, have been all entitled to medals ; for 
 the grant of which clear and special regulations 
 were prescribed. " I find," you continue, "that 
 " your lordship could not omit also mentioning with 
 " praise Brigadier-General Long and the Honourable 
 " Col. de Grey, for the part they had in conducting 
 " the cavalry." To adopt your own expression, 
 sir, " when the general note of thanksgiving was 
 " to be sounded, I mentioned him with praise." 
 But, still, this general note does not tend to establish 
 any such "particular services" as are required from 
 those who are recommended for medals. Indeed, 
 sir, had I not mentioned him in " the general note of 
 praise," the omission would have been considered as 
 
109 
 
 particular in an unfavourable sense ; and my silence 
 would have been construed by you, as it was on the 
 occasion of Los Santos. But, sir, your relative, on 
 finding that he was not included in the list for medals, 
 might have appealed — at the time and on the spot — 
 through Sir William Lumley to myself, or direct 
 to me, or immediately to the Duke of Wellington. 
 Many other officers have so done, as you will presently 
 see. But, I would here call your attention to this 
 very extraordinary circumstance. Your relative never, 
 during the period of his remaining in the Peninsula, 
 deemed it expedient to make any representation on a 
 matter, which, privately, he so bitterly complained of 
 as an act of personal injustice. What was the cause 
 of this forbearance ? Was General Long averse from 
 seeking redress when he considered himself injured? 
 Was he ignorant of how or where to apply for it ? 
 When, sir, as mentioned in your last publication, we 
 call to mind the complaint that he subsequently made 
 to the Duke of Wellington on a point, which he need 
 not have considered as personal to himself, and on 
 which he was proved to be in error, the above ques- 
 tions must be answered in the negative. Is it not 
 then, I demand, very extraordinary that a person, by 
 no means backward in asserting his claims, and doing 
 justice to himself, should have omitted doing so on 
 the occasion in question, if he really thought himself 
 personally aggrieved ? I will not follow you, sir, any 
 farther on this subject, but lay before the reader a 
 letter from the Horse Guards, which will confirm 
 
110 
 
 what I stated to you in my former letter, that medals 
 were not indiscriminately given to every general 
 officer who was present in a battle ; and, that when 
 any officer considered himself overlooked, an appeal 
 was open to him and known to be so, and he would 
 find redress if he was entitled to it. Brigadier-Gen. 
 Long, by his private correspondence, appears to have 
 considered himself in that predicament ; but instead 
 of having; recourse at once to the authorities on the 
 spot, he delayed his appeal for five years, when his 
 pretensions were considered by His Royal Highness 
 the Duke of York, the Commander in Chief at the 
 time ; and though your relative had then actually 
 received the thanks of Parliament with all the other 
 General Officers present at the battle of Albuera, his 
 claim to the medal was negatived, and, as I think, 
 neither in a soothing nor a flattering manner. I must 
 here observe, that several other officers, like General 
 Long, appealed to the Duke of York, and that, ac- 
 cording to the following letter, their claims were 
 admitted or negatived according to the justice of their 
 respective claims. 
 
 ''Horse Guards, 17th August, 1833. 
 " It very frequently occurred in the Peninsular war 
 " that the distribution of medals to general and other 
 " officers in command of corps, or in situations of 
 " responsibility, was not made general, but was con- 
 " fined to those who were actually engaged under a 
 " musketry fire : one instance of this is as good as a 
 " hundred; and, therefore, it may be sufficient to cite 
 
Ill 
 
 " Lord Hill, who commanded a large corps d'armee 
 " at Busaco, but, not being particularly engaged, did 
 " not get the medal. I might also mention Sir Miles 
 " Nightingale, who had a brigade of infantry in the 
 " 6th division, at Busaco, which was exposed to a 
 " cannonade, but who was not recommended for a 
 " badge of distinction. The same thing happened 
 " with the brigade of Guards on the same occasion, 
 " notwithstanding that the loss it sustained from the 
 " enemy's artillery was far from inconsiderable. 
 
 " It frequently happened that the names of officers 
 " who were entitled under the regulations, were by 
 " mistake omitted in the first instance, and were after* 
 " wards inserted in supplementary lists. Of these I 
 " have now several lying before me, and among others 
 " they contain the names of Sir John Elley, Sir Fre- 
 " deric Ponsonby, Lieut.-Col. Charles Beckwith, Sir 
 " Dudley Hill, &c. 
 
 " I send you an extract of the regulations under 
 " which the lists were prepared by the Duke of 
 " Wellington. 
 
 (Signed) " FlTZROY SOMERSET." 
 
 I will add the copy of the extract of the regulations 
 above-mentioned. 
 
 " The distribution of medals, or badges for military 
 " services of distinguished merit, shall be regulated 
 " as follows, viz. 
 
 " 1st. That no General or other officer shall 
 " be considered entitled to receive them unless he has 
 " been personally and particularly engaged upon those 
 
112 
 
 ft occasions of great importance and peculiar bril- 
 " liancy, in commemoration of which the Prince 
 " Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Ma- 
 " jesty, may be graciously pleased to bestow such 
 " marks of distinction." 
 
 " 2nd. That no officer shall be considered a can- 
 " didate for the medal or badge except under the 
 " special selection and report of the Commander of 
 " the Forces upon the spot, as having merited the 
 (C distinction by conspicuous services." 
 
 " 3rd. That the Commander of the Forces shall 
 " transmit to the Commander in Chief returns signed 
 " by himself, specifying the names and ranks of those 
 " officers whom he shall have selected as particularly 
 " deserving." 
 
 Any one, sir, who reads those instructions with 
 attention, will see that an officer may have done his 
 duty most perfectly, and yet not have had the oppor- 
 tunity of rendering any particular or conspicuous ser- 
 vices. Indeed it must be obvious to any one, that if, 
 as you suppose, every general officer present at a battle 
 was entitled to the medal, the instructions would be 
 superfluous and absurd. I am quite satisfied that I 
 did Brigadier-General Long most ample justice for 
 all the services he performed at the battle of Albuera; 
 nor can any one, I apprehend, be led to suppose, from 
 the extracts which you have quoted from my de- 
 spatches or general orders, that I had ever entertained 
 any feelings of personal unkindness towards him, or 
 still less that I had any intention of treating him with 
 
118 
 
 injustice. 1 must here, sir, again repeat, that during 
 the whole time Brigadier-General Long was under 
 my command, I was altogether ignorant of his being 
 in any respect dissatisfied with my conduct. I had 
 always believed that, from the commencement to the 
 conclusion of that period, the same good will had sub- 
 sisted between us, and that we had parted as amicably 
 as we had met. The nature of your relative's feel- 
 ings, while he was, thus, outwardly, living on terms of 
 kindly intercourse with one whom he was habitually 
 maligning in his private letters, I shall not attempt 
 to describe, or comment on. 
 
 I have the honour to be, &c, 
 
 Beresford. 
 
 August, 1831. 
 
LONDON : 
 PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES, 
 Duke Street, Lambeth. 
 
REPLY 
 
 LORD BERESFORD'S SECOND LETTER, 
 
 RELATIVE TO 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1811 
 
 Two Shillings, 
 
PENINSULAR WAR. 
 
 WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR. 
 
 With Plans, &c. 5s. bds. 
 
 A REPLY to the MISREPRESENTATIONS and AS- 
 PERSIONS on the MILITARY REPUTATION of the late 
 Lieutenant-General R. B. LONG; contained in a work, 
 entitled, " Further Strictures on those parts of Col. Napier's 
 History of the Peninsular War, which relate to the Military 
 Opinions and Conduct of General Viscount Beresford, &c. ;" 
 accompanied by Extracts from the Manuscript Journal and 
 Private Correspondence of that Officer, and corroborated by 
 the further testimony of Living Witnesses. By Charles 
 Edward Long, Esq. 
 
 LETTER to GENERAL VISCOUNT BERESFORD, 
 G.C.B. &c. &c. in REPLY to his Lordship's Letter to the 
 Author, relative to the Conduct of the late Lieut.-General 
 LONG, in the Campaign of 1811. By Charles Edward 
 Long, Esq. 
 
 " The pages before us settle the controversy The abilities of General 
 
 Long as a soldier, his coolness in the hour of clanger, and his humility as a 
 conqueror, when vanity is generally predominant, are clearly set forth in 
 the pages we have been perusing, and we have no hesitation in saying, that 
 we think General Beresford would perform an honourable part by recalling 
 his former statements, in justice to the memory of a distinguished brother 
 officer, whose well-earned fame he has sullied, by statements which we do 
 not think General Beresford would intentionally promulgate, if aware of 
 their incorrectness. In particular we refer the noble Viscount to the ample 
 refutation of the assertion that General Long was the author of the report 
 of the bodily capture of the 13th Dragoons, in the afl'air of Campo Mayor. It 
 is, indeed, conclusive." — Navul and Military Gazette, August 31, 1833. 
 
REPLY 
 
 LORD BERESFORD'S 
 herons) lUtttr 
 
 TO THE AUTHOR, 
 RELATIVE TO THE CAMPAIGN OF 1811 
 
 AND THE CONDUCT OF THE LATE 
 
 LIEUT.-GENERAL LONG, 
 
 Then commanding the Allied Cavalry. 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES EDWARD LONG, ESQ. 
 
 LONDON : 
 JAMES RIDGWAY AND SONS, PICCADILLY. 
 
 MDCCCXXXV, 
 
A LETTER, 
 
 ETC. ETC. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Controversies must have an end, and this 
 controversy has assuredly extended beyond the 
 bounds of patient endurance. My remarks, how- 
 ever, on your Lordship's new publication will be 
 comprised within the limits of a very few pages, 
 and will, I confidently trust, be found to contain 
 no expressions calculated to give just grounds of 
 offence to any party, — nothing, in short, which 
 the temperate exposition of errors, and a fair dif- 
 ference of opinion will not sanction. I should 
 not have taken any notice of your more recent 
 attacks upon the military character of my late 
 relative, had you confined the subject matter of 
 this your second letter to what indeed are now 
 its principal component parts, a rechauffee of 
 ingredients already disposed of, and a wearying 
 recapitulation of charges previously refuted, or 
 not worthy of refutation. 
 
 There are, however, two points in your Lord- 
 ship's present pamphlet which require some no- 
 tice, however cursory, and which have forced me 
 
 B 
 
( 2 ) 
 
 again into the field. First, as regards my late 
 relative, in the new attack made upon him in 
 respect of his conduct at Los Santos. Secondly, 
 as regards myself, that I should explain the 
 reason of the different reading in Sir Henry 
 Torrens's letter, as compared with the transcript 
 of it (seen by your Lordship) in the book at the 
 Horse Guards. 
 
 I certainly did not expect, after the lapse of 
 thirteen months from the date of my last publi- 
 cation, that I should have been honoured with 
 a second epistle, still less with one of such 
 voluminous magnitude. The season of its ap- 
 pearance, viz. in August last, will sufficiently 
 account to you for my delay in replying to it, 
 for which delay I must, notwithstanding, offer 
 my excuses, assuring your Lordship that various 
 engagements, and recently matters of a far more 
 important nature, have prevented my paying 
 any attention to the subject of our controversy — 
 now, as I hope, for the sake of ourselves and of 
 our readers (if we have any) approximating to, if 
 not arrived at, its final close. 
 
 In regard to my offering any further reply, 
 there is between me, and many to whose judg- 
 ment I should be disposed to defer, some diffe- 
 rence of opinion. Your Lordship will possibly 
 conceive that I am imprudent in not availing 
 myself of that advice. The difference is, not as 
 
( 3 ) 
 
 to the prudence of the proceeding, but as to its 
 necessity. I am told, first, that there is nothing 
 of sufficient importance to answer — that it is the 
 same ground trodden to death — an unceasing 
 vortex of recapitulation ; and secondly, that the 
 tone and taste of your last attack upon the me- 
 mory of my deceased relative, backed as it is 
 by a letter from your Quarter-master-general, 
 replete with the bitterest reproaches — this ' rip- 
 ping-up,' as you most appropriately term it, 
 of the affair of Los Santos, when all your other 
 ammunition had failed, is my best answer, and 
 that you have done more injury to the cause you 
 advocate than I might perhaps be able to inflict 
 by a repeated exposure of the many errors by 
 which it is upheld. It is not in the egotism of 
 authorship that I state this. The subject is now 
 narrowed within the limits of a common ques- 
 tion of evidence as to facts, and if any special 
 pleading on the part of the advocate was required, 
 I should have thrown up my brief long since. I 
 find, I must candidly own, in your Lordship's 
 present pamphlet of one hundred and odd pages, 
 much invective, great repetition, little argu- 
 ment, and abundant error. 
 
 Before I proceed any further, it is my desire 
 to exonerate myself from any seeming impro- 
 priety in having assumed (as I certainly did, 
 and which will account for any bitterness of ex- 
 
( 4 ) 
 
 pression that I may have been betrayed into), 
 in my reply to the author of the " Further Stric- 
 tures," that your Lordship was implicated as a 
 coadjutor in his labours. I feel obliged to do 
 this, because it has been cursorily hinted to me 
 that I was a little intemperate in my vindication, 
 and hardly justified in that assumption. It is 
 possible that I was a little premature, but your 
 Lordship has now shown that I was right. L Col. 
 Napier has, I observe, in plain terms, accused 
 your Lordship of being the actual writer of that 
 work. This certainly has not yet been contra- 
 dicted. But, nevertheless, and without con- 
 curring with Col. Napier, I must still hold your 
 Lordship to be in a very great degree responsi- 
 ble for that publication, and for the following 
 reasons supplied to me from your Lordship's last 
 pamphlet. In page 79 of that pamphlet, you 
 have given the whole, or, as I presume, nearly 
 the whole of Lord Walsingham's letter relative 
 to the retreat of the allied cavalry from Santa 
 Martha to Albuera, on the advance of Soult, and 
 to which communication you first directed my 
 attention in page 44 of your first pamphlet. 
 Neither the date of Lord Walsingham's letter, 
 nor the name of the individual to whom it was 
 addressed, then appeared. Now, however, 
 in this your second pamphlet, you afford me 
 the date (viz. April 17th), you tell me that it 
 
( 5 ) 
 
 <e was written shortly before his death," and I 
 find that it is addressed to your Lordship ; fur- 
 nishing me also with the fact, that on the pre- 
 ceding day your Lordship and Lord Walsingham 
 had held a conversation together on the same 
 subject. Now Lord Walsingham's death, as 
 your Lordship is aware, took place on the 27th 
 of April, 1831, and the author of the " Further 
 Strictures," as ycu are also aware, published his 
 work in 1832 — consequently it is quite manifest 
 that you must have held this communication 
 with Lord Walsingham, and received his letter, 
 in furtherance of some object; and whether that 
 object was or was not to render assistance to the 
 author of the " Further Strictures," I leave those 
 who are better versed than myself in circum- 
 stantial evidence to determine. As to my Lord 
 Walsingham's account of the retreat, I have con- 
 signed that long since to the keeping of the nine 
 officers in the two regiments under his command. 
 That they were " regimental and subaltern offi- 
 cers" is most certain ; but the public will never- 
 theless have judged on which side the balance of 
 correctness preponderates. 
 
 CAMPO MAYOR. 
 
 I shall not wake up the expiring embers of 
 this portion of our controversy, nor continue to 
 growl over a subject already picked to the bare 
 
( 6 ) 
 
 bone. Your Lordship, after 26 pages in your 
 first letter, and 53 in your second, must be hear- 
 tily sick of the details, and so, assuredly, am I. 
 Whether General Long's detour in approaching 
 the French force, then retreating from Campo 
 Mayor, was great or small, it is a fact which is 
 undisputed and indisputable that he encountered 
 the enemy two miles from Campo Mayor, and 
 ten from Badajos* — that their covering force of 
 cavalry was, by the daring gallantry of the 13th 
 — a gallantry not exceeded and hardly equalled 
 in any instance during the war, "entirely 
 " routed,"! " driven off the field, and pursued 
 " to the bridge-head of Badajos ;" and further, 
 that " the attack was admirably executed, and 
 " the success complete. "J That the heavy ca- 
 valry, then advancing on the same line, was 
 halted by your Lordship's order, for ten minutes 
 or a quarter of an hour,§ — that they were re- 
 advanced on the other flank of the French in- 
 fantry, accompanied by two of Major Hartmann's 
 guns— that, although the 13th were reported to 
 be in existence, and pursuing the enemy on the 
 Badajos road, and that the enemy's guns, &c. 
 were also reported to have been captured, || the 
 
 * p. 60, Reply to the Further Strictures. 
 
 f Lord Beresford's Dispatch. 
 
 X Sir B. D'Urban's Memoir. 
 
 § p. 63, Reply to the Further Strictures, 
 
 l| Reply to the Further Strictures, p. 50. 
 
( 7 ) 
 
 whole, cavalry and artillery, were halted for good, 
 after having advanced about a mile further,* 
 that is to a distance of three miles from Campo 
 Mayor, and nine from Badajos — that the 13th 
 returned, (the captured guns having previously 
 been abandoned by them in consequence of the 
 advance of the French column), and that thus 
 the affair terminated. I have no desire to say 
 any thing that may appear personal or offensive 
 to your Lordship ; but I cannot permit the 
 blame, if there was any, to be solely attributed 
 to General Long, and you cannot, I am per- 
 suaded, expect it of me. 
 
 In page 53 you controvert Colonel Macalister's 
 statement relative to the offer of Sir John Col- 
 borne to cut off the baggage, and his (Colonel 
 M.'s) offer of his own services to secure the 
 guns, by the portion of a letter from Sir John 
 Colborne descriptive of his movements and 
 position prior to, and during the attack ; and you 
 assume, from his silence relative to Colonel 
 Macalister's name, that the whole history is a 
 fable, and at best but the " confused and im- 
 " perfect recollections of & regimental officer, "f 
 In the first place, with respect to the baggage, 
 I must beg to observe, that Colonel Macalister 
 merely says, "I always understood," whereas 
 
 * p. 64, Reply to the Further Strictures. 
 + p. 58, Second Letter to Charles E. Long. 
 
( 8 ) 
 
 in the second, viz. of the guns, he says, " I am 
 "positive."* Colonel Macalister now informs 
 me that he " reconnoitred the guns previous to 
 "reporting to Colonel Colborne the practicabi- 
 " lity of bringing them in." But to show that 
 his statement is not the mere creature of an ex 
 post facto creation, I beg to offer the corroborat- 
 ing recollections of Mr. Jeffreys, then a Lieute- 
 nant, I believe, in the 13th, and given to me in 
 answer to the following question : 
 
 Question — Did you ever hear Colonel (then 
 Captain) Macalister, mention that Sir John Col- 
 borne had offered to intercept the baggage, and 
 that he (Col. M.) had volunteered to secure the 
 guns on the occasion of the affair at Campo 
 Mayor — if so, when did he mention this circum- 
 stance in your hearing ? 
 
 Answer. — " Colonel Macalister did mention 
 " to me that Sir John Colborne and himself had 
 " offered to intercept and cut off the baggage 
 " and guns at Campo Mayor. I heard this for 
 il the first time a day or two after the affair, but 
 " Colonel Macalister has frequently repeated it 
 " when the matter has been the subject of our 
 " conversation." 
 
 Now with respect to this letter, or rather frag- 
 ment of a letter from Sir John Colborne (and after 
 the fate of Sir Alexander Dickson's communica- 
 
 * p, 64, Letter to Lord B. 
 
( 9 ) 
 
 tion, as detailed in Colonel Napier's Reply to 
 your Lordship (p. 34), I must own that I 
 look with some anxiety upon these better halves 
 of a correspondence) with respect to this frag- 
 ment, I would observe, that it did not dis- 
 tinctly and unhesitatingly deny all recollection 
 of the observations mentioned in p. 70 of my 
 " Reply to the Strictures;" I therefore took 
 the liberty of writing to Sir John Colborne to- 
 wards the end of August last, as soon as your 
 Lordship's pamphlet was forwarded to me from 
 town, declaring my readiness, in the event of 
 his making a more distinct declaration to me on 
 the subject, to avow without hesitation that Ge- 
 neral Long must have been mistaken as to his 
 (Sir J. C.'s) meaning. To that letter I have, 
 within the last few days, received the following 
 reply. It is evident that General Long was mis- 
 taken in supposing that Sir John had any com- 
 munication with your Lordship respecting the 
 halt of the 66th. The regiment was halted three 
 times, but by whose orders does not distinctly 
 appear. 
 
 " Toronto, U. Canada, 
 
 "2\thDec. 1834. 
 
 " Sir, — I have had the honour of receiving 
 
 M your letter of the 21st of August, and I beg 
 
 " leave to acquaint you, that had you applied 
 
 M to me I should have considered it incumbent 
 
( io ) 
 
 ' on me to afford you such information as the 
 ' service on which I was employed in the affair 
 ' of Campo Mayor, might enable me to convey 
 ' to you, painful as it is to me to be drawn into 
 1 any controversy, having reference to the con- 
 ' duct of my old comrades and acquaintances. 
 
 " Several publications respecting Lord Beres- 
 ' ford's operations in the Alemtejo and Spanish 
 ' Estremadura have been sent to me, besides 
 ' the two which you have had the goodness to 
 ' forward. I have, since the receipt of your 
 ' letter, looked over them, and I think I may 
 * succeed in explaining to you that, although 
 1 the conversation to which General Long ad- 
 i verted may not be precisely expressed in the 
 ' extract of his letter which you published, 
 ' nor the inference drawn from it correct, yet 
 ' any essential difference in his statement and 
 1 mine has evidently arisen from his not having 
 ' understood that my command was altogether 
 ' an arrangement of Sir William Stewart's, after 
 \ the departure of Lord Beresford from the 
 ' ground on which the movements commenced. 
 
 " Lord Beresford requested, early in 1833, 
 ' that I would transmit to him any information 
 [ that I could give him respecting certain cir- 
 ' cumstances connected with the movement at 
 1 Campo Mayor, intimating to me, at the same 
 ' time, that he had not the least recollection of 
 
( 11 ) 
 
 *! my having been particularly employed on that 
 " occasion. I therefore found it necessary to 
 " enter into such details as might induce him 
 " to refer to other officers, who were near me 
 " during the affair. The statement I transmit- 
 " ted to him was contained in a private letter, 
 " and it describes, T believe, all occurrences 
 " that took place under my immediate obser- 
 " vation. Of the general arrangements of the 
 " march, or attack, I was totally ignorant at the 
 " time the allied force was put in motion. It 
 " is difficult to state accurately the time that 
 " elapsed from our separating from the 66th 
 a regiment, till we reached the right flank of 
 " the French column, but my impression has 
 " always been, that we were in that position in 
 " less than a quarter of an hour after I received 
 " my orders from Sir William Stewart. 
 
 " In regard to the offer stated to have been 
 " made by me, I can assure you, that we were 
 " too distant from Sir William Stewart's divi- 
 " sion to communicate with the Commander-in- 
 " Chief, during the actual pursuit, nor had I 
 " any intention or inclination to communicate 
 " with him, or any other corps, except the 66th 
 " regiment. To the commanding officer of this 
 " regiment I constantly dispatched instructions 
 " to hasten on, and follow our route. I did not 
 " see the 66th regiment till the evening, when 
 
( 12 ) 
 
 " I was informed that it had been halted three 
 " times, when making every effort to carry into 
 " effect my orders. To this interference I must 
 " have adverted in my conversation with General 
 "Long, and I might have attributed our failure 
 " partly to the detention of a corps that could 
 " have been employed in impeding the march 
 " of the French, till the approach of Sir William 
 " Stewart's division insured their surrender. 
 
 " Lieut. -Col. Goldie, formerly in the 66th 
 « regiment, will, I am persuaded, be happy to 
 " give you any information respecting the move- 
 u ments of the 66th regiment, you may wish to 
 " obtain.* General Long mentions in his letter, 
 iS that I. was detached round the town, and 
 " that, on observing the enemy quitting it, I 
 11 sent back word to beg that I might be sup- 
 " ported, and that I was in a situation to cut 
 u them off. That the answer I received was a 
 " positive order to halt. My statement to Lord 
 " Beresford does not vary essentially from this 
 " account, except that I affirm that I never re- 
 " ceived any communication from Lord Beres- 
 " ford, or sent any message to him; that when 
 
 * The arrival of this letter, just as the manuscript is going to 
 the press, prevents my making any application to Colonel Goldie. 
 But, in point of fact, as far as my defence of General Long is 
 concerned, it is of no consequence. Sir J. Colborne's letter 
 explains the thing very clearly. 
 
( 13 ) 
 
 " I arrived on the high ground near Campo 
 " Mayor, I did inform an Aide-de-Camp of a 
 " General of Brigade that, from my position, I 
 " could see all that was going on distinctly, and 
 " better than those on the left of the fortress. 
 " That I moved on rapidly with the 13th dra- 
 " goons, and that I was greatly disappointed at 
 " the detention of the 66th regiment,* and that 
 " we were hanging on the French column, or 
 " rather endeavouring to get to the rear of it, 
 " when we received orders to halt in common 
 " with the brigade of heavy cavalry and other 
 " corps, and that we had distinctly traced the 
 " movements of the 13th dragoons under Col. 
 " Head, and pointed them out to an officer of 
 " the staff, a short time after the orders to halt 
 " had been received. 
 
 " I have no recollection of other circum- 
 " stances that may have occurred during the 
 " affair of Campo Mayor. We were all greatly 
 " disappointed at the result, but after the ca- 
 " valry and infantry were halted, our further 
 " efforts would, I think, have been useless. 
 " Your most obedient servant, 
 
 " J. COLBORNE." 
 
 * I see nothing about this halt of the 66th regiment in your 
 Lordship's extract from Sir John Colborne's Letter, which is the 
 halt alluded to by General Long, nor of his (Sir J. C.'s) conse- 
 quent disappointment. 
 
( 14 ) 
 
 The next point to which I propose to call your 
 Lordship's attention, is that of the halt of Sir 
 Julius Hartmann's guns, which, as General 
 Long states in his letter to General Le Mar- 
 chant, " began firing, and with some, but not 
 " the desired, effect, into the column," (this 
 column being still eight or nine miles from Ba- 
 dajos, and having to cross an open country in 
 order to reach it,) " and all we had to do, was 
 " to continue thus to pepper them, till their 
 " order was broken, and then to let loose a por- 
 " tion of the cavalry, which surrounded them on 
 " every side." In answer to this you have de- 
 clared (what we never knew before) in accor- 
 dance with the " Further Strictures," though it 
 does not appear in your despatch, that the horses 
 were too distressed to keep pace with the infan- 
 try ; that it was only then that you ordered a 
 general halt of the troops ; and you quoted Sir 
 Henry Hardinge, who asserted that the horses 
 were "blown and fatigued, and it was found 
 " impossible to urge them forward, " # while Sir 
 Benjamin D 'Urban (another of your staff) and 
 your Aide-de-camp, the Count of Villa Real, are 
 stated to entertain similar recollections. I met 
 this statement of Sir Henry Hardinge, as you 
 are aware, by the counter-statement of an indi- 
 vidual, better able, with all submission (as I 
 
 * Pacre 38, first Letter to Charles E. Long, Esq. 
 
( 15 ) 
 
 should think) to judge than he was, viz. Sir 
 Julius Hartmann himself, the officer command- 
 ing those guns ; who distinctly affirmed, and 
 does still affirm, that the horses were " not by 
 " any means fatigued or distressed," that he 
 was " only prevented from advancing within the 
 " range for case-shot by an express order from 
 " your Lordship to halt ;" # and that " three or 
 " four hundred yards more trotting would, in 
 " his opinion, have done the business as far as 
 " the guns were concerned." You now endea- 
 vour to rebut this testimony by saying, that "to 
 " the last-mentioned officer," viz. Sir J. Hart- 
 mann, "the authority on my side of the ques- 
 " tion is confined, and it can hardly be regarded 
 " as sufficient to stand against the opposing 
 " testimony of Sir H. Hardinge, the Count of 
 " Villa Real, and Sir B. D'Urban."t For my- 
 self, I am abundantly satisfied with the evi- 
 dence of Sir Julias Hartmann, as the officer com- 
 manding that artillery ; but so may not the 
 public be, and so is not certainly your Lord- 
 ship. As, therefore, you would seem to desire 
 a further confirmation of that officer's statement, 
 I have endeavoured to obtain it, and it will be 
 found in the following letter from Captain Miel- 
 mann, and addressed to Sir Julius Hartmann: 
 
 * Page 60, Letter to Lord B. 
 
 ■f Page 50, second Letter to Charles E. Long, Esq. 
 
( ic ) 
 
 " Dear Sir, 
 
 " I remember the affair of Campo 
 < « Mayor, in March, 1811, perfectly and dis- 
 " tinctly well ; and, on reiterated perusals of 
 " your narrative in the Hanoverian Military 
 4 < Journal, have no hesitation in declaring it, as 
 " far as I can judge, correct in every respect. 
 
 " You will please to remember that I was with 
 " you when Lord Beresford stopped the advance 
 " of Lieut. Blumenbach's guns. We were rather 
 " amazed at this order, not conceiving the inv 
 " mediate cause. Our artillery horses I did not 
 " think the least fatigued. We only came that 
 " morning from Monte Regengo, and the ani- 
 " mals, at that period of the campaign, were 
 u still in excellent condition. 
 
 " I have the honor to remain, 
 " Dear Sir, 
 " Yours most sincerely, 
 (Signed) " H. Mielmann, 
 
 " Capt. Hanoverian Artillery. 
 " Jan. 9, 1835." 
 
 I should state, that this testimony of Captain 
 Mielmann was procured for me at my own re- 
 quest, as, in justice to Sir Julius Hartmann, I 
 was desirous of shewing that he is not the " only 
 " authority on my side of the question." I will 
 here further observe, that I have the authority 
 
( 17 ) 
 
 of Sir Julius Hartmann for stating that the inser- 
 tion of the name of Colonel de Rettberg, as 
 having commanded the two guns at Campo 
 Mayor, in page 60 of my letter to your Lord- 
 ship, was an error. The Colonel was not pre- 
 sent —the officer was Capt. Andrew Cleeves, long 
 since dead. 
 
 I now turn to that curious point in our contro- 
 versy, the "wild and improbable," as Sir Ben- 
 jamin D'Urban very justly calls it. "and, for- 
 " tunately, unfounded report of the light ca- 
 '■* valry having been cut off and lost." This 
 ridiculous misconception, as it regards General. 
 Long, has been so fully exposed in my previous 
 publication, that perhaps I am wrong in conde- 
 scending to waste upon it any further observa- 
 tions. A statement based solely upon your Lord- 
 ship's and the Count of Villa Real's indistinct 
 recollections of what you imagined that General 
 Long said he " thought " * might have occurred 
 — a report utterly unheard of, in connection 
 with General Long, by any officer of the 13th, 
 or of the Heavy Brigade, then or after — a won- 
 drous history, sealed up for the last twenty 
 years, and first brought to light by the acci- 
 dental apparition of a mysterious writer (I can- 
 not say authority), and when the officer on whom 
 it reflects is no longer able to vindicate himself, 
 
 * Page 25, first Letter to Charles E. Long, Esq. 
 C 
 
( 18 ) 
 
 is really too replete with hallucinations to re- 
 quire any further notice. I have only one reason 
 for alluding to it, viz. to introduce the conclud- 
 ing portion of the evidence of Lieut. -Col. Owen, 
 given in page 36 of your last letter. This officer 
 is stated to have been questioned by your Lord- 
 ship, " soon after the halt," on this subject, 
 having remained, as he says, with General Long 
 " after the disappearance of the 13th Dragoons." 
 I cannot distinctly discern the utility of this ap- 
 plication to Colonel Owen after the halt, seeing 
 that your Lordship had been assured of the 
 safety of the 13th, their pursuit of the enemy, and 
 the capture of the guns, &c. before the halt.* 
 But to proceed. " The Marshal said," writes 
 Colonel Owen, " ' Have you seen any thing of 
 " the 13th dragoons?' * Yes, Sir, they passed 
 *' me in pursuit of, and are beating the enemy.' 
 " The Marshal replied, ' Why General Long 
 " tells me they are all taken prisoners.' I an- 
 iC swered, ' that I was not of that opinion, that 
 " I knew the ground well, and did not believe 
 " that the regiment could have been taken.' 
 " The Marshal then said to General Long, 
 " ' Do you hear, Sir, what this Officer says?' 
 " The General made some observation with 
 " which I cannot charge my memory," — (it is 
 certainly unfortunate at this crisis to be deprived 
 
 * Page 50, Reply to Further Strictures : and 54, Letter to 
 Lord Beresford. 
 
( 19 ) 
 of General Long's answer, which the credulous 
 might conceive to have been a direct contradic- 
 tion, or, at the least, an explanation of the 
 error) — " when the Marshal somewhat angrily 
 " turned quick round to him, ' Damn it, Sir, 
 " why did you not do something — why did you 
 " not support them, or send to bring thembackV * 
 u Send to bring them back!!!" — send to bring 
 back a whole regiment conceived and reported 
 to have been cut off and captured ! ! Why your 
 very question shews that General Long did not 
 make this " wild and improbable, and, fortu- 
 nately, unfounded report;" even supposing me 
 bereft of the testimony of the fourteen cavalry 
 officers, who never heard this amazing narrative 
 affiliated upon their commanding officer from 
 that hour to this ! I wish your Lordship could 
 be induced to think that you may have been 
 mistaken. 
 
 But I forget. The object of my quoting Col. 
 Owen is not to analyse his testimony ; on the 
 contrary, I am rejoiced that he has given it; 
 and rejoiced too that your Lordship has printed 
 it, inasmuch as I look upon his statement as a 
 valuable acquisition. It is with your Lordship's 
 share of it that I have to deal. In your previous 
 publication you were for ever ringing the 
 changes upon your " forbearance," and your 
 
 * Page 36, second Letter to Charles E. Long, Esq. 
 
( 20 ) 
 
 " disposition not inclined to censure," and now 
 you provide me, at the very outset of the cam- 
 paign, on the very first occasion that you were 
 in face of the enemy, with this instance of equa- 
 nimity — " Damn it, Sir, why did you not do 
 " something?" nay, more, you add, " Why did 
 " you not support them?" when you had halted 
 the whole of the heavy brigade for ten minutes 
 or a quarter of an hour, which was advancing 
 on the same line, and which, if the 13th had 
 been in jeopardy, would have been pro tanto so 
 much the less able to afford them any assistance ! 
 Was this fair? I must here again deplore the 
 necessity that I am continually under of bring- 
 ing your Lordship forward as my witness. In 
 p. 49 you say, speaking of the heavy brigade, 
 i( I could not possibly suppose that, after the 
 " charge, it supported the 13th Light Dragoons; 
 " for on reaching the field, I found the heavy 
 " brigade 500 yards in rear of the enemy, and 
 " the 13th Light Dragoons not any where in 
 " sight." I thought that I had long since dis- 
 posed of this fact, by quoting your Lordship's 
 dispatch ; but you compel me to do it again. 
 
 " This charge, followed by Col. Otway with 
 " two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese, and sup- 
 " ported by Gen. Long with the remainder of 
 " that regiment, the 1st Portuguese, and the 
 " brigade of Col De Grey" &c. &c. 
 
( 21 ) 
 
 If your Lordship could not suppose it at the 
 time, why did you state it in your dispatch af- 
 terwards? But you now tell me, that you 
 founded the details of your dispatch (even unto 
 the "able manoeuvring," I suppose, of General 
 Long) upon the "after-report" of that officer. 
 On what after-report, I wonder, did your Lord- 
 ship's friend of the " Further Strictures" smother 
 this complimentary passage in your despatch, by 
 one imputing "mischief and folly?" It was, 
 indeed, a curious erratum to have crept out. 
 For " manoeuvred with great ability," in 1811, 
 read " further mischief and folly" in 1832 !! 
 
 It is perhaps hardly necessary to notice the 
 fact, that Mr. Jeffreys fully corroborates what 
 has been stated by his brother officers. Having 
 his testimony, however, before me, I give it in 
 his own words : 
 
 " The charge at Campo Mayor did form a 
 " subject of conversation in the regiment at the 
 " time, I may almost say, the exclusive conver- 
 " sation. The reported capture of the 13th 
 " Dragoons, and the subsequent halt of the 
 " heavy brigade, were never mentioned by my 
 " brother officers without the most unqualified 
 " astonishment and regret. I most certainly 
 " never heard it stated that General Long was 
 " the author of that report. It was I know ge- 
 " nerally ascribed to an officer on the staff." 
 
( 22 ) 
 
 This you will say is like the rest, all negative 
 testimony. No matter. 
 
 The next point to which I shall advert is the 
 reprimand of the 13th. Your Lordship has se- 
 dulously laboured again, in page 46 of your 
 "Refutation" of Col. Napier, to affix the onus 
 of that reprimand upon General Long. 
 
 It is certainly curious to find that while, on 
 the authority, as you state, of General Long, 
 you detailed the disorderly pursuit of the 13th 
 to the Duke of Wellington, and drew down that 
 severe censure which I printed in my Reply to 
 the Strictures — it is certainly, I say, curious to 
 find, as I do, in Col. Napier's "Justification" 
 (page 14), that you could write to Lord Stuart 
 on the 1st of April (five days only after the oc- 
 currence) in playful approbation of the " chase 
 " which your countrymen of the 13th Dragoons 
 " gave on the 25th;" that it was "literally a 
 " fox-chase of two leagues without drawing bit ; 
 " and which, though it lost you three battalions 
 " of infantry, that must else have been sur- 
 " rounded, had given a terror to the French 
 " that was perhaps equal to the capture of the 
 " infantry ;" and further, that u the Portuguese" 
 (who, according to Sir Henry Watson, proceeded 
 " in the most regular manner nearly to Badajos 
 " in columns'"*) "joined very handsomely, and 
 
 * Page 35. Lord Beresford to Charles E, Long, Ebq. 
 
( 23 ) 
 
 " appeared to have enjoyed the chase." It is 
 certainly curious to find this same 13th desig- 
 nated as a gallant pack, whipped in in such good 
 style by the Portuguese, at one moment, and at 
 another fulminated against as an " armed rab- 
 " ble." All this is curious ; but it is not the less 
 curious to find General Long now held up in 
 reprobation as the cause, and your Lordship put 
 forward as the mere passive medium of this 
 severe castigation ; and perhaps the more so, 
 when I find, on referring to my papers, that the 
 following letter was transmitted to you by Gene- 
 ral Long on the 6th of April, five clays after your 
 notice of the fox-chase in question : 
 
 " I have the honour to transmit to your Ex- 
 " cellency two letters (marked No. 1 and 2) 
 " which I have this morning received from 
 " Colonels Otway and Head, respectively, in 
 " consequence of the communication which I 
 " made to them and to their officers yesterday 
 " by vour command. 
 
 " I likewise think it proper to inclose a copy 
 c < of the General Order (No. 3) which I gave 
 '" out on the 27th ult. relating to the conduct 
 " of the corps engaged on the 25th; and also 
 " (No. 4) the substance of what I stated to 
 " Colonels Head and Otway, and their respective 
 " officers yesterday, by your orders. I wish to 
 " add no comment whatever of my own relative to 
 
( 24 ) 
 
 1 the transactions of the 25th ult. the progress 
 ' and result of which were evidently so much 
 ' influenced by the unfortunate separation of 
 1 the force placed at my disposal, at a very 
 ' critical moment, without my knowledge or 
 c concurrence ; but I may be permitted, from 
 ' what has since transpired, so far to do justice 
 ' to my own feelings as to sympathise with Co- 
 ' lonels Otway and Head, in the sincere regret 
 ' and disappointment they experience on find- 
 ' ing that the exertions made by themselves 
 ' and those under their command, to merit 
 ' the full approbation of their superiors have 
 
 * not only failed, but have produced conse- 
 
 • quences the very reverse of what was so 
 ' anxiously aimed at and hoped for by all." 
 
 &c. &c. &c. 
 
 Your Lordship will doubtless recollect this 
 letter, and it may serve as another evidence to 
 convince you that General Long was not " habi- 
 " tually," as you say, " maligning in his private 
 •' letters,'** those whom he dared not dissent 
 from in his open communications, and that he was 
 not unceasingly " detailing to his friends at 
 " home long catalogues of grievances against 
 M his superior officer, of which not a single hint 
 " was ever heard among his comrades abroad. "f 
 
 * Page 113, f Page 2, 
 
( 25 ) 
 
 How this letter, so early in the campaign, is to 
 be reconciled with the statement that " during 
 " the whole time that Brigadier-General Long 
 " was under your command, you were altoge- 
 " ther ignorant of his being, in any respect, 
 " dissatisfied with your conduct,"* is more than 
 I am able to conjecture. 
 
 You have alluded to the correspondence 
 which took place in November and December, 
 1811, after you had quitted your command, and 
 relative to the employment by General Long 
 of two Portuguese officers, as Aide-de-Camps, 
 or rather the giving leave, a very temporary 
 leave, of absence to one of them, for that was the 
 only valid ground of complaint. 
 
 Your Lordship cannot but be aware, that my 
 only object in printing the concluding paragraph 
 of your letter, was simply to shew that the ex- 
 pressions in that letter exhibited the very anti- 
 podes of that good will and amicable feeling of 
 which you had spoken. But it appears that you 
 have forgotten the whole nature and origin of 
 that correspondence. 
 
 Your Lordship's was a letter of complaint. 
 That letter of complaint was addressed to the 
 Duke of Wellington. It is not with the facts 
 but with the reflections contained in that letter, 
 
 * Page 113, 
 
( 2G ) 
 
 that I had to deal. The facts might have been 
 correct, but the inferences were erroneous. 
 
 " Thus," you write, " these officers have 
 " been dispensed from all duty by General 
 " Long, who either had no use for them, or did 
 " not desire to keep them with him. A con- 
 " duct which to your Lordship I need only 
 <c report." 
 
 " These reflections," writes the Duke in a 
 letter to Lord Hill, " might probably as well 
 " have been omitted, and if it had occurred to 
 " me that they would have irritated the feelings 
 " of General Long, I should have had the facts 
 " alleged in the letter extracted from it, and I 
 " should have forwarded them only for hisjusti- 
 " fication from them." Your Lordship, you will 
 therefore observe, has used the word " appeal" 
 in an erroneous sense. If you had written to 
 General Long, as I really think, in kindness and 
 courtesy, you ought, instead of penning an 
 angry letter to the Duke, and ordering the un- 
 happy Aide-cle-Camp " into arrest;" (I use your 
 Lordship's words) — and that General Long had 
 then written to the Duke, or that he had written 
 to the Duke in consequence of some reflections 
 upon his conduct made by your Lordship in any 
 other quarter ; his so writing would have been 
 in the nature of an " appeal." As it was — the 
 charges were first made by you to the judge, 
 
( 27 ) 
 
 and the judge very properly required an expla- 
 nation. General Long did explain, his explana- 
 tion was forwarded to head-quarters, and there 
 the matter ended. I really must apologise 
 for parading such trumpery transactions before 
 the public* 
 
 I cannot clearly understand the wood-cut 
 which you have given of the route of the heavy 
 brigade, in page 43, and purporting to be the 
 copy of that contained in the plan at page 33 of 
 my Reply to the Strictures. It does not cor- 
 respond, as will be seen, with mine. Your 
 Lordship has given the route of the heavy 
 cavalry, but omitted the line of the road, which 
 was parallel to it. This seems rather to confuse 
 than to elucidate the movement. 
 
 Again, there is a little irregularity of quota- 
 tion in Colonel Doyle's evidence, in your 45th 
 page, as follows: — "I was only sent once 
 " during the day, to Marshal Beresford, and 
 u this was only at the close of the affair ;" 
 for " only at the close," read " nearly at the 
 close." 
 
 * Your Lordship expressed a wish that I had printed the 
 whole of your letter. I cannot, in justice to my relative, do that 
 without giving all the correspondence. If your Lordship has 
 no copy of that letter and requires one, I shall be happy to send 
 it to you. 
 
( 28 ) 
 
 ALBUERA, 
 
 On this subject I feel it to be quite unneces- 
 sary for me to trespass at any length upon your 
 Lordship's patience. The retreat upon that vil- 
 lage from Santa Marta, on the 15th, was the 
 only point which it was of any real importance 
 that I should notice in my first letter ; and that 
 I did so fully and so effectually by the aid of 
 the sixteen officers, whose evidence was given, 
 that I will neither waste my time, nor your 
 Lordship's, by a fruitless analysis of your newly 
 mooted objections, more especially as they are 
 little better than a reproduction of their prede- 
 cessors. You may, perhaps, say that those ob- 
 jections are unanswerable — but let that pass. 
 
 As to the flying commentary of your anony- 
 mous General Officer, given in page 69, I shall 
 allow your Lordship the full benefit of his un- 
 disturbed remarks—feeling as little sympathy in 
 those ' griefs,' ' pains,' and ' still more pain' ! ! 
 which affected him during the accouchement of 
 his criticisms, as I feel apprehensive that the 
 statements of the several officers, " regimental 
 " and subaltern" though they were, have been 
 shaken by the weight of his arguments, which 
 have appeared, or of his name, which has not. 
 
( 29 ). 
 
 After indulging me with twenty additional pages 
 of reasoning on the subject of this retreat, you 
 finally tell me that the last evidence you shall 
 offer, in confirmation of this point of " hurry, 
 " confusion, and disorder," is " derived from a 
 " source to which you think that I shall not 
 " object. Colonel Napier says, ' In this posture 
 " < of affairs, about three o'clock in the evening 
 " < of the 15th, while Beresford was at some dis- 
 " ' tance on the left, the whole mass of the allied 
 " * cavalry, closely pursued by the French light 
 " ' horsemen, came in from Santa Marta in a 
 " ■ hurried manner, and passing the Albuera, 
 " ' abandoned the wooded heights in front to the 
 " * enemy, whose disposition being thus effec- 
 " 'tually concealed at the distance of cannon 
 " < shot, the strength of the position was already 
 i£ ' sapped.' : ' 
 
 Now, my Lord, I certainly do not object to Co- 
 lonel Napier as an authority. I believe him to 
 be an author as zealous in the pursuit of truth, 
 as he is unflinching in the declaration of it ; but 
 I do most decidedly object to your fastening upon 
 his first edition, seeing that a second edition had 
 been in print full six months before the publica- 
 tion of this your second letter. If you turn to 
 page 537 of that edition, you will find the pas- 
 sage amended as follows : 
 
 " In this posture of affairs, about three o'clock 
 
( 30 ) 
 
 u in the evening of the 15th, while Beresford 
 " was at some distance on the left, the whole 
 " mass of allied cavalry, closely followed by the 
 " French light horsemen, came in from Santa 
 " Marta, and as no infantry were posted be- 
 " yond the Albuerato support them, they passed 
 " that river. Thus the wooded heights on the 
 " right bank were abandoned to the enemy, and 
 " his force and dispositions being thereby effec- 
 " tually concealed, the strength of the allies' po- 
 u sition was already sapped." 
 
 It cannot be supposed that Colonel Napier 
 made this alteration at my request. It would be 
 an insult to the gallant historian to imagine that 
 he would pay the slightest attention to the appli- 
 cation of any individual like myself, when the evi- 
 dence was made public, and he could draw his 
 own conclusions. It appears that he has done so. 
 I shall here subjoin the testimony of Mr. Jeffreys 
 and that of his brother officers : and in so doing, 
 your Lordship will give me some credit for my per- 
 severance in seeking out every officer of the 13th 
 who could by possibility be heard of. — Of those 
 who, as far as I am able to discover, are living, 
 and have not given any testimony, Lieut. -Colo- 
 nel M'Lean is now in command of the regi- 
 ment at Madras — M. General, Sir Joseph Straton, 
 begged from the beginning not to be mixed up 
 in the controversy — and Captain Smith, at the 
 
( 31 ) 
 
 same time, in the most honourable manner 
 objected to answering any questions that could 
 by possibility be made the means of reflecting 
 in any way upon your Lordship, from whom, 
 when wounded at Campo Mayor, he had expe- 
 rienced some acts of kindness. 
 
 Mr. Jeffreys' answer relative to the retreat is 
 as follows : — 
 
 " I have no recollection of disorder or confu- 
 iC sion in the 13th Dragoons, on its retreat from 
 " Santa Martha to Albuera. I am certain none 
 " of the horses in the troop to which I was at- 
 " tached were distressed from hard riding, or 
 " suffered in any way from hard riding." 
 
 This officer makes up the seventeenth, to most 
 of whom I wrote in utter ignorance whether 
 their statements would be for good or for evil. 
 
 Am I then seriously to be told that all these 
 Gentlemen have " confused and imperfect recol- 
 " lections" on matters simply of fact, and that 
 they are to be scouted with contemptuous incre- 
 dulity from the witness-box, because, forsooth, 
 they are mere "subalterns"? Is it not rather 
 too much to expect that we are to be guided 
 wholly and solely by the officers of your own 
 staff— by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, then on his 
 road from Valverde, by Sir Henry Hardinge, 
 and by the Count of Villa Real, then I don't 
 know exactly where, and who could only speak 
 
( 32 ) 
 
 from hearsay ; and when we have found, too, 
 that these same officers were so utterly mistaken 
 at Campo Mayor as to a plain question of fact, I 
 mean the state of the artillery horses? 
 
 "If," says your Lordship in page 21, "I 
 " should point out only one palpable and obvious 
 " misstatement, with regard to a fact of which 
 " he had a personal knowledge, and ought to 
 " have been able to give correct information, 
 " his authority as a good and competent witness 
 " is annihilated for ever." 
 
 You follow up tliis dogma by quoting Sir 
 Henry Hardinge v. General Long ; but what, 
 my Lord, if we try Sir Henry Hardinge by this 
 standard ? what if we place in juxta-position his 
 statement relative to the artillery horses and 
 those of the officers commanding that artillery ? 
 what becomes of your dogma, and what of Sir 
 Henry Hardinge as a witness ? It is your Lord- 
 ship that has created this dilemma, not I. I am 
 clearly not much beholden to Sir Henry Har- 
 dinge for the part he has taken in the controver- 
 sy. His recollections of facts are, beyond a doubt, 
 most erroneous on one or two points, but am I 
 therefore to declare him " annihilated for ever" 
 as a witness? He may be perfectly correct in 
 some particulars, although in error in others. 
 But if your Lordship's doctrine is sound, I am 
 entitled to sweep aside nearly all your witnesses. 
 
( 33 ) 
 
 However, I do not adopt any such mode of meet- 
 ing the question. I oppose their evidence by 
 counter-evidence, and I leave the public to judge 
 which is the most accurate. But the most amus- 
 ing part of this your doctrine of evidence is that 
 while you annihilate for ever General Long as an 
 authority when writing your letter to me, you 
 avail yourself largely of his assistance, and fly 
 with all fondness to his arms as a helpmate, when 
 endeavouring to overthrow Mr. Gregory in your 
 Refutation of Colonel Napier. I protest against 
 this, and moreover I must maintain that you 
 have not overthrown Mr. Gregory, but that his 
 testimony and General Long's details most clear- 
 ly coincide. For example, you write in page 94, 
 " On the 30th May, fourteen days after the ac- 
 " tion, your relative appears to have been en- 
 " tirely unacquainted with these foraging parties; 
 " to have been equally ignorant of the enemy 
 " having passed the rivulet above our right, as 
 " stated by Captain Gregory ; and to have been 
 61 no less uninformed of his having made any 
 " report to me on the subject. He, on the con- 
 " trary, most decidedly contradicts it ; for after 
 " describing the real advance of the enemy, he 
 " says — 
 
 " ' The moment the enemy's movements were 
 " reported to head-quarters, the 4th Dragoons 
 
( 34 ) 
 
 " were ordered back, and fresh dispositions ap- 
 " peared to be making with the infantry.' 
 
 It is unnecessary to extend the quotation fur- 
 ther, but if the reader will only turn to p. 114 
 of my Reply to the Strictures, and peruse this 
 identical letter, dated May 30, he will find, 
 before the passage above quoted, beginning, 
 " The moment," &c. the following description 
 of the " real advance " of the enemy: — 
 
 " In half an hour afterwards " (that was after 
 the 4th Dragoons had been taken to the rear), 
 " we saw the enemy in motion, pushing a strong 
 " corps of cavalry towards the bridge, and cross- 
 " ing the greater part of their force over the 
 " rivulet to the right of our position, which evi- 
 " dently was to become the point of attack." 
 
 It was then that General Long sent a report to 
 head-quarters, and then that Captain Gregory 
 says that he took that report ; and while all this 
 was going on, and before the 4th Dragoons had 
 returned, the cannonade, as stated by Mr. Gre- 
 gory and Col. Wildman, had begun, and the 
 3rd Dragoon Guards, as stated by Gen. Long 
 and three of the officers of that regiment, had 
 driven back the Lancers in and over the river, 
 after they had crossed it. 
 
 You tell us, moreover, that Mr. Gregory 
 makes out that " the enemy's operation against 
 
( 35 ) 
 
 " your right, began nearly an hour — or in fact 
 " must have been completed-— before that against 
 " your left had been observed."* 
 
 I cannot see this. Mr. Gregory says that the 
 message from the right came " about 8 o'clock 
 " in the morning;" and if you will refer to Sir 
 William Lumley's evidence, as given in page 
 54 of your first letter, you will find that he also 
 says that he ''joined your Lordship on the 
 " height above the bridge about 8 o'clock, just 
 " as the attack commenced." I have been per- 
 haps rather too diffuse on this point, but your 
 Lordship will, I doubt not, bear me out in the 
 correctness of my statements. They certainly 
 agree with your Lordship's despatch, as is most 
 distinctly pointed out by Col. Napier. My ob- 
 ject, however, is only to shew that Gen. Long 
 and Mr. Gregory are not so much at variance 
 as your Lordship would seem to suppose. 
 
 I cannot, my Lord, profess to be a competent 
 critic on matters relating solely to military ope- 
 rations, but I do feel perfectly competent to 
 decide, according to the evidence, between what 
 is the fact, and what is not the fact. I say, 
 therefore, that it is a fact, backed by the tes- 
 timony of seventeen officers now living, that the 
 retreat of the cavalry from Santa Marta to 
 
 * Page 172, Refutation of Col. Napier. 
 
( 36 ) 
 
 Albuera, on the day preceding the battle, was 
 neither hurried, confused, nor disorderly. I say 
 that it is not the fact that Gen. Long and his 
 aide-de-camp headed that retreat — but that the 
 very reverse is the fact, as is attested by Mr. 
 Heathcote, Col. Light, and many other officers. 
 I say that Lord WalsinghairTs recollections re- 
 lative to his brigade never having halted during 
 that retreat, have been proved to be entirely 
 erroneous, by an officer in that, his own, bri- 
 gade. I say that the assertion that there was no 
 skirmishing, is distinctly overthrown by the evi- 
 dence, not only of Mr. Heathcote and other 
 officers, but of Col. Light, who took part in that 
 skirmishing. I say, moreover, that from the 
 very work you have quoted, viz. that of Col. 
 Lapene, it is shewn that the French cavalry, 
 commanded too by a general officer, did come 
 up with and "encounter" the rear-guard. # 
 
 It may be all very well for your Lordship to tell 
 me that my Lord Walsingham and his Brigade- 
 Major saw no necessity for retreat, and that they 
 never beheld an enemy; and that Gen. Long 
 
 * Your Lordship tells me that Col. Lapene states that this 
 encounter took place " two leagues from Santa Marta." This 
 is an error, as will be seen by reference to Mr. Heathcotes's state- 
 ment, p. 106. It could not have been more than two miles, if 
 that, from Santa Martha. 
 
( 37 ) 
 
 retired precipitately before the advance-guard 
 of the cavalry — (the rest of Latour Maubourg ? s 
 force being nowhere near) although " in the 
 " afternoon of the 15th the enemy's infantry 
 "began to arrive/' and although " Marshal 
 " Soult reconnoitred the position of the Allies,'' 
 on the same evening.* But I call upon my 
 readers to refer to Colonel Light's and Mr. 
 Heathcote's statements (the one the "intelli- 
 gent officer" of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's des- 
 patch, the other too well-known while on the 
 Quarter-Master-General's staff of the Duke of 
 Wellington's army, for me to speak of his qua- 
 lifications), and then, and with a knowledge 
 of the respective strength of the French and 
 Allied cavalry, taken on your Lordship's own 
 shewing, to determine whether the retreat was 
 even premature. Premature! why the French 
 head-quarters were at Villa Franca on the 14th,f 
 which is hardly further from Santa Marta than 
 the latter is from Albuera. 
 
 It is well that we have heard no more of the 
 ridiculous statements contained in the " Further 
 " Strictures." Your Lordship's finding the ca- 
 valry in confusion after their arrival at Albuera 
 — your forming them, &c. &c. all these ephe- 
 
 * D'Urban's Memoir, page 26, 27. 
 f Napier, vol. iii. page 528. 
 
( 33 ) 
 
 meral chimeras have very properly perished 
 long since with the work in which they were 
 engendered. Having, then, proved the utter 
 incorrectness of your Lordship's information — 
 having completely beaten down to the dust the 
 brittle barriers of your ill-constructed case— am I 
 to be again called upon for a renewal of my 
 defence ? 
 
 But then your Lordship seems still to consider 
 (as did your author of the " Strictures"), that 
 General Long should, upon receiving an order 
 from you to " march immediately to Albuera," 
 have remained where he was, or have been eisrht 
 hours in marching twelve miles, instead of four, 
 in the hope of checking the advance of the 
 French cavalry ; that with two-thirds of the force 
 you had at Albuera, and with which you did not 
 venture to pursue a beaten enemy, he should 
 have arrested an unbeaten one. What the pru- 
 dence might have been of opposing this " supe- 
 " rior and veteran cavalry of the enemy" on the 
 plain near Santa Marta, with the wood in his 
 rear, his left flank exposed, and being many 
 miles from the point cTappui, I cannot say. What 
 again the prudence of resisting it, unsupported 
 by any infantry or guns, on the plain near Al- 
 buera, with the river and the bridge in his rear, 
 I must leave your Lordship to determine. But 
 
( 39 ) 
 
 it seems that you have already determined ; for 
 
 I find, on turning to page 189 of your " Refuta- 
 tion of Colonel Napier/' the following passage : 
 
 " Neither did I consider it right to bring 
 " them," the cavalry, " in contact, and in an 
 
 II open field, with the superior and veteran 
 " cavalry of the enemy." And this, too, on 
 the same spot of ground !! 
 
 It is really too bad to assail my relative so 
 bitterly for his precipitancy at Campo Mayor, 
 in attacking an inferior force, and his precipi- 
 tancy at Santa Marta in retiring from before a 
 superior one. And then not being able to 
 weather the evidence of the seventeen eye-wit- 
 nesses, who saw neither hurry, nor confusion, 
 nor disorder during the retreat, to work upon 
 another tack and endeavour to shew that it was 
 premature. Is this fair ? 
 
 I have now done with Albuera, with the ex- 
 ception of mentioning another of the numerous 
 instances in which I am indebted to your Lord- 
 ship for a corroboration of my statements. It 
 relates to the trifling point about the " key" 
 of your position; and your assertion, which 
 I controverted in my last letter by the state- 
 ments of two or three individuals, that General 
 Long was the only persoyi who called the heights 
 on your right — the " key." 
 
( 40 ) 
 
 You have now, gratuitously, afforded me a 
 fourth party in the person of Sir William Lum- 
 ley who, in page 225 of your Refutation of 
 Colonel Napier, recounts, in vivid language, as 
 follows : — 
 
 " Frequently, as time and circumstances 
 " would permit, I scanned with no small anxi- 
 " ety the whole line of infantry on those hotly 
 " and effectively contested, and most important 
 " heights, the key of our position"!! 
 
 Having now (and I trust not disrespectfully) 
 disposed of the early portion of your letter, ex- 
 tending to the 95th page, we come to the 
 affair of 
 
 LOS SANTOS. 
 
 Your Lordship tells me that it is a subject on 
 which you were "not anxious to touch," and 
 you base its appearance upon the opportune 
 arrival, from British Guiana, of Sir Benj. Dur- 
 ban's letter, dated Jan. 25th, 1833, and which 
 letter you say, " affords a refutation by antici- 
 " pation" of my last pamphlet. It may be as 
 well to mention that Sir Benjamin D'Urban was 
 in England in the last summer, and that he con- 
 sequently saw my letter to your Lordship, and 
 was here before the publication of your second 
 and last. The previous points in Sir Benjamin 
 
( 41 ) 
 
 D' Urban 's letter have already been twice re- 
 futed. I shall say nothing of the taste and 
 spirit of that composition. It is before the 
 public and they will judge. I shall, therefore, 
 content myself, with quoting the passage that 
 relates to Los Santos, and subjoining the state- 
 ments of the officers engaged. What is matter 
 of opinion I pay no sort of regard to — what is 
 matter of fact will speak for itself. 
 
 V Then follows," writes Sir Benjamin, M the 
 " scene at the entrance of Los Santos, which 
 ' f can never be forgotten by any one who saw it ; 
 " and you must remember that a small brigade 
 " of French Hussars were there caught, in pre- 
 " sence of all our cavalry, heavy and light, and 
 " that much precious time was lost by General 
 " Long's indecision, until you, yourself, were at 
 " length obliged to ride up to him, and urge him 
 " to charge ; that he still galloped about calling 
 " for his guns; and that in the end they were 
 " charged by the 13th Light Dragoons (the regi- 
 " ment then in front of the column, upon some- 
 " what narrow ground), by your own personal 
 " order to the commanding officer. Nay, (if my 
 " memory serves me), so strong was the impres- 
 " sion on your mind at the time of the vacilla- 
 " tion which had before prevailed, and of the 
 " crisis to which it led, that you said to Boyce, 
 " c Charge them, or they will charge you.' The 
 
( 42 ) 
 
 " ensuing charge and pursuit there is no need 
 " to dwell upon : they had nothing to do with 
 11 the question before us." 
 
 Question. — With what squadron of the 13th 
 were you stationed at Los Santos ? Have the 
 kindness to state what you recollect of that af- 
 fair, and whether there appeared to be any un- 
 necessary delay or vacillation on the part of 
 General Long on that occasion ? 
 
 Colonel Patrick Doherty, then Major of the 
 Regiment : 
 
 " With respect to the affair at Los Santos, from 
 " the length of time that has passed since it took 
 " place, I find it difficult to call to recollection 
 " any particular circumstances, which might 
 " have taken place previous to the attack. I do 
 ". not, however, recollect its being observed by 
 " any officer of the regiment, nor had I any im- 
 " pression on my mind at the time, that General 
 " Long shewed any backwardness or indecision 
 " previous to the attack being made. I recollect 
 " perfectly well the regiment moving on at a 
 " brisk trot to the ground of formation — the 
 " charge that was made, by which the officer 
 " who led the French cavalry was cut down — 
 " his troops broken and pursued for some dis- 
 " tance— the rallying of the 13th — the regiment 
 " again following in pursuit in contiguous co- 
 " lumns of squadrons by threes from the right 
 
( 43 ) 
 
 ' of each, one of which was headed by General 
 : Long, another by Lord Beresford, who directed 
 c the movements of the regiment during the pur- 
 i suit, and until it halted/' 
 J. Jeffreys, Esq. late 13th Dragoons : 
 " I was stationed with Major Boyce's troop 
 ' which formed, with Captain Macalister's, the 
 ' leading squadron at Los Santos. I cannot 
 ' pretend at this distant period to have an accu- 
 ' rate recollection of the movements prior to the 
 ' attack, but I can state that I am not aware of 
 ' any unnecessary delay, or indecision being 
 ' imputed to General Long, and certainly not 
 ' any that came under my observation. With 
 ' respect to the attack, I remember perfectly 
 ' well that Major Boyce's troop was not clear of 
 6 the narrow lane or pass when I saw Captain 
 i Macalister's troop wheel up and charge. I 
 ' cannot therefore conceive that the attack could 
 1 have been earlier made, or more effectually 
 ' made, than it was on that occasion." 
 Major George Doherty, 27th Foot,* late 13th 
 
 Dragoons : 
 
 " I commanded the left squadron of the regi- 
 
 " ment on that day, which was only composed of 
 
 * It was with the deepest concern that I read in the news- 
 papers, not long after the receipt of this gallant officer's letter, 
 the mention of his death at Dublin. We were totally unac- 
 quainted. I had expressed a delicacy in applying for h)s testi- 
 
( 44 ) 
 
 *' the remains of the squadron that had been 
 " surprised near Olivenza a few days previous. 
 " On arriving near Los Santos the regiment was 
 " ordered to move on pretty briskly, and on 
 " reaching an open piece of ground to the left 
 " and beyond the town, the enemy was disco- 
 " vered in close columns of squadrons to our 
 " left. We had only time to wheel into line, 
 " when the leading squadron of the enemy 
 " moved to the charge, which was met by our 
 " right squadron and instantly repulsed with 
 " heavy loss to the enemy. This was followed 
 " by a charge of the 13th Dragoons, bat being 
 " in rear of the regiment, and with the left 
 " squadron, I did not share in it ; but as the 
 M enemy immediately gave way, and went off' 
 " in close column, at a rapid pace, I was ordered 
 " by Colonel Head to pursue with my squadron 
 " and cover the front of the regiment as skir- 
 " mishers, which continued to advance in line, 
 " and which lasted for I think about three 
 "leagues; when finding that the Heavy Bri- 
 
 mony, in consequence of his professional situation. His frank 
 and manly answer was as follows : — " I cannot believe that any 
 liberal-minded person could condemn me for stating what I believe 
 to be the fact ; and so far as I am concerned, I feel satisfied that 
 the bearing testimony to the merits of a deceased officer, given 
 from the recollections of youth, can never militate against, or in- 
 jure the future prospects of riper age." 
 
( 45 ) 
 
 " gade, which was ordered on our right to en- 
 " deawur to cut off the enemy's retreat, could 
 " not succeed in so doing, we were ordered to 
 " halt, and as well as I can recollect, the num- 
 " ber we had taken as prisoners amounted to 
 " between 150 and 200. We then retired to 
 " Los Santos, where we bivouacked for the 
 " night, and the next day occupied Zafra. So 
 " far from there being any delay or vacillation 
 " on the part of General Long, the whole thing 
 " appeared to be instantaneous, and until I saw 
 1 ' the enemy I did not even know we were so close 
 " upon him, and I am perfectly satisfied there 
 " was no hesitation or loss of time from that mo- 
 " ment until the general pursuit was given up. 
 " What might have occurred previous to our 
 " rapid move upon Los Santos I cannot say, as I 
 " had no opportunity of seeing General Long, 
 " the regiment being on the road, and in line of 
 " march." 
 
 Lieut. -Col. Macalister, late 13th Dragoons: 
 " Boyce commanded the right squadron, con- 
 " sisting of his troop and my own, and so far 
 " from there being any hesitation in attacking 
 " the enemy, the squadron was scarcely formed 
 " when the order to charge was given by Boyce. 
 " The left half squadron could scarcely have got 
 " clear of the narrow lane, when my troop 
 
( 4G ) 
 
 " formed up, and immediately on forming', 
 " charged."* 
 
 * The above evidence will sufficiently prove to your Lordship, 
 that I am not yet reduced to testimonials of character ; but I can- 
 not on this, the last occasion that I expect to have the honour of 
 being your Lordship's correspondent, withhold the satisfaction I 
 feel in having it in my power to record the opinions entertained of 
 General Long by the officers of the 1 3th. In addition to the 
 above question I had asked a second, as follows : 
 
 Question. — Did you ever hear your brother officers speak 
 with a want of confidence of the military qualifications of General 
 Long, and were they at all distrustful of his capacity for command? 
 
 I shall allow Colonel Doherty to make his first answer (and 
 I must hope that he will pardon me for so doing), by an extract 
 from a letter written by him to General Long in August, 1813 : 
 
 " My dear General, — I do most sincerely assure you, that I 
 " cannot sufficiently express the painful feelings I experienced on 
 " the receipt of your letter, announcing your being removed from 
 " the command of the 13th to one on the Home Staff. You will 
 " ever carry with you, my dear General, my most sincere good 
 " wishes. To me you have been particularly kind; and I shall ever 
 " be proud to say, that owing to your friendly advice and assist- 
 " ance, given to me on all occasions, I have been enabled, in the 
 " most trying situations, to carry on the affairs of the regiment, so 
 " as to keep it in an efficient state, I wish for no greater pleasure 
 " and gratification than the happiness of being again placed under 
 " your orders." &c. &c. 
 
 The lapse of two-and-twenty years has made, it appears, no 
 difference in that officer's opinion. 
 
 Colonel Doherty - 
 " The 13th Dragoons was one of the regiments which formed 
 " General Long's brigade during the period of his holding a com- 
 " mand in the Peninsula. He was universally esteemed and 
 
( 47 ) 
 
 The foregoing statements do not appear tore- 
 quire the aid of any italics to guide the reader. 
 I have taken Sir Benjamin D'Urban's account as 
 
 " respected, and I think I may with truth aver, by all the officers 
 " of the regiment, who felt much regret at parting from him." 
 
 J. Jeffreys, Esq. 
 " I perfectly well remember that my brother officers expressed 
 " the highest possible esteem and respect for General Long, 
 " which I think they would scarcely have done had they doubted 
 " his military qualifications or ability for command." 
 
 Major George Doherty, 27th Foot. 
 
 11 To the best of my recollection never* nor do I believe they 
 " ever entertained any other feeling for General Long, but that of 
 u the greatest regard, and respect, and confidence as their 
 " General." 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Macalister. 
 " I never heard any of my brother officers express any opinion 
 " of General Long except the highest possible esteem for his 
 " character, and the fullest confidence in him as a commander." 
 
 Major Boyce, whose name appears so prominent in Sir Benj. 
 D'Urban's letter, as the witness of General Long's vacillation, 
 is, most unfortunately, dead. His brother officer, Colonel Mac- 
 alister, writes in answer to my enquiry as follows : — 
 
 " As to poor Boyce having any distrust of your uncle's talents, 
 " or military capacity ; I can only say, that, if there was an 
 " officer of the corps who had a greater respect for, and confi- 
 " dence in, the General than the rest — Boyce was that man." 
 
 This you will, perhaps, say is only Colonel Macalister's opi- 
 nion. We will, therefore, hear Major Boyce himself. The 
 following is a letter written by him in 1813. 
 
 " My dear General, — I have just heard from Colonel Doherty, 
 
 * Underlined thrice in original. 
 
( 48 ) 
 
 the most prominent. The statement of your 
 Lordship's Aide-de-Camp, the Count of Villa 
 Real, may be compared by the reader by refe- 
 
 " that you are about to leave us. Believe me, my dear Sir, this 
 " information has caused infinite regret to the 13th; and to none* 
 " I believe, so much as to myself. I consider myself largely 
 " your debtor for many kindnesses, and would willingly, if I 
 " could, evince my gratitude more effectually, than by the simple 
 " expression of it. I have but thanks and good wishes to 
 " offer. Their sincerity may render them worthy your accept- 
 4< ance." &c &c. &c. 
 
 " Infinite regret to the 13th, and to none so much as to him- 
 self" ! ! and this in spite of the vacillation, &c. which he must 
 have witnessed at Los Santos ! ! 
 
 I cannot deny myself the pleasure of introducing the parting 
 expressions of two poor fellows who, subsequently, fell at 
 Waterloo: — 
 
 Captain James Gubbins. 
 
 " My dear General, — I hear with much regret, that you 
 " are upon the point of leaving us, and I cannot forego the 
 « gratification of offering you a small tribute of respect on 
 " this occasion, and assuring you, as I do sincerely, that I 
 " shall ever retain a pleasing recollection of the numerous acts of 
 " kindness which I have so constantly been favoured with by 
 "you. Indeed, I feel that I am about to lose a most kind and 
 " agreeable friend, and the recollection will long be painful 
 " to me." &c. &c. 
 
 Lieutenant J. Gale. 
 " My dear General, —I felt how incompetent any thing I 
 " could say was to declare the sense entertained by me of your 
 " kindness. I shall only observe, that your public conduct in 
 
( 49 ) 
 
 rence to your letter, and without my taking the 
 trouble to transcribe it. Its errors, especially in 
 the concluding portion, will easily be discovered. 
 
 Your Lordship tells me in your first letter, 
 that " of this affair General Long's memoranda 
 " afford rather a good and accurate description." 
 I believe it. These memoranda will be found 
 at pages 103 and 106 of my Reply to the Stric- 
 tures, and to them I refer. 
 
 Sir Benjamin D'Urban continues his letter by 
 adverting to the advance of Sonlt and the retreat 
 of our cavalry. " Then," he says, " followed a 
 " series of reports from the out-posts, conclud- 
 ' ' ing, as I think, with the memorable one from 
 " Santa Marta," &c. &c. " / cannot be mis- 
 " taken in their tenor," he continues in rather a 
 
 <l the various and most arduous affairs in which you have been 
 " engaged and have directed, has impressed me with the highest 
 " respect for your military talents ; and, individually, your con- 
 11 duct to me, and the politeness which you have invariably ma- 
 " nifested — with the most sincere and lasting gratitude. And 
 " should I continue in the army, that to serve under your imme- 
 " diate orders, and once more merit your approbation, would 
 <' be most satisfactory and the great object of my wishes," &c. &c. 
 
 Having read the above, your Lordship will not be surprised at 
 my disregarding the bitter invectives of your Quarter-Master 
 backed by your Deputy-Quarter-Master, General, or even your 
 own. I have already recorded the opinions of Lord Hill and 
 Sir William Lumley, the seniors in command to General Long. 
 I have now brought forward the juniors — what, can I do more? 
 
 E 
 
( 50 ) 
 
 decided tone — but then comes a haze of qualifi- 
 cation to dash this hopeful promise of certainty, 
 " which (if I do not greatly err)!! was full of 
 " difficulties, complaints, alarms, and despon- 
 " dency.'' 
 
 To this is appended the erroneous account of 
 the retreat, picked up, not from any of the seven- 
 teen officers whose testimony I gave (I wish it 
 had been, for we should then, my Lord, have been 
 spared much trouble), but from some exotic 
 quarter or other. Colonel D'Urban, as I have 
 before stated, not being within some miles of the 
 spot. For which, vide Mr. Gregory, pages 109 
 and i 10 of my Letter to your Lordship. Such 
 is Sir Benjamin D'Urban's letter, which instead 
 of being the channel of any argument, that I 
 can see, is merely a vehicle of vague and gene- 
 ral abuse, unsupported by a single fact to justify 
 it. I appeal to the evidence of the numerous 
 officers given in my last and present pamphlet 
 to bear me out in what I state. 
 
 I come now, my Lord, to the case of the Al- 
 buera medal, and here it is necessary that I 
 should at once proceed to notice your assertion 
 relative to the words ' consideration' and ' cir- 
 cumstances,' — the existence or non-existence of 
 which words in Sir Henry Torrens' letter formed 
 matter of private dispute between your Lordship 
 and me. But first you tell me that you "can- 
 
( 51 ) 
 
 " not even now perceive any thing in what you 
 " previously advanced, which intimated the 
 " slightest charge against me." I really know 
 not what construction your Lordship may put 
 upon the various passages in your own composi- 
 tions, but in page 58 of your first letter you will 
 find a passage which few people would have 
 permitted to pass without that " indignant de- 
 nial" which I gave it, and which you seem to 
 consider an unnecessary exhibition of wrath. 
 
 " Now, Sir, the different reading which you 
 " ham adopted, makes an important alteration in 
 "the sense. By substituting the word ' consi- 
 " deration' for ' circumstances' you cast the 
 " onus of your relative's having been refused 
 " the medal entirely upon rae, v &c. 
 
 The thing is gone by, so I say no more, espe- 
 cially as your Lordship now tells me, that " most 
 " assuredly no such accusation was intended 
 " against me." I am perfectly satisfied, but I 
 think your Lordship will admit that my indig- 
 nation had some foundation to rest upon. 
 
 I am now, however, to explain the reason of 
 our being so glaringly at issue on this question 
 of fact. On my return to Town, after reading 
 your Lordship's last pamphlet, I went to the Horse 
 Guards with Sir Henry Torrens's letter in my 
 pocket. I found the letter, with the exception 
 of Sir Henrv Torrens's signature, to be in the 
 
( 52 ) 
 
 hand-writing of a gentleman still at the office : 
 and I also found the transcript of that letter, 
 which transcript your Lordship saw, to be in the 
 same hand-writing. The error, a merely cle- 
 rical one, was made by him. In my letter the 
 word is, as I stated it to be, " consideration." 
 In the transcript it is, as your Lordship stated it 
 to be, " circumstances." With respect to the 
 real value of the words I am free to confess that, 
 from the beginning, I saw very little difference. 
 Your Lordship did see a wide difference, and as 
 my reading was to your prejudice, I, of course, 
 availed myself of it, and if I was disposed to 
 combat about such a shadow I should be clearly 
 entitled to a verdict in my favour, inasmuch as 
 my letter has Sir Henry Torrens's signature, 
 while its transcript, in the book at the Horse 
 Guards, has not. But I waive all this w T arring 
 about words. The real fact is, that Sir Henry 
 Torrens's notes, from which the letter was 
 framed for his approval, contained neither the 
 one word nor the other, as Lord Fitzroy Somer- 
 set, to whom I applied in vindication of my ow r n 
 veracity, will inform your Lordship, or has per- 
 haps already informed you. 
 
 But now, my Lord, with regard to this same 
 medal— you ask me, why General Long " on 
 " finding that he was not included in the list 
 " for medals, did not appeal at the time, and on 
 
( 53 ) 
 
 " the spot." You say that he " did not deem 
 " it expedient to make any representation of 
 " the matter, during the period of his remain- 
 " ino* in the Peninsula," — that he " delayed 
 " his appeal for five years, " # and so on. And 
 then you refer again, by way, as it appears, of 
 exhibiting his inconsistency, to his " complaint" 
 as you term it, but which I have shewn to have 
 been your complaint, to the Duke of Wellington, 
 relative to the paltry affair of the Portuguese 
 Aide-de-Camp. The medals for Albuera were 
 not conferred (as I am assured by an officer who 
 is in possession of one) till late in 1813 — in 
 which year General Long quitted the Peninsula, 
 and more than two years after the battle. Conse- 
 quently, it would have been marvellous indeed, 
 a remonstrance by anticipation, had General 
 Long appealed at the time and on the spot. 
 
 The injustice (I do not yet despair of con- 
 vincing your Lordship that it was an injustice) 
 of withholding the medal from General Long, 
 whether he was omitted "in conformity with 
 " your instructions," or from whatever other 
 cause, is not in the least degree affected by the 
 letter which you have published from Lord Fitz- 
 roy Somerset, in page 110. I do not enquire 
 whether Lord Hill was omitted at Busaco, nor 
 whether his Lordship's corps was engaged on 
 
 * Page 109. 
 
( 54 ) 
 
 that occasion, or not. These facts may be as- 
 certained by reference to the History of the Pe- 
 ninsular War, and the despatches of the day. 
 It is not necessary to institute any comparisons 
 with any other cases, when those cases are not 
 based upon the same foundation. The thanks 
 of Parliament were not voted for Busaco. The 
 gravamen of my charge, not yet replied to, is, 
 and has ever been, this— that General Long is 
 the solitary instance of an exception — and that he 
 was, not merely the only general officer omitted 
 in the particular case of Albuera, but the only 
 individual general officer during the whole of the 
 Peninsular war, who, on the occasion of a great 
 victory, received the thanks of Parliament, and was 
 yet unrewarded with the distinction of the medal 
 distributed in its commemoration. There is some- 
 thing so preposterous— something so monstrous 
 in the contradiction, by which six general officers 
 are formally thanked by the Parliament by 
 name, for their " distinguished services" in a 
 battle— and only five receive the badge of merit 
 for those services, that I will no longer dwell 
 upon a subject on which, I am well assured, 
 the great majority of military men have long 
 since made up their minds. 
 
 My Lord, I have now done, and I do assure 
 you, and I must repeat, that it is most unplea- 
 sant to me to have been dragged into this acri- 
 
( 55 ) 
 
 monious controversy, and to find that, owing to 
 the unjust imputations of an unknown writer 
 upon my deceased relative, 1 have had to appear 
 before the public in the very novel capacity of a 
 military disputant. We may now, I trust, dis- 
 miss our case with the usual confidence of com- 
 batants, each of whom considers himself to be 
 the victor. That your Lordship can collect, on 
 so small a field of operations, any matter of 
 reproach against my deceased relative more 
 bitter than that which has been already raked 
 up, seems hardly possible. 
 
 It cannot, your Lordship must be aware, have 
 been an agreeable thing for any one to be thrown 
 into virulent pamphleteering hostility against in- 
 dividuals towards whom he could never, by pos- 
 sibility, have entertained the slightest ill-will. 
 I have not, I trust, travelled beyond the limits 
 of a fair defence of my relative by casting undue 
 reflections upon, or indulging in insinuations of 
 motives, against your Lordship or any one else, 
 although the latter have been as abundantly dif- 
 fused throughout this your second letter as they 
 were throughout your first. Opinions I have 
 disregarded, — insinuations I have set at nought, 
 — statements I have refuted. I hope, however, 
 that we have now concluded our labours. While 
 I have not shrunk, and while I trust that I never 
 shall shrink, from the honest but not uncour- 
 
( 56 ) 
 
 teous declaration of what I believe to be the 
 truth, (be my opponents who they may,) I have 
 no wish to keep alive, by personal bitterness, and 
 irritating discussion, a controversy with which 
 the public, not less than • we ourselves, must be 
 sufficiently wearied. 
 
 You ask me, " Is it not intolerable, Sir, 
 " that I should be called upon after such a 
 " lapse of years, to defend myself against im- 
 " putations, produced upon the authority of a 
 " private and hidden correspondence, and these 
 " confused and imperfect recollections of regi- 
 " mental or subaltern officers? Is such conduct 
 " fair and just?'** 
 
 If, my Lord, you will only reverse the picture, 
 — if you will only put the words "a deceased 
 " relative," instead of the word " myself," and 
 " anonymous accuser" in place of " private cor- 
 " respondence," you will have fairly stated my 
 own position. 
 
 If it is matter of regret to me that my relative 
 should, during the two months that he was under 
 your Lordship's command, (and having then 
 acted immediately in your presence only on 
 three occasions,) have never (as it now appears) 
 merited your good opinion, it is on the other 
 hand more than compensated by the very flat- 
 tering testimony of Lord Hill, under whom he 
 
 * Page .58. 
 
( 57 ) 
 
 served for more than two years, and which testi- 
 mony, having already given in my previous let- 
 ter, I shall not here repeat. My consolation, in 
 the irksomeness of my task, has been, that it has 
 afforded me the means of repelling aspersions 
 that might have crept out under cover of the 
 same anonymous obscurity at some later period, 
 and when death, which has already made fear- 
 ful havoc in the Army List, might have swept 
 away the little testimony that time has left, and 
 accident afforded me. It has, at the same time, 
 shown that the gallant fellows of the 13th, who 
 were my relative's companions in arms from the 
 banks of the Guadiana to the defiles of the 
 Pyrenees, entertained no distrust of their Ge- 
 neral, — that their confidence was never shaken 
 their regard never lost. 
 
 I have the honor to be, 
 &c. &c. 
 
 C. E. LONG. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 NORMAN AND SKEEN, I-RlNTERS. MAIDEN I.ANE, COVENT GARDEN. 
 
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