CHINA
WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER OF RECENT EVENTS
By MAYO W. HAZELTINE
ILLUSTRATED
NEW YORK
PETER FENELON COLLIER
MDCCCXCVlll
TO
SIR HALLIDAY MACARTNEY, K.C.M.G.
AS A SLIGHT TRIBUTE OF PERSONAL RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FOR ONE WHO
HAS MAINTAINED THE RIGHT OF CHINA TO BE TREATED BT THS
GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE WITH THE DIGNITY AND
CONSIDERATION THAT BECOME A
GREAT EMPIRE.
IF TO LORD MACARTNEY WE OWE THE FIRST SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN
AUDIENCE OF THE EMPEROR OF CHINA ON THE SAME CONDI-
TIONS AS THOSE ON WHICH FOREIGN EMBASSADORS
ARE RECEIVED AT EUROPEAN COURTS, TO
SIR HALLIDAY MACARTNEY
A SCION OF THE SAME FAMILY
CHINA
OWES MUCH OF THE SUCCESS THAT HAS ATTENDED HEB DIPLOMACY
IS FOREIGN COUNTRIES
CONTENTS
CHAP. ASS
I. THE EARLY AGES 11
II. THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 25
III. A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 42
IV. THE SUNOS AND THE KINS 66
V. THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 86
VI. KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY 123
VII. THE MING DYNASTY 139
VIII. THE DECLINE OF THE MINGS 168
IX. THE MANCHU CONQUEST or CHINA. 175
X. THE FIRST MANCHU RULER 194
XI. THE EMPEROR KANGHI 204
XII. A SHORT REIGN AND THE BEGINNING OF A LONG ONE. 218
XIII. KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS. 229
XIV. THE COMMENCEMENT OF EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE 240
XV. THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHUS 249
XVI. THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANG 261
XVII. THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 271
XVIII. TAOUKWANG AND His SUCCESSOR 310
XIX. THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 335
XX. THE TAEPING REBELLION 890
XXI. THE REGENCY 427
XXII. THE REIGN OF KWANGSU 468
THE WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 506
THE FUTURE OF CHINA , .. 580
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
CHINA
Frontispiece The Emperor Receiving the Diplomatic Corps
Hong Kong
Canton The Flower Pagoda ......
Kang, the Reformer . . . . ' ' , , , ,
A SHORT
HISTORY OF CHINA
CHAPTER I
THE EARLY AGES
THE Chinese are unquestionably the oldest nation in the
world, and their history goes back to a period to which no
prudent historian will attempt to give a precise date. They
speak the language and observe the same social and political
customs that they did several thousand years before the
Christian era, and they are the only living representatives
to-day of a people and government which were contempo-
rary with the Egyptians, the Assyrians, and the Jews. So
far as our knowledge enables us to speak, the Chinese of the
present age are in all essential points identical with those of
the time of Confucius, and there is no reason to doubt that
before his time the Chinese national character had been
thoroughly formed in its present mold. The limits of the
empire have varied from time to time under circumstances
of triumph or disunion, but the Middle Kingdom, or China
Proper, of the eighteen provinces has always possessed more
or less of its existing proportions. Another striking and
peculiar feature about China is the small amount of influ-
ence that the rest of the world has exercised upon it. In
fact, it is only during the present century that that influence
can be said to have existed at all. Up to that point China
had pursued a course of her own, carrying on her own strug-
gles within a definite limit, and completely indifferent to, and
(11)
12 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
ignorant of, the ceaseless competition and contests of man
kind outside her orbit, which make up the history of the rest
of the Old "World. The long struggles for supremacy in
"Western Asia between Assyrian, Babylonian and Persian,
the triumphs of the Greek, followed by the absorption of
what remained of the Macedonian conquests in the Empire
of Rome, even the appearance of Islam and the Mohamme-
dan conquerors, who changed the face of Southern Asia from
the Ganges to the Levant, and long threatened to overrun
Europe, had no significance for the people of China, and
reacted as little on their destiny as if they had happened in
another planet. "Whatever advantages the Chinese may
have derived from this isolation, it has entailed the pen-
alty that the early history of their country is devoid of in-
terest for the rest of the world, and it is only when the long
independent courses of China and Europe are brought into
proximity by the Mongol conquests, the efforts of the medie-
val travelers, the development of commerce, and the wars
carried on for the purpose of obtaining a secure position for
foreigners in China four distinct phases covering the last
eeven centuries that any confidence can be felt in success-
full}- attracting notice to the affairs of China. Yet, as a
curiosity in human existence, the earlier history of that
country may justly receive some notice. Even though the
details are not recited, the recollection of the antiquity of
China's institutions must be ever present with the student,
as affording an indispensable clew to the character of the
Chinese people and the composition of their government.
The first Chinese are supposed to have been a nomad
tribe in the province of Shensi, which lies in the northwest
of China, and among them at last appeared a ruler, Fohi,
whose name at least has been preserved. His deeds and his
person are mythical, but he is credited with having given
his country its first regular institutions. One of his succes-
sors was Hwangti (which means Heavenly Emperor), who
was the first to employ the imperial style of Emperor, the
earlier rulers having been content with the inferior title of
THE EARLY AGES. 13
Wang, or prince. He adopted the convenient decimal divis-
ion in his administration as well as his coinage. His domin-
ions were divided into ten provinces, each of these into ten
departments, these again into ten districts, each of which
held ten towns. He regulated the calendar, originating the
Chinese cycle of sixty years, and he encouraged commerce.
He seems to have been a wise prince and to have been the
first of the great emperors. His grandson, who was also
emperor, continued his good work and earned the reputation
of being "the restorer or even founder of true astronomy."
But the most famous of Hwangti's successors was his
great-grandson Yao, who is still one of the most revered of
all Chinese rulers. He was "diligent, enlightened, polished
and prudent," and if his words reflected his actions he must
have been most solicitous of the welfare of his people. He
is specially remarkable for his anxiety to discover the best
man to succeed him in the government, and during the last
twenty-eight years of his reign he associated the minister
Chun with him for that purpose. On his death he left the
crown to him, and Chun, after some hesitation, accepted the
charge ; but he in turn hastened to secure the co-operation of
another minister named Yu in the work of administration,
just as he had been associated with Yao. The period cov-
ered by the rule of this triumvirate is considered one of the
most brilliant and perfect in Chinese history, and it bears a
resemblance to the age of the Antonines. These rulers seem
to have passed their leisure from practical work in framing
moral axioms, and in carrying out a model scheme of gov-
ernment based on the purest ethics. They considered that
"a prince intrusted with the charge of a State has a heavy
task. The happiness of his subjects absolutely depends
upon him. To provide for everything is his duty ; his min-
isters are only put in office to assist him," and also that "a
prince who wishes to fulfill his obligations, and to long pre-
serve his people in the ways of peace, ought to watch with-
out ceasing that the laws are observed with exactitude."
They were stanch upholders of temperance, and they ban-
14 A SHOR1 HISTORY OP CHINA.
ished the unlucky discoverer of the fact that an intoxicating
drink could be obtained from rice. They also held fast to
the theory that all government must be based on the popular
will. In fact, the reigns of Yao, Chun and Yu are the ideal
period of Chinese history, when all questions were decided by
moral right and justice, and even now Chinese philosophers
are said to test their maxims of morality by the degree
of agreement they may have with the conduct of those
rulers.
With them passed away the practice of letting the most
capable and experienced minister rule the State. Such an
impartial and reasonable mode of selecting the head of a
community can never be perpetuated. The rulers them-
selves may see its advantages and may endeavor as honestly
as these three Chinese princes to carry out the arrangement,
but the day must come when the family of the able ruler
will assert its rights to the succession, and take advantage
of its opportunities from its close connection with the gov-
ernment to carry out its ends. The Emperor Yu, true to
the practice of his predecessors, nominated the president
of the council as his successor, but his son Tiki seized the
throne, and became the founder of the first Chinese dynasty,
which was called the Hia, from the name of the province
first ruled by his father. This event is supposed to have
taken place in the year 2197 B.C., and the Hia dynasty, of
which there were seventeen emperors, ruled down to the
year 1776 B.C. These Hia princes present no features of
interest, and the last of them, named Kia, was deposed by
one of his principal nobles, Ching Tang, Prince of Chang.
This prince was the founder of the second dynasty, known
as Chang, which held possession of the throne for 654 years,
or down to 1122 B.C. With the exception of the founder,
who seems to have been an able man, this dynasty of
twenty-eight emperors did nothing very noteworthy. The
public morality deteriorated very much under this family,
and it is said that when one of the emperors wanted an
honest man as minister he could only find one in the person
THE EARLY AGES. l
of a common laborer. At last, in the twelfth century before
our era, the enormities of the Chang rulers reached a climax
in the person of Chousin, who was deposed by a popular ris-
ing headed by Wou "Wang, Prince of Chow.
This successful soldier, whose name signifies the Warrior
King, founded the third Chinese dynasty of Chow, which
governed the empire for the long space of 867 years down to
255 B.C. During that protracted period there were necessa-
rily good and bad emperors, and the Chow dynasty was ren-
dered specially illustrious by the appearance of the great
social and religious reformers, Laoutse, Confucius and Men-
cius, during the existence of its power. The founder of the
dynasty instituted the necessary reforms to prove that he
was a national benefactor, and one of his successors, known
as the Magnificent King, extended the authority of his
family over some of the States of Turkestan. But, on the
whole, the rulers of the Chow dynasty were not particu-
larly distinguished, and one of them in the eighth century
B.C. was weak enough to resign a portion of his sovereign
rights to a powerful vassal, Siangkong, the Prince of Tsin,
in consideration of his undertaking the defense of the fron-
tier against the Tartars. At this period the authority of the
central government passed under a cloud. The emperor's
prerogative became the shadow of a name, and the last three
centuries of the rule of this family would not call for notice
but for the genius of Laoutse and Confucius, who were both
great moral teachers and religious reformers.
Laoutse, the founder of Taouism, was the first in point
of time, and in some respects he was the greatest of these
reformers. He found his countrymen sunk in a low state of
moral indifference and religious infidelity which corresponded
with the corruption of the times and the disunion in the
kingdom. He at once set himself to work with energy and
devotion to repair the evils of his day, and to raise before
his countrymen a higher ideal of duty. He has been called
the Chinese Pythagoras, the most erudite of sinologues have
pronounced his text obscure, and the mysterious Taouism
.16
A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
which he founded holds the smallest or the least assignable
part in what passes for the religion of the Chinese. As a
philosopher and minister Laoutse will always attract atten-
tion and excite speculation, but as a practical reformer and
politician he was far surpassed by his younger and less theo-
retical contemporary Confucius.
Confucius was an official in the service of one of the
great princes who divided the governing power of China
among themselves during the whole of the seventh century
before our era, which beheld the appearance of both of these
religious teachers and leaders. He was a trained adminis-
trator with long experience when he urged upon his prince
the necessity of reform, and advocated a policy of union
throughout the States. His exhortations were in vain, and
so far ill-timed that he was obliged to resign the service of
one prince after another. In his day the authority of the
Chow emperor had been reduced to the lowest point. Each
prince was unto himself the supreme authority. Yet one
cardinal point of the policy of Confucius was submission to
the emperor, as implicit obedience to the head of the State
throughout the country as was paid to the father of every
Chinese household. Although he failed to find a prince
after his own heart, his example and precepts were not
thrown away, for hi a later generation his reforms were
executed, and down to the present day the best points in
Chinese government are based on his recommendations. If
"no intelligent monarch arose" in his time, the greatest
emperors have since sought to conform with his usages and
to rule after the ideal of the great philosopher. His name
and his teachings were perpetuated by a band of devoted
disciples, and the book which contained the moral and philo-
sophical axioms of Confucius passed into the classic litera-
ture of the country and stood in the place of a Bible for the
Chinese. The list of the great Chinese reformers is com-
pleted by the name of Mencius, who, coming two centuries
later, carried on with better opportunities the reforming
work of Confucius, and left behind him in his Sheking the
THE EARLY AGES. 17
most popular book of Chinese poetry and a crowning tribute
to the great Master.
From teachers we must again pass to the chronicle of
kings, although few of the later Chow emperors deserve
their names to be rescued from oblivion. One emperor suf-
fered a severe defeat while attempting to establish his au-
thority over the troublesome tribes beyond the frontier ; of
another it was written that "his good qualities merited a
happier day," and the general character of the age may be
inferred from its being designated by the native chroniclers
"The warlike period." At last, after what seemed an in-
terminable old age, marked by weakness and vice, the Chow
dynasty came to an end in the person of Nan "Wang, who,
although he reigned for nearly sixty years, was deposed in
ignominious fashion by one of his great vassals, and reduced
to a humble position. His conqueror became the founder of
the fourth Chinese dynasty.
During the period of internal strife which marked the last
four centuries of the Chow dynasty, one family had steadily
waxed stronger and stronger among the princes of China : the
princes of Tsin, by a combination of prudence and daring,
gradually made themselves supreme among their fellows.
It was said of one of them that "like a wolf or a tiger he
wished to draw all the other princes into his claws, so that
he might devour them." Several of the later Tsui princes,
and particularly one named Chow Siang "Wang, showed
great capacity, and carried out a systematic policy for their
own aggrandizement. When Nan Wang was approaching
the end of his career, the Tsin princes had obtained every-
thing of the supreme power short of the name and the right
to wear the imperial yellow robes. Ching Wang, or, to give
him his later name as emperor, Tsin Chi Hwangti, was the
reputed great-grandson of Chow Siang Wang, and under
him the fame and power of the Tsins reached their culmi-
nating point. This prince also proved himself one of the
greatest rulers who ever sat on the Dragon throne of
China.
18 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
The country had been so long distracted by internal strife,
and the authority of the emperor had been reduced to such a
shadow, that peace was welcomed under any ruler, and the
hope was indulged that the Tsin princes, who had succeeded
in making themselves the most powerful feudatories of the
empire, might be able to restore to the central government
something of its ancient power and splendor. Nor was the
expectation unreasonable or ungratified. The Tsins had
fairly earned by their ability the confidence of the Chinese
nation, and their principal representative showed no dimi-
nution of energy on attaining the throne, and exhibited in a
higher post, and on a wider field, the martial and statesman-
like qualities his ancestors had displayed when building up
the fabric of their power as princes of the empire. Their
supremacy was not acquiesced in by the other great feuda-
tories without a struggle, and more than one campaign was
fought before all rivals were removed from their path, and
their authority passed unchallenged as occupants of the
Imperial office.
It was in the middle of this final struggle, and when the
result might still be held doubtful, that Tsin Chi Hwangti
began his eventful reign. When he began to rule he was
only thirteen years of age, but he quickly showed that he
possessed the instinct of a statesman, and the courage of a
born commander of armies. On the one hand he sowed dis-
sension between the most formidable of his opponents, and
brought about by a stratagem the disgrace of the ablest gen-
eral in their service, and on the other he increased his army
in numbers and efficiency, until it became unquestionably the
most formidable fighting force in China. While he endeav-
ored thus to attain internal peace, he was also studious in
providing for the general security of the empire, and with
this object he began the construction of a fortified wall across
the northern frontier to serve as a defense against the trou-
blesome Hiongnou tribes, who are identified with the Huns
of Attila. This wall, which he began in the first years of
his reign, was finished before his death, and still exists as the
THE EARLY AGES. 19
Great Wall of China, which has been considered one of the
wonders of the world. He was careful in his many wars
with the tribes of Mongolia not to allow himself to be drawn
far from his own border, and at the close of a campaign he
always withdrew his troops behind the Great Wall. Toward
Central Asia he was more enterprising, and one of his best
generals, Moungtien, crossed what is now the Gobi Desert,
and made Hami the frontier fortress of the empire.
In his civil administration Hwangti was aided by the
minister Lisseh, who seems to have been a man of rare
ability, and to have entered heartily into all his master's
schemes for uniting the empire. While Hwangti sat on the
throne with a naked sword in his hand, as the emblem of his
authority, dispensing justice, arranging the details of his
many campaigns, and superintending the innumerable affairs
of his government, his minister was equally active in reor-
ganizing the administration and in supporting his sovereign
in his bitter struggle with the literary classes who advocated
archaic principles, and whose animosity to the ruler was in-
flamed by the contempt, not unmixed with ferocity, with
which he treated them. The empire was divided into thirty-
six provinces, and he impressed upon the governors the im-
portance of improving communications within their jurisdic-
tion . Not content with this general precept, he issued a special
decree ordering that "roads shall be made in all directions
throughout the empire," and the origin of the main routes
in China may be found with as much certainty in his reign
as that of the roads of Europe in the days of Imperial Rome.
When advised to assign some portion of his power to his rela-
tives and high officials in the provinces he refused to repeat
the blunders of his predecessors, and laid down the perma-
nent truth that "good government is impossible under a mul-
tiplicity of masters." He centralized the power in his own
hands, and he drew up an organization for the civil service of
the State which virtually exists at the present day. The two
salient features in that organization are the indisputable
supremacy of the emperor and the non-employment of the
20 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
officials in their native provinces, and the experience of two
thousand years has proved their practical value.
When he conquered his internal enemies he resolved to
complete the pacification of his country by effecting a gen-
eral disarmament, and he ordered that all weapons should
be sent hi to his capital at Hienyang. This ''skillful disarm-
ing of the provinces added daily to the wealth and prosperity
of the capital," which he proceeded to embellish. He built
one palace within the walls, and the Hall of Audience was
ornamented with twelve statues, each of which weighed
twelve thousand pounds. But his principal residence named
the Palace of Delight, was without the walls, and there he
laid out magnificent gardens, and added building to build-
ing. In one of the courts of this latter palace, it is said he
could have drawn up 10,000 soldiers. This eye to military
requirements in even the building of his residence showed
the temper of his mind, and, hi his efforts to form a regular
army, he had recourse to "those classes in the community
who were without any fixed profession, and who were pos-
sessed of exceptional physical strength." He was thus the
earliest possessor in China of what might be called a regular
standing army. "With this force he succeeded in establishing
his power on a firm basis, and he may have hoped also to
insure permanence for his dynasty ; but, alas ! for the fallacy
of human expectations, the structure he erected fell with
him.
Great as an administrator, and successful as a soldier,
Hwangti was unfortunate in one struggle that he provoked.
At an early period of his career, when success seemed uncer-
tain, he found that his bitterest opponents were men of let-
ters, and that the literary class as a body was hostile to his
interests and person. Instead of ignoring this opposition or
seeking to overcome it by the same agency, Hwangti ex-
pressed his hatred and contempt, not only of the literary
class, but of literature itself, and resorted to extreme meas-
ures of coercion. The writers took up the gage of battle
thrown down by the emperor, and Hwangti became the
THE EARLY AGES. 21
object of the wit and abuse of every literate who could use
a pencil. His birth was aspersed. It was said that he was
not a Tsin at all, that his origin was of the humblest, and
that he was a substituted child foisted on the last of the Tsin
princes. These personal attacks were accompanied by un-
favorable criticism of all his measures, and by censure where
he felt that he deserved praise. It would have been more
prudent if he had shown greater indifference and patience,
for although he had the satisfaction of triumphing by brute
force over those who jeered at him, the triumph was accom-
plished by an act of Vandalism, with which his name will be
quite as closely associated in history as any of the wise meas-
ures or great works that he carried out. His vanquished
opponents left behind them a legacy of hostility and revenge
of the whole literary class of China, which has found expres-
sion in all the national histories.
The struggle, which had been in progress for some years,
reached its culminating point in the year 213 B.C., when a
Grand Council of the empire was summoned at Hienyang.
At this council were present not only the emperor's chief
military and civil officers from the different provinces, but
also the large literary class, composed of aspirants to office
and the members of the academies and College of Censors.
The opposing forces in China were thus drawn up face to
face, and it would have been surprising if a collision had not
occurred. On the one side were the supporters of the man
who had made China again an empire, believers in his person
and sharers hi his glory ; on the other were those who had
no admiration for this ruler, who detested his works, pro-
claimed his successes dangerous innovations, and questioned
ins right to bear the royal name. The purpose of the em-
peror may be detected when he called upon speakers in this
assembly of his friends and foes to express their opinions of
his administration, and when a member of his household rose
to extol his work and to declare that he had "surpassed the
very greatest of his predecessors." This courtier-like dec-
laration, which would have been excusable even if it had
22 A SHORl HISTORY OF CHINA.
had a less basis of truth than it unquestionably possessed in
the case of Hwangti, was received with murmurs and marks
of dissent by the literati. One of them rose and denounced
the speaker as "a vile flatterer," and proceeded to expatiate
on the superior merit of several of the earlier rulers. Not
content with this unseasonable eulogy, he advocated the
restoration of the empire to its old form of principalities, and
the consequent undoing of all that Hwangti had accom-
plished. Hwangti interrupted this speaker and called upon
his favorite minister Lisseh to reply to him and explain his
policy. Lisseh began by stating what has often been said
since, and in other countries, that "men of letters are, as a
rule, very little acquainted with what concerns the govern-
ment of a country, not that government of pure speculation
which is nothing more than a phantom, vanishing the nearer
we approached to it, but the practical government which
consists in keeping men within the sphere of their proper
duties." He then proceeded to denounce the literary class
as being hostile to the State, and to recommend the destruc-
tion of their works, declaring that "now is the time or never
to close the mouths of these secret enemies and to place a
curb on their audacity." The emperor at once from his
throne ratified the policy and ordered that no time should be
lost hi executing the necessary measures. All books were
proscribed, and orders were issued to burn every work except
those relating to medicine, agriculture, and such science as
then existed. The destruction of the national literature was
carried out with terrible completeness, and such works as
were preserved are not free from the suspicion of being
garbled or incomplete versions of their original text. The
burning of the books was accompanied by the execution of
five hundred of the literati, and by the banishment of many
thousands. By this sweeping measure, to which no parallel
is to be found in the history of other countries, Hwangti
silenced during the last few years of his life the criticisms
of his chief enemies, but in revenge his memory has had to
bear for two thousand years the sully of an inexcusable act
THE EARLY AGES. 23
of tyranny and narrow-mindedness. The price will be pro-
nounced too heavy for what was a momentary gratification.
The reign of Hwangti was not prolonged many years
after the burning of the books. In 210 B.C. he was seized
with a serious illness, to which he succumbed, partly because
he took no precautions, and partly, no doubt, through the
incompetence of his physicians. His funeral was magnifi-
cent, and, like the Huns, his grave was dug in the bed of a
river, and with him were buried his wives and his treas-
ure. This great ruler left behind him an example of vigor
such as is seldom found in the list of Chinese kings of effete
physique and apathetic life. He is the only Chinese emperor
of whom it is said that his favorite exercise was walking,
and his vigor was apparent in every department of State.
On one occasion when he placed a large army of, it is said,
600,000 men at the disposal of one of his generals, the com-
mander expressed some fear as to how this huge force was
to be fed. Hwangti at once replied, "Leave it to me. I
will provide for everything. There shall be want rather in
my palace than in your camp." He does not seem to have
been a great general himself, but he knew how to select the
best commanders, and he was also so quick in discovering
the merits of the generals opposed to him, that some of his
most notable victories were obtained by his skill in detaching
them from their service or by ruining their reputation by
some intrigue more astute than honorable. Yet, all deduc-
tions made, Tsin Chi Hwangti stands forth as a great ruler
and remarkable man.
The Tsin dynasty only survived its founder a few years.
Hwangti' s son Eulchi became emperor, but he reigned no
more than three years. He was foolish enough to get rid
of the general Moungtien, who might have been the buttress
of his throne ; and the minister Lisseh was poisoned, either
with or without his connivance. Eulchi himself shared the
same fate, and his successor, Ing Wang, reigned only six
weeks, committing suicide after losing a battle, and with
him the Tsin dynasty came to an end. Its chief, nay its
24 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
only claim to distinction, arises from its having produced
the great ruler Hwangti, and its destiny was Napoleonic in
its brilliance and evanescence.
Looking back at the long period which connects the
mythical age with what may be considered the distinctly
historical epoch of the Tsins, we find that by the close of
the third century before the Christian era China possessed
settled institutions, the most remarkable portion of its still
existing literature, and mighty rulers. It is hardly open to
doubt that the Chinese annalist finds in these remote ages
as much interest and instruction as we should in the record
of more recent times, and proof of this may be discovered
in the fact that the history of the first four dynasties, which
we must dismiss in these few pages, occupies as much space
in the national history as the chronicle of events from Tsin
Chi Hwangti to the end of the Ming dynasty in 1644, at
which date the official history of China stops, because the
history of the Manchu dynasty, which has occupied the
throne ever since, will only be given to the world after it
has ceased to rule. "We must not be surprised at this dis-
cursiveness, because the teachings of human experience are
as clearly marked in those early times as they have been
since, and Chinese historians aim as much at establishing
moral and philosophical truths as at giving a complete rec-
ord of events. The consequences of human folly and in-
competence are as patent and conspicuous in those days as
they are now. The ruling power is lost by one family and
transferred to another because the prince neglects his busi-
ness, gives himself over to the indulgence of pleasure, or
fails to see the signs of the times. Cowardice and cor-
ruption receive their due and inevitable punishment. The
founders of the dynasties are all brave and successful war-
riors, who are superior to the cant of a hypercivilized state
of society, which covers declining vigor and marks the first
phase of effeteness, and who see that as long as there are
human passions they may be molded by genius to make the
many serve the few and to build up an autocracy. Nor are
25
the lessons to be learned from history applicable only to in-
dividuals. The faults of an emperor are felt in every house-
hold of the community, and injure the State. Indifference
and obtuseness at the capital entailed weakness on the fron-
tier and in the provincial capitals. The barbarians grew
defiant and aggressive, and defeated the imperial forces.
The provincial governors asserted their independence, and
founded ruling families. The empire became attenuated by
external attack and internal division. But, to use the phrase
of the Chinese historians, "after long abiding disunion, union
revived." The strong and capable man always appears in
one form or another, and the Chinese people, impressed with
a belief in both the divine mission of their emperor and also
in the value of union, welcome with acclaim the advent of
the prince who will restore their favorite and ideal system
of one-man government. The time is still hidden in a far-
distant and undiscoverable future when it will be otherwise,
and when the Chinese will be drawn away from their con-
sistent and ancient practice to pursue the ignis fatuus of
European politics that seeks to combine human equality
with good practical government and national security. The
Chinese have another and more attainable ideal, nor is there
any likelihood of their changing it. The fall of dynasties
may, needs must, continue in the ordinary course of nature,
but in China it will not pave the way to a republic. The
imperial authority will rise triumphant after every struggle
above the storm.
CHAPTER II
THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY
As the Chinese are still proud to call themselves the sons
of Han, it will be understood that the period covered by the
Han rulers must be an important epoch in their history, and
in more than one respect they were the first national dynasty.
V hen the successors of Tsin Chi Hwangti proved unable to
a
36 A SHORT HISTORY Of CHIXA.
keep the throne, the victorious general who profited by their
discomfiture was named Liu Pang. He had been a trusted
official of the Emperor Hwangti, but on finding that his
descendants could not bear the burden of government, he
resolved to take his own measures, and he lost no time in
collecting troops and in making a bid for popularity by
endeavoring to save all the books that had not been burned.
His career bears some resemblance to that of Macbeth, for
a soothsayer meeting him on the road predicted, "by the
expression of his features, that he was destined to become
emperor." He began his struggle for the throne by defeat-
ing another general named Pawang, who was also disposed
to make a bid for supreme power. After this success Liu
Pang was proclaimed emperor as Kao Hwangti, meaning
Lofty and August Emperor, which has been shortened into
Kaotsou. He named his dynasty the Han, after the small
state in which he was born.
Kaotsou began his reign by a public proclamation in favor
of peace, and deploring the evils which follow in the train of
war. He called upon his subjects to aid his efforts for their
welfare by assisting in the execution of many works of public
utility, among which roads and bridges occupied the fore-
most place. He removed his capital from Loyang in Honan
to Singanfoo in Shensi, and as Singan was difficult of access
in those days, he constructed a great highroad from the cen-
ter of China to this somewhat remote spot on the western
frontier. This road still exists, and has been described by
several travelers in our time. It was constructed by the
labor of one hundred thousand men through the most diffi-
cult country, crossing great mountain chains and broad
rivers. The Chinese engineers employed on the making of
this road, which has excited the admiration of all who have
traversed it, first discovered and carried into execution the
suspension bridge, which in Europe is quite a modern inven-
tion. One of these "flying bridges," as the Chinese called
them, is one hundred and fifty yards across a valley five
hundred feet below, and is still in use. At regular intervals
THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY. 27
along this road Kaotsou constructed rest-houses for travel-
ers, and postal-stations for his couriers. No Chinese ruler
has done anything more useful or remarkable than this ad-
mirable road from Loyang to Singanfoo. He embellished
his new capital with many fine buildings, among which was
a large palace, the grandeur of which was intended to corre-
spond with the extent of his power.
The reign of Kaotsou was, however, far from being one
of uncheckered prosperity. Among his own subjects his pop-
ularity was great because he promoted commerce and im-
proved the administration of justice. He also encouraged
literature, and was the first ruler to recognize the claims of
Confucius, at whose tomb he performed an elaborate cere-
mony. He thus acquired a reputation which induced the
King of Nanhai a state composed of the southern provinces
of China, with its capital at or near the modern Canton to
tender his allegiance. But he was destined to receive many-
slights and injuries at the hands of a foreign enemy, who at
this time began a course of active aggression that entailed
serious consequences for both China and Europe.
Reference has been made to the Hiongnou or Hun tribes,
against whom Tsin Hwangti built the Great "Wall. In the
interval between the death of that ruler and the consolida-
tion of the power of Kaotsou, a remarkable chief named
Meha, or Meta, had established his supremacy among the
disunited clans of the Mongolian Desert, and had succeeded
in combining for purposes of war the whole fighting force
of what had been a disjointed and barbarous confederacy.
The Chinese rulers had succeeded in keeping back this threat-
ening torrent from overflowing the fertile plains of their coun-
try, as much by sowing dissension among these clans and by
bribing one chief to fight another, as by superior arms. But
Meha's success rendered this system of defense no longer
possible, and the desert chieftain, realizing the opportunity
of spoil and conquest, determined to make his position secure
by invading China. If the enterprise had failed, there would
have been an end to the paramounce of Meha, but his rapid
28 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A.
success convinced the Huns that their proper and most profit-
able policy was to carry on implacable war with their weak
and wealthy neighbors. Meha's success was so great that
in a single campaign he recovered all the districts taken from
the Tartars by the general Moungtien. He turned the west-
ern angle of the Great Wall, and brought down his frontier
to the river Hoangho. His light cavalry raided past the
Chinese capital into the province of Szchuen, and returned
laden with the spoil of countless cities. These successes were
crowned by a signal victory over the emperor in person.
Koatsou was drawn into an ambuscade in which his troops
had no chance with their more active adversaries, and, to
save himself from capture, Kaotsou had no alternative but
to take refuge in the town of Pingching, where he was
closely beleaguered. It was impossible to defend the town
for any length of time, and the capture of Kaotsou seemed
inevitable, when recourse was had to a stratagem. The
most beautiful Chinese maiden was sent as a present to
propitiate the conqueror, and Meha, either mollified by the
compliment, or deeming that nothing was to be gained by
driving the Chinese to desperation, acquiesced in a conven-
tion which, while it sealed the ignominious defeat of the
Chinese, rescued their sovereign from his predicament.
This disaster, and his narrow personal escape, seem to
have unnerved Kaotsou, for when the Huns resumed their
incursions in the very year following the Pingching conven-
tion, he took no steps to oppose them, and contented himself
with denouncing in his palace Meha as "a wicked and faith-
less man, who had risen to power by the murder of his
father, and one with whom oaths and treaties carried no
weight." Notwithstanding this opinion, Kaotsou proceeded
to negotiate with Meha as an equal, and gave this barbarian
prince his own daughter in marriage as the price of his ab-
staining from further attacks on the empire. Never, wrote
a historian, "was so great a shame inflicted on the Middle
Kingdom, which then lost its dignity and honor." Meha
observed this peace during the life of Kaotsou, who found
THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY. 29
that his reputation was much diminished by his coming to
terms with his uncivilized opponent, but although several of
his generals rebelled, until it was said that "the very name
of revolt inspired Kaotsou with apprehension," he succeeded
in overcoming them all without serious difficulty. His
troubles probably shortened his life, for he died when he
was only fifty-three, leaving the crown to his son, Hoeiti,
and injunctions to his widow, Liuchi, as to the conduct of
the administration.
The brief reign of Hoeiti is only remarkable for the rigor
and terrible acts of his mother, the Empress Liuchi, who is
the first woman mentioned in Chinese history as taking a
supreme part hi public affairs. Another of Kaotsou 's wid-
ows aspired to the throne for her son, and the chief direction
for herself. Liuchi nipped their plotting in the bud by poi-
soning both of them. She marked out those who differed
from her, or who resented her taking the most prominent
part in public ceremonies, as her enemies, to be removed
from her path by any means. At a banquet she endeav-
ored to poison one of the greatest princes of the empire, but
her plot was detected and baffled by her son. It is perhaps
not surprising that Hoeiti did not live long after this episode,
and then Liuchi ruled in her own name, and without filling
up the vacancy on the throne, until the public dissatisfaction
warned her that she was going too far. She then adopted a
supposititious child as her grandson and governed as regent
In his name. The mother of this youth seems to have made
inconvenient demands on the empress, who promptly put her
out of the way, and when the son showed a disposition to
resent this action, she caused him to be poisoned. She
again ruled without a puppet emperor, hoping to retain
power by placing her relatives in the principal offices; but
the dissatisfaction had now reached an acute point, and
threatened to destroy her. It may be doubted whether she
would have surmounted these difficulties and dangers, when
death suddenly cut short her adventurous career. The pop-
ular legend is that this Chinese Lucretia Borgia .died of
JO A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
fright at seeing the apparitions of her many victims, and
there can be no doubt that her crimes did not conduce to
make woman government more popular in China.
It says much for the excellence of Kaotsou's work, and
for the hold the Han family had obtained on the Chinese
people, that when it became necessary to select an emperor
after the death of Liuchi the choice should have fallen unan-
imously on the Prince of Tai, who was the illegitimate son
of Kaotsou. On mounting the throne, he took the name of
Wenti. He began his reign by remitting taxes and by ap-
pointing able and honest governors and judges. He ordered
that all old men should be provided with corn, meat and
wine, besides silk and cotton for their garments. At the
suggestion of his ministers, who were alive to the dangers
of a disputed succession, he proclaimed his eldest son heir to
the throne. He purified the administration of justice by de-
claring that prince and peasant must be equally subject to
the law ; he abolished the too common punishment of mutila-
tion, and had the satisfaction of seeing crime reduced to such
low proportions in the empire that the jails contained only
four hundred prisoners. Wenti was a strong advocate of
peace, which was, indeed, necessary to China, as it had not
recovered from the effects of the last Hun invasion. He suc-
ceeded by diplomacy in inducing the Prince at Canton, who
had shown a disposition to assert his independence, to recog-
nize his authority, and thus averted a civil war. In his re-
lations with the Huns, among whom the authority of Meha
had passed to his son, Lao Chang, he strove to preserve the
peace, giving that chief one of his daughters in marriage, and
showing moderation in face of much provocation. When war
was forced upon him by their raids he did everything he could
to mitigate its terrors, but the ill success of his troops in their
encounters with the Tartars broke his confidence, and he died
prematurely after a reign of twenty-three years, which was
remarkable as witnessing the consolidation of the Hans. The
good work of Wenti was continued during the peaceful reign
of sixteen years of his son Kingti.
THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY. 31
The next emperor was Vouti, a younger son of Kingti,
and one of his earliest conquests was to add the difficult and
inaccessible province of J^uhkien to the empire. He also
endeavored to propitiate the Huns by giving their chief one
of the princesses of his family as a wife, but the opinion was
gaining ground that it would be better to engage in a war
for the overthrow of the national enemy than to purchase
a hollow peace. Wang Kua, a general who had commanded
on the frontier, and who knew the Hun mode of warfare,
represented that success would be certain, and at last gained
the emperor's ear. Vouti decided on war, and raised a large
army for the purpose. But the result was not auspicious.
Wang Kua failed to bring the Huns to an engagement, and
the campaign which was to produce such great results ended
ingloriously. The unlucky general who had promised so
much anticipated his master's displeasure by committing
suicide. Unfortunately for himself, his idea of engaging
in a mortal struggle with the Tartars gained ground, and
became in time the fixed policy of China. Notwithstanding
this check, the authority of Vouti continued to expand. He
annexed Szchuen, a province exceeding in size and popula-
tion most European states, and he received from the ruler
of Manchuria a formal tender of submission. In the last
years of his reign the irrepressible Hun question again came
up for discussion, and the episode of the flight of the Yuchi
from Kansuh affords a break in the monotony of the strug-
gle, and is the first instance of that western movement which
brought the tribes of the Gobi Desert into Europe. The
Yuchi are believed to have been allied with the Jats of India,
and there is little or no doubt that the Sacse, or Scythians,
were their descendants. They occupied a strip of territory
in Kansuh from Shachow to Lanchefoo, and after suffering
much at the hands of the Huns under Meha, they resolved
to seek a fresh home in the unknown regions of Western
Asia. The Emperor Vouti wished to bring them back, and
he sent an envoy named Chang Keen to induce them to re-
turn. That officer discovered them in the Oxus region, but
02 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
all his arguments failed to incline them to leave a quarter
in which they had recovered power and prosperity. Pow-
erless against the Huns, they had more than held their own
against the Parthians and the Greek kingdom of Bactria.
They retained their predominant position in what is now
Bokhara and Balkh, until they were gathered up by the
Huns in their western march, and hurled, in conjunction
with them, on the borders of the Roman Empire.
Meantime, the war with the Huns themselves entered
upon a new phase. A general named Wei Tsing obtained
a signal victory over them, capturing 15,000 prisoners and
the spoil of the Tartar camp. This success restored long-
lost confidence to the Chinese troops, and it was followed by
several other victories. One Chinese expedition, composed
entirely of cavalry, marched through the Hun country to
Soponomo on the Tian Shan, carrying everything before it
and returning laden with spoil, including some of the golden
images of the Hun religion. Encouraged by these successes,
Vouti at last took the field in person, and sent a formal sum-
mons to the Tartar king to make his submission to China.
His reply was to imprison the bearer of the message, and to
defy the emperor to do his worst. This boldness had the
effect of deterring the emperor from his enterprise. He
employed his troops in conquering Yunnan and Leaoutung
instead of in waging another war with the Huns. But he
had only postponed, not abandoned, his intention of over-
throwing, once and for all, this most troublesome and for-
midable national enemy. He raised an enormous force for
the campaign, which might have proved successful but
for the mistake of intrusting the command to an incompe-
tent general. In an ill-advised moment, he gave his brother-
in-law, Li Kwangli, the supreme direction of the war. His
incompetence entailed a succession of disasters, and the only
redeeming point amid them was that Li Kwangli was taken
prisoner and rendered incapable of further mischief. Liling,
the grandson of this general, was intrusted with a fresh
army to retrieve the fortunes of the war; but, although
THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY. 33
successful at first, he was outmaneuvered, and reduced to
the unpleasant pass of surrendering to the enemy. Both Li
Kwangli and Liling adapted themselves to circumstances,
and took service under the Tartar chief. As this conduct
obtained the approval of the historian Ssematsien, it is clear
that our views of such a proceeding would not be in harmony
with the opinion in China of that day. The long war which
Vouti waged with the Huns for half a century, and which
was certainly carried on in a more honorable and successful
manner than any previous portion of that historic struggle,
closed with discomfiture and defeat, which dashed to the
ground the emperor's hopes of a complete triumph over the
most formidable national enemy.
After a reign of fifty-four years, which must be pro-
nounced glorious, Vouti died, amid greater troubles and
anxieties than any that had beset him during his long reign.
He was unquestionably a great ruler. He added several
provinces to his empire, and the success he met with over the
Huns was far from being inconsiderable. He was a Nimrod
among the Chinese, and his principal enjoyment was to
chase the wildest animals without any attendants. Like
many other Chinese princes, Vouti was prone to believe in
the possibility of prolonging human life, or, as the Chinese
put it, in the draught of immortality. In connection with
this weakness an anecdote is preserved that will bear telling.
A magician offered the emperor a glass containing the pre-
tended elixir of eternal life, and Vouti was about to drink it
when a courtier snatched it from his hand and drained the
gcblet. The enraged monarch ordered him to prepare for
instant death, but the ready courtier at once replied, "How
can I be executed, since I have drunk the draught of immor-
tality?" To so convincing an argument no reply was pos-
sible, and Vouti lived to a considerable age without the aid
of magicians or quack medicines. Of him also it may be
said that he added to the stability of the Han dynasty, and
he left the throne to Chaoti, the youngest of his sons, a
child of eight, for whom he appointed his two most experi-
Ji A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
enced ministers to act as governors. As these ministers were
true to their duty, the interregnum did not affect the fort-
unes of the State adversely, and several claimants to the
throne paid for their ambition with their lives. The reign
of Chaoti was prosperous and successful, but, unfortunately,
he died at the early age of thirty-one, and without leaving
an heir.
After some hesitation, Chaoti's uncle Liucho was pro-
claimed emperor, but he proved to be a boor with low tastes,
whose sole idea of power was the license to indulge in coarse
amusements. The chief minister, Ho Kwang, took upon
himself the responsibility of deposing him, and also of plac-
ing on the throne Siuenti, who was the great-grandson, or,
according to another account, the grandson, of Vouti. The
choice was a fortunate one, and "Ho Kwang gave all his
care to perfecting the new emperor in the science of erovern-
ment." As a knowledge of his connection with the Imperial
family had been carefully kept from him, Siuenti was
brought from a very humble sphere to direct the destinies
of the Chinese, and his greater energy and more practical
disposition were probably due to his not having been bred in
the enervating atmosphere of a palace. He, too, was brought
at an early stage of his career face to face with the Tartar
question, and he had what may be pronounced a unique ex-
perience in his wars with them. He sent several armies
under commanders of reputation to wage war on them, and
the generals duly returned, reporting decisive and easily
obtained victories. The truth soon leaked out. The vic-
tories were quite imaginary. The generals had never ven-
tured to face the Tartars, and they were given no option by
their enraged and disappointed master but to poison them-
selves. Other generals were appointed, and the Tartars
were induced to sue for peace, partly from fear of the Chi-
nese, and partly because they were disunited among them-
selves. Such was the reputation of Siuenti for justice that
several of the Tartar chiefs carried their grievances to the
foot of his throne, and his army became known as "the
THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY. 35
troops of justice. " It is said that all the tribes and countries
of Central Asia as far west as the Caspian sent him tribute,
and to celebrate the event he built a kilin or pavilion, in
which he placed statues of all the generals who had contrib-
uted toward his triumph. Only one incident marred the
tranqiiillity of Siuenti's reign. The great statesman, Ho
Kwang, had sunk quietly into private life as soon as he
found the emperor capable of governing for himself; but his
wife Hohien was more ambitious and less satisfied with her
position, although she had effected a marriage between her
daughter and Siuenti. This lady was only one of the queens
of the ruler, and not the empress. Hohien, to further her
ends, determined to poison the empress, and succeeded only
too well. Her guilt would have been divulged by the doctor
she employed, but that Ho Kwang, by an exercise of his
authority, prevented the application of torture to him when
thrown into prison. This narrow escape from detection did
not keep Hohien from crime. She had the satisfaction of
seeing her daughter proclaimed empress, but her gratifica-
tion was diminished by the son of the murdered Hiuchi being
selected as heir to the throne. Hohien resolved to poison
this prince, but her design was discovered, and she and all
the members of her family were ordered to take poison. The
minister, Ho Kwang, had taken no part in these plots, which,
however, injured his reputation, and his statue in the Im-
perial pavilion was left without a name.
Siuenti did not long survive these events, and Yuenti, the
son of Hiuchi, became emperor. His reign of sixteen years
presents no features of interest beyond the signal overthrow
of the Tartar chief, Chichi, whose head was sent by the vic-
torious general to be hung on the walls of Singan. Yuenti
was succeeded by his son Chingti, who reigned twenty-six
years, and who gained the reputation of a Chinese Vitellius.
His nephew Gaiti, who was the next emperor, showed him-
self an able and well-intentioned prince, but his reign of six
years was too brief to allow of any permanent work being
accomplished. One measure of his was not without its influ-
36 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
ence on the fate of his successors. He had disgraced and
dismissed from the service an official named Wang Mang,
who had attained great power and influence under Chingti.
The ambition of this individual proved fatal to the dynasty.
On Gaiti's death he emerged from his retirement, and, in
conjunction with that prince's mother, seized the govern-
ment. They placed a child, grandson of Yuenti, on the
throne, and gave him the name of Pingti, or the Peace-
ful Emperor, but he never governed. Before Pingti was
fourteen, "Wang Mang resolved to get rid of him, and he
gave him the poisoned cup with his own hands. This was
not the only, or perhaps the worst, crime that Wang Mang
perpetrated to gain the throne. Pressed for money to pay
his troops, he committed the sacrilege of stripping the graves
of the princes of the Han family of the jewels deposited in
them. One more puppet prince was placed on the throne,
but he was soon got rid of, and Wang Mang proclaimed
himself emperor. He also decreed that the Han dynasty
was extinct, and that his family should be known as the Sin.
Wang Mang the usurper was certainly a capable adminis-
trator, but in seizing the throne he had attempted a task to
which he was unequal. As long as he was minister or
regent, respect and regard for the Han family prevented
many from revolting against his tyranny, but when he seized
the throne he became the mark of popular indignation and
official jealousy. The Huns resumed their incursions, and,
curiously enough, put forward a proclamation demanding
the restoration of the Hans. Internal enemies sprang up on
every side, and Wang Mang's attempt to terrify them by
severity and wholesale executions only aggravated the situa-
tion. It became clear that the struggle was to be one to the
death, but this fact did not assist Wang Mang, who saw his
resources gradually reduced and his enemies more confident
as the contest continued. After twelve years' fighting,
Wang Mang was besieged at Singan. The city was soon
carried by storm, and Wang Mang retired to the palace to
put an end to his existence. But his heart failed him, and
THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY. 37
ne was cut down by the foe. His last exclamation and the
dirge of his short-lived dynasty, which is denied a place in
Chinese history, was, "If Heaven had given me courage,
what could the family of the Hans have done?"
The eldest of the surviving Han princes, Liu Hiuen, was
placed on the throne, and the capital was removed from
Singan to Loyang, or Honan. Nothing could have been
more popular among the Chinese people than the restoration
of the Hans. It is said that the old men cried for joy when
they saw the banner of the Hans again waving over the
palace and in the field. But Liu Hiuen was not a good
ruler, and there might have been reason to regret the change
if he had not wisely left the conduct of affairs to his able
cousin, Liu Sieou. At last the army declared that Liu Sieou
should be emperor, and when Liu Hiuen attempted to form
a faction of his own he was murdered by Fanchong, the
leader of a confederacy known as the Crimson Eyebrows,
on whose co-operation he counted. The Crimson Eyebrows
were so called from the distinguishing mark which they had
adopted when first organized as a protest against the tyranny
of Wang Mang. At first they were patriots, but they soon
became brigands. After murdering the emperor, Fanchong,
their leader, threw off all disguise, and seizing Singan, gave
it over to his followers to plunder. Liu Sieou, on becoming
emperor, took the style of Kwang Vouti, and his first task
was to overthrow the Crimson Eyebrows, who had become
a public enemy. He intrusted the command of the army he
raised for this purpose to Fongy, who justified his reputation
as the most skillful Chinese general of his day by gaining
several victories over a more numerous adversary. "Within
two years Kwang Vouti had the satisfaction of breaking up
the formidable faction known as the Crimson Eyebrows, and
of holding its leader Fanchong as a prisoner in his capital.
Kwang Vouti was engaged for many more years in sub-
duing the numerous potentates who had repudiated the
imperial authority. His efforts were invariably crowned
with success, but he acquired so great a distaste for war
88 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A.
that it is said when his son asked him to explain how an army
was set in battle array he refused to reply. But the love of
peace will not avert war when a State has turbulent or am-
bitious neighbors who are resolved to appeal to arms, and >o
Kwang Vouti was engaged in almost constant hostilities to
the end of his days. Chingtse, the Queen of Kaochi, which
may be identified with the modern Annain, defied the Chi-
nese, and defeated the first army sent to bring her to reason.
This reverse necessitated a still greater effort on the part of
the Chinese ruler to bring his neighbor to her senses. The
occupant of the Dragon throne could not sit down tamely
under a defeat inflicted by a woman, and an experienced
general named Mayuen was sent to punish the Queen of
Kaochi. The Boadicea of Annam made a valiant defense,
but she was overthrown, and glad to purchase peace by
making the humblest submission. The same general more
than held his own on the northern and northwest frontiers.
When Kwang Vouti died, in A.D. 57, after a brilliant reign
of thirty-three years, he had firmly established the Han
dynasty, and he left behind him the reputation of being
both a brave and a just prince.
His son and successor, Mingti, was not unworthy of his
father. His acts were characterized by wisdom and clem-
ency, and the country enjoyed a large measure of peace
through the policy of Mingti and his father. A general
named Panchow, who was perhaps the greatest military
commander China ever produced, began his long and re-
markable career in this reign, and, without the semblance
of an effort, kept the Huns in order, and maintained the
imperial authority over them. Among other great and im-
portant works, Mingti constructed a dike, thirty miles long,
for the relief of the Hoangho, and the French missionary
and writer, Du Halde, states that so long as this was kept
in repair there were no floods. The most remarkable event
of Mingti's reign was undoubtedly the official introduction
of Buddhism into China. Some knowledge of the ^reat
Indian religion and of the teacher Sakya Muni seems to
THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY. 39
have reached China through either Tibet, or, more prob-
ably, Burma, but it was not until Mingti, hi consequence
of a dream, sent envoys to India to study Buddhism, that
its doctrine became known in China. Under to-, direct
patronage of the emperor it made rapid progress, and al-
though never unreservedly popular, it has held its ground
ever since its introduction in the first century of our era,
and is now inextricably intertwined with the religion of the
Chinese state and people. Mingti died after a successful
reign of eighteen years in 75 A.D. His son, Changti, with
the aid of his mother, Machi, the daughter of the general
Mayuen, enjoyed a peaceful reign of thirteen years, and
died at an early age lamented by his sorrowing people.
After Changti came his son, Hoti, who was only ten at
the time of his accession, and who reigned for seventeen
years. He was a virtuous and well-intentioned prince, who
instituted many internal reforms, and during his reign a
new writing paper was invented, which is supposed to have
been identical with the papyrus of Egypt. But the reign
of Hoti is rendered illustrious by the remarkable military
achievements of Panchow. The success of that general in
his operations with the Huns has already been referred to,
and he at last formed a deliberate plan for driving them
away from the Chinese frontier. Although he enjoyed th^
confidence of his successive sovereigns, the imperial sanction
was long withheld from this vast scheme, but during the life
of Changti he began to put in operation measures for the
realization of this project that were only matured under
Hoti. He raised and trained a special army for frontier
war. He enlisted tribes who had never served the emperor
before, and who were specially qualified for desert "warfare.
He formed an alliance with the Sienpi tribes of Manchuria,
who were probably the ancestors of the present Manchus,
and thus arranged for a flank attack on the Huns. This
systematic attack was crowned with success. The pres-
sure brought against them compelled the Hiongnou to give
way, and as they were ousted from their possessions, to
40 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
seek fresh homes further west. In this they were, n^
doubt, stimulated by the example of their old opponents,
the Yuchi, but Panchow's energy supplied a still more con-
vincing argument. He pursued them wherever they went,
across the Gobi Desert and beyond the Tian Shan range,
taking up a strong position at modern Kuldja and Kashgar,
sending his expeditions on to the Pamir, and preparing to
complete his triumph by the invasion of the countries of the
Oxus and Jaxartes. When Hoti was still a youth, he com-
pleted this programme by overrunning the region as far as
the Caspian, which was probably at that time connected with
the Aral, and it may be supposed that Khiva marked the
limit of the Chinese general's triumphant progress. It is
affirmed with more or less show of truth that he came into
contact with the Roman empire or the great Thsin, as the
Chinese called it, and that he wished to establish commer-
cial relations with it. But however uncertain this may be,
there can be no doubt that he inflicted a most material in-
jury on Rome, for before his legions fled the Huns, who,
less than four centuries later, debased the majesty of the
imperial city, and whose leader, Attila, may have been a
descendant of that Meha at whose hands the Chinese suf-
fered so severely.
After this brilliant and memorable war, Panchow re-
turned to China, where he died at the great age of eighty.
With him disappeared the good fortune of the Han dynasty,
and misfortunes fell rapidly on the family that had gov-
erned China so long and so well. Hoti's infant son lived
only a few months, and then his brother, Ganti, became
emperor. The real power rested in the hands of the widow
of Hoti, who was elevated to the post of regent. Ganti was
succeeded in A.D. 124 by his son, Chunti, hi whose time
several rebellions occurred, threatening the extinction of the
dynasty. Several children were then elevated to the throne,
and at last an ambitious noble named Leangki, whose sister
was one of the empresses, acquired the supreme direction of
affairs. He gave a great deal of trouble, but at last, finding
THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY. 41
that his ambitious schemes did not prosper, he took poison,
thus anticipating a decree passed for his execution. Hwanti,
the emperor who had the courage to punish this powerful
noble, was the last able ruler of the Hans. His reign was,
on the whole, a brilliant one, and the Sienpi tribes, who had
taken the place of the Hiongnou, were, after one arduous
campaign, defeated in a pitched battle. The Chinese were on
the verge of defeat when their general, Twan Kang, rushed
to the front, exclaiming: "Recall to your minds how often
before you have beaten these same opponents, and teach
them again to-day that in you they have their masters."
After Hwanti's death the decline of the Hans was rapid.
They produced no other ruler worthy of the throne. In the
palace the eunuchs, always numerous at the Chinese court,
obtained the upper hand, and appointed their own creatures
to the great governing posts. Fortunately this dissension at
the capital was not attended by weakness on the frontier,
and the Sienpi were again defeated. The battle is chiefly
memorable because the Sienpi endeavored to frighten the
Chinese general by threatening to kill his mother, who was
a prisoner in their hands, if he attacked. Not deterred by
this menace, Chow Pow attacked the enemy, and gained a
decisive victory, but at the cost of his mother's life, which so
affected him that he died of grief shortly afterward. After
some time dissensions rose in the Han family, and two half-
brothers claimed the throne. Pienti became emperor by the
skillful support of his uncle, General Hotsin, while his rival,
Hienti, enjoyed the support of the eunuchs. A deadly feud
ensued between the two parties, which was aggravated by
the murder of Hotsin, who rashly entered the palace without
an escort. His soldiers avenged his death, carrying the pal-
ace by storm and putting ten thousand eunuchs to the sword.
After this the last emperors possessed only the name of em-
peror. The practical authority was disputed among several
generals, of whom Tsow Tsow was the most distinguished
and successful; and he and his son Tsowpi founded a dy-
nasty, of which more will be heard hereafter. In A.D. 220
42 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Hienti, the last Han ruler, retired into private life, thus
bringing to an end the famous Han dynasty, which had
governed China for four hundred and fifty years.
Among the families that have reigned in China none
has obtained as high a place in popular esteem as the Hans.
They rendered excellent work in consolidating the empire
and in carrying out what may be called the imperial mis-
sion of China. Yunnan and Leaoutung were made prov-
inces for the first time. Cochin China became a vassal
state. The writ of the emperor ran as far as the Pamir.
The wealth and trade of the country increased with the
progress of its armies. Some of the greatest public works,
in the shape of roads, bridges, canals, and aqueducts, were
constructed during this period, and still remain to testify to
the glory of the Hans. As has been seen, the Hans produced
several great rulers. Their fame was not the creation of one
man alone, and as a consequence the dynasty enjoyed a
lengthened existence equaled by few of its predecessors or
successors. No ruling family was ever more popular with
the Chinese than this, and it managed to retain the throne
when less favored rulers would have expiated their mistakes
and shortcomings by the loss of the empire. With the strong
support of the people, the Hans overcame innumerable diffi-
culties, and even the natural process of decay; and when
they made their final exit from history it was in a graceful
manner, and without the execration of the masses. That
this feeling retains its force is shown in the pride with which
the Chinese still proclaim themselves to be the sons of Han,
THE ignominious failure of the usurper Wang Mang to
found a dynasty was too recent to encourage any one to take
upon himself the heavy charge of administering the whole
A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION. 43
of the Han empire, and so the state was split up into three
principalities, and the period is known from this fact as the
Sankoue. One prince, a member of the late ruling family,
held possession of Szchuen, which was called the principal-
ity of Chow. The southern provinces were governed by a
general named Sunkiueu, and called Ou. The central and
northern provinces, containing the greatest population and
resources, formed the principality of "Wei, subject to Tsowpi,
the son of Tsow Tsow. A struggle for supremacy very soon
began between these princes, and the balance of success grad-
ually declared itself in favor of Wei. It would serve no use-
ful purpose to enumerate the battles which marked this strug-
gle, yet one deed of heroism deserves mention, the defense
of Sinching by Changte, an officer of the Prince of Wei.
The strength of the place was insignificant, and, after a
siege of ninety days, several breaches had been made in the
walls. In this strait Changte sent a message to the besieg-
ing general that he would surrender on the hundredth day
if a cessation of hostilities were granted, "as it was a law
among the princes of Wei that the governor of a place which
held out for a hundred days and then surrendered, with no
prospect of relief visible, should not be considered as guilty."
The respite was short and it was granted. But the disap-
pointment of the besieger, already counting on success, was
great when a few days later he saw that the breaches had
been repaired, that fresh defenses had been improvised, and
that Sinching was in better condition than ever to withstand
a siege. On sending to inquire the meaning of these prep-
arations, Changte gave the following reply: "I am prepar-
ing my tomb and to bury myself in the ruins of Sinching."
Of such gallantry and resource the internecine strife of the
Sankoue period presents few instances, but the progress of
the struggle steadily pointed in the direction of the triumph,
of Wei.
The Chow dynasty of the Later Hans was the first to
succumb to the princes of Wei, and the combined resources
of the two states were then directed against the southern
44 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
principality of Ou. The supreme authority in "Wei had be-
fore this passed from the family of Tsowpi to his best gen-
eral, Ssemaohow, who had the satisfaction of beginning his
reign with the overthrow of the Chow dynasty. If he had
carried out the wishes of his own commander, Tengai, by
attacking Ou at once, and in the flush of his triumph over
Chow, he might have completed his work at a stroke, for
as Tengai wrote, "An army which has the reputation of
victory flies from one success to another." But Ssemachow
preferred a slower and surer mode of action, with the result
that the conquest of Ou was put off for twenty years. Ssem-
achow died in A.D. 265, and his son Ssemachu founded the
new dynasty of the Later Tsins under the name of Vouti, or
the warrior prince.
The main object with Vouti was to add the Ou principal-
ity to his dominions, and the descendants of Suukiuen thought
it best to bend before the storm. They sent humble embas-
sies to Loyang, expressing their loyalty and submission, but
at the same time they made strenuous preparations to defend
their independence. This double policy precipitated the col-
lision it was intended to avert. Vouti paid more heed to the
acts than the promises of his neighbor, and he ordered the
invasion of his territory from two sides. He placed a large
fleet of war junks on the Yangtsekiang to attack his oppo-
nent on the Tenting Lake. The campaign that ensued was
decided before it began. The success of Vouti was morally
certain from the beginning, and after his army had suffered
several reverses Sunhow threw up the struggle and surren-
dered to his opponent. Thus was China again reunited for
a short time under the dynasty of the Later Tsins. Having
accomplished his main task, Vouti gave himself up to the
pursuit of pleasure, and impaired the reputation he had
gained among his somewhat severe fellow-countrymen by
entertaining a theatrical company of five thousand female
comedians, and by allowing himself to be driven in a car
drawn by sheep through the palace grounds. Vouti lived
about ten years after the unity of the empire was restored,
A LONG PERIOl OF DISUNION. 45
and his son, Ssemachong, or Hweiti, became emperor on his
death in A.D. 290. One of the great works of his reign was
the bridging of the Hoangho at Mongtsin, at a point much
lower down its course than is bridged at the present time.
The reign of Hweiti was marred by the ambitious vin-
dictiveness of his wife, Kiachi, who murdered the principal
minister and imprisoned the widow of the. Emperor Vouti.
The only good service she rendered the state was to discern
in one of the palace eunuchs named Mongkwan a great gen-
eral, and his achievements bear a strong resemblance to those
of Narses, who was the only other great commander of that
unfortunate class mentioned in history. Wherever Mong-
k%van commanded in person victory attended his efforts, but
the defeats of the other generals of the Tsins neutralized his
success. At this moment there was a recrudescence of Tar-
tar activity which proved more fatal to the Chinese ruler
than his many domestic enemies. Some of the Hiongnou
tribes had retired in an easterly direction toward Manchuria
when Panchow drove the main body westward, and among
them, at the time of which we are speaking, a family named
Lm had gained the foremost place. They possessed all the
advantages of Chinese education, and had married several
times into the Han family. Seeing the weakness of Hweiti
these Lin chiefs took the title of Kings of Han, and wished
to pose as the liberators of the country. Hweiti bent before
the storm, and would have made an ignominious surrender
but that death saved him the trouble.
His brother and successor, Hwaiti, fared somewhat bet-
ter at first, but notwithstanding some flashes of success the
Lin Tartars marched further and further into the country,
capturing cities, defeating the best officers of the Tsins, and
threatening the capital. In A.D. 310 Linsong, the Han chief,
invaded China in force and with the full intention of ending
the war at a blow. He succeeded in capturing Loyang, and
carrying off Hwaiti as his prisoner. The capital was pil-
laged and the Prince Royal executed. Hwaiti is considered
the first Chinese emperor to have fallen into the hands of a
46 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
foreign conqueror. Two years after his capture, Hwaiti
was compelled to wait on his conqueror at a public banquet,
and when it was over he was led out to execution. This
foul murder illustrates the character of the new race and
men who aspired to rule over China. The Tartar successes
did not end here, for a few years later they made a fresh
raid into China, capturing Hwaiti's brother and successor,
Mingti, who was executed, twelve months after his capture.
at Pingyang, the capital of the Tartar Hans.
After these reverses the enfeebled Tsin rulers removed
their capital to Nankin, but this step alone would not have
sufficed to prolong their existence had not the Lin princes
themselves suffered from the evils of disunion and been com-
pelled to remove their capita] from Pingyang to Singan.
Here they changed their name from Han to Chow, but the
work of disintegration once begun proceeded rapidly, and in
the course of a few years the Lin power crumbled completely
away. Released from their most pressing danger by the fall
of this family, the Tsin dynasty took a new lease of life, but
it was unable to derive any permanent advantage from this
fact. The last emperors of this family were weak and in-
competent princes, whose names need not be given outside
a chronological table. There would be nothing to say about
them but that a humble individual named Linyu, who owed
everything to himself, found in the weakness of the govern-
ment and the confusion in the country the opportunity of
distinction. He proved himself a good soldier and able
leader against the successors of the Lin family on one side,
and a formidable pirate named Sunghen on the other. Dis-
satisfied with his position, Linyu murdered one emperor and
placed another on the throne, and in two years he compelled
his puppet, the last of the Later Tsins, to make a formal ab-
dication hi his favor. For a considerable portion of their
rule they governed the whole of China, and it is absolutely
true to say that they were the least worthy family ever in-
trusted with so great a charge. Of the fifteen emperors who
ruled for one hundred and fifty-five years there is not more
A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION. 4?
than the founder whose name calls for preservation on his
own merits.
Although Linyu's success was complete as far as it went,
his dynasty, to which he gave the name of Song, never pos-
sessed exclusive power among the Chinese. It was only one
administration among many others, and during his brief
reign of three years he could do nothing toward extending
his power over his neighbors, although he may have estab-
lished his own the more firmly by poisoning the miserable
Tsin emperor whom he deposed. His son and successor,
Chowti, was deposed and murdered after a brief reign of
one year. His brother Wenti succeeded him, and he was
soon drawn into a struggle for power, if not existence, with
his northern neighbor the King of Wei, who was one of the
most powerful potentates in the empire. The principal and
immediate bone of contention between them was the great
province of Honan, which had been overrun by the Wei
ruler, but which Wenti was resolved to recover. As the
Hoangho divides this province into two parts, it was ex-
tremely difficult for the Wei ruler to defend the portion south
of it, and when Wenti sent him his declaration of war, he
replied, "Even if your master succeeds in seizing this prov-
ince I shall know how to retake it as soon as the waters of
the Hoangho are frozen." Wenti succeeded in recovering
Honan, but after a protracted campaign, during which the
Wei troops crossed the river on the ice, his armies were again
expelled from it, and the exhausted combatants found them-
selves at the close of the struggle in almost the same position
they had held at the commencement. For a time both rulers
devoted their attention to peaceful matters, although Topa-
tao, king of Wei, varied them by a persecution of the Bud-
dhists, and then the latter concentrated all his forces with
the view of overwhelming the Song emperor. When suc-
cess seemed certain, victory was denied him, and the Wei
forces suffered severely during their retreat to their own
territory. This check to his triumphant career injured his
reputation and encouraged his enemies. A short time after
48 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
this campaign, Topatao was murdered by some discontented
officers.
Nor was the Song ruler, Wenti, any more fortunate, as
he was murdered by his son. The parricide was killed in
turn by a brother who became the Emperor Vouti. This
ruler was fond of the chase and a great eater, but, on the
whole, he did no harm. The next two emperors were cruel
and bloodthirsty princes, and during their reigns the execu-
tioner was constantly employed. Two more princes, who
were, however, not members of the Song family, but only
adopted by the last ruler of that house, occupied the throne,
but this weakness and unpopularity for the Chinese, unlike
the people of India, scout the idea of adoption and believe
only in the rights of birth administered the finishing stroke
to the Songs, who now give place to the Tsi dynasty, which
was founded by a general named Siaotaoching, who took the
imperial name of Kaoti. The change did not bring any
improvement in the conditions of China, and it was publicly
said that the Tsi family had attained its pride of place "not
by merit, but by force." The Tsi dynasty, after a brief and
ignominious career, came to an end in the person of a youth-
ful prince named Hoti. After his deposition, in A.D. 502,
his successful enemies ironically sent him in prison a present
of gold. He exclaimed, "What need have I of gold after
my death? a few glasses of wine would be more valuable."
They complied with his wish, and while he was drunk they
strangled him with his own silken girdle.
After the Tsi came the Leang dynasty, another of those
insignificant and unworthy families which occupy the stage
of Chinese history during this long period of disunion. The
new Emperor Vouti was soon brought into collision with the
state of "Wei, which during these years had regained all its
power, and had felt strong enough to transfer its capital
from the northern city of Pingching to Honan, while the
Leang capital remained at Nankin. The progress of this
contest was marked by the consistent success of Wei, and
the prince of that kingdom seems to have been as superior
A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION. 49
in the capacity of his generals as in the resources of his
state. One incident will be sufficient to show the devotion
which he was able to inspire in his officers. During the
absence of its governor, Vouti attempted to capture the
town of Ginching, and he would certainly have succeeded
in his object had not Mongchi, the wife of that officer, an-
ticipating by many centuries the conduct of the Countess oi
Montfort and of the Countess of Derby, thrown herself into
the breach, harangued the small garrison, and inspired it
with her own indomitable spirit. Vouti was compelled to
make an ignominious retreat from before Ginching, and hie
troops became so disheartened that they refused to engage
the enemy, notwithstanding their taunts and their marching
round the imperial camp with the head of a dead person
decked out in a widow's cap and singing a doggerel ballad
to the effect that none of Vouti 's generals was to be feared.
In the next campaign Vouti was able to restore his declining
fortunes by the timely discovery of a skillful general in the
person of Weijoui, who, taking advantage of the division of
the "Wei army into two parts by a river, gained a decisive
victory over each of them in turn. If Vouti had listened to
his general's advice, and followed up this success, he might
have achieved great and permanent results, but instead he
preferred to rest content with his laurels, with the result
that the Wei prince recovered his military power and confi-
dence. The natural consequences of this was that the two
neighbors once more resorted to a trial of strength, and, not-
withstanding the valiant and successful defense of a fortress
by another lady named Liuchi, the fortune of war declared
in the main for Vouti. This may be considered one of the
most remarkable periods for the display of female capacity
in China, as the great state of Wei was governed by a queen
named Houchi ; but the general condition of the country does
not support an argument in favor of female government.
The tenure of power by Houchi was summarily cut short
by the revolt of the Wei commander-in-chief, Erchu Jong,
who got rid of his mistress by tying her up in a sack and
i
50 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
throwing her into the Hoangho. He then collected twa
thousand of her chief advisers in a plain outside the capital,
and there ordered his cavalry to cut them down. Erchu
Jong then formed an ambitious project for reuniting the
empire, proclaiming to his followers his intention in this
speech: "Wait a little while, and we shall assemble all the
braves from out our western borders. We will then go and
bring to reason the six departments of the north, and fhe
following year we will cross the great Kiang, and place in
chains Siaoyen, who calls himself emperor." This scheme
was nipped in the bud by the assassination of Erchu Jong.
Although the death of its great general signified much loss
to the Wei state, the Emperor Vouti experienced bitter dis-
appointment and a rude awakening when he attempted to
turn the event to his own advantage. His army was de-
feated in every battle, his authority was reduced to a
shadow, and a mutinous officer completed in his palace
the overthrow begun by his hereditary enemy. Vouti was
now eighty years of age, and ill able to stand so rude a
shock. On being deposed he exclaimed: * It was I who
raised my family, and it was I who have destroyed it. I
have no reason to complain" ; and he died a few days later,
from, it is said, a pain in his throat which his jailers refused
to alleviate with some honey. On the whole, Vouti was a
creditable ruler, although the Chinese annalists blame him
for his superstition and denounce his partiality for Buddhism.
Vouti*s prediction that his family was destroyed proved
correct. He was succeeded in turn by three members of his
family, but all of these died a violent death. A general
named Chinpasien founded a fresh dynasty known as the
Chin, but he died before he had enjoyed power many years.
At this period also disappeared the Wei state, which was
dissolved by the death of Erchu Jong, and now merged
itself into that of Chow. The growth of this new power
proved very rapid, and speedily extinguished that of the
unfortunate Chins. The Chow ruler took the name of
Kaotsou Wenti, and ruled over a great portion of China.
A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION. 51
He changed the name of his dynasty to the Soui, which,
although it did not hold possession of the throne for long,
vindicated its claim to supremacy by successful wars and
admirable public works. This prince showed himself a very
capable administrator, and his acts were marked by rare
generosity and breadth of view. His son and successor,
Yangti, although he reached the throne by the murder of
a [ brother, proved himself an intelligent ruler and a bene-
factor of his people. He transferred his capital from Nan-
kin to Honan, which he resolved to make the most magnifi-
cent city in the world. It is declared that he employed two
million men in embellishing it, and that he caused fifty
thousand merchants to take up their residence there. But
of all his works none will compare with the great system of
canals which he constructed, and in connection with which
his name will live forever in history. Although he reigned
no more than thirteen years, he completed nearly five thou-
sand miles of canals. Some of these, such as the Grand
Canal, from the Hoangho to the Yangtsekiang, are splendid
specimens of human labor, and could be made as useful to-
day as they were when first constructed. The canal named
is forty yards wide and is lined with solid stone. The banks
are bordered with elms and willows. These works were
constructed by a general corvee or levy en masse, each fam-
ily being required to provide one able-bodied man, and the
whole of the army was also employed on this public under-
taking. It is in connection with it that Yangti 's name will
be preserved, as his wars, especially one with Corea, were
not successful, and an ignominious end was put to his ex-
istence by a fanatic. His son and successor was also mur-
dered, when the Soui dynasty came to an end, and with it
the magnificent and costly palace erected at Loyang, which
was denounced as only calculated "to soften the heart of a
prince and to foment his cupidity."
There now ensues a break in the long period of disunion
which had prevailed in China, and for a time the supreme
authority of the emperor recovered the general respect and
52 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
vigor which by right belonged to it. The deposer of the
Souis was Liyuen, who some years before had been given
the title of Prince of Tang. In the year A.D. 617 he pro-
claimed himself emperor under the style of Kaotsou, and he
began his reign in an auspicious manner by proclaiming an
amnesty and by stating his "desire to found his empire only
on justice and humanity." While he devoted his attention
to the reorganization of the administration at Singan, which
he chose for his capital, his second son, Lichimin, was in-
trusted with the command of the army in the field, to which
was assigned the task of subjecting all the provinces. Lichi-
min proved himself a great commander, and his success was
both rapid and unqualified. He was equally victorious over
Chinese rebels and foreign enemies. His energy and skill
were not more conspicuous than his courage. At the head
of his chosen regiment of cuirassiers, carrying black tiger
skins, he was to be found in the front of every battle, and
victory was due as often to his personal intrepidity as to his
tactical skill. "Within a few years the task of Lichimin was
brought to a glorious completion, and on his return to Sin-
gan he was able to assure his father that the empire was
pacified in a sense that had not been true for many centu-
ries. His entry into Singan at the head of his victorious
troops reminds the reader of a Roman triumph. Surrounded
by his chosen bodyguard, and followed by forty thousand
cavalry, Lichimin, wearing a breastplate of gold and accom-
panied by the most important of his captives, rode through
the streets to make public offering of thanks for victory
achieved, at the Temple of his ancestors. His success was
enhanced by his moderation, for he granted his prisoners
their lives, and his reputation was not dimmed by any acts
of cruelty or bloodshed.
The magnitude of Lichimin 's success and his consequent
popularity aroused the envy and hostility of his elder brother,
who aspired to the throne. The intrigues against him were
so far successful that he fell into disgrace with the emperor,
and for a time withdrew from the court. But his brother
A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION. 53
was not content with anything short of taking his life, and
formed a conspiracy with his other brothers and some prom-
inent officials to murder him. The plot was discovered, and
recoiled upon its authors, who were promptly arrested and
executed. Then Lichimin was formally proclaimed heir to
the throne; but the event sinks into comparative insignifi-
cance beside the abdication of the throne by Kaotsou in the
same year. The real cause of this step was probably not
disconnected with the plot against Lichimin, but the official
statement was that Kaotsou felt the weight of years, and
that he wished to enjoy rest and the absence of responsibil-
ity during his last days. Kaotsou must be classed among
the capable rulers of China, but his fame has been over-
shadowed by and merged in the greater splendor of his son.
He survived his abdication nine years, dying in A.D. 635 at
the age of seventy-one.
On ascending the throne, Lichimin took the name of
Taitsong, and he is one of the few Chinese rulers to whom
the epithet of Great may be given without fear of its being
challenged. The noble task to which he at once set himself
was to prove that the Chinese were one people, that the in-
terests of all the provinces, as of all classes of the commu-
nity, were the same, and that the pressing need of the hour
was to revive the spirit of national unity and patriotism.
Before he became ruler in his own name he had accom-
plished something toward this end by the successful cam-
paigns he had conducted to insure the recognition of his
father's authority. But Taitsong saw that much more re-
mained to be done, and the best way to do it seemed to him
to be the prosecution of what might be called a national war
against those enemies beyond the northern frontier, who
were always troublesome, and who had occasionally founded
governments within the limits of China like the Topa family
of Wei. In order to achieve any great or lasting success in
this enterprise, Taitsong saw that it was essential that he
should possess a large and well-trained standing army, on
which he could rely for efficient service beyond the frontier
54 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
as well as in China itself. Before his time Chinese armies
had been little better than a rude militia, and. the military
knowledge of the officers could only be described as con-
temptible. The soldiers were, for the most part, peasants,
who knew nothing of discipline, and into whose hands weap-
ons were put for the first time on the eve of a war. They
were not of a martial temperament, and they went unwill-
ingly to a campaign ; and against such active opponents as
the Tartars they would only engage when superiority of
numbers promised success. They were easily seized with a
panic, and the celerity and dash of Chinese troops only be-
came perceptible when their backs were turned to the foe.
So evident had these faults become that more than one
emperor had endeavored to recruit from among the Tartar
tribes, and to oppose the national enemy with troops not less
brave or active than themselves. But the employment of
mercenaries is always only a half remedy, and not free from
the risk of aggravating the evil it is intended to cure. But
Taitsong did not attempt any such palliation ; he went to the
root of the question, and determined to have a trained and
efficient army of his own. He raised a standing army of
nine hundred thousand men, which he divided into three
equal classes of regiments, one containing one thousand two
hundred men, another one thousand, and the third eight
hundred. The total number of regiments was eight hun-
dred and ninety-five, of which six hundred and thirty-
four were recruited for home service and two hundred and
sixty-one for foreign. By this plan he obtained tha assured
services of more than a quarter of a million of trained troops
for operations beyond the frontier. Taitsong also improved
the weapons and armament of his soldiers. He lengthened
the pike and supplied a stronger bow. Many of his troops
wore armor; and he relied on the co-operation of his cav-
alry, a branch of military power which has generally been
much neglected in China. He took special pains to train a
large body of officers, and he instituted a Tribunal of War,
to which the supreme direction of military matters was In-
.1 LOXG PERIOD OF DISUNION. 55
trusted. As these measures greatly shocked the civil man-
darins, who regarded the emperor's taking part in reviews
and the physical exercises of the soldiers as "an impropri-
ety," it will be allowed that Taitsong showed great moral
courage and surmounted some peculiar difficulties in carry-
ing out his scheme for forming a regular army. He over-
came all obstacles, and gathered under his banner an army
formidable by reason of its efficiency and equipment, as well
as for its numerical strength.
Having acquired what he deemed the means to settle it,
Taitsong resolved to grapple boldly with the ever-recurring
danger from the Tartars, Under different names, but ever
with the same object, the tribes of the vast region from
Corea to Koko Nor had been a trouble to the Chinese agri-
culturist and government from time immemorial. Their sole
ambition and object in life had been to harry the lands of the
Chinese, and to bear back to their camps the spoils of cities.
The Huns had disappeared, but in their place had sprung up
the great power of the Toukiriei or Turks, who were probably
the ancestors of the Ottomans. With these turbulent neigh-
bors, and with others of different race but of the same dispo-
sition on the southern frontier, Taitsong was engaged in a
bitter and arduous struggle during the whole of his life ; and
there can be little or no doubt that he owed his success to
the care he bestowed on his army. The Great Wall of Tsin
Hwangti had been one barrier in the path of these enemies,
but, held by a weak and cowardly garrison, it had proved
inadequate for its purpose. Taitsong supplied another and
a better defense in a consistent and energetic policy, and in
the provision of a formidable and confident army.
The necessity for this military reform was clearly shown
by the experience of his first campaign with these implacable
enemies, when, in the year of his accession and before his
organization had been completed, a horde of these barbarians
broke into the empire and carried all before them, almost to
the gates of the capital. On this occasion Taitsong resorted
to diplomacy and remonstrance. He rode almost unattended
56 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
to the Tartar camp, and reproached their chiefs with their
breach of faith, reminding them that on his sending one of
his sisters to be the bride of their chief they had sworn by a
solemn oath to keep the peace. He asked: "Are these pro-
ceedings worthy, I will not say of princes, but of men pos-
sessing the least spark of honor? If they forget the benefits
they have received from me, at the least they ought to be
mindful of their oaths. I had sworn a peace with them;
they are now violating it, and by that they place the justice
of the question on my side." The Chinese chroniclers de-
clare that the Tartars were so impressed by Taitsong's
majestic air and remonstrances that they agreed to retire,
and fresh vows of friendship and peace were sworn over the
body of a white horse at a convention concluded on the Pien-
kiao bridge across the Weichoui River. The only safe de-
duction from this figurative narrative is that there was a
Tartar incursion, and that the Chinese army did not drive
back the invaders. Their retreat was probably purchased,
but it was the first and last occasion on which Taitsong
stooped to such a measure.
The peace of Pienkiao was soon broken. The tribes
again drew their forces to a head for the purpose of invad-
ing China, but before their plans were complete Taitsong
anticipated them by marching into their territory at the head
of a large army. Taken by surprise, the Tartars offered but
a feeble resistance. Several of their khans surrendered, and
at a general assembly Taitsong proclaimed his intention to
govern them as Khan of their khans, or by the title of Tien
Khan, which means Celestial Ruler. This was the first occa-
sion on which a Chinese ruler formally took over the task of
governing the nomad tribes and of treating their chiefs as
his lieutenants. Down to the present day the Chinese em-
peror continues to govern the Mongol and other nomadic
tribes under this very title, which the Russians have ren-
dered as Bogdo Khan. The success of this policy was com-
plete, for not only did it give tranquillity to the Chinese
borders, but it greatly extended Chinese authority. Kash-
A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 57
garia was then, for the first time, formed into a province
under the name of Lonugsi, and Lichitsi, one of the em-
peror's best generals, was appointed Warden of the Western
Marches. Some of the most influential of Taitsong's advisers
disapproved of this advanced policy, and attempted to thwart
it, but in vain. Carried out with the vigor and consistency
of Taitsong there cannot be two opinions about its wisdom
and efficacy.
During this reign the relations between China and two of
its neighbors, Tibet and Corea, were greatly developed, and
the increased intercourse was largely brought about by th^
instrumentality of war. The first envoys from Tibet, or, as
it was then called, Toufan or Toupo, are reported to have
reached the Chinese capital in the year 634. At that time
the people of Tibet were rude and unlettered, and their chiefs
were little better than savages. Buddhism had not taken
that firm hold on the popular mind which it at present pos-
sesses, and the power of the lamas had not arisen in what
is now the most priest-ridden country in the world. A chief,
named the Sanpou which means the brave lord had,
about the time of which we are speaking, made himself
supreme throughout the country, and it was said that he
had crossed the Himalaya and carried his victorious arms
into Central India. Curiosity, or the desire to wed a Chi-
nese princess, and thus to be placed on what may be termed
a favored footing, induced the Sanpou to send his embassy to
Singan; but although the envoys returned laden with pres-
ents, Taitsong declined to trust a princess of his family in a
strange country and among an unknown people. The Sanpou
chose to interpret this refusal as an insult to his dignity, and
he declared war with China. But success did not attend his
enterprise, for he was defeated in the only battle of the war,
and glad to purchase peace by paying five thousand ounces
of gold and acknowledging himself a Chinese vassal. The
Sanpou also agreed to accept Chinese education, and as his
reward Taitsong gave him one of his daughters as a wife.
It is stated that one of his first reforms was to abolish the
58 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
national practice of painting the face, and he also built a
walled city to proclaim his glory as the son-in-law of the
Emperor of China. During Taitsong's life there was no
further trouble on the side of Tibet.
Taitsong was not so fortunate in his relations with Corea,
where a stubborn people and an inaccessible country imposed
a bar to his ambition. Attempts had been made at earlier
periods to bring Corea under the influence of the Chinese
ruler, and to treat it as a tributary state. A certain measure
of success had occasionaly attended these attempts, but on
the whole Corea had preserved its independence. When
Taitsong in the plenitude of his power called upon the King
of Corea to pay tribute, and to return to his subordinate posi-
tion, he received a defiant reply, and the Coreans began to
encroach on Sinlo, a small state which threw itself on the
protection of China. The name of Corea at this time was
Kaoli, and the supreme direction of affairs at this period
was held by a noble named Chuen Gaisoowun, ~who had
murdered his own sovereign. Taitsong, irritated by his defi-
ance, sent a large army to the frontier, and when Gaisoowun,
alarmed by the storm he had raised, made a humble submis-
sion and sent the proper tribute, the emperor gave expression
to his displeasure and disapproval of the regicide's acts by
rejecting his gifts and announcing his resolve to prosecute
the war. It is never prudent to drive an opponent to des-
peration, and Gaisoowun, who might have been a good
neighbor if Taitsong had accepted his offer, proved a bitter
and determined antagonist. The first campaign was marked
by the expected success of the Chinese army. The Coreans
were defeated in several battles, several important towns
were captured, but Taitsong had to admit that these suc-
cesses were purchased at the heavy loss of twenty-five thou-
sand of his best troops. The second campaign resolved itself
mto the siege and defense of Anshu, an important town near
the Yaloo River. Gaisoowun raised an enormous force with
the view of effecting its relief, and he attempted to over-
whelm the Chinese by superior numbers. But the better
A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION. 59
discipline and tactics of the Chinese turned the day, and the
Corean army was driven in rout from the field. But this
signal success did not entail the surrender of Anshu, which
was gallantly defended. The scarcity of supplies and the
approach of winter compelled the Chinese emperor to raise
the siege after he had remained before the place for several
months, and it is stated that as the Chinese broke up their
camp the commandant appeared on the walls and wished
them "a pleasant journey." After this rebuff Taitsong did
not renew his attempt to annex Corea, although to the end
of his life he refused to hold any relations with Gaisoowun.
During the first portion of his reign Taitsong was greatly
helped by the labors of his wife, the Empress Changsun-
chi, who was a woman of rare goodness and ability, and
set a shining example to the whole of her court. She said
many wise things, among which the most quotable was that
"the practice of virtue conferred honor upon men, especially
on princes, and not the splendor of their appointments."
She was a patron of letters, and an Imperial Library and
College in the capital owed their origin to her. She was
probably the best and most trustworthy adviser the emperor
had, and after her death the energy and good fortune of
Taitsong seemed to decline. She no doubt contributed to
the remarkable treatise on the art of government, called
the "Golden Mirror," which bears the name of Taitsong as
its author. Taitsong was an ardent admirer of Confucius,
whom he exalted to the skies as the great sage of the world,
declaring emphatically that "Confucius was for the Chinese
what the water is for the fishes." The Chinese annalists
tell many stories of Taitsong's personal courage. He was a
great hunter, and in the pursuit of big game he necessarily
had some narrow escapes, special mention being made of his
slaying single-handed a savage boar. Another instance was
his struggle with a Tartar attendant who attempted to mur-
der him, and whom he killed in the encounter. He had a
still narrower escape at the hands of his eldest son, who
formed a plot to assassinate him which very nearly sue-
60 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
ceeded. The excessive anxiety of Prince Lichingkien to
reach the crown cost him the succession, for on the discovery
of his plot he was deposed from the position of heir-apparent
and disappeared from, the scene.
After a reign of twenty-three years, during which he
accomplished a great deal more than other rulers had done
in twice the time, Taitsong died in A.D. 649, leaving the
undisturbed possession of the throne to his son, known as
the Emperor Kaotsong. There need be no hesitation in call-
ing Taitsong one of the greatest rulers who ever sat on the
Dragon Throne, and his death was received with extraor-
dinary demonstrations of grief by the people he had ruled
so well. Several of his generals wished to commit suicide
on his bier, the representatives of the tributary nations at
his capital cut off their hair or sprinkled his grave with their
blood, and throughout the length and breadth of the land
there was mourning and lamentation for a prince who had
realized the ideal character of a Chinese emperor. Nor does
his claim to admiration and respect seem less after the lapse
of so many centuries. His figure still stands out boldly as
one of the ablest and most humane of all Chinese rulers. He
not only reunited China, but he proved that union was for
his country the only sure basis of prosperity and power.
Under Kaotsong the power of the Tangs showed for thirty
years no diminution, and he -triumphed in directions where
his father had only pointed the way to victory. He began
his reign with a somewhat risky act by marrying one of his
father's widows, who then became the Empress Wou. She
was perhaps the most remarkable woman in the whole range
of Chinese history, acquiring such an ascendency over her
husband that she practically ruled the state, and retained
this power after his death. In order to succeed in so excep-
tional a task she had to show no excessive delicacy or scrupu-
lousness, and she began by getting rid of the other wives,
including the lawful empress of Kaotsong,. in a summary
fashion. It is stated that she cast them into a vase filled
with wine, having previously cut off their hands and feet
A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION. 61
w> prevent their extricating themselves. But on the whole
her influence was exerted to promote the great schemes of
her husband.
The Tibetan question was revived by the warlike pro-
clivities of the new Sanpou, who, notwithstanding his blood
relationship with the Chinese emperor, sought to extend his
dominion at his expense toward the north and the east. A
desultory war ensued, in which the Chinese got the worst
of it, and Kaotsong admitted that Tibet remained "a thorn
in his side for years." A satisfactory termination was given
to the struggle by the early death of the Sanpou, whose
warlike character had been the main cause of the dispute.
Strangely enough the arms of Kaotsong were more triumph-
ant in the direction of Corea, where his father had failed.
From A.D. 658 to 670 China was engaged in a bitter war
on land and sea with the Coreans and their allies, the
Japanese, who thus intervened for the first time in the
affairs of the continent. Owing to the energy of the Em-
press Won victory rested with the Chinese, and the Japa-
nese navy of four hundred junks was completely destroyed.
The kingdom of Sinlo was made a Chinese province, and
for sixty years the Coreans paid tribute and caused no
trouble. In Central Asia also the Chinese power was main-
tained intact, and the extent of China's authority and repu-
tation may be inferred from the King of Persia begging the
emperor's governor in Kashgar to come to his aid against
the Arabs, who were then in the act of overrunning "Western
Asia in the name of the Prophet. Kaotsong could not send
aid to such a distance from his borders, but he granted shel-
ter to several Persian princes, and on receiving an embassy
from the Arabs, he impressed upon them the wisdom and
magnanimity of being lenient to the conquered. Kaotsong
died in 683, and the Empress "Wou retained power until the
year 704, when, at the age of eighty, she was compelled to
abdicate. Her independent rule was marked by as much
vigor and success as during tha life of Kaotsong. She van-
quished the Tibetans and a new Tartar race known as the
62 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A.
Khitans, who appeared on the northern borders of Shensi,
She placed her son in confinement and wore the robes as-
signed for an emperor. The extent of her power may be
inferred from her venturing to shock Chinese sentiment by
offering the annual imperial sacrifice to heaven, and by her
erecting temples to her ancestors. Yet it was t not until she
was broken down by age and illness that any of her foes
were bold enough to encounter her. She survived her dep-
osition one year, and her banished son Chongtsong was
restored to the throne.
Chongtsong did not reign long, being poisoned by his
wife, who did not reap the advantage of her crime. Several
emperors succeeded without doing anything to attract notice,
and then Mingti brought both his own family and the Chinese
empiiy to the verge of ruin. Like other rulers, he began
well, quoting the maxims of the "Golden Mirror" and pro-
claiming Confucius King of Literature. But defeats at the
hands of the Khitans and Tibetans imbittered his life and
diminished his authority. A soldier of fortune named Gan-
lochan revolted and met with a rapid and unexpected success
owing to "the people being unaccustomed, from the long
peace, to the use of arms." He subdued all the northern
provinces, established his capital at Loyang, and compelled
Mingti to seek safety in Szchuen, when he abdicated in favor
of his son. The misfortunes of Mingti, whose most memor-
able act was the founding of the celebrated Hanlin College
and the institution of the "Pekin Gazette," the oldest period-
ical in the world, both of which exist at the present day, fore-
told the disruption of the empire at no remote date. His son
and successor Soutsong did something to retrieve the fort-
unes of his family, and he recovered Singan from Ganlochan.
The empire was then divided between the two rivals, and
war continued unceasingly between them. The successful
defense of Taiyueu, where artillery is said to have been used
for the first time, A.D. 757, by a lieutenant of the Emperor
Soutsong, consolidated his power, which was further in-
creased by the murder of Ganlochan shortly afterward.
A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION. 63
The struggle continued with varying fortune between the
northern and southern powers during 1 the rest of the reign
of Soutsong, and also during that of his successor. Taitsong
the Second. This ruler showed himself unworthy of his
name, abandoning his capital with great pusillanimity when
a small Tibetan army advanced upon it. The census returns
threw an expressive light on the condition of the empire dur-
ing this period. Under Mingti the population was given at
fifty- two million ; in the time of the second Taitsong it had
sunk to seventeen million. A great general named Kwo
Tsey, who had driven back the Tibetan invaders, enabled
Tetsong, the son and successor of Taitsong, to make a good
start in the government of his dominion, which was sadly
reduced in extent and prosperity. This great statesman in-
duced Tetsong to issue an edict reproving the superstitions
of the times, and the prevalent fashion of drawing auguries
from dreams and accidents. The edict ran thus: "Peace
and the general contentment of the people, the abundance
of the harvest, skill and wisdom shown in the administra-
tion, these are prognostics which I hear of with pleasure;
but 'extraordinary clouds,' 'rare animals,' 'plants before
unknown,' 'monsters,' and other astonishing productions
of nature, what good can any of these do men as auguries of
the future? I forbid such things to be brought to my notice. "
The early death of Kwo Tsey deprived the youthful ruler of
his best adviser and the mainstay of his power. He was a
man of magnificent capacity and devotion to duty, and when
it was suggested to him that he should not be content with
any but the supreme place, he proudly replied that he was
"a general of the Tangs." It seems from the inscription on
the stone found at Singan that he was a patron of the Nesto-
rian Christians, and his character and career have suggested
a comparison with Belisarius.
Tetsong lived twenty-four years after the death of his
champion, and these years can only be characterized as un-
fortunate. The great governors claimed and exacted the
privilege that their dignities should be made hereditary, and
64 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
this surrender of the imperial prerogative entailed the usual
deterioration of the central power which preceded a change
of dynasty. Unpopularity was incurred by the imposition
of taxes on the principal articles of production and consump-
tion, such as tea, and, worst symptom of all, the eunuchs
again became supreme in the palace. Although the dynasty
survived for another century, it was clear that its knell
sounded before Tetsong died. Under his grandson Hient-
song the mischief that had been done became more clearly
apparent. Although he enjoyed some military succ*
his reign on the whole was unfortunate, and he was poisoned
by the chief of the eunuchs. His son and successor, Mout-
song, from his indifference may be suspected of having been
privy to the occurrence. At any rate, he only enjoyed power
for a few years before he was got rid of in the same sum-
mary fashion. Several other nonentities came to the throne,
until at last one ruler named Wentsong, whose intentions
at least were stronger than those of his predecessors, at-
tempted to grapple with the eunuchs and formed a plot for
their extermination. His courage failed him and the plot
miscarried. The eunuchs exacted a terrible revenge on their
opponents, of whom they killed nearly three thousand, and
Wentsong passed the last year of his life as a miserable pup-
pet in their hands. He was not allowed even to name his
successor. The eunuchs ignored his two sons, and placed
his brother Voutsong on the throne.
The evils of the day became specially revealed during
the reign of Ytsong, who was scarcely seated on the throne
before his troops suffered several defeats at the hands of a
rebel prince in Yunnan, who completely wrested that prov-
ince from the empire. He was as pronounced a patron of
Buddhism as some of his predecessors had been oppressors,
and he sent, at enormous expense, to India a mission to pro-
cure a bone of Buddha's body, and on its arrival he received
the relic on bended knees before his whole court. His ex-
travagance of living landed the Chinese government in fresh
difficulties, and he brought the exchequer to the verge of
A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION. 65
bankruptcy. Nor was he a humane ruler. On one occa-
sion he executed twenty doctors because they were unable
to cure a favorite daughter of his. His son Hitsong came
to the throne when he was a mere boy, and at once experi-
enced the depth of misfortune to which his family had sunk.
He was driven out of his capital by a rebel named Hwang
Chao, and if he had not found an unexpected ally in the
Turk chief Likeyong, there would then have been an end
to the Tang dynasty. This chief of the Chato immigrants
a race supposed to be the ancestors of the Mohammedan
Tungani of more recent times at the head of forty thou-
sand men of his own race, who, from the color of their uni-
form, were named "The Black Crows," marched against
Hwang Chao, and signally defeated him. The condition of
the country at this time is painted in deplorable colors. The
emperor did not possess a palace, and all the great towns of
Central China were in ruins. Likeyong took in the situa-
tion at a glance, when he said, "The ruin of the Tangs is
not far distant." Likeyong, who was created Prince of
Tsui, did his best to support the emperor, but his power was
inadequate for coping with another general named Chuwen,
prince of Leang, in whose hands the emperor became a mere
puppet. At the safe moment Chuwen murdered his sov-
ereign, and added to this crime a massacre of all the Tang
princes upon whom he could lay his hands. Chao Siuenti,
the last of the Tangs, abdicated, and a few months later
Chuwen, to make assurance doubly sure, assassinated him.
Thus disappeared, after two hundred and eighty-nine years
and after giving twenty rulers to the state, the great Tang
dynasty which had restored the unity and the fame of China.
It forms a separate chapter in the long period of disunion
from the fall of the Hans to the rise of the Sungs.
After the Tangs came five ephemeral and insignificant
dynasties, with the fate of which we need not long detain
the reader. In less than sixty years they all vanished from
the page of history. The struggle for power between Chu-
wen, the founder of the so-called Later Leang dynasty, and
66 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Likeyong was successfully continued by the latter's son,
Litsunhiu, who proved himself a good soldier. He won a
decisive victory at Houlieoupi, and extinguished the Leang
dynasty by the capture of its capital and of Chuwen's son,
who committed suicide. Litsunhiu ruled for a short time
as emperor of the Later Leangs, but he was killed during
a mutiny of his turbulent soldiers. This dynasty had a very
brief existence; the last ruler of the line, finding the game
was up, retired with his family to a tower in his palace,
which he set on fire, and perished, with his wives and chil-
dren, in the flames. Then came the Later Tsins, who only
held their authority on the sufferance of the powerful Khitan
king, who reigned over Leaoutung and Manchuria. The
fourth and fifth of these dynasties, named the Later Hans
and Chows, ran their course in less than ten years; arid
when the last of these petty rulers was deposed by his prime
minister a termination was at last reached to the long period
of internal division and weakness which prevailed for more
than seven hundred and fifty years. The student reaches
at this point firmer ground in the history of China as an
empire, and his interest in the subject must assume a more
definite form on coming to the beginning of that period of
united government and settled authority which has been
established for nearly one thousand years, during which no
more than four separate families have held possession of the
throne.
CHAPTER IV
THE SUNOS AND THE KINS
ONE fact will have been noticed during the latter por-
tion of the period that has now closed, and that is the in-
creasing interest and participation in Chinese affairs of the
races neighboring to, but still outside, the empire. A large
number of the successful generals, and several of the princely
families which attained independence, were of Tartar or Turk
THE SUNOS AND THE KINS. 67
origin ; but the founder of the new dynasty, which restored
the unity of the empire, was of pure Chinese race, although
a native of the most northern province of the country. Chow
Kwang Yn was born in Pechihli, at the small town of Yeou-
tou, on the site of which now stands the modern capital of
Pekiu. His family had provided the governor of this place
for several generations, and Chow himself had seen a good
deal of military service during the wars of the period. He
is described as a man of powerful physique and majestic
appearance, to whose courage and presence of mind the
result of more than one great battle was due, and who had
become in consequence the idol of the soldiery. The ingenu-
ity of later historians, rather than the credulity of his con-
temporaries, may have discovered the signs and portents
which indicated that he was the chosen of Heaven ; but his
army had a simple and convincing method of deciding the
destiny of the empire. Like the legionaries of Rome, they
exclaimed, "The empire is without a master, and we wish
to give it one. "Who is more worthy of it than our general?"
Thus did Chow Kwang Yn become the Emperor Taitsou and
the founder of the Sung dynasty.
Taitsou began his reign by proclaiming a general am-
nesty, and he sent the proclamation of his pardon into prov-
inces where he had not a shred of authority. The step was
a politic one, for it informed the Chinese people that they
again had an emperor. At the same time he ordered that
the gates and doors of his palace should always be left open,
so that the humblest of his subjects might have access to him
at any time. His own words were that "his house should
resemble his heart, which was open to all his subjects." He
also devoted his attention to the improvement of his army,
and particularly to the training of his officers, who were
called upon to pass an examination in professional subjects
as well as physical exercises. A French writer said, forty
years ago, that "The laws of military promotion in the states
of Europe are far from being as rational and equitable as
those introduced by this Chinese ruler. ' ' His solicitude for
68 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the welfare of his soldiers was evinced during a campaign
when the winter was exceedingly severe. He took off his
own fur coat, and sent it to the general in command, with
a letter stating that he was sorry that he had not one to
send to every soldier in the camp. A soldier himself, he
knew how to win a soldier's heart, and the affection and
devotion of his army never wavered nor declined. He had
many opportunities of testing it. His first war was with
the Prince of Han, aided by the King of Leaoutung, whom
he speedily vanquished, and whose capacity for aggression
was much curtailed by the loss of the frontier fortress of
Loochow. His next contest was with an old comrade-in-
arms named Li Chougsin, whom he had treated very well,
but who was seized with a foolish desire to be greater than
his ability or power warranted. The struggle was brief,
and Li Chougsin felt he had no alternative save to commit
suicide.
The tranquillity gained by these successes enabled Tait-
sou to institute a great reform in the civil administration of
the empire, and one which struck at the root of the evil
arising from the excessive power and irresponsibility of the
provincial governors. Up to this date the governors had
possessed the power of life and death without reference to
the capital. It had enabled them to become tyrants, and
had simplified their path to complete independence. Taitsou
resolved to deprive them of this prerogative and to retain it
in his own hands, for, he said, "As life is the dearest thing
men possess, should it be placed at the disposal of an official
who is often unjust or wicked?" This radical reform greatly
strengthened the emperor's position, and weakened that of
the provincial viceroys; and Taitsou thus inaugurated a rule
which has prevailed in China down to the present day, where
the life of no citizen can be taken without the express author-
ity and order of the emperor. Taitsou then devoted his at-
tention to the subjugation of those governors who had either
disregarded his administration or given it a grudging obedi-
ence. The first to feel the weight of his hand was the vice-
THE SUNOS AND THE KINS. 69
roy of Honan ; but his measures were so well taken, and the
military force he employed so overwhelming, that he suc-
ceeded in dispossessing him and in appointing his own lieu-
tenant without the loss of a single man. The governor of
Szchuen, believing his power to be greater than it was, or
trusting to the remoteness of his province, publicly defied
Taitsou, and prepared to invade his dominions. The em-
peror was too quick for him, and before his army was in
the field sixty thousand imperial troops had crossed the fron-
tier and had occupied the province. By these triumphs Tait-
sou acquired possession of some of the richest provinces and
forty millions of Chinese subjects.
Having composed these internal troubles with enemies
of Chinese race, Taitsou resumed his military operations
against his old opponents in Leaoutung. Both sides had
been making preparations for a renewal of the struggle,
and the fortress of Taiyuen, which had been specially
equipped to withstand a long siege, was the object of the
emperor's first attack. The place was valiantly defended
by a brave governor and a large garrison, and although
Taitsou defeated two armies sent to relieve it, he was com-
pelled to give up the hope of capturing Taiyuen on this
occasion. Some consolation for this repulse was afforded
by the capture of Canton and the districts dependent on
that city. He next proceeded against the governor of
Kiangnan, the dual province of Anhui and Kiangsu, who
had taken the title of Prince of Tang, and striven to propiti-
ate the' emperor at the same time that he retained his own
independence. The two things were, however, incompati-
ble. Taitsou refused to receive the envoys of the Prince of
Tang, and he ordered him to attend in person at the capital.
With this the Tang prince would not comply, and an army
was at once sent to invade and conquer Kiangnan. The
campaign lasted one year, by which time the Tang power
was shattered, and his territory resumed its old form as a
province of China. With this considerable success Taitsou's
career may be said to have terminated, for although he sue-
70 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
ceeded in detaching the Leaoutung ruler from the side of
the Prince of Han, and was hastening at the head of his
forces to crush his old enemy at Taiyuen, death cut short
his career in a manner closely resembling that of Edward
the First of England. Taitsou died in his camp, in the midst
of his soldiers; and, acting on the advice of his mother,
given on her death-bed a few years before, "that he should
leave the throne to a relation of mature age," he appointed
his brother his successor, and as his last exhortation to him
said, "Bear yourself as becomes a brave prince, and govern
well." Many pages might be filled with the recitation of
Taitsou's great deeds and wise sayings; but his work in
uniting China and in giving the larger part of his country
tranquillity speaks for itself. His character as a ruler may
be gathered from the following selection, taken from among
his many speeches: "Do you think," he said, "that it is so
easy for a sovereign to perform his duties? He does noth-
ing that is without consequence. This morning the thought
occurs to me that yesterday I decided a case in a wrong
manner, and this memory robs me of all my joy."
The new emperor took the style of Taitsong, and during
his reign of twenty-three years the Sung dynasty may be
fairly considered to have grown consolidated. One of his
first measures was to restore the privileges of the descendant
of Confucius, which included a hereditary title and exemp-
tion from taxation, and which are enjoyed to the present
day. After three years' deliberation Taitsong determined
to renew his brother's enterprise against Taiyuen, and as he
had not assured the neutrality of the King of Leaoutung,
his task was the more difficult. On the advance of the Chi-
nese army, that ruler sent to demand the reason of the at-
tack on his friend the Prince of Han, to which the only
reply Taitsong gave was as follows: "The country of the
Hans was one of the provinces of the empire, and the prince
having refused to obey my orders I am determined to punish
him. If your prince stands aside, and does not meddle in
this quarrel, I am willing to continue to live at peace with
THE SUNOS AXD THE KL\s. 71
him; if he does not care to do this we will fight him." On
this the Leaou king declared war, but his troops were re-
pulsed by the covering army sent forward by Taitsong,
while he prosecuted the siege of Taiyuen in person. The
fortress was well defended, but its doom was never in doubt.
Taitsong, moved by a feeling of humanity, offered the Prince
of Han generous terms before delivering an assault which
was, practically speaking, certain to succeed, and he had
the good sense to accept them. The subjugation of Han
completed the pacification of the empire and the triumph of
Taitsong ; but when that ruler thought to add to this success
the speedy overthrow of the Khitan power in Leaoutung he
was destined to a rude awakening. His action was cer-
tainly precipitate, and marked by overconfidence, for the
army of Leaoutung was composed of soldiers of a warlike
race accustomed to victory. He advanced against it as if it
were an army which would fly at the sight of his standard,
but instead of this he discovered that it was superior to his
own forces on the banks of the Kaoleang River, where he
suffered a serious defeat. Taitsong was fortunate enough
to retain his conquests over the southern Han states and to
find in his new subjects in that quarter faithful and valiant
soldiers. The success of the Leaou army was also largely
due to the tactical skill of its general, Yeliu Hiuco, who
took a prominent part in the history of this period. "When
Taitsong endeavored, some years later, to recover what he
had lost by the aid of the Coreans, who, however, neglected
to fulfill their part of the contract, he only invited fresh
misfortunes. Yeliu Hiuco defeated his army in several
pitched battles with immense loss; on one occasion it was
said that the corpses of the slain checked the course of a
river. The capture of Yangyeh, the old Han defender of
Taiyuen, who died of his wounds, completed the triumph
of the Leaou general, for it was said, "If Yangyeh cannot
resist the Tartars they must be invincible." Taitsong's
reign closed under the cloud of these reverses ; but, on the
whole, it was successful and creditable, marking an im-
72 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHl^A.
provement in the condition of the country and the people,
and the triumph of the Sungs over at least one of their
natural enemies.
His son and successor, Chintsong, must be pronounced
fortunate in that the first year of his reign witnessed the
death of Yeliu Hiuco. The direct consequence of his death
was that the Chinese were, for the first time, successful in
their campaign against the Leaous. But this satisfactory
state of things did not long continue, and the Leaous be-
came so aggressive and successful that there was almost a
panic among the Chinese, and the removal of the capital to
a place of greater security was suggested. The firm counsel
and the courageous demeanor of the minister Kaochun pre-
vented this course being adopted. He figuratively described
the evil consequences of retreat by saying, "Your majesty
can, without serious consequences, advance a foot further
than is absolutely necessary, but you cannot retire, even to
the extent of an inch, without doing yourself much harm."
Chintsong, fortunately for himself and his state, adopted
this course; and the Tartars thought it best to come to
terms, especially as the Chinese emperor was willing to pay
annually an allowance in silk and money as the reward of
their respecting his frontier. The arrangement could not
have been a bad one, as it gave the empire eighteen years
of peace. The country, no doubt, increased greatly in pros-
perity during this period; but the reputation of Chintsong
steadily declined. He seems to have been naturally super-
stitious, and he gave himself up to fortune tellers and sooth-
sayers during the last years of his reign; and when he died,
in A.D. 1022, he had impaired the position and power of the
imperial office. Yet, so far as can be judged, the people
were contented, and the population rose to over one hun-
dred million.
Chintsong was succeeded by his sixth son, Jintsong, a
boy of thirteen, for whom the government was carried on
by his mother, a woman of capacity and good sense. She
took off objectionable taxes on tea and salt prime neces-
THE SUNOS AND THE KINS. 73
saries of life in China and she instituted surer measures
against the spiritualists and magicians who had flourished
under her husband and acquired many administrative offices
under his patronage. After ruling for ten peaceful years she
died and Jintsong assumed the personal direction of affairs.
During the tranquillity that had now prevailed for more
than a generation a new power had arisen on the Chinese
frontier in the principality of Tangut or Hia. This state
occupied the modern province of Kansuh, with some of the
adjacent districts of Koko Nor and the Gobi Desert. Chao
Yuen, the prince of this territory, was an ambitious war-
rior, who had drawn round his standard a force of one
hundred and fifty thousand fighting men. "With this he
waged successful war upon the Tibetans, and began a course
of encroachments on Chinese territory which was not to be
distinguished from open hostility. Chao Yuen was not con-
tent with the appellation of prince, and "because he came of
a family several of whose members had in times past borne
the imperial dignity," he adopted the title of emperor. Hav-
ing taken this step, Chao Yuen wrote to Jintsong express-
ing "the hope that there would be a constant and solid peace
between the two empires." The reply of the Chinese ruler
to this insult, as he termed it, was to declare war and to
offer a reward for the head of Chao Yuen.
It was soon made evident that Chao Yuen possessed the
military power to support an imperial dignity. He defeated
the emperor's army in two pitched battles at Sanchuen and
Yang Moulong, and many years elapsed before the Sung
rulers can be held to have recovered from the loss of their
best armies. The Khitans of Leaoutung took advantage of
these misfortunes to encroach, and as Jintsong had no army
with which to oppose them, they captured ten cities with little
or no resistance. The Chinese government was compelled
to purchase them back by increasing the annual allowance
it paid of gold and silk. A similar policy was resorted to
in the case of Chao Yuen, who consented to a peace on
receiving every year one hundred thousand pieces of silk
4
.4 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A.
and thirty thousand pounds of tea. Xot content with this
payment, Chao Yuen subsequently exacted the right to
build fortresses along the Chinese frontier. Soon after this
Chao Yuen was murdered by one of his sons, whose be-
trothed he had taken from him. If Jintsong was not fort-
unate in his wars he did much to promote education and to
encourage literature. He restored the colleges founded by
the Tangs, he built a school or academy in every town,
he directed the public examinations to be held impartially
and frequently, and he gave special prizes as a reward for
elocution. Some of the greatest historians China has pro-
duced lived in his reign, and wrote their works under his
patronage; of these Szemakwang was the most famous.
His history of the Tangs is a masterpiece, and his "Giirden
of Szemakwang" an idyll. He was remarkable for his sound
judgment as well as the elegance of his style, and during the
short time he held the post of prime minister his administra-
tion was marked by ability and good sense. The character
of Jintsong was, it will be seen, not without its good points,
which gained for him the affection of his subjects despite his
bad fortune against the national enemies, and his reign of
thirty years was, generally speaking, prosperous and satis-
factory. After the brief reign of his nephew, Yngtsong,
that prince's son, Chintsong the Second, became emperor.
The career of Wanganchi, an eccentric and socialistic
statesman, who wished to pose as a great national reformer,
and who long possessed the ear and favor of his sovereign,
lends an interest to the reign of the second Chintsong. Wan-
ganchi did not possess the confidence or the admiration of
his brother officials, and subsequent writers have generally
termed him an impostor and a charlatan. But he may only
have been a misguided enthusiast when he declared that
"the State should take the entire management of commerce,
Industry, and agriculture into its own hands, with the vie^
of succoring the working classes, and preventing their being
ground to the dust by the rich." The advocacy of such a
scheme is calculated to earn popularity, as few of those who
THE SUNOS AND THE KINS. 75
are to benefit by it stop to examine its feasibility, and Wan-
ganchi migbt have been remembered as an enlightened
thinker and enthusiastic advocate of the rights of the
masses if he had not been called upon to carry out his
theories. But the proof of experience, like the touch of
Ithuriel's spear, revealed the practical value of his sugges-
tions, and dissolved the attractive vision raised by his per-
fervid eloquence and elevated enthusiasm. His honesty of
purpose cannot, however, be disputed. On being appointed
to the post of chief minister he took in hand the application
of his own project. He exempted the poor from all taxa-
tion. He allotted lands, and he supplied the cultivators
with seeds and implements. He also appointed local boards
to superintend the efforts of the agricultural classes, and to
give them assistance and advice. But this paternal govern-
ment, this system of making the state do what the individ-
ual ought to do for himself, did not work as it was expected.
Those who counted on the agricultural laborer working with
as much intelligence and energy for himself as he had done
under the direction of a master were doomed to disappoint-
ment. "Want of skill, the fitfulness of the small holder,
aggravated perhaps by national calamities, drought, flood,
and pestilence, being felt more severely by laborers than
by capitalists, led to a gradual shrinkage in the area of cul-
tivated land, and at last to the suffering of the classes who
were to specially benefit from the scheme of Wanganchi.
The failure of his scheme, which, to use his own words,
aimed at preventing there being any poor or over-rich per-
sons in the state, entailed his disgrace and fall from power.
But his work and his name have continued to excite interest
and speculation among his countrymen down to the present
day. His memory has been aspersed by the writers of China,
who have generally denounced him as a free-thinker and a
nihilist, and although, twenty years after his death, a tablet
bearing his name was placed in the Hall of Confucius as the
greatest Chinese thinker since Mencius, it was removed after
a brief period, and since then both the name and the works
76 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
of Wanganchi have been consigned to an oblivion from which
only the curiosity of European writers has rescued them.
Chintsong's reign was peaceful, but he seems to have
only avoided war by yielding to all the demands of the Tar-
tars, who encroached on the frontier and seized several Chi-
nese cities. His son Chetsong was only ten when he became
emperor, and the administration was carried on by his mother,
the Empress Tefei, another of the capable women of Chinese
history. Her early death left Chetsong to rule as he listed,
and his first acts of independent authority were not of happy
augury for the future. He had not been on the throne many
months before he divorced his principal wife without any
apparent justification, and when remonstrated with he merely
replied that he was imitating several of his predecessors.
The censor's retort was, "You would do better to imitate
their virtues, and not their faults." Chetsong did not have
any long opportunity of doing either, for he died of grief at
the loss of his favorite son, and it is recorded that, as "he
did not expect to die so soon," he omitted the precaution of
selecting an heir. Fortunately the mischief of a disputed
successor was avoided by the unanimous selection of his
brother Hoeitsong as the new emperor. He proved him-
self a vain and superstitious ruler, placing his main faith
in fortune tellers, and expecting his subjects to yield im-
plicit obedience to his opinions as "the master of the law
and the prince of doctrine." Among other fallacies, Hoeit-
song cherished the belief that he was a great soldier, and
he aspired to rank as the conqueror of the old successful
enemy of China, the Khitans of Leaoutung. He had no
army worthy of the name, and the southern Chinese who
formed the mass of his subjects were averse to war, yet his
personal vanity impelled him to rush into hostilities which
promised to be the more serious because a new and formi-
dable power had arisen on the northern frontier.
The Niuche or Chorcha Tartars, who had assumed a dis
tinct name and place in the vicinity of the modern Kalgan,
about the year 1000 A.D., had become subservient to the
THE SUNOS AND THE KINS. 77
great Khitan chief Apaoki, and their seven hordes had re-
mained faithful allies of his family and kingdom for many
years after his death. But some of the clan had preferred
independence to the maintenance of friendly relations with
their greatest neighbor, and they had withdrawn northward
into Manchuria. For some unknown reason the Niuche be-
came dissatisfied with their Khitan allies, and about the year
1100 A.D. they had all drawn their forces together as an in-
dependent confederacy under the leadership of a great chief
named Akouta. The Niuche could only hope to establish
their independence by offering a successful resistance to the
King of Leaoutung, who naturally resented the defection of
a tribe which had been his humble dependents. They suc-
ceeded in this task beyond all expectation, as Akouta inflicted
a succession of defeats on the hitherto invincible army of
Leaoutung. Then the Niuche conqueror resolved to pose
as one of the arbiters of the empire's destiny, and to found
a dynasty of his own. He collected his troops, and he ad-
dressed them in a speech reciting their deeds and his pre-
tensions. "The Khitans," he said, "had in the earlier days
of their success taken the name of Pintiei, meaning the iron
of Pinchow, but although that iron may be excellent, it is
liable to rust and can be eaten away. There is nothing save
gold which is unchangeable and which does not destroy it-
self. Moreover, the family of Wangyen, with which I am
connected through the chief Hanpou, had always a great
fancy for glittering colors such as that of gold, and I am
now resolved to take this name as that of my imperial fam-
ily. I therefore give it the name of Kin, which signifies
gold." This speech was made in the year 1115, and it
was the historical introduction of the Kin dynasty, which
so long rivaled the Sung, and which, although it attained
only a brief lease of power on the occasion referred to, was
remarkable as being the first appearance of the ancestors
of the present reigning Manchus.
Like other conquerors who had appeared in the same
quarter, the Kins, PS we must now call them, owed their
78 A SHOR1 HISTORY OF CHINA.
rise to their military qualifications and to their high spirit.
Their tactics, although of a simpler kind, were as superior
to those of the Leaous as the latter's were to the Chinese.
Their army consisted exclusively of cavalry, and victory
was generally obtained by its furious attacks delivered from
several sides simultaneously. The following description,
taken from Mailla's translation of the Chinese official his-
tory, gives the best account of their army and mode of
fighting:
"At first the Niuche had only cavalry. For their sole
distinction they made use of a small piece of braid on which
they marked certain signs, and they attached this to both
man and horse. Their companies were usually composed of
only fifty men each, twenty of whom, clothed in strong cui-
rasses, and armed with swords and short pikes, were placed
in the front, and behind those came the remaining thirty in
less weighty armor, and with bows and arrows or javelins
for weapons. When they encountered an enemy, two men
from each company advanced as scouts, and then arranging
their troops so as to attack from four sides, they approached
the foe at a gentle trot until within a hundred yards of his
line. Thereupon charging at full speed, they discharged
their arrows and javelins, again retiring with the same
celerity. This maneuver they repeated several times until
they threw the ranks into confusion, when they fell upon
them with sword and pike so impetuously that they gen-
erally gained the victory."
The novelty, as well as the impetuosity, of thefr attack
supplied the want of numbers and of weapons, and when
the Khitans raised what seemed an overwhelming force to
crush the new power that ventured to play the rival to theirs
in Northern China, Akouta, confident in himself and in his
people, was not dismayed, and accepted the offer of battle.
In two sanguinary battles he vanquished the Khitan armies,
and threatened with early extinction the once famous dynasty
of Leaoutung. When the Sung emperor heard of the defeats
of his old opponents, he at once rushed to the conclusion that
THE SUNOS AND THE KINS. 79
I'he appearance of this new power on the flank of Leaoutung
must redound to his advantage, and, although warned by
the King of Corea that "the Kins were worse than wolves
and tigers," he sent an embassy to Akouta proposing a joint
alliance against the Khitans. The negotiations were not at
first successful. Akouta concluded a truce with Leaoutung,
but took oftense at the style of the emperor's letter. The
peace was soon broken by either the Kins or the Khitans,
and Hoeitsong consented to address Akouta as the Great
Emperor of the Kins. Then Akouta engaged to attack
Leaoutung from the north, while the Chinese assailed it on
the south, and a war began which promised a speedy termi-
nation. But the tardiness and inefficiency of the Chinese
army prolonged the struggle, and covered the reputation of
Hoeitsong and his troops with ignominy. It was compelled
to beat a hasty and disastrous retreat, and the peasants of
Leaoutung sang ballads about its cowardice and insufficiency.
But if it fared badly with the Chinese, the armies of
Akouta continued to be victorious, and the Khitans fled not
less precipitately before him than the Chinese did before
them. Their best generals were unable to make the least
stand against the Kin forces. Their capital was occupied
by the conqueror, and the last descendant of the great
Apaoki fled westward to seek an asylum with the Prince
of Hia or Tangut. He does not appear to have received the
protection he claimed, for after a brief stay at the court of
Hia, he made his way to the desert, where, after undergoing
incredible hardships, he fell into the hands of his Kin pur-
suers. With his death soon afterward the Khitan dynasty
came to an end, after enjoying its power for two hundred
years, but some members of this race escaped across the
Gobi Desert, and founded the brief -lived dynasty of the Kara
Khitay in Turkestan. Akouta died shortly before the final
overthrow of the Leaoutung power, and his brother Oukimai
ruled in his place.
The ill-success of Hoeitsong's army in its joint campaign
against Leaoutung cost the emperor his share in the spoil.
80 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
The Kins retained the whole of the conquered territory, and
the Sung prince was the worse off, because he had a more
powerful and aggressive neighbor. The ease of their con-
quest, and the evident weakness of the Chinese, raised the
confidence of the Kins to such a high point that they de-
clared that the Sungs must surrender to them the whole of
the territory north of the Hoangho, and they prepared to
secure what they demanded by force of arms. The Chinese
would neither acquiesce in the transfer of this region to the
Kins nor take steps to defend it. They were driven out of
that portion of the empire like sheep, and they even failed
to make any stand at the passage of the Hoangho, where
the Kin general declared that "there could not be a man
left in China, for if two thousand men had defended the
passage of this river we should never have succeeded in
crossing it." Hoeitsong quitted his capital Kaifong to seek
shelter at Nankin, where he hoped to enjoy greater safety,
and shortly afterward he abdicated hi favor of his son Kint-
song. The siege of Kaifong which followed ended in a con-
vention binding the Chinese to pay the Kins an enormous
sum ten millions of small gold nuggets, twenty millions of
small silver nuggets, and ten million pieces of silk; but the
Tartar soldiers soon realized that there was no likelihood of
their ever receiving this fabulous spoil, and in then* indig-
nation they seized both Hoeitsong and Kintsong, as well as
any other members of the royal family on whom they could
lay their hands, and carried them off to Tartary, where both
the unfortunate Sung princes died as prisoners of the Kins.
Although the Kins wished to sweep the Sungs from the
throne, and their general Walipou went so far as to proclaim
the emperor of a new dynasty, whose name is forgotten,
another of the sons of Hoeitsong, Prince Kang "Wang, had
no difficulty in establishing his own power and in preserving
the Sung dynasty. He even succeeded in imparting a new
vigor to it, for on the advice of his mother, who pointed out
to him that "for nearly two hundred years the nation ap-
pears to have forgotten the art of war," he devoted all his
THE SUNOS AND THE KINS. 81
attention to the improvement of his army and the organiza-
tion of his military resources. Prince Kang Wang, on be-
coming emperor, took the name of Kaotsong, and finally
removed the southern capital to Nankin. He was also driven
by his financial necessities to largely increase the issue of
paper money, which had been introduced under the Tangs.
As both the Kins and the Mongols had recourse to the same
expedient, it is not surprising that the Sungs should also
have adopted the simplest mode of compensating for a de-
pleted treasury. Considering the unexpected difficulties with
which he had to cope, and the low ebb to which the fortunes
of China had fallen, much might be forgiven to Kaotsong,
who found a courageous counselor in the Empress Mongchi,
who is reported to have addressed him as follows : "Although
the whole of your august family has been led captive into
the countries of the north, none the less does China, which
knows your wisdom and fine qualities, preserve toward the
Sungs the same affection, fidelity, and zeal as in the past.
She hopes and expects that you will prove for her what
Kwang Vouti was for the Hans.'* If Kaotsong did not
attain the height of this success, he at least showed himself
a far more capable prince than any of his immediate pre-
decessors.
The successful employment of cavalry by the Kins nat-
urally led the Chinese to think of employing the same arm
against them, although the inhabitants of the eighteen
provinces have never been good horsemen. Kaotsong also
devoted his attention especially to the formation of a corps
of charioteers. The chariots, four-wheeled, carried twenty-
four combatants, and these vehicles drawn up in battle array
not only presented a very formidable appearance, but afforded
a very material shelter for the rest of the army. Kaotsong
seems to have been better in imagining reforms than in the
task of carrying them out. After he had originated much
good work he allowed it to languish for want of definite
support, and he quarreled with and disgraced the minister
chiefly responsible for these reforms. A short tune after this
53 A SHORT HISTORY OP CHINA.
the Kins again advanced southward, but thanks to the im-
provement effected in the Chinese army, and to the skill and
valor of Tsongtse, one of Kaotsong's lieutenants, they did
not succeed in gaining any material advantage. Their ef-
forts to capture Kaifong failed, and their general Nlyamoho,
recognizing the improvement in the Chinese army, was con-
tent to withdraw his army with such spoil as it had been
able to collect. Tsongtse followed up this good service
against the enemy by bringing to their senses several rebel-
lious officials who thought they saw a good opportunity of
shaking off the Sung authority. At this stage of the war
Tsongtse exhorted Kaotsong, who had quitted Nankin for
Yangchow, to return to Kaifong to encourage his troops
with his presence, especially as there never was such a favor-
able opportunity of delivering his august family out of the
hands of the Kins. Tsongtse is reported to have sent as
many as twenty formal petitions to his sovereign to do this,
but Kaotsong was deaf to them all, and it is said that his
obtuseness and want of nerve caused Tsongtse so much pain
that he died of chagrin.
The death of Tsongtse induced the Kins to make a more
strenuous effort to humiliate the Sungs, and a large army
under the joint command of Akouta's son, Olito, and the
general Niyamoho, advanced on the capital and captured
Yangchow. Kaotsong, who saved his life by precipitate
flight, then agreed to sign any treaty drawn up by his con-
queror. In his letter to Niyamoho he said, "Why fatigue
your troops with long and arduous marches when I will
grant you of my own will whatever you demand?" But the
Kins were inexorable, and refused to grant any terms short
of the unconditional surrender of Kaotsong, who fled to
Canton, pursued both on land and sea. The Kin conquerors
soon found that they had advanced too far, and the Chinese
rallying their forces gained some advantage during their
retreat. Some return of confidence followed this turn in the
fortune of the war, and two Chinese generals, serving in
the hard school of adversity, acquired a military knowledge
THE SUNGS AND THE KINS. 83
and skill which made them formidable to eveii the best of
the Kin commanders. The campaigns carried on between
1131 and 1134 differed from any that had preceded them in
that the Kin forces steadily retired before Oukiai and Chang-
tsiun, and victory, which had so long remained constant in
their favor, finally deserted their arms. The death of the
Kin emperor, Oukimai, who had upheld with no decline of
luster the dignity of his father Akouta, completed the dis-
comfiture of the Kins, and contributed to the revival cf Chi-
nese power under the last emperor of the Sung dynasty.
The reign of Oukimai marks the pinnacle of Kin power,
which under his cousin and successor Hola began steadily
to decline.
The possession of Honan formed the principal bone of
contention between the Kins and Sungs, but after consider-
able negotiation and some fighting, Kaotsong agreed to leave
it in the hands of the Kins, and also to pay them a large
annual subsidy in silk and money. He also agreed to hold
the remainder of his states as a gift at the hands of his north-
ern neighbor. Thus, notwithstanding the very considerable
successes gained by several of the Sung generals, Kaotsong
had to undergo the mortification of signing a humiliating
peace and retaining his authority only on sufferance. Fort-
unately for the independence of the Sungs, Hola was mur-
dered by Ticounai, a grandson of Akouta, whose ferocious
character and ill-formed projects for the subjugation of the
whole of China furnished the Emperor Kaotsong with the
opportunity of shaking off the control asserted over his ac-
tions and recovering his dignity. The extensive preparations
of the Kin government for war warned the Sungs to lose no
time in placing every man they could in the field, and when
Ticounai rushed into the war, which was all of his own mak-
ing, he found that the Sungs were quite ready to receive him
and offer a strenuous resistance to his attack. A peace of
twenty years' duration had allowed of their organizing their
forces and recovering from an unreasoning terror of the
Kins. Moreover, there was a very general feeling among
84 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the inhabitants of both the north and the south that the war
was an unjust one, and that Ticounai had embarked upon a
course of lawless aggression which his tyrannical and cruel
proceedings toward his own subjects served to inflame.
The war began in 1161 A.D., with an ominous defeat of
the Kin navy, and when Kaoteong nerved himself for the
crisis in his life and placed himself at the head of his troops,
Ticounai must have felt less sanguine of the result than liis
confident declaration that he would end the war in a single
campaign indicated. Before the two armies came into col-
lision Ticounai learned that a rebellion had broken out in his
rear, and that his cousin Oulo challenged both his legitimacy
and his authority. He believed, and perhaps wisely, that
the only way to deal with this new danger was to press on,
and by gaming a signal victory over the Sungs annihilate
all his enemies at a blow. But the victory had to be gained,
and he seems to have underestimated his opponent. He
reached the Yangtsekiang, and the Sungs retired behind it.
Ticounai had no means of crossing it, as his fleet bad been
destroyed and the Sung navy stood in his path. Such river
junks as he possessed were annihilated in another encounter
on the river. He offered sacrifices to heaven in order to
obtain a safe passage, but the powers above were deaf to his
prayers. Discontent and disorder broke out in his camp.
The army that was to have carried all before it was stopped
by a mere river, and Ticounai's reputation as a general was
ruined before he had crossed swords with the enemy. In
this dilemma his cruelty increased, and after he had sen-
tenced many of his officers and soldiers to death he was mur-
dered by those who found that they would have to share the
same fate. After this tragic ending of a bad career, the Kin
army retreated. They concluded a friendly convention with
the Sungs, and Kaotsong, deeming his work done by the
repulse of this grave peril, abdicated the throne, which had
proved to him no bed of roses, in favor of his adopted heir
Hiaotsong. Kaotsong ruled during the long period of thirty-
six years, and when we consider the troubled time through
THE SUNOS AND THE KINS. 85
which he passed, and the many vicissitudes of fortune he
underwent, he probably rejoiced at being able to spend the
last twenty-five years of his life without the responsibility of
governing the empire and free from the cares 'of sovereignty.
The new Kin ruler Oulo wished for peace, but a section
of his turbulent subjects clamored for a renewal of the ex-
peditions into China, and he was compelled to bend to the
storm. The Kin army, however, had no cause to rejoice in
its bellicoseness, for the Chinese general, Changtsiun, de-
feated it in a battle the like of which had not been seen for
ten years. After this a peace was concluded which proved
fairly durable, and the remainder of the reigns of both Oulo
and Hiaotsong were peaceful and prosperous for northern
and southern China. Both of these princes showed an aver-
sion to war and an appreciation of peace which was rare in
their day. The Kin ruler is stated to have made this noble
retort when he was solicited by a traitor from a neighboring
state to seize it: "You deceive yourself if you believe me to
be capable of approving an act of treason whatever the pre-
sumed advantage it might procure me. I love all peoples of
whatever nation they may be, and I wish to see them at
peace with one another." It is not surprising to learn that
a prince who was so thoroughly imbued with the spirit of
civilization should have caused the Chinese classics to be
translated into the Kin language. Of all the Kin rulers
he was the most intellectual and the most anxious to elevate
the standard of his people, who were far ruder than the in-
habitants of southern China.
Hiaotsong was succeeded by his son Kwangtsong, and
Oulo by his grandson Madacou, both of whom continued
the policy of their predecessors. Kwangtsong was saved
the trouble of ruling by his wife, the Empress Lichi, and
after a very short space he resigned the empty title of em-
peror, which brought him neither satisfaction nor pleasure.
Mngtsong, the son and successor of Kwangtsong, ventured
on one war with the Kins in which he was worsted. This
was the last of the Kin successes, for Madacou died scon
<J A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
afterward, just on the eve of the advent of the Mongol peril,
which threatened to sweep all before it, and which eventu-
ally buried both Kin and Sung in a common ruin. The long
competition and the bitter contest between the Kins and
Sungs had not resulted in the decisive success o* either side.
The Kins had been strong enough to found an administra-
tion in the north but not to conquer China. The Bungs very
naturally represent in Chinese history the national dynasty,
and their misfortunes rather than their successes appeal to
the sentiment of the reader. They showed themselves
greater in adversity than in prosperity, and when the Mongol
tempest broke over China they proved the more doughty
opponent, and the possessor of greater powers of resistance
than their uniformly successful adversary the Kin or Golden
Dynasty.
CHAPTER V
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA
WHILE the Kins were absorbed in their contest with the
Southern Chinese, they were oblivious of the growth of a
new and formidable power on their own borders. The
strength of the Mongols had acquired serious dimensions
before the Kins realized that they would have to fight, not
only for supremacy, but for their very existence. Before
describing the long wars that resulted in the subjection of
China by this northern race, we must consider the origin
and the growth of the power of the Mongols, who were
certainly the most remarkable race of conquerors Asia, or
perhaps the whole world, ever produced.
The home of the Mongols, whose name signifies "brave
men," was in the strip of territory between the Onon and
Kerulon rivers, which are both tributaries or upper courses
of the Amour. They first appeared as a separate clan or
tribe in the ninth century, when they attracted special at-
tention for their physical strength and courage during one
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 87
of China's many wars with the children of the desert, and
it was on that occasion they gained the appellation under
which they became famous. The earlier history of the
Mongol tribe is obscure, and baffles investigation, but there
seems no reason to doubt their affinity to the Hiongnou,
with whose royal house Genghis himself claimed blood rela-
tionship. If this claim be admitted, Genghis and Attila,
who were the two specially typical Scourges of God, must
be considered members of the same race, and the probability
is certainly strengthened by the close resemblance in their
methods of carrying on war. Budantsar is the first chief
of the House of Genghis whose person and achievements are
more than mythical. He selected as the abode of his race the
territory between the Onon and the Kerulon, a region fertile
in itself, and well protected by those rivers against attack. It
was also so well placed as to be beyond the extreme limit
of any triumphant progress of the armies of the Chinese em-
peror. If Budantsar had accomplished nothing more than
this, he would still have done much to justify his memory
being preserved among a free and independent people. But
he seems to have incited his followers to pursue an active
and temperate life, to remain warriors rather than to be-
come rich and lazy citizens. He wrapped up this counsel
in the exhortation, "What is the use of embarrassing our-
selves with wealth? Is not the fate of man decreed by
heaven?" He sowed the seed of future Mongol greatness,
and the headship of his clan remained vested in his family.
In due order of succession the chiefship passed to Kabul
Khan, who in the year 1135 began to encroach on the do-
minion of Hola, the Kin emperor. He seems to have been
induced to commit this act of hostility by a prophecy, to the
effect that his children should be emperors, and also by dis-
courteous treatment received on the occasion of his visit to
the court of Oukimai. Whatever the cause of umbrage,
Kabul Khan made the Kins pay dearly for their arrogance
or short-sighted policy. Hola sent an army under one of his
best generals, Hushahu, to bring the Mongol chief to reason,
88 A SHOR1 HISTORY OF CHL\A.
but the inaccessibility of his home stood him iu good stead.
The Kin army suffered greatly in its futile attempt to cross
the desert, and during its retreat it was harassed by the
pursuing Mongols. When the Kin army endeavored to
make a stand against its pursuers, it suffered a crushing
overthrow in a battle at Hailing, and on the Kins sending
a larger force against the Mongols in 1139, it had no better
fortune. Kabul Khan, after this second success, caused
himself to be proclaimed Great Emperor of the Mongols.
His success in war, and his ambition, which rested satisfied
with no secondary position, indicated the path on which the
Mongols proceeded to the acquisition of supreme power and
a paramount military influence whithersoever they carried
their name and standards. The work begun by Kabul was
well continued by his son Kutula, or Kublai. He, too, was
a great warrior, whose deeds of prowess aroused as much
enthusiasm among the Mongols as those of Cceur de Lion
evoked in the days of the Plantagenets. The struggle with
the Kins was rendered more bitter by the execution of sev-
eral Mongols of importance, who happened to fall into the
hands of the Kins. "When Kutula died the chiefship passed
to his nephew, Yissugei, who greatly extended the influence
and power of his family among the tribes neighboring to
the Mongol home. Many of these, and even some Chinese,
joined the military organization of the dominant tribe, so
that what was originally a small force of strictly limited
numbers became a vast and ever-increasing confederacy of
the most warlike and aggressive races of the Chinese north-
ern frontier. Important as Yissugei's work in the develop-
ment of Mongol power undoubtedly was, his chief historical
interest is derived from the fact that he was the father of
Genghis Khan.
There are several interesting fables in connection with
the birth of Genghis, which event may be safely assigned
to the year Ilfi2. One of these reads as follows: "One
day Yissugei was hunting in company with his brothers,
and was following the tracks of a white hare in the snow.
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 89
They struck upon the track of a wagon, and following it up
came to a spot where a woman's yarirwas pitched. Then
said Yissugei, 'This woman will bear a valiant son.' He
discovered that she was the damsel Ogelen Eke (i.e., the
mother of nations), and that she was the wife of Yeke
Yilatu, chief of a Tartar tribe. Yissugei carried her off
and made her his wife." Immediately after his overthrow
of Temujin, chief of one of the principal Tartar tribes, Yis-
sugei learned that the promised "valiant son" was about to
be born, and in honor of his victory he gave him the name
of Temujin, which was the proper name of the great Gen-
ghis. The village or encampment in which the future con-
queror first saw the light of day still bears the old Mongol
name, Dilun Boldak, on the banks of the Onon. When
Yissugei died, Temujin, or Genghis, was only thirteen, and
his clan of forty thousand families refused to recognize him
as their leader. At a meeting of the tribe Genghis en-
treated them with tears in his eyes to stand by the son of
their former chief, but the majority of them mocked at
him, exclaiming, "The deepest wells are sometimes dry,
and the hardest stone is sometimes broken, why should we
cling to thee?" Genghis owed to the heroic attitude of his
mother, who flung abroad the cow-tailed banner of his race,
the acceptance of his authority by about half the warriors
who had obeyed his father. The great advantage of this
step was that it gave Genghis time to grow up to be a
warrior as famous as any of his predecessors, and it cer-
tainly averted what might have easily become the irretriev-
able disintegration of the Mongol alliance.
The youth of Genghis was passed in one ceaseless strug-
gle to regain the whole of his birthright. His most formi-
dable enemy was Chamuka, chief of the Juriats, and for a
long time he had all the worst of the struggle, being taken
prisoner on one occasion, and undergoing the indignity of
the cangue. On making his escape he rallied his remaining
followers round him for a final effort, and on the advice of
his mother, Ogelen Eke, who was his principal adviser and
90 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
stauchest supporter, he divided his forces into thirteen regi
ments of one thousand men each, and confined his attention
to the defense of his own territory. Chamuka, led away by
what he deemed the weakness of his adversary, attacked
him on the Onon with as he considered the overwhelming
force of thirty thousand men; but the result dispelled his
hopes of conquest, for Genghis gained a decisive victory.
Then was furnished a striking instance of the truth of the
saying that "nothing succeeds like success." The despised
Temujin, who was thought to be unworthy of the post of
ruling the Mongols, was lauded to the skies, and the tribes
declared with one voice, "Temujin alone is generous and
worthy of ruling a great people." At this time also he began
to show the qualities of a statesman and diplomatist. He
formed in 1194 a temporary alliance with the Kin em-
peror, Madacou, and the richness of his reward seems to
have excited his cupidity, while his experience of the Kin
army went to prove that they were not so formidable as
had been imagined. The discomfiture of Chamuka has
been referred to, but he had not abandoned the hope of
success, and when he succeeded in detaching the Kerait
chief, Wang Khan, from the Mongols, to whom he was
bound by ties of gratitude, he fancied that he again held
victory in his grasp. But the intrigue did not realize his
expectations. Wang Khan deserted Genghis while engaged
in a joint campaign against the Naimans, but he was the
principal sufferer by his treachery, for the enemy pursued
his force, and inflicted a heavy defeat upon it. In fact, he
was only rescued from destruction by the timely aid of the
man he had betrayed.
But far from inspiring gratitude, this incident inflamed
the resentment of Wang Khan, who, throwing off the cloak
of simulated friendship, declared publicly that either the
Kerait or the Mongol must be supreme on the great steppe,
as there was not room for both. Such was the superiority
in numbers of the Kerait, that in the first battle of this long
and keenly-contested struggle, Wang Khan defeated Temu-
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 81
jin near Ourga, where the mounds that cover the slain are
still shown to the curious or skeptical visitor. After this
serious, and in some degree unexpected reverse, the fort-
unes of Genghis sank to the lowest ebb. He was reduced
to terrible straits, and had to move his camp rapidly from
one spot to another. A small section of his followers, mind-
ful of his past success and prowess, still clung to him, and
by a sudden and daring coup he changed the whole aspect
of the contest. He surprised Wang Khan in his camp at
night, and overwhelmed him and his forces. Wang Khan
escaped to his old foes, the Naimans, who, disregarding the
laws of hospitality, put him to death. The death of Wang
Khan signified nothing less than the wholesale defection of
the Kerait tribe, which joined Genghis to the last man.
Then Genghis turned westward to settle the question of
supremacy with the Naimans, who were both hostile and
defiant. The Naiman chief shared the opinion of Wang
Khan, that there could not be two masters on the Tian
Shan, and with that vigorous illustration which has never
been wanting to these illiterate tribes, he wrote, "There
cannot be two suns in the sky, two swords in one sheath,
two eyes in one eyepit, or two kings in one empire." Both
sides made strenuous efforts for the fray, and brought every
fighting man they could into the field. The decisive battle
of the war was fought in the heart of Jungaria, and the
star of Genghis rose in the ascendant. The Naimans fought
long and well, but they were borne down by the heavier
armed Mongols, and their desperate resistance only added
to their loss. Their chief died of his wounds, and the tri-
umph of Genghis was rendered complete by the capture of
his old enemy, Chamuka. As Genghis had sworn the oath
of friendship with Chamuka, he would not slay him, but he
handed him over to a relative, who promptly exacted the
rough revenge his past hostility and treachery seemed to
call for. On his way back from this campaign the Mongol
chief attacked the Prince of Hia, who reigned over Kansuh
and Tangut, and thus began the third war he waged for the
92 A SHORT HISTOm OF CHINA.
sxtension of his power. Before this assumed serious propor-
tions he summoned a Grand Council or Kuriltai, at his camp
on the Onon, and then erected outside his tent the roj'al
Mongol banner of the nine white yak-tails. It was on this
occasion that Temujin took, and was proclaimed among the
Mongol chiefs by, the highly exalted name of Genghis Khan,
which means Very Mighty Khan. The Chinese character
for the name signifies "Perfect Warrior," and the earlier
European writers affirm that it is supposed to represent the
sound of "the bird of heaven." At this assemblage, which
was the first of a long succession of Mongol councils sum-
moned at the same place on critical occasions, it was pro-
posed and agreed that the war should be carried on with the
richer and less warlike races of the south. Among soldiers
it is necessary to preserve the spirit of pre-eminence and
warlike zeal by granting rewards and decorations. Gen-
ghis realized the importance of this matter and instituted
the order of Baturu or Bahadur, meaning warrior. He
also made his two leading generals Mufc Ja and Porshu
princes, one to sit on his right hand and the other on his
left. He addressed them before the council in the follow-
ing words: "It is to you that I owe my empire. You are
and have been to me as the shafts of a carriage or the
arms to a man's body." Seals of office were also granted
to all the officials, so that their authority might be the
more evident and the more honored.
In 1207 Genghis began his war with the state of Hia,
which he had determined to crush as the preliminary to
an invasion of China. In that year he contented himself
with the capture of Wuhlahai, one of the border fortresses
of that principality, and in the following year he established
his control over the tribes of the desert more fully, thus
gaining many Kirghiz and Naiman auxiliaries. In 12GU he
resumed the war with Hia in a determined spirit, and placed
himself in person at the head of all his forces. Although
the Hia ruler prepared as well as he could for the struggle,
he was really unnerved by the magnitude of the danger he
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 93
had to face. His army was overthrown, his best generals
were taken prisoners, and he himself had no resource left
but to throw himself on the consideration of Genghis. For
good reasons the Mongol conqueror was lenient. He mar-
ried one of the daughters of the king, and he took him into
subsidiary alliance with himself. Thus did Genghis absorb
the Hia power, which was very considerable, and prepared to
enroll it with all his own resources against the Kin empire.
If the causes of Mongol success on this occasion and after-
ward are inquired for, I cannot do better than repeat what
I previously wrote on this subject: "The Mongols owed
their military success to their admirable discipline and to
then* close study of the art of war. Their military su-
premacy arose from their superiority in all essentials as a
fighting power to their neighbors. Much of their knowledge
was borrowed from China, where the art of disciplining a
large army and maneuvering it in the field had been brought
to a high state of perfection many centuries before the time
of Genghis. But the Mongols carried the teaching of the
past to a further point than any of the former or contem-
porary Chinese commanders, indeed, than any in the whole
world, had done; and the revolution which they effected in
tactics was not less remarkable in itself, and did not leave
a smaller impression upon the age, than the improvements
made in military science by Frederick the Great and Napo-
leon in their day. The Mongol played in a large way in
Asia the part which the Normans on a smaller scale played
in Europe. Although the landmarks of their triumph have
now almost wholly vanished, they were for two centuries
the dominant caste in most of the states of Asia."
Having thus prepared the way for the larger enterprise,
it only remained to find a plausible pretext for attacking the
Kins. With or without a pretext Genghis would no doubt
have made war, but even the ruthless Mongol sometimes
showed a regard for appearances. Many years before the
Kins had sent as envoy to the Mongul encampment Chong-
hei, a member of their ruling house, and his mission had
94 A
been not only unsuccessful, but had led to a personal an-
tipathy between the two men. In the course of time Chong-
hei succeeded Madacou as emperor of the Kins, and when a
Kin messenger brought intelligence of this event to Genghis,
the Mongol ruler turned toward the south, spat upon the
ground, and said, "I thought that your sovereigns were of
the race of the gods, but do you suppose that I am going
to do homage to such an imbecile as that?" The affront
rankled in the mind of Chonghei, and while Genghis was
engaged with Hia, he sent troops to attack the Mongol out-
posts. Chonghei thus placed himself in the wrong, and gave
Genghis justification for declaring that the Kins and not he
began the war. The reputation of the Golden dynasty, al-
though not as great as it once was, still stood sufficiently
high to make the most adventurous of desert chiefs wary in
attacking it. Genghis had already secured the co-operation
of the ruler of Hia in his enterprise, and he next concluded
an alliance with Yeliu Liuko, chief of the Khitans, who were
again manifesting discontent with the Kins. Genghis finally
circulated a proclamation among all the desert tribes, calling
upon them to join him in his attack on the common enemy.
This appeal was heartily and generally responded to, and it
was at the head of an enormous force that Genghis set out
hi March, 1211, to effect the conquest of China. The Mon-
gol army was led by Genghis in person, and under him his
four sons and his most famous general, Chepo Noyan, held
commands.
The plan of campaign of the Mongol ruler was as simple
as it was bold. From his camp at Karakoram, on the Keru-
lon, he marched in a straight line through Kuku Khoten and
the Ongut country to Taitong, securing an unopposed pas-
sage through the Great Wall by the defection of tho Ongut
tribe. The Kins were unprepared for this sudden and vigor-
ous assault directed on their weakest spot, and successfully
executed before their army could reach the scene. During
the two years that the forces of Genghis kept the field on
this occasion, they devastated the greater portion of the three
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 95
northern provinces of Shensi, Shansi, and Pechihli. But the
border fortress of Taitong and the Kin capital, Tungking,
successfully resisted all the assaults of the Mongols, and
when Genghis received a serious wound at the former place,
he reluctantly ordered the retreat of his army, laden with an
immense quantity of spoil, but still little advanced in its main
task of conquering China. The success of the Khitan Yeliu
Liuko had not been less considerable, and he was proclaimed
King of Leaou as a vassal of the Mongols. The planting of
this ally on the very threshold of Chinese power facilitated
the subsequent enterprises of the Mongols against the Kins,
and represented the most important result of this war.
In 1213 Genghis again invaded the Kin dominions, but
his success was not very striking, and in several engage-
ments of no very great importance the Kin arms met with
some success. The most important events of the year were,
however, the deposition and murder of Chonghei, the mur-
der of a Kin general, Hushahu, who had won a battle against
the Mongols, and the proclamation of Utubu as emperor.
The change of sovereign brought no change of fortune to
the unlucky Kins. Utubu was only able to find safety be-
hind the walls of his capital, and he was delighted when
Genghis wrote him the following letter: "Seeing your
wretched condition and my exalted fortune, what may
3'our opinion be now of the will of heaven with regard
to myself? At this moment I am desirous to return to
Tartary, but could you allow my soldiers to take their
departure without appeasing their anger with presents?"
In reply Utubu sent Genghis a princess of his family as
a wife, and also "five hundred youths, the same number of
girls, three thousand horses, and a vast quantity of precious
articles. ' ' Then Genghis retired once more to Karakoram,
out on his march he stained his reputation by massacring
all his prisoners the first gross act of inhumanity he com-
mitted during his Chinese wars.
When Utubu saw the Mongols retreating, he thought to
provide against the most serious consequences of their return
96 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
by removing his capital to a greater distance from the fron
tier, and with this object he transferred his residence to Kai-
fong. The majority of his advisers were against this change,
as a retirement could not but shake public confidence. It
had another consequence, which they may not have contem-
plated, and that was its providing Genghis with an excuse
for renewing his attack on China. The Mongol at once
complained that the action of the Kin emperor implied an
unwarrantable suspicion of his intentions, and he sent his
army across the frontier to recommence his humiliation. On
this occasion a Kin general deserted to them, and thencefor-
ward large bodies of the Chinese of the north attached them-
selves to the Mongols, who were steadily acquiring a unique
reputation for power as well as military prowess. The great
event of this war was the siege of Yenking on the site of
which now stands the capital Pekin the defense of which
had been intrusted to the Prince Imperial; but Utubu, more
anxious for his son's safety than the interests of the state,
ordered him to return to Kaifong. The governor of Yen-
king offered a stout resistance to the Mongols, and when he
found that he could not hold out, he retired to the temple
of the city and poisoned himself. His last act was to write
a letter to Utubu begging him to listen no more to the per-
nicious advice of the man who had induced him to murder
Hushahu.
The capture of Yenking, where Genghis obtained a large
supply of war materials, as well as vast booty, opened the
road to Central China. The Mongols advanced as far as
the celebrated Tunkwan Pass, which connects Shensi and
Honan, but when their general, Samuka, saw how formi-
dable it was, and how strong were the Kin defenses and
garrison, he declined to attack it, and, making a detour
through very difficult country, he marched on Kaifong,
where Utubu little expected him. The Mongols had to
make their own road, and they crossed several ravines by
improvised "bridges made of spears and the branches of trees
bound together by strong chains." But the Mongol force
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 97
was too small to accomplish any great result, and the im-
petuosity of Samuka nearly led to his destruction. A
prompt retreat, and the fact that the Hoangho was frozen
over, enabled him to extricate his army, after much fatigue
and reduced in numbers, from its awkward position. The
retreat of the Mongols inspired Utubu with sufficient confi-
dence to induce him to attack Yeliu Liuko in Leaoutung,
and the success of this enterprise imparted a gleam of sun-
shine and credit to the expiring cause of the Kins. Yeliu
Liuko was driven from his newly-created kingdom, but
Genghis hastened to the assistance of his ally by sending
Muhula, the greatest of all his generals, at the head of a
large army to recover Leaoutung. His success was rapid
and remarkable. The Kins were speedily overthrown, Yeliu
Liuko was restored to his authority, and the neighboring
King of Corea, impressed by the magnitude of the Mongol
success, hastened to acknowledge himself the vassal of
Genghis. The most important result of this campaign
was that Genghis intrusted to Muhula the control of all
military arrangements for the conquest of China. He is
reported to have said to his lieutenant: "North of the
Taihing Mountains I am supreme, but all the regions to the
south I commend to the care of Muhula," and he "also pre-
sented him with a chariot and a banner with nine scalops.
As he handed him this last emblem of authority, he spoke
to his generals, saying, 'Let this banner be an emblem of
sovereignty, and let the orders issued from under it be
obeyed as my own. ' ' The principal reason for intrusting
the conquest of China to a special force and commander
was that GengLds wished to devote the whole of his personal
attention to the prosecution of his new war with the King
of Khwaresm and the other great rulers of Western Asia.
Muhula more than justified the selection and confidence
of his sovereign. In the year 1218-19 he invaded Honan,
defeated the best of the Kin commanders, and not merely
overran, but retained possession of the places he occupied
in the Kin dominions. The difficulties of Utubu were ag-
5
98 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
gravated by an attack from Ningtsong, the Sung emperor,
who refused any longer to pay tribute to the Kins, as they
were evidently unable to enforce the claim, and the Kin
armies were as equally unfortunate against their southern
opponents as their northern. Then Utubu endeavored to
negotiate terms with Muhula for the retreat of his army, but
the only conditions the Mongol general would accept were the
surrender of the Kin ruler and his resignation of the impe-
rial title in exchange for the principality of Honan. Utubu,
low as he had sunk, declined to abase himself further and to
purchase life at the loss of his dignity. The sudden death
of Muhula gained a brief respite for the distressed Chinese
potentate, but the advantage was not of any permanent sig-
nificance ; first of all because the Kins were too exhausted by
their long struggle, and, secondly, because Genghis hastened
to place himself at the head of his army. The news of the
death of Muhula reached him when he was encamped on
the frontier of India and preparing to add the conquest of
that country to his many other triumphs in Central and
Western Asia. He at once came to the conclusion that he
must return to set his house in order at home, and to pre-
vent all the results of Muhula's remarkable triumphs being
lost. What was a disadvantage for China proved a benefit
for India, and possibly for Europe, as there is no saying
how much further the Mongol encroachment might have
extended westward, if the direction of Genghis had not
been withdrawn. While Genghis was hastening from the
Cabul River to the Kerulon, across the Hindoo Koosh and
Tian Shan ranges, Utubu died and Ninkiassu reigned in
his stead.
One of the first consequences of the death of Muhula
was that the young king of- Hia, believing that the fort-
unes of the Mongols would then wane, and that he might
obtain a position of greater power and independence, threw
off his allegiance, and adopted hostile measures against
them. The prompt return of Genghis nipped this plan in
the bud, but it was made quite evident that the conquest
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 99
of Hia was essential to the success of any permanent an-
nexation of Chinese territory, and as its prince could dis-
pose of an army which he boasted numbered half a million
of men, it is not surprising to find that he took a whole year
in perfecting his arrangements for so grave a contest. The
war began in 1225 and continued for two years. The suc-
cess of the Mongol army was decisive and unqualified. The
Hias were defeated in several battles, and in one of them
fought upon the frozen waters of the Hoangho. Genghis
broke the ice by means of his engines, and the Hia army was
almost annihilated. The king Leseen was deposed, and Hia
became a Mongol province.
It was immediately after this successful war that Genghis
was seized with his fatal illness. Signs had been seen in
the heavens which the Mongol astrologers said indicated the
near approach of his death. The five planets had appeared
together in the southwest, and so much impressed was Gen-
ghis by this phenomenon that on his death-bed he expressed
"the earnest desire that henceforth the lives of our enemies
shall not be unnecessarily sacrificed.'* The expression of
this wish undoubtedly tended to mitigate the terrors of war
as carried on by the Mongols. The immediate successors
of Genghis conducted their campaigns after a more humane
fashion, and it was not until Timour revived the early Mon-
gol massacres that their opponents felt there was no chance
in appealing to the humanity of the Mongols. Various ac-
counts have been published of the cause of his death ; some
authorities ascribing it to violence, either by an arrow, light-
ning, or drowning, and others to natural causes. The event
seems to have unquestionably happened in his camp on the
borders of Shansi, August 27, 1227, when he was about
sixty-five years of age, during more than fifty of which he
had enjoyed supreme command of his own tribe.
The area of the undertakings conducted under his eye
was more vast and included a greater number of countries
than was the case with any other conqueror. Not a country
from the Euxine to the China Sea escaped the tramp of the
100 A SHORT HISTORY OF CH1XA.
Mongol horsemen, and if we include the achievements of
his immediate successors, the conquest of Russia, Poland,
and Hungary, the plundering of Bulgaria, Roumania, and
Bosnia, the final subjection of China and its southern tribu-
taries must be added to complete the tale of Mongol triumph.
The sphere of Mongol influence extended beyond this large
portion of the earth's surface, just as the consequence of an
explosion cannot be restricted to the immediate scene of the
disaster. If we may include the remarkable achievements
of his descendant Baber, and of that prince's grandson Ak-
bar, in India three centuries later, not a country in Asia
enjoyed immunity from the effect of their successes. Per-
haps the most important result of their great outpouring
into "Western Asia which certainly was the arrest of the
Mohammedan career in Central Asia, and the diversion of
the current of the fanatical propagators of the Prophet's
creed against Europe is not yet as fully recognized as it
should be. The doubt has been already expressed whether
the Mongols would ever have risen to higher rank than that
of a nomad tribe but for the appearance of Genghis. Leav-
ing that supposition in the category of other interesting but
problematical conjectures, it may be asserted that Genghis
represented in their highest forms all the qualities which
entitled his race to exercise governing authority. He was,
moreover, a military genius of the very first order, and it
may be questioned whether either Caesar or Napoleon can
as commanders be placed on a par with him. Even the
Chinese said that he led his armies like a god. The man-
ner in which he moved large bodies of men over vast dis-
tances without an apparent effort, the judgment he showed
in the conduct of several wars in countries far apart from
each other, his strategy in unknown regions, always on the
alert, yet never allowing hesitation or overcaution to inter-
fere with his enterprise, tne sieges which he brought to a
successful termination, his brilliant victories, a succession
of "suns of Austerlitz," all combined make up the picture
of a career to which Europe can offer nothing that will sur-
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 101
pass, if indeed she has anj'tliing to bear comparison with it.
After the lapse of centuries, and in spite of the indifference
with which the great figures of Asiatic history have been
treated, the name of Genghis preserves its magic spell. It
is still a name to conjure with when recording the great
revolutions of a period which beheld the death of the old
system in China, and the advent in that country of a newer
and more vigorous government which, slowly acquiring
shape in the hands of Kublai and a more national form
under the Mings, has attained the pinnacle of its utility
and strength under the influence of the great emperors of
the Manchu dynasty. But great as is the reputation Gen-
ghis has acquired it is probably short of his merits. He is
remembered as a relentless and irresistible conqueror, a hu-
man scourge ; but he was much more. He was one of the
greatest instruments of destiny, one of the most remarkable
molders of the fate of nations to be met with in the history
of the world. His name still overshadows Asia with its
fame, and the tribute of our admiration cannot be denied.
The death of Genghis did not seriously retard the progress
of the war against the Kins. He expressed the wish that
war should be carried on in a more humane and less vindic-
tive manner, but he did not advocate there being no war or
the abandonment of any of his enterprises. His son and
successor Ogotai was indeed specially charged to bring the
conquest of China to a speedy and victorious conclusion.
The weakness of the Mongol confederacy was the delay con-
nected with the proclamation of a new Khan and the neces-
sity of summoning to a Grand Council all the princes and
generals of the race, although it entailed the suspension
and often the abandonment of great enterprises. The death
of Genghis saved India but not China. Almost his last
instructions were to draw up the plan for attacking and
turning the great fortress of Tunkwan, which had provided
such an efficient defense for Honan on the north, and in
1230, Ogotai, who had already partitioned the territory taken
from the Kins into ten departments, took the field in person,
102 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A.
giving a joint command to his brother Tuli, under whom
served the experienced generals Yeliu Chutsia, Antchar,
and Subutai. At first the Mongols met with no great suc-
cess, and the Kins, encouraged by a momentary gleam of
victory, ventured to reject the terms offered by Ogotai and
to insult his envoy. The only important fighting during
the years 1230-31 occurred round Fongsian, which after a
long siege surrendered to Antchar, and when the campaign
closed the Kins presented a bold front to the Mongols and
still hoped to retain their power and dominions.
In 1232 the Mongols increased their armies in the field,
and attacked the Kins from two sides. Ogotai led the main
force against Honan, while Tuli, marching through Shensi
into Szchuen, assailed them on their western flank. The
difficulties encountered by Tuli on this march, when he had
to make his own roads, were such that he entered the Tvin
territories with a much reduced and exhausted army. The
Kin forces gained some advantage over it, but by either a
feigned or a forced retreat, Tuli succeeded in baffling their
pursuit, and in effecting a junction with his brother Ogotai,
who had met with better fortune. Tuli destroyed every-
thing along his line of march, and his massacres and sacks
revived the worst traditions of Mongol ferocity. In these
straits the Kins endeavored to flood the country round their
capital, to which the Mongols had now advanced, but the
Mongols fell upon the workmen while engaged in the task,
and slew ten thousand of them. "When the main Kin army
accepted battle before the town of Yuchow, it was signally
defeated, with the loss of three of its principal generals, and
Xinkiassu fled from Kaifong to a place more removed from
the scene of war. The garrison and townspeople of Kaifong
an immense city with walls thirty-six miles in circumfer-
ence, and a population during the siege, it is said, of one
million four hundred thousand families, or nearly seven mil-
lion people offered a stubborn resistance to the Mongols,
who intrusted the conduct of the attack to Subutai, the most
daring of all their commanders. The Mongols employed
THE MONGOL COXQUEST OF CHINA. 103
their most formidable engines, catapults hurling immense
stones, and mortars ejecting explosives and combustibles,
but twelve months elapsed before the walls were shattered
and the courage and provisions of the defenders exhausted.
Then Kaifong surrendered at discretion, and Subutai wished
to massacre the whole of the population. But fortunately
for the Chinese, Yeliu Chutsai was a more humane and a
more influential general, and under his advice Ogotai re-
jected the cruel proposal.
At this moment, when it seemed impossible for fate to
have any worse experience in store for the unfortunate Kins,
their old enemies, the Sungs, wishing to give them the coup
de grdce, declared war upon them, and placed a large army
in the field under their best general, Mongkong, of whom
more will be heard. The relics of the Kin army, under their
sovereign Ninkiassu, took shelter in Tsaichau, where they
were closely besieged by the Mongols on one side and the
Sungs on the other. Driven thus into a corner, the Kins
fought with the courage of despair and long held out against
the combined efforts of their enemies. At last Ninkiassu
saw that the struggle could not be prolonged, and he pre-
pared himself to end his life and career in a manner worthy
of the race from which he sprang. "When the enemy broke
into the city, and he heard the stormers at the gate of his
palace, he retired to an upper chamber and set fire to the
building. Many of his generals, and even of his soldiers,
followed his example, preferring to end their existence rather
than to add to the triumph of their Mongol and Sung oppo-
nents. Thus came to an end in 1234 the famous dynasty of
the Kins, who under nine emperors had ruled Northern China
for one hundred and eighteen years, and whose power and
military capacity may best be gauged by the fact that with-
out a single ally they held out against the all-powerful Mon-
gols for more than a quarter of a century. Ninkiassu, the
last of their rulers, was not able to sustain the burden of
their authority, but he at least showed himself equal to end-
ing it in a worthy and appropriately dramatic manner.
104 ^1 SHORT HISTORY OF CH2XA.
The folly of the Sungs had completed the discomfiture of
the Kins, and had brought to their own borders the terrible
peril which had beset every other state in Asia, and which
had in almost every case entailed destruction. How could
the Sungs expect to avoid the same fate, or to propitiate the
most implacable and insatiable of conquering races? They
had done this to a large extent with their eyes open. More
than once in the early stages of the struggle the Kin rulers
had sent envoys to beg their alliance, and to warn them that
if they did not help in keeping out the Mongols, their time
would come to be assailed and to share in the common ruin.
But Mngtsong did not pay heed to the warning, and scarcely
concealed his gratification at the misfortunes of his old op-
ponents. The nearer the Mongols came, and the worse the
plight to which the Kins were reduced, the more did he re-
joice. He forgave Tuli the violation of Sung territory, nec-
essary for his flank attack on Honan, and when the knell ot
the Kins sounded at the fall of Kaifong, he hastened to help
in striking the final blow at them, and to participate, as he
hoped, in the distribution of the plunder. By this time Lit-
song had succeeded his cousin Ningtsong as ruler of the
Sungs, and it is said that he received from Tsaichau the
armor and personal spoils of Ninkiassu, which he had the sat-
isfaction of offering up in the temple of his ancestors. But
when he requested the Mongols to comply with the more im-
portant part of the convention, by which the Sung forces
had joined the Mongols before Tsaichau, and to evacuate
the province of Honan, he experienced a rude awakening
from his dream that the overthrow of the Kins would re-
dound to his advantage, and he soon realized what value
the Mongols attached to his alliance. The military capac-
ity of Mongkong inspired the Sung ruler with confidence,
and he called upon the Mongols to execute their promises,
or to prepare for war. The Mongol garrisons made no
movement of retreat, and the utmost that Litsong was
offered was a portion of Honan, if it could be practically
divided. The proposition was probably meant ironically,
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 105
but at all events Litsong rejected it, and sent Mongkong
to take by force possession of the disputed province. The
Mongol forces on the spot were fewer than the Chinese, and
they met with some reverses. But the hope of the Sungs
that the fortune of war would declare in their favor was
soon destroyed by the vast preparations of the Mongols,
who, at a special kuriltai, held at Karakoram, declared that
the conquest of China was to be completed. Then Litsong's
confidence left him, and he sent an appeal for peace to the
Mongols, giving up all claim to Honan, and only asking to
be left in undisturbed possession of his original dominions.
It was too late. The Mongols had passed their decree that
the Sungs were to be treated like the Kins, and that the last
Chinese government was to be destroyed.
In 1235, the year following the immolation of Ninkiassu,
the Mongols placed half a million men in the field for the
purpose of destroying the Sung power, and Ogotai divided
them into three armies, which were to attack Litsong's king-
dom from as many sides. The Mongol ruler intrusted the
most difficult task to his son Kutan, who invaded the inac-
cessible and vast province of Szchuen, at the head of one of
these armies. Notwithstanding its natural capacity for offer-
ing an advantageous defense, the Chinese turned their op-
portunities to poor account, and the Mongols succeeded in
capturing all its frontier fortresses, with little or no resist-
ance. The shortcomings of the defense can be inferred from
the circumstances of the Chinese annalists making special
mention of one governor having had the courage to die at
his post. For some reason not clearly stated the Mongols
did not attempt to retain possession of Szchuen on this occa-
sion. They withdrew when they were in successful occupa-
tion of the northern half of the province, and when it seemed
as if the other lay at their mercy. In the two dual provinces
of Kiangnan and Houkwang, the other Mongol armies met
with considerable success, which was dimmed, however, by
the death of Kuchu, the son and proclaimed heir of Ogotai.
This event, entailing no inconsiderable doubt and long-con-
106 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
tinned disputes as to the succession, was followed by ifae
withdrawal of the Mongol forces from Sung territory, and
during the last six years of his life Ogotai abstained from
war, and gave himself up to the indulgence of his gluttony.
He built a great palace at Karakoram, where his ancestors
had been content to live in a tent, and he intrusted the gov-
ernment of the old Kin dominions to Yeliu Chutsai, who ac-
quired great popularity among the Chinese for his clemency
and regard for their customs. Yeliu Chutsai adopted the
Chinese mode of taxation, and when Ogotai's widow, Tura-
kina, who acted as regent after her husband's death, ordered
him to alter his system and to farm out the revenues, he
sent in his resignation, and, it is said, died of grief shortly
afterward. Ogotai was one of the most humane and ami-
able of all the Mongol rulers, and Yeliu Chutsai imitated his
master. Of the latter the Chinese contemporary writers said
*'he was distinguished by a rare disinterestedness. Of a
very broad intellect, he was able, without injustice and
without wronging a single person, to amass vast treasures
(D'Ohsson says only of books, maps, and pictures), and to
enrich his family, but all his care and labors had for their
sole object the advantage and glory of his masters. Wise
and calculating in his plans, he did little of which he had
any reason to repent."
During the five years following the death of Ogotai, the
Mongols were absorbed in the question who should be their
next Great Khan, and it was only after a warm and pro-
tracted discussion, which threatened to entail the disruption
of Mongol power, and the revelation of many rivalries
among the descendants of Genghis, that Kuyuk, the eldest
son of Ogotai, was proclaimed emperor. At the kuriltai
held for this purpose, all the great Mongol leaders were
present, including Batu, the conqueror of Hungary, and
after the Mongol chiefs had agreed as to their chief, the
captive kings, Yaroslaf of Russia and David of Georgia,
paid homage to their conqueror. We owe to the monk
Carpino, who was sent by the Pope to convert the Mon-
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 10?
gol, a graphic account of one of the most brilliant ceremo-
nies to be met with in the whole course of Mongol history.
The delay in selecting Kuyuk, whose principal act of sover-
eignty was to issue a seal having this inscription: "God in
Heaven and Kuyuk on earth; by the power of God the
ruler of all men," had given the Sungs one respite, and his
early death procured them another. Kuyuk died in 1248,
and his cousin, Mangu, the son of Tuli, was appointed his
successor. By this time the Mongol chiefs of the family of
Genghis in Western Asia were practically independent of
the nominal Great Khan, and governed their states in com-
plete sovereignty, and waged war without reference to
Karakoram. This change left the Mongols in their origi-
nal home of the Amour absolutely free to devote all their
attention to the final overthrow of the Sungs, and Mangu
declared that he would know no rest until he had finally
subjected the last of the Chinese ruling families. In this
resolution Mangu received the hearty support of his younger
but more able brother, Kublai, to whom was intrusted the
direction in the field of the armies sent to complete the con-
quest of China.
Kublai received this charge in 1251, so that the Sungs
had enjoyed, first through the pacific disposition of Ogotai,
and, secondly, from the family disputes following his death,
peace for more than fifteen years. The advantage of this
tranquillity was almost nullified by the death of Mongkong,
a general whose reputation may have been easily gained,
but who certainly enjoyed the confidence of his soldiers, and
who was thought by his countrymen to be the best com-
mander of his day. When the Chinese emperor, Litsong,
saw the storm again approaching his northern frontier, he
found that he had lost the main support of his power, and
that his military resources were inferior to those of his
enemy. He had allowed himself to be lulled into a false
sense of security by the long inaction of the Mongols, and
although he seems to have been an amiable prince, and a
typical Chinese ruler, honoring the descendants of Confucius
108 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
with the hereditary title of duke, which still remains in that
family, and is the only title of its kind in China, and en-
couraging the literary classes of his country, he was a bad
sovereign to be intrusted with the task of defending his
realm and people against a bold and determined enemy.
Kublai prepared the way for his campaigns in Southern
China by following a very wise and moderate policy in
Northern China similar to that begun by Muhula, and car-
ried out with greater effect by Yeliu Chutsai. He had
enjoyed the advantage of a Chinese education, imparted
by an able tutor named Yaochu, who became the prince's
private secretary and mentor in all Chinese matters. At
his instigation, or, at least, with his co-operation, Kublai
took in hand the restoration of the southern portion of
Honan, which had been devastated during the wars, and
he succeeded in bringing back its population and prosperity
to that great province of Central China. He thus secured a
base for his operations close to the Sung frontier, while he
attached to his person a large section of the Chinese nation.
There never was any concealment that this patronage of
Chinese officials, and these measures for the amelioration
of many millions of Chinese subjects, were the well calcu-
lated preliminaries to the invasion of Southern China and
the extinction of the Sung dynasty.
If Kublai had succeeded in obtaining a wise adviser in
Yaochu, he was not less fortunate in procuring a great
general in the person of Uriangkadai, the son of Subutai,
and his remarkable and unvarying successes were largely
due to the efforts of those two men in the cabinet and the
field. The plan of campaign, drawn up with great care
and forethought by the prince and his lieutenant, had the
double merit of being both bold and original. Its main
purpose was not one that the Sung generals would be likely
to divine. It was determined to make a flank march round
the Sung dominions, and to occupy what is now the prov-
ince of Yunnan ; and, by placing an army in the rear of
their kingdom, to attack them eventually from two sides.
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 109
At this time Yunnan formed an independent state, and its
ruler, from his position behind the Sung territory, must
have fancied himself secure against any attack by the Mon-
gols. He was destined to a rude awakening. Kublai and
Uriangkadai, marching across Szchuen and crossing the
Kinchakiang, or "river of golden sand," which forms the
upper course of the Great River, on rafts, burst into Yun-
nan, speedily vanquished the frontier garrisons, and laid
siege to the capital, Talifoo. That town did not hold out
long, and soon Kublai was in a position to return to his
own state, leaving Uriangkadai with a considerable gar-
rison in charge of Yunnan. That general, believing that
his position would be improved by his resorting to an active
offensive, carried the standard of his race against the many
turbulent tribes in his neighborhood, and invaded Burma
whose king, after one campaign, was glad to recognize the
supremacy of the Mongols. The success and the boldness,
which may have been considered temerity, of this cam-
paign, raised up enemies to Kublai at the court of Kara-
koram, and the mind of his brother Mangu was poisoned
against him by many who declared that Kublai aspired to
complete independence. These designs so far succeeded,
that in 1257 Mangu finally deprived Kublai of all his com-
raaiids, and ordered him to proceed to Karakoram. At this
harsh and unmerited treatment Kublai showed himself in-
dined to rebel and dispute his brother's authority. If he
had done this, although the provocation was great, he
would have confirmed the charges of his accusers, and a
war would have broken out among the Mongols which
would probably have rent their power in twain in Eastern
Asia. But fortunately Yaochu was at hand to give pru-
dent advice, and after much hesitation Kublai yielded to
the impressive exhortations of his experienced and sagacious
minister. He is reported to have addressed Kublai in the
following terms: "Prince! You are the brother of the em-
peror, but you are not the less his subject. You cannot,
without committing a crime, question his decisions, and,
110 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
moreover, if you were to do so, it would only result in
placing you in a more dangerous predicament, out of which
you could hardly succeed in extricating yourself, as you are
so far distant from the capital where your enemies seek to
injure you. My advice is that you should send your family
to Mangu, and by this step you will justify yourself and re-
move any suspicions there may be. ' '
Kublai adopted this wise course, and proceeded in person
to Karakoram, where he succeeded in proving his innocence
and in discomfiting his enemies. It is said that Mangu was
so affected at the mere sight of his brother that he at once
forgave him without waiting for an explanation and rein-
stated him in all his offices. To ratify this reconciliation
Mangu proclaimed that he would take the field in person,
and that Kublai should hold joint command with himself.
When he formed this resolution to proceed to China in per-
son, he appointed his next brother, Arikbuka, to act as his
lieutenant in Mongolia. It is necessary to recollect this ar-
rangement, as Mangu died during the campaign, and it led
to the separation of the Chinese empire and the Mongolian,
which were divided after that event between Kublai and
Arikbuka.
Mangu did not come to his resolution to prosecute the
war with the Sungs any too soon, for Uriangkadai was be-
ginning to find his isolated position not free from danger.
Large as the army of that general was, and skillfully as he
had endeavored to improve his position by strengthening
the fortresses and recruiting from the warlike tribes of
Yunnan, Uriangkadai found himse'f threatened by the
collected armies of the Sungs, who occupied Szchuen with
a large garrison and menaced the daring Mongol general
with the whole of their power. There seems every reason
to believe that if the Sungs had acted with only ordinary
promptitude they might have destroyed this Mongol army
long before any aid could have reached it from the north.
Once Mangu had formed his resolution the rapidity of his
movements left the Sungs little or no chance of attacking
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. Ill
Uriangkadai. This campaign began in the winter of 1257,
when the troops were able to cross the frozen waters of the
Hoangho, and the immense Mongol army was divided into
three bodies, while Uriangkadai was ordered to march north
and effect a junction with his old chief Kublai in Szchuen.
The principal fighting of the first year occurred in this part
of China, and Mangu hastened there with another of his
armies. The Sung garrison was large, and showed great
courage and fortitude. The difficulty of the country and
the strength of several of their fortresses seconded their
efforts, and after two years' fighting the Mongols felt so
doubtful of success that they held a council of war to de-
cide whether they should retreat or continue to prosecute
the struggle. It has been said that councils of war do not
come to bold resolutions, but this must have been an excep-
tion, as it decided not to retreat, and to make one more
determined effort to overcome the Chinese. The campaign
of 1259 began with the siege of Hochau, a strong fortress,
held by a valiant garrison and commander, and to whose
aid a Chinese army under Luwenti was hastening. The
governor, Wangkien, offered a stout resistance, and Lu-
wenti succeeded in harassing the besiegers; but the fall of
the fortress appeared assured, when a new and more formi-
dable defender arrived in the form of dysentery. The Mon-
gol camp was ravaged by this foe, Mangu himself died of
the disease, and those of the Mongols who escaped beat a
hasty and disorderly retreat back to the north. Once more
the Sungs obtained a brief respite.
The death of Mangu threatened fresh disputes and strife
among the Mongol royal family. Kublai was his brother's
lawful heir, but Arikbuka, the youngest of the brothers,
was in possession of Karakoram, and supreme throughout
Mongolia. He was hostile to Kublai, and disposed to assert
all his rights and to make the most of his opportunities. No
Great Khan could be proclaimed anywhere save at Karako-
ram, and Arikbuka would not allow his brother to gain that
place, the cradle of their race and dynasty, unless he could
112 .4 SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
do so by force of arms. Kublai attempted to solve the diffi-
culty by holding a grand council near his favorite city of
Cambaluc, the modern Pekin, and he sent forth his procla-
mation to the Mongols as their Khan. But they refused to
recognize one who was not elected in the orthodox fashion
at Karakoram ; and Arikbuka not merely defied Kublai. but
summoned his own kuriltai at Karakoram, where he was
proclaimed Khakhan in the most formal manner and with
all the accustomed ceremonies. Arikbuka was undoubtedly
popular among the Mongols, while Kublai, who was re-
garded as half a Chinese on account of his education, had
a far greater reputation south of the wall than north of it.
Kublai could not tolerate the open defiance of his authority,
and the contempt shown for what was his birthright, by
Arikbuka; and in 1261 he advanced upon Karakoram at
the head of a large army. A single battle sufficed to dis-
pose of Arikbuka's pretensions, and that prince was glad to
find a place of refuge among the Kirghiz. Kublai proved
himself a generous enemy. He sent Arikbuka his full par-
don, he reinstated him hi his rank of prince, and he left him
virtually supreme among the Mongol tribes. He retraced
his steps to Pekin, fully resolved to become Chinese emperor
in reality, but prepared to waive his rights as Mongol Khan.
Mangu Khan was the last of the Mongol rulers whose au-
thority was recognized in both the east and the west, and
his successor, Kublai, seeing that its old significance had
departed, was fain to establish his on a new basis in the
fertile, ancient and wide-stretching dominions of China.
Before Kublai composed the difficulty with Arikbuka he
had resumed his operations against the Sungs, and even
before Mangu's death he had succeeded in establishing
some posts south of the Yangtsekiang, in the impassabil-
ity of which the Chinese fondly believed. During the year
1260 he laid siege to Wochow, the modern Wouchang, but
he failed to make any impression on the fortress on this
occasion, and he agreed to the truce which Litsong pro-
posed. By the terms of this agreement Litsong acknowl-
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 113
edged himself a Mongol vassal, just as his ancestors had
subjected themselves to the Kins, paid a large tribute, and
forbade his generals anywhere to attack the Mongols. The
last stipulation was partly broken by an attack on the rear
of Uriangkadai's corps, but no serious results followed, for
Kublai was well satisfied with the manner in which the
campaign terminated, as there is no doubt that his advance
across the Yangtsekiang had been precipitate, and he may
have thought himself lucky to escape with the appearance
of success and the conclusion of a gratifying treaty. It was
with the reputation gained by this nominal success, and by
having made the Sungs his tributaries, that Kublai hastened
northward to settle his rivalry with Arikbuka. Having ac-
complished that object with complete success, he decided to
put an end to the Sung dynasty. The Chinese emperor, acting
with strange fatuity, had given fresh cause of umbrage,
and had provoked a war by many petty acts of discourtesy,
culminating in the murder of the envoys of Kublai, sent
to notify him of his proclamation as Great Khan of the
Mongols. Probably the Sung ruler could not have averted
war if he had shown the greatest forbearance and humility,
but this cruel and inexcusable act precipitated the crisis and
the extinction of his attenuated authority. If there was
any delay in the movements of Kublai for the purpose of
exacting reparation for this outrage, it was due to his first
having to arrange a difficulty that had arisen in his rela-
tions with the King of Corea. That potentate had long
preserved the peace with his Mongol neighbors, and per-
haps he would have remained a friend without any inter-
ruption, had not the Mongols done something which was
construed as an infraction of Corean liberty. The Corean
love of independence took fire at the threatened diminution
of then* rights, they rose en masse in defense of their coun-
try, and even the king, "Wangtien, who had been well dis-
posed to the Mongol rulers, declared that he could not con-
tinue the alliance, and placed himself at the head of his
people. Seeing himself thus menaced with a costly war in
114 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHFXA.
a difficult country on the eve of a more necessary and hope
ful contest, Kublai resorted to diplomacy. He addressed
"Wangtien in complimentary terms and disclaimed all in-
tention of injuring the Coreans, with whom he wished to
maintain friendly relations, but at the same time he pointed
out the magnitude of his power and dilated on the extent of
the Mongol conquests. Half by flattery and half by menace
Kublai brought the Corean court to reason, and TVangtien
again entered into bonds of alliance with Cambaluc and re-
newed his old oaths of friendship.
At this point of the long struggle with the Sungs it will
be appropriate to consider what was the exact position of
Kublai with regard to his own Chinese subjects, who now
formed the backbone of his power. By this time Kublai
had become to all practical intents and purposes a Chinese
emperor. He had accepted all the traditional functions of
the typical Hwangti, and the etiquette and splendor of his
court rivaled that of the Sungs. He had not merely adopted
the Chinese system of taxation and the form of administra-
tion to which the larger portion of his officials, being of Chi-
nese race, had been accustomed, but he declared himself the
patron of learning and of Buddhism, which had gained a
hold on the minds of the Mongols that it has not lost to the
present day. One of the most popular of his early measures
had been the order to liberate all the literate class among his
Chinese prisoners, and they had formed the nucleus of the
civil service Kublai attached to his interests and utilized
as his empire expanded. In his relations with Buddhism
Kublai showed not less astuteness, and in realizing that to
attain durable success he must appeal to the religious side of
human character, he showed that he had the true instincts
of a statesman.
At this time two facts were clearly apparent. The Chi-
nese were sunk in a low state of religious disbelief, and the
Sung rulers were not disposed to play the part of regen-
erators of their country. The second fact was that the only
vigorous religion in China, or. indeed, in Eastern Asia, was
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 115
Buddhism, which, since the establishment of Brahmanism
in India, had taken up its headquarters in Tibet, where, how-
ever, the supreme authority was still secular that is to say,
it was invested in the hands of a prince or king, and not in
those of a priest or Grand Lama. It so happened that there
was resident at Kublai's court a Tibetan priest, of the family
which had always supplied the Sanpou with his minister,
who gained the ear of Kublai, and convinced him how politic
and advantageous to him personally it would be if he were
to secure the co-operation and sympathy of his priestly order.
Kublai fell in with his plans, and proclaimed his friend Pakba
Lama, and sent him back to Tibet, there to establish the
ecclesiastical authority, which still exists in that country,
in intimate alliance and sympathy with the Chinese rulers.
By this and other similar proceedings Kublai gained over to
his side several influential classes among the Chinese people,
and many reflecting persons thought they saw in him a true
regenerator of the empire, and a worthy successor of their
greatest rulers. It was, therefore, with a thoroughly paci-
fied country, and to a great extent a contented people, that
Kublai began his last war with the rulers of Southern China.
In 1263 Kublai issued his proclamation of war, calling
on his generals "to assemble their troops, to sharpen their
swords and their pikes, and to prepare their bows and ar-
rows," for he intended to attack the Sungs by land and sea.
The treason of a Chinese general in his service named Litan
served to delay the opening of the campaign for a few weeks,
but this incident was of no importance, as Litan was soon
overthrown and executed. Brief as was the interval, it was
marked by one striking and important event the death of
Litsong, who was succeeded by his nephew, Chowki, called
the Emperor Toutsong. Litsong was not a wise ruler, but,
compared with many of his successors, he might be more
accurately styled unfortunate than incompetent. Toutsong,
and his weak and arrogant minister, Kiassetao, hastened to
show that there were greater heights of folly than any to
which he had attained. Acting on the advice of a renegade
116 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Sung general, well acquainted with the defenses of Southern
China, Kublai altered his proposed attack, and prepared for
crossing the Yangtsekiang by first making himself supreme
on its tributary, the Han River. His earlier attack on
Wouchang has been described, and his compulsory retire-
ment from that place had taught him the evil of making a
premature attack. His object remained the same, but in-
stead of marching direct to it across the Yangtsekiang he
took the advice of the Sung general, and attacked the for-
tress of Sianyang on the Han River, with the object of mak-
ing himself supreme on that stream, and wresting from the
Sungs the last first-class fortress they possessed in the north-
west. By the time all these preliminaries were completed
and the Mongol army had fairly taken the field it was 1268,
and Kublai sent sixty thousand of his best troops, with a
large number of auxiliaries, to lay siege to Sianyang, which
was held by a large garrison and a resolute governor. The
Mongol lines were drawn up round the town, and also its
neighbor of Fanching, situated on the opposite bank of the
river, with which communication was maintained by several
bridges, and the Mongols built a large fleet of fifty war junks,
with which they closed the Han River and effectually pre-
vented any aid being sent up it from Hankow or Wouchang.
Liuwen Hoan, the commandant of Sianyang, was a brave
man, and he commanded a numerous garrison and possessed
supplies, as he said, to stand a ten years' siege. He repulsed
all the assaults of the enemy, and, undaunted by his isola-
tion, replied to the threats of the Mongols, to give him no
quarter if he persisted in holding out, by boasting that he
would hang their traitor general in chains before his sov-
ereign. . The threats and vaunts of the combatants did not
bring the siege any nearer to an end. The utmost that the
Mongols could achieve was to prevent any provisions or re-
enforcements being thrown into the town. But on the for-
tress itself they made no impression. Things had gone on
like this for three years, and the interest in the siege had
begun to languish, when Kublai determined to make a su-
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 117
preme effort to carry the place, and at the same moment
the Sung minister came to the conclusion to relieve it at all
hazards.
The campaign of 1270 began with a heroic episode the
successful dispatch of provisions into the besieged town, un-
der the direction of two Chinese officers named Changkoua
and Changchun, whose names deserve to be long remem-
bered for their heroism. The flotilla was divided into two
bodies, one composed of the fighting, the other of the store-
ships. The Mongols had made every preparation to block-
ade the river, but the suddenness and vigor of the Chinese
attack surprised them, and, at first, the Chinese had the best
of the day. But soon the Mongols recovered, and from their
superior position threatened to overwhelm the assailing Chi-
nese squadron. In this perilous moment Changchun, devot-
ing himself to death in the interest of his country collected
all his war-junks, and making a desperate attack on the
Mongols, succeeded in obtaining sufficient time to enable
the storeships under Chaugkoua to pass safely up to Sian-
yang. The life of so great a hero as Changchun was,
however, a heavy price to pay for the temporary relief of
Sianyang, which was more closely besieged than ever after
the arrival of Kublai in person.
After this affair the Mongols pushed the siege with greater
vigor, and instead of concentrating their efforts on Sianyang
they attacked both that fortress and Fanching from all sides.
The Mongol commander, Alihaya, sent to Persia, where the
Mongols were also supreme, for engineers trained in the
working of mangonels or catapults, engines capable of throw-
ing stones of 160-pounds' weight with precision for a consid-
erable distance. By their aid the bridges across the river
were first destroyed, and then the walls of Sianyang were
so severely damaged that an assault appeared to be feasible.
But Fanching had suffered still more from the Mongol bom-
bardment, and Alihaya therefore attacked it first. The gar-
rison offered a determined resistance, and the fighting was
continued in the streets. Not a man of the garrison escaped,
118 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
and when the slaughter was over the Mongols found that
they had only acquired possession of a mass of ruins. But
they had obtained the key to Sianyang, the weakest flank
of which had been protected by Fanching, and the Chinese
garrison was so discouraged that Liuwen Hoan, despairing
of relief, agreed to accept the terms offered by Kublai. Those
terms were expressed in the following noble letter from the
Mongol emperor: "The generous defense you have made
during five years covers you with glory. It is the duty of
every faithful subject to serve his prince at the expense of
his life, but in the straits to which you are reduced, your
strength exhausted, deprived of succor and without hope of
receiving any, would it be reasonable to sacrifice the lives
of so many brave men out of sheer obstinacy? Submit hi
good faith to us and no harm shall come to you. "We prom-
ise you still more ; and that is to provide each and all of you
with honorable employment. You shall have no grounds
of discontent, for that we pledge you our imperial word."
It will not excite surprise that Liuwen Hoan, who had
been, practically speaking, deserted by his own sovereign,
should have accepted the magnanimous terms of his con-
queror, and become as loyal a lieutenant of Kublai as he had
shown himself to be of the Sung Toutsong. The death of
that ruler followed soon afterward, but as the real power
had been in the hands of the Minister Kiassetao, no change
took place in the policy or fortunes of the Sung kingdom.
At this moment Kublai succeeded in obtaining the services
of Bayan, a Mongol general who had acquired a great repu-
tation under Khulagu in Persia. Bayan, whose name sig-
nifies the noble or the brave, and who was popularly known
as Bayan of the Hundred Eyes, because he was supposed to
see everything, was one of the greatest military leaders of
his age and race. He was intrusted with the command
of the main army, and under him served, it is interesting
to state, Liuwen Hoan. Several towns were captured after
more or less resistance, and Bayan bore down with all nis
force on the triple cities of Hankow, Wouchang, and Han-
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 119
yaug. Bayan concentrated all his efforts on the capture of
Hanyang, while the Mongol navy under Artchu compelled
the Chinese fleet to take refuge under the walls of Wou-
chang. None of these towns offered a very stubborn resist-
ance, and Bayan had the satisfaction of receiving their sur-
render one after another. Leaving Alihaya with 40,000 men
to guard these places, Bayan marched with the rest of his
forces on the Sung capital, Lingan or Hangchow, the cele-
brated Kincsay of medieval travelers. The retreating fleet
and army of the Sungs carried with them fear of the Mon-
gols, and the ever-increasing representation of their extraor-
dinary power and irresistible arms. In this juncture public
opinion compelled Kiassetao to take the lead, and he called
upon all the subjects of the Sung to contribute arms and
money for the purpose of national defense. But his own
incompetence in directing this national movement deprived
it of half its force and of its natural chances of success.
Bayan's advance was rapid. Many towns opened their
gates in terror or admiration of his name, and Liuwen Hoan
was frequently present to assure them that Kublai was the
most generous of masters, and that there was no wiser course
than to surrender to his generals.
The Mongol forces at last reached the neighborhood of
the Sung capital, where Kiassetao had succeeded in collect-
ing an army of 130,000 men; but many of them were ill-
trained, and the splendor of the camp provided a poor
equivalent for the want of arms and discipline among the
men. Kiassetao seems to have been ignorant of the danger
of his position, for he sent an arrogant summons to the Mon-
gols to retire, stating also that he would grant a peace based
on the Yangtsekiang as a boundary. Bayan's simple reply
to this notice was, "If you had really aimed at peace you
would have made this proposition before we crossed the
Kiang. Now that we are the masters of it, it is a little
too late. Still if you sincerely desire it, come and see me
in person, and we will discuss the necessary conditions."
Very few of the Sung lieutenants offered a protracted re-
120 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
sistance, and even the isolated cases of devotion were con-
fined to the official class, who were more loyal than the mass
of the people. Chao Maofa and his wife Yongchi put an
end to their existence sooner than give up their charge at
Chichow, but the garrison accepted the terms of the Mon-
gols without compunction, and without thinking of their
duty. Kiassetao attempted to resist the Mongol advance
at Kien Kang, the modern Nankin, but after an engage-
ment on land and water the Sungs were driven back, and
their fleet only escaped destruction by retiring precipitately
to the sea. After this success Nankin surrendered without
resistance, although its governor was a valiant and appar-
ently a capable man. He committed suicide sooner than
surrender, and among his papers was found a plan of cam-
paign, after perusing which Bayan exclaimed, "Is it possible
that the Sungs possessed a man capable of giving such pru-
dent counsel? If they had paid heed to it, should we ever
have reached this spot?" After this success Bayan pressed
on with increased rather than diminished energy, and the
Sung emperor and his court fled from the capital. Kublai
showed an inclination to temporize and to negotiate, but
Bayan would not brook any delay. "To relax your grip
even for a moment on an enemy whom you have held by
the throat for a hundred years would only be to give him
time to recover his breath, to restore his forces, and in the
end to cause us an infinity of trouble."
The Sung fortunes showed some slight symptoms of im-
proving when Kiassetao was disgraced, and a more comr
petent general was found in the person of Chang Chikia.
But the Mongols never abated the vigor of their attack or
relaxed in their efforts to cut off all possibility of succor from
the Sung capital. "When Chang Chikia hoped to improve
the position of his side by resuming the offensive he was
destined to rude disappointment. Making an attack on the
strong position of the Mongols at Nankin he was repulsed
with heavy loss. The Sung fleet was almost annihilated
and 700 war- junks were taken by the victors. After this
THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA. 121
the Chinese never dared to face the Mongols again on the
water. This victory was due to the courage and capacity
of Artchu. Bay an now returned from a campaign in Mon-
golia to resume the chief conduct of the war, and he signal-
ized his return by the captue of Changchow. At this town
he is said to have sanctioned a massacre of the Chinese
troops, but the facts are enwrapped in uncertainty; and
Marco Polo declares that this was only done after the Chi-
nese had treacherously cut up the Mongol garrison. Alarmed
by the fall of Changchow, the Sung ministers again sued for
peace, sending an imploring letter to this effect: "Our ruler
is young and cannot be held responsible for the differences
that have arisen between the peoples. Kiassetao the guilty
one has been punished ; give us peace and we shall be better
friends in the future." Bayan's reply was severe and un-
compromising. "The age of your prince has nothing to do
with the question between us. The war must go on to its
legitimate end. Further argument is useless." The de-
fenses of the Sung capital were by this time removed, and
the unfortunate upholders of that dynasty had no option save
to come to terms with the Mongols. Marco Polo describes
Kincsay as the most opulent city of the world, but it was in
no position to stand a siege. The empress-regent, acting for
her son, sent in her submission to Bayan, and agreed to pro-
ceed to the court of the conqueror. She abdicated for her-
self and family all the pretensions of their rank, and she
accepted the favors of the Mongol with due humility, saying,
"The Son of Heaven (thus giving Kublai the correct im-
perial style) grants you the favor of sparing your life ; it is
just to thank him for it and to pay him homage." Bayan
made a triumphal entry into the city, while the Emperor
Kongtsong was sent off to Pekin. The majority of the
Sung courtiers and soldiers came to terms with Bayan, but
a few of the more desperate or faithful endeavored to uphold
the Sung cause in Southern China under the general, Chang
Chikia. Two of the Sung princes were supported by this
commander, and one was proclaimed by the empty title of
6
122 .4 SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
emperor. Capricious fortune rallied to their side for a brief
space, and some of the Mongol detachments which had ad-
vanced too far or with undue precipitancy were cut up and
destroyed.
The Mongols seem to have thought that the war was
over, and the success of Chang Chikia's efforts may have been
due to their negligence rather than to his vigor. As soon as
they realized that there remained a flickering flame of oppo-
sition among the supporters of the Sungs they sent two
armies, one into Kwantung and the other into Fuhkien, and
their fleet against Chang Chikia. Desperate as was his posi-
tion, that officer still exclaimed, "If heaven has not resolved
to overthrow the Sungs, do you think that even now it can-
not restore their ruined throne?" but his hopes were dashed
to the ground by the capture of Canton, and the expulsion
of all his forces from the mainland. One puppet emperor
died, and then Chang proclaimed another as Tiping. The
last supporters of the cause took refuge on the island of Tai
in the Canton estuary, where they hoped to maintain their
position. The position was strong and the garrison was num-
erous ; but the Mongols were not to be frightened by appear-
ances. Their fleet bore down on the last Sung stronghold
with absolute confidence, and, although the Chinese resisted
for three days and showed great gallantry, they were over-
whelmed by the superior engines as well as the numbers of
the Mongols. Chang Chikia with a few ships succeeded in
escaping from the fray, but the emperor's vessel was less
fortunate, and finding that escape was impossible, Lousion-
foo, one of the last Sung ministers, seized the emperor in his
arms and jumped overboard with him. Thus died Tiping,
the last Chinese emperor of the Sungs, and with him expired
that ill-fated dynasty. Chang Chikia renewed the struggle
with aid received from Tonquin, but when he was leading
a forlorn hope against Canton he was caught in a typhoon
and he and his ships were wrecked. His invocation tu
heaven, "I have done everything I could to sustain on the
throne the Sung ynasty. "When one prince died I caused
KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY. 123
another to be proclaimed emperor. He also has perished,
and I still live! Oh, heaven, shall I be acting against thy
desires if I sought to place a new prince of this family on the
throne?" sounded the dirge of the race he had served so well.
Thus was the conquest of China by the Mongols com-
pleted. After half a century of warfare the kingdom of the
Snugs shared the same fate as its old rival the Kin, and
Kublai had the personal satisfaction of completing the work
begun by his grandfather Genghis seventy years before. Of
all the Mongol triumphs it was the longest in being attained.
The Chinese of the north and of the south resisted with ex-
traordinary powers of endurance the whole force of the
greatest conquering race Asia had ever seen. They were
not skilled in war and their generals were generally incom-
petent, but they held out with desperate courage and obsti-
nacy long after other races would have given in. The stu-
dent of history will not fail to see in these facts striking
testimony of the extraordinary resources of China, and of
the capacity of resistance to even a vigorous conqueror pos-
sessed by its inert masses. Even the Mongols did not con-
quer until they had obtained the aid of a large section of the
Chinese nation, or before Kublai had shown that he intended
to prove himself a worthy Emperor of China and not merely
a great Khan of the Mongol Hordes.
CHAPTER VI
KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY
WHILE Bayan was winning victories for his master and
driving the Chinese armies from the field, Kublai was en-
gaged at Pekin in the difficult and necessary task of consoli-
dating his authority. In 1271 he gave his dynasty the name
of Yuen or Original, and he took for himself the Chinese
title of Chitsou, although it will never supersede his Mongol
name of Kublai. Summoning to his court the most expert
124 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
enced Chinese ministers, and aided by many foreigners, he
succeeded in founding a government which was imposing by
reason of its many-sidedness as well as its inherent strength.
It satisfied the Chinese and it was gratifying to the Mongols,
because they formed the buttress of one of the most imposing
administrations in the world. All this was the distinct work
of Kublai, who had enjoyed the special favor of Genghis,
who had predicted of him that "one day he will sit in my
seat and bring you good fortune such as you have had in
my time." He resolved to make his court the most splendid
in the world. His capital Cambaluc or Khanbalig "the
city of the Khan" stood on or near the present site of
Pekin, and was made for the first time capital of China by
the Mongols. There were, according to Marco Polo, twelve
gates, at each of which was stationed a guard of 1,000 men,
and the streets were so straight and wide that you could see
from one end to the other, or from gate to gate. The extent
given of the walls varies : according to the highest estimate
they were twenty-seven miles round, according to the lowest
eighteen. The khan's palace at Chandu or Kaipingfoo,
north of Pekin, where he built a magnificent summer palace,
kept his stud of horses, and carried out his love of the chase
in the immense park and preserves attached, may be con-
sidered the "Windsor of this Chinese monarch. The position
of Pekin had, and still has, much to recommend it as the
site of a capital. The Mings, after proclaiming Nankin the
capital, made scarcely less use of it, and Chuntche, the first
of the Manchus, adopted it as his. It has since remained
the sole metropolis of the empire.
When Kublai permanently established himself at Pekin
he drew up consistent lines of policy on all the great ques-
tions with which it was likely he would have to deal, and he
always endeavored to act upon these set principles. In fram-
ing this system of government he was greatly assisted by
his old friend and tutor Yaochu, as well as by other Chinese
ministers. He was thus able to deal wisely and also vigor-
ously with a society with which he was only imperfectly
^UBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY. 125
acquainted; and the impartiality and insight into human
character, which were his main characteristics, greatly sim-
plified the difficult task before him. His impartiality was
shown most clearly in his attitude on the question of relig-
ion ; but it partook very largely of a hard materialism which
concealed itself under a nominal indifference. At first he
treated with equal consideration Buddhism, Mohammedan-
ism, Christianity, and even Judaism, and he said that he
treated them all with equal consideration because he hoped
that the greatest among them would help him in heaven.
If some doubt may be felt as to the sincerity of this state-
ment, there can be none as to Kublai's effort to turn all
religions to a political use, and to make them serve his turn.
Some persons have thought he showed a predilection for
Christianity, but his measures in support of Buddhism, and
of his friend the Pakba Lama, are a truer indication of his
feelings. But none were admitted into his private con-
fidence, and his acts evinced a politic tolerance toward
all creeds. But his religious tolerance or indifference did
not extend to personal matters. He insisted on the proper
prayers being offered to himself and the extreme reverence of
the kow-tow. Priests were appointed and specially enjoined
to offer up prayers on his behalf before the people, who were
required to attend these services and to join in the responses.
Images of himself were also sent to all the provincial towns
for reverence to be offered. He also followed the Chinese
custom of erecting a temple to his ancestors, and the coins
that passed current bore his effigy. Thus did Kublai more
and more identify himself with his Chinese subjects, and a
he found his measures crowned with success he became him-
self more wedded to Chinese views, less tolerant of adverse
opinions, and more disposed to assert his sovereign majesty.
Having embellished his capital, it is not surprising to find
that he drew up a strict court ceremonial, and that he pre-
scribed gorgeous dresses for those who were to be allowed to
approach him. His banquets were of the most sumptuous
description. Strangers from foreign states were admitted to
126 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the presence, and dined at a table set apart for travelers,
while the great king himself feasted in the full gaze of his
people. His courtiers, guard, and ministers attended by a
host of servitors, and protected from enemies by 20,000
guards, the flower of the Mongol army ; the countless wealth
seized in the capitals of numerous kingdoms ; the brilliance
of intellect among his chief adherents and supporters; the
martial character of the race that lent itself almost as well
to the pageantry of a court as to the stern reality of battle;
and finally the majesty of the great king himself all com-
bined to make Kublai's court and capital the most splendid,
at that time, in the world. Although Kublai's instincts
were martial, he gave up all idea of accompanying his ar-
mies in the field after his war with Arikbuka. As he was
only forty-four when he formed this decision, it must be
assumed that he came to it mainly because he had so many
other matters to attend to, and also, no doubt, because he
felt that he possessed in Bayan a worthy substitute.
The most fortunate and successful monarch rarely es-
capes without some misfortune, and Kublai was not destined
to be an exception to the rule. The successes of the Mongol
navy undoubtedly led Kublai to believe that his arms might
be carried beyond the sea, and he formed the definite plan
of subjecting Japan to his power. The ruling family in that
kingdom was of Chinese descent, tracing back its origin to
Taipe, a fugitive Chinese prince of the twelfth century before
our era. The Chinese in their usual way had asserted the
superior position of a Suzerain, and the Japanese had as
consistently refused to recognize the claim, and had main-
tained their independence. As a rule the Japanese abstained
from all interference in the affairs of the continent, and the
only occasion on which they departed from this rule was
when they aided Corea against China. In 1266 Kublai sent
two embassadors by way of Corea to Japan with a letter
from himself complaining that the Japanese court had taken
no notice of his accession to power, and treated him with
indifference. The mission never had a chance of success, for
KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY. 127
the Coreans succeeded in frightening the Mongol envoys
with the terrors of the sea, and by withholding their assist-
ance prevented them reaching their destination. The envoys
returned without having been able to deliver their letter.
Kublai decided that the Japanese were hostile to him, and
he resolved to humble them. He called upon the King of
Corea to raise an auxiliary force, and that prince promised
to supply 1,000 ships and 10,000 men. In 1274 he sent a
small force of 300 ships and 15,000 men to begin operations
in the direction of Japan; but the Japanese navy came out
to meet it, and attacking it off the island of Tsiusima, in-
flicted a crushing defeat. As this expedition was largely
composed of the Corean contingent Kublai easily persuaded
himself that this defeat did not indicate what would happen
when he employed his own Mongol troops. He also suc-
ceeded in sending several envoys to Japan after his first
abortive attempt, and they brought back consistent reports
as to the hostility and defiance of the Japanese, who at last,
to leave no further doubt on the subject, executed his envoy
in ] 280. For this outrage the haughty monarch swore he
would exact a terrible revenge, and in 1280-81, when the last
of his campaigns with the Sungs had been brought to a tri-
umphant conclusion, he collected all his forces in the eastern
part of the kingdom, and prepared to attack Japan with all
his power.
For the purposes of this war he raised an army of over
100,000 men, of whom about one-third were Mongols; and
a fleet large enough to carry this host and its supplies was
gathered together with great difficulty in the harbors of
Chekiang and Fuhkien. It would have been wiser if the
expedition had started from Corea, as the sea voyage would
have been greatly reduced; but the difficulty of getting his
army to that country, and the greater difficulty of feeding it
when it got there, induced him to make his own maritime
possessions the base of his operations. From the beginning
misfortunes fell thick upon it, and the Japanese, not less
than the English when assailed by the Spanish armada and
128 ^i SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Boulogne invasions, owed much to the alliance of the sea.
Kublai had felt bound to appoint a Chinese generalissimo as
well as a Mongol to this host, but it did not work well. One
general fell ill and was superseded, another was lost in a
storm, and there was a general want of harmony in the
Mongol camp and fleet. Still the fleet set sail, but the ele-
ments declared themselves against Kublai. His shattered
fleet was compelled to take refuge off the islets to the north
of Japan, where it attempted to refit, but the Japanese
granted no respite, and assailed them both by land and sea.
After protracted but unequal fighting the Mongol commander
had no choice left but to surrender. The conquerors spared
the Chinese and Coreans among their prisoners, but they
put every Mongol to the sword. Only a stray junk or two
escaped to tell Kublai the tale of the greatest defeat the
Mongols had ever experienced. Thirty thousand of their
best troops were slaughtered, and their newly-created fleet,
on which they were founding such great expectations, was
annihilated, while 70,000 Chinese and Coreans remained as
prisoners in the hands of the victor. Kublai executed two
of his generals who escaped, but it is clear no one was to
blame. The Mongols were vanquished because they under-
took a task beyond their power, and one with which their
military experience did not fit them to cope. The most for-
midable portion of their army was cavalry, and they had no
knowledge of the sea. Nor could their Chinese auxiliaries
supply this deficiency; for, strange as it may appear, the
Chinese, although many of them are good fishermen and
sailors, have never been a powerful nation at sea. On the
other hand, the Japanese have always been a bold and cap-
able race of mariners. They have frequently proved that
the sea is their natural element, and all the power and re-
sources of Kublai availed not against the skill and courage
of these hardy islanders. Kublai was reluctant to acquiesce
in his defeat, and he endeavored to form another expedition,
but the Chinese sailors mutinied and refused to embark.
They were supported by all the Chinese ministers at Pekin 5
KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY. 129
and Kublai felt himself compelled to yield and abandon all
designs of conquest beyond the sea.
The old success of the Mongols did not desert them on
land, and Kublai received some consolation for his rude
repulse by the Japanese in the triumph of his arms in
Burmah. The momentary submission of the King of Bur-
mah, or Mien, as it was, and is still, called by the Chinese,
had been followed by a fit of truculence and open hostility.
This monarch had crossed over into Indian territory, and
had assumed the title of King of Bengala in addition to his
own. Emboldened by his success, he did not conceal his
hostility to the Mongols, sent a defiant reply to all their rep-
resentations, and even assumed the offensive with his frontier
garrisons. He then declared open war. The Mongol gen-
eral, Nasiuddin, collected all the forces he could, and when
the Burmese ruler crossed the frontier at the head of an
immense host of horse, foot, and elephants, he found the
Mongol army drawn up on the plain of Yungchang. The
Mongols numbered only 12,000 select troops, whereas the
Burmese exceeded 80,000 men with a corps of elephants,
estimated between 800 and 2,000, and an artillerj* force of
sixteen guns. Notwithstanding this numerical disadvantage
the Mongols were hi no way dismayed by their opponents'
manifest superiority; but seldom has the struggle between
disciplined and brute force proved closer or more keenly con-
tested. At first the charge of the Burmese cavalry, aided
by the elephants and artillery, carried all before it. But
Nasiuddin had provided for this contingency. He had dis-
mounted all his cavalry, and had ordered them to fire their
arrows exclusively against the elephant corps; and as the
Mongols were then not only the best archers in the world,
but used the strongest bows, the destruction they wrought
was considerable, and soon threw the elephants into hopeless
confusion. The crowd of elephants turned tail before this
discharge of arrows, as did the elephants of Pyrrhus, and
threw the whole Burmese army into confusion. The Mon-
gols then mounting their horses, charged and completed the
130 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
discomfiture of the Burmese, who were driven from the field
with heavy loss and tarnished reputation. On this occasion
the Mongols did not pursue the Burmese very far, and the
King of Burmah lost little or no part of his dominions, but
Nasiuddin reported to Pekin that it would be an easy matter
to add the kingdom of Mien to the Mongol empire. Kublai
did not act on this advice until six years later, when he sent
his kinsman Singtur with a large force to subdue Burmah.
The king took shelter in Pegu, leaving his capital Amien
at the mercy of the conqueror. The Mongol conquests were
thus brought down to the very border of Assam. In Ton-
quin and Annam the arms of Kublai were not so successful.
Kublai's son Togan made an abortive campaign in these
regions. Whenever an open force had to be overcome, the
Mongol army was successful, but when the Mongols encoun-
tered the difficulties of a damp and inclement climate, of the
absence of roads, and other disadvantages, they were dis-
heartened, and suffered heavily in men and morale. With
the loss of his two generals, and the main portion of his
army, Togan was lucky in himself escaping to China. Kublai
wished to make another effort to subdue these inhospitable
regions and their savage inhabitants, but Chinese public
opinion proved too strong, and he had to yield to the rep-
resentations of his ministers.
Kublai was the more compelled to sacrifice his feelings
on this point, because there were not wanting indications
that if he did not do so he would find a Chinese rebellion
on his hands. Notwithstanding his many successes, and
his evident desire to stand well with his Chinese subjects,
it was already clear that they bore their new leader little
love. Several of the principal provinces were in a state of
veiled rebellion, showing that the first opportunity would
be taken to shake off the Mongol yoke, and that Kublai's
authority really rested on a quicksand. The predictions of
a fanatic were sufficient to shake the emperor on his throne,
and such was Kublai's apprehension that he banished all
the remaining Sung prisoners to Mongolia, and executed
KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY. 131
their last faithful minister, who went to the scaffold with a
smile on his face, exclaiming, "I am content; my wishes
are about to be realized." It must not be supposed from
this that Kublai's authority had vanished or become effete.
It was absolutely supreme over all declared enemies, but be-
low the surface was seething an amount of popular hostil-
ity and discontent ominous to the longevity of the Mongol
dynasty. The restless ambition of Kublai would not be
satisfied with anything short of recognition, in some form
or other, of his power by his neighbors, and he consequently
sent envoys to all the kingdoms of Southern Asia to obtain,
by lavish presents or persuasive language, that recognition
of his authority on which he had set his heart. In most
cases he was gratified, for there was not a power in East-
ern Asia to compare with that of the Mongol prince seated
on the Dragon Throne of China, and all were flattered to be
brought into connection with it on any terms.
These successful and gratifying embassies had only one
untoward result : they induced Kublai to revert to his idea
of repairing the overthrow of his son Togan in Annam, and
of finally subjugating that troublesome country. The inten-
tion was not wise, and it was rendered more imprudent by
its execution being intrusted to Togan again. Another com-
mander might have fared better, but great as was his initial
success, he could not hope to permanently succeed. Togan
began as he formerly commenced by carrying all before
him. He won seventeen separate engagements, but the
further he advanced into the country the more evident did
it appear that he only controlled the ground on which he
stood. The King of Annam was a fugitive; his capital was
in the hands of the Mongols, and apparently nothing more
remained to be done. Apachi, the most experienced of the
Mongol commanders, then counseled a prompt retreat.
Unfortunately the Mongol prince Togan would not take
his advice, and the Annamites, gathering fresh forces on
all sides, attacked the exhausted Mongols, and compelled
them to beat a precipitate retreat from their country. All
132 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the friiits of early victory were lost, and Togan's disgrur v
was a poor consolation for the culminating discomfiture of
Kublai's reign. The people of Annam then made good their
independence, and they still enjoy it, so far as China is con-
cerned ; though Annam is now a dependency of the French
republic.
We cannot doubt that the failure of the emperor's en-
deavor to popularize his rule was as largely due to the
tyrannical acts and oppressive measures of some of his
principal ministers as to unpopular and unsuccessful expe-
ditions. Notwithstanding the popular dislike of the system,
and Kublai's efforts to put it down, the Mongols resorted to
the old plan of farming the revenue, and the extortion of
those who purchased the right drove the Chinese to the
verge of rebellion, and made the whole Mongol regime
hateful. Several tax farmers were removed from their
posts, and punished with death, but their successors car-
ried on the same system. The declining years of Kublai's
reign were therefore marred by the growing discontent of
his Chinese subjects, and by his inability or unwillingness
to put down official extortion and mismanagement. But
he had to cope with a still greater danger in the hostility
of some members of his own family. The rivalry between
himself and his brother Arikbuka formed one incident of
his earlier career, the hostility of his cousin Kaidu proved a
more serious peril when Kublai was stricken in years, and
approaching the end of his long reign.
Kaidu was one of the sons of Ogotai, and consequently
first cousin to Kublai. He held some high post in Mongolia,
and he represented a reactionary party among the Mongols.
who wished the administration to be less Chinese, and who,
perhaps, sighed for more worlds to conquer. But he hated
Kublai, and was jealous of his pre-eminence, which was,
perhaps, the only cause of his revolt. The hostility of
Kaidu might have remained a personal grievance if he
had not obtained the alliance of Nayan, a Mongol general
of experience and ability, who had long been jealous of the
KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY. 133
superior reputation of Bayan. He was long engaged in
raising an army, with which he might hope to make a bid
for empire, but at last his preparations reached the ear of
Kublai, who determined to crush him before his power had
grown too great. Kublai marched against him at the head
of 100,000 men, and all the troops Nayan could bring into
the field were 40,000, while Kaidu, although hastily gather-
ing his forces, was too far off to render any timely aid.
Kublai commanded in person, and arranged his order of
battle from a tower supported on the backs of four elephants
chained together. Both armies showed great heroism and
ferocity, but numbers carried the day, and Nayan's army
was almost destroyed, while he himself fell into the hands
of the victor. It was contrary to the practice of the Mon-
gols to shed the blood of their own princes, so Kublai or-
dered Nayan to be sewn up in a sack, and then beaten to
death. The war with Kaidu dragged on for many years,
and there is no doubt that Kublai did not desire to push
matters to an extremity with his cousin. Having restored
the fortunes of the war by assuming the command in per-
son, Kublai returned in a short time to Pekin, leaving his
opponent, as he hoped, the proverbial golden bridge by
which to retreat. But his lieutenant, Bayan, to whom
he intrusted the conduct of the campaign, favored more
vigorous action, and was anxious to bring the struggle to
a speedy and decisive termination. He had gained one re-
markable victory under considerable disadvantage, when
Kublai, either listening to his detractors or desirous of re-
straining his activity, dismissed him from his mHitary posts
and, summoning him to Pekin, gave him the uncongenial
office of a minister of State. This happened in 1293, and in
the following year Kublai, who was nearly eighty, and who
had occupied the throne of China for thirty-five years, sick
ened and died, leaving behind him a great reputation which
has survived the criticism of six centuries in both Europe
and China.
Kublai's long reign marked the climax of the Mongol
134 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
triumph which he had all the personal satisfaction of ex-
tending to China. "Where Genghis failed, or attained only
partial success, he succeeded to the fullest extent, thus veri-
fying the prophecy of his grandfather. But although he
conquered their country, he never vanquished the preju-
dices of the Chinese, and the Mongols, unlike the Manchus,
failed completely to propitiate the good will of the histori-
ographers of the Hanlin. Of iviiblai they take some recog-
nition, as an enlightened and well-meaning prince, but for
all the other emperors of the Yuen line they have nothing
good to say. Even Kublai himself could not assure the sta-
bility of his throne, and when he died it was at once clear
that the Mongols could not long retain the supreme position
in China.
But Kublai's authority was sufficiently established for it
to be transmitted, without popular disturbance or any insur-
rection on the part of the Chinese, to his legal heir, who was
his grandson. Such risk as presented itself to the succession
arose from the dissensions among the Mongol princes them-
selves, but the prompt measures of Bayan arrested any
trouble, and Prince Timour was proclaimed emperor under
the Chinese style of Chingtsong. A few months after this
signal service to the ruling family, Bayan died, leaving
behind him the reputation of being one of the most capa-
ble of all the Mongol commanders. Whether because he
could find no general worthy to fill Bayan's place, or be-
cause his temperament was naturally pacific, Timour ear-
ned on no military operations, and the thirteen years of his
reign were marked by almost unbroken peace. But peace
did not bring prosperity in its train, for a considerable part
of China suffered from the ravages of famine, and the crav-
ings of hunger drove many to become brigands. Timour's
anxiety to alleviate the public suffering gained him some
small measure of popularity, and he also endeavored to limit
the opportunities of the Mongol governors to be tyrannical
by taking away from them the power of life and death.
Timour was compelled by the sustained hostility of Kaidu
KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY. 135
to continue the struggle with that prince, but he confined
himself to the defensive, and the death of Kaidu, in 1301,
deprived the contest of its extreme bitterness although it
still continued.
Timour was, however, unfortunate in the one foreign
enterprise which he undertook. The ease with which Bur-
mah had been vanquished and reduced to a tributary state
emboldened some of his officers on the southern frontier to
attempt the conquest of Papesifu a state which may be
identified with the modern Laos. The enterprise, com-
menced in a thoughtless and light-hearted manner, re-
vealed unexpected peril and proved disastrous. A large
part of the Mongol army perished from the heat, and the
survivors were only rescued from their perilous position,
surrounded by the numerous enemies they had irritated,
by a supreme effort 011 the part of Koko, the viceroy of
Yunnan, who was also Timour's uncle. The insurrection-
ary movement was not confined to the outlying districts
of Annam and Burmah, but extended within the Chinese
border, and several years elapsed before tranquillity was
restored to the frontier provinces.
Timour died in 1306 without leaving a direct legitimate
heir, and his two nephews Haichan and Aiyuli Palipata
were held to possess an equal claim to the throne. Haichan
was absent in Mongolia when his uncle died, and a faction
put forward the pretensions of Honanta, prince of Gansi,
who seems to have been Timour's natural son, but Aiyuli
Palipata, acting with great energy, arrested the pretender
and proclaimed Haichau as emperor. Haichan reigned five
years, during which the chief reputation he gained was as
a glutton. When he died, in 1311, his brother Palipata was
proclaimed emperor, although Haichan left two sons. Pali-
pata's reign of nine years was peaceful and uneventful, and
his son Chutepala succeeded him. Chutepala was a young
and inexperienced prince who owed such authority as he
enjoyed to the courage of Baiju, a brave soldier, who was
specially distinguished as the lineal descendant of the great
136 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
general, Muhula. The plots and intrigues which compassed
the ruin of the Yuen dynasty began during this reign, and
both Chutepala and Baiju were murdered by conspirators.
The next emperor, Yesun Timour, was fortunate in a peace-
ful reign, but on his death, in 1328, the troubles of the dy-
nasty accumulated, and its end came clearly into view. In
little more than a year, three emperors were proclaimed and
died. Tou Timour, one of the sons of Haichan, who ruled
before Palipata, was so far fortunate in reigning for a longer
period, but the most interesting episode in his barren reign
was the visit of the Grand Lama of Tibet to Pekin, where
he was received with exceptional honor; but when Tou
Timour attempted to compel his courtiers to pay the rep-
resentative of Buddhism special obeisance he encountered
the opposition of both Chinese and Mongols.
After Tou Timour's death the imperial title passed to
Tohan Timour, who is best known by his Chinese title of
Chunti. He found a champion in Bayan, a descendant
of the general of that name, who successfully defended the
palace against the attack of a band of conspirators. In 1337
the first distinct rebellion on the part of the Chinese took
place in the neighborhood of Canton, and an order for the
disarmament of the Chinese population aggravated the situa-
tion because it could not be effectually carried out. Bayan,
after his defense of the palace, became the most powerful
personage in the state, and to his arrogance was largely due
the aggravation of the Mongol difficulties and the imbittering
of Chinese opinion. He murdered an empress, tyrannized
over the Chinese, and outshone the emperor in his apparel
and equipages, as if he were a "Wolsey or a Buckingham.
For the last offense Chunti could not forgive him, and Bayan
was deposed and disgraced. While these dissensions were
in progress at Pekin the Chinese were growing more daring
and confident hi their efforts to liberate themselves from the
foreign yoke. They had adopted red bonnets as the mark
of their patriotic league, and on the sea the piratical confed-
eracy of Fangkue Chin vanquished and destroyed such navy
KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY. 137
as the Mongols ever possessed. But in open and regular
fighting on land the supremacy of the Mongols was still
incontestable, and a minister, named Toto, restored the sink-
ing fortunes of Chunti until he fell the victim of a court
intrigue being poisoned by a rival named Hamar. "With
Toto disappeared the last possible champion of the Mongols,
and the only thing needed to insure their overthrow was the
advent of a capable leader who could give coherence to the
national cause, and such a leader was not long in making his
appearance.
The deli verer of the Chinese from the Mongols was an
individual named Choo Yuen Chang, who, being left an
orphan, entered a monastery as the easiest way of gaining
a livelihood. In the year 1345, when Chunti had been on
the throne twelve years, Choo quitted his retreat and joined
one of the bands of Chinese who had thrown off the authority
of the Mongols. His physique and fine presence soon gained
for him a place of authority, and when the chief of the band
died he was chosen unanimously as his successor. He at
once showed himself superior to the other popular leaders
by his humanity, and by his wise efforts to convince the
Chinese people that he had only their interests at heart.
Other Chinese so-called patriots thought mainly of plunder,
and they were not fess terrible to peaceful citizens than the
most exacting Mongol commander or governor. But Choo
strictly forbade plundering, and any of his band caught rob-
bing or ill-using the people met with prompt and summary
punishment. By this conduct he gained the confidence of
the Chinese, and his standard among all the national leaders
became the most popular and attracted the largest number
of recruits. In 1356 he captured the city of Nankin, which
thereupon became the base of his operations, as it was subse-
quently the capital of his dynasty. He then issued a proc-
lamation declaring that his sole object was to expel the
foreigners and to restore the national form of government,
^n this document he said, "It is the birthright of the Chinese
*o govern foreign peoples and not of these latter to rule in
138 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
China. It used to be said that the Yuen or Mongols, who
came from the regions of the north, conquered our empire
not so much by their courage and skill as by the aid of
Heaven. And now it is sufficiently plain that Heaven itself
wishes to deprive them of that empire, as some punishment
for their crimes, and for not having acted according to the
teaching of their forefathers. The time has now come to
drive these foreigners out of China." While the Mongols
were assailed in every province of the empire by insurgents,
Choo headed what was the only organized movement for
their expulsion, and his alliance with the pirate, Fangkue
Chin, added the command of the sea to the control he had
himself acquired over some of the wealthiest and most pop-
ulous provinces of Central China. The disunion among the
Mongols contributed to their overthrow as much as the valor
of the Chinese. The Emperor Chunti had quite given him-
self up to pleasure, and his debaucheries were the scandal of
the day. The two principal generals, Chahan Timour and
Polo Timour, hated each other, and refused to co-operate.
Another general, Alouhiya, raised the standard of revolt in
Mongolia, and, while he declared that his object was to
regenerate his race, he, undoubtedly, aggravated the em-
barrassment of Chunti.
In 1366, Choo, having carefully made all the necessary
preparations for war on a large scale, dispatched from Nankin
two large armies to conquer the provinces north of the
Yangtsekiang, which were all that remained in the posses-
sion of the Mongols. A third army was intrusted with the
task of subjecting the provinces dependent on Canton, and
this task was accomplished with rapidity and without a
check. Such Mongol garrisons as were stationed in this
quarter were annihilated. The main Chinese army of 250,-
000 men was intrusted to the command of Suta, Choo's
principal lieutenant and best general, and advanced direct
upon Pekin. In 1367 Suta had overcome all resistance south
of the Hoangho, which river he crossed in the autumn of
that year. The Mongols appeared demoralized, and at-
THE MIXG DYNASTY. 139
tempted little or no resistance. Chunti fled from Pekin
to Mongolia, where he died in 1370, and Suta carried the
capital by storm from the small Mongol garrison which
remained to defend it. Choo hastened to Pekin to receive
the congratulations of his army, and to prove to the whole
Chinese nation that the Yuen dynasty had ceased to rule.
The resistance offered by the Mongols proved surprisingly
slight, and, considering the value of the prize for which they
were fighting, quite unworthy of their ancient renown. The
real cause of their overthrow was that the Mongols never
succeeded in propitiating the good opinion and moral support
of the Chinese, who regarded them to the end as barbarians,
and it must also be admitted that the main force of the Mon-
gols had drifted to "Western Asia, where the great Timour
revived some of the traditions of Genghis. At the end of
his career that mighty conqueror prepared to invade China,
but he died shortly after he had begun a march that boded
ill to the peace and welfare of China. Thus, with the flight
of Chunti, the Mongol or Yuen dynasty came to an end, and
the Mongols only reappear in Chinese history as the humble
allies of the Manchus, when they undertook the conquest of
China in the seventeenth century.
CHAPTER VII
THE MING DYNASTY
HAVING expelled the Mongols, Choo assumed the style of
Hongwou, and he gave his dynasty the name of Ming, which
signifies "bright." He then rewarded his generals and offi-
cers with titles and pecuniary grants, and in 1369, the first
year of his reign after the capture of Pekin, he erected a
temple or hall in that city in honor of the generals who had
been slain, while vacant places were left for the statues of
those generals who still held command. But while he re-
warded his army, Hongwou very carefully avoided giving
140
his government a military character, knowing that the
Chinese resent the superiority of military officials, and he
devoted his main efforts to placing the civil administration
on its old and national basis. In this he received the cordial
support of the Chinese themselves, who had been kept in the
background by their late conquerors, whose administration
was essentially military. Hongwou also patronized litera-
ture, and endowed the celebrated Hanlin College, which was
neglected after the death of Kublai. He at once provided a
literary task of great magnitude in the history of the Yuen
dynasty, which was intrusted to a commission of eighteen
writers. But a still greater literary work was accomplished
in the codified Book of Laws, which is known as the Pandects
of Yunglo, and which not merely simplified the administra-
tion of the law, but also gave the people some idea of the
laws under which they lived. He also passed a great meas-
ure of gratuitous national education, and, in order to carry
out this reform in a thoroughly successful manner, he ap-
pointed all the masters himself. He also founded many
public libraries, and he wished to establish one in every
town, but this was beyond the extent of his power. Not
content with providing for the minds of his subjects, Hong-
wou did his utmost to supply the needs of the aged. He cut
down the court expenses and issued sumptuary laws, so that
he might devote the sums thus economized to the support of
the aged and sick. His last instructions to the new officials,
on proceeding to their posts, were to "take particular care
of the aged and the orphan." Thus did he show that the
Chinese had found in him a ruler who would revive the
ancient glories of the kingdom.
The frugality and modesty of his court have already been
referred to. The later Mongols were fond of a lavish dis-
play, and expended large sums on banquets and amusements.
At Pekin one of their emperors had erected in the grounds
of the palace a lofty tower of porcelain, at enormous expense,
and had arranged an ingenious contrivance at its base for
denoting the time. Two statues sounded a bell and struck
THE lUXG DYNASTY. 141
a drum at every hour. "When Hongwou saw this edifice, he
exclaimed, "How is it possible for men to neglect the most
important affairs of life for the sole object of devoting their
attention to useless buildings? If the Mongols in place of
amusing themselves with these trifles had applied their
energies to the task of contenting the people, would they not
have preserved the scepter in their family?" He then or-
dered that this building should be razed to the ground. Nor
did this action stand alone. He reduced the size of the
harem maintained by all the Chinese as well as the Mongol
rulers, and he instituted a rigid economy in all matters of
state ceremonial. Changtu, the Xanadu of Coleridge, the
famous summer palace of Kublai, had been destroyed during
the campaigns with the Mongols, and Hongwou systemati-
cally discouraged any attempt to embellish the northern cap-
ital, Pekin, which, under the Kin and Yuen dynasties, had
become identified with foreign rulers. Pekin, during the
whole of the Ming dynasty, was only a second-rate city, and
all the attention of the Ming rulers was given to the embel-
lishment of Nankin, the truly national capital of China.
The expulsion of the Mongols beyond the Great Wall and
the death of Chunti, the last of the Yuen emperors, by no
means ended the struggle between the Chinese and their late
northern conquerors. The whole of the reign of Hongwou
was taken up with a war for the supremacy of his authority
and the security of his frontiers, in which he, indeed, took
little personal part, but which was carried on under his
directions by his great generals, Suta and Fuyuta. The
former of these generals was engaged for nearly twenty
years, from 1368 to 1385, in constant war with the Mongols.
His first campaign, fought when the Chinese were in the
full flush of success, resulted in the brilliant and almost
bloodless conquest of the province of Shansi. The neighbor-
ing province of Shensi, which is separated from the other by
the river Hoangho, was at the time held by a semi-inde-
pendent Mongol governor named Lissechi, who believed that
he could hold his ground against the Mings. The principal
142 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
fact upon which this hope was based was the breadth and
assumed impassability of that river. Lissechi believed that
this natural advantage would enable him to hold out indefi-
nitely against the superior numbers of the Chinese armies.
But his hope was vain if not unreasonable. The Chinese
crossed the Hoangho on a bridge of junks, and Tsinyuen,
which Lissechi had made his capital, surrendered without a
blow. LeBsechi abandoned one fortress after another on the
approach of Suta. Expelled from Shensi he hoped to find
shelter and safety in the adjoining province of Kansuh,
where he took up his residence at Lintao. For a moment
the advance of the Chinese army was arrested while a great
council of war was held to decide the further course of the
campaign. The majority of the council favored the sugges-
tion that did not involve immediate action, and wished Suta
to abandon the pursuit of Lissechi and complete the conquest
of Shensi, where several fortresses still held out. But Suta
was of a more resolute temper, and resolved to ignore the
decision of the council and to pursue Lissechi to Lintao.
The vigor of Suta's decision was matched by the rapidity of
his march. Before Lissechi had made any arrangements
to stand a siege he found himself surrounded at Lintao by
the Ming army. In this plight he was obliged to throw him-
self on the mercy of the victor, who sent him to the capital,
where Hongwou granted him his life and a small pension.
The overthrow of Lissechi prepared the way for the more
formidable enterprise against Ninghia, where the Mongols
had drawn their remaining power to a head. Ninghia, the
old capital of Tangut, is situated in the north of Kansuh, on
the western bank of the Hoangho, and the Great Wall passes
through it. Strongly fortified and admirably placed, the
Mongols, so long as they possessed this town with its gates
through the Great Wall, might hope to recover what they
had lost, and to make a fresh bid for power in Northern
China. North and west of Ninghia stretched the desert,
but while it continued in their possession the Mongols re-
mained on the threshold of China and held open a door
THE MING DYNASTY. 143
through which their kinsmen from the Amour and Central
Asia might yet re-enter to revive the feats of Genghis and
Bayan. Suta determined to gain this place as speedily as
possible. Midway between Lintao and Ninghia is the fortified
town of Kingyang, which was held by a strong Mongol garri-
son. Suta laid close siege to this town, the governor of which
had only time to send off a pressing appeal for aid to Kuku
Timour, the governor at Ninghia, before he was shut in on
all sides by the Ming army. Kuku Timour apparently did
his best to aid his compatriot, but his forces were not suffi-
cient to oppose those of Suta in the open field, and Kingyang
was at last reduced to such straits that the garrison is said to
have been compelled to use the slain as food. At last the
place made an unconditional surrender, and the commandant
was executed, not on account of his stubborn defense, but
because at the beginning of the siege he had said he would
surrender and had not kept his word. After the fall of
Kingyang the Chinese troops were granted a well-earned
rest, and Suta visited Nankin to describe the campaign to
Hongwou.
The departure of Suta emboldened Kuku Timour so far
as to lead him to take the field, and he hastened to attack
the town of Lanchefoo, the capital of Kansuh, where there
was only a small garrison. Notwithstanding this the place
offered a stout resistance, but the Mongols gained a decisive
success over a body of troops sent to its relief. This force
was annihilated and its general taken prisoner. The Mon-
gols thought to terrify the garrison by parading this general,
whose name should be preserved, Yukwang, before the walls,
but he baffled their purpose by shouting out, "Be of good
courage, Suta is coming to your rescue." Yukwang was
cut to pieces, but his timely and courageous exclamation,
like that of D'Assas, saved his countrymen. Soon after this
incident Sufca reached the scene of action, and on his ap-
proach Kuku Timour broke up his camp and retired to
Ninghia. The Chinese commander then hastened to occupy
the towns of Souchow and Kia-yu-kwan, important as being
144 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the southern extremity of the Great Wall, and as isolating
Ninghia on the west. Their loss was so serious that the
Mongol chief felt compelled to risk a general engagement.
The battle was keenly contested, and at one moment it
seemed as if success was going to declare itself in favor of
the Mongols. But Suta had sent a large part of his force
to attack the Mongol rear, and when this movement was
completely executed, he assailed the Mongol position at the
head of all his troops. The struggle soon became a mas-
sacre, and it is said that as many as 80,000 Mongols were
slain, while Kuku Timour, thinking Ninghia no longer safe,
fled northward to the Amour. The success of Suta was
heightened and rendered complete by the capture of a large
number of the ex-Mongol ruling family by Ly Wenchoug,
another of the principal generals of Hongwou. Among the
prisoners was the eldest grandson of Chunti, and several ol.
the ministers advised that he should be put to death. But
Hongwou instead conferred on him a minor title of nobility,
and expressed his policy in a speech equally creditable to his
wisdom as a statesman and his heart as a man :
"The last ruler of the Yuens took heed only of his pleas-
ures. The great, profiting by his indolence, thought of noth-
ing save of how to enrich themselves ; the public treasures
being exhausted by their malpractices, it needed only a few
years of dearth to reduce the people to distress, and the ex-
cessive tyranny of those who governed them led to the form-
ing of parties which disturbed the empire even to its founda-
tions. Touched by the misfortunes with which I saw them
oppressed, I took up arms, not so much against the Yuens
as against the rebels who were engaged in war with them.
It was over the same foe that I gained my first successes.
And if the Yuen prince had not departed from the rules of
wise government in order to give himself up to his pleasures,
and had the magnates of his court performed their duty,
would all honorable men have taken up arms as they did and
declared against him? The misconduct of the race brought
me a large number of partisans who were convinced of the
THE MING DYNASTY. 145
rectitude of my intentions, and it was from their hands and
not from those of the Yuens that I received the empire. If
Heaven had not favored me should I have succeeded in de-
stroying with such ease those who withdrew into the desert
of Shamo? "We read in the Chiking that after the destruc-
tion of the Chang family there remained more than ten thou-
sand of their descendants who submitted themselves to the
Chow, because it was the will of Heaven. Cannot men
respect its decrees? Let them put in the public treasure-
house all the spoil brought back from Tartary, so that it may
serve to alleviate the people's wants. And with regard to
Maitilipala (Chunti's grandson), although former ages supply
examples of similar sacrifice, did Wou "Wang, I ask you,
when exterminating the Chang family, resort to this barbar-
ous policy? The Yuen princes were the masters of this em-
pire for nearly one hundred years, and my forefathers were
their subjects, and even although it were the constant prac-
tice to treat in this fashion the princes of a dynasty which
has ceased to reign, yet could I not induce myself to
adopt it."
These noble sentiments, to which there is nothing contra-
dictory in the whole life of Hongwou, would alone place his
reign high among the most civilizing and humanly interest-
ing epochs in Chinese history. To his people he appeared as
a real benefactor as well as a just prince. He was ever
studious of their interests, knowing that their happiness de-
pended on what might seem trivial matters, as well as in
showy feats of arms and high policy. He simplified the
transit of salt, that essential article of life, to provinces
where its production was scanty, and when dearth fell on
the land he devoted all the resources of his treasury to its
mitigation. His thoughtfulness for his soldiers was shown
by sending fur coats to all the soldiers in garrison at Ninghia
where the winter was exceptionally severe. A final instance
of his justice and consideration may be cited in his ordering
certain Mongol colonies established in Southern China, to
whom the climate proved uncongenial, to be sent back at his
7
146 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A
expense to their northern homes, when his ministers exhorted
him to proceed to extremities against them and to root them
out by fire and sword.
The pacification of the northern borders was followed by
the dispatch of troops into the southern provinces of Szchuen
and Yunnan, where officials appointed by the Mongols still
exercised authority. One of these had incurred the wrath
of Hongwou by assuming a royal style and proclaiming him-
self King of Hia. He was soon convinced of the folly of
taking a title which he had not the power to maintain, and
the conquest of Szchuen was so easily effected that it would
not call for mention if it were not rendered interesting as
providing Hongwou's other great general Fuyuta with the
first opportunity of displaying his skill as a commander.
The self -created King of Hia presented himself laden with
chains at the Chinese camp and begged the favor of his life.
The conquest of Szchuen was little more than completed
when the attention of Hongwou was again directed to the
northwest frontier, where Kuku Timour was making one
more effort to recover the footing he had lost on the fringe
of the Celestial Empire, and for a time fortune favored his
enterprise. Even when Suta arrived upon the scene and
took the command of the Chinese forces in person, the Mon-
gols more than held their own. Twice did Suta attack the
strong position taken up by the Mongol chief in the desert,
and twice was his assault repulsed with heavy loss. A de-
tachment under one of his lieutenants was surprised in the
desert and annihilated. Supplies were difficult to obtain,
and discouraged by defeat and the scarcity of food the Chi-
nese army was placed in an extremely dangerous position.
Out of this dilemma it was rescued by the heroic Fuyuta,
who, on the news of the Mongol recrudescence, had marched
northward at the head of the army with which he had con-
quered Szchuen. He advanced boldly into the desert, oper-
ated on the flank and in the rear of Kuku Timour, vanquished
the Mongols hi many engagements, and so monopolized their
attention that Suta was able to retire in safety and without
THE MING DYXASTY. 147
loss. The war terminated with the Chinese maintaining all
their posts on the frontier, and the retreat of the Mongols,
who had suffered too heavy a loss to feel elated at their
repulse of Suta. At the same time no solid peace had been
obtained, and the Mongols continued to harass the borders,
and to exact blackmail from all who traversed the desert.
When Hongwou endeavored to attain a settlement by a
stroke of policy his efforts were not more successful. His
kind reception of the Mongol Prince Maitilipala has been
referred to, and about the year 1374 he sent him back to
Mongolia, in the hope that he would prove a friendly neigh-
bor on his father's death. The gratitude of Maitilipala
seems to have been unaffected ; but, although he was the
legitimate heir, the Mongols refused to recognize him as
Khan on the death of his father. Gradually tranquillity
settled down on those borders. The Chinese officials were
content to leave the Mongols alone, and the Mongols aban-
doned their customary raids into Chinese territory. The
death of Kuku Timour. was followed by the abandonment
of all ideas of reviving Mongol authority in China. Not
long after that event died the great general, Suta, of whom
the national historians give the following glowing description
which merits preservation: "Suta spoke little and was en-
dowed with great penetration. He was always on good
terms with the generals acting with him, sharing the good
and bad fortune alike of his soldiers, of whom there was not
one who, touched by his kindness, would not have done his
duty to the death. He was not less pronounced in his mod-
esty. He had conquered a capital, three provinces, several
hundred towns, and on the very day of his return to court
from these triumphs he went without show and without
retinue to his own house, received there some learned pro-
fessors and discussed various subjects with them. Through-
out his life he was in the presence of the emperor respectful,
and so reserved that one might have doubted his capacity to
speak." Hongwou was in the habit of speaking thus in his
praise: "My orders received, he forthwith departed; his
148 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
task accomplished, he returned without pride and without
boasting. He loves not women, he does not amass wealth.
A man of strict integrity, without the slightest stain, as pure
and clear as the sun and moon, there is none like my first
general Suta."
Hongwou had the satisfaction of restoring amicable rela-
tions with the King of Corea, a state in which the Chinese
have always taken naturally enough a great interest from
its proximity, as well as from an apprehension that the Jap-
anese might make use of it as a vantage ground for the
invasion of the continent. The King of Corea sent a formal
embassy to Nankin, and when he died his son asked for and
received investiture in his authority with the royal yellow
robes at the hands of the Ming ruler. During this period it
will be convenient here to note that the ruling power in
Corea passed from the old royal family to the minister Li
Chungwei, who was the ancestor of the present king. The
last military episode of the reign of Hongwou was the con-
quest of Yunnan, which had been left over after the recovery
of Szchuen, in consequence of the fresh outbreak of the Mon-
gols in the north. This task was intrusted to Fuyuta, who
at the head of an army of 100,000 men, divided into two
corps, invaded Yunnan. The prince of that state offered
the utmost resistance he could, but in the one great battle
of the war his army fighting bravely was overthrown, and
he was compelled to abandon his capital. The conquest of
Yunnan completed the pacification of the empire, and the
authority of Hongwou was unchallenged from the borders
of Burmah to the Great Wall and the Corean frontier. The
population of the empire thus restored did not much exceed
sixty millions. The last ten years of the reign of Hongwou
were passed in tranquillity, marred by only one unpleasant
incident, the mutiny of a portion of his army under an ambi-
tious general. The plot was discovered in good time, but it
is said that the emperor did not consider the exigencies of
the case to be met until he had executed twenty thousand
of the mutineers.
THE MING DYNASTY. 149
In 1398 Hongwou was attacked with the illness which
ended his life. He was then in his seventy-first year, and
had reigned more than thirty years since his proclamation
of the Ming dynasty at Nankin. The Emperor Keen Lung,
in his history of the Mings, states that Hongwou possessed
most of the virtues and few of the vices of mankind. He
was brave, patient under suffering, far-seeing, studious of
his people's welfare, and generous and forbearing toward his
enemies. It is not surprising that he succeeded in establish-
ing the Ming dynasty on a firm and popular basis, and that
his family have been better beloved in China than any dy-
nasty with the possible exception of the Hans. In his will,
which is a remarkable document, he recites the principal
events of his reign, how he had "pacified the empire and
restored its ancient splendor." "With the view of providing
for the stability of his empire, he chose as his successor his
grandson Chuwen, because he had remarked in him much
prudence, a gentle disposition, good intelligence, and a readi-
ness to accept advice. He also selected him because he was
the eldest son of his eldest son, and as his other sons might
be disposed to dispute their nephew's authority he ordered
them to remain at their posts, and not to come to the capital
on his death. They were also enjoined to show the new
emperor all the respect and docility owed by subjects to their
sovereign. Through these timely precautions Chuwen, who
was only sixteen years of age, was proclaimed emperor
without any opposition, and took the title of Kien Wenti.
Hongwou had rightly divined that his sons might prove
a thorn in the side of his successor, and his policy of employ-
ing them in posts at a distance from the capital was only
half successful in attaining its object. If it kept them at a
distance it also strengthened their feeling of independence,
and enabled them to collect their forces without attracting
much attention. "Wenti, as it is most convenient to call the
new emperor, felt obliged to send formal invitations to his
uncles to attend the obsequies of their father. Most of them
had the tact to perceive that the invitation was dictated by
150 .4 SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
regard for decency, and not by a wish that it should be
accepted, and gave the simplest excuse for not attending the
funeral. But Ty, Prince of Yen, the most powerful and
ambitious of them all, declared that he accepted the em-
peror's invitation. This decision raised quite a flutter of
excitement, almost amounting to consternation, at Nankin,
where the Prince of Yen was regarded as a bitter and vin-
dictive enemy. The only way Wenti saw out of this dilem-
ma was to send his uncle a special intimation that his pres-
ence at the capital would not be desirable. Before he had
been many weeks on the throne Wenti was thus brought into
open conflict with the most powerful and ambitious of all his
relatives. He resolved, under the advice of his ministers, to
treat all his uncles as his enemies, and he sent his officers
with armies at their back to depose them, and bring them as
prisoners to his court. Five of his uncles were thus sum-
marily dealt with, one committed suicide, and the other four
were degraded to the rank of the people. But the Prince
of Yen was too formidable to be tackled in this fashion.
Taking warning from the fate of his brothers, he collected
all the troops he could, prepared to defend his position against
the emperor, and issued a proclamation stating that it was
lawful for subjects to revolt for the purpose of removing the
pernicious advisers of the sovereign. The last was, he an-
nounced, the cause of his taking up arms, and he disclaimed
any motive of ambitious- turbulence for raising his standard.
He said, "I am endeavoring to avert the ruin of my family,
and to maintain the emperor on a throne which is placed in
jeopardy by the acts of traitors. My cause ought, therefore,
to be that of all those who keep the blood of the great Hong-
wou, now falsely aspersed, in affectionate remembrance."
A large number of the inhabitants of the northern provinces
joined his side, and proclaimed him as "The Prince. " "Wenti
had recourse to arms to bring his uncle back to his allegiance,
and a civil war began, which was carried on, with excep-
tional bitterness, during five years. The resources of the
emperor, in men and money, were the superior, but he did
'iHE MIXG DYXAKTY. 151
not seem able to turn them to good account ; and the prince's
troops were generally victorious, and his power gradually
increased. In the year 1401 both sides concentrated all their
strength for deciding the contest by a single trial of arms.
The two armies numbered several hundred thousand men,
and it is stated that the imperial force alone mustered 600,-
000 strong. The battle which was fought at Techow in
Shantung considering the numbers engaged, it is not sur-
prising to learn, lasted several days, and its fortune alter-
nated from one side to the other. At last victory declared
for the prince, and the imperial army was driven in rout
from the field with the loss of 100,000 men.
After this great victory the further progress of the prince
was arrested by a capable general named Chinyong, who
succeeded in gaining one great victory. If Wenti had known
how to profit by this success he might have turned the course
of the struggle permanently in his own favor. But instead
of profiting by his good fortune, "Wenti, believing that all
danger from the prince was at an end, resumed his old
practices, and reinstated two of the most obnoxious of his
ministers, whom he had disgraced in a fit of apprehension.
Undoubtedly this step raised against him a fresh storm
of unpopularity, and at the same time brought many sup-
porters to his uncle, who, even after the serious disaster
described, found himself stronger than he had been before.
The struggle must have shown little signs of a decisive issue,
for in 1402 the prince made a voluntary offer of peace, with
a view to putting an end to all strife and of giving the em-
pire peace ; but Wenti could not make up his mind to forgive
him. The success of his generals in the earlier part of the
struggle seemed to warrant the belief that there was no
reason in prudence for coming to terms with his rebellious
uncle, and that he would succeed in establishing his indispu-
table supremacy. The prince seemed reduced to such straits
that he had to give his army the option of retreat. Address-
ing his soldiers he said: "I know how to advance, but not to
retreat"; but his army decided to return to their homes in
152 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the north, when the extraordinary and unexpected retreat
of the greater part of the army of Wenti revived their
courage and induced them to follow their leader through
one more encounter. Like Frederick the Great, the Prince
of Yen was never greater than in defeat. He surprised the
lately victorious army of Wenti, smashed it in pieces, and
captured Tingan, the emperor's best general. The occupa-
tion of Nankin and the abdication of "Wenti followed this
victory in rapid succession. Afraid to trust himself to the
mercy of his relative, he fled, disguised as a priest, to Yun-
nan, where he passed his life ignominiously for forty years,
and his identity was only discovered after that lapse of time
by his publishing, in his new character of a Buddhist priest,
a poem reciting and lamenting the misfortunes of Wenti.
Then he was removed to Pekin, where he died in honorable
confinement. As a priest he seems to have been more fort-
unate than as a ruler, and history contains no more striking
example of happiness being found in a private station when
unattainable on a throne.
After some hesitation the Prince of Yen allowed himself
to be proclaimed emperor, and as such he is best known as
Yonglo, a name signifying "Eternal Joy." Considering his
many declarations that his only ambition was to reform and
not to destroy the administration of his nephew, his first act
obliterating the reign of Wenti from the records and consti-
tuting himself the immediate successor of Hongwou was not
calculated to support his alleged indifference to power. He
was scarcely seated on the throne before he was involved in
serious troubles on both his northern and his southern fron-
tiers. In Mongolia he attempted to assert a formal supremacy
over the khans through the person of an adventurer named
Kulitchi, but the agent was unable to fulfill his promises, and
met with a speedy overthrow. In Tonquin an ambitious
minister named Likimao deposed his master and established
himself as ruler in his place. The emperor sent an army to
bring him to his senses, and it met with such rapid success
that the Chinese were encouraged to annex Tonquin and
THE MING DYNASTY. 153
convert it into a province of the empire. When Yonglo's
plans failed on the steppe he was drawn into a struggle with
the Mongols, which necessitated annual expeditions until he
died. During the last of these he advanced as far as the
Kerulon, and on his return march he died in his camp at
the age of sixty-five. Although he bore arms so long against
the head of the state there is no doubt that he greatly con-
solidated the power of the Mings, which he extended on one
side to the Amour and on the other to the Songcoi. It was
during his reign that Tamerlane contemplated the reconquest
of China, and perhaps it was well for Yonglo that that great
commander died when he had traversed only a few stages of
his march to the Great Wall. One of his sons succeeded
Yonglo as emperor, but he only reigned under the style of
Gintsong for a few months.
Then Suentsong, the son of Gintsong, occupied the throne,
and during his reign a vital question affecting the constitu-
tion of the civil service, and through it the whole adminis-
tration of the country, was brought forward, and fortunately
settled without recourse to blows, as was at one time feared
would be the case. Before his reign the public examinations
had been open to candidates from all parts of the empire, and
it had become noticeable that all the honors were being
carried off by students from the southern provinces, who
were of quicker intelligence than those of the north. It
seemed as if in the course of a short time all the posts would
be held by them, and that the natives of the provinces north
of the Hoangho would be gradually driven out of the service.
Naturally this marked tendency led to much agitation in the
north, and a very bitter feeling was spreading when Suen-
tsong and his minister took up the matter and proceeded to
apply a sound practical remedy. After a commission of
inquiry had certified to the reality of the evil, Suentsong
decreed that all competitors for literary honors should be
restricted to their native districts, and that for the purpose
of the competitive examinations China should be divided into
three separate divisions, one for the north, another for the
154 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHISA.
center, and the third for the south. The firmness shown Vy
the Emperor Suentsong in this matter was equally conspicu-
ous in his dealings with an uncle, who showed some inclina-
tion to revolt. He took the field in person, and before the
country was generally aware of the revolt,- Suestsong
conducting his relative to a state prison. The rest of Suen-
tsong's reign was peaceful and prosperous, and he left the
crown to his son, Yngtsong, a child eight years old.
During his minority the governing authority was exer-
cised by his grandmother, the Empress Changchi, the mother
of the Emperor Suentsong. At first it seemed as if there
would be a struggle for power between her and the eunuch
Wangchin, who had gained the affections of the young
emperor ; but after she had denounced him before the court
and called for his execution, from which fate he was only
rescued by the tears and supplications of the young sover-
eign, the feud was composed by Wangchin gaining such an
ascendency over the empress that she made him her associate
in the regency. Unfortunately Wangchin did not prove a
wise or able administrator. He thought more of the sweets
of office than of the duties of his lofty station. He appointed
his relations and creatures to the highest civil and military
posts without regard to their qualifications or ability. To
his arrogance was directly due the commencement of a dis-
astrous war with Yesien, the most powerful of the Mongol
chiefs of the day. When that prince sent the usual presents
to the Chinese capital, and made the customary request for
a Chinese princess as wife, Wangchin appropriated the gifts
for himself and sent back a haughty refusal to Yesien's peti-
tion, although it was both customary and rarely refused.
Such a reception was tantamount to a declaration of war,
and Yesien, who had already been tempted by the apparent
weakness of the Chinese frontier to resume the raids which
were so popular with the nomadic tribes of the desert, gath-
ered his fighting men together and invaded China. Alarmed
by the storm he had raised, Wangchin still endeavored to
meet it, and summoning all the garrisons in the north to his
THE M1XG DYNASTY 155
aid, he placed himself at the head of an army computed to
number half a million of men. In the hope of inspiring his
force with confidence he took the boy-emperor, Yngtsong,
with him, but his own incompetence nullified the value of
numbers, and rendered the presence of the emperor the cause
of additional ignominy instead of the inspiration of invincible
confidence. The vast and unwieldy Chinese army took up
a false position at a place named Toumon, and it is affirmed
that the position was so bad that Yesien feared that it must
cover a ruse. He accordingly sent some of his officers to
propose an armistice, but really to inspect the Chinese lines.
They returned to say that there was no concealment, and
that if an attack were made at once the Chinese army lay at
his mercy. Yesien delayed not a moment in delivering his
attack, and it was completely successful. The very numbers
of the Chinese, in a confined position, added to their discom-
fiture, and after a few hours' fighting the battle became a
massacre and a rout. Wangchin, the cause of all this ruin,
was killed by Fanchong, the commander of the imperial
guards, and the youthful ruler, Yngtsong, was taken pris-
oner. There has rarely been a more disastrous day in the
long annals of the Chinese empire than the rout at Toumon.
Then Yesien returned to his camp on the Toula, taking
his prisoner with him, and announcing that he would only
restore him for a ransom of 100 taels of gold, 200 taels of
silver, and 200 pieces of the finest silk. For some unknown
reason the Empress Changchi did not feel disposed to pay
this comparatively low ransom, and instead of reclaiming
Yugtsong from his conqueror she placed his brother, Kingti,
on the throne. The struggle with the Mongols under Yesien
continued, but his attention was distracted from China by
his desire to become the great Khan of the Mongols, a title
still held by his brother-in-law, Thotho Timour, of the House
of Genghis. Yesien, suddenly releasing of his own accord
Yugtsong who returned to Pekin hastened to the Keru-
lon country, where he overthrew and assassinated Thotho
Tiniour, and was in turn himself slain by another chieftain.
156 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
While the Mongol was thus pursuing his own ambition, and
reaching the violent death which forms so common a f eature
in the history of his family, the unfortunate Yngtsong re-
turned to China, where, on the refusal of his brother Kingti
to resign the throne, he sank quietly into private life. Kinirti
died seven years after his brother's return, and then, failing
a better or nearer prince, Yngtsong was brought from his
confinement and restored to the throne. He reigned eight
years after his restoration, but he never possessed any real
power, his authority being wielded by unscrupulous minis-
ters, who stained his reign by the execution of Yukien, the
most honest and capable general of the period. If his reign
was not remarkable for political or military vigor, some use-
ful reforms appear to have been instituted. Among others
may be named the formation of state farms on waste or con-
fiscated lands, the establishment of military schools for teach-
ing archery and horsemanship, and the completion of some
useful and elaborate educational works, of which a geography
of China, in ninety volumes, is the most famous.
Yngtsong died in the year 1465, and was succeeded by
his son, Hientsong, who began his reign with acts of filial
devotion that attracted the sympathy of his subjects. He
also rendered posthumous honors to the ill-used general,
Yukien, and established his fame as a national benefactor.
During the twenty-eight years that he occupied the throne
he was engaged in a number of petty wars, none of which
requires specific mention. The only unpopular measure as-
sociated with his name was the creation of a Grand Council
of Eunuchs, to which was referred all questions of capital
punishment, and this body soon acquired a power which
made it resemble the tyrannical and irresponsible British
Star Chamber. After five years this institution became so
unpopular and was so deeply execrated by the nation that
Hientsong, however reluctantly, had to abolish his own
creation, and acquiesce in the execution of some of its most
active members.
During Hientsong's reign a systematic attempt was
THE MING DYNASTY. 157
made to work the gold mines reputed to exist in Central
China, but although half a million men were employed
upon them it is stated that the find did not exceed thirty
ounces. More useful work was accomplished in the build-
ing of a canal from Pekin to the Peiho, which thus enabled
grain junks to reach the northern capital by the Euho and
Shaho canals from the Yangtsekiang. Another useful pub-
lic work was the repairing of the Great Wall, effected along
a considerable portion of its extent, by the efforts of 50,000
soldiers, which gave the Chinese a sense of increased secu-
rity. In connection with this measure of defense, it may
be stated that the Chinese advanced into Central Asia and
occupied the town of Hami, which then and since has
served them as a useful watch-tower in the direction of the
-t. The death of Hientsong occurred in 1487, at a mo-
ment when the success and prosperity of the country under
the Mings may be described as having reached its height.
During the reign of his son and successor, Hiaotsong,
matters progressed peacefully, for, although there was some
fighting for the possession of Hami, which was coveted by
several of the desert chiefs, but which remained during the
whole of this reign subject to China, the empire was not
involved in any great war. An insurrection of the black
aborigines of the island of Hainan was put down without
an}- very serious difficulty. These events do not throw any
very clear light on the character and personality of Hiao-
tsong, who died in 1505 at the early age of thirty-six; but
his care for his people, and his desire to alleviate the mis-
fortunes that might befall his subjects, was shown by his
ordering every district composed of ten villages to send in
annually to a State granary, a specified quantity of grain,
until 100,000 bushels had been stored in every such build-
ing throughout the country. The idea was an excellent one ;
but it is to be feared that a large portion of this gram was
diverted to the use of the peculating officials, whence arose
the phrase, "The emperor is full of pity, but the Court of
Finance is like the never-dying worm which devours the
158 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
richest crops." To Hiaotsong succeeded his son, Woutsong,
during whose reign many misfortunes fell upon the land.
The emperor's uncles had designs on his authority, but these
fell through and came to naught, rather through Wou-
tsong's good fortune than the excellence of his arrange-
ments. In Szchuen a peasant war threatened to assume
the dimensions of a rebellion, and in Pechihli bands of
mounted robbers, or Hiangmas, raided the open country.
He succeeded in suppressing these revolts, but his indiffer-
ence to the disturbed state of his realm was shown by his
passing most of his time in hunting expeditions beyond the
Great Wall. His successors were to reap the result of this
neglect of business for the pursuit of pleasure; and when he
died in 1519, without leaving an heir, the outlook was be-
ginning to look serious for the Ming dynasty. One event,
and perhaps the most important of Woutsong's reign, calls
for special mention, and that is the arrival at Canton of the
first native of Europe to reach China by sea. Of course it
will be recollected that Marco Polo and others reached the
Mongol court by land, although the Venetian sailed from
China on his embassy to southern India. In 1511, Raphael
Perestralo sailed from Malacca to China, and in 151? the
Portuguese officer, Don Fernand Perez D'Andrade, arrived
in the Canton River with a squadron, and was favorably re-
ceived by the mandarins. D'Andrade visited Pekin, where
he resided for some time as embassador. The commence-
ment of intercourse between Europeans and China was thus
effected most auspiciously ; and it might have continued so
but that a second Portuguese fleet appeared in Chinese
waters, and committed there numerous outrages and acts
of piracy. Upon this D'Andrade was arrested by order of
Woutsong, and after undergoing imprisonment, was exe-
cuted by his successor in 1523. It was a bad beginning for
a connection which, after nearly four hundred years, is
neither as stable nor as general as the strivers after per-
fection could desire.
The death of Woutsong without children, or any recog-
THE MING DYNASTY. 159
nized heir, threatened to involve the realm in serious dan-
gers ; but the occasion was so critical that the members of
the Ming family braced themselves to it, and under the aus-
pices of the Empress Changchi, the widow of the late ruler,
a secret council was held, when the grandson of the Emperor
Hientsong, a youth of fourteen, was placed on the throne un-
der the name of Chitsong. It is said that his mother gave
him good advice on being raised from a private station to
the lofty eminence of emperor, and that she told him that he
was about to accept a heavy burden ; but experience showed
that he was unequal to it. Still, his shortcomings were
preferable to a disputed s accession. The earlier years of
his reign were marked by some successes over the Tartars,
and he received tribute from chiefs who had never paid it
before. But Chitsong had little taste for the serious work
of administration. He showed himself superstitious in mat-
ters of religion, and he cultivated poetry, and may even
have persuaded himself that he was a poet. But he did
not pay any heed to the advice of those among his ministers
who urged him to take a serious view of his position, and to
act in a manner worthy of his dignity. It is clear that his
influence on the lot of his people, and even on the course of
his country's history, was small, and such reigns as his in-
spire the regret expressed at there being no history of the
Chinese people; but such a history is impossible.
It might be more instructive to trace the growth of
thought among the masses, or to indicate the progress of
civil and political freedom; yet, not only do the materials
not exist for such a task, but those we possess all tend to
show that there has been no growth to describe, no progress
to be indicated, during these comparatively recent centuries.
It is the peculiar and distinguishing characteristic of Chi-
nese history that the people and their institutions have re-
mained practically unchanged and the same from a very
early period. Even the introduction of a foreign element
has not tended to disturb the established order of things.
The supreme ruler possesses the same attributes and dis-
160 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
charges the same functions; the governing classes are
chosen in the same manner; the people are bound in the
same state of servitude, and enjoy the same practical lib-
erty; all is now as it was. Neither under the Tangs nor
the Sungs, under the Yuens nor the Mings, was there any
change in national character or in political institutions to be
noted or chronicled. The history of the empire has alwa3*s
been the fortunes of the dynasty, which has depended, in
the first place, on the passive content of the subjects, and,
in the second, on the success or failure of its external and
internal wars. This condition of things may be disappoint-
ing to those who pride themselves on tracing the origin of a
constitution and the growth of civil rights, and also would
have a history of China a history of the Chinese people;
although the fact is undoubted that there is no history of
the Chinese people apart from that of their country to be
recorded. The national institutions and character were
formed, and had attained in all essentials their present
state, more than two thousand years ago, or before the de-
struction of all trustworthy materials for the task by the
burning of the ancient literature and chronicles of China.
Without them we must fain content ourselves with the his-
tory of the country and the empire.
Chitsong was engaged in three serious operations beyond
his frontier, one with a Tartar chief named Yenta, another
with the Japanese, and the third in Cochin China. Yenta
was of Mongol extraction, and enjoyed supreme power on
the borders of Shansi. His brother was chief of the Ordus
tribe, which dwells within the Chinese frontier. Changtu,
the old residence of Kublai, was one of his camps, and it
was said that he could bring 100,000 horsemen into the field.
The .success of his raids carried alarm through the province
of Shansi, and during one of them he laid siege to the capi-
tal, Taiyuen. Then the emperor placed a reward on his
head and offered an official post to the person who would rid
him of his enemy by assassination. The offer failed to bring
forward either a murderer or a patriot, and Yenta's hostil
THE M1XQ DYNASTY. 161
ity was increased by the personal nature of this attack, and
perhaps by the apprehension of a sinister fate. He invaded
China on a larger scale than ever, and carried his ravages
to the southern extremity of Shansi, and returned laden
with the spoil of forty districts, and bearing with him
200,000 prisoners to a northern captivity. After this suc-
cess Yenta seems to have rested on his laurels, although
he by no means gave up his raids, which, however, assumed
more and more a local character. The Chinese annalists
state that never was the frontier more disturbed, and even
the establishment of horse fairs for the benefit of the Mon-
gols failed to keep them quiet. In Cochin China the
emperor gained some gratifying if not very important
successes, and asserted his right as suzerain over several
disobedient princes. But a more serious and less satisfac-
tory question had to be settled on the side of Japan.
The Japanese had never forgiven the formidable and
unprovoked invasion of their country by Kublai Khan.
The Japanese are by. nature a military nation, and the
Chinese writers themselves describe them as "intrepid,
inured to fatigue, despising life, and knowing well how
to face death; although inferior in number a hundred of
them would blush to flee before a thousand foreigners, and
if they did they would not dare to return to their country.
Sentiments such as these, which are instilled into them from
their earliest childhood, render them terrible in battle."
Emboldened by their success over the formidable Mongols
the Japanese treated the Chinese with contempt, and fitted
out piratical expeditions from time to time with the object
of preying on the commerce and coasting towns of China.
To guard against the descents of these enterprising islanders
the Chinese had erected towers of defense along the coast,
and had called out a militia which was more or less ineffi-
cient. On the main they did not so much as attempt to
make a stand against their neighbors, whose war junks
exercised undisputed authority on the Eastern Sea. While
this strife continued a trade also sprang up between the two
162 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
peoples, who share in an equal degree the commercial in-
stinct; but as the Chinese government only admitted Japa-
nese goods when brought by the embassador, who was sent
every ten years from Japan, this trade could only be carried
on by smuggling. A regular system was adopted to secure
the greatest success and profit. The Japanese landed their
goods on some island oft the coast, whence the Chinese re-
moved them at a safe and convenient moment to the main-
land. The average value of the cargo of one of the small
junks which carried on this trade is said to have been
$20,000, so that it may be inferred that the profits were
considerable. But the national antipathies would not be
repressed by the profitable character of this trade, and the
refusal of a Chinese merchant to give a Japanese the goods
for which he had paid lit the embers of a war which went
on for half a century, and which materially weakened the
Ming power. During the last years of Chitsong's long
reign of forty-five years this trouble showed signs of get-
ting worse, although the Japanese confined their efforts to
irregular and unexpected attacks on places on the coast,
and did not attempt to wage a regular war. In the midst
of these troubles, and when it was hoped that the exhorta-
tion of his ministers would produce some effect, Chitsong
died, leaving behind him a will or public proclamation to
be issued after his death, and which reads like a long con-
fession of fault. Mea culpa, exclaimed this Eastern ruler
at the misfortunes of his people and the calamities of his
realm, but he could not propound a remedy for them.
His third son succeeded him as the Emperor Moutsong,
and the character and capacity of this prince gave promise
that his reign would be satisfactory if not glorious. Unfort-
unately for his family, and perhaps for his country, the
public expectations were dispelled in his case by an early
death. The six years during which he reigned were ren-
dered remarkable by the conclusion of a stable peace with
the Tartar Yenta, who accepted the title of a Prince of the
Empire. Moutsong when he found that he was dying grew
THE DECLINE OF THE MINGS. 163
apprehensive lest the youth of his son might not stir up dis-
sension and provoke that internal strife which had so often
proved the bane of the empire and involved the wreck of
many of its dynasties. He exhorted his ministers to stand
by his son who was only a boy, to give him the best advice
in their power, and to render him worthy of the throne.
That the apprehensions of Moutsong were not without rea-
son was clearly shown by the mishaps and calamities which
occurred during the long reign of his son and successor
Wanleh. With the death of Moutsong the period ends
when it was possible to state that the majesty of the
Mings remained undimmed, and that this truly national
dynasty wielded with power and full authority the impe-
rial mandate. When they had driven out the Mongol the
Mings seem to have settled down into an ordinary and in-
tensely national line of rulers. The successors of Hongwou
did nothing great or noteworthy, but the Chinese acquiesced
hi their rule, and even showed that they possessed for it a
special regard and affection.
CHAPTER VIII
THE DECLINE OP THE MINGS
THE reign of Wanleh covers the long and important
epoch from 1573 to 1620, during which period occurred
some very remarkable events in the history of the coun-
try, including the first movements of the Manchus with a
view to the conquest of the empire. The young prince was
only six when he was placed on the throne, but he soon
showed that he had been \\tll-trained to play the part of
ruler. The best indication of the prosperity of the realm is
furnished by the revenue, which steadily increased until it
reached the great total, excluding the grain receipts, of sev-
enty-five millions of our money. But a large revenue be-
164 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A.
comes of diminished value unless it is associated with sound
finance. The public expenditure showed a steady increase;
the emperor and his advisers were incapable of checking
the outlay, and extravagance, combined with improvidence,
soon depleted the exchequer. Internal troubles occurred to
further embarrass the executive, and the resources of the
state were severely strained in coping with more than one
serious rebellion, among which the most formidable was the
mutiny of a mercenary force under the command of a Turk
officer named Popai, who imagined that he was unjustly
treated, and that the time was favorable to found an ad-
ministration of his own. His early successes encouraged
him to believe that he would succeed in his object; but
when he found that all the disposable forces of the empire
were sent against him, he abandoned the field, and shut
himself up in the fortress at Ninghia, where he hoped to hold
out indefinitely. For many months he succeeded in baffling
the attacks of Wanleh's general, and the siege might even
have had to be raised if the latter had not conceived the
idea of diverting the course of the river Hoangho, so that it
might bear upon the walls of the fortress. Popai was un-
able to resist this form of attack, and when the Chinese
stormers made their way through the breach thus caused,
he attempted to commit suicide by setting fire to his resi-
dence. This satisfaction was denied him, for a Chinese
officer dragged him from the flames, slew him, and sent
his head to the general Li Jusong, who conducted the
siege, and of whom we shall hear a great deal ore.
The gratification caused by the overthrow of Popai had
scarcely abated when the attention of the Chinese govern-
ment was drawn away from domestic enemies to a foreign
assailant who threatened the most serious danger to China.
Reference was made in the IRL chapter to the relations be-
tween the Chinese and the Japanese, and to the aggressions
of the latter, increased, no doubt, by Chinese chicane and
their own naval superiority and confidence. But nothing
serious might have come out of these unneighborly relations
THE DECLINE OF THE MINGS. 165
if they had not furnished an ambitious ruler with the oppor-
tunity of embarking on an enterprise which promised to in-
crease his empire and his glory. The old Japanese ruling
family was descended, as already described, from a Chinese
exile ; but the hero of the sixteenth century could claim no
relationship with the royal house, and owed none of his suc-
cess to the accident of a noble birth. Fashiba, called by
some English writers Hideyoshi ; by the Chinese Pingsiuki ;
and by the Japanese, on his elevation to the dignity of
Tycoon, Taiko Sanaa, was originally a slave; and it is said
that he first attracted attention by refusing to make the pre-
scribed obeisance to one of the daimios or lords. He was on
the point of receiving condign punishment, when he pleaded
his case with such ingenuity and courage that the daimio
not only forgave him his offense, but gave him a post in
his service. Having thus obtained honorable employment,
Fashiba devoted all his energy and capacity to promoting
the interests of his new master, knowing well that his posi-
tion and opportunities mut increase equally with them. In
a short time he made his lord the most powerful daimio in
the land, and on his death he stepped, naturally enough,
into the position and power of his chief. How long he
would have maintained himself thus in ordinary times may
be matter of opinion, but he resolved to give stability to his
position and a greater luster to his name by undertaking an
enterprise which should be popular with the people and
profitable to the state. The Japanese had only attempted
raids on the coast, and they had never thought of estab-
lishing themselves on the mainland. But Fashiba proposed
the conquest of China, and he hoped to effect his purpose
through the instrumentality of Corea. With this view he
wrote the king of that country the following letter: "I will
assemble a mighty host, and, invading the country of the
Great Ming, I will fill with hoar-frost from my sword the
whole sky over the 400 provinces. Should I carry out this
purpose, I hope that Corea will be my vanguard. Let her
not fail to do so, for my friendship to your honorable coun-
166 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
try depends solely on your conduct when I lead my army
against China."
Fashiba began with an act of aggression at Corea's ex-
pense, by seizing the important harbor of Fushan. Having
thus secured a foothold on the mainland and a gateway into
the kingdom, Fashiba hastened to invade Corea at the head
of a large army. The capital was sacked and the tombs of
Lipan's ancestors desecrated, while he himself fled to the
Chinese court to implore the assistance of Wanleh. An
army was hastily assembled and marched to arrest the
progress of the Japanese invader, who had by this reached
Pingyang, a town 400 miles north of Fushan. An action
was fought outside this town. The advantage rested with
the Japanese, who succeeded in destroying a Chinese regi-
ment. After this a lull ensued in the campaign, and both
sides brought up fresh forces. Fashiba came over from
Japan with further supplies and troops to assist his general,
Hingchang, while on the Chinese side, Li Jusong, the captor
of Ninghia, was placed at the head of the Chinese army. A
second battle was fought in the neighborhood of Pingyang,
and after some stubborn fighting the Japanese were driven
out of that town.
The second campaign was opened by a brilliant feat on
the part of Li Jusong, who succeeded in surprising and de-
stroying the granaries and storehouses constructed by the
Japanese, near Seoul. The loss of their stores compelled
the Japanese to retire on Fushan, but they did no with such
boldness and confidence that the Chinese did not venture to
attack them. The ultimate result of the struggle was still
doubtful when the sudden death of Fashiba completely
altered the complexion of the situation. The Japanese
army then withdrew, taking with it a vast amount of
booty and the ears of 10,000 Coreans. The Chinese troops
also retired, leaving the Corean king at liberty to restore
his disputed authority, and his kingdom once more sank
into its primitive state of exclusion and semi-darkness.
For the first time in Chinese history the relations between
THE DECLINE OF THE MINGS. 167
the Middle Kingdom and Europeans became of importance
during the reign of Wanleh, which would alone give it a
special distinction. The Portuguese led the way for Eu-
ropean enterprise in China, and it was very unfortunate that
they did so, for it was soon written of them that "the Portu-
guese have no other design than to come under the name of
merchants to spy the country, that they may hereafter fall
upon it with fire and sword." As early as the year 1560
they had obtained from the local officials the right to found
a settlement and to erect sheds for their goods at a place
which is now known as Macao. In a few years it became of
so much importance that it was the annual restort of five or
six hundred Portuguese merchants; and the Portuguese, by
paying a yearly rent of 500 taels, secured the practical mo-
nopoly of the trade of the Canton River, which was then and
long afterward the only vent for the external trade of China.
No doubt the Portuguese had to supplement this nominal
rent by judicious bribes to the leading mandarins. Next
after the Portuguese came the Spaniards, who, instead of
establishing themselves on the mainland, made their head-
quarters in a group of the Philippine Islands.
The promotion of European interests in China owed little
or nothing to the forbearance and moderation of either the
Spaniards or Portuguese. They tyrannized over the Chinese
subject to their sway, and they employed all their resources
in driving away other Europeans from what they chose to
consider their special commercial preserves. Thus the Dutch
were expelled from the south by the Portuguese and com-
pelled to take refuge in Formosa, while the English and
French did not make their appearance, except by occasional
visits, until a much later period, although it should be re-
corded that the English Captain Weddell was the first to
discover the mouth of the Canton River, and to make his
way up to that great city.
One of the principal troubles of the Emperor Wanleh
arose from his having no legitimate heir, and his ministers
impressed upon him, for many years, the disadvantage of
168 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHLXA.
this situation before he would undertake to select one of his
children by the inferior members of the harem as his suc-
cessor. And then he made what may be termed a divided
selection. He proclaimed his eldest son heir-apparent, and
declared the next brother to be in the direct order of succes-
sion, and conferred on him the title of Prince Fou Wang.
The latter was his real favorite, and, encouraged by his
father's preference, he formed a party to oust his elder
brother and to gam the heritage before it was due. The
intrigues in which he engaged long disturbed the court and
agitated the mind of the emperor. Supported by his mother,
Prince Fou Wang threatened the position and even the life
of the heir-apparent, Prince Chu Changlo, but the plot was
discovered and Fou Wang's rank would not have saved him
from the executioner if it had not been for the special inter-
cession of his proposed victim, Chu Changlo. In the midst
of these family troubles, as well as those of the state, the
Emperor Wanleh died, after a long reign, in 1620. The last
years of his life were rendered unhappy and miserable by the
reverses experienced at the hands of the new and formidable
opponent who had suddenly appeared upon the northern fron-
tier of the empire.
Some detailed account of the Manchu race and of the
progress of their arms before the death of Wanleh will form
a fitting prelude to the description of the long wars which
resulted in the conquest of China and in the placing of the
present ruling family on the Dragon Throne.
The first chief of the Manchu clan was a mythical per-
sonage named Aisin Gioro, who flourished in the middle of
the fourteenth century, while Hongwou, the founder of the
Mings, was employed in the task of driving out the Mongols.
Aisin Gioro is said to mean Golden Family Stem, and thus
the connection with the K"in dynasty finds recognition at -an
early stage. His birth is described in mythical terms it is
said that a magpie dropped a red fruit into the lap of a
maiden of the Niuche, who straightway ate it and conceived
a son. The skeptical have interpreted this as meaning
THE DECLINE OF THE MINGS. 169
Aisin Gioro was a runaway Mongol, who was granted shelter
by the Niuche of Hootooala. At all events he became lord
of the valley, and five generations later, in the reign of
Wanleh, his descendant, Huen, was head of the Manchus.
His grandson, the great Noorhachu, was born in the year
1559, and his birth was attended by several miraculous cir-
cumstances. He is said "to have been a thirteen-months'
child, to have had the dragon face and the phenix eye, an
enormous chest, large ears, and a voice like the tone of the
largest bell."
A chief named Haida was the first to stir up the embers
of internecine strife among the Niuche clans. To gratify
his own ambition or to avenge some blood feuds, he obtained
the assistance of one of the principal Chinese officers on the
Leaoutung borders, and thus overran the territory of his
neighbors. Encouraged bj~ his first successes, Haida pro-
ceeded to attack the chief of Goolo, who was married to a
cousin of Noorhachu, and who at once appealed to Hootooala
for assistance. The whole Manchu clan marched to his res-
cue, and it was on this occasion that Noorhachu had his first
experience of war on a large scale. The Manchus presented
such a bold front that there is every reason to believe that
Haida and his Chinese allies would have failed to conquer
Goolo by force, but they resorted to fraud, which proved only
too successful. Haida succeeded in enticing the old chief
Huen and his son, the father of Noorhachu, into a confer-
ence, when he murdered them and many of their compan-
ions. The momentary success gained by this breach of faith
was heavily paid for by the incentive it gave Noorhachu to
exact revenge for the brutal and cowardly murder of his
father and grandfather. Haida constructed a fortified camp
at Toolun, but he did not feel secure there against the open
attacks of Noorhachu or the private plots he formed to gain
possession of his person. Several times Haida fled from
Toolun to Chinese territory, where he hoped to enjoy greater
safety, until at last the Chinese became tired of giving him
shelter and protecting one who could not support his owr
8
170 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
pretensions. Then, with strange inconstancy, they deliv-
ered him over into the hands of Noorhachu, who straight-
way killed him, thus carrying out the first portion of his
vow to avenge the massacre at Goolo.
Then Noorhachu turned all his attention and devoted all
his energy to the realization of the project which Haida had
conceived, the union of the Niuche clans ; but whereas Haida
had looked to Chinese support and patronage for the attain-
ment of his object, Noorhachu resolved to achieve success as
an enemy of China and by means of his own Manchu fol-
lowers. His first measure was to carefully select a site for
his capital on a plain well supplied with water, and then to
fortify it by surrounding it with three walls. He then drew
up simple regulations for the government of his people, and
military rules imposing a severe discipline on his small
army. The Chinese appear to have treated him with in-
difference, and they continued to pay him the sums of money
and the honorary gifts which had been made to Haida.
Several of the Niuche clans, won over by the success and
reputation of Noorhachu, voluntarily associated themselves
with him, and it was not until the year 1591 that the Manchu
chief committed his first act of open aggression by invading
the district of Yalookiang. That territory was soon overrun
and annexed; but it roused such a fear among the other
Niuche chiefs, lest their fate should be the same, that seven
of them combined, under Boojai, to overthrow the upstart
who aspired to play the part of a dictator. They brought
mto the field a force of 30,000 men, including, besides their
own followers, a considerable contingent from the Mongols;
and as Noorhachu's army numbered only 4,000 men, it
seemed as if he must certainly be overwhelmed. But, small
as was his force, it enjoyed the incalculable advantage of
discipline; and seldom has the superiority of trained troops
over raw levies been more conspicuously illustrated than by
this encounter between warriors of the same race. This
battle was fought at Goolo Hill, and resulted in the decisive
victory of Noorhachu. Boojai and 4,000 of his men were
THE DECLINE OF THE MINGS. 171
killed, a large number of his followers were taken prisoners
and enrolled in the ranks of the victor, and the spoil included
many suits of mail and arms of offense which improved the
state of Noorhachu 's arsenal. Several of the districts which
had been subject to these confederated princes passed into
the hands of the conqueror, and he carried his authority
northward up the Songari River over tribes who had never
recognized any southern authority. These successes paved
the way to an attack on Yeho, the principality of Boojai,
which was reputed to be the most powerful of all the Niuche
states ; and on this occasion it vindicated its reputation by
repelling the attack of Noorhachu. Its success was not en-
tirely due to its own strength, for the Chinese governor of
Leaoutung, roused at last to the danger from Noorhachu, sent
money and arms to assist the Yeho people in their defense.
The significance of this repulse was diminished by other
successes elsewhere, and Noorhachu devoted his main atten-
tion to disciplining the larger force he had acquired by his
later conquests, and by raising its efficiency to the high point
attained by the army with which he had gained his first tri-
umphs. He also meditated a more daring and important
enterprise than any struggle with his kinsfolk; for he came
to the conclusion that it was essential to destroy the Chinese
power in Leaoutung before he should undertake any further
enterprise in Manchuria. His army had now been raised to
an effective strength of 40,000 men, and the Manchu bow-
man, with his formidable bow, and the Manchu man-at-
arms, in his cotton mail, proof to the arrow or spear, were
as formidable warriors as then existed in the world. Confi-
dent in his military power, and thinking, no doubt, that a
successful foreign enterprise was the best way to rally and
confirm the allegiance of his race, Noorhachu invaded
Leaoutung, and published a proclamation against the Chi-
nese, which became known as the Seven Hates. Instead of
forwarding this document to the Chinese Court he burned
it in the presence of his army, so that Heaven itself might
judge the justice of the cause between him and the Chinese,
172 .4 SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
It was in the year 1618 that Noorhachu invaded Leaou-
tung, and so surprised were the Chinese at his audacity that
they offered little or no resistance. The town of Fooshun was
captured and made the headquarters of the Manchu prince.
From this place he sent a list of his requirements to the gov-
ernor of Leaoutung, and it is said that he offered, on the. Chi-
nese complying with his terms, to withdraw and desist from
hostilities. But the Chinese did not appreciate the power of
this new enemy. They treated his grievances with indiffer-
ence and contempt, and they sent an army to drive him out
of Leaoutung. The Chinese troops soon had a taste of the
quality of the Manchu army. They were defeated in several
encounters, and the best Chinese troops fled before the im-
petuous charge of the Manchu cavalry. Noorhachu then
laid siege to the prefectural town of Tsingho, which he cap-
tured after a siege of some weeks, and where he massacred
nearly 20,000 of the garrison and townspeople. He would
have continued the campaign but that his followers de-
manded to be led back, stating that they feared for the
safety of their homes at the hands of Yeho, still hostile and
aggressive in their rear. The conquest of Leaoutung was
therefore discontinued for the purpose of closing accounts
with the last of the Niuche principalities ; but enough had
been accomplished to whet the appetite of the Manchu leader
for more, and to show him how easy it was to vanquish the
Chinese. On his return to his capital, Hingking, he pre-
pared to invade Yeho, but his plans were undoubtedly de-
layed by the necessity of resting his troops and of allowing
many of them to return to their homes. This delay, no
doubt, induced the Chinese to make a supreme effort to
avert the overthrow of Yeho, who had proved so useful an
ally, and accordingly the governor of Leaoutung advanced
with 100,000 men into Manchuria. He sacrificed the ad-
vantage of superior numbers by dividing his army into four
divisions, with very inadequate means of inter-communica-
tion. Noorhachu could only bring 60,000 men into the field;
but, apart from their high training, they represented a com-
THE DECLINE OF THE MINOS. 173
pact body subject to the direction of Noorhachu a*one. The
Manchu leader at once perceived the faulty disposition of
the Chinese army, and he resolved to attack and overwhelm
each corps in detail before it could receive aid from the oth-
ers. The strongest Chinese corps was that operating most
to the west, and marching from Fooshun on Hingking; and
Noorhachu perceived that if he could overthrow it the flank
of the rest of the Chinese army would be exposed, and its
line of retreat imperiled. The Chinese general in command
of this corps was impetuous and anxious to distinguish him-
self. His courage might on another occasion have helped
his country, but under the circumstances his very ardor
served the purpose of Noorhachu. Tousong, such was his
name, marched more rapidly than any of his comrades, and
reached the Hwunho the Tiber of the Manchus behind
which Noorhachu had, at a little distance, drawn up his
army. Without pausing to reconnoiter, or to discover with
what force he had to deal, Tousong threw himself across the
river, and intrenched himself on Sarhoo Hill. His overcon-
fidence was so extreme and fatuous that he weakened his
army by sending a detachment to lay siege to the town of
Jiefan. The Manchus had, however, well provided for the
defense of that place, and while the Chinese detachment sent
against it was being destroyed, Noorhachu attacked Tousong
in his position on Sarhoo Hill with the whole of his army.
The Chinese were overwhelmed, Tousong was slain, and the
majority of those who escaped the fray perished in the waters
of the Hwunho, beneath the arrows and javelins of the pur-
suing Manchus.
Then Noornachu hastened to attack the second of the
Chinese divisions under a capable officer named Malin, who
selected a strong position with great care, and wished to
stand on the defensive. His wings rested on two hills which
he fortified, and he strengthened his center in the interven-
ing valley with a triple line of wagons. If he had only re-
mained in this position he might have succeeded in keeping
Noorhachu at bay until he could have been joined by the two
1T4 A SHOR7 HISTORY OF CHINA.
remaining Chinese corps; but the impetuosity of his troops,
or it may have been the artifice of the Manchu leader, drew
him from his intrenchments. At first the Chinese seemed
to have the best of the battle, but in a short time victory
turned to the side of the Manchus, and Malm fled with the
relics of his force back to Chinese territory. After these two
successes Noorhachu proceeded to attack the third Chinese
corps under Liuyen, who had acquired a cheap reputation
by his success over the Miaotze. He had no better fortune
than any of his colleagues, and his signal defeat completed
the Manchu triumph over the Chinese army of invasion.
The defeat of Liuyen was effected by a stratagem as much
as by superior force. Noorhachu dressed some of his troops
in the Chinese uniforms he had captured, and sent them
among the Chinese, who received them as comrades until
they discovered their mistake in the crisis of the battle.
During this campaign it was computed that the total losses
of the Chinese amounted to 310 general officers and 45,000
private soldiers. Among other immediate results of this
success were the return of 20,000 Yeho troops to their homes
and the defection of 5,000 Coreans, who joined Noorhachu.
Like all great commanders, Noorhachu gave his enemies no
time to recover from their misfortunes. He pursued Malin
to Kaiyuen, which he captured, with so many prisoners that
it took three days to count them. He invaded Yeho, which
recognized his authority without a blow, and gave him an
additional 30,000 fighting men. All the Niuche clans thus
oecame united under his banner, and adopted the name of
Manchu. He had succeeded in the great object of his life,
the union of his race, and he had well avenged the death of
his father and grandfather; but his ambition was not satis-
fied with this success. It had rather grown with the widen-
ing horizon opened by the discomfiture of the Chinese, and
with the sense of military superiority.
Amid these national disasters the long reign of Wanleh
closed in the year 1620. That unhappy monarch lived long
enough to see the establishment on his northern borders of
THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA. 175
the power which was to destroy his dynasty. The very last
act of his reign was, whether by accident or good judgment,
the most calculated to prevent the Manchus overrunning the
State, and that was the selection of a capable general in
the person of Hiung Tingbi. With the death of Wanleh the
decadence of Ming power became clearly marked, and the
only question that remained was whether it could be arrested
before it resulted in absolute ruin.
CHAPTER IX
THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA
TINGBI, with the wrecks of the Chinese armies, succeeded
in doing more for the defense of his country than had been
accomplished by any of his predecessors with undiminished
resources. He built a chain of forts, he raised the garrison
of Leaoutung to 180,000 men, and he spared no effort to
place Leaouyang, the capital of that province, in a position
to stand a protracted siege. If his counsels had been fol-
lowed to the end, he might have succeeded in permanently
arresting the flood of Manchu conquest; but at the very
moment when his plans promised to give assured success, he
fell into disgrace at the capital, and his career was summa-
rily ended by the executioner. The greatest compliment to
his ability was that Noorhachu remained quiescent as long
as he was on the frontier, but as soon as he was removed he
at once resumed his aggression on Chinese soil.
Meanwhile, "Wanleh had been succeeded on the Chinese
throne by his son, Chu Changlo, who took the name of
Kwangtsong. He was an amiable and well-meaning prince,
whose reign was unquestionably cut short by foul means.
There is little doubt that he was poisoned by the mother of
his half-brother, from a wish to secure the throne for her
son ; but if so she never gained the object that inspired her
crime, for the princes of the family met in secret conclave,
176 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
and selected Kwangtsong's son, a youth of sixteen, as his
successor. The choice did not prove fortunate, as this prince
became known as Tienki the Unhappy, whose reign wit-
nessed the culmination of Ming misfortunes. One of his
first acts was the removal of Tingbi from his command,
and this error of judgment, aggravated by the ingratitude
it implied to a faithful servant, fitly marked the commence-
ment of a reign of incompetence and misfortune.
In 1621 the Manchu war reopened with an attack on
Moukden or Fanyang, which Noorhachu had marked out
as his next object. The garrison was numerous, and might
have made a good defense, for the walls were strong ; but the
commandant was brave to the degree of temerity, and, leav-
ing his fortress, marched out to meet the Manchus in the
open. The result was a decisive overthrow, and the victors
entered Moukden at the heels of the vanquished. The Chi-
nese still resisted, and a terrible slaughter ensued, but the
Manchus retained their conquest. At this juncture the Chi-
nese were offered the assistance of the Portuguese at Macao,
who sent a small body of 200 men, armed with arquebuses
and with several cannon, to Pekin; but after some hesita-
tion the Chinese, whether from pride or contempt of so small
a force, declined to avail themselves of their service, and
thus lost an auxiliary that might have turned the fortune of
the war in their favor. The Portuguese were sent back to
Macao, and, although the Chinese kept the cannon, and em-
ployed the Jesuit priests hi casting others for them, nothing
came of an incident which might have exercised a lasting
influence not merely on the fortune of the war, but also on
the relations between the Chinese and Europeans. The Chi-
nese sent several armies to recover Moukden ; but, although
they took these guns with them, they met with no success,
and Noorhachu made it the base of his plan of attack on
Leaouyang, the capital of the province. The defense of this
important town was intrusted to Yuen Yingtai, the court
favorite and incompetent successor of Tingbi. That officer,
unwarned by the past, and regardless of the experience of
THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA. 177
so many of his predecessors, weakened himself and invited
defeat by attempting to oppose the Manchus in the open.
He was defeated, losing some of his best soldiers, and com-
pelled to shut himself up in the town with a disheartened
garrison. The Manchus gained an entrance into the cit} T .
Then a terrible encounter took place. The garrison was
massacred to a man, Yuen Yingtai, brave, if incapable, com-
mitted suicide, and those of the townspeople who wished to
save their lives had to shave their heads in token of subjec-
tion. This is the first historical reference to a practice that
is now universal throughout China, and that has become
what may be called a national characteristic. The badge
of conquest has changed to a mark of national pride ; but it
is strange to find that the Chinese themselves and the most
patient inquirers among sinologues are unable to say what
was the origin of the pig-tail. They cannot tell us whether
shaving the head was the national custom of the Manchus,
or whether Noorhachu only conceived this happy idea of dis-
tinguishing those who surrendered to his power among the
countless millions of the long-haired people of China. All
that can be said of the origin of the pig-tail is that it was
first enforced as a badge of subjugation by the Manchus at
the siege of Leaouyang, and that thenceforward, until the
whole of China was conquered, it was made the one condi-
tion of immunity from massacre.
The capture of Leaouyang signified the surrender of the
remaining places in Leaoutung, which became a Manchu
possession, and Noorhachu, to celebrate his triumph, and
also to facilitate his plans for the further humiliation of the
Chinese, transferred his capital from Moukden to Leaouyang.
Misfortunes never come singly. In Szchuen a local chief had
raised a force of 30,000 men for service on the frontier in the
wars with the Manchus, and the viceroy of the province not
only declined to utilize their services, but dismissed them
without reward or even recognition of their loyalty. These
slighted and disbanded braves easily changed themselves
into brigands, and as the government would not have them
178 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
as supporters, they determined to make it feel their enmity,
Chetsong Ming, the chief who had raised them, placed him-
self at their head, and attracted a large number of the in-
habitants to his standard. The local garrisons were crushed,
the viceroy killed, and general disorder prevailed among the
people of what was the most fertile and prosperous province
of the empire. Chetsong attempted to set up an administra-
tion, but he does not deem to have possessed the capacity or
the knowledge to establish a regular government. While
he headed the rebellious movement, a woman named Tsin-
leang, the hereditary chieftainess of a small district, placed
herself at the head of the loyalists in the state, and, leading
them herself, succeeded in recovering the principal cities
and in driving Chetsong out of the province. She has been
not inappropriately called by one of the missionary historians
the Chinese Penthesilea. The success she met with in paci-
fying Szchuen after a two years' struggle was not attained
in other directions without a greater effort and at a still
heavier cost. In Kweichow and Yunnan a rebel named
Ganpangyen raised an insurrection on a large scale, and if
his power had not been broken by the long siege of a strong
fortress, obstinately defended by a valiant governor, there
is no telling to what success he might not have attained.
But his followers were disheartened by the delay in carrying
this place, and they abandoned him as soon as they found
that he could not command success. In Shantung another
rising occurred; but after two years' disturbance the rebel
leader was captured and executed. These internal disorders,
produced by the corruption and inertness of the officials as
much as by a prevalent sense of the embarrassment of the
Mings, distracted the attention of the central government
from Manchuria, and weakened its preparations against
Noorhachu.
For a time Noorhachu showed no disposition to cross the
River Leaou, and confined his attention to consolidating his
position in his new conquest. But it was clear that this lull
would not long continue, and the Chinese emperor, Tienki,
THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA. 179
endeavored to meet the coming storm by once more intrust-
ing the defense of the frontier to Tingbi. That general de-
vised a simple and what might have proved an efficacious
line of defense, but his colleague, with more powerful influ-
ence at court, would have none of it, and insisted on his
own plan being adopted. Noorhachu divined that the coun-
cils of the Chinese were divided, and that Tingbi was ham-
pered. He promptly took advantage of the divergence of
opinion, and, crossing the frontier, drove the Chinese behind
the Great Wall. Even that barrier would not have arrested
his progress but for the stubborn resistance offered by the
fortress of Ningyuen a town about seventy miles north-
east of Shanhaikwan, once of great importance, but now,
for many years past, in ruins. "When he reached that place
he found that Tingbi had fallen into disgrace and been ex-
ecuted, not for devising his own plan of campaign, but for
animadverting on that of his colleague in satirical terms.
The Chinese had made every preparation for the resolute
defense of Ningyuen, and when Noorhachu sat down before
it, its resolute defender, Chungwan, defied him to do his
worst, although ah 1 the Chinese troops had been compelled to
retreat, and there was no hope of re-enforcement or rescue.
At first Noorhachu did not conduct the siege of Ningyuen
in person. It promised to be an affair of no great impor-
tance, and he intrusted it to his lieutenants, but he soon per-
ceived that Chungwan was a resolute soldier, and that the
possession of Ningyuen was essential to the realization of
his future plans. "Therefore, he collected all his forces and
sat down before Ningyuen with the full determination to
capture it at all costs. But the garrison was resolute, its
commander capable, and on the walls were arranged the
cannon of European construction. Noorhachu led two as-
saults in person, both of which were repulsed, and it is said
that this result was mainly due to the volleys of the Euro-
pean artillery. At last, Noorhachu was compelled to with-
draw his troops, and although he obtained some successes in
other parts of the country, he was so chagrined at this re-
180 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
pulse that he fell ill and died some months later at Moukden,
in September, 1626.
Noorhachu was succeeded by his fourth son, the fourth
Beira or Prince, known as Taitsong, who continued both his
work and policy. Taitsong was as determined to humiliate
the Mings as his father had been. He commenced his offen-
sive measures by an attack on Corea, which he speedily re-
duced to such a pass that it accepted his authority and trans-
ferred its allegiance from the Mings to the Manchus. This
was an important success, as it secured his eastern flank and
deprived the Chinese of a useful ally in the Forbidden King-
dom. It encouraged Taitsong to think that the time was
once more ripe for attacking Ningyuen, and he laid siege
to that fortress at the head of a large army, including the
flower of his troops. Notwithstanding the energy of his at-
tack, Chungwan, the former bold defender of the place, had
again the satisfaction of seeing the Manchus repulsed, and
compelled to admit that the ramparts of Ningyuen presented
a serious if not insuperable obstacle to their progress. Al-
most at the very moment of this success the Emperor Tienki
died, and was succeeded, in 1627, by his younger brother,
Tsongching, who was destined to be the last of the Ming
rulers.
The repulse of Taitsong before Ningyuen might have
been fatal if he had not been a man of great ability and
resource. The occasion called for some special effort, and
Taitsong proved himself equal to it by a stroke of genius
that showed he was the worthy inheritor of the mission of
Noorhachu. "Without taking anybody into his confidence
he ordered his army and his allies, the Kortsin Mongols, to
assemble in the country west of Ningyuen, and when he
had thus collected over a hundred thousand men, he an-
nounced his intention of ignoring Ningyuen and marching
direct on Pekin. At this juncture Taitsong divided his
army into eight banners, which still remain the national
divisions of the Manchu race. The Manchus seem to have
been a little alarmed by the boldness of Taitsong's scheme,
THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA. 181
and they might have hesitated to follow him if he had given
them any time for reflection, but his plans were not fully
known until his forces were through the Dangan Pass on
the march to the capital. The Chinese, relying altogether
on Ningyuen as a defense, had made no preparation to hold
their ground on this side, and Taitsong encountered no oppo-
sition until he reached Kichow. Then Chungwan, realizing
that he had been outmaneuvered, and that the defenses of
Nmgyuen had been turned, hastened back by forced marches
to defend Pekin. Owing to his road being the better of the
two he gained the capital in time, and succeeded in throw-
ing himself and his troops into it in order to defend it
against the assault of the Manchus. After Taitsong sat
down before Pekin he engaged in an intrigue for the ruin
of Chungwan, whose disgrace would be equivalent to a
great victory. The method is not to be approved on gen-
eral grounds, but Taitsong conceived that he was justified
in bribing persons in Pekin to discredit Chungwan and
compass his ruin. The emperor was persuaded that Chung-
wan was too powerful a subject to be absolutely loyal, and
it was asserted that he was in communication with the
enemy. Chungwan, who had been so long the buttress of
the kingdom, was secretly arrested and thrown into a prison
from which he never issued. The disappearance of Chung-
wan was as valuable to Taitsong as a great victory, and he
made his final preparations for assaulting Pekin ; but either
the want of supplies or the occurrence of some disturbance
in his rear prevented the execution of his plan. He drew
off his forces and retired behind the Great "Wall at the very
moment when Pekin seemed at his mercy.
During four years of more or less tranquillity Taitsong
confined his attention to political designs, and to training a
corps of artillery, and then he resumed his main project of
the conquest of China. Instead of availing themselves of
the lull thus afforded to improve their position, the Chinese
ministers seemed to believe that the danger from the Man-
chus had passed away, and they treated all the communica-
182 A SHORT H1STORV OF CH1XA.
tions from Taitsong with imprudent and unnecessary dis-
dain. Their attention was also distracted by many internal
troubles, produced by their own folly, as well as by the
perils of the time.
Taitsong, in 1634, resumed his operations in China, and
on this occasion he invaded the province of Shansi, at the
head of an army composed largely of Mongols as well as of
Manchus. Although the people of Shansi had not had any
practical experience of Manchu prowess, and notwithstand-
ing that their frontier was exceedingly strong by nature,
Taitsong met with little or no resistance from either the
local garrisons or the people themselves. One Chinese
governor, it is said, ventured to publish a boastful report
of an imaginary victory over the Manchus, and to send a
copy of it to Pekin. Taitsong, however, intercepted the
letter, and at once sent the officer a challenge, matching
1,000 of his men against 10,000 of the Chinese. That the
offer was not accepted is the best proof of the superiority
of the Manchu army.
It was at the close of this successful campaign in Shansi,
that Taitsong, in the year 1635, assumed, for the first time
among any of the Manchu rulers, the style of Emperor of
China. Events had long been moving in this direction, but
an accident is said to have determined Taitsong to take this
final measure. The jade seal of the old Mongol rulers was
suddenly discovered, and placed in the hands of Taitsong.
When the Mongols heard of this, forty-nine of their chiefs
hastened to tender their allegiance to Taitsong, and the only
condition made was that the King of Corea should be com-
pelled to do so likewise. Taitsong, nothing loth, at once
sent off letters to the Corean court announcing the adhesion
of the Mongols, and calling upon the king of that state to
recognize his supremacy. But the Corean ruler had got
wind of the contents of these letters and declined to open
them, thus hoping to get out of his difficulty without offend-
ing his old friends the Chinese. But Taitsong was not to be
put off in this fashion. He sent an army to inflict chastise-
THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA. 183
ment on his neighbor, and its mission was successfully dis-
charged. The king and his family were taken prisoners,
although they had fled to the island of Gangwa for safety,
and Corea became a Manchu possession. The last years of
Taitsong's life were spent in conducting repeated expedi-
tions into the provinces of Shansi and Pechihli, but the
strength of the fortresses of Ningyuen and Shanhaikwan on
the Great Wall effectually prevented his renewing his at-
tempt on Pekin. These two places with the minor forts of
Kingchow and Songshan formed a quadrilateral that effect-
ually secured Pekin on its northern side, and being intrusted
to the defense of Wou Sankwei, a general of great capacity,
of whom much more will be heard, all Taitsong's ability
and resources were taxed to overcome those obstacles to his
progress south of the Great Wall. He succeeded after great
loss, and at the end of several campaigns, in taking King-
chow and Songshan, but these were his last successes, for ir
the year 1643 he was seized with a fatal illness at Moukden,
which terminated his career at the comparatively early age
of fifty-two. Taitsong's premature death, due, in all prob-
ability, to the incompetence of his physicians, cut short a
career that had not reached its prime, and retarded the con-
quest of China, for the supreme authority among the Man-
chus then passed from a skillful and experienced ruler into
the hands of a child.
The possession of a well-trained army, the production of
two great leaders of admitted superiority, and forty years
of almost continuously successful war, had not availed to
bring the authority of the Manchus in any permanent form
south of the Great Wall. The barrier of Tsin Che Hwangti
still kept out the most formidable adversary who had ever
borne down upon it, and the independence of China seemed
far removed from serious jeopardy. At this juncture events
occurred that altered the whole situation, and the internal
divisions of the Chinese proved more serious and entailed a
more rapid collapse than all the efforts of the Manchus.
The arch rebel Li Tseching, who proved more formidable
184 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
to the Ming ruler than his Manchu opponent, was the SOD.
of a peasant in the province of Shansi. At an early age he
attached himself to the profession of arms, and became well
known as a skillful archer and horseman. In 1629, he first
appears on the scene as member of a band of robbers, who
were, however, destroyed by a rare display of energy on the
part of one of the emperor's lieutenants. Li was one of the
few who were fortunate enough to escape with their lives
and liberty. He soon gathered round him another band,
and under his successful and courageous leading it shortly
acquired the size of an army. One reason of his sur
was his forming an alliance with the Mohammedan settlers
in Kansuh, who were already known as Tungani or "Colo-
nists." But the principal cause of his success was his skill
and promptitude in coming to terms with the imperial au-
thorities whenever they became too strong for him, and he
often purchased a truce when, if the officials had pushed
home their advantage, he must have been destroyed. His
power thus grew to a high point, while that of other robber
chiefs only waxed to wane and disappear; and about the
year 1640, when it was said that his followers numbered
half a million of men, he began to think seriously of dis-
placing the Ming and placing himself on the throne of
China. "With this object in view he laid siege to the town
of Honan, the capital of the province of the same name.
At first the resolution of the governor baffled his attempt,
but treachery succeeded when force failed. A traitor opened
a gate for a sum of money which he was never paid, and
La's army burst into the city. The garrison was put to the
sword, and horrible outrages were perpetrated on the towns-
people. From Honan Li marched on Kaifong, which he
oesieged for seven days ; but he did not possess the neces-
sary engines to attack a place of any strength, and Kaifong
was reputed to be the strongest fortress in China. He was
obliged to beat a hasty retreat, pursued by an army that
the imperial authorities had hurriedly collected. There is
reason to think his retreat was a skillful movement to the
THE MANCHU CONQUEST OP CHINA. 185
rear in order to draw the emperor's troops after him. Cer-
tain it is that they pursued him in four separate corps, and
that he turned upon them and beat them one after the other.
When he had vanquished these armies in four separate en-
counters he again laid siege to Kaifong, and it was thought
that he would have taken it, when Li was wounded by an
arrow, and called off his troops in consequence. Several
times afterward he resumed the attempt, but with no better
fortune, until an accident accomplished what all his power
had failed to do. The governor had among other precau-
tions flooded the moat from the Hoangho, and this extra
barrier of defense had undoubtedly done much toward dis-
comfiting the besiegers. But in the end it proved fatal to
the besieged, for the Hoangho, at all times capricious in its
movements, and the source of as much trouble as benefit to
the provinces it waters, rose suddenly to the dimensions of
a flood, and overflowing its banks spread over the country.
Many of Li's soldiers were drowned, and his camp was
flooded, but the most serious loss befell the Imperialists in
Kaifong. The waters of the river swept away the walls
and flooded the town. Thousands perished at the time,
and those who attempted to escape were cut down by the
rebels outside. Kaifong itself was destroyed and has never
recovered its ancient importance, being now a town of only
the third or fourth rank. This great success established the
reputation of Li Tseching on a firm basis, and constituted
him one of the arbiters of his country's destiny. He found
himself master of one-third of the state ; proclaimed himself
Emperor of China, under the style of Yongchang, and gave
his dynasty the name of Tachun. Having taken this step of
open defiance to the Ming government, Li invaded Shansi,
which he reduced to subjection with little difficulty or blood-
shed. An officer, named Likintai, was sent to organize some
measures of defense, but, on arrival, he found the province
in the hands of the rebel, and he had no choice save to beat
a discreet and rapid retreat. The success of Li continued
unchecked. Important places like Taiyuen and Taitong
186 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA
surrendered to him after a merely nominal resistance, and
when they fell there was no further impediment in the
way of his marching on Pekin.
No preparations had been made to defend Pekin. The
defenses were weak, the garrison insufficient, as all the best
troops were on the frontier, and the citizens disposed to come
to terms with the assailant rather than to die in the breach
for their sovereign. "When Li pitched his tent outside the
western gate of the capital, and sent a haughty demand to
the emperor to abdicate his throne, he was master of the situ-
ation; but Tsongching, ignorant of his own impotence, defied
and upbraided his opponent as a rebel. His indignation was
turned to despair when he learned that the troops had aban-
doned his cause, that the people were crying out for Li
Tseching, and that that leader's followers were rapidly ap-
proaching his palace. Tsongching strangled himself with
his girdle, but only one officer was found devoted enough to
share his fate. Although Tsongching had some nominal
successors, he was, strictly speaking, the last of the Ming
emperors, and with him the great dynasty founded by Hong-
wou came to an end. The many disasters that preceded its
fall rendered the loss of the imperial station less of a blow
to the individual, and the last of the Ming rulers seems to
have even experienced relief on reaching the term of his
anxieties. The episode of the faithful officer, Li Kweiching,
concludes the dramatic events accompanying the capture of
Pekin and the fall of the dynasty. After the death of his
sovereign he attempted to defend the capital; but overpow-
ered by numbers he surrendered to the victor, who offered
him an honorable command in his service. Li Kweiching
accepted the offer on the stipulation that he should be allowed
to give the Emperor Tsongching honorable burial, and that
the surviving members of the Ming family should be spared.
These conditions, so creditable to Li Kweiching, were gran*-
ed; bat, at the funeral of his late sovereign, grief or a spirit
of uiity so overcame him that he committed suicide on the
grave of Tsongching. Li Tseching, who had counted on
THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA. 187
valuable assistance from this officer, became furious at this
occurrence. He plundered and destroyed the ancestral tem-
ple of the Mings, and he caused every member of the im-
perial family on whom he could lay hands to be executed.
Thus terminated the events at Pekin in the absolute and
complete triumph of the rebel Li Tseching, and the panic
produced by his success and severity blinded observers to
the hollowness of his power, and to the want of solidity
in his administration. Yet it seemed for a time as if he
were left the virtual master of China.
While the Ming power was collapsing before the onset of
Li Tseching, there still remained the large and well-trained
Ming army in garrison on the Manchu frontier, under com-
mand of the able general, Wou Sankwei. At the eleventh
hour the Emperor Tsonching had sent a message to "Wou
Sankwei, begging him to come in all haste to save the capi-
tal ; and that general, evacuating Ningyuen, and leaving a
small garrison at Shanhaikwan, had begun his march for
Pekin, when he learned that it had fallen and that the Ming
dynasty had ceased to be. Placed in this dilemma, between
the advancing Manchus,who immediately occupied Ningyuen
on his evacuation of it, and the large rebel force in possession
of Pekin, Wou Sankwei had no choice between coming to
terms with one or other of them. Li Tseching offered him
liberal rewards and a high command, but in vain, for Wou
Sankwei decided that it would be better to invite the Manchus
to enter the country, and to assist them to conquer it. There
can be no doubt that this course was both the wiser and the
more patriotic, for Li Tseching was nothing more than a
successful brigand on a large scale; whereas the Manchu
government was a respectable one, was well organized, and
aspired to revive the best traditions of the Chinese. Having
come to a prompt decision, Wou Sankwei lost no time in
promptly carrying it out. He wrote a letter to the Manchus,
asking them to send an army to co-operate with his in driv-
ing Li Tseching out of Pekin; and the Manchus, at once
realizing that the moment had arrived for conquering China,
188 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
acquiesced promptly in his plans, sent forward their advanced
corps, and ordered a levee en masse of the nation for the
conquest of China. Assured of his rear, and also of speedy
re-enforcement, Wou Sankwei did not delay a day in march-
ing on Pekin. Li Tseching sent out a portion of his army
to oppose the advance of Wou Sankwei; but the officer's
instructions were rather to negotiate than to fight, for to the
last Li Tseching expected that Wou Sankwei would come
over to his side. He was already beginning to feel doubtful
as to the security of his position; and his fears were increased
by his superstition, for when, on entering Pekin, he passed
under a gate above which was written the character "joong"
(middle), he exclaimed, drawing his bow at fhe same time,
"If I hit this joong in the middle, it is a sign I have gained
the whole empire, as the empire is joong, the middle king-
dom." His arrow missed its mark. The apprehensions of
Li Tseching were soon confirmed, for Wou Sankwei defeated
the first army he had sent out with a loss of 20,000 men. Li
does not seem to have known of the alliance between that
officer and the Manchus, for he marched at the head of
60,000 men to encounter him. He took with him the aged
father of Wou Sankwei and two Ming princes, who had sur-
vived the massacre of their family, with a view to appealing
to the affection and loyalty of that commander; but these
devices proved vain.
Wou Sankwei drew up his forces at Yungping in a strong
position near the scene of his recent victory ; his front seems
to have been protected by the river Zanho, and he calmly
awaited the attack of Li Tseching, whose army far out-
numbered his. Up to this point Wou Sankwei had not been
joined by any of the Manchus, but a body was known to be
approaching, and he was anxious to put off the battle until
they arrived. For the same reason Li Tseching was as anx-
ious to begin the attack, and, notwithstanding the strength
of Wou Sankwei's position, he ordered his troops to engage
without delay. Adopting the orthodox Chinese mode of
attack of forming his army in a crescent, so that the extreme
THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA. 189
wings should overlap and gradually encompass those of the
enemy, Li trusted to his numerical superiority to give him
the victory. At one moment it seemed as if his expectation
would be justified; for, bravely as Wou Sankwei and his
army fought, the weight of numbers was telling its inevi-
table tale when a Manchu corps opportunely arrived, and
attacking the Chinese with great impetuosity, changed the
fortune of the day and put the army of Li Tseching to the
rout. Thirty thousand men are said to have fallen on
the field, and Li himself escaped from the carnage with
only a few hundred horsemen.
After this Li met with disaster after disaster. He was
driven out of Shansi into Honan, and from Honan into
Shensi. Wou Sankwei took Tunkwan without firing a shot,
and when Li attempted to defend Singan he found that his
soldiers would not obey his orders, and wished only to come
to terms with Wou Sankwei. Expelled from the last of his
towns he took refuge in the hills, but the necessity of obtain-
ing provisions compelled him now and then to descend into
the plains, and on one of these occasions he was surprised in
a village and killed. His head was placed in triumph over
the nearest prefecture, and thus ended the most remarkable
career of a princely robber chieftain to be found in Chinese
annals. At one time it seemed as if Li Tseching would be
the founder of a dynasty, but his meteor-like career ended
not less suddenly than his rise to supreme power was rapid.
Extraordinary as was his success, Wou Sankwei had rightly
gauged its nature when he declared that it had no solid basis.
The overthrow of Li Tseching paved the way for a fresh
difficulty. It had been achieved to a large extent by the
military genius of Wou Sankwei and by the exertions of his
Chinese army. That officer had invited the Manchus into
the country, but when victory was achieved he showed some
anxiety for their departure. This was no part of the com-
pact, nor did it coincide with the ambition of the Manchus.
They determined to retain the territory they had conquered,
at the same time that they endeavored to propitiate Wou
190 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
Sankwei and to retain the command of his useful services.
He was given the high sounding title of Ping-si Wang, or
Prince Pacifier of the West, and many other honors. Grat-
ified by these rewards and unable to discover any person
who could govern China, Wou Sankwei gradually reconciled
himself to the situation and performed his duty faithful
the most powerful lieutenant of the young Manchu ruler,
Chuntche, the son of Taitsong, who, after the fall of Li
Tseching, removed his capital to Pekin, and assumed the
style and ceremony of a Chinese emperor. The active ad-
ministration was intrusted to Prince Dorgun, brother of
Taitsong, who now became known as Ama Wang, the
Father Prince, and who acted as regent during the long
minority of his nephew. The new dynasty was inaugurated
at Pekin with a grand ceremony and court.
After this formal and solemn assumption of the govern-
ing power in China by the young Manchu prince, the
activity of the Manchus increased, and several armies were
sent south to subject the provinces, and to bring the whole
Chinese race under his authority. For some time no serious
opposition was encountered, as the disruption of Li's forces
entailed the surrender of all the territory north of the
Hoangho. But at Nankin, and in the provinces south of
the Yangtsekiang, an attempt had been made, and not
unsuccessfully, to set up a fresh administration under one
of the members of the prolific Ming family. Fou Wang,
a grandson of Wanleh, was placed on the Dragon Throne
of Southern China in this hope, but his character did not
justify the faith reposed in him. He thought nothing of the
serious responsibility he had accepted, but showed that he
regarded his high station merely as an opportunity for grati-
fying his own pleasures. There is little or no doubt that if
he had shown himself worthy of his station he might have
rallied to his side the mass of the Chinese nation, and Wou
Saukwei, who had shown some signs of chafing at Manchu
authority, might have been won back by a capable and sym-
pathetic sovereign. But notwithstanding the ability of Fou
THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA. 191
Wang's minister, Shu Kofa, who strove to repair the errors
of his master, the new Ming power at Nankin did not pros-
per. Wou Sankwei, cautious not to commit himself, rejected
the patent of a duke and the money gifts sent him by Shu
Kofa, while Ama Wang, on his side, sought to gain over
Shu Kofa by making him the most lavish promises of re-
ward. But that minister proved as true to his sovereign
as Wou Sankwei did to the Manchu. The result of the long
correspondence between them was nil, but it showed the
leaders of the Manchus in very favorable colors, as wishing
to avert the horrors of war, and to simplify the surrender of
provinces which could not be held against them. When
Ama Wang discovered that there was no hope of gaining
over Shu Kofa, and thus paving his way to the disintegra-
tion of the Nankin power, he decided to prosecute the war
against the surviving Ming administration with the greatest
activity.
While these preparations were being made to extend the
Manchu conquest over Central China, all was confusion at
Nankin. Jealousies between the commanders, none of whom
possessed much merit or experience, bickerings among the
ministers, apathy on the part of the ruler, and bitter disap-
pointment and disgust in the ranks of the people, all com-
bined to precipitate the overthrow of the ephemeral throne
that had been erected in the Southern capital. Ama Wang
waited patiently to allow these causes of disintegration time
to develop their full force, and to contribute to the ruin of
the Mings, but in the winter of 1644-45 he decided that the
right moment to strike had come. Shu Kofa made some
effort to oppose the Manchu armies, and even assumed the
command in person, although he was only a civilian, but
his troops had no heart to oppose the Manchus, and the de-
vices to which he resorted to make his military power appear
more formidable were both puerile and ineffective. Yet one
passage may be quoted to his credit if it gave his opponent
an advantage. It is affirmed on good authority that he could
have obtained a material advantage if he would only have
192 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
flooded the country, but he "refused to do so, on the ground
that more civilians would perish than Manchus, and he said,
'First the people, next the dynasty.' ' The sentiment was
a noble one, but it was too severe a crisis to admit of any
sentiment, especially when fighting an up-hill battle, and
Shu Kofa, soon realizing that he was not qualified to play
the part of a great soldier, resolved to end his existence. He
took shelter with a small force in the town of Yangchow,
and when he heard that the Manchus were entering the
gate, he and his officers committed suicide. The Chinese
lamented and were crushed by his death. In him they saw
the last of their great men, and, no doubt, they credited him
with a higher capacity even than he possessed. Only a
military genius of the first rank could have saved the Mings,
and Shu Kofa was nothing more than a conscientious and
capable civil mandarin, ignorant of war. His fortitude could
only be measured by his indifference to life, and by his
resolve to anticipate the fall of his sovereign as soon as he
saw it to be inevitable.
Fou Wang speedily followed the fate of his faithful min-
ister; for, when the Manchus marched on Nankin, he aban-
doned his capital, and sought safety in flight. But one of
his officers, anxious to make favorable terms for himself with
the conqueror, undertook his capture, and coming up with
him when on the point of entering a junk to put to sea, Fou
Wang had no alternative left between an ignominious sur-
render and suicide. He chose the latter course, and throw-
ing himself into the river was drowned, thus ending his
own career, and the Ming dynasty in its southern capital
of Nankin.
Meantime dissension further weakened the already dis-
couraged Chinese forces. The pirate Ching Chelong, who
was the mainstay of the Ming cause, cherished the hope
that he might place his own family on the throne, and he
endeavored to induce the Ming prince to recognize his son,
Koshinga, as his heir. Low as he had fallen, it is to the
credit of this prince that he refused to sign away the birth-
THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA. 193
right of his family. Ching was bitterly chagrined at this
refusal, and after detaching his forces from the other Chi-
nese he at last came to the resolution to throw in his lot with
the Manchus. He was promised honorable terms, but the
Tartars seem to have had no intention of complying with
them, so far at least as allowing him to retain his liberty.
For they sent him off to Pekin, where he was kept in honor-
able confinement, notwithstanding his protests and promises,
and the defiant threats of his son Koshinga. In preserving
his life he was more fortunate than the members of the Ming
family, who were hunted down in a remorseless manner and
executed with all their relations on capture. The only place
that offered any resistance to the Manchus was the town of
Kanchow, on the Kan River, in Kiangsi. The garrison de-
fended themselves with desperate valor during two months,
and a council of war was held amid much anxiety, to con-
sider whether the siege should be abandoned. Bold counsels
prevailed. The Manchus returned to the attack, and had the
satisfaction of carrying the town by assault, when the garri-
son were put to the sword.
The relics of the Chinese armies gathered for a final stand
in the city of Canton, but unfortunately for them the leaders
were still divided by petty jealousies. One Ming prince pro-
claimed himself Emperor at Canton, and another in the ad-
joining province of Kwangsi. Although the Manchus were
gathering their forces to overwhelm the Chinese in their last
retreat, they could not lay aside their divisions and petty
ambitions in order to combine against the national enemy,
but must needs assail one another to decide which should
have the empty title of Ming emperor. The Maiichus had
the satisfaction of seeing the two rivals break their strength
against each other, and then they advanced to crush the
victor at Canton. Strong as the place was said to be, it
offered no serious resistance, and the great commercial city
of the south passed into the hands of the race who had sub-
dued the whole country from Pekin to the Tonquin frontier.
At this moment the fortune of the Manchus underwent a
9
194 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
sudden and inexplicable change. Two repulses before a for-
tress southwest of Canton, and the disaffection of a large
part of their Chinese auxiliaries, who clamored for their pay,
seem to have broken the strength of the advanced Manchu
army. A wave of national antipathy drove the Tartars out
of Canton and the southern provinces, but it soon broke its
force, and the Manchus, returning with fresh troops, speed-
ily recovered all they had lost, and by placing stronger gar-
risons in the places they occupied consolidated their hold on
Southern China. Although the struggle between the Man-
chus and their new subjects was far from concluded, the
conquest of China as such may be said to have reached its
end at this stage. How a small Tartar tribe succeeded after
fifty years of war in imposing its yoke on the skeptical,
freedom-loving, and intensely national millions of China
will always remain one of the enigmas of history.
CHAPTER X
WHILE the Manchu generals and armies were estab-
lishing their power in Southern China the young Emperor
Chuntche, under the direction of his prudent uncle, the
regent Ama Wang, was setting up at Pekin the central
power of a ruling dynasty. In doing so little or no oppo-
sition was experienced at the hands of the Chinese, who
showed that they longed once more for a settled govern-
ment; and this acquiescence on the part of the Chinese
people in their authority no doubt induced the Manchu
leaders to adopt a far more conciliatory and lenient policy
toward the Chinese than would otherwise have been the
case. Ama Wang gave special orders that the lives and
property of all who surrendered to his lieutenants should
be scrupulously respected. This moderation was only de-
parted from in the case of some rebels in Shensi, who, after
THE FIRST MANCHU RULER. 195
accepting, repudiated the Manchu authority, and laid close
siege to the chief town of Singan, which held a garrison of
only 3,000 Manchus. The commandant wished to make his
position secure by massacring the Chinese of the town, but
he was deterred from taking this extreme step by the repre-
sentations of a Chinese officer, who, binding himself for the
good faith of his countrymen, induced him to enroll them
in the ranks of the garrison. They proved faithful and ren-
dered excellent service in the siege; and when a relieving
Manchu army came from Pekin the rebels were quickly
scattered and pursued with unflagging bitterness to their
remotest hiding places.
In the province of Szchuen a Chinese leader proclaimed
himself Si Wang, or King of the West. He was execrated
by those who were nominally his subjects. Among the most
heinous of his crimes was his invitation to literary men to
come to his capital for employment, and when they had as-
sembled to the number of 30,000, to order them to be mas-
sacred. He dealt in a similar manner with 3,000 of his cour-
tiers, because one of them happened to omit a portion of his
full titles. His excesses culminated in the massacre of Chen-
tu, when 600,000 innocent persons are said to have perished.
Even allowing for the Eastern exaggeration of numbers, the
crimes of this inhuman monster have rarely, if ever, been
surpassed. His rage or appetite for destruction was not ap-
peased by human sacrifices. He made equal war on the
objects of nature and the works of man. He destroyed
cities, leveled forests, and overthrew all the public monu-
ments that embellished his province. In the midst of his
excesses he was told that a Manchu army had crossed the
frontier, but he resolved to crown his inhuman career by a
deed unparalleled in the records of history, and, what is
more extraordinary, he succeeded in inducing his followers
to execute his commands. His project was to massacre all
the women in attendance on his army.
When the assembly took place Si Wang slew his wives
coram populo, and his followers, seized with an extreme
196 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
frenzy, followed his example. It is said that as many as
400,000 women were slain that day, and Si Wang, intoxi-
cated by his success in inducing his followers to execute his
inhuman behests, believed that he had nothing to fear at
the hands of the Manchus. But he was soon undeceived,
for in one of the earliest affairs at the outposts he was killed
by an arrow. His power at once crumbled away, and
Szchuen passed under the authority of the Manchus. The
conquest of Szchuen paved the way for the recovery of the
position that had been lost in Southern China, and close
siege was laid to the city of Canton. Outside Canton the
Manchus carried everything before them, and that city itself
at last was captured, after what passed for a stubborn re-
sistance. Canton was given over to pillage.
At this moment of success Ama Wang, the wise regent,
died, and Chuntche assumed the reins of government. He
at once devoted his attention to administrative reforms.
Corruption had begun to sway the public examinations, and
Chuntche issued a special edict, enjoining the examiners to
give fair awards and to maintain the purity of the service.
But several examiners had to be executed and others ban-
ished beyond the Wall before matters were placed on a
satisfactory basis. He also adopted the astronomical system
in force in Europe, and he appointed the priest Adam Schaal
head of the Mathematical Board at Pekin. But his most
important work was the institution of the Grand Council,
which still exists, and which is the supreme power under the
emperor in the country. It is composed of only four mem-
Ders two Manchus and two Chinese who alone possess the
privilege of personal audience with the emperor whenever
they may demand it. As this act gave the Chinese an equal
place with the Manchus in the highest body of the empire it
was exceedingly welcome, and explains, among other causes,
the popularity and stability of the Manchu dynasty. When
allotting Chuntche his place among the founders of Manchu
greatness, allowance must be made for this wise and far-
reaching measure.
THE FIRST MANCHU RULER. 197
An interesting event in the reign of Chuntche was the
arrival at Pekin of more than one embassy from European
States. The Dutch and the Russians can equally claim the
honor of having had an envoy resident in the Chinese capi-
tal during the year 1656.
In 1661 the health of Chuntche became so bad that it
was evident to his courtiers that his end was drawing near,
although he was little more than thirty years of age. On
his deathbed he selected as his successor the second of his
sons, who afterward became famous as the Emperor Kanghi.
Kanghi assumed the personal direction of affairs when only
fourteen years of age. Such a bold step undoubtedly be-
tokened no ordinary vigor on the part of a youth, and its
complete success reflected still further credit upon him.
The interest of the period passes from the scenes at court
to the camp of Wou Sankwei, who, twenty years earlier,
had introduced the Manchus into China. During the Man-
chu campaign in Southern China he had kept peace on the
western frontier, gradually extending his authority from
Shensi into Szchuen and thence over Yunnan. When a
Ming prince, Kwei Wang, who had fled into Burmah, re-
turned with the support of the king of that country to make
another bid for the throne, he found himself confronted by
all the power and resources of Wou Sankwei, who was still
as loyal a servant of the Manchu emperor as when he car-
ried his ensigns against Li Tseching. Kwei Wang does not
appear to have expected opposition from Wou Sankwei, and
in the first encounter he was overthrown and taken prisoner.
The conqueror, who was already under suspicion at the
Manchu court, and whom every Chinese rebel persisted in
regarding as a natural ally, now hesitated as to how he
should treat these important prisoners. Kwei Wang and
his son the last of the Mings were eventually led forth
to execution, although it should be stated that a less authen-
tic report affirms they were allowed to strangle themselves.
Having made use of Wou Sankwei, and obtained, as they
thought, the full value of his services, the Manchus sought
198 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
to treat him with indifference and to throw him into the
shade. But the splendor of his work was such that they
had to confer on him the title of Prince, and to make him
viceroy of Yunnan and the adjacent territories. He exerted
such an extraordinary influence over the Chinese subjects
that they speedily settled down under his authority ; revenue
and trade increased, and the Manchu authority was main-
tained without a Tartar garrison, for Wou Sankwei's army
was composed exclusively of Chinese, and its nucleus was
formed by his old garrison of Ningyuen and Shanhaikwan.
There is no certain reason for saying that Wou Sankwei
nursed any scheme of personal aggrandizement, but the
measures he took and the reforms he instituted were calcu-
lated to make his authority become gradually independent
of Manchu control. For a time the Manchu government
suppressed its apprehensions on account of this powerful
satrap, by the argument that in a few years his death in
the course of nature must relieve it from this peril, but Wou
Sankwei lived on and showed no signs of paying the com-
mon debt of humanity. Then it seemed to Kanghi that
Wou Sankwei was gradually establishing the solid founda-
tion of a formidable and independent power. The Manchu
generals and ministers had always been jealous of the greater
fame of Wou Sankwei. When they saw that Kanghi wanted
an excuse to fall foul of him, they carried every tale of al-
leged self-assertion on the part of the Chinese viceroy to the
imperial ears, and represented that his power dwarfed the
dignity of the Manchu throne and threatened its stability.
At last Kanghi resolved to take some decisive step to
bring the question to a .climax, and he accordingly sent
Wou Sankwei an invitation to visit him at Pekin. Wou
Sankwei excused himself from going to court on the
ground that he was very old, and that his only wish was
to end his days in peace. He also deputed his son to tender
his allegiance to the emperor and to perform the Kotao in
his name. But Kanghi was not to be put off in this way,
and he sent two trusted officials to Wou Sankwei to repre-
THE FIRST MANCHU RULER. 199
sent that he must comply with the exact terms of his com-
mand, and to point out the grave consequences of his refus-
ing. Wou Sankwei cast off his allegiance to the Manchus,
and entered upon a war which aimed at the subversion of
their authority. Such was the reputation of this great com-
mander, to whose ability and military prowess the Manchus
unquestionably were indebted for their conquest of the em-
pire, that a large part of Southern China at once admitted
his authority, and from Szchuen to the warlike province of
Hunan his lieutenants were able to collect all the fighting
resources of the state, and to array the levies of those prov-
inces in the field for the approaching contest with Kanghi.
While Wou Sankwei was making these extensive prep-
arations in the south, his son at Pekin had devised an ingen-
ious and daring plot for the massacre of the Manchus and the
destruction of the dynasty. He engaged in his scheme the
large body of Chinese slaves who had been placed in servi-
tude under their Tartar conquerors, and these, incited by the
hope of liberty, proved very ready tools to his designs. They
bound themselves together by a solemn oath to be true to one
another, and all the preparations were made to massacre the
Manchus on the occasion of the New Year's Festival. This
is the grand religious and social ceremony of the Chinese.
It takes place on the first day of the first moon, which falls
in our month of February. All business is stopped, the tri-
bunals are closed for ten days, and a state of high festival
resembling the Carnival prevails. The conspirators resolved
to take advantage of this public holiday, and of the excite-
ment accompanying it, to carry out their scheme, and the
Manchus appear to have been in total ignorance until the
eleventh hour of the plot for their destruction. The discov-
ery of the conspiracy bears a close resemblance to that of the
Gunpowder Plot. A Chinese slave, wishing to save his mas-
ter, gave him notice of the danger, and this Manchu officer
at once informed Kanghi of the conspiracy. The son of Wou
Sankwei and the other conspirators were immediately arrested
and executed without delay. The Manchus thus escaped by
200 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the merest accident from a danger which threatened them
with annihilation, and Kanghi, having succeeded in getting
rid of the son, concentrated his power and attention on the
more difficult task of grappling with the father.
But the power and reputation of Wou Sankwei were so
formidable that Kanghi resolved to proceed with great cau-
tion, and the emperor began his measures of offense by issu-
ing an edict ordering the disbandment of all the native
armies maintained by the Chinese viceroys, besides Wou
Sankwei. The object of this edict was to make all the
governors of Chinese race show their hands, and Kanghi
learned the full measure of the hostility he had to cope with
by every governor from the sea coast of Fuhkien to Canton
defying him, and throwing in their lot with Wou Sankwei.
The piratical confederacy of Formosa, where Ching, the son
of Koshinga, had succeeded to his authority, also joined in
with what may be called the national party, but its alliance
proved of little value, as Ching, at an early period, took
umbrage at his reception by a Chinese official, and returned
to his island home. But the most formidable danger to the
young Manchu ruler came from an unexpected quarter.
The Mongols, seeing his embarrassment, and believing that
the hours of the dynasty were numbered, resolved to take
advantage of the occasion to push their claims. Satchar,
chief of one of the Banners, issued a proclamation, calling
his race to his side, and declaring his intention to invade
China at the head of 100,000 men. It seemed hardly possible
for Kanghi to extricate himself from his many dangers.
With great quickness of perception Kanghi saw that the
most pressing danger was that from the Mongols, and he
sent the whole of his northern garrisons to attack Satchar
before the Mongol clans could have gathered to his assist-
ance. The Manchu cavalry, by a rapid march, surprised
Satchar in his camp and carried him and his family off as
prisoners to Pekin. The capture of their chief discouraged
the Mongols and interrupted their plans for invading China.
Kanghi thus obtained a respite from what seemed his great-
THE FIRST MANCHU RULER. 201
est peril. Then he turned his attention to dealing with "Wou
Sankwei, and the first effort of his armies resulted in the
recovery of Fuhkien, where the governor and Ching had
reduced themselves to a state of exhaustion by a contest
inspired by personal jealousy not patriotism. From Fuhkien
his successful lieutenants passed into Kwantung, and the
Chinese, seeing that the Manchus were not sunk as low as
had been thought, abandoned all resistance, and again rec-
ognized the Tartar authority. The Manchus did not dare
to punish the rebels except in rare instances, and, therefore,
the recovery of Canton was unaccompanied by any scenes
of blood. But a garrison of Manchus was placed in each
town of importance, and it was by Kanghi's order that a
walled town, or "Tartar city," was built within each city
for the accommodation and security of the dominant race.
But notwithstanding these successes Kanghi made little
or no progress against the main force of "Wou Sankwei,
whose supremacy was undisputed throughout the whole of
southwest China. It was not until 1677 that Kanghi ven-
tured to move his armies against "Wou Sankwei in person.
Although he obtained no signal success in the field, the
divisions among the Chinese commanders were such that
he had the satisfaction of compelling them to evacuate
Hunan, and when Wou Sankwei took his first step back-
ward the sun of his fortunes began to set. Calamity rapidly
followed calamity. Wou Sankwei had not known the mean-
ing of defeat in his long career of fifty years, but now, in his
old age, he saw his affairs in inextricable confusion. His
adherents deserted him, many rebel officers sought to come
to terms with the Manchus, and Kanghi's armies gradually
converged on Wou Sankwei from the east and the north.
Driven out of Szchuen, Wou Sankwei endeavored to make a
stand in Yunnan. He certainly succeeded in prolonging the
struggle down to the year 1679, when his death put a sudden
end to the contest, and relieved Kanghi from much anxiety ;
for although the success of the Manchus was no longer un-
certain, the military skill of the old Chinese warrior might
202 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
have indefinitely prolonged the war. "Wou Sankwei was
one of the most conspicuous and attractive figures to be met
with in the long course of Chinese history, and his career
covered one of the most critical periods in the modern exist-
ence of that empire. From the time of his first distinguish-
ing himself in the defense of Ningyuen until he died, half a
century later, as Prince of Yunnan, he occupied the very
foremost place in the minds of his fellow-countrymen. The
part he had taken, first in keeping out the Manchus, and
then in introducing them into the state, reflected equal credit
on his ability and his patriotism. In requesting the Manchus
to crush the robber Li and to take the throne which the fall
of the Mings had rendered vacant, he was actuated by the
purest motives. There was only a choice of evils, and he
selected that which seemed the less. He gave the empire
to a foreign ruler of intelligence, but he saved it from an
unscrupulous robber. He played the part of king-maker
to the family of Noorhachu, and the magnitude of their
obligations to him could not be denied. They were not as
grateful as he may have expected, and they looked askance
at his military power and influence over his countrymen.
Probably he felt that he had not been well treated, and
chagrin undoubtedly induced him to reject Kanghi's request
to proceed to Pekin. If he had only acceeded to that arrange-
ment he would have left a name for conspicuous loyalty and
political consistency in the service of the great race, which
he had been mainly instrumental in placing over China.
But even as events turned out he was one of the most re-
markable personages the Chinese race ever produced, and
his military career shows that they are capable of producing
great generals and brave soldiers.
The death of "Wou Sankwei signified the overthrow of
the Chinese uprising which had threatened to extinguish the
still growing power of the Manchu under its youthful Em-
peror Kanghi. Wou Shufan, the grandson of that prince,
endeavored to carry on the task of holding Yunnan as an
independent territory, but by the year 1681 his possessions
THE FIRST MANCHU RULER. W3
were reduced to the town of Yunnanfoo, where he was
closely besieged by the Manchu forces. Although the Chi-
nese fought valiantly, they were soon reduced to extremities,
and the Manchus carried the place by storm. The garrison
were massacred to the last man, and Wou Shufan only
avoided a worse fate by committing suicide. The Manchus,
not satisfied with his death, sent his head to Pekin to be
placed on its principal gate in triumph, and the body of Wou
Sankwei himself was exhumed so that his ashes might be
scattered in each of the eighteen provinces of China as a
warning to traitors. Having crushed their most redoubtable
antagonist, the Manchus resorted to more severe measures
against those who had surrendered in Fuhkien and Kwan-
tuiig, and many insurgent chiefs who had surrendered, and
enjoyed a brief respite, ended their lives under the knife
of the executioner. The Manchu soldiers are said to have
been given spoil to the extent of nearly ten million dollars,
and the war which witnessed the final assertion of Manchu
power over the Chinese was essentially popular with the sol-
diers who carried it on to a victorious conclusion. A very
short time after the final overthrow of Wou Sankwei and his
family, the Chinese regime in Formosa was brought to an
end. Kanghi, having collected a fleet, and concluded a
convention with the Dutch, determined on the invasion and
conquest of Formosa. In the midst of these preparations
Ching, the son of Koshinga, died, and no doubt the plans
of Kanghi were facilitated by the confusion that followed.
The Manchu fleet seized Ponghu, the principal island of the
Pescadore group, and thence the Manchus threw a force into
Formosa. It is said that they were helped by a high tide,
and by the superstition of the islanders, who exclaimed, "The
first Wang (Koshinga) got possession of Taiwan by a high
tide. The fleet now comes in the same manner It is the
will of Heaven." Formosa accepted the supremacy of the
Manchus without further ado. Those of the islanders who
had ever recognized the authority of any government, ac-
cepted that of the Emperor Kanghi, shaved their heads in
204 A SHORT HISTORY OP CHINA.
token of submission, and became so far as in them lay
respectable citizens.
The overthrow of Wou Sankwei and the conquest of
Formosa completed what may be called the pacification
of China by the Manchus. From that period to the Taeping
Rebellion, or for nearly 200 years, there was no internal
insurrection on a large scale. On the whole the Manchus
stained their conclusive triumph by few excesses, and
Kanghi's moderation was scarcely inferior to that of his
father, Chuntche. The family of Wou Sankwei seems to
have been rooted out more for the personal attempt of the
son at Pekin than for the bold ambition of the potentate
himself. The family of Koshinga was spared, and its prin-
cipal representative received the patent of an earl. Thus,
by a policy judiciously combined of severity and moderation,
did Kanghi make himself supreme, and complete the work
of his race. Whatever troubles may have beset the govern-
ment in the last 220 years, it will be justifiable to speak of the
Manchus and the Tatsing dynasty as the legitimate author-
ities in China, and, instead of foreign adventurers, as the
national and recognized rulers of the Middle Kingdom.
CHAPTER XI
THE EMPEROR KANGHI
AMONG the Mongol tribes the noblest at this period were
the Khalkas. They prided themselves on being the descend-
ants of the House of Genghis, the representatives of the
special clan of the great conqueror, and the occupants of
the original home in the valleys of the Ouon and Kerulon.
Although then- military power was slight, the name of the
Khalka princes stood high among the Mongol tribes, and
they exercised an influence far in excess of their numbers or
capacity as a fighting force. Kanghi determined to establish
friendly relations with this clan, and by the dispatch of
THE EMPEROR KANGHL 205
friendly letters and costly presents he succeeded in inducing
the Khalka chiefs to enter into formal alliance with himself,
and to conclude a treaty of amity with China, which, be it
noted, they faithfully observed. Kanghi's efforts in this
direction, which may have been dictated by apprehension
at the movements of his new neighbors, the Russians, were
thus crowned with success, and the adhesion of the Khalkas
signified that the great majority of the Mongols would thence-
forth abstain from acts of unprovoked aggression on the
Chinese frontier. But the advance of China and her influ-
ence, even in the form of paying homage- to the emperor as
the Bogdo Khan, or the Celestial Ruler, so far west as the
upper course of the Amour, involved the Pekin Government
in fresh complications by bringing it into contact with tribes
and peoples of whom it had no cognizance. Beyond the
Khalkas were the Eleuths, supreme in 111 and Kashgaria,
and divided into four hordes, who obeyed as many chiefs.
They had had some relations with the Khalkas, but of China
they knew nothing more than the greatness of her name.
"When the surrender of the Khalka princes became known
the Eleuth chiefs held a grand assembly or kuriltai, and at
this it was finally, and, indeed, ostentatiously, decided not
to yield Kaiighi his demands. Important as this decision
was, it derived increased weight from the character of the
man who was mainly instrumental in inducing the Eleuths
to take it.
Much has been written of the desert chiefs from Yenta
t.~> Yakoob Beg, but none of these showed greater ability or
attained more conspicuous success than Galdan, who strained
the power of China, and fought for many years on equal
terms with the Emperor Kanghi. Galdan determined that
the easiest and most advantageous beginning for his enter-
prise would be to attack his neighbors the Khalkas, who, by
accepting Kanghi's offers, had made themselves the advanced
guard of China in Central Asia. He began a systematic
encroachment into their lands in the year 1679, but at the
same time he resorted to every device to screen his move-
06 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
ments from the Chinese court, and such was the delay in
receiving intelligence, and the ignorance of the situation
beyond the border, that in the very year of his beginning to
attack the Khalkas, his envoy at Pekin received a flattering
reception at the hands of Kanghi, still hopeful of a peaceful
settlement, and returned with the seal and patent of a Khan.
Events had not reached a state of open hostility three years
later, when Kanghi sent special envoys to the camp of
Galdan, as well as to the Khalkas. They were instructed
to promise and pay much, but to rest content with nothing
short of the formal acceptance by all the chiefs of the
supremacy of China. Galdan, bound by the laws of hos-
pitality, nowhere more sacred than in the East, gave them
an honorable reception, and lavished upon them the poor
resources he commanded. In hyperbolic terms he declared
that the arrival of an embassy from the rich and powerful
Chinese emperor in his poor State would be handed down as
the most glorious event of his reign. But he refused to
make any tender of allegiance, or to subscribe himself as a
Chinese vassal. The dissensions among the Khalka princes
assisted the development of Galdan's ambition, and added
to the anxiety of the Chinese ruler. Kanghi admonished
them to heal their differences and to abstain from an inter-
necine strife, which would only facilitate their conquest by
Galdan, and he succeeded so far that he induced them to
swear a peace among themselves before an image of Buddha.
At this juncture the Chinese came into collision with the
Russians on the Amour. The Russians had built a fort at
Albazin, on the upper course of that river, and the Chinese
army located in the Khalka country, considering its proximity
a menace to their own security, attacked it in overwhelming
force. Albazin was taken, and those of the garrison who
fell into the hands of the Chinese were carried off to Pekin,
where their descendants still reside as a distinct Russian
colony. But when the Chinese evacuated Albazin the Rus-
sians returned there with characteristic obstinacy, and
Kanghi, becoming anxious at the increasing activity of
THE EMPEROR KANGHI, 207
Galdan, accepted the overtures of the Russian authorities
in Siberia, who, in 1688, sent the son of the Governor-gen-
eral of Eastern Siberia to Pekin to negotiate a peace. After
twelve months' negotiation, protracted by the outbreak of
war with Galdan, the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the first con-
cluded between China and any European power, was signed,
and the brief and only war between Russia and China was
thus brought to a speedy and satisfactory termination. The
Russians agreed to the destruction of Fort Albazin, but they
were allowed to build another at Nerchinsk.
There is reason to believe that Galdan thought that he
might derive some advantage from the complications with
Russia, for his military movements were hastened when he
heard that the two powers were embroiled on the Amour,
and he proclaimed his intention of invading the Khalka re-
gion, because some of their people had murdered his kins-
men. Galdan endeavored to conclude an alliance with the
Russians, who sent an officer to his camp; but they soon
came to the determination that it would be more advanta-
geous to keep on friendly terms with the Chinese than to em-
bark on a hazardous adventure with the chief of an Asiatic
horde. The mere rumor of a possible alliance between Gal-
dan and the Russians roused Kanghi to increased activity,
and all the picked troops of the Eight Manchu Banners, the
Forty-nine Mongol Banners, and the Chinese auxiliaries,
were dispatched across the steppe to bring the Napoleon of
Central Asia to reason. In face of this formidable danger
Galdan showed undiminished courage and energy. Realiz-
ing the peril of inaction, he did not hesitate to assume the
offensive, and the war began with a victory he gained over
a general named Horni, within the limits of Chinese terri-
tory. The moral of this success was that it showed that
Kanghi had not decided a moment too soon in resorting to
extreme measures against the ambitious potentate who found
the Gobi Desert and the surrounding region too circumscribed
for his ambition.
Kanghi intrusted the chief command of his armies to hig
20? A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
brother, Yu Tsing Wang, who justified his appointment by
bringing the Eleuth forces speedily to an engagement, and
by gaining a more or less decisive victory over them at Oulan
Poutong. The loss was considerable on both sides, among
the imperial officers killed being an uncle of the emperor;
but Galdan's forces suffered a great deal more during the
retreat than they had done in the action. After this disas-
ter Galdan signed a treaty with the Chinese commander,
Yu Tsing Wang. At first he attempted to gain an advan-
tage by excluding his personal enemies, the Khalkas, from
it, but the Chinese were not to be entrapped into any such
arrangement, and, standing up for their dependents, the
provisions of the treaty provided equally for their safety
and for the acceptance by Galdan of the supremacy of
China. This new arrangement or treaty was concluded in
1690, but Kanghi himself seems to have placed no great
faith in the sincerity of Galdan, and to have regarded it
merely as a truce. This view was soon found to be correct,
for neither side laid aside their arms, and the unusual vigi-
lance of the Chinese gave Galdan additional cause for um-
brage. Kan hi showed that he was resolved not to let the
terms, to which Galdan had subscribed, become a dead let-
ter. He summoned a great assemblage of the Khalka tribes
on the plain of Dolonor the Seven Springs near Changtu
and he attended it in person, bestowing gifts and titles with
a lavish hand. Kanghi was thus able to convince himself
that, so far as the Mongol tribes were concerned, he might
count on their loyalty and support. He then began to estab-
lish an understanding with Tse Wang Rabdan, and thus ob-
tain an ally in the rear of Galdan. This latter circumstance
was the direct cause of the second war with Galdan, for
Kanghi's embassador was waylaid and murdered in the
neighborhood of Hami. The outrage for which, whether
he inspired it or not, Galdan was held blameworthy, aroused
the strongest resentment and anger of Kanghi.
Kanghi made extraordinary preparations for the cam-
paign. He placed four armies in the field numbering about
THE EMPEROR KANGHL 209
150,000 combatants, and it has been computed that, with
non-combatants, the total of men employed did not fall
short of a million. The first of these armies numbered
35,600 men, and was intrusted to Feyanku, the Ney of the
Manchu army. Kanghi took personal command of the sec-
ond, and its strength is given at 37,700 men; and the third
army, 35,400 men, was plaed under the orders of Sapsu.
The fourth, of unstated but greatest numerical strength^
acted as the reserve force for the others, and did not, prop-
erly speaking, come into action at all. In order to render
the war popular Kanghi offered special pay to the soldiers,
and undertook to provide for the widows and orphans of
those slain. At the same time Kanghi neglected no precau-
tion to insure the success of his arms. He provided cotton
armor which was proof to the bullet for his cavalry and
part of his infantry, and he organized a corps of artillerists
mounted on camels, which also carried the light pieces, and
rendered good service as "flying artillery." Before setting
out for the campaign, the emperor reviewed his army, and
he chose for the occasion the date of the popular Feast of
Lanterns, when all China takes a holiday. After the in-
spection of the numerous and well equipped army an im-
pressive ceremony took place. Feyanku approached his
sovereign, and received at his hands a cup of wine, which
the general took while on his knees, and which, on descend-
ing from the steps of the throne, he quaffed in full view of
the spectators. Each of his assistant generals and the sub-
ordinate officers in groups of ten went through the same
ceremony, and the ruin of Galdan was anticipated in the
libations of his conquerors. While Feyanku marched to en-
counter Galdan wherever he should find him, the ministers
and courtiers at Pekin made a strenuous effort to prevent
Kanghi taking the field in person, expatiating on the dan-
gers of a war in the desert, and of the loss to the empire if
anything happened to him. But Kanghi, while thanking
them for their solicitude, was not to be deterred from his
purpose. He led his army by a parallel route to that pur-
BIO A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
sued by Feyanku across the Gobi Desert to Kobdo, where
Galdan had established his headquarters. The details of
the march are fully described by the Roman Catholic priest,
Gerbillon, in his interesting narrative. They reveal the diffi-
culties of the enterprise as well as its success. Some detach-
ments of the Chinese army were compelled to beat a retreat,
but the main body succeeded in making its way to the valley
of the Kerulon, where some supplies could be obtained. Fe-
yanku's corps, when it reached the neighborhood of the mod-
ern Ourga, was reduced to an effective strength of 10,000
men, and of Sapsu's army only 2,000 ever reached the scene
of operations, and they formed a junction with the force
under Feyanku. But Galdan did not possess the military
strength to take any advantage of the enfeebled state in
which the Chinese armies reached his neighborhood. He
abandoned camp after camp, and sought to make good his
position by establishing an empty alliance with the Russians
in Siberia, from whom he asked 60,000 troops to consum-
mate the conquest of China. Such visionary projects as this
provided a poor defense against the active operations of a
Chinese army in his own country. In a fit bordering on
desperation Galdan suddenly determined to risk an attack
on the camp of Feyanku at Chowmodo. That general, less
fortunate than his sovereign, had been reduced to the verge
of distress by the exhaustion of his supplies, and was even
meditating a retreat back to China, when the action of Gal-
dan relieved him from his dilemma. The exact course of
the battle at Chowmodo is not described in any authentic
document. During three hours Feyanku stood on the de-
fensive, but when he gave the order for attack, the Eleuths
broke in confusion before the charge of his cavalry. Two
thousand of their best warriors were slain, their organization
was shattered, and Galdan became a fugitive in the region
where he had posed as undisputed master. This victory un-
doubtedly relieved the Chinese from serious embarrassment,
and Kanghi felt able to return to Pekin, leaving the further
conduct of the war and the pursuit of Galdan in the hands
THE EMPEROR KANOHI. 211
of Feyanku. Formidable enemy as Galdan had proved him-
self, the defeat at Chowmodo put an end to his career, and
destroyed all his schemes of greatness. The Chinese pur-
sued him with great persistence, and at last he died in 1697,
either of his deprivations or by the act of his own hand.
With Galdan disappeared one of the most remarkable of the
desert chiefs; but, although Kanghi flattered himself that
such would be the case, peace did not settle down on Cen-
tral Asia as the consequence of the death of his active and
enterprising antagonist. The Chinese armies were recalled
for this occasion, and the only force left on the remote fron-
tier was a small one under the command of the gallant
Feyanku.
The overthrow and death of Galdan brought Tse "Wang
Rabdan into direct contact with the Chinese. He had from
his hostile relations with Galdan the murderer of his father
Tsenka acted as the ally of Kanghi, but when he became
the chief of the Eleuths on the death of his uncle, his ideas
underwent a change, and he thought more of his dignity
and independence. No rupture might have taken place, but
that the Chinese, in their implacable resolve to exterminate
the family of their enemy Galdan, demanded from Tse Wang
Rabdan not only the bones of that chieftain, but also the
persons of his son and daughter, who had taken refuge with
him. Tse Wang Rabdan resented both the demand itself
and the language in which it was expressed. He evaded
the requests sent by Feyanku, and he addressed a letter of
remonstrance to Kanghi, in the course of which he said,
"The war being now concluded, past injuries ought to be
buried in oblivion. Pity should be shown to the vanquished,
and it would be barbarous to think of nothing but of how to
overwhelm them. It is the first law inspired by humanity,
and one which custom has consecrated from the earliest pe-
riod among us who are Eleuths." Kanghi, undeterred by
this homily, continued to press his demand, and sent several
missions to the Eleuth camp to obtain the surrender of Gal-
dan's remains and relations. His pertinacity was at last
212 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
rewarded, and the bones of his old opponent were surren-
dered to be scattered as those of a traitor throughout China,
and his son was sent to Pekin, where, however, he received
an honorable appointment in lieu of being handed over to
the public executioner. Although Tse Wang Rabdan at
last conceded to Kanghi what he demanded, his general
action soon marked him out as the antagonist of the Chinese
in Central Asia. He first vanquished in battle, and then
established an alliance with the Kirghiz, and thus his mili-
tary forces were recruited from the whole of the vast terri-
tory from Hami on the east to Khokand on the west.
The main object of his policy was to assert his influence
and authority in Tibet, and to make the ruling lama at
Lhasa accept whatever course he might dictate for him.
Galdan had at one time entertained the same idea; but
probably because he had not as good means of access into
the country as Tse Wang Rabdan had, on account of his
possession of Khoten, it lay dormant until it was dispelled
by the rupture after his adoption of Mohammedanism. Up
to this time China had been content with a very shadowy
hold on Tibet, and she had no resident representative at
Lhasa. But Kanghi, convinced of the importance of main-
taining his supremacy in Tibet, took energetic measures to
counteract the Eleuth intrigues, and for a time there was a
keen diplomatic struggle between the contending potentates.
From an early period the supremacy in the Tibetan admin-
istration had been disputed between two different classes,
the one which represented the military body making use of
religious matters to forward its designs, the other being an
order of priests supported by the unquestioning faith and
confidence of the mass of the people. The former became
known as Red Caps and the latter as Yellow Caps. The
rivalry between these classes had been keen before, and was
still bitterly contested when Chuntche first ascended the
throne ; but victory had finally inclined to the side of the
Yellow Caps before the fall of Galdan. The Dalai Lama
was their great spiritual head, and his triumph had been
THE EMPEROR KANQH1. 213
assisted by the intervention and influence of the Manchu
emperor. The Red Caps were driven out of the country
into Bhutan, where they still hold sway. After this suc-
cess a new functionary, with both civil and military author-
ity, was appointed to carry on the administration, under the
orders of the Dalai Lama, who was supposed to be lost in
his spiritual speculations .and religious devotions. This func-
tionary received the name of the Tipa, and, encouraged by
the little control exercised over his acts, he soon began to
carry on intrigues for the elevation of his own power at the
expense of that of his priestly superiors. The ambition of
one Tipa led to his fall and execution, but the offense was
attributed to the individual, and a new one was appointed.
This second Tipa was the reputed son of a Dalai Lama, and
when his father died in 1682 he kept the fact of his death
secret, giving out that he had only retired into the recesses
of the palace, and ruled the state in his name for the space
of sixteen years. The Tipa well knew that he could not
hope to obtain the approval of Kanghi for what he had done,
and he had made overtures to the princes of Jungaria for
protection, whenever He might require it, against the Chi-
nese emperor. At last the truth was divulged, and Kanghi
was most indignant at having been duped, and threatened
to send an army to punish the Tipa for his crime. Then the
Tipa selected a new Dalai Lama, and endeavored to appease
Kanghi, but his choice proved unfortunate because it did
not satisfy the Tibetans. His own general, Latsan Khan,
made himself the executor of public opinion. The Tipa was
slain with most of his supporters, and the boy Dalai Lama
shared the same fate. These occurrences did not insure the
tranquillity of the state, for when another Dalai Lama was
found, the selection was not agreeable to Latsan Khan, and
his friends had to convey the youth for safety to Sining, in
China.
It was at this moment that Tse Wang Rabdan determined
to interfere in Tibet, and, strangely enough, instead of at-
tempting to make Latsan Khan his friend, he at once resolved
814 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
to treat him as an enemy, throwing his son, who happened
to be at Hi, into prison. He then dispatched an army into
Tibet to crush Latsan Khan, and at the same time he sent a
force against Sining in the hope of gaining possession of the
person of the young Dalai Lama, The Eleuth army quitted
the banks of the Di in 1709, under the command of Zeren
Donduk, and having crossed Eastern Turkestan appeared in
due course before Lhasa. It met with little or no resistance.
Latsan Khan was slain, and the Eleuth army collected an
incalculable quantity of spoil, with which it returned to the
banks of the Hi. The expedition against Sining failed, and
the rapid advance of a Chinese army compelled the retreat
of Zeren Donduk without having attained any permanent
success. As the Eleuth army had evacuated Tibet there
was no object in sending Chinese troops into that state, and
Kanghi's generals were instructed to march westward from
Hami to Turfan. But their movements were marked by
carelessness or over-confidence, and the Eleuths surprised
their camp and inflicted such loss upon Kanghi's commanders
that they had even to evacuate Hami. But this was only
a temporary reverse. A fresh Manchu army soon retrieved
it, and Hami again became the bulwark of the Chinese
frontier. At the same time Kanghi sent a garrison to Tibet,
and appointed resident ambans at Lhasa, which officials
China has retained there ever since. The war with Tse
Wang Rabdan was not ended by these successes, for he
resorted to the hereditary tactics of his family, retiring when
the Chinese appeared in force, and then advancing on their
retreat. As Kanghi wrote, they are "like wolves who, at
the sight of the huntsmen, scatter to their dens, and at the
withdrawal of danger assemble again round the prey they
have abandoned with regret. Such was the policy of these
desert robbers." The last year of Kanghi's reign was illus-
trated by a more than usually decisive victory over the
forces of Tse Wang Rabdan, which a courtier declared to
be " equivalent to the conquest of Tibet"; but on the whole
the utmost success that can be claimed for Kanghi's policy
THE EMPEROR KANGHI. 215
was that it repelled the chronic danger from the desert chiefs
and their turbulent followers to a greater distance from the
immediate frontier of the empire than had been the case for
many centuries. He left the task of breaking the Eleuth
power to his grandson, Keen Lung.
The close of Kanghi's reign witnessed a decline in the
interest he took in the representatives of Europe, and this
was not revived by the splendor of the embassy which Peter
the Great sent to Pekin in 1719. The embassy consisted of
the embassador himself, M. Ismaloff; his secretary, M. de
Lange; the English traveler, Mr. Bell, and a considerable
suite. Kanghi received in the most gracious manner the let-
ter which Peter addressed to him in the following terms:
"To the emperor of the vast countries of Asia, to the Sover-
eign Monarch of Bogdo, to the Supreme Majesty of Khitay,
friendship and greeting. With the design I possess of hold-
ing and increasing the friendship and close relations long
established between your Majesty and my predecessors and
myself, I have thought it right to send to your court, in the
capacity of embassador-extraordinary, Leon Ismaloff, cap-
tain in my guards. I beg you will receive him in a manner
suitable to the character in which he comes, to have regard
and to attach as much faith to what he may say on the sub-
ject of our mutual affairs as if I were speaking to you myself,
and also to permit his residing at your Court of Pekin until
I recall him. Allow me to sign myself your Majesty's good
friend, Peter." Kanghi gave the Russian envoy a very
honorable reception. A house was set apart for his accom-
modation, and when the difficulties raised by the mandarins
on the question of the kotao ceremony at the audience threat-
ened to bring the embassy to an abortive end, Kanghi him-
self intervened with a suggestion that solved the difficulty.
He arranged that his principal minister should perform the
kotao to the letter of the Russian emperor, while the Russian
envoy rendered him the same obeisance. The audience then
took place without further delay, and it was allowed on all
hands that no foreign embassy had ever been received with
216 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
greater honor in China than this. Ismaloff returned to his
master with the most roseate account of his reception and
of the opening in China for Russian trade. A large and rich
caravan was accordingly fitted out by Peter, to proceed to
Pekin ; but when it arrived it found a very different state
of affairs from what Ismaloff had pictured. Kanghi lay 'on
his death-bed, the anti-foreign ministers were supreme, de-
claring that "trade was a matter of little consequence, and
regarded by them with contempt," and the Russians were
ignominiously sent back to Siberia with the final declaration
that such intercourse as was unavoidable must be restricted
to the frontier. Thus summarily was ended Peter's dream
of tapping the wealth of China.
Although Kanghi was not altogether free from domestic
trouble, through the ambition of his many sons to succeed
him, his life must on the whole be said to have passed along
tranquilly enough apart from his cares of state. The public
acts and magnificent exploits of his reign prove him to have
been wise, courageous, and magnanimous, and his private
life will bear the most searching examination, and only
render his virtue the more conspicuous. He always showed
a tender solicitude for the interests of his people, which was
proved, among other things, by his giving up his annual
tours through his dominions on account of the expense thrown
on his subjects by the inevitable size of his retinue. His
active habits as a hunter, a rider, and even as a pedestrian,
were subjects of admiring comment on the part of the Chi-
nese people, and he was one of their few rulers who made
it a habit to walk through the streets of his capital. He
was also conspicuous as the patron of learning; notably
in his support of the foreign missionaries as geographers
and cartographers. He was also the consistent and ener-
getic supporter of the celebrated Hanlin College, and, as he
was no ordinary litterateur himself, this is not surprising.
His own works filled a hundred volumes, prominent among
which were his Sixteen Maxims on the Art of Government,
and it is believed that he took a large part in bringing out
THE EMPEROR KANGHI. 217
the Imperial Dictionary of the Hanlin College. His writings
were marked by a high code of morality as well as by the
lofty ideas of a broad-minded statesman. His enemies have
imputed to him an excessive vanity and avarice; but the
whole tenor of his life disproves the former statement, and,
whatever foundation in fact the latter may have had, he
never carried it to any greater length than mere prudence
and consideration for the wants of his people demanded.
We know that he resorted to gentle pressure to attain his
ends rather than to tyrannical force. When he wished to
levy a heavy contribution from a too rich subject he had
recourse to what may be styled a mild joke, sooner than to
threats and corporal punishment. The following incident
has been quoted in this connection : One day Kanghi made
an official, who had grown very wealthy, lead him, riding
on an ass, round his gardens. As recompense the emperor
gave him a tael. Then he himself led the mandarin in sim-
ilar fashion. At the end of the tour he asked how much
greater he was than his minister? "The comparison is im-
possible," said the ready courtier. "Then I must make the
estimate myself," replied Kanghi. "I am 20,000 times as
great, therefore you will pay me 20,000 taels." His reign
was singularly free from the executions so common under
even the best of Chinese rulers; and, whenever possible, he
always tempered justice with mercy.
Notwithstanding his enfeebled health and the many ill-
nesses from which he had suffered in later life, he persisted
in following his usual sporting amusements, and he passed
the winter of 1722 at his hunting-box at Haidsu. He seems
to have caught a chill, and after a brief illness he died on the
20th of December in that year.
The place of Kanghi among Chinese sovereigns is clearly
defined. He ranks on almost equal terms with the two
greatest of them all Taitsong and his own grandson, Keen
Lung and it would be ungracious, if not impossible, to say
in what respect he falls short of complete equality with
either, so numerous and conspicuous were his talents and his
10
218 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
virtues. His long friendship and high consideration for the
Christian missionaries have no doubt contributed to bring
his name and the events of his reign more prominently before
Europe than was the case with any other Chinese ruler.
But, although this predilection for European practices may
have had the effect of strengthening his claims to precede
every other of his country's rulers, it can add but little to the
impression produced on even the most cursory reader by the
remarkable achievements in peace and war accomplished by
this gifted emperor. Kanghi's genius dominates one of the
most critical periods in Chinese history, of which the narra-
tive should form neither an uninteresting nor an uninstruc-
tive theme. Celebrated as the consolidator and completer
of the Manchu conquest, Kanghi's virtue and moderation
have gained him permanent fame as a wise, just, and benef-
icent national sovereign in the hearts of the Chinese people.
CHAPTER XII
A SHORT REIGN AND THE BEGINNING OP A LONG ONE
IMMEDIATELY after the death of Kanghi, his fourth son,
who had long been designated as his heir, was proclaimed
emperor, under the style of Yung Ching, which name means
"the indissoluble concord or stable peace." The late em-
peror had always favored this prince, and in his will he
publicly proclaimed that he bore much resemblance to him-
self, and that he was a man of rare and precious character.
His first acts indicated considerable vigor and decision of
mind. In the edict announcing the death of his father and
his own accession he said that on the advice of his ministers
he had entered upon the discharge of his imperial duties,
without giving up precious time to the indulgence of his
natural grief, which would be gratifying to his feelings, but
injurious to the public interests. As Yung Ching was of the
mature age of forty-five, and as he had enjoyed the confi-
A SHORT REIGN. 219
dence of his predecessor, he was fully qualified to carry on
the administration. He declared that his main purpose was
to continue his father's work, and that he would tread as
closely as he could in Kanghi's footsteps. While Yung
Ching took these prompt steps to secure himself on the
throne, some of his brothers assumed an attitude of menacing
hostility toward him, and all his energy and vigilance were
required to counteract their designs. A very little time was
needed, however, to show that Kanghi had selected his
worthiest son as hte successor, and that China would have
no reason to fear under Yung Ching the loss of any of the
benefits conferred on the nation by Kanghi. His fine pres-
ence, and frank, open manner, secured for him the sympathy
and applause of the public, and in a very short time he also
gained their respect and admiration by his wisdom and
justice.
The most important and formidable of his brothers was
the fourteenth son of Kanghi, by the same mother, however,
as that of Yung Ching. He and his son Poki had been
regarded with no inconsiderable favor by Kanghi, and at
one time it was thought that he would have chosen them
as his successors ; but these expectations were disappointed.
He was sent instead to hold the chief command against the
Eleuths on the western borders. Young Ching determined
to remove him from this post, in which he might have oppor-
tunities of asserting his independence, and for a moment it
seemed as if he might disobey. But more prudent counsels
prevailed, and he returned to Pekin, where he was placed
in honorable confinement, and retained there during the
whole of Yung Ching 's reign. He and his son owed their
release thirteen years later to the greater clemency or self-
confidence of Keen Lung. Another brother, named Sessaka,
also fell under suspicion, and he was arrested and his estates
confiscated. He was then so far forgiven that a small mili-
tary command was given him in the provinces. Others of
more importance were involved in his affairs. Lessihin, son
of Prince Sourniama, an elder brother of Kanghi, was de-
220 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
nounced as a sympathizer and supporter of Sessaka. The
charge seems to have been based on slender evidence, but
it sufficed to cause the banishment of this personage and all
his family to Sining. It appears as if they were specially
punished for having become Christians, and there is no doubt
that their conversion imbittered the emperor's mind against
the Christian missionaries and their religion. It enabled him
to say, or at least induced him to accept the statement, that
the Christians meddled and took a side in the internal politics
of the country. Yung Ching saw and seized his opportunity.
His measures of repression against the recalcitrant party in
his own family culminated in the summary exile of Sourni-
ama and all his descendants down to the fourth generation.
Sourniama vainly endeavored to establish his innocence,
and he sent three of his sons, laden with chains, to the
palace, to protest his innocence and devotion. But they
were refused audience, and Sourniama and his family sank
into oblivion and wretchedness on the outskirts of the empire.
Having thus settled the difficulties within his own fam-
ily, Yung Ching next turned his attention to humbling the
bold band of foreigners who had established themselves in
the capital and throughout the country, as much by their
own persistency and indifference to slight as by the acquies-
cence of the Chinese government, and who, after they had
reached some of the highest official posts, continued to preach
and propagate their gospel of a supreme power and mercy
beyond the control of kings, a gospel which was simply de-
structive of the paternal and sacred claims on which a Chi-
nese emperor based his authority as superior to all earthly
interference, and as transmitted to him direct from Heaven.
The official classes confirmed the emperor's suspicions, and
encouraged him to proceed to extreme lengths. On all sides
offenses were freely laid at the doors of the missionaries. It
was said of them that "their doctrine sows trouble among
the people, and makes them doubt the goodness of our laws."
In the province of Fuhkien their eighteen churches were
closed, and the priests were summarily ordered to return to
A SHORT REIQX.
Macao. At Pekin itself the Jesuits lost all their influence.
Those who had been well-disposed toward them were either
banished or cowed into silence. The emperor turned his
back on them and refused to see them, and they could only
wait with their usual fortitude until the period of imperial
displeasure had passed over. When they endeavored to en-
list in their support the sympathy and influence of the em-
peror's brother the thirteenth prince who in Kanghi's time
had been considered their friend, they met with a rebuff not
unnatural or unreasonable when the mishaps to his relations
for their Christian proclivities are borne in mind. This prince
said, in words which have often been repeated since by Chi-
nese ministers and political writers, "What would you say
if our people were to go to Europe and wished to change
there the laws and customs established by your ancient sages?
The emperor, my brother, wishes to put an end to all this in
an effectual manner. I have seen the accusation of the
Tsongtou of Fuhkien. It is undoubtedly strong, and your
disputes about our customs have greatly injured you. What
would you say if we were to transport ourselves to Europe
and to act there as you have done here? Would you stand
it for a moment? In the course of time I shall master this
business, but I declare to you that China will want for noth-
ing when you cease to live in it, and that your absence will
not cause it any loss. Here nobody is retained by force, and
nobody also will be suffered to break the laws or to make
light of our customs."
The influence of Yung Ching on the development of the
important foreign question arrested the ambition and san-
guine flight of the imagination of the Roman Catholic mis-
sionaries, who, rendered overconfident by their success un-
der Kanghi, believed that they held the future of China in
their own hands, and that persistency alone was needed to
secure the adhesion of that country to the Christian Church.
Yung Ching dispelled these illusions, and so far as they
were illusions, which nearly two subsequent centuries have
proved them to be, it was well that they should be so dis-
222 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
pelled. He asserted himself in very unequivocal terms as
an emperor of China, and as resolute in maintaining his sov-
ereign position outside the control of any religious potentate
or creed. The progress of the Christian religion of the Ro-
man Catholic Church in China was quite incompatible with
the supposed celestial origin of the emperor, who was alleged
to receive his authority direct from Heaven. It is not sur-
prising that Yung Ching, at the earliest possible moment,
decided to blight these hopes, and to assert the natural and
inherited prerogative of a Chinese emperor. There is no
room to doubt that the Catholic priests had drawn a too
hasty and too favorable deduction from the favor of Kanghi.
They confounded their practical utility with the intrinsic
merit and persuasive force of Christianity. An enlightened
ruler had recognized the former, but a skeptical people showed
themselves singularly obdurate to the latter. The persecu-
tion of the Christians, of which the letters from the mission-
aries at Pekin at this time are so full, did not go beyond the
placing of some restraint on the preaching of their religion.
No wholesale executions or sweeping decrees passed against
their persons attended its course or marked its development.
Yung Ching simply showed by his conduct that they must
count no longer on the favor of the emperor in the carrying
out of their designs. The difficulties inherent in the task
they had undertaken stood for the first time fully revealed,
and having been denounced as a source of possible danger
to the stability of the empire, they became an object of
suspicion even to those who had sympathized with them
personally, if not with their creed.
The early years of the reign of Yung Ching were marked
by extraordinary public misfortunes. The flooding of the
Hoangho entailed a famine, which spread such desolation
throughout the northern provinces that it is affirmed, on
credible authority, that 40,000 persons were fed at the state
expense in Pekin alone for a period of four months. The
taxes in some of the most important cities and wealthiest
districts had to be greatly reduced, and the resources of the
A SHORT REIGN. !>'.}
exchequer were severely strained. But the loss and suffering
caused by the famine were speedily cast into the shade by
a terrible and sudden visitation which carried desolation and
destruction throughout the whole of the metropolitan prov-
ince of Pechihli. The northern districts of China have for
many centuries been liable to the frequent recurrence of
earthquakes on a terribly vast and disastrous scale, but none
of them equaled in its terrific proportions that of the year
1730. It came without warning, but the shocks continued
for ten days. Over 100,000 persons were overwhelmed in
a moment at Pekin, the suburbs were laid in ruins, the im-
perial palace was destroyed, the summer residence at Yuen
Ming Yuen, on which Yung Ching had lavished his taste
and his treasure, suffered in scarcely a less degree. The
emperor and the inhabitants fled from the city, and took
shelter without the walls, where they encamped. The loss
was incalculable, and it has been stated that Yung Ching
expended seventy-five million dollars in repairing the damage
and allaying the public misfortune. Notwithstanding these
national calamities the population increased, and in some
provinces threatened to outgrow the production of rice.
Various devices were resorted to to check the growth of the
population; but they were all of a simple and harmless char-
acter, such as the issue of rewards to widows who did not
marry again and to bachelors who preserved their state.
The military events of Yung Ching's reign were confined
to the side of Central Asia, where Tse Wang Rabdan emu-
lated with more than ordinary success the example of his
predecessors, and where he transmitted his power and author-
ity to his son, Galdan Chereng, on his death in 1727. He
established his sovereignty over the whole of Kashgaria,
which he ruled through a prince named Daniel, and he
established relations with the Russians, which at one time
promised to attain a cordial character, but which were sud-
denly converted into hostility by the Russian belief that the
Upper Urtish lay in a gold region which they resolved to
conquer. Instead of an ally they then found in Tse "Wang
A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
Rabdan the successful defender of that region. But the
wars of Central Asia had no interest for Yung Ching. He
was one of the Chinese rulers who thought that he should
regard these matters as outside his concern, and the experi-
ence of Kanghi's wars had divided Chinese statesmen into
two clearly-defined parties : those who held that China should
conquer Central Asia up to the Pamir, and those who thought
that the Great Wall was 'the best practical limit for the exer-
cise of Chinese authority. Yung Ching belonged to the lat-
ter school, and, instead of dispatching fresh armies into the
Gobi region to complete the triumph of his father, he with-
drew those that were there, and publicly proclaimed that the
aggressive chiefs and turbulent tribes of that region might
fight out their own quarrels, and indulge their own petty
ambitions as best they felt disposed. The success of this
policy would have been incontestable if it had been reflected
in the conduct of the Central Asian princelets, who, how-
ever, seemed to see in the moderation and inaction of the
Chinese ruler only a fresh incentive to aggression and turbu-
lence. Yung Ching himself died too soon to appreciate the
shortcomings of his own policy.
In the midst of his labors as a beneficent ruler the lif e of
Yung Ching was cut short. On October 7, 1735, he gave
audience to the high officials of his court in accordance with
his usual custom ; but feeling indisposed he was compelled
to break off the interview in a sudden manner. His indis-
position at once assumed a grave form, and in a few hours
he had ceased to live. The loss of this emperor does not
seem to have caused any profound or widespread sentiment
of grief among the masses, although the more intelligent
recognized in him one of those wise and prudent rulers whose
tenure of power makes their people's happiness.
Yung Ching died so suddenly that he had not nominated
his heir. He left three sons, and, after brief consideration,
the eldest of these to whom was given the name of Keen
Lung was placed upon the throne. The choice was justi-
fied by the result, although the chroniclers declare that it
A SHORT REIGN. 225
oame as a surprise to the recipient of the honor, as he had
passed his life in the pursuit of literary studies rather than
in practical administrative work. His skill and proficiency
in the field of letters had already been proved before his
father's death ; but of public affairs and the government of
a vast empire he knew little or nothing. He was a student
of books rather than of men, and he had to undergo a pre-
liminary course of training in the art of government before
he felt himself capable of assuming the reigns of power.
Moreover, Keen Lung, although the eldest son, was not the
offspring of the empress, and the custom of succession in the
imperial family was too uncertain to allow any one in his
position to feel absolute confidence as to his claims securing
the recognition they might seem to warrant. His admission
of his being unequal to the duties of his lofty position, not-
withstanding that he was twenty-five years of age, was
thoroughly characteristic of the man, and augured well for
the future of his reign. He appointed four regents, whose
special task was to show him how to rule ; but in the edict
delegating his authority to them he expressly limited its ap-
plication to the period of mourning, covering a space of four
years; and as a measure of precaution against any undue
ambition he made the office terminable at his discretion.
Keen Lung began his reign with acts of clemency, which
seldom fail to add a special luster to a sovereign's assump-
tion of power. His father had punished with rigor some of
the first princes of the court simply because they were his
relations, and there is some ground for thinking that he had
put forward antipathy to the foreign heresy of the Christians
as a cloak to conceal his private animosities and personal
apprehensions. Keen Lung at once resolved to reverse the
acts of his predecessor, and to offer such reparation as he
conld to those who had suffered for no sufficient offense.
The sons of Kanghi and their children who had fallen under
the suspicion of Yung Ching were released from their con-
finement, and restored to their rank and privileges. They
showed their gratitude to their benefactor by sustained loy-
223 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
alty and practical service that contributed to the splendor
of his long reign. The impression thus produced on the
public mind was also most favorable, and already the people
were beginning to declare that they had found a worthy suc-
cessor to the great Kanghi.
There is nothing surprising to learn that in consequence
of the pardon and restitution of the men who had nominally
suffered for their Christian proclivities the foreign mission-
aries began to hope and to agitate for an improvement in
their lot and condition. They somewhat hastily assumed
that the evil days of persecution were over, and that Keen
Lung would accord them the same honorable positions as
they had enjoyed under his grandfather, Kanghi. These
expectations were destined to a rude disappointment, as the
party hostile to the Christians remained as strong as ever at
court, and the regents were not less prejudiced against them
than the ministers of Yung Ching had been. The emperor's
own opinion does not appear to have been very strong one
way or the other, but it seems probable that he was slightly
prejudiced against the foreigners. He certainly assented to
an order prohibiting the practice of Christianity by any of
his subjects, and ordaining the punishment of those who
should obstinately adhere to it. At the same time the for-
eign missionaries were ordered to confine their labors to the
secular functions in which they were useful, and to give up
?11 attempts to propagate their creed. Still some slight
abatement in practice was procured of these rigid meas-
ures through the mediation of the painter Castiglione, who,
while taking a portrait of the emperor, pleaded, and not in-
effectually, the cause of his countrymen. There was one
distinct persecution on a large scale in the province of Fuh-
kien, where several Spanish missionaries were tortured, their
chief native supporters strangled, and Keen Lung himself
sent the order to execute the missionaries in retaliation for
the massacre of Chinese subjects by the Spaniards in the
Philippines. After he had been on the throne fifteen years,
Keen Lung began to unbend toward the foreigners, and to
.1 SHOR7 REIGN. 227
avail himself of their services in the same manner as his
grandfather had done. The artists Castiglione and Attiret
were constantly employed in the palace, painting his por-
trait and other pictures. Keen Lung is said to have been
so pleased with that drawn by Attiret that he wished to
make him a mandarin. The French in particular strove
to amuse the great monarch, and to enable him to wile away
his leisure with ingeniously constructed automatons worked
by clockwork machinery. He also learned from them much
about the politics and material condition of Europe, and it
is not surprising that he became imbued with the idea that
France was the greatest and most powerful state in that
continent. Almost insensibly Keen Lung entertained a more
favorable opinion of the foreigners, and extended to them
his protection with other privileges that had long been with-
held But this policy was attributable to practical considera-
tions and not to religious belief.
Very little detailed information is obtainable about the
inner working of the government and the annual course of
events, owing to the practice of not giving the official history
of the dynasty publicity until after it has ceased to reign ; so
all that can be said with any confidence of the first fifteen
years of Keen Lung's reign, is that they were marked by
great internal prosperity arising from the tranquillity of the
realm and the content of the people. Any misfortunes that
befell the realm were of personal importance to the sovereign
Bather than of national significance, although some of the
foreign priests affected to see in them the retribution of
Providence for the apathy and tyranny of the Chinese rulers.
In 1751 Keen Lung lost both his principal wife, the empress,
and his eldest son. His disagreements with his ministers
also proved many and serious, and the letters from Pekin
note, with more than a gleam of satisfaction, that those
who were most prominent as Anti-Christians suffered most
heavily. Keen Lung suffered from physical weakness, and
a susceptibility to bodily ailments, that detracted during the
first few years of his reign from his capacity to discharge all
228 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the duties of his position, and more than their usual share
of power consequently fell into the hands of the gretit tri-
bunals of the state. When Keen Lung resolutely devoted
himself to the task of supervising the acts of the official
world the evils became less perceptible, and gradually the
provincial governors found it to be their best and wisest
course to obey and faithfully execute the behests of their
sovereign. For a brief space Keen Lung seemed likely to
prove more indifferent to the duties of his rank than either
of his predecessors ; but after a few years' practice he hast-
ened to devote himself to his work with an energy which
neither Kanghi nor Yung Ching had surpassed.
Keen Lung seems to have passed his time between his
palace at Pekin and his hunting-box at Jehol, a small town
beyond the Wall. The latter, perhaps, was his favorite resi-
dence, because he enjoyed the quiet of the country, and the
purer and more invigorating air of the northern region
agreed with his constitution. Here he varied the monotony
of rural pursuits for he never became as keen a hunter as
Kanghi with grand ceremonies which he employed the for-
eigners in painting. It was at Jehol that he planned most
of his military campaigns, and those conquests which carried
his banners to the Pamir and the Himalaya. If the earlier
period of Keen Lung's reign was tranquil and undisturbed
by war, the last forty years made up for it by their sustained
military excitement and achievement. As soon as Keen
Lung grasped the situation and found that the administra-
tion of the country was working in perfect order, he resolved
to attain a complete settlement of the questions pending in
Central Asia, which his father had shirked. Up to this time
Keen Lung had been generally set down as a literary student,
as a man more of thought than of action. But his reading
had taught him one thing, and that was that the danger to
China from the side of Central Asia was one that went back
to remote ages, that it had never been allayed, save for brief
intervals, and then only by establishing Chinese authority on
either side of the Tian Shan His studies showed Keen Lung
KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS. 229
what ought to be done, and the aggressions of his neighbors
soon gave him the opportunity of carrying out the policy
that he felt to be the best.
CHAPTER XIII
KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS
IT was the arrival of a chief named Amursana at his
court that first led Keen Lung to seriously entertain the idea
of advancing into Central Asia, and having determined on
the Central Asian campaign, Keen Lung's military prepara-
tions were commensurate with the importance and magni-
tude of the undertaking. He collected an army of 150,000
men, including the picked Manchu Banners and the cele-
brated Solon contingent, each of whom was said to be worth
ten other soldiers. The command of this army was given
to Pauti, the best of the Manchu generals, and Amursana,
who accompanied it, received a seal and the honorary title
of Great General. But Keen Lung superintended all the
operations of the war, and took credit to himself for its
successful issue.
The triumph of Amursana, by the aid of the Chinese, did
not bring tranquillity to Central Asia. He was not con-
tented with the position to which the friendship of Keen
Lung had raised him, and, placing too high an estimate on
his own ability and resources, he was inclined to dispute the
accepted opinion that all his success was due to the Chinese
Army. On the termination of the campaign the major por-
tion of that army returned to China, but Panti was left
with a select contingent, partly to support Amursana, and
partly to secure the restoration of China's authority. Amur-
sana, however, considered that the presence of this force
detracted from the dignity of his position. Having risen to
the greatness he coveted, Amursana meditated casting aside
A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the prop by which he had risen ; but before he took an irre-
traceable step he resolved to make use of the Chinese forces
for extending his authority south of the Tian Shan range
into Kashgaria. With some hesitation Panti lent him 500
Chinese soldiers, and with their aid the Eleuth prince cap-
tured the cities of Kashgar and Yarkand, and set up a chief
named Barhanuddin Khoja as his nominee. This success
confirmed Amursana in his good opinion of himself and his
resources, and when Keen Lung, who had grown mistrustful
of his good faith, summoned him to Pekin, he resolved to
throw off the mask and his allegiance to China. At this
supreme moment of his fate not the least thought of grati-
tude to the Chinese emperor, who had made him what he
was, seems to have entered his mind. He determined not
merely to disregard the summons to Pekin and to proclaim
his independence, but also to show the extent of his hostility
by adding to his defiance an act of treachery. Before he
fully revealed his plans he surprised the Chinese garrison
and massacred it to the last man; the valiant Panti, who
had gained his victories for him, being executed by the
public executioner.
The impression produced by this event was profound, and
when Amursaua followed up the blow by spreading abroad
rumors of the magnitude of his designs they obtained some
credence even among the Mongols. Encouraged by this
success he sought to rally those tribes to his side by imputing
iinister intentions to Keen Lung. His emissaries declared
that Keen Lung wished to deprive them all of their rank
and authority, and that he had summoned Amursana to
Pekin only for the purpose of deposing him. To com-
plete the quarrel, Amursana declared himself King of the
Eleuths, and absolutely independent of China. But the
energy and indignation of Keen Lung soon exposed the hoi-
lowness of these designs, and the inadequacy of Amursana's
power and capacity to make good his pretensions. Keen
Lung collected another army larger than that which had
placed him on his throne, to hurl Amursana from the su-
KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS. 231
premacy which had not satisfied him and which he had
grossty abused.
The armies of Keen Lung traversed the Gobi Desert and
arrived in Central Asia, but the incapacity of his generals
prevented the campaigns having those decisive results which
he expected. The autocratic Chinese ruler treated his gen-
erals who failed like the fickle French Republic. The pen-
alty of failure was a public execution. Keen Lung would
accept nothing short of the capture of Amursana as evidence
of his victory, and Amursana escaped to the Kirghiz. His
celerity or ingenuity cost the lives of four respectable Chinese
generals, two of whom were executed at Pekin and two were
slain by brigands on their way there to share the same fate.
Emboldened by the inability of the Chinese to capture him,
Amursana again assembled an army and pursued the retiring
Chinese across the desert, where he succeeded in inflicting
no inconsiderabte loss upon them.
When the Chinese army retired before Amursana one
corps maintained its position and successfully defied him,
thanks to the capacity of its commander, Tchaohoei. Tchao-
hoei not merely held his ground, but drew up a scheme for
regaining all that had been lost in Central Asia, and Keen
Lung was so impressed by it that he at once resolved to
intrust the execution of his policy to the only officer who
had shown any military capacity. Two fresh armies were
sent to the Hi, and placed, on their arrival there, under the
command of Tchaohoei, who was exhorted, above all things,
to capture Amursana, dead or alive. Tchaohoei at once
assumed the offensive, and as Amursana was abandoned by
his followers as soon as they saw that China was putting
forth the whole of her strength, he had no alternative but
once more to flee for shelter to the Kirghiz. But the condi-
tions imposed by Keen Lung were so rigorous that Tchaohoei
realized that the capture of Amursana was essential to his
gaining the confidence and gratitude of his master. He,
therefore, sent his best lieutenant, Fouta, to pursue the
Eleuth prince. Fouta pursued Amursana with the energy
232 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
of one who has to gain his spurs, and he almost succeeded
in effecting his capture, but Amursana just made his escape
in time across the frontier into Russian territory. But Keen
Lung was not satisfied with this result, and he sent both to
Fouta and Tchaohoei to rest satisfied with nothing short
of the capture of Amursana. The close of that unfortunate
prince's career was near at hand, although it was not ended
by the act of the Chinese officers. He died in Russian ter-
ritory of a fever, and when the Chinese demanded of their
neighbors that his body should be surrendered they refused,
on the ground that enmity should cease with death; but
Fouta was able to report to his sovereign that he had seen
with his own eyes the mortal remains of the Eleuth chief
who had first been the humble friend and then the bitter
foe of the Manchu ruler.
Keen Lung decided to administer the country which he
had conquered. But another step was seen to be necessary
to give stability to the Chinese administration, and that was
the annexation of Kashgaria. The great region of Little
Bokhara or Eastern Turkestan, known to us now under the
more convenient form of Kashgaria, was still ruled by the
Khoja Barhanuddin, who had been placed in power by
Amursana, and it afforded a shelter for all the disaffected,
and a base of hostility against the Chinese. Even if Tcha-
ohoei had not reported that the possession of Kashgaria
was essential to the military security of Jungaria, there is
no doubt that sonner or later Keen Lung would have pro-
ceeded to extreme lengths with regard to Barhanuddin. The
Chinese were fully warranted, however, in treating him as
an enemy when he seized an envoy sent to his capital by
Tchaohoei and executed him and his escort. This outrage
precluded all possibility of an amicable arrangement, and
the Chinese prepared their fighting men for the invasion and
conquest of Kashgaria. They crossed the frontier in t\vo
bodies, one under the command of Tchaohoei, the other
under that of Fouta. Any resistance that Barhanuddin
and his brother attempted was speedily overcome; the
KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS. 233
principal cities, Kashgar and Yarkand, were occupied,
and the ill-advised princes were compelled to seek their
personal safety by a precipitate flight. The conquest and
annexation of Kashgaria completed the task with which
Tchaohoei was charged, and it also realized Keen Lung's
main idea by setting up his authority in the midst of the
turbulent tribes who had long disturbed the empire, and
who first learned peaceful pursuits as his subjects. The
Chinese commanders followed up this decided success by
the dispatch of several expeditions into the adjoining states.
The ruler of Khokand was either so much impressed by
his neighbor's prowess, or, as there is much reason to believe,
experienced himself the weight of their power by the occupa-
tion of his principal cities, Tashkent and Khokand, that he
hastened to recognize the authority of the emperor and to
enroll himself among the tributaries of the Son of Heaven.
The tribute he bound himself to pay was sent without a
break for a period of half a century. The Kirghiz chiefs
of low and high degree imitated his example, and a firm
peace was thus established from one end of Central Asia to
the other. The administration was divided between Chinese
and native officials, and if there was tyranny, the people
suffered rather from that of the Mohammedan Hakim Beg
than that of the Confucian Amban.
Keen Lung was engaged in many more wars than those
in Central Asia. On the side of Burmah he found his bor-
ders disturbed by nomad and predatory tribes not less than
in the region of Gobi. These clans had long been a source
of annoyance and anxiety to the viceroy of Yunnan, but the
weakness of the courts of Ava and Pegu, who stood behind
these f rontagers, had prevented the local grievance becoming
a national danger. But the triumph of the remarkable
Alompra, who united Pegu and Burmah into a single state,
and who controlled an army with which he effected many
triumphs, showed that this state of things might not always
continue, and that the day would come when China might
be exposed to a grave peril from this side. The successors
234 A SHORT HISTORi OF CH1XA.
of Alompra inherited his pretensions if not his ability, and
when the Chinese called upon them to keep the borders in
better order or to punish some evildoers, they sent back a
haughty and unsatisfactory reply. Sembuen, the grandson
of Alompra, was king when Keen Lung ordered, in the year
1768, his generals to invade Burmah, and the conduct of the
war was intrusted to an officer in high favor at court, named
Count Alikouen, instead of to Fouta, the hero of the Central
Asian war, who had fallen under the emperor's grave dis-
pleasure for what, after all, appears to have been a trifling
offense. The course of the campaign is difficult to follow,
for both the Chinese and the Burmese claim the same battles
as victories, but this will not surprise those who remember
that the Burmese court chroniclers described all the encoun-
ters with the English forces in the wars of 1829 and 1853 as
having been victorious. The advance of the Chinese army,
estimated to exceed 200,000 men, from Bhamo to Ava shows
clearly enough the true course of the war, and that the Chi-
nese were able to carry all before them up to the gates of the
capital. Count Alikouen did not display any striking mili-
tary capacity, but by retaining possession of the country
above Ava for three years he at last compelled the Burmese
to sue for peace on humiliating terms.
In previous chapters the growth of China's relations with
Tibet has been traced, and especially under the Manchu
dynasty. The control established by Kanghi after the retire-
ment of the Jungarian army was maintained by both his
successors, and for fifty years Tibet had that perfect tran-
quillity which is conveyed by the expression that it had no
history. The young Dalai Lama, who fled to Sining to
escape from Latsan Khan, was restored, and under the
name of Lobsang Kalsang pursued a subservient policy to
China for half a century. In the year 1749 an unpleasant
incident took place through a collision between the Chinese
ambans and the Civil Regent or Gyalpo, who administered
the secular affairs of the Dalai Lama. The former acted in
a high-handed and arbitrary manm>r. and put the Gyalpo
KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS. 235
to death. But in this they went too far, for both the lamas
and the people strongly resented it, and revolted against the
Chinese, whom they massacred to the last man. For a time
it looked as if the matter might have a very serious ending,
but Keen Lung contented himself with sending fresh ambans
and an escort to Tibet, and enjoining them to abstain from
undue interf erence with the Tibetans. But at the same time
that they showed this moderation the Chinese took a very
astute measure to render their position stronger than ever.
They asserted their right to have the supreme voice in nomi-
nating the Gyalpo, and they soon reduced that high official,
the Prime Minister of Tibet, to the position of a creature of
their own. The policy was both astute and successful. The
Tibetans had welcomed the Chinese originally because they
saved them from the Eleuth army, and provided a guarantee
against a fresh invasion. But the long peace and the de-
struction of the Eleuth power had led the Tibetans to think
less of the advantage of Chinese protection, and to pine for
complete independence. The lamas also bitterly resented the
assumption by the ambans of all practical authority. How
long these feelings could have continued without an open
outbreak must remain a matter of opinion ; but an unexpected
event brought into evidence the unwarlike character of the
Tibetans, and showed that theh' country was exposed to
many dangers from which only China's protection could
preserve them. In Kanghi's tune the danger had come
from Hi ; in the reign of Keen Lung it came from the side
of Nepaul.
As a general rule the mighty chain of the Himalaya has
effectually separated the peoples living north and south of
it, and the instances in history are rare of any collision be-
tween them. Of all such collisions the most important was
that which has now to be described as the main cause of the
tightening of the hold of China upon Tibet. The mountain
kingdom of Nepaul was equally independent of the British
and the Mogul Empire of Delhi. It was ruled by three sep-
arate kings, until in the year 1769 the Goorkha chief Prithi
236 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Narayan established the supremacy of that warlike race.
The Goorkhas cared nothing for trade, and their exactions
resulted in the cessation of the commercial intercourse which
had existed under the Nepaulese kings between India and
Tibet. Their martial instincts led them to carry on raids
into both Tibet and India. The Tibetans were unequal to
the task of punishing or restraining them, and at last the
Goorkhas were inspired with such confidence that they
undertook the invasion of their country. It is said that the
Goorkhas were encouraged to take this step by the belief that
the Chinese would not interfere, and that the lamaseries con-
tained an incalculable amount of treasure. The Goorkhas
invaded Tibet in 1791 with an army of less than 20,000 men,
and, advancing through the Kirong and Kuti passes, over-
came the frontier guards, and carried all before them up to
the town of Degarchi, where they plundered the famous
lamasery of Teshu Lumbo, the residence of the Teshu Larna.
Having achieved this success and gratified their desire for
plunder, the Goorkhas remained inactive for some weeks,
and wasted much precious time. The Tibetans did not
attempt a resistance, which their want of military skill and
their natural cowardice would have rendered futile, but they
sent express messengers to Pekin entreating the Chinese
emperor to send an army to their assistance. Keen Lung
had not sent troops to put a stop to the raids committed on
the frontier by the Goorkhas ; but when he heard that a por-
tion of his dominions was invaded, and that the predomi-
nance of his country in the holy land of Buddhism was in
danger, he at once ordered his generals to collect all the forces
they could and to march without delay to expel the foreign
invader. He may have been urged to increased activity by
the knowledge that the Tibetans had also appealed for aid
to the British, and by his being ignorant what steps the
Indian Government would take. Within a very short time
of the receipt of the appeal for assistance a Chinese army of
70,000 men was dispatched into Tibet, and the Goorkhas,
awed by this much larger force, began their retreat to their
KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS. 23",
own country. Their march was delayed by the magnitude
of their spoil, and before they had reached the passes through
the Himalaya the Chinese army had caught them up. In
the hope of securing a safe retreat for his baggage and
booty, the Goorkha commander drew up his force in battle
array on the plain of Tengri Maidan, outside the northern
entrance of the Kirong Pass, and the Chinese general, Sund
Fo, made his dispositions to attack the Goorkhas ; but before
delivering his attack he sent a letter reciting the outrages
committed, and the terms n which his imperial master
would grant peace. Among these were the restitution of
the plunder and the surrender of the renegade lama, whose
tales were said to have whetted the cupidity of the Goorkhaa.
A haughty reply was sent back, and the Chinese were told
to do their worst.
In the desperately-contested battle which ensued the vic-
tory was decisive, and the Goorkha king at once sued for
peace, which was readily granted, as the Chinese had at-
tained all their objects, and Sund Fo was beginning to be
anxious about his retreat owing to the approach of winter.
When, therefore, the Goorkha embassy entered his camp
Sund Fo granted terms which, although humiliating, were
as favorable as a defeated people could expect. The Goor-
khas took an oath to keep the peace toward their Tibetan
neighbors, to acknowledge themselves the vassals of the
Chinese emperor, to send a quinquennial embassy to China
with the required tribute, and, lastly, to restore all the plun-
der that had been carried off from Teshu Lumbo. The
exact language of this treaty has never been published, but
its provisions have been faithfully kept. The Goorkhas still
pay tribute to China ; they have kept the peace with one in-
significant exception ever since on the Tibetan border; and
they are correctly included among the vassals of Pekin at
the present time. The gratitude of the Tibetans, as well as
the increased numbers of the Chinese garrison, insured the
security of China's position in Tibet, and, as both the Tibe-
tans and the Goorkhas considered that the English deserted
A SHORT HISTORl OF CHINA.
them in their hour of need, for the latter when hard pressed
also appealed to us for assistance, China has had no diffi-
culty in effectually closing Tibet to Indian trade. China
closed all the passes on the Nepaul frontier, and only
allowed the quinquennial mission to enter by the Kirong
Pass. Among all the military feats of China none is more
remarkable or creditable than the overthrow of the Goor-
khas, who are among the bravest of Indian races, and who,
only twenty years after their crushing defeat by Sund Fo,
gave the Anglo-Indian army and one of its best command-
ers, Sir David Ochterlcney, an infinity of trouble in two
doubtful and keenly contested campaigns.
Keen Lung's war in Formosa calls for only brief notice;
but, in concluding our notice of his many military conquests
and campaigns, some description must be given of the great
rising in an island which Chinese writers have styled "the
natural home of sedition and disaffection." In the year
1786 the islanders rose, slaughtered the Tartar garrisons,
and completely subverted the emperor's authority. The re-
volt was one not on the part of the savage islanders them-
selves, but of the Chinese colonists, who were goaded into
insurrection by the tyranny of the Manchu officials. At
first it did not assume serious dimensions, and it seemed as
if it would pass over without any general rising, when the
orders of the Viceroy of Fuhkien, to which Formosa was
dependent until made a separate province a few years ago,
fanned the fuel of disaffection to a flame. The popular
leader Ling organized the best government he could, and,
when Keen Lung offered to negotiate, laid down three con-
ditions as the basis of negotiation. They were that "the
mandarin who had ordered the cruel measures of repres-
sion should be executed," that "Ling personally should
never be required to go to Pekin," and, thirdly, that "the
mandarins should abandon their old tyrannical ways."
Keen Lung's terms were an unconditional surrender and
trust in his clemency, which Ling, with perhaps the Miaotze
incident fresh in his mind, refused. At first Keen Lung sent
KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS. 239
numerous but detached expeditions to reassert his power;
but these were attacked in detail, and overwhelmed by
Ling. Keen Lung said that "his heart was in suspense
both by night and by day as to the issue of the war in
Formosa"; but, undismayed by his reverses, the emperor
sent 100,000 men under the command of a member of his
family to crush the insurrection. Complete success was at-
tained by weight of numbers, and Formosa was restored to
its proper position in the empire.
A rising in Szchuen, which may be considered from some
of its features the precursor of the Taeping Rebellion, and the
firs toutbreak of the Tungan Mohammedans in the northwest,
whom Keen Lung wished to massacre, marked the close of
this long reign, which was rendered remarkable by so many
military triumphs. The reputation of the Chinese empire
was raised to the highest point, and maintained there by
the capacity and energy of this ruler. Within its borders
the commands of the central government were ungrudg-
ingly obe} T ed, and beyond them foreign peoples and states
respected the rights of a country that had shown itself so
well able to exact obedience from its dependents and to pre-
serve the very letter of its rights. The military fame of the
Chinese, which had always been great among Asiatics, at-
tained its highest point in consequence of these numerous
and rapidly-succeeding campaigns. The evidences of mili-
tary proficiency, of irresistible determination, and of per-
sonal valor not easily surpassed, were too many and too
apparent to justify any in ignoring the solid claims of
China to rank as the first military country in Asia a posi-
tion which, despite the appearance of England and Russia
in that continent, she still retains, and which must event-
ually enable her to exercise a superior voice in the arrange-
ment of its affairs to that of either of her great and at
present more powerful and better prepared neighbors.
240 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
CHAPTER XIV
THE COMMENCEMENT OP EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE
KEEN LUNG was the first Manchu prince to receive for-
mal embassies from the sovereigns of Europe. Among these
the Portuguese were the first in point of time, although they
never attained the advantage derivable from that priority;
and indeed the important period of their connection with
China may be said to have terminated before the Manchus
had established their authority. Still, as the tenants of
Macao, the oldest European settlement in China for more
than three centuries and a half, their connection with the
Chinese government must always possess some features of
interest and originality. The Portuguese paid their rent to
and carried on all their business with the mandarins at Can-
ton, who lost no opportunity of squeezing large sums out of
the foreigners, as they were absolutely in their power. The
Portuguese could only pay with good or bad grace the bribes
and extra duty demanded as the price of their being allowed
to trade at all. The power of China seemed so overwhelm-
ing that they never attempted to make any stand against its
arbitrary decrees, and the only mode they could think of for
getting an alleviation of the hardships inflicted by the Can-
ton authorities was to send costly embassies to the Chinese
capital. These, however, failed to produce any tangible re-
sult. Their gifts were accepted, and their representatives
were accorded a more or less gratifying reception ; but there
was no mitigation of the severity shown by the local man-
darins, and, for all practical purposes, the money expended
on these missions was as good as thrown away. The Port-
uguese succeeded in obtaining an improvement in their lot
only by combining their naval forces with those of the Chi
COMMENCEMENT OF EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE. 241
nese in punishing and checking the raids of the pirates, who
infested the estuary of the Canton River known as the Bogue.
But they never succeeded in emancipating themselves from
that position of inferiority in which the Chinese have always
striven to keep all foreigners; and if the hattle of European
enterprise against Chinese exclusiveness had been carried on
and fought by the Portuguese it would have resulted in the
discomfiture of Western progress and enlightenment.
The Dutch sent an embassy to Pekin in 1795, but it was
treated with such contumely that it does not reflect much
credit on those who sent it. The Spaniards never held any
relations with the central government, all their business
being conducted with the Viceroy of Fuhkien ; and the suc-
cessive massacres of Manila completely excluded them from
any good understanding with the Pekin government. "With
Russia, China's relations have always been different from
those with the other powers, and this is explained partly by
the fact of neighborship, and partly by Russia seeking only
her own ends, and not advantages for the benefit of every
other foreign nation.
With France, the relations of China, owing to a great
extent to the efforts and influence of the missionaries, had
always been marked with considerable sympathy and even
cordiality. The French monarchs had from time to time
turned their attention to promoting trade with China and
the Far East. Henry the Fourth sanctioned a scheme with
this object, but it came to nothing; and Colbert only suc-
ceeded in obtaining the right for his countrymen to land
their goods at Whampoa, the river port of Canton. But
French commerce never flourished in China, and a bold but
somewhat Quixotic attempt to establish a trade between that
country and the French settlements on the Mississippi failed
to achieve anything practical. But what the French were
unable to attain in the domain of commerce they succeeded
in accomplishing in the region of literature. They were the
first to devote themselves to the study of the Chinese litera-
ture and language, and what we know of the history of
II
242 A SHORT BISTORT OF CHZ.Y.4.
China down to the last century is exclusively due to their
laborious research and painstaking translations of Chinese
histories and annals. They made China known to the polite
as well as the political world of Europe. Keen Lung him-
self appreciated and was flattered by these efforts. His
poetry, notably his odes on "Tea," and the "Eulogy of
Moukden" as the cradle of his race, was translated by
Pere Amiot, and attracted the attention of Voltaire, who
addressed to the emperor an epistolary poem on the re-
quirements and difficulties of Chinese versification. The
French thus rendered a material service in making China
better known to Europe and Europe better known in China,
which, although it may be hard to gauge precisely, entitles
them still to rank among those who have opened up China
to Europeans. The history of China, down to the eighteenth
century at least, could not have been written but for the
labors of the French, of Mailla, Du Halde, Amiot, and
many others.
There remains only to summarize the relations with the
English, who, early in the seventeenth century, and before
the Manchus had established their supremacy, possessed
factories at Amoy and on the island of Chusan. But their
trade, hampered by official exactions, and also by the jeal-
ousy of the Portuguese and Dutch, proved a slow growth ;
and at Canton, which they soon discovered to be the best
and most convenient outlet for the state, they were more
hampered than anywhere else, chiefly through the hostile
representations of the Portuguese, who bribed the mandarins
to exclude all other foreigners. The English merchants, like
the Portuguese, believed that the only way to obtain a rem-
edy for their grievances was by approaching the imperial
court and obtaining an audience with the emperor; but they
were wise in not attempting to send delegates of their own.
They saw that if an impression was to be created at Pekin
the embassador must come fully accredited by the British
government, and not merely as the representative of a body
of merchants who were suppliants for commercial privileges.
COMMENCEMENT OF EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE. 243
The war with the Goorkhas had made the Chinese authori-
ties acquainted with the fact that the English, who were
only humble suitors for trade on the coast, were a great
power in India. The knowledge of this fact undoubtedly
created a certain amount of curiosity in the mind of Keen
Lung, and when he heard that the King of England con-
templated sending an embassy to his court he gave every
encouragement to the suggestion, and promised it a wel-
come and honorable reception. Permission was given it to
proceed to Pekin, and thus was a commencement made in
the long story of diplomatic relations between England and
China, which have at length acquired a cordial character.
As great importance was attached to this embassy, every
care was bestowed on fitting it out in a worthy manner.
Colonel Cathcart was selected as the envoy, but died on
the eve of his departure, and a successor was found in the
person of Lord Macartney, a nobleman of considerable at-
tainments, who had been Governor of Madras two years
before. Sir George Staunton, one of the few English sino-
logues, was appointed secretary, and several interpreters
were sought for and obtained, not without difficulty. The
presents were many and valuable, chosen with the double
object of gratifying the emperor and impressing him with
the wealth and magnificence of the English sovereign. In
September, 1792 the same month that witnessed the over-
throw of the Goorkhas at Nayakot the embassy sailed
from Portsmouth, but it did not reach the Peiho, on which
Pekin is inaccurately said to stand, until the following
August.
An honorable and exceedingly gratifying reception
awaited it. The embassador and his suite, on landing
from the man-of-war, were conducted with all ceremony
and courtesy up the Peiho to Tientsin, where they received
what was called the unusual honor of a military salute.
Visits were exchanged with the Viceroy of Pechihli and
some of the other high officials, and news came down from
Pekin that "the emperor had shown some marks of great
244 A SHORT HISTORY OF CflZY.-i.
satisfaction at the news of the arrival of the English em
bassador." Keen Lung happened to be residing at his
summer palace at Jehol beyond the "Wall, but he sent per*
emptory instructions that there was to be no delay in send-
ing the English up to Pekin. Up to this point all had gone
well, but the anti-foreign party began to raise obstructions,
and, headed by Sund Fo, the conqueror of the Goorkhas, to
advise the emperor not to receive the embassador, and to
reject all his propositions. "Whether to strengthen his case,
or because he believed it to be the fact, Sund Fo declared
that the English had helped "the Goorkha robbers," and
that he had found among them "men with hats," i.e., Eu-
ropeans, as well as "men with turbans." As Sund Fo was
the hero of the day, and also the viceroy of the Canton
province, his views carried great weight, and they were
also of unfavorable omen for the future of foreign relations.
But for this occasion the inquisitiveness of the aged emperor
prevailed over the views of the majority in his council and
also over popular prejudice. When the embassy had l>een
detained some time at Pekin, and after it looked as if a
period of vexatious delay was to herald the discomfiture of
the mission, such positive orders were sent by Keen Lung
for the embassy to proceed to Jehol that no one dared to
disobey him. Lord Macartney proceeded to Jehol with his
suite and a Chinese guard of honor, and he accomplished
the journey, about one hundred miles, in an English car-
riage. The details of the journey and reception are given
in Sir George Staunton's excellent narrative; but here it
may be said that the emperor twice received the British em-
bassador in personal audience in a tent specially erected for
the ceremony in the gardens of the palace. The embassy
then returned to Pekin, and, as the Gulf of Pechihli was
frozen, it was escorted by the land route to Canton. On
this journey Lord Macartney and his party suffered consid-
erable inconvenience and annoyance from the spite and ani-
mosity of the Chinese inferior officials; but nothing serious
occurred to mar what was on the whole a successful mis-
COMMENCEMENT OF EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE. 245
sion. Keen Lung is said to have wished to go further, but
his official utterance was limited to the reciprocation of "the
friendly sentiments of His Britannic Majesty." His ad-
vanced age and his abdication already contemplated left
him neither the inclination nor the power to go very closely
into the question of the policy of cultivating closer relations
with the foreign people who asserted their supremacy on the
sea and who had already subjugated one great Asiatic em-
pire. But it may at least be said that he did nothing to
make the ultimate solution of the question more difficult,
and his flattering reception of Lord Macartney's embassy
was an important and encouraging a precedent for English
diplomacy with China.
The events of internal interest in the history of the coun-
try during the last twenty years of this reign call for some
brief notice, although they relate to comparatively few mat-
ters that can be disentangled from the court chronicles and
official gazettes of the period. The great floods of the
Hoangho and the destruction caused thereby had been a
national calamity from the earliest period. Keen Lung,
filled with the desire to crown his reign by overcoming it,
intrusted the task of dealing with this difficulty to Count
Akoui, whose laurels over the Miaotze had raised him to
the highest position in public popularity and his sovereign's
confidence. Keen Lung issued his personal instructions on
the subject in unequivocal language. He said in his edict,
"My intention is that this work should be unceasingly car-
ried on, in order to secure for the people a solid advantage
both for the present and in the time to come. Share my
views, and in order to accomplish them, forget nothing in
the carrying out of your project, which I regard as my
own, since I entirely approve of it, and the idea which
originated it was mine. For the rest, it is at my own
charge, and not at the cost of the province, that I wish all
this to be done. Let expenses not be stinted. I take upon
myself the consequences, whatever they may be." Akoui
threw himself into his great task with energy, and it is
246 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
said that he succeeded in no small degree in controlling the
waters and restricting their ravages. We are ignorant of
the details of his work, but it may certainly be said that the
Hoangho has done less damage since Akoui carried out his
scheme than it had effected before. The question is still
unsolved, and probably there is no undertaking in which
China would benefit more from the engineering science of
Europe than this, if the Chinese government were to seri-
ously devote its attention 'to a matter that affects many mil-
lions of people and some of the most important provinces of
the empire.
A great famine about the same period is chiefly remark-
able for the persecution it entailed on the Christian mission-
aries and those among the Chinese themselves professing
the foreign religion. The cause of this scarcity was mainly
due to the extraordinary growth of the population, which
had certainly doubled in fifty years, and which, according
to the official censuses, had risen from sixty millions in 1735
to three hundred millions in 1792. Of course the larger part
of this increase was due to the expansion of the empire and
the consolidation of the Manchu authority. So great was
the national suffering that the gratuitous distribution of
grain and other supplies at the cost of the state provided
but a very partial remedy for the evil, which was aggra-
vated by the peculation of the mandarins, and the evidence
of the few European witnesses shows that the horrors of
this famine have seldom been surpassed. The famine was
laid to the charge of the Christians, and a commission of
mandarins drew up a formal indictment of Christianity,
which has stood its ground ever since as the text of the
argument of the anti -foreign school. It read as follows:
"We have examined into the European religion (or the doc-
trine) of the Lord of Heaven, and although it ought not to
be compared with other different sects, which are absolutely
wicked, yet, and that is what we lay to its blame, it has had
the audacity to introduce itself, to promulgate itself, and to
establish itself in secret. No permission has ever been given
COMMENCEMENT OF EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE. 247
to the people of this country to embrace it. Nay, the laws
have absolutely long forbidden its adoption. And now all
these criminals have had the boldness to come, all of a sud-
den, into our kingdom, to establish their bishops and priests
in order to seduce the people ! This is why it is necessary
to extinguish this religion by degrees and to prevent its mul-
tiplying its votaries. ' ' The fury of the Chinese, fortunately,
soon exhausted itself; and although many Europeans were
injured none lost their lives, but several thousand native
converts were branded on the face and sent to colonize the
Hi valley.
While Lord Macartney was at Pekin it was known that
the emperor contemplated abdicating when he had completed
the sixtieth year of his reign the cycle of Chinese chronology
because he did not desire his reign to be of greater length
than that of his illustrious grandfather, Kanghi. This date
was reached in 1796, when on New Year's day (6th of Feb-
ruary) of the Chinese calendar, he publicly abdicated, and
assigned the imperial functions to his son, Kiaking. He
survived this event three years, and during that period he
exercised, like Charles the Fifth of Germany, a controlling
influence over his son's administration ; and he endeavored
to inculcate in him the right principles of sound government.
But in China, where those principles have been expressed in
the noblest language, their practical application is diiTicult,
because the official classes are underpaid and because the
law of self-preservation, as well as custom, compels them to
pay themselves at the equal expense of the subjects and the
government. Even Keen Lung had been unable to grapple
with this difficulty of the Chinese civil service, which is as
formidable at the present time as ever. One of the ablest
and most honest of Keen Lung's ministers, when questioned
on the subject, said that there was no remedy. "It is im-
possible, the emperor himself cannot do it, the evil is too
widespread. He will, no doubt, send to the scene of these
disorders mandarins, clothed with all his authority, but they
will only commit still greater exactions, and the inferior
248 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
mandarins, in order to be left undisturbed, will offer them
presents. The emperor will be told that all is well, while
everything is really wrong, and while the poor people are
being oppressed." And so the vicious circle has gone on to
the present day, with serious injury to the state and the
people. When Keen Lung had the chance of bringing
matters under his own personal control he did not hesitate
to exercise his right and power, and all capital punishments
were carried out at the capital only after he had examined
into each case. It is declared that he always tempered
justice with mercy, and that none but the worst offenders
suffered death. Transportation to Hi, which he wished to
develop, was his favorite form of punishment.
To the end of his life Keen Lung retained the active
habits which had characterized his youth. Much of his
official work was carried on at an early hour of the morn-
ing, and it surprised many Europeans to find the aged ruler
so keen and eager for business at these early conferences.
His vigor was attributed by competent observers to the
active life and physical exercises common among the Tar-
tars. It will be proper to give a description of the personal
appearance of this great prince. A missionary thus de-
scribed him: "He is tall and well built. He has a very
gracious countenance, but capable at the same time of in-
aspiring respect. If in regard to his subjects he employs a
great severity, I believe it is less from the promptings of
his character than from the necessity which would other-
wise not render him capable of keeping within the bounds
of dependence and duty two empires so vast as China and
Tartary. Therefore the greatest tremble in his presence.
On all the occasions when he has done me the honor to
address me it has been with a gracious air that inspired
me with the courage to appeal to him in behalf of our re-
ligion. . . . He is a truly great prince, doing and seeing
everything for himself." Keen Lung survived his abdica-
tion about three years, dying on the 8th of February,
which also happened to be the Chinese New Year's day.
THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHUS. 249
With the death of Keen Lung the vigor of China reached
a term, and just as the progress had been consistent and
rapid during the space of 150 years, so now will its down-
ward course be not less marked or swift, until, in the very
hour of apparent dissolution, the empire will find safety in
the valor and probity of an English officer, Charles George
Gordon, and in the ability and resolution of the empress-
regents and their two great soldier-statesmen, Li Hung
Chang and Tso Tsung Tang.
CHAPTER XV
THE DECLINE OP THE MANCHUS
THE favorable opinion which his father had held of Kia-
king does not seem to have been shared by all his ministers.
The most prominent of them all, Hokwan, who held to Keen
Lung the relation that Wolsey held to Henry the Eighth,
soon fell under the displeasure of the new emperor, and was
called upon to account for his charge of the finances. The
favor and the age of Keen Lung left Hokwan absolutely
without control, and the minister turned his opportunities to
such account that he amassed a private fortune of eighty mil-
"iion taels, or more than one hundred and twenty-five million
dollars. He was indicted for peculation shortly after the
death of Keen Lung, and, without friends, he succumbed to
the attack of his many enemies incited to attack him by the
greed of Kiaking. But the amount of his peculations amply
justified his punishment, and Kiaking in signing his death
warrant could not be accused of harshness or injustice.
The execution of Hokwan restored some of his ill-gotten
wealth to the state, and served as a warning to other offi-
cials; but as none could hope to enjoy his opportunities, it
did not act as a serious deterrent upon the mass of the Chi-
nese civil service. If arraigned, they might have justified
their conduct by the example of their sovereign, who, in-
250 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
stead of devoting the millions of Hokwan to the necessities
of the state, employed them on his own pleasure, and in a
lavish palace expenditure.
The Portuguese were the tenants, as has previously been
stated, of Macao, for which they paid an annual rent to the
Chinese ; but the nature of their tenure was not understood
in Europe, where Macao was considered a Portuguese pos-
session. During the progress of the great European strug-
gle, the French, as part of one of their latest schemes for
regaining their position in the East, conceived the idea of
taking possession of Macao; but while the} T were contem-
plating the enterprise, an English squadron had accom-
plished it, and during the year 1802 Macao was garrisoned
by an English force. The Treaty of Amiens provided for
its restoration to Portugal, and the incident closed, chiefly
because the period of occupation was brief, without the Chi-
nese being drawn into the matter, or without the true nature
of the Portuguese hold on Macao being explained. The exi-
gencies of war unfortunately compelled the re-occupation of
Macoa six years later, when the indignation of the Chinese
authorities at the violation of their territory fully revealed
itself. Peremptory orders were sent to the Canton authori-
ties from Pekin to expel the foreigners at all costs. The
government of India was responsible for what was a dis-
tinct blunder in our political relations with China. In 1808,
when alarm at Napoleon's schemes was at its height, it sent
Admiral Drury and a considerable naval force to occupy
Macao. The Chinese at once protested, withheld supplies,
refused to hold any intercourse with that commander, and
threatened the English merchants at Lintin with the com-
plete suspension of the trade. In his letter of rebuke the
chief mandarin at Canton declared that, "as long as there
remained a single soldier at Macao," he would not allow
any trade to be carried on, and threatened to "block up the
entrance to Macao, cut off your provisions, and send an
army to surround you, when repentance would be too late."
The English merchants were in favor of compliance with
THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHUS. 251
the Chinese demands, but Admiral Drury held a very ex-
alted opinion of his own power and a corresponding con-
tempt for the Chinese. He declared that, as "there was
nothing in his instructions to prevent his going to war with
the Emperor of China," he would bring the Canton officials
to reason by force. He accordingly assembled all his avail-
able forces, and proceeded up the river at the head of a
strong squadron of boats with the avowed intention of forc-
ing his way up to the provincial capital. On their side the
Chinese made every preparation to defend the passage, and
they blocked the navigation of the river with a double line
of junks, while the Bogue forts were manned by all the
troops of the province. When Admiral Drury came in sight
of these defenses, which must have appeared formidable to
him, he hesitated, and instead of delivering his attack he
sent a letter requesting an interview with the mandarin,
again threatening to force his way up to Canton. But the
Chinese had by this time taken the measure of the English
commander, and they did not even condescend to send him
a reply; when Admiral Drury, submitting to their insult,
hastily beat a retreat. On several subsequent occasions he
renewed his threats, and even sailed up the Bogue, but al-
ways retreated without firing a shot. It is not surprising
that the Chinese were inflated with pride and confidence by
the pusillanimous conduct of the English officer, or that
they should erect a pagoda at Canton in honor of the defeat
of the English fleet. After these inglorious incidents Ad-
miral Drury evacuated Macao and sailed for India, leaving
the English merchants to extricate themselves as well as
they could from the embarrassing situation in which his
hasty and blundering action had placed them. If the offi-
cials at Canton had not been as anxious for their own selfish
ends that the trade should go on as the foreign merchants
themselves, there is no doubt that the views of the ultra
school at Pekin, who wished all intercourse with foreigners
interdicted, would have prevailed. But the Hoppo and his
associates were the real friends of the foreigner, and opened
252 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the back door to foreign commerce at the very moment that
they were signing edicts denouncing it as a national evil
and misfortune.
The Macartney mission had attracted what may be called
the official attention of the British government to the Chi-
nese question, and the East India Company, anxious to ac-
quire fresh privileges to render that trade more valuable,
exercised all its influence to sustain that attention. On its
representations a costly present was sent to Sung Tajin, one
of the ablest and most enlightened of all the Chinese officials
who had shown cordiality to Lord Macartney, but the step
was ill-advised and had unfortunate consequences. The
present, on reaching Pekin, was returned to Canton with a
haughty message that a minister of the emperor dare not
even see a present from a foreign ruler. The publicity of
the act rather than the offer of a present must be deemed
the true cause of this unqualified rejection, but the return
of the present was not, unfortunately, the worst part of the
matter. The Emperor Kiaking sent a letter couched in lofty
language to George the Third, declaring that he had taken
such British subjects as were in China under his protection,
and that there was "no occasion for the exertions of your
Majesty's Government." The advice of the Minister Sung,
who was suspected of sympathy with the foreigners, was
much discredited, and from a position of power and influ-
ence he gradually sank into one of obscurity and impotence.
This was especially unfortunate at a moment when several
foreign powers were endeavoring to obtain a footing at
Pekin. The Russian emperor, wishing no doubt to emulate
the English, sent, in 1805, an imposing embassy under
Count Goloyken to the Chinese capital. The presents
were rich and numerous, for the express purpose of im-
pressing the Chinese ruler with the superior wealth and
power of Russia over other European states, and great
hopes were entertained that Count Goloyken would estab-
lish a secure diplomatic base at Pekin. The embassy
reached Kalgan on the Great Wall in safety, but there
THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHUS. 253
it was detained until reference had been made to the cap-
ital. The instructions came back that the Russian envoy
would oiily be received in audience provided he would per-
form the kotow, or prostration ceremony, and that if he
would not promise to do this he was not to be allowed
through the Wall. Count Goloyken firmly refused to give
this promise, and among other arguments he cited the ex-
emption accorded to Lord Macartney. The Chinese re-
mained firm in their purpose, Count Goloyken was informed
that his visit had been prolonged too far, and the most bril-
liant of all Russian embassies to China had to retrace its
steps without accomplishing any of its objects. This was
not the only rebuff Russia experienced at this time. The
naval officer Krusenstern conceived the idea that it would
be possible to attain all the objects of his sovereign, and to
open up a new channel for a profitable trade, by establishing
communications by sea with Canton, where the Russian
flag had never been seen. The Russian government fitted
out two ships for him, and he safely arrived at Canton,
where he disposed of their cargoes. "When it became known
at Pekin that a new race of foreigners had presented them
selves at Canton, a special edict was issued ordering that
"all vessels belonging to any other nation than those which
have been in the habit of visiting this port shall on no ac-
count whatever be permitted to trade, but merely suffered
to remain in port until every circumstance is reported to us
and our pleasure made known." Thus in its first attempt
to add to its possession of a land trade, via Kiachta and the
Mongol steppe, a share in the sea trade with Canton, Russia
experienced a rude and discouraging rebuff.
The unsatisfactory state of our relations with the Chinese
government, which was brought home to the British authori-
ties by the difficulty our ships of war experienced in obtain-
ing water and other necessary supplies on the China coast,
which had generally to be obtained by force, led to the de-
cision that another embassy should be sent to Pekin, for the
purpose of effecting a better understanding.
854 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Lord Amherst, who was specially selected for the mis-
sion on account of his diplomatic experience, reached the
mouth of the Peiho in August, 1816. When the embassy
reached Pekin, the Emperor Kiaking's curiosity to see the
foreigners overcame his political resolutions, and with the
natural resolve of an irresponsible despot to gratify his wish
without regard to the convenience of others, he determined
to see them at once, and ordered that Lord Amherst and his
companions should be brought forthwith into his presence.
This sudden decision was most disconcerting to his own
ministers, who had practically decided that no audience
should be granted unless Lord Amherst performed the
kotow, and especially to his brother-in-law Ho Koong
Yay, who, at the emperor's repeated wish to see the
English representatives, was compelled to abandon his
own schemes and to remove all restrictions to the audi-
ence. The firmness of Lord Amherst was unexpected and
misunderstood. Ho Koong Yay repeated his invitation
several times, and even resorted to entreaty; but when the
Chinese found that nothing was to be gained they changed
their tone, and the infuriated Kiaking ordered that the em-
bassador and his suite should not be allowed to remain at
Pekin, and that they should be sent back to the coast at
once. Thus ignominiously ended the Amherst mission,
which was summarily dismissed, and hurried back to the
coast in a highly-inconvenient and inglorious manner. In a
letter to the Prince Regent, Kiaking suggested that it would
not be necessary for the British government to send another
embassy to China. He took some personal satisfaction out
of his disappointment by depriving Ho Koong Yay of all his
offices, and mulcting him in five years of his pay as an im-
perial duke. The cause of his disgrace was expressly stated
to be the mismanagement of the relations with the English
embassador and the suppression of material facts from the
emperor's knowledge. Sung Tajin, who had been specially
recalled from his governorship in Hi to take part in the re-
ception of the Europeans, and whose sympathy for them
THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHU& 255
was well known, was also disgraced, and did not recover
his position until after the death of Kiaking. The failure
of the Amherst mission put an end to all schemes for diplo-
matic intercourse with Pekin until another generation had
passed away ; but the facts of the case show that its failure
was not altogether due to the hostility of the Chinese em-
peror. No practical results, in all probability, would have
followed; but if Lord Amherst had gone somewhat out of
his way to humor the Chinese autocrat, there is no doubt
that he would have been received in audience without any
humiliating conditions.
Long before the Amherst mission reached China evidence
had been Afforded that there were many elements of disorder
in that country, and that a dangerous feeling of dissatisfac-
tion was seething below the surface. The Manchus, even
in their moments of greatest confidence, had always dis-
trusted the loyalty of their Chinese subjects, and there is no
dispute that one of their chief reasons for pursuing an exclud-
ing policy toward Europeans was the fear that they might
tamper with the mass of their countrymen. What had been
merely a sentiment under the great rulers of the eighteenth
century became an absolute conviction when Kiaking found
himself the mark of conspirators and assassins. The first
of the plots to which he nearly fell a victim occurred at such
an early period of his reign that it could not be attributed to
popular discontent at his misgovernment. In 1803, only
four years after the death of Keen Lung, Kiaking, while
passing through the streets of his capital in his chair, carried
by coolie bearers, was attacked by a party of conspirators,
members of one of the secret societies, and narrowly escaped
with his life. His eunuch attendants showed considerable
devotion and courage, and in the struggle several were killed ;
but they succeeded in driving off the would-be assassins.
The incident caused great excitement, and much consterna-
tion in the imperial palace, where it was noted that out of
the crowds in the streets only six persons came forward to
help the sovereign in the moment of danger. After this the
256 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
emperor gave up his practice of visiting the outer city of
Pekin, and confined himself to the imperial city, and still
more to the Forbidden palace which is situated within it.
But even here he could not enjoy the sense of perfect
security, for the discovery was made that this attempted
assassination was part of an extensive plot with ramifica-
tions into the imperial family itself. Inquisitorial inquiries
were made, which resulted in the disgrace and punishment
of many of the emperor's relatives, and thus engendered an
amount of suspicion and a sense of insecurity that retained
unabated force as long as Kiaking filled the throne. That
there was ample justification for this apprehension the sec-
ond attempt on the person of the emperor clearly revealed.
Whatever dangers the emperor might be exposed to in the
streets of Pekin, where the members of the hated and dreaded
secret societies had as free access as himself, it was thought
that he could feel safe in the interior of the Forbidden city
a palace-fortress within the Tartar quarter garrisoned by a
large force, and to which admission was only permitted to
a privileged few. Strict as the regulations were at all times,
the attempt on Kiaking and the rumors of sedition led un-
doubtedly to their being enforced with greater rigor, and
it seemed incredible for any attempt to be made on the
person of the emperor except by the mutiny of his guards
or an open rebellion. Yet it was precisely at this moment
that an attack was made on the emperor in his own private
apartments which nearly proved successful, and which he
Himself described as an attack under the elbow. In the year
1813 a band of conspirators, some two hundred hi number,
made their way into the palace, either by forcing one of the
gates, or, more probably, by climbing the walls at an un
guarded spot, and, overpowering the few guards they met,
some of them forced their way into the presence of the em-
peror. There is not the least doubt that Kiaking would then
have fallen but for the unexpected valor of his son Prince
Meenning, afterward the Emperor Taoukwang, who, snatch-
ing up a gun, shot two of the intruders. This prince had
THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHUS. 257
been set down as a harmless, inoffensive student, but his
prompt action on this occasion excited general admiration,
and Kiaking, grateful for his life, at once proclaimed him
his heir.
Toward the close of his reign, and very soon after the
departure of Lord Amherst, Kiaking was brought face to
face with a very serious conspiracy, or what he thought
to be such, among the princes of the Manchu imperial
family. By an ordinance passed by Chuntche all the de-
scendants of that prince's father were declared entitled to
wear a yellow girdle and to receive a pension from the state;
while, with a view to prevent their becoming a danger to
the dynasty, they were excluded from civil or military
employment, and assigned to a life of idleness. This im-
perial colony was, and is still, one of the most peculiar and
least understood of the departments of the Tartar govern-
ment ; and although it has served its purpose hi preventing
dynastic squabbles, there must always remain the doubt as
to how far the dynasty has been injured by the loss of the
services of so many of its members who might have possessed
useful capacity. They purchased the right to an easy and
unlaborious existence, with free quarters and a small income
guaranteed, at the heavy price of exclusion from the public
service. No matter how great their ambition or natural
capability, they had no prospect of emancipating themselves
from the dull sphere of inaction to which custom relegated
them. Toward the close of Kiaking's reign the number of
these useless Yellow Girdles had risen to several thousand,
and the emperor, alarmed by the previous attacks, or having
some reason to fear a fresh plot, adopted strenuous measures
against them. Whether the emperor's apprehensions over-
came his reason, or whether there were among his kinsmen
some men of more than average ability, it is certain that the
princes of the Manchu family were goaded or incited into
what amounted to rebellion. The exact particulars remain
unknown until the dynastic history sees the light of day;
but it is known that many of them were executed, and that
258 .4 SHORT HISTOm OF CHINA.
many hundreds of them were banished to Manchuria, where
they were given employment in taking care of the ancestral
tombs of the ruling family.
Special significance was given to these intrigues and
palace plots by the remarkable increase in the number and
the confidence of the secret societies which, in some form or
other, have been a feature of Chinese public life from an
early period. Had they not furnished evidence by their in-
creased numbers and daring of the dissatisfaction prevalent
among the Chinese masses, whether on account of the hard-
ships of their lot, or from hatred of their Tartar lords, they
would scarcely have created so much apprehension in the
bosom of the Emperor Kiaking, whose authority met with
no open opposition, and whose reign was nominally one of
both internal and external peace. These secret societies
have always been, in the form of fraternal confederacies
and associations, a feature in Chinese life; but during the
present century they have acquired an importance they could
never previously claim, both in China and among Chinese
colonies abroad. The first secret society to become famous
was that of the Water-Lily, or Pe-leen-keaou, which associa-
tion chose as its emblem and title the most popular of all
plants in China. Although the most famous of the socie-
ties, and the one which is regarded as the parent of all that
have come after it, the Water- Lily had, as a distinct organi-
zation, a very brief existence. Its organizers seem to have
dropped the name, or to have allowed it to sink into dis-
use in consequence of the strenuous official measures taken
against the society by the government for the attempt, in
1803, on Kiaking's life in the streets of Pekin, They merged
themselves into the widely-extended confederacy of the
Society of Celestial Reason the Theen-te-Hwuy which
became better known by the title given to it by Europeans
of the Triads, from their advocacy of the union between
Heaven, earth, and man. The Water-Lily Society, before
it was dissolved, caused serious disturbances in both Shan
tung and Szchuen, and especially in the latter province,
THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHUS. 259
where the disbanded army that had rescued Tibet and pun-
ished the Goorkhas furnished the material for sedition. With
more or less difficulty, and at a certain expense of life, thes?
risings were suppressed, and Kiaking's authority was ren-
dered secure against these assailants, while for his successors
was left the penalty of feeling the full force of the national
indignation of which their acts were the expression.
With regard to the organization of these secret societies,
which probably remain unchanged to the present day, China
had nothing to learn from Europe either as to the objects to
be obtained in this way or as to how men are to be bound
together by solemn vows for the attainment of illegal ends.
By signs known only to themselves, and by pass- words, these
sworn conspirators could recognize their members in the
crowded streets, and could communicate with each other
without exciting suspicion as to their being traitors at heart.
In its endeavors to cope with this formidable and widespread
organization under different names, Kiaking's government
found itself placed at a serious disadvantage. Without an
exact knowledge of the intentions or resources of its secret
enemies, it failed to grapple with them, and, as its sole rem-
edy, it could only decree that proof of membership carried
with it the penalty of death.
During the last years of the reign of Kiaking the secret
societies rather threatened future trouble than constituted a
positive danger to the state. They were compelled to keep
quiet and to confine their attention to increasing their num-
bers rather than to realizing their programme. The emperor
was consequently able to pass the last four years of his life
with some degree of personal tranquillity, and in full indul-
gence of his palace pleasures, which seem at this period to
have mainly consisted of a theatrical troupe which accom-
panied him even when he went to offer sacrifice in the tem-
ples. His excessive devotion to pleasure did not add to his
reputation with his people, and it is recorded that one of the
chief causes of the minister Sung's disgrace and banishment
to Hi was his making a protest against the emperor's pro-
260 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
ceedings. Some time before his death Kiaking drew up his
will, and on account of his great virtues he specially selected
as his successor his second son, Prince Meenning, who had
saved his life from assassins in the attack on the palace.
Kiaking died on September 2, 1820, in the sixty-first year
of his age, leaving to his successor a diminished authority,
an enfeebled power, and a discontented people. Some miti-
gating circumstance may generally be pleaded against the
adverse verdict of history in its estimation of a public char-
acter. The difficulties with which the individual had to
contend may have been exceptional and unexpected, the
measures which he adopted may have had untoward and
unnatural results, and the crisis of the hour may have called
for genius of a transcendent order. But in the case of
Kiaking not one of these extenuating facts can be pleaded.
His path had been smoothed for him by his predecessor, his
difficulties were raised by his own indifference, and the con-
sequences of his spasmodic and ill-directed energy were
scarcely less unfortunate than those of his habitual apathy.
So much easier is the work of destruction than the labor of
construction, that Kiaking in twenty-five years had done
almost as much harm to the constitution of his country and
to the fortunes of his dynasty as Keen Lung had conferred
solid advantages on the state in his brilliant reign of sixty
years.
On the whole it seems as if the material prosperity of the
people was never greater than during the reign of Kiaking.
The population by the census of 1812 is said to have exceeded
360 millions, and the revemie never showed a more flourish-
ing return on paper. To the external view all was still fair
and prosperous when Kiaking died; under his successor,
who was in every sense a worthier prince, the canker and
decay were to be clearly revealed.
THE EMPEROR TAOUK\VAXQ 261
CHAPTER XVI
THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANG
THE early years of the new reign were marked by a
number of events unconnected with each other but all con-
tributing to the important incidents of the later period which
must be described, although they cannot be separated. The
name of Taoukwang, which Prince Meenning took on as-
cending the throne, means Reason's Light, and there were
many who thought it was especially appropriate for a prince
who was more qualified for a college than a palace. Most
of the chroniclers of the period gave an unfavorable picture
of the new ruler, who was described as "thin and toothless,"
and as "lank in figure, low of stature, with a haggard face,
a reserved look, and a quiet exterior." He was superior to
his external aspect, for it may be truly said that although
he had to deal with new conditions he evinced under critical
circumstances a dignity of demeanor and a certain royal
patience which entitled him to the respect of his opponents.
Taoukwang began his reign in every way in a creditable
manner. While professing in his proclamations the greatest
admiration for his father, his first acts reversed his policy
and aimed at undoing the mischief he had accomplished.
He released all the political prisoners who had been con-
signed to jail by the suspicious fear of Kiaking, and many
of the banished Manchu princes were allowed to return to
Pekin. He made many public declarations of his intention
to govern his people after a model and conscientious fashion
and his subsequent acts showed that he was at least sincere
in his intentions, if an accumulation of troubles prevented
his attaining all the objects he set before himself when he
first took the government in hand. Nothing showed his in-
tegrity more clearly than his restoration of the minister Sung
262 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
to the favor and offices of which he had been dispossessed.
The vicissitudes of fortune passed through by this official
have been previously referred to, and his restoration to
power was a practical proof of the new ruler's good resolu-
tions, and meant more than all the virtuous platitudes ex-
pressed in vermilion edicts. Sung had gained a popularity
that far exceeded that of the emperor, through the lavish
way in which he distributed his wealth, consistently refus-
ing to accumulate money for the benefit of himself or his
family. But his independent spirit rendered him an un-
pleasant monitor for princes who were either negligent of
their duty or sensitive of criticism, and even Taoukwang
appears to have dreaded, in anticipation, the impartial and
fearless criticism of the minister whom he restored to favor.
Sung was employed in two of the highest possible posts,
Viceroy of Pechihli and President of the Board of Censors,
and until his death he succeeded in maintaining his position
in face of his enemies, and notwithstanding his excessive
candor. One of the first reforms instituted by the Emperor
Taoukwang was to cut down the enormous palace expenses,
which his father had allowed to increase to a high point, and
to banish from the imperial city all persons who could not
give some valid justification for their being allowed to re-
main. The troupes of actors and buffoons were expelled,
and the harem was reduced to modest dimensions. Taouk-
wang declared himself to be a monogamist, and proclaimed
his one wife empress. He also put a stop to the annual visits
to Jehol and to the costly hunting establishment there, which
entailed a great waste of public funds. The money thus
saved was much wanted for various national requirements,
and the sufferings caused by flood and famine were alleviated
out of these palace savings. How great the national suffer-
ing had become was shown by the marked increase of crime,
especially all forms of theft and the coining of false money,
for which new and severe penalties were ordained without
greatly mitigating the evil. During all these troubles and
trials Taoukwang endeavored to play the part of a beneficent
THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANG. 263
and merciful sovereign, tempering the severity of the laws
by acts of clemency, and personally superintending every
department of the administration. He seems thus to have
gained a reputation among his subjects which he never lost,
and the blame for any unpopular measures was always as-
signed to his ministers. But although he endeavored to play
the part of an autocrat, there is every ground for saying that
he failed to realize the character, and that he was swayed
more than most rulers by the advice of his ministers. The
four principal officials after Sung, whose death occurred at
an early date after Taoukwang's accession, were Hengan,
Elepoo, Keying, and Keshen.
The first ten years of Taoukwang's reign have been
termed prosperous, because they have left so little to re-
cord, but this application of the theory that "the country is
happy which has no history," does not seem borne out by
such facts as have come to our knowledge. There is no
doubt that there was a great amount of public suffering,
and that the prosperity of the nation declined from the high
point it had reached under Kiaking. Scarcity of food and
want of work increased the growing discontent, which did
not require even secret societies to give it point and expres-
sion, and as far as could be judged it was worse than when
the Water-Lily Society inspired Kiaking with most appre-
hension. Kiaking, as has been observed, escaped the most
serious consequences of his own acts. There was much pop-
ular discontent, but there was no open rebellion. Taouk-
wang had not been on the throne many years before he was
brought face to face with rebels who openly disputed his
authority, and, strangely enough, his troubles began in
Central Asia, where peace had been undisturbed for half
a century.
The conquest of Central Asia had been among the most
brilliant and remarkable of the feats of the great Keen Lung.
Peace had been preserved there as much by the extraordi-
nary prestige or reputation of China as by the skill of the
administration or the soundness of the policy of the govern-
264 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
ing power, which left a large share of the work to the sub-
ject races. Outside each of the principal towns the Chinese
built a fort or gulbagh, in which their garrison resided, and
military officers or ambans were appointed to every district.
The Mohammedan officials were held responsible for the
good conduct of the people and the due collection of the
taxes, and as long as the Chinese garrison was maintained
in strength and efficiency they discharged their duties with
the requisite good faith. The lapse of time and the embar-
rassment of the government at home led to the neglect of
the force in Central Asia, which had once been an efficient
army. The Chinese garrison, ill-paid and unrecruited, grad-
ually lost the semblance of a military force, and was not to
be distinguished from the rest of the civil population. The
difference of religion was the only unequivocal mark of dis-
tinction between the rulers and the ruled, and it furnished
an ever-present cause of enmity and dislike, although apart
from this the Mohammedans accepted the Chinese rule as
not bad in itself, and even praised it. The Chinese might
have continued to govern Hi and Kashgar indefinitely, not-
withstanding the weakness and decay of their garrison, but
for the ambition of a neighbor. The Chinese are to blame,
however, not merely for having ignored the obvious aggres-
siveness of that neighbor, but for having provided it with
facilities for carrying out its plans. The Khanate of Kho-
kand, the next-door state in Central Asia, had been inti-
mately connected with Kashgar from ancient times, both in
politics and trade. The Chinese armies in the eighteenth
century had advanced into Khokand, humbled its khan,
and reduced him to a state of vassalage. For more than
fifty years the khan sent tribute to China, and was the
humble neighbor of the Chinese. He gave, however, a
place of refuge and a pension to Sariinsak, the last repre-
sentative of the old Khoja family of Kashgar, and thus re-
tained a hold on the legitimate ruler of that state. Sarimsak
had as a child escaped from the pursuit of Fouta and the
massacre of his relations by the chief of Badakshan, but he
THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANG. 265
was content to remain a pensioner at Khokand to the end of
his days, and he left the assertion of what he considered his
rights to his children. His three sons were named, in the
order of their age, Yusuf, Barhanuddin, and Jehangir, and
each of them attempted at different times to dispossess the
Chinese in Kashgar. In the year 1812, when Kiaking's
weakness was beginning to be apparent, the Khan of Kho-
kand, a chief of more than usual ability, named Mahomed
Ali, refused to send tribute any more to China, and the
Viceroy of Hi, having no force at his disposal, acquiesced in
the change with good grace, and no hostilities ensued. The
first concession was soon followed by others. The khan
obtained the right to levy a tax on all Mohammedan mer-
chandise sold in the bazaars of Kashgar and Yarkand, and
deputed consuls or aksakals for the purpose of collecting
the duties. These aksakals naturally became the center of
all the intrigue and disaffection prevailing in the state
against the Chinese, and they considered it to be as much
their duty to provoke political discontent as to supervise the
customs placed under their charge. Before the aksakals
appeared on the scene the Chinese ruled a peaceful terri-
tory, but after the advent of these foreign officials trouble
soon ensued.
Ten years after his refusal to pay tribute the Khan of
Khokand decided to support the Khoja pretenders who en-
joyed his hospitality, and hi 1822 Jehangir was provided
with money and arms to make an attempt on the Chinese
position in Kashgaria. Although the youngest, Jehangir
seems to have been the most energetic of the Khoja princes;
and having obtained the alliance of the Kirghiz, he at-
tempted, by a rapid movement, to surprise the Chinese in
the town of Kashgar. In this attempt he was disappointed,
for the Chinese kept better guard than he expected, and he
was compelled to make an ignominious retreat. The Khan
of Khokand, disappointed at the result and apprehensive of
counter action on the part of the Chinese, repudiated all par-
ticipation in the matter, and forbade Jehangir to return to
12
266 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHISA.
his country. That adventurer then fled to Lake Issik Kul,
whither the Chinese pursued him; but when his fortunes
seemed to have reached their lowest ebb a revulsion sud-
denly took place, and by the surprise and annihilation of a
Chinese force he was again able to pose as an arbiter of
affairs in Central Asia. The fortitude of Jehangir con-
firmed the attachment of his friends, and the Khokandian
ruler, encouraged by the defeat of the Chinese, again took
up his cause and sent him troops and a general for a fresh
descent on Kashgaria. The khan had his own ends in view
quite as much as to support the Khoja pretender; but his
support encouraged Jehangir to leave his mountain retreat
and to cross the Tian Shan into Kashgaria. This happened
in the year 1826, and the Chinese garrison of Kashgar very
unwisely quitted the shelter of its citadel and went out to
meet the invaders. The combat is said to have been fiercely
contested, but nothing is known about it except that the
Chinese were signally defeated. This overthrow was the
signal for a general insurrection throughout the country,
and the Chinese garrisons, after more or less resistance,
were annihilated. An attempt was then made to restore
the old Mohammedan administration, and Jehangir was
proclaimed by the style of the Seyyid Jehangir Sultan.
One of his first acts was to dismiss the Khokandian con-
tingent, and to inform his ally or patron, Mahomed AH, that
he no longer required his assistance. His confidence re-
ceived a rude check when he learned a short time after-
ward that the Chinese were making extraordinary prepa-
rations to recover their lost province, and that they had
collected an immense army in Hi for the purpose. Then
he wished his Khokandian allies back again ; but he still re-
solved to make as good a fight as he could for the throne
he had acquired; and when the Chinese general Chang
marched on Kashgar, Jehangir took up his position at
Yangabad and accepted battle. He was totally defeated;
the capture of Kashgar followed, and Jehangir himself fell
into the hands of the victors. The Khoja was sent to
THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANG. 267
Pekin, where, after many indignities, he was executed
and quartered as a traitor. The Chinese punished all open
rebels with death, and as a precaution against the recur-
rence of rebellion they removed 12,000 Mohammedan fami-
lies from Kashgar to Hi, where they became known as the
Tarantchis, or toilers. They also took the very wise step
of prohibiting all intercourse with Khokand, and if they
had adhered to this resolution they would have saved
themselves much serious trouble. But Mahomed Ali was
determined to make an effort to retain so valuable a per-
quisite as his trade relations with Kashgar, and as soon as
the Chinese had withdrawn the main portion of their force
he hastened to assail Kashgar at the head of his army, and
put forward Yusuf as a successor to Jehangir. Only des-
ultory fighting ensued, but his operations were so far suc-
cessful that the Chinese agreed to resort to the previous
arrangement, and Mahomed Ali promised to restrain the
Khojas. Fourteen years of peace and prosperity followed
this new convention.
Serious disorders also broke out in the islands of Formosa
and Hainan. In the former the rebellion was only put
down by a judicious manipulation of the divisions of the
insurgent tribes; but the settlement attained must be pro-
nounced so far satisfactory that the peace of the island was
assured. In Hainan, an island of extraordinary fertility and
natural wealth, which must some day be developed, the
aboriginal tribes revolted against Chinese authority, and
massacred many of the Chinese settlers, who had begun to
encroach on the possessions of the natives. Troops had to
be sent from Canton before the disorders were suppressed,
and then Hainan reverted to its tranquil state, from which
only the threat of a French occupation during the Tonquin
war roused it. These disorders in different parts of the
empire were matched by troubles of a more domestic char-
acter within the palace. In 1831 Taoukwang's only son, a
young man of twenty, whose character was not of the best,
gav~ him some cause of offense, and he struck him. The
268 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
young prince died of the blow, and the emperor was left for
the moment without a child. His grief was soon assuaged
by the news that two of his favorite concubines had borne
him sons, one of whom became long afterward the Emperor
Hienfung. At this critical moment Taoukwang was seized
with a severe illness, and his elder brother, Hwuy Wang,
whose pretensions had threatened the succession, thinking
his chance had at last come, took steps to seize the throne.
But Taoukwang recovered, and those who had made prema-
ture arrangements in filling the throne were severely pun-
ished. These minor troubles culminated in the Miaotze Re-
bellion, the most formidable internal war which the Chinese
government had to deal with between that of Wou Sankwei
and the Taepings. From an early period the Miaotze had
been a source of trouble to the executive, and the relations
between them and the officials had been anything but har-
monious. The Manchu rulers had only succeeded in keep-
ing them in order by stopping their supply of salt on the
smallest provocation ; and in the belief that they possessed
an absolutely certain mode of coercing them, the Chinese
mandarins assumed an arrogant and dictatorial tone toward
their rude and unreclaimed neighbors. In 1832 the Miaotze,
irritated past endurance, broke out in rebellion, and their
principal chief caused himself to be proclaimed emperor.
Their main force was assembled at Lienchow, in the north-
west corner of the Canton province, and their leader as-
sumed the suggestive title of the Golden Dragon, and called
upon the Chinese people to redress their wrongs by joining
his standard. But the Chinese, who regarded the Miaotze
as an inferior and barbarian race, refused to combine with
them against the most extortionate of officials or the most
unpopular of governments. Although they could not enlist
the support of any section of the Chinese people, the Miaotze,
by their valor and the military skill of their leader, made so
good a stand against the forces sent against them by the
Canton viceroy that the whole episode is redeemed from ob-
livion, and may be considered a romantic incident in modern
THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANO. 269
Chinese history. The Miaotze gained the first successes of the
war, and for a time it seemed as if the Chinese authorities
would be able to effect nothing against them. The Canton
viceroy fared so badly that Hengan was sent from Pekin to
take the command, and the chosen braves of Hoonan were
sent to attack the Miaotze in the rear. The latter gained
a decisive victory at Pingtseuen, where the Golden Dragon
and several thousand of his followers were slain. But, al-
though vanquished in one quarter, the Miaotze continued to
show great activity and confidence in another, and when
the Canton viceroy made a fresh attack on them they re-
pulsed him with heavy loss. The disgrace of this officer
followed, and his fall was hastened by the suppression of
the full extent of his losses, which excited the indignation
of his own troops, who said, "There is no use in our sacri-
ficing our lives in secret; if our toils are concealed from the
emperor neither we nor our posterity will be rewarded."
This unlucky commander was banished to Central Asia,
and after his supersession Hengan had the satisfaction of
bringing the war to a satisfactory end within ten days.
Some of the leaders were executed, the others swore to keep
the peace, and a glowing account of the pacification of the
Miaotze region was sent to Pekin. Some severe critics sug-
gested that the whole arrangement was a farce, and that
Hengan's triumph was only on paper; but the lapse of time
has shown this skepticism to be unjustified, as the Miaotze
have remained tranquil ever since, and the formidable
Yaoujin, or Wolfmen, as they are called, have observed
the promises given to Hengan, which would not have been
the case unless they had been enforced by military success.
Should they ever break out again, the government would
possess the means, from their command of money and mod-
ern arms, of repressing their lawlessness with unprecedented
thoroughness, and of absolutely subjecting their hitherto
inaccessible districts.
If the first ten or twelve years of the reign of the Em-
peror Taoukwang were marked by these troubles on a minor
270 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
scale, an undue importance should not be attached to them,
for they did not seriously affect the stability of the govern-
ment or the authority of the emperor. It is true that they
caused a decline in the revenue and an increase in the ex-
penditure, which resulted in the year 1834 in an admitted
deficit of fifty million dollars, and no state could be consid-
ered in a flourishing condition with the public exchequer in
such a condition. But this large deficit must be regarded
rather as a floating debt than an annual occurrence.
The Chinese authorities continued to hinder and protest
against the foreign trade and intercourse between their sub-
jects and the merchants of Europe as much as ever; but
their opposition was mainly confined to edicts and proclama-
tions. When Commissioner Lin resorted to force and vio-
lence some years later the auspicious moment for expelling
all foreigners had passed away, and the weakness of the
government contributed in no small degree to this result.
Taoukwang, although his claims as occupant of the Dragon
Throne were unabated, could not pretend to the power of a
great ruler like Keen Lung, who would have known how to
enforce his will. Nor was it possible after 1834 to continue
the policy of uncompromising hostility to all foreign nations
whose governments had become directly interested in, and
to a certain extent responsible to, their respective peoples,
for the opening of the Chinese empire to civilized intercourse
and commerce. Up to this point Taoukwang's only experi-
ence of the pretensions of the foreign powers had been the
Amherst mission, in the time of his father, which had ended
BO ignominiously, and the Russian mission which arrived at
Pekin every ten years to recruit the Russian college there,
and to pay the descendants of the garrison of Albazin the
sum allotted by the czar for their support. But from these
trifling matters Taoukwang's attention was suddenly and
completely distracted to the important situation at Canton
and on the coast, the settlement of the questions arising out
of which filled the remainder of his reign.
THE fIRST FOREIGN WAR. 271
CHAPTER XVII
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR
AT the very time that the Emperor Taoukwang, by the
dismissal of the Portuguese astronomers at Pekm and by
his general indifference to the foreign question, was showing
that no concessions were to be expected from him, an un-
known legislature at a remote distance from his capital was
decreeing, in complete indifference to the susceptibilities of
the occupant of the Dragon Throne, that trade with China
might be pursued by any English subject. Up to the year
1834 trade with China had, by the royal charter, remained
the monopoly of the East India Company; but when the
charter was renewed in that year for a further period of
twenty years, it was shorn of the last of its commercial
privileges, and an immediate change became perceptible in
the situation at Canton, which was the principal seat of the
foreign trade. The withdrawal of the monopoly was dic-
tated solely by English, and not Chinese, considerations.
Far from facilitating trade with the Chinese, it tended to
hinder and prevent its developing ; for the Chinese officials
had no objection to foreigners coming to Canton, and buy-
ing or selling articles of commerce, so long as they derived
personal profit from the trade, and so long as the laws of the
empire were not disputed or violated. The servants of the
East India Company were content to adapt themselves to
this view, and they might have carried on relations with
the Hong merchants for an indefinite period, and without
any more serious collision than occasional interruptions.
Had the monopoly been renewed things would have been
left in precisely the same position as when intercourse was
first established, and trade might have continued within its
old restricted limits. But the abolition of the monopoly and
A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the opening of the trade created quite a new situation, and
by intensifying the opposition of the Chinese government,
paved the way to the only practicable solution of the ques-
tion of foreign intercourse with China, which was that, how-
ever reluctantly, she should consent to take her place in the
family of nations.
The Chinese were not left long in doubt as to the signifi-
cance of this change. In December, 1833, a royal commis-
sion was issued appointing Lord Napier chief superintend-
ent of trade with China, and two assistants under him, of
whom one was Sir John Davis. The Chinese had to some
extent contributed to this appointment, the Hoppo at Canton
having written that "in case of the dissolution of the Com-
pany it was incumbent on the British government to appoint
a chief to come to Canton for the general management of
commercial dealings, and to prevent affairs from going to
confusion." But in this message the Hoppo seems to have
expressed his own view rather than that of the Pekin gov-
ernment or the Canton viceroy; and certainly none of the
Chinese were prepared to find substituted for "a chief of
commercial dealings" an important commissioner clothed
with all the authority of the British ruler. How very dif-
ferent was the idea formed of this functionary by the Chi-
nese and English may be gathered from their official views
of his work. "What the Chinese thought has been told in
the words of the Hoppo. Lord Pahnerston was more precise
from his point of view. His instruction to Lord Napier read,
"Your lordship will announce your arrival at Canton by let-
ter to the viceroy. In addition to the duty of protecting and
fostering the trade at Canton, it will be one of your principal
objects to ascertain whether it may not be practicable to ex-
tend that trade" to other parts of the Chinese dominions. It
is obvious that, with a view to the attainment of this object,
the establishment of direct communication with the imperial
court at Pekin would be most desirable." The two points
of radical disagreement between these views were that the
Chinese wished to deal with an official who thought exclu-
THE FIRS7 FOREIGN WAR. 273
sively of trade, whereas Lord Napier's task was not less dip-
lomatic than commercial ; and, secondly, that they expected
him to carry on his business with the Hoppo, as the Com-
pany's agents had done, while Lord Napier was specially
instructed to communicate with the viceroy, whom those
agents had never dared to approach.
If it was thought that the Chinese would not realize all
the significance of the change, those who held so slight an
opinion of their clear-headedness were quickly undeceived.
Lord Napier reached the Canton River in July, 1834, and
he at once addressed a letter of courtesy to the viceroy an-
nouncing his arrival. The Chinese officers, after perusing
it, refused to forward it to the viceroy, and returned it to
Lord Napier. Such was the inauspicious commencement
of the assumption of responsibility by the crown in China.
The Chinese refused to have anything to do with Lord
Napier, whom they described as "a barbarian eye," and they
threatened the merchants with the immediate suspension of
the trade. The viceroy issued an order forbidding the new
superintendent to proceed to Canton, and commanding him
to stay at Macao until he had applied in the prescribed form
for permission to proceed up the river. But Lord Napier
did not listen to these representations, nor did he condescend
to delay his progress a moment at Macao. He proceeded
up the river to Canton, but, although he succeeded in mak-
ing his way to the English factory, it was only to find him-
self isolated, and that, in accordance with the viceroy's order,
the Hoppo had interdicted all intercourse with the English.
The Chinese declared that the national dignity was at stake,
and so thoroughly did both officials and merchants harmon-
ize tli at the English factory was at once deserted by all Chi-
nese subjects, and even the servants left their employment.
On his arrival at Canton, Lord Napier found himself con-
fronted with the position that the Chinese authorities refused
to have anything to do with him, and that his presence effect-
ually debarred his countrymen from carrying on the trade,
which it was his first duty to promote. At this conjuncture
274 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
it happened that the Chinese had discovered what they
thought to be a new grievance against the foreign traders
in the steady efflux of silver as the natural consequence of
the balance of trade being against China. In a report to
the throne in 1833 it was stated that as much as 60,000,000
taels of silver, or $100,000,000, had been exported from
China in the previous eleven years, and, as the Chinese
of course made no allowance for the equivalent value im-
ported into their country, this total seemed in their eyes an
incredibly large sum to be lost from the national treasure.
It will be easily understood that at this particular moment
the foreign trade appeared to possess few advantages, and
found few patrons among the Chinese people.
In meeting this opposition Lord Napier endeavored to
combine courtesy and firmness. He wrote courteous and
argumentative letters to the mandarins, combating their
views, and insisting on his rights as a diplomatist to be
received by the officials of the empire; and at the same
time he issued a notice to the Chinese merchants which was
full of threats and defiance. "The merchants of Great
Britain," he said, "wish to trade with all China on prin-
ciples of mutual benefit; they will never relax in their ex-
ertions till they gain a point of equal importance to both
countries, and the viceroy will find it as easy to stop the
current of the Canton River as to carry into effect the in-
sane determinations of the Hong." This notice was natu-
rally enough interpreted as a defiance by the viceroy, who
placed the most severe restrictions he could on the trade,
sent his troops into the foreign settlements to remove all
Chinese servants, and ordered the Bogue forts to fire on
any English ship that attempted to pass. The English mer-
chants, alarmed at the situation, petitioned Lord Napier
to allay the storm he had raised by retiring from Canton to
Macao, and, harassed in mind and enfeebled in body, Lord
Napier acquiesced in an arrangement that stultified all his
former proceedings. The Chinese were naturally intoxi-
cated by their triumph, which vindicated their principle
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 275
that no English merchant or emissary should be allowed
to come to Canton except by the viceroy's permit, granted
only to the petition and on the guarantee of the Hong mer-
chants. The viceroy had also carried his point of holding
no intercourse with the English envoy, to whom he had
written that "the great ministers of the Celestial Empire,
unless with regard to affairs of going to court and carrying
tribute, or in consequence of imperial commands, are not
permitted to have interviews with outside barbarians."
While the Chinese officials had been both consistent and
successful, the new English superintendent of trade had
been both inconsistent and discomfited. He had attempted
to carry matters with a high hand and to coerce the man-
darins, and he was compelled to show in the most public
manner that he had failed by his retirement to Macao. He
had even imperiled the continuance of the trade which he
had come specially to promote, and all he could do to show
his indignation was to make a futile protest against "this
act of unprecedented tyranny and injustice." Very soon
after Lord Napier's return to Macao he died, leaving to
other hands the settlement of the difficult affair which
neither his acts nor his language had simplified.
On Lord Napier's departure from Canton the restrictions
placed on trade were removed, and the intercourse between
the English and Chinese merchants of the Hong was re-
sumed. But even then the mandarins refused to recognize
the trade superintendents, and after a short time they issued
certain regulations which had been specially submitted to
and approved by the Emperor Taoukwang as the basis on
which trade was to be conducted. These Regulations, eight
in number, forbade foreign men-of-war to enter the inner
seas, and enforced the old practice that all requests on the
part of Europeans should be addressed through the Hong
in the form of a petition. It therefore looked as if the Chi-
nese had completely triumphed in carrying out their views,
that the transfer of authority from the East India Company
to the British crown, with the so-called opening of the trade,
276 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
had effected no change in the situation, and that such com-
merce as was carried on should be as the Chinese dictated,
and in accordance with their main idea, which was to "pre-
vent the English establishing themselves permanently at
Canton." The death of the Viceroy Loo and the familiar-
ity resulting from increased intercourse resulted in some
relaxation of these severe regulations, and at last, in March,
1837, nearly three years after Lord Napier's arrival in the
Bogue, the new superintendent of trade, Captain Elliot,
received, at his own request, permission through the Hong
to proceed to Canton. The emperor passed a special edict
authorizing Captain Elliot to reside in the factory at Canton,
where he was to "control the merchants and seamen"; but
it was also stipulated that he was to strictly abide by the old
regulations, and not to rank above a supercargo. As Cap-
tain Elliot was the representative of a government not less
proud or exacting than that of China, it was clear that these
conditions could not be permanently enforced ; and although
he endeavored for a period to conciliate the Chinese and to
obtain more favorable terms by concessions, there came a
time when it was impossible to assent to the arrogant de-
mands of the mandarins, and when resort became necessary
to the ultima ratio regum. But for the first two critical
years Captain Elliot pursued the same policy as Lord Na-
pier, alternating concessions with threats, and, while vaunt-
ing the majesty of his sovereign, yielding to demands which
were unreasonable and not to be endured.
The balance of trade against China was the principal
cause of the export of silver, and the balance of trade was
only against China through the increasing import of opium.
Without acquiescing in the least with the strong allegations
of the anti-opium party, there is no reason to doubt that the
excessive use of opium, especially in a crowded city like Cau-
ton, was attended with sufficient mischief to justify its official
denunciation. The Pekin government may be so far credited
with the honest intention to reduce the mischief and to pre-
vent a bad habit from becoming more and more of a national
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 277
vice, when they determined for far other reasons to place it
in the front of their tirade against foreign trade generally.
They soon found that it would be more convenient and more
plausible to substitute the moral opposition to the opium traffic
for the political disinclination to foreign intercourse in any
form. They scarcely expected that in this project they would
receive the assistance and co-operation of many of the Euro-
peans themselves, who shared with them the opinion that
opium was detestable, and its use or sale a mark of de-
pravity.
In January, 1839, Taoukwang ordered Lin Tsihseu, vice-
roy of the double province of Houkwang and an official of
high reputation, to proceed to Canton as Special Commis-
sioner to report on the situation, and to propound the best
remedy for the opium evil. At this moment the anti-opium
party was supreme in the imperial council, and three Man-
chu princes were disgraced and banished from Pekin for in-
dulging in the practice. The peremptory instructions given
to Commissioner Lin, as he is historically known, were "to
cut off the fountain of evil, and, if necessary for the attain-
ment of his object, to sink his ships and break his caldrons,
for the indignation of the great emperor has been fairly
aroused at these wicked practices of buying and selling
and using opium and that the hourly thought of his heart
is to do away with them forever."
Before Lin reached Canton there had been frequent fric-
tion between Captain Elliot and the local mandarins, and
more than one interruption of the trade. Less than six
months after his installation at Canton his official relations
were broken off, and he wrote home to his government a
dispatch complaining of the difficulty of conducting any sort
of amicable relations with the local mandarins, and indors-
ing the growing demand for the right of dealing direct with
the Pekin government. Captain Elliot, acting under in-
structions from home, issued a public notice warning all
English subjects to discontinue the illicit opium trade, and
stating that "her Majesty's Government would not in any
278 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
way interfere if the Chinese Government should think fit to
seize and confiscate the same."
At this juncture Commissioner Lin, whose fervor and
energy carried him away, appeared upon the scene, and,
whereas a less capable or honest man would have come to
an arrangement with Captain Elliot, his very ability and
enthusiasm tended to complicate the situation and render a
pacific solution unattainable. Commissioner Lin, on taking
up his post, lost no time in showing that he was terribly in
earnest; but both his language and his acts proved that he
had a very much larger programme than was included in his
propaganda against the opium traffic. He wished to achieve
the complete humiliation of the foreigners, and nothing less
would satisfy him. Within a week of his arrival at Canton
he issued an edict denouncing the opium trade; throwing
all the blame for it on the English, and asserting what was
absolutely untrue; viz., that "the laws of England prohib-
ited the smoking of opium, and adjudged the user to death."
The language of the edict was unfriendly and offensive. The
Europeans were stigmatized as a barbarous people, who
thought only of trade and of making their way by stealth
into the Flowery Land. At the same time that he issued
this edict he gave peremptory orders that no foreigner was
to leave Canton or Macao until the opium question had been
settled to his satisfaction. Even then English merchants
and officials, who felt no great sympathy with the opium
traffic, saw that these proceedings indicated an intention to
put down the trade in other articles, and to render the posi-
tion of foreigners untenable. Lin's demands culminated in
the request for all stores of opium to be surrendered to him
within three days. By the efforts of some of the merchants
about a thousand chests were collected and handed over to
the Chinese for destruction; but this did not satisfy Lin,
who collected a large rabble force, encamped it outside the
settlement, and threatened to carry the place by storm. In
this crisis Captain Elliot, who had declared that his confi-
dence in the justice and good faith of the provincial govern-
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 279
ment was destroyed, and who had even drawn up a scheme
for concentrating all his forces at Hongkong, called upon all
the English merchants to surrender to him, for paramount
considerations of the lives and property of every one con-
cerned, all the stores of opium in their possession. More
than 20,000 chests, of an estimated value of $10,000,000, were
placed at his disposal, and in due course handed over by
him to Commissioner Lin for destruction. This task was
performed at Chuenpee, when the opium was placed in
trenches, then mixed with salt and lime, and finally poured
off into the sea. After this very considerable triumph, Lin
wrote a letter to Queen Victoria whose reign has witnessed
the most critical periods of the China question and its satis-
factory settlement calling upon her Majesty to interdict the
trade in opium forever. The letter was as offensive in its
tone as it was weak in argument, and no answer was vouch-
safed to it. Before any reply could be given, the situation,
moreover, had developed into one of open hostilities.
But great as were the concessions made by Captain El-
liot, in consequence of the threatening attitude of Commis-
sioner Lin, the Chinese were not satisfied, and made fresh
and more exacting demands of those who had been weak
enough to make any concession at all. They reasserted their
old pretension that Europeans in China must be subject to
her laws, and as the sale of opium was a penal offense they
claimed the right to punish those Englishmen who had been
connected with the traffic. They accordingly drew up a list
of sixteen of the principal merchants, some of whom had
never had anything to do with opium, and they announced
their intention to arrest them and to punish them with death.
Not only did Commissioner Lin and the Canton authorities
claim the right to condemn and punish British subjects, but
they showed in the most insolent manner that they would
take away their liberty and lives on the flimsiest and falsest
pretext. Captain Elliot, weak and yielding as he was on
many pointg, declared that "this law is incompatible with
safe or honorable continuance at Canton." Apparently the
280 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Chinese authorities acted on the assumption that so long as
there remained even one offending European the mass of his
countrymen ought to be hindered in their avocations, and
consequently petty restrictions and provocations continued
to be enforced. Then Captain Elliot, seeing that the situa-
tion was hopeless and that there was no sign of improve-
ment, took the bold, or at least the pronounced, step of or-
dering all British subjects to leave Canton or to stay at their
own peril. It was on this occasion that he explained away,
or put a new interpretation on, his action with regard to the
opium surrendered for destruction, which most of the mer-
chants thought represented an irrecoverable loss. It will be
best to give the precise words used in his notice of the 22d
of May, 1839. "Acting on behalf of her Majesty's Gov-
ernment in a momentous emergency, he has, in the first
place, to signify that the demand he recently made to her
Majesty's subjects for the surrender of British-owned opium
under their control had no special reference to the circum-
stances of that property ; but (beyond the actual pressure of
necessity) that demand was founded on the principle that
these violent compulsory measures being utterly unjust per
se and of general application for the enforced surrender of
any other property, or of human life, or for the constraint
of any unsuitable terms or concessions, it became highly
necessary to vest and leave the right of exacting effectual
security and full indemnity for every loss directly in the
queen." Unfortunately, Captain Elliot's language at the
time of the surrender of the opium had undoubtedly led to
the conclusion that he sympathized with Commissioner Lin,
and that he took the same view as the Chinese officials of
the moral iniquity of selling or using opium. The whole
mercantile community adopted Captain Elliot's counsel, and
the English factory at Canton, which had existed for nearly
two hundred years, was abandoned. At the same time a
memorial was sent home begging the government to protect
the English merchants in China against "a capricious and
corrupt government," and demanding compensation for the
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 281
$10,000,000 worth of opium destroyed by Commissioner Lin.
Pending the reply of the home government to that appeal,
nothing could be more complete than the triumph of Com-
missioner Lin. The Emperor Taoukwang rewarded him
with the important viceroyship of the Two Kiang, the seat
of which administratoin is at Nankin.
But the limit of endurance had been reached, and the
British government was on the point of taking decisive action
at the very moment when the Chinese triumph seemed most
complete and unthreatened. Even before the action of the
home authorities was known in the Bogue the situation had
become critical, and the sailors in particular had thrown off
all restraint. Frequent collisions occurred between them
and the foreigners, and in one of them a Chinaman was
killed. Commissioner Lin characterized this act as "going
to the extreme of disobedience to the laws," and demanded
the surrender of the sailor who committed the act, so that
a life might be given for a life. This demand was flatly
refused, and in consequence of the measures taken by the
Chinese - at Lin's direction to prevent all supplies reaching
the English, Captain Elliot felt bound to remove his resi-
dence from Macao to Hongkong. The Chinese called out
all their armed forces, and incited their people along the
Canton River to attack the foreigners wherever found. An
official notice said, "Produce arms and weapons; join to-
gether the stoutest of your villagers, and thus be prepared
to defend yourselves. If any of the said foreigners be found
going on shore to cause trouble, all and every of the people
are permitted to fire upon them, to withstand and drive them
back, or to make prisoners of them." This appeal to a force
which the Chinese did not possess was an act of indiscretion
that betrayed an overweening confidence or a singular depth
of ignorance. When the mandarins refused to supply the
ships with water and other necessaries they carried their
animosity to a length which the English naval officers at
once defined as a declaration of open hostilities They
retaliated by ordering their men to seize by force whatever
882 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
was necessary, and thus began a state of things which may
be termed one of absolute warfare. The two men-of-war
on the station had several encounters with the forts in the
Bogue, and on November 3, 1839, they fought a regular
engagement with a Chinese fleet of twenty-nine junks off
Chuenpee. The Chinese showed more courage than skill,
and four of their junks were sunk. It is worth noting that
the English sailors pronounced both their guns and their
powder to be excellent. While this action deterred the Chi-
nese fleet from coming to close quarters, it also imbittered
the contest, and there was no longer room to doubt that if
the Chinese were to be brought to take a more reasonable
view of foreign trade it would have to be by the disagree-
able lesson of force. And at the end of 1839 the Chinese
were fully convinced that they had the power to carry out
their will and to keep the European nations out of their
country by the strong hand.
A short time after the action at Chuenpee an English-
man named Mr. Gribble was seized by the Canton officials
and thrown into prison. The English men-of-war went up
the river as far as the Bogue forts, which they threatened to
bombard unless he was released; and, after considerable
discussion, Mr. Gribble was set free, mainly because the
Chinese heard of the large force that was on its way from
England. Before that armament arrived the Emperor
Taoukwang had committed himself still further to a policy
of hostility. A report of the fight at Chuenpee was duly
submitted to him, but the affair was represented as a very
creditable one for his commander, and as a Chinese victory.
The misled monarch at once conferred a high honor on his
admiral, and commanded his officers at Canton "to at once
put a stop to the trade of the English nation. ' ' This had,
practically speaking, been already accomplished, and the
English merchants had taken refuge at Macao or in their
ships anchored at Hongkong.
Before describing the military operations now about to
take place, a survey may conveniently be taken of events
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 283
since the abolition of the monopoly, and it may be pardon-
able to employ the language formerly used. From an
impartial review of the facts, and divesting our minds, so
far as is humanly possible, of the prejudice of accepted
political opinions, and of conviction as to the hurtful or
innocent character of opium in the mixture as smoked by
the Chinese, it cannot be contended that the course pursued
by Lord Napier and Captain Elliot, and particularly by the
latter, was either prudent in itself or calculated to promote
the advantage and reputation of England. Captain Elliot's
proceedings were marked by the inconsistency that springs
from ignorance. The more influential English merchants,
touched by the appeal to their moral sentiment, or impressed
by the depravity of large classes of the Canton population,
of which the practice of opium-smoking was rather the mark
than the cause, set their faces against the traffic in this
article, and repudiated all sympathy and participation in it.
The various foreign publications, whether they received their
inspirations from Mr. Gutzlaff or not matters little, differed
on most points, but were agreed on this, that the trade in
opium was morally indefensible, and that we were bound,
not only by our own interests, but in virtue of the common
obligations of humanity, to cease to hold all connection with
it. Those who had surrendered their stores of opium at the
request of Captain Elliot held that their claim for compensa-
tion was valid, in the first place, against the English govern-
ment alone. They had given them up for the service of the
country at the request of the queen's representative, and,
considering the line which Captain Elliot had taken, many
believed that it would be quite impossible for the English
government to put forward any demand upon the govern-
ment of China. Tne ten million dollars, according to
these large-hearted and unreflecting moralists, would have
to be sacrificed by the people of England in the cause of
humanity, to which they had given so much by emancipat-
ing the slaves, and the revenue of India should, for the fu-
ture, be poorer by the amount that used to pay the dividend
284 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
of the great Company ! The Chinese authorities could not
help being encouraged in their opinions and course of pro-
ceeding by the attitude of the English. Their most sweep-
ing denunciations of the iniquity of the opium traffic elicited
a murmur of approval from the most influential among the
foreigners. No European stood up to say that their allega-
tions as to the evil of using opium were baseless and absurd.
What is more, no one thought it. Had the Chinese made
sufficient use of this identity of views, and shown a desire
to facilitate trade in the so-called innocent and legitimate
articles, there is little doubt that the opium traffic would
have been reduced to very small dimensions, because there
would have been no rupture. But the action of Commis-
sioner Lin revealed the truth that the Chinese were not to
be satisfied with a single triumph. The more easily they
obtained their objects in the opium matter the more anxious
did they become to impress the foreigners with a sense of
their inferiority, and to force them to accept the most onerous
and unjust conditions for the sake of a continuance of the
trade. None the less, Captain Elliot went out of his way to
tie his own hands, and to bind his own government, so far
as he could, to co-operate with the emperor's officials in the
suppression of the opium traffic. That this is no random
assertion may be judged from the following official notice,
issued several months after the surrender of the stores of
opium. In this Captain Elliot announced that "Her 3 1 .ij-
esty's flag does not fly in the protection of a traffic declared
illegal by the emperor, and, therefore, whenever a \-.
is suspected of having opium on board Captain Elliot will
take care that the officers of his establishment shall accom-
pany the Chinese officers in their search, and that if, after
strict investigation, opium shall be found, he will offer no
objection to the seizure and confiscation of th.3 cargo."
The British expedition arrived at the mouth of the Can-
ton River in the month of June, 1840. It consisted of 4,000
troops on board twenty-five transports, with a convoy of
fifteen men-of-war. If it was thought that this considerable
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 285
force would attain its objects without fighting and merely
by making a demonstration, the expectation was rudely dis-
appointed. The reply of Commissioner Lin was to place a
reward on the person of all Englishmen, and to offer $20,000
for the destruction of an English man-of-war. The English
fleet replied to this hostile step by instituting a close blockade
at the mouth of the river, which was not an ineffectual re-
tort. Sir Gordon Bremer, the commander of the first part
of the expedition, came promptly to the decision that it would
be well to extend the sphere of his operations, and he accord-
ingly sailed northward with a portion of his force to occupy
the island of Chusan, which had witnessed some of the
earliest operations of the East India Company two centuries
before. The capture of Chusan presented no difficulties to a
well-equipped force, yet the fidelity of its garrison and inhab-
itants calls for notice as a striking instance of patriotism.
The officials at Tinghai, the capital of Chusan, refused to
surrender, as their duty to their emperor would not admit
of their giving up one of his possessions. It was their duty
to fight, and although they admitted resistance to be useless,
they refused to yield, save to force. The English commander
reluctantly ordered a bombardment, and after a few hours
the Chinese defenses were demolished, and Tinghai was
occupied. Chusan remained in our possession as a base of
operations during the greater part of the war, but its insalu-
brity rather dissipated the reputation it had acquired as an
advantageous and well-placed station for operations on the
coast of China. Almost at the same time as the attack on
Chusan, hostilities were recommenced against the Chinese
on the Canton River, in consequence of the carrying off of
a British subject, Mr. Vincent Stanton, from Macao. The
barrier forts were attacked by two English men-of-war and
two smaller vessels. After a heavy bombardment, a force
of marines and blue-jackets was landed, and the Chinese
positions carried. The forts and barracks were destroyed,
and Mr. Stanton released. Then it was said that "China
must either bend or break," for the hour of English for-
286 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
bearance had passed away, and unless China could vindicate
her policy by force of arms there was no longer any doubt
that she would have to give way.
"While these preliminary military events were occurring,
the diplomatic side of the question was also in evidence.
Lord Palmerston had written a letter stating in categorical
language what he expected at the hands of the Chinese
government, and he had directed that it should be delivered
into nobody else's hands but the responsible ministers of the
Emperor Taoukwang. The primary task of the English
expedition was to give this dispatch to some high Chinese
official who seemed competent to convey it to Pekin. This
task proved one of unexpected difficulty, for the mandarins,
basing their refusal on the strict letter of their duty, which
forbade them to hold any intercourse with foreigners, re-
turned the document, and declared that they could not
receive it. This happened at Amoy and again at Ningpo,
and the occupation of Chusan did not bring our authorities
any nearer to realizing their mission. Baffled in these
attempts, the fleet sailed north for the mouth of the Peiho,
when at last Lord Palmerston's letter was accepted by
Keshen, the viceroy of the province, and duly forwarded
by him to Pekin. The arrival of the English fleet awoke
the Chinese court for the time being from its indifference,
and Taoukwang not merely ordered that the fleet should be
provided with all the supplies it needed, but appointed Keshen
High Commissioner for the conclusion of an amicable ar-
rangement. The difficulty thus seemed in a fair way toward
settlement, but as a matter of fact it was only at its com-
mencement, for the wiles of Chinese diplomacy are infinite
and were then only partially understood. Keshen was re-
markable for his astuteness and for the yielding exterior
which covered a purpose of iron, and in the English political
officer, the Captain Elliot of Canton, he did not find an oppo-
nent worthy of his steel. Although experience had shown
how great were the delays of negotiation at Canton, and how
inaccessible were the local officials, Captain Elliot allowed
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR.
himself to be persuaded that the best place to carry on
negotiations was at that city, and after a brief delay the
fleet was withdrawn from the Peiho and all the advantages
of the alarm created by its presence at Pekin were surren-
dered. Relieved by the departure of the foreign ships,
Taoukwang sent orders for the dispatch of forces from the
inland provinces, so that he might be able to resume the
struggle with the English under more favorable conditions,
and at the same time he hastened to relieve his overcharged
feelings by punishing the man whom he regarded as respon-
sible for his misfortunes and humiliation. The full weight
of the imperial wrath fell on Commissioner Lin, who from
the position of the foremost official in China fell at a stroke
of the vermilion pencil to a public criminal arraigned before
the Board of Punishments to receive his deserts. He was
stripped of all his offices, and ordered to proceed to Pekin,
where, however, his life was spared.
Keshen arrived at Canton on November 29, 1840, but his
dispatch to the emperor explaining the position he found
there shows that his view of the situation did not differ ma-
terially from that of Lin. "Night and day I have consid-
ered and examined the state of our relations with the En-
glish. At first moved by the benevolence of his Majesty
and the severity of the laws, they surrendered the opium.
Commissioner Lin commanded them to give bonds that they
would never more deal in opium a most excellent plan for
securing future good conduct. This the English refused to
give, and then they trifled with the laws, and so obstinate
were their dispositions that they could not be made to submit.
Hence it becomes necessary to soothe and admonish them
with sound instruction, so as to cause them to change their
mien and purify their hearts, after which it will not be too
late to renew their commerce. It behooves me to instruct
and persuade them so that their good consciences may be
restored, and they reduced to submission." The language
of this document showed that the highest Chinese officers
still believed that the English would accept trade facilities
288 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
as a favor, that they would be treated de haut en bas, and
that China possessed the power *o make good her lofty
pretensions. China had learned nothing from her military
mishaps at Canton, Amoy, and Chusan, and from the ap
pearance of an English fleet in the Gulf of Pechihli. Keshen
had gained a breathing space by procrastination in the north,
and he resorted to the same tactics at Canton. Days ex-
panded into weeks, and at last orders were issued for an
advance up the Canton River, as it had become evident that
the Chinese were not only bent on an obstructive policy,
but were making energetic efforts to assemble a large army.
On January 7, 1841, orders were consequently issued for an
immediate attack on the Bogue forts, which had been placed
in a state of defense, and which were manned by large num-
bers of Chinese. Fortunately for us, the Chinese possessed
a very rudimentary knowledge of the art of war, and showed
no capacity to take advantage of the strength of their posi-
tion and forts, or even of their excellent guns. The troops
were landed on the coast in the early morning to operate on
the flank and rear of the forts at Chuenpee. The advance
squadron, under Captain, afterward Sir Thomas, Herbert,
was to engage the same forts in front, while the remainder
of the fleet proceeded to attack the stockades on the adjoin-
ing island of Taikok. The land force of 1,500 men and three
guns had not proceeded far along the coast before it came
across a strongly intrenched camp in addition to the Chuen-
pee forts, with several thousand troops and many guns in
position. After a sharp cannonade the forts were carried
at a rush, and a formidable army was driven ignominiously
out of its intrenchments with hardly any loss to the assail-
ants. The forts at Taikok were destroyed by the fire of the
ships, and their guns spiked and garrisons routed by storm-
ing parties. In all, the Chinese lost 500 killed, besides an
incalculable number of wounded, and many junks. The
Chinese showed some courage as well as incompetence, and
the English officers described their defense as "obstinate
and honorable."
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 289
The capture of the Bogue forts produced immediate and
important consequences. Keshen at once begged a cessation
of hostilities, and offered terms which conceded everything
we had demanded. These were the payment of a large in-
demnity, the cession of Hongkong, and the right to hold
official communication with the central government. In
accordance with these preliminary articles, Hongkong was
proclaimed, on January 29, 1841, a British possession, and
the troops evacuated Chusan to garrison the new station.
It was not considered at the time that the acquisition was
of much importance, and no one would have predicted for
it the brilliant and prosperous position it has since attained.
But the promises given by Keshen were merely to gain time
and to extricate him from a very embarrassing situation.
The morrow of what seemed a signal reverse was marked
by the issue of an imperial notice, breathing a more defiant
tone than ever. Taoukwang declared, hi this edict, that he
was resolved "to destroy and wash the foreigners away
without remorse," and he denounced the English by name
as "staying themselves upon their pride of power and fierce
strength." He, therefore, called upon his officers to proceed
with courage and energy, so that "the rebellious foreigners
might give up their ringleaders, to be sent encaged to Pekin,
to receive the utmost retribution of the laws." So long as
the sovereign held such opinions as these it was evident that
no arrangement could endure. The Chinese did not admit
the principle of equality in their dealings with the English,
and this was the main point in contention, far more than
the alleged evils of the opium traffic. So long as Taoukwang
and his ministers held the opinions which they did not hesi-
tate to express, a friendly intercourse was impossible. There
was no practical alternative between withdrawing from the
country altogether and leaving the Chinese in undisturbed
seclusion, or forcing their government to recognize a com-
mon humanity and an equality in national privileges.
It is not surprising that under these circumstances the
suspension of hostilities proved of brief duration. The con-
13
290 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A.
flict was hastened by the removal of Keshen from his post,
in consequence of his having reported that he considered the
Chinese forces unequal to the task of opposing the English.
His candor in recognizing facts did him credit, while it cost
him his position; and his successor, Eleang, was compelled
to take an opposite view, and to attempt something to justify
it. Eleang refused to ratify the convention signed by Keshen,
and, on February 25, the English commander ordered an
attack on the inner line of forts which guarded the ap-
proaches to Canton. After a brief engagement, the really
formidable lines of Anunghoy, with 200 guns in position,
were carried at a nominal loss. The many other positions of
the Chinese, up to Whampoa, were occupied in succession ;
and on March 1 the English squadron drew up off Howqua's
Folly, in Whampoa Reach, at the very gateway of Canton.
On the following day the dashing Sir Hugh Gough arrived
to take the supreme direction of the English forces. After
these further reverses, the Chinese again begged a suspen-
sion of hostilities, and an armistice for a few days was
granted. The local authorities were on the horns of a
dilemma. They saw the futility of a struggle with the
English, and the Cantonese had to bear all the suffering
for the obstinacy of the Pekin government ; but, on the other
hand, no one dared to propose concession to Taoukwang,
who, confident of his power, and ignorant of the extent of
his misfortunes, breathed nothing but defiance. After a fe\v
days' delay, it became clear that the Cantonese had neither
the will nor the power to conclude a definite arrangement,
and consequently their city was attacked with as much for-
bearance as possible. The fort called Dutch Folly was <
tured, and the outer line of defenses was taken possession
of, but no attempt was made to occupy the city itself. Sir
Hugh Grough stated, in a public notice, that the city was
spared because the queen had desired that all peaceful people
should be tenderly considered. The first English successes
had entailed the disgrace of Lin, the second were not k-ss
fatal to Keshen. Keshen was arraigned before the Board
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 291
at Pekin, his valuable property was escheated to the crown,
and he himself sentenced to decapitation, which was com-
muted to banishment to Tibet, where he succeeded in amass-
ing a fresh fortune. The success of the English was pro-
claimed by the merchants re-occupying their factories on
March 18, 1841, exactly two years after Lin's first fiery edict
against opium. It was a strange feature in this struggle
that the instant they did so the Chinese merchants resumed
trade with undiminshed ardor and cordiality. The officials
even showed an inclination to follow their example, when
they learned that Taoukwang refused to listen to any con-
clusive peace, and that his policy was still one of expelling
the foreigners. To carry out his views, the emperor sent a
new commission of three members to Canton, and it was
their studious avoidance of all communication with the En-
glish authorities that again aroused suspicion as to the Chi-
nese not being sincere in their assent to the convention which
had saved Canton from an English occupation. Taoukwang
was ignorant of the success of his enemy, and his commis-
sioners, sent to achieve what Lin and Keshen had failed to
do, were fully resolved not to recognize the position which
the English had obtained by force of arms, or to admit that
it was likely to prove enduring. This confidence was in-
creased by the continuous arrival of fresh troops, until at
last there were 50,000 men in the neighborhood of Canton,
and all seemed ready to tempt the fortune of war again, and
to make another effort to expel the hated foreigner. The
measure of Taoukwang 's animosity may be taken by his
threatening to punish with death any one who suggested
making peace with the barbarians.
While the merchants were actively engaged in their com-
mercial operations, and the English officers in conducting
negotiations with a functionary who had no authority, and
who was only put forward to amuse them, the Chinese were
busily employed in completing their warlike preparations,
which at the same time they kept as secret as possible, in
the hope of taking the English by surprise. But it was
A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
impossible for such extensive preparations to be made with-
out their creating some stir, and the standing aloof of the
commissioners was in itself ground of suspicion. Suspicion
became certainty when, on Captain Elliot paying a visit to
the prefect in the city, he was received in a disrespectful
manner by the mandarins and insulted in the streets by the
crowd. He at once acquainted Sir Hugh Gough, who was
at Hongkong, with the occurrence, and issued a notice, on
May 21, 1841, advising all foreigners to leave Canton that
day. This notice was not a day too soon, for, during the
night, the Chinese made a desperate attempt to carry out
their scheme. The batteries which they had secretly erected
at various points in the city and along the river banks began
to bombard the factories and the ships at the same time that
fire-rafts were sent against the latter in the hope of causing
a conflagration. Fortunately the Chinese were completely
baffled, with heavy loss to themselves and none to the En-
glish; and during the following day the English assumed
the offensive, and with such effect that all the Chinese bat-
teries were destroyed, together with forty war- junks. The
only exploit on which the Chinese could compliment them-
selves was that they had sacked and gutted the English
factory. This incident made it clearer than ever that the
Chinese government would only be amenable to force, and
that it was absolutely necessary to inflict some weighty pun-
ishment on the Chinese leaders at Canton, who had made so
bad a return for the moderation shown them and their city,
and who had evidently no intention of complying with the
arrangement to which they had been a party.
Sir Hugh Gough arrived at Canton with all his forces on
May 24, and on the following morning the attack commenced
with the advance of the fleet up the Macao passage, and with
the landing of bodies of troops at different points which ap-
peared well suited for turning the Chinese position and
attacking the gates of Canton. The Chinese did not molest
the troops in landing, which was fortunate, as the operation
proved exceedingly difficult and occupied more than a whole
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 293
day. The Chinese had taken up a strong position on the
hills lying north of the city, and they showed considerable
judgment in their selection, and no small skill in strengthen-
ing their ground by a line of forts. The Chinese were said
to be full of confidence in their ability to reverse the previous
fortune of the war, and they fought with considerable con-
fidence, while the turbulent Cantonese populace waited im-
patiently on the walls to take advantage of the first symptoms
of defeat among the English troops. The English army,
divided into two columns of nearly 2,000 men each, with
a strong artillery force of seven guns, four howitzers, five
mortars, and fifty-two rockets, advanced on the Chinese
intrenchments across paddy fields, rendered more difficult
of passage by numerous burial-grounds. The obstacles were
considerable and the progress was slow, but the Chinese did
not attempt any opposition. Then the battle began with the
bombardment of the Chinese lines, and after an hour it
seemed as if the Chinese had had enough of this and were
preparing for flight, when a general advance was ordered.
But the Chinese thought better of their intention or their
movement was misunderstood, for when the English streamed
up the hill to attack them they stood to their guns and pre-
sented a brave front. Three of their forts were carried with
little or no loss, but at the fourth they offered a stubborn if
ill-directed resistance. Even then the engagement was not
over, for the Chinese rallied in an intrenched camp one mile
in the rear of the forts, and, rendered confident by their
numbers, they resolved to make a fresh stand, and hurled
defiance at the foreigners. The English troops never halted,
in their advance, and, led by the 18th or Royal Irish, they
carried the intrenchment at a rush and put the whole Chi-
nese army to flight. The English lost seventy killed and
wounded, the Chinese losses were never accurately known.
It was arranged that Canton was to be stormed on the fol-
lowing day, but a terrific hurricane and deluge of rain pre-
vented all military movements on May 26, and, as it proved,
saved the city from attack. Once more Chinese diplomacy
294 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
came to the relief of Chinese arms. To save Canton the
mandarins were quite prepared to make every concession,
if they only attached a temporary significance to their lan-
guage, and they employed the whole of that lucky wet day
in getting round Captain Elliot, who once more allowed
himself to place faith in the promises of the Chinese. The
result of this was seen on the 27th, when, just as Sir Hugh
Gough was giving orders for the assault, he received a
message from Captain Elliot stating that the Chinese had
come to terms and that all hostilities were to be suspended.
The terms the Chinese had agreed to in a few hours were
that the commission erg and all the troops should retire to a
distance of sixty miles from Canton, and that $6,000,000
should be paid "for the use of the English crown."
Five of the $6,000,000 had been handed over to Captain
Elliot, and amicable relations had been established with the
city authorities, when the imperial commissioners, either
alarmed at the penalties their failure entailed, or encouraged
to believe in the renewed chances of success from the impo-
tence into which the English troops might have sunk, made
a sudden attempt to surprise Sir Hugh Gough's camp and
to retrieve a succession of disasters at a single stroke. The
project was not without a chance of success, but it required
prompt action and no hesitation in coming to close quarters
the two qualifications in which the Chinese were most
deficient. So it was on this occasion. Ten or fifteen thou-
sand Chinese braves suddenly appeared on the hills about
two miles north of the English camp; but instead of seizing
the opportunity created by the surprise at their sudden ap-
pearance and at the breach of armistice, and delivering home
their attack, they merely waved their banners and uttered
threats of defiance. They stood their ground for some time
in face of the rifle and artillery fire opened upon them, and
then they kept up a sort of running fight for three miles as
they were pursued by the English. They did not suffer any
serious loss, and when the English troops retired in conse-
quence of a heavy storm they became in turn the pursuers
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 295
and inflicted a few casualties. The advantages they obtained
were due to the terrific weather more than to their courage,
but one party of Madras sepoys lost its way, and was sur-
rounded by so overwhelming a number of Chinese that they
would have been annihilated but that their absence was fort-
unately discovered and a rescuing party of marines, armed
with the new percussion gun, which was to a great degree
secure against the weather, went out to their assistance.
They found the sepoys, under their two English officers,
drawn up in a square firing as best they could and presenting
a bold front to the foe "many of the sepoys, after extract-
ing the wet cartridge very deliberately, tore their pocket
handkerchiefs or lining from their turbans and, baling water
with their hands into the barrel of their pieces, washed and
dried them, thus enabling them to fire an occasional volley."
Out of sixty sepoys one was killed and fourteen wounded.
After this Sir Hugh Gough threatened to bombard Canton
if there were any more attacks on his camp, and they at once
ceased, and when the whole of the indemnity was paid the
English troops were withdrawn, leaving Canton as it was,
for a second time "a record of British magnanimity and
forbearance."
After this trade reverted to its former footing, and by
the Canton convention, signed by the imperial commission-
ers in July, 1841, the English obtained all the privileges
they could hope for from the local authorities. But it was
essentially a truce, not a treaty, and the great point of direct
intercourse with the central government was no nearer set-
tlement than ever. At this moment Sir Henry Pottinger
arrived as Plenipotentiary from England, and he at once set
himself to obtaining a formal recognition from the Pekin
executive of his position and the admission of his right to
address them on diplomatic business. With the view of
pressing this matter on the attention of Taoukwang, who
personally had not deviated from his original attitude of em-
phatic hostility, Sir Henry Pottinger sailed northward with
the fleet and a large portion of the land forces about the end
296 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
of August. The important seaport of Amoy was attacked
and taken after what was called "a short but animated re-
sistance." This town is situated on an island, the largest
of a group lying at the entrance to the estuary of Lung-
kiang, and it has long been famous as a convenient port and
flourishing place of trade. The Chinese had raised a ram-
part of 1, 100 yards in length, and this they had armed with
ninety guns, while a battery of forty-two guns protected ite
flank. Kulangsu was also fortified, and the Chinese had
placed in all 500 guns in position. They believed in the
impregnability of Amoy, and it was allowed that no incon-
siderable skill as well as great expense had been devoted to
the strengthening of the place. When the English fleet ar-
rived off the port the Chinese sent a flag of truce to demand
what it wanted, and they were informed the surrender of
the town. The necessity for this measure would be hard
to justify, especially as we were nominally at peace with
China, for the people of Amoy had inflicted no injurj r on
our trade, and their chastisement would not bring us any
nearer to Pekin. Nor was the occupation of Amoy neces-
sary on military grounds. It was strong only for itself, and
its capture had no important consequences. As the Chinese
determined to resist the English, the fleet engaged the bat-
teries, and the Chinese, standing to their guns "right man-
fulty," only abandoned their position when they found their
rear threatened by a landing party. Then, after a faint
resistance, the Chinese sought safety in flight, but some of
their officers, preferring death to dishonor, committed sui-
cide, one of them being seen to walk calmly into the sea
and drown himself in face of both armies. The capture of
Amoy followed.
As the authorities at Amoy refused to hold any inter-
course with the English, the achievement remained barren
of any useful consequence, and after leaving a small garri-
son on Kulangsu, and three warships in the roadstead, the
English expedition continued its northern course. After be-
ing scattered by a storm in the perilous Formosa channel,
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 297
the fleet reunited off Ningpo, whence it proceeded to attack
Chusan for a second time. The Chinese defended Tinghai,
the capital, with great resolution. At this place General
Keo, the chief naval and military commander, was killed,
and all his officers, sticking to him to the last, also fell with
him. Their conduct in fact was noble ; nothing could have
surpassed it. On the reoccupation of Chusan, which it was
decided to retain until a formal treaty had been concluded
with the emperor, Sir Henry Pottinger issued a proclama-
tion to the effect that years might elapse before that place
would be restored to the emperor's authority, and many
persons wished that it should be permanently annexed as
the best base for commercial operations in China. A gar-
rison of 400 men was left at Tinghai, and then the expedi-
tion proceeded to attack Chinhai on the mainland, where
the Chinese had made every preparation to offer a strenuous
resistance. The Chinese suffered the most signal defeat and
the greatest loss they had yet incurred during the war. The
victory at Chinhai was followed by the unopposed occupa-
tion of the important city of Ningpo, where the inhabitants
shut themselves up in their houses, and wrote on their doors
"Submissive People." Ningpo was put to ransom and the
authorities informed that unless they paid the sum within
a certain time their city would be handed over to pillage
and destruction. As the Pekin government had made no
sign of giving in, it was felt that no occasion ought to be
lost of overawing the Chinese, and compelling them to ad-
mit that any further prolongation of the struggle would be
hopeless. The arrival of further troops and warships from
Europe enabled the English commanders to adopt a more
determined and uncompromising attitude, and the capture
of Ningpo would have been followed up at once but for the
disastrous events in Afghanistan, which distracted attention
from the Chinese question, and delayed its settlement. It
was hoped, however, that the continued occupation of Amoy,
Chusan and Ningpo would cause sufficient pressure on the
Pekin government to induce it to yield all that was demanded.
A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
These anticipations were not fulfilled, for neither the swift-
recurring visitation of disaster nor the waning resources of
the imperial government in both men and treasure, could
shake the fixed hostility of Taoukwang or induce him to
abate his proud pretensions. Minister after minister passed
into disgrace and exile. Misfortune shared the same fate
as incompetence, and the more the embarrassments of the
state increased the heavier fell the hand of the ruler and the
verdict of the Board of Punishments upon beaten generals
and unsuccessful statesmen. The period of inaction which
followed the occupation of Ningpo no doubt encouraged the
emperor to think that the foreigners were exhausted, or that
they had reached the end of their successes, and he ordered
increased efforts to be made to bring up troops, and to
strengthen the approaches to Pekin. The first proof of
his returning spirit was shown in March, 1842, when the
Chinese attempted to seize Ningpo by a coup de main. Sud-
denly, and without warning, a force of between ten and
twelve thousand men appeared at daybreak outside the south
and west gates of Ningpo, and many of them succeeded in
making their way over the walls and gaining the center of
the town ; but, instead of proving the path to victory, this
advance resulted in the complete overthrow of the Chinese.
Attacked by artillery and foot in the market-place they were
almost annihilated, and the great Chinese attack on Ningpo
resulted in a fiasco. Similar but less vigorous attacks were
made about the same time on Chinhai and Chusan, but they
were both repulsed with heavy loss to the Chinese. In con-
sequence of these attacks and the improved position hi Af-
ghanistan it was decided to again assume the offensive, and
to break up the hostile army at Hangchow, of which the
body that attacked Ningpo was the advanced guard. Sir
Hugh Gough commanded the operations in person, and he
had the co-operation of a naval force under Sir William
Parker. The first action took place outside Tszeki, a small
place ten miles from Ningpo, where the Chinese fancied
they occupied an exceedingly strong position. But careful
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR.
inspection showed it to be radically faulty. Their lines cov-
ered part of the Segaou hills, but their left was commanded
by some higher hills on the right of the English position,
and the Chinese left again commanded their own right. It
was evident, therefore, that the capture of the left wing of
the Chinese encampment would entail the surrender or
evacuation of the rest. The difficulties of the ground caused
a greater delay in the advance than had been expected, and
the assault had to be delivered along the whole line, as it
was becoming obvious that the Chinese were growing more
confident, and, consequently, more to be feared from the
delay in attacking them. The assault was made with the
impetuosity good troops always show in attacking inferior
ones, no matter how great the disparity of numbers; and
here the Chinese were driven out of their position although
they stood their ground in a creditable manner and chased
over the hills down to the rice fields below. The Chinese
loss was over a thousand killed, including many of the Im-
perial Guard, of whom 500 were present, and whom Sir
Hugh Gough described as "remarkably fine men," while
the English had six killed and thirty -seven wounded. For
the moment it was intended to follow up this victory by an
attack on the city of Hangchow, the famous Kincsay of
medieval travelers; but the arrival of fresh instructions
gave a complete turn to the whole war.
Little permanent good had been effected by these suc-
cessful operations on the coast, and Taoukwang was still as
resolute as ever in his hostility ; nor is there any reason to
suppose that the capture of Hangchow, or any other of the
coast towns, would have caused a material change in the
situation. The credit of initiating the policy which brought
the Chinese government to its knees belongs exclusively to
Lord Ellenborough, then governor-general of India. He
detected the futility of operations along the coast, and he
suggested that the great waterway of the Yangtsekiang,
perfectly navigable for warships up to the immediate neigh-
borhood of Nankin, provided the means of coercing the Chi-
800 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
nese, and effecting the objects which the English Gov-
ernment had in view. The English expedition, strongly
re-enforced from India, then abandoned Ningpo and Chin-
hai, and, proceeding north, began the final operations of the
war with an attack on Chapoo, where the Chinese had made
extensive measures of defense. Chapoo was the port ap-
pointed for trade with Japan, and the Chinese had collected
there a very considerable force from the levies of Chekiang,
which ex-Commissioner Lin had been largely instrumental
in raising. Sir Hugh Gough attacked Chapoo with 2,000
men, and the main body of the Chinese was routed without
much difficulty, but 300 desperate men shut themselves up
in a walled inclosure, and made an obstinate resistance.
They held out until three-fourths of them were slain, when
the survivors, seventy-five wounded men, accepted the quar-
ter offered them from the first. The English lost ten killed
and fifty-five wounded, and the Chinese more than a thou-
sand. After this the expedition proceeded northward for
the Great River, and it was found necessary to attack "Woo-
sung, the port of Shanghai, en route. This place was also
strongly fortified with as many as 175 guns in position, but
the chief difficulty in attacking it lay in that of approach,
as the channel had first to be sounded, and then the sailing
ships towed into position by the steamers. Twelve vessels
were in this manner placed broadside to the batteries on
land, a position which obviously they could not have main-
tained against a force of anything like equal strength; but
they succeeded in silencing the Chinese batteries with com-
paratively little loss, and then the English army was landed
without opposition. Shanghai is situated sixteen miles up
the Woosung River, and while part of the force proceeded up
the river another marched overland. Both columns arrived
together, and the disheartened Chinese evacuated Shanghai
after firing one or two random shots. No attempt was
made to retain Shanghai, and the expedition re-embarked,
and proceeded to attack Chankiang or Chinkiangfoo, a town
on the southern bank of the Yangtsekiang, and at the north-
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 301
era entrance of the southern branch of the Great Canal.
This town has always been a place of great celebrity, both
strategically and commercially, for not merely does it hold
a very strong position with regard to the Canal, but it forms,
with the Golden and Silver Islands, the principal barrier in
the path of those attempting to reach Nankin. At this
point Sir Hugh Gough was re-enforced by the 98th Regi-
ment, under Colonel Colin Campbell. The difficulties of
navigation and the size of the fleet, which now reached
seventy vessels, caused a delay in the operations, and it
was not until the latter end of July, or more than a month
after the occupation of Shanghai, that the English reached
Chinkiangfoo, where, strangely enough, there seemed to be
no military preparations whatever. A careful reconnais-
sance revealed the presence of three strong encampments at
some distance from the town, and the first operation was to
carry them, and to prevent their garrisons joining such
forces as might still remain in the city. This attack was
intrusted to Lord Saltoun's brigade, which was composed of
two Scotch "regiments and portions of two native regiments,
with only three guns. The opposition was almost insignifi-
cant, and the three camps were carried with comparatively
little loss and their garrisons scattered in all directions. At
the same time the remainder of the force assaulted the city,
which was surrounded by a high wall and a deep moat.
Some delay was caused by these obstacles, but at last the
western gate was blown in by Captain Pears, of the Engi-
neers, and at the same moment the walls were escaladed at
two different points, and the English troops, streaming in on
three sides, fairly surrounded a considerable portion of the
garrison, who retired into a detached work, where they per-
ished to the last man either by our fire or in the flames of
the houses which were ignited partly by themselves and
partly by the fire of our soldiers. The resistance did not
stop here, for the Tartar or inner city was resolutely de-
fended by the Manchus, and owing to the intense heat the
Europeans would have been glad of a rest ; but, as the Man-
A SHOR7 HISTORY OF CHIXA.
chus kept up a galling fire, Sir Hugh Gough felt bound to
order an immediate assault before the enemy grew too dar-
ing. The fight was renewed, and the Tartars were driven
back at all points ; but the English troops were so exhausted
that they could not press home this advantage. The inter-
val thus gained was employed by the Manchus, not in mak-
ing good their escape, but in securing their military honor
by first massacring their women and children, and then
committing suicide. It must be remembered that these were
not Chinese, but Manchu Tartars of the dominant race.
The losses of the English army at this battle 40 killed,
and 130 wounded were heavy, and they were increased by
several deaths caused by the heat and exhaustion of the day.
The Chinese, or rather the Tartars, never fought better, and
it appears from a document discovered afterward that if
Hailing's recommendations had been followed, and if he had
been properly supported, the capture of Chinkiangfoo would
have been even more difficult and costly than it proved.
Some delay at Chinkiangfoo was rendered necessary by
the exhaustion of the troops and by the number of sick and
wounded ; but a week after the capture of that place in the
manner described the arrangements for the further advance
on Nankin were completed. A small garrison was left in an
encampment on a height commanding the entrance to the
Canal; but there was little reason to apprehend any fresh
attack, as the lesson of Chinkiangfoo had been a terrible
one. That city lay beneath the English camp like a vast
charnel house, its half -burned buildings filled with the self-
immolated Tartars who had preferred honor to life ; and so
thickly strewn were these and so intense the heat that the
days passed away without the ability to give them burial,
until at last it became absolutely impossible to render the
last kind office to a gallant foe. Despite the greatest pre-
cautions of the English authorities, Chinkiangfoo became
the source of pestilence, and an outbreak of cholera caused
more serious loss in the English camp than befell the main
force intrusted with the capture of Nankin. Contrary winds
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 303
delayed the progress of the English fleet, and it was not un-
til the fifth of August, more than a fortnight after the battle
at Chinkiangfoo, that it appeared off Nankin, the second
city in reputation and historical importance of the empire,
with one million inhabitants and a garrison of 15,000 men,
of whom two-thirds were Manchus. The walls were twenty
miles in length, and hindered, more than they promoted,
an efficient defense; and the difficulties of the surrounding
country, covered with the debris of the buildings which con-
stituted the larger cities of Nankin at an earlier period of
history, helped, the assailing party more than they did the
defenders. Sir Hugh Gough drew up an admirable plan for
capturing this vast and not defenseless city with his force of
5,000 men, and there is no reason to doubt that he would
have been completely successful ; but by this the backbone
of the Chinese government had been broken, and even the
proud and obstinate Taoukwang was compelled to admit that
it was imperative to come to terms with the English, and to
make some concessions in order to get rid of them.
The minister Elepoo, who once enjoyed the closest inti-
macy with Taoukwang, and who was the leader of the
Peace party, which desired the cessation of an unequal
struggle, had begun informal negotiations several months
before they proved successful at Nankin. He omitted no
opportunity of learning the views of the English officers, and
what was the minimum of concession on which a stable
peace could be based. He had endeavored also to give
something of a generous character to the struggle, and he
had more than once proved himself a courteous as well as
a gallant foe. After the capture of Chapoo and Woosung
he sent back several officers and men who had at different
times been taken prisoners by the Chinese, and he expressed
at the same time the desire that the war should end. Sir
Henry Pottinger's reply to this letter was to inquire if he
was empowered by the emperor to negotiate. If he had
received this authority the English plenipotentiary would
be very happy to discuss any matter with Him^ but if not
304 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the operations of war must proceed. At that moment Ele-
poo had not the requisite authority to negotiate, and the war
went on until the victorious English troops were beneath the
walls of Nankin. At the same tune as these pourparlers
were held with Elepoo at Woosung, Sir Henry Pottinger
issued a proclamation to the Chinese stating what the Brit-
ish Government required to be done. In this document the
equality of all nations as members of the same human fam-
ily was pointed out, and the right to hold friendly inter-
course insisted on as a matter of duty and common obliga-
tion. Sir Henry said that "England, coming from the
utmost west, has held intercourse with China in this utmost
east for more than two centuries past, and during this time
the English have suffered ill-treatment from the Chinese
officials, who, regarding themselves as powerful and us as
weak, have thus dared to commit injustice." Then followed
a list of the many high-handed acts of Commissioner Lin
and his successors. The Chinese, plainly speaking, had
sought to maintain their exclusiveness and to live outside
the comity of nations, and they had not the power to attain
their wish. Therefore they were compelled to listen to and
to accept the terms of the English plenipotentiary, which
were as follows : The emperor was first of all to appoint a
high officer with full powers to negotiate and conclude ar-
rangements on his own responsibility, when hostilities would
be suspended. The three principal points on which these
negotiations were to be based were compensation for losses
and expenses, a friendly and becoming intercourse on terms
of equality between officers of the two countries, and the
cession of insular territory for commerce and for the
dence of merchants, and as a security and guarantee against
the future renewal of offensive acts. The first step toward
the acceptance of these terms was taken when an imperial
commission was formed of three members, Keying, Elepoo,
and Niu Kien, viceroy of the Two Kiang; and to the last
named, as governor of the provinces most affected, fell the
task of writing the first diplomatic communication of a satis-
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 305
factory character from the Chinese government to the En-
glish plenipotentiary. This letter was important for more
reasons than its being of a conciliatory nature. It held out
to a certain extent a hand of friendship, and it also sought
to assign an origin to the conflict, and Niu Kien could find
nothing more handy or convenient than opium, which thus
came to give its name to the whole war. With regard to
the Chinese reverses, Niu Kien, while admitting them, ex-
plained that "as the central nation had enjoyed peace for a
long time the Chinese were not prepared for attacking and
fighting, which had led to this accumulation of insult and
disgrace." In a later communication Niu Kien admitted
that "the English at Canton had been exposed to insults
and extortions for a series of years, and that steps should be
taken to insure in future that the people of your honorable
nation might carry on their commerce to advantage, and not
receive injury thereby." These documents showed that the
Chinese were at last willing to abandon the old and impos-
sible principle of superiority over other nations, for which
they had so long contended; and with the withdrawal of
this pretension negotiations for the conclusion of a stable
peace became at once possible and of hopeful augury.
The first step of the Chinese commissioners was to draw
up a memorial for presentation to the emperor, asking his
sanction of the arrangement they suggested. In this docu-
ment they covered the whole ground of the dispute, aud
stated in clear and unmistakable language what the English
demanded, and they did not shrink from recommending
compliance with their terms. Keying and his colleagues
put the only two alternatives with great cogency. Which
will be the heavier calamity, they said, to pay the English
the sum of money they demand (21,000,000 dollars, made
up as follows: Six million for the destroyed opium, 3,000,000
for the debts of the Hong merchants, and 12,000,000 for the
expenses of the war), or that they should continue those
military operations which seemed irresistible, and from
which China had suffered so grievously? Even if the lat-
306 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
ter alternative were faced and the war continued, the evil
day would only be put off. The army expenses would be
very great, the indemnity would be increased in amount,
and after all there would be only "the name of fighting
without the hope of victory." Similar arguments were used
with regard to the cession of Hongkong, and the right of
trading at five of the principal ports. The English no doubt
demanded more than they ought, but what was the use of
arguing with them, as they were masters of the situation?
Moreover, some solace might be gathered in the midst of
affliction from the fact that the English were willing to pay
certain duties on their commerce which would in the end
repay the war indemnity, and contribute to "the expenditure
of the imperial family." With regard to the question of
ceremonial intercourse on a footing of equality, they de-
clared that it might be "unreservedly granted." The reply
of Taoukwang to this memorial was given in an edict of
considerable length, and he therein assented to all the views
and suggestions of the commissioners, while he imposed on
Keying alone the responsibility of making all the arrange-
ments for paying the large indemnity. All the preliminaries
for signing a treaty of peace had therefore been arranged
before the English forces reached Nankin, and as the Chi-
nese commissioners were sincere in their desire for peace,
and as the emperor had sanctioned all the necessary ar-
rangements, there was no reason to apprehend any delay,
and much less a breakdown of the negotiations.
It was arranged that the treaty should be signed on
board a British man-of-war, and the Chinese commissioners
were invited to pay a visit for the purpose to the "Corn-
wallis," the flagship of the admiral. The event came off
on the 20fch of August, 1842, and the scene was sufficiently
interesting, if not imposing. The long line of English war-
ships and transports, drawn up opposite to and within short
range of the lofty walls of Nankin ; the land forces so dis-
posed on the raised causeways on shore as to give them
every facility of approach to the city gates, while leaving
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 307
it doubtful to the last which gate would be the real object
of attack ; and then the six small Chinese boats, gayly dec-
orated with flags, bearing the imperial commissioners and
their attendants, to sign for the first time in history a treaty
of defeat with a foreign power. The commissioners were
dressed in their plainest clothes, as they explained, because
imperial commissioners are supposed to proceed in haste
about their business, and have no time to waste on their
persons, but there is reason to believe that they thought
such clothing best consorted with the inauspicious charac-
ter for China of the occasion. The ceremony passed off
without a hitch, and four days later Sir Henry Pottinger
paid the Chinese officers a return visit, when he was re-
ceived by them in a temple outside the city walls. A third
and more formal reception was held on the 26th of August
in the College Hall, in the center of Nankin, when Sir
Henry Pottinger, twenty officers, and an escort of native
cavalry rode through the streets of one of the most famous
cities of China. It was noted at the time that on this date
an event of great importance had happened in each of the
three previous years. On the 26th of August, 1839, Lin
had expelled the English from Macao, in 1840 the British
fleet anchored off the Peiho, and in 1841 Amoy was cap-
tured. Three days after this reception the treaty itself was
signed on board the "Cornwallis," when Keying and his
colleagues again attended for the purpose. The act of sign-
ing was celebrated by a royal salute of twenty one guns,
and the hoisting of the standards of England and China at
the masthead of the man-of-war. The Emperor Taouk-
wang ratified the treaty with commendable dispatch, and
the only incident to mar the cordiality of the last scene in
this part of the story of Anglo-Chinese relations was the
barbarous and inexcusable injury inflicted by a party of
English officers and soldiers on the famous Porcelain Tower,
which was one of the finest specimens of Chinese art, hav-
ing been built 400 years before at great expense and the
labor of twenty years.
308 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
The ports in addition to Canton to be opened to trade
were Shanghai, Ningpo, Amoy and Foochow, but these
were not to be opened until a tariff had been drawn up
and consular officers appointed. As the installments of
the indemnity were paid the troops and fleet were with-
drawn, but a garrison was left for some time in Chusan
and Kulangsu, the island off Amoy. The attack and mas-
sacre of some shipwrecked crews on the coast of Formosa
gave the Chinese government an occasion of showing how
marked a change had come over its policy. An investiga-
tion was at once ordered, the guilty officials were punished,
and the emperor declared, "We will not allow that, because
the representation came from outside foreigners, it should
be carelessly cast aside without investigation. Our own
subjects and foreigners, ministers and people, should all
<ilike understand that it is our high desire to act with even-
handed and perfect justice." Sir Henry Pottinger's task
was only half performed until he had drawn up the tariff
and installed consular officers in the new treaty ports.
Elepoo was appointed to represent China in the tariff nego-
tiations, and Canton was selected as the most convenient
place for discussing the matter. Within two months of the
resumption of negotiations they seemed on the point of a
satisfactory termination, when the death of Elepoo, the
most sincere and straightforward of all the Chinese offi-
cials, caused a delay in the matter. Elepoo was a member
of the Manchu imperial family, being descended from one
of the brothers of Yung Ching, who had been banished by
that ruler and reinstated by Keen Lung. That the Pekin
government did not wish to make his death an excuse for
backing out of the arrangement was shown by the prompt
appointment of Keying as his successor. At this stage of
the question the opium difficulty again rose up as of the first
importance in reference to the settlement of the commercial
tariff. The main point was whether opium was to appear
in the tariff at all or to be relegated to the category of con-
traband articles. Sir Henry Pottinger disclaimed all sym-
THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR. 309
pathy with the traffic, and was quite willing that it should
be declared illicit ; but at the same time he stated that the
responsibility of putting it down must rest with the Chinese
themselves. The Chinese were not willing to accept this
responsibility, and said that "if the supervision of the En-
glish representatives was not perfect, there will be less or
more of smuggling." Keying paid Sir Henry Pottinger a
ceremonious visit at Hongkong on the 26th of June, 1843,
and within one month of that day the commercial treaty
was signed. Sir Henry issued a public proclamation calling
upon British subjects to faithfully conform with its provis-
ions, and stating that he would adopt the most stringent
and decided measures against any offending persons. On
his side Keying published a notification that "trade at the
five treaty ports was open to the men. from afar." The
only weak point in the commercial treaty was that it con-
tained no reference to opium. Sir Henry Pottinger failed
to obtain the assent of the Chinese government to its legali-
zation, and he refused to undertake the responsibility of a
preventive service in China, but at the same time he pub-
licly stated that the "traffic in opium was illegal and con-
traband by the laws and imperial edicts of China." Those
who looked further ahead realized that the treaty of Nankin,
by leaving unsettled the main point in the controversy and
the primary cause of difference, could not be considered a
final solution of the problem of foreign intercourse with
China. The opium question remained over to again dis-
turb the harmony of our relations.
As has been said before, it would be taking a narrow
view of the question to affirm that opium was the principal
object at stake during this war. The real point was whether
the Chinese government could be allowed the possession of
rights which were unrecognized in the law of nations and
which rendered the continuance of intercourse with foreign-
ers an impossibility. What China sought to retain was never
claimed by any other nation, and could only have been estab-
lished by extraordinary military power. When people talk,
310 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
therefore, of the injustice of this war as another instance of
the triumph of might over right, they should recollect that
China in the first place was wrong in claiming an impossible
position in the family of nations. We cannot doubt that if
the acts of Commissioner Lin had been condoned the lives
of all Europeans would have been at the mercy of a system
which recognizes no gradation in crime, which affords many
facilities for the manufacture of false evidence, and which
inflicts punishment altogether in excess of the fault. It is
gratifying to find that many unprejudiced persons declared
at the time that the war which resulted in the Nankin treaty
was a just one, and so eminent an authority on international
law as John Quincy Adams drew up an elaborate treatise to
show that "Britain had the righteous cause against China."
"We may leave the scene of contest and turn from the record
of an unequal war with the reflection that the results of the
struggle were to be good. However inadequately the work
of far-seeing statesmanship may have been performed in
1842, enough was done to make present friendship possible
and a better understanding between two great governing
peoples a matter of hope and not desponding expectancy.
CHAPTER XVIII
TAOUKWANQ AND HIS SUCCESSOR
THE progress and temporary settlement of the foreign
question so completely overshadows every other event during
Taoukwang's reign that it is difficult to extract anything of
interest from the records of the government of the country,
although the difficult and multifarious task of ruling three
hundred millions of people had to be performed. More than
one fact went to show that the bonds of constituted authority
were loosened in China, and that men paid only a qualified
respect to the imperial edict. Bands of robbers prowled
about the country, and even the capital was not free from
TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 311
their presence. "While one band made its headquarters
within the imperial city, another established itself in a
fortified position in the central provinces of China, whence
it dominated a vast region. The police were helpless, and
such military forces as existed were unable to make any
serious attempt to crush an opponent who was stronger than
themselves. The foreign war had led to the recruiting of a
large number of braves, and the peace to their sudden dis-
bandment, so that the country was covered with a large
number of desperate and penniless men, who were not
particular as to what they did for a livelihood. It is not
surprising that the secret societies began to look up again
with so promising a field to work in, and a new association,
known as the Green Water Lily, became extremely formidable
among the truculent braves of Hoonan. But none of these
troubles assumed the extreme form of danger in open rebel-
lion, and there was still wanting the man to weld all these
hostile and dangerous elements into a national party of in-
surgents against Manchu authority, and so it remained until
Taoukwang had given up his throne to his successor.
In Yunnan there occurred, about the year 1846, the first
simmerings of disaffection among the Mohammedans, which
many years later developed into the Panthay Rebellion, but
on that occasion the vigor of the viceroy nipped the danger
in the bud. In Central Asia there was a revival of activity
on the part of the Khoja exiles, who fancied that the dis-
comfiture of the Chinese by the English and the internal
disorders, of which rumor had no doubt carried an exag-
gerated account into Turkestan, would entail a very much
diminished authority in Kashgar. As it happened, the Chi-
nese authority in that region had been consolidated and ex-
tended by the energy and ability of a Mohammedan official
named Zuhuruddin. He had risen to power by the thorough-
ness with which he had carried out the severe repressive
measures sanctioned after the abortive invasion of Jehan-
gir, and during fifteen years he increased the revenue and
trade of the great province intrusted to his care. His loy-
312 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
alty to the Chinese government seems to have been unim-
peachable, and the only point he seems to have erred in was
an overconfident belief in the strength of his position. He
based this opinion chiefly on the fact of his having con-
structed strong new forts, or yangyshahr, outside the prin-
cipal towns. But a new element of danger had in the mean-
time been introduced into the situation in Kashgar by the
appointment of Khokandian consuls, who were empowered
to raise custom dues on all Mohammedan goods. These of-
ficials became the center of intrigue against the Chinese
authorities, and whenever the Khan of Khokand determined
to take up the cause of the Khojas he found the ground
prepared for him by these emissaries.
In 1842 Mahomed Ali, Khan of Khokand, a chief of con-
siderable ability and character, died, and his authority
passed, after some confusion, to his kinsman, Khudayar,
who was a man of little capacity and indisposed to meddle
with the affairs of his neighbors. But the Khokandian
chiefs were loth to forego the turbulent adventures to which
they were addicted for the personal feelings of their nominal
head, and they thought that a descent upon Kashgar of-
fered the best chance of glory and booty. Therefore they
went to the seven sons of Jehangir and, inciting them by
the memory of their father's death as well as the hope of a
profitable adventure, to make another attempt to drive the
Chinese out of Central Asia, succeeded in inducing them to
unfurl once more the standard of the Khojas. The seven
Khojas Haft Khojagan issued their proclamation in the
winter of 1845-46, rallied all their adherents to their side,
and made allies of the Kirghiz tribes.
"When the Mohammedan forces left the hills they ad-
vanced with extreme rapidity on Kashgar, to which they
laid siege. After a siege of a fortnight they obtained pos-
session of the town through the treachery of some of the
inhabitants ; but the citadel or yangyshahr continued to hold
out, and their excesses in the town so alienated the sympathy
of the Kashgarians, that no popular rising took place, and
TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 313
the Chinese were able to collect all their garrisons to expel
the invaders. The Khojas were defeated in a battle at Kok
Robat, near Yarkand, and driven out of the country. The
affair of the seven Khojas, which at one time threatened the
Chinese with the gravest danger, thus ended in a collapse,
and it is remarkable as being the only invasion in which the
Mohammedan subjects of China did no* fraternize with her
enemies. Notwithstanding the magnitude of his services as
an administrator, Zuhuruddin was disgraced and dismissed
from his post for what seemed his culpable apathy at the
beginning of the campaign.
Another indication of the weakness of the Chinese execu-
tive was furnished in the piratic confederacy which estab-
lished itself at the entrance of the Canton River, and defied
all the efforts of the mandarins until they enlisted in their
behalf the powerful co-operation of the English navy. The
Bogue had never been completely free from those lawless
persons who are willing to commit any outrage if it holds
out a certain prospect of gain with a minimum amount of
danger, and the peace had thrown many desperate men out
of employment who thought they could find in piracy a mode
of showing their patriotism as well as of profiting them-
selves. These turbulent and dangerous individuals gathered
round a leader named Shapuntsai, and in the year of which
we are speaking, 1849, they controlled a large fleet and a
well-equipped force, which levied blackmail from Fochow
to the Gulf of Tonquin, and attacked every trading ship,
European or Chinese, which did not appear capable of defend-
ing itself. If they had confined their attacks to their own
countrymen it is impossible to say how long they might have
gone on in impunity, for the empire possessed no naval
power; but, unfortunately for them, and fortunately for
China, they seized some English vessels and murdered some
English subjects. One man-of-war under Captain Hay was
employed in operations against them, aiid in the course of
six months fifty-seven piratical vessels were destroyed, and
a thousand of their crews either slain or taken prisoners.
14
314 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Captain Hay, on being joined by another man-of-war, had
the satisfaction of destroying the remaining junks and the
depots in the Canton River, whereupon he sailed to attack
the headquarters of Shapuntsai in the Gulf of Tonquin.
After some search the piratical fleet was discovered off an
island which still bears the name of the Pirates' Hold, and
after a protracted engagement it was annihilated. Sixty
junks were destroyed, and Shapuntsai was compelled to
escape to Cochin China, where it is believed that he was
executed by order of the king. The dispersion of this pow-
erful confederacy was a timely service to the Chinese, who
were informed that the English government would be at all
times happy to afford similar aid at their request. Even at
this comparatively early stage of the intercourse it was ap-
parent that the long-despised foreigners would be able to
render valuable service of a practical kind to the Pekin
executive, and that if the Manchus wished to assert their
power more effectually over their Chinese subjects they
would be compelled to have recourse to European weapons
and military and scientific knowledge. The suppression of
the piratical confederacy of the Bogue was the first occasion
of that employment of European force, which was carried
to a much more advanced stage during the Taeping re-
bellion, and of which we have certainly not seen the last
development.
One of the last acts of Taoukwang's reign showed to
what a depth of mental hesitation and misery he had sunk.
It seems that the Chinese New Year's day February !>,
1850 was to be marked by an eclipse of the sun, which was
considered very inauspicious, and as the emperor was ee
cially susceptible to superstitious influences, he sought to get
out of the difficulty, and to avert any evil consequences, by
decreeing that the new year should begin on the previous
day. But all-powerful as a Chinese emperor is, there are
some things he cannot do, and the good sense of the Chinese
revolted against this attempt to alter the course of nature.
The imperial decree was completely disregarded, and re-
TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 315
ceived with expressions of derision, and in several towns
the placards were torn down and defaced. Notwithstanding
the eclipse, the Chinese year began at its appointed time.
Some excuse might be made for Taoukwang on the ground
of ill-health, for he was then suffering from the illness which
carried him off a few weeks later. His health had long been
precarious, the troubles of his reign had prematurely aged
him, and he had experienced a rude shock from the death,
at the end of 1849, of his adopted mother, toward whom he
seems to have preserved the most affectionate feelings.
From the first day of his illness its gravity seems to have
been appreciated, and an unfavorable issue expected. On
February 25, a grand council was held in the emperor's
bed-chamber, and the emperor wrote in his bed an edict
proclaiming his fourth son his heir and chosen successor.
Taoukwang survived this important act only a very short
time, but the exact date of his death is uncertain. There
is some reason for thinking that his end was hastened by the
outbreak of a fire within the Imperial City, which threatened
it with destruction. The event was duly notified to the
Chinese people in a proclamation by his successor, in which
he dilated on the virtues of his predecessor, and expressed
the stereotyped wish that he could have lived a hundred
years.
Taoukwang was in his sixty-ninth year, having been born
on September 12, 1781, and the thirty years over which his
reign had nearly extended were among the most eventful,
and in some respects the most unfortunate, in the annals of
his country. When he was a young man, the power of his
grandfather, Keen Lung, was at its pinnacle, but the mis-
fortunes of his father's reign had prepared him for the
greater misfortunes of his own, and the school of adversity
in which he had passed the greater portion of his life had
imbued him only with the disposition to bear calamity, and
not the vigor to grapple with it. Yet Taoukwang was not
without many good points, and he seems to have realized
the extent of the national trouble, and to have felt acutely
316 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
his inability to retrieve what had been lost. He was also
averse to all unnecessary display, and his expenditure on the
court and himself was less than that of any of his predeces-
sors or successors. He never wasted the public money on
his own person, and that was a great matter. His habits
were simple and manly.
Although Taoukwang's reign had been marked by un-
qualified misfortune, he seems to have derived consolation
from the belief that the worst was over, and that as his
authority had recovered from such rude shocks it was not
likely to experience anything worse. He had managed to
extricate himself from a foreign war, which was attended
with an actual invasion of a most alarming character, with-
out any diminution of his authority. The symptoms of in-
ternal rebellion which had revealed themselves in more than
one quarter of the empire had not attained any formidable
dimensions, and seemed likely to pass away without endan-
gering the Chinese constitution. Taoukwang may have
hoped that while he had suffered much he had saved his
family and dynasty from more serious calamities, and that
on him alone had fallen the resentment of an offended
Heaven. The experience of the next fifteen years was to
show how inaccurately he had measured the situation, and
how far the troubles of the fifteen years following his death
were to exceed those of his reign; for just as he had inherited
from his father, Kiaking, a legacy of trouble, so did he pass
on to his son an inheritance of misfortune and difficulty,
rendered all the more onerous by the pretension of supreme
power without the means to support it.
The accession of Prince Yihchoo who took the name
of Hienfung, which means "great abundance," or "complete
prosperity" to the throne threatened for a moment to be
disturbed by the ambition of his uncle, Hwuy Wang, who,
it will be remembered, had attempted to seize the throne
from his brother Taoukwang. This prince had lived in re-
tirement during the last years of his brother's reign, and
the circumstances which emboldened him to again put for-
TAOUKWANO AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 317
ward his pretensions will not be known until the state his-
tory of the Manchu dynasty is published. His attempt
signally failed, but Hienfung spared his life, while he pun-
ished the ministers, Keying and Muchangah, for their
supposed apathy, or secret sympathy with the aspirant to
the imperial office, by dismissing them from their posts.
When Hienfung became emperor he was less than twenty
years of age, and one of his first acts was to confer the title
of Prince on his four younger brothers, and to associate them
in the administration with himself. This was a new depart-
ure in the Manchu policy, as all the previous emperors had
systematically kept their brothers in the background. Hien-
fung' s brothers became known in the order of their ages as
Princes Kung, Shun, Chun, and Fu, and as Hienfung was
the fourth son of Taoukwang, they were also distinguished
numerically as the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth princes.
Although Hienfung became emperor at a time of great na-
tional distress, he was so far fortunate that an abundant
harvest, in the year 1850, tended to mitigate it, and by hav-
ing recourse to the common Chinese practice of "voluntary
contributions," a sufficiently large sum was raised to remove
the worst features of the prevailing scarcity and suffering.
But these temporary and local measures could not improve
a situation that was radically bad, or allay a volume of pop-
ular discontent that was rapidly developing into unconcealed
rebellion.
An imperial proclamation was drawn up by the Hanlin
College in which Hienfung took upon himself the whole
blame of the national misfortunes, but the crisis had got
far beyond a remedy of words. The corruption of the public
service had gradually alienated the sympathies of the people.
Justice and probity had for a time been banished from the
civil service of China. The example of the few men of
honor and capacity served but to bring into more prominent
relief the faults of the whole class. Justice was nowhere to
be found ; the verdict was sold to the highest bidder. The
guilty, if well provided in worldly goods, escaped scot-free;
318 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the poor suffered for their own frailties as well as the crimes
of wealthier offenders. There was seen the far from uncom-
mon case of individuals sentenced to death obtaining substi-
tutes for the capital punishment. Offices were sold to men
who had never passed an examination, and who were wholly
illiterate, and the sole value of office was as the means of
extortion. The nation was heavily taxed, but the taxes to
the state were only the smaller part of the sums wrung from
the people of the Middle Kingdom. How was honor, or a
sense of duty, to be expected from men who knew that their
term of office must be short, and who had to receive their
purchase money and the anticipated profit before their post
was sold again to some fresh and possibly higher bidder?
The officials waxed rich on ill-gotten wealth, and a few in-
dividuals accumulated enormous fortunes, while the govern-
ment sank lower and lower in the estimation of the people.
It lost also in efficiency and striking power. A corrupt and
effeminate body of officers and administrators can serve but
as poor defenders for an embarrassed prince and an assailed
government against even enemies who are in themselves in-
significant and not free from the vices of a corrupt society
and a decaying age, and it was only on such that Hienfung
had in the first place to lean against his opponents. Even
his own Manchus, the warlike Tartars, who, despite the
smallness of their numbers, had conquered the whole of
China, had lost their primitive virtue and warlike efficiency
in the southern climes which they had made their home. To
them the opulent cities of the Chinese had proved as fatal
as Capua to the army of the Carthaginian, and, as the self-
immolations of Chapoo and Chinkiangfoo proved to have no
successors, they showed themselves unworthy of the empire
won by their ancestors. For the first time since the revolt
of Wou Sankwei, the Manchus were brought face to face
with a danger threatening their right of conquest ; yet on
the eve of the Taeping Rebellion all Hienfung could think
of to oppose his foes with was fine woids as to his shortcom-
ings and lavish promises of amendment.
TAOUKWANQ AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 319
Among the secret societies the Triads were the first to
give a political and dynastic significance to their propa-
ganda. The opening sentence of the oath of membership
read as follows: "We combine everywhere to recall the
Ming and exterminate the barbarians, cut off the Tsing
and await the right prince." But as there were none of
the Mings left, and as their name had lost whatever hold
it may have possessed on the minds of the Chinese people,
this proclaimed object tended rather to deter than to invite
recruits to the society. Yet if any secret society shared in
the origination of the Taeping Rebellion that credit belongs
to the Triads, whose anti-Manchu literature enjoyed a wide
circulation through Southern China, and they may have
had a large share in drafting the programme that the
Taeping leader, Tien "Wang, attempted to carry out.
The individual on whom that exalted title was subse-
quently bestowed had a very common origin, and sprang
from an inferior race. Hung-tsiuen, such was his own
name, was the son of a small farmer near Canton, and
he was a hakka, a despised race of tramps who bear some
resemblance to our gypsies. He was born in the year 1813,
and he seems to have passed all his examinations with spe-
cial credit ; but the prejudice on account of his birth pre-
vented his obtaining any employment in the civil service of
bis country. He was therefore a disappointed aspirant to
office, and at such a period it was not surprising that he
should have become an enemy of the constituted authorities
and the government. As he could not be the servant of the
gtate he set himself the ambitious task of being its master,
and with this object in view he resorted to religious practices
in order to acquire a popular reputation, and a following
among the masses. He took up his residence in a Buddhist
monastery: and the ascetic deprivations, the loud prayers
and invocations, the supernatural counsels and meetings,
were the course of training which every religious devotee
adopts as the proper novitiate for those honors based on the
superstitious reverence of mankind which are sometimes no
320 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
inadequate substitute for temporal power and influence, even
when they fail to pave the way to their attainment. He left
his place of seclusion to place himself at the head of the larg-
est party of rebels, who had made their headquarters in the
remote province of Kwangsi, and he there proclaimed him-
self as Tien Wang, which means the Heavenly Prince, and
as an aspirant to the imperial dignity. Gradually the rebels
acquired possession of the whole of the territory south of the
Canton River, and when they captured the strong and im-
portant military station at Nanning the emperor sent three
commissioners, one of them being his principal minister
Saichangah, to bring them to reason, but the result was
not encouraging, and although the Taepings were repulsed
in their attempt on Kweiling, they remained masters of the
open part of the province. One of the Chinese officers had
the courage to write and tell the emperor that "the outlaws
were neither exterminated nor made prisoners." Notwith-
standing the enormous expenditure on the war and the col-
lection of a large body of troops the imperial forces made no
real progress in crushing the rebels. Fear or inexperience
prevented them from coming at once to close quarters with
the Taepings, when their superior numbers must have de-
cided the struggle in their favor and nipped a most formi-
dable rebellion in the bud. That some of Hienf ung's officers
realized the position can be gathered from the following let-
ter, written at this period by a Chinese mandarin: "The
whole country swarms with rebels. Our funds are nearly
at an end, and our troops few ; our officers disagree, and the
power is not concentrated. The commander of the forces
wants to extinguish a burning wagonload of fagots with a
cupful of water. I fear we shall hereafter have some serious
affair that the great body will rise against us, and our own
people leave us." The military operations in Kwangsi lan-
guished during two years, although the tide of war declared
itself, on the whole, against the imperialists; but the rebels
themselves were exposed to this danger that they were ex-
clusively dependent on the resources of the province, and
TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 321
that these being exhausted, they were in danger of being
compelled to retire into Tonquin. It was at this exceed-
ingly critical moment that Tien Wang showed himself an
able leader of men by coming to the momentous decision
to march out of Kwangsi, and invade the vast and yet un-
touched provinces of Central China. If the step was more
the pressure of dire need than the inspiration of genius, it
none the less forms the real turning-point in the rebellion.
Tien Wang announced his decision by issuing a proclama-
tion, in the course of which he declared that he had received
"the Divine commission to exterminate the Manchus, and to
possess the empire as its true sovereign" ; and, BS it was also
at this time that his followers became commonly known as
Taepings, it may be noted that the origin of this name is
somewhat obscure. According to the most plausible ex-
planation it is derived from the small town of that name,
situated in the southwest corner of the province of Kwangsi,
where the rebel movement seems to have commenced. An-
other derivation gives it as the style of the dynasty which
Tien Wang hoped to found, and its meaning as "Universal
peace." Having called in all his outlying detachments and
proclaimed his five principal lieutenants by titles which have
been rendered as the northern, southern, eastern, western
and assistant kings, Tien Wang began his northern march
in April, 1H52. At the town of Yungan, on the eastern
borders of the province of Kwangsi, where he seems to have
hesitated between an attack on Canton and the invasion of
Hoonan, an event occurred which threatened to break up
his force. The Triad chiefs, who had allied themselves with
Tien Wang, were superior in knowledge and station to the
immediate followers of the Taeping leader, and they took
offense at the arrogance of his lieutenants after they had
been elevated to the rank of kings. These officers, who pos-
sessed no claim to the dignity they had received, assumed
the yellow dress and insignia of Chinese royalty, and looked
down on all their comrades, especially the Triad organizers,
who thought themselves the true originators of the rebellion.
322 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Irritated by this treatment, the Triads took their sudden and
secret departure from the Taeping camp, and hastened to
make their peace with the imperialists. Of these Triads one
chief, named Chang Kwoliang, received an important com-
mand, and played a considerable part in the later stages or
the struggle.
The defection of the Triads put an end to the idea of
attacking Canton, and the Taepings marched to attack
Kweiling, where the Imperial Commissioners still remained.
Tien Wang's assault was repulsed with some loss, and, afraid
of discouraging his troops by any further attempt to seize so
strong a place, he marched into Hoonan. Had the imperial
commanders, who had shown no inconsiderable capacity in
defense, exhibited as much energy in offensive measures,
they might then and there have annihilated the power of
the Taepings. Had they pursued the Taeping army they
might have harassed its rear, delayed its progress, and event-
ually brought it to a decisive engagement at th most favor-
able moment. But the Imperial Commissioners did nothing,
being apparently well satisfied with having rid themselves
of such troublesome neighbors. The advance of the Tae-
pings across the vast province of Hoonan was almost un-
opposed. The towns were unprepared to resist an assailant,
and it was not until Tien "Wang reached the provincial capi-
tal, Changsha, that he encountered any resistance worthy
of the name. Some vigorous preparations had been made
here to resist the rebels. Not merely was there a garrison
in the place, but it so happened that Tseng Kwofan, a man
of considerable ability and of an influential family, was re-
siding near the town. Tseng had held several offices in the
public service, and, as a member of the Hanlin, enjoyed a
high position and reputation; but he happened to be at his
own home in retirement in consequence of the death of a
near relation when tidings of the approaching Taepings
reached him, and he at once made himself responsible for
the defense of Changsha. He threw himself with all the
forces his influence or resources enabled him to collect into
TJkOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 3 '2 3
that town, and at the same time he ordered all the militia
of the province to collect and harass the enemy. He caned
upon all those who had the means to show their duty to the
state and sovereign by raising recruits or by promising re-
wards to those volunteers who would serve in the army
against the rebels. Had the example of Tseng Kwofan
been generally followed, it is not too much to say that the
Taepings would never have got to Nankin. When the reb-
els reached Changsha, therefore, they found the gates closed,
the walls manned, and the town victualed for a siege. They
attempted to starve the place into surrender, and to frighten
the garrison into yielding by threats of extermination ; but
when these efforts failed they delivered three separate as-
saults, all of which were repulsed. After a siege of eighty
days, and having suffered very considerable losses, the Tae-
pings abandoned the attack, and on the 1st of December re-
sumed their march northward, which, if information could
have been rapidly transmitted, would have soon resulted in
their overthrow. On breaking up from before Changsha
they succeeded in seizing a sufficient number of junks and
boats to cross the great inland lake of Tungting, and on reach-
ing the Yangtsekiang at Yochow they found that the impe-
rial garrison had fled at the mere mention of their approach.
The capture of Yochow was important, because the Tae-
pings acquired there an important arsenal of much-needed
weapons and a large supply of gunpowder, which was said
to have been the property of Wou Sankwei. Thus, well
equipped and supplying their other deficiencies by celerity
of movement, they attacked the important city of Hankow,
which surrendered without a blow. The scarcely less im-
portant town of Wouchang, on the southern and opposite
bank of the river, was then attacked, and carried after a
siege of a fortnight. The third town of Hanyang, which
forms, with the others, the most important industrial and
commercial hive in Central China, also surrendered without
ny attempt at resistance, and this striking success at once
restored the sinking courage of the Taepings, and made the
824 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
danger from them to the dynasty again wear an aspect of
the most pressing importance.
It would be difficult to exaggerate the effect of this suc-
cess on the spirits of the Taepings, who had been seriously
discouraged before they achieved this gratifying result.
The capture of these towns removed all their most serious
causes of doubt, and enabled them to repay themselves for
the losses and hardships they had undergone, while it also
showed that the enterprise they had in hand was not likely
to prove unprofitable. After one month's rest at Hankow,
and having been joined by many thousands of new follow-
ers, the Taepings resolved to pursue their onward course.
To tell the truth, they were still apprehensive of pursuit
from Tseng Kwofan, who had been joined by the Triad
leader, Chang Kwoliang ; but there was no ground for the
fear, as these officials considered themselves tied to their
own province, and unfortunately the report of the success
of the mperialists in Hoonan blinded people to the danger
in the Yangtse Valley from the Taepings. The Taepings
resumed active operations with the capture of Kiukiang
and Ganking, and in March, 1853, they sat down before
Nankin. The siege continued for a fortnight, but notwith
standing that there was a large Manchu force in the Tartar
city, which might easily have been defended against an
enemy without artillery, the resistance offered was singu-
larly and unexpectedly faint-hearted. The Taepings suc-
ceeded in blowing in one of the gates, the townspeople
fraternized with the assailants, and the very Manchus who
had defied Sir Hugh Gough in 1842 surrendered their lives
and their honor to a force which was nothing more than an
armed rabble. The Tartar colony at Nankin, numbering
4,000 families, had evidently lost the courage and discipline
which could alone enable them to maintain their position in
China. Instead of dying at their posts they threw them-
selves on the mercy of the Taeping leader, imploring him
for pity and for their lives when the gate was blown in by
Tien Wan ;'s soldiery. Their cowardice helped them not;
TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 325
of 20,000 Manchus not one hundred escaped. The tale rests
on undoubted evidence. A Taeping who took part in the
massacre said, "We killed them all, to the infant in arms;
we left not a root to sprout from, and tne bodies of the slain
we cast into the Yangtse."
The acquisition of Nankin at once made the Taepings a
formidable rival to the Manchus, and Tien Wang a contest-
ant with Hienfung for imperial honors. The possession of
the second city in the empire gave them the complete con-
trol of the navigation of the Yangtsekiang, and thus en-
abled them to cut off communications between the north and
the south of China. To attain this object in a still more per-
fect manner they occupied Chinkiangfoo at the entrance to
the Grand Canal. They also seized Yangchow on the north-
ern bank of the river immediately opposite the place where
Sir Hugh Gough had gained his decisive victory in 1842.
Such was the terror of the Taepings that the imperial gar-
risons did not attempt the least resistance, and town after
town was evacuated at their approach. Tien Wang, en-
couraged by his success, transferred his headquarters from
Hankow to Nankin, and proclaimed the old Ming city his
capital. By rapidity and an extraordinary combination of
fortunate circumstances, the Taepings had advanced from
the remote province of Kwangsi into the heart of the em-
pire, but it was clear that unless they could follow up their
success by some blow to the central government they would
lose all they had gamed as soon as the Manchus recovered
their confidence. At a council of war at Nankin it was de-
cided to send an army against Pekin as soon as Nankin had
been placed in a proper state to undergo a protracted siege.
Provisions were collected to stand a siege for six or seven
years, the walls were repaired and fresh batteries erected.
By the end of May, 1853, these preparations were com-
pleted, and as the Taeping army had then been raised to a
total of 80,000 men, it was decided that a large part of it
could be spared for operations north of the Yangtsekiang.
That army was increased to a very large total by volunteers
326 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
who thought an expedition to humble the Manchus at the
capital promised much glory and spoil. The progress of
this northern army very closely resembled that of the Tae-
pings from Kwangsi to Nankin. They overran the open
country, and none of the imperial troops ventured to oppose
them, but when any Manchu officer showed valor in defend-
ing a walled city they were fain to admit their inadequate
engineering skill and military capacity. They attacked Kai-
fong, the capital of Honan, but were repulsed, and pursuing
their former tactics continued their march to Pekin. Hav-
ing crossed the Hoangho they attacked Hwaiking, where,
after being delayed two months, they met with as signal a
repulse as at Kaifong. Notwithstanding this further re-
verse, the Taepings pressed on, and defeating a Manchu
force in the Lin Limmiug Pass, they entered the metropol-
itan province of Pechihli in September, 1853. The object of
their march was plain. Not only did they mystify the em-
peror's generals, but they passed through an untouched
country where supplies were abundant, and they thus suc-
ceeded in coming within striking distance of Pekin in al-
most as fresh a state as when they left Nankin. Such wag
the effect produced by their capture of the Limming Pass
that none of the towns in the southern part of the province
attempted any resistance, and they reached Tsing, only
twenty miles south of Tientsin, and less than a hundred
from Pekin, before the end of October. This place marked
the northern limit of Taeping progress, and a reflex wave of
Manchu energy bore back the rebels to the Yangtse.
The forcing of the Limming Pass carried confusion and
terror into the imperial palace and capital. The fate of the
dynasty seemed to tremble in the balance at the hands of a
ruthless and determined enemy. There happened to be very
few troops in Pekin at the time, and levies had to be hastily
summoned from Mongolia. If the Taepings had only shown
the same enterprise and rapidity of movement that they had
exhibited up to this point, there is no saying that the central
government would not have been subverted and the Man-
TAOVKWANO AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 327
chu family extinguished as completely as the Mings. But
fortunately for Hienfung, an unusual apathy fell upon the
Taepings, who remained halted at Tsing until the Mongol
levies had arrived, under their great chief, Sankolinsin.
They seem to have been quite exhausted by their efforts,
and after one reverse in the open field they retired to their
fortified camp at Tsinghai, and sent messengers to Tien
Wang for succor. In this camp they were closely belea-
guered by Sankolinsin from October, 1853, to March, 1854,
when their provisions being exhausted they cut their way
out and began their retreat in a southerly direction. They
would undoubtedly have been exterminated but for the timely
arrival of a relieving army from Nankin. The Taepings
then captured Liutsing, which remained their headquarters
for some months; but during the remainder of the year 1854
their successes were few and unimportant. They were vigi-
lantly watched by the imperial troops, which had expelled
them from the "whole of the province of Shantung before
March, 1855. Their numbers were thinned by disease as
well as loss in battle, and of the two armies sent to capture
Pekin only a small fragment ever regained Nankin. While
these events were in progress in the region north of Nankin,
the Taepings had been carrying their arms up the Yangtse-
kiaiig as far as Ichang, and eastward from Nankin to the
Boa. These efforts were not always successful, and Tien
Wang's arms experienced as many reverses as successes.
The important city of Kanchang, the capital of the province
of Kiangsi, was besieged by them for four months, and after
many attempts to carry it by storm the Taepings were com-
pelled to abandon the task. They were more successful at
Hankow, which they recovered after a siege of eighty days.
They again evacuated this town, and yet once again, in
1855, wrested it from an imperial garrison.
The establishment of Taeping power at Nankin and the
rumor of its rapid extension in every direction had drawn
the attention of Europeans to the new situation thus created
in China, and had aroused opposite opinions hi different sec-
328 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
tions of the foreign community. While the missionaries
were disposed to regard the Taepings as the regenerators
of China, and as the champions of Christianity, the mer-
chants only saw in them the disturbers of peace and the ene-
mies of commerce. To such an extent did the latter antici-
pate the ruin of their trade that they petitioned the consuls
to suspend, if not withhold, the payment of the stipulated
customs to the Chinese authorities. This proposed breach
of treaty was emphatically rejected, and the consuls en-
joined the absolute necessity of preserving a strict neutrality
between the Taepings and the imperial forces. But at the
same time it became necessary to acquaint the Taeping ruler
with the fact that he would be expected to observe the pro-
visions of the Treaty of Nankin as scrupulously as if he
were sovereign of China or a Manchu viceroy. Sir George
Bonham, the superintendent of trade and the governor of
Hongkong, determined to proceed in person to Nankin, in
order to acquaint the Taepings with what would .be expected
from them, and also to gain necessary information as to their
strength and importance by personal observation, But un-
fortunately this step of Sir George Bonham tended to help
the Taepings by increasing their importance and spreading
about the belief that the Europeans recognized in them the
future ruling power of China. It was not intended to be,
but it was none the less, an unfriendly act to the Pekin
government, and as it produced absolutely no practical
result with the Taepings themselves, it was distinctly a
mistaken measure. Its only excuse was that the imperial
authorities were manifesting an increasing inclination to
enlist the support of Europeans against the rebels, and it
was desirable that accurate information should be obtained
beforehand. The Taotai of Shanghai even presented a re-
quest for the loan of the man-of-war at that port, and when
he was informed that we intended to remain strictly neutral,
the decision was also come to to inform the Taepings of this
fact. Therefore in April, 1853, before the army had left for
the northern campaign, Sir George Bonham sailed for Nan-
TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 329
KI in the "Hermes" man-of-war On the twenty-seventh
of that month the vessel anchored off Nankin, and several
interviews were held with the Taeping "Wangs, of whom the
Northern King was at this time the most influential. The
negotiations lasted a week, and they had no result. It was
soon made apparent that the Taepings were as exclusive and
impracticable as the worst Manchu mandarin, and that they
regarded the Europeans as an inferior and subject people.
Sir George Boiiham failed to establish any direct communi-
cation with Tien Wang, who had by this retired into private
life, and while it was given out that he was preparing sacred
books he was really abandoning himself to the pursuit of
profligacy. There is nothing to cause surprise in the fact
that the apathy of Tien Wang led to attempts to supersede
him in his authority. The Eastern King in particular posed
as the delegate of Heaven. He declared that he had inter-
views with the celestial powers when in a trance, he as-
sumed the title of the Holy Ghost or the Comforter, and he
censured Tien "Wang for his shortcomings, and even inflicted
personal chastisement upon him. If he had had a following
he might have become the despot of the Taepings, but as he
offended all alike his career was cut short by a conspiracy
among the other Wangs, who, notwithstanding his heavenly
conferences, murdered him.
At this period one of the most brilliant military exploits
of the Taepings was performed, and as it served to introduce
the real hero of the whole movement, it may be described in
more detail than the other operations, which were conducted
in a desultory manner, and which were unredeemed by any
exhibition of courage or military capacity. The government
had succeeded in placing two considerable armies in the
field. One numbering 40,000 men, under the command of
Hochun and the ex-Triad Chang Kwoliang, watched Nankin,
while the other, commanded by a Manchu general, laid close
siege to Chankiang, which seemed on the point of surrender.
The Taepings at Nankin determined to effect its relief, and
a large force was placed under the orders of an officer named
830 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Li, but whom it will be more convenient to designate by the
title subsequently conferred on him of Chung Wang, or the
Faithful King. His energy and courage had already at-
tracted favorable notice, and the manner in which he exe-
cuted the difficult operation intrusted to him fully established
his reputation. By a concerted movement with the Taeping
commandant of Chankiang, he attacked the imperialist lines
at the same time as the garrison made a sortie, and the result
was a decisive victory. Sixteen stockades were carried by
assault, and the Manchu army was driven away from the
town which seemed to lie at its mercy. But this success
promised only to be momentary, for the imperialist forces,
collecting from all sides, barred the way back to Nankin,
while the other Manchu army drew nearer to that cit3 T , and
its general seemed to meditate attacking Tien Wang in his
capital. An imperative summons was sent to Chung Wang
to return to Nankin. As the imperialist forces were for the
most part on the southern side of the river, Chung Wang
crossed to the northern bank and began his march to Nankin.
He had not proceeded far when he found that the imperial-
ists had also crossed over to meet him, and that his progress
was arrested by their main army under Chang Kwoliang.
With characteristic decision and rapidity he then regained
the southern bank, and falling on the weakened imperialists
gained so considerable a victory that the Manchu commander
felt bound to commit suicide. After some further fighting
he made good his way back to Nankin. But when he ar-
rived there the tyrant Tung Wang refused to admit him into
the city until he had driven away the main imperialist army,
which had been placed under the command of Hienfung's
generalissimo, Heang Yung, and which had actually seized
one of the gates of the city. Although Chung Wang's troops
were exhausted they attacked the government troops with
great spirit, and drove them back as far as Tanyang, where,
however, they succeeded in holding their ground, notwith-
standing his repeated efforts to dislodge them. Heang
Yung, taking his misfortune too deeply to heart, committed
TAOUKWANQ AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 331
suicide, and thus deprived the emperor of at least a brave
officer. But with this success the Taeping tide of victory
reached its end, for Chang Kwoliang arriving with the other
imperialist army, the whole force fell upon Chung "Wang
and drove him back into the city with the loss of 700 of his
best men, so that the result left of Chung "Wang's campaign
was the relief of Chankiang and the return to the status quo
at Nankin. It was immediately after these events that
Tung Wang was assassinated, and scenes of blood followed
which resulted in the massacre of 20,000 persons and the
disappearance of all, except one, of the Wangs whom Tien
Wang had created on the eve of his enterprise. Chung
Wang seems to have had no part in these intrigues and mas-
sacres, and there is little doubt that if the imperialist com-
manders had taken prompt advantage of them the Taepings
might have been crushed at that moment, or ten years earlier
than proved to be the case.
While the main Taeping force was thus causing serious
danger to the existing government of China, its offshoots or
imitators were emulating its example in the principal treaty
ports, which brought the rebels into contact with the Eu-
ropeans. The Chinese officials, without any military power
on which they could rely, had endeavored to maintain order
among the turbulent classes of the population by declaring
that the English were the allies of the emperor, and that
they would come to his aid with their formidable engines of
war if there were any necessity. Undoubtedly this threat
served its turn and kept the turbulent quiet for a certain
period; but when it could no longer be concealed that the
English were determined to take no part in the struggle,
the position of the government was weakened by the oft-
repeated declaration that they mainly relied on the support
of the foreigners. The first outbreak occurred at Amoy in
May, 1853, when some thousand marauders, under an in-
dividual named Magay, seized the town and held it until
the following November. The imperialists returned in suffi-
cient force in that month and regained possession of the
332 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
town, when, unfortunately for their reputation, they avenged
their expulsion in a particularly cruel and indiscriminating
fashion. Many thousand citizens were executed without
any form of trial, and the arrest of the slaughter was en-
tirely due to the intervention of the English naval officer at
Amoy. The rising at Shanghai was of a more serious char-
acter, and took a much longer time to suppress. As the
European settlement there was threatened with a far more
imminent danger than anywhere else, preparations to defend
it began in April, 1853, and under the auspices of the consul,
Mr. Rutherford Alcock, the residents were formed into a
volunteer corps, and the men-of-war drawn up so as to
effectually cover the whole settlement. These precautions
were taken in good time, for nothing happened to disturb
the peace until the following September. The Triads were
undoubtedly the sole instigators of the rising, and the
Taepings of Nankin were in no sense responsible for, or
participators in it. They seized the Taotai's official residence,
and as his guard deserted bim 3 that officer barely escaped
with his life. Other officials were not so fortunate, but on
the whole Shanghai was acquired by the rebels with very
little bloodshed. In a few hours this important Chinese city
passed into the hands of a lawless and refractory mob, who
lived on the plunder of the townspeople, and who were ripe
for any mischief. The European settlement was pi
meantime in a position of efficient defense, and although
the Triads wished to have the spoil of its rich factories, they
very soon decided that the enterprise would be too risky, if
not impossible.
After some weeks' inaction the imperialist forces, gath-
ering from all quarters, proceeded to invest the marauders
in Shanghai, and had the attack been conducted with any
degree of military skill and vigor they must have succumbed
at the first onset. But, owing to the pusillanimity of the
emperor's officers and their total ignorance of the military
art, the siege went on for an indefinite period, and twelve
months after it began seemed as far off conclusion as ever.
TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR. 333
"While the imperialists laboriously constructed their lines
and batteries they never ceased to importune the Europeans
for assistance, and as it became clearer that the persons in
possession of Shanghai were a mob rather than a power, the
desire increased among the foreigners generally to put an
end to what was an intolerable position. On this occasion
the French took an initiative vvhich had previously been left
to the English. The French settlement at Shanghai con-
sisted at this time of a consulate, a cathedral, and one house,
but as it was situated nearest the walls of the Chinese city
it was most exposed to the fire of the besiegers and besieged.
In consequence of this the French admiral, Laguerre, de-
termined to take a part in the struggle, and erecting a bat-
tery in the French settlement, proceeded to bombard the
rebels on one side of the city while the imperialists attacked
it on another. Although the bombardment was vigorous
and effective, the loss inflicted on the insurgents was incon-
siderable, because they had erected an earthwork behind the
main wall of the place, and every day the Triads challenged
the French to come on to the assault. At last a breach was
declared to be practicable, and 400 French sailors and marines
were landed to carry it, while the imperialists, wearing blue
sashes to distinguish them from the rebels, escaladed the
walls at another point. But the assault was premature, for,
although the assailants gained the inside of the fortification,
they could not advance. The insurgents fought desperately
behind the earthworks and in the streets, and after four
hours' fighting they put the whole imperialist force to flight.
The French were carried along by their disheartened allies,
who, allowing race hatred to overcome a temporary arrange-
ment, even fired on them, and when Admiral Laguerre reck-
oned up the cost of his intervention he found it amounted to
tour officers and sixty men killed and wounded. Such was
the result of the French attack on Shanghai, and it taught
the lesson that even good European troops cannot ignore the
recognized rules and precautions of war. After this en-
gagement the siege languished, and the French abstained
334 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
from taking any further part in it. But the imperialists
continued their attack in their own bungling but persistent
fashion, and at last the insurgents, having failed to obtain
the favorable terms they demanded, made a desperate sortie,
when a few made their way to the foreign settlement, where
they found safety, but by far tiie greater number perished
by the sword of the imperialists. More than 1,500 insur-
gents were captured and executed along the highroads, but
the two leaders of the movement escaped, one of them to
attain great fortune as a merchant in Siam. The imperial-
ists unfortunately sullied their success by grave excesses and
by the cruel treatment of the unoffending townspeople, who
were made to suffer for the original incapacity and cowardice
of the officials themselves. At Canton, which was also
visited by the Triads in June, 1854, matters took a different
course. The Chinese merchants and shopkeepers combined
and raised a force for their own protection, and these well-
paid braves effectually kept the insurgents out of Canton.
They, however, seized the neighboring town of Fatshan,
where the manufacturing element was in strong force, and
but for the unexpected energy of the Cantonese they would
undoubtedly have seized the larger city too, as the govern-
ment authorities were not less apathetic here than at Shang-
hai. The disturbed condition of things continued until Feb-
ruary, 1855, when the wholesale executions by which its
suppression was marked, and during which a hundred thou-
sand persons are said to have perished, ceased.
The events have now been passed in review which marked
the beginning and growth of the Taeping Rebellion, from the
time of its being a local rising in the province of Kwangsi to
the hour of its leader being installed as a ruling prince in the
ancient city of Nankin. But from the growing Taeping
Rebellion, which we have now followed down to the year
1856, our attention must be directed to the more serious and
important foreign question which had again reached a crisis,
and which would not wait on the convenience of the Celestial
emperor and his advisers.
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 335
CHAPTER XIX
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR
THE events which caused the second foreign war began
to come into evidence immediately after the close of the first ;
and for the sake of clearness and brevity they have been left
for consideration to the same chapter, although they hap-
pened while Taoukwang was emperor. After the departure
of Sir Henry Pottinger, who was succeeded by Sir John
Davis, and the arrival of the representatives of the other
European powers, who hastened to claim the same rights
and privileges as had been accorded to England, the main
task to be accomplished was to practically assert the rights
that had been theoretically secured, and to place the rela-
tions of the two nations on what may be called a working
basis. The consulates were duly appointed, the necessary
land for the foreign settlements was acquired, and the war
indemnity being honorably discharged, Chusan was restored
to the Chinese. With regard to the last matter there was
some maneuvering of a not altogether creditable nature, and
although the Chinese paid the last installment punctually to
date, Chusan and Kulangsu were not evacuated for some
months after the stipulated time. It was said that our hesi-
tation in the former case was largely due to the fear that
France would seize it; but this has been permanently re-
moved by the expressed assertion of our prior right to occupy
it. A far more gratifying subject is suggested by the har-
mony of the relations which were established in Chusan
between the garrison under Sir Colin Campbell and the
islanders, who expressed deep regret at the departure of
the English troops. The first members of the consular staff
in China were as follows : Mr. G. T. Lay was consul at Can-
ton, Captain George Balfour at Shanghai (where, however,
336 A SHOUT HISTORY OF CHI.\A.
he was soon succeeded by Sir Rutherford Alcock), Mr. Henry
Gribble at Amoy, and Mr. Robert Thorn at Ningpo. Among
the interpreters were the future Sir Thomas Wade and Sir
Harry Parkes. Various difficulties presented themselves
with regard to the foreign settlements, and the island of
Kulangsu at Amoy had to be evacuated because its name
was not mentioned in the treaty. At Canton also an attempt
was made to extend the boundaries of the foreign settlement
by taking advantage of a great conflagration, but in this
attempt the Europeans were baffled by the superior quick-
ness of the Chinese, who constructed their new houses in a
single night. These incidents showed that the sharpness
was not all on one side, and that if the Chinese were back-
ward in conceding what might be legitimately demanded,
the Europeans were not averse to snatching an advantage
if they saw the chance.
The turbulence of the Canton populace, over whom the
officials possessed but a nominal control, was a constant cause
of disagreement and trouble. In the spring of 1846 a riot
was got up by the mob on the excuse that a vane erected on
the top of the flagstaff over the American Consulate inter-
fered with the Fung Shui, or spirits of earth and air; and
although it was removed to allay the excitement of the su-
perstitious, the disturbance continued, and several personal
encounters took place, in one of which a Chinese was killed.
The Chinese mandarins, incited by the mob, demanded the
surrender of the man who fired the shot; and that they
should have made such a demand, after they had formally
accepted and recognized the jurisdiction of consular courts,
furnished strong evidence that they had not mastered the
lessons of the late war or reconciled themselves to the pro-
visions of the Treaty of Nankin. The fortunate arrival of
Keying to "amicably regulate the commerce with foreign
countries" smoothed over this difficulty, and the excitement
of the Canton mob was allayed without any surrender. It
was almost at this precise moment, too, that Taoukwang
made the memorable admission that the Christian religion
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 337
might be tolerated as one inculcating the principles of virtue.
But the two pressing and practical difficulties in the foreign
question were the opening of the gates of Canton and the
right of foreigners to proceed beyond the limits of their fac-
tories and compounds. The Chinese wished for many rea-
sons, perhaps even for the safety of the foreigners, to Confine
them to then? settlements, and it might be plausibly argued
that the treaty supported this construction. Of course such
confinement was intolerable, and English merchants and oth-
ers would not be prevented from making boating or shooting
excursions in the neighborhood of the settlements. The Chi-
nese authorities opposed these excursions, and before long a
collision occurred with serious consequences. In March, 1847,
a small party of Englishmen proceeded in a boat to Fatshan,
a manufacturing town near Canton which has been called
the Chinese Birmingham. On reaching the place symptoms
of hostility were at once manifested, and the Europeans with-
drew for safety to the yamen of the chief magistrate, who
happened unfortunately to be away. By this time the popu-
lace had got very excited, and the Englishmen were with
difficulty escorted in safety to their boat. The Chinese, how-
ever, pelted them with stones, notwithstanding the efforts of
the chief officer, who had by this time returned and taken
the foreigners under his protection. It was due to his great
heroism that they escaped with their lives and without any
serious injury.
The incident, unpleasant in itself, might have been ex-
plained away and closed without untoward consequences if
Sir John Davis had not seized, as he thought, a good oppor-
tunity of procuring greater liberty and security for English-
men at C :nton. He refused to see in this affair an accident,
but denounced it as an outrage, and proclaimed "that he
would exact and require from the Chinese government that
British subjects should be as free from molestation and in-
sult in China as they would be in England." This demand
was both unreasonable and unjust. It was impossible that
the hated foreigner, or "foreign devil," as he was called,
338 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
could wander about the country in absolute security when
the treaty wrung from the emperor as the result of an ardu-
ous war confined him to five ports, and limited the emperor's
capacity to extend protection to those places. But Sir John
Davis determined to take this occasion of forcing events, so
that he might compel the Chinese to afford greater liberty
to his countrymen, and thus hasten the arrival of the day
for the opening of the gates of Canton. On the 1st of April
all the available troops at Hongkong were warned for imme-
diate service, and on the following day the two regiments in
garrison left in three steamers and escorted by one man-of-
war to attack Canton. They landed at the Bogue forts,
seized the batteries without opposition and spiked the guns.
The Chinese troops, whether surprised or acting under or-
ders from Keying, made no attempt at resistance. Not a
shot was fired, not a man was injured among the assailants.
The forts near Canton, the very batteries on the island op-
posite the city, were captured without a blow, and on the
3d of April, 1H47, Canton again lay at the mercy of an En-
glish force. Sir John Davis then published another notice,
stating that "he felt that the moderation and justice of all
his former dealings with the government of China lend a
perfect sanction to measures which he has been reluctantly
compelled to adopt after a long course of misinterpreted for-
bearance," and made certain demands of the Chinese au-
thorities which may be epitomized as follows: The City of
Canton to be opened at two years' date from April 6,
1847; Englishman to be at liberty to roam for exercise or
amusement in the neighborhood of the city on the one con-
dition that they returned the same day ; and some minor
conditions, to which no exception could be taken. After
brief consideration, and notwithstanding the clamor of the
Cantonese to be led against the foreigners, Keying agreed
to the English demands, although he delivered a side-thrust
at the high-handed proceedings of the English officer when
he said, "If a mutual tranquillity is to subsist between the
Chinese and foreigners, the common feelings of mankind,
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 339
as well as the just principles or Heaven, must be considered
and conformed with."
Keying, by the terms of his convention with Sir John
Davis, had agreed that the gates of Canton were to be
opened on April 6, 1849, but the nearer that day approached
the more doubtful did it appear whether the promise would
be complied with, and whether, in the event of refusal, it
would be wise to have recourse to compulsion. The officials
on both sides were unfeignedly anxious for a pacific solution,
but trade was greatly depressed in consequence of the threat-
ening demeanor of the Canton populace. There was scarcely
any doubt that the Chinese authorities did not possess the
power to compel obedience on the part of the Cantonese to
an order to admit Europeans into their city, and on the ques-
tion being referred to Taoukwang he made an oracular reply
which was interpreted as favoring the popular will. "That, "
he said, "to which the hearts of the people incline is that on
which the decree of Heaven rests. Now the people of Kwan-
tung are unanimous and determined that they will not have
foreigners enter the city ; and how can I post up everywhere
my imperial order and force an opposite course on the peo-
ple?" The English government was disposed to show great
forbearance and refrained from opposing Taoukwang's views.
But although the matter was allowed to drop, the right ac-
quired by the convention with Keying was not surrendered;
and, as Taoukwang had never formally ratified the promise
of that minister, it was considered that there had been no
distinct breach of faith on the part of the Chinese govern-
ment. The Chinese continued to cling tenaciously to their
rights, and to contest inch by inch every concession de-
manded by the Europeans, and sometimes they were within
their written warrant in doing so. Such a case happened
at Foochow shortly after the accession of Hienfung, when
an attempt was made to prevent foreigners residing in that
town, and after a long correspondence it was discovered that
the Chinese were so far right, as the treaty specified as the
place of foreign residence the kiangkan or mart at the mouth
340 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
of the river, and not the ching or town itself. It was at this
critical moment that the Chinese were attracted in large num-
bers by the discovery of gold in California and Australia to
emigrate from China, and they showed themselves well ca-
pable by their trade organization and close union of obtain-
ing full justice for themselves and an ample recognition of
all their rights in foreign countries. The effect of this emi-
gration on Chinese public opinion was much less than might
have been expected, and the settlement of the foreign ques-
tion was in no way simplified or expedited by their influence.
The position of affairs at Canton could not, by the great-
est stretch of language, be pronounced satisfactory. The
populace was unequivocally hostile; the officials had the
greatest difficulty in making their authority respected, and
the English government was divided between the desire to
enforce the stipulation as to the opening of the Canton gates,
and the fear lest insistence might result in a fresh and seri-
ous rupture. Sir George Bonham, who succeeded Sir John
Davis, gave counsels of moderation, and when he found that
some practical propositions which he made for improved in-
tercourse were rejected he became more convinced that the
question must wait for solution for a more convenient and
promising occasion.
In 1852 Sir George Bonham returned to England on leave,
and his place was taken by Dr. John Bowring, who had offi-
ciated for a short period as consul at Canton. His instruc-
tions were of a simple and positive character. They were
"to avoid all irritating discussions with the authorities of
China." He was also directed to avoid pushing arguments
on doubtful points in a manner that would fetter the free
action of the government ; but he was, at the same time, to
recollect that it was his duty to carefully watch over and
insist upon the performance by the Chinese authorities of
their engagements. The proper fulfillment of the latter duty
necessarily involved some infringement of the former rec-
ommendation; and while the paramount consideration with
the Foreign Office was to keep things quiet, it was natural
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 341
that the official on the spot should think a great deal, if not
altogether, of how best to obtain compliance to the fullest
extent with the pledges given in the treaty and the subse-
quent conventions. Dr. Bowring was not an official to be
deterred from expressing his opinions by fear of headquar-
ters. He sent home his view of the situation, expressed in
very clear and intelligible language. "The Pottinger treat-
ies," he said, "inflicted a deep wound upon the pride, but by
no means altered the policy, of the Chinese government. . . .
Their purpose is now, as it ever was, not to invite, not to
facilitate, but to impede and resist the access of foreigners.
It must, then, ever be borne in mind, in considering the state
of our relations with these regions, that the two governments
have objects at heart which are diametrically opposed, except
in so far that both earnestly desire to avoid all hostile action,
and to make its own policy, as far as possible, subordinate
to that desire." At this point a Liberal administration gave
place to a Conservative ; but Lord Malmesbury reiterated in
stronger language the instructions of Lord Granville. "All
irritating discussions with the Chinese should be avoided,
and the existing good understanding must in no way be im-
periled." One of Dr. Bowring's first acts was to write a
letter to the viceroy expressing a desire for an interview,
with the object of suggesting a settlement of pending diffi-
culties ; but the viceroy made his excuses. The meeting did
not take place, and the whole question remained dormant
for two years, by which time not only had Sir John Bow-
ring been knighted and confirmed in the post of governor,
but the viceroy had been superseded by the subsequently
notorious Commissioner Yeh. Up to this point all Sir John
Bowring's suggestions with regard to the settlement of the
questions pending with the Chinese had been received with
the official reply that he was to abstain from all action, and
that he was not to press himself on the Canton authorities.
But, in the beginning of 1854, his instructions were so far
modified that Lord Clarendon wrote admitting the desira-
bility of "free and unrestricted intercourse with the Chinese
343 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
officials," and of "admission into some of the cities of China,
especially Canton."
Encouraged by these admissions in favor of the views he
had been advancing for some time, Sir John Bowring wrote
an official letter to Commissioner Yeh inviting him to an
early interview, but stating that the interview must be held
within the city of Canton at the viceroy's yamen. It will be
noted that what Sir John asked fell short of what Keying
had promised. The opening of the gates of Canton was to
have been to all Englishmen, but the English government
would at this point have been satisfied if its representative
had been granted admission for the purpose of direct nego-
tiation with the Chinese authorities. To the plain question
put to him Yeh returned an evasive answer. All his time
was taken up with the military affairs of the province, and
he absolutely ignored the proposal for holding an interview
within the city. The matter had gone too far to be put on
one side in this manner, and Sir John Bowring sent his sec-
retary to overcome, if possible, the repugnance of Commis-
sioner Yeh to the interview, and in any case to gain some
information as to his objections. As the secretary could only
see mandarins of very inferior rank he returned to Hong-
kong without acquiring any very definite information, but he
learned enough to say that Yeh denied that Keying's arrange-
ment possessed any validity. The Chinese case was that it
had been allowed to drop on both sides, and the utmost con-
cession Yeh would make was to agree to an interview at the
Jinsin Packhouse outside the city walls. This proposition
was declared to be inadmissible, when Yeh ironically re-
marked that he must consequently assume that "Sir John
Bowring did not wish for an interview." It was hoped to
overcome Chinese finesse with counter finesse, and Sir John
Bowring hastened to Shanghai with the object of establish-
ing direct relations with the viceroy of the Two Kiang.
After complaining of the want of courtesy evinced by Yeh
throughout his correspondence, he expressed the wish to
negotiate with any of the other high officials of the empire.
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 343
The reply of Eleang, who held this post, and who was be-
lieved to be well disposed to Europeans, did not advance
matters. He had no authority, he said, in the matter, and
could not interfere in what was not his concern. Commis-
sioner Yeh was the official appointed by the emperor to con-
duct relations with the foreigners, and no other official could
assume his functions. Sir John Bowring therefore returned
to Hongkong without having effected anything by his visit
to Shanghai, but at this moment the advance of the rebels
to the neighborhood of Canton seemed likely to effect a
diversion that might have important consequences. In a
state of apprehension as to the safety of the town, Yeh ap-
piled to Sir John Bowring for assistance against the rebels,
but this could not be granted, and Sir John Bowring only
proceeded to Canton to superintend the preparations made
for the defense of the English settlement at that place. All
the consuls issued a joint proclamation declaring their inten-
tion to remain neutral. The prompt suppression of the re-
bellion, so far as any danger to Canton went, restored the
confidence of the Chinese authorities, and they reverted to
their old position on the question of the opening of the gates
of Canton.
In June, 1855, Sir John Bowring returned to the subject
of official interviews, and made an explicit demand for the
reception if not of himself, then at least of the consul at
Canton. Yeh took his time before he made any reply, and
when he did send one it was to the effect that there was no
precedent for an interview with a consul, and that as Sir
John had refused to meet him outside the city there was an
end of the matter. Mr. Harry Parkes succeeded Mr. Alcock
as consul at Canton, and no inconsiderable amount of tact
was required to carry on relations with officials who refused
to show themselves. But the evil day of open collision could
not be averted, and the antagonism caused by clashing views
and interests at last broke forth on a point which would have
been promptly settled, had there been direct intercourse be'
tween the English and Chinese officials.
344 ^1 SHORT HISTORY OF CHLXA.
On October 8, 1856, Mr. Parkes reported to Sir John
Bo wring at Hongkong the particulars of an affair which
had occurred on a British-owned lorcha at Canton. The
lorcha "Arrow," employed in the iron trade between Can-
ton and the mouth of the river, commanded by an English
captain, and flying the English flag, had been boarded by a
party of mandarins and their followers while at anchor near
the Dutch Folly. The lorcha a Portuguese name for a fast
sailing boat had been duly registered in the office at Hong-
kong, and although not entitled at that precise moment to
British protection, through the careless neglect to renew the
license, this fact was only discovered subsequently, and was
not put forward by the Chinese in justification of their action.
The gravity of the affair was increased by the fact that the
English flag was conspicuously displayed, and that, notwith-
standing the remonstrances of the master, it was ostenta-
tiously hauled down. The crew were carried off prisoners
with the exception of two men, left at their own request to
take charge of the vessel. Mr. Parkes at once sent a letter
to Yeh on the subject of this "very grave insult," request-
ing that the captured crew of the "Arrow" should be re-
turned to that vessel without delay, and that any charges
made against them should be then examined into at the En-
glish consulate. In his reply Commissioner Yeh justified
and upheld the act of his subordinates. Of the twelve men
seized, he returned nine, but with regard to the three whom
he detained, he declared one to be a criminal, and the others
important witnesses. Not merely would he not release them,
but he proceeded to justify their apprehension, while he did
not condescend to so much as notice the points of the insult
to the English flag, and of his having violated treaty obliga-
tions. Yeh did not attempt to offer any excuse for the pro-
ceedings taken in his name. He asserted certain things as
facts which, in his opinion, it was sufficient for him to accept
that they should pass current. But the evidence on which
they were based was not sufficient to obtain credence in the
laxest court of justice; but even if it had been conclusive it
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 345
would not have justified the removal of the crew from the
"Arrow" when the British flag was flying conspicuously at
her mast. What, in brief, was the Chinese case? It was
that one of the crew had been recognized by a man passing
in a boat as one of a band of pirates who had attacked, ill-
used, and plundered him several weeks before. He had
forthwith gone to the Taotai of Canton, presented a demand
for redress, and that officer had at once given the order for
the arrest of the offender, with the result described. There
is no necessity to impugn the veracity of the Chinaman's
story, but it did not justify the breach of "the ex- territorial
rights of preliminary consular investigation before trial"
granted to all under the protection of the English flag. The
plea of delay did not possess any force either, for the man
could have been arrested just as well by the English consul
as by the mandarins, but it would have involved a damag-
ing admission of European authority in the matter of a
Chinese subject, and the mandarins thought there was no
necessity to curtail their claim to jurisdiction. Commis-
sioner Yeh did not attempt any excuses, and he even de-
clared that "the 'Arrow' is not a foreign lorcha, and, there-
fore," he said, "there is no use to enter into any discussion
about her."
The question of the nationality of the "Arrow" was
complicated by the fact that its registry had expired ten
days before its seizure. The master explained that this
omission was due to the vessel having been at sea, and
that it was to have been rectified as soon as he returned
to Hongkong. As Lord Clarendon pointed out. this fact
was not merely unknown to the Chinese, but it was also
"a matter of British regulation which would not justify
seizure by the Chinese. No British lorcha would be safe
if her crew were liable to seizure on these grounds." The
history of the lorcha "Arrow" was officially proved to be
as follows: ''The 'Arrow' was heretofore employed in trad-
ing on the coast, and while so employed was taken by
pirates. By them she was fitted out and employed on the
346 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Canton River during the disturbances between the impe-
rialists and the insurgents. While on this service she was
captured by the braves of one of the loyalist associations
organized by the mandarins for the support of the govern-
ment. By this association she was publicly sold, and was
purchased by a Chin-chew Hong, a respectable firm at Can-
ton, which also laid out a considerable sum in repairing her
and otherwise fitting her out. She arrived at Hongkong
about the month of June, 1855, at which time a treaty was
on foot (which ended in a bargain) between Fong Aming,
Messrs. T. Burd & Co.'s comprador, and Lei-yeong-heen,
one of the partners in the Chin-chew Hong, for the purchase
of the lorcha by the former. Shortly after the arrival of the
vessel at Hongkong she was claimed by one Quantai, of
Macao, who asserted that she had been his property before
she was seized by the pirates. Of course, the then owner
disputed his claim ; upon which he commenced a suit in the
Vice- Admiralty Court. After a short time, by consent of the
parties, the question was referred to arbitration, but the arbi-
trators could not agree and an umpire was appointed, who
awarded that the ownership of the lorcha should continue
undisturbed. The ownership of the vessel was then trans-
ferred to Fong Aming, and in his name she is registered,
These are the simple facts connected with the purchase of
the lorcha by a resident of the colony at Hongkong and her
registry as a British vessel, and it is from these facts that
the Imperial Commissioner Yeh has arrived at an erroneous
conclusion as to the ownership of the boat.*' As the first
step toward obtaining the necessary reparation, a junk,
which was supposed to be an imperial war vessel, was
seized as a hostage, and Mr. Parkes addressed another
letter to Yeh reminding him that "the matter which has
compelled this menace still remains unsettled."
Had there been that convenient mode of communication
between the governor of Hongkong and the Chinese officials
at Canton which was provided for by the Nankin Treaty
and the Keying Convention, the "Arrow" complication
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 347
would, in all probability, never have arisen, and it is also
scarcely less certain that it would not have produced such
serious consequences as it did but for the arrogance of Yeh.
He even attempted to deny that the "Arrow" carried the
English flag, but this was so clearly proved to be a fact by
both English and Chinese witnesses that it ceased to hold a
place in the Chinese case. As it was clear that Commis-
sioner Yeh would not give way, and as delay would only
encourage him, the admiral on the station, Sir Michael Sey-
mour, received instructions to attack the four forts of the
Barrier, and he captured them without loss. Thus, after an
interval of fourteen years, was the first blow struck in what
may be called the third act of Anglo-Chinese relations, but
it would be a mistake to suppose that the ''Arrow" case was
the sole cause of this appeal to arms. A blue book, bearing
the significant title of "Insults to Foreigners," gives a list
and narrative of the many outrages and indignities inflicted
on Europeans between 1842 and 1856. The evidence con-
tained therein justifies the statement that the position of
Europeans in China had again become most unsafe and
intolerable. Those who persist hi regarding the "Arrow"
affair as the only cause of the war may delude themselves
into believing that the Chinese were not the most blame-
worthy parties in the quarrel; but no one who seeks the
truth and reads all the evidence will doubt that if there had
been no "Arrow" case there would still have been a rupture
between the two countries. The Chinese officials, headed by
Yeh, had fully persuaded themselves that, as the English
had put up with so much, and had acquiesced hi the con-
tinued closing of the gates of Canton, they were not likely
to make the "Arrow" affair a casus belli. Even the cap-
ture of the Barrier forts did not bring home to their minds
the gravity of the situation.
After dismantling these forts, Sir Michael Seymour pro-
ceeded up the river, capturing the fort in Macao Passage,
and arriving before Canton on the same day. An ulti-
matum was at once addressed to Yeh, stating that unless
348 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA,
he at once complied with all the English demands the
admiral would "proceed with the destruction of all the de-
fenses and public buildings of this city and of the govern-
ment vessels in the river." This threat brought no satisfac-
tory answer, and the Canton forts were seized, their guns
spiked and the men-of-war placed with their broadsides
opposite the city. Then Yeh, far from being cowed, uttered
louder defiance than ever. He incited the population to
make a stubborn resistance; he placed a reward of thirty
dollars on the head of every Englishman slain or captured,
and he publicly proclaimed that there was no alternative but
war. He seems to have been driven to these extremities by
a fear for his own personal safety and official position. He
had no warrant from his imperial master to commit China
to such a dangerous course as another war with the English,
and he knew that the only way to vindicate his proceedings
was to obtain some success gratifying to national vanity.
"While Yeh was counting on the support of the people, the
English admiral began the bombardment of the city, direct-
ing his fire principally against Yeh's yamen and a part of
the wall, which was breached in two days. After some re-
sistance the breach was carried; a gate was occupied, and
Sir Michael Seymour and Mr. Parkes proceeded to the
yamen of the viceroy, but as it was thought dangerous
to occupy so large a city with so small a force the posi-
tions seized were abandoned, although still commanded by
the fire of the fleet. After a few days' rest active opera-
tions were resumed against the French Folly fort and a
large fleet of war junks which had collected up the river.
After a warm engagement the vessels were destroyed and
the fort captured. Undaunted by these successive reverses,
Yeh still breathed nothing but defiance, and refused to make
the least concession. There remained no alternative but to
prosecute hostilities with renewed vigor. On the 12th and
13th of November, Sir Michael attacked the Bogue forts on
both sides of the river and captured them with little loss.
These forts mounted 400 guns, but only contained 1,000 men.
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 349
Notwithstanding these continuous reverses, the Chinese
remained defiant and energetic. As soon as the English
admiral left Canton to attack the Bogue forts the Chinese
hastened to re-occupy all their positions and to repair the
breaches. They succeeded in setting fire to and thus de-
stroying the whole foreign settlement, and they carried off
several Europeans, all of whom were put to death and some
of them tortured. The heads of these Europeans treach-
erously seized and barbarously murdered were paraded
throughout the villages of Kwangtung, in order to stimu-
late recruiting and to raise national enthusiasm to a high
pitch. Notwithstanding their reverses whenever it became
a question of open fighting, the Chinese, by their obstinacy
and numbers, at last succeeded in convincing Sir Michael
Seymour that his force was too small to achieve any decis-
ive result, and he accordingly withdrew from his positions
in front of the city, and sent home a request for a force of
5,000 troops. Meantime the Chinese were much encouraged
by the lull in hostilities, and for the time being Yeh himself
was not dissatisfied with the result. The Cantonese saw in
the destruction of the foreign settlement and the withdrawal
of the English fleet some promise of future victory, and at
all events sufficient reason for the continued confidence of
the patriot Yeh. Curiously enough, there was peace and
ostensible goodwill along the coast and at the other treaty
ports, while war and national animosity were in the ascend-
ant at Canton. The governor- generals of the Two Kiang
and Fuhkien declared over and over again that they wished
co abide by the Treaty of Nankin, and they threw upon Yeh
the responsibility of his acts. Even Hienfung refrained
from showing any unequivocal support of his truculent
lieutenant, although there is no doubt that he was im-
pressed by the reports of many victories over the English
barbarians with which Yeh supplied him. As long as Yeh
was able to keep the quarrel a local one, and to thus shield
the central government from any sense of personal danger,
he enjoyed the good wishes, if not the active support, of
350 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
his sovereign. But, unfortunately for the success of his
schemes, only the most energetic support of the Pekin gov-
ernment in money and men could have enabled him to hold
his own; and as he did nothing but report victories in order
to gain a hearing for his policy, he could not grumble when
he was not sent the material aid of which he stood most in
need. His unreasonable action had done much to unite all
foreign nations against China. French, American and Span
ish subjects had been the victims of Chinese ignorance and
cruelty, as well as English, and they all saw that the success
of Yen's policy would render their position untenable.
On the receipt of Sir Michael Seymour's request for a
force of 5,000 men, it was at once perceived in London that
the question of our relations with China had again entered
a most important and critical phase. It was at once decided
to send the force for which the admiral asked ; and, while
1,500 men were sent from England and a regiment from the
Mauritius, the remainder was to be drawn from the Madras
army. At the same tune it was considered necessary to send
an embassador of high rank to acquaint the Pekin authori-
ties that, while such acts as those of Yeh would not be toler-
ated, there was no desire to press too harshly on a country
which was only gradually shaking off its exclusive preju-
dices. Lord Elgin was selected for the difficult mission, and
his instructions contained the following five categorical de-
mands, the fourth of which was the most important in its
consequences :
Those instructions were conveyed in two dispatches of
the same date, April 20, 1857. We quote the following as
the more important passages: "The demands which you are
instructed to make will be (1), for reparation of injuries to
British subjects, and, if the French officers should co-operate
with you, for those to French subjects also ; (2) for the com-
plete execution at Canton, as well as at the other ports, of
the stipulations of the several treaties; (3) compensation to
British subjects and persons entitled to British protection for
losses incurred in consequence of the late disturbances ; (4)
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 351
the assent of the Chinese government to the residence at
Pekin, or to the occasional visit to that capital, at the option
of the British government, of a minister duly accredited by
the queen to the emperor of China, and the recognition
of the right of the British plenipotentiary and chief super-
intendent of trade to communicate directly in writing with
the high officers at the Chinese capital, and to send his com-
munications by messengers of his own selection, such ar.
rangements affording the best means of insuring the due
execution of the existing treaties, and of preventing future
misunderstandings ; (5) a revision of the treaties with China
with a view to obtaining increased facilities for commerce,
such as access to cities on the great rivers as well as to
Chapoo and to other ports on the coast, and also permission
for Chinese vessels to resort to Hongkong for purposes of
trade from all ports of the Chinese empire without distinc-
tion." These were the demands formulated by the English
government for the consent of China, and seven proposals
were made as to how they were to be obtained should coer-
cion become necessary. It was also stated that ' 'it is not
the intention of her Majesty's government to undertake any
land operations in the interior of the country."
An event of superior, and, indeed, supreme knportance
occurred to arrest the movement of the expedition to Canton.
"When Lord Elgin reached Singapore, on June 3, 1857, he
found a letter waiting for him from Lord Canning, then
Governor-general of India, informing him of the outbreak of
the Indian Mutiny, and imploring him to send all his troops
to Calcutta in order to avert the overthrow of our authority
in the valley of the Ganges, where, "for a length of 750
miles, there were barely 1,000 European soldiers." To such
an urgent appeal there could only be one answer, and the
men who were to have chastised Commissioner Yeh followed
Havelock to Cawnpore and Lucknow. But while Lord Elgin
sent his main force to Calcutta, he himself proceeded to
Hongkong, where he arrived in the first week of July, and
found that hostilities had proceeded to a still more advanced
352 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
stage than when Sir Michael Seymour wrote for re-enforce-
ments. The Chinese had become so confident during the
winter that that officer felt bound to resume offensive meas-
ures against them, and having been joined by a few more
men-of-war, and having also armed some merchant ships
of light draught, he attacked a main portion of the Chinese
fleet occupying a very strong position in Escape Creek. The
attack was intrusted to Commodore Elliott, who, with five
gunboats and the galleys of the larger men-of-war, carried
out with complete success and little loss the orders of his
superior officer. Twenty-seven armed junks were destroyed,
and the thirteen that escaped were burned the next day.
It was then determined to follow up this success by attack-
ing the headquarters of Yeh's army at Fatshan, the place
already referred to as being some distance from Canton.
By road it is six and by water twelve miles from that city.
The remainder of the Chinese fleet was drawn up in Fatshan
Channel, and the Chinese had made such extensive prepara-
tions for its defense, both on land and on the river, that they
were convinced of the impregnability of its position.
The Chinese position was unusually strong, and had been
selected with considerable judgment. An island named after
the hyacinth lies in midstream two miles from the entrance
to the Fatshan Channel, which joins the main course of the
Sikiang a few miles above the town of that name. The
island is flat and presents no special advantages for defense,
but it enabled the Chinese to draw up a line of junks across
the two channels of the river, and to place on it a battery of
six guns, thus connecting their two squadrons. The seventy-
two junks were drawn up with their sterns facing down
stream, and their largest gun bearing on any assailant pro-
ceeding up it. On the left bank of the river an elevated and
precipitous hill had been occupied in force and crowned \vith
a battery of nineteen guns, and other batteries had been
erected it different points along the river. There seems no
reason to question the accuracy of the estimate that more
than 300 pieces of artillery and 10,000 men were holding this
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 353
position, which had been admirably chosen and carefully
strengthened. The force which Sir Michael Seymour had
available to attack this formidable position slightly exceeded
2,000 men, conveyed to the attack in six gunboats and a
large flotilla of boats. The English advance was soon known
to the Chinese, who began firing from their junks and bat-
teries as soon as they came within range. Three hundred
marines were landed to attack the battery on the hill, which
was found not to be so strong as it appeared; for on the
most precipitous side the Chinese, believing it to be unscal-
able, had placed no guns, and those in position could not be
moved to bear on the assailants in that quarter. The ma-
rines gained the top with scarcely any loss, and as they
charged over the side the Chinese retired with little loss,
owing to the ill-directed fire of the marines.
Meantime the sailors had attacked the Chinese position
on the river. The tide was at low water, and the Chinese
had barred the channel with a row of sunken junks, leaving
a narrow passage known only to themselves. The leading
English boat struck on the hidden barrier, but the passage
being discovered the other vessels got through. Those boats
which ran aground were gradually floated, one after the
other, by the rising tide, and at last the flotilla, with little
damage, reached the line of stakes which the Chinese had
placed to mark the range of the guns in their junks. At
once the fire from the seventy-two junks and the battery on
Hyacinth Island became so furious and well-directed that
it was a matter of astonishment how the English boats
passed through it. They reached and pierced the line of
junks, of which one after another was given to the flames.
Much of the success of the attack was due to the heroic
example of Commodore Harry Keppel, who led the advance
party of 500 cutlasses, and who gave the Chinese no time to
rest or rally. Having broken the line of junks, he took
up the pursuit in his seven boats, having determined that
the only proof of success could be the capture of Fatshan,
and after four miles' hard rowing he came in sight of the
354 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
elaborate defenses drawn up by the Chinese for the security
of that place. At the short range of a quarter of a mile the
fire of the Chinese guns was tremendous and destructive.
KeppeFs own boat was reduced to a sinking state, and had
to be abandoned. Some of his principal officers were killed,
three of his boats ran aground, and things looked black for
the small English force. At this critical moment, the Chi-
nese, thinking that they had checked the English attack,
and hearing of the magnitude of their reverse down stream,
thought their best course would be to retire. Then the few
English boats resumed the attack, and hung on to the
retreating junks like bull-dogs. Many junks were given
to the flames, and five were carried off under the teeth of
the Fatshan populace; but KeppePs force was too small
to hold that town and put it to the ransom, so the worn-out,
but still enthusiastic force, retired to join the main body
under Sir Michael Seymour, who was satisfied that he had
achieved all that was necessary or prudent with his squad-
ron. In these encounters thirteen men were killed and
forty wounded, of whom several succumbed to their wounds,
for it was noticed that the Chinese shot inflicted cruel in-
juries. The destruction of the Chinese fleet on the Canton
River could not be considered heavily purchased at the cost,
and the extent of the trepidation caused by Commodore
KeppePs intrepidity could not be accurately measured.
Lord Elgin reached Hongkong very soon after this event,
and, although he brought no soldiers with him, he found
English opinion at Hongkong very pronounced in favor of
an attack on Canton with a view of re-opening that city
to trade. But the necessary force was not available, and
Lord Elgin refused to commit himself to this risky course.
Sir Michael Seymour said the attack would require 5,000
troops, and General Ashburnham thought it could be done
with 4,000 men if all were effective, while the whole Hong-
kong garrison numbered only 1,500, and of these one-sixth
were invalided. Lord Elgin decided to go to Calcutta, and
ascertain when Lord Canning would be able to spare him
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 355
the troops necessary to bring China to reason. He returned
to Hongkong on September 20, and he found matters very
much as he had left them, and all the English force was
capable of was to blockade the river. To supplement the
weakness of the garrison a coolie corps of 750 Chinese was
organized, and proved very efficient, and toward the end of
November troops, chiefly marines, began at last to arrive
from England. A fleet of useful gunboats of small draught,
under Captain Sherard Osborn, arrived for the purpose of
operating against the junks in shallow creeks and rivers.
At the same time, too, came the French embassador, Baron
Gros, charged with a similar mission to Lord Elgin, and
bent on proving once for all that the pretensions of China to
superiority over other nations were absurd and untenable.
On December 12 Lord Elgin sent Yeh a note apprising
him of his arrival as plenipotentiary from Queen Victoria,
and pointing out the repeated insults and injuries inflicted
on Englishmen, culminating in the outrage to their flag and
the repeated refusal to grant any reparation for their wrongs.
But Lord Elgin went on to say that even at this eleventh
hour there was time to stay the progress of hostilities by
making prompt redress. The terms were plain and simple,
and the English demands were confined to two points the
complete execution at Canton of all treaty engagements,
including the free admission of British subjects to the city,
and compensation to British subjects and persons entitled
to British protection for losses incurred in consequence of
the late disturbances. To this categorical demand Yeh
made a long reply, going over the ground of controversy,
reasserting what he wished to believe were the facts, and
curtly concluding that the trade might continue on the old
conditions, and that each side should pay its own losses.
Mr. Wade said that his language might bear the construc-
tion that the English consul, Mr. Harry Parkes, should pay
all the cost himself. If Commissioner Yeh was a humorist
he chose a bad time for indulging his proclivities, and, a
sufficient force being available, orders were at once given
356 h. SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
to attack Canton. On December 15 Honan was occupied,
and ten days were passed in bringing up the troops and the
necessary stores, when, all being in readiness, an ultimatum
was sent to Yeh that if he would not give way within forty-
eight hours the attack would commence. At the same time
every effort was made to warn the unoffending townspeople,
so that they might remove to a place of safety. The attack-
ing force numbered about 5,000 English, 1,000 French, and
750 of the Chinese coolie corps, and it was agreed that the
most vulnerable point in the Chinese position was Lin's fort,
on the eastern side of the city. When the attack began, on
December 28, this fort was captured in half an hour, and
the Chinese retired to the northern hills, which they had
made their chief position in 1842. The destruction of Lin's-
fort by the accidental explosion of the magazine somewhat
neutralized the advantage of its capture. On the following
day the order was given to assault the city by escalade, and
three separate parties advanced on the eastern wall. The
Chinese kept up a good fire until the troops were within a
short distance, but before the ladders were placed against
the wall they abandoned their defenses and fled. The En-
glish troops reformed on the wide rampart of the wall and
pursued the Chinese to the north gate, where, being joined
by some Manchu troops, the latter turned and charged up to
the bayonets of an English regiment But they were re-
pulsed and driven out of the city, and simultaneously with
this success the fort on Magazine Hill, commanding both
the city and the Chinese position on the northern hills, was
captured without loss. In less than two hours the great city
of Canton was in the possession of the allies, and the Chinese
resistance was far less vigorous and worse directed than on
any occasion of equal importance. Still, the English loss
was fourteen killed and eighty-three wounded, while the
French casualties numbered thirty-four. The Chinese had,
however, to abandon their positions north of the city, and
their elaborate fortifications were blown up.
Although all regular resistance had been overcome, the
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 357
greater part of the city remained in possession of the Chinese
and of Yen in person. That official, although in the lowest
straits, had lost neither his fortitude nor his ferocity. He
made not the least sign of surrender, and his last act of
authority was to order the execution of 400 citizens, whom
he denounced as traitors to their country. From his yamen
in the interior of the city, when he found that the English
hesitated to advance beyond the walls, he incited the popu-
lace to fresh efforts of hostility, and, in order to check their
increasing audacity, it was resolved to send a force into the
city to effect the capture of Yeh. On January 5, 1858, three
detachments were sent into the native city, and they ad-
vanced at once upon the official residences of Yeh and
Pihkwei, the governor. The Chinese were quite unprepared
for this move, and being taken unawares they offered
scarcely any resistance. The yamen was occupied and the
treasury captured, while Pihkwei was made prisoner in his
own house. The French at the same time attacked and
occupied the Tartar city a vast stone-built suburb which
had been long allowed to fall into decay, and which, instead
of being occupied, as was believed, by 7,000 Manchu war-
riors, was the residence of bats and nauseous creatures.
But the great object of the attack was unattained, for Yeh
still remained at large, and no one seemed to know where
he ought to be sought, for all the official buildings had been
searched in vain. But Mr. Parkes, by indefatigable inquiry,
at last gained a clew from a poor scholar whom he found
poring over an ancient classic at the library, undisturbed in
the midst of the turmoil. From him he learned that Yeh
would probably be found in a yamen situated in the south-
west quarter of the city. Mr. Parkes hastened thither with
Captain (afte ; ard Admiral) Cooper Key and a party of
sailors. They arrived just in time, for all the preparations
for flight had been made, and Captain Key caught Yeh with
his own hand as he was escaping over the wall. One of his
assistants came forward with praiseworthy devotion and
declared himself to be Yeh, in the hope of saving his su-
358 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
perior; but the deception was at once detected by Mr.
Parkes, who assured Yeh that no harm would be done him.
The capture of Yeh completed the effect of the occupation
of Canton, and the disappearance of the most fanatical oppo-
nent of the foreigners insured the tranquillity of the Canton
region, which had been the main seat of disorder, during the
remainder of the war. The government of Canton was then
intrusted to Pihkwei and a commission of one Frenchman
and two Englishmen, and the Chinese admitted it had never
been better governed. Yeh himself was sent to Calcutta,
where he died two years later, and, considering the abun-
dant evidence of his cruel treatment of defenseless prisoners,
he had every reason to consider his punishment lenient.
Having thus settled the difficulty at Canton, it remained
for Lord Elgin to carry out the other part of his task, and
place diplomatic relations between England and China on a
satisfactory basis by obtaining the right of direct communi-
cation with Pekin. A letter dated February 11, 1858, was
sent to the senior Secretary of State at Pekin describing
what had occurred in the south, and summarizing what
would be required from the Chinese government. The
English and French plenipotentiaries also notified that they
would proceed to Shanghai for the purpose of conducting
further negotiations. This letter was duly forwarded to
Pekin by the Governor of Kiangsu, and when Lord Elgin
reached Shanghai on March 30 he found the reply of Yu-
ching, the chief adviser of Hienfung, waiting for him.
Yuching's letter was extremely unsatisfactory. It was
arrogant in its terms and impracticable as to its proposals.
Lord Elgin was told that "no imperial commissioner ever
conducts business at Shanghai," and that it behooved the
English minister to wait at Canton until the arrival of a new
imperial commissioner from Pekin. The only concession the
Chinese made was to dismiss Yeh from his posts, and as he
was a prisoner in the hands of the English this did not mean
much. Lord Elgin's reply to this communication was to
announce his intention of proceeding to the Peiho, and there
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 359
negotiating direct with the imperial government. Lord
Elgin reached the Gulf of Pechihli about the middle of
April, and he again addressed Yuching in the hope of an
amicable settlement, and requested that the emperor would
appoint some official to act as his plenipotentiary. Three
minor officials were appointed, more out of curiosity than
from a desire to promote business, but on Lord Elgin discov-
ering that they were of inferior rank and that their powers
were inadequate, he declined to see them. But Yuching re-
fused to appoint any others ; stating curtly that their powers
were ample for the adjustment of affairs, and then Lord
Elgin announced that he would proceed up the Peiho to
Tientsin. Some delay was caused by the non-arrival of the
fleet, which was not assembled in the Gulf of Pechihli,
through different causes of delay, until the end of May, or
about three weeks after Lord Elgin announced his intention
of forcing his way up to Tientsin. There is no doubt that
Sir Michael Seymour was in no sense to blame for this delay,
but unfortunately it aroused considerable irritation in the
mind of Lord Elgin, who sent home a dispatch, without
informing his colleague, stating that the delay was "a most
grievous disappointment," and attributing it to the supine-
ness of the admiral.
On May 19 the allied fleet p .-oceeded to the mouth of the
river, and summoned the commandant to surrender the Taku
forts on the following morning. No reply being received, the
attack commenced, and after the bombardment had gone on
at short range for an hour and a quarter the Chinese gun-
ners were driven from their batteries, and the troops landed,
occupying the whole line of forts and intrenched camps. An
attempt to injure our fleet by fire-ships miscarried, and con-
sidering that the Chinese had some of their best troops pres-
ent, including a portion of the Imperial Guard, their resist-
ance was not as great as might have been expected. Their
general committed suicide, and the Chinese lost the best part
of their artillery, which had been removed from Pekin and
Tientsin for the defense of the entrance to the Peiho, The
360 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
fleet proceeded up the river to Tientsin, and Lord Elgin took
up his quarters in that city. The Chinese government was
brought to reason by this striking success, and, with his
capital menaced, the emperor hastened to delegate full pow-
ers to two high commissioners, Kweiliang and Hwashana,
both Manchus and dignitaries of the highest birth and rank.
Their powers were superior to those granted to Keying at the
time of the old war, and they were commanded with affec-
tionate earnestness to show the foreigners that they were
competent and willing to grant anything not injurious to
China. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the pro-
posals of the new Chinese representatives, and they were
anxious to settle everything with the least possible delay.
At this point there reappeared upon the scene a man whose
previous experience and high position entitled him to some
consideration. Less than a week after his first interview
with the imperial representatives, Lord Elgin received a
letter from Keying, who, it was soon found, had come on
a self-appointed mission to induce the English by artifice
and plausible representation to withdraw their fleet from the
river. His zeal was increased by the knowledge that the
penalty of failure would be death, and as his reputation had
been very great among Europeans there is no saying but that
he might have succeeded had there not been discovered in
Yen's yamen at Canton some of his papers, which showed
that he had played a double part throughout, and that at
heart he was bitterly anti-foreign. When he found that the
English possessed this information he hastened back to Pekin,
where he was at once summoned before the Board of Pun-
ishment for immediate judgment, and, being found guilty,
it was ordered that as he had acted "with stupidity and
precipitancy" he should be strangled forthwith. As an act
of extreme grace the emperor allowed him to put an end to
his existence in consideration of his being a member of the
imperial family.
After the departure of Keying, negotiations proceeded
very satisfactorily with Kweiliang and Hwashana, and all
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 361
Hie points were practically agreed upon, excepting the right
to have a resident minister at Pekin. This claim was op-
posed on several grounds. It was not merely something
that had never been heard of, but it would probably be
attended with peril to the envoy as well as to the Chinese
government. Then the commissioners wanted to know if
he would wear the Chinese dress, if all the powers would
have only one minister, and if he would make the kotow?
Finding such arguments fail they asked that the visit of an
English embassador to Pekin should be postponed till a more
favorable occasion. They made the admission that "there
is properly no objection to the permanent residence at Pekin
of a plenipotentiary minister of her Britannic Majesty," and
they even spoke of sending a return mission to London ; but
they deprecated the proposal as novel and as specially risky
at this moment in consequence of the formidable Taeping
Rebellion. These representations did not fail to produce their
effect, for it was not to the interest of Europeans generally
that the emperor's authority should be subverted on the
morrow of his signing a treaty with us. In consequence of
these feelings, and with a wish to reciprocate the generally-
conciliatory attitude of the Chinese officials, Kweiliang and
Hwashana were informed that the right would be waived
for the present, except that it would be necessary for the
English minister to visit Pekin twelve months later, on the
occasion of exchanging the ratifications of the treaty; and
so the matter was left pending the arrival of that occasion.
While the Treaty of Tientsin provided for the conclusion of
a peace that promised to be enduring, and arranged for the
future diplomatic relations of the two countries, commis-
sioners were duly appointed to meet at Shanghai and draw
up a tariff. But at Tientsin the great crux in the com-
mercial relations between us and the Chinese had been set-
tled by the legalization of opium. It was agreed that opium
might be imported into China on payment of thirty taels, or
about fifty dollars, per chest. Experience had shown that
leaving the most largely-imported article into China contra-
16
363 A SHORT HISTORY OF CII1XA.
band had been both futile and inconvenient, while the Chi-
nese government was a direct loser by not enjoying a legiti-
mate source of revenue. How general the view had become
that the evils of the use of opium were exaggerated, and,
even admitting them, that there was no better way of dimin-
ishing their effect than by legalizing the import of opium,
can be judged by the ready acquiescence of the Chinese com-
missioners; and here, from many other matured opinions,
we may quote the final and deliberate conviction of Sir
Henry Pottiuger:
"I take this opportunity to advert to one important topic
on which I have hitherto considered it right to preserve a
rigid silence I allude to the trade in opium; and I now
unhesitatingly declare in this public manner that after the
most unbiased and careful observations I have become con-
vinced during my stay in China that the alleged demoraliz-
ing and debasing evils of opium have been and are vastly
exaggerated. Like all other indulgences, excesses in its use
are bad and reprehensible ; but I have neither myself seen
such vicious consequences as are frequently ascribed to it,
nor have I been able to obtain authentic proofs or informa-
tion of their existence. The great, and perhaps I might say
sole, objection to the trade, looking at it morally and ab-
stractedly, that I have discovered, is that it is at present con-
traband and prohibited by the laws of China, and therefore
to be regretted and disavowed; but I have striven and I
hope with some prospect of eventual success to bring about
its legalization ; and were that point once effected, I am of
opinion that its most objectionable feature would be alto-
gether removed. Even as it now exists it appears to me to
be unattended with a hundredth part of the debasement and
misery which may be seen in our native country from the
lamentable abuse of ardent spirits, and those who so sweep-
ingly condemn the opium trade on that principle need not,
I think, leave the shores of England to find a far greater and
more besetting evil."
The ink on the Tientsin treaty was scarcely dry before
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 363
reasons began to be furnished against the sincerity of the
emperor and his desire for peace. Before the fleet left the
Peiho workmen were already engaged repairing and re-arm-
ing the Taku forts, and the morrow of Lord Elgin's depart-
ure from Hongkong witnessed the revival 01 disturbances
round Canton, where the new imperial commissioner Hwang,
instead of seeking to restore harmony, had devoted himself
to inciting the population to patriotic deeds in emulation of
Commissioner Yeh. It was found necessary to take strenu-
ous measures against the turbulent patriots of Kwantung,
and to break up their main force in their strong and well-
chosen position at Shektsin, which was accomplished by a
vigorous attack both on land and water. The suspicion that
the Chinese were not absolutely straightforward in their
latest dealings with us was confirmed by the discovery at
Shektsin of secret imperial edicts, breathing defiance to the
foreigners and inciting the people to resistance. These and
other facts warned the European authorities on the spot that
there was no certainty that the Treaty of Tientsin would be
ratified, or that a British envoy would be admitted into the
capital for even the temporary business of a diplomatic cere-
mony. While people in Europe were assuming that the
Chinese question might be dismissed for twenty years, the
English consuls and commanders in the treaty ports were
preparing themselves for a fresh and more vigorous demon-
stration of Chinese hostility and animosity. The matter that
was to prove the sincerity and good faith of the Chinese
government was the reception at Pekin of the English offi-
cer intrusted with the duty of exchanging the ratified copies
of the treaty. If he were allowed to proceed to Pekin there
would be reason for accepting the assurances of the emperor
that a permanent arrangement should be effected later on,
when it would not injure his dignity or authority.
Mr. Frederick Bruce, who had been secretary to his
brother, Lord Elgin, and who had previously served at
Hongkong, was appointed her Majesty's representative for
the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the treaty. He
364 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
was instructed to inform the Chinese officials that, while the
British government would not renounce the right of having
a permanent resident minister at Pekin, they were prepared
to waive it for a time by allowing diplomatic intercourse to
be carried on at Shanghai. But no deviation was to be per-
mitted from the arrangement that the ratifications were to
be exchanged at Pekin, and Lord Malmesbury warned the
new envoy that "all the arts at which the Chinese are such
adepts will be put in practice to dissuade you from repairing
to the capital." Mr. Bruce received his instructions on
March 1, 1859, and the exchange of ratifications had to be
effected before June 26. Mr. Bruce reached Hongkong in
April, and he found the air full of unsatisfactory rumors;
and when he reached Shanghai the uncertainty was inten-
sified by the presence of Kweiliang and Hwashana, who
seemed to think that everything might be settled without
a journey to Pekin. They endeavored to get up a discussion
on some unsettled details of minor importance, in the hope
that the period for the ratification of the treaty might be
allowed to expire. Mr. Bruce announced his imminent
departure for the Peiho to Kweiliang, and expressed the
hope that arrangements would be made for his safe convey-
ance to and appropriate accommodation at Pekin. Neither
Mr. Bruce's instructions nor his own opinion justified any
delay in proceeding to the north, and the fleet sent on in
advance under the command of Admiral Hope reached the
mouth of the Peiho on June 17, three days before Mr. Bruce.
The admiral on arrival sent a notification to the Chinese
officers in command of the forts that the English envoy was
coming. But the reception given to the officers who con-
veyed this intimation was distinctly unfavorable and even
hostile. The two boats sent ashore found that the entrance
to the river was effectually barred by a row of iron stakes
and by an inner boom, and that a large and excited crowd
forbade them to land. A vague promise was given that an
opening would be made in the obstructions to admit the
passage of the English ships; but on the boats repeating
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 365
their visit on the succeeding day they found that the small
passages had been more effectually secured, and that there
could no longer be any doubt that the Chinese did not intend
to admit the English envoy. It was therefore determined
to make a demonstration with the fleet, and if necessary to
resort to force, which it was never doubted would be attended
with little risk and crowned with complete success.
On June 25 the attack on the Taku forts began with the
removal of the iron stakes forming the outer barrier by the
steamer "Opossum," and this part of the operations was
performed without a shot being fired. When, however, the
eleven ships forming the English fleet reached the inner
boom all the Chinese forts and batteries began to fire with
an accuracy which showed that the guns had been trained
to bear on this precise spot. The result of this unexpectedly
vigorous bombardment was soon shown in the damaged
condition of our ships. Two gunboats were sunk, all the
vessels were more or less damaged, and when, after three
hours' cannonade, it was sought to retrieve the doubtful
fortune of the day by a land attack, the result only went to
accentuate the ill results of the naval engagement. In this
disastrous affair more than 300 men were killed and wounded,
which, added to the loss of three gunboats, represented a
very serious disaster. But the worst of it was that it con-
vinced the emperor and his advisers that they could hold
their own against Europeans, and that it placed the extreme
party once more in the ascendant at Pekin. Sankolinsin, the
Mongol prince who had checked the advance of the Taepings,
became master of the situation, and declared that there was
nothing to fear from an enemy who had been repulsed by
the raw levies of the province while he held the flat country
between the Peiho and Pekin with the flower of the Banner
army. Mr. Bruce returned to Shanghai, the fleet to Hong-
kong, and the matter remained suspended until fresh instruc-
tions and troops could be received from Europe.
After some hesitation and delay, a plan of joint action
was agreed upon in November, 1859, between France and
366 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
England, and it was hoped that the whole expeditionary
force would have reached its destination by April, 1860.
Pending its arrival Mr. Bruce was instructed to present an
ultimatum with thirty days' grace demanding an immediate
apology, the payment of a large indemnity amounting to
$12,000,000 to both England and France, and the ratification
of the Treaty of Tientsin. The minister, Pang Wanching,
replied, categorically refusing all these requests; and, as
neither indemnity nor apology was offered, there remained
no alternative but the inevitable and supreme appeal to arms.
The troops which were to form the expedition were mainly
drawn from India, and Sir Hope Grant, who had not merely
distinguished himself during the Mutiny, but who had served
in the first English war with China during the operations
round Canton, was appointed to the command of the army ;
while Admiral Hope, strongly re-enforced in ships, retained
the command of the naval forces. A force of five batteries
of artillery, six regiments of infantry, two squadrons of cav-
alry, together with a body of horse and foot from the native
army of India, amounting in all to about 10,000 men, was
placed at the general's disposal in addition to the troops
already in China. The French government agreed to send
another army of about two-thirds this strength to co-operate
on the Peiho, and General Montauban was named for the
command. The collection of this large expedition brought
into prominence the necessity of employing as embassador a
diplomatist of higher rank than Mr. Bruce ; and accordingly,
in February Lord Elgin and Baron Gros were commissioned
to again proceed to China for the purpose of securing the
ratification of their own treaty. Sir Hope Grant reached
Hongkong in March, 1860, and by his recommendation a
stronger native contingent (one Sikh regiment, four Punjab
regiments, two Bombay regiments, one Madras regiment of
foot, and two irregular regiments of Sikh cavalry, known
as Fane's and Probyn's Horse; Sir John Michel and Sir
Robert Napier commanding divisions under Sir Hope Grant)
was added, raising the English force in the field to more
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 367
than 13,000 men. A lease was obtained in perpetuity,
through the skillful negotiation of Mr. Parkes, of Kowlun
and Stonecutter Island, where, from their salubrious posi-
tion, it was proposed to place the troops on their arrival from
India or England. Chusan was occupied the following
month without opposition by an English brigade of 2,000
men.
The summer had commenced before the whole of the
expedition assembled at Hongkong, whence it was moved
northward to Shanghai about a year after the failure of
the attack on the forts on the Peiho. A further delay was
caused by the tardiness of the French, and July had begun
before the expedition reached the Gulf of Pechihli. Then
opposite opinions led to different suggestions, and while the
English advocated proceeding to attack Pehtang, General
Montauban drew up another plan of action. But the exi-
gencies of the alliance compelled the English, who were
ready, to wait for the French, who were not, in order that
the assault might be made simultaneously. Before that
time arrived the French commander had been brought round
to the view that the proper plan of campaign was that sug-
gested by the English commander ; viz. , to attack and cap-
ture Pehtang, whence the Taku forts might be taken in the
rear. It is somewhat remarkable to observe that no one
suggested a second time endeavoring to carry by a front
attack these forts, which had in the interval since Admiral
Hope's failure been rendered more formidable.
At Pehtang the Chinese had made few preparations for
defense, and nothing of the same formidable character as
at Taku. The forts on both sides of the river were neither
extensive nor well-armed. The garrison consisted largely
of Tartar cavalry, more useful for watching the movements
of the foreigners than for working artillery when exposed to
the fire of the new Armstrong guns of the English. The
attacking force landed in boats and by wading, Sir Hope
Grant setting his men the example. No engagement took
place on the night of disembarkation. When morning broke
368 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA
a suspicious silence in the enemy's quarters strengthened the
belief that Pehtang would not be defended. While the gar-
rison had resolved not to resist an attack, they had contem-
plated causing their enemy as much loss as if he had been
obliged to carry the place by storm by placing shells in the
magazine which would be exploded by the moving of some
gunlocks put in a spot where they could not fail to be trod-
den upon. This plot, which was thoroughly in accordance
with the practices of Chinese warfare, was fortunately
divulged by a native more humane than patriotic, and
Pehtang was captured and occupied without the loss of a
single man. This success at the commencement enabled the
whole of the expedition to land without further delay or
difficulty. Three days after the capture of Pehtang, recon-
noitering parties were sent out to ascertain what the Chinese
were doing, and whether they had made any preparations
to oppose an advance toward Taku or Tientsin. Four miles
from Pehtang they came in sight of a strongly intrenched
camp, where several thousand men opened fire upon the
reconnoitering parties with their gingalls, and several men
were wounded. The object being only to find out what the
Celestial army was doing, and where it was, the Europeans
withdrew on discovering the proximity of so strong a force.
The great difficulty was to discover a way of getting from
Pehtang on to some of the main roads leading to the Peiho ;
for the whole of the surrounding country had been under
water, and was more or less impassable. In fact, the region
round Pehtang consisted of nothing but mud, while the one
road, an elevated causeway, was blocked by the fortified
camp just mentioned as having been discovered by the
reconnoitering party. A subsequent reconnaissance, con-
ducted by Colonel (now Lord) Wolseley, revealed the pres-
ence of a cart-track which might prove available for the
march of troops. This track was turned to advantage for
the purpose of taking the Chinese position in flank, and to
Sir Robert Napier's division was assigned this, as it proved,
difficult operation. When the maneuver of out-flanking
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 369
had been satisfactorily accomplished, the attack was com-
menced in front. Here the Chinese stood to their position,
but only for a brief time, as the fire from eighteen guns,
including some forty-pounders, soon silenced their gingalls,
and they precipitately abandoned their intrenchments. While
the engagement in front had reached this favorable termina-
tion Sir Robert Napier had been engaged on the right hand
with a strong body of Tartar cavalry, which attacked with
considerable valor, and with what seemed a possibility of
success, until the guns opening upon them and the Sikh
cavalry charging them dispelled their momentary dream of
victory. The prize of this battle was the village of Sinho
with its line of earthworks, one mile north of the Peiho, and
about seven miles in the rear of the Taku forts.
The next day was occupied in examining the Chinese
position and in discovering, what was more difficult than its
capture, how it might be approached. It was found that the
village, which formed a fortified square protected by bat-
teries, could be best approached by the river bank, and the
only obstacle in this quarter was that represented by the fire
of the guns of two junks, supported by a battery on the oppo-
site side of the river. These, however, were soon silenced
by the superior fire directed upon them, and the guns were
spiked by Captain Willis and a few sailors, who crossed the
river for the purpose. The flank of the advance being thus
protected, the attack on Tangku itself began with a cannon-
ade from thirty-six pieces of the best artillery of that age.
The Chinese fire was soon rendered innocuous, and their
walls and forts were battered down. Even then, however,
tho garrison gave no signs of retreat, and it was not until
the Armstrongs had been dragged within a very short dis-
tance of the walls, and the foot-soldiers had absolutely
effected an entrance, that the garrison thought of th^ir per-
sonal safety and turned in flight.
Some days before the battle and capture of Tangku, Lord
Elgin received several communications from Hang, the Gov-
ernor-general of Pechihli, requesting a cessation of hostilities,
370 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHISA.
and announcing the approach of two imperial commissioners
appointed for the express purpose of ratifying the Treaty of
Tientsin. But Lord Elgin very wisely perceived that it
would be impossible to negotiate on fair terms unless the
Taku forts were in his possession. The capture of Tangku
placed the allied forces in the rear of the northern forts on
the Peiho; and those forts once occupied, the others on the
southern side would be practically untenable and obliged to
surrender at discretion. Several days were passed in pre-
liminary observations and skirmishing. On the one side, the
whole of the Tartar cavalry was removed to the southern
bank ; on the other, a bridge of boats was thrown across the
Peiho, and the approach to the northern fort carefully exam-
ined up to 600 yards from the wall. At this point the views
of the allied generals again clashed. General Montauban
wished to attack the southern forts. Sir Hope Grant was
determined to begin by carrying the northern. The attack
on the chief northern fort commenced on the morning of Au-
gust 21 with a heavy cannonade; the Chinese, anticipating
the plans of the English, were the first to fire. The Chinese
fought their guns with extraordinary courage. A shell ex-
ploded their principal magazine, which blew up with a ter-
rible report ; but as soon as the smoke cleared off they recom-
menced their fire with fresh ardor. Although even this fort
had not been constructed with the same strength in the rear
as they all presented in the front, the resistance was most
vigorous. A premature attempt to throw a pontoon across
the ditch was defeated with the loss of sixteen men. The
coolie corps here came to the front, and, rushing into the
water, held up the pontoons while the French and some
English troops dashed across. But all their efforts to scale
the wall were baffled, and it seemed as if they had only gone
to self-destruction. "While the battle was thus doubtfully
contested, Major Anson, who had shown the greatest in-
trepidity on several occasions, succeeded in cutting the ropes
that held up a drawbridge, and an entrance was soon effected
within the body of the works. The Chinese still resisted
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 371
nobly, and it was computed that out of a garrison of 500
men but 100 escaped. The English loss was 22 killed, and
179, including 21 officers, were wounded. To these figures
must be added the French loss.
There still remained four more forts on the northern side
of the river, and it seemed as if these would offer further
resistance, as the garrisons uttered threats of defiance to a
summons to surrender. But appearances were deceptive,
and for the good reason that all of these forts were only pro-
tected in the rear by a slight wall. The French rushed im-
petuously to the attack, only to find that the garrison had
given up the defense, while a large number had actually
retired. Two thousand prisoners were made, and the fall
of the forts on the northern bank was followed by an imme-
diate summons to those on the southern to surrender; and
as they were commanded by the guns in the former they
yielded with as good a grace as they could muster. The
following day formal occupation was made, and the spoil
included more than 600 cannon of various sizes and degrees
of efficiency. On that day also the fleet, which had during
these operations been riding at anchor off the mouth of the
river, proceeded across the bar, removed the different ob-
stacles that had been intended to hinder its approach, and
Admiral Hope anchored in security off those very forts
which had repulsed him in the previous year, and which
would in all probability have continued to defy any direct
attack from the sea. Let it not be said, therefore, that Sir
Hope Grant's capture of the Taku forts reflected in any way
on the courage or capacity of Admiral Hope for the failure
in 1859.
By this decisive success the road to Tientsin was openecf
both by land and by the river. The fleet of gunboats, which
had participated as far as they could without incurring any
undue danger in the attack on the forts, were ordered up the
Peiho; and the English embassador, escorted by a strong
naval and military force, proceeded to Tientsin, where it
would be possible, without any loss of dignity, to resume
372 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
negotiations "with the Pekiii government. The advanced
gunboats arrived at Tientsin on August 23, and three days
later the greater portion of the expedition had entered that
city. No resistance was attempted, although several batter-
ies and intrenched camps were passed on the way. Precau-
tions were at once taken to make the position of the troops
as secure as possible in the midst of a very large and pre-
sumably hostile population. The people showed, according
to the ideas of Europe, an extraordinary want of patriotic
fervor, and were soon engaged, on the most amicable terms,
in conducting a brisk trade with the invaders of their coun-
try; but there was never any doubt that on the first sign of
a reverse they would have turned upon the foreign troops,
and completed by all the means in their power their discom-
fiture. Several communications passed between the opposite
camps during these days; and when Hang announced the
withdrawal of all Chinese troops from Tientsin he expressed
a wish that the English embassador would not bring many
vessels of war with him. But such requests were made
more with the desire to save appearances than from any
hope that they would be granted. The reality of their fears,
and of their consequent desire to negotiate, was shown by
the appointment of Kweiliang, who had arranged the Treaty
of Tientsin, as high commissioner to provide for the neces-
sary ceremonies in connection with its ratification. Kweiliang
apparently possessed powers of the most extensive character ;
and he hastened to inform Lord Elgin, who had taken up
MIS residence in a beautiful yamen in Tientsin, that he had
received the emperor's authority to discuss and decide every-
thing. In response to this notification the reply was sent
that the three conditions of peace were an apology for the
attack on the English flag at Peiho, the payment of an in-
demnity, including the costs of the war, and, thirdty, the
ratification and execution of the Treaty of Tientsin, includ-
ing, of course, the reception at Pekin of the representative
of the Queen of England on honorable terms adequate to
the dignity of that great sovereign. To none of these was
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 373
Kweiliang himself disposed to raise any objection. Only in
connection with the details of the last-named point was there
likely that any difference of opinion would arise; and that
difference of opinion speedily revealed itself when it became
known that the English insisted on the advance of their
army to the town of Tungchow, only twelve miles distant
from the walls of Pekiii. To the Chinese ministers this sim-
ple precaution seemed like exacting the extreme rights of the
conqueror, before, too, the act of conquest had been consum-
mated ; for already fresh troops were arriving from Mongolia
and Manchuria, and the valor of Sankolinsin was beginning
to revive. That the Chinese government had under the
hard taskmaster, necessity, made great progress in its views
on foreign matters was not to be denied, but somehow or
other its movements always lagged behind the requirements
of the hour, and the demands of the English were again
ahead of what it was disposed to yield.
If the Chinese government had promptly accepted the
inevitable, and if Kweiliang had negotiated with as much
celerity as he pretended to be his desire, peace might have
been concluded and the Chinese saved some further igno-
miny. But it soon became clear that all the Chinese were
thinking about was to gain time, and as the months avail-
able for active campaigning were rapidly disappearing, it
was imperative that not the least delay should be sanctioned.
On September 8, Lord Elgin and Sir Hope Grant left Tien-
tsin with an advance force of about 1,500 men; and, march-
ing by the highroad, reached the pretty village of Hosiwu,
half-way between that town and the capital. A few days
later this force was increased by the remainder of one divis-
ion, while to Sir Robert Napier was left the task of guarding
with the other Tientsin and the communications with the sea.
At Hosiwu negotiations were resumed by Tsai, Prince of I,
a nephew of the emperor, who declared that he had received
authority to conclude all arrangements; but he was curtly
informed that no treaty could be concluded save at Tung-
chow, and the army resumed its advance beyond Hosiwu.
374 A SHOR7 HISTORY OP CHL\A.
The march was continued without molestation to a point
beyond the village of Matow, but when Sir Hope Grant
approached a place called Chau-chia-wan he found himself
in presence of a large army. This was the first sign of any
resolve to offer military opposition to the invaders since the
capture of the Taku forts, and it came to a great extent in
the manner of a surprise, for by a special agreement with
Mr. Parkes the settlement of the difficulty was to be con-
cluded at Chan-chia-wan in an amicable manner. Instead,
however, of the emperor's delegates, the English commander
found Sankolinsin and the latest troops drawn from Pekin
and beyond the wall in battle array, and occupying the
very ground which had been assigned for the English en-
campment.
The day before the English commander perceived that
he was in face of a strong force Mr. Parkes and some other
officers and civilians had been sent ahead with an escort of
Sikh cavalry to arrange the final preliminaries with the im-
perial commissioners at Tungchow, both as to where the
camp was to be pitched and also as to the interview between
the respective plenipotentiaries of the opposing powers. This
party proceeded to Tungchow without encountering any op-
position or perceiving any exceptional military precautions.
Troops were indeed observed at several points, and officers
in command of pickets demanded the nature of their business
and where they were going, but the reply "To the Commis-
sioners" at once satisfied all inquiries and opened every bar-
rier. The one incident that happened was of happy augury
for a satisfactory issue if the result went to prove the falla-
ciousness of human expectations. A change had in the mean-
while come over the minds of the imperial commissioners,
whether in accordance with the working of a deep and long-
arranged policy, or from the confidence created by the sight
of the numerous warriors drawn from the cradle of the
Manchu race for the defense of the capital and dynasty,
can never be ascertained with any degree of certainty.
Their tone suddenly assumed greater boldness and arro-
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 376
gance. To some of the Englishmen it appeared "almost
offensive," and it was only after five hours' discussion
between Mr. Parkes and the commissioners at Tungchow
that some sign was given of a more yielding disposition.
The final arrangements were hastily concluded in the even-
ing of September 17 for the arrival of the troops at the pro-
posed camping ground on the morrow, and for the interview
that was to follow as soon after as possible. "While Mr.
Parkes and some of his companions were to ride forward in
the morning to apprise Sir Hope Grant of what had been
agreed upon, and to point out the site for his camp, the
others were to remain hi Tungchow with the greater part
of the Sikc escort.
On their return toward the advancing English army in
the early morning of the following day, Mr. Parkes and his
party met with frequent signs of military movement in the
country between Tungchow and Chan-chia-wan. Large
bodies of infantry and gingall-men were seen marching
from all quarters to the town. At Chan-chia-wan itself still
more emphatic tokens were visible of a coming battle. Cav-
alry were drawn up in dense bodies, but under shelter. In
a nullah one regiment of a thousand sabers was stationed
with the men standing at their horses' heads ready for in-
stant action. At another point a number of men were busily
engaged in constructing a battery and in placing twelve guns
in position. When the Englishmen gained the plain they
found the proposed site of the English camp in the actual
possession of a Chinese army, and a strong force of Tartar
cavalry, alone reckoned to number six or seven thousand
men, scouring the plain. To all inquiries as to what these
warlike arrangements betokened no reply was made by the
soldiers, and when the whereabout of the responsible general
acked there came the stereotyped answer that "he was
many li away." To the most obtuse mind these arrange-
ments could convey but one meaning. They indicated that
the Chinese government had resolved to make another en-
deavor to avert the concessions demanded from them by the
376 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
English and their allies, and to appeal once more to the God
of Battles ere they accepted the inevitable. When the whole
truth flashed across the mind of Mr. Parkes, the army of Sir
Hope Grant might be, and indeed was, marching into the
trap prepared for it, with such military precautions perhaps
as a wise general never neglected, but still wholly unpre-
pared for the extensive and well -arranged opposition planned
for its reception by a numerous army established in a strong
position of its own choosing. It became, therefore, of the
greatest importance to communicate the actual state of affairs
to him, and to place at his disposal the invaluable informa-
tion which the Englishmen returning from Tungchow had
in their possession. But Mr. Parkes had still more to do.
It was his duty to bring before the Chinese imperial commis-
sioners at the earliest possible moment the knowledge of this
flagrant breach of the convention he had concluded the day
before, to demand its meaning, and to point out the grave
consequences that must ensue from such treacherous hos-
tility; and in that supreme moment, as he had done on the
many other critical occasions of his career in China at Can-
ton and Taku in particular the one thought in the mind of
Mr. Parkes was how best to perform his duty. He did not
forget also that, while he was almost in a place of safety
near the limits of the Chinese pickets, and not far distant
from the advancing columns of Sir Hope Grant, there were
other Englishmen in his rear possibly in immiment peril of
their lives amid the Celestials at Tungchow.
Mr. Parkes rode back, therefore, to that town, and with
him went one English dragoon, named Phipps, and one
Sikh sowar carrying a flag of truce on his spear-point. We
must leave them for the moment to follow the movements
of the others. To Mr. Loch was intrusted the task of com-
municating with Sir Hope Grant; while the remainder of
the party were to remain stationary, in order to show the
Chinese that they did not suspect anything, and that they
were full of confidence. Mr. Loch, accompanied by two
Sikhs, rode at a hard canter away from the Chinese lim s.
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 377
He passed through one body of Tartar cavalry without oppo-
sition, and reached the advanced guard of the English force
in safety. To tell his news was but the work of a minute.
It confirmed the suspicions which General Grant had begun
to feel at the movements of some bodies of cavalry on the
flank of his line of march. Mr. Loch had performed his
share of the arrangement. He had warned Sir Hope Grant.
But to the chivalrous mind duty is but half-performed if aid
is withheld from those engaged in fulfilling theirs. What
he had done had proved unexpected!}- easy ; it remained for
him to assist those whose share was more arduous and peril-
ous. So Mr. Loch rode back to the Chinese lines, Captain
Brabazon insisting on following him, again accompanied
by two Sikhs but not the same who had ridden with him
before.
Sir Hope Grant had given him the assurance that unless
absolutely forced to engage he would postpone the action for
two hours. This small party of four men rode without hesi-
tation, and at a rapid pace, through the skirmishers of the
Chinese army. The rapidity of their movements discon-
certed the Chinese, who allowed them to pass without oppo-
sition and almost without notice. They rode through the
streets of Chan-chia-wan without meeting with any moles-
tation, although they were crowded with the mustering men
of the imperial army. They gained Tungchow without let
or hinderance, after having passed through probably not less
than 30,000 men about to do battle with the long hated and
now feared foreigners. It may have been, as suggested,
that they owed their safety to a belief that they were the
bearers of their army's surrender! Arrived at Tungchow,
Mr. Loch found the Sikh escort at the temple outside the
gates unaware of any danger all the Englishmen being
absent in the town, where they were shopping and a letter
left by Mr. Parkes warning them on return to prepare for
instant flight, and saying that he was off in search of Prince
Tsai. In that search he was at last successful. He found
the high commissioner, he asked the meaning of the change
378 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
that had taken place, and was told in curt and defiant tones
that "there could be no peace, there must be war."
The last chance of averting hostilities was thus shown to
be in vain. Prince Tsai indorsed the action of Sankolinsin.
Mr. Parkes had only the personal satisfaction of knowing
that he had done everything he could to prove that the En-
glish did not wish to press their military superiority over an
antagonist whose knowledge of war was slight and out of
date. He had done this at the greatest personal peril. It
only remained to secure his own safety and that of his com-
panions. By this time the whole party of Englishmen had
re-assembled in the temple ; and Mr. Loch, anxious for Mr.
Parkes, had gone into the city and met him galloping away
from the yamen of the commissioner. There was no longer
reason for delay. Not an Englishman had yet been touched,
but between this small band and safety lay the road back
through the ranks of Sankolinsin's warriors. From Tung-
chow to the advanced post of Sir Hope Grant's army was a
ten mile ride; and most of the two hours' grace had already
expired. Could it be done? By this time most of the Chi-
nese troops had reached Chan-chia-wan, where they had
been drawn up in battle array among the maize-fields and
in the nullahs as already described. From Tungchow to
that place the country was almost deserted ; and the fugi-
tives proceeded unmolested along the road till they reached
that town. The streets were crowded partly with armed
citizens and peasants, but chiefly with panic-stricken house-
holders; and by this time the horses were blown, and some
of them almost exhausted. Through this crowd the seven
Englishmen and twenty Sikhs walked their horses, and met
not the least opposition. They reached the eastern side with-
out insult or injury, passed through the gates, and descend-
ing the declivity found themselves in the rear of the whole
Chinese army. The dangers through which they had passed
were as nothing compared with those they had now to en-
counter. A shell burst in the air at this moment, followed
by the discharge of the batteries on both sides. The battle
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 379
had begun. The promised two hours had expired. The
fugitives were some ten minutes too late.
The position of this small band in the midst of an Asiatic
army actually engaged in mortal combat with their kinsmen
may be better imagined than described. They were riding
down the road which passed through the center of the Chi-
nese position, and the banks on each side of them were lined
with matchlock-men, among whom the shells of the English
guns were already bursting. Parties of cavalry were not
wanting here, but out in the plain where the Tartar horse-
men swarmed in thousands the greatest danger of all awaited
them. Their movements were slow, painfully slow, and the
progress was delayed by the necessity of waiting for those
who were the worst mounted; but they were "all in the
same boat, and, like Englishmen, would sink or swim to-
gether." In the accumulation of difficulties that stared them
in the face not the least seemed to be that they were advanc-
ing in the teeth of their own countrymen's fire, which was
growing fiercer every minute. In this critical moment men
turned to Mr. Parkes, and Captain Brabazon expressed the
belief of those present in a cool brave man in arduous ex-
tremity when he cried out, "I vote Parkes decides what is to
be done." To follow the main road seemed to be certain
destruction and death without the power of resisting; for
even assuming that some of them could have cut their way
through the Tartar cavalry, and escaped from the English
shell, they could hardly have avoided being shot down by
the long lines of matchlock-men who were ready to fire on
them the instant they saw their backs. There was only one
possible avenue of escape, and that was to gain the right
flank of the army, and endeavor to make their way by a
detour round to the English lines. Assuredly this was not
a very promising mode of escape, but it seemed to have the
greatest chances of success. But when the Chinese, who
had up to this regarded their movements without interfering,
saw this change in their course, they at once took measures
to stop it. A military mandarin said if they persisted in
380 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
their attempt they would be treated as enemies and fired
upon ; but that he was willing to respect their flag of truce,
and that if they would accompany him to the general's pres-
ence he would obtain a safe conduct for them. The offer
was accepted, partly no doubt because it could not be re-
fused, but still also on its own merits. Safe conducts during
the heat of battle, even with civilized European peoples, are,
however, not such easy things either to grant or to carry
out. Mr. Parkes accepted his offer, therefore, and he, Mr.
Loch, and the Sikh trooper Nalsing, bearing a flag of truce,
rode off with the mandarin in search of the general, while
the five other Europeans and the Sikh escort remained on
the road awaiting their return. They proceeded to the left,
where it was understood that Sankolinsin commanded in
person. They met with some adventures even on this short
journey. Coming suddenly upon a large body of infantry,
they were almost pulled from their horses, and would have
been killed but for the mandarin rushing between them and
shouting to the men "not to fire." A short distance beyond
this they halted, when the approach of Sankolinsin was an-
nounced by loud shouts of his name from the soldiery. Mr.
Parkes at once addressed him, saying that they had come
under a flag of truce, and that they wished to regain their
army. The Chinese commander replied to his remarks on
the usages of war in true Tartar fashion with laughter and
abuse. The soldiers pressed round the unfortunate English-
men and placed their matchlocks against their bodies. Es-
cape was hopeless, and death seemed inevitable. But insult
was more the object of the Mongol general than their death.
They were dragged before him and forced to press the ground
with their heads at the feet of Sankolinsin. They were sub-
jected to numerous other indignities, and at last, when it
became evident that the battle was going against the Chi-
nese, they were placed in one of the country carts and sent
off to Pekin. While Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch were thus
ill-used, their comrades waiting on the road had fared no
better. Shortly after their departure the Chinese soldiers
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 381
began to hustle and jeer at the Englishmen and their native
escort. As the firing increased and some of the Chinese were
hit they grew more violent. When the news was received
of what had happened to Mr. Parkes, and of how Sanko-
linsin had laughed to scorn their claim to protection, the sol-
diers could no longer be restrained. The Englishmen and
the natives were dragged from their horses, cruelly bound,
and hurried to the rear, whence they followed at no great
distance their companions in misfortune. "While the greater
portion of these events had been in progress, Colonel Walker,
Mr. Thompson, and the men of the King's Dragoon Guards,
had been steadily pacing up and down on the embankment
as arranged, in order to show the Chinese that they suspected
no treachery and had no fears. They continued doing this
until a French officer joined them ; but on his getting into a
dispute wit'u some of the Chinese about his mule, he drew
his pistol and fired at them. He was immediately killed.
There was then no longer the least hope of restraining the
Chinese, so the whole of the party spurred their horses and
escaped to the English army under a heavy but ineffectual
fire from matchlocks and gingalls. Their flight was the
signal for the commencement of the battle, although at that
very moment, had they only known it, the chief party of
Englishmen had gained the road east of Chan-chia-wan,
and, if the battle had only been delayed a quarter of an
hour, they might all have escaped.
But the two hours of grace were up, and Sir Hope Grant
saw no further use in delay. General Montauban was still
more impatient, and the men were eager to engage. They
had to win their camping-ground that night, and the day
was already far advanced. The French occupied the right
wing, that is the position opposite the spot where we have
seen Sankolinsin commanding in person, and a squadron of
Fane's Horse had been lent them to supply their want of
cavalry. The battle began with the fire of their batteries,
which galled the Chinese so much that the Tartar cavalry
were ordered up to charge the guns, and right gallantly they
382 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
did so. A battery was almost in their hands, its officers had
to use their revolvers, when the Sikhs and a few French
dragoons, led by Colonel Foley, the English commissioner
with the French force, gallantly charged them in turn, and
compelled them to withdraw. Neither side derived much
advantage from this portion of the contest, but the repulse
of the Tartar cavalry enabled the French guns to renew theii
fire with great effect on the line of Chinese infantry. "While
the French were thus engaged on the right, the English
troops had begun a vigorous attack on both the center and
their left. The Chinese appeared in such dense masses, and
maintained so vigorous, but fortunately so ill-directed, a fire,
that the English force made but little progress at either
point. The action might have been indefinitely prolonged
and left undecided, had not Sir Hope Grant suddenly re-
solved to re-enforce his left with a portion of his center, and
to assail the enemy's right vigorously. This latter part of
the battle began with a charge of some squadrons of Probyn's
Horse against the bodies of mounted Tartars moving in the
plain, whom they, with their gallant leader at their head,
routed in the sight of the two armies. This overthrow of
their chosen fighting-men greatly discouraged the rest of the
Chinese soldiers, and when the infantry advanced with the
Sikhs in front they slowly began to give ground. But even
then there were none of the usual symptoms of a decisive vic-
tory. The French were so exhausted by their efforts that
they had been compelled to halt, and General Montauban was
obliged to curb his natural impetuosity, and to admit that
he could take no part in the final attack on Chan-chia-wan.
Sir Hope Grant, however, pressed on and occupied the town.
He did not call in his men until they had seized without re-
sistance a large camp about one mile west of the town, where
they captured several guns. Thus ended the battle of Chan-
chia-wan with the defeat and retreat of the strong army
which Sankolinsin had raised in order to drive the barbarians
into the sea.
Although the battle was won, Sir Hope Grant, measuring
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 383
the resistance with the eye of an experienced soldier, came
to the conclusion that his force was not sufficiently strong
to overawe so obstinate a foe; and accordingly ordered Sir
Robert Napier to join him with as many troops as he could
spare from the Tientsin garrison. Having thus provided for
the arrival of re-enforcements at an early date, he was will-
ing to resume his onward march for Tungchow, where it
was hoped some tidings would be obtained of the missing
officers and men. Two days intervened before any decisive
move was made, but Mr. "Wade was sent under a flag of
truce into Tungchow to collect information. But he failed
to learn anything more about Mr. Parkes than that he had
quitted the town in safety after his final interview with
Prince Tsai. Lord Elgin now hastened up from Hosiwu to
join the military headquarters, and on September 21, the
French having been joined by another brigade, offensive
operations were recommenced. The delay had encouraged
the Chinese to make another stand, and they had collected
in considerable force for the defense of the Palikao bridge,
which affords the means of crossing the Peiho west of Tung-
chow. Here again the battle commenced with a cavalry
charge which, despite an accident that might have had more
serious results, was completely successful. This achieve-
ment was followed up by the attack on several fortified posi-
tions which were not defended with any great amount of
resolution, and while these matters were in progress on the
side where the English were engaged, the French had car-
ried the bridge with its twenty-five guns in position in very
gallant style. The capture of this bridge and the dispersion
of the troops, including the Imperial Guard, which had been
intrusted with its defense, completed the discomfiture of the
Chinese. Pekin itself lay almost at the mercy of the in-
vader, and, unless diplomacy could succeed better than
arms, nothing would prevent the hated foreigners violat-
ing its privacy not merely with their presence, but in the
most unpalatable guise of armed victors.
The daj r after the battle at the Palikao bridge came a
384 A SHORT HISTORY OF CH7.Y.I.
letter from Prince Kung the emperor's next brother, stating
that Prince Tsai and his colleagues had not managed matters
satisfactorily, and that he had been appointed with plenipo-
tentiary powers for the discussion and decision of the peace
question. But the prince went on to request a temporary
suspension of hostilities a demand with which no general
or embassador could have complied so long as officers were
detained who had been seized in violation of the usages of
war. Lord Elgin replied in the clearest terms that there
could be no negotiations for peace until these prisoners were
restored, and that if they were not sent back in safety th
consequences would be most serious for the Chinese govern-
ment. But even at this supreme moment of doubt and dan-
ger, the subtlety of Chinese diplomacy would have free play.
Prince Kung was young in years and experience, but his
finesse would have done credit to a gray-haired statesman.
Unfortunately for him, the question had got beyond the
stage for discussion: the English embassador had stated
the one condition on which negotiations would be renewed,
and until that had been complied with there was no need
to give ear to the threats, promises and entreaties even of
Prince Kung. As the prince gave no sign of yielding this
point during the week's delay in bringing up the second
division from Tientsin, Lord Elgin requested Sir Hope
Grant to resume his march on Pekin, from which the ad-
vanced guard of the allied forces was distant little more
than ten miles. The cavalry had reconnoitered almost up
to the gates, and had returned with the report that the walls
were strong and in good condition. The danger to a small
army of attempting to occupy a great city of the size arid
population of Pekin is almost obvious; and, moreover, the
consistent policy of the English authorities had been to cause
the Chinese people as little injury and suffering as possible.
Should an attack on the city become unavoidable, it was de-
cided that the point attacked should be the Tartar quarter,
including the palace, which occupied the northern half of the
city. By this time it had become known that Parkes and
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 385
Loch were living, that they were confined in the Kaou
Meaou Temple, near the Tehshun Gate, and that latterly
they had been fairly well treated.
In execution of the plan of attack that had heen agreed
upon, the allied forces marched round Pekin to the north-
west corner of the walls, having as their object the Summer
Palace of the emperor at Yuen Min Yuen, not quite four
miles distant from the city.
On the approach of the foreign army, Hienfung fled in
terror from his palace, and sought shelter at Jehol, the hunt-
ing residence of the emperors beyond the Wall. His flight
was most precipitate; and the treasures of the Summer Pal-
ace were left at the mercy of the Western spoilers. The
French soldiers had made the most of the start they had ob-
tained, and left comparatively little for their English com-
rades, who, moreover, were restrained by the bonds of a
stricter discipline. But the amount of prize property that
remained was still considerable, and, by agreement between
the two generals, it was divided in equal shares between the
armies. The capture and occupation of the Summer Palace
completed the European triumph, and obliged Prince Kung
to promptly acquiesce in Lord Elgin's demand for the imme-
diate surrender of the prisoners, if he wished to avoid the far
greater calamity of a foreign occupation of the Tartar quar-
ter of Pekin and the appropriation of its vaster collection of
treasures.
On October 6 Mr. Parkes wrote from his place of confine-
ment that the French and English detained were to be re-
turned on the 8th of the month, and that the imperial com-
manders had been ordered at the same time to retire for a
considerable distance from Pekin. These promises were car-
ried out. Prince Kung was at last resolved to make all the
concessions requisite to insure the speedy conclusion of peace.
The restoration of these captives removed what was thought
to be the one obstacle to Lord Elgin's discussing the terms on
which the invading force would retire and to the respective
governments resuming diplomatic relations. It was fort-
386 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHISA.
unate for China that the exact fate of the other prisoners
was unknown, and that Lord Elgin felt able, in consequence
of the more friendly proceedings of Prince Kung, to overlook
the earlier treatment of those now returned to him, for tle
narrative of Mr. Parkes and his fellow prisoners was one
that tended to heighten the feeling of indignation at the
original breach of faith. To say that they were barbarously
ill-used is to employ a phrase conveying a very inadequate
idea of the numerous indignities and the cruel personal treat-
ment to which they were subjected. Under these great
trials neither of these intrepid Englishmen wavered in their
refusal to furnish any information or to make any concession
compromising their country. Mr. Loch's part was in one
sense the more easy, as his ignorance of the language pre-
vented his replying, but in bodily suffering he had to pay
a proportionately greater penalty. The incidents of their
imprisonment afford the most creditable testimony to the
superiority which the pride of race as well as "the equal
mind in arduous circumstance" gives weak humanity over
physical suffering. They are never likely to pass out of the
public memory ; and those who remember the daring and
the chivalry which had inspired Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch
on the day when Prince Tsai's treachery and Sankolinsin's
mastery were revealed, will not be disposed to consider it
exaggerated praise to say that, for an adventure so honor-
ably conceived and so nobly carried out, where the risk was
never reckoned and where the penalty was so patiently
borne, the pages of history may be searched almost in vain
for an event that, in the dramatic elements of courage and
suffering, presents such a complete and consistent record of
human gallantry and devotion as the capture and subse-
quent captivity of these English gentlemen and their Sikh
companion.
The further conditions as preliminary to the ratification
of the Treaty of Tientsin were gradually, if reluctantly,
complied with. On October 13 the northeast gate was
handed over to the allied troops, but not before Sir Hope
THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR. 387
Grant had threatened to open fire on the walls. At the
same time Prince Kung returned eight sowars of Fane's
Horse and one Frenchman, ail the survivors, besides those
already surrendered, of the small band which had ridden
from Tungchow nearly a month before. The Chinese prince
stated in explanation that "a certain number were missing
after the fight, or have died of their wounds or of sickness. ' '
But the narrative of the Sikhs was decisive as to the fate of
the five Englishmen and their own comrades. They had
been brutally bound with ropes which, although drawn as
tight as human force could draw them, were tightened still
more by cold water being poured upon the bands, and they
had been maltreated in every form by a cruel enemy, and
provided only with food of the most loathsome kind. Some
of the prisoners were placed in cages. Lieutenant Anderson,
a gallant young officer for whom future renown had been
predicted, became delirious and died on the ninth day of his
confinement. Mr. De Normann died a week later. What
fate befell Captain Barbazon and his French companion, the
Abbe de Luc, is uncertain, but the evidence on the subject
inclines us to accept as accurate the statement that the Chi-
nese commander in the fight at Palikao, enraged at his
defeat, caused them to be executed on the bridge. The sol"
dier Phipps endured for a longer time than Mr. Bowlby the
taunts and ill-usage of their jailers, but they at last shared
the same fate, dying from the effects of their ill-treatment.
The bodies of all the Englishmen, with the exception of Cap-
tain Barbazou, were restored, and of most of the Sikhs also.
The Chinese officials were more barbarous in their cruelty
than even the worst scum among their malefactors ; for the
prisoners in the jails, far from adding to the tortures of the
unfortunate Europeans, did everything in their power to
mitigate their sufferings, alleviate their pains, and supply
their wants.
The details of these cruel deeds raised a feeling of great
horror in men's minds, and, although the desire to arrange
the question of peace without delay was uppermost with
388 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Lord Elgin, still it was felt that some grave step was neces-
sary to express the abhorrence with which England regarded
this cruel and senseless outrage, and to bring home to the
Chinese people and government the fact that Englishmen
could not be murdered with impunity. Lord Elgin refused
to hold any further intercourse with the Chinese government
until this great crime had been purged by some signal pun-
ishment. Sir Hope Grant and he had little difficulty in
arriving at the decision that the best mode of expiation was
to destroy the Summer Palace. The French commander
refused to participate in the act which carried a permanent
lesson of political necessity to the heart of the Pekin govern-
ment, and which did more than any other incident of the
campaign to show Hienfung that the hour had gone by fo>
trifling. On October 18 the threat was carried into exe-
cution. The Summer Palace was destroyed by fire, and
the sum of $500,000 was demanded and obtained from the
Chinese as some compensation for the families of the mur-
dered men. The palace of Yuen Min Yuen had been the
scene of some of the worst sufferings of the English pris-
oners. From its apartments the high mandarins and the
immediate courtiers of the emperor had gloated over and
enjoyed the spectacle of their foreign prisoners' agony. The
whole of Pekin witnessed in return the destruction wrought
to the sovereign's abode by the indignant English, and the
clouds of smoke hung for days like a vast black pall over
the city.
That act of severe but just vengeance consummated, the
negotiations for the ratification of the treaty were resumed.
The Hall of Ceremonies was selected as the place in which
the ratifying act should be performed, while, as some pun-
ishment for the hostile part he had played, the palace of
Prince Tsai was appropriated as the temporary official resi-
dence of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros. The formal act of
ratification was performed in this building on October 24.
Lord Elgin proceeded in a chair of state, accompanied
by his suite, and also by Sir Hope Grant with an escort
THE SECOND FOREIGN l\'AR. 38i
of 100 officers and 500 troops, through the streets from the
Anting Gate to the Hall of Ceremonies. Prince Kung,
attended by a large body of civil and military mandarins,
was there in readiness to produce the imperial edict author
izing him to attach the emperor's seal to the treaty, and to
accept the responsibility for his country of conforming with
its terms and carrying out its stipulations. Some further
delay was caused by the necessity of waiting until the ^d'.cl
should be received from the emperor at Jehol authorizing the-
publication of the treaty, not the least important point in
connection with its conclusion if the millions of China were
to understand and perform what their rulers had promised
for them. That closing act was successfully achieved, and
more rapidly than had been expected. The Pekinese beheld
English troops and officers in residence in their midst fci
the first time, and when the army was withdrawn and the
plenipotentiary, Lord Elgin, transferred to his brother, Mr.
Frederick Bruce, the charge of affairs in China as Resident
Minister, the ice had been broken in the relations between
the officials of the two countries, and the greatest, if not the
last, barrier of Chinese exclusiveness had been removed.
The last of the allied troops turned their backs upon Pekin
on November 9, and the greater portion of the expe-
dition departed for India and Europe just before the cold
weather set in. A few days later the rivers were frozen and
navigation had become impossible, which showed how nar-
row was the margin left for the completion of the operations
of war.
The object which the more far-seeing of the English
residents had from the first hour of difficulty stated to be
necessary for satisfactory relations direct intercourse with
the Pekin government was thus obtained after a keen and
bitter struggle of thirty years. Although vanquished, the
Chinese may be said to have come out of this war with an
increased military reputation. The war closed with a treaty
enforcing all the concessions made by its predecessor. The
right to station an embassador in Pekiii signified that the
390 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
greatest barrier of all had been broken down ; the old school
of politicians were put completely out of court, and a young
and intelligent prince, closely connected with the emperor,
assumed the personal charge of the foreign relations of the
country. As one who had seen with his own eyes the mis-
fortunes of his countrymen, Prince Kung was the more dis-
posed to adhere to what he had promised to perform. Under
his direction the ratified Treaty of Tientsin became a bond of
union instead of an element of discord between the cabinets
of London and Pekin; and a termination was put, by an ar-
rangement carried at the point of the sword, to the constant
friction and recrimination which had been the prevailing
characteristics of the intercourse for a whole generation.
The Chinese had been subjected to a long and bitter lesson.
They had at last learned the virtue of submitting to neces-
sity; but although they have profited to some extent both in
peace and war by their experience, it requires some assur-
ance to declare that they have even now accepted the inevi-
table. That remains the problem of the future ; but in 1 860
Prince Kung came to the sensible conclusion that for thai
period, and until China had recovered from her internal con-
fusion, there was nothing to be gained and much to be lost
by protracted resistance to the peoples of the West. What-
ever could be retained by tact and finesse were to form part
of the natural rights of China; but the privileges only to be
asserted in face of Armstrong guns and rifles were to be
abandoned with as good a grace as the injured feeling of a
nation can ever display.
CHAPTER XX
THE TAEPING REBELLION
WE left the Taepings supreme at Nankin, but maintain-
ing themselves there with some difficulty against two im-
perial armies raised by the loyal efforts of ihe inhabitants of
THE TAEPIXG REBELLION. 391
the central provinces. This was at the beginning of 1857;
and there is no doubt that if the government had avoided a
conflict with the Europeans, and concentrated its efforts and
power on the contest with the Taeping rebels, they would
have speedily annihilated the tottering fabric of Tien Wang's
authority. But the respite of four years secured by the
attention of the central government being monopolized by
the foreign question enabled the Taepiugs to consolidate their
position, augment their fighting forces, and present a more
formidable front to the imperial authorities. When Prince
Kung learned from Lord Elgin the full extent of the success
of the Taepings on the Yangtse, of which the officials at
Pekin seemed to possess a very imperfect and inaccurate
knowledge, the Manchu authorities realized that it was a
vital question for them to reassert their authority without
further delaj r , but on beginning to put their new resolve into
practice they soon experienced that the position of the Tae-
pings in 1861 differed materially from what it was in 1857.
The course of events during that period must be briefly
summarized. In 1858 the imperialists under Tseng Kwofan
and Chang Kwoliang renewed the siege of Nankin, but as
the city was well supplied with provisions, and as the impe-
rialists were well known to have no intention of delivering
an assault, the Taepings did not feel any apprehension.
After the investment had continued for nearly a year, Chung
"Wang, who had now risen to the supreme place among the
rebels, insisted on quitting the city before it was completely
surrounded, with the object of beating up levies and gener-
ally relieving the pressure caused by the besiegers. In this
endeavor he more than once experienced the unkindness of
fortune, for when he had collected 5,000 good troops he was
defeated in a vigorous attempt to cut his way through a far
larger imperial force. Such, however, was his reputation
that the imperial commanders before Nankin sent many of
their men to assist the officers operating against him, and
Chung Wang, seizing the opportunity, made his way by
forced marches back to Nankin, overcoming such resistance
392 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
as the enfeebled besiegers were able to offer. The whole of
the year 1859 was passed in practical inaction, but at its
close the Taepings only retained possession of four towns,
besides Nankin, on the Yangtse. It again became necessary
for Chung "Wang to sally forth and assume the offensive in
the rear and on the line of supplies of the beleaguering im-
perialists. His main difficulty was in obtaining the consent
of Tien Wang, who was at this time given over to religious
pursuits or private excesses, and Chung Wang states that
he only consented when he found that he could not stop him.
In January, 1860, Chung Wang began what proved to be a
very remarkable campaign. He put his men in good humor
by distributing a large sum of money among them, and he
succeeded in eluding the imperial commanders and hi mis-
leading them as to his intentions. While they thought he
had gone off to relieve Ganking, he had really hastened to
attack the important city of Hangchow, where much spoil
and material for carrying on the war might be secured by
the victor. He captured the city with little or no loss, on
March 19, 1860, but the Tartar city held out until relieved
by Chang Kwoliang, who hastened from Nankin for the
purpose. Once again the imperial commanders in their
anxiety to crush Chung Wang had reduced their force in
front of Nankin to an excessively low condition, and the
Taeping leader, placed in a desperate position, seized the
only chance of safety by hastening from Hangchow to Nan-
kin at full speed, and attacking the imperial lines. Thia
battle was fought early in the morning of a cold snowy day
May 3, 1860 and resulted in the loss of 5,000 imperialists,
and the compulsory raising of the siege. The Taeping cause
might have been resuscitated by this signal victory if Tien
Wang had only shown himself able to act up to the great
part he assumed, but not merely was he incapable of playing
the part of either a warrior or a statesman, but his petty
jealousy prevented his making use of the undoubted alflity
of his lieutenant Chung Wang, who after the greatest of his
successes was forbidden to re-enter Nankin.
THE TAEPING REBELLION. 393
The energy and spirit of Chung Wang impelled him to
fresh enterprises, and seeing the hopelessness of Tien Wang,
he determined to secure a base of operations for himself,
which should enable him to hold his own in the warring
strife of the realm, and perhaps to achieve the triumph of
the cause with which he was associated. It says much for
his military energy and skill that he was able to impart new
vigor to the Taeping system, and to sustain on a new field
his position single-handed against the main forces of the
empire. He determined to obtain possession of the impor-
tant city of Soochow, on the Grand Canal, and not very far
distant from Shanghai. On his way to effect this object he
gained a great victory over Chang Kwoliang, who was him-
self killed in the battle. As the ex-Triad chief possessed
great energy, his loss was a considerable one for the govern-
ment, but his troops continued to oppose the advance of the
Taepings, and fought and lost three battles before Chung
Wang reached Soochow. That place was too large to be
successfully defended by a small force, and the imperialists
hastily abandoned it. At this critical moment May, 1860
Ho Kweitsin, the viceroy of the Two Kiang, implored the
aid of the English and French, who were at this moment
completing their arrangements for the march on Pekin,
against these rebels, and the French were so far favorable
to the suggestion that they offered to render the assistance
provided the English would combine with them. Mr. Bruce,
however, declined the adventure, which is not surprising,
considering that we were then engaged in serious hostilities
with the Chinese, but the incident remains unique of a
country asking another for assistance during the progress
of a bitter and doubtful war. The utmost that Mr. Bruce
would do was to issue a notification that Shanghai would
not be allowed to again fall into the hands of an insurgent
force. The viceroy who solicited the aid was at least con-
sistent. He memorialized the Throne, praying that the de-
mands of the Europeans should be promptly granted, and
that they should then be employed against the Taepings.
?* A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
His memorial was ill-timed. He was summoned to Pekin
and executed for his very prudent advice. With the posses-
sion of Soochow, Chung Wang obtained fresh supplies of
money, material, and men, and once more it was impossible
to say to what height of success the Taepings might not
attain. But Chung Wang was not satisfied with Soochow
alone ; he wished to gain possession of Shanghai.
Unfortunately for the realization of his project, the Eu-
ropeans had determined to defend Shanghai at all hazards,
but Chung Wang believed either that they would not, or
that then* army being absent in the north they had not
power to carry out this resolve. The necessity of capturing
Shanghai was rendered the greater in the eyes of Chung
Wang by its being the base of hostile measures against him-
self, and by a measure which threatened him with a new
peril. The wealthy Chinese merchants of Shanghai had
formed a kind of patriotic association, and provided the
funds for raising a European contingent. Two Americans,
Ward and Burgevine, were taken into their pay, and hi
July, 1860, they, having raised a force of 100 Europeans
and 200 Manila men, began operations with an attack on
Sunkiang, a large walled town about twenty miles from
Shanghai. This first attack was repulsed with some loss,
but Ward, afraid of losing the large reward he was promised
for its capture, renewed the attack, and with better success,
for he gained possession of a gate, and held it until the
whole imperial army had come up and stormed the town.
After this success Ward was requested to attack Tsiugpu,
which was a far stronger place than Sunkiang, and where
the Taepings had the benefit of the advice and leading of
several Englishmen who had joined them. Ward attacked
Tsingpu on August 2, 1860, but he was repulsed with heavy
loss. He returned to Shanghai for the purpose of raising
another force and two larger guns, and then renewed the
attack. It is impossible to say whether the place would
have held out or not, but after seven days' bombardment
Chung Wang suddenly appeared to the rescue, and, surpris-
THE TAEPING REBELLION. 395
ing "Ward's force, drove it away in utter confusion, and with
the loss of all its guns and stores. Encouraged by this suc-
cess, Chung "Wang then thought the time opportune for
attacking Shanghai, and he accordingly marched against it,
burning and plundering the villages along the road. The
imperialists had established a camp or stockade outside the
tern gate, and Chung Wang carried this without any
difficulty, but when he reached the walls of the town he
found a very different opponent in his path. The walls were
lined with English and French troops, and when the Tae-
pings attempted to enter the city they were received with
a warm fire, which quickly sent them to the right-about.
Chung "Wang renewed the attack at different points during
the next four or five days, but he was then obliged to retreat.
Before doing so, however, he sent a boasting message that
he had come at the invitation of the French, who were trai-
tors, and that he would have taken the city but for the for-
eigners, as "there was no city which his men could not
storm." At this moment the attention of Chung "Wang was
called off to Nankin, which the imperialists were investing
for a sixth time, under Tseng Kwofan, who had been ele-
vated to the viceroyalty of the Two Kiang. Tien Wang, in
despair, sent off an urgent summons to Chung Wang to
come to his assistance, and although he went with reluctance
he felt that he had no course but to obey.
Having done what he could to place Nankin in an efficient
state of defense, Chung Wang hastened back to Soochow to
resume active operations. It is unnecessary to describe these
in detail ; but although Chung Wang was twice defeated by
a Manchu general named Paochiaou, he succeeded, by ra-
pidity of movement, in holding his own against his more
numerous adversaries. In the meantime an important
change had taken place in the situation. The peace between
China and the foreign powers compelled a revision of the
position at Shanghai. Admiral Hope sailed up to Nankin,
interviewed the Wangs, and exacted from them a pledge
that Shanghai should not be attacked for twelve months,
d96 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
and that the Taeping forces should not advance within a
radius of thirty miles of that place. In consequence of this
arrangement Ward and Burgevine were compelled to desist
from recruiting Europeans; but after a brief interval they
were taken into the Chinese service for the purpose of drill-
ing Chinese soldiers, a measure from which the most impor-
tant consequences were to flow, for it proved to be the origin
of the Ever- Victorious Army. These preparations were not
far advanced when Chung Wang, elated by his capture of
Ningpo and Haugchow, resolved to disregard Tien Wang's
promise, and make a second attack on Shanghai, the posses-
sion of which he saw to be indispensable if his cause was to
attain any brilliant triumph. He issued a proclamation that
"the hour of the Manchus had come! Shanghai is a little
place, and we have nothing to fear from it. We must take
Shanghai to complete our dominions." The death of Hien-
fung seems to have encouraged Chung Wang to take what
he hoped would prove a decisive step.
On January 14, 1862, the Taepings reached the imme-
diate vicinity of the town and foreign settlement. The sur-
rounding country was concealed by the smoke of the burning
villages, which they had ruthlessly destroyed. The foreign
settlement was crowded with thousands of fugitives, implor-
ing the aid of the Europeans to save their houses and prop-
erty. Their sufferings, which would at the best have been
great, were aggravated by the exceptional severity of the
winter. The English garrison of two native regiments and
some artillery, even when supported by the volunteers, was
far too weak to attempt more than the defense of the place;
but this it was fortunately able to perform. The rebels, dur-
ing the first week after their reappearance, plundered and
burned in all directions, threatening even to make an attack
>n Woosung, the port at the mouth of the river, where they
were repulsed by the French. Sir John Michel arrived at
Shanghai with a small re-enforcement of English troops,
and Ward, having succeeded in disciplining two Chinese
regiments of about one thousand strong in all, sallied forth
THE TAEPINQ REBELLION. 397
from Sunkiang for the purpose of operating on the rear of
the Taeping forces. Ward's capture of Quanfuling, with
several hundred rebel boats which were frozen up in the
river, should have warned the Taepings that it was nearly
time for them to retire. However, they did not act as pru-
dence would have dictated, and during the whole of Feb-
ruary their raids continued round Shanghai. The suburbs
suffered from their attacks, the foreign factories and boats
were not secure, and several outrages on the persons of for-
eigners remained unatoned for. It was impossible to tolerate
any longer their enormities. The English and French com-
manders came to the determination to attack the rebels, to
enforce the original agreement with Tien Wang, and to clear
the country round Shanghai of the presence of the Taepings
for the space of thirty miles.
On February 21, therefore, a joint force composed of 336
English sailors and marines, 160 French seamen, and 600
men from Ward's contingent, accompanied by their respect-
ive commanders, with Admiral Hope in chief charge, ad-
vanced upon the village of Kachiaou, where the Taepings
had strengthened their position and placed guns on the
walls. After a sharp engagement the place was stormed,
Ward's men leading the attack with Burgevine at their
head. The drilled Chinese behaved with great steadiness,
but the Taepings were not to be dismayed by a single defeat.
They even resumed their attacks on the Europeans. On one
occasion Admiral Hope himself was compelled to retire be-
fore their superior numbers, and to summon fresh troops to
his assistance. The re-enforcements consisted of 450 Eu-
ropeans and 700 of Ward's force, besides seven howitzers.
With these it was determined to attack Tseedong, a place of
great strength, surrounded by stone walls and ditches seven
feet deep. The Taepings stood to their guns with great
spirit, receiving the advancing troops with a very heavy fire.
When, however, Ward's contingent, making a detour, ap-
peared in the rear of the place, they hastily evacuated their
positions ; but the English sailors had carried the walls, and,
398 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
caught between two fires, they offered a stubborn but futile
resistance. More than 700 were killed and 300 were taken
prisoners. The favorable opinion formed of "the Ever- Vic-
torious Army" by the action at Kachiaou was confirmed by
the more serious affair at Tseedong ; and Mr. Bruce at Pekin
brought it under the favorable notice of Prince Kung and
the Chinese government. Having taken these hostile steps
against the rebels, it necessarily followed that no advantage
would accrue from any further hesitation with regard to
allowing Europeans to enter the imperial service for the pur-
pose of opposing them. Ward was officially recognized, and
allowed to purchase weapons and to engage officers. An
Englishman contracted to convey 9,000 of the troops who
had stormed Ganking from the Yangtse to Shanghai. These
men were Honan braves, who had seen considerable service
in the interior of China, and it was proposed that they should
garrison the towns of Kiangsu accordingly as they were
taken from the rebels. The arrival of General Staveley
from Tientsin at the end of March, with portions of two
English regiments (the 31st and 67th), put a new face on
affairs, and showed that the time was at hand when it would
be possible to carry out the threat 'of clearing the country
round Shanghai for the space of thirty miles.
The first place to be attacked toward the realization of
this plan was the village of Wongkadza, about twelve miles
west of Shanghai. Here the Taepings offered only a brief
resistance, retiring to some stronger stockades four miles
further west. General Staveley, considering that his men
had done enough work for that day, halted them, intending
to renew the attack the next morning. Unfortunately Ward
was carried away by his impetuosity, and attacked this inner
position with some 500 of his own men. Admiral Hope ac-
companied him. The Taepings met them with a tremendous
fire, and after several attempts to scale the works they were
repulsed with heavy loss. Admiral Hope was wounded in
the leg, seven officers were wounded, and seventy men killed
and wounded. The attack was repeated in force on the fol-
THE TAEPINQ REBELLION. 399
lowing day, and after some fighting the Taepings evacuated
their stockades. The next place attacked was the village of
Tsipoo; and, notwithstanding their strong earthworks and
three wide ditches, the rebels were driven out in a few hours.
It was then determined to attack Kahding, Tsingpu, Nanjao,
and Cholin, at which places the Taepings were known to
have mustered in considerable strength.
The first place was taken with little resistance, and its
capture was followed by preparations for the attack on
Tsingpu, which were hastened rather than delayed by a
desperate attempt to set fire to Shanghai. The plot was
fortunately discovered in time, and the culprits captured and
summarily executed to the number of two hundred. Early
in May a strong force was assembled at Sunkiang, and pro-
ceeded by boat, on account of the difficulties of locomotion,
to Tsingpu. The fire of the guns, in which the expedition
was exceptionally strong, proved most destructive, and two
breaches being pronounced practicable the place was carried
by assault. The rebels fought well and up to the last, when
they found flight impossible. The Chinese troops slew every
man found in the place with arms in his hands. A few days
later Nanjao was captured, but in the attack the French
commander, Admiral Protet, a gallant officer who had been
to the front during the whole of these operations, was shot
dead. The rebels, disheartened by these successive defeats,
rallied at Cholin, where they prepared to make a final stand.
The allied force attacked Cholin on May 20, and an English
detachment carried it almost at the point of the bayonet.
"With this achievement the operations of the English troops
came for the moment to an end, for a disaster to the imperial
arms in their rear necessitated their turning their attention
to a different quarter.
The troops summoned from Ganking had at last arrived
to the number of five or six thousand men ; and the Futai
Sieh, who was on the point of being superseded to make
room for Li Hung Chang, thought to employ them before
his departure on some enterprise which should redound to his
400 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
credit and restore his sinking fortunes. The operation was
as hazardous as it was ambitious. The resolution he came
to was to attack the city and forts of Taitsan, a place north-
west of Shanghai, and not very far distant from Chung
"Wang's headquarters at Soochow. The imperialist force
reached Taitsan on May 12, but less than two days later
Chung Wang arrived in person at the head of 10,000 chosen
troops to relieve the garrison. A battle ensued on the day
following, when, notwithstanding their great superiority in
numbers, the Taepings failed to obtain any success. In this
extremity Chung Wang resorted to a stratagem. Two thou-
sand of his men shaved their heads and pretended to desert
to the imperialists. When the battle was renewed at sunrise
on the following morning this band threw aside their as-
sumed character and turned upon the imperialists. A dread-
ful slaughter ensued. Of the 7,000 Honan braves and the
Tartars from Shanghai, 5,000 fell on the field. The con-
sequences of this disaster were to undo most of the good
accomplished by General Staveley and his force. The im-
perialists were for the moment dismayed, and the Taepings
correspondingly encouraged. General Staveley 's communi-
cations were threatened, and he had to abandon his intended
plan and retrace his steps to Shanghai.
Chung Wang then laid regular siege to Sunkiang, where
Ward was in person, and he very nearly succeeded in carry-
ing the place by escalade. The attempt was fortunately dis-
covered by an English sailor just in time, and repulsed with
A loss to the rebels of 100 men. The Taepings continued to
show great daring and activity before both Sunkiang and
Tsingpu ; and although the latter place was bravely defended,
it became clear that the wisest course would be to evacuate
it. A body of troops was therefore sent from Shanghai to
form a junction with Ward at Sunkiang, and to effect the
safe retreat of the Tsingpu garrison. The earlier proceedings
were satisfactorily arranged, but the last act of all was
grossly mismanaged and resulted in a catastrophe. Ward
caused the place to be set on fire, when the Taepings, realiz-
THE TAEPINO REBELLION. 401
ing what was being done, hastened into the town, and as-
sailed the retiring garrison. A scene of great confusion
followed; many lives were lost, and the commandant who
had held it so courageously was taken prisoner. Chung
"Wang could therefore appeal to some facts to support his
contention that he had got the better of the Europeans and
the imperialists in the province of Kiangsu.
From the scene of his successes Chung Wang was once
more called away by the timidity or peril of Tien Wang,
who was barely able to maintain his position at Nankin, but
when he hastened off to assist the chief of the Taepings he
found that he was out of favor, and that the jealousy or fear of
his colleagues had brought about his temporary disgrace and
loss of title. Shortly after Chung Wang's departure Ward
was killed in action and Burgevine succeeded to the com-
mand, but it soon became apparent that his relations with
the Chinese authorities would not be smooth. General Ching
was jealous of the Ever- Victorious Army and wished to
have all the credit for himself. Li Hung Chang, who had
been appointed Futai or Governor of Kiangsu, entertained
doubts of the loyalty of this adventurer. Burgevine was a
man of high temper and strong passions, who met the wiles
of the Futai with peremptory demands to recognize the
claims of himself and his band. Nor was this all. Burge-
vine had designs of his own. Although the project had not
taken definite form in his mind the inclination was strong
within him to play the part of military dictator with the
Chinese ; or failing that, to found an independent authority
on some convenient spot of Celestial territory. The Futai
anticipated, perhaps, more than divined his wishes. In
Burgevine he saw, very shortly after their coming into con-
tact, not merely a man whom he disliked and distrusted, but
one who, if allowed to pursue his plans unchecked, would in
the end form a greater danger to the imperial authority than
even the Taepings. It is not possible to deny Li's shrewd-
ness in reading the character of the man with whom he had
to deal.
402 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
The Futai Li, in order to test his obedience, proposed that
Burgevine and his men should be sent round by sea to Nan-
kin to take part in the siege of that city. The ships were
actually prepared for their conveyance, and the Taotai Wou,
who had first fitted out -a fleet against the rebels, was in
readiness to accompany Burgevine, when Li and his col-
league, as suspicious of Burgevine's compliance as they
would have been indignant at his refusal, changed their
plans and countermanded the expedition. Instead of carry-
ing out this project, therefore, they laid a number of formal
complaints before General Staveley as to Burgevine's con-
duct, and requested the English government to remove him
from his command, and to appoint an English officer in his
place. The charges against Burgevine did not at this time
amount to more than a certain laxness in regard to the ex-
penditure of the force, a disregard for the wishes and preju-
dices of the Chinese government, and the want of tact, or
of the desire to conciliate, in his personal relations with the
Futai. If Burgevine had resigned, all would have been
well, but he regarded the position from the standpoint of
the adventurer who believes that his own interests form a
supreme law and are the highest good. As commander of
the Ever- Victorious Army he was a personage to be consid-
ered even by foreign governments. He would not volunta-
rily surrender the position which alone preserved him from
obscurity. Having come to this decision it was clear that
even the partial execution of his plans must draw him into
many errors of judgment which could not but imbitter the
conflict. The reply of the English commander was to the
effect that personally he could not interfere, but that he
would refer the matter to London as well as to Mr. Bruce at
Pekin. In consequence of the delay thus caused the project
of removing the force to Nankin was revived, and, the
steamers having been chartered, Burgevine was requested to
bring down his force from Sunkiang and to embark it at
Shanghai. This he expressed his willingness to do on pay-
ment of his men, who were two months in arrear, and on the
THE TAEPING REBELLION. 40)5
settlement of all outstanding claims. Burgevine was sup-
ported by his troops. Whatever his dislike to the proposed
move, theirs was immeasurably greater. They refused to
move without the payment of all arrears; and on January
3 they even went so far as to openly mutiny. Two days
later Burgeviue went to Shanghai and had an interview with
Takee. The meeting was stormy. Burgevine used personal
violence toward the Shanghai merchant, whose attitude was
at first overbearing, and he returned to his exasperated
troops with the money, which he carried off by force. The
Futai Li, on hearing of the assault on Takee, hastened to
General Staveley to complain of Burgevine's gross insubor-
dination in striking a mandarin, which by the law of China
was punishable with death. Burgevine was dismissed the
Chinese service, and the notice of this removal was for-
warded by the English general, with a recommendation to
him to give up his command without disturbance. This
Burgevine did, for the advice of the English general was
equivalent to a command, and on January 6, 1863, Burge-
vine was back at Shanghai. Captain Holland was then
placed in temporary command, while the answer of the
home government was awaited to General Staveley's prop-
osition to intrust the force to the care of a young captain of
engineers, named Charles Gordon. Chung Wang returned
at this moment to Soochow, and in Kiangsu the cause of the
Taepings again revived through his energy. In February
a detachment of Holland's force attacked Fushan, but met
with a check, when the news of a serious defeat at Taitsan,
where the former Futai Sieh had been defeated, compelled
its speedy retreat to Suukiang. Li had some reason to be-
lieve that Taitsan would surrender on the approach of the
imperialists, and he accordingly sent a large army, including
2,500 of the contingent, to attack it. The affair was badly
managed. The assaulting party was stopped by a wide
ditch; neither boats nor ladders arrived. The Taepings fired
furiously on the exposed party, several officers were killed,
and the men broke into confusion. The heavy guns stuck
t04 .4 SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
in the soft ground and had to be abandoned ; and despite the
good conduct of the contingent the Taepings achieved a de-
cisive success (February 13). Chung Wang was able to feel
that his old luck had not deserted him, and the Taepings of
Kiangsu recovered all their former confidence in themselves
and their leader. This disaster inflicted a rude blow on the
confidence of Li and his assistants ; and it was resolved that
nothing should be attempted until the English officer, at last
appointed, had assumed the active command.
Such was the position of affairs when on March 24, 1863,
Major Gordon took over the command of the Ever- Victorious
Army. At that moment it was not merely discouraged by
its recent reverses, but it was discontented with its position,
and when Major Gordon assumed the command at Sunkiang
there was some fear of an immediate mutiny. The new
commander succeeded in allaying their discontent, and be-
lieving that active employment was the best cure for insub-
ordination resolved to relieve Chanzu without delay. The
Taepings were pressing the siege hard and would probably
have captured the place before many days when Major
Gordon attacked them in their stockades and drove them
out with no inconsiderable loss. Having thus gained the
confidence of his men and the approbation of the Chinese
authorities Major Gordon returned to Sunkiang, where he
employed himself in energetically restoring the discipline of
his force, and in preparing for his next move, which at the
request of Li Hung Chang was to be the capture of Quiiigan.
On April 24 the force left Sunkiang to attack Quinsan, but
it had not proceeded far when its course had to be altered to
Taitsan, where, through an act of treachery, a force of 1,500
imperialists had been annihilated. It became necessary to
retrieve this disaster without dela}% more especiall3 r as all
hope of taking Quinsan had for the moment to be abandoned.
Major Gordon at once altered the direction of his march,
and joining en route General Ching, who had, on the news,
broken up his camp before Quinsan, hastened as rapidly a3
possible to Taitsan, where he arrived on April 29. Bad
THE /MF/'AYG REBELLION. 400
weather obliged the attack lo be deferred until May 1, when
two stockades 011 the west side were earned, and their De-
fenders compelled to flee, not into the town as they would
have wished, but away from it toward Chanzu. On the fol-
lowing day, the attack was resumed on the north side, while
the armed boats proceeded to assault the place from the
creek. The firing continued from nine in the morning until
five in the evening, when a breach seemed to be practicable,
and two regiments were ordered to the assault. The rebels
showed great courage and fortitude, swarming hi the breach
and pouring a heavy and well-directed fire upon the troops.
The attack was momentarily checked ; but while the storm-
ers remained under such cover as they could find, the shells
of two howitzers were playing over their heads and causing
frightful havoc among the Taepings in the breach. But for
these guns, Major Gordon did not think that the place would
have been carried at all ; but after some minutes of this firing
at such close quarters, the rebels began to show signs of
wavering. A party of troops gained the wall, a fresh regi-
ment advanced toward the breach, and the disappearance
of the snake flag showed that the Taeping leaders had given
up the fight. Taitsan was thus captured, and the three
previous disasters before it retrieved.
On May 4 the victorious force appeared before Quinsan, a
place of considerable strength and possessing a formidabe ar-
tillery directed by a European. The town was evidently too
strong to be carried by an immediate attack, and Major
Gordon's movements were further hampered by the conduct
of his own men, who, upon their arrival at Quinsan, hurried
off in detachments to Sunkiang for the purpose of disposing
of their spoil. Ammunition had also fallen short, and the
commander was consequently obliged to return to refit and
10 rally his men. At Sunkiang worse confusion followed.
Lor the men, or rather the officers, broke out into mutiny on
the occasion of Major Gordon appointing an English officer
with the rank of lieutenant-colonel to the control of the com-
missariat, which had been completely neglected. The men
406 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
who had served with Ward and Burgevine objected to this,
and openly refused to obey orders. Fortunately the stores
and ammunition were collected, and Major Gordon an-
nounced that he would march on the following morning,
with or without the mutineers. Those who did not answer
to their names at the end of the first half-march would be
dismissed, and he spoke with the authority of one in com-
plete accord with the Chinese authorities themselves. The
soldiers obeyed him as a Chinese official, because he had
been made a tsungping or brigadier-general, and the officers
feared to disobey him as they would have liked on account
of his commanding the source whence they were paid. The
mutineers fell in, and a force of nearly 3,000 men, well-
equipped and anxious for the fray, returned to Quinsan,
where General Ching had, in the meanwhile, kept the rebels
closely watched from a strong position defended by several
stockades and supported by the "Hyson" steamer. Imme-
diately after his arrival, Major Gordon moved out his force
to attack the stockades which the rebels had constructed on
their right wing. These were strongly built; but as soon
as the defenders perceived that the assailants had gained
their flank they precipitately withdrew into Quinsan itself.
General Ching wished the attack to be made on the eastern
gate, opposite to which he had raised his own intrenchments,
and by which he had announced his intention of forcing his
way ; but a brief inspection showed Major Gordon that that
was the strongest point of the town, and that a direct attack
upon it could only succeed, if at all, by a very considerable
sacrifice of men. Like a prudent commander Major Gordon
determined to reconnoiter; and, after much grumbling on
the part of General Ching, he decided that the most hopeful
plan was to carry some stockades situated seven miles west
of the town, and thence assail Quinsan on the Soochow side,
which was weaker than the others. These stockades were
at a village called Chumze. On May 30 the force detailed
for this work proceeded to carry it out. The "Hyson" and
fifty imperial gunboats conveyed the land force, which con-
THE TAEPING REBELLION. 407
sisted of one regiment, some guns, and a large body of im-
perialists. The rebels at Chumze offered hardly the least
resistance ; whether it was that they were dismayed at the
sudden appearance of the enemy, or, as was stated at the
time, because they considered themselves ill-treated by their
comrades in Quinsan. The "Hyson" vigorously pursued
those who fled toward Soochow, and completed the effect of
this success by the capture of a very strong and well-built
fort covering a bridge at Ta Edin. An imperialist garrison
was installed there, and the "Hyson" continued the pursuit
to within a mile of Soochow itself.
The defenders of Quinsan itself were terribly alarmed at
the cutting off of their communications. They saw them-
selves on the point of being surrounded, and they yielded to
the uncontrollable impulse of panic. During the night, after
having suffered severely from the "Hyson" fire, the garrison
evacuated the place, which might easily have held out; and
General Ching had the personal satisfaction, on learning
from some deserters of the flight of the garrison, of leading
his men over the eastern walls which he had wished to as-
sault. The importance of Quinsan was realized on its cap-
ture. Major Gordon pronounced it to be the key of Soochow,
and at once resolved to establish his headquarters there,
partly because of its natural advantages, but also and not
less on account of its enabling him to gradually destroy the
evil associations which the men had contracted at Sunkiang.
The change was not acceptable, however, to the force
itself ; and the artillery in particular refused to obey orders,
and threatened to shoot their officers. Discipline was, how-
ever, promptly reasserted by the energy of the commander,
who ordered the principal ringleader to be shot, and "the
Ever- Victorious Army" became gradually reconciled to its
new position at Quinsan. After the capture of Quinsan
there was a cessation of active operations for nearly two
months. It was the height of summer and the new troops
had to be drilled. The difficulty with Ching, who took
all the credit for the capture of Quinsan to himself, was
408 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
arranged through the mediation of Dr. Macartney, who had
just left the English army to become Li's right-hand man.
Two other circumstances occurred to embarrass the young
commander. There were rum o s of some meditated move-
ment on the part of Burgevine, who had returned from Pekin
with letters exculpating him, and who endeavored to recovei-
the command in spite of Li Hung Chang, and there was a
further manifestation of insubordination in the force, which,
as Gordon said, bore more resemblance to a rabble than the
magnificent army it was popularly supposed to be. The
artillery had been cowed by Major Gordon's vigor, but its
efficiency remained more doubtful than could be satisfactory
to the general responsible for its condition, and also relying
upon it as the most potent arm of his force. He resolved to
remove the old commander, and to appoint an English offi-
cer, Major Tapp, in his place. On carrying his determina-
tion into effect the officers sent in "a round robin," refusing
to accept a new officer. This was on July 25, and the expe-
dition which had been decided upon against "Wokong had
consequently to set out the following morning without a
single artillery officer. In face of the inflexible resolve of
the leader, however, the officers repented, and appeared in a
body at the camp begging to be taken back, and expressing
their willingness to accept "Major Tapp or any one else" as
their colonel.
"With these troops, part of whom had only just returned
to a proper sense of discipline, Gordon proceeded to attack
Kahpoo, on the Grand Canal south of Soochow, where
the rebels held two strongly-built stone forts. The force
had been strengthened by the addition of another steamer,
the "Firefly," a sister vessel to the "Hyson." Major Gor-
don arrived before Kahpoo on July 27; and the garrison,
evidently taken by surprise, made scarcely the least resist-
ance. The capture of Kahpoo placed Gordon's force between
Soochow and "Wokong, the next object of attack. At Wokong
the rebels were equally unprepared. The garrison at Kah-
poo, thinking only of its own safety, had fled to Soochow,
THE TAEPINQ REBELLION. 409
leaving their comrades at Wokong unwarned and to their
fate. So heedless were the Taepings at this place of all
danger from the north, that they had even neglected to
occupy a strong stone fort situated about 1,000 yards north
of the walls. The Taepings attempted too late to repair their
error, and the loss of this fort caused them that of all their
other stockades. Wokong itself was too weak to offer any
effectual resistance; and the garrison on the eve of the as-
sault ordered for July 29 sent out a request for quarter, which
was granted, and the place surrendered without further
fighting. Meanwhile an event of far greater importance
had happened than even the capture of these towns, although
they formed the necessary preliminary to the investment of
Soochow. Burgevine had come to the decision to join the
Taepings.
Disappointed in his hope of receiving the command,
Burgevine remained on at Shanghai, employing his time in
watching the varying phases of a campaign in which he
longed to take part, and of which he believed that it was
only his due to have the direction, but still hesitating as to
what decision it behooved him to take. His contempt for all
Chinese officials became hatred of the bitterest kind of the
Futai, by whom he had been not merely thwarted but over-
reached, and predisposed him to regard with no unfavorable
eye the idea of joining his fortunes to those of the rebel Tae-
pings. To him in this frame of mind came some of the dis-
missed officers and men of the "Ward force, appealing to his
vanity by declaring that his soldiers remembered him with
affection, and that he had only to hoist his flag for most of
his old followers to rally round him. There was little to
marvel at if he also was not free from some feeling of jeal-
ousy at the success and growing fame of Major Gordon, for
whom he simulated a warm friendship. The combination
of motives proved altogether irresistible as soon as he found
that several hundred European adventurers were ready to
accompany him into the ranks of the Taepings, and to en-
deavor to do for them what they had failed to perform for
18
410 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the imperialists. On July 15, Dr. Macartney wrote to Major
Gordon stating that he had positive information that B urge-
vine was enlisting men for some enterprise, that he had
already collected about 300 Europeans, and that he had even
gone so far as to choose a special flag, a white diamond on a
red ground, and containing a black star in the center of the
diamond. On the 21st of the same month Burgevine wrote
to Major Gordon saying that there would be many rumors
about him, but that he was not to believe any of them, and
that he would come and see him shortly. This letter was
written as a blind, and, unfortunately, Major Gordon at-
tached greater value to Burgevine's word than he did to the
precise information of Dr. Macartney. He was too much
disposed to think that, as the officer who had to a certain
extent superseded Burgevine in the command, he was bound
to take the most favorable view of all his actions, and to trust
implicitly in his good faith. Major Gordon, trusting to his
word, made himself personally responsible to the Chinese
authorities for his good faith, and thus Burgevine escaped
arrest. Burgevine's plans had been deeply laid. He had
been long in correspondence with the Taepings, and his terms
had been accepted. He proclaimed his hostility to the gov-
ernment by seizing one of their new steamers.
At this very moment Major Gordon came to the decis-
ion to resign, and he hastened back to Shanghai in order to
place his withdrawal from the force in the hands of the Futai.
He arrived there on the very day that Burgevine seized the
"Kajow" steamer at Sunkiang, and on hearing the news
he at once withdrew his resignation, which had been made
partly from irritation at the irregular payment of his men,
and also on account of the cruelty of General Ching. Not
merely did he withdraw his resignation, but he hastened
back to Quinsan, into which he rode on the night of the very
same day that had witnessed his departure. The immediate
and most pressing danger was from the possible defection
of the force to its old leader, when, with the large stores of
artillery and ammunition at Quinsan in their possession, not
THE TAEPIXG REBELLION. 411
even Shangnai, with its very weak foreign garrison, could
be considered safe from attack. As a measure of precaution
Major Gordon sent some of his heavy guns and stores back
to Taitsan, where the English commander, General Brown,
consented to guard them, while he hastened off to Kahpoo,
now threatened both by the Soochow force and by the for-
eign adventurers acting under Burgevine. He arrived at a
most critical moment. The garrison was hard pressed. Gen-
eral Ching had gone back to Shanghai, and only the presence
of the "Hyson" prevented the rebels, who were well-armed
and possessed an efficient artillery, from carrying the fort by
a rush. The arrival of Major Gordon with 150 men on board
his third steamer, the "Cricket," restored the confidence of
the defenders, but there was no doubt that Burgevine had
lost a most favorable opportunity, for if he had attacked this
place instead of proceeding to Soochow it must have fallen.
General Ching, who was a man of almost extraordinary
energy and restlessness, resolved to signalize his return to
the field by some striking act while Major Gordon was com-
pleting his preparations at Quinsan for a fresh effort. His
headquarters were at the strong fort of Ta Edin, on the creek
leading from Quinsan to Soochow, and having the "Hyson"
with him he determined to make a dash to some point nearer
the great rebel stronghold. On August 30 he had seized the
position of Waiquaidong, where, in three days, he threw up
stockades, admirably constructed, and which could not have
been carried save by a great effort on the part of the whole
of the Soochow garrison. Toward the end of September,
Major Gordon, fearing lest the rebels, who had now the sup-
posed advantage of Burgevine's presence and advice, might
make some attempt to cut off General Ching's lengthy com-
munications, moved forward to Waiquaidong to support him;
but when he arrived he found that the impatient mandarin,
encouraged either by the news of his approach or at the in-
action of the Taepings in Soochow, had made a still further
advance of two miles, so that he was only 1,000 yards distant
from the rebel stockades in front of the east gate. Major
412 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A.
Gordon had at this time been re-enforced by the Franco
Chinese corps, which had been well disciplined, under the
command of Captain Bonnefoy, while the necessity of leav-
ing any strong garrison at Quinsan had been obviated by the
loan of 200 Belooches from General Brown's force. The
rebel position having been carefully reconnoitered, both on
the east and on the south, Major Gordon determined that
the first step necessary for its proper beleaguerment was to
seize and fortify the village of Patachiaou, about one mile
south of the city wall. The village, although strongly stock-
aded, was evacuated by the garrison after a feeble resistance,
and an attempt to recover it a few hours later by Mow Wang
in person resulted in a rude repulse chiefly on account of the
effective fire of the "Hyson." Burgevine, instead of fight-
ing the battles of the failing cause he had adopted, was
traveling about the country : at one moment in the capital
interviewing Tien Wang and his ministers, at another going
about in disguise even in the streets of Shanghai. But dur-
ing the weeks when General Ching might have been taken
at a disadvantage, and when it was quite possible to recover
some of the places which had been lost, he was absent from
the scene of military operations. After the capture of Pata-
chiaou most of the troops and the steamers that had taken
it were sent back to Waiquaidong, but Major Gordon re-
mained there with a select body of his men and three howitz-
ers. The rebels had not resigned themselves to the loss of
Patachiaou, and on October 1 they made a regular attempt
to recover it. They brought the "Kajow" into action, and,
as it had found a daring commander in a man named Jones,
its assistance proved very considerable. They had also a
32-pounder gun on board a junk, and this enabled them to
overcome the fire of Gordon's howitzers and also of the
'Hyson," which arrived from Waiquaidong during the en-
gagement. But notwithstanding the superiority of their
artillery, the rebels hesitated to come to close quarters, and
when Major Gordon and Captain Bonnefoy led a sortie
against them at the end of the day they retired precipitately.
THE TAEPIXG REBELLION. 413
At this stage Burgevine wrote to Major Gordon two let-
ters the first exalting the Taepings, and the second written
two days later asking for an interview, whereupon he ex-
pressed his desire to surrender on the provision of personal
safety. He assigned the state of his health as the cause of
this change, but there was never the least doubt that the
true reason of this altered view was dissatisfaction with his
treatment by the Taeping leaders and a conviction of the
impossibility of success. Inside Soochow, and at Nankin,
it was possible to see with clearer eyes than at Shanghai that
the Taeping cause was one that could not be resuscitated.
But although Burgevine soon and very clearly saw the hope-
lessness of the Taeping movement, he had by no means made
up his mind to go over to the imperialists. With a consid-
erable number of European followers at his beck and call,
and with a profound and ineradicable contempt for the whole
Chinese official world, he was loth t 3se or surrender the
position which gave him a certain ?..iportance. He vacil-
lated between a number of suggestions, and the last he came
to was the most remarkable, at the same time that it revealed
more clearly than any other the vain and meretricious char-
acter of the man. In his second interview with Major Gor-
don he proposed that that officer should join him, and com-
bining the whole force of the Europeans and the disciplined
Chinese, seize Soochow, and establish an independent au-
thority of their own. It was the old filibustering idea,
revived under the most unfavorable circumstances, of fight-
ing for their own hand, dragging the European name in the
dirt, and founding an independent authority of some vague,
undefinable and transitory character. Major Gordon list-
ened to the unfolding of this scheme of miserable treachery,
and only his strong sense of the utter impossibility, and in-
deed the ridiculousness of the project, prevented his contempt
and indignation finding forcible expression. Burgevine, the
traitor to the imperial cause, the man whose health would
not allow him to do his duty to his new masters in Soochow,
thus revealed his plan for defying all parties, and for decid-
114 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
ing the fate of the Dragon Throne. The only reply he
received was the cold one that it would be better and wiser
to confino his attention to the question of whether he in-
tended to yield or not, instead of discussing idle schemes
of "vaulting ambition."
Meantime, Chung Wang had come down from Nankin
to superintend the defense of Soochow ; and in face of a more
capable opponent he still did not despair of success, or at the
least of making a good fight of it. He formed -the plan of
assuming the offensive against Chanzu while General Chin<c
was employed in erecting his stockades step by step nearer
to the eastern wall of Soochow. In order to prevent the
realization of this project Major Gordon made several dem-
onstrations on the western side of Soochow, which had the
effect of inducing Chung "Wang to defer his departure. At
this conjuncture serious news arrived from the south. A
large rebel force, assembled from Chekiang and the silk dis-
tricts south of the Taho Lake, had moved up the Grand Canal
and held the garrison of Wokong in close leaguer. On
October 10 the imperialists stationed there made a sortie,
but were driven back with the loss of several hundred men
killed and wounded. Their provisions were almost ex-
hausted, and it was evident that unless relieved they could
not hold out many days longer. On October 12 Major Gor-
don therefore hastened to their succor. The rebels held a
position south of "Wokong, and, as they felt sure of a safe
retreat, they fought with great determination. The battle
lasted three hours ; the guns had to be brought up to within
fifty yards of the stockade, and the whole affair is described
as one of the hardest fought actions of the war. On the
return of the contingent to Patachiaou, about thirty Eu-
ropeans deserted the rebels, but Burgevine and one or two
others were not with them. Chung Wang had seized the
opportunity of Gordon's departure for the relief of "Wokong
to carry out his scheme against Chanzu. Taking the "Ka-
jow" with him, and a considerable number of the foreign
adventurers, he reached Monding, where the imperialists
THE TAEPING REBELLION 415
were strongly intrenched at the junction of the main creek
from Chanzu with the Canal. He attacked them, and a
severely contested struggle ensued, in which at first the
Taepings carried everything before them. But the fortune
of the day soon veered round. The "Kajow" was sunk by
a lucky shot, great havoc was wrought by the explosion of a
powder-boat, and the imperialists remained masters of a hard-
fought field. The defection of the Europeans placed Burge-
vine in serious peril, and only Major Gordon's urgent rep-
resentations and acts of courtesy to the Mow "Wang saved
his life. The Taeping leader, struck by the gallantry and
fair dealing of the English officer, set Burgevine free, and
the American consul thanked Major Gordon for his great
kindness to that misguided officer. Burgevine came out of
the whole complication with a reputation in every way tar-
nished. He had not even the most common courage which
would have impelled him to stay in Soochow and take the
chances of the party to which he had attached himself.
Whatever his natural talents might have been, his vanity
and weakness obscured them all. With the inclination to
create an infinity of mischief, it must be considered fortu-
nate that his ability was so small, for his opportunities were
abundant.
The conclusion of the Burgevine incident removed a
weight from Major Gordon's mind. Established on the east
and south of Soochow, he determined to secure a similar
position on its western side, when he would be able to inter-
cept the communications still held by the garrison across the
Taho Lake. In order to attain this object it was necessary,
in the first place, to carry the stockades at Wuliungchow, a
village two miles west of Patachiaou. The place was cap-
tured at the first attack and successfully- held, notwithstand-
ing a fierce attempt to recover it under the personal direction
of Chung Wang, who returned for the express purpose
This success was followed by others. Another large body
of rebels had come up from the south and assailed the gar-
rison of Wokong. On October 26 one of Gordon's lieuten-
416 A SHORT HISTORY OF CTTINA.
ants, Major Kirkham, inflicted a severe defeat upon them,
and vigorously pursued them for several miles. The next
operation undertaken was the capture of the village of
Leeku, three miles north of Soochow, as the preliminary
to investing the city on the north. Here Major Gordon re-
sorted to his usual flanking tactics, and with conspicuous
success. The rebels fought well; one officer was killed at
Gordon's side, and the men in the stockade were cut down
with the exception of about forty, who were made prisoners.
Soochow was then assailed on the northern as well as on the
other sides, but Chung Wang's army still served to keep
open communications by means of the Grand Canal. That
army had its principal quarters at Wusieh, where it \vas
kept in check by a large imperialist force under Santajin,
Li's brother, who had advanced from Kongyin on the Yang-
tse. Major Gordon's main difficulty now arose from the in-
sufficiency of his force to hold so wide an extent of country ;
and in order to procure a re-enforcement from Santajin, he
agreed to assist that commander against his able opponent
Chung "Wang. "With a view to accomplishing this the Tae-
ping position at Wanti, two miles north of Leeku, was
attacked and captured.
At this stage of the campaign there were 13,500 men
round Soochow, and of these 8,500 were fully occupied in the
defense of the stockades, leaving the very small number of
5,000 men available for active measures in the field. On the
other hand, Santajin had not fewer than 20,000, and pos-
sibly as many as 30,000 men under his orders. But the Tae-
pings still enjoyed the numerical superiority. They had
40,000 men in Soochow, 20,000 at Wusieh, and Chung Wang
occupied a camp, half-way between these places, with 18,000
followers. The presence of Chung Wang was also estimated
to be worth a corps of 5,000 soldiers. Had Gordon been free
to act, his plan of campaign would have been simple and
decisive. He would have effected a junction of his forces
with Santajin, he would have overwhelmed Chung Wang's
18,000 with his combined arr 7 of double that strength, and
THE TAEPINQ REBELLION, 417
j-e would have appeared at the head of his victorious troops
before the bewildered garrison of Wusieh. It would prob-
ably have terminated the campaign at a stroke. Even the
decisive defeat of Chung "Wang alone might have entailed
the collapse of the cause now tottering to its fall. But Major
Gordon had to consider not merely the military quality of
his allies, but also their jealousies and differences. General
Ching hated Santajin on private grounds as well as on pub-
lic. He desired a monopoly of the profit and honor of the
campaign. His own reputation would be made by the cap-
ture of Soochow. It would be diminished and cast into the
shade were another imperial commander to defeat Chung
"Wang and close the line of the Grand Canal. Were Gordon
to detach himself from General Ching he could not feel sure
what that jealous and impulsive commander would do. He
would certainly not preserve the vigilant defensive before
Soochow necessary to insure the safety of the army operating
to the north. The commander of the Ever- Victorious Army
had consequently to abandon the tempting idea of crushing
Chung "Wang and to have recourse to slower methods.
On November 19 Major Gordon collected the whole of
his available force to attack Fusaiquan, a place on the Grand
Canal six miles north of Soochow. Here the rebels had
barred the Canal at three different points, while on the banks
they occupied eight earthworks, which were fortunately in a
very incomplete state. A desperate resistance was expected
from the rebels at this advantageous spot, but they preferred
their safety to their dutj-, and retreated to "Wusieh with
hardly any loss. In consequence of this reverse Chung
Wang withdrew his forces from his camp in face of Santajin,
and concentrated his men at Monding and Wusieh for the
defense of the Grand Canal. The investment of Soochow
being now as complete as the number of troops under the
imperial standard would allow of, Major Gordon returned to
General Ching's stockades in front of that place, with the
view of resuming the attack on the eastern gate. General
Ching and Captain Boimefoy had met with a slight repulse
418 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
there on October 14. The stockade in front of the east gate
was known by the name of the Low Mun, and had been
strengthened to the best knowledge of the Taeping engineers.
Their position was exceedingly formidable, consisting of a line
of breastworks defended at intervals with circular stockades.
Major Gordon decided upon making a night attack and he ar-
ranged his plans from the information provided by the Euro-
pean and other deserters who had been inside. The Taepings
were not without their spies and sympathizers also, and
the intended attempt was revealed to them. The attack was
made at two in the morning of November 27, but the rebels
had mustered in force and received Major Gordon's men
with tremendous volleys. Even then the disciplined troops
would not give way, and encouraged by the example of their
leader who seemed to be at the front and at every point at
the same moment, fairly held their own on the edge of the
enemy's position. Unfortunately the troops in support be-
haved badly, and got confused from the heavy fire of the
Taepings, which never slackened. Some of them absolutely
retired and others were landed at the wrong places. Major
Gordon had to hasten to the rear to restore order, and during
his absence the advanced guard were expelled from their
position by a forward movement led by Mow Wang in per-
son. The attack had failed, and there was nothing to do
save to draw off the troops with as little further loss as pos-
sible. This was Major Gordon's first defeat, but it was so
evidently due to the accidents inseparable from a night at-
tempt, and to the fact that the surprise had been revealed,
that it produced a less discouraging effect on officers and
men than might have seemed probable. Up to this day
Major Gordon had obtained thirteen distinct victories be-
sides the advantage in many minor skirmishes.
Undismayed by this reverse Major Gordon collected all
his troops and artillery from the other stockades, and resolved
to attack the Low Muii position with his whole force. He
also collected all his heavy guns and mortars and cannonaded
the rebel stockade for some time; but on an advance being
THE TAEPING REBELLION. 419
ordered the assailants were compelled to retire by the fire
which the Taepings brought to bear on them from every
available point. Chung Wang had hastened down from
Wusieh to take part in the defense of what was rightly
regarded as the key of the position at Soochow, and both he
and Mow Wang superintended in person the defense of the
Low Mun stockade. After a further cannonade the advance
was again sounded, but this second attack would also have
failed had not the officers and men boldly plunged into the
moat or creek and swum across. The whole of the stock-
ades and a stone fort were then carried, and the imperial
forces firmly established at a point only 900 yards from the
inner wall of Soochow. Six officers and fifty men were
killed, and three officers, five Europeans, and 128 men
were wounded in this successful attack. The capture of the
Low Mun stockades meant practically the fall of Soochow.
Chung Wang then left it to its fate, and all the other Wangs
except Mow Wang were in favor of coming to terms with
the imperialists. Even before this defeat Lar Wang had
entered into communications with General Ching for coming
over, and as he had the majority of the troops at Soochow
under his orders Mow Wang was practically powerless,
although resolute to defend the place to the last. Several
interviews took place between the Wangs and General Ching
and Li Hung Chang. Major Gordon also saw the former,
and had one interview with Lar Wang in person. The En-
glish officer proposed as the most feasible plan his surrender-
ing one of the gates. During all this period Major Gordon
had impressed on both of his Chinese colleagues the impera-
tive necessity there was, for reasons of both policy and pru-
dence, to deal leniently and honorably by the rebel chiefs.
All seemed to be going well. General Ching took an oath
of brotherhood with Lar Wang, Li Hung Chang agreed
with everything that fell from Gordon's lips. The only
one exempted from this tacit understanding was Mow Wang,
always in favor of fighting it out and defending the town;
and his name was not mentioned for the simple reason that
420 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
he had nothing to do with the negotiations. For Mow
Wang Major Gordon had formed the esteem due to a gallant
enemy, and he resolved to spare no effort to save his life.
His benevolent intentions were thwarted by the events that
had occurred within Soochow. Mow Wang had been mur-
dered by the other Wangs, who feared that he might detect
their plans and prevent their being carried out. The death
of Mow Wang removed the only leader who was heartily
opposed to the surrender of Soochow, and on the day after
this chief's murder the imperialists received possession of
one of the gates. The inside of the city had been the scene
of the most dreadful confusion. Mow Wang's men had
sought to avenge their leader's death, and on the other hand
the followers of Lar Wang had shaved their heads in token
of their adhesion to the imperialist cause. Some of the more
prudent of the Wangs, not knowing what turn events might
take amid the prevailing discord, secured their safety by a
timely flight. Major Gordon kept his force well in hand,
and refused to allow any of the men to enter the city, where
they would certainly have exercised the privileges of a mer-
cenary force hi respect of pillage. Instead of this Major
Gordon endeavored to obtain for them two months' pay from
the Futai, which that official stated his inability to procure.
Major Gordon thereupon resigned in disgust, and on suc-
ceeding in obtaining one month's pay for his men, he sent
them back to Quinsan without a disturbance.
The departure of the Ever- Victorious Army for its head-
quarters was regarded by the Chinese officials with great
satisfaction, and for several reasons. In the flush of the suc-
cess at Soochow both that force and its commander seemed
in the way of the Futai, and to diminish the extent of his
triumph. Neither Li nor Ching also had the least wish for
any of the ex-rebel chiefs, men of ability and accustomed to
command, to be taken into the service of the government.
Of men of that kind there were already enough. General
Ching himself was a sufficiently formidable rival to the
Futai, without any assistance and encouragement from Lar
THE TAEi>IXG REBELLIOX. 421
Wang and the others. Li had no wish to save them from
the fate of rebels; and although he had promised, and Gen-
eral Ching had sworn to, their personal safety, he was benl
on getting rid of them in one way or another. He feared
Major Gordon, but he also thought that the time had arrived
when he could dispense with him and the foreign-drilled
legion in the same way as he had got rid of Sherard Osborn
and his fleet. The departure of the Quinsan force left him
free to follow his own inclination. The Wangs were invited
to an entertainment at the Futai's boat, and Major Gordon
saw them both in the city and subsequently when on their
way to Li Hung Chang. The exact circumstances of their
fate were never known; but nine headless bodies were dis*
covered on the opposite side of the creek, and not far distant
from the Futai's quarters. It then became evident that Lar
Wang and his fellow Wangs had been brutally murdered.
Major Gordon was disposed to take the office of their avenger
into his own hands, but the opportunity of doing so fortu-
nately did not present itself. He hastened back to Quinsan,
where he refused to act any longer with such false and dis-
honorable colleagues. The matter was reported to Pekin.
Both the mandarins sought to clear themselves by accusing
the other ; and a special decree came from Pekin conferring
on the English officer a very high order and the sum of 10,-
000 taels. Major Gordon returned the money, and expressed
his regret at being unable to accept any token of honor from
the emperor in consequence of the Soochow affair.
A variety of reasons, all equally creditable to Major
Gordon's judgment and single-mind edness, induced him
after two months' retirement to abandon his inaction and
to sink his difference with the Futai. He saw very clearly
that the sluggishness of the imperial commanders would
result in the prolongation of the struggle with all its at-
tendant evils, whereas, if he took the field, he would be
able to bring it to a conclusion within two months. More-
over, the Quinsan force, never very amenable to discipline,
shook off all restraint when in quarters, and promised to
423 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A.
become as dangerous to the government in whose pay it
was as to the enemy against whom it was engaged to fight.
Major Gordon, in view of these facts, came to the prompt
decision that it was his duty, and the course most calculated
to do good, for him to retake the field and strive as ener-
getically as possible to expel the rebels from the small part
of Kiangsu still remaining in their possession. On Febru-
ary 18, 1864, he accordingly left Quinsan at the head of
his men, who showed great satisfaction at the return to ac-
tive campaigning. Wusieh had been evacuated on the fall
of Soochow, and Chung "Wang's force retired to Changchow,
while that chief himself returned to Nankin. A few weeks
later General Ching had seized Pingwang, thus obtaining
the command of another entrance into the Taho Lake. San-
ta j in established his force in a camp not far distant from
Changchow, and engaged the rebels in almost daily skir-
mishes. This was the position of affairs when Major Gordon
took the field toward the end of February, and he at once
resolved to carry the war into a new country by crossing the
Taho Lake and attacking the town of Yesing on its western
shores. By seizing this and the adjoining towns he hoped
to cut the rebellion in two, and to be able to attack Chang
chow in the rear. The operations at Yesing occupied two
days ; but at last the rebel stockades were carried with tre-
mendous loss not only to the defenders, but also to a reliev-
ing force sent from Liyang. Five thousand prisoners were
also taken. Liyang itself was the next place to be attacked ;
but the intricacy of the country, which was intersected by
creeks and canals, added to the fact that the whole region
had been desolated by famine, and that the rebels had broken
all the bridges, rendered this undertaking one of great diffi-
culty and some risk. However, Major Gordon's fortitude
vanquished all obstacles, and when he appeared before Li-
yang he found that the rebel leaders in possession of the
town had come to the decision to surrender. At this place
Major Gordon came into communication with the general
Paochiaou, who was covering the siege operations against
THE TAEPING REBELLION, 423
Nankin, which Tseng Kwofan was pressing with ever-in-
creasing vigor. The surrender of Liyang proved the more
important, as the fortifications were found to be admirably
constructed, and as it contained a garrison of fifteen thou-
sand men and a plentiful supply of provisions. From Li-
yang Major Gordon marched on Kintang, a town due north
of Liyang, and about half-way between Changchow and
Xankin. The capture of Kintang, by placing Gordon's
force within striking distance of Changchow and its com-
munications, would have compelled the rebels to suspend
these operations and recall their forces. Unfortunately the
attack on Kintang revealed unexpected difficulties. The
garrison showed extraordinary determination ; and although
the wall was breached by the heavy fire, two attempts to
assault were repulsed with heavy loss, the more serious in-
asmuch as Major Gordon was himself wounded below the
knee, and compelled to retire to his boat. This was the
second defeat Gordon had experienced-
In consequence of this reverse, whicn dashed the cup of
success from Gordon's hands when he seemed on the point
of bringing the campaign to a close in the most brilliant
manner, the force had to retreat to Liyang, whence the
commander hastened back with one thousand men to Wusieh.
He reached Wusieh on the 25th of March, four days after
the repulse at Kintang, and he there learned that Fushan
had been taken and that Chanzu was being closely attacked.
The imperialists had fared better in the south. General
Ching had captured Kashingfoo, a strong place in Chekiang,
and on the very same day as the repulse at Kintang, Tso
Tsung Tang had recovered Hangchow. Major Gordon, al-
though still incapacitated by his wound from taking his
usual foremost place in the battle, directed all operations
from his boat. He succeeded, after numerous skirmishes,
in compelling the Taepings to quit their position before
Chanzu ; but they drew up in force at the village of Waisso,
where they offered him battle. Most unfortunately, Major
Gordon had to intrust the conduct of the attack to his lieu-
434 .4 SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
tenants, Colonels Howard and Rhodes, while he superin-
tended the advance of the gunboats up the creek. Finding
the banks were too high to admit of these being usefully
employed, and failing to establish communications with the
infantry, he discreetly returned to his camp, where he found
everything in the most dreadful confusion owing to a ter-
rible disaster. The infantry, in fact, had been outmaneu-
vered and routed with tremendous loss. Seven officers and
265 men had been killed, and one officer and sixty-two men
wounded. Such an overwhelming disaster would have
crushed any ordinary commander, particularly when com-
ing so soon after such a rude defeat as that at Kintang. It
only roused Major Gordon to increased activity. He at once
took energetic measures to retrieve this disaster. He sent
his wounded to Quinsan, collected fresh troops, and, having
allowed his own wound to recover by a week's rest, resumed
in person the attack on Waisso. On April 10 Major Gordon
pitched his camp within a mile of Waisso, and paid his men
as the preliminary to the resumption of the offensive. The
attack commenced on the following morning, and promised
to prove of an arduous nature ; but by a skillful flank move-
ment Major Gordon carried two stockades in person, and
rendered the whole place no longer tenable. The rebels
evacuated their position and retreated, elosely pursued by
the imperialists. The villagers, who had suffered from
their exactions, rose upon them, and very few rebels
escaped. The pursuit was continued for a week, and the
lately victorious army of Waisso was practically annihi-
lated. The capture of Changchow was to be the next and
crowning success of the campaign. For this enterprise the
whole of the Ever- Victorious Army was concentrated, in-
cluding the ex-rebel contingent of Liyang. On April 23
Major Gordon carried the stockades near the west gate. In
their capture the Liyang men, although led only by Chinese,
showed conspicuous gallantry, thus justifying Major Gor-
don's belief that the Chinese would fight as well under their
own countrymen as when led by foreigners. Batteries were
THE TAEPIXG REBELLION. 425
i hen constructed for the bombardment of the town itself.
Before these were completed the imperialists assaulted, but
were repulsed with loss. On the following day (April 27)
the batteries opened fire, and two pontoon bridges were
thrown across, when Major Gordon led his men to the as-
sault. The first attack was repulsed, and a second one,
made in conjunction with the imperialists, fared not less
badly. The pontoons were lost, and the force suffered a
greater loss than at any time during the war, with the
exception of "Waisso. The Taepings also lost heavily ; and
their valor could not alter the inevitable result. Chang-
chow had consequently to be approached systematically by
trenches, in the construction of which the Chinese showed
themselves very skillful. The loss of the pontoons compelled
the formation of a cask-bridge; and, during the extensive
preparations for renewing the attack, several hundred of
the garrison came over, reporting that it was only the Can-
tonese who wished to fight to the bitter end. On May 11,
the fourth anniversary of its capture by Chung Wang, Li
requested Major Gordon to act in concert with him for carry-
ing the place by storm. The attack was made in the middle
of the day, to the intense surprise of the garrison, who made
only a feeble resistance, and the town was at last carried
with little loss. The commandant, Hoo "Wang, was made
prisoner and executed. This proved to be the last action of
the Ever- Victorious Army, which then returned to Quinsan,
and was quietly disbanded by its commander before June 1.
To sum up the closing incidents of the Taeping war. Ta-
yan was evacuated two days after the fall of Changchow,
leaving Nankin alone in their hands. Inside that city there
were the greatest misery and suffering. Tien Wang had
refused to take any of the steps pressed on him by Chung
Wang, and when he heard the people were suffering from
want, all he said was, "Let them eat the sweet dew." Tseng
Kwofan drew up his lines on all sides of the city, and grau
ually drove the despairing rebels behind the walls. Chung
Wang sent out the old women and children ; and let it be
A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
recorded to the credit of Tseng Kwotsiuen that he did not
drive them back, but charitably provided for their wants,
and dispatched them to a place of shelter. In June Major
Gordon visited Tseng's camp, and found his works covering
twenty-four to thirty miles, and constructed in the most
elaborate fashion. The imperialists numbered 80,000 men,
but were badly armed. Although their pay was very much
in arrear, they were well fed, and had great confidence in
their leader, Tseng Kwofan. On June 30, Tien "Wang, de-
spairing of success, committed suicide by swallowing golden
leaf. Thus died the Hungtsiuen who had erected the stand-
ard of revolt in Kwangsi thirteen years before. His son was
proclaimed Tien Wang on his death becoming known, but
his reign was brief. The last act of all had now arrived.
On July 19 the imperialists had run a gallery under the wall
of Nankin, and charged it with 40,000 pounds of powder. The
explosion destroyed fifty yards of the walls, and the impe-
rialists, attacking on all sides, poured in through the breach.
Chung Wang made a desperate resistance in the ulterior,
holding his own and the Tien Wang's palace to the last.
He made a further stand with a thousand men at the south-
ern gate, but his band was overwhelmed, and he and the
young Tien Wang fled into the surrounding country. In
this supreme moment of danger Chung Wang thought more
of the safety of his young chief than of himself, and he gave
him an exceptionally good pony to escape on, while he him
self took a very inferior animal. As the consequence Tien
Wang the Second escaped, while Chung Wang was captured
in the hills a few days later. Chung Wang, who had cer-
tainly been the hero of the Taeping movement, was beheaded
on August 7, and the young Tien Wang was eventually cap-
tured and executed also, by Shen Paochen. For this decisive
victory, which extinguished the Taeping Rebellion, Tseng
Kwofan, whom Gordon called "generous, fair, honest and
~>atriotic," was made a Hou, or Marquis, and his brother
Tseng Kwotsiuen an Earl.
It is impossible to exaggerate the impression made by
THE REGENCY. 427
Gordon's disinterestedness on the Chinese people, who ele-
vated him for his courage and military prowess to the pedes-
tal of a national god of war. The cane which he carried
when leading his men to the charge became known as * ' Gor-
don 's wand of victory"; and the troops whom he trained,
and converted by success from a rabble into an army, formed
the nucleus of China's modern army. The service he ren-
dered his adopted country was, therefore, lasting as well as
striking, and the gratitude of the Chinese has, to their credit,
proved not less durable. The name of Gordon is still one to
conjure with among the Chinese, and if ever China were
placed in the same straits, she would be the more willing,
from his example, to intrust her cause to an English officer.
As to the military achievements of General Gordon in China
nothing fresh can be said. They speak indeed for them-
selves, and they form the most solid portion of the reputa-
tion which he gained as a leader of men. In the history of
the Manchu dynasty he will be known as "Chinese Gordon";
although for us his earlier sobriquet must needs give place,
from his heroic and ever-regrettable death, to that of "Gor-
don of Khartoum."
CHAPTER XXI
THE REGENCY
WHILE the suppression of the Taeping Rebellion was in
progress, events of great interest and importance happened
at Pekin. It will be recollected that when the allied forces
approached that city in 1860, the Emperor Hienfung fled to
Jehol, and kept himself aloof from all the peace negotiations
which were conducted to a successful conclusion by his
brother, Prince Kuug. After the signature of the conven-
tion in Pekin, ratifying the Treaty of Tientsin, he refused
to return to his capital; and he even seems to have hoped
that he might, by asserting his imperial prerogative, trans-
fer the capital from Pekin to Jehol, and thus evade one of
A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the principal concessions to the foreigners. But if this was
impossible, he was quite determined, for himself, to have
nothing to do with them, and during the short remainder
of his life he kept his court at Jehol. While his brother was
engaged in meeting the difficulties of diplomacy, and in ar-
ranging the conditions of a novel situation, Hienfung, by
collecting round his person the most bigoted men of his
family, showed that he preferred those counselors who
had learned nothing from recent events, and who would
support him in his claims to undiminished superiority and
inaccessibility. Prominent among the men in his confi-
dence was Prince Tsai, who had taken so discreditable a
part in the arrest of Parkes and his companions at Tung-
chow, and among his other advisers were several inexperi-
enced and impetuous members of the Manchu family. They
were all agreed in the policy of recovering, at the earliest
possible moment, what they considered to be the natural and
prescriptive right of the occupant of the Dragon Throne to
treat all other potentates as in no degree equal to himself.
No respect for treaties would have deterred them from re-
asserting what had solemnly been signed away, and the per-
manent success of the faction at Jehol would have entailed,
within a comparatively short period, the outbreak of another
foreign war. But the continued residence of the emperor at
Jehol was not popular with either his own family or the
inhabitants of Pekin. The members of the Manchu clan,
who received a regular allowance during the emperor's resi-
dence at Pekin, were reduced to the greatest straits, and even
to the verge of starvation, while the Chinese naturally re-
sented the attempt to remove the capital to any other place.
This abnegation of authority by Hienfung, for his absence
meant nothing short of that, could not have been prolonged
indefinitely, for a Chinese emperor has many religious and
secular duties to perform which no one else can discharge,
and which, if not discharged, would reduce the office of em-
peror to a nonentity. Prince Tsai and his associates had no
difficulty in working upon the fears of this prince, who held
THE REGENCY. 429
the most exalted idea of his own majesty, at the same time
that he had not the power or knowledge to vindicate it.
While such were the views prevailing in the imperial cir-
cle at Jehol, arrangements were in progress for the taking
up of his residence at Pekin of the British minister. After
Lord Elgin's departure, his brother, Sir Frederick Bruce,
who was knighted for his share in the negotiations, was ap-
pointed first occupant of the post of minister in the Chinese
capital, and on March 22, 1861, he left Tientsin for Pekin.
Mr. Wade accompanied Sir Frederick as principal secretary,
and the staff included six student interpreters, whose ranks,
constantly recruited, have given many able men to the public
service. Before Sir Frederick reached the capital, the Chi-
nese minister had taken a step to facilitate the transaction
of business with the foreign representatives. Prince Kung
and the credit of the measure belongs exclusively to him
will always be gratefully remembered by any foreign writer
on modern China as the founder of the department known
as the Tsungli Yamen, which he instituted in January, 1861.
This department, since its institution, has very fully answered
all the expectations formed of it ; and, although it is errone-
ous to represent it as in any sense identical with the Chinese
government, or as the originating source of Chinese policy,
it has proved a convenient and well-managed vehicle for the
dispatch of international business. Prince Kung became its
first president, and acted in that capacity until his fall fron*
power in 1884.
Before long, reports began to be spread of the serious
illness of the emperor. In August Prince Kung hastened
to Jehol, the object of his journey being kept secret.
The members of the Tsungli Yamen were observed by the
foreign officials to be pre-occupied, and even the genial
Wansiang could not conceal that they were passing through
a crisis. Not merely was Hienfuug dying, but it had be-
come known to Prince Kung and his friends that he had
left the governing authority during the minority of his son,
a child of less than six years of age, to a board of regency
430 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
composed of eight of the least intelligent and most arrogant
and self-seeking members of the imperial family, with Prince
Tsai at their head. The emperor died on August 22. A few
hours later the imperial decree notifying the last wishes of
the ruler as to the mode of government was promulgated.
The board of regency assumed the nominal control of affairs,
and Hienfung's son was proclaimed emperor under the style
of Chiseang. In all of these arrangements neither Prince
Kung nor his brothers, nor the responsible ministers at the
capital, had had the smallest part. It was an intrigue
among certain members of the imperial clan to possess
themselves of the ruling power, and for a time it seemed
as if their intrigue would be only too successful. Nothing
happened during the months of September and October to
disturb their confidence, for they remained at Jehol, and at
Pekin the routine of government continued to be performed
by Prince Kung. That statesman and his colleagues em-
ployed the interval hi arranging their own plan of action,
and in making sure of the fidelity of a certain number of
troops. Throughout these preparations Prince Kung was
ably and energetically supported by his brother, Prince Chun,
by his colleague, "Wansiang, and by his aged father-in-law,
the minister Kweiliang. But the conspirators could not keep
the young emperor at Jehol indefinitely, and when, at the
end of October, it became known that he was on the point
of returning to Pekin, it was clear that the hour of conflict
had arrived. At Jehol the Board of Regency could do little
harm ; but once its pretensions and legaluy were admitted
at the capital, all the ministers would have to take their
orders from it, and to resign the functions which they had
retained. The main issue was whether Prince Kung or
Prince Tsai was to be supreme. On November 1 the young
emperor entered his capital in state. A large number of
soldiers, still dressed in their white mourning, accompanied
their sovereign from Jehol; but Shengpao's garrison was
infinitely more numerous, and thoroughly loyal to the cause
of Prince Kung. The majority of the regents had arrived
THE REGENCY. 431
with the reigning prince ; those who had not yet come were
on the road, escorting the dead body of Hienfung toward its
resting-place. If a blow was to be struck at all now was the
time to strike it. The regents had not merely placed them-
selves in the power of their opponent, but they had actually
brought with them the young emperor, without whose per-
son Prince Kung could have accomplished little. Prince
Kung had spared no effort to secure, and had fortunately
succeeded in obtaining, the assistance and co-operation of
the Empress Dowager, Hienfuug's principal widow, named
Tsi An. Her assent had been obtained to the proposed plot
before the arrival in Pekin, and it now only remained to
carry it out. On the day following the entry into the capi-
tal, Prince Kung hastened to the palace, and, producing be-
fore the astonished regents an Imperial Edict ordering their
dismissal, he asked them whether they obeyed the decree
of their sovereign, or whether he must call in his soldiers
to compel them. Prince Tsai and his companions had no
choice save to signify their acquiescence in what they could
not prevent^ but, on leaving the chamber in which this
scene took place, they hastened toward the emperor's apart-
ment in order to remonstrate against their dismissal, or to
obtain from him some counter-edict reinstating them in their
positions. They were prevented from carrying out their pur*
pose, but this proof of contumacy sealed their fate. They
were promptly arrested, and a second decree was issued or-
dering their degradation from their official and hereditary
rank. To Prince Kung and his allies was intrusted the
charge of trying and punishing the offenders.
The next step was the proclamation of a new regency,
composed of the two empresses, Tsi An, principal widow of
Hienfung, and Tsi Thsi, mother of the young emperor. Two
precedents for the administration being intrusted to an em-
press were easily found by the Hanlin doctors during the
Ming dynasty, when the Emperors Chitsong and Wanleh
wore minors. Special edicts were issued and arrangements
made for the transaction of business during the continuance
432 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
of the regency, and as neither of the empresses knew Man-
chu, it was specially provided that papers and documents,
which were always presented in that language, should be
translated into Chinese. Concurrently with these measures
for the settlement of the regency happened the closing scenes
in the drama of conspiracy which began so successfully at
Jehol and ended so dramatically at Pekin. For complete
success and security it was necessary that all the ringleaders
should be captured, and some of them were still free.
The bravest, if not the ablest, of the late Board of Re-
gency, Sushuen, remained at large. He had been charged
with the high and honorable duty of escorting the remains
of Hienfung to the capital. It was most important that h>
should be seized before he became aware of the fate that
had befallen his colleagues. Prince Chun volunteered to
capture the last, and hi a sense the most formidable, of the
intriguers himself, and on the very day that the events de-
scribed happened at Pekin he rode out of the capital at the
head of a body of Tartar cavalry. On the following night
Prince Chun reached the spot where he was encamped, and,
breaking into the house, arrested him while in bed. Sushuen
did not restrain his indignation, and betrayed the ulterior
plans entertained by himself and his associates by declaring
that Prince Chun had been only just in time to prevent a
similar fate befalling himself. He was at once placed on
his trial with the other prisoners, and on November 10 the
order was given in the emperor's name for their execution.
Sushuen was executed on the public ground set apart for
that purpose ; but to the others, as a special favor from their
connection with the imperial family, was sent the silken cord,
with which they were permitted to put an end to their exist-
ence. In the fate of Prince Tsai may be seen a well merited
retribution for his treachery and cruelty to Sir Harry Parkes
and his companions.
Another important step which had to be taken was the
alteration of the style given to the young emperor's reign.
It was felt to be impolitic that the deposed ministers shoulc
THE REGENCY. 433
retain any connection whatever in history with the young
ruler. Were Hienfung's son to be handed down to poster-
ity as Chiseang there would be no possibility of excluding
their names and their brief and feverish ambition from the
national annals. After due deliberation, therefore, the name
of Tungche was substituted for that of Chiseang, and mean-
ing, as it does, "the union of law and order," it will be al-
lowed that the name was selected with some proper regard
for the circumstances of the occasion. Prince Kung was re-
warded with many high offices and sounding titles in addi-
tion to the post of chief minister under the two empresses.
He was made president of the Imperial Clan Court in the
room of Prince Tsai, and the title of Iching "Wang, or Prince
Minister, was conferred upon him. His stanch friends and
supporters, Wansiang, Paukwen, and Kweiliang, were ap-
pointed to the Supreme Council. Prince Chun, to whose
skill and bravery hi arresting Sushuen Prince Kung felt
very much indebted, was also rewarded. "With these inci-
dents closed what might have proved a grave and perilous
complication for the Chinese government. Had Prince
Kung prematurely revealed his plans there is every rea-
son to suppose that he would have alarmed and forewarned
his rivals, and that they, with the person of the emperor in
their possession, would have obtained the advantage. His
patience during the two months of doubt and anxiety while
the emperor remained at Jehol was matched by the vigor
and promptitude that he displayed on the eventful 2d of Xo-
vember. That his success was beneficial to his country will
not be disputed by any one, and Prince Kung's name must
be permanently remembered both for having commenced,
and for having insured the continuance of, diplomatic rela-
tions with England and the other foreign powers.
The increased intercourse with Europeans not merely led
to greater diplomatic confidence and to the extension of
trade, but it also induced many foreigners to offer their
services and assistance to the Pekin government during the
embarrassment arising from internal dissension. At first
19
434 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHI* A.
these persons were, as has been seen, encouraged and em
ployed more in consequence of local opinion in the treaty-
ports than as a matter of State policy. But already the sug-
gestion had been brought forward in more than one form for
the employment of foreigners, with the view of increasing
the resources of the government by calling in the assistance
of the very agency which had reduced them. A precedent
had been established for this at an earlier period before, in
fact, the commencement of hostilities by the appointment
of Mr. Horatio N. Lay to direct and assist the local author-
ities in the collection of customs in the Shanghai district.
Mr. Lay's experience had proved most useful in drawing up
the tariff of the Treaty of Tientsin, and his assistance had
been suitably acknowledged. In 1862, when the advantages
to be derived from the military experience of foreigners had
been practically recognized by the appointment of Europeans
to command a portion of the army of China, and in pur-
suance of a suggestion made by the present Sir Robert Hart
in the previous year, it was thought desirable for many rea-
sons that something should also be done to increase the naval
resources of the empire, and Mr. Lay was intrusted with a
commission for purchasing and collecting in Europe a fleet
of gunboats of small draught, which could be usefully em-
ployed for all the purposes of the Pekin government on the
rivers and shallow estuaries of the country. Mr. Lay, who
undertook the commission, said, "This force was intended
for the protection of the treaty-ports, for the suppression of
piracy then rife, and for the relief of this country from the
burden of 'policing' the Chinese waters"; but its first use in
the eyes of Prince Kung was to be employed against the
rebels and their European supporters of whom Burgevim-
was the most prominent. Captain Sherard Osborn, a dis-
tinguished English naval officer, was associated with Mr.
Lay in the undertaking. An Order of Council was issued
on August 30, 1862, empowering both of these officers to act
in the matter as delegates of the Chinese. Captain Osbcrn
and Mr. Lay came to England to collect the vessels of this
THE REGENCY. 435
fleet, and the former afterward returned with them to China
in the capacity of their commodore. The transaction was
not well managed from the very commencement. Mr. Lay
wrote in August, 1862, to say that he had chosen as the na-
tional ensign of the Chinese navy "a green flag, bearing a
yellow diagonal cross," and he wrote again to request that
an official notification should appear in the "Gazette." Had
his request been complied with, there would have been very
strong reason for assuming that the English government
was prepared to support and facilitate every scheme for
forcing the Chinese to accept and submit to the exact method
of progress approved of and desired by the European servants
of their government, without their taking any part in the
transaction save to ratify terms that might be harsh and
exorbitant. Fortunately, the instinctive caution of our For-
eign Office was not laid aside on this occasion. Mr. Lay was
informed that no notice could appear in the "London Ga-
zette" except after the approval of the Pekin authorities had
been expressed; and Prince Kung wrote, on October 22, to
say that the Chinese ensign would be of "yellow ground,
and on it will be designed a dragon with bb head toward the
upper part of the flag." Mr. Lay prv^eded ;he vessels
seven gunboats and one store-ship and arrived at Pekin in
May, 1863.
Prince Kung had been most anxious for the speedy arrival
of the flotilla ; and the doubtful fortune of the campaign in
Kiangsu, where the gunboats would have been invaluable,
rendered him extremely desirous that they should commence
active operations immediately on arrival. But he found, in
the first place, that Mr. Lay was not prepared to accept the
appointment of a Chinese official as joint-commander, and
in the second place, that he would not receive orders from
any of the provincial authorities. Such a decision was mani-
festly attended with the greatest inconvenience to China ; for
only the provincial authorities knew what the interests of the
State demanded, and where the fleet might co-operate with
advantage in the attacks on the Taepings. Unless Captain
436 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Osborn were to act on the orders of Tsen Kwofan, and par-
ticularly of Li Hung Chang, it was difficult to see of what
possible use he or his flotilla could be to China. The found-
ers of the new Chinese navy claimed practically all the privi-
leges of an ally, and declined the duties devolving on them
as directing a department of the Chinese administration.
Of course, it was more convenient and more dignified for the
foreign officers to draw their instructions and their salaries
direct from the fountain-head; but if the flotilla was not to
be of any practical use to China it might just as well never
have been created. The fleet arrived in safety, but remained
inactive. The whole summer and autumn of 1863, with its
critical state of affairs round Soochow, passed away without
anything being done to show what a powerful auxiliary Mr.
Lay's ships might be. The ultimate success of those opera-
tions without the smallest co-operation on the part of Captain
Osborn or his flotilla virtually sealed its fate. In October,
Wansiang, in the name of the Foreign Office, declared that
the Chinese could not recognize or ratifj" the private arrange-
ment between Mr. Lay and his naval officer, and that it was
essential for Captain Osborn to submit to receive his instruc-
tions from the provincial authorities. In the following month
Mr. Lay was summarily dismissed from the Chinese service,
and it was determined, after some delay and various counter
suggestions, to send back the ships to Europe, there to be
disposed of. The radical fault in the whole arrangement had
been Mr. Lay's wanting to take upon himself the responsi-
bility not merely of Inspector-General of Customs, but also
of supreme adviser on all matters connected with foreign
questions. The Chinese themselves were to take quite a
subordinate part in their realization, and were to be treated,
in short, as if they did not know how to manage their own
affairs. Mr. Lay's dreams were suddenly dispelled, and his
philanthropic schemes fell to the ground. Neither Prince
Kung nor his colleagues had any intention to pave the way
for their own effacement.
After Mr. Lay's departure the Maritime Customc wen*
THE REGENCY. 437
placed under the control of Mr. Robert Hart, who had acted
during Mr. Lay's absence in Europe. This appointment was
accompanied by the transfer of the official residence from
Pekin to Shanghai, which was attended with much practical
advantage. Already the customs revenue had risen to three
millions, and trade was steadily expanding as the rebels were
gradually driven back, and as the Yangtsekiang and the
coasts became safer for navigation. Numerous schemes were
suggested for the opening up of China by railways and the
telegraph ; but they all very soon ended in nothing, for the
simple reason that the Chinese did not want them. They
were more sincere and energetic in their adoption of military
improvements.
The anxieties of Prince Kung on the subject of the dy-
nasty, and with regard to the undue pretensions and expecta-
tions of the foreign officials who looked on the Chinese merely
as the instruments of their self-aggrandizement, were further
increased during this period by the depredations of the
Nienfei rebels in the province of Shantung. During these
operations Sankolinsia died, leaving Tseng Kwofan in undis-
puted possession of the first place among Chinese officials.
Sankolinsin, when retreating after a reverse, was treacher-
ously murdered by some villagers whose hospitality he had
claimed.
The events of this introductory period may be appro-
priately concluded with the strange stroke of misfortune that
befell Prince Kung in the spring of 1865, and which seemed
to show that he had indulged some views of personal ambi-
tion. The affair had probably a secret history, but if so the
truth is hardly likely to be ever known. The known facts
were as follows: On April 2, 1865, there appeared an edict
degrading the prince hi the name of the two regent-em-
presses. The charge made against him was of having grown
arrogant and assumed privileges to which he had no right.
He was at first "diligent and circumspect," but he has now
become disposed "to overrate his own importance." In con-
sequence, he was deprived of all his appointments and dis<
438 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A.
missed from the scene of public affairs. Five weeks after
his fall, however, Prince Kung was reinstated, on May 8, in
all his offices, with the exception of that of President of the
Council. This episode, which might have produced grave
complications, closed with a return to almost the precise
state of things previously existing. There was one impor-
tant difference. The two empresses had asserted their pre-
dominance. Prince Kung had hoped to be supreme, and to
rule uncontrolled. From this time forth he was content
to be their minister and adviser, on terms similar to those
that would have applied to any other official.
The year 1865, which witnessed this very interesting
event in the history of the Chinese government, beheld be-
fore its close the departure of Sir Frederick Bruce from
Pekin, and the appointment of Sir Rutherford Alcock, who
had been the first British minister to Japan during the crit-
ical period of the introduction of foreign intercourse with
that country, to fill the post of Resident Minister at Pekin.
Sir Rutherford Alcock then found the opportunity to put in
practice some of the honorable sentiments to which he had
given expression twenty years before at Shanghai. When
Sir Rutherford left Yeddo for Pekin, the post of Minister
in Japan was conferred on Sir Harry Parkes, who had been
acting as consul at Shanghai since the conclusion of the war.
The relations between the countries were gradually settling
down on a satisfactory basis, and the appointment of a Su-
preme Court for China and Japan at Shanghai, with Sir
Edmund Hornby as Chief Judge, promised to enforce obe-
dience to the law among even the unsettled adventurers of
differem, nationalities left by the conclusion of the Taeping
Rebellion and the cessation of piracy without a profitable
pursuit.
While the events which have been set forth were hap-
pening in the heart of China, other misfortunes had befallen
the executive in the more remote quarters of the realm, but
resulting none the less in the loss and ruin of provinces, and
in the subversion of the emperor's authority. Two great
THE REGENCY. 4: 19
uprisings of the people occurred in opposite directions, both
commencing while the Taeping Rebellion was in full force,
and continuing to disturb the country for many years after
its suppression. The one had for its scene the great south-
western province of Yunnan; the other the two provinces
of the northwest, Shensi and Kansuh, and extending thence
westward to the Pamir. They resembled each other in one
point, and that was that they were instigated and sustained
by the Mohammedan population alone. The Panthays and
the Tungani were either indigenous tribes or foreign immi-
grants who had adopted or imported the tenets of Islam.
Their sympathies with the Pekin government were probably
never very great, but they were impelled in both cases to
revolt more by local tyranny than by any distinct desire
to cast off the authority of the Chinese ; but, of course, the
obvious embarrassment of the central executive encouraged
by simplifying the task of rebellion. The Panthay rising
calls for description in the first place, because it began at an
earlier period than the other, and also because the details
have been preserved with greater fidelity. Mohammedanism
is believed to have been introduced into Yunnan in or about
the year 1275, and it made most progress among the so-called
aboriginal tribes, the Lolos and the Mantzu. The officials
were mostly Chinese or Tartars, and, left practically free
from control, they more often abused their power than
sought to employ it for the benefit of the people they gov-
erned. In the very first year of Hienfung's reign (1851) a
petition reached the capital from a Mohammedan land pro-
prietor in Yunnan named Ma Wenchu, accusing the em-
peror's officials of the gravest crimes, and praying that "a
just and honest man" might be sent to redress the wrongs
of an injured and long-suffering people. The petition was
carefully read and favorably considered at the capital; but
beyond a gracious answer the emperor was at the time
powerless to apply a remedy to the evil. Four years passed
away without any open manifestation of the deep discontent
smoldering below the surface. But in 1855 the Chinese and
440 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the Mohammedan laborers quarreled in one of the principal
mines of the province, which is covered with mines of gold,
iron, and copper. It seems that the greater success of the
Mohammedans in the uncertain pursuit of mining had roused
the displeasure of the Chinese. Disputes ensued, in which
the Mussulmans added success in combat to success in min-
ing ; and the official appointed to superintend the mines, in-
stead of remaining with a view to the restoration of order,
sought his personal safety by precipitate flight to the town
of Yunnan. During his absence the Chinese population
raised a levy en masse, attacked the Mohammedans who
had gained a momentary triumph, and compelled them by
sheer weight of numbers to beat a hasty retreat to their own
homes in a different part of the province. This success was
the signal for a general outcry against the Mohammedans,
who had long been the object of the secret ill-will of the
other inhabitants. Massacres took place in several parts of
Yunnan, and the followers of the Prophet had to flee for
their lives.
Among those who were slain during these popular dis-
orders was a young chief named Ma Sucheng; and when the
news of his murder reached his native village, his younger
brother, Ma Sien, who had just received a small military
command, declared his intention to avenge him, and fled to
join the Mohammedan fugitives in the mountains. In this
secure retreat they rallied their forces, and, driven to des-
peration by the promptings of want, they left their fastnesses
with the view of regaining what they had lost. In this they
succeeded better than they could have hoped for. The Chi-
nese population experienced hi their turn the bitterness of
defeat; and the mandarins had the less difficulty in con-
cluding a temporary understanding between the exhausted
combatants. Tranquillity was restored, and the miners re-
sumed their occupations. But the peace was deceptive, and
in a little time the struggle was renewed with increased fury.
In this emergency the idea occurred to some of the officials
that an easy and efficacious remedy of the difficulty in which
THE REGENCY. 441
they found themselves would be provided by the massacre
of the whole Mussulman population. In this plot the fore-
most part was taken by Hwang Chung, an official who bit-
terly hated the Mohammedans. He succeeded in obtaining
the acquiescence of all his colleagues with the exception of
the viceroy of the province, who exposed the iniquity of the
design, but who, destitute of all support, was powerless to
prevent its execution. At the least he resolved to save his
honor and reputation by committing suicide, and he and his
wife were found one morning hanging up in the hall of the
yamen. His death simplified the execution of the project
which his refusal might possibly have prevented. May 19,
1856, was the date fixed for the celebration of this Chinese
St. Bartholomew. But the secret had not been well kept.
The Mohammedans, whether warned or suspicious, dis-
trusted the authorities and their neighbors, and stood vigi-
lantly on their guard. At this time they looked chiefly to a
high priest named Ma Tesing for guidance and instruction.
But although on the alert, they were after all, taken to some
extent by surprise, and many of them were massacred after
a more or less unavailing resistance. But if many of the
Mussulmans were slain, the survivors were inspired with a
desperation which the mandarins had never contemplated.
From one end of Yunnan to the other the Mohammedans,
in face of great personal peril, rose by a common and spon-
taneous impulse, and the Chinese population was compelled
to take a hasty refuge in the towns. At Talifoo, where the
Mohammedans formed a considerable portion of the popula
tion, the most desperate fighting occurred, and after three
days' carnage the Mussulmans, under Tu Wensiu, were left
in possession of the city. The rebels did not remain without
leaders, whom they willingly recognized and obeyed ; for the
Kwanshihs, or chiefs, who had accepted titles of authority
from the Chinese, cast off their allegiance and placed them
selves at the head of the popular movement. The priest Ma
Tesing was raised to the highest post of all as Dictator, but
Tu Wensiu admitted no higher authority than his own
443 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
within the walls of Talifoo. Ma Tesing had performed the
pilgrimage to Mecca, he had resided at Constantinople for
two years, and his reputation for knowledge and saintliness
stood highest among his co-religionists.
While Ma Tesing exercised the supremacy due to his age
and attainments, the young chief Ma Sien led the rebels in
the field. His energy was most conspicuous, and in the
year 1858 he thought he was sufficiently strong to make an
attack upon the city of Yunnan itself. His attack was
baffled by the resolute defense of an officer named Lin
Tzuchin, who had shown great courage as a partisan leader
against the insurgents before he was intrusted with the de-
fense of the provincial capital. Ma Sien was compelled to
beat a retreat, and to devote himself to the organization
of the many thousand Ijen or Lolos recruits who signified
their attachment to his cause. For the successful defense of
Yunnan Lin was made a Titu, and gradually collected into
his own hands such authority as still remained to the em-
peror's lieutenants. On both sides preparations were made
for the renewal of the struggle, but before the year 1858
ended Ma Sien met with a second repulse at the town of
Linan. The year 1859 was not marked by any event of sig-
nal importance, although the balance of success inclined on
the whole to the Mussulmans. But in the following year the
Mohammedans drew up a large force, computed to exceed
50,000 men, round Yunnanfoo, to which they laid vigorous
siege. The imperialists were taken at a disadvantage, and
the large number of people who had fled for shelter into the
town rendered the small store of provisions less sufficient for
a protracted defense. Yunnanfoo was on the point of sur-
render when an event occurred which not merely relieved
it from its predicament, but altered the whole complexion of
the struggle. The garrison had made up its mind to yield.
Even the brave Lin had accepted the inevitable, and begun
to negotiate with the two rebel leaders, Ma Sien and the
priest Ma Tesing. Those chiefs, with victory in their grasp,
manifested an unexpected and surprising moderation. In
THE REGENCY. 443
stead of demanding from Lin a complete and unconditional
surrender, they began to discuss with him what terms could
be agreed upon for the cessation of the war and the restora-
tion of tranquillity to the province. At first it was thought
that these propositions concealed some intended treachery,
but their sincerity was placed beyond dispute by the suicide
of the mandarin Hwang Chung, who had first instigated the
people to massacre their Mohammedan brethren. The terms
of peace were promptly arranged, and a request was for-
warded to Pekin for the ratification of a convention con-
cluded under the pressure of necessity with some of the rebel
leaders. The better to conceal the fact that this arrange-
ment had been made with the principal leader of the dis-
affected, Ma Sien changed his name to Ma Julung, and
received the rank of general in the Chinese service; while
the high priest accepted as his share the not inconsiderable
pension of two hundred taels a month. It is impossible to
divine the true reasons which actuated these instigators
of rebellion in their decision to go over to the side of the
government. They probably thought that they had done
sufficient to secure all practical advantages, and that any
persistence in hostilities would only result in the increased
misery and impoverishment of the province. Powerful as
they were, there were other Mohammedan leaders seeking
to acquire the supreme position among their co-religionists ;
and foremost among these was Tu Wensiu, who had reduced
the whole of Western Yunnan to his sway, and reigned at
Talifoo. The Mohammedan cause, important as it was, did
not afford scope for the ambitions of two such men as Ma
Julung and Tu Wensiu. The former availed himself of the
favorable opportunity to settle this difficulty in a practical
and, as he shrewdly anticipated, the most profitable man-
ner for himself personally, by giving in his adhesion to the
government.
This important defection did not bring in its train any
certainty of tranquillity. Incited by the example of then-
leaders, every petty officer and chief thought himself de-
444 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
serving of the highest honors, and resolved to fight for his
own hand. Ma Julung left Yunnanfoo for the purpose of
seizing a neighboring town which had revolted, and during
his absence one of his lieutenants seized the capital, mur-
dered the viceroy, and threatened to plunder the inhabitants.
Ma Julung was summoned to return in hot haste, and as a
temporary expedient the priest Ma Tesing was elected vice-
roy. "When Ma Julung returned with his army he had to
lay siege to Yunnanfoo, and although he promptly effected
an entrance into the city, it took five days' hard fighting in
the streets before the force in occupation was expelled. The
insurgent officer was captured, exposed to the public gaze
for one month in an iron cage, and then executed in a cruel
manner. Ma Tesing was deposed from the elevated position
which he had held for so short a time, and a new Chinese
viceroy arrived from Kweichow. The year 1863 opened with
the first active operations against Tu Wensiu, who, during
these years of disorder in Central Yunnan, had been gov-
erning the western districts with some prudence. It would
have been better if they had not been undertaken, for they
only resulted in the defeat of the detachments sent by Ma
Julung to engage the despot of Talifoo. Force having failed,
they had recourse to diplomacy, and Ma Tesing was sent to
sound Tu Wensiu as to whether he would not imitate their
example and make his peace with the authorities. These
overtures were rejected with disdain, and Tu "Wensiu pro-
claimed his intention of holding out to the last, and refused
to recognize the wisdom or the necessity of coming to terms
with the government. The embarrassment of Ma Julung
and the Yunnan officials, already sufficiently acute, was at
this conjuncture further aggravated by an outbreak in their
rear among the Miaotze and some other mountain tribes in
the province of Kweichow. To the difficulty of coping with
a strongly placed enemy in front was thus added that of
maintaining communications through a hostile and difficult
region. A third independent party had also come into exist-
ence in Yunnan, where an ex-Chinese official named Liang
THE REGENCY. 445
Shihmei had set up his own authority at Linan, mainly, it
was said, through jealousy of the Mohammedans taken into
the service of the government. The greatest difficulty of all
was to reconcile the pretensions of the different commanders,
for the Chinese officials, and the Futai Tsen Yuying in par-
ticular, regarded Ma Julung with no friendly eye. With
the year 1867, both sides having collected their strength,
more active operations were commenced, and Ma Juluug
proceeded in person, at the head of the best troops he could
collect, to engage Tu "Wensiu. It was at this time that the
imperialists adopted the red flag as their standard in contra-
distinction to the white flag of the insurgents. A desultory
campaign ensued, but although Ma Julung evinced both cour-
age and capacity, the result was on the whole unfavorable to
him ; and he had tp retreat to the capital, where events of
some importance had occurred during his absence in the
field. The viceroy, who had been stanchly attached to Ma
Julung, died suddenly and under such circumstances as to
suggest a suspicion of foul play ; and Tsen Yuying had by
virtue of his rank of Futai assumed the temporary discharge
of his duties. The retreat of Ma Julung left the insurgents
free to follow up their successes; and, in the course of 1868,
the authority of the emperor had disappeared from every
part of the province except the prefectural city of Yunnan-
foo. This bad fortune led the Mussulmans who had fol-
lowed the advice and fortunes of Ma Julung to consider
whether it would not be wise to rejoin their co-religionists,
and to at once finish the contest by the destruction of the
government. Had Ma Julung wavered in his fidelity for
a moment they would have all joined the standard of Tu
Wensiu, and the rule of the Sultan of Talifoo would have
been established from one end of Yunnan to the other ; but
he stood firm and arrested the movement in a summary
manner.
Tu Wensiu, having established the security of his com-
munications with Burmah, whence he obtained supplies of
arms and munitions of war, devoted his efforts to the cap-
446 A SHORT HISTORY OF C'HTXA.
ture of Yunnanfoo, which he completely invested. The
garrison was reduced to the lowest straits before Tsen Yu-
ying resolved to come to the aid of his distressed colleague.
The loss of the prefectural town would not merely entail
serious consequences to the imperialist cause, but he felt it
would personally compromise him as the Futai at Pekin. In
the early part of 1869, therefore, he threw himself into the
town with three thousand men, and the forces of Tu "Wensiu
found themselves obliged to withdraw from the eastern side
of the city. A long period of inaction followed, but during
this time the most important events happened with regard
to the ultimate result. Ma Julung employed all his artifice
and arguments to show the rebel chiefs the utter hopeless-
ness of their succeeding against the whole power of the Chi-
nese empire, which, from the suppression of the Taeping
Rebellion, would soon be able to be employed against them.
They felt the force of his representations, and they were also
oppressed by a sense of the slow progress they had made
toward the capture of Yunnanfoo. Some months after Tsen
Yuying's arrival, those of the rebels who were encamped to
the north of the city hoisted the red flag and gave in thoir
adhesion to the government. Then Ma Julung resumed ac-
tive operations against the other rebels, and obtained several
small successes. A wound received during one of the skir-
mishes put an end to his activity, and the campaign resumed
its desultory character. But Ma Julung's illness had other
unfortunate consequences ; for during it Tsen Yuying broke
faith with those of the rebel leaders who had come over, and
put them all to a cruel death. The natural consequence of
this foolish and ferocious act was that the Mohammedans
again reverted to their desperate resolve to stand firmly
by the side of Tu Wensiu. The war again passed into a
more active phase. Ma Julung had recovered from his
wounds. A new viceroy, and a man of some energy, was
sent from Pekin. Lin Yuchow had attracted the notice of
Tseng Kwofan among those of his native province who had
responded to his appeal to defend Hoonan against the Tae-
THE REGENCY. 447
pings sixteen years before; and shortly before the death of
the last viceroy of Yunnan, he had been made Governor
of Kweichow. To the same patron at Pekin he now owed
his elevation to the viceroyalty. It is said that he had lost
the energy which once characterized him; but he brought
with him several thousand Hoonan braves, whose courage
and military experience made them invaluable auxiliaries
to the embarrassed authorities in Yunnan. In the course
of the year 1870 most of the towns in the south and the
north of Yunnan were recovered, and communications were
reopened with Szchuen. As soon as the inhabitants per-
ceived that the government had recovered its strength, they
hastened to express their joy at the change by repudiating
the white flag which Tu Wensiu had compelled them to
adopt. The imperialists even to the last increased the diffi-
culty of their work of pacification by exhibiting a relentless
cruelty ; and while the inhabitants thought to secure their
safety by a speedy surrender, the Mussulmans were ren-
dered more desperate in their resolve to resist. The chances
of a Mohammedan success were steadily diminishing when
Yang Yuko, a mandarin of some military capacity, who had
begun his career in the most approved manner as a rebel,
succeeded in capturing the whole of the salt-producing dis-
trict which had been the main source of their strength. In
the year 1872 all the preliminary arrangements were made
for attacking Talifoo itself. A supply of rifles had been re-
ceived from Canton or Shanghai, and a few pieces of artil-
lery had also arrived. With these improved weapons the
troops of Ma Julung and Tsen Yuying enjoyed a distinct
advantage over the rebels of Talifoo. The horrors of war
were at this point increased by those of pestilence, for the
plague broke out at Puerh on the southern frontier, and,
before it disappeared, devastated the whole of the province,
completing the effect of the civil war, and ruining the few
districts which had escaped from its ravages. The direct
command of the siege operations at Talifoo was intrusted to
Yang Yuko, a hunchback general, who had obtained a repu-
448 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
tation for invincibility; and when Tsen Yuying had com-
pleted his own operations he also proceeded to the camp be-
fore the Mohammedan capital for the purpose of taking part
in the crowning operation of the war.
Tu "Weusiu and the garrison of Talifoo, although driven
to desperation, could not discover any issue from their diffi-
culties. They were reduced to the last stage of destitution,
and starvation stared them in the face. In this extremity
Tu "Wensiu, although there was every reason to believe that
the imperialists would not fulfill their pledges, and that sur-
render simply meant yielding to a cruel death, resolved to
open negotiations with Yang Yuko for giving up the town.
The emperor's generals signified their desire for the speedy
termination of the siege, at the same time expressing ac-
quiescence in the general proposition of the garrison being
admitted to terms. Although the Futai and Yang Yuko
had promptly come to the mutual understanding to cele-
brate the fall of Talifoo by a wholesale massacre, they ex-
pressed their intention to spare the other rebels on the sur-
render of Tu Wensiu for execution and on the payment of
an indemnity. The terms were accepted, although the more
experienced of the rebels warned their comrades that thej r
would not be complied with. On January 15, 1873, Tu
Wensiu, the original of the mythical Sultan Suliman, the
fame of whose power reached England, and who had been
an object of the solicitude of the Indian government, ac-
cepted the decision of his craven followers as expressing the
will of Heaven, and gave himself up for execution. He at-
tired himself in his best and choicest garments, and seated
himself in the yellow palanquin which he had adopted as
o;ne of the few marks of royal state that his opportunities
allowed him to secure. Accompanied by the men who had
negotiated the surrender, he drove through the streets, re-
ceiving for the last time the homage of his people, and out
beyond the gates to Yang Yuko's camp. Those who saw
the cortege marveled at the calm indifference of the fallen
despot. He seemed to have as little fear of his fate as con
THE REGENCY. 449
sciousness of his surroundings. The truth soon became evi-
dent. He had baffled his enemies by taking slow poison.
Before he reached the presence of the Futai, who had wished
to gloat over the possession of his prisoner, the opium had
done its work, and Tu Wensiu was no more. It seemed but
an inadequate triumph to sever the head from the dead body,
and to send it preserved in honey as the proof of victory to
Pekin. Four days after Tu Wensiu's death, the imperialists
were in complete possession of the town, and a week later
they had taken all their measures for the execution of the
fell plan upon which they had decided. A great feast was
given for the celebration of the convention, and the most im-
portant of the Mohammedan commanders, including those
who had negotiated the truce, were present. At a given
signal they were attacked and murdered by soldiers con-
cealed in the gallery for the purpose, while six cannon shots
announced to the soldiery that the hour had arrived for them
to break loose on the defenseless townspeople. The scenes
that followed are stated to have surpassed description. It
was computed that 30,000 men alone perished after the fall
of the old Panthay capital, and the Futai sent to Yunnanfoo
twenty-four large baskets full of human ears, as well as the
heads of the seventeen chiefs.
With the capture of Talifoo the great Mohammedan re-
bellion in the southwest, to which the Burmese gave the
name of Panthay, closed, after a desultory struggle of nearly
eighteen years. The war was conducted with exceptional
ferocity on both sides, and witnessed more than the usual
amount of falseness and breach of faith common to Oriental
struggles. Nobody benefited by the contest, and the pros-
perity of Yunnan, which at one time had been far from in-
considerable, sank to the lowest possible point. A new class
of officials came to the front during this period of disorder,
and fidelity was a sufficient passport to a certain rank. Ma
Julung, the Marshal Ma of European travelers, gained a
still higher station ; and notwithstanding the jealousy of his
colleagues, acquired practical supremacy in the province.
450 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
The high priest, Ma Tesing, who may be considered as the
prime instigator of the movement, was executed or poisoned
in 1874 at the instigation of some of the Chinese officials.
Yang Yuko, the most successful of all the generals, only
enjoyed a brief tenure of power. It was said that he was
dissatisfied with his position as commander-in-chief, and as-
pired to a higher rank. He also was summoned to Pekin,
but never got further than Shanghai, where he died, or was
removed. But although quiet gradually descended upon this
part of China, it was long before prosperity followed in its
train.
About six years after the first mutterings of discontent
among the Mohammedans in the southwest, disturbances
occurred in the northwest provinces of Shensi and Kansuh,
where there had been many thousand followers of Islam
since an early period of Chinese history. They were gen-
erally obedient subjects and sedulous cultivators of the soil ;
but they were always liable to sudden ebullitions of fanati-
cism or of turbulence, and it was said that during the later
years of his reign Keen Lung had meditated a wholesale
execution of the male population above the age of fifteen.
The threat, if ever made, was never carried out, but the
report suffices to show the extent to which danger was ap-
prehended from the Tungan population. The true origin of
the great outbreak in 1862 in Shensi seems to have been a
quarrel between the Chinese and the Mohammedan militia as
to their share of the spoil derived from the defeat and over-
throw of a brigand leader. After some bloodshed, two im-
perial commissioners were sent from Pekin to restore order.
The principal Mohammedan leader formed a plot to murder
the commissioners, and on their arrival he rushed into their
presence and slew one of them with his own hand. His co-
religionists deplored the rash act, and voluntarily seized and
surrendered him for the purpose of undergoing a cruel death.
But although he was torn to pieces, that fact did not satisfy
the outraged dignity of the emperor. A command was is-
sued in Tungche's name to the effect that all those who per-
THE REGEX'T. 451
sisted in following the creed of Islam should perish by the
sword. From Shensi the outbreak spread into the adjoin-
ing province of Kansuh ; and the local garrisons were van-
quished in a pitched battle at Tara Ussu, beyond the regular
frontier. The insurgents did not succeed, however, in tak-
ing any of the larger towns of Shensi, and after threatening
with capture the once famous city of Singan, they were grad-
ually expelled from that province. The Mohammedan rebel-
lion within the limits of China proper would not, therefore,
have possessed more than local importance but for the fact
that it encouraged a similar outbreak in the country further
west, and that it resulted in the severance of the Central
Asian provinces from China for a period of many years.
The uprising of the Mohammedans in the frontier prov-
inces appealed to the secret fears as well as to the longings
of the Tungan settlers and soldiers in all the towns and mili-
tary stations between Souchow and Kashgar. The sense of
a common peril, more perhaps than the desire to attain the
same object, led to revolts at Hami, Barkul, Urumtsi, and
Turfan, towns which formed a group of industrious com-
munities half-way between the prosperous districts of Kan-
buh on the one side and Kashgar on the other. The Tun-
gani at these towns revolted under the leading of their
priests, and imitated the example of their co-religionists
within the settled borders of China by murdering all who
did not accept their creed. After a brief interval, which
we may attribute to the greatness of the distance, to the
vigilance of the Chinese garrison, or to the apathy of the
population, the movement spread to the three towns imme-
diately west of Turfan, Karashar, Kncha, and Aksu, where
it came into contact with, and was stopped by, another in-
surrectionary movement under Mohammedan, but totally
distinct, auspices. "West of Aksu the Tungan rebellion never
extended south of the Tian Shan range. The defection of
the Tungani, who had formed a large proportion, if not the
majority, of the Chinese garrisons, paralyzed the strength
of the Celestials in Central Asia. Both in the districts de-
452 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
pendent on Hi, and in those ruled from Kashgar and Yar-
kaiid, the Chinese were beset by many great and permanent
difficulties. They were with united strength a minority, and
now that they were divided among themselves almost a
hopeless minority. The peoples they governed were fanat-
ical, false, and fickle. The ruler of Khokand and the refu-
gees living on his bounty wore always on the alert to take
the most advantage of the least slip or act of weakness on the
part of the governing classes. Their machinations had been
hitherto baffled, but never before had so favorable an oppor-
tunity presented itself for attaining their wishes as when it
became known that the whole Mohammedan population was
up in arms against the emperor, and that communications
were severed between Kashgar and Pekin. The attempts
made at earlier periods on the part of the members of the
old ruling family in Kashgar to regain their own by expel-
ling the Chinese have been described. In 1857 Wali Khan,
one of the sons of Jehangir, had succeeded in gaining tempo-
rary possession of the city of Kashgar, and seemed for a mo-
ment to be likely to capture Yarkand also. He fell by his
vices. The people soon detested the presence of the man to
whom they had accorded a too hasty welcome. After a rule
of four months he fled the country, vanquished in the field
by the Chinese garrison, and followed by the execrations
of the population he had come to deliver. The invasion of
Wali Khan further imbittered the relations between the Chi-
nese and their subjects; and a succession of governors bore
heavily on the Mohammedans. Popular dissatisfaction and
the apprehension in the minds of the governing officials that
their lives might be forfeited at any moment to a ]x>pular
outbreak added to the dangers of the situation in Kashyar
itself, when the news arrived of the Tungan revolt, and of
the many other complications which hampered the action
of the Pekin ruler. "We cannot narrate here the details of
the rebellion in Kashgar. Its influence on the history of
China would not sanction such close exactitude. But in
the year 1863 the Chinese officials had become so alarmed
THE REGENCY. 453
at their isolated position that they resolved to adopt the des-
perate expedient of massacring all the Mohammedans or
Tungani in their own garrisons. The amban and his officers
were divided in council and dilatory in execution. The Tun-
gani heard of the plot while the governor was summoning
the nerve to carry it out. They resolved to anticipate him.
The Mohammedans at Yarkand, the largest and most im-
portant garrison in the country, rose in August, 1863, and
massacred all the Buddhist Chinese. Seven thousand men
are computed to have fallen. A small band fled to the cita-
del, which they held for a short time ; but at length, over-
whelmed by numbers, they preferred death to dishonor, and
destroyed themselves by exploding the fort with the maga-
zine. The defection of the Tungani thus lost Kashgaria for
the Chinese, as the other garrisons and towns promptly fol-
lowed the example of Yarkand ; but they could not keep it
for themselves. The spectacle of this internal dissension
proved irresistible for the adventurers of Khokand, and
Buzurg, the last surviving son of Jehangir, resolved to
make another bid for power and for the recovery of the posi-
tion for which his father and kinsmen had striven in vain.
The wish might possibly have been no more attained than
theirs, had he not secured the support of the most capable
soldier in Khokand, Mahomed Yakoob, the defender of Ak
Musjid against the Russians. It was not until the early
part of the year 1865 that this Khoja pretender, with his
small body of Khokandian officers and a considerable num-
ber of Kirghiz allies, appeared upon the scene. Then, how-
ever, their success was rapid. The Tungan revolt in Alty-
shahr resolved itself into a movement for the restoration of
the Khoja dynasty. In a short time Buzurg was established
as ruler, while his energetic lieutenant was employed in
the task of crushing the few remaining Chinese garrisons,
and also in cowing his Tungan allies, who already regarded
their new ruler with a doubtful eye. By the month of Sep-
tember in the same year that witnessed the passage of the
invading force through the Terek defile, the triumph of
454 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the Khoja's arms was assured. A few weeks later Maho-
med Yakoob deposed his master, and caused himself to be
proclaimed ruler in his stead. The voice of the people rati-
fied the success of the man; and in 1866 Mahomed Yakoob,
or Yakoob Beg, received at the hands of the Ameer of
Bokhara the proud title of Athalik Ghazi, by which he was
long known. The Mohammedan rising spread still further
within the limits of Chinese authority in Central Asia.
While the events which have been briefly sketched were
happening in the region south of the great Tian Shan range,
others of not less importance had taken place in Hi or Kuldja,
which, under Chinese rule, had enjoyed uninterrupted peace
for a century. It was this fact which marked the essential
difference between the Tungan rebellion and all the disturb-
ances that had preceded it. The revolution in the metro-
politan province was complicated by the presence of different
races, just as it had been in Kashgaria by the pretensions of
the Khoja family. A large portion of the population con-
sisted of those Tarantchis who were the descendants of the
Kashgarians deported on more than one occasion by the
Chinese from their own homes to the banks of the Mi ; and
they had inherited a legacy of ill-will against their rulers
which only required the opportunity to display itself. The
Tungan or Dungan, as the Russians spell it element was
also very strong, and colonies of the Sobo and Solon tribes,
who had been emancipated from their subjection to the
Mongols by the Emperor Kanghi for their bravery, further
added to the variety of the nationalities dwelling in this
province. It had been said with some truth that the Chinese
ruled in this quarter of their dominions on the old principle
of commanding by the division of the subjected; and it had
been predicted that they would fall whenever any two of the
dependent populations combined against them. There is
little difficulty in showing that the misfortunes of the Chi-
nese were due to their own faults. They neglected the
plainest military precautions, and the mandarins thought
only of enriching themselves. But the principal cause of the
THE REGENCY. 455
destruction of their power was the cessation of the supplies
which they used to receive from Pekin. The government
of these dependencies was only possible by an annual gift
from the imperial treasury. When the funds placed at the
disposal of the Hi authorities were diverted to other uses, it
was no longer possible to maintain the old efficiency of the
service. Discontent was provided with a stronger argument
at the same time that the executive found itself embarrassed
in grappling with it.
The news of the Mohammedan outbreak in China warned
the Tungani in Hi that their opportunity had come. But
although there were disturbances as early as January, 1863,
these were suppressed, and the vigilance of the authorities
sufficed to keep things quiet for another year. Their sub-
sequent incapacity, or hesitation to strike a prompt blow,
enabled the Mohammedans to husband their resources and
to complete their plans. A temporary alliance was con-
cluded between the Tungani and the Tarantchis, and they
hastened to attack the Chinese troops and officials. The
year 1865 was marked by the progress of a sanguinary
struggle, during which the Chinese lost their principal towns,
and some of their garrisons were ruthlessly slaughtered after
surrender. The usual scenes of civil war followed. When
the Chinese were completely vanquished and their garrisons
exterminated, the victors quarreled among themselves. The
Tungani and the Tarantchis met in mortal encounter, and
the former were vanquished and their chief slain. When
they renewed the contest, some months later, they were,
after another sanguinary struggle, again overthrown. The
Tarantchis then ruled the state by themselves, but the ex-
ample they set of native rule was, to say the least, not
encouraging. One chief after another was deposed and
murdered. The same year witnessed no fewer than five
leaders in the supreme place of power; and when Abul
Oghlan assumed the title of Sultan the cup of their iniquities
was already full. In the year 1871 an end was at last put
to these enormities by the occupation of the province by a
456 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Russian force, and the installation of a Russian governor.
Although it is probable that they were only induced to take
this step by the fear that if they did not do so Yakoob Beg
would, the fact remains that the Russian government did a
good thing in the cause of order by interfering for the res-
toration of tranquillity in the valley of the Hi.
The Mohammedan outbreaks in southwestern and north-
western China resulted, therefore, in the gradual suppression
of the Panthay rebellion, which was completed in the twelfth
year of Tungche's reign, while the Tungan rising, so far
as the Central Asian territories were concerned, remained
unquelled for a longer period. The latter led to the estab-
lishment of an independent Tungan confederacy beyond
Kansuh, and also of the kingdom of Kashgaria ruled by
Yakoob Beg. The revolt in Hi, after several alternations
of fortune, resulted in the brief independence of the Taran-
tchis, who were in turn displaced by the Russians under a
pledge of restoring the province to the Chinese whenever
they should return. Judged by the extent of territory in-
volved, the Mohammedan rebellion might be said to be not
less important than the Taeping ; but the comparison on that
ground alone would be really delusive, as the numerical
inferiority of the Mohammedans rendered it always a ques-
tion only of time for the central power to be restored.
The young Emperor Tungche, therefore, grew up amid
continual difficulties, although the successes of his principal
lieutenants afforded good reason to believe that, so far as
they arose from rebels, it was only a question of time before
they would be finally removed. The foreign intercourse still
gave cause for much anxiety, although there was no appre-
hension of war. It would have been unreasonable to suppose
that the relations between the foreign merchants and resi-
dents and the Chinese could become, after the suspicion and
dangers of generations, absolutely cordial. The commercial
and missionary bodies, into which the foreign community
was naturally divided, had objects of trade or religion to
advance, which rendered them apt to take an unfavorable
THE REGENCY. 457
view of the progress made by the Chinese government in the
paths of civilization, and to be ever skeptical even of its good
faith. The main object with the foreign diplomatic repre-
sentatives became not more to obtain justice for their coun-
trymen than to restrain their eagerness, and to confine their
pretensions to the rights conceded by the treaties. A clear
distinction had to be drawn between undue coercion of the
Chinese government on the one hand, and the effectual com-
pulsion of the people to evince respect toward foreigners and
to comply with the obligations of the treaty on the other.
Instances repeatedly occurred in reference to the latter mat-
ter, when it would have been foolish to have shown weak-
ness, especially as there was not the least room to suppose
that the government possessed at that time the power and
the capacity to secure reparation for, or to prevent the repe-
tition of, attacks on foreigners. Under this category came
the riot at Yangchow in the year 1868, when some mission-
aries had their houses burned down, and were otherwise
maltreated. A similar outrage was perpetrated in Formosa;
but the fullest redress was always tendered as soon as the
executive realized that the European representatives attached
importance to the occurrence. The recurrence of these local
dangers and disputes served to bring more clearly than ever
before the minds of the Chinese ministers the advisability of
taking some step on their own part toward an understanding
with European governments and peoples. The proposal to
depute a Chinese embassador to the West could hardly be
said to be new, seeing that it had been projected after the
Treaty of Nankin, and that the minister Keying had mani-
fested some desire to be the first mandarin to serve in that
novel capacity. But when the Tsungli Yam en took up the
question it was decided that in this as in other matters it
would be expedient to avail themselves in the first place
of foreign mediation. The favorable opportunity of doing
so presented itself when Mr. Burlinghame retired from his
post as minister of the United States at Pekin. In the win-
ter of 1867-68 Mr. Burlinghame accepted an appointment
20
458 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
as accredited representative of the Chinese government to
eleven of the principal countries of the world, and two Chi-
nese mandarins and a certain number of Chinese students
were appointed to accompany him on his tour. The Chinese
themselves did not attach as much importance as they might
have done to his efforts, and Mr. Burlinghame's mission will
be remembered more as an educational process for foreigners
than as signifying any decided change in Chinese policy.
His death at St. Petersburg, in March, 1870, put a sudden
and unexpected close to his tour, but it cannot be said that
he could have done more toward the elucidation of Chinese
questions than he had already accomplished, while his bold
and optimistic statements, after awakening public attention,
had already begun to produce the inevitable reaction.
In 1869 Sir Rutherford Alcock retired, and was succeeded
in the difficult post of English representative in China by Mr.
Thomas "Wade, whose services have been more than once
referred to. In the very first year of his holding the post an
event occurred which cast all the minor aggressive acts that
had preceded it into the shade. It may perhaps be surmised
that this was the Tientsin massacre an event which threat-
ened to re-open the whole of the China question, and which
brought France and China to the verge of war. It was in
June, 1870, on the eve of the outbreak of the Franco-Prus-
sian War, that the foreign settlements were startled by the
report of a great popular outbreak against foreigners in the
important town of Tientsin. At that city there was a large
and energetic colony of Roman Catholic priests, and their
success in the task of conversion, small as it might be held,
was still sufficient to excite the ire and fears of the literary
and official classes. The origin of mob violence is ever diffi-
cult to discover, for a trifle suffices to set it in motion. But
at Tientsin specific charges of the most horrible and, it need
not be said, the most baseless character were spread about as
to the cruelties and evil practices of those devoted to the ser-
vice of religion. These rumors were diligently circulated,
and it need not cause wonder if, when the mere cry of ' ' Fan-
THE REGENCY 450
quai" Foreign Devil sufficed to raise a disturbance, these
allegations resulted in a vigorous agitation against the mis-
sionaries, who were already the mark of popular execration.
It was well known beforehand that an attack on the mission-
aries would take place unless the authorities adopted very
efficient measures of protection. The foreign residents and
the consulates were warned of the coming outburst, and a
very heavy responsibility will always rest on those who
might, by the display of greater vigor, have prevented the
unfortunate occurrences that ensued. At the same time,
allowing for the prejudices of the Chinese, it must be allowed
that not only must the efforts of all foreign missionaries be
attended with the gravest peril, but that the acts of the
French priests and nuns at Tientsin were, if not indiscreet, at
least peculiarly calculated to arouse the anger and offend the
superstitious predilections of the Chinese. That the wrong
was not altogether on the side of the Chinese may be gath-
ered from an official dispatch of the United States Minister,
describing the originating causes of the outrage: "At many
of the principal places in China open to foreign residence, the
Sisters of Charity have established institutions, each of which
appears to combine in itself a foundling hospital and orphan
asylum. Finding that the Chinese were averse to placing
children in their charge, the managers of these institutions
offered a certain sum per head for all the children placed
under their control, to be given to them; it being understood
that a child once in then* asylum no parent, relative, or
guardian could claim or exercise any control over it. It has
ror some tune been asserted by the Chinese, and believed by
most of the non-Catholic foreigners residing here, that the
system of paying bounties induced the kidnaping of children
for these institutions for the sake of the reward. It is also
asserted that the priests or sisters, or both, have been in the
habit of holding out inducements to have children brought
to them in the last stages of illness for the purpose of being
baptized in articulo mortis. In this way many children
have been taken to these establishments in the last stages
460 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
of disease, baptized there, and soon after taken away dead.
All these acts, together with the secrecy and seclusion which
appear to be a part and parcel of the regulations which gov-
ern institutions of this character everywhere, have created
suspicions in the minds of the Chinese, and these suspicions
have engendered an intense hatred against the sisters."
At that time Chung How, the superintendent of trade
for the three northern ports, was the principal official in
Tientsin; but although some representations, not as forcible
however as the occasion demanded, were made to him by M.
Fontanier, the French Consul, on June 1 8, three days before
the massacre, no reply was given and no precautions were
taken. On the 21st a large crowd assembled outside the
mission house. They very soon assumed an attitude of
hostility, and it was clear that at any moment the attack
might begin. M. Fontanier hastened off in person to Chung
How, but his threats seem to have been as unavailing as his
arguments. On his return he found the attack on the point
of commencing. He made use of menaces, and he fired a
shot from his revolver, whether in self-defense or in the heat
of indignation at some official treachery will never be known.
The mob turned upon him, and he was murdered. The Chi-
nese then hastened to complete the work they had begun.
Chung How, like Surajah Dowlah, was not to be disturbed,
and the attack on the mission house and consulate proceeded,
while the officials responsible for order remained inactive.
Twenty-one foreigners in all were brutally murdered under
circumstances of the greatest barbarity, while the number
of native converts who fell at the same time can never be
ascertained.
The Tientsin massacre was followed by a wave of aiiti-
foreign feeling over the whole country; but although an
official brought out a work entitled "Death-blow to Corrupt
Doctrine" which obtained more than a passing notoriety,
and notwithstanding that some members of the imperial
family, and notably, as it was stated, Prince Chun, regarded
the movement with favor, the arguments of Prince Kung
THE REGENCY. 461
and the more moderate ministers carried the day, and it was
resolved to make every concession in the power of the gov-
ernment for the pacific settlement of the dispute that had
arisen with France. The outbreak of the war between
France and Germany, while it contributed to a peaceful
settlement of the question, rendered the process of diplomacy
slow and dubious. The Tsungli Yamen, as soon as it real-
ized that nothing short of the dispatch of a mission of apology
to Europe would salve the injured honor of France, deter-
mined that none other than Chung How himself should go to
Paris to assure the French that the government deplored the
popular ebullition and had taken no part in it. The untoward
result of the great war for France embarrassed her action in
China. Chung How's assurances were accepted, the prof-
fered compensation was received ; but the Chinese were in-
formed that in recognition of France's moderation, and in
return for the reception of their envoy by M. Thiers, the
right of audience should be conceded to the French minister
resident at Pekin. The Audience Question naturally aroused
the greatest interest at Pekin, where it agitated the official
mind not merely because it signified another concession to
force, but also because it promised to produce a disturbing
effect on the mind of the people. The young emperor was
growing up, and might be expected to take a direct share in
the administration at an early date. It was not an idle
apprehension that filled the minds of his ministers lest he
might lay the blame on them for having cast upon him the
obligation of receiving ministers of foreign States in a man-
ner such as they had never before been allowed to appear in
the presence of the occupant of the Dragon Throne. The
youth of the sovereign served to postpone the question for a
short space of time, but it was no longer doubtful that the
assumption of personal authority by the young Emperor
Tungche would be accompanied by the reintroduction, and
probably by the settlement, of the Audience Question. It
was typical of the progress Chinese statesmen were making
that none of them seemed to consider the possibility of dia-
462 A SHORT HISTORY OP
tinctly refusing this privilege. Its concession was only post-
poned until after the celebration of the young emperor's
marriage.
It had been known for some time that the young ruler
had fixed his affections on Ahluta, a Manchu lady of good
family, daughter of Duke Chung, and that the empresses
had decided that she was worthy of the high rank to which
she was to be raised. The marriage ceremony was deferred
on more than one plea until after the emperor had reached his
sixteenth birthday, but in October, 1872, there was thought
to be no longer any excuse for postponement, and it was
celebrated with great splendor on the 16th of that month.
The arrangements were made in strict accordance with the
precedent of the Emperor Kanghi's marriage in 1674, that
ruler having also married when in occupation of the throne,
and before he had attained his majority. It was stated that
the ceremonial was imposing, that the incidental expenses
were enormous, and that the people were very favorably
impressed by the demeanor of their young sovereign. Four
months after the celebration of his marriage the formal act
of conferring upon Tungche the personal control of his
dominions was performed. In a special decree issued from
the Board of Rites the emperor said that he had received
"the commands of their majesties the two empresses to as-
sume the superintendence of business." This edict was
directed to the Foreign Ministers, who in return presented
a collective request to be received in audience. Prince Kung
was requested "to take his Imperial Majesty's orders with
reference to their reception." The question being thus
brought to a crucial point, it was not unnatural that the
Chinese ministers should make the most vigorous resistance
they could to those details which seemed to and did encroach
upon the prerogative of the emperor as he had been accus-
tomed to exercise it. For, in the first place, they were nc
longer free agents, and Tungche had himself to be consid-
ered in any arrangement for the reception of foreign envoys.
The discussion of the question assumed a controversial char-
THE REGENCY. 463
acter, in which stress was laid on the one side upon the
necessity of the kotow even in a modified form, while on the
other it was pointed out that the least concession was as
objectionable as the greatest, and that China would benefit
by the complete settlement of the question. It says a great
deal for the fairness and moderation of Prince Kung and the
ministers with him that, although they knew that the for-
eign governments were not prepared to make the Audience
Question one of war, or even of the suspension of diplomatic
relations, they determined to settle the matter in the way
most distasteful to themselves and most agreeable to foreign-
ers. On June 29, 1873, Tungche received in audience the
ministers of the principal powers at Pekin, and thus gave
completeness to the many rights and concessions obtained
from his father and grandfather by the treaties of Tientsin
and Nankin. The privilege thus secured caused lively grati-
fication in the minds of all foreign residents, to whom it sig-
nified the great surrender of the inherent right to superiority
claimed by the Chinese emperors, and we have recently seen
that it has been accepted as a precedent.
The sudden death of Tseng Kwofan in the summer of
1872 removed unquestionably the foremost public man in
China. After the fall of Nankin he had occupied the high-
est posts in the empire, both at that city and in the metrop-
olis. He was not merely powerful from his own position,
but from his having placed his friends and dependents in
many of the principal offices throughout the empire. At
first prejudiced against foreigners, he had gradually brought
himself to recognize that some advantage might be derived
from their knowledge. But the change came at too late a
period to admit of his conferring any distinct benefit on his
country from the more liberal policy he felt disposed to pur-
sue with regard to the training of Chinese youths in the
science and learning of the West. It was said that had he
been personally ambitious he might have succeeded in dis-
placing the Tartar regime. But such a thought never as-
sumed any practical shape in his mind, and to the end of his
464 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
days Tseng Kwofan was satisfied to remain the steadfast
supporter and adherent of the Manchus. In this respect he
has been closely imitated by his most distinguished lieu-
tenant, Li Hung Chang, who succeeded to some of his
dignities and much of his power.
Another of Tseng's proteges, Tso Tsung Tang, had been
raised from the viceroyalty of Chekiang and Fuhkien to
that of Shensi and Kansuh. The promotion was of the more
doubtful value, seeing that both those provinces were in the
actual possession of the rebels ; but Tso threw himself into
the task of reconquering them with remarkable energy, and
within two years of his arrival he was able to report that
he had cleared the province of Shensi of all insurgents. He
then devoted his attention to the pacification of Kansuh ; and
after many desultory engagements proceeded to lay siege to
the town of Souchow, where the Mohammedans had massed
their strength. At the end of the year 1872 the imperial
army was drawn up in front of this place, but Tso does not
seem to have considered himself strong enough to deliver an
attack, and confined his operations to preventing the intro-
duction of supplies and fresh troops into the town. Even in
this he was only partially successful, as a considerable body
of men made their way in, in January, 1873. In the fol-
lowing month he succeeded in capturing, by a night attack,
a temple outside the walls, upon which the Mohammedans
placed considerable value. The siege continued during the
whole of the summer, and it was not until the month of
October that the garrison was reduced to such extremities as
to surrender. The chiefs were hacked to pieces, and about
four thousand men perished by the sword. The women,
children, and old men were spared, and the spoil of the
place was handed over to the soldiery. It was Tso's dis-
tinctive merit that, far from being carried away by these
successes, he neglected no military precaution, and devoted
his main efforts to the reorganization of the province. In
that operation he may be left employed for the brief re-
mainder of Tungche's reign; but it may be said that in
THE REGENCY. 465
1874 the campaign against Kashgaria had been fully decided
upon. A thousand Manchu cavalry were sent to Souchow.
Sheepskins, horses, and ammunition in large quantities were
also dispatched to the far west, and General Kinshun, the
Manchu general, was intrusted with the command of the
army in the field.
The year 1874 witnessed an event that claims notice.
There never has been much good will between China and
her neighbors in Japan. The latter are too independent in
their bearing to please the advocates of Chinese predomi-
nance, at the same time that their insular position has left
them safe from the attack of the Pekin government. The
attempt made by the Mongol, Kublai Khan, to subdue these
inlanders had been too disastrous to invite repetition. In
Corea the pretensions of the ruler of Yeddo had been re-
pelled, if not crushed ; but wherever the sea intervened the
advantage rested more or less decisively with him. The
island of Formosa is dependent upon China, and the west-
ern districts are governed by officials duly appointed by the
Viceroy of Fuhkien. But the eastern half of the island, sep-
arated from the cultivated districts by a range of mountains
covered with dense if not impenetrable forests, is held by
tribes who own no one's authority, and who act as they
deem fit. In the year 1868 or 1869 a junk from Loochoo
was wrecked on this coast, and the crew were murdered by
the islanders. The civil war in Japan prevented any prompt
claim for reparation, but in 1873 the affair was revived, and
a demand made at Pekin for compensation. The demand
was refused, whereupon the Japanese, taking the law into
their own hands, sent an expedition to Formosa. China
replied with a counter-demonstration, and war seemed in-
evitable. In this crisis Mr. Wade offered his good services in
the interests of peace, and after considerable controversy he
succeeded in bringing the two governments to reason. The
Chinese paid an indemnity of half a million taels, and the
Japanese evacuated the island.
In all countries governed by an absolute sovereign it is
466 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
as interesting as it is difficult to obtain some accurate knowl-
edge of the character of the autocrat. A most important
change had been effected in the government of China, yet
it is impossible to discover what its precise significance was,
or to say how far it influenced the fortunes of the country.
The empresses had retired into private life, and for a time
their regency came to an end. Prince Kung was only the
minister of a young prince who had it in his power to guide
affairs exactly as he might feel personally disposed. Prince
Kung might be either the real governor of the state or only
the courtier of his nephew. It depended solely on that
prince's character. There were not wanting signs that
Tungche had the consciousness, if not the capacity, of su-
preme power, and that he wished his will to be paramount.
Such evidence as was obtainable agreed in stating that ho
was impatient of restraint, and that the prudent reflections
of his uncle were not overmuch to his fancy. On Septem-
ber 10 the young ruler took the world into his confidence
by announcing in a Vermilion Edict that he had degraded
Prince Kung and his son in their hereditary rank as princes
of the empire, for using "language in very many respects
unbecoming." Whether Tungche took this very decided
step in a moment of pique or because he perceived that
there was a plan among his chief relatives to keep him in
leading-strings, must remain a matter of opinion. At the
least he must have refused to personally retract what he
had done, for on the very following day (September 11) a
decree appeared from the two empresses reinstating Prince
Kung and his son in their hereditarj' rank and dignity,
and thus reasserting the power of the ex-regents.
Not long after this disturbance in the interior of the pal-
ace, of which only the ripple reached the surface of pub-
licity, there were rumors that the emperor's health was in a
precarious state, and in the month of December it became
known that Tungche was seriously ill with an attack of
smallpox. The disease seemed to be making satisfactory
progress, for the doctors were rewarded ; but 011 Dec-amber
THE REGEX< V. 40?
18 an edict appeared ordering or requesting the empresses
dowager to assume the persona] charge of the administra-
tion. Six days later another edict appeared which strength-
ened the impression that the emperor was making good
progress toward recovery. But appearances were decep-
tive, for, after several weeks' uncertainty, it became known
that the emperor's death was inevitable. On January 12,
1875, Tungche "ascended upon the Dragon, to be a guest
on high," without leaving any offspring to succeed him.
There were rumors that his illness was only a plausible
excuse, and that he was really the victim of foul play ; but
it is not likely that the truth on that point will ever be re-
vealed. Whether he was the victim of an intrigue similar
to that which had marked his accession to power, or whether
he only died from the neglect or incompetence of his medical
attendants, the consequences were equally favorable to the
personal views of the two empresses and Prince Kung.
They resumed the exercise of that supreme authority which
they had resigned little more than twelve months. The
most suspicious circumstance in connection with this event
was the treatment of the young Empress Ahluta, who, it
was well known, was pregnant at the time of her husband's
death. Instead of waiting to decide as to the succession
until it was known whether Tungche's posthumous child
would prove to be a son or a daughter, the empresses
dowager hastened to make another selection and to place
the young widow of the deceased sovereign in a state of
honorable confinement. Their motive was plain. Had
Ahluta's child happened to be a son, he would have been
the legal emperor, as well as the heir by direct descent, and
she herself could not have been excluded from a prominent
share in the government. To the empresses dowager one
child on the throne mattered no more than another; but it
was a question of the first importance that Ahluta should be
set on one side. In such an atmosphere there is often griev-
ous peril to the lives of inconvenient personages. Ahluta
sickened and died. Her child was never born. The chari-
468 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
table gave her credit for having refused food through grief
for her husband, Tungche. The skeptical listened to the
details of her illness with scorn for the vain efforts to ob-
scure the dark deeds of ambition. In their extreme anxiety
to realize their own designs, and at the same time not to
injure the constitution, the two empresses had been obliged
to resort to a plan that could only have been suggested by
desperation. For the first time since the Manchu dynasty
occupied the throne it was necessary to depart from the due
line of succession, and to make the election of the sovereign
a matter of individual fancy or favor instead of one of in-
heritance. The range of choice was limited ; for the son of
Prince Kung himself, who seemed to enjoy the prior right
to the throne, was a young man of sufficient age to govern
for himself; and moreover his promotion would mean the
compulsory retirement from public life of Prince Kung, for
it was not possible in China for a father to serve under his
son, until Prince Chun, the father of the present reigning
emperor, established quite recently a precedent to the con-
trary. The name of Prince Kung's son, if mentioned at all,
was only mentioned to be dismissed. The choice of the em-
presses feU upon Tsai Tien, the son of Prince Chun or the
Seventh Prince, who on January 13 was proclaimed em-
peror. As he was of too tender an age to rule for himself,
his nomination served the purposes of the two empresses and
their ally, Prince Kung, who thus entered upon a second
'ease of undisputed power.
CHAPTER XXII
THE REIGN OF KWANGSU
THUS after a very brief interval the governing power
again passed into the hands of the regents who had ruled
the state so well for the twelve years following the death of
Hienfung. The nominal emperor was a child of little more
THE REIGN OF KWANGSU. 469
than three years of age, to whom was given the style of
"Kwangsu," or "illustrious succession," and the empresses
could look forward to many years of authority in the name
of so young a sovereign. The only opposition to their return
to power seems to have come from the palace eunuchs, who
had asserted themselves during the brief reign of Tungche
and hoped to gain predominance in the imperial councils.
But they found a determined mistress in the person of Tsi
An, the Eastern Empress, as she was also called, who took
vigorous action against them, punishing their leaders with
death and effectually nipping in the bud all their projects
for making themselves supreme.
The return of the empresses to power was followed by
a great catastrophe in the relations between England and
China. For the moment it threw every other matter into
the shade, and seemed to render the outbreak of war between
the two countries almost inevitable. In the year 1874 the
government of India, repenting of its brief infatuation for
the Panthay cause, yet still reluctant to lose the advantages
it had promised itself from the opening of Yunnan to trade,
resolved upon sending a formal mission of explory under
Colonel Horace Browne, an officer of distinction, through
Burmah to that province. The difficulties in the way of
the undertaking seemed comparatively few, as the King
of Burmah was friendly and appeared disposed at that time
to accept his natural position as the dependent of Calcutta.
The Pekin authorities also were outwardly not opposed to
the journey ; and the only opposition to be apprehended was
from the Yunnan officials and people.
It was thought desirable, with the view of preparing the
way for the appearance of this foreign mission, that a rep-
resentative of the English embassy at Pekin, having a
knowledge of the language and of the ceremonial etiquette
of the country, should be deputed to proceed across China
and meet Colonel Browne on -the Burmese frontier. The
officer selected for this delicate and difficult mission was Mr.
Raymond Augustus Margary, who to the singular aptitude
70 A SHORT HISTORY OF CH1SA.
he had displayed in the study of Chinese added a buoyant
spirit and a vigorous frame that peculiarly fitted him for the
long and lonely journey he had undertaken across China.
His reception throughout was encouraging. The orders of
the Tsungli Yamen, specially drawn up by the Grand Secre-
tary Wansiang, were explicit, and not to be lightly ignored.
Mr. Margary performed his journey in safety; and, on Jan-
uary 26, 1875, only one fortnight after Kwangsu's accession,
he joined Colonel Browne at Bhamo. A delay of more than
three weeks ensued at Bhamo, which was certainly unfort-
unate. Time was given for the circulation of rumors as to
the approach of a foreign invader along a disturbed frontier
held "by tribes almost independent, and whose predatory
instincts were excited by the prospect of rich plunder, at the
same time that then- leaders urged them to oppose a change
which threatened to destroy their hold on the caravan route
between Bhamo and Talifoo. When, on February 17, Colonel
Browne and his companions approached the limits of Burmese
territory, they found themselves in face of a totally different
state of affairs from what had existed when Mr. Margary
passed safely through three weeks before. The preparations
for opposing the English had been made under the direct en-
couragement, and probably the personal direction, of Lisitai,
a man who had been a brigand and then a rebel, but who at
this time held a military command on the frontier.
As Colonel Browne advanced he was met with rumors
of the opposition that awaited him. At first these were dis-
credited, but on the renewed statements that a large Chinese
force had been collected to bar his way, Mr. Margary rode
forward to ascertain what truth there was hi these rumors.
The first town on this route within the Chinese border is
Momem, which, under the name of Tengyue, was once a
military station of importance, and some distance east of it
again is another town, called Manwein. Mr. Margary set
out on February 19, and it was arranged that only in the
event of his finding everything satisfactory at Momein
he to proceed to Manwein.
THE REIGN OF KWANOSU. 471
Mr. Margary reached Momein in safety, and reported in
a letter to Colonel Browne that all was quiet at that place,
and that there were no signs of any resistance. That letter
was the last news ever received from Mr. Margary. On Feb-
ruary 19 he started from Momein, and the information sub-
sequently obtained left no doubt that he was treacherously
murdered on that or the following day at Manwein. An
ominous silence followed, and Colonel Browne's party de-
layed its advance until some definite news should arrive as
to what had occurred in front, although the silence was
sufficient to justify the worst apprehensions. Three days
later the rumor spread that Mr. Margary and his attendants
had been nurdered. It was also stated that an army was
advancing to attack the English expedition ; and on Febru-
ary 22 a large Chinese force did make its appearance on the
neighboring heights. There was no longer any room to
doubt that the worst had happened, and it only remained
to secure the safety of the expedition. The Chinese num-
bered several thousand men under Lisitai in person, while
to oppose them there were only four Europeans and fifteen
Sikhs. Yet superior weapons and steadfastness carried the
day against greater numbers. The Sikhs fought as they
retired, and the Chinese, unable to make any impression
on them, abandoned an attack which was both perilous and
useless.
The news of this outrage did not reach Pekin until a
month later, when Mr. Wade at once took the most ener-
getic measures to obtain the amplest reparation in the power
of the Pekin government to concede. The first and most
necessary point in order to insure not merely the punishment
of the guilty, but also that the people of China should not
have cause to suppose that their rulers secretly sympathized
with the authors of the attack, was that no punitive meas-
ures should be undertaken, or, if undertaken, recognized,
until a special Commission of Inquiry had been appointed
to investigate the circumstances on the spot. Mr. Margary
was an officer of the English government traveling under
472 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
the special permission and protection of the Tsungli Yamen.
The Chinese government could not expect to receive consid-
eration if it failed to enforce respect for its own commands,
and the English government had an obligation which it
could not shirk in exacting reparation for the murder of its
representative. The treacherous killing of Mr. Margary
was evidently not an occurrence for which it could be con-
sidered a sufficient atonement that some miserable criminals
under sentence of death, or some desperate individuals anx-
ious to secure the worldly prosperity of their families, should
undergo painful torture and public execution in order to
shield official falseness and infamy. Although no one ever
suspected the Pekin government of having directly insti-
gated the outrage, the delay in instituting an impartial and
searching inquiry into the affair strengthened an impression
that it felt reluctant to inflict punishment on those who had
committed the act of violence. Nearly three months elapsed
before any step was taken toward appointing a Chinese
official to proceed to the scene of the outrage in company
with the officers named by the English minister; but on
June 19 an edict appeared in the "Pekin Gazette" ordering
Li Han Chang, governor-general of Houkwang, to tempo-
rarily vacate his post, and "repair with all speed to Yunnan
to investigate and deal with certain matters." Even then
the matter dragged along but slowly. Li Han Chang, who,
as the brother of Li Hung Chang, was an exceptionally well-
qualified and highly-placed official for the task, and whose
appointment was in itself some evidence of sincerity, did not
leave Hankow until August, and the English commissioners,
Messrs. Grosvenor, Davenport and Colborne Baber, did not
set out from the same place before the commencement of
October. The intervening months had been employed by
Mr. Wade in delicate and fluctuating negotiation with Li
Hung Chang (who had succeeded Tseng Kwofan as Viceroy
of Pechihli and who had now come to the front as the chief
official in the Chinese service) at Tientsin and with the
Tsungli Yamen at Pekin. It was not till the end of the
THE REIGN OF KWANGSU. 473
year that the commission to ascertain the fate of Mr. Mar-
gary began its active work on the spot. The result was
unexpectedly disappointing, The mandarins supported one
another. The responsibility was thrown on several minor
officials, and on the border-tribes or savages. Several of the
latter were seized, and their lives were offered as atonement
for an offense they had not committed. The furthest act
of concession which the Chinese commissioner gave was to
temporarily suspend Tsen Yuying the Futai for remissness;
but even this measure was never enforced with rigor. The
English officers soon found that it was impossible to obtain
any proper reparation on the spot.
Sir Thomas "Wade, who was knighted during the negoti-
ations, refused to accept the lives of the men offered, whose
complicity in the offense was known to be none at all, while
its real instigators escaped without any punishment. When
the new year, 1876, opened, the question was still unsettled,
and it was clear that no solution could be discovered on tha
spot. Sir Thomas Wade again called upon the Chinese in
the most emphatic language allowed by diplomacy to con-
form with the spirit and letter of their engagements, and he
informed the Tsungli Yamen that unless they proffered full
redress for Mr. Margary's murder it would be impossible to
continue diplomatic relations. To show that this was no
meaningless expression, Sir Thomas Wade left Pekin, while
a strong re-enforcement to the English fleet demonstrated
that the government was resolved to support its representa-
tive. In consequence of these steps, Li Hung Chang was,
in August, 1876, or more than eighteen months after the
outrage, intrusted with full powers for the arrangement of
the difficulty; and the small seaport of Chefoo was fixed
upon as the scene for the forthcoming negotiations. Even
then the Chinese sought to secure a sentimental advantage
by requesting that Sir Thomas Wade would change the scene
of discussion to Tientsin, or at least that he would consent to
pay Li Hung Chang a visit there. This final effort to con-
ceal the fact that the English demanded redress as an equaj
474 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
and not as a suppliant having been baffled, there was no
further attempt at delay. The Chefoo Convention was signed
in that town, to which the viceroy proceeded from Tientsin.
Li Hung Chang entertained the foreign ministers at a great
banquet; and the final arrangements were hurried forward
for the departure to Europe of the Chinese embassador,
whose dispatch had been decided upon in the previous
year. When the secret history of this transaction is re-
vealed it will be seen how sincere were Li Hung Chang's
wishes for a pacific result, and how much his advice con-
tributed to this end.
The most important passage in the Chefoo Convention
was unquestionaly that commanding the different viceroys
and governors to respect, and afford every protection to, all
foreigners provided with the necessary passport from the
Tsungli Yamen, and warning them that they would be held
responsible in the event of any such travelers meeting with
injury or maltreatment. The next most important passage
was that arranging for the dispatch of an embassy to Lon-
don bearing a letter of regret for the murder of the English
official. The official selected for this duty was Kwo Sung-
tao, a mandarin of high rank and unexceptionable charac-
ter. The letter was submitted to Sir Thomas Wade in order
that its terms should be exactly in accordance with Chinese
etiquette, and that no phrase should be used showing that
the Chinese government attached less importance to the
mission than the occasion demanded. The embassy pro-
ceeded to Europe, and, whatever may be thought of its
immediate effect, it must be allowed that it established a
precedent of friendly intercourse with this country, which
promises to prove an additional guarantee of peace. Kwo
Sungtao was accompanied by the present Sir Halliday Ma-
cartney, who had rendered such good service to China, his
adopted country, during the Taeping war and afterward,
and who, during the last sixteen years, has taught the Chi-
nese government how to make itself listened to by the most
powerful States of Europe.
THE REIGN OF KIVAXGSU. 475
A curiou* incident arising from the passion of gambling
which is so prevalent in China, and bearing incidentally
upon the national character, may be briefly referred to.
The attention of the Pekin government was attracted to
this subject by a novel form of gambling, which not merely
attained enormous dimensions, but which threatened to bring
the system of public examination into disrepute. This latter
fact created a profound impression at Pekin, and roused the
mandarins to take unusually prompt measures. Canton was
the headquarters of the gambling confederacy which estab-
lished the lotteries known as the Weising, but its ramifica-
tions extended throughout the whole of the province of
Kwantung. The Weising, or examination sweepstakes,
were based on the principle of drawing the names of the
successful candidates at the official examinations. They
appealed, therefore, to every poor villager, and every father
of a family, as well as to the aspirants themselves. The
subscribers to the Weising lists were numbered by hundreds
of thousands. It became a matter of almost as much im-
portance to draw a successful number or name in the lottery
as to take the degree. The practice could not have been
allowed to go on without introducing serious abuses into the
system of public examination. The profits to the owners of
the lottery were so enormous that they were able to pay not
less than eight hundred thousand dollars as hush-money to
the viceroy and the other high officials of Canton. In order
to shield his own participation in the profits, the viceroy
declared that he devoted this new source of revenue to the
completion of the river defenses of Canton.
In 1874 the whole system was declared illegal, and severe
penalties were passed against those aiding, or participating
in any way in, the Weising Company. The local officers did
not, however, enforce with any stringency these new laws,
and the Weising fraternity enjoyed a further but brief
period of increased activity under a different name. The
fraud was soon detected, and in an edict of August 11, 1875,
it was very rightly laid down that "the maintenance of the
47 G A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
purity of government demands that it be not allowed under
any pretext to be re-established," and for their apathy in
the matter the Viceroy Yinghan and several of the highest
officials in Canton were disgraced and stripped of their offi-
cial rank.
In China natural calamities on a colossal scale have often
aggravated political troubles. The year 1876 witnessed the
commencement of a dearth in the two great provinces of
Honan and Shansi which has probably never been surpassed
as the cause of a vast amount of human suffering. Al-
though the provinces named suffered the most from the
prevalent drought, the suffering was general over the whole
of Northern China, from Shantung and Pechihli to Honan
and the course of the Yellow River. At first the govern-
ment, if not apathetic, was disposed to say that the evil
would be met by the grant of the usual allowance made by
the provincial governors in the event of distress; but when
one province after another was absorbed within the famine
area, it became no longer possible to treat the matter as
one of such limited importance, and the high ministers felt
obliged to bestir themselves in face of so grave a danger.
Li Hung Chang in particular was most energetic, not merely
in collecting and forwarding supplies of rice and grain, but
also in inviting contributions of money from all those parts
of the empire which had not been affected by famine. Al-
lowing for the general sluggishness of popular opinion in
China, and for the absence of any large amount of currency,
it must be allowed that these appeals met with a large and
liberal response. The foreign residents also contributed their
share, and even the charity of London found a vent in send-
ing some thousands of pounds to the scene of the famine in
Northern China. This evidence of foreign sympathy hi the
cause of a common humanity made more than a passing im-
pression on the minds of the Chinese people.
While the origin of the famine may be attributed to
either drought or civil war, there is no doubt that its exten-
sion and the apparent inability of the authorities to grapple
THE REIGN OF KWAXGSr. 47'.
with it may be traced to the want of means of communi-
cation, which rendered it almost impossible to convey the
needful succor into the famine districts. The evil being so
obvious, it was hoped that the Chinese would be disposed to
take a step forward on their own initiative in the great and
needed work of the introduction of railways and other me-
chanical appliances. The viceroy of the Two Kiang gave his
assent to the construction of a short line between Shanghai
and the port of Woosung. The great difficulty had always
been to make a start; and now that a satisfactory com-
mencement had been made the foreigners were disposed in
their eagerness to overlook all obstacles, and to imagine the
Flowery Land traversed in all directions by railways. But
these expectations were soon shown to be premature. Half
of the railway was open for use in the summer of 1876, and
during some weeks the excitement among the Chinese them-
selves was as marked as among the Europeans. The hopes
based upon this satisfactory event were destined to be soon
dispelled by tho animosity of the officials. They announced
their intention to resort to every means in their power to
prevent the completion of the undertaking. The situation
revealed such dangers of mob violence that Sir Thomas
Wade felt compelled to request the company to discontinue
its operations, and after some discussion it was arranged
that the Chinese should buy the line. After a stipulated
period the line was placed under Chinese management,
when, instead of devoting themselves to the interests of
the railway, and to the extension of its power of utility,
they willfully and persistently neglected it, with the express
design of destroying it. At this conjuncture the viceroy
allowed the Governor of Fuhkien to remove the rails and
plant to Formosa. The fate of the Woosung railway de-
stroyed the hopes created by its construction, and postponed
to a later day the great event of the introduction of railway?
into China. Notwithstanding such disappointments as this,
and the ever present difficulty of conducting relations witt
an unsympathetic people controlled by suspicious officials.
478 A SHOR1 HISTORY OP CHINA.
there was yet observable a marked improvement in the re-
lations of the different nations with the Chinese. Increased
facilities of trade, such as the opening of new ports, far
from extending the ar- of danger, served to promote a
mutual goodwill. In 1876 Kiungchow, in the island of
Hainan, was made a treaty port, or rather the fact of its
having been included in the Treaty of Tientsin was prac-
tically accepted and recognized. In the following year four
new ports were added to the list. One, Pakhoi, was intended
to increase trade intercourse with Southern China. Two of
the three others, Ichang and "Wuhu, were selected as being
favorably situated for commerce on the Yangtse and its
affluents, while Wenchow was chosen for the benefit of the
trade on the coast. Mr. Colborne Baber, who had been a
member of the Yunnan commission, was dispatched to
Szchuen, to take up his residence at Chungking for the
purpose of facilitating trade with that great province. The
successful tour of Captain Gill, not merely through South-
west China into Burmah, but among some of the wilder and
more remote districts of Northern Szchuen, afforded reason
to believe that henceforth traveling would be safer in China,
and nothing that has since happened is calculated to weaken
that impression.
When Kwangsu ascended the throne the preparations for
the campaign against Kashgaria were far advanced toward
completion, and Kinshun had struck the first of those blows
which were to insure the overthrow of the Tungani and of
Yakoob Beg. The fall of Souchow had distinguished the
closing weeks of the year 1873, and in 1874 Kinshun had
begun, under the direction of Tso Tsung Tang, who was
described by a French writer as "very intelligent, of a brav-
ery beyond all question, and an admirable organizer," his
march across the desert to the west. He followed a cir-
cuitous line of march, with a view of avoiding the strongly
placed and garrisoned town of Hami. The exact route is
not certain, but he seems to have gone as far north as
Uliassutai, where he was able to recruit some of the most
THE REIGN OF KWANvSV. 479
faithful and warlike of the Mongol tribes. But early in
1875 he arrived before the walls of Barkul, a town lying to
the northwest of Hami. No resistance was offered, and a
few weeks later Hami was also occupied. The Tungani
retreated on the approach of the Chinese, and assembled
their main force for the defense of the two towns of Urumtsi
and Manas, which are situated on the northern side of the
eastern spurs of the Tian Shan. Once Barkul and Hami
were in the possession of the Chinese, it became necessary
to reopen direct communications with Souchow. This task
occupied the whole of the next twelve months, and was only
successfully accomplished after many difficulties had been
overcome, and when halting stations had been established
across Gobi. -There is nothing improbable in the statement
that during this period the Chinese planted and reaped the
seed which enabled them, or those who followed in their
train, to march in the following season. "With the year
1876 the really arduous portion of the campaign com-
menced. The natural difficulties to the commencement of
the war from distance and desert had been all overcome.
An army of about twenty-five thousand effective troops,
besides a considerable number of Mongol and other tribal
levies, had been placed in the field and within striking dis-
tance of the rebels. The enemies were face to face. The
Tungani could retreat no further. Neither from Russia nor
from Yakoob Beg could they expect a place of refuge. The
Athalik Ghazi might help them to hold their own ; he cer-
tainly would not welcome them within the limits of the six
c-ities. The Tungani had, therefore, no alternative left save
to make as resolute a stand as they could against the Chi-
nese who had returned to revenge their fellow-countrymen
who had been slaughtered in their thousands twelve years
before. The town of Urumtsi, situated within a loop of the
mountains, lies at a distance by road of more than 300 miles
from Barkul. Kinshun, who had now been joined by Liu
Kintang, the taotai of the Sining district and a man of
proved energy and capacity, resolved to concentrate all his
480 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA..
efforts on its capture. He moved forward his army ft?
Guchen, 200 miles west of Barkul, where he established a
fortified camp and a powder factory, and took steps to ascer-
tain the strength and intentions of the enemy. Toward the
end of July the Chinese army resumed its march. The diffi-
culties of the country were so great that the advanced guards
of the opposing armies did not come into contact until Au-
gust 10. The Chinese general seems to have attempted on
that date a night surprise ; but although he gained some suc-
cess in the encounter which ensued, the result must have
been doubtful, seeing that he felt obliged to call off his men
from the attack. It was only, however, to collect his forces
for the delivery of a decisive blow. On August 13 a second
battle was fought with a result favorable to the Chinese.
Two days later the enemy, who held a fortified camp at
Gumti, were bombarded out of it by the heavy artillery
brought from the coasts of China for the purposes of the
war, and after twenty-four hours' firing three breaches
were declared to be practicable. The place was carried by
storm at the close of four hours' fighting and slaughter,
during which 6,000 men were stated to have been killed.
Kinshun followed up his victory by a rapid march on
Urumtsi. That town surrendered without a blow, and
many hundred fugitives were cut down by the unsparing
Manchu cavalry, which pursued them along the road to
Manas, their last place of shelter. As soon as the neces-
sary measures had been taken for the military protection of
Urumtsi, the Chinese army proceeded against Manas. Their
activity, which was facilitated by the favorable season of
the year, was also increased by the rumored approach of
Yakoob Beg with a large army to the assistance of the Tun-
gani. At Manas the survivors of the Tungan movement
proper had collected for final resistance, and all that des-
peration could suggest for holding the place had been done.
Kinshun appeared before Manas ou September 2. On the
7th his batteries were completed, and he began a heavy fire
upon the northeast angle of the wall. A breach of fourteen
THE REIGN OF KWANGSU. 481
feet having been made, the order to assault was given, but
the stormers were repulsed with the loss of 100 killed. The
operations of the siege were renewed with great spirit on
both sides. Several assaults were subsequently delivered;
but although the Chinese always gained some advantage at
the beginning they never succeeded in retaining it. In one
of these later attacks they admitted a loss of 200 killed alone.
The imperial army enjoyed the undisputed superior^ in
artillery, and the gaps in its ranks were more than filled by
the constant flow of re-enforcements from the rear. The
siege gradually assumed a less active character. The Chi-
nese dug trenches and erected earthworks. They approached
the walls by means of galleries hi readiness to deliver the
attack on any symptom of discouragement among the be-
sieged. On October 16 a mine was sprung under the wall,
making a wide breach ; but although the best portion of the
Chinese army made two assaults on separate occasions, they
were both repulsed with loss. Twelve days later another
mine was sprung, destroying a large portion of the wall;
but when the Chinese stormers endeavored to carry the re-
maining works, they were again driven back with heavy
loss, including two generals killed in the breach. Although
thus far repulsed, the imperialists had inflicted very heavy
losses on the besieged, who, seeing that the end of their re-
sources was at hand, that there was no hope of succor, and
that the besiegers were as energetic as ever, at last arrived
at the conclusion that they had no choice left save to surren-
der on the best terms they could obtain. On November 4,
after a two months' siege, Haiyen, as the Chinese named the
Mohammedan leader, came out and offered to yield the town.
His offer seems to have been partly accepted, and on the 6th
of the month the survivors of the brave garrison, to the
number of between two and three thousand men, sallied
forth from the west gate. It was noticed as a ground of
suspicion that all the men carried their weapons, and that
they had placed their old men, women and children in the
center of their phalanx as if they contemplated rather a sortie
21
482 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIhA.
than a tame and unresisting surrender. The Chinese com-
manders were not indisposed to deal with the least suspicious
circumstances as if they meant certain treachery. The im-
perialists gradually gathered around the garrison. The Mc-
hammedans made one bold effort to cut their way through.
They failed in the attempt, and were practically annihilated
on the ground. Those men who were taken by the cavalry
were at once beheaded, whether in the city or among those
who had gone forth, but the aged, the women and the chil-
dren were spared by Kinshun's express orders. All the leaders
taken were tortured before execution as rebels, and even the
bodies of the dead chiefs were exhumed in order that they
might be subjected to indignity. The siege of Manas was
interesting both for the stubbornness of the attack and de-
fense, and also as marking the successful termination of the
Chinese campaign against the Tungani. With its capture,
those Mohammedans who might be said to be Chinese in
ways and appearance ceased to possess any political impor-
tance. It would not be going much too far to say that they
no longer existed. The movement of rebellion which began
at Hochow in 1862 was thus repressed in 1876, after having
involved during those fourteen years the northwestern prov-
inces of China, and much of the interior of Asia, in a strug-
gle which, for its bitter and sanguinary character, has rarely
been surpassed.
The successes of the Chinese gave their generals and army
the confidence and prestige of victory, and the overthrow of
the Tungani left them disengaged to deal with a more formi-
dable antagonist. The siege of Manas had been vigorously
prosecuted in order that the town might be taken before the
army of Yakoob Beg should arrive. The Athalik Ghazi
may have believed that Manas could hold out during the
winter, for his movements in 1876 were leisurely, and be-
trayed a confidence that no decisive fighting would take
place until the following spring. His hopes were shown to
be delusive, but too late for practical remedy. Manas had
fallen before he could move to its support. The Chinese
KANG, THE REFORMER
China.
THE REIGN OF KWANGSU. 48b
bad crushed the Tungani, and were in possession of the
mountain passes. They were gathering their whole strength
to fall upon him, and to drive him out of the state in which
he had managed to set up a brief authority. While the
events recorded had been in progress, Yakoob Beg had been
ruling the state of Kashgaria with sufficient vigor and wis-
dom to attract the observation of his great neighbors, the
governments of England and Russia. He had shown rare
skill in adapting circumstances to suit his own ends. The
people passively accepted the authority which he was pre-
pared to assert with his Khokandian soldiery, and the inde-
pendent state of Kashgaria might have continued to exist
for a longer period had the Chinese not returned. But in
1875 the arrival of Kinshun at Barkul showed Yakoob Beg
that he would have to defend his possessions against their
lawful owners, while the overthrow of the Tungani and the
capture of their strongholds, in 1876, carried with them a
melancholy foreboding of his own fate. The Athalik Ghazi
made his preparations to take the field, but there was no
certainty in his mind as to where he should make his stand.
He moved his army eastward, establishing his camp first at
Korla and then moving it on to Turfan, 900 miles distant
from Kashgar. The greatest efforts of this ruler only
availed to place 15,000 men at the front, and the barren-
ness of the region compelled him to distribute them. The
Ameer was at Turfan with 8,500 men and twenty guns.
His second son was at Toksoun, some miles in the rear, at
the head of 6,000 more and five guns. There were several
smaller detachments between Korla and the front. Opposed
to these was the main Chinese army under Kinshun at
tJrumtsi, while another force had been placed in the field
at Hami by the energy of Tso, and intrusted to the direc-
tion of a general named Chang Yao. No fighting took
place until the month of March, 1877, and then the cam-
paign began with a rapid advance by Chang Yao from
Hami to Turfan. The Kashgarians were driven out of
Pidjam, and compelled, after a battle, to evacuate Turfan.
484 .4 SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
The Chinese records do not help us to unravel the events
of the month of April. The campaign contained no more
striking or important episodes, and yet the reports of the
generals have been mislaid or consigned to oblivion. The
Athalik Ghazi fought a second battle at Toksoun, where he
rejoined his son's army, but with no better fortune. He
was obliged to flee back to his former camp at Korla. After
the capture of Turfan the Chinese armies came to a halt. It
was necessary to reorganize the vast territory which they
had already recovered, and to do something to replenish
their arsenals. During five months the Celestials stayed
their further advance, while the cities were being re-peopled
and the roads rendered once more secure. Tso Tsung Tang
would leave nothing to chance. He had accomplished two
of the three parts into which his commission might be natu-
rally divided. He had pacified the northwest and over-
thrown the Tungani, and he would make sure of his ground
before attempting the third and the most difficult of all.
And while the Chinese viceroy had, for his own reasons,
come to the very sensible conclusion to refresh his army
after its arduous labors in the limited productive region
situated between two deserts, the stars in their courses
fought on his side.
Yakoob Beg had withdrawn only to Korla. He still
cherished the futile scheme of defending the eastern limits
of his dominion, but with his overthrow on the field of bat-
tle the magic power which he had exercised over his sub-
jects vanished. His camp became the scene of factious
rivalry and of plots to advance some individual pretension
at the cost of the better interests and even the security of
the State. The exact details of the conspiracy will never
be known, partly from the remoteness of the scene, but also
on account of the mention of persons of whom nothing was,
or is ever likely to be, known. The single fact remains
clear that Yakoob Beg died at Korla on May 1, 1877, of
fever according to one account, of poison administered by
Hakim Khan Torah according to another. Still the Chi-
THE REIGN OF KWANGSU. 485
nese did not even then advance, and Yakoob's sons were
left to contest with Hakim Khan Torah over the dismem-
bered fragments of their father's realm. A bitter and pro-
tracted civil war followed close upon the disappearance of
the Athalik Ghazi. On the removal of his dead body for
sepulture to Kashgar his eldest son, Kuli Beg, murdered his
younger brother over their father's bier. It was then that
Hakim Khan came prominently forward as a rival to Kuli
Beg, and that the Mohammedans, weak and numerically
few as they were, divided themselves into two hostile par-
ties. While the Chinese were recruiting their troops and
repairing their losses, the enemy were exhausting them-
selves in vain and useless struggles. In June, 1877, Hakim
Khan was signally defeated and compelled to flee into Rus-
sian territory, whence on a later occasion he returned for a
short time in a vain attempt to disturb the tranquillity of
Chinese rule. When, therefore, the Chinese resumed their
advance much of their work had been done for them. They
had only to complete the overthrow of an enemy whom they
had already vanquished, and who was now exhausted by
his own disunion. The Chinese army made no forward
movement from Toksoun until the end of August, 1877.
Liu Kintang, to whom the command of the advance had
been given, did not leave until one month later; and when
he arrayed his forces he found them to number about 15,000
men. It had been decided that the first advance should not
be made in greater force, as the chief difficulty was to feed
the army, not to defeat the enemy.
The resistance encountered was very slight, and the coun-
try was found to be almost uninhabited. Both Karashar and
Korla were occupied by a Chinese garrison, and the district
around them was intrusted to the administration of a local
chief. Information that the rebel force was stationed at the
next town, Kucha, which is as far beyond Korla as that place
is from Toksoun, induced Liu Kintang to renew his march
and to continue it still more rapidly. A battle was fought
outside Kucha in which the Chinese were victorious, but not
486 A SHORT HISTORY OF CH1XA.
until they had overcome stubborn resistance. However, the
Chinese success was complete, and with Kucha in their power
they had simplified the process of attacking Kashgar itself.
A further halt was made at this town to enable the men to
recover from their fatigue, to allow fresh troops to come up,
and measures to be taken for insuring the security of com-
munications with the places in the rear. At Kucha also the
work of civil administration was intrusted to some of the
local notables. The deliberation of the Chinese movements,
far from weakening their effect, invested their proceedings
with the aspect of being irresistible. The advance was
shortly resumed. Aksu, a once flourishing city within the
limits of the old kingdom of Kashgar, surrendered at the
end of October. Ush Turf an yielded a few days later. The
Chinese had now got within striking distance of the capital
of the state. They had only to provide the means of mak-
ing the blow as fatal and decisive as possible. In December
they seized Maralbashi, an important position on the Kashgar
Darya, commanding the principal roads to both Yarkand and
Kashgar. Yarkand was the chief object of attack. It sur-
rendered without a blow on December 21. A second Chinese
army had been sent from Maralbashi to Kashgar, which was
defended by a force of several thousand men. It had been
besieged nine days, when Liu Kintang arrived with his troops
from Yarkand. A battle ensued, in which the Mohamme-
dans were vanquished, and the city with the citadel outside
captured. Several rebel leaders and some eleven hundred
men were said to have been executed ; but Kuli Beg escaped
into Russian territory. The city of Kashgar was taken on
December 26, and one week later the town of Khoten, fa-
mous from a remote period for its jade ornaments, passed
into the hands of the race who best appreciated their beauty
and value. The Chinese thus brought to a triumphant con-
clusion the campaigns undertaken for the reassertion of their
authority over the Mohammedan populations which had re-
rolted. They had conquered in this war by the superiority
of their weapons and their organization, and not by an over-
THE REIGN OF KWANQSU. 487
whelming display of numbers. Although large bodies of
troops were stationed at many places, it does not seem that
the army which seized the cities of Yarkand and Kashgar
numbered more than twenty thousand men. Having van-
quished their enemy in the field, the Celestials devoted all
their attention to the reorganization of what was called the
New Dominion, the capital of which after much deliberation
was fixed at Urumtsi. Their rule has been described by a
Mussulman as being both very fair and very just.
Having conquered Eastern Turkestan, the Chinese next
took steps for the recovery of Hi. "Without the metropolitan
province the undertaking of Tso Tsung Tang would lack
completeness, while indeed many political and military dan-
gers would attend the situation in Central Asia. But this
was evidently a matter to be effected in the first place by
negotiation, and not by violence and force of arms. Russia
had always been a friendly and indeed a sympathetic neigh-
bor. In this very matter of Hi she had originally acted with
the most considerate attention for China's rights, when it
seemed that they had permanently lost all definite meaning,
for she had declared that she would surrender it on China
sending a sufficient force to take possession, and now this
had been done. It was, therefore, by diplomatic representa-
tions on the part of the Tsungli Yamen to the Russian Min-
ister at Pekin that the recovery of Hi was expected in the
first place to be achieved. At about the same time the Rus-
sian authorities at Tashkent came to the conclusion that the
matter must rest with the Czar, and the Chinese official world
perceived that they would have to depute a Minister Pleni-
potentiary to St. Petersburg.
The official selected for the difficult and, as it proved,
dangerous task of negotiating at St. Petersburg, was that
same Chung How who had been sent to Paris after the
Tientsin massacre. He arrived at Pekin in August, 1878,
and was received in several audiences by the empresses while
waiting for his full instructions from the Tsungli Yamen.
He did not leave until October, about a month after the
488 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
Marquis Tseng, Tseng Kwofan's eldest son, set out from
Pekin to take the place of Kwo Sungtao as Minister in
London and Paris. Chung How reached St. Petersburg
in the early part of the following year, and the discussion
of the various points in question, protracted by the removal
of the court to Livadia, occupied the whole of the summer
months. At last it was announced that a treaty had been
signed at Livadia, by which Russia surrendered the Kuldja
valley, but retained that of the Tekes, which left in her
hands the command of the passes through the Tian Shan
range into Kashgar. Chung How knew nothing about fron-
tiers or military precautions, but he thought a great deal
about money. He fought the question of an indemnity with
ability, and got it fixed at five million roubles, or little more
than half that at which it was placed by the later treaty.
There was never any reason to suppose that the Chinese gov-
ernment would accept the partial territorial concession ob-
tained by Chung How. The first greeting that met Chung
How on his return revealed the fate of his treaty. He had
committed the indiscretion of returning without waiting for
the Edict authorizing his return, and as the consequence he
had to accept suspension from all his offices, while his treaty
was submitted to the tender mercies of the grand secretaries,
the six presidents of boards, the nine chief ministers of state,
and the members of the Hanlin. Three weeks later, Prince
Chun was specially ordered to join the Committee of Delib-
eration. On January 27 Chung How was formally cashiered
and arrested, and handed over to the Board of Punishment
for correction. The fate of the treaty itself was decided a
fortnight later. Chung How was then declared to have
"disobeyed his instructions and exceeded his powers." On
March 3 an edict appeared, sentencing the unhappy envoy
to "decapitation after incarceration. " This sentence was not
carried out, and the reprieve of the unlucky envoy was due
to Queen Victoria's expression of a hope that the Chinese gov-
ernment would spare his life.
At the same time that the Chinese refused their ratifica-
THE REIGN OF KWANQSU. 489
tion to Chung How's treaty, they expressed their desire for
another pacific settlement, which would give them more
complete satisfaction. The Marquis Tseng was accordingly
instructed to take up the thread of negotiation, and to pro-
ceed to the Russian capital as Embassador and Minister
Plenipotentiary. Some delay ensued, as it was held to be
doubtful whether Russia would consent to the reopening of
the question. But owing to the cautious and well-tuned
approaches of the Marquis Tseng, the St. Petersburg For-
eign Office acquiesced in the recommencement of negotia-
tions, and, after six months' discussion, accepted the princi-
ple of the almost unqualified territorial concession for which
the Chinese had stood firm. On February 12, 1881, these
views were embodied in a treaty, signed at St. Petersburg,
and the ratification within six months showed how differ-
ently its provisions were regarded from those of its predeces-
sor. With the Marquis Tseng's act of successful diplomacy
the final result of the long war in Central Asia was achieved.
The Chinese added Hi to Kashgar and the rest of the New
Dominion, which at the end of 1880 was made into a High
Commissionership and placed under the care of the dashing
General Liu Kintang.
The close of the great work successfully accomplished
during the two periods of the Regency was followed within
a few weeks by the disappearance of the most important of
the personages who had carried on the government through-
out these twenty years of constant war and diplomatic ex-
citement. Before the Pekin world knew of her illness, it
heard of the death of the Empress Dowager Tsi An, who
as Hienfung's principal widow had enjoyed the premier
place in the government, although she had never possessed
a son to occupy the throne in person. In a proclamation
issued in her name and possibly at her request, Tsi An de-
scribed the course of her malady, the solicitude of the em-
peror, and urged upon him the duty of his high place to put
restraint upon his grief. Her death occurred on April 18,
from heart disease, when she was only forty-five, and her
490 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
funeral obsequies were as splendid as her services demanded
For herself she had always been a woman of frugal habits,
and the successful course of recent Chinese history was largely
due to her firmness and resolution. Her associate in the
Regency, Tsi Thsi, who has always been more or less of an
invalid, still survives.
The difficulty with Russia had not long been composed,
when, on two opposite sides of her extensive dominion, China
was called upon to face a serious condition of affairs. In
Corea, "the forbidden land" of the Far East, events were
forced by the eagerness and competition of European states
to conclude treaties of commerce with that primitive king-
dom, and perhaps, also, by their fear that if they delayed
Russia would appropriate some port on the Corean coast.
To all who had official knowledge of Russia's desire and
plan for seizing Port Lazareff, this apprehension was far
from chimerical, and there was reason to believe that Rus-
sia's encroachment might compel other countries to make
annexations in or round Corea by way of precaution. Prac-
tical evidence of this was furnished by the English occupa-
tion of Port Hamilton, and by its subsequent evacuation
when the necessity passed away ; but should the occasion
again arise the key of the situation will probably be found
in t^e possession not of Port Hamilton or Quelpart, but of
the Island of Tsiusima. Recourse was had to diplomacy to
avert what threatened to be a grave international danger;
and although the result was long doubtful, and the situation
sometimes full of peril, a gratifying success was achieved in
the end. In 1881 a draft commercial treaty was drawn up,
approved by the Chinese authorities and the representatives
of the principal powers at Pekin, and carried to the court of
Seoul for acceptance and signature by the American naval
officer, Commodore Schufeldt. The Corean king made no
objection to the arrangement, and it was signed with the
express stipulation that the ratifications of the treaty were
to be exchanged in the following year. Thus was it harmo-
niously arranged at Pekin that Corea was to issue from her
THE REIGN OF KWANGSU. 491
hermit's call, and open her ports to trading countries under
the guidance and encouragement of China. There can be
no doubt that if this arrangement had been carried out, the
influence and the position of China in Corea would have
been very greatly increased and strengthened. But, un-
fortunately, the policy of Li Hung Chang for if he did
not originate, he took the most important part in directing
it aroused the jealousy of Japan, which has long asserted
the right to have an equal voice with China in the control
of Core. ,n affairs ; and the government of Tokio, on hearing
of the Schufeldt treaty, at once took steps not merely to ob-
tain all the rights to be conferred by that document, to which
no one would have objected, but also to assert its claim to
control equally with China the policy of the Corean court.
"With that object, a Japanese fleet and army were sent to
the Seoul River, and when the diplomatists returned for
the ratification of the treaty, they found the Japanese in
a strong position close to the Corean capital. The Chinese
were not to be set on one side in so open a manner, and a
powerful fleet of gunboats, with 5,000 troops, were sent to
the Seoul River to uphold their rights. Under other cir-
cumstances, more especially as the Chinese expedition was
believed to be the superior, a hostile collision must have en-
sued, and the war which has so often seemed near between
the Chinese and Japanese would have become an accom-
plished fact ; but fortunately the presence of the foreign di-
plomatists moderated the ardor of both sides, and a rupture
was averted. By a stroke of judgment the Chinese seized
Tai Wang Kun, the father of the young king, and the leader
of the anti-foreign party, and carried him off to Pekin, where
he was kept in imprisonment for some time, until matters
had settled down in his own country. The opening of Corea
to the Treaty Powers did not put an end to the old rivalry
of China and Japan in that country, of which history con-
tains so many examples; and, before the Corean question
was definitely settled, it again became obtrusive. Such evi-
dence as is obtainable points to the conclusion that Chinese
492 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
influence was gradually getting the better of Japanese in the
country, and the attack on the Japanese legation in ls84
was a striking revelation of popular antipathy or of an elab-
orate an ti- Japanese plot headed by the released Chinese
prisoner, Tai "Wang Kun.
At the opposite point of the frontier China was brought
face to face with a danger which threatened to develop into
a peril of the first magnitude, and in meeting which she \vas
undoubtedly hampered by her treaties with the general body
of foreign powers and her own peculiar place in the family
of nations. It is the special misfortune of China that .^he
cannot engage in any, even a defensive, war with a maritime
power without incurring the grave risk, or indeed the prac-
tical certainty, that if such a war be continued for any length
of time she must find herself involved with every other for-
eign country through the impossibility of confining the hostil-
ity of her own subjects to one race of foreigners in particu-
lar. In considering the last war with a European country
in which China was engaged, due allowance must be made
for these facts, and also for the anomalous character of that
contest, when active hostilities were carried on without any
formal declaration of war a state of things which gave the
French many advantages. Toward the end of the year 1882,
the French government came to the decision to establish a
"definite protectorate" over Tonquin. Events had for some
time been shaping themselves in this direction, and the colo-
nial ambition of France had long fixed on Indo-China as a
field in which it might aggrandize itself with comparatively
little risk and a wide margin of advantage. The weakness
of the kingdom of Annam was a strong enough temptation
in itself to assert the protectorate over it which France had,
more or less, claimed for forty years; but when the reports
of several French explorers came to promote the conviction
that France might acquire the control of a convenient and
perhaps the best route into some of the richest provinces of
ulterior China without much difficulty, the temptation be-
came irresistible. French activity in Indo-China was height-
THE REIGN OF KWANGSl/. 493
ened by the declaration of Gamier, Rocher, and others, that
the Songcoi, or Red River, furnished the best means of com-
municating with Yunnan, and tapping the wealth of the rich-
est mineral province in China. The apathy of England in
her relations with Burmah, which presented, under its arro-
gant and obstructive rulers, what may have seemed an in-
superable obstacle to trade intercourse between India and
China, afforded additional inducement to the French to act
quickly ; and, as they felt confident of their ability and power
to coerce the court of Hue, the initial difficulties of their un-
dertaking did not seem very formidable. That undertaking
was, in the first place, defined to be a protectorate of Ann am,
and, as the first step in the enterprise, the town of Hanoi, in
the delta of the Red River, and the nominal capital of Ton-
quin, was captured before the end of the year 1882.
Tonquin stood in very much the same relationship to
China as Corea ; and, although the enforcement of the suze-
rain tie was lax, there was no doubt that at Pekin the opin-
ion was held very strongly that the action of France was an
encroachment on the rights of China. But if such was the
secret opinion of the Chinese authorities, they took no imme-
diate steps to arrest the development of French policy in
Tonquin by proclaiming it a Chinese dependency, and also
their intention to defend it. It is by no means certain that
the prompt and vigorous assertion of their rights would have
induced the French to withdraw from their enterprise, for
its difficulties were not revealed at first ; but if China is to
make good her hold over such dependencies, she must be
prepared to show that she thinks them worth fighting for.
While Li Hung Chang and the other members of the Chi-
nese government were deliberating as to the course they
should pursue, the French were acting with great vigor in
Tonquin, and committing their military reputation to a task
from which they could not in honor draw back. During the
whole of the year 1883 they were engaged in military opera-
tions with the Black Flag irregulars, a force half piratical
and half patriotic, who represented the national army of the
494 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
country. It was believed at the time, but quite erroneously,
that the Black Flags were paid and incited by the Chinese.
Subsequent evidence showed that the Chinese authorities did
not taken even an indirect part in the contest until a much
later period. After the capture of Hanoi, the French were
constantly engaged with the Black Flags, from whom they
captured the important town of Sontay, which was reported
to be held by imperial Chinese troops, but on its capture this
statement was found to be untrue. The French were in the
full belief that the conquest of Tonquin would be easily
effected, when a serious reverse obliged them to realize the
gravity of their task. A considerable detachment, under
the command of Captain Henri Riviere, who was one of the
pioneers of French enterprise on the Songcoi, was surprised
and defeated near Hanoi. Riviere was killed, and it became
necessary to make a great effort to recover the ground that
had been lost. Fresh troops were sent from Europe, but
before they arrived the French received another check at
Phukai, which the Black Flags claimed as a victory because
the French were obh'ged to retreat.
Before this happened the French had taken extreme
measures against the King of Annam, of which state Ton-
quin is the northern province. The king of that country,
by name Tuduc, who had become submissive to the French,
died in July, 1883, and after his death the Annamese, per-
haps encouraged by the difficulties of the French in Tonquin,
became so hostile that it was determined to read them a
severe lesson. Hue was attacked and occupied a month
after the death of Tuduc, and a treaty was extracted from
the new king which made him the dependent of France.
"When the cold season began in Tonquin, the French forces
largely increased, and, commanded by Admiral Courbet,
renewed operations, and on December 11 attacked the mam
body of the Black Flags at Sontay, which they had reoccu-
pied and strengthened. They offered a desperate and well
sustained resistance, and it was only with heavy loss that
the French succeeded in carrying the town. The victors
THE REIGN OF KWANOSU. 495
were somewhat recompensed for their hardships and loss by
the magnitude of the spoil, which included a large sum of
money. Desultory fighting continued without intermission;
Admiral Courbet was superseded by General Millot, who
determined to signalize his assumption of the command by
attacking Bacninh, which the Black Flags made their head-
quarters after the loss of Sontay. On March 8, he attacked
this place at the head of 12,000 men, but so formidable were
its defenses that he would not risk an attack in front, and by
a circuitous march of four days he gained the flank of the
position, and thus taken at a disadvantage the Black Flags
abandoned their formidable lines, and retreated without
much loss, leaving their artillery, including some Krupp
guns, in the hands of the victors. At this stage of the
question diplomacy intervened, and on May 11 a treaty of
peace was signed by Commander Fournier, during the min-
istry of M. Jules Ferry, with the Chinese government.
One of the principal stipulations of this treaty was that the
French should be allowed to occupy Langson and other
places in Tonquin. "When the French commander sent
a force under Colonel Dugenne to occupy Langson it was
opposed in the Bacle defile and repulsed with some loss.
The Chinese exonerated themselves from all responsibility
by declaring that the French advance was premature, be-
cause no date was fixed by the Fournier Convention, and
because there had not been time to transmit the necessary
orders. On the other hand, M. Fournier declared on his
honor that the dates in his draft were named in the original
convention. The French government at once demanded an
apology, and an indemnity fixed by M. Jules Ferry, in a
moment of mental excitement, at the ridiculous figure of
$50,000,000. An apology was offered, but such an in-
demnity was refused, and eventually France obtained one
of only $800,000.
After the Bacle affair hostilities were at once resumed,
and for the first time the French carried them on not only
against the Black Flags, but against the Chinese. M. Jules
496 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
Ferry did not, however, make any formal declaration of war
against China, and he thus gained an advantage of position
for his attack on the Chinese which it was not creditable to
French chivalry to have asserted. The most striking in-
stance of this occurred at Foochow, where the French fleet,
as representing a friendly power, was at anchor above the
formidable defenses of the Min River. In accordance with
instructions telegraphed to him, the French admiral attacked
those places in reverse and destroyed the forts on the Min
without much difficulty or loss, thanks exclusively to his
having been allowed past them as a friend. The French
also endeavored to derive all possible advantage from there
being no formal declaration of war, and to make use of
Hongkong as a base for their fleet against China. But this
unfairness could not be tolerated, and the British minister at
Pekin, where Sir Harry Parkes had in the autumn of 1883
succeeded Sir Thomas "Wade, issued a proclamation that the
hostilities between France and China were tantamount to a
state of war, and that the laws of neutrality must be strictly
observed. The French resented this step, and showed some
inclination to retaliate by instituting a right to search for
rice, but fortunately this pretension was not pushed to ex-
tremities, and the war was closed before it could produce
any serious consequences. The French devoted much of their
attention to an attack on the Chinese possessions in Formosa,
and the occupation of Kelung; a fort in the northern part of
that island was captured, but the subsequent success of the
French was small. The Chinese displayed great energy and
resource in forming defenses against any advance inland
from Kelung or Tamsui, and the French government was
brought to face the fact that there was nothing to be gained
by carrying on these desultory operations, and that unless
they were prepared to send a large expedition, it was com-
puted of not less than 50,000 men, to attack Pekin, there
was no alternative to coming to terms with China. How
strong this conviction had become may be gathered from the
fact that the compulsory retreat, in March, 1885, of the
THE REIGN OF KWANGSU. *97
French from before Langson, where some of the Chinese
regular troops were drawn up with a large force of Black
and Yellow Flags the latter of whom were in Chinese pay
did not imperil the negotiations which were then far ad-
vanced toward completion. On June 9 of the same year a
treaty of peace was signed by M. Patenotre and Li Hung
Chang which gave France nothing more than the Fournier
Convention.
The military lessons of this war must be pronounced in-
conclusive, for the new forces which China had organized
since the Pekin campaign were never fully engaged, and the
struggle ended before the regular regiments sent to Langson
had any opportunity of showing their quality. But the im-
pression conveyed by the fighting in Formosa and the north-
ern districts of Tonquin was that China had made consider-
able progress in the military art, and that she possessed the
nucleus of an army that might become formidable. But
while the soldiers had made no inconsiderable improvement,
as much could not be said of the officers, and among the com-
manders there seemed no grasp of the situation, and a com-
plete inability to conduct a campaign. Probably these defi-
ciencies will long remain the really weak spot in the Chinese
war organization, and although they have men who will
fight well, the only capacity their commanders showed in
Tonquin and Formosa was in selecting strong positions and
in fortifying them with consummate art. But as the strong-
est position can be turned and avoided, and as the Chinese,
like all Asiatics, become demoralized when their rear is
threatened, it cannot be denied that, considerable progress
as the Chinese have made in the military art, they have not
yet mastered some of its rudiments. All that can be said
is that the war between France and China was calculated
to teach the advisability of caution in fixing a quarrel upon
China. Under some special difficulties from the character
of the war and with divided councils at Pekin, the Chinese
still gave a very good account of themselves against one of
the greatest powers of Europe.
498 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
During the progress of this struggle a coup d'etat was
effected at Pekin of which at the time it was impossible to
measure the whole significance. In July, 1884, the Chinese
world was startled by the sudden fall and disgrace of Prince
Rung, who had been the most powerful man in China since
the Treaty of Pekin. A decree of the empress-regent ap-
peared dismissing him from all his posts and consigning him
to an obscurity from which after nine years he has not yet
succeeded in emerging. The causes of his fall are not clear,
but they were probably of several distinct kinds. "While he
was the leader of the peace party and the advocate of a
prompt arrangement with France, he was also an opponent
of Prince Chun's desire to have a share in the practical ad-
ministration of the state, or, at least, an obstacle in the \vay
of its realization. Prince Chun, who was a man of an im-
perious will, and who, on the death of the Eastern Empress,
became the most important personage in the palace and su-
preme council of the empire, was undoubtedly the leader
of the attack on Prince Kung, and the immediate cause of
his downfall. Prince Kung, who was an amiable and well
intentioned man rather than an able statesman, yielded
without resistance, and indeed he had no alternative, for he
had no following at Pekin, and his influence was very slight
except among Europeans. Prince Chun then came to the
front, taking an active and prominent part in the govern-
ment, making himself president of a new board of national
defense and taking up the command of the Pekin Field
Force, a specially trained body of troops for the defense of the
capital. He retained possession of these posts after his son
assumed the government in person, notwithstanding the law
forbidding a father serving under his son, which has already
been cited, and he remained the real controller of Chinese
policy until his sudden and unexpected death in the first
days of 1891. Some months earlier, in April, 1890, China
had suffered a great loss in the Marquis Tseng, whose diplo-
matic experience and knowledge of Europe might have ren-
dered his Country infinite service in the future. He was the
THE REIGN OF KWANQSU. 499
chosen colleague of Prince Chun, and he is said to have
gained the ear of his young sovereign. While willing to
admit the superiority of European inventions, he was also
an implicit believer in China's destiny and in her firmly
holding her place among the greatest powers of the world.
In December, 1890, also died Tseng Kwo Tsiuen, uncle of
the marquis, and a man who had taken a prominent and
honorable part in the suppression of the Taeping Rebellion.
In 1885 an important and delicate negotiation between
England and China was brought to a successful issue by the
joint efforts of Lord Salisbury and the Marquis Tseng. The
levy of the lekin or barrier tax on opium had led to many
exactions in the interior which were injurious to the foreign
trade and also to the Chinese government, which obtained
only the customs duty raised in the port. After the subject
had been thoroughly discussed in all its bearings a conven-
tion was signed hi London, on July 19, 1885, by which the
lekin was fixed at eighty taels a chest, in addition to the
customs due of thirty taels, and also that the whole of this
sum should be paid in the treaty port before the opium was
taken out of bond. This arrangement was greatly to the
advantage of the Chinese government, which came into
possession of a large revenue that had previously been frit-
tered away in the provinces, and much of which had gone
into the pockets of the mandarins. This subject affords the
most appropriate place for calling attention to the conspic-
uous services rendered, as Director-general of Chinese Cus-
toms dunng more than thirty years, by Sir Robert Hart,
who, on the premature death of Sir Harry Parkes, was ap-
pointed British Minister at Pekin, which post, for weighty
reasons, he almost immediately resigned. It is impossible
to measure the consequences and important effect of his con-
duct and personal influence upon the policy and opinion of
China, while his work in the interests of that country has
been both striking and palpable. To his efforts the central
government mainly owes its large and increasing cash rev-
enue, and when some candid Chinese historian sums up the
500 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
work done for his country by foreigners, he will admit that,
what Gordon did in war and Macartney in diplomacy, Hart
accomplished in those revenue departments which are an
essential element of strength, and we must hope that this
truthful chronicler will also not forget to record that all these
loyal servants were English, members of a race which, after
fighting China fairly, frankly held out the hand of friend-
ship and alliance. In connection with this subject it may
be noted that the emperor issued an edict in 1890 formally
legalizing the cultivation of opium, which, although prac-
tically carried on, was nominally illegal. An immediate
consequence of this step was a great increase in the area
under cultivation, particularly in Manchuria, and so great
is the production of native opium now becoming that that of
India may yet be driven from the field as a practical revenge
for the loss inflicted on China by the competition of Indian
tea. But at all events these measures debar China from
ever again posing as an injured party in the matter of the
opium traffic. She has very rightly determined to make the
best of the situation and to derive all the profit she can by
taxing an article in such very general use and consumption;
but there is an end to all representations like those made by
prominent officials from Commissioner Lin to Prince Kung
and Li Hung Chang, that the opium traffic was iniquitous,
and constituted the sole cause of disagreement between China
and England.
During these years the young Emperor Kwangsu was
growing up. In February, 1887, in which month falls the
Chinese New Year, it was announced that his marriage was
postponed in consequence of his delicate health, and it was
not until the new year of 1889, when Kwangsu was well
advanced in his eighteenth year, that he was married to
Yeh-ho-na-la, daughter of a Manchu general named Knei
Hsiang, who had been specially selected for this great honor
out of many hundred candidates. The marriage was cele-
brated with the usual state, and more than $5,000,000 is said
to have been expended on the attendant ceremonies. At the
THE REIGN OF KWANGSU. 501
same time the empress-regent issued her farewell edict and
passed into retirement, but there is reason to believe that she
continued to exercise no inconsiderable influence over the
young emperor.
The marriage and assumption of governing power by the
Emperor Kwangsu brought to the front the very important
question of the right of audience by the foreign ministers
resident at Pekin. This privilege had been conceded by
China at the time of the Tientsin massacre, and it had been
put into force on one occasion during the brief reign of
Tungche. The time had again arrived for giving it effect,
and, after long discussions as to the place of audience and
the forms to be observed, Kwangsu issued in December,
1890, an edict appointing a day soon after the commence-
ment of the Chinese New Year for the audience, and also
arranging that it should be repeated annually on the same
date. In March, 1891, Kwangsu gave his first reception to
the foreign ministers, but after it was over some criticism
and dissatisfaction were aroused by the fact that the cere-
mony had been held in the Tse Kung Ko, or Hall of Trib-
utary Nations. As this was the first occasion on which
Europeans saw the young emperor, the fact that he made a
favorable impression on them is not without interest, and
the following personal description of the master of so many
millions may well be quoted. "Whatever the impression
'the Barbarians' made on him the idea which they carried
away of the Emperor Kwangsu was pleasing and almost
pathetic. His air is one of exceeding intelligence and gen-
tleness, somewhat frightened and melancholy looking. His
face is pale, and though it is distinguished by refinement and
quiet dignity it has none of the force of his martial ancestors,
nothing commanding or imperial, but is altogether mild,
delicate, sad and kind. He is essentially Manchu in feat-
ures, his skin is strangely pallid in hue, which is, no doubt,
accounted for by the confinement of his life inside these for
bidding walls and the absence of the ordinary pleasures and
pursuits of youth, with the constant discharge of onerous,
502 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
complicated and difficult duties of state which, it must be
remembered, are, according to imperial Chinese etiquette,
mostly transacted between the hours of two and six in the
morning. His face is oval shaped with a very long narrow
chin and a sensitive mouth with thin, nervous lips; his nose
is well shaped and straight, his eyebrows regular and very
arched, while the eyes are unusually large and sorrowful in
expression. The forehead is well shaped and broad, and the
head is large beyond the average."
Owing to the dissatisfaction felt at the place of audience,
which seemed to put the Treaty Powers on the same footing
as tributary states, the foreign ministers have endeavored to
force from the Tsungli Yamen the formal admission that a
more appropriate part of the imperial city should be assigned
for the ceremony; but as the powers themselves were not
disposed to lay too much stress on this point, no definite con-
cession has yet been made, and the Chinese ministers have
held out against the pressure of some of the foreign repre-
sentatives. But, although no concise alteration has been
made in the place of audience, the question has been practi-
cally settled by a courteous concession to the new English
minister, Mr. O' Conor, who succeeded Sir John Walsham
in 1892, and it is gratifying to feel that this advantage wag
gained more by tact than by coercion. When Mr. O'Conor
wished to present his credentials to the emperor, it was ar-
ranged that the emperor should receive him in the Cheng
Kuan Tien Palace, which is part of the imperial residence of
Peace and Plenty within the Forbidden City. The British
representative, accompanied by his secretaries and suite in
accordance with arrangement, proceeded to this palace on
December 13, 1892, and was received in a specially honor-
able way at the principal or imperial entrance by the officials
of the court. Such a mark of distinction was considered
quite unique in the annals of foreign diplomacy in China,
and has since been a standing grievance with the other min-
isters at Pekin. It was noticed by those present that the
emperor took a much greater interest in the ceremony than
THE REIGN OF KWANGSU. 503
on previous occasions, and that he showed special attention
as Prince Ching, the President of the Yamen, translated the
letter from Queen Victoria. This audience, which lasted a
considerable time, was certainly the most satisfactory and
encouraging yet held with the Emperor Kwangsu by any
foreign envoy, and it also afforded opportunity of confirming
the favorable impression which the intelligence and dignified
demeanor of the Emperor Kwangsu have made on all who
have had the honor of coming into his presence. One inci-
dent in the progress of the audience question deserves notice,
and that was the emperor's refusal, in 1891, to receive Mr.
Blair, the United States Minister, in consequence of the hos-
tile legislation of that country against China. The anti-
foreign outbreak along the Yangtsekiang, in the summer
of 1891, was an unpleasant incident, from which at one time
it looked as if serious consequences might follow; but the
ebullition fortunately passed away without an international
crisis, and it may be hoped that the improved means of exer-
cising diplomatic pressure at Pekin will render these attacks
less frequent, and their settlement and redress more rapid.
During the last ten years events in Central Asia and
Burmah have drawn England and China much more closely
together, and have laid the basis of what it must be hoped
will prove a firm and durable alliance. If suspicion was laid
aside and candid relations established on the frontier, it
should not be difficult to maintain an excellent understand-
ing with China, and at the present moment every diffi-
culty has been smoothed over with the exception of that on
the Burmese frontier. It is to be hoped that not less success
will be obtained in this quarter than in Sikhim and Hunza,
and Mr. O'Conor's convention of Pekin in July, 1886, recog-
nizing China's right to receive a tribute mission from Bur
in ah once in ten years went far to prove the extent of con-
cession England would make to China. It is divulging what
cannot long be kept secret, to explain the circumstances
under which Mr. O'Conor's convention was signed, and the
unusual concession made by a British government of admit-
504 A SHOR1 HISTORY OF CHINA.
ting its liability to send a tribute mission. Tbe Chefoo Con-
vention, closing the Yunnan incident, contained a promise
from the Chinese government to allow an English mission
to pass through Tibet. Years passed without any attempt
to give effect to this stipulation, but at last, in 1884, Mr.
Colman Macaulay, a member of the Indian Civil Service,
obtained the assent of his government to requesting the per-
mission of the Chinese government to visit Lhasa. He went
to Pekin and he came to London, and he obtained the nec-
essary permission and the formal passport of the Tsungli
Yamen; and there is no doubt that if he had set off for Tibet
with a small party, he would have been honorably received
and passed safely through Tibet to India. On the other
hand there is no doubt that such a visit would have pre-
sented no feature of special or striking importance. It would
have been an interesting individual experience, but scarcely
an international landmark. This modest character for his
long-cherished project did not suit Mr. Macaulay, and un-
mindful of the adage that there may be a slip betwixt the cup
and the lip, he not merely delayed the execution of his visit,
but he made ostentatious preparations for an elaborate mis-
sion, and he engaged many persons with scientific qualifica-
tions to accompany him, with the view of examining the
mineral resources of Tibet. The Chinese themselves did not
like, and had never contemplated, such a mission, but their
dissatisfaction was slight in comparison with the storm it
raised in Tibet; and the Chinese government was thus
brought face to face with a position in which it must either
employ its military power to coerce the Tibetans, who made
preparations to oppose the Macaulay mission by force of
arms, or acquiesce in the Tibetans ignoring its official pass-
ports, and thus provoke a serious complication with this
country. Such was the position of the Tibetan question
when Burmah was annexed in January, 1886, and negotia-
tions followed with China for the adjustment of her claims
in the country. Negotiations were carried on, in the first
place by Lord Salisbury, and in the second by Lord Rose-
THE REIGN OF KWANGSU. 505
bery, with the Chinese minister in London, and the draft of
more than one convention was prepared. Among such con-
templated arrangements were the dispatch of a mission from
Burmah to China, and of a return one from China; the ap-
pointment of the Head Priest of Mandalay as the person to
send the mission, thus making it a purely native matter,
outside the participation of the British government; and the
concession of material advantages on the Irrawaddy and in
the Shan country, as the equivalent for the surrender of the
tribute. It is probable that one of these three arrangements
would have been carried out, but that, on certain points
being referred to Pekin, the knowledge came to the ears
of the British government that if the Tibetan mission were
withdrawn, the Chinese would be content with the formal
admission of their claim to receive the tribute mission from
Burmah in accordance with established usage. As both
governments wanted a speedy settlement of the question,
the Chinese, with the view of allaying the rising agitation
in Tibet and getting rid of a troublesome question, and the
English not less anxious to have the claims of China in Bur-
mah defined in diplomatic language, the convention which
bears Mr. O'Conor's name was drawn up and signed with
quite remarkable dispatch. For the abandonment of the
Macaulay mission, and the recognition of their right to re-
ceive the tribute mission from Burmah, the authorities at
Pekin were quite, at the moment, willing to forego material
claims such as a port on the Irrawaddy. Diplomacy has
not yet said the last word on this matter, and the exact fron-
tier between Burmah and China has still to be delimited,
but the fixing of a definite date for the dispatch of the first
mission from Mandalay to Pekin, which is timed to set out
in January, 1894, is in itself of hopeful augury for the settle-
ment of all difficulties. When this matter is composed there
will be no cloud in the sky of Anglo-Chinese relations, and
that such an auspicious result will be obtained is not open
to serious doubt. The most gratifying fact in the history
of China during the last ten years is the increasing sym-
506 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
pathy and tacit understanding between the two great em-
pires of England and China in Asia, which must in time
constitute an effective alliance against any common danger
in that continent, and the aggressive policy of Russia.
THE WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT
EVENTS
WE have seen that, up to 1892, it had been customary to
receive the representatives of foreign powers in the Tse Kung
Ko, or Hall of Tributary Nations. Naturally, much dissat-
isfaction was provoked by the selection of a place of audience
which seemed to put the treaty powers on the same footing
as tributary states, and, accordingly, the foreign ministers
undertook to exact from the Tsungli Yamen, or Board for
Foreign Affairs, the designation of a more suitable locality
in the imperial city for the annual ceremony. The proposed
innovation was resisted for some time ; but when Sir Nicolas
O'Conor was appointed British Minister at Pekin, an ex-
ception was made in his favor, and a place of superior im-
portance to the Hall of Tributary Nations was chosen for
the presentation of his credentials. The Emperor Kwangsu
agreed to receive him in the Cheng Kuan Tien Palace, or
pavilion which forms part of the imperial residence of Peace
and Plenty within the Forbidden City. In pursuance of this
arrangement, the British representative, attended by his suite,
proceeded to this pavilion on December 13, 1892, and was re-
ceived at the principal entrance by the high court officials. It
was also noted that the emperor took a greater interest in the
ceremonv than on preceding occasions, and followed with at-
tention the reading of Queen Victoria's letter, by Prince
Ching, then president of the Tsungli Yamen. Thenceforth,
there was observed with every year a decided improvement
in the mode of receiving foreign diplomatists, and, event-
ually, the imperial audience was supplemented with an an-
WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. 507
nual dinner given by the Board for Foreign Affairs. Through
the personal reception accorded by the Emperor of China to
Prince Henry of Prussia on May 15, 1898, the audience ques-
tion was finally settled in favor of the right of foreign poten-
tates to rank on an equality with the so-called Son of Heaven.
We come now to the most memorable event in the modern
history of China since the Taeping Rebellion ; to wit, the war
with Japan. In order to comprehend, however, the causes
of this contest between the two chief races of the Far East,
it is necessary to review the development of the Corean
question which gave rise to it. There seems to be no doubt
that Japan derived its first civilizing settlers, and most of
its arts and industries, from the Corean peninsula. It is
certain that, for centuries, the intercourse between the two
countries was very close, and that more than one attempt
was made by Japanese rulers to subjugate Corea. The lat-
est and most strenuous endeavor to that end was made near
the end of the sixteenth century, and, although it resulted
in a temporary occupation of the peninsula, the Japanese
troops were eventually withdrawn, and Corea resumed its
former status of a kingdom tributary to the Celestial Em-
pire. Thenceforth, for almost three centuries, Corea and
Tonquin bore, in theory, precisely the same relation to the
Middle Kingdom. In each instance, the practical question
was whether China was strong enough to make good her
nominal rights. The outcome of her resistance to French
aggression in Tonquin had shown that there, at least, she
had no such power. But, in the subsequent ten years, efforts
had been made to organize an efficient army and navy, and
the belief was entertained at Pekin that China was at all
events strong enough to uphold her claims in Corea, which
was, geographically and strategically, of far more impor-
tance to the Middle Kingdom than was Tonquin. Yet,
while it was evident that Corea would not be renounced
without a struggle, the Pekin authorities, for some years,
met the Japanese encroachments with a weak and vacillat-
ing policy. As early as 1876, the Mikado's advisers entered
508 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
on a course which obviously aimed at the attainment of com-
mercial, if not, also, political, ascendency in the Hermit
Kingdom. An outrage having been committed upon some
of her sailors, Japan obtained, by way of reparation from
the court of Seoul, the opening of the port of Fushan to her
trade. Four years later, Chemulpo, the port of Seoul, was
also opened. These forward steps on the part of the Japa-
nese aroused the Chinese to activity, and, in 1881, a draft
commercial treaty was prepared by the Chinese authorities
in council with the representatives of the principal powers
at Pekin, and sent to Seoul, where it was accepted. The
Japanese alleged, however, that they possessed a historical
right to an equal voice with China in the Corean peninsula,
and that, consequently, the treaty to which we have just
referred required their ratification. To sustain this claim,
the Japanese allied themselves with the Progressive party
in Corea, a move which compelled the Chinese to lean upon
the Reactionists, who were opposed to the concessions lately
made to foreigners, and who, as events were to show, were
preponderant in the Hermit Kingdom. In June, 1882, the
Corean Reactionists attacked the Japanese Legation at Seoul,
murdered some members of it, and compelled the survivors
to flee to the seacoast. Thereupon, the Mikado sent some
troops to exact reparation, and the Chinese, on their part,
dispatched a force to restore order. A compromise was
brought about, and, for two years, Japanese and Chinese
soldiers remained encamped beside one another under the
walls of the Corean capital. In December, 1884, however,
a second collision occurred between the Japanese and the
Coreans, the latter being, this time, assisted by the Chi-
nese. The Mikado's subjects were again compelled to take
to flight. The Tokio government now resolved upon firm
measures, and, while it exacted compensation from the Co-
reans, it sent Count Ito Hirobumi to China to bring about
an accommodation with the Pekin government. At that
conjuncture, there is no doubt that China possessed advan-
tages in the Corean peninsula that were lacking to the Japa-
WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. 509
nese. Not only was she popular with the majority of the
people, but the treaty powers were more disposed to act
through her than through Japan in order to secure the gen-
eral extension of trade with the Hermit Kingdom. Those
advantages, nevertheless, were thrown away by an agree-
ment which the shortsighted advisers of the Chinese emperor
were persuaded to accept. Li Hung Chang was appointed
the Chinese Plenipotentiary to negotiate with Count Ito,
and, after a short conference, a convention was signed at
Tientsin on April 18, 1885. The provisions of the conven-
tion were, first, that both countries should withdraw their
troops from Corea; secondly, that no more officers should
be sent by either country to drill the Corean army; and,
thirdly, that if, at any future time, either of the two coun-
tries should send troops to Corea, it must inform the other.
It is manifest that, by this agreement, China, practically,
acquiesced hi Japan's assertion of an equal right to control
the Hermit Kingdom. Thenceforth, it was impossible to
speak of Corea as being a vassal state of the Celestial Em-
pire.
For some nine years, nevertheless, after the conclusion
of the Tientsin agreement, there were no dangerous disturb-
ances in the Peninsular Kingdom. In the early part of 1894,
however, Kim-Ok-Kiun, a reformer, and the leader of the
Corean uprising in 1884, was assassinated at Shanghai, and
it subsequently transpired that the murder had been com-
mitted by the order of the Corean authorities. It is certain
that honors and rewards were bestowed upon the assassin
u his return to the Hermit Kingdom, while the body of his
victim was drawn and quartered as that of a traitor. Just
at this juncture, the Tonghaks, a body of religious reform-
ers, having failed to obtain certain concessions, revolted,
and, by the end of May, achieved so much success over the
Corean forces that the Seoul government became alarmed,
and sent to China for assistance. In response to the request,
some two thousand Chinese troops were disembarked on June
10 at Asan, a seaport some distance south of the Corean capi-
510 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
tal, and a few Chinese men-of-war were dispatched to the
coast of the peninsula. Formal notice of these proceedings
was given to Japan under the terms of the Tientsin Conven-
tion. Thereupon, the Mikado*s government decided to un-
dertake a like interposition, and acted with so much energy
that, within forty-eight hours after the arrival of the Chi-
nese at Asan, they had placed at Seoul a much superior
force. They were thus able to dominate the court, although
it was in entire sympathy with China. The Pekin govern-
ment now made the mistake of reviving its pretensions to
regard the Hermit Kingdom as a vassal state. These pre-
tensions Japan refused to tolerate, on the ground, first, that
she had never admitted them, and, secondly, that the Tien-
tsin Convention recognized an equality of rights in the two
states. The Japanese also called attention to the misrule
that prevailed in Corea, and proposed that the Chinese should
join them in carrying out needful reforms. To this proposal,
China could not accede, being hampered by her alliance with
the reactionary party at Seoul ; consequently, Japan under-
took the execution of the task alone. As a first step in that
direction, the Japanese got possession of the person of the
Corean ruler, and compelled him to act as the instrument of
his captors. The initial document which he was constrained
to sign was an order that the Chinese troops, who had come
at his invitation, should leave the country. The seizure of
the king's person, which occurred on July 23, 1894, was fol-
lowed by two successful acts of aggression. On the 25th,
the Japanese squadron attacked the Chinese transport
"Kowshing," conveying fresh soldiers to Asan, and its
escort of warships. In the engagement, one Chinese man-
of-war was sunk, one was disabled, and 1,200 soldiers were
destroyed on the "Kowshing," which was torpedoed. On
July 29, the Japanese general Oshima, at the head of a
small force, made a night attack upon the Chinese fortified
camp at Song Hwang, and carried the place with a loss to
their opponents of 500 killed and wounded. These prelimi-
nary encounters were followed by a declaration of war on
\\~AR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. oil
August 1, 1894. During the ensuing six weeks, Japan
poured her troops into the peninsula, while the Chinese
fleet, instead of harassing the enemy, remained in the
harbors of Port Arthur and Wei-hai-Wei. On September
15, the Japanese army in Corea was strong enough to de-
tach a corps of 14,000 men to attack the Chinese position
at Pingyang, a town on the northern banks of the Paidong
River. The passage of the river was difficult, and the Chi-
nese might have overwhelmed the Japanese when crossing
it, but they took no measures to this end, and the battle be-
gan at sunrise on the day just named. There were five forts
to be captured, and some of them were vigorously defended,
nor was it until night set in that the garrison finally deter-
mined upon evacuating the place. In the battle itself and
the retreat, over 2,000 Chinese were killed, to say nothing
of the wounded and the prisoners. The Japanese themselves
lost 162 killed, 438 wounded and 33 missing, and there seems
to be no reason to doubt that, had all the Chinese officers
been capable of the valor displayed by the general Tso-pao-
kuei, the Japanese would have been repulsed. As it was,
the battle proved decisive, for not a Chinaman paused until
he had reached the other side of the Yalu River, which forms
the northwest boundary of Corea.
On the very day of the fight at Pingyang, a number of
Chinese war vessels, under the command of Admiral Ting,
were transporting troops to the mouth of the Yalu, where
the Chinese were assembling a second army. On its return
from this task, it was encountered, September 17, off the
island of Haiyang, by a Japanese squadron under Admiral
Ito. Ostensibly, the two fleets were evenly matched. They
each numbered ten fighting vessels, and, if two of the Chi-
nese ships possessed a more powerful armament, the Japa-
nese were superior in steam power. It was to quickness in
maneuvering that the Japanese admiral trusted for victory,
and his first attack consisted mainly in circling around the
Chinese squadron. He was careful, also, to reserve his fire
until only two miles separated him from his adversaries.
51xJ A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
After a duel with the Japanese "Matsushima," the Chi-
nese flagship "Tingyuen" was severely damaged, and only
saved from sinking by the intervention of her sister ship, the
"Chenyuen." These two ironclads, together with the tor-
pedo boats, succeeded in making their escape, but five of
the Chinese vessels were sunk or destroyed. In men, the
Chinese lost 700 killed or drowned and 300 wounded, while
the Japanese lost 115 killed and 150 wounded. The result
of this victory was that the Chinese never afterward at-
tempted to dispute the control of the sea, and their water
communication with the Yalu was effectually cut off.
After the battle of Pingyang, the Japanese army halted,
and it was not until after they received re- enforcements
under Marshal Yamagata that they resumed their forward
movement. On October 10 their advance guard reached the
Yalu, a river broad and difficult of passage, behind which
was stationed a considerable Chinese army, which, however,
after a nominal resistance, soon retreated. In the aban-
doned positions on the northern bank of the Yalu, the Jap-
anese captured a vast quantity of material of war, includ-
ing 74 cannons, over 4,000 rifles, and more than 4,000,000
rounds of ammunition. It was supposed that the retreating
Chinese force would make a stand at Feng Hwang, but, on
reaching that town, October 30, the Japanese found it evac-
uated, and were informed that the Chinese soldiers had
dispersed.
While Marshal Yamagata was beginning the invasion of
China from the direction of Corea, another Japanese army,
under Marshal Oyama, had landed on tl}e Liau-Tung, or
.Regent's Sword Peninsula, with the aim of capturing the
Chinese naval station of Port Arthur. Even in Chinese
hands, this was. a redoubtable stronghold. It had 300 guns
in position, and the garrison numbered some 10,000 men,
while the attacking force did not exceed 13,000, although
we should bear in mind that it was aided by the Japanese
fleet. After landing at the mouth of the Huhua-Yuan
River, about 100 miles north of Port Arthur, the Japanese
WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. 513
advanced south, and took the fortified city of Chinchow,
without incurring any loss. The next day they reached
Talienwan, where the Chinese had five heavily armed bat-
teries, and a considerable garrison, which, however, on the
approach of the enemy, abandoned the post without firing
a shot. In the forts at this point were found over 120 can-
nons, two and a half million rounds of ammunition for the
artillery and nearly 34,000,000 rifle cartridges. On Novem-
ber 20, 1894, the Japanese army was drawn up in front of
Port Arthur, and the fleet prepared to co-operate in the
action. The attack began in the morning of November 22,
and, although, in one quarter, the Chinese offered sturdy
resistance, yet, by the end of the day, with the loss of no
more than 18 men killed and 250 wounded, the Japanese
were in possession of the strongest position in China, a naval
fortress and arsenal on which $30,000,000 had been spent.
Throughout December the force under Marshal Yama-
gata pushed forward into Manchuria, but met there with
more vigorous opposition than it had hitherto encountered.
In the fight at Kangwasai, the Japanese lost 400, and, in
the capture of the town of Kaiting, 300 killed and wounded.
About the middle of January, 1895, the Japanese began op-
erations against Wei-hai-Wei, the naval stronghold on the
northern coast of Shangtung, in which the remnant of
China's fleet had taken refuge. Although not so strong as
Port Arthur, this harbor is considered one of the keys to the
Gulf of Pechihli. On January 20 the Japanese troops be-
gan to land at Yungchang, a little west of the point to be
attacked, and, on the 26th, they appeared at the gates of
Wei-hai-Wei. About half of the beleaguered garrison con-
sisted of 4,000 sailors from the fleet, under Admiral Ting,
who was to show himself a leader of courage and energy.
The assault on the land side of Wei-hai-Wei began on Jan-
uary 29, and continued throughout that and the following
day. At certain points, where Admiral Ting's squadron
was able to act with effect, the Japanese were repulsed,
but, eventually, the whole of the land garrison fled panic-
614 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
stricken to Chefoo. Even then Ting's squadron and the
island force continued to resist, and it was not until Febru-
ary 9, when almost all the vessels had been taken or sunk,
that he consented to capitulate, after receiving a telegram
from Li Hung Chang to the effect that no help could be
given him. No sooner were the terms of capitulation agreed
upon than Admiral Ting retired to his cabin and took a fatal
dose of opium. He had held out for three weeks, whereas
Port Arthur had been lost in a day. The war continued for
a few weeks longer, the Japanese pursuing their advance in
Manchuria, and capturing the two places which are collect-
ively called Newchang, thus threatening Pekin. They now
possessed an army of 100,000 men ready to advance upon
the Chinese capital. As there was no reason to suppose that
Pekin could be successfully defended, the necessity of con-
cluding peace as promptly as possible was recognized. To
that end it was needful to appoint a plenipotentiary whose
name would convince the Japanese government that the
Chinese were in earnest in their overtures. The only two
men who possessed the requisite qualifications were Prince
Kung and La Hung Chang. The former, however, be-
ing a prince of the imperial family, and the uncle of the
reigning emperor, Kwangsu, could not be induced to submit
to the humiliation of proceeding to Japan and suing for
peace. The only possible selection, therefore, was Li Hung
Chang, who was, accordingly, appointed plenipotentiary.
He reached Shimonoseki on March 20, 1895, and, four
days after his arrival, the success of his mission was
greatly promoted by the attempt of a fanatic to assassin-
ate hi during his conference with Count Ito, the Japanese
representative. The wound was not very serious, but the
outrage caused a unanimous expression of sympathy and
regret on the part of the Japanese people, and the Mikado
sent his own physician to attend the wounded minister. To
attest their sorrow for this incident, the Japanese at once
granted an armistice, and the terms of peace which they at
first proposed were materially mitigated. On April 1? the
WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT ElENTS. 515
Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, and, on May 8, the rati-
fications were exchanged at Chefoo. The terms of the origi-
nal treaty were these : First, China was to surrender Formo-
sa and the Pescadores Islands and the southern part of the
Shingking province, including the Liau-Tung, or Regent's
Sword Peninsula, and of course, also, the naval fortress of
Port Arthur. China was likewise to pay in eight install-
ments a money indemnity of 200,000,000 Kuping taels, or,
say, $160,000,000. She was also to grant certain commer-
cial concessions, including the admission of ships under the
Japanese flag to the Chinese lakes and rivers, and the ap-
pointment of consuls. In view of the completeness of
Japan's triumph, these conditions could not be considered
onerous, but they, undoubtedly, disturbed the balance of
power in the Far East, and, had they been permitted to
stand, would have effectually thwarted Russia's plan of ad-
vancing southward, and of obtaining an ice-free port. The
Czar's government, accordingly, determined to interpose,
and, having secured the co-operation of its French ally, and
also of Germany, it presented to the Mikado, in the name of
the three powers, a request that he should waive that part
of the Shimonoseki Treaty which provided for the surrender
of the Liau-Tung Peninsula. It was proposed that, in re-
turn for the renunciation of this territory on the Chinese
mainland, the pecuniary indemnity should be increased by
$30,000,000, and that Wei-hai-Wei should be retained until
the whole sum should have been paid. The demand was,
obviously, one that could not be rejected without war against
the three interposing powers, and the odds were too great
for Japan to face without the assistance of Great Britain,
which Lord Rosebery, then prime minister, did not see fit to
offer. The Mikado, accordingly, submitted to the loss of the
best part of the fruits of victory, retaining only Formosa
and the Pescadores, the value of which is, as yet, undeter-
mined; with the money indemnity, however, Japan has
been enabled so greatly to strengthen her fleet that, when
all the vessels building for her are completed, she will
516 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
take rank as a naval power of the first class in the
Pacific.
For some time after the revision of the Shimonoseki
Treaty, the Chinese seem to have imagined that the Czar
had intervened from disinterested motives, but Count Cas-
sini, the Russian minister at Pekin, eventually made it
clear that the interposition would not be gratuitous. In
what form the payment for Russia's services should be
made was, for some tune, the subject of debate, but, before
Li Hung Chang left China in the spring of 1896, as a special
embassador to attend the coronation of Nicholas II. at Mos-
cow, the heads of a convention had been drawn up, and, on
Li's arrival in Russia, he signed an agreement which em-
bodied the concessions to be made to the Czar in return for
his services. This secret treaty gave Russia the control of
the Liau-Tung Peninsula, which she had ostensibly saved,
at the cost to China of $30,000,000, and the St. Petersburg
government was also to be allowed to build a branch of the
Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria to Talienwan
and Port Arthur. A period of eighteen months elapsed be-
fore the details of this momentous agreement became known.
On the return of Li Hung Chang to Pekin, he not only
failed to recover the viceroyship of Chihli, but he found his
relations with the Emperor Kwangsu quite as unsatisfactory
as they had been after his return from Shimonoseki. He
was restored, indeed, to a seat on the Tsungli Yamen, or
Board of Foreign Affairs, but, for twelve months, it seemed
as if, despite the support of the Empress-dowager Tsi An,
his influence would never revive.
The two years that followed the Shimonoseki Treaty
gave a breathing spell to China, and should have been de-
voted to energetic reforms in the military and naval admin-
istration. As a matter of fact, nothing had been accom
plished, when, in 1897, a blow fell which brought the Middle
Kingdom face to face with the prospect of immediate par-
tition. In November of that year, without any preliminary
notice or warning to the Pekin government, two Germ, in
WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. 517
men-of-war entered the harbor of Kiao Chou, and ordered
the commandant to give up the place in reparation for the
murder of two German missionaries in the province of Shan-
tung. Germany refused to evacuate Kiao Chou unless due
reparation should be made for the outrage on the mission-
aries, and unless, further, China would cede to her the ex-
clusive right to construct railways and work mines through-
out the extensive and populous province of Shantung. This,
of course, was equivalent to the demarcation of a sphere of
influence. For a tune, the Pekin government showed itself
recalcitrant, but, in January, 1898, it consented to lease Kiao
Chou to Germany for ninety-nine years, and to make the
required additional concession of exclusive rights in Shan-
tung. Russia, on her part, did not wait long after the Ger-
man seizure of Kiao Chou, to put forward her claim for
compensation on account of the services rendered in the
matter of the revision of the Shimonoseki Treaty. The
terms of the Cassini agreement were now gradually re-
vealed. In December, 1897, the St. Petersburg government
announced that the Chinese had given permission to the
Russian fleet to winter at Port Arthur ; in February, 1898,
Russia added Talienwan to Port Arthur, but essayed to dis-
arm criticism by declaring that the first-named port would
be opened to the ships of all the great powers like other ports
on the Chinese mainland. This promise was subsequently
qualified, and on March 27 a convention was signed at Pekin
giving the Russians the "usufruct" of Port Arthur and
Talienwan, which, practically, meant that Russia had ob-
tained those harbors unconditionally, and for an indefinite
period. France, on her part, obtained possession of the port
of Kwangchowfoo, which is the best outlet to the sea for the
trade of the southern province of Kwangsi ; she also secured
a promise that the island of Hainan should not be ceded to
any other power; and, finally, she gained a recognition of
her claim, first advanced.,m 1895, to a prior right to control
the commercial development of the province of Yunnan.
This claim is as reasonable as that put forward by Germany
518 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
with reference to the province of Shantung, but it is incom-
patible with the northeastward development of British Bur-
mah. While these acts, which, virtually, amounted to mu-
tilations of the Middle Kingdom, were being committed by
Germany, Russia and France, England undertook to assert
the principle of the "open door," the principle, namely, that,
whatever territorial concessions might be made by the Pekin
government, no nation could be deprived of its treaty rights
in the ports ceded. That is to say, American citizens, Brit-
ish subjects, or the subjects of any other power which has a
treaty with China containing "the most favored nation"
clause, must be allowed to enjoy precisely the same rights in
Talienwan, Kiao Chou and Kwangchowfoo as they would
have enjoyed had not those places been surrendered to Rus-
sia, Germany and France respectively. This principle could
only have been enforced by war, in which England would
have needed the assistance of Japan ; but Japan was not yet
ready to engage in a contest, for the reason that she still had
to receive $60,000,000 of the war indemnity due from China,
and because the war vessels which she had ordered to be
constructed in foreign shipyards were not yet sufficiently
near completion. Being thus constrained to abandon the
hope of maintaining its treaty rights in the ceded parts of
China, the British Foreign Office changed its ground and fell
back on the policy of exacting an equivalent for the advan-
tages gained by Russia, Germany and France. In the pur-
suance of this policy it obtained "Wei-hai-Wei, which, as we
have said, is one of the two keys to the Gulf of Pechihli. It
is, however, very inferior to Port Arthur; only by the ex-
penditure of a large sum of money could it be made a naval
fortress of high rank, and, even then, it would require a
large garrison for its protection. This was not all that
England gained, however; she secured a promise from the
Pekin government that the valley of the Yangstekiang
should never be alienated to any foreign power except Great
Britain. The limits of the valley, nevertheless, were not
defined, and the Pekin authorities have acted on the hypoth-
WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. 519
esis that the covenant against alienation did not debar them
from giving commercial and industrial privileges within
the basin to the subjects of European powers other than
England. The right to build, for instance, a railway from
Pekin to Hangchow has been conferred upon a syndicate
nominally Belgian, in which, however, it is understood that
Russia is deeply interested. On the other hand, in spite of
protests from St. Petersburg, the privilege of extending to
Newchwang in Manchuria the railway which already ex-
tends some distance in a northeasterly direction from Tien-
tsin, has been secured by a British corporation.
In September, 1898, a palace revolution occurred at
Pekin. For some time, the Emperor Kwangsu had been
known to be under the influence of a highly intelligent and
progressive Cantonese named Kang Yu Wei. At the lat-
- suggestion, edicts were put forth decreeing important
inistrative reforms which would have deprived the man-
darins of their opportunities of embezzlement, and also in-
dicating an intention to reorganize the educational system
of China upon European models. The necessity of such
changes is obvious enough if China is to follow Japan in the
path of progress, but it is equally plain that the advocacy of
them would render the emperor obnoxious to the whole body
of mandarins and of the literati. The unpopularity caused
by his proposed innovations proved fatal to Kwangsu; for
the party at court, headed by the Empress-dowager Tsi An,
took advantage of it to arrest and imprison him. Kang Yu
"Wei, having received warning of the conspiracy, had fled,
and succeeded in gaining an asylum under the British flag,
but many of the emperor's personal followers were put to
death. On September 22, appeared an edict ostensibly signed
by Kwangsu announcing that he had requested the empress-
dowager to resume authority over the affairs of State. It
has been since reported that he has been killed. The im-
mediate effect of the coup d'etat was to place all power at
Pekin in the hands of Manchus least friendly to the adoption
of European ideas, and more willing to lean upon Russia
520 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
than upon any other foreign power. The early restoration
to high office of Li Hung Chang, who has, for some time,
been a useful tool of the St. Petersburg government, and
who is a favorite of the empress-dowager, may be looked
upon as probable.
THE FUTURE OF CHINA
IT is obvious that arterial communication is the first
organic need of all civilized States, and pre-eminently of a
country so vast and various in its terrestrial conditions as
is China. This need has been recognized by the ablest of its
rulers, who, from time to time, have made serious efforts to
connect the most distant parts of the empire by both land
and water routes. The Grand Canal, or Yunho ("River of
Transports"), is pronounced as memorable a monument of
human industry in its way as is the Great Wall. It is not,
however, a canal in the Western sense of the word, but
merely, as Richthofen has explained, "a series of abandoned
river beds, lakes and marshes, connected one with another by
cuttings of no importance, fed by the Wanho in Shantung,
which divides into two currents at its summit, and by other
streams and rivers along its course. A part of the water of
the Wanho descends toward the Hoangho and Gulf of Pe-
chihli; the larger part runs south in the direction of the
Yangtee." The Grand Canal links Hangchow, a port on
the East China Sea, south of the Yangtse, with Tientsin
in Chihli, where it unites with the Peiho, and thus may be
said to extend to Tungchow in the neighborhood of Pekin.
When the canal was in order, before the inflow of the Yel-
low River failed, there was uninterrupted water communica-
tion from Pekin to Canton, and to the many cities and towns
met with on the way. For many years past, however, and
especially since the carriage of tribute-rice by steamers along
the coast began, repairs of the Grand Canal have been prac-
tically abandoned. The roads in China, confined generally
THE FUTURE OF CHINA.
to the northern and western sections of the country, are de-
scribed as the very worst in the world. The paving, accord-
ing to Baber, "is of the usual Chinese pattern, rough bowl-
ders and blocks of stone being laid somewhat loosely together
on the surface of the ground; 'good for ten years and bad
for ten thousand,' as the Chinese proverb admits. On the
level plains of China, where the population is sufficiently
affluent to subscribe for occasional repairs, the system has
much practical value. But, in the Yunnan mountains, the
roads are never repaired ; so far from it, the indigent natives
extract the most convenient blocks to stop the holes hi their
hovel walls, or to build a fence on the windward side of their
poppy patches. The rains soon undermine the pavement,
especially where it is laid on a steep incline ; sections of it
topple down the slope, leaving chasms a yard or more in
depth." Where traveling by water is impossible, sedan
chairs are used to carry passengers, and coolies with poles
and slings transport the luggage and goods. The distances
covered by the sedan chair porters are remarkable, being
sometimes as much as thirty-five miles a day, even on a
journey extending over a month. The transport animals
ponies, mules, oxen and donkeys are strong and hardy, and
manage to drag carts along the execrable roads. The ponies
are said to be admirable, and the mules unequaled in any
other country. The distances which these animals will cover
on the very poorest of forage are surprising.
The rapid adoption of steamers along the coast and on the
Yangtse has paved the way for railways. Shallow steamers
have yet to traverse the Poyang and the Tungting Lakes,
which lie near the Yangtse, and Peiho and Canton Rivers,
as well as many minor streams. It is the railway, however,
that is the supreme necessity. Mr. Colquhoun has pointed
out that, except along the Yangtse for the thousand-odd
miles now covered by steamers, there is not a single trade
route of importance in China where a railway would not
pay. Especially would a line from Pekin carried through
the heart of China to the extreme south, along the existing
.4 SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
trade routes, be advantageous and remunerative. The enor-
mous traffic carried on throughout the Celestial Empire in
the face of appalling difficulties, on men's backs, or by cara-
vans of mules or ponies, or by the rudest of carts and wheel-
barrows, must be, some day, undertaken by railways. In
the judgment of careful observers, too much stress should
not be laid on the introduction of the locomotive for strategic
purposes. The capital aim of railway construction should
be, they think, the development of the interprovincial trade
of China, the interchange of the varied products of a coun-
try which boasts so mam- climates and soils. This would
bring prosperity to the people, render administrative reforms
possible, and open China for the Chinese quite as much as
for the European merchant or manufacturer. From the
viewpoint of Chinese interests, the most useful lines would
be two that should connect Pekin, Tientsin and all the north
era part of the country with central and southern China.
Trunk lines could be constructed for this purpose without
any difficulty. They would pass along the old trade tracks,
and would encounter populous cities the whole way. Through
eastern Shansi and Honan, for example, to Hangchow on the
Yangtse; thence to the Si Kiang and Canton; such lines
would be shafts driven through the heart of the Middle King-
dom, connecting the North and the South. For the entire
distance, some 1,300 or 1,400 miles, the extent, fertility and
variety of the soil are described as remarkable. From the
North, abounding in cotton and varieties of grain and pulse,
to the South, where many vegetable products of the Orient
are met, the redundancy of the population is a striking feat-
ure. A constant succession of villages, towns and cities
would be transformed into a picture of bustle and business.
The internal economical conditions of China to-day are
very much the same as were those of India when railways
were introduced. The only difference is that the Chinese
people are better off per man, and that the Chinese and Indo-
Chinese, unlike the natives of India, are born travelers and
traders. Yet, even in India, contrary to expectation, the
THE FUTURE OF CHIXA.
juirisenger traffic on the railways has, from the first, exceeded
the goods traffic. In 1857, the number of passengers carried
by railway in India was 2,000,000; in 1896, it had risen to
160,000,000. In the first named year, the quantity of goods
transported was 253,000 tons; in 1896, it was 32,500,000 tons.
There has been witnessed in India during those forty years
an expansion of commerce which, at the outset of the period,
would have been deemed incredible. The imports and ex-
ports rose in that time from 400,000,000 to 2,000,000,000
rupees. Forty years ago, India was merely a dealer in
drugs, dyes and luxuries ; now she is one of the largest pur-
veyors of food grains, fibers, and many other staples. Few
persons are aware how favorably the earnings of Indian rail-
ways compare with those of other countries. The average
earnings of railways in the TJnited States are 3 per cent; in
Great Britain, 3.60 per cent; in India, 5.46 per cent. This
in spite of the fact that, in India, a man can travel 400 miles
within twenty-four hours for the sum of $2.08. The policy
of low charges has answered well, the people, on its adop-
tion, at once having begun to travel and to send their prod-
uce by rail. In China, also, low rates will be a necessity.
Another fact of importance to China is that, out of the
260,000 people employed on Indian railways, 95.66 percent
are natives. Only the higher posts are held by Europeans.
In China, the proportions would probably be even more in
favor of the native element.
Mr. Colquhoun, who is a high authority, has no doubt
that, as Richthof en anticipated years ago, China will eventu-
ally be directly connected with Europe via Hami, Lanchow
and Sian. "No direct connection of this kind," says Rich-
thofen, "is possible south of the Wei basin, and any road to
the north of it would have to keep entirely north of the Yel-
low River and run altogether through desert countries. " The
same reason which confined the commerce of China with the
West during thousands of years to the natural route via
Hami will be decisive as regards railway communication
also. In respect of natural facilities, and because of the
524 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
existence of populous, productive and extensive commercial
regions at both ends of the line, it is the only practicable
route. It is further to be noted that the whole tract would be
provided with coal. The province of Kansuh rivals Shansi
in the richness and extent of its coal fields; no section of it
north of the Tsungling Mountains appears to be deficient in
coal measures, ancj, in some parts, a superabundance of the
combustible exists. The coal formation extends, with few
interruptions, from Eastern Shansi to Hi through thirty de-
grees of longitude. There is scarcely, remarks Richthofen,
an instance on record "where so many favorable and e.-.
tial conditions co-operate to concentrate all future intercourse
on so long a line upon one single and definite channel." As
regards railways within the empire, a Pekin-Hankow line
has been arranged for, as we pointed out in the previous
chapter, with a so-called Belgian syndicate, and, if properly
executed, should be a good line; but, as we have said, it is
the opinion of experts that the best railway contemplated in
China would be that from Pekin via Tientsin to Hangchow,
with an extension later to Canton. The line would pass
some forty towns, with an average population of 25,000 each,
and a large number of villages. The length of the Grand
Canal from Tientsin to Hangchow is 650 miles. According
to Mr. Colquhoun, no better line for a railway exists in the
world, from the viewpoint of population, resources and cheap-
ness of construction. It follows the most important of the
actual routes of commerce in the empire, passes the greatest
possible number of cities, towns and villages, and connects
great seaports with rich coal regions of authenticated value.
We pass to the telegraph and postal service. It appears
that government telegraphs are being rapidly extended
throughout the empire. There are lines between Pekin and
Tientsin, and lines connecting the capital with the principal
places in Manchuria as far as the Russian frontier on the
Amour and the Usuri, while Newchwang, Chefoo, Shang-
hai, Yangchow, Souchow, the seven treaty ports on the
Yangtse, Canton, Woochow, Lungchow, and, in fact, most
THE FUTURE OF CHJXA. 525
of the principal cities in the empire, are now joined by wire
with one another and with the metropolis. The line from
Canton westward passes via Yunnanfoo to Manwein, on the
borders of Bunnah. Shanghai is in communication with
Foochow and Moy, Kashing, Shaoshing, Ningpo and other
places. Lines have been constructed between Foochow and
Canton and between Taku, Port Arthur and Seoul in Corea,
and the line along the Yangtse Valley has been extended to
Chungking. By an arrangement made with the Russian
telegraph authorities, the Chinese and Siberian lines in the
Amour Valley were joined in the latter part of 1892, and
there is now overland communication between Pekin and
Europe through Russian territory. The postal service of
China is unquestionably primitive from a Western point of
view. It is carried on by means of post carts and runners.
There are, besides, numerous private postal couriers, and,
during the winter, when the approach to the capital is closed
by sea and river, a service between the office of Foreign
Customs at Pekin and the outports is maintained. The Chi-
nese, it seems, have always been great believers in their own
postal system. Even those who have emigrated to British
colonies have adhered to their own method of transporting
letters, refusing to use the duly constituted government posts,
except under compulsion. Both Hongkong and the Straits
Settlements have been actually compelled to legislate in the
matter. It is said, however, to be remarkable how safe the
native post is, not merely for the carriage of ordinary letters,
but for the conveyance of money. We should add that, on
February 2, IS'.i?, the Imperial Chinese Post Office was
opened under the management of Sir Robert Hart, and
China has since joined the Postal Union.
In a chapter of Mr. Colquhoun's book bearing the cap-
tion "England's Objective in China," we are told that there
are two ways of attacking the trade of China in the Middle
Kingdom, so far as England is concerned. The one is from
the seaboard, entering China by the chief navigable rivers,
notably the Yangtse, which is the main artery of China, and
526 ,1 SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the "West River, which passes through the southern provinces.
The other mode of approach is from England's land base,
Burmah, through Yunnan. It is acknowledged that the
sea approach, hitherto the only one, is, from the purely
trading point of view, incomparably the more important;
but the other, or complementary land route, is pronounced
a necessity if England's commercial and political influence
is to be maintained and extended. The isolation of China
over sea has long since been annuled by steam, and her for-
mer complete isolation by land has now ceased also. Hith-
erto cut off from access by land, she will, in the north, be
shortly placed in direct railway communication with Europe,
a fact which by itself renders imperative a corresponding ad-
vance from the south. It is many years since Mr. Colquhoun
began to advocate the railway communication of Burmah
with southwestern China, first with the view to open Yunnan
and Szchuen, and, secondly, to effect a junction between
those two great waterways, the Yangtse and the Irrawaddy.
It seemed to him that the connection of the navigation limit
of the Yangtse with the most easterly province of Anglo-
India was a matter of cardinal importance, not merely be-
cause it was eminently desirable for commercial purposes to
connect the central and lower regions of the Yangtse with
Burmah, but also for political reasons. It so happens that
the navigation limit of that river lies within the province of
Szchuen, which, in Mr. Colquhoun's opinion, should be the
commercial and political objective of England. Szchuen,
from its size, population, trade and products, may, accord-
ing to Mrs. Bishop, be truly called the Empire Province.
Apart from its great mineral resources, the province pro-
duces silk, wax and tobacco, all of good quality; grass
cloth, grain in abundance, and tea, plentiful though of
poor flavor. The climate is changeable, necessitating a va-
riety of clothing. Cotton is grown in Szchuen, but Bourne
states that Indian yarn is driving it out of cultivation, not
apparently on account of the enormous saving through spin-
ning by machinery, but because the fiber can be grown more
THE FUTURE OF CHISA. 52?
cheaply in India. The greater part of the surplus wealth
of Szchuen is devoted to the purchase of raw native and
foreign cotton and woolen goods. All the cotton bought is
not consumed in the province, for the inhabitants manufact-
ure from the imported raw material and export the product
to Yunnan and western Kweichow. Rich as it is, Szchuen
has the disadvantage of being difficult of access from the
rest of the world, for at present merchandise can now only
reach it during certain months of the year, and after a diffi-
cult voyage. Its trade would be increased very greatly were
the* navigation of the Yangtse rendered easier and safer, thus
facilitating the establishment of effective steam communica-
tion not only to Chungking, but as far as Suifoo.
The natural channel of trade between Hongkong and
southwestern China is the Sikiang, or West River. Owing,
however, to the obstacles raised by taxation and the non-
enforcement by England of the transit-pass system, trade
has been diverted to other channels, such as the Pakhoi-
Ncinning route, and later to the Tonquin route, the French
having insisted on the effective carrying out of the transit-
pass system via Mengtse. At present British goods are
actually sent from Hongkong through French territory via
Mengtse to a point within seven days of Bhamo in Burmah.
The Lungchow route, whatever its merits might have been,
had the railway line from Pakhoi to Nanning not been se-
cured by the French government, is now. according to Mr.
Colquhoun, of quite secondary importance. He concedes
that, unless the West River is at once effectively opened
throughout its course, the Pakhoi-Nanning-Yunnan route
is bound to command the largest share of the trade of south
and southwestern China.
Having passed under review the provinces of south and
southwestern China and the great waterways to wit, the
Yangtse and West rivers we may now inquire what meas-
ures should be adopted to improve the present state of affairs
in the interest of China and of foreign trade. The first step
suggested is the improvement of communication by railways
528 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHIXA.
and steam navigation. So far as railways are concerned,
Burmah should be connected, with Tali and Yunnanfoo,
Yunnanfoo with Nanning, Canton with Kaulun. This
would thoroughly open the whole of Southern China lying
between Burmah and the British colony of Hongkong.
Yunnanfoo should also be connected to the northeast with
Suifoo on the upper Yangtse, the navigation limit of that
waterway. Steam navigation should at once be extended to
Nanning and to Suifoo, and also, wherever it may be prac-
ticable, throughout all inland waters. Next in importance
to the creation of proper communication is the question of
taxation. All travelers, in Southern China especially, dwell
on the obstacles to trade resulting from the collection of so
many various imposts. The British government should in-
sist on its treaty rights, especially the enforcement, success-
fully accomplished by the French government, of the transit-
pass system. It is, finally, the conviction of all competent
students of the subject that it is from Burmah, on the one
hand, and from Shanghai and Hongkong on the other, that
England must, by the aid of steam applied overland and by
water, practically occupy the upper Yangtse region, which
will be found to be the key to a dominant position hi China.
In some comments on China's prospective commercial
development Mr. Colquhoun, the latest first-hand observer,
sets forth some statistics which are of interest not only to
Englishmen but to Americans. He shows that in 1896 the
total net value of imports and of exports was 55,768,500,
and the total gross value 57,274,000, of which the British
dominions contributed 39,271,000, leaving for all other na-
tions 18,003,000. Of this aggregate Russia contributed
2,856,000, the rest of Europe 4,585,000, Japan 4,705,000,
and other countries, including the United States, 5,767,000.
The percentage of the carrying trade of the Middle Kingdom
under foreign flags was: British, 82.04; German, 7.49;
French, 2.00; Japanese, 1.34; Russian, 0.59; other coun-
tries, 5.54. The percentage of dues and duties paid under
foreign flags was as follows: British, 76.04; German, 10.12;
THE FUTURE OF CHINA. 529
French, 2.95; Japanese, 2.28; Russian, 1.90; all other na-
tions, 6.71. It appears, then, that Great Britain not only
carries eighty-two per cent of the total foreign trade with
China, but pays seventy-two per cent of the revenue result-
ing from that trade. Until recently, British subjects were
at liberty to carry on business at but eighteen ports in China.
They were Newchwang, Tientsin, Chifui, on the northern
coast; Chungking, Ichang, Hankow, Kiukiang, Wehu,
Chinkiang and Shanghai, on the Yangtse River; Ningpo,
"Wenchow, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow, Canton, Hoihow (Ki-
ungchow) and Pakhoy, on the coast south of the Yangtse.
To these must be now added Shansi on the Yangtse, be-
tween Ichang and Hankow ; Hangchow and Souchow, two
inland cities near Shanghai ; Woocho w and Sanshui on the
"West River and Ssumao and Lungchow, hi the south. It is
also reported that three other ports have been very recently
opened; viz., Yochow, on the Tungting Lake; Chungwang,
on the Gulf of Pechihli, and Funing in Fuhkien.
Let us now proceed to demonstrate how deeply the United
States are concerned in the China question from the indus-
trial point of view. Inasmuch as, owing to the fact that
Americans now manufacture more than they consume, they
are compelled to embark on a foreign policy and to look
increasingly to foreign markets, they cannot but feel that
the future of the Middle Kingdom is a matter of vital impor-
tance to themselves. It is manifest that the Pacific slope,
though at present playing but a small part, is destined to be
more profoundly affected by the development of China than
is any other section of the American republic. Our Pacific
States are possessed of enormous natural resources; their
manufactures have quadrupled in twenty years, and will, hi
the course of time, find a most advantageous market in the
Far East. When the Nicaragua Canal shall have been dug,
the Atlantic States will also be brought into close connection
with China and with the rest of Eastern Asia. The volume
of the United States traffic with China already represented a
considerable part of the foreign trade of the empire in 1896.
23
$30 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
While the imports from China received by the United States
have increased but slowly, the exports from the last-named
country to the Middle Kingdom have increased 126 per cent
in ten years, and are more than fifty per cent greater than
the exports of Germany to the same market. The export of
American cotton cloths to China amounted to $7,485,000 in
1897, or nearly one-half the entire value of cotton cloths sent
abroad by the United States. The export of kerosene oil
from the States to China now ranks second in importance
to that of cotton goods, and is likely to increase at a rapid
rate. The Chinese demand for the illuminating fluid is
quickly growing, and the delivery of it from the United
States to China has more than trebled in value during the
past ten years. That is to say, it has risen from $1,466,000
in 1888 to $4,498,000 in 1897. The Russian oil has hitherto
been the only serious foreign competitor of the American
product, but the Langkat oil is coming to some extent into
use. The exports of American wheat flour to China reached
a value in 1897 of $3,390,000, and those of chemicals, dyes,
etc., $1,000,000. At present, the export trade of the United
States to China is confined mainly to cottons and mineral
oils; that is to say, it is largely restricted to commodities
which would be hard to sell in any Chinese port where the
conditions of equal trade did not prevail. It would probably
prove impossible to sell them in any Asiatic port controlled
by Russia or by France. It follows that, although England
has most to lose by the partition of China, even though she
should receive a large share of territory, the United States
are also deeply interested in the question, for their trade is
already considerable, and is likely, under favorable circum-
stances, to undergo great expansion.
Let us, finally, examine the Chinese question from a
political point of view. We concur with Mr. Colquhoun in
believing that Englishmen are now at the parting of the
ways, and that their failure to take the right course in the
Far East will mean the loss of England's commercial su-
premacy, and, eventually, the disintegration of the British
THE FUTURE OF CHIXA. 531
Empire. He maintains that, since November 16, 1896, when
the German government was compelled by Bismarck's reve-
lations to disclose the drift of its future policy, it has been
apparent that there is an increasing tendency toward co-
operation in the Near East and the Far East between Ger-
many and Russia, and therefore, also, between those powers
and France, which is Russia's ally. The understanding is
based upon mutual interest, territorial in the case of Russia,
commercial in that of Germany, and political in the case of
France. The cornerstone of the combination is Russia,
whose goodwill is sought for at all costs by France, in a
lesser degree by Germany, and, latterly, even by Austria-
Hungary. The chief aim of the combination is the reduc-
tion of England to a secondary position, politically and com-
mercially. In China, the outcome of the coalition has been
to isolate England completely. For some years past, her
efforts to secure concessions at Pekin have been frustrated
by Russia and France. Meanwhile, these two countries,
and, more lately, Germany as well, have secured for them-
selves solid advantages. Japan, on her part, since she was
compelled to submit to a revision of the Shimonoseki treaty,
has been watching silently and preparing anxiously for
eventualities. England's official optimists talked in 1895,
however, as they still talk, of the successes gained, the "recti-
fication" of the Burmo-Chinese frontier and the incomplete
"opening" of the West River. As a matter of fact, the
British government has done little or nothing to establish
overland railway communication from Burmah to China, or
to reach China "from behind," as Lord Salisbury called it;
and the Upper Yangtse, the main artery of China, has re-
mained practically unopened. Such, at least, was the situa-
tion a few months ago.
To understand the present situation, which is the natural
sequel of 1895, it is needful, first of all, to recognize the fact
that Russia is, at this moment, the protector of China against
all comers, and that France supports her firmly, while Ger-
many, having once taken the decisive step of placing herself
532 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
alongside Russia, is likely to follow the czar's lead for two
sufficient reasons ; namely, for fear of displeasing the Russian
ally of France, and because concessions are not likely to be
obtained at Pekin by Germany, if the latter country places
itself in direct and open opposition to the St. Petersburg gov-
ernment. Russian influence has, for some time past, been
omnipotent at Pekin, mainly through the kindly assistance
rendered to China in 1895, followed up by what has been
practically an offensive and defensive league. The nature
of the understanding between Russia and the Middle King-
dom has, indeed, for some tune been patent to all the world
except Englishmen, the chief features of it being : First, an
offensive and defensive alliance; secondly, branch railways
through Manchuria; thirdly, the refortification of Port
Arthur and Talienwan, both to be paid for by China, and
either or both of these harbors to be placed at Russia's dis-
posal whenever they may be required. It is true that China
has denied the existence of any agreement except that con-
cerning the northern Manchurian Railway, but Russia has
never denied anything except the accuracy of the version of
the so-called "Cassini" Convention, published by a Shanghai
paper. Apart from the existence of any written contract, the
facts speak for themselves. Russia, having had a prior Hen
on Kiao Chou, it is obvious that Germany could not have
seized that harbor in opposition to Russia. Again, what is
to prevent Germany from discovering some day that Kiao
Chou does not "meet her requirements," in which event
what is there to hinder Russia from taking over Kiao Chou
and giving Germany another port? Provision has, in truth,
been made to enable Germany to treat Kiao Chou as a nego-
tiable bill of exchange.
There is really nothing unforeseen in the recent evolution
of affairs in the Far East. On the contrary, it has been
clearly indicated by various writers in the past fifty years.
As far back as 1850, Meadows wrote : "China will not be
conquered by any Western power until she becomes the
Persia of some future Alexander the Great of Russia, which
THE FUTURE Of CHINA. 533
is the Macedon of Europe. England, America and France
will, if they are wise, wage, severally or collectively, a war
of exhaustion with Russia rather than allow her to conquer
China, for, when she has done that, she will be mistress
of the world." In reply to those who ridicule the policy of
"guarding against imaginary Russian dangers in China,"
he said: "Many may suppose the danger to be too remote
to be a practical subject for the present generation. The
subject is most practical at the present hour, for, as the
English, Americans and French now deal with China, and
with her relations to Russia, so the event will be. For those
to whom 'it will last our time' is a word of practical wis-
dom, this volume is not written." Again, a few years later,
Meadows wrote: "The greatest, though not nearest, dan-
ger of a weak China lies precisely in those territorial ag-
gressions of Russia which she began two centuries ago, and
which, if allowed to go on, will speedily give her a large
and populous territory, faced with Sveaborgs and Sebas-
topols on the seaboard of Eastern Asia. Let England,
America and France beware how they create a sick giant
in the Far East. China is a world-necessity." Foreshad-
owing the gradual extension of Russia into China, and the
time when the former country would become dominant at
Pekin, and when, with all Manchuria organized behind her,
she would occupy the whole of the Yellow River basin,
Meadows expressed the belief that, should that occasion
occur, no combination of powers would then be able to
thwart Russia's purpose. "With 120,000,000 Chinese to
work or fight for her, nothing would stand between Russia
and the conquest of the rest of the Celestial Empire; not
China alone, but Europe itself would then be dominated,
and it would cost the Russian Emperor of China but little
trouble to overwhelm the Pacific States of the New World."
Such was the forecast of a writer whose name is to-day
iorgotten.
What are the advantages which Russia possesses over
England in dealing with China? There is, in the first place.
534 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the advantage of proximity. The Chinese people in the
northern provinces, and especially at the capital, which is not
far from the Great Wall, undoubtedly discriminate between
Russians and other foreigners. Like other Orientals, they
only believe what they see ; and Russia is seen and realized
on the northern frontier. Besides the effect of contact, the
Russians possess a gift in dealing with the Chinese. The
affinities and analogies which the Russians and Chinese
exhibit have been depicted by Michie in his book on the
"Siberian Overland Route." "Analogies in the manners,
customs and modes of thought of the two races are constantly
turning up, and their resemblance to the Chinese has become
a proverb among the Russians themselves. The Russians
and the Chinese are peculiarly suited to each other in the
commercial as well as in the diplomatic departments. They
have an equal disregard for truth, for the Russian, in spite
of his fair complexion, is, at the bottom, more than half
Asiatic. There is nothing original about this observation,
but it serves to explain how it is that the Russians have won
their way into China by quiet and peaceable means, while
we have always been running our heads against a stone
wall, and never could get over it without breaking it down.
The Russians meet the Chinese as Greek meets Greek; craft
is encountered with craft, politeness with politeness, and
patience with patience. They understand each other's char-
acter thoroughly, because they are so closely alike." Michie
went on to say that "when either a Russian or a Chinese
meets a European, say an Englishman, he instinctively re-
coils from the blunt, straightforward, up-and-down manner
of coming to business at once, and the Asiatic either declines
a contest which he cannot fight with his own weapons, or,
seizing the weak point of his antagonist, he angles for him
until he wearies him into acquiescence. As a rule, the
Asiatic has the advantage. His patient equarimity and
heedlessness of the waste of time are too much for th im-
petuous haste of the European. This characteristic of the
Russian trading classes has enabled them to insinuate them-
THE FUTURE OF CHINA. 535
selves into the confidence of the Chinese; to fraternize and
identify themselves with them, and, as it were, to make
common cause with, them in their daily life; while the West-
ern European holds himself aloof, and only comes in contact
with the Chinese when business requires it; for, in all the
rest, a great gulf separates them in thoughts, ideas and the
aims of life."
Of interest, also, as showing how history repeats itself,
are the observations made nearly forty years ago by Lock-
hart, a missionary, after a long residence in China. Lock-
hart wrote: "The Russian government anticipated us, not
in the knowledge of the advantages of close commercial and
political relations with an empire so enormous in its resources,
but in the employment of those arguments that alone could
render a vain and effeminate State sensible of their value. . . .
The map of all the Russias, published at St. Petersburg,
now includes that vast portion of Central Asia heretofore
constituting the outlying provinces of the Chinese empire
beyond the Great "Wall. Having placed a mission in the
Chinese capital and organized an overwhelming army in
Chinese Tartary, with magazines of warlike resources,
Russia easily secured a permanent footing in region after
region, till she had dominated over, and then obtained the
cession of, all the intervening space, leaving the conquest of
the entire Chinese empire to the time when it should please
the reigning Czar to order his Cossacks to take possession.
It is impossible to state with any precision the amount of
moral or material support which the Chinese emperor re-
ceived from his imperial brother and formidable Aeighbor,
and which encouraged him to the obstinate resistance that
he offered to the demands of England and France [in I860];
but a slight acquaintance with Russian policy must satisfy
any one that, having established itself as a favored nation,
Russia could not regard with complacency any attempt
made by another nation to share such advantages." Com-
prehending, therefore, the Chinese character, perceiving
clearly that the present Maicchu dynasty is unable to perform
536 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
the elementary functions of an organized society, that Pekin
is another Teheran or Constantinople, that, while the people
are sound, the courts and the officials are corrupt, Russia
has studied and gained over certain influential persons and
applied skillfully the maxim, divide et impera. What China
is taught night and day is that Russia is a land power, and,
therefore, alone can protect China; that she keeps her prom-
ises and threats; that, with England, on the other hand, it
is always a case of vox et prceterea nihil. In short, Russia
protects China in a peculiar sense, that is to say, for a price,
to be paid to Russia or even to her friends. The dominating
idea instilled into the Chinese court and bureaucracy, which,
in the absence of a strong policy on England's part, are in a
hypnotized condition, is to be saved from Japan. The great
object of Russian policy is to utilize China for territorial and
political expansion.
What would China be worth to Russia? This question is
answered by Mr. Colquhoun at considerable length. "What
the utilization of China would mean can be realized, he says,
only by a full appreciation of the extraordinary resources of
that country, judged from various points of view. The
Celestial Empire has the men with which to create armies
and navies; the materials, especially iron and coal, requisite
for the purposes of railway and steam navigation; all the
elements, in fact, out of which to evolve a great living force.
One thing alone is wanting, namely, the will, the directing
power, which, absent from within, is now being applied from
without. That supplied, there are to be found in abundance
within China itself the capacity to carry out, the brains to
plan, the hands to work. When, moreover, it is understood
that not merely is the soil fertile, but that the mineral
resources, the greatest, perhaps, in the whole world, are,
as yet, practically untouched, the merest surface being
scratched ; when we further consider the volume of China's
population, the ability and enterprise, and, above all, the
intense vitality of the people, as strong as ever after four
millenniums; when we reflect on the general characteristics
THE FUTURE OF CHINA. 637
of the race; it seems indisputable that the Chinese, under
wise direction, are destined to dominate the whole of Eastern
Asia, and, may be, to play a leading part in the affairs of
the world. Even although the Celestial Empire appears to
be now breaking up, it is capable, under tutelage, of becom-
ing reconsolidated. Often before now, when conquered, has
China either thrown off the yoke or absorbed its conquerors.
But never before has the conqueror come, as does the czar
to-day, in the guise of a great organizing force. To much
the same effect wrote Michie, whose opinion is of weight,
and from whom we have already quoted: "The theory that
China's decadence is due to the fact that she has long since
reached maturity and has outlived the natural term of a
nation's existence does not hold good. The mass of the
people have not degenerated ; they are as fresh and vigorous
as ever they were; it is the government only that has become
old and feeble ; a change of dynasty may yet restore to China
the luster which belongs legitimately to so great a nation.
The indestructible vitality of Chinese institutions has pre
served the country unchanged throughout many revolutions.
The high civilization of the people and their earnestness in
the pursuit of peaceful industry have enabled them to pre-
serve their national existence through more dynastic changes
than perhaps any other country or nation has experienced."
Mr. Colquhoun, for his own part, testifies that, in peaceful
pursuits, in agriculture, in the arts and manufactures, no
limit can be placed to the capabilities of China. Even in
the paths of war, he deems it difficult to foretell what, under
skillful direction, may not be accomplished. It is true that,
touching this point, there is a wide difference of opinion.
Prjevalski said, apropos of the Tonquin campaign: "She
[China] lacks the proper material ; she lacks the life-giving
spirit. Let Europeans supply the Chinese with any number
of arms that they please: let them exert themselves ever
so energetically to train Chinese soldiers: let them even
supply leaders: the Chinese Army will, nevertheless, even
under the most favorable conditions, never be more than an
838 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA.
artificially created, mechanically united, unstable organism.
Subject it but once to the serious test of war, speedy dis-
solution will overtake such an army, which could never hope
for victory over a foe animated with any real spirit." On
the other hand, high testimony has been borne by other
travelers and military critics to the excellent quality of
China's raw material for military purposes. Wingrove
Cooke, the "Times" correspondent with the allied forces
in 1857-58, who is generally accounted one of the best critics
of Chinese men and affairs; Count d'Escayrac de Lauture,
one of the Pekin prisoners in 1859-60; Chinese Gordon and
Lord "Wolseley, have all spoken highly of the courage and
endurance of the Chinese soldier. The following summary
of his capabilities was given by one who had had experience
with Gordon's "Ever- Victorious Army" : "The old notion is
pretty well got rid of that they are at all a cowardly people,
when properly paid and efficiently led; while the regularity
and order of their habits, which dispose them to peace in
ordinary times, give place to a daring bordering on reck-
lessness in tunes of war. Their intelligence and capacity
for remembering facts render them well fitted for use in
modern warfare, as do also the coolness and the calmness
of their disposition. Physically, they are, on the average,
not so strong as Europeans, but considerably more so than
most of the other races of the East; and, on a cheap diet of
rice, vegetables, salt fish and pork, they can go through a
vast amount of fatigue whether in a temperate climate or
a tropical one, where Europeans are ill fitted for exertion.
Their wants are few; they have no caste prejudices and
hardly any appetite for intoxicating liquors."
It is Mr. Colquhoun's opinion, based upon prolonged ob-
servp^on, that, if China were conquered by Russia, organ-
ized, disciplined and led by Russian officers and Russian
administrators, an industrial and military organization would
be developed which India could not face, and which would
shake to its foundations the entire fabric of the British Em-
pire. If, he says, the Chinese failed to profit by their nu-
THE FUTURE OF CHINA. 539
merical superiority and their power of movement in Ton-
quin, it must be remembered that they were as ill-equipped
and supplied and nearly as unorganized and unofficered as
they were in the Chino-Japanese war. Transport, commis-
sariat, tents, medical service, all the paraphernalia employed
in organized army work, were then, as in the late campaign,
absolutely unknown. Notwithstanding the unfavorable judg-
ment of Prjevalski that the Chinese are animated by neither
military nor patriotic spirit, the conviction of many observ-
ers is that, however undisciplined they proved themselves in
the Chino-Japanese war; however badly the undrilled, unfed,
unled Chinamen in uniform compared with the highly or-
ganized troops of Japan, their capabilities, as the compo-
s of a fighting machine, should be rated exceedingly
igh. The apparent inconsistencies of the Chinese can, in
^11 likelihood, be reconciled. That they offer excellent mili-
tary material when shaped and guided by foreigners may
be pronounced certain. If they come from the Manchurian
provinces or from Shantung, they are found to be steady,
willing to be taught and amenable to discipline, of splendid
physique and able to bear hardships and cold without a mur-
mur. If from Honan, they exhibit many of the best char-
acteristics of highland races courage and loyalty to their
own leader, but they are more difficult to manage, and they
are not steady in any sense of the word. The southern Chi-
nese seem to be held generally in low esteem, but one should
not forget that the best fighters of the Taeping army were
the men from the Canton province, and that, as seamen, the
coast populations of Southern China are unequaled. The
western highlanders, whether Mohammedans or not, are
men of good physique, and would make good fighting ma-
terial. The Mongolians are horsemen from their early years,
and are suitable for light cavalry of the Cossack type.
Like the Central Asian peoples, the Chinese possess in a
high degree the virtue of passive bravery. At first the Rus-
sians, in their contests in Central Asia, expended much time
and wasted many lives in besieging towns. They acted with
540 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHL\A.
caution, throwing up approaches and opening trenches. This
method, however, was presently abandoned for that of open
escalade, as, for instance, at Tashkend, Khojand and Ura-
tapa. Finally, the plan was adopted of storming breaches,
to permit of which breaching batteries would be thrown up
at very close quarters, after which, a favorable time being
chosen, the place would be carried by storm. From every
point of view, this proved to be the most effective method.
The Chinamen, as has been proved repeatedly, is like other
Central Asiatics in this respect, that, under cover, he sus-
tains the heaviest fire with indifference ; he never surrender
except under bold assaults, which he cannot withstand.
"What is the conclusion to which the observations of alj
first-hand students of China have conducted them? Their
conclusion is that it is a question of vital importance, a mat , ;
ter of commercial life and death, for England to maintain
and consolidate herself in the Yangtse basin, which cannot
possibly be done except by an effective occupation of the up-
per Yangtse, and by developing in every possible way her
communications along that watercourse, and by the "West
River from Hongkong, also by railway connection with
Upper Burmah and through that province with India. Mr.
Colquhoun, for his part, also believes it to be high time that
countries like the United States, Australasia and Germany
should set themselves to watch with attention, not to say
anxiety, the situation in the Far East. He advises them
to reflect upon the history of the ancient empire formed by
Genghis Khan and his successors, for that history is repeat-
ing itself to-day. Russia is conquering by modern methods
the kingdoms of Genghis and Kublai Khan, and the Russian
Czar, once emperor of China, will take the place of the Tar-
tar conquerors who carried fire and sword beyond the Car-
pathians and the Vistula and throughout eastern, western
and southern Asia.
THE END
A 000172488 9